WRECKERS ON TRIAL

Edited with a Foreword by
Andrew Rothstein

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WRECKERS
ON
T R I A L

A record of the Trial of the Industrial Party held in Moscow, Nov.-Dec., 1930.

Edited with a foreword by Andrew Rothstein.

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FOREWORD

In the winter of 1930 and the spring of 1931 a world-wide sensation was aroused by the news that two large groups of highly-placed and trusted public servants in the Soviet Union were being brought to trial on charges of counter-revolution. Every step in the proceedings at the Supreme Court was watched and discussed with an intensity probably unique in the history of such trials. The only feature in the international press, platform and pulpit campaign waged against the U.S.S.R. in connection with the trial which was not unique was its venomous hatred of the first Workers' Republic and its frenzied lying.

The nature of the charges levelled against the leaders of the "Industrial Party" and the Menshevik "U.S.S.R. Bureau" was something novel in the history of the Revolution. Trials of counter-revolutionaries were not new; charges of conspiracy, of sedition, of espionage, of co-operation with the foreign capitalists against the Soviet power, of wrecking sabotage in factories and mines, have been made before. The new feature in the trials was the charge of *planned wrecking*—of deliberately planning the economic activities of the country in such a way as to retard progress, delay and wreck the fulfilment of the Soviet Government's economic plans, and thereby bring national economic life into a state of disorder, ruin and decay, which would pave the way for armed intervention.

Why should a trial on this particular charge arouse such a volume of fury among the capitalist enemies of the Soviet Union and among their hangers-on? Abundant reasons can be found in the present book. For one thing, the depth of moral degeneracy which could condemn a whole nation to starvation and ruin on the pretext of "liberating" it from Bolshevism, was not a lovely thing to have revealed. But most damning of all was the exposure of the active preparations for war on the U.S.S.R.—the methodical operations of the French General Staff, the financial relations between the wreckers and the foreign Imperialists, the drainage works and factory construction in areas of military importance. Not the least of the severe blows inflicted on the interventionists by the trials was the exposure of

the nests of wreckers themselves, when both their responsible position and the confidence they enjoyed seemed to assure them opportunities of criminal activity for a long time to come.

The trial of the Mensheviks had its particular importance. The complete degeneration of the Menshevik Party and its fellow-members of the so-called " Labour and Socialist " International—in the forefront, the German Social Democratic Party—into the Imperialists' machinery of espionage, corruption, wrecking and sabotage against the Socialist Republic was shown up in all its ugly details. Nothing could have been more devastating for a self-styled " Socialist " Party than to have its leading members get up in open court, one after another, and admit that for years they had not ventured to make any propaganda among the Russian workers on account of the latter's complete lack of sympathy, and that the most fertile soil for their ideas to-day was the lower middle-class—the shopkeepers, small traders, well-paid technicians, and the like. Equally revealing was the confession of the Menshevik Sher, secretary of the revolutionary staff during the 1905 Revolution, that he had faced death many times before without a tremor, knowing that his death at the hands of Tsarism would only advance the Socialist cause; but that to-day he had no courage to face death, because he had no such conviction.

Naturally, the capitalist newspapers did their utmost to befog and bewilder the workers' minds about these trials. Lie followed on lie, each more ridiculous than the last. After hysterical outcries about these innocent victims of Bolshevik terrorism (" old revolutionary fighters " was the decription given to the indicted Mensheviks), tortured and browbeaten into making confessions, came equally hysterical denunciations of them—directly the trial began—as " corrupted agents of the G.P.U." After columns of print devoted to the indictments, the newspapers stopped printing reports of the trials, once the first two or three days' proceedings showed that the accused were making a full confession. When the scores of foreign correspondents present at the trials commented on the good appearance and evident sincerity of the accused, the newspapers simply omitted to print their cables. After involving themselves in a hopeless welter of confusion and contradictory lying, the capitalist papers spent its remaining energies in one last shriek about " Bolshevik bloodthirstiness " when the death sentences were passed: and relapsed into stupefied silence when the Central Executive Committee commuted the sentences—on the grounds set forth in the decree printed on page 212 of the present volume.

Soviet justice does not seek blood or vengeance: it seeks to defend the Socialist Revolution. The trials proved a powerful

weapon in the hands of the Revolution. They effectively threw into confusion the interventionist plans of the foreign capitalists, by the very publicity they forced upon them, and the world-wide explosion of anger among the workers of all countries which this publicity brought.

Within the Soviet Union, an important effect of the trials can best be described in Stalin's words :—

> " We are observing definite signs of a change of attitude on the part of a certain section of the intellectuals, who formerly sympathised with the wreckers, towards the Soviet power. The fact that not only this section of the old intelligentsia, but even those who yesterday were themselves wreckers, indeed, a large number of those who yesterday were wreckers, are beginning in a number of factories and workshops to work hand in hand with the working class—this fact definitely shows that a change of mind among the old technical intelligentsia is taking place. That, of course, does not mean that there are no longer any wreckers in our midst. By no means. Wreckers exist and will continue to exist as long as we have classes and as long as we are surrounded by capitalism. But it does mean that, since a large section of the old technical intelligentsia, who to a more or less extent sympathised with the former wreckers, have now turned to the side of the Soviet power, the active wreckers have become very few in number, that they have been isolated and are obliged to go underground."
>
> *New Conditions—New Tasks* Modern Books, Ltd. **2d.**

The trial of the counter-revolutionary " Industrial Party " itself revealed that all the efforts of the wreckers had been powerless to arrest the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan, although they were strong enough to delay it in certain respects. The magnificent creative effort of the working class and the collective farmers overcame the sabotage and the wrecking. The exposure and isolation of the wreckers gave a fresh impetus to Socialist competition—the rivalry of the workers in the building of Socialism. Already it is clear that the Five Year Plan will be completed in four years : already it is clear that the foundations of Socialism will be completed in 1931—by such measures as the collectivisation of 80 per cent.—90 per cent. of the present farms in the decisive grain areas of the country, by the increase of industrial output by 45 per cent. in one year, by the firm establishment of universal and compulsory elementary education. And, while these achievements are capped day by day with new successes, and the Soviet Union grows stronger daily as a result, they also sharpen the antagonism between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world, bankrupt, riddled with contradictions and racked with crisis.

While the Soviet Union is surrounded by Imperialist Powers there is, and will always be, a menace of war against the first Workers' State. The fear of its revolutionary example for the workers and oppressed peoples of the world, the greed for the vast markets and boundless natural resources lost for ever to

capitalism as a result of the 1917 Revolution, the hundreds of millions lost by the factory owners and the bondholders who lent money to the Tsarist régime, will continue to stimulate the capitalist class of the world to a war against the U.S.S.R., which in effect is for the capitalists a war of self-preservation. The pages which follow throw a flood of light on the bitter and relentless hostility of the Imperialists to the U.S.S.R. All friends of the Soviet Union, and in the first instance the working-class, dare not forget this.

Some naïve persons may point to the fact that the British Government figures very little in the present volume, and refer to the indignant denials of His Britannic Majesty's Labour Government. Diplomatic denials are diplomatic denials. For years the Liberal Government before the War denied the existence of a secret agreement with the French military and naval authorities. In quite recent times a Conservative Foreign Minister repeatedly denied the existence of a secret understanding with France about trained military reserves. It is quite in order for a Labour Government, for whom there is no greater compliment than to say that it is no less an Imperial Government than the Liberals and Tories were, to deny also—until it is found out. Meanwhile, the training of the Estonian Air Force and the Roumanian Navy by British officers goes on, so do the annual "friendly visits" of British warships to Baltic waters, and so does the building of air bases and military camps along the N.W. Frontier. The Labour Government is entitled to all the credit it can claim for continuing to maintain a more efficient Secret Service and espionage organisation than the French.

No intelligent person will be taken in by the protestations of innocence of British Labour politicians. Eternal vigilance and ceaseless struggle against the war manœuvres of the Imperialists remains foremost on the order of the day for all friends of the Soviet Union and friends of world peace.

ANDREW ROTHSTEIN.

August, 1931.

WRECKERS ON TRIAL

THE CHARGES.

The trial took place in the Hall of Columns at the Trade Union Palace at Moscow. It began on November 25th, 1930, and lasted until December 7th, the proceedings, except for one short session, being conducted in open court.

The accused, all of them Soviet citizens, were :

1. Leonid Konstantinovitch Ramzin, 43, former Director of the Thermo-Technical Institute and Professor of the Moscow Technical High School.
2. Ivan Andreyevitch Kalinnikov, 56, former Vice-Chairman of the Industrial Section of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., Professor of the Military Aviation Academy and of other Technical High Schools.
3. Victor Alexeyevitch Laritchev, 43, former member of the Presidium and chairman of the Fuel Section of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.
4. Nikolai Franzovitch Charnovsky, 62, former Vice-Chairman of the Engineering Advisory Committee of the Supreme Economic Council of the U.S.S.R. and Professor of various Technical High Schools.
5. Alexander Alexandrovitch Fyedotov, 66, former Chairman of the Board of the Textile Scientific Research Institute and Professor of a number of Technical High Schools.
6. Sergei Victorovitch Kuprianov, 59, former technical director of the Textile Rationalisation Department of the Supreme Economic Council of the U.S.S.R.
7. Vladimir Ivanovich Ochkin, 39, former secretary of the Thermo-Technical Institute and a leading official of the Section of Scientific Research of the Supreme Economic Council of the U.S.S.R.
8. Xenofont Vasilievitch Sitnin, 52, former engineer of the All-Union Textile Syndicate.

The first six were charged under Article 58 clause 3, 58 clause 4, and 58 clause 6 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., while the charge against Ochkin was preferred under Article 58 clause

3 and 58 clause 6, and against Sitnin under Article 58 clause 3 and 58 clause 4.

The provisions of these articles are as follows:—Article 58 clause 3: Communications with counter-revolutionary intentions with a foreign State or with its individual representatives, likewise the rendering of assistance in any shape or form whatsoever to a foreign State which is in a state of war with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or which is fighting it by intervention or blockade, entail the measures of social defence provided by article 58 of the present Code,

[*Namely*: The supreme measure of social defence—shooting or the declaration as enemy of the toilers, with confiscation of property and loss of citizenship of the Federal Republic, and thereby loss of citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and banishment from the confines of the U.S.S.R. for ever; but in case of mitigating circumstances the measure of social defence may be reduced to imprisonment with strict isolation for a period of not less than three years, with confiscation of all or part of property.]

Article 58 clause 4: The rendering of assistance by any means whatsoever to hostile activities against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the part of that section of the international bourgeoisie which, not recognising the equal rights of the Communist system arising in succession to the capitalist system, strives for its overthrow; and likewise on the part of social groups and organisations under the influence of, or organised directly by, that bourgeoisie, entails: imprisonment with strict isolation for a period of not less than three years with the confiscation of the whole or part of property, with an increase of penalty in particularly aggravated circumstances to the supreme measure of social defence—shooting or the declaration as enemy of the toilers, with loss of citizenship of the Federal Republic, and thereby of citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and banishment from the confines of the U.S.S.R. for ever with confiscation of property.

Article 58 clause 6: Espionage—i.e., delivery, theft or collection for the purpose of transmission to foreign States, counter-revolutionary organisations or private persons of information bearing the character of specially guarded State secrets entails: imprisonment with strict isolation for a period of not less than three years, with confiscation of the whole or part of property; and in cases when espionage has led or might lead to specially grave consequences for the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the supreme measure of social defence—shooting or declaration as enemy of the toilers, with loss of citizenship of the Federal Republics and thereby of citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and banishment for ever with confiscation of property.

The delivery, theft or collection, for the purpose of transmission to the organisations or persons indicated above, of economic information which according to its content does not constitute specially guarded State secrets, but the publication of which is prohibited either by express provision of the law or by order of the chiefs of departments, institutions and enterprises, either for or without remuneration, entail: imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years.

THE FIRST DAY. NOVEMBER 25th.

(Evening Session.)

The President of the Court, Professor A. J. Vyshinsky, opened the sitting with a short speech, in the course of which he acquainted the accused with the composition of the Court (the Special Session of the Supreme Court, of the U.S.S.R.), namely, that, in addition to himself, it consisted of V. P. Antonov-Saratovsky (Judge of the Supreme Court) and V. L. Lvov (a Worker at the " AMO " Automobile Works), P. A. Ivanov (a Worker at the " PUTILOV " Works) attending in the capacity of Judge in reserve.

In reply to a question by the Presiding Judge as to whether they had any objection to any members of the Court, the accused replied in the negative.

Proceeding, the President informed the accused that, in virtue of Article 277 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the R.S.F.S.R., they were entitled to address questions to any other of the accused or to any witness who might be called, and to offer at any time during the proceedings any explanations, either on the subject matter of the charges against them or on any circumstances relevant thereto. These rights could be exercised by them either in person or through Counsel.

Only two of the accused, Sitnin and Kuprianov, wished to be represented by Counsel, the members of the Collegium of Defending Counsel, Otzep and Braude, appearing on their behalf. The other accused conducted their own case.

The prosecution was represented by the Public Prosecutor of the R.S.F.S.R., N. V. Krylenko, and his assistant, Friedberg.

After the Indictment had been read out by the Secretary of the Court, the accused, in reply to the President, in turn pleaded guilty to the charges of the Indictment, and declared themselves ready and willing to give explanations.

On the proposal of the Prosecution, supported by the Defence, the Court decided to begin the proceedings with statements by the accused.

Ramzin was the first to be called, and declared as follows :—

Ramzin's Statement.

RAMZIN : I unreservedly admit my guilt. I do not intend to defend or justify myself before the Supreme Court and the country as a whole. For how can I defend myself or justify the tremendous crimes which I have committed? I can only succeed

in mitigating my guilt by frank and truthful testimony and by sincerely admitting my crimes and mistakes. Therefore, by making here my full and wholehearted repentance, by undertaking to cut off all my connections with anti-Soviet circles both in the U.S.S.R. and abroad, by fully disarming myself and discontinuing forever my struggle against the Soviet Government, I wish to reveal with merciless clarity the whole truth before the Supreme Court and before the wide masses in our Union as well as the proletariat the world over.

I shall not attempt to justify myself or to lay the blame for my actions on others. Having, together with the Industrial Party, gone through the path of sabotage, treachery and betrayal, I wish, without sparing myself, to take advantage of our terrible experience to achieve two objects. The first is to reveal our criminal work in connection with the preparations abroad for intervention, in all its intricacies, and thus to ease the burden of the U.S.S.R. in its struggle against the military plans of the world capitalism. For, while working in alliance with the world bourgeoisie, I had an opportunity to observe its hidden schemes and to discover its real aims, namely, the territorial dismemberment of our country and its economic and political enslavement. Secondly, unveiling before you without concealment the whole picture of the criminal activities of the " Industrial Party." I wish to show by our shameful experience the utter worthlessness of counter-revolutionary aims, to show their crying contradiction to the actual interests of our country.

I should like, as the result of this trial of the " Industrial Party," that the word " FINIS " be written under the dark and shameful past of the intelligentsia as an aloof caste, that all engineers to a man should enter the great family of the proletariat, which is heroically engaged in building Socialism, and by their self-denying work remove the stains of sabotage and treachery.

The founding of the Engineering Centre took place before my time, and as far as I know its early history must be put at the end of 1925 or early in 1926.

The representatives of the old engineers, who were formerly in the employ of the capitalists and still preserved vivid memories of their pre-revolutionary status, constituted at that time numerically the larger part of the old engineering personnel, and by their authority and influence they unquestionably played at the moment the leading role in engineering circles. This section of the old engineers who ideologically directed the entire engineering world through the All Union Association of Engineers and the Mining Club, and equally through their personal and official connections, definitely regarded engineers as a special caste with definite class interests and a definite class ideology.

Following the revolution these class interests of the engineers were infringed by the poorer material conditions of prominent engineers, who lost their previous leading positions in industry owing to the natural mistrust of the Soviet Government and the party and public control of their work. At the same time, in their political views the old engineering circles generally fluctuated from Cadet to Monarchist convictions, being completely alien to the ideology of the Communist Party. The old engineers were completely and firmly convinced of the necessity for a capitalist structure as the only base on which the productive forces of the country could develop successfully and steadily.

Owing to the tremendous influence of this section of the old engineers their propaganda met with considerable success.

At the same time it is necessary to point out another factor, namely, the *firm belief in the imminence of intervention or of a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat,* which was taken very seriously in engineering circles, approximately in 1927. This conviction was, to a large degree, supported by the information received by the old engineers from their former employers, from White emigrant circles abroad. Contact with former employers was also maintained by many of the old leading engineers. These contacts with the former employers and owners were at first expressed in the sending of financial aid, and the money was usually accompanied by the assurance that these engineers and employees who received it were bound by no obligations. After the establishment of this contact of a financial character it naturally began to grow and become more serious. In compensation for financial aid, engineers began to render certain private services to the White emigrants and former owners. At first this aid was chiefly concerned with preserving the enterprises of former owners for them, and even improving them.

Here definite instructions were received to conceal the most valuable seams, carry out unnecessary expensive repairs, purchase new equipment, extend the enterprises, etc. In a word, the basic aim and idea of these instructions was the possible preservation of former properties, and even their improvement and growth at the expense of the Soviet Government.

At this time the White emigrants still definitely considered the enterprises their own.

Approximately beginning with 1927, with the transition to the definite reconstruction of national economy, a sharp change in the sentiments of both engineering and White emigrant groups took place. The Socialist offensive and the beginning of reconstruction furnished an immediate cause and base for active combat.

The sharpening of the class struggle consequent on the Socialist offensive against bourgeois elements in the city and in the village was unquestionably also one of the stimuli which led

to active struggle. Others were the worsening of living conditions and economic and business difficulties which made themselves felt, and the developing struggle inside the Communist Party.

The next circumstance which led to the sharpening of the struggle was the successful beginning of the reconstruction work and the proper approach of the Soviet Government to the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan for industry. Here begins, quite clearly and definitely, the first information of preparations for intervention and of its imminence, the first date indicated being 1928. In this connection there arose still another circumstance which greatly facilitated the task of enrolling members into the counter-revolutionary " Industrial Party," namely, the endeavours of the engineers taking part in Soviet reconstruction to insure themselves, in the event of a counter-revolutionary upheaval, against possible repressions because of their participation in Soviet construction. By entering the ranks of the Industrial Party some engineers considered themselves, to a certain extent, insured against such repressions.

This is the reason for the sentiments prevalent during the year 1927. Moreover, this fighting spirit was strengthened by definite pressure from former industrialists and the ruling circles, chiefly of France and partly England. At the same time the fear was spread that the Five-Year Plan was a plan to eliminate all old engineers. Therefore the instinct of self-preservation urged them to more active methods of struggle.

And, finally, the internal party differences which took place at that time, and the severe criticisms of the Soviet Government by the Right opposition, also confirmed the necessity for actively opposing it.

That was the atmosphere and the basis on which the Engineering Centre, or the Union of Engineering Organisations, was organised. Later, a more powerful organisation, the Industrial Party, took its place.

According to my information, the Engineering Centre did not at once become a complete and fully formed organisation. It was created and constructed gradually. The main seed from which it grew, according to my knowledge, was the Mining Club organised by Palchinsky, Rabinovitch and Fedorovitch for the purpose of ideologically influencing the engineering circles, in particular the mining engineers.

At the time I joined the Engineering Centre, i.e., in the first half of 1927, it was composed as follows: The president and leader of the Centre was Palchinsky, with Rabinovitch, Khrennikov, Charnovsky, Fyedotov, Laritchev, Krassovsky and myself. In 1927 Kalinikov, Yanushevsky, Strizhov, Kuprianov and Fedorovitch came very close to the Centre. It should be pointed out

that there were no formal elections to the Engineering Centre or to its Presiding Board. It is, therefore, difficult to separate the the members of the actual Engineering Centre from the members of its branch organisations. The functions of the members of the Engineering Centre were distributed according to the special profession of each of its participants, for the entire structure of the Engineering Centre bore a departmental character. Palchinsky led the activity in mining and precious metals in the Geological Committee. In addition, he directed all the activities of the Centre as a whole. In his hands were concentrated foreign contacts and financial questions. Rabinovitch directed work in the coal industries and various other branches of industries with which he was closely connected, thanks to his position at that time—Chairman of the Industrial Section of the State Planning Commission.

Khrennikov and Charnovsky carried on work in the metal industry. Fyedotov and Kuprianov in the textile industry, Laritchev handled fuel, particularly oil; Krassovsky, transport.

The branch centres were further linked up with the local organisations, and, as I have already said, this contact was made on the chain principle. Therefore, members of two different branches did not know each other.

A similar structure was maintained later in the Industrial Party, with the only difference that, of late, district centres began to be formed. This linked workers of various branch groups on the territorial principle. Such a structure made it very difficult to keep track of the number of members. It is my opinion that the total strength of the Moscow organisation directly connected with the Centre was from 40 to 50, or 60 people at most. The total strength of the organisation as a whole, approximately in the middle of 1929, when the Engineering Centre had already become the Industrial Party, I estimate in the neighbourhood of 2,000 persons. Thus the total numerical strength of the party was comparatively insignificant, which demonstrates its exclusive character.

As the Engineering Centre grew and its membership increased, general questions of political orientation began to arise, questions of general ideology which might unite and bind the various members of the organisations on some common political basis.

Palchinsky represented the monarchist tendency. At the same time there were representatives of bourgois republican tendencies: Rabinovitch, for instance. There was a group upholding State Capitalism, Laritchev and myself. Thus, there was obviously no single political unity in the Engineering Centre. One could only consider the drawing up of a basic programme which would unite the majority of the active workers of the

Centre. This process gradually took place during the latter half of 1927 and the first half of 1928, so that, approximately, in the middle of 1928 the fundamental outlines of the programme were more or less cleared up and generally accepted. For the sake of clarity, I repeat the basic premises in their main outline.

First of all, the form of government caused considerable discussion in the Engineering Centre, because there was a group favouring the monarchist system. These had to be argued with for a long time before they were convinced of the complete unsuitability of such tendencies. The old dynasty would completely discredit us among wide masses of the population, and the search for a new dynasty would involve a very dangerous adventure. Moreover, the very idea of monarchism had become so discredited among the wide masses of the population that to present it to them would mean losing their support.

This argument resulted in the gradual acceptance by the overwhelming majority of the Engineering Centre of a bourgeois-democratic republic as the most suitable form of government. At the same time, negotiations and contacts went on with the White emigrants, a large and important part of whom, namely, the " Left " section of the Trade and Industrial Committee (" Torgprom ") considered this acceptable. Later, a parliament elected by adult suffrage with vote by suitable ballot, with a system of indirect elections ensuring an acceptable parliamentary body, was proposed.

The Wreckers' Programme.

The industrial programme naturally excited the greatest interest, and there was a variety of proposals. During the first period, the majority of the old factories were still in existence, and it was possible to talk about their actual return to their former owners. By the end of 1927, and still more in 1928, the face of industry had changed so much that there could be no talk of returning industrial undertakings to their former owners. This became a subject for discussion.

The form of compensation was gradually found in the shape of the flotation of special public companies to take over factories which were part of Soviet industry. This method would first of all permit compensation of former owners for factories which had belonged to them, and in view of the fact that the present value of all Soviet factories considerably exceeded their original value, would leave a considerable sum for general State needs and, in addition, for compensating the landowners.

This, in the opinion of the Torgprom, was a thoroughly acceptable solution. The leaders of the Torgprom also pointed out that the issuing of shares in these factories would be of con-

siderable aid in settling the mutual accounts of various firms, and in recompensing them for financing intervention organisations, and that the participation of individual firms in intervention organisations could be taken into account in the distribution of shares.

So far as agriculture was concerned, it was thought necessary to consider the land the property of the peasantry, since it was very clear that attempts to return it to the former owners could not be successful. Moreover, the formal conveyance of this land to the peasants, in order to convince them that the land was theirs, was discussed. At the same time, partial compensation to the former landowners, out of the surplus shares which remained in the possession of the State, was considered.

Thus, factories which had been completely reconstructed or liquidated, and in general old enterprises as such, ceased to interest their former owners. From this moment, therefore, definite instructions about individual factories were no longer given. The Torgprom dropped its interest in individual factories, plants and mines. It became a general question of the possibility of organising intervention, the overthrow of the Soviet Government, and a counter-revolutionary coup.

Other details of the political programme, so far as I know, received no clear definition. The question of local government and of parliament was not hurried, because everyone was agreed that a military dictatorship would be necessary at first. The majority favoured the well-known Stolypin principle: first order, and then reform. Therefore, the promised freedom of speech, press, conscience, meeting, organisation, etc., was conceived of only as a later step, after the final strengthening of the new Government. It was considered absolutely essential, as I stated, to introduce a military dictatorship to begin with.

The general features of this programme make it quite clear that it promoted the interests of the large industrial bourgeoisie and of the well-to-do individual peasants.

These basic principles were largely shared by the " Working Peasants' Party " (W.P.P.), which served as a great stimulus for establishing mutual contact between these two organisations, for the purpose of mutual support and assistance in carrying out a counter-revolutionary upheaval.

I should like to point out something else, which may be of secondary importance, but nevertheless was characteristic of general sentiment in engineering circles at that time. Palchinsky, in particular, supported the idea, which met with tremendous success in engineering circles, of the establishment of a provisional Government based on a highly developed technique, and managed by engineers, as the representatives of this technique.

The leading rôle in the management of the country and national economy must be in the hands of the engineers.

The real stimulus for the reorganisation of the Engineering Centre into the Industrial Party was a number of reports made by Professor A. V. Chayanov at meetings of the Engineering Centre during the course of 1927, and possibly the beginning of 1928. In these reports, Professor Chayanov informed us of the general outlines of the political programme of his Party, its growth, and its dimensions. These reports in agrarian and economic circles gave the outward impetus for bringing up the question of the constitution of a party in the Engineering Centre also. Besides this, there were other more serious reasons for reorganising into a party. These basic reasons were, firstly, the necessity for a wider framework in order to bring the engineering masses into the organisation, the channels of the Engineering Centre, in the form which it bore in 1927, being too limited for this purpose. The second reason was the necessity of mobilising engineering forces in the forthcoming struggle for power. Many of the engineers still doubted whether they would be able to receive the share of influence and power which they desired after the counter-revolutionary revolt. This all necessitated the consolidation of the Engineering Party on a wider scale. During my absence abroad, the question of reorganising the Engineering Centre into the Industrial Party was brought up by Rabinovitch, and during the first half of 1928 this actual transformation was effected. I therefore consider that this change was finally brought about in the middle of 1928, at which time the Engineering Centre really became the Central Committee of the Industrial Party.

Four Periods.

Coming to the question of the tactics employed by the Industrial Party, it is necessary to say that these tactics changed considerably from time to time, in accordance with the needs of the situation. The entire activity of the Engineering Centre and the Industrial Party can be classified into four fundamental periods.

The first period, beginning, one might say, in 1927, coincided with the reconstruction period in Soviet industry; this period bore a somewhat passive character. At this time there existed direct links between the different outstanding leaders of the Engineering Centre and the former industrialists. (I will discuss this more fully further on.)

At this period, the White emigrants were convinced that the factories were theirs, and hoped for the speedy return of the factories. They regarded the process of reconstruction and improvement of these factories fairly calmly.

The second period was approximately from the spring of

1927 to the end of 1928. This period coincides with the beginning of the successful reconstruction of Soviet economy, with a rapid strengthening of the economic welfare of the country and of Soviet power. It immediately brought the chief workers of the Engineering Centre to a consciousness of the complete futility of a counter-revolutionary upheaval by internal means. From this moment, as I have already stated, very active communication set in with the White emigrants as to the organisation of intervention and its proximity, in so far as it was set for 1928. The ideal of intervention became defined clearly and sharply as the one means for the real achievement of a counter-revolutionary upheaval and the overthrow of the Soviet Government.

In the Engineering Centre, the necessity of help from within began to be felt by the beginning of 1928. This was reinforced by the instructions which began to come in from abroad, by the insistent demands of the Torgprom. A definite feeling in favour of the utmost possible internal help for intervention and its speeding up began to grow at this time. All information and instructions coming from circles abroad definitely stated that the sooner intervention could be organised the better the ground would be prepared for it, and the worse the economic conditions of the Soviet Union the easier it would be to realise intervention.

In order to hasten intervention, a completely clear and definite objective was laid down of aiding it from within by means of artificially worsening the economic conditions of the country. We endeavoured to bring this about at first by means of direct economic wrecking. However, this method was discarded, since it gave extremely poor results so far as effecting a blow at national economy was concerned, at the same time presenting great dangers and tremendous difficulties. Therefore, very soon, as early as 1927, this procedure of direct technical wrecking at different technical points was abandoned, and we adopted the method of planned sabotage.

I will enumerate the principal forms taken by this plan of sabotage.

In the first place there was the method of minimum standards, that is, the greatest retarding of the economic development of the country, and holding back of the pace of industrialisation.

In the second place, the creation of disproportion between the individual branches of national economy and also between individual sections of one and the same branch.

Finally, the third direction, which we began to extend more and more during the course of the last period, was the method of " freezing " capital, i.e., the investment of capital either in absolutely unnecessary construction or in that which might have been postponed, not being absolutely essential at the moment. This method of " freezing " capital meant cutting down the rate

of industrialisation. Without doubt this lowered the general level of the economic life of the country, thus creating discontent among large masses of the population.

The third tactical period in the work of the Industrial Party began in October, 1928. From the end of 1928, following the journeys abroad made by myself, Laritchev, and other members of the organisation, direct and definite connections with the Torgprom and chiefly the French, partly the British General Staffs, was established, in order to furnish information and data of a military character.

A regular system of financing the Industrial Party was agreed upon at this time.

Thus from the end of 1928 the Industrial Party had in its hands entirely different means of carrying on preparatory work for intervention. Thenceforward, the activity of the Industrial Party in the sphere of preparation for intervention made rapid progress.

Finally, we began the establishment of a military organisation with the specific task of directly aiding the interventionists, both in the preparation for, and in particular in the consummation of, their plans for intervention.

And finally, the fourth and last period, from the beginning of 1930 to the end of the year. This period is characterised by a considerable weakening of the Industrial Party, as the result of the disruption of a large number of wrecking organisations due to the arrest of many active members of the Industrial Party; and, in addition, as the result of receiving definite information of the impossibility of intervention in 1930, on which all activities during the last two years have been based.

In the ranks of the Industrial Party a certain nervousness already began to be felt. Moreover, by 1930 the schemes of the foreign capitalist States showed themselves very definitely and unequivocally, as well as the measure of payment to be exacted by them for their participation in intervention. Up to this time, for obvious reasons of a propaganda nature, these schemes were sufficiently veiled, and they came to the surface only gradually. These schemes involved, in brief, considerable territorial losses on our side, granting of concessions, payment of debts, etc. They showed that intervention, were it to be realised, would be bought at an exceedingly high price.

A fairly strong tendency in favour of a counter-revolutionary revolt with the help of internal forces alone, without counting on help from abroad, therefore began to develop in the ranks of the Industrial Party.

Connections with the Working Peasants' Party were renewed with the idea of using the forces at its disposal for the achievement of a counter-revolution. Besides this, many doubted

the possibility of the realisation of intervention. Many said: In 1930 they promised intervention. It did not take place. There is no guarantee that it will take place in 1931.

Thus began the search for new ways and means. But at the same time the preparation for intervention continued.

These are the four tactical periods which can be distinguished during the existence of the Industrial Party.

In order to finish with the question of tactics and organisation, I will also give the projected composition of the future Government. In the middle of 1928 the following composition of the future Government was laid down: Prime Minister, Palchinsky; Minister of War, the same Palchinsky or Lukomsky, the White Guard general who was regarded as the future leader of the intervention; Minister of Industry and Trade, Riabushinsky, Khrennikov, Rabinovitch, Kalinnikov; Minister for the Interior, Riabushinsky, Professor Worms, Tretyakov of the Torgprom, and, not very definitely, Professor Charnovsky; Minister of Finance, Ozerov, Rabinovitch, and from emigrant circles Vishnegradsky and Davidov, also Denisov, or some representative of the W.P.P.; Minister of Communications, Krassovsky, Von-Mekk and J. N. Borisov; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Academician Tarle; Minister of Agriculture, Professor A. V. Chayanov and, from abroad, Filimovitch or a candidate nominated by the W.P.P. And, finally, Palchinsky, as dictator during the period of the military dictatorship.

This was the composition of the future Government.

Now I come to the Torgprom, which played a very prominent rôle in all of the activities of the Industrial Party. The Torgprom, or the Russian Trade and Industrial Committee, existing in Paris, was founded, as far as I know, in 1920 or 1921. It represented—or rather represents, since it still exists at the present time—an organisation abroad of former Russian industrialists. Its aim is, first, to defend the interests of the former Russian industrialists abroad, and secondly, to secure the return of their former enterprises in the U.S.S.R., or at least to recover compensation for them. In order to accomplish these aims, the Torgprom attempted to organise intervention in the U.S.S.R., seeing therein the only possibility of accomplishing its purpose. The Torgprom includes a large number of important industrialists of Tsarist Russia: Denisov, Nobel, Gukasov, Mantashev, Riabushinsky, Tretyakov, Meshchersky, Konovalov, Krestovnikov, Karpov, Paramonov, Morosov, Demidov, Novikov and others. Members of the Torgprom, many of whom are still wealthy, participate in a number of enterprises abroad, and therefore have a certain amount of influence and political connections. This organisation, since it was concerned with the same immediate tactical aim of the organisation and

realisation of intervention in the U.S.S.R., naturally was the ally of the Industrial Party in its work.

The first connections with individual industrialists, members of the Torgprom, which have been continued until recent times, date back to 1923-24; thus, for instance, Palchinsky's connections, and those of the textile group, particularly those of Khrennikov. Regular contacts in the textile industry and the oil industry were also established since 1928, although they had been formed before. In the oil industry, Strizhov was connected with Nobel; Palchinsky, in the metal industry, with Meshchersky, the former owner of the Kolomna and Vyksa Works; in the textile industry, Lopatin, who died in 1927, and later Fyedotov, were in contact with Krestovnikov, Konovalov and Karpov; Rabinovitch maintained similar connections with Dvorzhanchikov, in Poland. Finally, we met Riabushinsky during my trip abroad in 1928, and the definite contact with Torgprom was established in November 1928, by myself and Laritchev. From the end of 1928 one purpose was followed: to accomplish one definite aim, namely, the organisation of intervention against the Soviet Union. The meetings of Laritchev and myself with members of the Torgprom in Paris were limited to mutual obligations of the Industrial Party and the Torgprom for the preparation of intervention. All the external preparation for intervention from abroad was undertaken by the Torgprom; the Industrial Party undertook the preparations within the Union.

The external preparation of intervention meant (1) negotiations with foreign Government circles, chiefly with French circles, for they were the main centre of the organisation of the intervention; (2) the carrying on of agitation and propaganda in favour of intervention, making free use of personal connections as well as of the Press. Finally, the preparation and organisation of the military side of intervention, naturally through foreign Government circles.

On the other hand, internal preparations amounted to helping intervention from within, by creating a general paralysis of national economic life at the moment of intervention, and, secondly, by direct aid to intervention by means of sabotage, assistance on the part of the military organisations of the Industrial Party, etc.

The work of financing the internal preparation for intervention, that is, financing the Industrial Party, was also undertaken by the Torgprom, partly from its own means, and partly from those received from industrial circles of France, and at first was also marked by two sharply differentiated periods. The first period, up to the end of 1928, was characterised by a general irregularity and haphazardness in the financing. After the organisation of the Engineering Centre, Palchinsky succeeded in

arranging for part of the money to come regularly. During the early stages of the Industrial Party money received from abroad came through individual engineers travelling abroad, or through foreign connections or foreign agents in the U.S.S.R. I believe it is impossible to give any accurate account of the money received from abroad, but the average amount of money received by the Engineering Centre in a centralised manner, up to the end of 1928, may be estimated at approximately 1½ to 2 million roubles. It is possible that a like sum was received by the lower branch nuclei of the Engineering Centre directly, without passing through the central treasury. Thus the total sum received from abroad in this period can be set at from 3½ to 4 million roubles.

The regular financing of the Industrial Party from abroad began at the end of 1928, through the medium of the Torgprom. According to the estimate drawn up in Paris, a million roubles were to be received during the course of the year. This budget was carried out fairly exactly: from November 1928 to March 1930 about 1,600,000 roubles were received from abroad, i.e., about one million roubles a year.

Delivery was at the same time completely regularised. The money was delivered by French agents either to Laritchev or myself. I received the money three times, in all about 350,000 roubles, Laritchev the rest. As far as the distribution of this money was concerned it was distributed among various branches of industry, percolating gradually from the higher to the lower links, and thence to the local outlying organisations.

On the three basic industries, fuel, oil, and peat, Laritchev expended about 300,000 roubles. About 50,000 roubles were spent by Meyer in the timber industry. Khrennikov, Charnovsky, Hartman and Kutsky spent about 500,000 roubles in the metal industry. Fyedotov and Kuprianov 200,000 roubles in the textile industry, and in various other branches of industry expenditure totalled 200,000 roubles, which were handled by Kalinnikov. About 50,000 roubles were expended by me on the organisation of the Thermo-Technical Institute, and about 50,000 roubles were spent on economic résumés and individual reports, drawn up chiefly by the instructions of the Torgprom. About 200,000 roubles were transmitted for the People's Commissariat for Transport through Kogan-Bernstein. I spent about 100,000 roubles on the electrical industry. Instead of the 50,000 roubles for the economic group mentioned in the indictment, there should be about 100,000 roubles. The rest of the money went on petty expenditure of the Industrial Party.

The Organisation of Intervention.

I have exhausted all the basic questions of the organisation, tactics, structure and financing of the Industrial Party. Now I

come to the second important part of my evidence, that dealing with intervention and its organisation which is of fundamental moment in all the activities of the Industrial Party. I will also deal with the internal preparations for intervention by the Industrial Party, i.e., its wrecking work, intended to produce a crisis in national economy.

The rapid and successful period of reconstruction of industry, the successful commencement of reconstruction, the successful beginning of the Socialist offensive, all created the complete conviction that in a short time the struggle against the Soviet Union, even with the aid of intervention, would be completely impossible. The strengthening of the economic and military power of the country was proceeding very rapidly. The rate of development of the economic life of the Union during the past year had no precedent. For this reason all hope of effecting a counter-revolutionary coup by internal forces in the future was out of the question. This made it necessary to discuss intervention as quickly as possible, for further delay might result in failure. The Industrial Party, which saw in intervention the only means for attaining the ultimate aim, took this point of view.

In the organisation of intervention the Industrial Party had two natural allies: the first was the Torgprom, with similar aims, and the second the official circles in capitalist countries manifesting the greatest activity in this direction, namely, official circles in France and, during the first period, England. These endeavours on the part of French Government circles were very comprehensible. They aimed at the destruction of the Soviet Union as the only Socialist country in the world; and were further prompted by the desire to receive definite territorial and economic possessions.

The information and data of the Industrial Party regarding intervention, the first part of which refers to the period 1925-26, are little known to me. I will, therefore, not discuss this period. The information and data concerning intervention of which I am aware relate to the 1927 period. Fairly definite information regarding the preparations of France and Britain for intervention were given first by Khrennikov on his return from abroad in 1927, when he carried on negotiations with Meshchersky and Riabushinsky.

The next information was received by me from Riabushinsky in the second half of 1927, during my stay in Paris. The meeting took place on the instructions of Palchinsky, to be more exact, of the Engineering Centre. The talk with Riabushinsky touched on the question of issuing shares in the factories, which I mentioned before. Riabushinsky said that from the point of view of the Torgprom this system was both possible and desirable, for it ensured proper accounting between members of the Torgprom and

firms which participate therein. Other points of the programme discussed concerned the form of government. No objections were raised by Riabushinsky or by the Torgprom. There was only some doubt regarding the land questions, since there was not complete agreement in the ranks of the Torgprom itself and the White emigrants. Therefore the decision to allot the land to the peasants and not to return it to its former owners had not yet been definitely accepted, and the Torgprom had no final and definite policy on this question.

Concerning intervention, Riabushinsky told me at this meeting that the Torgprom was already carrying on negotiations with individual members of the French Government. He named Loucheur, through whom he attempted to carry on negotiations with the French Government. Riabushinsky stated that the information which he had received from French Government circles gave every hope of the realisation of intervention with their aid in the near future, perhaps in the coming year—1928. However, from the very beginning, Riabushinsky stressed the demand of the Torgprom and French Government circles for strengthening preparations in the U.S.S.R. by creating and deepening economic crises, increasing the dissatisfaction of the peasant masses and wide strata of the population in general, an essential condition for hastening intervention from abroad.

In general, during the course of 1927, the Torgprom, as such, did not show any particular activity in the sense of intervention. The fundamental idea of the Torgprom was that it was necessary to wait longer for the improvement and extension of the different factories which formerly belonged to them, in order to receive them with an increased value. Thus, in this period, it seems to me, the initial rôle in furthering the idea of intervention no longer came from the Torgprom, but from the Government circles of France and England, the more so because, at this time, in 1928, England had already broken off diplomatic relations with our Union.

A decisive step forward in the matter of the organisation of intervention, and also a change in the information which the Industrial Party began to receive, occurred in 1928, chiefly because at this time a series of trips abroad were undertaken by prominent workers of the Industrial Party. They had interviews with influential members of the Torgprom, and brought back more substantial information concerning the organisation of intervention abroad. This was the kind of information which Fyedotov brought back, after seeing Karpov—information concerning conversations with representatives of French Government circles, Poincaré and Briand, about the organisation of intervention. The same kind of information was brought by Sitnin through Konovalov, whom he saw abroad. And, finally, absolutely

definite information and details of the organisation of intervention in 1928 were received by myself and Laritchev, both in England and in France. In view of the fact that I myself was party to these conversations, I think that it is necessary to tell of these conversations in more detail.

During my own and Laritchev's stay in Paris in October 1928, we used the opportunity to meet the leading members of the Torgprom. This meeting had already been arranged by preliminary communications from Moscow, even before our journey abroad. As early as the beginning of 1928, the Industrial Party had a close and regular connection through French agents in Moscow, and through one of them, Mr. K., I sent preliminary communications to the Torgprom concerning our journey to Paris and the desirability of utilising this journey for meetings and the elucidation of several questions. Then, immediately before our departure to Paris from London, I asked the director of the firm of Vickers, engineer Simon, to advise the time of our arrival and the name of the hotel in which we were going to stay.

We stayed in Paris at the Terminus Hotel, near the Gare du Nord. Soon after our arrival in Paris, some one at the Torgprom called me up on the telephone and arranged for our participation in a joint meeting with members of the Torgprom in their offices. This meeting took place in the middle of the day, approximately at one o'clock. Besides myself and Laritchev, the following members of the Torgprom were present: Denisov, President of the Torgprom, then Riabushinsky, Nobel, Gukasov, Meshchersky, Konovalov, Starinkevitch, and Mantashev. The general substance of this meeting was the following. In the first place I gave a report on the work of the Industrial Party and the intensification of efforts to cover the whole of industry. I described also the fundamental lines of our work. At this time the chief concern was for the minimum rate of development of national economy, and I showed concretely what had been done in this direction, chiefly by the adoption of a minimum Five-Year Plan. I also pointed out that parts of the organisation had already begun to collapse, mentioning the discovery of the Shakhty group, the transport group in the People's Commissariat for Transport, and indicated the greater dangers which threatened our work as a consequence. Laritchev added to this a report on the situation in the oil industry, which interested the oil men present at the meeting. On this question they had already received information from Strizhov. Therefore Laritchev's report was quite brief. After discussion of our reports, the general line of action of the Industrial Party was fully approved. But at the same time the absolute necessity to continue working for intervention from within was stressed, since the work which the Torg-

prom had taken upon itself was meeting with complete success and had produced quite concrete results.

Next came the report from Denisov on what the Torgprom had been able to accomplish in the general preparation abroad for intervention. Denisov stated that the Torgprom had already achieved concrete and tangible results. He confirmed the information which Fyedotov and Sitnin had brought with regard to the reception of members of the Torgprom by Poincaré and Briand. I recall the names of Riabushinsky, Tretyakov and Konovalov who had been present at these receptions. At the audiences which Poincaré granted to the members of the Torgprom, he expressed complete sympathy with the idea of organising intervention against the U.S.S.R., and stated that this question had already been turned over to the French General Staff to be worked out.

At the same time, Poincaré definitely demanded that they carry on increased preparations within the country to spread the wrecking, deepen the internal crisis chiefly at the moment of intervention and also to shatter the Five-Year Plan, in order to discredit the Soviet Government, and in this manner to simplify the carrying out of intervention. Thus, information which had been brought from abroad by other members of the Industrial Party was completely confirmed by the information and news which I and Laritchev received in Paris. In reply to my questions as to how reliable all these hopes for the aid of the French Government circles were, since the composition of the Government might change, and therefore calculations for two years in advance might be unreliable, we were informed that the influence of Poincaré and Briand was so great in France that, irrespective of their being in power, it would not change.

Further, in this report Denisov stated that a special commission of the French General Staff, headed by Colonel Joinville, to organise intervention against the U.S.S.R. already existed. Besides representatives from the French General Staff, there were also representatives from the British General Staff. On the basis of the contacts which the Torgprom had with this commission, Denisov further gave a brief description of the basic factors in the plan of intervention.

The connection between the Torgprom and the French General Staff was effected through military White emigrant circles. Denisov stated that the leader of military intervention was to be General Lukomsky, who in turn was in close contact with Colonel Joinville. Moreover, the Torgprom had contact along the same lines with the French General Staff in the person of Colonel Richard.

As far as the policy and plan of the organisation of intervention are concerned, we received information on this ques-

tion in condensed form at this same meeting. It was pointed out that France herself did not propose to intervene with military forces; at the most she would furnish military instructors, perhaps the help of the naval and air fleets, and that the real military forces which it was proposed should be used for the realisation of intervention would be those of Poland, Roumania and the Baltic border States. Further hope was given of the use of White emigrant military forces, that is, the Wrangel Army which was maintained abroad.

At this same conference we decided on the division of labour in the field of preparation for intervention about which I spoke before, namely, the Torgprom took upon itself the preparation of intervention externally, and the Industrial Party took over the internal organisation for intervention. In this connection the Industrial Party was particularly instructed to intensify work in the field of wrecking, especially in the metal industry.

And the last question turned on the date. This question was fundamental, in so far as it was necessary to fix the time of crisis for a definite date. The view of the representatives of the Torgprom was that the most suitable and desirable date would be the summer of 1930. Simultaneously this date was decided upon from the point of view of military and diplomatic considerations, as giving time sufficient for the practical organisation of public opinion abroad, for the carrying on of the necessary conversations between the Governments of the different countries who would participate in intervention, and for the completion of the military and technical preparations. They considered that the year and a half remaining would suffice for this.

At this conference it was definitely revealed that the leading spirit of intervention was France, and that its technical direction was in the hands of the French General Staff with the participation, help and support of England.

On the other hand, it was shown by myself and Laritchev that the year 1930 was just as definitely favoured by the Industrial Party, since only this year could be considered suitable for intervention and most favourable for the bringing about of a general crisis in its most acute form. I will dwell later more in detail on those motives that prompted us to decide on 1930.

Thus the two basic considerations for the preparation abroad of intervention set 1930 as an acceptable and desirable date.

This sums up the questions discussed at the morning meeting in the Torgprom. Moreover, at the end of this meeting, on my initiative I believe, we came to an agreement concerning the organisation of meetings with representatives of the French General Staff and with General Lukomsky.

I suggested that the presence of Laritchev and myself in Paris be made use of for establishing personal contact with General

Lukomsky and Colonels Joinville and Richard, in order to come to an agreement as to the further continuation of this contact. The basic direction of intervention on the part of the General Staff made this connection absolutely imperative. Denisov and other members of the Torgprom supported my suggestion. It was decided to arrange this meeting, on which I will report later on.

(*The Court adjourns.*)

THE SECOND DAY. NOVEMBER 26th.

(Morning Session.)

Continuing his evidence, Ramzin stated that, following the first meeting at the Torgprom in October, 1928, in Paris, both he and Laritchev met members of the Torgprom that same evening in a restaurant on the Grand Boulevard, where they discussed the question of intervention "unofficially." Denisov, Nobel, Gukasov, Meshchersky and Tretyakov were present at this meeting. Complete faith in the success of intervention was expressed. It was pointed out that help might be expected from Wrangel's troops, though negotiations had not been completed on that score. Tretyakov estimated their number at 100,000.

Details of the plan for intervention were not given, but it was learned that Moscow and Leningrad were to be attacked simultaneously. A small, but strong army of 600,000 to 800,000 was considered sufficient by some members of the Torgprom and White emigrant circles. Questions regarding the financing of intervention were met evasively, but it was learned that much of the money was to come from oil circles, particularly the Deterding group. The most important sources were, however, the ruling circles of England and France. Some money was also to be supplied by the Torgprom.

This meeting had been arranged for at the close of the morning gathering in the Torgprom, and lasted about two or two and a half hours. RAMZIN proceeded:—On the next day, in accordance with the agreement with the Torgprom, I met General Lukomsky and Colonel Joinville of the French General Staff. Denisov called for me in an automobile (we had arranged this in a café), and together we went to a private apartment where the meeting took place. There we met General Lukomsky and Colonel Joinville, of the French General Staff, as he was introduced to me. We spoke for the most part in Russian, with Denisov and Lukomsky translating the conversation into French for Colonel Joinville. Although I speak French I do not speak it well enough to go into any great detail.

The conversations on the whole consisted of the following: Colonel Joinville was mainly interested in the possibility of receiving information regarding the military strength of the Soviet Union, i.e., about the Red Army, and, secondly, in the possibility of obtaining military aid from within during intervention, and especially through subversive acts at the time of intervention.

General Lukomsky was the first to raise the question of the creation within the Industrial Party of a special military organisation, which could meet the requirements of the French General Staff as to the possibility of military aid during intervention. At the same time it was proposed to effect a closer and permanent connection between the Industrial Party and the French General Staff along military lines. After further discussion, the basic tasks of a military organisation, as they occurred to General Lukomsky and the French General Staff, were briefly noted down. I shall speak of these later when I take up the question of the military organisation.

