


Annabelle Bucar

The
TRUTH
about
AMERICAN
DIPLOMATS



ANNABELLE BUCAR

**THE TRUTH
ABOUT AMERICAN
DIPLOMATS**

— * 1949 * —

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
PUBLISHERS

MOSCOW

To My Mother

B. DENISOV,
Editor

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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FOREWORD

The past year brought great changes in my life. I am a native-born American. I love my country and served it sincerely and unselfishly, nevertheless, during this past year I decided to make my permanent home in the Soviet Union, a country I have come to know and love well, though I had lived in it for only two years. It would be a mistake to think that this was an easy decision for me. I considered long and anxiously all the factors which urged me to this step, as well as those which were against it. And if I decided in favor of the former it is because there were deep reasons for this.

Unfriendly people seek these motives in my personal life; nothing, however, could be further from the truth. In fact they are purely objective. I made my decision because I became convinced that the ruling circles of the United States are leading America, and with it the whole world, to an awful catastrophe.

I did not come to this conviction overnight and it was not the result of speeches and pamphlets emanating from organizations and persons who are preaching the cause of peace. It was the result of my personal contact and daily work in the

State Department in Washington and the American Embassy in Moscow during a period of almost three years. In Washington, as well as in Moscow, I saw how step by step the American diplomats who are responsible for the foreign policy of the United States were doing everything in their power to bring about world disaster. Their policy is and always has been directed against the Soviet Union, which, as I came to understand, was and is nullifying their subversive efforts directed against world peace, against the striving of all peoples for a happier and better life.

These diplomats had come to appreciate the fact that it is the Soviet Union which prevents American billionaires from dominating the world. Therefore, it is their immediate aim to discredit the Soviet Union by ascribing to it aggressive intentions and thereby justify their own preparations for war against Russia. For, during my work in the State Department and in the Embassy in Moscow, I became convinced that the efforts of high-ranking leaders of both these organizations are directed to this purpose.

It is evident that I was faced with the dilemma of keeping quiet and blindly fulfilling all the orders of the warmongers of the State Department and the United States Embassy in Moscow, thereby taking upon myself part of the great responsibility to the peoples of the world, or to raise my voice against their frightful activities. Such a protest made in the Embassy would be nothing more

than a voice crying in the wilderness. Therefore it was necessary to take a more effective step, that is, such a step as would give me the opportunity of effectively participating in the struggle against the warmongers. In order to do this it was necessary to renounce all personal and sentimental considerations, and that is what I have done.

I resigned from the Embassy and have decided to remain in the Soviet Union where I can, to the best of my ability, participate in the struggle for peace and world prosperity.

This book is the result of my extensive association with individuals whom the American people expected to maintain and develop good neighbor relations with all countries, including the Soviet Union which gave its priceless service to humanity in its fight against the mortal danger of fascism. However, the activities that I witnessed in the State Department and the United States Embassy in Moscow were in crying contradiction to the expectations of the American people. I saw the sword of Damocles suspended over humanity, the blade being steadily lowered, threatening anew millions of people.

Therefore I cannot be silent.

CHAPTER ONE

MY WORK IN INTELLIGENCE

I was born one of a large family, near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. My parents like so many of the people of the Pittsburgh area were European immigrants who had come to America in search of a better life in what they had been told was "a land of wealth, freedom and golden opportunity."

Like other immigrants to America, my parents soon discovered that in reality they had been "imported" in order to be exploited. They were units of a commodity known as "cheap labor" and were treated by the employers who purchased their labor, like all other industrial raw materials, like the iron ore and coal which went to make steel in the center of America's coal and iron industry.

Many of the immigrants did not survive the terrible exploitation and lawlessness; some, more fortunate, returned to Europe. Many others remained for the rest of their lives as laborers, and in many instances died a pauper's death. My parents survived with great effort, and thanks to the number of working hands in the family, even prospered in a modest way on a farm near Pittsburgh.

Having graduated from high school, I was determined, in spite of all difficulties, to obtain a higher education. There is no system of government scholarships for students. Therefore when I entered the University of Pittsburgh it was necessary to work part time in order to pay for my living expenses and tuition. Like the vast majority of all students in American universities, I was forced to work during all the time of my studies in order to earn my living. After four extremely difficult and uncertain years of overwork and anxiety as to whether I could complete school, as to whether there would be a place for me when I did, I left and went out to seek employment.

At first I found short-term work with different firms, and during the war worked with American Intelligence. Later I was offered a position in the State Department which at the end of the war sent me to work in the United States Embassy in Moscow.

That, in brief, is my life story. It has no importance except to show that I am just one of tens of millions of Americans who are the children of immigrants from Europe to the U.S., one of the hundred and forty million ordinary Americans with in many respects the same background and experiences.

Among the multitude of people with whom I came in contact in America, at home, in schools, in the university and in jobs in New York and Washington, I found very few who did not have

in their background and in their current lives hardships and deprivations.

The common concept of American life among Europeans who seem to think that in the United States everyone lives in a state of economic security and confidence of the future, that American youth grows up carefree and happy, is as far from the truth as anything could be.

Only when I worked in the State Department in Washington and in the United States Embassy in Moscow did I come in contact with young people who, with a few exceptions, were the children of the upper classes and who had grown up in a highly protected atmosphere of well-being. They were as far away from the real American life as people on other planets. They belonged to an entirely different world from the rest of us who make up the bulk of the nation.

While I, of course, lived in modest circumstances almost all my life, I was nevertheless more fortunate in most respects than most young Americans of my generation. Unlike many of my friends and acquaintances who left school at an early age to go to work in the coal mines, steel mills, stores and factories in the Pittsburgh area, and who are still in those mines, mills, stores and factories by and large, I did manage to obtain a higher education and found "respectable" work.

After leaving the university I worked for some time for private commercial firms, but this work did not satisfy me at all. I felt a great desire to

take some part, to the best of my abilities, in the war against fascist Germany. About that time I was offered a job with Intelligence in the U.S. Air Transport Command, which I accepted.

In this organization I worked for a time in the North Atlantic Division and shortly thereafter I was transferred to a position in the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the basic American intelligence organization.

My primary function was the careful study of foreign newspapers and periodicals published in the United States, especially publications issued in the Slavic languages. I was supposed to write general reviews and reports on the activities of various Slavonic organizations existing in the U.S.A., particularly progressive organizations. In these reports I was expected to make suggestions for utilizing these organizations in fulfilling the intelligence tasks of OSS.

I thought my working in the American intelligence organizations could really be useful in the struggle against the enemy of all mankind, Hitlerism. I hate fascism with all my being and I thought that work in Intelligence would be the best way of fighting the fascist plague. Later on I discovered that I was, at least, very naive to have had such idealistic thoughts. As it is well known, the American intelligence organizations during the war did not fight fascism effectively, whereas after the war they are following a policy of full cooperation with the former and present

fascist intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations of Germany, Italy and Spain.

During my work in OSS I became acquainted with some interesting details of the history, functions, methods and forms of work of this intelligence organization which Americans nicknamed "Cloak and Dagger."

The chief of the Office of Strategic Services was General William Donovan. He was born in Buffalo, N. Y., in 1883, and graduated Columbia University Law School. During the first world war he was in the cavalry of the A.E.F. in France. Donovan is a Catholic and a member of the Republican Party. He was an unsuccessful candidate for the post of Governor of New York in 1932.

From the very beginning of the work of OSS, General Donovan managed to gain the trust of the American Government. By very sly maneuvering he was successful in enabling the reactionary forces of Wall Street to exert their influence on this organization.

He was able to do this thanks to the fact that Roosevelt was at that time occupied with more important matters pertaining to the war effort of the U.S.A. Therefore Donovan personally chose the top-level personnel of his intelligence organization.