At this same meeting a permanent connection with the French General Staff and the Torgprom was effected. It was Denisov who pointed out to me that, besides the contact which the Industrial Party already had through K., it was necessary to establish a second contact through one of the French people living in Moscow, a Mr. R. At the same time, Denisov and I arranged to bring about this contact, and it was agreed that R. was first to call on me at the Thermo-Technical Institute in Moscow, with a letter requesting permission for a group of French engineers to visit the Institute.

The Forces of and Anticipated Participants in Intervention.

At this same meeting the question was raised of the possible forces and military plan of intervention. General Lukomsky said that it would be premature to make a final reckoning of our forces at this time, since conversations were going on with regard to the organisation of the military side of intervention. But he assured me that he, personally, together with White emigrant circles, felt no doubt as to the success of intervention, since they were certain of supplies and support from France and England.

Finally, the last essential piece of information which I received at this meeting with Lukomsky, Denisov and Joinville was given by Denisov, who said that conversations were already being carried on with various countries which were to participate in intervention, but that these conversations were being obstructed at their initial stage by the greed which the various countries showed in regard to future compensation. He pointed out that Poland, in particular, laid claim to the whole of the right-bank of the Dnieper.

I think that it was on the next day (at this point I must correct the statement of Laritchev, quoted in the indictment—it was not on the same day, but the next day or the day after) that I met Colonel Richard of the French General Staff. Laritchev was also there. Colonel Richard was interested mainly in the direction in which the Industrial Party was working, and particularly in the war industries, particularly the chemical war

industries, and in the possibilities of receiving information along these lines.

In order to conclude with the question of Richard, permit me to point out that about the end of 1929, at my last meeting with R., the French agent in Moscow, I was told that the existing contact between the Industrial Party and the French General Staff did not satisfy French military circles, and that he insisted on direct connection between the military organisation of the Industrial Party, which at that time was beginning to be organised, and the French General Staff, through Colonel Richard, who was being appointed specially to organise permanent and close contact along military lines.

During this same trip abroad in 1928 we held three meetings in London. I will briefly summarise what went on there. The first meeting was with engineer Simon, director of the firm of Vickers, at his apartment. I have known Simon for over 20 years. Another member of the firm of Vickers was also present at this meeting. He was called Sir Philip. Engineer Simon and Sir Philip informed me that France and the French General Staff were taking the lead in the preparation of intervention, but that England was also participating in this work, and would lend support financially and through its navy, also that oil circles in Great Britain, particularly Deterding's group, were interested in bringing about intervention. In England, the Association of British Creditors of Russia was also working toward that end, and was, as far as I know, under the direction of Urquhart and in touch with the Torgprom. The preparation of intervention was supported, as was to be expected, by Conservative circles in Great Britain, where, I was told, Churchill was the moving spirit of the idea of intervention.

Here once again I was told of the greedy territorial appetites of developing Poland, which was one of those difficulties in the way of organising intervention which was yet to be overcome.

Laritchev, who met Mr. Patrick through oil circles, received almost identical information.

Finally, a third meeting was organised in London with Colonel Lawrence, at which Engineer Simon, Laritchev and I were present. The meeting was held in one of the British automobile clubs. The meeting was quite short, lasted about forty minutes, and was more in the nature of making one another's acquaintance. At this meeting I was told that British military circles were in favour of intervention, and were beginning preparations for it. At the same time contacts were established through British firms in Moscow, since diplomatic relations with England had not yet been renewed.

On the basis of these meetings and information received from various sources, it is clear that the leading rôle in the organisation of intervention from abroad undoubtedly belongs to France.

While in the first period—that is, in 1928—England still played a definite part in the organisation of intervention, later, after the renewal of diplomatic relations, after France took the lead in the International Commission of General Janin, after the change in the British Cabinet, British interest in intervention noticeably fell.

The information we had created the definite impression that the soul of the organisation of intervention in France was Poincaré himself, and that he had the active support of Briand. The active support given by French Government circles had found concrete expression already by the end of 1928, first, in the organisation of the Janin Commission; secondly, in the establishment of permanent connections between the Industrial Party and the French General Staff, and finally, in the active assistance in maintaining financial connections, arranging for an exchange of correspondence, making contacts, etc., given us through agents of the French service in Moscow.

But, together with increasing support from these circles and their increasing participation in the preparations for intervention, demands that the Industrial Party fulfil its part in the preparation for and realisation of intervention began to grow more insistent. Very pressing demands began to come in the middle of 1929 for the creation of a military organisation and for the creation and development of a terrorist organisation of the Industrial Party. Very insistent demands were made on the Industrial Party for confidential information, so that gradually it became an intelligence service of the French General Staff.

In regard to the financing of intervention, according to all the information we had, most of the money was to come through the estimates of the French War Ministry, and then from oil circles. A small portion of these funds was to come from the Torgprom.

In regard to the armed forces of intervention on which it could count in 1930, the following was the picture: In the forefront were the military forces of Poland and Roumania, and then came those of the Baltic States, the Wrangel Army, and a small corps of Krasnov's Cossacks, who were supposed to be sent through Roumania to the Black Sea coast, for example, the Novorossisk district.

According to our information, France did not expect to contribute any considerable part of the armed forces. It expected to furnish training and general leadership of the military side of intervention. Besides this, France took upon itself the furnish-

ing of military supplies, the equipping of the army, and support through its air force.

England, apart from some financial help, which was to come mainly from oil circles, at the time when our meetings were held in 1928 was supposed to lend assistance through its fleet in the Black Sea and in the Gulf of Finland.

One prominent German told me that there was some hope of raising a small expeditionary force of, say, 300,000 men in Germany among the Stahlhelm (Fascist) organisation and the Russian White emigrants.

As I have already said, toward the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930 all the information which we had regarding the rôle and participation of England in the organisation of intervention gradually fell away, and in recent months the whole scheme of intervention was based on France as the main organising centre.

In giving the reasons why the date set for intervention had been changed, Ramzin pointed out the following. In putting off the date from 1928 to 1930 the lack of preparedness of the various countries was taken into consideration. It was decided that at least one year and a half was needed to prepare the grounds for intervention. The second date, 1930, seemed to be the most suitable for sowing the seeds of discontent, because it was to be the most difficult year in the Five-Year Plan, and therefore lent itself best to the provocation of insurrections and strikes. The Industrial Party was to increase difficulties by creating a crisis in the national economy, a crisis which in turn would weaken the ability of the country to defend itself; while the Kondratiev-Chayanov group (Working Peasants' Party) was to organise the mass movement. But in the second half of 1929 the date was postponed for another year. The causes for this second change lay in the lack of preparedness abroad. The countries which were to participate had not been able to come to any agreement. The Torgprom claimed also that the change was necessitated because the Industrial Party was not ready to give that assistance which was needed from it. Ramzin considered, however, that the inability of the various Governments to come to an agreement was the main reason why this further change was made. This was complicated by the relationship between France and Italy, and the indefinite attitude of Germany, and likewise the failure of the adventure on the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was looked upon as a test of the preparedness of the Soviet Union for war. All concerned realised that 1931 would be a more difficult year in which to carry out intervention, for in that year they could no longer count on a rebellion, and the economic conditions would have improved.

But to put off intervention to 1932 was impossible, because conditions would have become entirely unfavourable by then.

The first war move in 1930 was supposed to be made by Roumania after the provocation of some frontier incident. After Roumania, Poland was to come in, and then the Border States on the Baltic. Besides this, Wrangel's troops were to move through Roumania and join the southern army of intervention. England, according to the plan worked out in 1928, was to support the operations on the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland.

Naval operations on the Black Sea were to cover the landing of the army and cut off the Caucasian oil wells, and, secondly, to effect the bombarding of the southern shore. Ramzin continued :—

Besides this, according to information received from R., in the middle of 1929, as I have already said, it was expected that Krasnov's Cossacks, who numbered, as far as I remember, 20,000, would be used. This small corps was to be brought through Rumania, landed on the shore of the Black Sea, in the Novorossisk district, and moved on the Don. We counted mainly on risings in the Don and the Ukraine, and Krasnov's Cossacks were to support them. This was their main task.

The risings were to cut off communications between the Donetz coalfield and Moscow, and heighten the crisis in the supply of metals and fuel, in order to bring about a fuel collapse, about which I will speak later.

The military plan provided for a simultaneous attack on Moscow and Leningrad, while the southern army was to move through the western districts of the Ukraine, with its flank on the right bank of the Dnieper, and so on towards Moscow. The northern army, with the support of the naval and air fleet, was to move against Leningrad.

The basic aim of the Industrial Party, or, to be more exact, the basic task set for the Industrial Party, was the bringing about of a general crisis in 1930 and some other minor activities which were, if fulfilled, to help the intervention. Of these I will speak later.

The plan for intervention in 1931 retained in general the form of the plan for 1930, with only this difference, that there was a possible alternative method of provoking war, the seizing of Lithuania by Poland. Another characteristic feature of the plan for intervention in 1931 was the absence of any hope of a serious insurrection on the Don and in the Ukraine. This necessitated the cutting off of communications between the Donetz coalfield and Moscow by artificial means, through destructive acts.

And, finally, the third distinguishing feature of this plan was the considerably reduced rôle of England in warlike operations

and, on the other hand, the growing importance of the rôle of France.

It must be said that the plan for intervention in 1931, speaking generally, was considerably less worked out and less known to us, as information relating to this plan began to reach us only recently.

Another characteristic of the plan for 1931 was the organisation of an economic blockade, as a preliminary to intervention, in order to counterbalance the growth of the economic power of the Soviet Union and the improvement of its economic life in 1931.

In this plan, the rôle Germany was to play is not clear, for most of the communications do not count on her armed forces, with the exception of one authoritative communication by the prominent German I mentioned earlier. The naval operations of Germany in the plan for 1931 are also not clear.

At first, the Torgprom, in the person of Karpov, definitely informed us through Fyedotov that they stood firmly for a united and undivided Russia, and very easy conditions of payment of the old debts; so that at first there was intensive propaganda of the idea that intervention would not cost the country anything very appreciable. However, information which began to arrive in 1928 showed that in reality matters were otherwise.

With this introduction, Ramzin detailed the territorial aspirations of the forces organising intervention—Poland and Roumania for the western territory of the Ukraine, the Deterding group and subsequently France for sweeping concessions in the Caucasus, and, thirdly, for the separation of the Ukraine and Georgia. These proposals were reported by a variety of persons—Denisov and Yasinsky of the Torgprom, Mr. Simon and Sir Philip in London, Mr. R. in Moscow, etc.

Although Fyedotov, in a statement quoted in the indictment, had asserted that throughout the Torgprom and the Industrial Party had stood for the indivisibility of the country, Ramzin was obliged to contradict this, pointing out that neither organisation had the slightest guarantee that the interventionists, in whose hands real power would lie, would refrain from annexations. "Both the Torgprom and the Industrial Party definitely and in full knowledge were accepting the dividing up of the country."

Ramzin then proceeded to deal with the methods by which relations were maintained by the Industrial Party with their allies abroad. He was requested by the President not to mention the names of persons holding official posts in Moscow (i.e., officials of the French Embassy), but to refer to them by their initials, and the name would be given in full at the session to be held in camera.*

* This caution by the President was quite justified, as Mr. K. was present in court and, being protected by his diplomatic immunity, took his seat in the diplomatic box.

Ramzin gave the successive stages by which contact was made—through Lopatin and British circles in 1927; later on through British firms operating in Moscow; through Mr. K., with whom Ramzin was given contact by Riabushinsky in Paris in 1927; and Mr. R., indicated by Denisov in 1928. Ramzin was introduced to Mr. K. by Palchinsky in November, 1927, had his first talk with K. in the spring of 1928, and a second meeting at Laritchev's flat towards the end of 1928. The meetings with R. began in 1928, several other members of the Industrial Party being in touch with the same person. Ramzin went on :—

During one of these meetings at the end of 1928 Mr. K. brought me the usual sum of money.

The first talk I had with K. was about the visit abroad which Laritchev and myself were to undertake soon, when we were to go to London and Paris. On that particular occasion I arranged with K. as to how we were to use our journey to meet prominent members of the Torgprom so as to discuss at least some of the questions I had already submitted. K. took it upon himself to inform the Committee in due time about our journey so as to give them an opportunity to meet us. The main question discussed here—it was raised by K.—was the possibility of obtaining information regarding the war industries. Kalinnikov and I promised to take steps to do so, and, as a matter of fact, we did actually carry out this particular mission, following the instructions of the Party C.C. At this same meeting we were informed by K. what was being done to organise intervention; and I may add that, if I recollect aright, it was then that we had our first news regarding the possible participation of the Wrangel troops. K. stated that so far there was no complete certainty on this point, since the Wrangel troops drew their strength from the monarchist section of the foreign emigrants, and the Torgprom had not come finally to terms with these monarchist circles.

Speaking generally, the information we had had from Palchinsky was repeated at this meeting by K., and he furnished us with no particularly new items of news. There you have the substance of the first talk I had with K., at my apartment in the middle of 1928.

PRESIDENT OF THE COURT : So far you have given the whole conversation as seen from the one side. I mean to say, that you have only told us what K. said. What was it you said during that conversation? What was your part in the talk? Were you only listening or did you say anything yourself?

RAMZIN : To begin with, our part in this conversation began with a discussion of how to meet the Torgprom members in Paris.

PRESIDENT : That is to say, you asked that they should guarantee you a meeting?

RAMZIN : We asked that K. use his connections to inform the Torgprom of our wishes so that we might meet them. Then the second point raised was the possibility of passing on the particular information concerning the war industries required by K. I do not go into this in detail just now, because I will deal with this later.

PRESIDENT : Then we can put it on record that you also displayed a certain activity in this discussion?

RAMZIN : You mean with regard to the possibility of passing on the information needed by the French General Staff? Yes; that may be recorded. As regards intervention, the same may be said with regard to the discussion on the arrangements for passing on information which I just mentioned. As I already said, our last meeting of any length with K. was in 1928 at Laritchev's. (I may add that Laritchev and Kalinnikov were responsible for maintaining the chief connections.) That was after we had returned from abroad. We talked over our meeting in Paris and our additional connections which had brought us into contact with R. K. said that all the arrangements were known to him, including the maintenance of contact with R. In other words, he had obtained this information ahead of us. We then went on to talk over the way we were to maintain these contacts; it being decided that Laritchev and Kalinnikov would keep in touch with K., and I would maintain connections with R. Actually this arrangement was adhered to in the future. The next question raised at this meeting was that of the economic summaries the Torgprom was anxious to obtain as supplements to the quarterly economic supplements sent it by the Central Committee of the Industrial Party. Through K., the Torgprom asked the C.C. to furnish separate summaries on the most important branches of national economy, these to deal in greater detail with particular branches.

Then, if I remember rightly, the last question gone into at this meeting concerned the further development of the war industries and the instructions of the French General Staff and the Torgprom to take all possible steps to hold up the work of further construction in these industries and in the erection of munition plants.

It was stated that the question of precisely what plants and other constructions were to be held up would be gone into later in more concrete fashion. I shall give the details of this plan more fully.

These were the two chief meetings I had with K. and the subjects dealt with in our talk.

I met R. three times, or, rather, four times in all if I include our first meeting. The first talk we had was one evening in November, 1928, at my home. I asked Ochkin that same day

to come along to my house, so that we could go together to R.'s. Contact was also arranged through Engineer Gordon for delivery of letters in both directions.

During the conversation with R. considerable attention was devoted to the general situation of the Industrial Party, the economic condition of the Union as a whole, and the question of drawing up a minimum Five-Year Plan. As far as intervention was concerned, R. gave us no new information, for we had just returned from abroad.

The next meeting with R. took place at Kalinnikov's apartment in the middle of 1929. The main subject of conversation was the question of organising and planning camouflaged and destructive action. I outlined the general policy which had been accepted at that time by the Industrial Party—to develop this activity chiefly in the power industry.

In this manner it would be possible to render useless a large number of enterprises at one time, at the same time causing no large capital damage and making it possible later to start the enterprises again without any difficulty. First of all, the current supply of the Moscow District Power Station (Moges) and the Leningrad Power Station, and then that of the Donetz coal mines were to be affected. Such action was to be taken next in the power stations of the war industries.

We also discussed destructive acts at the moment of intervention.

On this occasion Professor Kalinnikov submitted a statement on the work begun by the C.C. of the Industrial Party to draft a special list of munition and other war plants which would be the first to suffer from destructive acts.

At this meeting with R. he asked that we provide a statement on the technical state of aviation in the U.S.S.R. for the Torgprom and the French General Staff—I have been finding it difficult recently to separate the one from the other, for seemingly statements of this kind were sent to both addresses. I undertook this task and fulfilled it, about which I will make a statement later.

Finally, at this same meeting I obtained information regarding the intention to make use of Krasnov's Cossacks. R. kept hurrying us in the matter of forming the military organisation.

Last of all, the third meeting with R. took place at Ochkin's at the end of 1929. The questions then dealt with were as follows: R. confirmed the fact that it would be impossible to pull off intervention in 1930 and that it had been postponed to 1931, giving the reasons for doing so which are the same as those I have given myself. And here again, I may add, we got further confirmation of the greed for territory displayed by Poland and Roumania which I mentioned before. From R. we also

obtained thus early a certain rough draft of the new plan for intervention in 1931, and information of the proposed economic blockade of the U.S.S.R. At this same meeting I received a statement of the need for establishing direct connections with the French General Staff, more strictly speaking with Colonel Richard. At this meeting I handed R. a written statement regarding the state of aviation in the country.

I now come to the preparations for intervention here within the country. I refer to the work of the Industrial Party in creating internal crises which were to reach their climax in 1930, i.e., just when intervention was to take place.

Until the very end, right up to the arrest of the leadership of the party, the work of preparation for intervention went on.

Passing now to that aspect of the Industrial Party's activities connected with the preparations within the country for a general crisis in 1930, it must be stated that its work was developed throughout all branches of industry. In this respect, the chief principle of the party was, first and foremost, to do everything possible to slow down the rate at which the national economy of the country was developing, this applying more particularly to its leading branches, such as fuel, metal, power and transport."

Ramzin proceeded to give further detailed evidence regarding the wrecking activities of the Industrial Party in the basic industries. The methods adopted, apart from planned delays in economic development, included the calculated sinking of large capital investments in undertakings which would not begin to bring in a return for many years, the dragging out of actual building works, the disproportionate development of various industries. The method of " freezing " capital investments began to be adopted in 1929, with the purpose of making the works concerned available only after the anticipated counter-revolution. Towards the end of 1929 a new method was adopted, consisting of excessively speeding up the fulfilment of the plan, and this also was meant to create crisis, but arose out of the recognition of the energetic application of the general line of the Communist Party. Ramzin gave examples taken from the oil, peat, coal and metal industries, and then dwelt at considerable length on the industry best known to him, the power industry.

Ramzin pointed out that it was possible to do this because the Industrial Party had its own men at key points—for example, in the Electrical Planning Department, which controls all national power development; in the Electrical Department of the Supreme Economic Council, which controls the actual building of all power stations; in the power department, controlling the distribution of power; in the Moscow, Leningrad Power Stations, etc. He gave further examples drawn from transport (the organisation

of several years' discussion on the building of a Moscow-Donetz railway), the chemical industry (delay in the development of the sulphuric acid industry, vital for defence purposes), the textile industry, agricultural machinery industry (a plan of output providing for 150,000 tractors by 1932-33, whereas the present programme provides for over 900,000), etc.

These preparations to bring about a general crisis which were carried out in industry and transport by the Industrial Party were extended to affect agriculture, the food supply, and finance, through the contacts the Industrial Party had with the Kondratiev-Chayanov group. First contacts with the Working Peasants' Party (W.P.P.) were made at the beginning of 1927 by Palchinsky personally—with A. M. Chayanov; the latter, as I already pointed out, attending quite a number of meetings of the Engineering Centre during 1927. At the end of 1928 it was planned to set up a joint centre, to which I was appointed by the Industrial Party (N. F. Charnovsky being appointed later), and Kondratiev, Makarov, and Groman by the W.P.P. We five were to represent a joint centre whose main task was to arrange for co-ordinated action.

About this time, too, conversations were begun as to the possibility of setting up a coalition Government, the Industrial Party being of the opinion that if the Kondratiev-Chayanov group were to participate in the counter-revolutionary coup d'état on a large enough scale, it would be necessary to concede a larger number of seats in the Government; otherwise, if the revolt were accomplished by military forces and with the aid of military intervention, then the W.P.P. could be given only one seat, that of Minister of Agriculture.

In 1929 a joint meeting was held of the central committees of both parties on the premises of the State Planning Commission. The question was discussed of arranging a bloc between the two in order to enlist the help of the W.P.P. in the launching of intervention in 1930, the creation of crises in farming, the food supply, and co-operation. In addition, financial questions, including those involving foreign currency, were discussed, and it was decided that the maximum expenditure on imports of machinery was to take place while the W.P.P. was to hold up the influx of foreign currency into the country.

At the beginning of 1930 another joint meeting of the two C.C.'s was held, at which they discussed the possibility of carrying out the counter-revolutionary coup d'état and overthrow of the Soviet Government by internal forces, without having recourse to intervention. This discussion led to negative results, the decision being reached that it would be out of the question.

The first instructions regarding the make-up of the organisation to carry out destructive acts were received from the Torgprom in 1928, at the suggestion of the French General Staff.

These demands became particularly insistent when it was ascertained that intervention in 1930 was impossible, and that it would have to be put off until 1931.

In the main, activities in this direction were to take three chief lines: (1) war industries; (2) electric power stations; and (3) the railways.

As I already pointed out, in regard to the war industries a special list of plants to be subjected first to destructive acts was drawn up together with the agents of the French service in Moscow. And here, again, the main instruction was to carry out such acts in those plants, first, which were outside the area likely to be affected by intervention, i.e., situated mainly to the east and north of Moscow and therefore likely to serve as a supply base in the rear. In this list, primary consideration was given to those plants turning out munitions and war supplies, such as factories producing shells, powder, shell-cases, etc.

Acting on my instructions, Evreinov drafted a plan setting forth the measures to be adopted in connection with these factories, according to the list worked out under the guidance of Kalinnikov and Charnovsky jointly with the representatives of the French General Staff.

For the purpose of co-ordinating the various measures in this field, a small technical commission was appointed. Work was then begun on the organising of the necessary nuclei at various points which were to carry out these acts. Such nuclei were set up inside the Thermo-Technical Institute and the Electric Power Trust, while work was begun on the formation of nuclei in other key points of the country, such as the Donetz and at other power stations.

Kogan-Bernstein was instructed to work out a plan for the execution of similar destructive acts on the railroads. He was to work in conjunction with Laritchev. In the case of the railroads this was to take the form of creating tangles which would hold up traffic, and in extreme cases by destroying capital equipment.

In regard to the military organisation, the first suggestion to set up a body of this kind was put forward by General Lukomsky and Colonel Lawrence in 1928 when we were abroad. The chief tasks of this military organisation had already been outlined in a sufficiently clear-cut and definite manner, as early as our Paris visit, when we met Colonel Joinville and General Lukomsky.

The tasks of this military organisation were to include, first, arrangements to keep the Industrial Party informed of the

state of the Red Army and the sentiments prevailing among the rank and file—also in the Red Navy; secondly, to establish close contacts with the interventionists and later on with other military organisations. Then it was called upon to work out and apply measures to lessen the country's ability to defend itself; and finally, to give direct assistance during the actual counter-revolutionary revolt, i.e., at the very moment the intervention took place. This to be done by carrying out a number of destructive acts, such as damaging aeroplane motors, the motors of tanks, and so on. It was also its duty to spread dissatisfaction among the technical forces in the first place and, when intervention began, to see that they were furnished with any information they might be in need of.

Work was commenced among the engineering and technical forces by the Industrial Party in the second half of 1929. It then began to seek the necessary contacts and through them to set up military nuclei of its own in the various sections of the army and navy. This work progressed very slowly owing to the difficulty of making acquaintance with suitable persons in the military services and of moulding the minds of those military employees with whom contacts were made. The result was that the Industrial Party's military organisation was actually in its very beginnings.

As regards the " reconnaissance " duties of the Industrial Party, it, to start with, furnished the Torgprom with regular quarterly summaries on the economic position of the Union, which threw light on preparedness and opportunities for the intervention. As a rule, these summaries were drafted in the State Planning Commission by employees of that institution under Osadchy's direction, also Laritchev's and Kalinnikov's. The work of editing these summaries was performed by Osadchy, the forwarding of this material to the Torgprom through K. falling to Laritchev. With regard to the contents of these summaries, I may say that they gave the index figures covering the rate of output, etc., for the various branches of industry. Usually these summaries consisted of separate tables with a small explanatory text where necessary.

In addition to these summaries, at K.'s request, and later at R.'s as well, summaries were compiled on the various branches of national economy. Thus, for instance, through Kalinnikov a written statement regarding the timber industry was drawn up by Meyer; then again, under Osadchy's direction, Groman and Ginsburg drafted a written statement for 1930 dealing with the power industry of the country; this service being performed in the case of textiles by Fyedotov; for the Commissariat of Ways and Communication by Kogan-Bernstein, and by Laritchev and Stechkin with regard to the fuel supply and the oil and coal

industries. Three such statements passed through my hands, that of Chayanov with regard to agriculture and the outlook of 1930, a statement by Gordon and Kamenetsky regarding the state of the power industry and its prospects for 1930, finally, Stechkin's statement regarding the technical state of aviation in the U.S.S.R.

I have already mentioned several times before that at the request of the French agencies in Moscow information concerning the war industries was supplied.

The securing of this information for the chemical and metallurgical sections of the war industries was assigned to Kalinnikov and Charnovsky, who have already stated that they turned the same over to K. on three or four occasions since they had contact with him.

This, I believe, exhausts the espionage activities of the Industrial Party and covers the chief phases of their work. If I have forgotten anything I can add it during cross-examination.

In completing my first testimony I take the liberty of summarising the activity of the party. Despite the enormity of the crimes committed and the heavy responsibility for them, I consider it my duty honestly and straightforwardly to declare that the action of the Industrial Party for the overthrow of the Soviet Government, with the aid of intervention and in alliance with French Government circles and White emigrants, was not only a betrayal of the Soviet Government but of my fatherland, for in case of intervention the whole country would have been subjected to the horrors of war, and at the same time would have had to sacrifice its vital interests to the organisers and participants of this intervention.

The criminal work of the Industrial Party in the internal preparation of intervention by creating and deepening crisis in the fields of industry and transport, as well as the formation of a bloc between the Industrial Party and the Working Peasants' Party, directed towards the intensifying of crises in agriculture, food supply, co-operatives and finance, considerably increased the temporary economic difficulties of the Soviet Union and sharpened the class struggle, thus harming the national economy of the country. Unquestionably, in the absence of this sabotage and of the active opposition of counter-revolutionary organisations, economic difficulties would have been much less noticeable, and the rate of industrialisation and Socialist construction would have been even more rapid.

I must admit that, during a period of sharpened class struggle and intensified preparation by world capitalism for an attack on the Soviet Union, the Industrial Party aimed at the overthrow of the Soviet Government and the formation of a bourgeois Government. In this way it joined the active enemies

of Socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, finally becoming a weapon in the hands of French Government circles and White emigrants.

Lastly, I must admit that the entire burden of responsibility for the above-mentioned criminal activity of the Industrial Party must be placed on the members of its Central Committee, and, above all, on myself, as the ideological leader and the most active worker for intervention.

I have nothing more to say.

PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

Laritchev's Statement.

(*Laritchev is next called.*)

LARITCHEV: I completely admit my guilt of these serious crimes. Fully admitting my guilt, and wholly repenting of my criminal activity, I consider it my duty to the Supreme Court and to the Soviet Government, and also the Soviet public, to disclose all that I know about the criminal activity of the organisation which calls itself the Industrial Party.

I was one of the most active members of this party. From the moment of its formation I became one of the leaders of the Central Committee. Even before the organisation of the Industrial Party I was among the members of the so-called Engineering and Technical Centre, which was the first stage in uniting the counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet sentiments of engineering and technical circles.

The Engineering and Technical Centre conducted its struggle with the Soviet Government on the basis of economic counter-revolution, which found expression in extensive wrecking of various branches of national economy, and ultimately penetrated into practically all the most important enterprises and organisations of the Union.

Permit me to speak briefly about this organisation. The chief reason which prompted technical circles and engineers in this struggle was the fact that the October Revolution was regarded with hostility.

The majority of engineers were not in a position to accept the principles of the proletarian State, and all the more unable to accept the proletarian dictatorship, which fundamentally is opposed to their customary forms and habitual conditions of existence; and, above all, the proletarian dictatorship was incomprehensible to them.

When the period of the New Economic Policy began it served to encourage the revival of hopes in these circles of the realisation of their ideal—a democratic republic—not by means of open opposition, but through a possible degeneration of the Soviet Government. They believed that the Soviet Government was re-

ceding from its original position, that the permission of private property in certain fields, particularly in trade turnover, in small-scale industry, would make it possible to restore on a large scale the old forms—the form of capitalist management of private industry. The engineers in large numbers during the first period strove to prove that the Soviet Government would be unable to achieve the restoration of national economy following the tremendous destruction which had been left as a heritage of the world and civil wars.

They further considered that, affected by the difficulties of economic reconstruction, the Soviet Government would have to retreat from its position and extend Nep, thus preserving the capitalist structure, and bringing about a revival of the old system.

This stimulated the initiation of the wrecking work, which was at first scattered, but later on became very widespread in the different branches of industry and transport. The beginning of this activity in various branches of industry naturally gave rise to the idea of unifying this work, as a result of which the so-called " Engineering and Technical Centre," or " Union of Engineering Organisations," was formed.

At this time, i.e., the beginning of 1926, many engineers held very responsible posts, and the Government recognised the necessity of the engineers taking an active part in both the rebuilding and the management of industry. Rabinovitch occupied the most responsible post, notably that of vice-chairman of the Industrial Section of the State Planning Commission. Schein, an old engineer, had the great responsibility of the moral leadership of the engineers as chairman of the Engineers' and Technicians' Bureau. It was men like these who constituted the " Engineering Centre," formed at the end of 1926, which explains its widespread influence among technicians and engineers.

Despite the fact that in 1927 the organisation had already been formed, and its activities became more or less widespread, they were powerless to prevent the growth of national economy. The reconstruction period progressed rapidly. But it would have been more effective if there had been no acts of obstruction on the part of wrecking organisations.

This fact brought up the question that, in combatting the Soviet Government, methods of economic warfare were insufficient and that further work would have to be based on the possibility of intervention. Moreover, these hopes were constantly fanned by White emigrant circles, with whom individual members of the Engineering and Technical Centre had formed connections in one way or another.

It is obvious that when calculations of the possibility of intervention became greater it was necessary to broaden the platform of the Engineering and Technical Centre, i.e., to form a political

party. Further impetus to this was given by the fact that in this period other counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet groups had already been formed and disclosed their political aspects—such as the Kondratiev-Chayanov group, known as the W.P.P. (Working Peasants' Party) and the Menshevik group of Groman, which in the final issue also had as its aim to overthrow the Soviet Government.

It was necessary to act as a single organisation with a political platform, in order to participate in the counter-revolutionary rising and the struggle for the formation of a government. The emigrant circles with which the Engineering and Technical Centre was connected insisted on this formation of a party which became the Industrial Party.

To count on the wide sympathy, not of the working class, which was out of the question, but even of the broad peasant masses was practically futile. Therefore, in view of the fact that the chief stake was on intervention for the actual counter-revolutionary coup, it was necessary that the first period after the overthrow of the Soviet Government be connected with a dictatorship. Palchinsky was considered candidate for dictator. The Industrial Party was headed by the leaders of the Engineering and Technical Centre, among whom I was included. These leaders automatically became the first Central Committee of the Industrial Party, which kept this form practically up to the first break-up of the C.C. with the arrests of Rabinovitch, Palchinsky and Khrennikov. After this the C.C. drew in as active workers Schein (who gave us contact with the professional organisations), Osadchy, and Kogan-Bernstein.

This describes the organisational side of the activities of the Industrial Party.

I now wish to discuss the actual forces on which the Industrial Party based itself and its basic policy.

(*The Court adjourns until* 6 *o'clock in the evening.*)

NOVEMBER 26th.

(Evening Session.)

LARITCHEV: As a body uniting all the organisations which made up the Engineering and Technical Centre, the Industrial Party naturally sought its support chiefly among those of the older generation of engineers who were in any way in favour of counter-revolution. As many of these prominent specialists in many institutions held a number of responsible and directing posts, it was but natural that they should represent a powerful force which could offer support of definite value. An example of this is shown by the fact that there existed an organisation with fairly wide ramifications within the State Planning Commission,

and in the Supreme Economic Council. Similarly, the most prominent posts in various managerial and economic bodies were occupied by members of the Industrial Party.

Strictly speaking, the men who supported us were not great in number owing to the fact that they formed a separate caste. I will not undertake to give exact figures as to the strength of the Industrial Party. While it is true, however, that I frequently use the term " the broad circles of the engineering masses," all the same I must state definitely that by no means all the people belonging to the engineering profession were in the ranks of the Industrial Party, and certainly very far from all the old prominent engineers. In this regard it may be said that the further it went the more difficult the Industrial Party found things, until the Central Committee of the Party was forced to the conviction that it had overestimated its influence and chances of extending its hold over what I have called the " broad circles " of the engineers and technicians of the country, this applying especially to those employed directly in production, who had to come into immediate contact with the realities of everyday life and who were actually participating in the work of construction that was going on and who had far closer contacts with the working masses. And in the case of such engineers it was very difficult indeed at times to lure them into the ranks of the Industrial Party, in spite of the fact that the necessary agitation to bring them in was widely and efficiently conducted.

The result was that in many cases the Industrial Party C.C. (Central Committee) was forced to admit that its chief support came from the prominent engineers and chiefly from those working in the central institutions.

But no matter how strong this group of engineers might be in the economic struggle, they were plainly inadequate to effect a counter-revolutionary change of power. It was necessary to seek support among certain forces who could be relied upon as being more effective in carrying out the counter-revolutionary coup d'état which was the main goal of the Industrial Party.

Counter-revolution Impossible Without External Aid.

Where could such support come from? Naturally it would have to come from without. In this case the Industrial Party pinned its faith primarily to the emigrant circles of the former industrialists. A certain contact with the organisation of the property owners, i.e., with the Trade and Industrial Committee (Torgprom) was established by the Engineering and Technical Centre. Later on, the Industrial Party strengthened this contact, which resulted in the Torgprom becoming the directing organ guiding the work of the Industrial Party and helping it to reach that main objective towards which the Torgprom

itself was also working—that is, the re-establishment of the capitalist order, and the restitution of the properties to their former owners.

Through the more intimate contacts thus established during the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928, both the Torgprom and the Industrial Party soon realised that it would be impossible to carry out their initial plans for a counter-revolutionary coup d'état by an internal uprising or by any form of peaceful intervention. This naturally meant that the only real force capable of bringing them to their goal would be intervention from without employing the armed forces of foreign Powers. Instructions to this effect regarding intervention and the hope of its speedy realisation were received in 1927, and as early as the first part of 1928 they began to take shape.

How were the contacts established with foreign circles, and how have I arrived at the conclusions I have stated?

I have already stated that the first news as to the feasibility of intervention began to come through as far back as 1927-1928. This was the results of the visits abroad of a number of prominent men connected with the Engineering and Technical Centre, Khrennikov and Ramzin, later members of the Industrial Party.

In the first half of 1928, the Industrial Party C.C. was already clear as to various features bound up with this issue, and understood perfectly that the question of intervention was no longer a matter of talk, but one of business requiring serious consideration, and that it could already count on the definite support of certain States. More particularly, the Central Committee was aware that Torgprom representatives had had an audience with Poincaré and Briand. The statement had been made to them quite definitely on that occasion that they might have support in this undertaking. They were also informed that the whole matter would be looked into by various interested circles and by the French General Staff. Instructions were then given stating plainly that we must already begin to take action within the Soviet Union to apply measures that would really ensure the success of the intervention. In particular, the more or less continuous improvement in the position of the Soviet Union made it clear that not only was that general discontent absent regarding which the emigrant circles were so fond of talking to their patrons, but after all there were no special signs whatever of dissatisfaction to be observed.

It is true that all this was broached in general conversations, the first few after Ramzin's return boiling down to this: that providing the industrial situation and the whole setting were favourable, the initial time for the proposed intervention was set for 1928 because it was assumed that, arising out of the rupture of diplomatic relations with Great Britain, events might come to

head more quickly, and, providing an anti-Soviet bloc came into being, might lead to the possibility of quick action. The visit abroad made by Ramzin and myself in October, 1928, was of decisive significance in giving direction to the activities of the Industrial Party. Ramzin has here set forth the details of this journey. I consider it my duty to supplement his statement with a few additional remarks which I regard as directly connected with the present case. As a result of this journey we had a number of meetings and informal conferences.

In the present instance it is important to emphasise the fact that these meetings and conferences led to definite results, and later influenced the direction taken by our activities. First and foremost, I refer here to the meeting with the representatives of the Torgprom in the offices of that Committee at Denisov's.

With regard to the position within the Industrial Party, I consider it necessary to add the following. When we came to discuss the position inside our own organisation, we were forced to admit to ourselves that our activities had been paralysed for the time being owing to the break-up of our first Central Committee, when we had to slow up all our activities due in considerable measure to the discovery of the sabotage organisation in the Shakhty and transport groups. These points greatly interested the Torgprom representatives, who asked us to dwell in detail on them, and to give our opinion as to how far the further existence of the Industrial Party C.C. was threatened. It was pointed out that the public trial of the Shakhty case would do much to draw the attention of the masses to all our activities and compel them to be more vigilant. I pointed out that, although the Shakhty trial had dealt a serious blow at our organisation (in the coal industry it had largely collapsed), the main roots of our sabotage activities in industry had not been uncovered. No small measure of help was accorded us, in our opinion, by the manner in which the two public prosecutors who spoke at the trial, Osadchy and Schein, at that time actually members of the Industrial Party, covered up the traces that would have led ultimately in the course of the Shakhty trial to the disclosure of the whole of our activities. At the Shakhty trial there was only the faintest mention made of the fact that there existed a Moscow centre, but the centre itself was not discovered. Although the Industrial Party C.C. had been temporarily paralysed, still it had not been destroyed. Neither had the fundamental policies of this centre been revealed. It was this circumstance that served as a weighty argument for the representatives of the Torgprom, and for Denisov more particularly, to insist on the preservation of our organisation. They pointed out that their position had been strengthened considerably, since, on Denisov's statement, they could be sure of the support of the Frenc[redacted]

Government and, to a considerable extent, of the British, in guiding their activities.

It is noteworthy that Denisov drew attention to the fact that at the moment it was necessary to concentrate all available forces on sabotage activities in the metal industries, as they were the most vulnerable place in the country's defences, which would mean much in achieving our general aim of creating a crisis.

The main subject of the conversation was intervention. We were given to understand, and by no means in an ambiguous manner, that the policy being pursued by Government circles of France in relation to the U.S.S.R. involved their assuming a definitely hostile attitude despite the preservation of official relations. We were also to understand that support by French Government circles in favour of intervention already existed; and that, further, they would turn out in the end to be the inspirers of the whole plan.

After all these points had been made clear to us as the result of these conversations, it became plain to us what was the nature of the support for the Torgprom, and through it, for the Industrial Party, of which Denisov had assured us. We already felt there that definite pressure was being brought to bear both on the Torgprom and the Industrial Party not merely in that they were being urged to speed up their measures to prepare for a general crisis, but also to extend them to matters of a purely military character.

At this juncture, one might well repeat that the first conversation regarding the formation of military nuclei took place at this period. In addition, demands began coming in as well regarding the organisation of what might be called reconnaissance work, by which I mean that we were to furnish information regarding the war, chemical, and other industries, this demand being made by Colonel Richard.

There is another important point that has to be taken due notice of. There were certain things they were most unwilling to enlighten us upon, although, not being children, we could sense enough of what was in the wind. It was clear that in carrying out the plan of intervention, which required action by Poland, Roumania, and the Baltic States, we would certainly come into conflict with the very serious annexation tendencies evinced by these States. Representatives of the Torgprom themselves did not yet know how they were to get out of the fix they were in, nor how the appetites of these States were to be held in check.

Another question that cropped up in still more definite shape was this: that once the intervention took place, with a counter-revolution and the establishment of a new Government, it would mean, of course, that we would have to count very definitely not only on the return of properties to their former owners, but also

to make certain big concessions. Without going into details, it may be stated quite simply that we would have to come up against the fact of the economic conquest of quite a number of the most important branches of industry in the Soviet Union, *e.g.*, the seizure of the oil wells of Baku and Grozny. Actually, the group represented by Nobel, Gukasov and the others were working entirely on the instructions of the powerful Deterding group, which possessed a large number of shares bought from former oil companies. Deterding's group could count both on the return of all the values represented by these shares, and on obtaining what would amount practically to a monopoly in the oilfields of the Caucasus.

Finally, the question was settled of how the Industrial Party was to be financed. As the arrangement stood, it was decided to supply the Industrial Party with about a million roubles a year. To avoid trouble, it was arranged that it be sent through the agents in French service in Moscow, they to bring the money either to me or to Ramzin at our homes.

There you have the substance of our talks in Paris, and, in part, in London as well. Perhaps it would be worth while mentioning our meeting with Colonel Lawrence and the other agent of the British General Staff whom I had met on Strizhov's instructions. (Strizhov had been abroad, but could not get to England and pass on the necessary information regarding the preparation of bases in the Black Sea.) I had promised to hand on this information, and did so at one of these meetings. In these conversations in England, and especially in the talk we had with Colonel Lawrence, we were naturally interested in getting to know the attitude British circles had adopted in the question of intervention. From these talks we were able to draw the conclusion that, even if active assistance could not be given, at least there was a definitely sympathetic attitude to the whole question. It was therefore obvious that Denisov's assurance to us that they had the support of British industrial circles, and to a certain extent of the Conservative Government which was then in power, had some basis in fact.

After our return we reported on these results to the Industrial Party C.C., and with them it was definitely decided to work on the basis of heading for intervention in 1930. All our later relations with the Torgprom, with the military circles of France, and also with the General Staff of that country, effected through certain persons in French circles in Moscow, took on a regular character.

These connections were maintained through two persons—K. and R.—by three members of the C.C.—Ramzin, Kalinnikov, and myself. In agreement with Ramzin I was instructed, personally, to keep in touch with one of these agents with K. and it

became my duty to receive the money brought to my flat by this agent. Then, through me, a portfolio was given to this agent when he came with the money, the said portfolio containing material which was being sent either to the Torgprom, or consisted of answers to individual questions by French military circles.

I met this K. six times after our return from abroad. It is true I met him before we left for Paris—that was in May, 1928. I had previously heard of him from Khrennikov and Palchinsky, who had apparently been the first to establish contact with him, as he had long been resident in Moscow.

Of these meetings of mine with K., four were very brief, and consisted merely of handing over to him what I had to give him and receiving what he had brought me.

There was one more serious meeting which I had with him, jointly with Kalinnikov. It took place at my home at the end of 1929. The question gone into then was one of a very serious nature, arising from the postponement of intervention, this fact having just then come to our knowledge. Regarding this point K. stated that it had been decided finally to put off intervention until 1931. He also told us that the same information was being passed on by another person to Ramzin, in addition to ourselves. When we went on to talk of why intervention had been postponed, much attention was given to the situation that had been created after the failure of the Far-Eastern adventure. K.'s words made it apparent that French circles had been greatly interested in this question, inasmuch as they were interested in the Chinese Eastern Railway itself, and also, as Ramzin stated, this had been a sort of " trial shot." It had now been shown that they had shot far wide of the mark in counting on the weakness of the Red Army—this conception had actually prevailed till then in French circles. It also became plain that far more thorough preparations for intervention were necessary, particularly in the carrying on of work of a purely military character to affect sections of the Red Army. He asked Kalinnikov and myself to submit this question to the C.C.

In the course of our further relations it became my primary duty to receive money through his agent and pass it on to the organisations concerned. Of course, exact accounts were not kept, for conspirative reasons, but I remember receiving about 350,000 roubles for the fuel industry and about 300,000 for the metal industry. After that, money began to come through other persons—Charnovsky and Hartman. Kalinnikov received about 200,000 roubles for the chemical and war industries; 50,000 roubles were assigned to the timber industry. I do not quite recall what sum was allotted to the Thermo-Technical Institute because Ramzin distributed the money from the means in his

possession, but I believe about 50,000-60,000. Kogan-Bernstein was given about 150,000 roubles for the transport organisations, and for the economic activities of employees of the Supreme Economic Council through Belotzerkovsky and the Groman group (since they chiefly carried on the work in the Gosplan compiling economic information which they allowed us to use). Part of this sum was set aside for such work. Almost 200,000 roubles were given through Fyedotov to the textile industry. If I am not mistaken, altogether 1,600,000 roubles were received by us during this period.

After our return from abroad, the C.C. renewed its work in the different organisations of the Industrial Party, and, as I have already pointed out, strengthened our ranks by the addition of such important workers as Osadchy, Schein and Kogan-Bernstein. In the first and second quarters of the 1928-29 working year, the basic measures and instructions of the Industrial Party C.C. were for the slowest rate of development of national economy and the creation of maladjustments therein, as well as within each separate branch. These measures were to assure us of the creation of a general crisis in 1930, chiefly in the key industries: metallurgy, fuel, electric power, and transport, since disorganisation in these spheres would most quickly lead to disorganisation of the whole national economy.

But in this case, as former experience showed, it was impossible to carry out this work of drafting the Five-Year Plan with the members of the Industrial Party and the technical circles alone. To assure the success of this work, the Industrial Party had very powerful and important allies in the persons of other counter-revolutionary groups, the Kondratiev-Chayanov group and the Groman economic group.

It was not sufficient to prove the impossibility, for technical reasons, of raising the metal and fuel industries to a high level of development. It was necessary to convince many of the Soviet public and in Government circles that all economy as mapped out by the Five-Year Plan was necessarily circumscribed.

Help was extended, and with some success, by agitation and by those arguments developed by the economic groups concerned, particularly the theory of the " declining curve " of economic development.

In agriculture, minimum plans of extension, minimum plans for its industrialisation, as well as for its mechanisation were drawn up. In regard to the production of articles of mass consumption, definite minimum tasks were set which were accepted for fulfilment in the different branches of industry. This was all done so that industry, agriculture, and the production of articles of mass consumption would justify us in looking to 1930 as the time for a general crisis, including food and other supplies.

I was personally instructed to direct the work of carrying through the Five-Year Plan of sabotage in fuel supply. Here we were concerned with slowing up the rate of development in the fuel industry, and chiefly the intensification and aggravation of the fuel crisis in 1930. The plans were compiled with the following end in view: that the general tension of the fuel supply situation would remain unchanged, that reserves would be kept at a minimum, and consequently the slightest dislocation in transport or in other concerns controlling the fuel supply (especially during the period of military activities, when mobilisation would absorb a part of their working staffs), would give us the chance of banking on non-delivery of fuel by the different trusts and organisations.

I must mention here that the instructions received by us from Denisov concerning the metal industry were passed on by us to Khrennikov, Kalinnikov and Charnovsky.

I should like to mention particularly the disproportions which resulted between the development of oil-fired transport and the volume of output which was marked out by the minimum plan. If one calls to mind the rôle that oil plays, and is able to play, during war time, one will agree that the absence of this means of transport would immediately bring about extremely serious difficulties. Similar work was carried on extensively in the field of electric power.

Destructive Work and Espionage.

Already in the spring of 1927 we began to receive definite demands for the extension and strengthening of activities in the sphere of destructive work. Without going into the details of this question, I must say that I was informed through K. of definite demands for the preparation of destructive acts against the mobilisation of fuel reserves. I passed on the task of working out a plan of subversive acts on the railroads to Kogan-Bernstein.

Finally, we were obliged to give information on a number of questions of reconnaissance. Besides those quarterly résumés which we prepared more or less regularly for the Torgprom, duplicates were supplied to the French circles interested in such questions. These résumés, listed in the indictment, were compiled chiefly by our men working in the State Planning Commission. When this work concerned industrial questions they were worked out by Kalinnikov. I supplied information on fuel, and it was Osadchy's duty to work up the general material. In the main, however, we used the material of the economic group in the State Planning Commission, who compiled a survey of the economic situation for a report to the Presidium of that Commission.

Finally, from the second half of 1929, and especially from the end of 1929, we were faced with one of the most difficult

tasks set us in Paris, namely, the organisation of military groups. This work was not immediately begun by the Industrial Party C.C., owing to the difficulties involved, but at last, after strong pressure was brought to bear, it was necessary to start it somehow or another.

It was at the meeting which took place at my home that K. reiterated that this task was being definitely stressed.

From the successful realisation of the first year of the Five-Year period it was seen that, so far as the various branches of national economy were concerned, production possibilities had been plainly under-estimated and that they could be considerably greater. Points came to light which had been concealed in the Five-Year Plan which had been drafted jointly with the saboteurs. This was a fairly serious blow, and was responsible for no small measure of blame being hurled at us for our activities; but it must be stated that the causes lay far deeper. They lay in the fact that, in spite of the sombre prognosis given for the summer of 1930, even the economic foundations of the crisis were destroyed by actual realities.

I must admit that, seen from this aspect, the results of our work were really unsatisfactory, and the second year of the Five-Year period showed most plainly that the question of carrying through the Five-Year Plan in the shortened period of four years might well be broached as a practical possibility; and, for certain branches, in the still shorter period of three years.

In this respect I differ from the conception of our activities as exaggerating plans. For example. Ramzin quoted the case of 42 million tons of oil, saying that it was impossible. I investigated this question shortly before my arrest, and will say that it is quite feasible, given certain conditions. The fact is that our cards were beaten, and beaten all along the line. We realised that every year led to a constant strengthening of the Soviet Union, and delay in striking a blow became impossible. Intervention in 1930 was postponed, but only for a year.

Kalinnikov's Statement.

PRESIDENT: " Accused Kalinnikov."

KALINNIKOV: " Judges of the Supreme Court! That you may be clear as to the manner in which I, who was once trusted implicitly by the Soviet Government, who was a member of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission, became a traitor to the State, permit me to analyse briefly my relations to the Soviet Government in the light of the attitude taken by the leading technicians of our country.

It is generally known that in Russia the engineers were, on the whole, drawn from the lower middle classes. Only isolated

individuals came from the nobility, from the higher bureaucracy, and the former bourgeoisie.

In the struggle against the October Revolution, the leading lights of the technical intelligentsia, as I call them, took a very active part, indulging in open sabotage against the orders and measures issued by the Soviet Government.

The October Revolution found me working in the Moscow Technical High School (M.T.H.S.) as Professor, and chief of the Technical Department of the Moscow Metal Controller. I remained there till the official controller was replaced and a Board appointed by the Moscow Soviet. That was in the middle of 1918. I left, as I did not wish to work with any Board made up of workers. It was open sabotage. In the M.T.H.S. I was the last elected director—for the two years 1920-21 and 1921-22. When the Chief Department for Vocational Training discharged me as rector and Chairman of the Board, I objected to this ruling, and referred the matter to a meeting of the Board, thus openly opposing the Soviet Government. The Board, as a protest, unanimously decided to stop all teaching, a strike which was largely supported by the students.

When the New Economic Policy was introduced in 1921, the engineers, now certain that the restoration of industry would be bound to lead to a bourgeois restoration as well, began to join hands willingly with the Soviet Government.

In April 1921, the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) was founded under the Council of Labour and Defence, and began to function. By order of the Council of People's Commissars I was appointed a member of that Commission; then round about July, 1924, I was made a member of its Presidium, in which I remained until January 1st, 1930. At the same time I was, for the greater part of this time, Chairman of the Industrial Section.

Every year we members of Gosplan, all specialists in our particular lines of engineering and economics, drafted the plans for the rehabilitation and further advancement of national economy. In doing so we were compelled to witness with our own eyes, to our astonishment, the way that realities outstripped each of these annual plans.

At the end of the period of industrial restoration, that is, in 1926-27, when the Soviet Government launched an extensive programme involving the granting of concessions for industrial enterprises, the engineers as a whole, as well as the engineer-economists of Gosplan, evidenced great readiness to support the new policy of the Government, in the confident belief that it meant the first step toward the conquest of our country by foreign capital. With the watchword of attracting as much foreign capital as possible to the Soviet Union on economic and political

conditions advantageous to the foreigners, we engineers of Gosplan took part in the transactions of the Commission, presided over by Osadchy, to draft the list of plants due to be granted as concessions. In doing this we were working in the interests of foreign capital and not protecting the interests of the Soviet Government.

At this stage the first signs given by the engineers of the direction in which they were moving was their recognition of the principle of complete political neutrality in their official attitude to their work in Soviet service, this being given the name of " loyalty." At that time one could no longer sabotage openly. The period of open sabotage had gone for ever; it was necessary to hide one's feelings, and the screen behind which most of them concealed their real attitude to the Soviet Government was loyalty and " no politics."

Later on, when the period of new constructive endeavour resulted in a sharpening of the class struggle, the engineers—who after all had linked their fate with Russian capitalism—could not remain passive. This was the start of the wrecking activities in transport and in industry.

It was about this time, in 1927, on Khrennikov's invitation that I joined the Engineering Centre.

The autumn of 1927 saw a great deal of intensive work in the State Planning Commission in the preparation of the Five-Year Plan. From the Engineering Centre I was given the task of carrying out counter-revolutionary sabotage work in the industrial section of the Commission. My basic instructions were to stick to the lowest possible rates of development in industry as a whole, in particular in regard to the heavy industries; to create and intensify glaring maladjustments in the development of the various branches of industry, both as separate branches and in relation to the requirements of national economy as a whole, which was bound to lead to a crisis; to drag out capital construction, which was calculated to tie up as much capital as possible in order to bring about a financial crisis.

We were all given our set tasks of what we were to do on the planning organs of the country."

Kalinnikov proceeded to substantiate the evidence given by Ramzin as to the two plans which had to be drafted—a minimum plan, in the State Planning Commission, and a maximum plan in the Supreme Economic Council, both of which were used by the wreckers for their own purposes. He gave a list of the persons responsible at that time for counter-revolutionary work in the State Planning Commission and its Departments—metal, chemical, textile, building, foodstuffs, leather, etc. Each was in contact with the individual in charge of similar work in the Supreme Economic Council: thus Hartman and Taube, in the

Metal Section, kept contact with Khrennikov, of the Metal Department in the S.E.C.

Kalinnikov threw much light on the methods by which the wreckers worked, namely, (1) exaggerations in drawing up the annual " balances " of consumption and production of metals, fuel, etc., in which faulty statistics still leave much room for abuses; (2) ignoring of the factor of quality, which always fell in practice below the standard fixed by the wreckers, while quantity much exceeded it; (3) delay in breaking up the various plans into their details for individual trusts, factories and shops. He pointed out that experience had shown the necessity of increasing the fuel plans thus drawn up by 80 per cent., metal plans by 70 per cent., power stations by 40 to 50 per cent. He emphasised that, as post-war experience in Germany and the U.S.A. had shown, metal output could be increased 30 to 50 per cent. without building new works and equipment, by proper attention to selection of ores, washing of coke, etc. All this was deliberately ignored.

Up to the time of his arrest he had never seen a plan worked out for the reconstruction of the metallurgical industry. It was proceeding haphazard, without proper reckoning up of the productive capacity of existing works, the quality of their output, etc. In the sphere of machine building there was a similar state of affairs.

Kalinnikov then gave a survey of the origin and development of the Industrial Party, confirming the evidence already given by Ramzin and Laritchev and the reports made on their visits to Paris and London in 1927 and 1928. At the end of the latter year and the beginning of 1929, the Central Committee of the Industrial Party organised two conferences to ascertain the probable economic conditions in 1930. Both came to the conclusion that 1930 would be the most difficult in the economic sense.

In the autumn of 1929, at meetings attended by Ramzin, Laritchev, Charnovsky and himself, he first heard of the proposed postponement of intervention to 1931 owing to facts revealed by the Chinese Eastern Railway affair, and this was confirmed at a meeting at the beginning of 1930. The meeting discussed the difficult problem of how to create and link up sympathetic groups in the Red Army. Kalinnikov emphasised that Ramzin as Chairman often acted on his own after consultation with various groups of the Central Committee, and contacts with the French General Staff and the Torgprom passed through his hands.

He gave further details of the confidential economic reports, prepared primarily for the Presidium of the State Planning Commission, which the wreckers transmitted abroad. Kogan-Bernstein prepared the transport reports, Kamzolkin the chemical,

Chilikin the textile, and general editing devolved upon Osadchy. Kalinnikov himself collected information on the war chemical industry, and handed it over, together with information on other war industries, to Mr. K—— in a theatre, while the public were leaving after the performance. Ramzin also introduced him to Mr. R——, in order to ensure contact, should he (Ramzin) be arrested. At a meeting at Kalinnikov's flat, Ramzin told R—— of the plans for destructive work in the chief power stations, and R—— agreed that the French General Staff ought to indicate definitely in which order the main works had to be put out of action.

Experience, however, showed that the Industrial Party was completely defeated by the energy of the working class, and its leaders, when arrested by the G.P.U., were already beaten men. Kalinnikov attributed his crimes to the fact that, owing to his bourgeois education and lack of Marxist training, he did not understand that only the working class could develop industry to its highest phase. Prison had been a good school for him. He called on all engineers, many of whom were making the same mistake as himself, to learn from his example and become honest builders of Socialism.

Charnovsky's Statement.

CHARNOVSKY opened by a statement fully recognising his guilt, as set out in the indictment. He was brought into the work of disorganisation by Khrennikov, who at first did not disclose to him the real aims of the organisation, but convinced him of the need of uniting the forces of the engineers in order to improve their position in industry—to win back their former positions in industry.

Only much later, during conversations which followed, he became aware of the real purpose of the organisation, i.e., to overthrow the Soviet Government by means of gradual preparation for an industrial crisis and with the help of foreign intervention.

The hostility felt by the engineering fraternity was sufficient ground for the formation of a counter-revolutionary organisation. The engineers had not yet undergone any change of heart that would render it possible for them to feel that they could adapt themselves to the new order. In Charnovsky's opinion, they understood better than anyone that the industrial reconstruction going on in the U.S.S.R. would raise the country to a technical level which was impossible for the old form of privately owned firms. " A return to the old inefficiency of private industry was not our aim. But the unaccustomed feeling of being under the control of higher bodies drove us to resist the new forms of industry. This resistance would normally have been passive.

By degrees we should have adapted ourselves to the new order, but for one thing—the hope that there would be a return to the old order of things, a hope fostered by the steady stream of information which flowed in to us from abroad, with every messenger who happened to have been there."

The association of former industrialists active in Paris under the name of the Trade and Industrial Committee (known also as the Torgprom), was a link in the connecting chain. Fundamentally, this particular link did not possess anything like real importance in the eyes of the engineers. It was the people who stood behind it that were of importance. From the Torgprom the news came that it was backed by mightier forces and a far greater power—France herself. In other words, the Torgprom was supported by France with her financial and technical strength, her General Staff and all her various means of coercion, the actual tools being Poland, Finland and the other border states. The aim was to establish a bourgeois democratic government with a dictatorship as a transitional stage.

As a result of the success of re-establishing Soviet industry and pushing forward new construction, the Industrial Party had to face the necessity of hastening the moment of intervention.

"We all saw," said Charnovsky, "that the country was picking up at a tremendous speed and that the Five Year Plan would be successfully carried out, maybe not to the whole hundred per cent. in every branch, but on the whole it would go through. If that took place, it would be too late to talk about intervention, and so we in the Industrial Party decided to take steps to hasten the moment of intervention."

The methods to be used were to draw up plans for industry and to supervise their fulfilment in such a way as to produce chaos.

"At first, the scheme was merely to cut down on the plans and retard production, especially with regard to raw materials and fuel, but in 1928 a new method was introduced. The Industrial Party no longer tried to retard the schedules and to decrease control figures underlying fresh construction, but made an effort to accentuate the tendency to invest the largest possible sums in basic capital investments which would and could yield no immediate results. All this was done for the purpose of tying up all available capital to yield the minimum returns to the country. The results expected were a crisis to shake the whole economic life of the country and, at the same time, an increase in the financial difficulties in fulfilling the Plan."

Next followed a number of examples of deliberate mismanagement, construction of huge plants, which could not function owing to the absence of some comparatively trifling parts. Many plans were deliberately revised five times.

" For four years we drew up plans of works at Magnetostroi, Kuznetz and the Donetz coalfield, and in the Ordjonikidze Commission, which I personally attended, we had a mass of constructional plans, to each of which we attached the note: ' This plan is to be regarded only as an outline, and no orders are to be placed on the strength of it.' This after four years of consideration! At the same time fantastic schemes were drawn up, e.g., for the distillation of peat and the transmission of the gases produced through a pipe line at the bottom of the Volga. The Sverdlovsk and Kramatovsky Engineering Works were delayed for two years.

In 1929 we were given quite a number of tasks by the French General Staff, the orders being brought by Ramzin. They may be divided into various classes: those concerned with sabotage in various branches of industry (I have just spoken about this), including those industries of importance for the country's defence. Then there were tasks involving subversive acts to provide aid at the moment of intervention.

I know more regarding the tasks of dislocating industrial construction. Basically, they attempted to bring about a crisis and various maladjustments, a typical example of which is seen in hasty investments and in tying up of capital without practical results. The shortage of metals is always a direct threat to the development of the consuming industries. At the moment of intervention this would have created an extraordinarily dangerous and highly strained position, since plants would have been working without any reserves in stock. The branch particularly affected would have been locomotive repairs.

There is always a crisis regarding tyres, because the heavy metallurgical works do not repair tyres and the lighter works have not the necessary machines. The central works for producing wheels without tyres were left without steel, because as yet they cannot work on the special patent which they possess. The same applies to machine construction plants, without which it is impossible to carry on work for defensive purposes.

I would draw the attention of the Supreme Court to Osadchy's report, in which the final facts are given on this point and in which mention is made of the unpreparedness of all of us for intervention. Speaking generally, we must admit that in spite of all the efforts put forth by the Industrial Party, even though it had 2,000 men in its ranks, and despite our partial successes, we recognised that the Five Year Plan was on the whole being fulfilled in a manner by no means slipshod, indeed with remarkable efficiency. This was due to the energy and enthusiasm of the working class, against which the efforts of a handful of engineers were of little avail."

(*Charnovsky had not concluded his evidence when the court rose for the day.*)

THE THIRD DAY. NOVEMBER 27th.

(Morning Session.)

Concluding his evidence, Charnovsky summed up, claiming that he was brought into the Party by the leaders to act as a go-between. He was not connected with the planning department or with the operating departments. He simply supplied information. His life had been a nightmare and it was a real relief to feel that the nightmare was over. If the Court would give him the possibility of working honestly in the future, he would try to make amends for his crimes.

Kuprianov's Statement.

KUPRIANOV was the first of the accused connected with the textile industry. He, too, began his statement by admitting his guilt and the correctness of the charges against him. The wrecking organisation in the textile industry existed since 1919, i.e., from the moment of the nationalisation of industry. It was organised by Lopatin, who was connected with some of the former owners now abroad, Konovalov, Riabushinsky and others. These connections were kept up by Lopatin through the medium, first, of German and, later, of French and English circles. All the above he had learnt from Lopatin. The object of the organisation at that period was to maintain the factories for the former owners in the state in which they had been left. All possible measures were taken to prevent the transference of machinery from one factory to another. After the introduction of the New Economic Policy, the hopes of the former owners moved in a different direction. According to Lopatin, the return of the mills to the former owners on the terms of lease was imminent. However, by 1925 these hopes had not been realised. At that time the Torgprom came into being, and at its instance an official wrecking organisation was formed consisting of Lopatin, Fyedotov, Kirpotenko, Sitnin, Kuprianov himself, and others.

What were the objects of this organisation? The first item in their programme was to accelerate the building of new factories. The building was to be of a capital character, not stopping at any expense, while the period of building was to be dragged out. The second item laid down that the raw materials were not to be used in a proper and rational way, while the assortment worked out was not to agree with the requirements of the market. The third item was to delay the development of the

manufacture of textile machinery, concentrating on importation of the latter from abroad. The fourth item directed that in working out the Five Year Plan for the development of the textile industry, marked preference should be shown to the cotton industry to the detriment of the flax and woollen industries. The argument nominally was that two million spindles in Poland and Esthonia had been lost to Russia as a result of the war. The real reason was Lopatin's anxiety to promote the interests of the former cotton manufacturers. Kuprianov was in charge of the work under the second item of the programme, the activities under the first being directed first by Lopatin and then by Fyedotov. The new factories were built with unnecessary luxury and waste of money. The plans of the textile industry were prepared without regard to actual requirements. Long discussions were begun and conducted with a view to causing delays. The third item was controlled by Schein, who was chairman of a special " bureau " created for the purpose of co-ordinating the requirements in metal of various industries. Other members of this bureau also belonged to the wrecking organisation, and assisted in covering their work. The plans for the importing of new machinery were discussed in London with a gentleman called Charnock, who acted as the representative of the firms in question, and had previously lived in Russia. Charnock told Lopatin that better times were coming for the engineers.

In 1927 he first heard from Fyedotov about the plans for intervention. When Fyedotov returned from abroad he reported on his interview with Karpov who, like Krestovnikov, had complained about the insufficiency of the wrecking work because it yielded no positive results, and told him that intervention was therefore becoming a matter of necessity. Karpov also informed them that connections with the Torgprom could be carried on through an agent of the French Embassy in Moscow. (*At this stage the President of the Court requested Kuprianov not to mention official institutions of foreign states in open court.*)

Some time later, they heard from Fyedotov that Ramzin and Laritchev had brought news from abroad confirming that which he had learned from Karpov, namely, that intervention was being prepared for 1930-31, that French Government circles were favourably disposed to the idea of intervention and that Ramzin and Laritchev, while in Paris, had had an interview on this subject with representatives of the French army, at which Denisov from the Torgprom and the White General, Lukomsky, were present. The French were not satisfied with the results of the wrecking tactics, and insisted on the formation of points of support for the coming intervention in the ranks of the Red Army. For this purpose it was necessary to make use of the discontent which existed among the peasantry, and which was

bound to spread among the soldiers of the Red Army. Fyedotov further informed them of the desire of the Central Committee to have wrecking cells in all large offices and factories drawn from among the many ex-Tsarist and former White officers who were employed therein. Such a cell was to be formed also in the Textile Syndicate. This work was entrusted by Kuprianov to Deviatkov, but he did not know what the results were.

Before Sitnin's journey to America, Kuprianov asked him to try in Paris to see Konovalov, for whom Kuprianov had worked for many years, and to bring news about his views on intervention. Sitnin on his return stated that Konovalov had lost his wealth and a great deal of his former influence and authority in emigrant circles, but that he was still a figure to be reckoned with. Furthermore, that he was quite positive about the prospects for intervention.

Fyedotov's Statement.

FYEDOTOV opened by describing the methods of the textile group. In the textile industry, the original plans were to preserve certain factories in good condition for their former owners, but this had to be given up.

Afterwards, there arose the idea of supporting the Right wingers in the U.S.S.R. The support took the form of articles in the press, and also by arranging matters in the textile industry so as to give colour to their theories. The Right wingers advocated the building of textile factories at the expense of the development of iron and steel, and the Industrial Party supported this line by their technical agreements. A long discussion was organised to " prove " the impracticability of the three-shift system. Later, another method of sabotage was used—the wrong selection of goods to be manufactured. Afterwards, on receipt of definite orders from abroad, the method adopted was to disorganise plans.

" We arranged," said Fyedotov, " that there should be some confusion in every branch of the industry, shortage of raw materials, etc. In this way, by throwing one department out of gear, we could stop a whole factory and so arouse the dissatisfaction of the workers and of the whole population, because the quantity of products on the market was reduced."

They were assisted in their plans by a short cotton crop, which gave only 16,000,000 poods instead of the 18,500,000 poods that were expected. Later, they put forward the fantastic idea that a crop of 60,000,000 poods of cotton could be expected by 1932.

In the textile industry there were a number of groups at work—the group under Engineer Lopatin, the cotton group under Sitnin and Derzhann, the flax group under Nolde, and a

wool group. The most influential was the cotton group, in which Kuprianov took a prominent part.

Fyedotov next dealt with the financial means received from the emigrés and distributed to individual members of the wrecking organisation.

" Part of the money in 1925 came directly through the British Mission." (*At this point, the President of the Court interrupted Fyedotov to remind him not to mention official institutions of foreign Governments in Moscow in open court.*)

" Another part was received as commissions or brokerage on purchase of machinery in 1925. In this case I was guilty of accepting such money. We received about 50,000 roubles in this way.

Machinery was purchased in England from English manufacturers. One-half per cent. of the sum of the order was paid by the manufacturers to the textile engineers' organisation.

Similar commissions or, frankly speaking, bribes, were received through engineer Sitnin from the cotton sellers. But that was much later, in 1928.

After the beginning of 1929, a sum of 200,000 roubles was received and distributed among the members of the organisation.

The linen organisation received a larger sum than the cotton. They began to receive money earlier and independently. This money was largely delivered by engineer Lazarkevitch, who came here from Nolde, and then again through K."

According to Fyedotov, one of the most active of all the founders of the Industrial Party was Lopatin, but on the death of the latter, in 1927, the work was carried on by Fyedotov and Kuprianov, who had begun co-operating with Lopatin at his request some time before.

Dealing with the question of intervention, Fyedotov stated :—

" The idea of intervention has never died out among the White emigrés. I saw Karpov in 1923. At that time the White armies had been defeated and it was clear that there could be no question of intervention. However, Karpov was quite sure that in a very short time he would ride into Moscow on a white horse ! At that time this talk seemed extremely strange and ridiculous." But in 1925 there were certain indications that hope was entertained in the Torgprom of intervention, that intervention would certainly take place and special preparations would have to be made for it. What were those preparations? First, measures were to be taken in France and England to prepare public opinion in Europe for the desirability and necessity of intervention. The example of a country in the East developing into a great power was a dangerous one for Western workers, and its system of government would have to be changed. Newspapers were bribed to publish leading articles—the French newspapers

willingly publish any article if paid for it—and the Russian emigré press, as represented by "Rul" and "Posliednie Novosti," were supported financially.

In 1928, I saw Karpov in Berlin. He let me know that intervention was not only possible, but would take place, and preparations were already on foot. Intervention was, moreover, seriously contemplated by the French General Staff. He informed me that Poincaré had received as deputies from the Torgprom three of their most important members, namely, Lianozov, Riabushinsky and Tretyakov, with whom he had conducted negotiations and who had been given information as to activities up to date. They learned that a detailed study of this question had been entrusted to a special commission headed by Colonel Joinville. Further details were cleared up at a meeting which was held with Professor Ramzin and Laritchev in October of the same year.

The question was then more definitely discussed. He said that intervention would be impossible unless the ground was prepared, unless there was dissatisfaction among the workers and especially among the peasantry. This dissatisfaction already existed, according to the information of Colonel Joinville's agency in Moscow, but he reckoned on the Industrial Party, and especially the textile section, to take more energetic measures.

He pointed out that not only were government circles or certain sections of these circles interested in intervention, but that the business circles of capitalist Europe were greatly disturbed by the rapid development of economic power in Russia. He mentioned Urquhart and Deterding as violent opponents of the Soviet system, for they were losing large sums of money in competition with Soviet oil on the world market. English and French circles were disturbed by the fact that Russian textiles were being sold in Persia and the Far East, and that the demand for and sale of these goods was brisk. When the home market in the Soviet Union was fully satisfied, it was clear which line Soviet trade would follow. The Eastern peoples are even now inclined to look on the Soviets as their natural defender, and in the future they would come within its sphere, owing to the policy of the Soviet Government, which does not distinguish between races."

Karpov further pointed out that the prophecies of the economists about Soviet Russia had proved false. They had foretold a series of depressions, commodity shortages and, eventually, complete pauperisation and starvation, but this was not taking place. He said that the time for intervention had arrived because Russia was on the eve of becoming a great power. If intervention were not carried out at once, it would become impossible.

Many of these things I realised only when I reflected on them during the four months I spent in solitary confinement. Prior to this I was confused. The rôle of the Torgprom and its relations with Government circles and public figures had changed. Whereas previously representatives of the Torgprom haunted the doorsteps of important personages, the latter now received these representatives, arranged meetings with them, visited restaurants with them, etc. The initiative now came from a different quarter.

The Torgprom was a purely bourgeois organisation, distinct from the monarchist organisations. Miliukov, President of the Left Cadets, and Abramovitch, President of the Menshevik group, had previously objected to relations with a bourgeois group of capitalists, but Karpov stated that by 1928 these differences had been smoothed over.

Karpov informed us that both Miliukov and Riabushinsky had been proposed for the future Cabinet. This is rather unclear, because Paul Riabushinsky, the prominent public man, had already died, and Vladimir was not particularly well spoken of. He was not reputed to have great capabilities, but as his organisation had appointed him as one of its leaders, I suppose he had grown more intelligent.

However this may be, the left group—Miliukov and the Social-Democrats—stretched out their hands to a bourgeois organisation. Evidently they had also come to the conclusion that it was now or never. A date had to be fixed which must be as soon as possible. Karpov mentioned 1930 or 1931. Later, after Ramzin's interview with the French General Staff, the nearer date, 1930, was definitely chosen, but as matters did not work out as expected, it was again postponed until 1931.

During my trip abroad in 1928, I had the opportunity of asking various manufacturers how intervention was regarded in England, and I was told that the English would not participate in this venture. The president of the Manufacturers' Association, Noodle, made the same statement to me when he was in Moscow at the commencement of 1929. When I asked him what were the chances, he said that since the Labour Government came to power and the Labour movement had become so strong, and also since the great growth of unemployment to over a million, it was impossible to undertake such futile expenditure as that made by Churchill in the first intervention.

Karpov insisted that it was necessary that crises should be developed more rapidly and more sharply. He expressed his displeasure at the lack of popular dissatisfaction and absence of crisis in the U.S.S.R. He suggested that agitation be carried on in the universities, reminding us of the important rôle played by the students during the revolution. Living abroad, he com-

pletely failed to understand how utterly the character of our former schools had changed, i.e., the proletarianisation of the student body which has taken place of recent years.

It is absolutely impossible (remarked Fyedotov) to spread such ideas among the students. At my lectures in the Plekhanov Institute, for instance, out of 35 students 30 were Communists, and not boys, but people with wide experience, about 30 years old. It is laughable to talk about agitation with such students."

Karpov also urged the necessity of relying on the Right wingers in the Communist Party, but this idea was somewhat out of date by 1928.

He made a very important statement with regard to the compensation which the interventionists would expect for their work and assistance, and officially informed me in the name of the Torgprom and the White émigré groups that France expected extensive concessions in the Soviet Union. Poland also is suffocating within its own boundaries because, although a manufacturing country, it has no exports at all. All its industries were originally based on the internal market, i.e., on the Russian market. According to Karpov, this market was the main aim of France and Poland.

With regard to the payment of Tsarist and war debts, he stated that a minimum rate of five per cent. would be accepted, but that the principle of payment of old debts would be fully recognised. In the later half of 1929, I learned from Professor Charnovsky that Ramzin had informed him of his consent in the name of the Industrial Party to the concessions demanded by the interventionists. This meant that Poland would receive the western territories of the Ukraine and that we should lose the oil-fields of the Caucasus. I do not remember whether France or England was to have them."

Fyedotov recalled Ramzin's sarcastic remark in his evidence, that only very simple souls could have believed that foreign powers would take any trouble except for their own material advantage. " But at that time," he said, " we were so naïve that we believed it. We thought that Russia would not be partitioned among other powers."

Fyedotov mentioned in brief the measures which followed Karpov's demands. It was decided to make a study of mobilisation plans in the textile industry. Engineer Kuprianov undertook this, and it was effected through engineers Obreskov and Maximov. The same occurred in connection with the formation of groups of former officers. Engineer Kuprianov was to have done this through a former white officer, Deviatkov, but was prevented by the arrests which took place in 1929.

According to Fyedotov's statement, the enthusiasm of many of the engineers cooled off very considerably when they realised the extent of Ramzin's concession to the foreign imperialists, but nevertheless they continued their wrecking work, being carried along by what he described as " a group instinct."

While in prison, he had thought deeply of these matters. He now realised that the Soviet Government was founded on the will of the people and was leading the people to a brighter future. He could now see that Russia had no need to rely on individual initiative, on individual competition, but that the stimulus of social effort was giving and would give far higher results.

The advances of capitalist industry could easily be transplanted on to Communist soil and would give such an outlook for the future as no other method could provide.

" There is no other Government and no other system which affords such opportunities as are given us in the Soviet Union. In Germany, for instance, there are several Institutes similar to the one where I worked, whose budget is miserly, not more than ten thousand marks. Wealthy England assigns to the Woollen Institute in Manchester about 500,000 roubles a year. Our experimental Textile Institute has a budget of two million roubles, which illustrates the attitude of the Soviet Government to science."

In conclusion, Fyedotov made a full acknowledgment of his guilt. As a professor he naturally had some knowledge of political economy, and admitted that he could have been expected to realise the inevitable results of all that he had done—that it would lead him to high treason, to a situation in which he was ashamed. (*At this point, Fyedotov broke down and was unable to proceed for some time.*)

" I am guilty of all the charges preferred against me, and any punishment meted out to me by the Court will be deserved. If I may be permitted the hope of work, I promise I will use all my efforts to further industrialisation and to atone for my crimes. If this is impossible, I shall accept the sentence which will be passed on me, recognising that it is justly deserved."

Ochkin's Statement.

OCHKIN gave a brief résumé of the wrecking tactics in the metal and coal industries. The aim of the Industrial Party was definitely to bring about a counter-revolutionary rebellion for the overthrow of the Soviet Government. The fuel supply was selected as a branch to be retarded at all costs. In the Institute of Scientific Research in which he had been working until lately, about four hundred technical improvements had been left on paper and literally dumped in a corner.

Measures were taken to cause crises in the production of metal, fuel and electricity. These preparations proceeded in two directions: stimulating the necessity for intervention in foreign circles by means of the contacts mentioned by members of the Central Committee, and the directing of the preparations within the Union. At the end of 1929, Professor Ramzin said that intervention was to be postponed for an indefinite period, until the end of 1930 or 1931.

In 1928, Ramzin introduced him to a certain Mr. K——, who spoke Russian well. Afterwards, Ramzin sent him on several occasions to meet Mr. K——, and to hand over sealed envelopes. Sealed documents were given him several times in 1929 to be passed on to another person, Mr. R——. To effect these commissions, he arranged meetings with " K—— " and " R—— " in post-offices, hotel lobbies, etc. He also made arrangements for French engineers to visit the Thermo-Technical Institute, etc.

Ramzin instructed him not to mention these matters to anyone.

Concluding, he said :—

" I am firmly convinced that the present trial will cause many engineers, now confused in their political conceptions, to stop short and think things over. Our trial will open their eyes to the disastrous path which they have taken in contemplating the surrender of the U.S.S.R. to the imperialists. I have nothing further to add."

Sitnin's Statement.

SITNIN, who was a factory manager at Tver when the October Revolution took place, gave a detailed account of his sabotage, commencing from 1922, when he joined the group organised by Lopatin. Up to 1925, Lopatin had hoped to " prove " that the Textile Trust of the U.S.S.R. was incapable of functioning efficiently. Hence the efforts of the engineers were directed to creating confusion and striving to ruin the industry. However, in 1925 it was already obvious that more active methods were needed. The new policy adopted was to undermine the plans of the Government and to create disproportion between raw materials and manufacturing possibilities.

" Every year we drew up plans on the basis of exaggerated figures of the production of raw materials. As the fiscal year commenced on October 1st, it was impossible for anyone to verify the figures used, for the crop was not yet gathered. Later in the year, when the supply of raw cotton failed, the factories closed, or else cotton had to be imported.

" Further, the funds necessary to increase the sowings of cotton were utilised to build absolutely unnecessary factories, and the factories themselves were built as expensively as possible.

The three-shift system and the five-day week were opposed, and the introduction of American textile methods discouraged.

" The policy of our organisation was to dislocate planned economy, force the Soviet Government into conciliation with the capitalist West, and find a solution to the situation by adopting State capitalism, or even, as was anticipated in 1928, a bourgeois democratic republic."

Rumours regarding intervention spread about this time, although they were more problematic than concrete. However, in 1928, he went to America on the business of the Textile Trust, and on the way back, called on Konovalov in Paris.

Konovalov, one of the previous Russian textile manufacturers, informed him that the emigrés, as well as foreign governments, were closely following events in the U.S.S.R. The course adopted by the Union would, in his opinion as well as that of the Torgprom, inevitably call forth intervention. They were closely watching the struggle of various tendencies in the C.P.S.U., and were convinced that the time for action was approaching. Further, he said that the leaders of the Torgprom, Riabushinsky and Tretyakov, had been granted an audience by a prominent Frenchman who was sympathetic, Poincaré, who expressed his sympathy with intervention and his conviction that this idea would meet with support in France. According to Konovalov, intervention would take place in 1931, but its success would be impossible without corresponding preparations within the U.S.S.R. He told this to Kuprianov on his return to Moscow.

While in America, he made arrangements with firms to pay into the organisation a commission on purchases in return for sabotage by the cotton inspectors as regards the quality of the cotton accepted. These percentages brought in 80,000 to 100,000 roubles a year.

" As for military and espionage groups," he concluded, " I had nothing to do with them. I had begun to doubt the correctness of our policy a year before I was arrested, and while in prison I have lost the slightest remains of my belief. I have made an honest statement of my faults."

This concluded the testimony of all the prisoners. Before proceeding with the trial, some of the prisoners volunteered to make supplementary statements. Ramzin was called first. His statement was as follows :—

" In the summer of 1930, while in Berlin, I had expected to meet Denisov, a representative of the Torgprom, but was unable to do so. Since another member of the Industrial Party, Professor Osadchy, remained there after me, I requested him to see Denisov and receive the necessary instructions and information. I do not know whether Professor Osadchy fulfilled my request, because shortly after his return I was arrested. In any case,

Professor Osadchy can testify as to whether he met Denisov, and he will have more recent and interesting information from the Torgprom concerning intervention."

Further, Ramzin gave the name of S. D. Schein as the person responsible for collecting information for the French General Staff concerning the benzole and coke industries.

In conclusion, he wished to emphasise that only 6-7 per cent. of the 30,000 engineers in the U.S.S.R. were included in the wrecking organisation.

Charnovsky stated that the Industrial Party had several joint meetings with the " Working Peasants' Party." The subject discussed was the creation of crises in food supplies. His own name had been mentioned as a member of the future government, but he had not taken this seriously.

He had arranged for 150,000 roubles to be distributed in the metallurgical and engineering industries.

Kalinnikov stated that he had received about 200,000 roubles for Larichev and, by agreement with him and Ramzin, this was distributed among the chemical, war and paper industries.

As for agents " K—— " and " R——," he had met them several times, in theatres and in Ramzin's and Laritchev's houses. Laritchev handed written reports to Mr. R——.

The Further Order of the Proceedings.

KRYLENKO: " Article 282 of the Criminal Code provides that ' if the accused agrees with the facts as given in the indictment, admits the correctness of the charges brought against him, and has given evidence, the court may dispense with the further investigation of the case, and proceed at once to the speeches of the contending sides.' However, I am not in a position to suggest such an order of proceedings. Although the accused have stated that they are giving their evidence sincerely, stating everything known to them on their case, some of the material in the possession of the prosecution leads me to believe that a number of circumstances have not been sufficiently cleared up, furthermore, that the circumstances as stated here have not been stated in full and absolute accordance with the facts as they actually occurred.

Accordingly, the prosecution requests that a number of witnesses be called, namely, A. A. Nolde and A. A. Kirpotenko, to give evidence referring to the wrecking work in the textile industry; L. N. Yurovsky, to give evidence on questions connected with the relations between the Industrial Party and the counter-revolutionary group of Kondratiev-Chayanov; P. I. Krasovsky, in connection with the work of the organisation in the transport industry, and, finally, there being *one particular branch of wrecking work which has remained uncleared and even unmentioned,* that

the engineers D. M. Michailenko, P. V. Tseidler, Professor R. P. Sparo and V. P. Sirotsinsky be called as witnesses.

Finally, as the names of P. S. Osadchy and engineer Schein, both of whom acted as social prosecutors in the Shakhty case, have been mentioned here, it will be necessary to produce them in court, too. However, the position of these witnesses is different, owing to their membership of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. It is necessary, therefore, to obtain the permission of this body to institute proceedings against these persons, but the granting of this permission does not yet entitle the prosecution to bring them to trial. The prosecution accordingly asks that P. S. Osadchy be called as witness. I do not insist for the time being on calling engineer Schein. Although the fact that he had some conversations with Mr. K—— is of great importance in itself, the role of this K—— has already been made clear in a number of other statements by the accused.

As to the order of the proceedings, the prosecution asks the Court to be allowed to submit its suggestions on this point at the evening session to-morrow, in order to enable the prosecution and defence to examine and sort out the evidence in the morning."

(There being no objection from the defence, the Court (after retiring for a period) decided to call the witnesses as asked for by the prosecution, and to defer its decision on the further order of the proceedings to the evening session the next day.)

THE FOURTH DAY. NOVEMBER 28th.

(Evening Session.)

KRYLENKO: "In the opinion of the prosecution, the following questions ought to be further cleared up:—

(1) Biographical data about each of the accused, about their political views and class sympathies, and about the time when they entered the wrecking organisation.

(2) The class nature of the Industrial Party and the Trade and Industrial Committee, and a more detailed definition of the relations of each of the accused with the latter body.

(3) The connections established during the journeys abroad; questions connected with the activities of Poincaré and Briand, and with the methods adopted for preparing intervention, in pursuance of instructions received from abroad.

(4) A session in camera, for the purpose of establishing the identity of K—— and R——, and dealing with questions relating to espionage, etc."

The defence having agreed to this list of questions, the Court decided accordingly. It was agreed that the examination should proceed in turn on each of the groups of questions mentioned by Krylenko, all the accused being examined on each.

Examination of Ramzin.

Ramzin stated that he was born in 1887; his father and mother were village school teachers. He graduated from the Moscow Technical High School in 1914. He was granted a research studentship at the High School, later becoming teacher and professor; the latter occurred in 1920, under the Soviet Government. He is the author of about one hundred and fifty scientific works, many of which were published abroad. Since 1920 he had taken part in the work of the Commission on Electrification. Between 1921 and 1924 he was chief of the Fuel Section of the State Planning Commission. In 1921, upon the formation of the Thermo-Technical Institute, he was appointed director, a post which he held till his arrest. He was also a member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council, and of a number of scientific organisations.

The Public Prosecutor and Antonov-Saratovsky, a member of the Court, by a series of questions brought out some more information about his political views and development. In his early youth, as a student, he was for a short time connected with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, but subsequently

gave up active participation, remaining, however, a sympathiser with the Menshevists. As such he was opposed to the October Revolution of 1917, and for the first two years refused to work under the Soviet Government. Having entered the service of the Soviet Government to the end of 1926, he accepted the Soviet platform on the whole and kept aloof from the circles of engineers. At the beginning of his work at the Thermo-Technical Institute, his relations with these circles were extremely bad. The treatment meted out to him by this group began to affect his work. The moral and ideological pressure brought to bear by the group made him search for contact with them. At that time he was entertaining grave doubts about the correctness of the policy of the Soviet Government. By the end of 1926, he succeeded in establishing more or less friendly relations with Palchinsky, Rabinovitch and Khrennikov. Early in 1927 he had a long talk in the Gosplan with Palchinsky and Rabinovitch, who tried to persuade him that the economic collapse of the Soviet Government was unavoidable and imminent, and must be followed by a political collapse.

ANTONOV-SARATOVSKY: What was your financial position up to the revolution while you were engaged in teaching?

RAMZIN: When I was retained by the Technical High School I was receiving 125 to 150 roubles per month. In addition I had some other work, so that my total income amounted to about 200 roubles.

ANTONOV-SARATOVSKY: And what was your position before your arrest?

RAMZIN: I was receiving a very high salary. As far as financial conditions were concerned I was splendidly provided: I had a nice home, a private motor car and a modern, well-equipped, up-to-date laboratory in the Thermo-Technical Institute. A laboratory for a scientific worker is much more important than a home. My total income amounted to 1,500 roubles per month. . . . *I can safely affirm that there are few scientists abroad who are placed in such favourable condition as I was by the Soviet Government.* Thus I had and could have no personal motive to fight the Soviet Government.

In reply to a question by Otzep (defending counsel) whether during the whole period of his sabotage work he was "categorically and fully opposed to the Soviet regime" and whether "he ever had any waverings as an engineer," Ramzin replied: "On the whole, like a part of the Engineering Centre and the Industrial Party I adopted during that period of our work the point of view of State capitalism. The policy adopted after 1928 we regarded as ruinous, and considered that it was leading to a catastrophe, to a breakdown of the economic life of the country. This con-

viction was to a great degree confirmed by the violent criticism of the general line of the Party which emanated from within the Party itself . . ." The presiding judge having interfered, and brought him back to the direct question put by counsel, Ramzin admitted that since 1930 doubts had begun to arise in his mind about the correctness of his work as a saboteur, doubts which were shared by other members of the organisation, too.

KRYLENKO: The doubts remained doubts, but the facts were that you continued your wrecking work.

RAMZIN: We continued the work of the Industrial Party.

KRYLENKO: More than that, you said that one of the most important instructions connected with the direct preparation of intervention you gave to Professor Osadchy.

RAMZIN: Yes.

KRYLENKO: When was that?

RAMZIN: In June, 1930.

In the course of cross-examination, Ramzin stated that one article of faith of the Industrial Party had been that in a modern bourgeois democratic State only engineers and technicians ought to rule. Under pressure from Krylenko, however, he admitted that in a capitalist system, and in conditions of class struggle, such a state of things was impossible, and that the idea was "a means of agitation among the wide mass of engineers. I could not accept it as genuine."

Examination of Laritchev.

LARITCHEV was born in 1887, of peasant origin, his father having been a small furrier. In 1912 he took his degree in the Moscow Technical High School, and began his work as an engineer on the construction of a power station for a private factory in Yegorievsk. He continued to work for private factory owners up to 1916, when he joined the staff of the Moscow Fuel Committee (Moskvotop) established during the war. He remained on this up to 1918.

Like most of the technical intelligentsia, he had no political views. He was very little interested in political questions. During his student years he had some connections with Party workers, to whom he rendered little services here and there, without joining any political Party group. He sympathised with the February Revolution, but "the October Revolution was for him a great surprise." He did not understand the meaning of events, and was opposed to them. His attitude towards the question of refusing to work with the Soviet Government he defined by saying that he was in favour of continuing to work in organisations engaged upon feeding the population and provid-

ing it with fuel, as sabotage work in this field would hit the political groups less than the population in general. In 1919 he joined the staff of the Coal Centre and thus started to work in Soviet institutions. During that time he was sent to Kharkov and remained there after the occupation of Kharkov by the White troops. He could have left with the retreating Red Army, but preferred to remain, not wishing to expose himself to the danger of having to retreat under fire. He would have done the same if he had to retreat with the Whites (*laughter in the hall*). After re-occupation by the Red Army, he remained in the Donetz for three years. Reading in the papers of the report on electrification of the country made at the VIII Congress of Soviets by Kryzhanovsky, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Laritchev wrote him a personal letter, and was appointed to work in the State Planning Commission.

Prior to the Revolution he had been earning 500 roubles a month at the Moscow Fuel Committee.

KRYLENKO: You were assistant chairman, and afterwards chairman, of the fuel section of the State Planning Commission?

LARITCHEV: Yes, from 1925 up to the time of my arrest.

KRYLENKO: How much did you earn of late?

LARITCHEV: My salary was, first, 600 roubles, to which must be added 100 roubles in fees for literary work.

KRYLENKO: Did you at that time regard the restoration of capitalism expedient and desirable, or would you have preferred to retain in force the principle of nationalisation of the means of production?

LARITCHEV: From the very first I was a firm believer in the nationalisation of the most responsible sections of the national economy: transport was to remain entirely and fuel partly in the hands of the State.

KRYLENKO: Were you fairly well acquainted with political questions?

LARITCHEV: Very badly, I am sorry to say.

KRYLENKO: I am interested in the following question: Were you clear in your mind about what it must mean to restore capitalism with the assistance of the Torgprom, counter-revolutionary groups, etc.?

LARITCHEV: When this question seriously arose, approximately in 1927, the intention was not to return the factories to the late owners, the latter having ceased to exist. Therefore the method proposed was that of issuing shares, while retaining main control in the hands of the State.

KRYLENKO: You thought this practicable?

LARITCHEV: Later on, when I had an opportunity to make closer acquaintance with these sharks, I understood that this wouldn't work.

KRYLENKO: The military dictatorship of General Lukomsky on one side, the return of the police bullies on the other, the restoration of the capitalists, compensation to the previous landlords—at what price was all this to be attained? Did you think of that?

LARITCHEV: I did, but somewhat late. (*Laughter in the hall.*)

KRYLENKO: But then you did not think of it?

LARITCHEV: I thought little about it.

KRYLENKO: Do you regard the violent suppression of the working class objectively admissible or not?

LARITCHEV: We were assured, and we thought, maybe somewhat light-heartedly, that there could be no suppression, because we were convinced, and we pointed this out, that a gigantic political education of the masses was taking place here, and the mere mailed fist would not do. We told them not to forget that, as far as repressive measures are concerned, they must be rather careful.

KRYLENKO: To whom did you say that?

LARITCHEV: We made it clear, although not in such a crude form, in our conversation with the representative of the Torgprom. They knew that the eight-hour day must be retained, and that relations must be such as not to call forth acute discontent and animosity. In addition, that the land must in no case be taken away from the peasants and that it was impossible to compensate the landlords and former owners by taking away the land from the peasants.

KRYLENKO: Did Lukomsky and the others promise that to you?

LARITCHEV: I did not talk to Lukomsky, and he did not promise.

KRYLENKO: Maybe Denisov, Nobel and the others did?

LARITCHEV: They were bound to have understood the real state of affairs.

KRYLENKO: Did you understand the reality of this promise?

LARITCHEV: It appeared to us that Lukomsky was just such a figure as they could and must hold in check.

KRYLENKO: Who must hold him in check?

LARITCHEV: The big bourgeoisie and the French military circles.

KRYLENKO: The big bourgeoisie and the French military circles would hold him in check? And who would hold them? Laritchev and Ramzin?

LARITCHEV: No, we couldn't do that.

KRYLENKO (*to the President*): Permit me to put the same question at once to Ramzin, so as not to return to it.

The PRESIDENT: Please. Defendant Ramzin.

KRYLENKO (*to Ramzin*): Did you clearly see your way to bring about the realisation of your political programme through Lukomsky and the other members of the Torgprom and the interventionists?

RAMZIN: At first, the idea was to create a bourgeois-democratic republic, the period of military dictatorship being regarded as unavoidable.

KRYLENKO: Military dictatorship against whom?

RAMZIN: After a revolution the powers that be require a certain period of time in order to consolidate their position, and the period of military dictatorship was just such a period.

THE PRESIDENT: How do you define the content of a military dictatorship? What are its real and concrete features?

RAMZIN: A military dictatorship is characterised by the necessity before the election of the first parliament and the beginnings of local self-government, for somebody to govern, in order to carry out the elections, and so on. It was necessary to give the new government some time for it to become strong, and during that period to uphold order somehow in the country.

THE PRESIDENT: Who could threaten order in the country?

KRYLENKO: Against whom was the military dictatorship to be applied?

RAMZIN: Before the new government had consolidated its positions, so long as its position was unstable and insecure, the military dictatorship was necessary to defend it and give it the opportunity to strengthen its position.

THE PRESIDENT: The question is not of a dictatorship in general, but of a military dictatorship to secure the consolidation of the old capitalist order. Against which class would it have been directed? Who would have fought against the new government?

RAMZIN: It would have been in the first instance the working class, the proletariat, which would have fought the new government.

THE PRESIDENT: The working class would have fought against the military dictatorship, and the latter would have fought against whom?

RAMZIN: They would have fought against the new government and against the military dictatorship defending it. . . .

KRYLENKO: The military dictatorship would have fought against whom—against the working class?

RAMZIN: Evidently the military dictatorship would have had to protect the new government, and to fight against the working class, in so far as the latter would not remain silent.

KRYLENKO: By what means?

RAMZIN: The only means in a period of military dictatorship are the means of punitive expeditions and repressions.

THE PRESIDENT: In other words, the means of the physical destruction of the advanced strata of the working class, and of workers generally?

RAMZIN: There could be no question of destroying the whole of the working class.

THE PRESIDENT: But there could be a question of destroying a certain part of the working class?

RAMZIN: Yes, the active, leading section of the working class.

Ramzin stated that it was hoped to do without repressive measures, pacifying the workers by importing large quantities of foreign goods, so as to give an impression of prosperity, and by "not hinting at first at any changes in the working day." Under cross-examination, however, he admitted that such a policy on the part of the allies of the Industrial Party was unlikely.

FRIEDBERG (Assistant Public Prosecutor): Tell me, please, were you representing the "left" section in the Central Committee of the Industrial Party?

RAMZIN: Yes.

FRIEDBERG: It thus follows that the "left" section was agreeing to a military dictatorship. What, then, were the aims of the "right" section of the Central Committee?

RAMZIN: As I have stated in my first speech, there were a number of different political groups in the ranks of the Industrial Party, but the main points of the programme which was finally adopted were accepted by both the "rights" and

the " lefts." As to the future, the hopes of the " lefts " and of the " rights " were certainly quite different from each other, the " lefts " hoping for State capitalism, while the " rights " entertained quite opposite desires.

KRYLENKO: To put the question in a somewhat vulgar way: who swindled whom in this business, the " rights " or the " lefts "?

RAMZIN: In the question of the military dictatorship, the upper hand remained with the " rights," who came out as the more clever and far-sighted.

FRIEDBERG: And where did the victory of the " lefts' " come in?

RAMZIN: The " lefts " received a concession on the question of the future form of the State. It was agreed that it should be a bourgeois-democratic republic, and all talk about a monarchy was set aside. Next, the land was to remain in the possession of the peasants. But it must be admitted that the concessions made by the " rights " were of a theoretical character, while those made by the " lefts," if intervention had been realised, were of a practical and real nature.

KRYLENKO: Would the military dictatorship have been in the hands of the " rights " or the " lefts "?

RAMZIN: In my opinion, the military dictatorship would have been in the hands of the military.

KRYLENKO: Is Lukomsky a " right " or a " left "?

RAMZIN: I don't think that in the final analysis Lukomsky would have been the complete master. He would have had to act on instructions given to him.

KRYLENKO: Who would have had the real power?

RAMZIN: In the final analysis it would have been Poincaré.

KRYLENKO: And what about the Torgprom?

RAMZIN: The Torgprom would have played a secondary part, and would have had to act according to the directions of French influential circles.

ANTONOV-SARATOVSKY: Is it to be understood from your explanations that the Russian names of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party, the Torgprom, and the military dictator, Lukomsky, were to be only a screen for the French military authorities?

RAMZIN: Objectively, I am now firmly convinced that the leading part would certainly have been played,

not by those persons, but by those who held in their hands the military forces and the military threads of intervention, i.e., French imperialism.

In the course of further cross-examination by the President of the Court, Ramzin and Laritchev admitted that they had interpreted the New Economic Policy as the beginning of the degeneration of the Soviet system into a capitalist system, and as such Laritchev said he " considered it a stimulus to his work in the Soviet State."

ANTONOV-SARATOVSKY : Perhaps you can explain to us the methods by which new members were recruited by you.

LARITCHEV : It is rather a difficult question, because the approach to each individual was different.

ANTONOV-SARATOVSKY : But how did you approach them?

LARITCHEV : Generally by talking of the necessity of improving the general material conditions of existence, and particularly of the particular individuals or groups of individuals concerned.

ANTONOV-SARATOVSKY : Were there only conversations? No other real material methods?

LARITCHEV : The material methods consisted in financing the various organisations.

ANTONOV-SARATOVSKY : That means first agitation and then financial assistance? What next?

LARITCHEV : When it became clear that the main thing was intervention, it was necessary to prepare the particular individual and to inspire the belief that engineers who were members of the Engineering Centre and the Industrial Party would, on the one hand, be secure against reprisals after the counter-revolution and, on the other, would have better chances to receive positions.

ANTONOV-SARATOVSKY : Did it happen that in those branches of industry which were in your hands you showed favour to your adherents, while trying to squeeze out the adherents of the Soviet Government?

LARITCHEV : There certainly existed certain opposition to the nomination of members of the Communist Party and other undesirable persons. In Gosplan there was a tendency not to let in young people. There were some incidents with Rabinovitch because of his squeezing out young Communists.