For leading administrative positions Donovan invited his business colleagues and his fellow veterans of the first world war. Some of these were: Colonel G. E. Buxton with whom in 1919 Dono-

van laid the ground for the fascist organization, the American Legion; Atherton Richards, president of a large import-export firm, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company; J. S. Morgan; Elmo Roper of **Fortune** magazine, mouthpiece of Wall Street; R. Livermore, "hero" of the first world war and a Wall Street lawyer, and others. Donovan also recruited for work in the OSS a cousin of Winston Churchill, Raymond Guest; a son of T. Ryan, the millionaire; Bill Dewart, the owner of the reactionary **New York Sun**; Paul Mellon, heir to the Mellon millions, and the former tsarist prince and general Sergei Obolensky who led a miserable life before he joined the OSS.

Soon after the founding of the OSS Donovan sent his representatives abroad to collect information on the economic conditions and policies of various countries. Many of them went abroad as newspaper correspondents.

After the defeat of France, Donovan visited that country in an effort to determine the cause of her debacle.

On his return to the United States, Donovan confidently informed the American Government that the defeat of France was due not to a "fifth column," nor to the activities of the French Communists as was reported by Ambassador Bullitt and the American press, but to the poor military leadership and the complete unpreparedness of France for modern warfare.

Some time later Donovan visited the Balkans and the Middle East. He also visited London, Cai-

ro, Athens, Belgrade, Sofia, Ankara and Jerusalem. He made this tour in order to gather special information for American military circles and also to inspect the work of the American intelligence organizations in these countries.

While in Algiers Donovan had a lengthy discussion with General Weygand and became thoroughly acquainted with the situation in North Africa. As a matter of fact, at the end of 1940, the Americans began preparations for their operations in North Africa and even at that time established contact with the French military authorities in North Africa through the American Intelligence.

In September 1942 Donovan had a discussion in London with the leader of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare Intelligence Service, the so-called SOE, concerning the distribution of undercover propaganda materials in Axis countries and Axis-occupied territories. A decision was reached for the distribution of propaganda which would give moral support to the pro-Allied elements in those countries but at the same time would not permit them to revolt against the Germans at a date earlier than would be advantageous to the Americans and British. The interests of the people of the occupied countries were the last thing to be considered in these negotiations.

Speculating on the hatred of the European peoples for fascism, the Office of Strategic Services established contact with underground resistance groups in these countries, infiltrating its own

agents into these organizations, planning to use them in the interests of American Intelligence after the war.

I was extremely shocked to learn from the papers that the American intelligence organizations some months ago presented the counter-intelligence service of fascist Spain with a list of Spaniards who took part in the resistance movement against the Germans in France during the second world war. This is the way, to my great shame, America is repaying her debt for aid received from the partisans.

Working in the OSS I very soon discovered that the main intelligence activities of the organization were directed not only against Germany, but also against the Soviet Union.

On the basis of my many observations I can state definitely that the leaders of American Intelligence took advantage of the Allied relations that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the war to infiltrate their professional intelligence officers into the territory of the U.S.S.R., for intelligence work against that Allied country. These intelligence officers were sent into the Soviet Union under various guises—as counsellors, second and third secretaries, attachés and simply as clerks of the Embassy; as officers and employees of the Military Supply Mission and the Military Attaché's office; and last, but not least, in the guise of correspondents of American newspapers, magazines and radio broadcasting companies, or as

specialists who worked on the assembling of lend-lease equipment.

The anti-Soviet direction of the activities of the American intelligence organizations is confirmed by the fact that during the war which the United States fought in alliance with the Soviet Union against fascist Germany, the Russian sub-division was the largest in the OSS. It was headed by a professor of history at Columbia University, Robinson, who in the United States is considered a great "specialist" on the Soviet Union.

The Russian sub-division consisted of special sections which collected intelligence information on the U.S.S.R. on industrial and military output, transport, man power, national income, foreign trade, agriculture, etc.

From the very beginning, the OSS considered intelligence work against the Soviet Union to be of the greatest significance. Towards the end of the war the OSS considered the collection of secret information concerning the Soviet Union and its foreign policy, and information on democratic countries friendly to the Soviet state, as of utmost importance.

I know definitely that the representatives of the OSS in London established close contact with British, Greek and Belgian intelligence officers and recruited agents who furnished them with secret information not only about the enemy, but about the Allies, particularly the U.S.S.R.

The representatives of the OSS in Chungking, for instance, collected intelligence information on the Soviet Union. In 1942 a special officer of the OSS, the Whiteguard Russian I. Tolstoy, was sent to Tibet to study the districts bordering on the U.S.S.R. as well as to organize intelligence activities against the U.S.S.R. from these areas. From Istanbul OSS operatives sent agents into Germany as well as into the U.S.S.R.

In some instances, when it was in the interest of the American Command, operatives of the OSS organized disturbances in the territories occupied by Germany; in other instances, which were much more frequent, they purposely retarded the growth of the resistance movement and directed it into channels that were strategically important to the U.S.A. I know definitely that the OSS deliberately retarded the revolt of the French resistance organizations until D Day. The Americans in Siam acted in a similar manner, although the leaders of the resistance movement had made all the necessary preparations for a general revolt against the Japanese forces of occupation.

The OSS organized small special operative groups from volunteer American recruits. In many instances these groups acted as "organizers" of the resistance movement in the occupied countries of Europe and North Africa where they created reactionary underground organizations. They collected intelligence data and took an active part in the struggle against the partisans of the People's Front, especially against the Com-

munists, in France. They gave their support exclusively to the underground organizations of General de Gaulle who unquestioningly fulfilled all the orders of the Americans.

Thus the OSS not only gathered intelligence information behind the lines of the German army, but also fought the progressive forces in the occupied territories of Europe.

Similar groups were active in the fight against the progressive forces in Japan.

At the beginning of the second world war, recruits were chosen from among the most trustworthy of the Siamese students who were studying at that time in the United States. They were sent to a special intelligence school of the OSS. There the Siamese students were instructed in radio communications, sabotage, and the tactics of guerilla warfare. By underground channels this group found its way into Siam where it managed to infiltrate into the command of the resistance movement and seize control of it. This enabled it to use the movement almost exclusively for fulfilling the orders of the American intelligence organizations.

During the war, following the conclusion of a special agreement between the Government of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, an American-Chinese intelligence organization was created in China which was subsequently named "SACO"—Sino-American Cooperative Organization. The activities of "SACO" were directed by the OSS.

The American intelligence officers received full cooperation from the Chiang Kai-shek government. A U.S. Navy Department statement claimed that history knows no example of such close cooperation between two intelligence organizations.

I can vouch for the fact that this cooperation of the two intelligence organizations continues up to the present time. The American Intelligence continues to use the Chinese Intelligence Service in its work against the Soviet Far East.

During my work in the Embassy I became aware of the fact that the intelligence officers of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow were active assistants of the American intelligence officers working in the U.S.S.R.

Thus we see how the intelligence organization, which, it would seem, had been created for the noble fight against fascism, was transformed under the leadership of the reactionary chief of the OSS, General Donovan, and his Wall Street friends into a nest of reaction which trained personnel for intelligence and other subversive work against the Soviet Union. In those countries where the OSS operated it was always supported by the most reactionary elements which in an equal degree hated the Soviet Union, progress, and democracy.

During the war, Donovan and the leaders of other American intelligence organizations regarded Allied relations with the U.S.S.R. as a pure formality, necessary but insincere. They

tried to take advantage of the difficulties and hardships which the Soviet people were undergoing at this time. They impatiently awaited the weakening of the U.S.S.R., hoping that after the war they would be able to force that great country to its knees. They were bitterly disappointed.

However, their failure taught them nothing. At present they have the same aspirations. Obviously they failed to benefit from the lesson taught Hitler and fascist Germany.

CHAPTER TWO

TOP-LEVEL ANTI-SOVIET CLIQUE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

It is well known in U.S. Government circles, and particularly well known in the United States Embassy in Moscow, that Soviet-American affairs are almost the exclusive preserve of a small group of U.S. career foreign service officers.

Ever since the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was founded in 1933, this group, or rather clique, has managed to have the deciding say in the State Department. They have had, of course, to reckon with some Secretaries of State and American Ambassadors to the Soviet Union who were not from their set.