Kalinnikov's Statement.

Kalinnikov was born in 1874. His father, before his marriage, was in business as a pedlar, but married the

daughter of a landowner, receiving some land as a dowry. By the time of the Revolution, 45 years later, he owned about 200 dessiatines (540 acres) of land, worth about 35,000 roubles (£3,500). Kalinnikov took his degree at the University and also at the Technical High School. He worked as a lecturer at the Technical High School, and after the February Revolution became a Professor, remaining in that position up to 1924, apart from being engaged during the war in various military, technical and industrial commissions. At the beginning of his academic work, his salary was 100 roubles per month, but before the war he was receiving up to 300 roubles. After the October Revolution, a definite counter-revolutionary act on his part took place in the form of the academic strike in which he participated. Notwithstanding this, the Commissariat of Education left him at his post up to 1924. He worked subsequently in the Military Aviation Academy, where he directed the material testing laboratory. In 1924 he was appointed member of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission, and remained there until January, 1930, occupying most of the time the post of Chairman of the Industrial Section. At the same time he occupied a number of other posts on various scientific and technical committees, four of them by direct appointment of the Government, and as editor of a scientific journal. In the State Planning Commission his salary was successively 400, 500 and, since the end of 1929, 600 roubles per month. His total income, including literary fees, amounted during the last two or three years to about 1,000 roubles per month.

KRYLENKO: What were your political opinions after the October Revolution and up to the present?

KALINNIKOV: " I welcomed the February Revolution. I sympathised with the Party of the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets), although I remained officially outside the Party. My attitude to the October Revolution was one of definite hostility."

The accused briefly summarised his former statements about his hopes at the beginning of the New Economic Policy, the collapse of these hopes after the end of the restoration period, and the beginning of his wrecking work some time in 1926. At that time he was participating as a member of the State Planning Commission in drafting a list of proposed concessions, and this work was conducted by him along definite sabotage lines. He first met Palchinsky in 1923, at the time of some economic crisis, and Palchinsky often used to repeat his favourite sentence: " The worse, the better." In the summer of 1927 he joined the Engineering Centre, being induced to do so by Khrennikov.

In reply to a question by Krylenko, he admitted that he began his wrecking work as a result of his own convictions, without any inducement from outside, and it was in this spirit that he carried on his sabotage work in the concessions committee. As to the idea of intervention, it was imported from abroad. He never took any part in political work and was not interested in politics, neither was he familiar with various political programmes and tendencies.

KRYLENKO: You said that the idea of the intervention was brought from abroad, so that the methods of its realisation, about which we questioned Ramzin and Laritchev, were sufficiently clear to you.

KALINNIKOV: The methods of intervention were to be by way of a military attack.

KRYLENKO: And how did you comprehend the method of the restoration of capitalism?

KALINNIKOV: The method of restoration, once a military dictatorship was established, was, of course, to be only one—white terror. There could have been no other. That admits of no doubt. Once we were relying upon intervention, if the foreign troops, the foreign bourgeoisie, foreign imperialism, had won, they naturally would have tried first to stamp out in the severest possible way all that which had helped to create and support the development of the Soviet order.

KRYLENKO: Ramzin said here that he did not visualise quite clearly the objective inevitability of such a course, but you, although far removed from politics, were quite clear about the situation?

KALINNIKOV: To me it was quite clear.

KRYLENKO: I assume it was clear to any other member of your organisation?

KALINNIKOV: I should think so. Once the foreign troops had arrived, they would in any case have settled the question of the dictatorship in their own way. They would be masters of the situation, and the Industrial Party and the Torgprom could do nothing.

KRYLENKO: And you will probably agree with me if I say that any other conception, or the propaganda of any other conception, is nothing but political hypocrisy?

KALINNIKOV: I quite agree with you.

KRYLENKO: What were your duties as a member of the Central Committee? I mean wrecking duties?

KALINNIKOV: My duty was to co-ordinate the industrial plans. Acting on instructions from the Engineering Centre, and

later from the Central Committee of the Industrial Party, what I did was to let all the defects remain in the plans, as they arose from the unco-ordinated development of the individual branches of the industry, and the disproportions introduced by the wrecking work of the State Planning Commission and contained already in the plans as they emerged from the Supreme Economic Council.

Questioned as to his conception of the régime to be established in consequence of the overthrow of the Soviet Government, Kalinnikov, like his predecessors, stated that it was to be a dictatorship. Like them, he had not considered its practical consequences, but admitted that it was " impossible " for the dictatorship to be bloodless : " White terror cannot be bloodless."

THE PRESIDENT : In your capacity as Principal of the Moscow Technical High School you were engaged in sabotage and in a strike?

KALINNIKOV : I took part in and led the strike.

THE PRESIDENT : Was that a strike of professors or students, and what were its objects?

KALINNIKOV : It was a strike of professors. Its object was to secure academic autonomy.

THE PRESIDENT : Autonomy from whom?

KALINNIKOV : From interference by the People's Commissariat of Education.

THE PRESIDENT : From the Soviet Government?

KALINNIKOV : Yes.

THE PRESIDENT : The strike was thus directed against the Soviet Government?

KALINNIKOV : Yes.

THE PRESIDENT : The strike bore a definitely political character?

KALINNIKOV : Yes.

THE PRESIDENT : How do you reconcile that with your statement that you were outside of politics?

KALINNIKOV : I don't deny that I have throughout held strong counter-revolutionary views.

THE PRESIDENT : You said that after the collapse of the Cadet Party, you dropped your Cadet views and became more " left " than they.

KALINNIKOV : I considered that they had played a shameful role, that they had let power slip from their hands in October. I decided that it was not worth supporting them in the future.

THE PRESIDENT : What party did you support?

KALINNIKOV: I became more radical than the Cadets.

THE PRESIDENT: How?

KALINNIKOV: In the direction of a bourgeois-democratic republic.

THE PRESIDENT: And what in your opinion is the view of the Cadets?

KALINNIKOV: A constitutional democracy.

THE PRESIDENT: You thus differentiate between a bourgeois democracy and constitutional democracy, and regard the former as being more radical, more to the left, than the second. Do you consider such a differentiation correct?

KALINNIKOV: I am not sufficiently versed in political questions, and cannot say.

THE PRESIDENT: But you are versed in the main question, in your attitude to the Soviet State, to the Soviet Government and to Socialist construction?

KALINNIKOV: I fully admit my hostility to the Soviet power as a whole.

THE PRESIDENT: From the beginning?

KALINNIKOV: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And up to the very last?

KALINNIKOV: Until I was arrested. Of late, before my arrest, I felt as if my views were changing, but I could not stop my hostile work against the Soviet Government.

THE FIFTH DAY. NOVEMBER 29th.

(Morning Session.)

(*Charnovsky was next called up for examination.*)

CHARNOVSKY: I am 62 years of age and was born in Warsaw. My parents died when I was 12 years old. I began to earn my own living by giving lessons while still in the secondary school, and had to fight for existence the whole time of my studies, both at school and the university. I held the degrees of both the Moscow University and the Technical High School. It was intended to send me abroad for further study, but these plans were frustrated by the Ministry of Education in view of my Polish origin. I began to work in a factory and have been active as an engineer since 1896 (i.e., for 35 years). During my service at the Sormovo Works, I was the first to introduce the eight hour day instead of the twelve hour day in the hot steam workshop. This led to some complications, and owing partly to this (as well as to some personal reasons), I had to leave the factory. That was in 1907. I was then offered a chair in the Moscow Technical High School, which I accepted, at a salary of 2,400 roubles a year; the last salary at the factory was 4,200 roubles a year.

I met the October Revolution in a spirit of unfriendliness because it introduced great changes in my existence. As to the February Revolution, it aroused some apprehensions and expectation of changes, but I expected the latter to be in the direction of better times. I could judge of the results of the revolution only as a technician, not being much of a politician. It is true that I know history well and have read a great deal, but I did not belong to any political party.

KRYLENKO: And the main question, that of the autocracy, did it interest you?

CHARNOVSKY: I was not an upholder of the autocracy as such, but I was reconciled to it.

KRYLENKO: It did not disturb you?

CHARNOVSKY: No, it did not.

KRYLENKO: Did you take any part in political life during 1905, 1906 and 1907?

CHARNOVSKY: No. I was a witness of events, but took no part in them.

KRYLENKO: Did you vote at the elections to the State Duma?

CHARNOVSKY: Not to the first one.

KRYLENKO: As a matter of principle?

CHARNOVSKY: For a variety of reasons, and I was not quite clear for whom to vote. At the election to the second Duma I voted for the least incomprehensible to me, namely, for the Cadets, although I was not a member of their Party and differed from them on many points.

KRYLENKO: You said that you met the October Revolution in a spirit of unfriendliness. Perhaps you will find some stronger expression, more in accordance with reality?

CHARNOVSKY: Well, hostility.

KRYLENKO: Perhaps that would be more correct?

CHARNOVSKY: Probably it would.

Proceeding, the accused related how in 1918, when working as a scientific secretary of the Society for the Promotion of Experimental Research Work, he was able, by approaching N. P. Gorbunov, to save the library of that society from the destruction which threatened it: the library was nationalised, and some funds were granted to execute some repairs in the building. So he became for the first time an official of a Soviet institution, of the Scientific Technical Section of the Supreme Economic Council. From 1919 to 1921 he worked in Centrosoyus, and in that year he received an official appointment to a responsible position in the Scientific Technical Section.

KRYLENKO: Your hostility continued?

CHARNOVSKY: It did not express itself in anything tangible, but it was there because no change had yet occurred.

KRYLENKO: To what group did you belong in Centrosoyus?

CHARNOVSKY: I attended only to my technical work.

KRYLENKO: What was the attitude of the employees? Was it anti-Soviet?

CHARNOVSKY: As far as I can judge, there was a great deal of anti-Soviet feeling, but there were also pro-Soviet elements.

KRYLENKO: What was the character of the general conversations of the circles in which you moved?

CHARNOVSKY: They were not anti-Soviet but they were critical.

KRYLENKO: When did your acquaintance with Khrennikov begin?

CHARNOVSKY: It began at Sormovo, where Khrennikov was assistant director and afterwards director. In 1927 he was chairman of the Scientific Technical Council on the metal industry, I myself being chairman of the section of this Council dealing with the treatment of metals.

KRYLENKO: When did you first become aware of some wrecking work?

CHARNOVSKY: In 1927, soon after I was drawn in by Khrennikov. The aims of some acts were not clear to me, but some actions I could not regard otherwise than as wrecking. For instance, the closing down of some works seemed to me to be an act of sabotage, or the destruction of part of the equipment owing to negligence or to design, I couldn't say which.

KRYLENKO: You saw this?

CHARNOVSKY: I saw it and it seemed to me incomprehensible. I was not aware of the actual aims, not having been confided in, and I thought it was done owing to tomfoolery.

KRYLENKO: But you were the scientific adviser, and you saw something wrong; surely you ought to have reported it?

CHARNOVSKY: As I stated before, I possessed neither the civic courage nor the civic honesty required for that.

KRYLENKO: Why?

CHARNOVSKY: Because it seemed to me that it was beyond my duties. Only once I took official action and reported that a number of old buildings were being destroyed, and that the scrap metal resulting therefrom was being sold at extremely low prices, although it contained a great amount of valuable metal.

KRYLENKO: But didn't you talk to Khrennikov and others about what all this meant?

CHARNOVSKY: I talked to those whom I met, but received in reply some general statements to the effect that this was done according to plan. I admit that I was guilty of a bureaucratic attitude.

KRYLENKO: It is now a well-known fact that one of the aims of the wreckers at that period of reconstruction of the industrial enterprises consisted in efforts towards the reconstruction of some enterprises to prepare them for their former owners. They developed some enterprises and did nothing for the others. Did you experience in practice this part of the wrecking work?

CHARNOVSKY: Only in some cases.

KRYLENKO: Your hostile attitude to the Soviet Government remained as before, and you were probably of the opinion, as were some others, that "the worse the better?"

CHARNOVSKY: No, it was not that, but I thought it was not my business and held aloof. In this I am guilty.

KRYLENKO: It did not disturb you?

CHARNOVSKY: No, it didn't.

KRYLENKO: Very well, let us pass now to your direct approach and first acquaintance with the wreckers.

CHARNOVSKY: In 1927 I was drawn by Khrennikov into the work of the Engineering Centre. As I stated before, he at first hid the aims of the organisation, talking mostly on the improvement of the material and service position of the technicians and engineers, on the necessity of united efforts in order to obtain the restoration of their former rights.

KRYLENKO: And when were you clearly told what it was all about?

CHARNOVSKY: I think it was towards the autumn of 1927, after the holidays.

THE PRESIDENT: What were your total earnings at that time?

CHARNOVSKY: I was receiving about 700 to 800 roubles per month. Just before my arrest, my income, together with fees for literary work, amounted to from 800 to 850 roubles per month. But there were periods when I brought out some big works, during which I received more. I was paid, first, about 100 roubles per sheet (16 pages), later on I received 200, and for some work even 250 roubles per sheet.

KRYLENKO: Let us return to the moment when the political aims of the organisation became clear to you. Was it towards the end of 1927?

CHARNOVSKY: I think it was more towards the middle.

KRYLENKO: Perhaps we can make it a little earlier.

CHARNOVSKY: No, I began this work, began attending various commissions and circles, in the spring of 1927.

KRYLENKO: What questions relating to intervention were you discussing then?

CHARNOVSKY: In 1927 we were already informed that intervention was contemplated. I had occasion to talk about this with Khrennikov. We were going somewhere in a railway carriage and, being in a small circle, he told us about his Paris

meetings. He mentioned intervention and the prospects of a dictatorship and the future bourgeois democratic order. I remember having asked how intervention was conceived of in the complete absence of any internal help, in the absence of a sympathetic attitude on the part of the population. Would this question be discussed, and how? He replied that there was nothing to discuss; the question was settled there, in Paris. Once they had settled it they would carry it through, as well as the dictatorship. Although I was not much of a politician, I said that it seemed doubtful to me that such a plan could be carried out without many victims. I reminded him of the Paris Commune and the dictatorship of MacMahon, which lasted for 7 years. Such a protracted period might lead to the total ruin of industry, because for the whole of that time industry would not work. He replied that that was not our business, that once they had decided on it, it was for them to prepare for it and look out for the necessary means.—It thus became clear to me that a counter-revolutionary organisation existed which would apply counter-revolutionary methods.

KRYLENKO: How is it that you, a man standing aside from politics, plunged suddenly into politics up to your neck?

CHARNOVSKY: I consider this one of the greatest mistakes of my life.

KRYLENKO: A mistake! Was it only a mistake?

CHARNOVSKY: And a crime, too.

Being further pressed by Krylenko as to why he was thus brought into the inner circle of the wreckers by Khrennikov, and whether there were not some more definite actions in his past which might have justified and provoked Khrennikov's confidence, the accused first gave a number of evasive replies, admitting, however, that Khrennikov regarded him as "one of his own people, who would not betray him and would support him in so far as it lay in his power." In 1918 he, together with Kalinnikov, took an active part in the academic strike. On the question of the dictatorship, and what it implied for the working class, he repeated Khrennikov's statements that as the question was settled in Paris there was nothing to talk about.

At the same time, however, he "considered that the question was not settled finally, but only on principle."

The examination was next taken up by Krylenko's assistant, Friedberg, who referred to the incident in the High School during a lecture given by Charnovsky, in which he quoted to the students some wrong figures, deliberately, as the latter saw. Charnovsky denied that he quoted wrong figures and that it was for that that he left the High School.

FRIEDBERG: In your depositions you said that you were acting as the connecting link between the Central Committee of the Industrial Party and your group?

CHARNOVSKY: Yes, that was my main task.

FRIEDBERG: Perhaps it would be more correct to say that you, as a member of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party, were the leader of that particular group?

CHARNOVSKY: I took part in the work of the Central Committee in directing these activities.

FRIEDBERG: In your depositions you stated further that you were carrying out counter-revolutionary obligations and that it weighed heavily on you. What does that mean?

CHARNOVSKY: It means that a change, a sobering process, was taking place within me; I felt that the plans for reconstruction worked out by the Soviet Government were correct, and would have the most useful effect on our industry. I felt that, acting as wreckers, we were as a matter of fact interfering with this useful work.

FRIEDBERG: Notwithstanding this, you continued your work on the Central Committee up to your arrest?

CHARNOVSKY: As a matter of fact, already in the spring I informed my comrades that the work was weighing so heavily on me that I was not able, either physically or morally, to continue it.

FRIEDBERG: But you took no steps to make yourself free?

CHARNOVSKY: Official declarations were not in vogue with us. I just pointed out that I was unable to continue working.

FRIEDBERG: Perhaps this burden on you was caused by the realisation that your work was hopeless?

CHARNOVSKY: I considered that all our efforts led to nothing, and that the Five Year Plan would be carried out all the same.

KRYLENKO: You were the leader of the wrecking work in the metal industry? Were you representing this branch of industry on the Central Committee?

CHARNOVSKY: Yes.

KRYLENKO: Was this work, which continued for several years, guided by you or not?

CHARNOVSKY: We guided it.

KRYLENKO: Not we, but you.

CHARNOVSKY: I personally——

KRYLENKO: Were you guiding these wrecking acts or not?

CHARNOVSKY: I was not guiding wrecking acts in the literal sense of the word.

KRYLENKO: What, then, were you guiding?

CHARNOVSKY: I was making out the requirements and the shortage of various details, and reported.

KRYLENKO: To whom?

CHARNOVSKY: I reported to the Machinery Construction Board.

KRYLENKO: That's not it. To whom did you report on this in the wrecking organisation?

(*Charnovsky made no reply.*)

KRYLENKO: Were you guiding the wrecking work in the metal industry?

CHARNOVSKY: I was not doing any wrecking work in the field of production.

KRYLENKO: In which field, then?

CHARNOVSKY: In planning.

KRYLENKO: And what about the field of production?

CHARNOVSKY: You see, my words may conflict with my actions. I pointed out the necessity of taking certain steps in order to improve the direction, but those measures could not be carried out.

KRYLENKO: To whom did you point this out?

CHARNOVSKY: To the Machinery Construction Board.

KRYLENKO: Were you directing the wrecking work in the Central Committee of the Industrial Party with regard to the metallurgical industry, or not?

CHARNOVSKY: I was ascertaining the consequences that would arise if the existing state of affairs continued—which would be worse.

KRYLENKO: That means that in your wrecking work you were an adviser?

CHARNOVSKY: That is correct. I was pointing out the consequences but could do nothing myself. I had two persons at my disposal.

KRYLENKO: And did these persons do wrecking work?

CHARNOVSKY: Yes, they did it in the Trusts.

KRYLENKO: You were doing wrecking work in planning, while your deputies were acting in the sphere of production, and

you were submitting the plans of the wrecking work to the Central Committee?

CHARNOVSKY: I ought to have gone to the Machinery Construction Board and reported that wrecking work was going on everywhere.

KRYLENKO: But what kind of a wrecker would you have been then?

CHARNOVSKY: That would have been my civic duty. I didn't do it, although I saw everywhere a number of hostile actions, which I covered up and didn't reveal.

The further examination of Charnovsky, during which he was confronted with Kalinnikov, definitely established that Charnovsky was one of the most important members of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party, the direct successor to Khrennikov in arranging wrecking work in the metal industry, as well as espionage work. Further, Kalinnikov did not confirm the statement by Charnovsky that the latter was complaining to him some time in 1929 about being tired of his work as a wrecker.

During cross-examination it was revealed that Charnovsky, who led the professors' strike against the Soviet Government because it had interfered with the "independence" of the schools by prohibiting counter-revolutionary activities, had refused to sign a famous protest of university professors in 1912, against interference with university independence by the Tsarist Minister of Education, Casso.

Examination of Kuprianov—The True Servant of His Former Master.

KUPRIANOV stated that he was born in 1871 in a peasant family, his father and mother both being peasants. They were a family of eleven children. He started his education in the village school and later on, thanks to the assistance of some relatives, he was able to enter a secondary school. He earned his own living by giving lessons. He finished the Moscow Technical High School in 1895 and entered the service of the former "Great Yaroslav Factory." A year after, he was sent to England for nine months. On his return he was made head of the spinning department. About three years later he obtained a position as assistant director of the "Pokrovsk Factory," where he remained for two years. He then left to take up a position in a factory in the Kostroma province belonging to Konovalov, where he remained for 17 years, as manager of the weaving, spinning and finishing sheds. He worked there up to the time of the nationalisation of the factory in 1918, when he was made a member of the State Board which was formed at

that time. His remuneration during his work with Konovalov was at first 4,200 roubles per year, rising towards the end to 11,000 plus a bonus of 1,000. He had no shares in the factory, working all the time as an employee.

KRYLENKO: Did you take part in political life?

KUPRIANOV: Neither as a student nor later did I belong to any political party, or take any part in political life.

KRYLENKO: Did you vote at the elections to the Duma?

KUPRIANOV: Only in the elections to the last Duma, Konovalov being the candidate, and it being very awkward for me not to do so.

KRYLENKO: And did you vote at the elections to the Constituent Assembly?

KUPRIANOV: I don't remember. I think that Konovalov was already arrested at that time.

KRYLENKO: So you didn't vote because it was useless?

KUPRIANOV: I was a very busy man and did not engage in politics.

KRYLENKO: What was your attitude to the February and October revolutions?

KUPRIANOV: The February revolution was greatly welcomed by all of us, because it seemed to open before us a broad vista, the more so that my late master was a member of the Provisional Government. As to the October revolution, I was quite unprepared for it. It was a complete surprise for me, and at first I could not make out what it all meant.

KRYLENKO: Did you have any relations with Konovalov while he was in the Government?

KUPRIANOV: No, at that time he did not attend to the factory, the whole management of the latter being in the hands of a Board and of Lopatin in particular.

KRYLENKO: When did Konovalov emigrate?

KUPRIANOV: I cannot say for certain, but I think it was at the beginning of 1918.

KRYLENKO: Did he leave any instructions to the Board before escaping abroad?

KUPRIANOV: I was not in Moscow before he left. Gerasimov went to see him, but probably the conversation was chiefly about providing him with funds. I think so, because I heard later from Gerasimov that Konovalov had very small resources abroad.

KRYLENKO: So the talk with Gerasimov turned about the transference of money abroad.

KUPRIANOV: Probably so.

KRYLENKO: Can you say anything more definite?

KUPRIANOV: I heard from Gerasimov that about £20,000 were purchased and transmitted abroad.

KRYLENKO: When was that?

KUPRIANOV: In 1918.

KRYLENKO: And afterwards?

KUPRIANOV: At that time the factory was already nationalised.

KRYLENKO: That was so legally, but *de facto* the management remained in the hands of Gerasimov, Lopatin and yourself?

KUPRIANOV: No, a State Board of working men was formed.

KRYLENKO: But you were members of it?

KUPRIANOV: I joined it to hand over affairs and resigned in July, 1918.

KRYLENKO: Do you know whether Lopatin had any connection with Konovalov at that time?

KUPRIANOV: I know that from 1919 to 1922 Lopatin frequently gave directions to preserve the factories in the state in which they were left. At that time neither any wrecking organisation nor the Torgprom were in existence, so I presume that Lopatin was connected directly with the owners.

KRYLENKO: Was this Konovalov?

KUPRIANOV: I remember there were instructions not only from Konovalov, Lopatin at that time being rather closer to Riabushinsky. His relations with Konovalov were rather unfriendly, because of an incident after which Lopatin had to stop all communications with Konovalov.

KRYLENKO: What was that?

KUPRIANOV: I heard this story from Lopatin. I cannot say for certain in which year it was, but in any case before the introduction of the New Economic Policy. Lopatin (i.e., the late Board) sold or discounted on the " Black Exchange " acceptances by Konovalov, Ltd. These acceptances were presented for payment abroad, and he knew nothing about the whole affair.

KRYLENKO: In other words, Lopatin's group simply swindled Konovalov. What was the amount?

KUPRIANOV: £50,000.

KRYLENKO: You said you did not understand the October revolution, but what in fact was your attitude towards it?

KUPRIANOV: In 1918 I left the textile industry and went to live with my brother in the country.

KRYLENKO: Was your attitude positive or negative?

KUPRIANOV: Certainly negative, otherwise I should not have left work.

KRYLENKO: Perhaps we can define it more exactly. Was it hostile?

KUPRIANOV: It took no active form.

KRYLENKO: Except a refusal to work?

KUPRIANOV: Yes.

KRYLENKO: Except an act of sabotage?

KUPRIANOV: Yes.

KRYLENKO: Had you any personal savings?

KUPRIANOV: About 40,000 roubles in State loans.

KRYLENKO: What happened to them?

KUPRIANOV: They were all lost.

KRYLENKO: When did you begin responsible work in Soviet institutions?

KUPRIANOV: Towards the end of 1922 I joined the staff of the Ivanovo-Vosnessensk Trust and in May, 1924, at the urgent request of the late V. P. Nogin, I assumed the post of Director of Cotton Industry in the Textile Directorate of the Supreme Economic Council. Later I was promoted to the position of Senior Director, and after the formation of the All-Union Textile Syndicate I joined the latter in the position of manager of its Industrial Section. That was in 1928.

KRYLENKO: What was under your management?

KUPRIANOV: Eight trusts, about 75 to 80 per cent. of the textile industry.

KRYLENKO: What were its functions? Planning?

KUPRIANOV: No, it was the fulfilment of the industrial programme and control over it. The plans were prepared in another section headed by Lopatin.

KRYLENKO: So Lopatin was heading the planning section and you the industrial section.

KUPRIANOV: Yes, it was so during the last period.

KRYLENKO: And who were your assistants? Were they also wreckers?

KUPRIANOV: Yes, they were all "infected."

KRYLENKO: When did you begin actual wrecking work?

KUPRIANOV: By the middle of 1925, at which time we were organised by Lopatin.

KRYLENKO: In what way?

KUPRIANOV: He created the wrecking group. It was done at first on the pretext that it was necessary to defend in a co-ordinated way the questions of principle which were under discussion.

KRYLENKO: Were you receiving any financial remuneration from Lopatin?

KUPRIANOV: He offered me some, but I was suspicious that it was the money obtained from the acceptances drawn on Konovalov.

KRYLENKO: You were suspicious about the money being stolen?

KUPRIANOV: Yes.

KRYLENKO: And what about the money distributed for wrecking work.

KUPRIANOV: I was receiving that.

KRYLENKO: When was that?

KUPRIANOV: At the end of 1927 I received a small sum, and then again in the second half of 1928, and the first half of 1929.

KRYLENKO: When did you become aware of the existence of a Centre?

KUPRIANOV: About the middle of 1926.

KRYLENKO: And when did you enter it?

KUPRIANOV: During Lopatin's lifetime I took no part in the work of the Centre. After his death the first candidate to take his place was A. A. Fyedotov, but owing to ill-health he requested me to attend instead.

KRYLENKO: Were you acquainted with the political programme before entering?

KUPRIANOV: No, but later I was.

KRYLENKO: And also with the intervention plans?

KUPRIANOV: Yes, they were known to me. I knew from Lopatin about the concessions policy. Talks about intervention went on during his lifetime. When Fyedotov returned

from abroad in 1925, after his interview with Krestovnikov, he told us that the first conversation during that interview related to intervention, but at that time it was all so vague that no particular importance was attached to it.

KRYLENKO: But when did you learn more definitely?

KUPRIANOV: In 1927 we learned from Fyedotov about the news Ramzin had brought with him.

In the course of his further examination, accused admitted that he was present three times at the sittings of the Central Committee, but denied that he had any knowledge of espionage work. The question of damaging the factories at the time of intervention was raised, but nothing definite was decided, some of the plans suggested being rather childish. He was instructed to have "his own" men in all departments dealing with mobilisation, and he insisted on the selection of suitable men for these posts with an eye to the work intended. In reply to Braude (counsel for the defence), who asked when he first heard about the interest taken by Poincaré in intervention, he replied that it was in 1928 after the return of Fyedotov from abroad.

BRAUDE: What effect on you had the news that Poincaré himself was promoting the idea of intervention? Did it assist in furthering the wrecking ideas in your group?

KUPRIANOV: Certainly, once the head of the Government . . .

Further questions by the presiding judge produced the information that the idea of intervention was first mooted in their group as far back as 1925, but that afterwards this idea was somewhat relegated to the background. It again became acute in 1927. They also received instructions to set up counter-revolutionary cells amongst the former White officers and the students of the High Schools, this latter task having been entrusted to Ramzin and Charnovsky. This brought Charnovsky to his feet. He wanted to know when these instructions were given.

KUPRIANOV: About the end of 1929.

CHARNOVSKY: May I be permitted to say that, from May, 1929, up to the end of that year, I was not attending at the university, owing to the strained relations which existed between myself and the students, in consequence of a note in the wall paper.

KRYLENKO: What was there in the wall paper?

CHARNOVSKY: It made a strange allegation that I was hiding some church property in my study, and people laughed at me.

THE PRESIDENT: What kind of church property?

CHARNOVSKY: A lustre from the church school. There was a fire in the church school.

THE PRESIDENT: But why was the lustre in your study?

CHARNOVSKY: Somebody must have put it there.

THE PRESIDENT (*addressing Fyedotov*): Were there any instructions to form cells amongst the students?

FYEDOTOV: Karpov told me in 1928 that it was desirable that attention should be directed to the students, so as to bring into existence an opposition to the Government amongst them, and gain them for the wrecking organisation. He said that it was necessary to *support the Right deviation,* and thus cause a split amongst the students. I submitted Karpov's idea to the Central Committee, which decided to instruct all its members who were professors to take steps to organise such cells.

THE PRESIDENT: So Charnovsky received such instructions?

FYEDOTOV: Yes, as did all other professors.

CHARNOVSKY: May I say that I had the instructions, but did not carry them out?

THE PRESIDENT: Now you see. You denied before that you ever had such instructions.

CHARNOVSKY: I accepted the instructions as coming from the Central Committee.

THE PRESIDENT: You submitted to Party discipline?

CHARNOVSKY: Yes, I did.

Fyedotov's Examination.

FYEDOTOV stated that he was 67 years of age. He began working at 13, his parents being poor people of peasant origin. He took his degree in the Moscow Technical High School as far back as 1887. He worked as engineer in a number of factories, including the Morosov Works, where he was working in 1905. He was at one time in England, continuing his studies of the textile industry. He spoke and wrote three languages, including English. Up to 1905 he took no part in politics. He took some interest in political questions, but just as the man in the street. He was well read, mostly on economics and labour problems, and he studied the labour legislation of England and Australia, then the most advanced countries in this respect. In 1905 a change took place in his life. He took part in some " Red Funerals " of working men who were killed by the Cossacks during a demonstration. As a result he lost his position with Morosov. At that time his salary was about 25,000 roubles a

year. He then began work as a consulting engineer, working at the same time as a contributor to the Liberal "Russky Viedomosty," signing his articles with the nom-de-plume "Engineer." He mostly wrote on labour questions and on the textile industry, generally defending the interests of the working classes. He was one of the first to advocate in the legal press the introduction of the eight-hour day; he was also in favour of raising the wages of the workers and limiting the profits of the owners. During the first two years he earned in this way from 3,000 to 4,000 roubles a year, which rose afterwards to about 6,000 roubles. In 1917, after the February revolution, he was invited by Morosov to undertake some permanent consulting work with his firm, which he accepted. At that time he belonged to the Cadet party, and although not occupying any official party position he was allowed to attend the meetings of the Central Committee of the party. The February revolution he met in a spirit of great sympathy and even joy. As a "Cadet," he did not approve of the October revolution, but he understood its political necessity. After the nationalisation of the factories, he was elected by the workers, who remembered him from early days and knew the reasons why he left the factory, to the State Board. Before the war and Revolution he had some savings, which he invested in buying an estate of about 200 dessiatines (540 acres). For his work with Morosov he was receiving 5,000 roubles a month, i.e., 60,000 roubles a year.

KRYLENKO: And what was your attitude to the October revolution? Was it one of non-approval, or more?

FYEDOTOV: I admit that I belonged to a party which was hostile to the Bolsheviks, but at the same time I did not feel the hostility implied in your question. Since my student days I held the opinion that Communism, or Marxism, as we used to say then, is the highest achievement as an ideal. But only just an ideal.

KRYLENKO: Not ideal at all in real life?

FYEDOTOV: In real life impossible, impracticable, just as we see round ourselves millions of orthodox people, but not a single Christian.

KRYLENKO: Let us leave the Christians alone. Your opinion, then, is that Communism is an ideal impracticable in actual life?

FYEDOTOV: Yes, that was my point of view at the outbreak of the October revolution . . . Of late I have altered this opinion, because a lot of things which seemed totally impracticable and utopian have turned out differently in practice . . .

I joined the Board of the Orekhovo-Zuievo concern, was soon appointed its chairman, and worked with Communist working men, quite honestly and loyally.

KRYLENKO: And just at that time you were arrested in connection with the affair of the "Tactical Centre"?

FYEDOTOV: Yes, that was in 1920, but, as you know, I was released before the trial.

KRYLENKO: Yes, I remember. I was conducting that case.

FYEDOTOV: That is just what I wanted to remind you of. (*Laughter in the hall. The President calls for silence.*)

KRYLENKO: What was your attitude in 1918?

FYEDOTOV: I began to look at events as on a new historical stage through which it was necessary to pass. I looked on them as an experiment, which must be given, as the English say, a fair chance.

KRYLENKO: And did you at that time assist that experiment?

FYEDOTOV: I am proud to say that between 1918 and 1925 I worked quite honestly and satisfactorily.

Proceeding, the accused related how in 1920, V. P. Nogin took an interest in him and assisted him in obtaining a place in a sanatorium, and afterwards in getting work at the Textile Syndicate. He still regarded that time as one of the happy periods in his life, and was sure that, if Nogin had remained alive, he would not be sitting here now in the dock. But Nogin died in 1924. In 1925 he joined the wrecking group.

KRYLENKO: Will you now, please, explain to us your change to an anti-Soviet position, your turn to the camp of counter-revolution?

FYEDOTOV: That is the most difficult question you are putting me. In 1925 Lopatin suggested that I should join a new group of engineers who, he declared, ought to combine in order to raise their authority and improve conditions of life for themselves and their families. This form of approach seemed innocent enough. A number of engineers occupying high positions and enjoying general esteem joined this group, and I did not think it right to refuse.

KRYLENKO: Did you feel at the time a need to improve your position?

FYEDOTOV: The engineering circles as a whole undoubtedly did. The engineers at that time felt highly dissatisfied with their position. They were bereft of a number of rights and privileges which were inherently theirs.

KRYLENKO: In the sense of managerial rights?

FYEDOTOV: Yes. It must be pointed out that the engineers were placed in the position which made it impossible for them to uphold discipline at work, while at the same time it was their duty to enforce that discipline. This contradiction was felt very acutely by many engineers. In addition, the engineers found themselves exposed to insults from the working men, the latter being practically immune from punishment.

KRYLENKO: But don't you remember regulations by the Soviet Government safeguarding the interests of the engineers?

FYEDOTOV: Yes, but still it was so.

KRYLENKO: So all of you, under the influence of Nolde and Lopatin, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create a special group and a conspirative organisation of engineers?

FYEDOTOV: Yes, yes.

KRYLENKO: And how can this entry into a conspirative and illegal organisation be reconciled with your attitude to the Soviet Government?

FYEDOTOV: It could not be reconciled. And therein lies the whole tragedy of my life.

The accused referred to his journey abroad in 1923, when he met the two brothers Karpov, who made some enquiries about their factories, and to his journey in 1925, when he met Krestovnikov. The latter mentioned something about intervention, but the accused did not take this seriously, and laughed at the idea. The brothers Karpov told him that they had an arrangement with some English firms about the supply of new machinery for their factories as soon as they were able to return home. They were firmly convinced that the Soviet régime would soon collapse. He tried to persuade them that this hope was utterly unfounded.

KRYLENKO: Did you know Krestovnikov before?

FYEDOTOV: No, I never met him before. He came to me quite unexpectedly without any recommendations or introductions, so that I ran the risk of being deceived by an agent-provocateur. He knocked at my room late in the evening. I opened the door, and a young man in evening dress, about 35 years old, came in. He said that the chief object of his visit was to talk about a certain percentage from the orders which were to be placed in England, this percentage being destined as a commission for the emigrants. It was arranged with Lopatin before our journey and by correspondence with the respective firms—they were combined in an association—that one per cent. was to be paid to the emigrants and ½ per cent. to the engineers.

KRYLENKO: Lopatin arranged that in Moscow? Were you aware of it?

FYEDOTOV: Yes, I was instructed by Lopatin to confirm to the chairman of the association that we desired and supported this arrangement.

KRYLENKO: Did you carry out these instructions?

FYEDOTOV: Yes.

KRYLENKO: Did Lopatin inform you that you would have to negotiate on this question with the emigrants?

FYEDOTOV: No.

KRYLENKO: So he came on his own initiative?

FYEDOTOV: Yes. There was no need for any further negotiations, the whole thing being arranged beforehand.

KRYLENKO: And what did he want?

FYEDOTOV: He came to persuade us that one per cent. was too small a commission. He said they could not agree, and wanted at least five per cent.

KRYLENKO: And what was the result of this conversation?

FYEDOTOV: I said that one per cent. was sufficient.

KRYLENKO: Can you say to what it amounted?

FYEDOTOV: The sum was not paid all at once. During a period of one and a half to two years, they received about 200,000 roubles, and the engineers about 50,000.

Accused further gave in detail a description of his work in the wrecking organisation on the lines of his opening statement. The real objects of the organisation were disclosed to him by Lopatin after he returned from abroad. His main function was to discuss and draft the wrecking plans in the wrecking organisation and then to get them passed by the Board of the Textile Syndicate. After the death of Lopatin, he was to take his place as a connecting link with Khrennikov, but entered on these duties only by the end of 1927 after having received a personal invitation from Khrennikov.

KRYLENKO: Let us return to Krestovnikov's visit. On behalf of whom did he come?

FYEDOTOV: He told me he came from Konovalov. I was rather surprised to hear the evidence of Kuprianov, who said that Konovalov has lost his popularity and influence. On the contrary, I heard from Krestovnikov that it was the Riabushinskys who had lost their influence, because they had defrauded the Russian treasury and Wrangel, and had made a lot of money out of supplies to the Southern Army, having supplied

footwear with cardboard soles. I heard that that made a very unfavourable impression among the White emigrants, and had lowered the prestige of the Riabushinsky family.

KRYLENKO: You know that Riabushinsky was received in audience by Poincaré?

FYEDOTOV: So I was told.

KRYLENKO: I put this question from the point of view of his standing among the White emigrants.

FYEDOTOV: I understand.

KRYLENKO: It amounts to this, that Poincaré was receiving people who were guilty of fraud and theft?

FYEDOTOV: It does, undoubtedly.

KRYLENKO: Let us now proceed to the question of the commission. It was paid by the firms, the sellers?

FYEDOTOV: Yes.

KRYLENKO: And it was distributed amongst the engineering groups?

FYEDOTOV: Yes. They were added to other moneys received by the engineers from the emigrants.

KRYLENKO: What did the sellers pay the commission for?

FYEDOTOV: For nothing in particular. Out of kindness.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps out of gratitude?

FYEDOTOV: "Commission" is a usual form for bribes.

KRYLENKO: That is what we want to find out. But people demand some compensation for bribes.

FYEDOTOV: Exactly.

KRYLENKO: What were the bribes given for?

FYEDOTOV: Well, say, that orders should not be placed somewhere else.

KRYLENKO: And you accepted these bribes?

FYEDOTOV: Yes.

KRYLENKO: From 1925 till——?

FYEDOTOV: Up to the beginning of 1927. There was only one order.

KRYLENKO: How much was your share?

FYEDOTOV: I did not receive much.

KRYLENKO: How much?

FYEDOTOV: About 3,000 to 4,000 roubles . . . It was paid in instalments.

KRYLENKO: So you received in bribes 3,000 to 4,000 roubles in order to show preference to certain firms?

FYEDOTOV: Yes.

KRYLENKO: I have no more questions to ask.

Ochkin's Examination.

OCHKIN was born in a poor family, his father being a clerk receiving about 50 roubles a month. He was brought up in straitened circumstances, the family numbering six children. He was educated at a secondary school and afterwards in a technical school. At that time his father died and he had to earn his own living, so he combined attendance at the technical school with work as an assistant engine driver. Having finished the technical school, he was called up for military service, and after that was engaged as an assistant engineer by the Moscow Fuel Commission. After the October revolution he disagreed with that group of employees which refused to work, and he and a few other employees who accepted the dictatorship of the proletariat remained at work. With great difficulty they managed to carry on the work of the Commission. Some time afterwards he was invited to the Supreme Economic Council and entrusted with the organisation of the Chief Fuel Board (Glavtop). All this time he was working honestly and loyally, and enjoyed the practically unlimited confidence of the Soviet authorities. In 1920 he was sent to work in the Donetz coalfield, but did not remain there for long, as he felt the need of enlarging his education. When the Thermo-Technical Institute was formed, he asked to be attached to it. There he met Ramzin, who had the greatest influence on his future life. Ramzin taught him a great deal in technical knowledge, and also influenced his political outlook. Up to about 1928 he did not notice any change in Ramzin's attitude to the Soviet Government; Ramzin worked with the greatest energy and initiative and quite loyally, becoming on this account estranged from most of the engineers. All this changed in 1928, and by the end of this year he found himself a member of the Industrial Party. He was under great obligations to Ramzin; the latter was better educated and a stronger man than himself, so that he had to give way gradually.

KRYLENKO: In what form did your anti-Soviet views reveal themselves at that time?

OCHKIN: They coincided with those of Ramzin. We were in favour of reducing the rate of industrialisation.

KRYLENKO: And when did you become aware of his political tendencies?

OCHKIN: Towards the end of 1928.

KRYLENKO: And did you accept them at once?

OCHKIN: Yes.

KRYLENKO: And the programme, too?

OCHKIN: Yes.

KRYLENKO: And the intervention idea, and the methods of its preparation? Did you accept these all at once?

OSHKIN: During 1929.

KRYLENKO: Have you had some conversations, some disputes with Ramzin with regard to all these questions?

OCHKIN: Oh, yes, we had great disputes, but he always beat me in political questions.

KRYLENKO: To put it shortly, he saddled you and you carried him?

OCHKIN: Yes, I carried him.

KRYLENKO: I have no more questions.

Sitnin's Examination.

SITNIN was born in 1878, of peasant origin and brought up in poor circumstances. Out of a family of five he was the only one who managed to receive a higher education. During his studies at the Moscow Technical School, he was arrested for being a member of a Social-Democratic circle, and deported to his native town. There he remained for three years. After that he was able to continue his studies, and took his degree in 1904. He was sent abroad to England, and on returning home in 1905 began to work as an engineer in factories. His salary was at first 75 roubles a month, gradually rising to 400 roubles by 1913, and to 1,000 roubles afterwards. By the time of the revolution he was earning 1,300 roubles. He was not a member of any political party, and did not vote at the elections to the Duma. He did vote for a Social Democratic candidate at the elections to the Constituent Assembly after the October revolution.

KRYLENKO. What was your attitude to the October revolution?

SITNIN: Quite favourable. I had no political opinions whatsoever.

KRYLENKO: Did you vote for the Social-Revolutionaries?

SITNIN: No, I voted for the Social Democrats.

KRYLENKO: For the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks? Which was it?

SITNIN: For the Mensheviks . . . But I am afraid to say definitely now. All this was a sealed book to me.

KRYLENKO: So you were in favour of the October revolution, and voted for the Mensheviks?

SITNIN: I can explain why. As I said, I belonged to no Party, had no political views, just a general tendency. During the period between the February and October revolutions I became convinced that the Mensheviks and all other political parties which had been in office were of no use and had proved bankrupt through complete impotence.

KRYLENKO: You became convinced that they were not political parties, but a political jelly, and yet you voted for this jelly?

SITNIN: I did not know that at the time.

KRYLENKO: Were the elections to the Constituent Assembly before the October revolution?

SITNIN. It has gone out of my memory. As a man who did not engage in politics, I did not attach any importance to that.

KRYLENKO: Perhaps you voted by chance for the Bolsheviks?

SITNIN: I cannot say.

Proceeding, the accused referred to his election to the State board of the factory at which he worked after the October revolution. Soon afterwards he was elected to the Joint Board of the factories of the Tver province, and remained in this position until 1922. Then he became a member of the Board of the All-Union Textile Syndicate, and remained with this institution up to the time of his arrest, acting for the last few months as deputy for Kuprianov. By the end of 1925 or at the beginning of 1926, he was enlisted in the wrecking organisation by Lopatin. Up to that time, and especially during 1925, he was carrying on a fierce fight against Lopatin, who in his opinion did not concern himself with the interests of the factories. The object of the organisation at first was to induce the Soviet Government to follow on the path of the New Economic Policy, and thus move to the " right "; as this did not happen, they had " to move to the right " themselves, and aim at the forcible removal of the Soviet Government. At first he did not pay much attention to this, because he considered that there were no forces within the country to effect the overthrow of the Soviet Government. Then this force appeared in the form of intervention from abroad.

KRYLENKO: That means that after 1925 you worked in support of intervention?

SITNIN: I belonged to that group. My work was not important, but I worked and helped . . .

KRYLENKO: But the policy of intervention was known to you?

SITNIN: Yes, it was.

KRYLENKO: And you were doing work behind the textile front to create favourable conditions for intervention?

SITNIN: To a certain degree, I may say I did.

KRYLENKO: To a certain degree you did? It was clear that one of the objects of intervention was to overthrow the Soviet Government. Was this clear to you? Was that your aim?

SITNIN: It was an aim forced upon me.

KRYLENKO: How do you mean " forced "?

SITNIN: An aim to which I was drawn . . . I accepted the policy of intervention although it was a sore point with me. I don't know, it may seem ridiculous.

THE PRESIDENT: So you accepted the policy of intervention, being a member of the organisation which had accepted it? But what caused the inner conflict within you? Why was that?

SITNIN: According to my convictions I have a strong nationalist feeling. I love my country, and I consider that, for the present, Russia as a country, as a nation, can have no better government than the Soviet Government.

THE PRESIDENT: What, then, kept you in the organisation at that time, seeing that its object was intervention from abroad?

SITNIN: When the whole thing became clear to me, I thought I might find means to get out of it by and by. I did not know what else to do.

Accused gave details of his visits abroad, particularly to the U.S.A., where he organised the payment of secret commissions to the engineers.

KRYLENKO: Please, let us know, did you live all this time only by your earnings?

SITNIN: Yes.

KRYLENKO: Even when you were a member of the wrecking organisation?

SITNIN: Yes.

KRYLENKO: How much did you earn of late?

SITNIN: Of late, my salary was 550 roubles a month.

KRYLENKO: Was that all? Had you no other sources of income?

SITNIN: During the last few months I was giving lectures on the technology of textiles.

KRYLENKO: But you had no auxiliary sources of income?

SITNIN: I do not understand. What "auxiliary sources"?

KRYLENKO: I mean, not earned in the course of your employment?

SITNIN: No, nothing.

KRYLENKO: You are not an amateur collector of old coins?

SITNIN: No.

KRYLENKO: Have never collected?

SITNIN: No.

KRYLENKO: And you are not a collector of gold coins either?

(*Sitnin did not reply.*)

KRYLENKO: You do not collect gold coins?

SITNIN: Perhaps you will put the question more clearly. I do not understand it.

KRYLENKO: Will you tell us, please, whether anything was found at your home? Some gold coins?

SITNIN: They did not find them at my home.

KRYLENKO: Where, then, did they find them?

SITNIN: I gave them up myself.

KRYLENKO: When did you give them up, to whom, and why?

SITNIN: I handed them over to the G.P.U.

KRYLENKO: How much was there?

SITNIN: About 7,500 roubles (*sensation in the hall*).

KRYLENKO: Tell us, please, where did you get all this gold coin from?

(*Sitnin did not reply.*)

THE PRESIDENT: What coinage were they? Pre-revolutionary?

SITNIN: Yes, they were pre-revolutionary coins.

THE PRESIDENT: Russian coinage?

SITNIN: Yes, old Russian coinage.

KRYLENKO: Where did you get them from?

SITNIN: It was like this. At the beginning of 1922, with the revival of private trade, the tendency became noticeable in

many trusts, including the Tver Trust, to retain a certain commission, for the benefit of the staff.

KRYLENKO: You had, then, some income from outside?

SITNIN: It was only for one period lasting half a year.

KRYLENKO: But how did you get gold, and why?

SITNIN: They were allowed by the private traders who bought textile goods from the trust.

KRYLENKO: What was your role in this transaction?

SITNIN: I was a member of the Board, and the whole Tver group did so.

KRYLENKO: You, as a member of the Board, were selling textile goods to private traders, and were receiving for this a commission which you preferred to have in gold coins?

SITNIN: I don't remember now, why. I don't remember why I asked them to have it paid in gold.

KRYLENKO: In fact, it was a bribe from the private traders?

SITNIN: In fact, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And why did you prefer to receive the bribes in Tzarist gold coinage?

SITNIN: Just because this money was in my opinion . . . because this money was to remain for a rainy day . . . It was done in Moscow by the manager of the Moscow office . . . There was no chervonetz then, the Soviet currency was falling in value.

In reply to the President, the accused admitted that his written statement in his deposition at the first examination by the examining magistrate, to the effect that he knew nothing about the existence of an Industrial Party, was not correct. Further questions by Otzep brought out that his wrecking activity consisted in not calling attention to the work of sabotage which he noticed, and in receiving bribes. He was not able to say whether the commission received by him from the American suppliers of cotton was a bribe in the legal sense or not, but in consequence of this commission, the seller expected that the cotton supplied by him would not be too strictly inspected before being passed, and that although he "did not guarantee such an inspection to the seller, he knew that the seller expected an easy inspection and took this into consideration."

This concluded the examination of the accused on the first group of questions.

THE SIXTH DAY. NOVEMBER 30th.

(Morning Session.)

The Court proceeded to the examination of the accused on the second group of questions, i.e., relations with the Torgprom in Paris and other agencies abroad. The examination began with Ramzin.

Ramzin first became aware of the existence of the Torgprom in 1927, when he joined the Engineering Centre. He knew that Palchinsky was in communication with Meshchersky. While Khrennikov was connected with both Meshchersky and Riabushinsky, Fedorovitch kept up connections with Urquhart. When he left for abroad in 1927, he was instructed by Palchinsky and Khrennikov to clear up the following three points with the Torgprom: First, the programme; second, intervention; third, new instructions, if any. He was given an address through which to communicate with Riabushinsky and, on arriving in Paris, rang him up on the 'phone and arranged for a drive in a motor-car, to have a discussion. The drive lasted for several hours, in the course of which Riabushinsky imparted to him a great deal of information, particularly about intervention, and the negotiations which he (Riabushinsky), was having on that subject with the French Government, through Loucheur. Riabushinsky also gave him some instructions on behalf of the Torgprom on the necessity of preparations being made within the country, and also arranged for future communications through the French agent in Moscow, K. He later made the acquaintance of this K. through Palchinsky.

Questions by Krylenko addressed to both Ramzin and Fyedotov brought out the fact that Riabushinsky, who was a member of the Torgprom and had dealings with Ramzin, was called Vladimir, and that, in the words of Fyedotov, he was regarded as an "extremely stupid man"; he was also the same man who defrauded Wrangel. Krylenko asked the Court to accept as evidence an article signed V. Riabushinsky, which appeared in the White Guard Paper, "Vozrozhdenie," No. 1861, of July 7th last, entitled "A Necessary War."

The Court decided to accept this article as evidence, and to have it read in court. The article runs as follows:—

"A NECESSARY WAR"

(An article by V. Riabushinsky published in the "Vozrozhdenie" No. 1861, July 7th, 1930 in Paris)

There are wars that are senseless, harmful, destructive; and there are wars that are useful, sensible, all-creative.

The last Great European clash belongs to the first category; and the coming armed struggle to be waged by the cultured section of humanity against the Third International, to secure the liberation of Russia, will, beyond a shadow of doubt, be assigned by history to the group of most just and most serviceable of all wars.

Almost five years ago it was pointed out in the columns of this paper that the Communist power was costing Russia two and a half billion gold roubles every year. To-day, unfortunately, the fact must be recorded that the sum has grown considerably since then.

As a matter of fact, in 1925 one might well have thought that the national wealth of Russia, even although it had greatly decreased during the first years of Revolution, had for the time being reached a certain state of equilibrium, which was equilibrium, after all, even if somewhat unstable; the damage wrought by the Bolsheviks amounted mainly to the fact that there had been no addition to the country's wealth.

We see a much worse state to-day: the active impoverishment of Russia has once more begun, and is acquiring enormous dimensions; and we shall scarcely be exaggerating if we put the damage at one and a half billion gold roubles annually. To this must be added the absence of that natural increment in Russia's national wealth on which one might have counted at the present time, providing the Bolshevik power had been destroyed even four years ago.

What could this amount to?

Before the Great War, our native land was able to place the equivalent every year of not less than two to three billion gold roubles on its assets columns.

In the opinion of many authorities, the United States is annually becoming richer at a rate of from thirty to thirty-five billion gold roubles.

Considering the way the Bolsheviks have been managing the country, our backwardness and other factors, yet at the same time taking cognisance of Russia's size and national wealth, as well as the business ability of her people and their numbers, we hold that after four years of free labour we could easily reach ten to fifteen per cent. of the amount represented by America's savings, that is, an average of nearly four billion gold roubles a year.

Coupled with the present improvishment of the country by one and a half billion roubles, this sum represents approximately the total amount of Russia's losses due to Communism. They

are therefore equal to five and a half billion gold roubles per annum.

It is perfectly clear that the annual influx into the European economic system of such wealth, in the form of a demand for various kinds of goods, with the possibility of immediate payment, would very speedily be reflected in the reduction, and it might even be in the wiping out, of the five-million strong army of the unemployed of Austria, Germany, and Great Britain.

This really would be a drastic solution of the problem of unemployment, and not one of those pitiful palliatives to which the timid statesmen of Western Europe have recourse at the present time.

How are we to rid the body politic of Europe of this Bolshevik ulcer?

Back in 1920, and up to 1925, specialists were prepared to carry out this operation in the space of six months, with an army of 1,000,000 men. The expenditure was calculated to run to £100,000,000.

To-day we see the machinery of the Soviet Power greatly shaken, and deserted entirely by the petty-bourgeois elements of the country, the peasantry chiefly. Proceeding on this assumption, and also for many other reasons, one may arrive at the conclusion that the operation of setting Russia free ought to be possible at the present time with a smaller number of men and in a shorter space of time than was the case five years ago.

Probably 500,000 men and three to four months would be sufficient to finish off this work in the rough. The final crushing of individual Communist bands would, of course, occupy a little more time, but that is rather in the nature of police work than of military operations.

Speaking generally, it must be observed that with each passing year the expenditure of force necessary to overthrow the Bolsheviks will become less, but it may be asked whether it is advisable just to wait for this reason alone.

It is possible that in five years' time the blow, not of an army, but of two or three divisions, will be enough to destroy the Red nightmare, and the expenses will be relatively insignificant—ten million pounds sterling instead of one hundred. But in the meantime world economy, and European economy particularly, will lose not less than two billion pounds sterling.

Does that look like a business proposition?

The overthrowing of Communism in Russia constitutes a grand and sacred undertaking and the moral duty of humanity. But even if we take our stand on the plain, unvarnished, soulless, and purely business point of view, "lending an ear indifferently to good and evil," even then we can safely make the assertion that there is not an enterprise in the world which would be more

justified from the business standpoint, or more profitable, than that of effecting the emancipation of Russia.

By spending one billion roubles mankind will receive a return of not less than five billions, *i.e.*, five hundred per cent. per annum, with the prospect of a further increase in the rate of profit every year by another hundred to two hundred per cent.

Where could you do better business?

And let us add this: The benefits will not be reaped in some future time, but immediately.

The formation of an international volunteer army of 1,000,000 men would at once reduce the numbers of the unemployed in Europe; and it is common knowledge, further, that any small war of short duration does not destroy economic life, but very often proves most beneficial. There is no doubt that the work of setting Russia free will bring about an industrial revival in Europe.

It can be taken that the demand for workers will increase by not less than five hundred thousand persons in any case; and they, together with the army volunteers, will solve to a considerable extent the problem of unemployment in Germany and Britain. There is nothing immoral in this, for the people who go to the war will not be compelled to do so, but will go voluntarily, will go for the sake of an idea."

KRYLENKO: I would like the Court to take note that the contents of this article fully confirm the description given to Riabushinsky by Fyedotov.

FYEDOTOV (*from his place*): I fully confirm that.

Fyedotov then volunteered a statement in which he said that, " if such articles as the one just read in Court are accepted in Europe, it shows the extremely low state of the mental capacities, not only of Riabushinsky, but of the Fascist section of French public and political opinion." He further ridiculed the assertions of the article about the injury caused to Russia by the existence of a Communist Government, and concluded by remarking that if, in the opinion of Riabushinsky, two divisions might be sufficient to overthrow the Soviet Government in five years' time, while about 500,000 men were required to do it now, then why not wait for another, say, six years when the Soviet Government would collapse without any effort from outside. " Why, then, all this bother?"

THE PRESIDENT: But does the article conform to the line of policy pursued by the Torgprom?

FYEDOTOV: Why, certainly, I do not deny that.

Fyedotov further submitted that the Torgprom always held strong opinions on the necessity of intervention, and that during

his second journey abroad, in 1928, he found the White Guard press full of articles describing the growth of the economic and military strength of the Soviet Union. The logical deduction from these articles was the necessity of hastening the date of intervention.

The examination of Ramzin was then resumed. He referred to his second journey abroad in 1928, together with Laritchev, to the preparations made in Moscow through K. for a meeting with representatives of the Torgprom and to the interviews which took place in London and Paris, already described in his opening statement.

KRYLENKO (*addressing the Court*): In view of the fact that a number of names have been mentioned here, I ask the Court to accept as evidence the book, "The Kolchak Campaign," which contains a translation of extracts from the diary of Janin. This will show, first, that Janin had already some previous experience as an interventionist on the territory of the U.S.S.R., and secondly, will disclose the work which he did during that intervention.

The Court decided to have extracts read out from the diary of General Janin. In this he says:—

"Honest people are so seldom met here that even I, a man who has seen a great deal, am bewildered."

This caused a kind of discussion between Janin and the British General, Knox, who, in an article published in the "Slavonic Review" for March, 1925, wrote:—

"The final tragedy in Siberia was prepared by many factors. One of them which is worth mentioning and which, of course, is omitted by the author of the diary, is the fact that the French General proved incapable of enforcing discipline in the Allied armies under his command."

To this General Janin replied:—

"Maybe he (General Knox) will remember the plenary meeting of the Allied Missions held in July, 1919, at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the presence of a representative of the United States, at which meeting General Knox, having described the outrageous state of affairs, concluded by recounting all the supplies and materials lost, and added: "If after all these I ever again ask my Government for anything, you can call me a damned fool."

"It seemed to me (to General Janin), as their commander, that it was a crime to sacrifice 50,000 brave men, exhausted by the war and privation, to the pleasure and profits of a gang of swindlers, profiteers and brute reactionaries assembled in Omsk, and representing the old Russia. . . ."

Laritchev was next called, and gave evidence about the meeting with the Torgprom and his report on the Industrial Party at that meeting. He referred to the demand presented by the Deterding interests to Russian Oil Products, Ltd., to reserve five per cent. from the sales of oil in Great Britain in favour of the late owners, a demand which was categorically rejected by R.O.P. The accused also described in detail their meeting with Lukomsky and Joinville.

At this stage, Krylenko again requested the Court to admit as evidence the declaration by the Torgprom published in the paper " Za Svobodu " of November 24, 1930. The declaration runs as follows :—

" In view of the publication on November 11, 1930, by the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. of the indictment of the counter-revolutionary organisation of the Engineering Centre (Industrial Party), the Russian Trade and Industrial Committee deems it its duty to declare the following :—

" The indictment declares that the Russian Trade and Industrial Committee has had communications with the so-called ' Engineering Centre ' in Russia, that it has assisted the accused with funds and organised an interview between the accused and the French General Staff for the purpose of preparing foreign intervention. All these statements, without exception, are invented. The Torgprom has never had any negotiations with the accused, has never organised any interviews with anybody, has never placed any funds at their disposal, and had no connections with them whatsoever.

" These accusations are alleged to be founded on the depositions of the accused. Such evidence has either been invented by the G.P.U., or has been got out of the accused by means of torture.

" The Soviet Government is obliged to explain to the Russian people the breakdown of its mad economic plans, and to justify them before political circles abroad. It is for this purpose that this terrible trial has been staged, and dozens of innocent people will be sentenced to death by the murderers.

" The Torgprom protest energetically against the lying assertions of the Soviet Government by means of which the latter wishes to justify the murdering *en masse* of elements undesirable to them. These horrible deeds show the hopeless position of the Soviet Government.

" In its capacity of the central organisation of the trading and industrial circles abroad, the Torgprom will continue untiringly its struggle against the Soviet Government, will continue to enlighten public opinion in the civilised countries on the actual meaning of events in Russia, and will continue to prepare for the

future emancipation of the Fatherland in the sense of freedom and right."

Signed, N. C. Denisov (Chairman), E. N. Lubovitch, G. N. Nobel, S. G. Lianosov, N. N. Ismar, S. N. Tretyakov."

RAMZIN : I have refused to be defended at this trial, and still more do I refuse the defence which is offered me by the Torgprom. I refuse it in the most categorical form because this defence is nothing but a tissue of impudent lies, because all the information which we gave about relations with the Torgprom, about contact with the French General Staff, about the finances, is absolutely true. And it might have been in our interest to make use of such evidence. But having from the beginning chosen the path of sincerely admitting our guilt, the path of discontinuing the struggle against the Soviet Government, I refuse categorically to make use of such a defence, and declare that the printed declarations by the Torgprom or its statements are nothing but impudent and unmitigated lies.

As to the assertion that we were subjected to torture, I think our presence here in court is sufficient material evidence of the fact that this is also an invention and a lie."

The other accused in turn made statements on similar lines to Ramzin. Fyedotov announced that, subject to the permission of the Court, they were prepared to sign a statement for the press denying all the allegations and inventions of the Torgprom. The Public Prosecutor, however, saw no reason for such a course, " the Court not being engaged in correspondence with the Torgprom "; the statements by the accused, being made in open Court would find their way into the press. Counsel for the defence agreed, and the Court decided accordingly.

THE SIXTH DAY. NOVEMBER 30th.

(Evening Session.)

Krylenko asked the Court to admit as evidence a statement published in the same issue of the White paper, " Za Svobodu," intended to counteract the unpleasant consequences of the trial for the Torgprom and White circles. The statement was headed : " Sensational disclosure on the forged documents made use of by Krylenko in the trial of the Industrial Party."

KRYLENKO : We are not making use of any document, and the prosecution does not possess the documents mentioned in this statement. I am requesting the Court to submit this document in evidence, not because I attach any importance to it as evidence for or against the accused, but simply in order, on the one hand, to register the anxiety prevailing in White Guard circles, in whose interest it is to belittle beforehand the evidence given by the accused in this trial, and, on the other hand, as showing what importance can be attached to statements and declarations emanating from White Guard circles, including the Torgprom.

The Court decided to admit as evidence, and to have read out, an extract from the statement, giving a list of the " documents " :—

A letter by N. Yakovlev to the editor of the paper, in which he stated that " in the near future there will take place in the U.S.S.R. a trial of the engineers of the so-called Industrial Party," and that the prosecution would make use of a number of forged documents, namely :—

1. The minutes of the proceedings and decisions of the Trade and Industrial Committee.

2. Reports on meetings giving the names of the persons present, among whom are included industrial experts living in the U.S.S.R.

3. Secret correspondence between the representative of the General Military Union, General Lukomsky, and high officers of the French General Staff.

4. Correspondence of some well-known public men with Poincaré, and also letters from P. N. Miliukov to Briand.

5. Various documents written on official notepaper of the French and other foreign institutions, and particularly of foreign embassies.

6. A copy of an agreement concluded between General

Lukomsky, the representative of the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich, and the Japanese general staff.

The examination of Ramzin and others was resumed. Ramzin gave further details of his meeting with Joinville and Janin.

Joinville and Lukomsky were trying to re-establish the connections which had been severed by the arrest of the members of the counter-revolutionary organisation in the war industries of the U.S.S.R. To his straight question on the strength of the army intended for intervention, he received no direct reply, apart from mere references to the military forces of Poland, Roumania, the Baltic States and the expeditionary forces of the former Wrangel troops. Mention was also made of assistance from the British fleet, both in the North and the South.

The examination next dealt with the interview with Colonel Richard, of the French General Staff, who expected to be sent on official duties to Moscow. The interview had for its object the establishment of contact for work in the future. Evidence was given by Laritchev, who described the subjects discussed with Richard. The latter was chiefly interested in the position of the war and chemical industries.

Fyedotov was next called, and asked whether it was a fact that Poincaré, when receiving the former Russian industrialists, showed particular interest in the preparation of crises and economic breakdown.

FYEDOTOV: Yes, Karpov told me that the disarrangement of the industrial plans was a trump card in the hands of the Torgprom.

KRYLENKO: But did Poincaré press for the acceleration of such work?

FYEDOTOV: As far as I could make out from Karpov's communication, he came purposely to urge the acceleration of this work, as this was demanded from the Torgprom by Poincaré.

KRYLENKO: In what sense was this trump card in the hands of the Torgprom?

FYEDOTOV: In the sense that, having prepared the ground for intervention and thus contributed its share by its wrecking work, it could appear as an equal party and put forward its demands. Otherwise nobody would have talked to or taken any notice of it.

KRYLENKO: Was your meeting with Karpov arranged from Moscow?

FYEDOTOV: No, the meeting was not arranged beforehand. I had no intention of going to Paris, but was to confine my journey to Germany. Only Khrennikov knew of my journey,

and I assume that he sent word about it through K. On my arrival in Berlin, I received a letter from Karpov in which he asked whether I could come to Paris and see him. I replied that I could not, and in another letter he informed me that he would come for a day to Berlin. We met in the Tiergarten, and went by car to some café in the outskirts of Berlin, where we remained for several hours in a separate room.

Fyedotov's examination having concluded, accused before resuming his seat asked to be permitted to make the following statement :—

There is one circumstance to which I should like to draw attention. During my interview with Karpov, he mentioned the name of Miliukov as a future minister. This shows that there was some agreement with the " left " wing of the emigrants. On the other hand, Professor Ramzin spoke about the intention of making use of the Wrangel army, which is in the hands of the " right " emigrants. This shows a combination of all the emigré forces.

KRYLENKO : You say that you regard it as important that the forces of the " right " and " left " combined?

FYEDOTOV : Yes, because up till then they never worked together. It is clear that this union of the various groups of emigrants was caused and directed by the French General Staff—the force which held the whole affair in its hands, and did everything possible to drawn in all elements : monarchists, Lukomsky, Wrangel, the Industrial Party in Moscow. . . . It is clear, and the more I think of it the more it becomes evident to me now, that it was the French General Staff which made all these groups combine and led them on a string.

After Ramzin had stated that during his last stay abroad—when sent by the Soviet Government to attend the World Power Conference in Berlin, in July, 1930—he had arranged for future contacts with the Torgprom to be made through Osadchy, a member of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., Osadchy was called.

Osadchy—Member of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.

When an old man with the face of a scholar was led into the hall, there was sensation among the audience.

Professor Osadchy, escorted by members of the G.P.U., approached the Court from the audience. He bowed to the Judges and commenced talking almost immediately.

It was a strange lecture that Osadchy delivered—Osadchy, the same man who in 1928 was himself with Krylenko and

Chayanov a public prosecutor in the Shakhty case—standing there, a corpulent old gentleman with a tuft of pointed beard clinging to his chin, his eye-glasses on the middle of his nose, his clear eyes meeting Krylenko's stony stare.

WITNESS OSADCHY: I joined the Industrial Party at the beginning of 1929, being closely associated with its Central Committee. After the arrest of Laritchev and Fyedotov which, I believe, took place in March, 1930, I was formally made a member of the Central Committee.

I knew in general what had been done so far as regards intervention. I knew for certain that Ramzin and Laritchev had been in Paris at the end of 1928, where they had communications both with the Torgprom and the representatives of the French General Staff. I already knew at that time that General Lukomsky was designated as the future Commander-in-Chief of the White Guard armies of intervention. I was not aware of the details until I became a member of the Central Committee. At its meetings—that is, in March and possibly in April, 1930—a complete picture of the proposed intervention plans was revealed to me for the first time. I got the following impression. France was to head the intervention. It was France which, through the General Staff and with the assistance of the Torgprom, was conducting what appeared to be a lengthy work of preparation. My recollection is that the work of these organisations had started before 1928, when Laritchev and Ramzin were in Paris. France apparently reserved to itself the guidance, instruction, and to some extent the material supply of the interventionist army. Apart from the White army, two countries were to play an active rôle: Roumania and Poland. Of the Border States Finland was definitely referred to as a country aggresively inclined against the Soviet Union, and which had apparently great experience in provoking all sorts of frontier incidents, for it was precisely frontier incidents that were taking place all along the frontier in Roumania and Poland. But my impression was that it was mainly in Finland that provocative action was to be taken, such as would supply a pretext for intervention. As regards the date of an intervention, all the time I was working in the Committee and was associated with it I was under the impression that it was to take place in 1930, last summer. It was only at a meeting of the Committee in March or April, 1930, at the time when intervention should really have become imminent, that I learned definitely of Ramzin's information to the effect that the interventionist forces abroad were not prepared to effect intervention at the appointed date.

I have forgotten to mention that I was aware, in general outline, that there existed in Moscow relations between the

members of the Central Committee and the agents of the French diplomatic service. In the Committee I learned quite definitely that there existed two persons: K. and R. (they figured under these initials), who, my impression is, were already in touch with the representatives of the Central Committee throughout 1929 and served as intermediaries in its relations with Paris. There, in the Committee, I learned definitely—although I heard of it earlier, while I was associated with the Committee—of considerable sums received from France. I am under the impression that these sums came from various sources. They came partly from the Torgprom. The General Staff also apparently contributed to them, also apparently organisations in sympathy with the preparation of intervention inside the country. These sums in March amounted to more than one million roubles.

At this meeting it transpired that even if intervention from without was ready for action in the summer of 1930, in any case the Industrial Party, in so far as it undertook to conduct preparatory work within the country for intervention (especially after receiving large sums of money), had not as yet managed to carry it out, or, to be more accurate, had done so only to an insignificant extent. Although some results had been achieved—the incredible delay of electrical construction in the Donetz, delay in electric power supply to Moscow and Leningrad—these results were insufficient. Moreover, it transpired at the same time that the work of the sabotage groups in industry had not reached the state of preparedness counted upon by the leaders.

The crucial point, however, was not so much the technical position of preparations within the country as the general political and social conditions as they appeared in March and the beginning of April, 1930. That which in 1929 was assumed to be a factor facilitating the technical work of the Industrial Party, which was its main field of activity, namely the hope of a real slowing down in the rate of construction—this factor was at once refuted by life. That which was regarded as an almost decisive factor—the class struggle, which had, apparently, reached a highly acute state in 1929, the class struggle in the village which, it was assumed, could create conditions more favourable for intervention than all the technical work of the Industrial Party, by risings of the kulaks, by, possibly, the demoralisation of the middle peasantry—factors which, up to January and even up to February seemed to be growing in importance and, right up to March seemed to be in glaring contrast to the unpreparedness of intervention from without—these factors, already in February (I believe it was in February or at the beginning of March, after the historic article by Stalin about dizziness from success), revealed a new picture to many (I should not say all), of the principal members of the Industrial Party.

They revealed that it was not due to the leadership of the Central Government or the Central Committee of the Communist Party, but to local over-zealousness, that there were many distortions of policy. A situation arose which in my mind already pre-determined the death of the Industrial Party and the extinguishing of all the hopes cherished by its leaders.

Such, approximately, was the position in May—I could adduce details in support of it—at the time that Ramzin, myself, and a number of other persons were already preparing to proceed to the International Power Conference in Berlin, which was to open on June 15th.

The Committee had already decided definitely to send an answer to Paris through an agent to the effect that not only they but also we ourselves were not ready, and the country was not ready either.

Abroad, they did not realise clearly the inevitable defeat of the Right deviation, on which tendency the majority of our rank and file members and some of the members of the Central Committee undoubtedly placed their principal emphasis.

It was difficult to settle the question of what answer to give as to when it would be possible to expect a favourable situation for intervention, but the answer had to be given, it was expected, and in the Central Committee we said in a tentative, approximate way, " Well, let us postpone it for a year." There was, apparently, a communication to the effect that within the country the work of preparation could progress independent of the political aim, which was to be defined in June, and that they could progress considerably in the course of a year.

This was the position at the time that Ramzin and I went to Berlin. Ramzin went earlier, I was detained by the preparation of material and left later. I met Ramzin in Berlin after June 20th, probably on the 24th or 25th, and learned that he had had an interview in Berlin. I remember a definite person by the name of Yasinsky, a professor, whom I knew in Moscow many years ago and who had been banished from the territory of the Union. I could not make out whether he was the representative or agent of the Torgprom on certain questions bearing on connections between the Torgprom and the White emigrés in Berlin. Ramzin agreed with Yasinsky that at the beginning of June, or maybe at the very end of June, he would be prepared to meet Denisov of the Torgprom, who wanted to have an interview with him after obtaining this information from the Committee. I learned this from Ramzin at the conference, where it was difficult to discuss the details. Ramzin informed me that immediately after the conference he would have to leave Berlin for the U.S.S.R., on account of urgent business for the Industrial party, and asked me to act as his deputy and representative

at the meeting with Denisov, whom I had never seen and with whom I could not talk about the details in which Denisov was interested. I refused. I had to leave Berlin for Scandinavia. Immediately after the World Power Conference, an international electro-technical commission was to be formed, to which I was delegated by the Soviet Union, being one of four Soviet delegates. Ramzin was dissatisfied. My impression was that he was nevertheless compelled to return to the U.S.S.R., and that the interview with Denisov was thus hanging in the air.

I was not very much concerned about it. We parted in haste, and on June 26th I left for the meeting of the international technical commission. I arrived in Stockholm probably on June 29th. I spent one day in Copenhagen, and in Stockholm, glancing through the newspapers, saw that the Swedish newspapers from the end of June were full of news, always in big head lines, about Fascist activities in Finland, which had been taking place in the summer, and about the frontier incidents with the U.S.S.R.

Impressed by this news, I spent a week in Stockholm, and was pondering the news almost daily. I felt a sense of responsibility, a certain fear for the consequences of my refusal to carry out the request of Ramzin's, since I was a member of the Committee, bearing full responsibility for everything he was unable to do on account of his work. Therefore I decided to meet Denisov and Yasinsky. I was definitely told that the meeting had to take place with these two persons. I sent word to Yasinsky—this was at the very beginning of July—that I should be passing through Berlin on July 10th-11th, and that I was prepared to meet him. I must mention that Ramzin informed Yasinsky beforehand that I was acting in his stead in the negotiations with himself and Denisov. On my part I fixed the interview for July 10th, the day most convenient for myself, at 9 p.m., the place of meeting being the Friedrichstrasse Station, near the exchange office, which at that time is closed and usually deserted.

On July 10th I returned to Berlin, and at about 9 p.m. went to Friedrichstrasse, walked up and down the open deserted vestibule, near the exchange office, and at about 9 p.m. or a little later, Yasinsky made his appearance—a tall man, recognisable from afar.

He was in company with a person whom I did not know. Yasinsky walked up to me (he knew me by sight) and introduced the other man to me, Denisov, a member of the Torgprom. I did not know Denisov, and shall subsequently refer to him as the person who called himself Denisov. But I can now recall his appearance as it impressed me then. A short man, in any case shorter than Yasinsky, clean shaven with hair turning grey, in a grey overcoat, I believe, in a grey hat, his eyes, I recollect,

were also grey. Such were the external features of the person who was introduced to me. I told him I was at his service. Yasinsky led us along the Friedrichstrasse and took us to a second-rate beer and coffee house. We sat at a small table in the background. There were few people about at that hour, and Denisov started talking to me, while Yasinsky sat apart and was silent all the time. Denisov started by expressing rather trenchantly his dissatisfaction with the fact that, instead of Ramzin, whom he expected to meet, he was meeting another person, with whom he was compelled to talk on very secret and confidential topics. However, he must certainly have been prepared by Yasinsky, who had it from Ramzin, that I was a person with whom one could talk, and not an unknown person.

After this he said: " Explain in detail why, and in what respect, there is unpreparedness in the work of your Party?" I repeated to him substantially the same as I have already told the Court, but added: " You see " (this was July 10th; by that time the Party Congress was already finished, or nearly so, and in any case the newspapers were full of reports of its results); " it is perfectly obvious that the Right deviation is not only defeated but crushed." This important political event showed strikingly that the conditions on which reliance had been placed hitherto, had grown worse. Denisov heard me out, and said indignantly: " This is the political side of it—you could not do anything in this respect, you have taken millions from us." (He obviously referred to millions of francs.) " You have taken millions from us and apparently have failed to do anything, and failed to prepare the country." I replied to him, with restraint, that I was surprised at such an exaggeration on his part and obviously on the part of the Torgprom, of the importance of the Industrial Party in the preparation of intervention, but, carrying out the mission with which I was charged by the Committee, I added: " But surely you are informed of the opinion of the Committee, to the effect that in the course of a year, by the summer of 1931, the preparatory work will have made very considerable progress?"

To this Denisov with still greater indignation replied: " What is the use of 1931—that would mean another year. In a year's time the whole situation abroad may have radically changed "; and he enumerated passionately and incisively: " (1) The U.S.S.R. may be recognised by the United States, and this in itself may altogether change the situation as regards intervention, in the sense that it will be prejudiced thereby and may be rendered impossible altogether. (2) Negotiations " (which at that time had been started, or at any rate decided upon) " between the U.S.S.R. and England on debts, a commercial treaty, etc., may be crowned with success, and they, too,

lessen the chances of intervention; (3) finally, you see yourself what is taking place in Germany " (at that time a crisis was ripening in Germany, which as you know, subsequently brought about a General Election): in Germany there may appear by that time such groupings in the Government, in Parliament, in public opinion, and finally among the proletariat, that they will tend to increase the rôle and importance of the Communist Party " (which proved correct, as is known, in the September elections). " This will render intervention in 1931 absolutely impossible for us, whatever preparations are made within the country."

I replied to this that I fully shared his views, which he apparently expressed on the spur of the moment, that the chances for intervention would decrease by the summer of 1931, but, I added, with the reservation that I was only expressing my personal views: " Apparently you too, in enumerating these factors, are also expressing your personal opinion." He agreed. Then I told him that, " Irrespective of the more or less favourable chances for intervention from outside, which may or may not occur as a result of the above causes, within the country, at any rate in my personal opinion, the chances for intervention will not increase, but decrease." He said: " How is it that the Committee referred to 1931?" I said: " I am expressing my own opinion, the same as you do: the chances may decrease because, as experience has shown, the preparatory work, the work of methodical sabotage, the destructive work, etc., is being outweighed by the successes of Socialist construction, outweighed by the victory of the general line of the Party, which must be obvious to you too now, after the Congress. As a result of this the Soviet Union is now in a better position to defend itself.

" The Industrial Party may, possibly, render the Union to an insignificant degree less capable of defending itself by means of sabotage, but you cannot count on anything substantial in the future, in view of the changed political situation." I added that, in any case, they must rely on their own forces, and that they must possess big forces. They must not rely on any serious assistance on the part of the Industrial Party, which was numerically weak, consisting mainly of the remains of the intelligentsia with out-of-date views. They were rapidly losing their hold on the surrounding new masses, both of the workers and of the intellectuals, imbued with a firm spirit of Socialist construction.

Denisov said: " I have heard your personal opinion and I have expressed mine, but this is not enough to take any decisions." The conversation was drawing to a close. Apparently he was not inclined to continue it. I told him that I was definitely charged to inform him in the name of our party of our unpreparedness for 1930, and asked him to supply me with some definite information as to when the future intervention was

planned. Did they take 1931 as the approximate period of the intervention, or did they not?

To this Denisov replied sharply, that he was not authorised to give me an answer to this question, that after some time he would reply through the usual channel through which information between Paris and the Industrial Party was exchanged; but in any case such answer could only be expected after Ramzin had informed him that he knew of my conversation with Denisov and was aware of that personal opinion of mine, which I had expressed, and when Ramzin had informed the Torgprom of his attitude and that of the Central Committee to my personal opinion.

" In any case," wound up Denisov, " you understand that even your personal opinion, like my personal opinion, gives such new material for discussion both by the Torgprom and the French General Staff that it must be weighed up and a decision taken only after a lengthy discussion."

Denisov stated in conclusion that he expected from Ramzin a definite, carefully reasoned and well-founded plan of preparatory work for the Industrial Party during the forthcoming year, which might give some assurance that in 1931 their millions would not be spent to as little purpose as in 1930.

" Upon this our conversation ended, and we parted. That is all."

Osadchy, upon concluding his evidence, asked permission to make a public profession of his sincere repentance for his great crime.

Yurovsky's Examination.

YUROVSKY was the next witness. A sturdy man of commanding presence, his sharp, eagle-like face and smooth-shaven head gave him the air of a man accustomed to give orders rather than take them. As he mounted the tribunal he looked at Krylenko with a hard, defiant stare, answering all questions with military curtness.

Yurovsky served the Soviet Government in the Financial Department, but was connected with the underground " Working Peasants' Party," a rival to Ramzin's organisation. Neither party concerned itself with the doings of the other, in fact each had its own lists of foreign people to whom they retailed regular information.

KRYLENKO: Citizen Yurovsky, you were not a member of the Industrial Party?

Witness YUROVSKY: No, I was not.

KRYLENKO: But you knew of its existence?

Witness YUROVSKY: Yes, I knew.

KRYLENKO: Did you have any relations with it?

Witness YUROVSKY: Yes, I had.

KRYLENKO: Perhaps you will tell the Court of the facts, known to you lately, bearing on the attitude of the Industrial Party to preparations for intervention and, in particular, what you knew in this connection about the activity of the emigrant groups of former industrialists and White Guard politicians?

Witness YUROVSKY: I must first say a few words about the source of the information which will form the subject matter of my evidence before the Supreme Court. In other words, I shall say a few words about the relations between the Industrial Party and that other counter-revolutionary organisation to which I belonged, and through which I received the information in which the Supreme Court is now interested.

THE PRESIDENT: To what other counter-revolutionary organisation did you belong?

Witness YUROVSKY: To the organisation which called itself the Working Peasants' Party.

THE PRESIDENT: Continue.

Witness YUROVSKY: These relations cover approximately a period of three or four years, but were not evenly close during the whole of that period, and therefore the materials of which I dispose are not equally complete and exhaustive in reference to the entire period. The connection became close gradually. Since 1928 it can be regarded as sufficiently complete in the sense that if not all, at any rate very many of the materials possessed by the Industrial Party were known to the leaders of the Working Peasants' Party, in part even at the end of 1927. Therefore, one of my main sources of that information is the information given at the centre of the Working Peasants' Party, both by its members, who maintained the requisite connections. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You are referring, obviously, to the Kondratiev-Chayanov group?

Witness YUROVSKY: Yes, and sometimes also by the representatives of the Industrial Party themselves, I mean in this connection, principally Ramzin and Charnovsky.

The second source of the information I possess is the communication made to me abroad by the representatives of the White emigrants. I was abroad at the beginning of 1928, and during the last days of January and the beginning of February had interviews there with the leader of the Republican-Democratic centre, Miliukov, and with a member of the Torgprom. I had one conversation with each of them. Each I knew before the revolution and even before the war.

As regards Miliukov, my conversation with him referred partly to the existing economic conditions in the U.S.S.R., and was concerned with ascertaining the attitude of Miliukov personally and of the Republican-Democratic centre in general to foreign intervention. As regards the fact of the preparations, the periods of organisation, etc., I shall refer to them later. Miliukov told me that he was aware of the existence of the Industrial Party in the U.S.S.R. He did not let me know the source of his information. He knew that this organisation was connected with the Torgprom.

As regards his personal attitude and that of the Republican-Democratic Centre on the subject of intervention, he told me that he regarded a change of régime, let alone the overthrow of the Soviet Government and of the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of a mere movement of the internal social and political forces in the U.S.S.R., to be highly improbable. Both he, personally, and the Republican-Democratic centre were partisans of foreign armed intervention.

To my question about what were the chances of such intervention, and what in particular was the attitude of French political forces, he replied that he considered that the idea of intervention was popular in France. In particular, with regard to the attitude to intervention of the Socialist Party of France, he declared that, although the workers of France would be hostile to any war and especially to such a war, still the leadership of the Socialist Party, if not openly at any rate in reality, would support such intervention in one way or another.

As regards my conversation with Gevding, of the Torgprom, which took place soon after my conversation with Miliukov, Gevding dealt with a number of questions of organisation of intervention, referring also to the connection between the Torgprom and the Industrial Party in the U.S.S.R. Gevding told me, in this connection, that the Torgprom had such connections that it was able to finance the Industrial Party, and that it was receiving information from the latter on a number of questions in which it was interested. This conversation, I repeat, took place in February, 1928.

The statements of Miliukov and Gevding, and the material obtained by the Torgprom from the Industrial Party in Moscow, were the main sources of my information as to the organisation of intervention.

The first question is the date. The original date of intervention was planned to be 1928. In view of the fact that at the beginning of 1928 I was in Paris, and had an interview with Miliukov, one of the topics of my conversation was to clear up the question of to what extent that date would be adhered to, i.e., whether, and to what extent, intervention would take place

in 1928? Miliukov said that it would be possible to count on France taking the initiative in undertaking the organisation of this matter only at a moment when it had a strong Government, supported by a solid parliamentary majority. At the time I was in France, the Poincaré Government could regard itself as a Government of that type, but this was shortly before the new elections, which took place, if I am not mistaken, in April, 1928. Miliukov expressed to me the fear that, even if these elections enabled Poincaré to remain in power, judging by the by-elections and his general information, there was ground for supposing that Poincaré in future would have to rely on a heterogeneous and insufficiently stable parliamentary majority. Since the elections were to take place in April, it was only by May, by the summer, that the true character and stability of the French Government would actually be revealed. Consequently the summer of 1928 appeared to be unfavourable for embarking on the big and complicated enterprise of intervention.

Apart from this, he pointed to another circumstance which also would prevent the launching of intervention in 1928 : namely, the fact that the revision of the Dawes Plan was about to take place. The very process of this revision, as well as the inevitable international friction which was bound to come to the surface in a question like this, made this period unsuitable for that great international campaign, for that complicated international agreement, which was a pre-requisite condition for the launching of intervention.

Irrespective even of whether the revision actually took place, Miliukov considered that some time would inevitably elapse before the new financial and other relations could be regulated to such an extent that one could think of armed interference in the affairs of the U.S.S.R. Such were the external causes which made him think that intervention would not take place in 1928. When I asked him when he thought it was probable, he said 1930.

At the beginning of 1930 Kondratiev stated that intervention would obviously not take place in 1930, first because the armed forces of Roumania and Poland were regarded as insufficiently prepared, and secondly because the internal situation in most countries of Western Europe, owing to the economic crisis and partly owing to the strengthening of the Labour movement, and in particular the Communist Parties, in many countries, was regarded as unfavourable. Therefore 1930 would not be the year of armed intervention. Subsequently they spoke of 1931, and also referred to 1932 as the most probable date of intervention.

As regards the organisation and participation of various countries in intervention, it appeared that France was to guide the movement.

The idea that England could play a considerable rôle was abandoned at the beginning of 1928. In any case, as regards England, it was assumed that under a Conservative Government participation to a certain degree was possible, but that it was improbable under a Labour Government.

As regards France, she was to fulfil the following tasks in this venture: first, preliminary preparations in the sense of collecting all the necessary material, secondly, the working out of the plan of the campaign, thirdly, the financing of those countries which had to play the most active rôle in the coming armed struggle, and—fourthly and finally—general guidance during the period of intervention itself.

The immediate participants and the first countries which were to act were the following groups of States: I am sub-dividing them into groups, because they had to play various parts and, according to our information, the very nature of their connections with France was not the same. First of all, Poland and Roumania had to act, the influence of France in those countries being most complete; then the so-called Baltic Border states: Esthonia, Latvia, and after them, with a lesser degree of probability, Finland. Lastly, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia were separately referred to, but without any certainty of their actually joining such a coalition. On the basis of my conversation with Miliukov, I got the impression that, if there was no final agreement, in any case there was some preliminary agreement between France, Poland and Roumania which guaranteed active preparations for intervention in 1930. The immediate grounds for the beginning of military operations, according to their plan, were to be such circumstances as the agitation of the Communist International—either in European countries, during some Labour movement, or in colonial countries, some reference to the inacceptability of the commercial policy of the U.S.S.R., some feature in the monopoly of foreign trade, or may be, the entire monopoly as a system. It was stressed that the relations between the Soviet Government, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Communist International were of so intimate a nature that the Soviet Government must bear the entire responsibility for everything ascribed to the Communist International, and of which the latter was accused. Moreover, it was borne in mind that some immediate pretext for intervention would be necessary, but they did not specially dwell on this aspect. It was only stated that some frontier incident, either provoked or accidental, or some other casual pretext, would serve as a ground for declaring war. At the same time there was the intention as

far as possible to camouflage the foreign nature of intervention, and therefore General Lukomsky was proposed as the head of the armies to be directed against the U.S.S.R., or in any case some such person, who to a certain extent could conceal the foreign face of intervention. I have forgotten to mention the proposal that, apart from the foreign States which I have enumerated as participants in an intervention, a detachment of Russians of emigrant origin would also take part in it, in the main those forces which have been maintained until then under the leadership of Wrangel.

Preparing to Seize Soviet Territory.

As regards the demands which the States participating in intervention made as compensation for saving Russia, they were as follows: all participants, save France, demanded territorial concessions. On the part of Roumania, the official recognition by the future Government of Russia of the annexation of Bessarabia by Roumania, as well as a demand to cede Odessa with certain adjoining territories. Poland demanded part of the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper, as well as part of White Russia.

Esthonia and Latvia advanced a demand for such a rectification of the frontier as would materially increase their respective territories.

So far as Finland was mentioned, there was talk of adding to it a part of the Karelian Republic.

As regards France itself, there was no question of any territorial acquisitions, but the following was borne in mind. In the first place, there would follow the settlement not only of the pre-war, but even of the pre-revolutionary debts on terms more favourable than were possible under any other agreement; secondly, that French capitalists would get back the property they owned in Russia before the revolution, and those of them who suffered losses from the revolution would receive appropriate compensation; thirdly, that a special commercial treaty would be concluded between the future Governments of Russia and France which would secure the maximum of benefits for France; fourthly, that France would obtain a large number of concessions on the territory of the U.S.S.R., and it was assumed that, by the time of intervention, owing to the large-scale capital construction which is being conducted by the Soviet Government, the objects of such concessions would be more numerous than those which the Soviet Government could or would offer during previous negotiations; and, finally, it was assumed that such participation of France as the leading State in intervention, would secure for it political influence over the future Government of Russia, and thereby

consolidate that hegemony which France to a large extent enjoys at the present time in Western Europe.

Actions of a counter-revolutionary and sabotage nature which were discussed in the negotiations between the Industrial Party and the Torgprom in Paris, and in part directly with representatives of French Government circles, were first of all in the domain of planning. On the one hand this would create disproportion in national economy, by laying special emphasis on tasks which were not urgent and could be postponed, and on the other hand by drawing up a general economic plan the realisation of which, owing to the extreme strain which it involved, was bound to cause economic complications.

KRYLENKO: You can confirm here that, while the Torgprom, according to information supplied here by Ramzin, was of the opinion that an armed invasion was necessary, Miliukov and his group at that period—the first half of 1928—shared this opinion?

YUROVSKY: Yes—they did take that standpoint.

KRYLENKO: And therefore also agreed to the necessity of those territorial losses which flowed as a logical corollary from intervention?

YUROVSKY: Yes.

KRYLENKO: Was there any talk about concrete measures taken by his group, and about the financing of intervention?

YUROVSKY: No, he only stated that he had certain relations, and I understood close relations, with the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

KRYLENKO: He only indicated that his group had some such connections?

YUROVSKY: Yes.

KRYLENKO: And, according to the information which you had concerning the relations of your counter-revolutionary group with the Industrial Party, was there any plan of concentrated action in this direction? A contact between the Kondratiev-Chayanov group, your group, and the Industrial Party?

YUROVSKY: Yes, there was.

KRYLENKO: What was the form and essence of this contact?

YUROVSKY: The essence of it was that counter-revolutionary and sabotage activities were divided according to objects between the Industrial Party and the Torgprom. Moreover, the connection consisted in that a part of the sums

received by the Industrial Party from abroad was transferred to that group.

KRYLENKO: Thus you had no independent sources of financing in your group?

YUROVSKY: We had not.

KRYLENKO: Thus, to a certain extent, you were kept by the Industrial Party?

YUROVSKY: That is so.

He further stated that in 1928 there was a scheme to set up a " United Centre " to lead both groups—the Industrial Party and the Working Peasants' Party, but nothing came of it. Contact was maintained by inter-representation at meetings of the respective Central Committees.

KRYLENKO asked the Court to admit as further evidence three articles by Poincaré which appeared in 1930 in " Excelsior " and " Nacion " (the latter published in Argentina) and next, his articles in " Excelsior " written after the publication of the indictment, namely, the articles, " The Claws of the U.S.S.R." and " The Fever of Europe."

" I ask for these articles to be admitted and read out, because they characterise the political line and attitude of Poincaré towards the Soviet Union, towards events which have taken place in the Soviet Union, and its rôle in international politics."

Similarly, the Prosecution asks the Court to admit as evidence the information contained in " Pravda " of November 18th, 1930, and reprinted from the White Guard paper " Vozrozhdenie," about a banquet in Paris to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Torgprom. The Court granted these requests of the prosecution, the defence not objecting.

THE SEVENTH DAY. DECEMBER 1st.

(Morning Session.)

The Court resumed the examination of the accused on the third group of questions, relating to wrecking activities within the territory of the U.S.S.R. between 1927 and 1930.

Ramzin gave evidence on a meeting of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party in the first half of 1927, in Khrennikov's room. At this meeting, the state of the fuel and metal industries was discussed and instructions issued to adopt and support the minimum rates of development of coal-mining, peat production and fuel supply generally. Particular stress was laid on the necessity of delaying the development of the peat works in the Moscow region. The meeting was presided over by Palchinsky, and those attending included Rabinovitch, Laritchev, Charnovsky and Strizhov. The report was read by Laritchev.

The general line of policy laid down at that meeting, as well as at other meetings of the Central Committee, was as follows:

Coal: The work of exploration was delayed and protracted as well as the work of sinking shafts and providing lodgings for the workers.

Peat: A very low figure of only about 15,000,000 tons was provided for the last year of the Five Year Plan, while already the output of peat has reached 30,000,000 tons. Improved methods of peat cutting were not introduced. The cost of production was kept at a very high figure and, as a result, peat turned out to be one of the most expensive kinds of fuel.

In order to cover up their work, endless arguments and polemics in the newspapers were arranged, the rôles being distributed beforehand. This method was particularly effective in preventing the building of new railways required for the transportation of coal. The injury to national economy caused by this delay in providing new railways he estimated as very high. The construction of the Bobrikov electrical station was also obstructed and delayed by useless arguments, faked discussions and other means.

Ramzin denied that he ever introduced wrecking ideas into his scientific work and publications; he did so in his practical work chiefly by not disclosing the actual state of affairs, and not taking steps to remedy matters. Ramzin was very anxious

to prove that he did not engage in wrecking all the time, and that much of his scientific work could be made use of.

Ramzin's evidence was supported by Laritchev, who gave more details and examples. The Kashira electrical station was supplied with turbines which were known to be unsuitable, both on account of the grade of coal supplied, and their unsuitable burners and stoves.

Similar methods of delay and obstruction were applied in the oil industry.

The next to be called up was Charnovsky, who was examined on his work as a saboteur in the metal industry. He admitted right at the beginning that he was wrong in trying to persuade the Court that his wrecking work consisted only in acting as adviser. His general line of sabotage, practised as the head of the Scientific Technical Council of the Supreme Economic Council, was to delay the rates of development and reduce output. When the question of the output of pig-iron was discussed, it was decided to fix for the last year of the Five Year Plan an output of six millions tons only, whereas already now, in the second year, the output exceeds five million tons. So the State Planning Commission put forward the figure of six million, while the Supreme Economic Council insisted on eight million tons. Two months were spent in arguing this figure, and finally a special commission laid down the output at ten million tons.

In the domain of machine building, the aim was to create disproportion between the requirements of the machine building industry in metals and the output of the metallurgical industry. The construction of self-loading railway cars was obstructed, thus perpetuating the slow rate of loading. Designs for the required type of plants were held back, so that machinery was to be imported from abroad, and the construction of new machine building works was also obstructed by wrecking tactics.

All these actions were guided and directed by him and carried out in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party.

DECEMBER 1ST, 1930.
(Evening Session.)

The examination of Charnovsky was continued. In reply to questions by a member of the Court, Lvov, the accused gave details about wrecking in the production of tractors and motor cars. He was aware of the wrecking work in transport which extended to planning railway carriage and engine building and repairing, bridge construction, obstructing the introduction of automatic couplings, and so on. He had heard of the slogan, "It is necessary so to overload the stomach of the transport

system with reforms that the system should not be able to digest them." A sabotage organisation existed in the Institute for Designing Metal Works, Khrennikov being head of one of the most important sections of this Institute.

Kalinnikov was the next to be examined. He was directing the wrecking work in the chemical, timber, paper, building materials, and a number of other industries, acting through the engineers and saboteurs who were at the head of affairs in those branches. The objects of the wrecking tactics were to cause delays, obstructions and disproportions by advocating either deliberately reduced or exaggerated plans or projects of which he gave details. He was also connected with wrecking work in the metal industry, and mentioned particularly that the delay in beginning the building of tractors at the Putilov works in Leningrad (from 1924 until 1926) was due to deliberate wrecking activities.

Kalinnikov's place was taken by Fyedotov, who described in detail the work of the wreckers in the textile industry. It took the form, first of all, of a useless and deliberately protracted discussion in the press about types of machinery, sizes of buildings, etc., in which both participants in the discussion were members of the Industrial Party. Buildings for the textile factories were erected on the principle of " mill-palaces," the height of the building being made unnecessarily large. He would not admit that this in itself constituted wrecking work, it being necessary in his opinion for the Soviet Government to provide exceptionally roomy and hygienic premises for the workers, but the sabotage consisted in unnecessary expenditure at a time when it was necessary to save every possible kopek.

Factories were built in places not directly suitable, as for instance in White Russia, where it was done on instructions received by him from Karpov, and by Ramzin from somebody else abroad.

He went on to deal with sabotage in the wrong use of raw material, referring to the problems of long-fibre and short-fibre cotton. The use of long-fibre cotton where short-fibre could be used was in itself an act of wrecking, and caused unnecessary expense in importing such cotton from abroad. As far as flax and wool were concerned, the same wrecking tactics were applied, in insisting on a wrong assortment of the raw materials.

As regards the home construction of textile machinery, this idea was deliberately opposed and obstructed, so as to perpetuate the necessity of relying for this machinery on imports from abroad.

Kirpotenko's Evidence.

A new witness was next called in the person of engineer A. A. Kirpotenko.

KRYLENKO: What did you know about the methods and forms of the wrecking work?

KIRPOTENKO: I was mostly concerned about wrecking in the designing of machinery. A special bureau for co-ordinating the designing of machinery was set up, engineer Schein being head of the bureau and the textile industry being represented on it by myself.

Continuing, witness described the obstruction of the development of machine building in the Soviet Union. He was acting on instructions received from Fyedotov and Kuprianov. Instructions were received to accelerate the building of new factories, and in a short time it turned out that the existing factories could be utilised in full by means of introducing the shift system and some other small adjustments. Or instructions were given to increase the cost of building new factories by resorting, say, to concrete, where wood would have been sufficient, ventilation systems of excessive size and cost, etc. All this led to the tying up of capital. Some of the plans of new factories the witness described as smacking of " Kanatchikova Datcha " (the Moscow equivalent of Colney Hatch, a well-known lunatic asylum).

Witness confirmed the fact that information about intervention was brought from abroad by Fyedotov and others. He was instructed to promote as much as possible the construction of factories along the Western frontier of the Soviet Union, particularly in White Russia, so that these factories should at an early stage of the intervention be occupied by the invading troops and serve as a basis and point of support for military operations. This instruction he received from Fyedotov. The latter was confronted with the witness and asked whether he confirmed that.