However, these "monopolists of Soviet-American relations" had complete control of the personnel apparatus in the State Department and in the American Embassy in Moscow. They were always able, with the exception of a very few periods, to impose their anti-Soviet line on almost all major issues, and without exception on all minor issues.

Particularly today this clique, which is firmly bound together by close ties of friendship and, which is much more important, by ties of mutual self-interest, occupy strategic posts throughout the foreign service and the State Department.

The members of this "monopoly of Soviet-American affairs" are also closely tied by the same political outlook. They all belong to the extreme anti-Soviet wing of a generally vicious anti-Soviet group in the U.S. Foreign Service. They all believe that a war against the Soviet Union must be provoked, that it has been preordained by God himself.

I knew many of these people personally. I worked under some of them and I heard about the others from people who knew them intimately. When I speak about their political outlook and about them generally I know what I am talking about.

In the U.S. Embassy in Moscow I, like all other Embassy employees, had daily dealings with these "monopolists of Soviet-American affairs." Thus I got to know them well.

The more I came to know of them, the more disgusted I was with the operation of their machinery. I became so interested in the workings of this group that I deliberately went out of my way to study them. I do not mind saying that I learned many interesting things.

If I can transmit my knowledge, even in part, to the general public, I think perhaps it may lead common people all over the world to a bet-

ter understanding of why the United States attitude towards the Soviet Union is so hostile.

The U.S. State Department anti-Soviet clique is a glaring example of how the coincidence of interests between a small but crucially placed group of bureaucrats in a modern capitalist state, on the one hand, and a ruling group representing capitalist financial interests, on the other hand, can be made to further imperialist policies which inevitably lead a nation towards war and destruction while the peaceful population of that state is completely oblivious to what goes on and why.

I can factually state that this is a conspiracy of an infinitely small number of people against world peace and friendship between nations.

A small "gang" of diplomats gets control of the relations of one large and powerful nation with another large and powerful nation. This "gang" finds that by using its influence cleverly it can deliberately ruin the relations between these two nations. The worse the relations between these two nations, the more powerful becomes the position of the "gang." The members of the "gang" get promotions and are placed in important positions, in so far as they have convinced their colleagues that relations with this particular country are a "special" problem requiring special knowledge, training and experience which only members of their "gang" possess.

This is a vicious circle. The "gang" uses its increased influence to poison and disrupt relations with the other great nation even more thoroughly.

War is inevitable if this process is not stopped. Members of the "gang" would welcome war, for they dream of profitable business in the occupied territories. In their conceit they presuppose a "military victory" for their country.

It goes without saying that no such group of careerists and reactionaries would be able to operate unless it was in the interests of other and larger forces. In the presence of such interested larger forces, the "gang" effectively serves its own ends and its members at the same time become ideal executors of the will of the larger forces.

This is a picture of the general operation of the State Department "monopoly of Soviet-American affairs." The larger forces which the "monopoly" serves are American capitalism personified by Wall Street. Hostile actions directed against the Soviet Union serve the interests of the financiers of the United States. The actions of this "monopoly" fit in with their plans for the militarization of the nation, for a fascist domestic regime, for war with the Soviet Union. Details and facts follow.

Who are the leaders and principal figures of this "monopoly of Soviet-American affairs" in the U.S. State Department and in the foreign service?

Loy Henderson. Henderson is the senior member of the "monopoly" and until very recently still managed to retain a decisive voice in the affairs of the "monopoly" even though since 1943

his work has not been concerned with Soviet-American relations.

Loy Henderson has been described by people who know him as a dry and uninteresting person in his middle fifties. His colleagues, while they respect his position, consider him apparently a thoroughly mediocre person in all respects except one. He possesses an unusual talent for personal intrigue coupled with an exterior which so belies this talent as to lead those who do not know him intimately to consider him an honest and frank human being.

Henderson's success, and it has been considerable, is in fact not due to any ability, but to his talent for intrigue, plus the fact that at the beginning of his career he picked a good horse which he has ridden ever since.

Henderson began his career in the State Department as a specialist in anti-Soviet affairs and machinations; he has remained in that capacity ever since.

His first contact with the Soviet Union came even before he had been appointed to the foreign service.

When conscription was enacted during the first world war, like some other young men of military age in the United States, Henderson sought refuge in the Red Cross. This was an effective, though fairly transparent, device for draft-dodging and avoiding military service. The doors of the Red Cross were wide open to certain young men with excellent connections who for

one reason and another, most often cowardice, did not want to fight. Henderson, perhaps, had not yet heard at that time of the American Foreign Service which is a much more effective draft-dodging device than the Red Cross ever was.

It is, in fact, no coincidence that no one of the anti-Soviet clique has ever had to fight in any war. If they had to fight they would be less enthusiastic about the idea of provoking a war than they are now. But as it is they can leave "the dirty work" which ensues from their policies for other people to execute. They would not go to the front. Not them, they don't want to be wounded or killed in a war!

Henderson first saw the Soviet Union as a Red Cross representative. This organization, which then as now worked hand in hand with American diplomacy and American Intelligence, found work for the would-be spy in the young Soviet Republic.

When Henderson made his acquaintance with the Soviet Union he saw that here was a "good thing," as an American investor would say. He could foresee—and it took no mastermind—that there would undoubtedly be an excellent demand for "Russian specialists"—or as they might more properly be called "anti-Russian" specialists—in U.S. Government institutions.

Having this in mind, he applied for and was appointed to the foreign service. After several routine assignments such as are given to all beginning foreign service officers, Henderson was

sent to the Baltic States where his work was directly related to Soviet affairs.

By simple maneuvering he made himself a key man in the organization of espionage directed against the Soviet Union. Even before official relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were established, Henderson succeeded in convincing the senior officers of the State Department in charge of Soviet affairs that he was the man to whom they should entrust "Soviet matters." He also convinced them that he should be prepared as the leading "Russian specialist" of the foreign service.

He was brought back to the United States to prepare for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which, as these men foresaw, was inevitable.

One of the preparatory steps Henderson recommended was the selection immediately of a group of younger "smart" men for training as "anti-Russian experts." The recommendation was accepted by his superiors and Henderson chose three young diplomatic officers for training.

Since these persons are still important in Soviet-American affairs it is worth while mentioning their names. They were George Kennan, Charles Bohlen, and Edward Page.

Kennan got a preliminary taste of the Department's anti-Soviet policies and some "ideological indoctrination" in the bourgeois Baltic States prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Bohlen was sent briefly to Prague and Page to Harbin which at that time, like Prague, Paris, Berlin, and Riga was a center of Whiteguard intrigue against the Soviet regime.

After these assignments Kennan was sent to Berlin to study Russian; Page and Bohlen were sent to Paris for the same purpose.

It is noteworthy that although at that time it would undoubtedly have been quite possible to send these officers to Moscow to learn Russian among Soviet Russians, they were instead sent to centers where they studied among Whiteguard elements.

This then was the beginning of the State Department "monopoly of Soviet-American affairs." It was carefully planned and organized over a period of several years before diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were established; it was done with a view to obtaining complete control of these relations from the very first day.

It is quite evident that this can be properly characterized as a plot directed at the poisoning of relations between two great countries prior to their formal establishment. At that time the clique of anti-Soviet leaders in the State Department headed by Henderson, with Kennan, Bohlen and Page as understudies, branched out until today it embraces only slightly less than a dozen diplomatic officers and up to half a dozen young understudies for the new crop of "anti-Russian specialists."

Loy Henderson himself remained in the State Department until the establishment of a U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1933. While in the Department he laid the groundwork of the organization in Washington which handles Soviet-American relations, and which has since become the Division of Eastern European Affairs.

Once diplomatic relations were established and a U.S. Embassy set up in Moscow, Henderson lost no time in getting himself and his understudies into the Soviet Union.

Henderson, together with George Kennan, who by this time had finished his course of training in Berlin and in the bourgeois Baltic States, actually organized the Embassy. They selected both American and Soviet employees, arranged the physical setup of the Embassy, and organized the Embassy's work.

The U.S. Embassy was set up in Moscow in 1933. The principal espionage activities which were carried on in Riga were transferred to Moscow but Riga was not abandoned as an espionage center.

Although part of the espionage activities were in the hands of the military representatives of the United States in Moscow, the Embassy staff also played an important part.

From the very beginning Henderson created a conspirative atmosphere around the Embassy which prevails to this day, and which has been spread by the American Embassy to some other foreign missions in Moscow.

Henderson took advantage of every possible opportunity for his anti-Soviet activities. He and his diplomatic officers attempted to recruit espionage agents among the Soviet population.

Whenever one of these agents was arrested by the Soviet authorities, Henderson went around to all the other missions in Moscow weeping crocodile tears at the "cruelty of the Soviet authorities." He sent full reports to the State Department couched in similar hypocritical tones. Since, of course, very few people knew of the actual espionage activities of these arrested persons and since those Americans who did naturally kept silent, the run-of-the-mill American employees of the Embassy were thus indoctrinated by Henderson to believe that any Russian who talked to an American would be arrested the next day. Many Americans who arrive in Moscow still believe this to be the case.

Henderson personally had a "heart-to-heart" talk with every new Embassy employee. The new American was told that he would be surrounded by Soviet espionage agents. He was told certain instances, some "real," like the arrest of some of Henderson's agents, some completely fictitious. He was then told that undoubtedly he himself would receive telephone calls in the near future from girls who were Soviet agents. He was warned thoroughly, and usually, if naive, as many of these Americans were, went out of Henderson's office shaking with nervousness and every time he left

the Embassy for a walk, continually looked behind him to see whether he was being followed.

In order to make his talk effective, Henderson usually arranged "phone calls." These were made by persons under Henderson's orders and the girl calling often displayed some unusual knowledge of the boy she called up. Then this particular person, frightened half to death, would go around the Embassy for weeks and say: "You know, just one day after I arrived here a girl called me up. She knew my middle name and my home town in the United States." His inference was that the Russian "spy" who had telephoned certainly was well provided with background information. He stood in awe of the whole matter and usually took a long time to recover from this state.

This "indoctrination" evidently still goes on, and not without success.

The conspirative atmosphere of the U.S. Embassy was furthered by the fact that Henderson's diplomatic officers were encouraged to talk continually about "phone calls" and arrests of Soviet citizens in the presence of subordinate employees.

These topics furnished such a large part of the conversational material for the Embassy that anybody working there—and this is still the case—began to feel that his shadow was spying on him. There have actually been cases of Americans who became so obsessed with Henderson's "ghost stories" and "fairy tales" that they had to be sent

home. In several cases they were sent to sanitariums for recovery from nervous breakdowns.

Lest there should be any doubt as to the authenticity of my material on Henderson's activities, I should add that two Americans who were in the Embassy at that time told me how, on Henderson's instructions, they frightened newcomers. I fear they would not have talked had they not been the worse off for drink on the occasion when they discussed the whole matter in my presence. Laughing at these "practical jokes" as they called them, they ridiculed many of the individuals they themselves had fooled with such cynical devices.

After Henderson got this inquisitorial system under way in the Embassy, he was recalled to the State Department to take charge of Soviet-American affairs there. He occupied this position for five years, from 1938 to mid-1943, with the title of Assistant Chief for Eastern European Affairs.

At the beginning of the war between Russia and Germany Henderson made a mistake which seriously affected his career for a time.

Like the other "Russian experts" of the United States Government, guided by wishful thinking rather than actual facts, he predicted that the Soviet Union would be overrun by Germany in a matter of weeks. He advised against trying to establish any closer contact between the United States and the Soviet Union in spite of their very evident common interests in the war against Germany.

The White House itself was in fact forced to directly intervene in Soviet-American affairs. The White House saved the situation and corrected what might otherwise have been an irreparable mistake, costing millions of American lives, a mistake which would have inevitably forestalled and postponed for months and years that cooperation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. which played an important part in ultimately destroying fascist Germany.

Henderson's intensive efforts to sabotage the cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. so provoked the White House that he was exiled to Iraq where he was made United States Minister in Bagdad.

Henderson, however, is never at a loss. He has a ready answer to everything. Having come to the home of the Arabian Nights he, like Aladdin, pulled out his personal magic lamp. Presto, there appeared a genie. Henderson's discovery in Iraq was the same discovery he had made elsewhere—the "red menace."

No doubt if Henderson were sent as American emissary to the South Pole, within a year's time he would have discovered a "red menace" among the penguins.

Henderson's discovery that there was a "danger of Communism" in Bagdad so endeared him to the State Department bigwigs that he was shortly recalled—to head the Department's Division of Middle Eastern Affairs. Here he made another "discovery"—namely, that there was a

"red menace" not only in Iraq, but throughout the whole Middle East.

At this post Henderson anticipated the so-called Truman doctrine providing for active warfare against the democratic movement in Greece.

Henderson also discovered just how effectively oil could be used to lubricate not only machinery, but also the State Department. Under the direct influence of American oil companies in the Middle East, Henderson masterminded another flop of U.S. diplomacy—the change in policy on Palestine. This change resulted in the United States demanding the alteration of a United Nations decision which it had itself sponsored.

As I write these lines it has been reported that Henderson has been appointed American Ambassador to India. It is reasonable to expect that within the next half year or so the State Department will make the sensational discovery, with the assistance of Mr. Loy Henderson, that "Communism menaces India." In any case Henderson's career has not ended and the last has not been heard of him.

George Kennan. The man of whom it is most frequently said in the State Department that "he knows more about Russia than any other American" studied the Russian language at the famous school for German intelligence agents designated for work in Russia—the Osteuropäische Institut.

This is perhaps as typical a fact as can be selected from the biography of a man whose entire career demonstrates that for him the path to

"knowledge" of Russia lay not through Moscow, but Berlin.

Kennan speaks Russian with a marked foreign accent. He speaks German without any accent.

Even after Kennan came to Moscow in 1934 he continued to seek and find his "inspiration" and "knowledge" on the Soviet Union not in the high pace of socialist construction going on all about him, but in other quarters. It is well known in the State Department that Kennan's best friends while he served in the American Embassy in Moscow were diplomats and army officers from the German Embassy. It was from them that he heard about Russia and it was through their Hitlerite spectacles that he saw the country he was assigned to study.

It is hardly surprising therefore that this "expert on Russia" has never progressed in his understanding of the Soviet Union beyond his teachers and is now trying to repeat almost exactly the disastrous mistakes of these fascist officers, diplomats and spies who even at that time were dreaming and planning how they would conquer the U.S.S.R. in three months.

George Kennan at the very beginning of his diplomatic career, some twenty years ago, was selected as a "man of the future" destined to become a "leading diplomatic specialist" on Russia by a small group of important State Department officials. These officials foresaw that, despite their efforts, the day would come when the

United States would have to establish relations with the U.S.S.R. and maintain an Embassy in Moscow.

They decided, therefore, that they must select and train clever young men who with their assistance would be able to establish and maintain indefinitely a tight monopoly on Soviet-American relations.

Instrumental in the choice of these younger men, of course, was Loy Henderson who planned for himself the leadership of this clique. Henderson's first choice was Kennan, and Kennan has richly justified Henderson's expectations.

During the period from 1928 to 1933, with the exception of the two years when he was in Germany studying the Russian language, Kennan was stationed in the Baltic States which at that time, before there was an American Embassy in Moscow, were the centers of American espionage on the U.S.S.R. Kennan fitted into this system without any difficulty since he has a natural propensity for intelligence work.

He has always preferred the type of distorted and false information which is typical of American espionage to the facts of Soviet development.

Kennan was in the Soviet Union twice before the second world war. The first occasion was at the time of the establishment of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Kennan personally selected a staff of local employees for the mission and took charge of the partial transfer to Moscow of some of

the "activities" previously carried on in Riga. What some of these "activities" were it would take no inside information to guess.