FYEDOTOV: Generally speaking . . . in some parts . . . so to say . . . yes.

Krylenko next referred to instructions given by him (Fyedotov) to delay the construction of textile machinery, and thus maintain the U.S.S.R.'s dependence upon English machinery. What motives had he in that?

FYEDOTOV: I don't know.

KRYLENKO: You don't know? Was there not a direct material interest?

FYEDOTOV: On whose part?

KRYLENKO: On your part.

FYEDOTOV: Such an interest on my part certainly existed.

KRYLENKO: A direct interest in the form of commission?

FYEDOTOV: Oh, yes, yes.

Resuming the examination of Kirpotenko, the President asked him whether he could give some concrete examples of obstructing the construction of a particular factory.

KIRPOTENKO: Yes, I remember, it was in February or March, 1928. On my return from my holiday, I was told by Kutsky, who was one of the deputy chairmen of the "Co-ordination Bureau," the other deputy being myself, that a memorandum on the necessity of constructing a factory for building textile machinery was sent up to the Scientific Council, and that it was necessary to reject this scheme in the Council. He asked whether I could undertake to prepare a memorandum advising the rejection of this plan. I had a talk about this with Kuprianov and Fyedotov, and it was agreed that if we should not succeed in getting the plan rejected by the Scientific Technical Council, we should have to do that in the Co-ordination Bureau.

KRYLENKO: Did you know Sitnin?

KIRPOTENKO: Yes.

KRYLENKO: Was he an active wrecker?

KIRPOTENKO: I will tell you about that. In June, 1928, I was approached by Kuprianov and Koltsov, who told me that, according to information received from the Torgprom, they were dissatisfied with Fyedotov's work, not seeing any real results, and that they had raised the question of replacing Fyedotov by Sitnin, as the leader and organiser of wrecking in the textile industry.

KRYLENKO: Why was the name of Sitnin put forward?

KIRPOTENKO: Because he used frequently to go abroad, because he is much younger and more energetic and, besides, he enjoys a certain degree of authority in textile circles.

Being confronted with Kuprianov, witness adhered to his version, while Kuprianov, admitting that such a conversation took place, denied that it was begun by him, and stated that, according to his recollection, the talk was begun by Kirpotenko.

Witness went on to state that he had a talk on this subject with Sitnin, who "took it very favourably." He reported on that to Kuprianov.

Sitnin, being confronted with the witness, admitted such a conversation, but insisted that he replied to that suggestion "only with a smile," not taking it seriously.

Nolde's Evidence.

The next witness to be called was Nolde.

KRYLENKO: Were you aware of the existence of the wrecking organisation, the Industrial Party?

NOLDE: Yes.

KRYLENKO: Since when?

NOLDE: Since 1925-26.

KRYLENKO: Were you directly connected with this organisation?

NOLDE: Yes, I was a member of it.

KRYLENKO: What were the different stages of the wrecking work?

NOLDE: At first, in the period between 1925 and 1928, it bore a somewhat narrow character, being directed principally to local sabotage by means of our own forces. In 1928, the work clearly fell under the influence of foreign organisations, and particularly of the former industrialists and the forces which were directing the activities of these organisations. The textile organisations also had then to increase their wrecking activity and to conduct it on the lines laid down by the organisations abroad.

KRYLENKO: I should like to know what were the methods adopted particularly in the flax industry, in the first period and then in the second.

NOLDE: In the first period the general line was laid down by Lopatin, and it could be reduced to two main propositions: first, to delay as far as possible the general growth of the textile industry, and for this purpose to apply the method of expensive building, requiring and tying up large financial resources. Also to protract the time of building and to obstruct such textile machinery construction as would make our country independent of foreign supplies. Secondly, to aim at the development of those branches of the textile industry which were largely or exclusively connected with foreign markets. In the first instance, to develop the cotton industry, then the worsted and fine-cloth industries, and also the jute industry, all of them working on imported raw materials, and to delay the development of the flax and hemp industries, which were working on home raw materials. This line of policy was agreed upon by Lopatin with the former owners, and its object was to establish a permanent connection with, and dependence on, abroad. All the plans, the yearly and Five Year Plans, were prepared on the strength of these instructions.

In the second period, the aim was not only to delay the development of our industry, but to create crises which would

place obstacles in the road of the further development of the respective branches of industry.

This took the form of preparing exaggerated plans which were unrealisable (e.g. the expansion of the flax industry 100 per cent. in two years), and which were to create a disproportion between the productive capacities of the factories, built with a large expenditure of money, and the available raw materials.

KRYLENKO: Tell us please, more concretely, what you know about the foreign groups and circles connected with your organisation.

NOLDE: I know that the chief organisation engaged in this was the Torgprom in Paris, and that some organisation existed in London also consisting of some of our former industrialists. But I think that of late this latter organisation no longer existed.

The witness next confirmed the information about intervention as given in previous evidence. In addition, he referred to the information and instructions brought by Lazarkevitch, who stated that some negotiations were going on between the White organisations abroad and the French Government, and that these negotiations were of a more serious nature than all the former talks about intervention.

The financing of the organisation was effected from commissions allowed by the foreign firms which purchased Soviet flax. These commissions dated from 1924, but they assumed a regular character from 1926 onward.

The witness also stated that when Lazarkevitch left, he informed them that he had arranged for connections through K., and that it would be possible to forward letters through him. He received one or two letters from K.

THE EIGHTH DAY. DECEMBER 2nd.

(Morning Session.)

Krylenko recalled Kuprianov, and put to him a few questions.

Kuprianov confirmed that, when Soviet flax was being exported, a certain percentage—up to 1 per cent.—was reserved by the buyers in favour of the Torgprom, by which the money was distributed among the wrecking organisations. He knew that in the wrecking organisation in the flax industry the money was distributed through Nolde, and that in their group (cotton) this was done by Lopatin and then by Fyedotov.

Kuprianov further admitted that a wrecking group in the People's Commissariat for Labour was connected with the Industrial Party and that, in addition to being responsible for exaggerated and costly designs of factories, this group was also instrumental in building such premises for the timber and oil industries as could be used for military purposes, namely, for aeroplanes and heavy artillery. He had heard this from Kirpotenko, who in his turn had heard about it from Syrotzinsky.

Kuprianov had also heard of wrecking activities in the field of irrigation.

KRYLENKO: What about bribery? Is it a common occurrence among the engineers?

KUPRIANOV: No, not very.

KRYLENKO: Well, we meet with such facts in the case of the orders in England, of the purchase and inspection of cotton, and so on. It looks as if, so soon as anyone comes in contact with firms abroad, he at once receives bribes.

KUPRIANOV: I should say that has been so of late.

KRYLENKO: Why of late? How about before?

KUPRIANOV: It was not always so.

KRYLENKO: It comes to this, that under the old régime, under the capitalist system, the engineers were ashamed to accept bribes, while under the Soviet régime they regard it as quite normal.

KUPRIANOV: I should say that under the old régime it was more difficult to receive bribes, because the owner usually attended more closely to financial matters.

KRYLENKO: In other words, it was not because they were ashamed, but because it was more difficult to receive bribes.

KUPRIANOV: In any case it did not exist.

Krylenko suggested to the Court that the investigation of wrecking work other than that connected with preparations for intervention should be regarded as completed, and that the Court should proceed to the investigation of wrecking work connected with intervention, namely, the creation of crises in 1930, communications with the French agents, and action in pursuance of the instructions received by Ramzin in Paris.

The Court decided in accordance with this proposal, and Ramzin was again called up.

KRYLENKO: Reverting to the negotiations which you had in Paris with Joinville and Richard. You then gave four kinds of "promissory notes," namely: a crisis in 1930, espionage, destructive acts, treason in the Red army. On the other side you were given "promissory notes" by the Torgprom—money—and by the military circles—military intervention. What was done by you to meet all these obligations?

RAMZIN in reply said that the work of preparing internal crises was fairly advanced, very critical positions having developed in the supply of fuel, in the metal industry and in the supply of electric power. As far as this part of the work was concerned, he thought that they had met their obligations, and in case of intervention the crisis would have led to a catastrophe. The statement by Osadchy that Denisov was highly dissatisfied with the work of the Industrial Party referred not to this sphere, but to the work of espionage and destruction. At the same time, their actions did not succeed in provoking discontent amongst the population, and at a joint meeting of the Central Committees of both the Industrial Party and the Working Peasants' Party, held at the beginning of 1930, it was put on record that the political and economic situation within the country was far different from the expectations entertained previously by both parties, so far as the year 1930 was concerned. "The country is not ready for intervention"—such was the outcome of their deliberations. This opinion caused disappointment within their ranks.

Fyedotov, Charnovsky and Laritchev being in turn called, confirmed Ramzin's statements, Fyedotov adding that it turned out that all parties were deceiving one another: the Industrial Party, the Torgprom and the Working Peasants' Party. The latter was boasting about hundreds of thousands of adherents, but it turned out that their basis consisted of a very thin layer of the technical intelligentsia working in the agricultural experimental institutions. None of the parties to the plot were

able to meet their obligations. Ramzin agreed that it would probably have been more correct to call Kondratiev's party not the Working Peasants' Party, but the Kulaks' Party.

KRYLENKO: Let us proceed to the second "promissory note" espionage work. Did this work begin in 1928?

RAMZIN: No, the work began much earlier, the "Engineering Centre" passing on information abroad before the existence of the Industrial Party. The information related to questions of defence. Since the formation of the "Industrial Party," and during 1929-1930, this work had gone on, information on economic questions being passed abroad to the Torgprom, from whence they found their way to the French General Staff. The memoranda on economic questions were prepared with the assistance and participation of the Menshevik Groman. The final editing was done by Osadchy. Such information was sent periodically every three months. A memorandum of information on the question of defence was prepared, *at the special request of R.*, by Professor Stetchkin, dealing with the technical state of aviation.

Further work of the same group related to the preparation of oil bases along the Western border and near Leningrad, a request coming through to have such bases provided and increased. The request was received by Laritchev, to whom its realisation was entrusted by the Central Committee. Another request referred to the formation of aviation bases. It was received from R. at the end of 1929. There were also requests for information about the state of the war and chemical industries. These were passed to K., this particular work having been entrusted to Kalinnikov and Charnovsky. As far as he knew, three or four memoranda on this subject were handed to K.

The accused Laritchev, Charnovsky and Kalinnikov confirmed Ramzin's evidence.

Krylenko next examined Ramzin on the third "note"—questions relating to destructive acts. The organisation of such work was urged on them from Paris by Lukomsky, Jainville, and individual members of the Torgprom. During 1929, urgent requests were received through K. and R. These requests became particularly urgent when it became clear that intervention would have to be postponed till 1931. The main object of this work was to have in readiness special organisations to stop the work of various industrial undertakings, principally in the war industries, electric power supply and the railways. Such groups were formed in some of the above branches, and a list of factories was drawn up where such cells were to be organised. *The whole work was carried on in co-ordination with K. and R.* It was carried out by Kalinnikov, Charnovsky, and himself.

Proceeding to give evidence on the next " note "—the military organisations—Ramzin agreed that instructions were received in Paris. They did not attempt to build up mass organisations, but aimed at having in various military institutions and services small groups on which to base their further work. *At the end of* 1929 *a request was received through R. to establish direct contact between the leaders of the military organisation and Colonel Richard.* A special commission consisting of Laritchev, Kalinnikov and Osadchy was set up by the Central Committee to attend to this.

Laritchev and Kalinnikov confirmed Ramzin's evidence.

KRYLENKO: Now I have still another question to put to Ramzin. Tell me, please, was there any other kind of work, in addition to what you have just told us, which you were carrying on in support of intervention?

RAMZIN: Another branch of work existed, but it was not carried on by the Central Committee of the Industrial Party. However, I possess information on these objects. I have in view the preparation of *points d'appui* for invasion by interventionist troops.

KRYLENKO: Did the Central Committee know about this work?

RAMZIN: Yes, they did.

KRYLENKO: You never mentioned it up till now.

RAMZIN: This work was carried on through the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and was very little connected with the Central Committee.

DECEMBER 2ND.

(Evening Session.)

The Court proceeded with the examination of witnesses. The first to be brought in was the engineer Krassovsky.

KRYLENKO: Tell me, please, when you were arrested?

KRASSOVSKY: On April 1st, 1928.

KRYLENKO: Thus your evidence will refer to the time previous to your arrest?

KRASSOVSKY: Yes.

The witness confirmed that he knew of the existence of a central counter-revolutionary organisation, that he knew most of the accused and that he took part in conferences with them, reading reports on the state of the wrecking work on the railways.

The wrecking work in the transport system of the country was first based on the " theory of crises " as enunciated by the

All-Union Association of Engineers, according to which the Soviet Government was to collapse as a result of the numerous economic crises in all branches of industry which succeeded each other at that time. The object of the wreckers was to assist, as far as lay in their power, the growth and intensification of such crises. This theory soon proved to be wrong and futile, and from the second half of 1927 news began to come through from abroad about the necessity and imminence of foreign intervention to be carried out by the armed forces of Poland and Roumania, with the financial and material assistance of France and, in one form or another, of England. Accordingly, the Engineering Centre instructed its members to pay particular attention to such wrecking acts as were likely to lower the defensive capacity of the country and its economic strength. The railway system generally was to be regarded as being of great importance for the defence of the country, but this was particularly so with regard to the railways situated along the Western border. So the wrecking organisation concentrated all its efforts on disorganising and injuring these railways. Under the pretext of the scarcity of materials and spare-parts, the border railways were worse provided for than the railways in other parts of the country. This affected the repair of railway cars and engines, and was responsible for frequent break-downs. In order to make matters worse and more complicated, engines were supplied to these railways of various types and series. The mobilisation plans of these railways were prepared in an obviously incorrect, insufficient and inexact way. Steps were taken to reduce the credits allowed to the border railways, which affected the work of construction and repair. In this way, acting on the direct instructions of the Engineering Centre, the wrecking organisation in the sphere of transport disorganised the border railways. This disorganisation was bound to have its effect, if not right at the beginning of mobilisation, at any rate in the course of military operations.

The next witness to be examined was the architect, Syrotzinsky, a member of the Technical Council of the Building Committee of the Supreme Economic Council for the last three-and-a-half years. Before that he worked for a few months in the People's Commissariat for Labour, where he was connected with the production of the exaggerated plans of factory building mentioned previously by Fyedotov and others.

He had been a member of the wrecking organisation since the end of 1926. Soon after that, a meeting of the wrecking group in the building industry was held at the home of one of the wreckers. A member of the group, Noa, who had just returned from abroad, made a statement calculated to inspire the wreckers with new energy and hope. He told them that their

organisation at present was not isolated, that the movement against Communism was growing and spreading everywhere, that the economic offensive against the Soviet Union was to be replaced by a military offensive, in the form of an armed invasion and intervention. All the threads of this scheme were concentrated in and directed by France, that being the only country which could organise military intervention based on the Border States. He further told them that *the Russian White emigrants had placed themselves entirely at the disposal of the French General Staff and that all instructions which might be received from abroad must be regarded as absolutely compulsory, emanating as they did, not from the Whites but from the French General Staff.* Some time afterwards they were told that all building for industrial purposes conducted both in the North of the Soviet Union, around Archangel and Leningrad, and in the South, in the Caucasus and along the Black Sea Coast, was to be carried out in strict accordance with the instructions received from the central wrecking group of the building industry.

At a later date he became aware that, under the influence of the wreckers, industrial works were being constructed which could be destroyed by bombardment from the sea. In a private conversation he was told that factories were being built in the Black Sea region which had special platforms provided for the mounting of heavy artillery. In addition, another industrial undertaking which was at that time under consideration was held back in the Technical Council for over six months, and, as it transpired afterwards, *the plans were sent abroad to be approved or improved there.* When they were returned from abroad, they contained, in addition to the buildings for the factories proper, designs for a workers' settlement, and he was told that, as this factory would be built on a spot accessible to invasion from the sea, the settlement in case of such invasion would be used by the invading troops. The same project provided for a speedy adaptation of this factory for the manufacture of explosives.

As to the buildings erected in the North, some of the sawmills were built much too big, both in length and in width, the intention being to transform these sawmills into aeroplane sheds in case of intervention.

Proceeding, the witness cited instances confirming the wrecking intentions as they manifested themselves in the construction of chemical works. In one instance, a large chemical works was constructed on a swamp, thus necessitating the building of a foundation four metres thick underneath the building to be erected over an extremely large piece of land. Notwithstanding this, in spring and in autumn, water will get into the building. Apart from that, the whole building after its comple-

tion will immediately begin to sink, and will require a large amount of additional funds to have this remedied. In another instance, a large industrial undertaking is being erected in a practically waterless country, the only water sources being a few rivulets which it is proposed to connect into one basin. For this purpose two dams are being built, but they will be subjected to so high a pressure that the breaking of either dam will put the whole of the factory under water for a long time. This danger was pointed out by a foreign expert with a very high reputation, who was invited to inspect this work.

Questions by the President further brought out the fact that such extensive activities on the part of the wreckers were possible only owing to the fact that they had their organisation in the planning centres from whence all the guidance and directions issued. The Central Committee of the Industrial Party was, of course, aware of all this work, particularly Ramzin and Charnovsky. General directions were received from abroad.

The next witness was Michailenko, a railway engineer, and a specialist in hydro-technical work.

Up to 1927 he was working in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, after which he was in charge of a number of hydro-technical works in the Caucasus. He was arrested last March. He knew only of the existence of a wrecking organisation in the hydro-technical industry to which he belonged. He knew the names of the persons at the head of the organisation, but received his instructions from Professor Sparo. The witness first described some hydro-technical works which were carried out in the Caucasus at great expense, although the local population at its existing level of development could hardly make full use of these works. That was pure sabotage, intended to tie up large sums of money in useless and ineffective enterprises.

KRYLENKO: And did you become aware that a connection existed, or was likely to exist, between your land-drainage work and the idea of intervention?

MICHAILENKO: The first talks on this subject began in 1926. Then a number of places were marked out as likely to prove of assistance for intervention.

The witness was warned by the President not to mention any names of States or localities. He proceeded to describe the land-drainage work which was carried out by him at a certain spot on the Soviet frontier in 1929. In their natural state, these localities were impassable for any form of transport, particularly for troops. On the other hand, the drainage of such ground was of economic importance. Accordingly, the wrecking tactics consisted in not taking account of military considerations, and hiding them under the screen of economic necessities and interests.

In the autumn of 1926 a plan was brought forward for draining a large territory along one of our frontiers, the official explanation of this work being the necessity of improving agriculture in this area. The main objective was to drain a considerable number of swamps, which would open the way to an important railway centre for any invading troops. If they were successful, the whole region of Leningrad would be cut off from the rest of the country.

Similar projects were marked out and partly executed in White Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The methods of work, technically speaking, were not different from those used in the normal course of drainage operations. The wrecking directions emanated from the Irrigation Institute headed by Riesenkampf, who was the Director of the Scientific Land Reclamation Institute in Leningrad, a Professor of various High Schools and a member of the Technical Committee of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. He was also a member of the Technical Council of the State Planning Commission, and acted as a consulting engineer for a number of such works in Central Asia and Trans-Causasia, both before and after the revolution. In 1929 the witness was put in charge of some land-drainage works at a certain place on the sea coast, and was told that the work was extremely urgent and must be performed in a very short time. The time was quite out of proportion to the size of the works and to the period normally allowed for such operations. *As an explanation of the urgency he was told that in the autumn of* 1930 *this territory would become the theatre of military operations of an interventionist character.* He was given to understand this by Professor Sparo, while the economic organisation which was carrying out this work urged it from a purely economic point of view. However, he was not able to complete this work in the time stipulated, and last autumn the work was stopped and transferred to some other places which did not possess the same military importance. He was told that the return from abroad of the Kuban and Don Cossacks was expected to take place at this particular spot, and that an attempt to land there by the White General Ulagai failed because of the state of the ground. A special inspector came down to report on the state of the work, and was highly dissatisfied with its progress. As a result, he was removed. A system of " premiums " was also in existence, intended as graft for the wrecking work. He received about 3,000 roubles, of which half was paid by him to some of his assistants.

Ramzin, being called up and examined on the evidence of Michailenko, admitted that he knew about this special wrecking work in the sphere of land drainage. He had heard about it from both Khrennikov and Groman. He was aware of the

personnel of the central organisation in charge of this work, and stated that the contact with this group was maintained first by himself and later on by Osadchy. Referring particularly to the last instance mentioned by Michailenko, he said *that R. showed particular interest in this work and in its urgency, and that he had a special conversation with R. on this subject in the middle of* 1929.

Laritchev and Kalinnikov confirmed the statements of both Michailenko and Ramzin.

At this stage the President, addressing Ramzin, asked whether Osadchy and Schein, when appearing as Prosecutors in the Shakhty Trial, were members of the Industrial Party. Ramzin replied in the affirmative, and added that their rôle during that trial was sanctioned by the Central Committee of the Industrial Party.

The Court next proceeded to the examination of the witness Tseidler, also a member of the wrecking organisation in the hydro-technical section.

He knew of the existence of the wrecking organisation, and was a member, having been recruited by Riesenkampf in the spring of 1926. He was in charge of the irrigation works in Central Asia, carried on for the purposes of cotton growing. His wrecking rôle consisted in wrongly and irrationally conducting the irrigation works so as to entail heavy and useless expenses. He heard about drainage works being conducted with hidden military objects in view, but he personally took no part in such work. He knew that the leaders of the wrecking organisation in the hydro-technical section there were connected with the Central Committee of the Industrial Party, the names mentioned being Ramzin, Laritchev and Kalinnikov.

The three latter having been asked in turn why they did not mention these facts before in their depositions and statements, replied that it was due to lack of time.

The Prosecution proposed to dispense with the examination of Professor Sparo, as his examination would hardly reveal anything new after the full evidence of Michailenko and Tseidler and the confirmation by the accused.

The witness Kirpotenko was then recalled and examined on the destructive acts in the textile industry.

He knew that the Central Committee of the Industrial Party was engaged in preparing various acts of destruction, and that, so far as the textile industry was concerned, they were to consist of acts disorganising mobilisation plans in so far as supplies to the Red Army during intervention were concerned, and acts disorganising the work of some factories supplying the Red Army and some supplying the general population. The intention was to organise special destruction cells in the military groups, when

and in so far as they were organised. At the moment of intervention, special members of the wrecking organisation were to be attached to these cells. This work was under the control of Kuprianov.

Kuprianov, confronted with the witness, admitted his part in this work, explaining that the destructive acts, so far as he could remember, were to be carried out primarily by interference with the supply of electric power to the textile mills, and that the counter-revolutionary plans in case of mobilisation in the textile industry were adopted in pursuance of orders brought by Fyedotov from abroad.

This concluded the examination of witnesses.

Krylenko, addressing the Court, asked that two more articles by Poincaré be admitted as evidence, namely, his article in " Excelsior " as given in the Tass telegram published in " Izvestia " on March 2nd, 1930, and his article as printed in " Pravda " of December 3rd, 1930. In the first of these articles, Poincaré dealt with the internal situation in France and also with foreign affairs, while in the second he tried to assume an air of bewilderment at what was taking place at the trial.

The Court decided to admit the two articles mentioned as evidence. They were referred to more fully in Krylenko's speech for the prosecution.

Krylenko then proposed that the next session should be held in private and, after a short interval, the Court was cleared.

THE NINTH DAY. DECEMBER 4th.

(Evening Session.)

The public session was resumed.

Krylenko, addressing in turn each of the accused, put to them the question whether they personally received any of the monies sent from abroad for financing the wrecking work. Only Fyedotov, Sitnin and Kuprianov admitted having accepted such money. The other accused denied ever having received or accepted for themselves any sums.

Krylenko next asked the Court to admit as evidence a copy of the White paper " Vozrozhdenie " of June 15th, 1930, and a copy of the same paper of June 13th. They contained a description of the celebration of the anniversary of the foundation of the White secondary school in Paris, at which Sir Henri Deterding made a speech, and also a letter from the same person in which he predicted that a " new Russia " would arise from its ashes " within a few months." Next, extracts from the same paper giving a description of the Suvorov anniversary festivals in Paris. He wished to refer to these documents in his closing speech for the prosecution.

This request being granted by the Court Counsel for the defence, Otzep, requested that the sentences of the Court in the Shakhty Trial and in the trial of the " League for the Liberation of Ukraine," and certain copies of " Pravda," as well as some pamphlets on the Five Year Plan, to all of which he intended to refer in his speech, be admitted as evidence. This request was granted.

Krylenko then rose to deliver his speech for the prosecution. His address was not concluded at the end of the evening session, and was continued during next day's morning session.

CLOSING SPEECH OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, N. V. KRYLENKO.

Comrades, the ten brief days which have elapsed since the commencement of this trial have passed under peculiar and unusual circumstances. The opening of the trial was marked by demonstrations by millions of workers, who came out on to the streets of the capitals and large cities in every part of the Soviet Union to protest against the deeds of the individuals who now stand accused before this Court. The working class, in giving

expression to its indignation, at the same time demonstrated its readiness to continue the struggle and, if need be, to defend the Socialist fatherland with arms in hand, just as it defended it during the years of the civil war. That is why every item of news regarding this trial has been followed with such tense interest; that is why the working-class masses of our Soviet Union have listened with bated breath to every word uttered in this hall.

No less intense is the interest shown by the workers of Western Europe; and not by the workers alone, but also by the bourgeoisie, from members of the ruling class, to the ordinary man in the street. The bourgeois press has surrounded the trial in a fog of insinuation, slander, invention and falsehood, in an endeavour, the purpose of which is only too clear, to distract attention from the real significance and character of this trial. We have had utterances on the subject from persons standing very close to foreign ruling circles. There have been questions and discussions in Parliament. The views of certain statesmen have even been published in the press, direct testimony, in a manner of speaking, and, as such, certain of these statements have been included in the records of this trial.

The Soviet Government and the Prosecution at this trial have not hesitated to expose and lay bare to the working class of the Soviet Union the numerous and grave sores festering within our State industry. The evidence has shown that there is hardly a single branch of industry where it can be said with any degree of certainty that an organisation of wreckers has not been active. This state of affairs—which, by the way, illustrates the incredibly difficult conditions under which the working class is struggling to advance the cause of Socialist construction—has been clearly brought out at this trial and has focused the attention both of the workers of the Soviet Union and of their enemies.

We have not feared to declare publicly that such festering sores exist. We believe that the sooner the workers of our country realise the part played by the wreckers, the sooner they realise who their enemies are, the sooner will it be possible to remove these sores and the sooner will it be possible so to order our State apparatus and machinery that we may be fully confident that it is working as we wish it to work, aiding the working class and furthering the cause of the upbuilding of Socialism. And if, in the course of the trial, our enemies may have learned something of the sore spots, they will also have learned to what an extent they may count upon our resisting to the utmost any attempt to interfere in our affairs.

Comparisons with the Shakhty Trial.

Comrades, two years ago the Shakhty case was tried in this very hall. Two years ago we listened to the trial of an organisa-

tion of wreckers who operated in the coal-mining industry. One is involuntarily compelled to draw certain parallels between these two cases.

It seems to me that the present case is a reproduction of the Shakhty case on a larger scale. All the features, all the concrete factors which appeared in the Shakhty trial have been reproduced here, but on an extended basis. In the Shakhty case we tried certain traitors in the coal-mining industry. To-day we are trying men who have directed wrecking operations in every fundamental branch of industry. In the Shakhty case there were individual instances of contacts having been established between representatives of the managements of certain mines, of certain coal industries, with their former owners. Take, for instance, Sokolov, Shtedting, and so forth. Now, however, the associates of the wreckers are no longer isolated former owners. The foreign associates of these wreckers are represented by the Torgprom, a united organisation of all branches of industry, combining all the formations and groupings of the former owners of the nationalised industries. And the contact with them has now assumed an entirely different, a much more highly organised form.

In a document that has been attached to the records of this trial—I refer to the statement issued by the Torgprom on the occasion of the celebration of its tenth anniversary, at which Nobel, Denisov and others were present—one of the most interesting and important passages is the assertion that the Torgprom represents an unofficial embassy abroad, an agency bearing a political character. In other words, they have the boldness to declare that they are an agency claiming practically diplomatic privileges.

In the course of the Shakhty trial, when we examined the various cases of foreign contacts we came across the names of certain foreign industrialists, but there was not a single reference to foreign Government circles, to individuals standing in direct relations, or who in the past were related, to foreign Governments. But here we have mentioned Poincaré, an individual sufficiently notorious as a leader of French politics, representing, moreover, a definite line of French policy. His connection, his relation to the Torgprom has been referred to here.

And there is, finally, one other sphere of foreign activity characterising the evolution which has taken place during this interval. The idea of intervention was to be found in the Shakhty case; that was revealed during the trial. But we now have not merely the idea of intervention: we have a specific plan. And not only a plan: definite dates are indicated, the very months are mentioned. In the Shakhty case, the relations of the wreckers

with isolated agencies of foreign States were brought out. But here we are faced with a whole combination of States. It has been stated at this trial that certain countries interested in intervention were preparing not merely for the isolated action of Lukomsky's expeditionary army, but were circulating in the most detailed manner all the forces that can be relied on for the purpose of intervention, such as, for instance, that of neighbouring States. We meet with direct references to agreements, definite understandings, a complete and detailed plan of armed invasion. Their minds have been definitely imbued with the belief that there would be a combination of States.

And what about the home sphere? At home we have exactly the same picture, bearing out the characterisation I have just given. Only engineers were tried in the Shakhty case. It was engineers that sat on the bench of the accused; and only two or three of the accused who had taken part in the wrecking work were not engineers. But here we have a regular bloc of counter-revolutionary groups. Not a wrecking group consisting of engineers alone, but a bloc of two counter-revolutionary organisations: one represented by the Central Committee of what is known as the Industrial Party, and the other that referred to by Yurovsky and by all the accused, the Kondratiev-Chayanov group.

What does that mean? It means that in programme and in political aims we have a bloc between a party of industrial capitalism and a party representing the kulaks. And there is a correspondingly analogous bloc abroad. Let us recall what was said by the witness Yurovsky and by the accused Fyedotov. They spoke of the formation abroad of a bloc between the Republican-Democratic-Centre headed by Miliukov and the Torgprom. When Yurovsky went abroad, he met not only Miliukov, but also Gevding, an active member of the Torgprom. Fyedotov stated that rivalry formerly existed between these two groups—the White Guards and the emigrés—that they were at loggerheads; but that later there was a rapprochement, a contact was established, with the result that even on such important questions as intervention, armed invasion and military dictatorship, questions which had long caused dissension in the ranks of the White Guards, even on that question agreement had been reached.

One more factor. In the Shakhty case, only a certain section of engineers was involved. But here we have commercial leaders also, economists of the Gosplan, accountants, architects; in a word, representatives of all sections and groups of the technical intelligentsia. And then we have the wreckers in the food supply industries, who were eradicated not long prior to this trial. We have Groman and his group, and other Mensheviks, and the

Belotzerkovskys and the Sokolovskys and the "economists" who also joined in the general procession of counter-revolutionaries.

A reproduction of the Shakhty case, but on a larger scale, is revealed in yet another sphere. Methods are also reproduced, also on an extended basis. Wrecking tactics have also passed through a long and profound process of evolution. It began with the fight for the preservation of factories on behalf of the former owners. The next stage was wrecking in technical matters; then came wrecking in questions of concessions policy, until in its final stage, wrecking assumed the character of a planned movement.

Let us take another sphere, namely, destructive acts. Were there instances of destructive acts in the Shakhty case, such as destruction of machinery and means of production? There were. And now? Now it has become a system, a system which was to be carried into effect according to a unified and definite plan, at a given moment agreed on beforehand, namely, the moment of intervention.

But that is not all. Were there instances of espionage in the Shakhty case? There were. You will remember Boyarinov and the rest. And here? Here we have espionage plus a definite plan of operations intended to assist the enemy at the moment of intervention.

In the Shakhty case there were instances of betrayal of military information. But here we have the formation of an actual military organisation. Sufficient material on this matter has been cited in the indictment and adduced in the evidence given by the accused themselves. The other day, in the public session of the court, we lifted the veil ever so slightly on this matter, but, for reasons that will be easily understood, we could not reveal everything.

During the present trial, revelations were made of the criminal work performed with the object of creating conditions which would facilitate intervention, which would facilitate the operations of the enemy fronts. Michailenko has related his activities in the South and what was done on the western frontier; Syrotzinsky told us of the measures taken in the vicinity of Archangel and Leningrad and the structures built in certain factories on the south coast. All this was absent in the Shakhty case.

I think I may fairly characterise the situation as a consolidation, a combination of all the forces of counter-revolution for the achievement by armed force of a fundamental aim—the annihilation of the Soviet Union.

The question involuntarily arises: what is the reason for all this, to what is it due? Why, parallel with the growth and strengthening of the economic power of the Soviet Union do we find this consolidation of hostile forces and their centralisation in one combined organisation in direct contact with interventionist circles in Western Europe?

To explain it I will cite the words uttered by Comrade Stalin at the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. Comrade Stalin said:

> "Two and a half years have passed since the Fifteenth Congress. . . . To characterise this period in a few words, we might call it the turn of the tide. The tide turned not only for us in the U.S.S.R., but also for the capitalist countries of the whole world. But there was a radical difference between these two turns. While the turn for the U.S.S.R. meant a turn towards a new and important economic advance, for the capitalist countries it meant a turn towards economic decline. We in the U.S.S.R. have a growing advance in Socialist construction, both in industry and in agriculture. They, the capitalists, have a growing crisis in their economic life, both in industry and in agriculture."

From this contrast, Comrade Stalin proceeded to draw certain conclusions. Here they are:

> "The most important result of the world economic crisis is the laying bare and sharpening of the contradictions inherent in world capitalism. There are being laid bare and sharpened the contradictions between the most important imperialist countries, the struggle for markets, the struggle for raw materials, the struggle for export of capital."

> "This means," Comrade Stalin says, "that the war danger will grow at an increasingly rapid rate."

Further:

> "There are being laid bare and will be sharpened the contradictions between the victorious and the vanquished countries."

> "There are being laid bare and sharpened the contradictions between the imperialist States and the colonial and dependent countries." This is borne out by what is now going on in the East.

And, finally:

> "There have been laid bare and sharpened the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the capitalist countries."

" This means," Comrade Stalin goes on to say, " in the first place, that the bourgeoisie will seek a way out of the situation in further fascisation in the sphere of internal policy, making use of all the forces of reaction for this purpose, including Social Democracy. It means, secondly, that the bourgeoisie will seek a way out through a new imperialist war and intervention, in the sphere of external policy. It means, finally, that the proletariat, fighting capitalist exploitation and the war danger, will seek a way out through revolution."

But Comrade Stalin ended with a still more definite conclusion. He said:

" Therefore, every time the capitalist contradictions begin to grow acute the bourgeoisie turns its gaze toward the U.S.S.R.: ' cannot we settle this or that contradiction of capitalism, or all the contradictions taken together, at the expense of the U.S.S.R., the land of the Soviets, the citadel of the revolution, revolutionising by its very existence the working class and the colonies. . . .' "

These words were spoken in June, 1930, at the time Ramzin was preparing to go abroad in order to find out from the Torgprom whether the period originally set for " the assault of the adventurist forces against the U.S.S.R.," organised by international capitalism, still held good. When, he was anxious to know, was it going to take place: in June or July, in 1930 or 1931?

It seems to me that these facts clearly explain the hullabaloo raised around this trial, the fierce howls set up by a section of the bourgeois press and the mystifications, the false and stupid inventions to which it resorts. Caught redhanded! Caught redhanded on the very eve of the carrying out of the plan. That is the reason for the hullabaloo and the howling, the lies and the inventions.

Our policy always was, still is and will remain a policy of peace. Our policy was, and still is, the Socialist reconstruction of our country. Our policy was, and still is, the upbuilding of Socialism. Socialism is our guiding principle. It is ridiculous to accuse us of planning adventurist assaults. We are pursuing, and shall continue to pursue, a policy of peace, in spite of assertions, such as are made by Poincaré in his article, that we are preparing for war; in spite of the fact that he demands that we refrain from interfering in their affairs " in the way France refrains from interfering in our affairs. No, we certainly do not interfere in theirs in the way France " refrains from interfering " in our affairs. We have never employed *such methods,* do not now, and shall not in the future.

We must get a clear idea of the nature of this organisation. We must understand the full complexity of the class struggle now proceeding, in order that we may fully appreciate the degree of real danger to which our country is subjected by the activities of these individuals as a whole, and in order at the same time to define the degree of individual danger which each of them represents. For, independently of the general causes which may exert their influence on us, we are engaged in a legal trial, and we must conduct it in a manner befitting a legal trial.

The Industrial Party as the Leader of the Wreckers.

I have referred to the complicated canvas produced by the interweaving of the various interests represented at this trial. There are international interests: the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class, for whom the existence of the U.S.S.R. represents a breach in the world domination of the imperialist bourgeoisie, a disturbance of the equilibrium of the mastery of the bourgeoisie as a class. Then we have the interests of the bourgeois class in its national divisions. We have the interests of the various bourgeois groups struggling for mastery in one or other branch of industry, for control of the world market. We have the interests of smaller groupings, as, for instance, various sections of engineers. And, finally, there are the personal interests of the actual individuals involved—Fyedotov, Kuprianov and Sitnin—who possessed considerable property and were in direct charge of large industries or groups of industries under the old régime.

In examining the acts of the accused, we must not for a single moment abandon a certain fundamental viewpoint, namely, the struggle for the defence of our country from foreign attack, the struggle for the opportunity to proceed peacefully with the work of Socialist construction, the struggle for the right of the working class—the masters of our country—to deal with and order the affairs of the country, its economic life and its State system, as they alone deem fit, as they alone believe and understand to be right. This cause has been directly endangered, and we must therefore not abandon this standpoint for a single moment, even when we are dealing with small matters, such as the personal interests of the individuals accused in this trial and the part they played.

It has already been frequently pointed out, and, indeed, is a generally known fact, that under our Soviet conditions we look upon wrecking, not as the isolated acts of individuals, but as a method of class warfare of the bourgeoisie as a whole. That explains why there are so many wrecking organisations, why they arose almost simultaneously and independently in different in the character of their activities and why they finally fused into

branches of industry. It explains the subsequent development in the character of their activities and why they finally fused into one centre.

We know from the evidence of witnesses, from the accused themselves, as well as from the material in the possession of the Court, that in the Commissariat for Transport, for instance, a wrecking organisation grew up among the track engineers prior to 1927, and that it was only in that year, or in the beginning of 1928, that it joined, or rather fused into the central wrecking organisation. The same is true of other branches, such as the war industry and the textile, oil and coal industries, where the wreckers were active long before the formation of the central organisation. The same is true of irrigation and land reclamation, as the witness Michailenko testified.

The rôle of the central wrecking group, of the accused at this trial, is therefore clear. They were not the initiators, the founders of the wrecking work; they were, so to speak, its co-ordinators, condensors: they collected and combined into one stream the various channels of wrecking operations. The wrecking centre created at the end of 1927, known as the Engineering and Technical Centre, combined all the groups of wreckers in the various branches of industry, which had before them come into being independently, but had assumed a definite, consolidated and organised form.

The Structure of the Wrecking Organisation.

This organisation, as was described by Ramzin and borne out by the other accused, was constructed on the chain system of contact along definite branches of industry. In other words, the directions issued from a single united centre and proceeded along a chain, down through the various wrecking organisations. Thus the wreckers in one chain, as a rule, did not know those in another chain. That this was the case, is borne out by the evidence of the witnesses, which showed that the members in the districts knew only their immediate wrecking chief, through whom contact with the centre was maintained. And only those directly in touch with the centre knew the nature of the work being performed and how contact was effected. This structural form grew naturally out of the very development of the wrecking organisations and, indeed, fully answers to conspiratorial requirements; since it was difficult and, in fact, unnecessary for the guiding centre to know all the members of the organisation directly or the actual work performed by a given organisation or its individual members. It is interesting to note that the same chain and branch system of contact was maintained within the individual branches of industry themselves, as, for instance, in the Commissariat of Transport, in which the wrecking organisa-

tions were divided according to the various departments of work of the Commissariat.

On the other hand, a systematic and planned control of the various branches was essential. This control was exercised through Gosplan. That is why certain workers in Gosplan were singled out for the special attention of the wreckers; that was why their main assault was directed against Gosplan. I am referring to Laritchev, Charnovsky, Fyedotov and so on. I particularly refer to the vice-chairman of Gosplan, Osadchy. He was not the chairman of a section, but assistant to the head of the whole organisation. That is why it was of such tremendous importance to the wrecking organisation to win Osadchy to its side. It will be asked: was this purpose achieved? The reply is obvious: we have heard it from the lips of Osadchy himself. Gosplan was conquered: it was conquered in the person of the heads of the chief groups, of the chief departments and of the heads of the whole organisation.

The Real Political Programme of the Industrial Party.

I shall now dwell upon another question, which is of interest from the point of view of understanding the ideology of these people.

During the hearing of this case some dispute arose over the theory of government with the aid of engineers, of a government of engineers which would conduct the political life of the country solely in the interests of a given class, of an economically powerful class, depending for its strength on the part it played in production and distribution. Such a government of engineers is sheer fantasy and utter nonsense, as has been proved by the history of revolution in general, and by any given State, economic or class conflict in particular. And if intervention succeeded, and the interventionists assumed control of the country, to believe that they would even for one minute dream of putting Citizen Ramzin, Citizen Fyedotov, not to mention Citizen Charnovsky, in charge of the country, let alone permit them to conduct an independent policy—to believe that is, as I said during the investigation, either political naïveté, aye, political stupidity, or political hypocrisy, for it is obviously false and nonsensical.

During the investigation, I particularly dwelt on the question of what would be the cost of intervention. What would be the cost to the working class and the toiling masses of the Soviet Union? To-day I had attached to the records of the trial a newspaper excerpt ("Vozrozhdenie," November 25th, 1930), describing the celebration held in Paris in commemoration of Suvorov. This celebration was attended by former Russian high

princes and princesses, metropolitan bishops, White Guard generals and admirals, former Russian officers of the Life Guards and French officers in uniform, among them General Nissel, of the French Supreme Military Council. The latter occupied the chair and was in full parade uniform, adorned with the ribbon of the Legion of Honour. The address of welcome was delivered by A. A. Bashmakov, chairman of the Suvorov Committee, who proposed that in accordance with the Russian custom the proceedings should be opened by a prayer and that the memory of those who had fallen for the fatherland be honoured standing.

> " The first speech was delivered by Lt.-General Gulevitch, Professor of the Tsarist Military Academy, and was devoted to a description of the character of the great military leader. . . . The next speaker was the former commander of the Russian troops in France, Lt.-General Lokhvitzky, who in a speech on ' The Suvorov School ' brilliantly described the personality of Suvorov, who was first and foremost a Russian man and military leader. A model man and soldier, strong in his faith in God, his loyalty to the Tsar and his love of the fatherland, he trained his soldiers in the same spirit. . . . The Suvorov commandments demand much faith, belief in the State and in the Fatherland. They must be made our foundation when the will to victory is demanded of us.
>
> " The strains of the ' Semenov March ' drowned the applause which greeted the eloquent speech of General Lokhvitzky.
>
> " A fiery expression of the unquenchable Suvorov sentiments and traditions was delivered by A. A. Bashmakov, a descendant of Suvorov. In an eloquent speech on ' The Suvorov Commandments,' delivered first in Russian and then in French, he remarked that it was not by chance that it fell to him, a civilian, to have the honour to speak of the great military leader. The absence among the Russian civil population of those Suvorov commandments, with which the army had been always strongly imbued, led to the catastrophe which befell our fatherland. . . . "

The paper then goes on to describe the last speech, that of General Nissel, which was greeted by a loud ovation and the singing of the " Marseillaise " and the Tsarist national hymn.

Amid all this nonsense, the chief thing that interests us is the political slogans of this group: Religion, the Tsar and the Fatherland. They are the slogans of the old autocracy with all its charms, with all its meanness and vileness. The political programme of the accused included the military dictatorship of

General Lukomsky, one of the members of this group. Did they expect Lukomsky to come alone? Did they think these sharks and bloodsuckers would not have crawled back with him? Did you expect, Citizen Ramzin, that Lukomsky would transfer to you the right " to rule and govern this Russian land "? Why, you yourself, Citizen Ramzin, said, " first pacification and then reforms." Aye, first brutal shootings, punitory expeditions, hecatombs of human corpses, millions of working class and peasant victims. And then? And then Ramzin would be told: " Make way, good fellow, your work is done!"

That is the true picture of what these gentlemen were preparing. The restoration of capitalism was their real aim. And what about the " State capitalism " professed by Laritchev and Ramzin? Allow me very briefly to examine this part of their programme.

I will not stop to point out that Ramzin's conception of State capitalism is a rather peculiar one. I will not attempt to analyse it, but in essence it amounted to retaining the factories and fundamental branches of industry in the hands of the State. But would the industrialists really have agreed to that? He talked to Riabushinsky on the subject! Driving in an automobile in the Bois de Boulogne he, Ramzin, came to an agreement with Riabushinsky. Vladimir Riabushinsky's article has been read here, and fully bears out the ironic characterisation given him by Fyedotov: " Can he have grown intelligent? " But which of these two, driving together in the Bois de Boulogne, was the wiser: Vladimir Riabushinsky or Ramzin, who assured Riabushinsky that agreement had not been reached on the land question, because, forsooth, the landowners were not yet prepared to consent to the non-return of the land, but that, as to the capitalists, they had already agreed?

The landowners, you see, had not yet fully consented; but the capitalists were already prepared to hand over their factories to the State. Ramzin had talked them round to it. It seems to me that if an analysis is made of the real class forces involved, the question as to who was the wiser, Ramzin or Riabushinsky, leaves no room for doubt.

Having described how this counter-revolutionary organisation grew up, and to what extent the central group participated in the wrecking operations and having analysed its real programme, and not the programme they talked about, I must now pass on to examine the actual deeds of this group.

Why Did They Confess?

One of the questions raised concerning this trial, or rather one of the methods used in attempting to discredit it, is to ask with a hypocritical air of amazement: what sort of a trial is this

in which the accused confess everything? What is the actual value of such confessions? And therefore what is one to make of these confessions and of this trial? But I put the matter differently (regarding concrete material evidence I shall speak later): I ask: What concrete evidence, indeed, can there be in a trial of this kind? Can one even for a moment assume that there was a conspiracy on the part of these people, who were arrested at different times, each for acts performed in his own branch of industry, and whose evidence agrees only as regards the methods employed, only as regards the plan and the purpose, and differs regarding the technical nature of the wrecking work performed in each individual branch of industry?

What concrete evidence can there be? Documents? I questioned them on this point and it appears that where documents existed, they were destroyed. At the Shakhty trial it was revealed that, owing to our shortsightedness, it was given out at a certain meeting of wreckers that a conspiracy had been discovered. Those present at that meeting immediately hastened to destroy all the compromising documents in their possession. Witnesses? Can you expect people to come here of their own free will and tell about the wrecking organisation, people in charge of the wrecking organisation and yet still at liberty? Do you think we are such idiots as to leave such people at liberty? We had them arrested, of course. And we considered it perfectly natural, expedient and necessary that those who know and can tell about the wrecking organisation should come here and do so. And these people, of course, are under arrest as direct participants in the wrecking operations. We considered it right that they should say what they knew in the sphere of their own activities; so that by comparing their evidence with that of the accused, by analysing the various details and the contradictions, we may be able to establish to what extent that which the accused state is credible and well-founded, to what degree it corresponds with the truth.

Take any sphere of wrecking activity referred to in this Court. In every case we find the same thing: complete agreement in the evidence, complete absence of contradition.

And now I will turn to the explanation of the question, why the accused confessed?

Let us leave the question of torture aside. But even if the vilest assumptions are granted in this respect, they would still not explain how it is that such diverse detailed and technical evidence concerning diverse branches of industry should be fully corroborated by the official statements regarding the results of wrecking activities in each of these branches of industry.

But why do they confess? I, for my part, ask: what else should they do? The hope that perhaps somehow, somebody will get them out of the mess, is a poor hope indeed. Stubbornness, they know, will not help. And if they have the least vestige of conscience it will prompt them to confess. I ask, why is it that in the vast majority of wrecking cases the accused confess?

If these people had the masses behind them, upon whom they could rely for support; if they had close intellectual and organisational connections to strengthen their political convictions, to arm them with a moral certainty in the justness of their cause, and develop in them a spirit of political firmness and integrity—that would be a different matter. But in this case? A wretched, isolated handful of men, working with the aid of foreign money, who have long since lost all authority and influence in the eyes of the masses, aye, who are even regarded by the masses as the enemy of the people—on what could this wretched little group count? That is why when these representatives of a moribund class are caught redhanded they confess. They confess because they have no alternative, because they never had and never can have any inner convictions. And we know the price they were paid for all this.

One more word on this question of confession. There are confessions and confessions, but in this trial we are still a long way from wholehearted confession. It has been brought out that there are three spheres in which Ramzin failed to confess, " for lack of time," as he put it. Take Krasovsky. Why, in 1928 he wholeheartedly confessed to everything, except to the fact that he was a member of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party. Why? Because at that time no arrests had yet taken place, and it might have been assumed that we knew nothing about the matter and would never learn anything about it. Only to the limits within which silence was no longer of any avail, and always with the hope that after all not everything would come to light, only to those limits did the accused confess. And that is in perfect accord with the psychology of these people. So much for the juridical significance of their confession.

The Torgprom and Its Allies.

And now as to the Torgprom. That the Torgprom exists there can be no doubt. The fact that its policy is definitely counter-revolutionary and definitely aggressive is also beyond doubt. However, permit me, in corroboration of this fact, to quote a declaration from an official document of the Torgprom as the central counter-revolutionary organisation abroad of the former commercial and industrial class of Russia:

" The Trade, Industrial and Financial Committee (Torgprom) will continue its unremitting struggle against the Soviet Government, will continue to enlighten the public opinion of the cultured countries as to the true significance of the events taking place in Russia and to prepare for the future revolt in the name of freedom and truth."

Still more frank in this respect were the speeches made by active members of the Torgprom at the banquet given in celebration of its tenth anniversary, of which we have already spoken. In the opening speech, delivered by Nobel (I must point out that the statements made by the Torgprom itself regarding its membership fully corroborate the testimony given by the accused long before the appearance of any such statements), the oil magnate declared that the banquet had been organised as " a demonstration of faith in the early resurrection of Russia and in the possibility of soon being able to work in the fatherland."