Kennan's second assignment to Moscow was made very unpleasant by the arrival of Ambassador Joseph Davies. Davies was, as is well known, more interested in facts about the Soviet Union than in the fables of Kennan and Henderson, and this hardly fitted in with the plans of these two who were both in Moscow at the time. Kennan left fairly soon after Davies' arrival in the Soviet Union. It has been stated that the mere suggestion that Davies might be sent here some day again as an Ambassador is sufficient to cause Kennan nervous headaches and sleepless nights.

After the Munich deal Kennan was sent to Prague and reportedly was on excellent terms with the puppet government of Hacha. Following this assignment Kennan was sent to Berlin where he stayed until the United States joined the nations fighting against Germany.

During the war Kennan undoubtedly must have gone through one of the worst periods of his life. It was at this period that he thought that his whole career had come to naught, for the U.S. and the Soviet Union were in alliance against Germany and fighting side by side to defeat Hitler. His intimate friends claim that Kennan developed his stomach ulcer in this period and that it got worse as the American-Soviet alliance became stronger.

It was with great misgivings, I would judge, that Kennan accepted the post of Counsellor of the American Embassy in Moscow in 1944. He apparently feared that in this job he would, whether he liked it or not, have to fit in with the good relations between the two nations.

When he arrived in Moscow, however, he discovered that he had acquired a key post which gave him wide possibilities for the poisoning of this friendship. This became apparent with new force immediately after Roosevelt's death.

Kennan found very strong support in Ambassador Harriman who hardly waited for Roosevelt's death to betray his policy.

I definitely know that day after day, Kennan wrote telegram after telegram and report after report to the new leadership of the State Department.

He set out to prove:

1. That American-Soviet friendship was a mistake and that America and the Soviet Union could never live in peace despite the successful alliance during the war;

2. That the Soviet Government was determined on "world domination," on the "immediate bolshevization of Europe," and eventual "aggression against the United States";

3. That the United States must "resist" the Soviet Union on every issue, no matter how small, and in no case ever come to an agreement with the Soviet Government since "agreement with Russia was impractical";

4. That the agreements of Teheran, Yalta and later that of Potsdam (despite frantic efforts Kennan was unable to prevent these agreements) were "serious mistakes," and that the United States must go back on the commitments which it had made in these agreements.

Kennan's telegrams and reports received the highest attention of the State Department. They were highly praised. They became, in fact, the Bible of the new Secretary of State, Byrnes, and were compulsory reading for all policy personnel and for many others in the State Department, as well as in important missions throughout the world.

Before my departure for the U.S.S.R. in 1946, I was required to attend a course of lectures of eight to ten weeks duration which was held in the old building of the State Department. The lectures took place every other morning. There were about twenty to twenty-five lecturers, mainly officers of the foreign service who had been stationed for some time abroad. They discussed their experiences and answered our questions. The aim of these lectures was to give a reactionary slant to the future work of employees of the State Department going abroad as well as to teach them how to collect confidential information and to "keep their ears and eyes wide open."

George Kennan lectured on Soviet foreign policy and conditions of work in the Soviet Union. All of his lectures were filled with ill will and

anti-Soviet attacks. Of all our reactionary lecturers he was probably the most reactionary.

The aggressive anti-Soviet elements in Washington which represented financial and military groups found in Kennan just what they had been looking for. They had control of the Government of the United States after Roosevelt's death as a result of fraud, not of lawful elections.

Kennan expressed their views better than they could themselves and, furthermore, was able to speak from the authoritative vantage point of Moscow, a fact which lent his statements great weight.

So, suddenly and unexpectedly Kennan found himself designated by acclaim the chief ideologist of the new foreign policy of the United States.

This position was formalized in 1947 when he was appointed Chairman of the Policy Planning Board by Secretary of State Marshall. In this position he is called on to formulate U.S. foreign policy principles for the "foreseeable future" and even to assist in the execution of current policies. He constantly had the ear of Secretary of State Marshall and was able to exert a great influence on him.

He has on occasion even become an official spokesman for State Department views. Not long ago he published under the pen name of Mr. "X" an article in **Foreign Affairs** magazine. To insure that the American press should not underestimate the significance of this article, certain newspaper reporters were tipped off. This caused a sensation

—as it was intended to—with the result that Kennan's article was much more widely read throughout the U.S. and abroad than it ever would have been if published under his own name.

Kennan's article in **Foreign Affairs** magazine is well known. The privately expressed views of this leading State Department official were openly and widely discussed within the American Embassy in Moscow.

Kennan holds that "war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is inevitable." He does not believe that the "United States can tolerate the continued existence of successful Socialism" personified by the Soviet Union.

Considering war as inevitable, he claims that the sooner it comes the better. The "tough" policy or "cold war," as it has been called, Kennan regards as a means of provoking full-scale war. The policy of "curbing" Communism which he advocates is another way of saying that the United States should occupy the whole world.

An inveterate pro-German, Kennan is insistent on a rearmed Germany, regarding it as a spearhead of a U.S. attack on the U.S.S.R. Kennan, who has always advocated the Western bloc, would give Germany, rather than England, the leadership of this system. It must be said that Kennan's ideas, in general, are startlingly similar to the ideology of some of Hitler's "philosophers."

Like all of his fellow members of the group of "monopolists of Soviet-American affairs" in the State Department, Kennan puts great faith in the

atom bomb. He regards it as the final and only answer to Communism and dreams of using it on Soviet cities. This would be in full accord with the plans and hopes of Kennan's colleagues.

The chief obstacle to the realization of Kennan's provocational and expansionist plans, other than the farsighted policy of the Soviet Union itself, is, of course, the American nation. Kennan, who has lived little in the United States and who knows even less about the life and attitudes of ordinary Americans, as distinct from the diplomatic society in which he has spent all his life, resents the good-will sentiments of the average American just as he resented Franklin Roosevelt and his domestic and foreign policies.

He resents even a bourgeois-democratic representative system of government which despite its faults still forces, in some degree, American foreign policy officials to give public account of their actions. He resents the presence of a Congress which can interfere with the operation of "higher intellect" such as he conceives himself to possess. He turns white with fury at the mere thought of a body of voters which, in the last analysis, can bring his clever plans to naught by simply refusing to go along with them.

Kennan is intelligent enough to realize that ordinary Americans do not want war and, therefore, in such of his remarks as may become public, endeavors to persuade his listeners that his policy leads to peace. But all the time he suggests steps which lead to war.

Kennan understands better the principle attributed to the American circus organizer P. T. Barnum that there is a "sucker born every minute," than that of Abraham Lincoln who said that "you can fool some of the people all of the time and all of the people some of the time, but you can't fool all of the people all of the time."

War hysteria, like war itself, is a boomerang and those who start it on its flight usually get hit with it themselves. Kennan and his clique have built up a war hysteria in the United States and now they must keep it boiling in order to avoid disaster for the policies they represent and for their own personal careers. Kennan and his following in anti-Soviet policy are at their most dangerous point, for the menace to peace and security of the whole world is now more real than ever before. That is why it is necessary to write about a person who otherwise and under other circumstances would not be worth a fifteen-word obituary.

Charles Bohlen. Bohlen is no less important in the anti-Soviet clique of diplomats than Henderson or Kennan. He is generally described in the State Department as "brilliant," a phrase which probably covers merely a quick mind plus inordinate opportunism.

Bohlen studied Russian in Paris in the early 1930's. Then, instead of going through the customary training in the Baltic States, he was assigned directly to the newly established U.S. Embassy in Moscow where he worked directly under Henderson and Kennan for several years.

He was assigned to the State Department for a time, but returned to the U.S. Embassy in 1937 and remained in Moscow until 1940. During this session he was for a considerable period the "representative" of the "monopolists of Soviet-American affairs" in the Embassy since Henderson at that time held the Russian desk in Washington and Kennan was on assignment in Prague and Germany.