Denisov—a second name we have become familiar with at this trial—stated that " during the past ten years the Torgprom has made it its aim to fight the Bolsheviks on the economic front in every manner and form. . . ." The former Tsarist Minister of Finance, Kokovtzev, referred to the services performed by the Torgprom " in the fight for the resurrection of Russia, in the sphere of enlightening Russian and foreign public opinion and in assembling the forces required for future work." Bogaevsky, the head of the counter-revolutionary Cossack groups, said that " the Cossacks could testify that the Torgprom supported every fight against the Bolsheviks and assisted the Cossacks in their military activities." Kartashev (we have met his name also at this trial) spoke of the Torgprom as " the unofficial embassy of the Russian emigrés " and stated that the strength of the Torgprom lay in its alliance with the army. " We have now not long to wait," he declared. Nobel praised the hospitality of France and raised a glass to its continued prosperity.

These citations bear witness not only to the political status of the Torgprom : that was already borne out by the first document; they demonstrate its organisational contact and political and financial unity, along all lines, with the most counter-revolutionary of the emigré groups, the Tsarist generals. It also demonstrates that the Torgprom intended to fulfil the functions of a political representative within the ruling circles of foreign countries.

Kartashev said that the Torgprom was the unofficial embassy of the Russian emigrés. Such a statement could be made under such circumstances only if it were actually true that the Torgprom was fulfilling such functions. Neither Nobel, nor Kartashev, nor Denisov would dare to make such a claim at a banquet

of such a character if the truth were that they were sent off with a flea in their ear every time they attempted to exercise the functions of an unofficial embassy among foreign ruling classes. And the very fact that these quotations regarding the unofficial, or semi-official, representation of the Russian emigrés correspond with statements and assertions made by the accused bears out the veracity of the latter.

But from the newspapers we now learn another fact. I refer to the parade of White Guard troops. We have already seen from the document which was to-day attached to the records regarding the Suvorov celebrations, that the White Guards attach great significance to military uniforms, military contacts and military parades as appearing to bear out the fact of their legality. But what is the significance of these parades? They signify a real gathering and concentration of armed forces. Whatever one may think of the real value of the military forces represented at the parades which have taken place, and are taking place in France, whatever one may think of the chances of intervention undertaken with the aid of these forces, the fact remains that the White Guards regard intervention as a definite fighting method, and that to them the armed struggle against the Soviet Power is a matter not of words, but of deeds.

Permit me to quote from another document which was attached to-day to the records, quoting certain excerpts from a speech delivered by Deterding on June 11th of this year on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Russian Normal School in Paris. There is no need to enumerate all the good fellows who attended on this occasion; I will only mention that, in addition to the Metropolitan Eulogius and the honorary patroness of the school, Lady Deterding, there were present Generals Miller, Kedrov, and Suvorov, professors and writers, Princess Murat, the Countess Shuvalova, etc., etc. I quote:

> "The speech delivered by Sir Henri Deterding in French was listened to with great interest.
>
> "He began by declaring that there was no need to thank him, since he was only fulfilling his duty. We all enjoyed the love of our parents and near ones, we are all united by our faith. I was born, he said, in a poor family; but I had a mother and she helped me to achieve all that I have won by energy, persistence and hard work.
>
> "You, said Sir Henri, addressing himself to the students, must rely upon yourselves. You must remember that all your work and activities will take place on your native Russian soil. The hope, he declared, of the early liberation of Russia—now suffering a national calamity—is

growing and becoming stronger every day. The hour of emancipation of your great fatherland is at hand . . .

" The liberation of Russia may take place much sooner than we all think; it may even be the matter of a few months."

Sir Henri Deterding is no empty chatterer—he is a man of affairs. At this assemblage of bloodthirsty White Guards, of shekel-thirsty counter-revolutionaries, he positively states that the " emancipation " of Russia would take place, maybe, within a few months. A statement of this kind is an obligation. It is a political act, a political document which cannot be repudiated. This was in June, 1930, when the postponement of intervention until the spring of 1931 was already being discussed; when Denisov, through his agents, was calling the meeting in Berlin in order to find out why all the preparations for intervention had not been made within the country, and what had not been done and what still remained to be done in order to carry out the plan of intervention. Deterding's statement cannot be regarded as having been made without purpose. But let us assume that he let the cat out of the bag. It sometimes happens that way: he got a little maudlin at the memory that he had a mother, and said a little more than he had intended. That is what he said, but what did he write? A letter of Sir Henri Deterding is a document. The letter is written in reply to the expression of gratitude received from a certain emigré student for the possibility afforded him to continue his education at one of the higher places of learning in Paris. Deterding writes:

" It was with satisfaction that I received the letter of gratitude of the Russian students, whom it gives me the greatest pleasure to assist.

" If you really desire to express your gratitude, I would ask you to do the following:

" 1. *Endeavour in the new Russia, which will re-arise within a few months, to be the best sons of your fatherland.*

" 2. In the future, do unto others that which I have done unto you."

The paper in which this letter is printed is dated June 15th, 1930.

The French Interventionists.

Another support on which Ramzin and the others relied in their wrecking work consisted of certain military circles in France associated with the French General Staff.

In analysing this factor, allow me, first of all, to draw your attention to the following circumstance. Assuming that preparations for intervention were undertaken seriously, who, one asks,

among French military circles would be regarded as best fitted for the job: those who have already had practical experience in the organisation of intervention, or those who have had no such experience? The most appropriate people for this job, of course, are those military men who were once involved in the dastardly work of intervention, although they got smartly rapped over the knuckles for their pains.

I refer to Janin. Certain selections from his diary have been included in the records. That worthy general would do well to remember that life is a strange thing, full of surprises, and that a diary printed in a foreign newspaper may subsequently serve a purpose for which it was never originally intended. Janin describes, as we have quoted, the situation he encountered during the first intervention and what he was called upon to perform. He characterises the representatives of the White Guards as a gang of rascals, ne'er-do-wells and criminals. He describes the brutalities of the police, bestialities of which only the utterly degraded White Guards were capable. He admits that he even suffered certain qualms of conscience in the performance of this job and that his only consolation was that the conscience of the British general, Knox, must be still more troublesome.

This historical correspondence is important only to the extent that it enables us to establish the identity of names, and the fact that the interventionist circles considered it desirable, from the point of view of technical execution, to entrust the job to those French militarists who had once taken an active part in intervention.

Assuming intervention were regarded seriously, would the creation of a commission be necessary, or would it not? Assuming that it were required to unite the armed forces of the White Guards, headed by Lukomsky, with such forces as other countries might supply for the purposes of intervention, certain technical measures, in the sense of creating the material basis for the united army, would be essential, and therefore the formation of such a commission would seem a logical and essential measure.

In the same number of the newspaper in which the Torgprom banquet is reported there is a quotation from an article entitled, " In that Case, War," taken from the liberal journal, " La Republique," which, in turn, quotes from an article printed last November in " l'Européen " by the industrialist Fouchère, a member of the Chamber of Deputies, belonging to the Tardieu group. Fouchère declares that " two facts alone, namely the propaganda of the Communist International and Soviet dumping, are sufficient reasons for the League of Nations holding the Soviet Union at a distance." And he asks: " Shall we wait for the gangrene to spread, or shall we perform the simple surgical

operation of expelling the Soviet Union from the circle of civilised nations? "

This quotation is sufficient to show that the idea of a surgical operation prevails in certain governing circles independently of the Torgprom and the Industrial Party. " La Republique " comments as follows: " Everybody knows that there is no such thing as dumping, and that behind this campaign is the money of Deterding and his company, and nothing more." But the quotation, while illustrating the frame of mind of certain Government circles and of the French bourgeoisie they represent, also bears out the assertions of the accused to the effect that these circles had displayed the initiative and the eagerness to establish contact with those Torgprom circles which desired, and were making preparations for, intervention.

The Position of Poincaré.

Still more important is the meeting with Poincaré. I have before me Poincaré's article which has been attached to the records of this trial. " I should like to know," writes Poincaré, " in what secret hall the Russian conspirators conversed with my double and what authority that double had for granting them an audience? " It was not Ramzin or Laritchev who conversed with him in this secret hall: it was the members of the Torgprom. I am therefore unfortunately unable to say in what secret hall this meeting took place. But I can say what authority Monsieur Poincaré had for granting that rendezvous, and I believe the answer to this question arises clearly from the analysis of the interests of the world bourgeoisie, to which I have referred. Were I to ask what authority the deputy Fouchère had for appealing in the press for the performance of a surgical operation on the Soviet Union, what authority he had for so bold an official statement, his reply would be identical with that which might be given to the question as to what authority Poincaré had for granting an audience to Lianozov and the others. Ask your colleague, Monsieur Poincaré, and you will get the right reply. And the replies to his other questions are no more difficult. Poincaré writes: " I should like, first of all, to be informed what were the alleged plans of the French General Staff, and when and under what conditions the alleged invasion was to take place? "

Monsieur Poincaré asked for this information on December 3rd, 1930. Yet on February 28th, 1930, " l'Excelsior " had printed an article by Monsieur Poincaré which furnished the answers to his own questions. We recall that the plan for intervention was timed for 1930 and was to be initiated by some incident on the Roumanian frontier. This is what Poincaré writes:

" It is high time to put an end to the interminable London Conference, our presence at which may produce certain very unpleasant surprises for us. It is high time to examine whether Germany has carried out the conditions for our ratification of the Young Plan. But this does not exhaust the serious problems, the burden of solving which will lie on the next Government. In various parts of the world incidents are daily occurring which may be pregnant with the most serious consequences. We have only to cast a glance at Bessarabia. In this Roumanian province we are witnessing conflicts which are being stirred up by the U.S.S.R. in order to be used sooner or later as a pretext for fresh intrigues. Certain dark spots may be also perceived on the Polish frontiers. Can France at such a moment occupy herself with petty internal squabbles? Much more important matters are facing us."

Much more important matters, indeed!

The 1930 plan was to develop out of an incident on the Roumanian frontier. Monsieur Poincaré, the plans you enquire about you will find in your article of February 28th, in which you call attention to this very frontier.

But most interesting of all is an item in the same newspaper, which reports the Bucharest correspondent of the American " Chicago Tribune " as having written that

" the French General Staff, in conjunction with the Polish, have drawn the attention of Roumania to the danger of a Soviet attack on Bessarabia, and have advised her to take corresponding military measures."

These facts, reported not by us, but by the foreign press, are in complete accord with the plan for intervention as related by the accused, as well as with the demands à la Fouchère for the performance of a surgical operation on the U.S.S.R.

But we have another piece of evidence of an interesting and important nature. I refer to Poincaré's article entitled " The Claws of the U.S.S.R.," printed on November 30th of this year in " l'Excelsior." In this article Poincaré appeals to the nations to unite in the struggle against us.

" It is painful to note that the nations, instead of uniting to combat the danger which menaces them, remain disunited in the face of a huge conspiracy against their tranquillity. Moreover, certain nations are seeking in Russia a means for the realisation of their own secret ambitions. The nations resorting to such ill-advised measures will be the first to fall victims, but they will inevitably drag the rest of mankind with them into the abyss."

Permit me to conclude with one more quotation from the same article. Poincaré writes:

"But enough of joking. Let us leave this world of madmen and return to the earth on which we live."

Yes, we have had enough of joking. Joking, when they are preparing to blow up our war factories! Joking, when they enter into agreements with French agents to perform acts of sabotage and to carry on military espionage! Joking, when it is a matter of armed interference with the work of Socialist construction, of disturbing by armed force the conditions of peace in which we were building Socialism and desire to continue to build! That is not joking. To describe this as a joke is only a clumsy and insincere polemical trick, which can be explained only by the fact that Poincaré must consider that for a person of his immeasurable importance, logic is superfluous, and is equally superfluous for the readers of his articles.

Economic Crises and Intervention.

I will now pass to a consideration of the activities of the Industrial Party, as represented by its Central Committee, carried on at home in fulfilment of the aims agreed upon at the meeting held in Paris in October, 1928. These aims were twofold: one was in the nature of a bill issued to the Torgprom and the other in the nature of a bill issued to the military circles. I shall first deal with the bill handed to the Torgprom.

This obligation involved an entirely new conception of wrecking tactics. The object now was to create crises in various branches of industry, which were to reach their culminating point during the year 1930. The branches of industry on which attention was primarily concentrated were fuel, metals, transport, power and textiles. It was these branches that were most extensively represented in the Industrial Party: fuel by Laritchev, power by Ramzin, textiles by Fyedotov, metals by Charnovsky, and "the rest" by Kalinnikov.

The extreme detail with which we went into certain questions touching these various branches of industry—such as the most effective method of supplying power to the Donetz Basin and the comparative merits of British and American textile machinery—may have appeared rather tedious and to a large extent unnecessary to many of those present at this trial. But the purpose was to bring out clearly the specific nature of the wrecking methods employed and the consequences resulting therefrom.

Take the question of fuel. I would request the court to bear in mind the geographical distribution of our main fuel bases: the Donetz coalfield, the most important of all; the Moscow field, situated adjacent to the most important centres of large-

scale industry, and the Kuznetz field, which was described by the accused as the pearl of the Soviet Union, and which holds second place in the world for the vastness and richness of its reserves of mineral fuel. It was on those fields that the wreckers concentrated their attention.

And what do we find? Take the Donetz, which formed the chief object of investigation during the Shakhty trial. What have we learned at this present trial, and what conclusions are we obliged to draw? We are obliged to conclude that, in spite of the fact that the secret of the Shakhty problem was revealed at that trial, nevertheless, to this present day, we find the same retardation of the development of this vast coal area, the same failure to fulfil the plans and conditions set for its development. And that was not due so much to the activities of a wrecking organisation on the spot, as to the fact that the directing and planning centre was in the hands of a wrecking organisation, and that wrecking took the form of external sabotage of a not easily detectable nature, such as systematic bureaucratic red-tape, withholding instructions, and deliberate neglect to institute constant and scrupulous control of the way instructions were being carried out.

I questioned the accused particularly regarding the Skachinsky mine. There was considerable argument regarding this particular mine during the Shakhty trial, and it now appears that systematic interference in the development of this rich anthracite field is being practised to this day, and that the mine is still failing to yield the output it should give and was planned to give.

Then as to the question of main railway lines. If, in time of war, the railway line connecting Moscow with the Donetz were severed, our chief industrial centres would be robbed of the artery which supplies them with fuel; and if by that time measures had not been taken to secure fuel from other fields, the situation would, indeed, become catastrophic. From the point of view of defence, the Moscow coalfield is a fuel base of vital importance, since it is the nearest source of supply for the central industrial region. We have had certain documents attached to the records reporting the disputes (of course, of an utterly fictitious nature), which were indulged in by wrecking circles and carried on in the columns of the press, as to whether it was expedient or not to develop the Moscow coalfield. And thanks to these disputes it has not been developed to the extent that it should have been.

Regarding the Kuznetz coalfield, here too the question of railway communication between this field and the industrial areas of the central regions of the U.S.S.R. is involved. Will the existing line bear the tremendous traffic which will result from

the more intensive development of the Kuznetz coalfield? And, furthermore, does its present stage of development correspond with the plans drawn up for it?

It seems to me that the critical state of the fuel situation, the fact that mining development of the Donetz has been retarded, that the question of the development of the Moscow coalfield has not yet been settled, that the question of improved railway communication with the Kuznetz coalfield is being kept in abeyance—all this goes to prove that the wreckers have been active in this field and that they have earned the price they say they received in recompense for this work.

And now as to metals. From the figures that have been quoted here, it is obvious that metals represent one of our most difficult problems. We make no concealment of the fact. It has been stated by the accused themselves that 37 per cent. of our metal requirements remain unsatisfied. We have no desire to deny or conceal the seriousness of this fact. We have hitherto attributed this state of affairs to the vigorous development of our industry and to the heavy demand for metals of all grades arising from the capital construction work being carried out in all the main branches of production. But we did not know to what extent wrecking operations were being conducted, although the evidence of Khrennikov and certain others, who had been arrested and had confessed, gave us certain indications of what consequences might be expected from their activities. But we had no idea of the details. We did not know, for instance, that beginning from October, 1928, special pressure was brought to bear upon metals along every line—locomotive construction, shipbuilding, oil tanks, machinery and the production of the raw materials for the metallurgical industry. As a result, the metal situation is a very serious one. That is a fact; we realise it and have no desire to conceal it.

Exactly the same thing may be said of transport, the condition of which is deplorable. And it is obvious that in the event of intervention, in the event of the outbreak of war, the dangers inherent in the situation would become still more acute, and we should feel the full consequences of the weakness of our transport system and the full effects of the strained metal situation. Here, too, the wreckers have achieved what they planned.

I should like to dwell particularly on the question of textiles. Here the wrecking tactics employed were of a somewhat different nature. They consisted in working for a crisis in the year 1930 by creating a disproportion between the supply of raw materials and the available equipment; in other words, by bringing textile mills to a standstill owing to lack of raw material. The cotton crops were planned in dimensions which were practically impossible of fulfilment. At the same time, capital was invested in the

construction and equipment of new mills which it would be impossible to keep going, thereby entailing a useless expenditure of capital. Is it true that mills have stood idle during the past two years? It is. Were the wrecking plans in part realised? They were. This was one of the most subtle forms of wrecking: it consisted in a wasteful investment of capital in the construction of new mills, and in the equipment of these mills with machinery which did not correspond with the interests of production.

During the dispute that arose on the question of the comparative merits of American and British textile machinery, Fyedotov, in an article on the subject, argued that not everything that was suitable for America was suitable for the Soviet Union; that in America capital was cheap, while labour was dear, whereas in the Soviet Union capital was dear and labour cheap. And since, according to the highly scientific opinion of Fyedotov, our labour would always be cheap, it was irrational and unwise to import American machinery. An editorial comment on the article pointed out the reactionary nature of this point of view and declared it to be entirely contrary to the wages and labour policy of the Soviet Union. Fyedotov had two motives for wanting to retain British machinery in our textile industry: firstly, because our textile industry would thereby be kept at a lower technical level and, secondly, a secret commission could be obtained on British machinery. Accordingly, science and the scientific arguments of the learned expert in textiles, Professor Fyedotov, were placed at the service of British capitalism.

The textile wreckers resorted to still other methods. Take, for instance, the dispute as to whether mills of palatial proportions should be built for the workers, or the old-fashioned box-like structures. We have no desire to perpetuate these box-like structures. We know that in the old textile mills of pre-revolutionary days the sanitary and hygienic conditions were deplorable. One of the tasks of the Soviet Union, indeed, a task which a proletarian State must set itself, is to create decent labour conditions. And on these grounds a most interesting dispute was started between the wreckers in the Supreme Economic Council and the wreckers in the Commissariat of Labour. The wreckers in the Commissariat of Labour, in the person of Syrotzinsky, Kudriavtzev and others, issued a compulsory order that the height of the sheds in textile mills must be not less than nine metres. But the wreckers in the Supreme Economic Council declared that this was impossible, and that even five or six metres was too much. Finally, they decided to compromise on five and a half metres, although they were fully aware that the standard, answering all the requirements of hygiene, was 4.2

metres. The whole argument was fictitious, simply a smoke-screen.

Such were the methods employed in the textile industry, and it must be admitted that the textile group beat all records. Other branches of industry, such as coal and oil, were not so completely under the control of the wrecking groups.

And, finally, the textile group was also directly involved in matters affecting military mobilisation. There were disputes as to whether destructive actions should also be carried on in textile mills. What was decided? The textile wreckers tell us that the question was decided negatively, that they refused to consent to the blowing up of textile mills at the time of intervention. The most they consented to was to damage the power supply. But Kirpotenko tells us differently. He says he knows for a fact that it was decided to bring the textile mills to a standstill when intervention took place, and that he and others (Kuprianov corroborates this) made efforts to mobilise destructive groups of former White officers for this purpose.

Syrotzinsky, the architect, told us of another use planned for textile mills. He told us of a certain mill on the Black Sea coast which is visible from the sea, and was deliberately built within bombardment reach; and that the revision of the plans for this mill, and not of the mill alone, but of the workers' settlement surrounding it, was received from abroad. He also told us of certain peculiar features introduced during the construction of certain mills, such as the provision of emplacements for heavy guns. All this demonstrates a branch of activity of the textile group which has no connection whatever with textiles, but is very closely connected with preparations for intervention.

Another field of wrecking operations is irrigation and hydraulic work connected with cotton growing. Tseidler has recounted his activities in this field, but it appears to me that he was not telling the whole truth when he stated that this work consisted in irrational employment of capital, of irrigating not always the most suitable areas, and of employing the wrong kind of machinery and the wrong kind of technical personnel. The aim was rather to diminish the cotton crop, and thus contribute to the disproportion between the supply of raw material and the requirements of the textile mills.

And, finally, one other branch of wrecking operations of which we learned here, namely, that of the Michailenko group in the sphere of land development. I shall refer to only one phase of this work, that was carried on in the Kuban in 1929, in the irrigation of a territory, which, in case of civil war, owing to its marshy character, would act as a hindrance to counter-revolutionary activities. Michailenko was sent there by the wrecking centre with the urgent mission of irrigating this area

by the autumn of 1930. An inspector of the Commissariat of Agriculture was sent down to hurry up the work and brought money to Michailenko, and the threat to have him removed if he failed to perform the job. Michailenko had little knowledge of the wrecking centre, he knew nobody on the bench of the accused, he only knew Sparo, from whom he received the direct commission. Yet Ramzin knew of this work, as he told us here, as did the French agent referred to here as R. This work was provided for in the military strategical plans for the invasion by Krasnov's Cossacks, who were to form part of Lukomsky's army.

Why was it Ramzin told us nothing of all this before Michailenko appeared here as a witness? It was not to his advantage to do so! But he could not escape it, since Tseidler, Riesenkampf, Kennig, Sparo, Michailenko and others might appear here, one after the other, and compel Ramzin to confess what he knew. The evidence of Michailenko formed very valuable corroboration of what we know of the date, place and plan of intervention.

Such is the general picture of the work of the wreckers based upon concrete material and facts indicating exactly the place, the time, the performers, the objects and the methods of the wrecking operations.

I cannot dwell in detail here on questions directly associated with the control and direction of espionage, destructive acts and high treason. These questions were gone into at the secret session of the Court. But the existence of such contact was established. K. and R. have been shown to be real and living persons; their identity has been established. The character of the instructions given has been revealed in detail. As regards destructive acts and explosions, we have established the identity of the persons who received such instructions and were preparing to carry them out. All these facts go to prove that the accused, in actual deed, were preparing for intervention, in the form of destructive acts, espionage and high treason.

Having defined the degree of real danger of war, I can now proceed to deal with the character and guilt of each of the individuals involved. I should only like to point out that now, since the revelations at this trial, there are even greater grounds for believing that the danger of intervention is not a delusion, a fantasy, an invention, but an actual political fact, and, as such, must be borne in mind when examining the individual responsibility of both of the accused.

The Plan of Intervention.

In order to describe the part played by each of the accused in the work of counter-revolution, in the preparations for the armed invasion of the U.S.S.R., the overthrow of the Soviet

power and the restoration of capitalism, it is necessary to dwell on one more factor characterising the general conditions under which they worked and the aims they set themselves. One of the most important parts of the testimony of the accused relates to the concrete plan of intervention. This plan was discussed in Paris in 1928. It was modified when the date of intervention was postponed, but the integral parts of the plan remained unchanged.

According to the plan, the leadership and control of intervention were to be entrusted to French command. The names of Janin, Richard and Joinville have not been denied by any of the self-appointed repudiators: not by the Torgprom, or by the French public figures who have expressed themselves on the subject, not even by Poincaré.

The evidence of Monsieur Poincaré of February, 1930 (to the effect that the situation on the Roumanian and Bessarabian frontiers inspired him, Poincaré, with suspicion, and that there were certain "dark spots" and constantly recurring "incidents," which he attributed to the evil designs of the Soviet Union), when compared with the concrete plan for 1930 revealed at this trial—in accordance with which intervention was to be initiated by conflicts on the Roumanian and Polish frontiers—presents an extremely significant coincidence.

What do we find in the revelations of this trial corresponding with the proposed operations on the North-Western frontier and the double blow to be struck at Moscow and Leningrad? We have, according to the evidence of Michailenko, the intensification in 1929 of the land development work begun in 1926.

Moreover, the plans for aiding intervention considered the question of supplies for air forces and the question of housing for aeroplanes. According to the evidence of Syrotzinsky, sawmills around Archangel and Leningrad were so planned as to be easily adapted for use as hangars.

Roumanian border incidents, invasion by an expeditionary force, reliance on the counter-revolutionary activities of the kulaks in Southern Russia, land improvement work on the Western frontier, the rendering unfit of the roads in the frontier areas for military purposes, the preparation of fuel bases and suitable housing for an air force and a combined blow at Moscow and Leningrad—these were the main military strategical calculations on which the plan for intervention was based.

I ask, does such a plan conform with the experience of civil war in the past? In documents which are now no secret, since they have been published in the European press, and again in the published documents regarding the agreement among the Powers which took part in the intervention in the U.S.S.R., the

areas of invasion were clearly and precisely described and with equal clarity and precision were the strategical and tactical problems defined. And they are the very same problems which have been spoken about at this trial: the same movements on the Western frontier in the direction of Leningrad, the same plan of occupation in the North, the same frontier zone and movements through Roumania and Poland and the same calculation on the counter-revolutionary attitude of the White Guard officers and the kulaks of the Northern Caucasus. The basic factors of this plan have been provided by history and the concrete relation of class forces.

And so we are obliged to conclude that all these facts bear out the truth and accuracy of the assertion that the date of intervention was set for 1930. We may believe the accused when they state that both in them and their foreign friends the conviction was growing that the plan must be carried out at the earliest possible moment, and that it was the only method that now remained, if hope were not to be abandoned entirely. That explains the shortness of the period set, and why the postponement was only from 1930 to 1931. And for that reason, increased watchfulness and heightened caution on the part of the proletarian masses of the U.S.S.R. is essential.

We look ahead boldly. We face the future with confidence. That is borne out by the attitude of the proletariat and the toiling masses of the U.S.S.R. toward this trial. Should the need arise and the hour of trouble approach, we shall rise in defence of the Soviet Union, all of us, adults and children, workers and peasants, men and women, old and young. I think there is not a single person among us who at the present moment, when the question of intervention is said to be a matter of months, as Deterding says it is, will not proclaim that, come when it may, the U.S.S.R. will meet the collision fully armed and in complete military preparedness. The U.S.S.R. will be defended and its future welfare guaranteed. But for the interventionists the consequences of the collision may be such as they never dreamed of.

Ramzin.

Citizen Ramzin, professor of a higher technological institute and an intellectual of the first water, was the chief organiser and inspiration of the wrecking centre. During the early years of the revolution he was an active saboteur, a member of Kirsch's group, which, with few exceptions, refused on principle to work in Soviet institutions and under Soviet conditions. Hence, we first meet with Ramzin in the years 1918 to 1920 as an active enemy of the Soviet power. Then follows a period during which, according to Ramzin himself, he became a sincere Soviet

worker and whole-heartedly accepted the Soviet platform. But miracles do not happen on this earth, and the historical development of an individual, just as of a train of events, is governed by an inner logic, more cogent than naked assertions such as Ramzin was pleased to make here. When the civil war ended, for the majority of engineers and intellectuals who were opposed to the Soviet power no other alternative remained but to reconcile themselves to the situation, and when, therefore, Ramzin declares that he accepted the Soviet platform, permit me to state that such was not the case, and that he merely accepted and reconciled himself to the fact that the Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat had become consolidated, and thus all attempts to overthrow the Soviet power by force of arms had failed.

Ramzin is a typical practical worker, a man of business, an organiser. Ideas and principles are not the things for which he is prepared to act and for which he would be prepared to fight and, if necessary, to die. And it was as a man of business that he made his cold calculations and formed his sober judgments. The Soviet Government existed, but would it continue to exist? You will find very few of the old intellectuals who really believed in their heart of hearts that the Soviet Government would continue to remain in existence, who did not believe that it was a temporary phenomenon that would soon pass. Ramzin was no exception, and his assertions to the effect that he believed in the Soviet power, but that later, after the introduction of the New Economic Policy, he became disillusioned, are pure invention.

He was, and still remains, an active counter-revolutionary. He was, and still remains, an active enemy of the Soviet power, with which out of necessity he had temporarily made his peace. But, meeting with the hostility of the engineering circles in which he moved, who interfered with his political career, he decided, from purely practical motives, that it would be more profitable to throw in his lot with them, rather than with the Soviet power, since, after all, the Soviet power could not possibly be stable. But he was mistaken.

Such were his calculations and such were the reasons for his right-about-face.

Ramzin is the type of political adventurer par excellence. Although he himself does not come from the industrial bourgeois class, he is the type which in the conditions of the class war, with all its complexities and changing aspects, now and again comes to the surface. He plays a definite part in certain acute moments of the class conflict, when the social interplay of group, class and personal interests assumes a most intricate form. Ramzin is just such a type, and that largely explains many of his political activities.

Take, for instance, his meeting with the Torgprom in Paris in 1928. He is anxious to check the authenticity of the information given by Denisov. " Mr. Denisov, you state that you have relations with military circles. Permit me to see for myself. I am risking my head, so let me meet them and talk to them myself." The same with regard to money affairs, which were discussed at the evening meeting: he wants to know who would supply the money, from what sources it would be forthcoming and how it would be remitted in future. At the meeting with Joinville and Lukomsky, he said to the latter: " Let us have concrete facts, old man. Tell me the exact plan, where are the armed forces, where is the material base." As to whether there would be a dictatorship or not, how the land question would be settled, what is State capitalism—that for Ramzin was not important, that could be thought about later. It was definite, practical matters that had to be settled now.

And see how Ramzin acts. At that time he knew that territorial concessions would have to be made, he was aware of the appetites of the interventionists and what price they demanded. Fyedotov told us that when he learned that Ramzin had agreed to these concessions he went to Charnovsky and said: " What is all this about? I am a decent and honest former Cadet. I sincerely believed that the interventionists were going to help us out of the goodness of their hearts, and would demand nothing. And Ramzin agreed. But Karpov does not say that the interventionists will demand nothing, and to that also Ramzin agreed." And Fyedotov argues: either Karpov fooled me, or Ramzin fooled me. Or perhaps the Torgprom fooled us all. I have been fooled in any case. That is how Fyedotov argued.

But Ramzin does not argue. His attitude is much simpler. Must concessions be made? They must. Need his colleagues be told about it? Not necessarily. May one fool them on the subject? One may. In other words, a typical political adventurer, pursuing a definite and concrete purpose, and stopping at nothing, not even at deceiving his comrades.

Such is Ramzin, the leader of the wreckers. Ramzin, the spy, since direct contact with K. and R. was effected through him. Ramzin, the conspirator, planning with the military circles of foreign Powers for armed invasion of our territory. And, finally, Ramzin, the liar, who came here with his wholehearted confessions, but failed to tell the whole truth until he was compelled to.

Charnovsky.

Charnovsky is 61 years and 11 months old (as he, with such precision, himself told us). He received his education at the Moscow University and the Technological Institute. He first

worked in industry and then received a professorship, and it was during the performance of his professorial duties that he formed relations with the wrecking organisation and subsequently became a member of the Central Committee of that organisation.

Charnovsky has declared here that the absolutism of the Tsarist monarchy did not inconvenience him. He was fully absorbed in his factory duties, like an industrious ant. And then later, somehow, he became involved with the wrecking organisation. Is that really so, Citizen Charnovsky, and does that conform with the characterisation which you gave yourself in your evidence?

Charnovsky declared that he was only a reporter of information, not a leader. He then admitted that he was not a reporter, but a leader and executive, responsible for a definite branch of industry, in which he was the successor of Khrennikov. He is a twister. He twisted like a snake at this trial, trying to writhe out of the evidence and the inexorable logic of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence.

And what did he amount to as a professor? The fact (as was reported in the wall newspaper) that he was found to possess church utensils is not without significance. He was an active member of the Black Hundreds. He refused to vote for the Constituent Assembly because, as he declared, it was unnecessary. And he devoted himself to the wrecking work and became one of its chief leaders.

Metallurgy is one of those fundamental industries on which the defence of the country depends, and it was in this field that Charnovsky led the wrecking operations. The fact that, together with Ramzin, he planned what war factories, in the event of intervention were to be destroyed, and in what order, is sufficient to enable us to determine what sort of man Charnovsky is.

Politically, he is without ideas or principles of any kind; for him political questions have no significance. He is a petty, vile, abject little person. But he was active, an energetic wrecker, a spy, planning to destroy war factories. And he is a liar. When he said that he performed his wrecking work without recompense, he lied.

Kalinnikov.

Kalinnikov is one of the comparatively few representatives of the old bourgeoisie, of the old group of bourgeois professors, who had sufficient counter-revolutionary courage to carry on open and active counter-revolutionary activities under the Soviet system. He was one of those who refused to work with the Soviet power; he was one of the organisers and inspirers of the academic strike. But at the same time he was one of those who later responded to the appeal of the Soviet Government and agreed to

work. When I asked him why he decided to work, he answered: Why not, I was apparently needed; but I went without changing my opinions.

The Soviet Government placed the greatest confidence in Kalinnikov. He himself says that he had not the slightest reason to complain. And, enjoying this confidence, he worked persistently as a wrecker, and was one of the leaders of the wrecking organisation. He, together with Osadchy and Laritchev, was a member of the commission which drew up secret economic reports to be transmitted to the Torgprom. Together with Laritchev and Ramzin, he was a member of the commission, which, on the instructions of R., was engaged in drawing up a list of the war factories that were to be blown up at the time of intervention. He was a member of the commission which was engaged in distributing the work of organising acts of treachery to be performed in the Red Army at the time of intervention. He also took upon himself the execution of the tasks assigned by R. and K., acting as a spy, and transmitting information demanded by the agency of a foreign power. He placed himself entirely, with all his honourable title and degrees, at the disposal of that agency.

Laritchev.

Laritchev was a wrecker in 1925. After the arrest of Rabinovitch and Palchinsky, the task of leading the wrecking operations in the fuel industries fell to him. He actively assisted Ramzin in the work abroad. As a fuel expert, Laritchev took part in the negotiations with the oil magnates in Paris in 1928. He was also present at the evening meeting with Col. Richard. He took upon himself the execution of espionage and destructive tasks in the U.S.S.R. Together with Kalinnikov and Ramzin, he worked on the plan of destructive acts which were to be carried out in the war factories. With Osadchy and Kalinnikov, he shared the duties of establishing military contacts and of making preparations for acts of treachery on the part of certain divisions and commanding officers of the Red Army at the time of intervention.

Espionage, high treason and wrecking—such are the counter-revolutionary services of Citizen Laritchev. Add to this the admission made by Ramzin, Kalinnikov and himself that they had originally not told the whole truth regarding the wrecking operations, not even in the verbose explanations made during the first days of the trial, and you will get a clear picture of the political and ideological character of Laritchev. These people confess only to the extent that concealment is no longer possible. What they can conceal, they conceal.

Fyedotov.

It appeared, at least during the early days, that the most interesting individual at this trial, and one deserving a certain amount of sympathy, was Fyedotov. Here was the familiar figure of the Russian intellectual: a professor, who had been a constant member of the Constitutional Democratic Party from the day of its formation until the day of its liquidation in the autumn of 1917; a man who, in the past, had to his credit certain political deeds which were held in high esteem in these professorial circles, although we, it is true, used to jeer at them as not demanding a very high order of civic courage.

Later he became a member of the staff of the "Russky Vedomosty," that is to say, was associated with the upper circle of academic Liberals. He also had the privilege of attending the meetings of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party.

Add to the picture the material enjoyments he had achieved at that time. He was earning nearly 60,000 roubles a year. He had his own estate, purchased with his hard-won earnings, and enjoyed close contacts and acquaintanceships in industrial capitalist circles.

Such is the person of Fyedotov; and there we would rest, were it not for certain facts that came out at the trial. The truth is that we had two Fyedotovs before us at the trial, not one. We had a Fyedotov who argued and defended himself with spirit, even with a certain venom, hurling at times not unhappy retorts at me and at the accused. And we had a broken Fyedotov, capitulating and humbled.

And what was the reason? The reason was the revelation of quite a different side to the activities of Fyedotov, which completely undermined and destroyed him as a political figure. That side of his activities is covered by the clause of the Criminal Code dealing with corruption and bribery in the most direct meaning of the term. These were not bribes received for the needs of the Torgprom, for the engineers, for the work of counter-revolution; not bribes intended for the payment of his fellow wreckers, but bribes received for the granting of contracts, for the purchase and reception abroad of British machinery, bribes that went directly into the pocket of Citizen Fyedotov.

Facts are facts, and the value of the political integrity of the professor and Cadet, who at one time, he declares, defended the working class in the "Russky Vedomosty," is measured by the amount of pounds sterling for which he sold his science and his political and civic honour.

Kuprianov.

For seventeen years Kuprianov guarded the welfare of Konovalov. He voted for "the master" when the latter was

put forward as a candidate for the Constituent Assembly. It would not have been decent to do otherwise. " What the old master orders " must be done. He even refused to share the money stolen from the master by Lopatin and other wreckers, who shared and sold Konovalov's stocks on the Black Bourse. He had sufficient courage and scruples to refuse this money. But he did not refuse other money. Twelve and a half thousand roubles went into his pocket as a fair recompense for the wrecking work he had performed.

Kuprianov not only led a group in a branch of industry; he was not only an active wrecker himself; he was also an accepted person in the Central Committee. He was, in fact, a member of the circle from which no secrets were kept, even on the most important, the most conspiratorial questions, such as the preparations for intervention.

Practically, his work consisted, as I said, in active leadership, the organisation of groups for the commission of destructive acts and the organisation of military groups. This was a job definitely connected with preparations for intervention, as such, as distinct from the general work he performed in the way of creating a crisis in the textile industry.

Ochkin.

Among the various incidents from the biography of Ochkin recited at the trial, there stands out the fact that he remained on the Central Fuel Board when the others deserted, cutting himself off from the Kirsch group. He declares that he did so from definite intellectual convictions. I suggest that when the judges come to consider Ochkin's case they should clearly bear in mind the character of this man and ask themselves whether in the actions of this *alter ego* of Ramzin there can be any question of profound intellectual convictions. His motives for remaining on the Central Fuel Board were much more elementary. He remained because he found it a good job. The revolution and its fate interested him very little, but here he could earn his bread. So he remained. Then Ramzin took him in hand, and at the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928 that change in him occurred, which Ramzin described as a swing over to the wreckers.

What was the work Ochkin performed? He carried out some of the most important commissions. At the closed session of the court we dwelt particularly on the part played by Ochkin and established the fact that he was directly entrusted with destructive work and with espionage. There is the question of money. Ochkin declares that they overlooked him, forgot him. I am convinced that an important person like Ochkin, the business manager of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party,

was not overlooked. He received his recompense, and it is useless for him to deny it. That will not help him. And that is all I have to say about Ochkin.

Sitnin.

And, finally, as to Sitnin, this "Soviet" man, who, as others have testified, enjoyed influence and authority as a member of the Board of the Textile Syndicate, and a member of the board of the Textile Trust; a man who was entrusted with important commissions by both sides: by the Government, in the purchase of cotton, and by the textile group in the wrecking organisation.

Comprehending very little in political questions, and not understanding the subtleties and shades of the political struggle, Sitnin, nevertheless, fulfilled the tasks entrusted to him, and brought the information required, whether regarding the position of Konovalov, or regarding the audiences with Poincaré, or regarding the motives which had led Poincaré to insist on the intensification of the wrecking work.

While one may not have been inclined to use strong words in describing Fyedotov, one has absolutely no scruples in the case of Sitnin. He took bribes in the U.S.S.R.; he took bribes abroad. A bribe-taker on an international scale, in fact. A swindler, for swindling is the only decription for his gold manipulations, he felt drawn to political affairs and sought the leadership of the textile wrecking group. His position as a social menace is as clear as his position as a social benefit. As a social benefit, he is a cipher. That he is a social menace has been demonstrated.

Conclusions.

I shall now proceed to the final section of my closing speech, namely, to determine the definite measures of repression which should be applied to each of the accused, and the reasons for doing so.

If we approached this case in the usual way, one ought to determine who bears the greater guilt and who the less. But our object is not to weigh in the huckster's scales whose guilt is greater and whose is less, but to seek the measure which is appropriate in each individual case from the point of view of the defence and protection of the country against counter-revolution.

In the fight against counter-revolution, our Soviet court is first and foremost a weapon of the dictatorship of the working class, a weapon of the class which rules our country, faced by the remnants of the shattered bourgeoisie of our own country and the dominant and ruling bourgeois class abroad. Lenin said:

" There are enemies who may be routed in several engagements, may be crushed for a time, but who cannot be destroyed. . . . They are the millions of the working class, growing ever more numerous in the cities, in the factories and mills and on the railways. They are the impoverished peasants. . . . Such enemies as the working class and the poor peasantry cannot be destroyed."

Can the accused be included in this category of enemies that cannot be destroyed? They cannot. They have not the millions, the masses behind them. They have behind them the relics of a class that has been crushed and destroyed, and the international bourgeois class that history has condemned to destruction. And Lenin, in respect of such enemies, says that the question of revolutionary force and revolutionary repression must be regarded differently.

" Is a revolutionary class thinkable," he wrote, " which would not punish such crimes with death, at a time when the civil war has assumed the most acute form, and the bourgeoisie is plotting invasion by foreign troops for the purpose of overthrowing the workers' government?"

And further:

" After the revolution of October 25th, 1917, we did not even close down the bourgeois press. There was no thought of terror. We set at liberty not only many of Kerensky's ministers, but even Krasnov himself, who had fought against us. . . . You know that Krasnov, who was magnanimously allowed by the Russian workers to go free when he appeared in Petrograd and surrendered his sword, was released because of the prejudices of the intellectuals against the death penalty. I should like to see that people's court, that workers' and peasants' court, that would not shoot Krasnov."

Lenin has also dealt with the question of the technical experts:

" We can, and must, compel them to refrain from active part in counter-revolution; we can so terrify them that they will be afraid to lift a finger in response to the call of the White Guards."

And that is exactly what we have to do now.

It seems to me that when the masses of the working class are sending their greeting to the body which exposed the deeds of this group, to the sentinel of the revolution, the G.P.U.; when they are giving expression to their readiness to bare their breasts in defence of the Soviet Union and to lay down their lives for the right and opportunity to build up their Socialist fatherland in the way they think fit; when the masses of the world proletariat

are looking to the Soviet Union as the leader and guiding star in the struggle for the emancipation of mankind; and when the bourgeoisie, now approaching the end of its reign, is lifting its head against us and consolidating its forces, and, feeling its end approaching, is discussing the hour for the destruction of the Soviet Union; at this moment, when the wave of this new war is rising and it seems almost inevitable that the two worlds in the very near future may be locked in a death grapple—at such a moment all that which in the Soviet Union may lend aid to this other world must be swept away and destroyed once and for all.

The State Prosecution demands of the Supreme Court that the accused be shot, all without exception."

Krylenko's final words were followed by a crash of applause from the public in the body of the Court.

His speech was followed by addresses on behalf of Kuprianov and Sitnin by Braude and Otzep.

SPEECH BY BRAUDE, KUPRIANOV'S COUNSEL.

Braude stated that if revenge and just retribution had been the purpose of Soviet justice, he would have been forced to agree with every word of the Public Prosecutor, not only with regard to the enormity of the crime, but also with regard to the punishment demanded by him. However, revenge and retribution were conceptions altogether alien to Soviet justice. The principle of " an eye for an eye " was altogether discarded in this country. Therefore he differed with regard to the punishment.

A Soviet advocate was first and foremost a citizen of the Soviet Union, and as such he could not help feeling the greatest indignation at the criminal activities of the defendants.

" Our hearts beat in unison with the hearts of the millions of workers who came to the Court on the opening day of the trial and demanded the supreme penalty for the criminals."

But when it comes to punishment, one has to weigh very carefully the motives of the defendant and the danger he represents for society.

Kuprianov was far from being the guiding spirit in the conspiracy. He was a good engineer, a man thoroughly competent in his profession, but he never took any active part in politics. He only followed his employer Konovalov. Konovalov's word was law for him both before the revolution, when he was Kuprianov's employer, and after the revolution, when Konovalov lived as an exile abroad. In political questions, even the colleagues of Kuprianov in the Industrial Party regarded him as of no account. Ramzin, who was planning to divide the future Cabinet posts among his principal supporters, altogether ignored him.

Kuprianov was the son of a peasant, and it was only due to fortunate circumstances that he was able to qualify as an engineer and to occupy a leading position among Russian textile specialists.

Kuprianov had recognised the enormity of his offence, and had given the Court proof of his sincere repentance. He was now of no danger to the State. Deeds such as were contemplated by the members of the Industrial Party could only be performed in secret, concealed from the light of the people. Once they were brought into the limelight, they ceased to be dangerous, because the people were bound to be thoroughly hostile to any such plotting. He was an enemy who had not only repented, but had been entirely crushed, and therefore presented now no danger to the Socialist commonwealth.

He was only a secondary figure in this trial. The prime movers, responsible for the activities of the Industrial Party and for the preparation of intervention to realise the plans of counter-revolution and sabotage, men who should be in the dock were, unfortunately, not present here. The chief historical culprits, the real defendants who constituted the actual directing brains of counter-revolutionary sabotage—Poincaré, the Torgprom and the reactionary adventurers of the world—had so far escaped the proletarian court. The absence of the chief culprits inevitably distorted the situation, and reflected on the defendants who had committed the most heinous crimes. He asked the Court to be lenient in deciding the punishment for Kuprianov, for he was an individual politically and morally crushed, who served as a tool in the hands of the actual organisers of the counter-revolutionary onslaught against the Soviet Union, and in the counter-revolutionary struggle with the Soviet Government.

Moreover, he should be given a chance of expiating his crime by helping to reconstruct Socialist economy. He had told the Court he was anxious to expiate his crime in this way, and there was no reason to disbelieve him. They all knew that he was one of the greatest experts in the textile industry.

SPEECH OF OTZEP, SITNIN'S COUNSEL.

Otzep followed very much the same line of defence as Braude. He pointed out that Counsel, in a case like this, felt an inner conflict between his duty as an advocate and his feelings as a citizen. In his latter capacity he could not but join in the universal feeling of indignation, shared by every one in the country, by the international proletariat, and by the intellectual leaders of Western Europe, such as George Bernard Shaw, Romain Rolland and Stefan Zweig.

They were all struck by the cold-blooded, truly professorial manner assumed by men who were committing dastardly crimes,

calculated to bring about misery and destitution to the entire country.

They professed to be patriotic, yet the interventionists relied most " on the hatred of Poles and Roumanians for the Russian people." They wanted to bring into Russia coloured troops from the French colonies, and they relied on the highly perfected means of extermination which would be used by the French.

The guilt of the accused was beyond doubt, but it was in regard to the punishment that Counsel differed from the Public Prosecutor.

Otzep quoted the Shakhty case, which resulted in a reprieve for several of the accused, and he laid special emphasis on the recent case of the " League for the Liberation of the Ukraine," as a result of which none of the accused were condemned to death, though they were guilty of a crime not less heinous than the present one. This was due to the fact that the Soviet Government was now so strong that there was no necessity for it to resort to extreme measures. Disarmed enemies such as Sitnin were no longer dangerous for the country, and they could be useful to it if they genuinely recognised their crimes. Sitnin, who was of secondary importance in this trial, had undoubtedly recognised his offence, and was now disarmed and harmless. Therefore, it would be right and proper to allow him to atone for his crimes by useful work on behalf of the Soviet Union.

Those of the accused who were not defended by Counsel were now asked if they wished to address the Court.

LAST STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED.

Last Statement of Ramzin, the leader of the Industrial Party.

Citizen Judges of the Supreme Court : I am quite clearly and definitely conscious of the fact that to-day's last statement of mine is in fact my final speech, my last appearance before a large audience. I should like simply and without any hypocrisy to state a few additional considerations referring to the matter you have just investigated. Now, a few hours before my end, it would be out of place to lie and to prevaricate.

First of all, about the personal motives which prompted me to join the counter-revolutionary organisation, motives which prompted me to take an active part in its work. The Public Prosecutor explained it by mere material interest on my part. I insist that this explanation, as well as the characterisation of myself, and, so far as I know, of the other defendants, does not correspond to what exists in reality. This characterisation is too mechanical.

Could I personally have done it on account of some sort of doubtful advantages that might ensue? What could I have

expected from a change of régime? Nothing better for me, in any case, because that which I enjoyed in the Soviet Union in the sense of material comfort and in the sense of those exceptionally favourable surroundings in which I was placed, can hardly ever be dreamt of by a foreign scholar.

I was not guided by any personal or mercenary motives. The main and basic cause which forced me to take this path was at that time a definite, firm and deep conviction that the policy of the Soviet Government was wrong and pernicious.

There were only two paths open—there was nothing else to choose from—either the path to the left, to the Kremlin and through it up a difficult path towards the peaks of Socialism, or the path to the right, which under existing circumstances must inevitably lead to Paris, a path that must inevitably lead to that hellish den of militant imperialism where wars, attacks by means of espionage, treason, betrayal and sabotage, are being prepared.

There was and is no third path. The path of neutrality does not exist. Of these two paths, we chose the one to the right, and where did we get to?

Having thought matters over during the past year, during the months of imprisonment, during the preliminary investigations, during the trial, I now see clearly where we got to. In the event of a victory for intervention, which was our primary goal, we should inevitably have witnessed the territorial partition of our fatherland, enormous economic and political sacrifices, including even the loss of our economic and political independence. In the event of intervention failing, we should, all the same, have achieved the frustration of economic construction, the frustration of the Five Year Plan, delay in the economic development of the country. In either case, we should have achieved results obviously antagonistic to the interests of the country.

Therefore, having fully understood and seen this with absolute clarity, having traversed the path of frank confession and repentance, I deemed it necessary to fight this evil—albeit late in the day—but fight it by the only possible means left at my disposal—the means of exposing the real inspirers, the real organisers and culprits of the blood bath which is being engineered—including myself.

The Public Prosecutor here asked the question: how can such a mass confession, such lack of resistance and of struggle, such submission and readiness not only not to defend, but even to accuse oneself, be explained?