Bohlen, despite this responsibility, however, was not apparently regarded by Henderson at that time as worthy of senior rank in his closed corporation. His opportunity came only later.

After Henderson was evicted from Russian affairs in 1943 and sent to Iraq, the "monopoly" faced a serious crisis. It was necessary to find persons within it who not only could be trusted to handle its affairs, but who could command Roosevelt's confidence in view of the keen interest in Russian affairs displayed by the White House.

Bohlen was chosen, and along with Bohlen another and younger officer was moved into responsible position, Reinhardt. Bohlen, however, was left with the whole "monopoly" on his hands when Reinhardt was assigned to other work. The preparations for introducing Bohlen to the White House as "new blood" in American-Soviet affairs were clever and careful. The opportunity came when it became necessary to find a translator for high-level White House conversations with Soviet representatives.

Bohlen was presented to Roosevelt as a "translator." He was described as the "only person" in the Department suitable for the job, although there is no doubt that there were many other people in the Government in Washington who knew Russian better than Bohlen.

In diplomatic circles Bohlen is generally regarded as having an attractive personality and a considerable share of "personal charm." It was hoped that this "personal charm" plus Bohlen's "quick mind" would lead Roosevelt into the trap prepared for him.

It worked. Roosevelt apparently came to like Bohlen; he came to think of him as a competent young man who could be trusted with considerable responsibility.

Bohlen was taken to the Moscow Conference in 1943 and then made Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs. Subsequently, Roosevelt took him to the Teheran Conference in the latter part of 1943. By late 1944, Bohlen's position had become so strong that it was possible to name him Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for liaison with the White House. Early in 1945 he was present at the Yalta Conference.

Bohlen retained his position as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State after Roosevelt's death. He had become a vital person to the "monopoly of Soviet-American affairs." He nominally acted as a translator at the conferences he attended, but in fact he took the liberty to give far-reaching advice on Soviet-American relations.

Bohlen attended every high-level international conference, acting in his dual position as translator and adviser. He was at Potsdam. Since then this sly diplomat has been at every meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, including the meeting in Moscow. He is now generally recognized throughout the State Department as the "outstanding expert" on Soviet-American relations.

The chief thing to remember about Bohlen is the fact that he did his very best, in a quiet unobtrusive manner, to undermine Roosevelt's policies toward the Soviet Union. Representing himself as a "liberal" and as striving for understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States, Bohlen, on behalf of the "monopoly," was constantly laying the foundation for the subsequent complete abandonment of Roosevelt's policies towards the Soviet Union. After Roosevelt's death he took an active part in the wrecking of the friendship between the two nations which had been established during the war. This Bohlen did intentionally and deliberately, and with a complete awareness of what he was doing.

Furthermore, in his capacity as a personal adviser to the President on Soviet-American relations, Bohlen was able to control, in a very large measure, the appointments of personnel to key posts in the department concerned with these affairs. He was instrumental in naming Elbridge Durbrow as his assistant in the Division of Eastern European Affairs in the State Department

and it was, to the best of my knowledge, Bohlen who secured Durbrow the appointment of chief of this division when he moved up. Bohlen was later instrumental in securing the appointment of Durbrow as Counsellor of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Bohlen was also instrumental in securing for Kennan the post of Counsellor of the Embassy in Moscow in 1944, and, possibly, in facilitating Kennan's subsequent appointment as head of the Policy Planning Board. In other words, even in 1944 and 1945, before Roosevelt's death, Bohlen was engaged in placing the members of the "monopoly" in leading posts. In this way he prepared for a return to the old policy of enmity towards Russia.

Bohlen has been described in the American press as a scion of the famous family of German munition makers, Krupp von Bohlen. This allegation in all probability is false, but it has in any case one element of truth. If Bohlen were actually a representative of the Krupp von Bohlen family in America he could not have more successfully represented their interests and the interests of all big capitalists and imperialists.

It is clear from his record that he acted as an "inside agent" not only for the "monopoly of Soviet-American affairs" and its narrow interests, but also for the powers of Wall Street and American finance who had repeatedly stated that they would never tolerate Soviet-American friendship and alliance as planned by Franklin Roosevelt.

Elbridge Durbrow. Durbrow, about whom I write in detail elsewhere in this book, began his contact with the "monopoly" when he was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1934.

He has since become one of the leading and most trusted representatives of this clique and has occupied a series of highly responsible positions in which he was effectively able to represent their interests.

Charles Thayer. Thayer, who is Bohlen's brother-in-law, is a graduate of West Point. At the present time he is in charge of the Voice of America broadcasts from New York. He was chosen for that post because of his "experience" in Russia where he served in the Embassy in 1940 and 1941.

Thayer represents the "monopoly" in the Voice of America. He is, however, a "man of the future" for this group, and is very likely to be heard of before much time passes. In all probability he will occupy highly important positions in Soviet-American affairs in the State Department and abroad from whence he will endeavor to put into effect the anti-Soviet policies of his friends and relatives.

Edward Page. For a long period of time Page served in the American Embassy in Moscow as well as in the Department of State as an expert on Soviet-American relations. He was originally trained, along with Bohlen and Kennan, to be one of Henderson's understudies in the "monopoly" which helped him to attain responsible posts.

Frederick Reinhardt. Of Reinhardt I write at length elsewhere. He is one of the most obnoxious of this group of obnoxious people. One should regard him with the same contempt, if not greater, as the rest of the clique. This unprincipled individual is certain to have an excellent career in the State Department, especially in connection with American-Soviet relations. It is very likely that he will be kept at this work for some time.

Francis Stevens. Stevens is another member of the clique and has held responsible positions in Soviet-American affairs for the last six years. According to his official biography he was trained by the State Department in the Russian language.

Richard Davis. Davis worked in the American Embassy before my arrival and has held responsible positions in Soviet-American affairs in the State Department. He is not a full-fledged member of the clique, but is energetically striving to become one.

A person in the position of Davis will either be accepted into the clique if he concurs in virulent anti-Soviet policies, or, if he does not, he will be dropped by the wayside on some convenient pretext.

Llewellyn Thompson. Judging from what I heard in the Embassy, Thompson is hardly what one could call a full member of the "monopoly." He has, however, cooperated with it and at the present time occupies an important post in the State Department.

John Davies. Davies is a specialist on the Far East and not on the Soviet Union, although he did spend two years here (1946-1947).

John Davies, however, is an excellent example of how the "monopoly on Soviet-American relations" is expanding its activities by taking in persons dealing with other areas.

I worked directly under Davies in the American Embassy and know him pretty well. He is possessed, like some others of this group, with an overwhelming obsession of his own personal career. He will do anything to further his career regardless of how low he has to stoop.

Davies grew up and studied in China. He is a master of Eastern intrigue and thinks like a Chinese politician. This, of course, stands him in good stead since there are many parallels between current American diplomacy and reactionary Chinese politics.

Davies, furthermore, is greatly influenced by his wife who is no less clever than he and just as much interested in his career. His wife is the daughter of an American capitalist and politician, Henry Grady, who has in recent years been selected for various especially obnoxious diplomatic jobs requiring cunning and a propensity for foul play.

In the Embassy Davies was one of the principal executors of the policies of Kennan and Durbrow. He controlled the activities of the USIS and also the "press reporting."

Davies was commissioned by Kennan and Dur-

brow to collect from all Embassy employees information on their contacts with Russians and information about each other. His wife was a most ardent assistant.

Davies, who has the mentality of a stooge, was frequently assigned tasks of a provocative nature in local Embassy affairs. He was ordered to undermine the position of certain employees and officers in preparation for their transfer out of Moscow. For instance, Davies was given the task of getting rid of Armond Willis which he did successfully. Since I was a witness to this affair I will give a detailed account of it elsewhere.

Davies was also commissioned by the American Embassy to maintain close contacts with American correspondents in Moscow for intelligence and possible provocational purposes.

It was very rare for me to walk into Davies' office and not find one or two correspondents with him. He used certain correspondents systematically in order to try to send out of the Soviet Union distorted accounts of developments and provocative rumors. To these correspondents he systematically made available the whole file of his own secret reports and telegrams and those of other Embassy officers. He encouraged these correspondents to take notes on the reports for use in articles to be written when they returned to the United States. This was intended, of course, to directly influence the type of information being given to the American public on the Soviet Union.

The most flagrant example of this sort of thing, however, was furnished during the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1947. Davies ordered one of his subordinate employees in the Embassy, a girl clerk who also furnished information to him on other Americans in the Embassy, to accumulate a carefully selected file of false reports on the Soviet Union for the use of the several dozens of correspondents who came to Moscow, nominally to cover the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. However, most of them were actually sent by their newspapers in order to bring home for publication collections of rumor and fancy to be presented to American newspaper readers as "the truth about Russia gained by correspondents on the spot."

Throughout the conference Davies encouraged all American correspondents to read all these reports and take notes, and even copy whole reports which they later published as "original observations." During this period he spent almost all of his time with correspondents. He fed them his own special brand of clever lies about Soviet life and the Soviet Union. Most of these correspondents were sent to hear and report just the sort of thing Davies was giving them. They were that much more pleased that they did not have to dig up such fabrications for themselves.

Davies, I believe, was by no means a professional spy, or if a professional, was, in any case, not very experienced. For instance, Davies had one of the Embassy officers in the Consular Sec-

tion systematically interview all "interesting persons" who came as claimants to American citizenship.

This officer, Wallace by name, who later was expelled from Moscow by the Embassy itself for being involved in a drunken brawl in which he almost got his skull fractured, would write reports for Davies on his "interviews." Davies used to report these conversations, after adding many anti-Soviet fabrications, to all his friends who would repeat them all over the Embassy.

Davies personally questioned some of the people coming to the Consular Section in an effort to obtain "information" that would fit in with his anti-Soviet line.

John Davies did so exceedingly well in his work at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that he was forgiven his previous sins. These sins consisted in his taking a line in China supposedly favorable to the Chinese Communists. Actually, of course, Davies was not being "favorable," he was just being two-faced as usual. His hope was to pull off a high-class piece of espionage and provocation in internal Chinese politics on behalf of the Kuomintang government and of the United States. In any case, he had made a mistake and earned a reputation, even among Americans, as a pro-Communist in Chinese politics and was removed from China during the general purge of the American Embassy there.

Davies was given an opportunity to expiate himself by being sent to Moscow. He did expa-

tiate himself. His work in Moscow was so vicious that it attracted the particular attention of the "monopoly on Soviet-American relations."

When he left Moscow he went to Washington where he found work in the policy committee headed by Kennan. From this vantage point he is now able to carry on his intrigues on a much larger scale.

The "monopoly on Soviet-American relations" of the State Department is in the process of rapid expansion of its personnel and influence. Its ultimate aim is, of course, to take over the direction of all State Department policy.

In order to provide a corps of "anti-Soviet experts," arrangements have been made for the training of a large group of younger officers of the diplomatic service. These younger officers, working under the direction of the leaders of the "monopoly," are intended to occupy strategic posts throughout the State Department and in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and carry out the orders of the "monopoly." It is intended that they will ultimately take over the "monopoly," after the present leaders retire. Of this corps of understudies a few stand out as the "smartest," clearly predestined for leading positions in the future.

In this way the "monopoly" plans its anti-Soviet activities.

CHAPTER THREE

MY TRIP TO MOSCOW

I was very glad to have the opportunity to go to Moscow to work in the American Embassy. In my childhood I had heard a great deal about Russia. It seemed to me to be a mysterious, distant, attractive land. Later on I was entranced by the writings of Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Pushkin even though they did lose some of their charm in translation. Nevertheless, they enabled me in some degree to get acquainted with the life of the Russian people of which I knew so little.

Having been educated in American schools, reading American newspapers and magazines, I involuntarily absorbed to some degree the stupid nonsense that these "free" publications printed about the Soviet Union. At the same time I felt that the American press was taking a far from objective position in its writings on Soviet life.

It was difficult for me to believe that a country which gave the world such geniuses as Lomonosov, Tolstoy and Pushkin could be guilty of such ill will and actions as were attributed to the

Soviet Union by the Hearst press and similar newspapers and magazines of my country.

Some news as to the Soviet Government's activities in the field of public education, public health, social security and maternal and child welfare were brought to my attention, although oftentimes somewhat distorted. By sheer logic this piecemeal information succeeded in breaking through the "iron curtain" which had been created by the American ruling class in order to prevent the average American from really knowing the truth about the U.S.S.R.

In due time I began to comprehend that the slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union which were so energetically disseminated in the United States could in all probability be explained by the same logical facts, i. e., that the sixty families that hold all political and economic power in the palms of their hands are deathly afraid that the Soviet example might be "contagious." If the average American discovered that in a socialist and communist society common people live better and enjoy a greater degree of freedom than under capitalism, perhaps they might attempt to take into their hands all means of production and political power in the United States. It seemed to me that for precisely that reason, the ruling classes of the U.S.A. were doing their utmost to discredit the Soviet way of life in the eyes of the Americans.

This thought, it is true, was only in its embryonic stages, although I instinctively felt that

this was so. But years of education in American schools did not pass without leaving their mark. It is difficult for me to cite all the nonsense that is taught to students in American schools under the guise of "information" about the Soviet Union. I doubt whether it is necessary to do so.

The average individual studying in American schools, unless he takes special steps to find out the truth about the Soviet Union, gets the impression that the U.S.S.R. is a wild, backward and aggressive country. The ruling circles of the United States give heed to the old advertising slogan that "reputation is repetition." A good reputation can be created for a firm or its products by constant repetition of their good qualities in the press, on the radio and by skywriting. In this manner even groundless assertions are successful in impressing the American public.

For instance, on many street corners and highways in the United States countless billboards proclaim the wonderful qualities of Coca-Cola. Millions of Americans blindly believe that Coca-Cola is good for the health and "gives you a lift," in spite of the fact that the Journal of the American Medical Association has often published data showing that Coca-Cola dissolves tooth enamel. However, a magazine having a circulation of but a few thousand copies cannot compete effectively with the millions of advertisements on billboards, in the press and the radio, which praise the pseudo qualities of Coca-Cola.

The American ruling circles base their anti-Soviet propaganda on this same advertising principle. They believe that repetition of different versions of slanderous fabrications about the Soviet Union, if repeated often enough, will be eventually accepted as truths by the average American. They know that the true facts about the Soviet Union, published in the progressive press, do not reach the majority of the American readers. This is due to the small circulations of these publications and to lack of funds to publish larger progressive papers that would print the truth about various countries.

The American press is free in the sense that it can print countless slanderous accusations against the American progressive organizations, trade unions, the Soviet Union and countries of people's democracy.

When I agreed to work in Moscow, I did so because of my longfelt desire to learn the truth about the Soviet Union and its people.

During the war against the fascist beasts I breathlessly followed developments on the Soviet-German front. The legendary feats of the soldiers of the Red Army in defense of their homeland, the terrific battles for Moscow, Stalingrad and Leningrad, the expulsion of the German invaders from the territory of the Soviet Union—all this brought me to the conclusion that a people who defended the honor and independence of their country in a manner hitherto unheard-of in history could not be as bad a people as the American schools,

papers and magazines would have us think. Only a people who love their country more than life itself could so defend it.

This became clear to me when I was still in America. I wanted to see with my own eyes the Soviet Union and its heroic people who had put an end, as I then thought, to the fascist beasts. I felt without a doubt the continuity between the humanism of Tolstoy and Pushkin and that which was taking place in the U.S.S.R.

I decided to forget everything that I had been told about the Soviet Union in the American newspapers, magazines and schools in order to have the opportunity to obtain firsthand knowledge of life in the Soviet Union, to get to know the Soviet people and draw the correct conclusions.

Americans love to refer to Russia as the great enigma. To some degree the country was a mystery to me also. I wanted to solve this mystery. I wanted to understand the motivating forces that transformed Russia from a backward country into a strong world power which was victorious in the battle against the most aggressive and well-armed imperialist state.