The cause of this confession is perfectly clear. No inner convictions, no fundamental principles, no points of support were left with which to defend the road we had chosen, to defend its

correctness or its expediency. Therefore one of the advocates was right in saying that we did not come here to fight or to defend ourselves.

Finally, I personally came here fully convinced of the bankruptcy of my former ideas, of the mistakenness of my former conceptions, with a feeling that often actuates especially a Russian criminal, the feeling of that purifying effect which is brought about by a public repentance, a public confession of one's guilt, errors and crimes.

And I will say that I shall leave this trial, whatever its results for me personally, with greater peace of mind than I had before the trial.

During this trial, in the course of the eleven days which we have spent here, I felt acutely that hatred, those curses which from the body of the hall were hurled here against the bench of the defendants and against me personally. I felt also those waves of hatred which swelled around the building from the length and breadth of the country. I felt the concentrated hatred and contempt in the speech of the Public Prosecutor, and yet I felt that, having come here with sincere repentance and confession, maybe not now, but after some time, this burning hatred will be softened by the conviction of the mass of the people that, at any rate, towards the end of our criminal career, we tried to turn away from it.

We tried, true to an insignificant extent, to mend and alleviate that enormous damage which we did to the Republic.

Now, when I think of the coming penalty, of the coming retribution, there is a conflict of two feelings within me; one feeling that tells me that, with such a disgrace, with such a distrust (because I cannot be treated otherwise) it is impossible to live on. Better death than such a life. Yet, on the other hand, I want to live in order to witness myself that epoch of wonders such as has never yet existed in the history of mankind. I wish to take part myself in this great work of construction. The settlement of this question will be in the hands of the Court, and I dare not prompt the Court to adopt any decision. Let the Soviet Government, represented by the Supreme Court, decide what is best for the Republic—my death or my life and work. I must honestly, straightforwardly and boldly state that the sentence demanded for me by the Public Prosecutor is just. If my death can satisfy the just indignation of the broad proletarian masses and will enable Socialist construction to regain the great engineering forces so necessary to it and taken away by the Industrial Party, I am prepared to suffer the extreme penalty, which I richly deserve.

If, for this purpose, my life must be taken by the Republic, let it be taken.

My promise is not mere verbiage or an empty phrase. After the complete collapse of my entire former ideology, after a painful inner crisis and the moral suffering I have endured, you may believe me.

Last Statement of Charnovsky.

I am fully conscious of the gravity of my guilt, of my crime against the Workers' Government, and bring my sincere repentance to the Supreme Court. I am prepared to atone for this guilt of mine by the sentence which the Supreme Court will find necessary to impose on me. But if the Court deigns to allow me to work, I am prepared to place all my forces at the services of the Soviet Government and of Soviet industry.

I shall permit myself—not in defence, since I have refused to be defended, but only in order to explain the circumstances of my fall—to point out some additional facts, to sum up my activity, in order that the Supreme Court can see clearly how I came to be a member of the Industrial Party and what has become of me now.

I should also like to point out certain creditable aspects in my former life, if you will allow me. (The PRESIDENT: You can speak as long as you think necessary.) My pedagogical activity was here referred to. That was for me most valuable, the most precious period of my life. I was teaching for twenty-four years, during which time I rendered myself very useful.

I consider that in this way I made a certain contribution towards the future industrial construction.

I beg the Court to show leniency in its sentence.

Last Statement of Laritchev.

The Public Prosecutor's summing up of our activities was deadly in its severity.

But could it be otherwise? Certainly not. The crimes committed are far too heinous, and in consequence our punishment, and mine in particular, is bound to be very heavy.

Perhaps the Public Prosecutor, in evaluating our activities, has exaggerated in some particulars, but after all it is only a matter of details which do not affect the essence of the case. Therefore I don't want to dwell on them. Maybe they intensify the legal aspect of my guilt, but they cannot increase my moral guilt, the weight of which I feel and for which I seek no justification.

I do not want to defend myself in this my last statement. But if, in my present state, there is no justification for me, I have still preserved a sense of duty. I understand that this duty of mine consists in breaking for ever with the past, acknowledging my guilt before the Soviet Government and before all the toilers

of the Union, and coming here to say, honestly and openly, everything I knew of our criminal activity, i.e., of our sabotaging counter-revolutionary work, which finally led up to the gravest crime of all—high treason, treason to the cause of the working class.

But I have broken with the past, I believe and I repeat it again. There is no ground for supposing that we have come here with some ulterior motive. No, I have done with the past, and I am yearning to take part in that construction, so as to atone for my guilt, be it even only to a certain extent. But I am clearly conscious of the gravity of my crimes and the harm I did to the Soviet Union and to my native country; and I consider that I am not entitled to ask the Court for leniency. Let the Court itself decide whether I can be useful, whether I am still capable of not being a socially dangerous element and atoning for my crime.

But, I repeat, I have no right in view of the gravity of my crimes to ask for leniency. Any sentence, whatever it be, I shall accept as a just punishment for my deeds.

Last Statement by Ochkin.

I am infinitely glad that at last the painful drama, which was going on in my soul, is drawing to a close.

I have been working all my life and I worked honestly and devotedly.

Ramzin has given me much, but he has taken from me still more. I curse the hour when I swerved from that path which I had been continuously treading ever since the beginning of the October Revolution.

I now refuse to defend myself, for there is no sense in so doing after committing such grave crimes against the working class.

I here express my complete repentance and beg the Soviet Government to spare me, in spite of all the crimes I have committed against the proletariat, and to give me the possibility of expiating my fault.

Last Statement of Kalinnikov.

What can I say to you, judges of the Supreme Court, in this last statement of mine, after I have already confessed to all my criminal deeds, which have been proved here in Court, after the Public Prosecutor has demanded a severe punishment for me?

This is neither the place nor the time to sum up my life before you. As the Public Prosecutor rightly and fittingly observed, I have been throughout a consistent counter-revolutionary. However, our wrecking attempts were futile. The power and enthusiasm of the working class have defeated all

our wrecking schemes. I shall not quote figures proving those brilliant successes, they are already known here.

And what did our inspirers, our allies abroad, do? They were so insistent, so persistent in urging us along the path of sabotage, yet they proved to be extraordinarily weak.

They were the first to sound a retreat in this work at the end of 1929. They could not invent anything better—either the French General Staff or the Torgprom—than to urge us more insistently to intensify our sabotage, to extend espionage and destructive work and to strive to set up military cells in the army.

As society becomes better organised and developed, the scope of individual life must be narrowed. That is right. Progress is the result of ever greater sacrifices of the personal element to the community. In all sections of national economy —be it industry, transport or agriculture—the highest development can only be reached when there is a complete unity of the collective body of the toilers of all grades, from labourers to engineers, provided in any case that the proletariat itself assumes the guidance. The Soviet Government fully secures such an economic system.

I need only add the following : I acknowledge all my crimes, and sincerely repent of having committed them. My crimes are so grave and shameful that I dare not beg the Supreme Court for any leniency. However severe your sentence, Judges of the Supreme Court, it will be just with regard to myself, and I shall accept it as the deserved punishment for my crimes. But if the Soviet Government and you, Judges of the Supreme Court, will recognise my repentance as sincere, and will grant me the possibility of proving it by my work, I promise you to apply all my efforts and all my knowledge towards attenuating and expiating —be it even to a slight extent—the sin which I have committed before the Soviet Union by my criminal deeds.

Last Statement of Fyedotov.

I am now allowed to say my last word. I have confessed to my crimes. I have refused the services of Counsel. What shall I say in my last word? Do I need it? I need only say : I am guilty. I have already told the Court that any punishment to which I shall be sentenced I shall recognise as just, and yet I have asked to be allowed to make this last statement.

We have more or less to repeat ourselves. Don't take this amiss—it is but natural. We are in the same position, and the evolutions of our sentiments are alike.

To tell the truth, the present result is after all better and more fortunate than if we had not been caught, if intervention had actually taken place.

It is better to die by the sentence of the Court instead of knowing the results of one's activity brought about intervention. The disclosure of our actions, our confession at the present time, will constitute considerable obstacles for further similar activities.

Intervention is not altogether impossible. There are too many interests abroad which will continue to strive for intervention, and will continue to seek for and enlist allies in order to attack Russia. The henchmen of these interests, represented by our White emigrants, will perhaps come still closer together, maybe will even to a greater extent renounce their former ideals and teachings in order to help intervention, in order to come back to the fatherland But here in the Soviet Union they will not find anyone to help them.

And this thought serves to a certain extent as a consolation in that terrible fate which has befallen us.

The Public Prosecutor spoke very pungently and very severely indeed—but I can assure both him and you that the words which I have been saying to myself in the sleepless nights I have spent during the last eight months were far more bitter, and the anguish, the infinite anguish, which I lived through are not to be compared to anything he said. He is certainly right. The whole trouble is that he is quite right. . . .

We are guilty, and we cannot be forgiven. We are guilty of all those crimes which he enumerated. But, apart from all these, I am guilty of having betrayed the principles of the whole of my life. I have been untrue to my honour, to morality. I went so far as to accept money. If I had only been an enemy, I could not be treated with contempt; as it is, who can have any sympathy for me?

The Public Prosecutor said that, during the first days I evoked even sympathy, that is, I evoked sympathy in him; that now this sympathy was gone. That is both natural and intelligible. Recently I was called before one of the high officials of the G.P.U. After examining me, he stretched out his hand to me. I burst into tears.

Yet I wish to expiate my guilt. I am not afraid of death, I have not long to live, I am older than all the other accused, I am 67. All that remains of my life is a couple of years. But I should not like to die by way of execution. For the sake of my family, for the sake of my children, I should like to rehabilitate myself, so that they would not have to change their name and renounce kinship with me.

The Public Prosecutor does not believe in our sincerity. My opinion is that he is not right in that.

I must state that, when I was appointed President of the Board of Scientific Research Institutes, a definite change already began to take place in my soul. Comrade Judges—but I have

no right to address you as " comrades," pardon me—if the Judges of the Supreme Court will peruse the records, and will recall to their minds the evidence of Professor Ramzin, for instance, and of others, they will see that, already in the second half of 1929 and in 1930, I rarely took part in, and tried to dissociate myself from, the sabotage in which I was implicated.

And now imprisonment has completed the evolution which began when I was at liberty. I have understood that, in the economic sense, economic activity, such as it is represented in political economy text-books, in the former bourgeois text-books, does not at all require personal initiative, does not all require competition. There is something superior to it. There is collectivism, the understanding that interests are mutual and harmonious. I did not believe in the possibility of such incentives. But this possibility has been proved, spectacularly and thoroughly, by those facts and achievements which are now amazing the world. If such is the case, if this fundamental principle of economic activity is present, if it has been justified—everything else will adapt itself, everything else will follow as a matter of course.

First of all. The Government which discovers and furthers such incentives is a strong and durable Government. I have realised that this Government is that of the people. It does not represent the two or three thousand persons mentioned by the Industrial Party (whether there were actually two thousand I don't know)—it represents millions, one hundred and fifty million people, who to the last drop of their blood will defend their fatherland and the results achieved.

Since the fundamental principle of economic activity has been discovered and recognised, there is no limit to the achievements which can be attained.

" To catch up and outstrip "—the formula which has become a slogan of late—this formula will very soon be realised. We are confronted with a brilliant and happy future, in which the workers and peasants will be comrades.

I have realised this, and repeat that, with this background, this new basis, my feelings have undergone a very severe trial. On this basis, so it has seemed to me, there was no way out for me, and I have wished to die. I am telling you this quite sincerely. If at the present time I none the less beg, and will beg, for leniency, it is not for myself, as I said, but for my family. In begging for leniency, I have reviewed my life and want to tell you a few words about those aspects which might serve as some ground for leniency. I must say that until 1925 I could be proud of my life. I received my education on my own earnings from the age of thirteen. I am not only a self-made man—I helped my brothers and my sister to get their

education. When I entered the service as an engineer I did not feel myself separated from the workers. At the All-Russian Fair in Nizhni-Novgorod in 1896—I was then a young man—I, a young engineer, made a speech in which I pointed out that the engineers must learn from the workers, that only an engineer who is on intimate terms with the workers can become a real expert in his work. I had forgotten that speech. Accidentally —it took place in 1896, thirty-four years ago—I came across a printed report. It was the report of the Congress on vocational training at which I made this speech. Here it is. If the Public Prosecutor at some future date would find time to glance through it, in case he does not believe me, he will find that, already at that time, I spoke in a definite manner, already at that time my world outlook began to frame itself in a definite direction.

I worked at a factory and was on good terms with the workers. It may be a detail, but I never called them " thou," and never used abusive language. I took part in a Red funeral. This fact is vouched for by a certificate issued to me by a factory with a Communist Board. The Public Prosecutor said : " Let us not go into all these details—maybe Fyedotov himself called these troops, these Cossacks which caused that funeral." I venture to say that one should be more generous to a beaten foe. On the contrary, not only did I take part in the funeral, but I protested against the calling out of the troops. The troops were called by the Managing Director, and two months subsequently he was killed by a worker in his office. This worker disappeared without being seen by anyone in the office, and hid himself in the factory. The workers did not betray him.

I repeat once more that I am guilty, and am willing to repeat it time after time. I said already when the Torgprom was discussed that I should accept any punishment as just, but beg all the same to enable me if possible to do some more work.

Not only am I repentant. I am ashamed—ashamed of that disgrace which will be attached to me so long as I live. But I hope—in case I am allowed to live—that after the lapse of one, two, I don't know how many years, I shall regain that confidence which I once enjoyed and maybe comrade Krylenko, if he meets me, will shake hands with me.

Last Statement of Sitnin.

I am ashamed of my past. I can find no justification and it would be senseless to try to justify myself when my guilt is obvious to you.

I throw myself on the mercy of the proletarian Court. Let it do with me as it thinks fit. Apparently that is what I deserve.

Last Statement of Kuprianov.

I have already declared to the Supreme Court that I fully acknowledge my guilt, and both before the examining authorities and the Supreme Court have made a clean breast in my evidence.

On this ground I ask the Supreme Court to be lenient to me.

I have many years' practical experience as an engineer. I am regarded as a good engineer. I am familiar with the cotton industry. I can work and want to work, to work honestly, and therefore I beg of the Soviet Government, if it finds it possible, to enable me to wipe off that shameful stain which has sullied my name.

(*The Court then adjourned to consider its decision.*)

THE LAST DAY.

The next day, December 7th, a gigantic crowd besieged the Trade Union Palace from three o'clock in the afternoon. Queues half a mile long extended up the streets around the Palace. The public was admitted at 7 p.m., but it was not until 11.30 p.m. that the Commandant of the Supreme Court announced the entry of the Judges to a hall packed with over 2,000 people. All rose. Standing, in complete silence, for over an hour, prisoners, Counsels and public heard the verdict and sentence read out.

SENTENCE.

In the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Special Session of the Supreme Court of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has considered in open and closed session from November 25th until December 7th, 1930, Case No. 38 of the Counter-Revolutionary Organisation of the " Union of Engineering Organisations " (" Industrial Party "), with the following charges :—

1. **Leonid Konstantinovich RAMZIN.**
2. **Ivan Andreyevich KALINNIKOV.**
3. **Victor Alexeyevich LARITCHEV.**
4. **Nikolai Franzovich CHARNOVSKY.**
5. **Alexander Alexandrovich FYEDOTOV.**
6. **Sergei Victorovich KUPRIANOV.**

—All six with crimes covered by Article 58, clauses 3, 4 and 6, of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

7. **Vladimir Ivanovich OCHKIN.**
8. **Xenofont Vasilievich SITNIN.**

with crimes covered by Article 58, clauses 3 and 4, of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

The final destruction by the Red Army of the Army of the White generals in 1920, an army organised and directed by imperialist Governments attempting to overthrow the Soviet Government and to restore the power of the landed proprietors and capitalists, opened the way for the working class of the U.S.S.R. to peaceful economic construction on a Socialist basis.

During the whole course of the restoration period, the struggle of the working class for the most rapid organisation of the economic life of the U.S.S.R. and for the success of Socialist construction met with a stubborn and continuous opposition on the part of the surviving capitalist elements in our country, and on the part of the bourgeois intelligentsia associated with it.

The transition from the restoration to the construction period which marked the progress of the entire national economy of the U.S.S.R. and the great successes of Socialist construction, on the one hand, and the ever-growing crisis in capitalist countries on the other hand, aroused the fierce opposition of capitalist elements and of the circles of technical intelligentsia ideologically related to them—both in the U.S.S.R. and all over the world.

In the face of the ever-growing economic, political and military power of the U.S.S.R., a united front of all the forces of the old world was mobilised to wage a " crusade " against the proletarian State and fatherland of the world proletariat and of all toilers; employing every method of underhand and open attack.

Such were the circumstances in which the counter-revolutionary organisation, " The Union of Engineering Organisations," was formed and began to function, welding into a single unit all the sabotaging groups active in various branches of industry.

The Court, on examining the case of the Industrial Party, found that the formation of this group into the Industrial Party was to a certain degree aided by the fact that its basic nucleus constituted the members of the counter-revolutionary organisation formed in 1925, and known under the name of the " Engineering Centre," headed by engineer Palchinsky, shot in 1930 for sabotage in the platinum and gold industries, engineer Rabinovitch, convicted in the Shakhty case, and Fedorovitch, both former capitalists and mine-owners.

The Industrial Party, composed of persons belonging to the narrow strata of bourgeois intellectuals, had no contacts with the wide masses of the people, had no support from these masses, and hence was doomed to a narrow caste existence. This fact further explained the placing of all hopes for the realisation of the criminal plans of the Industrial Party on external rather than internal forces.

The Special Session has established that the Central Committee of the Industrial Party enrolled its members from the engineering, technical and teaching personnel of various institutions, enterprises, scientific research and other higher educational institutes. It employed the most diverse methods, from agitation and financial remuneration for services rendered, to threats of reduction in the private or public status of persons hesitating or refraining from entrance into the ranks of the Industrial Party, in the event of the overthrow of the Soviet Government.

The Industrial Party was founded strictly on a conspiratorial basis, permitting contacts between individual members only within the organisation in that particular branch of industry, as a result of which members of different branch organisations were not acquainted with each other.

The Industrial Party was headed, as was established by the Court, by a Central Committee, composed of the basic nucleus of the Engineering Centre, whose most important figures were Palchinsky, Rabinovitch, Fedorovitch, Khrennikov, Krassovsky, and later, Ramzin, Laritchev, Kalinnikov, Charnovsky, Fyedotov, Osadchy, Schein and others. Following the arrest of Palchinsky and Khrennikov, the leading rôle passed to Ramzin.

The reorganisation of the Engineering Centre into the Industrial Party was accomplished by the end of 1927 or the beginning of 1928. The Court found that one of the causes which accelerated this reorganisation was the desire of the Engineering Centre to mobilise and unite all the counter-revolutionary elements of the technical intelligentsia in the struggle for power.

Another most important reason was the influence of foreign counter-revolutionary organisations tending in the same direction, such as the Torgprom (an amalgamation of former Russian capitalists, headed by Denisov, Riabushinsky, Tretyakov, Konovalov, Gukasov, Nobel, Mantashev, etc.) with headquarters in Paris, and the more aggressive imperialist circles of France.

The Industrial Party based its criminal sabotaging activities on a programme, the chief items of which were the destruction of the Soviet Government and the restoration of the power of the capitalists and landowners, by means of the establishment of a military dictatorship. The military dictator was to be the White General Lukomsky, or the leader of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party, Palchinsky. The economic provisions in the programme of the Industrial Party provided for the return of enterprises to their former owners or, in the event of the reconstruction of their enterprises, for compensation to former owners by so-called " pooling." Thus, compensation of foreign owners would have been achieved by increased valuation of the enterprises restored, reorganised and rebuilt by the heroic efforts of the working class of the Soviet Union.

In the field of agriculture, the programme of the Industrial Party tended towards the restoration of the land to landowners, and the strengthening of the kulaks with the return of the land to the former owners, or their compensation from a special fund set aside out of receipts from the above-mentioned " pooling " of enterprises.

As far as the methods of carrying out this programme are concerned, these differed at various periods of the criminal activities of the Engineering Centre and the Industrial Party. During its initial period of criminal work, at the time of the introduction of the New Economic Policy, the goal of the Industrial Party (the Engineering Centre) was the capitalistic degeneration of the Soviet Government.

Shortly afterwards, however, the Industrial Party discovered that its conception of the possibility of a change in the Soviet Government was unfounded, in view of the successful development of Socialist construction.

This led to the search for new ways and means of combating the Soviet Government, and to the gradual turn to preparations for an armed overthrow of the Soviet Government by means of internal and external counter-revolution. The Industrial Party, however, cut off as it was from the masses and lacking all support from the labouring classes, was brought in a short time to the conviction that to calculate upon an insurrection based on domestic counter-revolutionary elements in the U.S.S.R. was completely hopeless. From then onwards, the Industrial Party began to pin its chief hopes to military intervention against the U.S.S.R. With this purpose in view, it entered into contact with interventionist organisations within the U.S.S.R. (the Social-Revolutionary-Cadet and kulak groups of Kondratiev-Chayanov, the Menshevik group of Sukhanov-Groman) as well as abroad (the Torgprom, the Miliukov group and the interventionist circles of Paris).

During the first period of the existence of the Engineering Centre, the contacts between the latter and the representatives of the Torgprom consisted of individual contacts between various members of the Engineering Centre and the former owners.

However, beginning with 1927-28, these contacts were organised and became regular. Moreover, the Industrial Party completely subordinated itself to the leadership of the Torgprom, definitely becoming a paid agency of the latter and of foreign interventionists.

The first meeting of Ramzin and Riabushinsky, in accordance with instructions from Palchinsky and the Engineering Centre, took place at this time. At this meeting, during the latter half of 1927, not only questions of the programme, such as the " pooling " of enterprises, the form of the future govern-

ment, etc., were discussed, but negotiations were conducted between the Torgprom and the leading circles of France in connection with the organisation of intervention, which was to take part in 1928. At this meeting, Riabushinsky acquainted Ramzin with the demand of the Torgprom and French capitalist circles for more intensive internal preparation for intervention.

A decisive change in this direction took place in 1928, when several members of the Industrial Party and its Central Committee (Ramzin, Laritchev, Fyedotov, Sitnin and others) visited the leaders of the White emigré circles in Paris. The result was a concrete plan and method for preparing intervention, and a detailed de-limitation of functions between the Torgprom and the more aggressive military circles of France on the one hand, and the Central Committee of the Industrial Party on the other.

Of particular significance in this connection were the meetings between members of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party, Ramzin and Laritchev, and leaders of the Torgprom in the persons of Denisov, Riabushinsky, Nobel, Gukasov, Konovalov, Starinkevitch and Mantashev, which were held in Paris in October, 1928, as well as Ramzin's conferences with General Lukomsky and Colonel Joinville, and later with Colonel Richard.

At these meetings with the Torgprom, particular attention was paid to events which hampered the activities of the Industrial Party. These were: the disclosure of sabotage activities in the Donetz coalfield, the Shakhty case, and the collapse of the sabotage organisation in transport. Denisov stressed the importance of turning attention now to increasing sabotage activities in the metal industries, in order to bring about gross disproportion and detract from the value of capital investments.

Nobel and Gukasov put questions as to the situation in the oil industry. They pointed out that the general directions with regard to the sabotage policy in the oil industry had been given by them to Strizhov, a member of the Industrial Party, during his stay in Paris. As far as the general condition of the Industrial Party was concerned, Denisov stated that, despite the collapse of individual sabotage organisations, the work must be continued at all costs. Denisov, speaking on behalf of the Torgprom, reported that Government circles in France had decided to organise military intervention against the U.S.S.R. Discussing furthermore the measures to be adopted for this intervention, Denisov stated that a special military commission, headed by General Janin, the former military representative of France with Kolchak, had been formed.

The Special Session found that Ramzin, during his stay in Paris in 1927 and 1928, arranged contact with K. and R., persons in the French service in Moscow. These contacts between

the Industrial Party and Ramzin, and later, Laritchev, Kalinnikov and Ochkin, and the above-mentioned persons in the French service, continued throughout the ensuing period up to the time of the arrest of the defendants in connection with this case in the summer of 1930. This contact was widely used to obtain from abroad for the Industrial Party various instructions concerning intervention, and to send abroad information which bore the nature of official secrets.

The Special Session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. in closed session concerned itself with an investigation of these phases of the criminal activity of the defendants, and found, so far as K. and R. were concerned, that the facts fully confirmed the data in the indictment, and decided that this should be specially brought to the attention of the Government.

In conformity with the agreement reached with the Torgprom at the Paris conference in October, 1928, the Industrial Party started from that moment to speed up its work of "artificial deterioration of the economic life of the country," making wide use of planned sabotage methods for this purpose.

The Special Session discovered numerous facts about sabotage which gave a detailed picture of this feature of the criminal activity of the Industrial Party, and which, though they harmed our Socialist economy, were nevertheless powerless to ruin our Five Year Plan and to prevent our progress.

The sabotage work of the Industrial Party was paralysed by the tremendous enthusiasm of the labouring masses and the relentless struggle to fulfil and exceed the industrial and financial plan.

Shock-brigades, Socialist competition, the growing class vigilance of the proletariat, and the workers' industrial and financial counter-plan from below ensured such successes of Socialist construction, that the minimum Five Year Plan of the Industrial Party was exceeded and surpassed during the first two years. The Industrial Party, having adopted planned sabotage, concentrated its criminal energies on the most important branches of industry and transport, attempting to strike blows at the metal, fuel, power, chemical and textile industries and transport, in order to cause interruptions, maladjustments and crises.

In the field of fuel economy, the Industrial Party intended to cause a crisis by directing the development of this economy so as to facilitate to the utmost the task of intervention. To this end it employed all measures calculated to delay as much as possible the production of fuel locally, particularly in the Moscow coalfield and the peat and coal-production in the Kuznetz Basin. Thus a critical situation would have been brought about in the central industrial and north western districts, and in such centres as Moscow and Leningrad. A thrust at the railway trunk line

connecting these centres with the Donetz Basin would interrupt the supply of Donetz coal to these districts. At the same time, the Industrial Party objected to the inroduction of any kind of rational method of extracting fuel, and particularly to the extraction of peat by milling, as well as to its cheap, rational exploitation.

The Special Session found that this sabotage work of the Industrial Party was not only effected by its members who held different positions in Soviet institutions, but by a corresponding direction of the activities of scientific research institutes such as the Thermo-Technical Institute headed by Ramzin, or the Peat Institute headed by a member of the Industrial Party, V. Kirpichnikov.

Basically, sabotage in the fuel industry consisted of plans which :

(1) deliberately selected low indices and a pace considerably less than actual production possibilities;

(2) assured disproportion between initial plans and actual production plans;

(3) favoured production of inferior quality at the expense of higher quality.

Particular attention was paid by the wreckers to the basic fuel regions, such as the Donetz, Kuznetz, Kizel and others, aiming their chief blow at the supply of these districts with electric power. To cut off that power through their nuclei, the members of the Industrial Party took measures to delay the construction or expansion of new power stations (Tver, Bobrikov, Shter, Zuevo and others), and to supply them with unsuitable equipment.

Sabotage in power supply was intended to bring about a critical condition in the most important power centres, which would most clearly be evident in 1930, i.e., the date of the intended intervention.

The sum-total of the criminal activity of the Industrial Party in the field of power supply was characterised by Ramzin at the trial as follows :

" The Donetz, Moscow district, Leningrad district, Kuznetz, Kizel—these were the points at which the electric power supply was retarded and overtaxed as much as possible, so that at the time of military action a casastrophe would be inevitable." It must, however, be said that in these spheres, too, the attempts of the Industrial Party were completely foiled.

In the field of metal supply, the Industrial Party attempted to increase the metal shortage by creating disproportion between production and demand, and by deliberately decreasing the figures of possible production (for instance, 7,000,000 tons of pig iron

instead of 17,000,000): by means of improper use of metal manufactured in the country (particularly in boilermaking): by bringing about maladjustments between the metal industry and the metallurgical industries (disproportions between various shops in the same works); by means of deliberate delay in machine building, etc.

In the field of transport, sabotage took the form of attempts to limit the rolling stock, particularly locomotives, to disorganise the fuel supply, car-building, etc.

The Special Session found by questioning the defendant Ramzin, the witness Krassovsky, and from other material forming part of the case, that sabotage work proceeded on principles the direct aim of which was:

1. To prejudice repairs and reduce the hauling capacity of the railway lines.

2. To draw up incorrect mobilisation plans with criminal intent.

3. Deliberately, with criminal intent, to limit credits to the network of railways along the frontier.

4. To employ the so-called "methods of decreased indices," i.e., indices which they knew to be too low, as a result of which capital was invested in building railway equipment, both in quantity and of a kind which did not correspond to actual needs. Thus capital was immobilised.

All these criminal acts had as their aim the disorganisation of transport, to bring about a critical condition of transport at the moment of military invasion of the U.S.S.R., particularly in the western zone, as well as to cut off means of communications leading to the Donetz coalfield, thus breaking its contact with the centre.

In the chemical industries, sabotage activities consisted chiefly of attempts to construct a number of large plants in clearly unsuitable conditions and locations, as well as to prevent the production of apparatus necessary for the chemical industry.

In the textile industries, sabotage was directed at irrational use of capital by means of maliciously miscalculating the height of floors in building new textile mills, permitting large spaces in factory buildings to remain unused; delay in the introduction of the latest American equipment; improper management of cotton economy and wilfully inefficient use of cotton; maldistribution of the cotton crop, etc.; wilfully improper distribution of various textiles. Particularly outstanding in this branch was the sabotage work to delay the development of the flax and hemp industries in connection with the preparations for intervention, a delay which

might, in this respect also, prejudice the defensive capacity of the U.S.S.R.

The Court also found that, simultaneously with attempts to bring about an economic crisis by the spring of 1930, the Industrial Party made criminal preparations for destructive acts, assuring favourable conditions for the success of definite military acts in case of intervention.

It was found by the Court that the Industrial Party first received instructions to carry out destructive acts from the Torgprom and from Mr. K. in 1928. The main instructions were to avoid such destruction as would radically undermine industries, in order not to hamper the future counter-revolutionary and interventionist government. Therefore, it was intended to shut off the electric power supply feeding one or more groups of enterprises, in order to shut them down for more or less lengthy periods.

To accomplish destructive acts more successfully, the Industrial Party organised special destructive groups in certain institutions (for instance, in the Thermo-Technical Institute, Electrotok, the Moscow Power Station and others) whose purpose was to effect the shutting down of important enterprises.

The Court examination established that, as 1930, the date for the intended intervention, approached, and particularly towards the end of 1929, the question of carrying out one additional instruction received from Paris from foreign interventionist circles, namely, that of organising military nuclei, was put forward in a very insistent manner.

In the autumn of 1928, at Ramzin's meeting with K. in Laritchev's apartment, as established by the Court, K. demanded more aggressive work, since the internal preparations were considered unsatisfactory and the internal crisis which the interventionists were awaiting had not accrued.

The Special Session found that members of the Industrial Party who, by virtue of their official positions, participated in certain work in frontier districts, repeatedly tried to take advantage of their position to direct and organise this work of realisation of their criminal and even traitorous plans. Utilising their participation in such work (drainage activities, construction of industrial buildings, etc.) they directed their endeavours towards preparing the most favourable ground for military action against the U.S.S.R. by the interventionists and their military forces. They attempted to prepare for them roads suitable for troops, landing grounds for aeroplanes, fields for military manœuvres, bases for fuel supplies for the enemy troops, etc.

In direct connection with the destructive and interventionist activities of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party was its work in organising espionage and reconnaissance in the

interests of the interventionists. The Special Session ascertained that, as early as 1928, the Central Committee of the Industrial Party received instructions from the Torgprom to organise the systematic delivery to foreign counter-revolutionary centres of quarterly summaries of the economic situation in the U.S.S.R., with special emphasis on the points in which these circles were chiefly interested.

Laritchev and Kalinnikov were entrusted by the Central Committee of the Industrial Party with the work of compiling these summaries, which was regularly done by them. The transfer abroad of these résumés was effected through K., who, in addition, received direct information with regard to the defence of the country. Contacts with K. and R. were maintained, as has been found by the Court at the trial, by the defendants Ramzin and Ochkin, who were performing a similar espionage service and who supplied the information demanded of them in both written and verbal form.

Such was the nature of the widely ramified, sabotaging, counter-revolutionary work of preparing intervention—work which was conducted under the guidance of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party in many different directions. The three main forces at work in this connection were the capitalist and military circles of France, the Torgprom and the Industrial Party.

The relative importance of each of these forces was not the same. The main and leading rôle in the preparations for intervention, as has been irrefutably established by the Court proceedings, was played by the capitalist and military groups in France. The influence of these circles was felt even in such matters as the drawing up of plans and methods for intervention, as the fixing of its date. The strategic plans for intervention counted on operations by the combined forces of foreign expeditionary troops and the remaining sections of Wrangel's army and the Cossack regiments of Krasnov; they provided for a concentrated blow at Moscow and Leningrad. According to this plan, the southern armies were to advance towards the Ukraine to the west of the Dnieper, holding on to the right bank of the Dnieper, and thence to Moscow.

The northern section of the interventionist army was to attack Leningrad, with the support of the naval and air fleets. The plan for intervention included the use of some frontier conflict as a pretext for attacking the U.S.S.R., in order to be able to use in the course of its further development the armed forces of France's allies, Poland and Roumania, as well as the armies of the other countries bordering on the Soviet Union. The interventionists believed that the success of armed intervention against the U.S.S.R. would lead to its territorial division and the annexa-

tion of considerable sections of the country, as well as the winning of considerable financial and economic advantages for the foreign participants in intervetion. All this would result in the enslaving of the labouring masses of the U.S.S.R. According to these plans, the imperialist circles of France were to receive payment of the Tsarist debts and concessions for the exploitation of the mineral wealth of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, as has been found by the Court, these concessions were tantamount to direct annexation; the imperialist circles of Great Britain were to come into possession of the Caucasus with its oil wells; territorial claims were advanced by imperialist circles in Roumania and Poland for that part of the Ukraine lying west of the Dnieper, Kiev, Odessa.

Although the date of the intervention was first set even for 1928, it was found necessary to postpone it until 1930, and later until 1931.

The postponement of intervention was not so much caused by the fact that the interventionist circles of the capitalist governments who were making preparations for it found themselves unprepared for an attack, in view of certain differences between them, as by the absence of conditions within the U.S.S.R. favouring the realisation of intervention.

In spite of the widespread sabotage work carried out by various counter-revolutionary organisations, including the Industrial Party, aiming at creating diverse and serious difficulties in the economic life of the U.S.S.R. entailing economic and provisioning crises calculated to result in the discontent of the toiling masses with the Soviet Government, these attempts were altogether fruitless. This outcome proved that all the calculations of the interventionists which relied upon the dissatisfaction of the toiling masses with the Soviet Government were completely groundless.

Herein also lies one of the most important reasons for the postponement of the date of intervention. This was found all the more necessary for the interventionists in view of the fact, established during the trial, that the interventionist circles in France could not but take account of the lesson of the Chinese Eastern Railway conflict, which proved the strength of the Soviet Union and its ability to defend itself, as well as the united will of the toiling masses to defend their country, and their readiness to fight for the Soviet Government and Socialist construction.

On the basis of the above, and in conformity with Articles 319 and 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the R.S.F.S.R., the Special Session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. finds that:

(1) LEONID KONSTANTINOVICH RAMZIN, in the first half of 1927 joined the counter-revolutionary organisation of

the Union of Engineering Organisations (or " Engineering Centre "), participated actively in the organisation of a counter-revolutionary party known as the Industrial Party, and, following the arrest of Palchinsky and Khrennikov, leaders of that organisation, became the head of the Central Committee of that party, whose activity was aimed at the direct overthrow of the Soviet Government by means of military intervention and the restoration of the capitalist system in the U.S.S.R.

For this purpose, as well as to prepare directly for intervention, Ramzin :

(a) entered into contact, in the name of the Industrial Party, with the White emigré centre of former property owners located in Paris (the Torgprom);

(b) formed contacts with interventionist circles in France, establishing regular communications through certain individuals, K. and R., in the French service in Moscow;

(c) arranged for the systematic financing of the Industrial Party by the Torgprom and the above-mentioned circles (see point b);

(d) participated in the drafting of a detailed plan, jointly with the above-mentioned leading circles and the Torgprom, for intervention against the U.S.S.R., and, in the name of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party, agreed to the payment of Tsarist debts and the forcible alienation of considerable territories from the U.S.S.R.;

(e) organised and conducted, for the same purpose, systematic sabotage in various branches of national economy in the U.S.S.R.;

(f) organised the preparation of destructive acts, to which end he formed suitable groups and, in addition, personally drew up a plan for destructive activity in the field of power supply;

(g) maintained regular contacts with R. and K. in the French service, giving information to and receiving instructions from them in verbal and written form, bearing the character of espionage;

(h) organised and effected the distribution of sums of money received from abroad for the criminal activities of the Industrial Party;

i.e., committed crimes covered by Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11, of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

(2) IVAN ANDREYEVICH KALINNIKOV—

(a) joined the same organisation as a member of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party, and guided its wrecking,

destructive and espionage activities directed towards the overthrow of the Soviet Government by means of armed intervention to restore the capitalist régime; moreover, as vice-chairman of the Industrial Section of the State Planning Commission, made use of his official position for the purpose of drawing up wrecking plans and disrupting the Five Year Plan;

(b) together with Charnovsky, proposed to the Central Committee of the Industrial Party the execution of a plan of destructive activity in the field of metallurgy, which was accepted by the Central Committee of the Industrial Party;

(c) established contacts with K. and R., persons in the French service in Moscow, drew up and transmitted abroad through the said persons information bearing the character of espionage;

(d) distributed sums of money received from abroad among members of the Industrial Party in the branch section under his direct control;

i.e., committed crimes covered by Article 58, clauses, 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

(3) VICTOR ALEXEYEVICH LARITCHEV joined the counter-revolutionary organisation—the Engineering Centre—in 1926, and participated in the organisation of the Industrial Party. As a member of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party he directed destructive, espionage and wrecking activities directed towards the above-stated aims. Moreover, he:

(a) entered into direct dealings with the Torgprom and interventionist circles in Paris, in the name of the Industrial Party;

(b) formed contacts with K. and R. in the French service in Moscow for the above-mentioned purposes;

(c) distributed money received from abroad among members of the wrecking branch organisations directly under his control;

(d) as Chairman of the Fuel Section of the State Planning Commission, using his official position for counter-revolutionary ends, personally directed sabotage in the planning of the fuel industry, particularly of the oil industry; participating also in sabotage work in transport;

(e) carried out espionage by transmitting certain information abroad through the above-mentioned persons in French service in Moscow;

i.e., committed crimes covered by Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

(3) NIKOLAI FRANZOVICH CHARNOVSKY entered in 1927 the same counter-revolutionary organisation and actively participated in the direction of the counter-revolutionary organisation, the Industrial Party, as a member of its Central Committee, carrying out wrecking, destructive and espionage work with the same aims. Moreover, he:

(a) directed sabotage in the metallurgical industry;

(b) directed destructive acts in passing plans through the Scientific-Technical Council, of which he was the head, as a consequence of which the construction of a number of plants, including those for producing engineering machinery, was retarded, causing maladjustments in shops, irrational investment of capital and, in general, delaying the development of the metallurgical industry;

(c) prepared, jointly with Kalinnikov, plans of destructive work in military supply factories;

(d) distributed among members of the wrecking branch which he directed money received from abroad;

(e) prepared, jointly with Kalinnikov, summaries bearing the character of espionage for transmission abroad;

i.e., committed crimes covered by Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

(5) ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH FYEDOTOV in 1925 joined the textile sabotage group which he later directed; entered the Industrial Party as a member of its Central Committee, carried out destructive and espionage acts for the Industrial Party, and moreover:

(a) directed personally the wrecking activities in the branch organisation of the textile industry, effecting this both in his work of drawing up the Five Year Plan and by means of artificial retardation of the rate of development of the industry and of new construction, causing difficulties in supplying this industry with raw materials and imported technical equipment of the best quality, and undermining the development of those industries which the Soviet Government particularly needed in case of commencement of hostilities;

(b) distributed sums of money for wrecking purposes received from the above-mentioned sources;

i.e., committed crimes covered by Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

(6) SERGEI VICTOROVICH KUPRIANOV, as a member of the Industrial Party, for the same purposes:

(a) maintained contacts with representatives of the Torg-

prom in order to further the wrecking and intervention activities of the Industrial Party;

(b) carried into effect the instructions of the Industrial Party by drawing up wrecking plans for the textile industry, allocating an assortment of goods not in accordance with market requirements, retarding textile machine-building, arranging for unsuitable and faulty distribution of textile goods in the provinces;

(c) distributed money among the members of the textile sabotage groups;

(d) undertook on behalf of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party to organise a military group of former White officers;

(e) took orders from the Central Committee of the Industrial Party with a view to obtaining secret information on the mobilisation work of the textile industry;

i.e., committed crimes covered by Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.;

(7) VLADIMIR IVANOVICH OCHKIN, as a member of the Industrial Party, carried out instructions given by Ramzin for the Central Committee by maintaining contact with K. and R., persons in the French service in Moscow; in addition, was a member of the destructive group in the Thermo-Technical Institute;

i.e., committed crimes covered by Article 58, clauses 3, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.;

(8) XENOFONT VASILIEVICH SITNIN, as a member of the Industrial Party and aware of its objects, agreed to carry out corresponding tasks in the field of sabotage, and furthermore entered into contact with representatives of the Torgprom, informing the latter of the activities of the Industrial Party, and transmitted from them directions to the Industrial Party;

i.e., committed crimes covered by Article 58, clauses 3, 4 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.;

On the basis of Article 326, clause 3, of the Criminal Procedure Code of the R.S.F.S.R., the Special Session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. has sentenced:

SERGEI VICTOROVICH KUPRIANOV, under Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., to ten years' imprisonment with deprivation of his civic rights for five years, in accordance with Article 31 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., covered by Sections a, b, c, d, e of Article 31, and confiscation of all his property;

XENOFONT VASILIEVICH SITNIN, under Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., to ten years' imprisonment, with deprivation of his civic rights for five years, in accordance with Article 31 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. covered by sections a, b, c, d, e of Article 31, and confiscation of all his property;

VLADIMIR IVANOVICH OCHKIN, in accordance with Article 58, clauses 3, 6, and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., to ten years' imprisonment with deprivation of civic rights for five years, in accordance with Article 31 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., covered by sections a, b, c, d, e of Article 31, and confiscation of all his property;

IVAN ANDREYEVICH KALINNIKOV, in accordance with Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., to be shot—the supreme measure of social defence—with confiscation of all his property;

NIKOLAI FRANZEVICH CHARNOVSKY, in accordance with Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., to be shot—the supreme measure of social defence—with confiscation of all his property;

VICTOR ALEXEYEVICH LARITCHEV, in accordance with Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., to be shot—the supreme measure of social defence—with confiscation of all his property;

ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH FYEDOTOV, in accordance with Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., to be shot—the supreme measure of social defence—with confiscation of all his property;

LEONID KONSTANTINOVICH RAMZIN, in accordance with Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., to be shot—the supreme measure of social defence—with confiscation of all his property.

In regard to those sentenced to terms of imprisonment, the period spent in preliminary confinement shall be considered part of the term of imprisonment.

The sentence is final and is not subject to appeal.

President of the Special Session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., A. VYSHINSKY.

Members of the Special Session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., ANTONOV-SARATOVSKY, LVOV.

Moscow, December 7th, 1930, 11.35 *p.m.*

The sentence was received by the prisoners in silence, and, after a moment's pause, with a crash of applause from the public in Court—the majority men and women workers from the chief factories in Moscow, Leningrad and other industrial centres.

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Two days later all the Soviet newspapers printed the following documents, constituting the last stage in the memorable trial of the counter-revolutionary Industrial Party.

PETITION FOR REPRIEVE.

To the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. Petition for Reprieve:

By sentence of the Special Session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. pronounced on December 7th of this year, I have been condemned to death by shooting for my crimes in the case of the Industrial Party according to Article 58, clauses 3, 4, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code.

I hereby beg you to take into consideration my sincere confession and deep repentance which I have shown, both in the preliminary and Court investigations, and my sincere readiness to work honestly and determinedly to atone for the weighty crimes which I have committed: and to revoke the death sentence by commuting it to a term of imprisonment.

Signed: L. RAMZIN.

To the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. Petition for Modification of Sentence:

Dated Dec. 7th, 1930.

I, Vladimir Ivanovich OCHKIN, have been sentenced by the Special Session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. to ten years' imprisonment with loss of civil rights for five years in accordance with Article 58, clauses 3, 6 and 11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

I hereby beg that you take into consideration my sincere repentance which I showed both during preliminary and Court investigations.

In expressing my deep repentance for the crimes I have committed, I would beg the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to modify the sentence passed on me by the Supreme Court, and give me an opportunity by honest and loyal labour to prove to the Soviet Government that I can in a short time by energetic, useful and honest work atone for my onerous crimes.

V. OCHKIN.

Analogous petitions to the Presidium of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. for reprieve of the death sentence were made by Kalinnikov, Fyedotov, Laritchev and Charnovsky and for modification of term of imprisonment by Kuprianov and Sitnin.

DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

Having considered this 8th day of December, 1930, the petitions for pardon of L. K. Ramzin, N. F. Charnovsky, I. A. Kalinnikov, V. A. Laritchev and A. A. Fyedotov, who were sentenced by the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. to be shot for crimes committed in the case of the counter-revolutionary organisation, the so-called Industrial Party; and the petitions of V. I. Ochkin, K. V. Sitnin and S. V. Kuprianov, sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in the above case;

And taking into consideration:

(1) that the condemned not only confessed and repented of the crimes committed by them, but by their testimony at the preliminary and Court investigations disarmed and disclosed their counter-revolutionary organisation, which acted as the agency and executed the instructions of interventionist and military circles of the leading bourgeoisie of France and the Torgprom—an amalgamation of former wealthy Russian magnates in Paris;

(2) that the Soviet Government cannot be guided in its actions by feelings of vengeance, especially with regard to repentant and confessed criminals now rendered completely harmless,—

The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics therefore decrees:

1. To commute the supreme measure of social defence meted out to L. K. Ramzin, N. F. Charnovsky, I. A. Kalinnikov, V. A. Laritchev and A. A. Fyedotov to ten years' imprisonment with loss of rights and, as provided for in the sentence of the Supreme Court, confiscation of property.

2. To commute the sentence of ten years' imprisonment passed against V. I. Ochkin, K. V. Sitnin and S. V. Kuprianov to eight years' imprisonment; the remainder of the sentence passed by the Supreme Court with regard to loss of rights and confiscation of property to stand unchanged.

M. KALININ, President of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A. YENUKIDZE, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.

Kremlin, Moscow,
December 8th.

" Black Exchange."—The system of illegal buying and selling of shares, bills, etc., of properties which have been nationalised.

Central Executive Committee.—The central body (composed of two chambers—the Union Council and Council of Nationalities) elected by the biennial Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.

Centrosoyus.—The Central Union of Co-operative Societies.

Charnock.—A British family in the textile business under the Tsarist régime, settled in Moscow, bore this name.

Chervonetz.—The standard monetary unit of the Soviet Union, equivalent to 10 roubles, or 21/3 in English money.

Constitutional Democrats (Cadets).—The party of industrial capitalists under the Tsardom, standing for " modified autocracy."

Duma.—The Russian parliament under the Tsardom, first brought into existence after the 1905 Revolution.

Engineering Centre.—The first counter-revolutionary organisation formed in 1925 by anti-Soviet engineers in Moscow.

February Revolution.—The bourgeois democratic revolution at the beginning of 1917, in which the Tsar was overthrown and a bourgeois democratic Republic established.

Five Year Plan.—The programme of economic and cultural construction in all spheres adopted by the Soviet Union for the years 1928-1933.

Gosplan.—See State Economic Planning Commission.

Industrial Party.—The political organisation set up by the leaders of the " Engineering Centre " in order to arrange for wrecking activities and prepare the way for intervention.

Kulaks.—Rich peasant exploiters, largely liquidated in 1930-31 by the great wave of collectivisation of peasant farms.

Mensheviks.—Formerly reformist or opportunist Socialists, now an active counter-revolutionary body, connected through the Second International with the British Labour Party.

Milinkov, P.—A well-known Professor, formerly leader of the Cadets, now editor of a White paper in Paris.

Nash, Major-General Sir Philip, K.C.M.G.—President of Metropolitan-Vickers, Ltd.

N.E.P. (New Economic Policy).—The change-over from War Communism (the absolute State control of trade and production due to military necessities of the civil war) to free buying and selling in 1921.

October Revolution.—The second revolution of 1917 (October 25th, old Russian calendar, November 7th, Western, or new calendar), which established the rule of the workers and peasants.

Orga-Textile.—A State institution for the rationalisation of the textile industry.

People's Commissariat.—A Government Department or Ministry in the Soviet Union.

Plekhanov Institute.—A central college of economic studies in Moscow.

Rouble.—A unit of coinage, worth 2/1½ (50 cents).

Shakhty Trial.—The trial of one of the first groups of wreckers discovered in the mining industry in 1928.

Simon, Mr. A. A., held the post of Deputy Director of the Continental Department of Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Export Company, Ltd., until 1929, the year of his death.

Social Revolutionaries.—Formerly Radical terrorists using Socialist phrases. Now an active counter-revolutionary body abroad.

Southern Army.—The name given to the anti-Soviet army led by Denikin and Wrangel (1919-1920).

State Economic Planning Commission (*Gosplan*).—The central body of economic experts, trade unionists, etc., which draws up economic plans for the year.

Supreme Economic Council.—The Government Department responsible for the management of industry.

Tactical Centre.—One of the anti-Soviet conspiracies discovered during the Civil War in 1919.

Textile Syndicate.—The selling organisation of the State textile trusts.

Working Peasants' Party.—A counter-revolutionary group discovered in 1930, consisting chiefly of professors who worked for a kulak rising against the Soviet Government.

Torgprom.—The organisation in Paris of the Russian bankers, merchants and manufacturers driven out by the October Revolution.

U.S.S.R.—The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which now exists on the territory formerly ruled by Tsardom (except Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, which have become separate capitalist republics).

" White " Emigrants, Generals, etc.—" White " is the general term applied to anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary elements.

Wrangel.—The last White general commanding the Southern " Army," defeated 1920. Died 1929.