And so, I arrived in Moscow.

My work in the American Embassy in Moscow was my first in the diplomatic field. This was my first position abroad and I had never worked in an Embassy or consulate previously.

During my work in the U.S. air force and OSS documents went through my hands that proved that American Embassies and consulates abroad

engaged to a certain degree in intelligence activities. We often received reports from American Embassies in various countries classified as "top secret" containing intelligence data on the politics, economic situation and armed forces of these states. These were written by officials of the Embassies.

Working in intelligence organizations, I perhaps naively thought that intelligence work was just a small part of Embassy work and that the main work of the Embassy was directed towards the bettering of relations between the U.S.A. and the country where our Embassy functioned. I also thought that our Embassies were to organize the transmission of officially obtained and objective information on conditions in the country of their location. Generally speaking I thought that employees of the American Embassies, being the "eyes and ears" of the American people abroad, should be objective in their work because the interest of the U.S.A. and the American people demand truthful and objective information of the policies of many countries.

I also thought that American Ambassadors and Embassy employees abroad should use all their talents and efforts to maintain normal political and trade relations with the governments of the countries where they are located. Without this objective approach it will never be possible to end the chaos, mutual misunderstandings and contradictions interfering with the efforts to create a stable and prosperous world.

Actually, if an American Embassy in some country in its reports to its government always distorts the facts about the policy of that country, stating, for instance, that it has aggressive intentions against the United States whereas in reality this is not so, this tendentious and unobjective information may eventually do irreparable damage to the interests of the American people. It is precisely for this reason that I thought that an objective attitude towards the country of their location and dispassionate registration of officially obtained facts, characterizing the real policies of that country, was the main thing in the work of American Ambassadors and their staffs.

I must admit that I was bitterly disappointed in this respect when I started work in the Embassy.

During my first days in the Embassy it became clear to me that not only the ambassador, counsellor and secretaries, in other words the individuals who to a certain extent determine the Russian policy of the State Department, but even certain rank-and-file employees of the various Embassy sections were extremely anti-Soviet in their views. In some cases their hatred of the Soviet system was pathological.

It was obvious to me that the Embassy was a true copy of the State Department in miniature. Ambassadors come and go, as do the Secretaries of State, but all the strategic positions in the Embassy, such as counsellor and the secretaries of the mission, have for many years been in the hands of the State Department top-level anti-So-

viet clique, namely Kennan, Durbrow, Bohlen, Reinhardt et al. These career diplomats play a major role in determining the ways and means of accomplishing the State Department's anti-Soviet foreign policy.

The present American Ambassador to Moscow, W. B. Smith, is a professional intelligence officer. He was directly connected with American military intelligence during World War I. In his capacity as chief of Eisenhower's staff in World War II, Smith directed the military intelligence activities of the American expeditionary forces operating in Europe. It is of interest to note that even the **Amerika** magazine, published by the USIS for the U.S.S.R. (before I left the Embassy one of my jobs was assistant editor of this publication), printed a picture of General Smith in its first issue with a caption to the effect that he was considered to be "an experienced and excellent organizer of intelligence work." It is quite obvious that by appointing as Ambassador to Moscow an experienced intelligence operator the State Department wanted to give its career diplomats the necessary guidance and qualified leadership in their anti-Soviet intelligence work.

It became clear to me that my work in the Embassy was in actuality a continuation of my work in the same intelligence outfit that I worked in prior to my arrival in Moscow. The only difference was that in the States I was on the receiving side, i.e., in the organization that carried on research and disseminated intelligence data ob-

tained abroad, whereas in Moscow I was, to use a military term, on the front line, in an organization that actually did the collecting of intelligence information.

As a matter of fact all the information that the Embassy transmits to the State Department is extremely prejudiced. Soviet domestic and foreign policy as well as all events and facts taking place in the Soviet Union are always permeated with the extreme anti-Soviet attitude of the top-level Embassy leadership, including Ambassador Smith, Counsellor Durbrow and First Secretaries Davies and Reinhardt. The State Department, in its turn, exaggerates this false information before turning it over to the American people.

Conversations with rank-and-file members of the Embassy staff, as well as my own personal observations, quickly proved to me that employees of the Embassy who in their work are, or even intend to be, objective toward the Soviet Union, very soon learn that they must change their attitude or else... They come to understand that if they do not change their mind they will be recalled and thrown out of the civil service, a fate which in the United States is almost equivalent to a death sentence, because no private American firm would give a job to an individual who was purged from the civil service for "disloyalty to the United States."

That has been the experience of many American employees who were fired from government service as a direct result of the provocational

activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These people, who were discharged from government jobs without any definite charges drawn up against them, fail to find work with private firms.

When I speak of individuals who are objective in their attitude towards the Soviet Union I do not mean the career diplomats. They are usually thoroughly screened. As a rule only the most reactionary elements are sent abroad for work. I have in view chiefly individuals whose work in the State Department is of a more or less accidental nature, those who started their work during the war as a result of the wartime expansion of the State Department foreign services. These individuals came from universities and scientific institutions in the United States, although the State Department did try its best to choose the most reactionary of the possible candidates.

Elbridge Durbrow is the Counsellor of the American Embassy in Moscow and has occupied this position for the last two years. His is the most important post in the Embassy, where he represents the State Department anti-Soviet clique.

Durbrow has one characteristic which all who meet him quickly observe. He has one overwhelming passion which dwarfs all others and about which he cannot be silent. Durbrow hates Russia, the Soviet Union and everything Slavonic with a tremendous and malignant super-hate, with wrath and emotion which at times so possess him that he is unable to control himself.

Whence comes this emotion, what is behind it and what its psychological roots are, I cannot explain. Even Ambassador Smith, who is far from being objective in his attitude towards the Soviet Union, has completely fallen under his spell.

Suffice it to say, however, that even those Americans in the Moscow Embassy who are cynical to the core and are indoctrinated every day in the latest anti-Soviet fabrications and rumors, and are themselves in many cases bitterly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian, cannot accustom themselves to and are taken aback by the "intensity" of Durbrow's feelings.

They are quite accustomed to the ordinary professional anti-Sovietism of American diplomats, adopted in considerable part for the purpose of furthering their careers, and they are impressed by the meticulously-phrased "ideology" of George Kennan. But Durbrow falls outside their ken.

This short, well-nourished individual with an accurate part in the middle of his head is a master of double-dealing and intrigue. With a broad smile, a joking air and a hearty slap on the back he impresses one initially as an honest and decent fellow. And many an individual who has been sent packing by a Durbrow intrigue remains firmly convinced to the end that Durbrow is his best friend.

Yet by no means all Americans who have been here have been deceived by this actually fairly transparent person. Many see through him. And in fact even among Americans in the Moscow

Embassy who subscribe to Durbrow's policies there are many who detest and despise him. Among a random group of Americans in Moscow, it is rare that one does not hear a snide remark or perhaps just a malicious laugh whenever his name is mentioned. For many Americans just laugh at Durbrow. He is an exhibitionist among his other talents. At a party he insists on being the center of attention even if he has to take off his clothes in the center of the room in order to be it. He outdoes everyone else in his antics.

At a costume party held at the ambassador's personal residence, Spasso House, in the fall of 1947, Durbrow appeared dressed as a circus strong man and weight lifter in close-fitting tights and inscribed all over with suitable inscriptions written with lipstick. He monopolized the floor all evening and gave no one else a chance to show off.

If he is laughed at on such occasions it is partly, of course, because it is not polite not to laugh at a Counsellor of Embassy who insists on being a clown, partly because he is ridiculous, and even more because he is really funny, and if this role is to his liking he ought by rights to be employed in a circus instead of by the State Department which, in my opinion, is no place for clowns.

But this clown has in fact risen fairly high in the inner councils of the State Department.

Had he not chanced into the State Department's foreign service, Durbrow would probably be engaged today somewhere in the United States

in dirty politics or a shady law practice. He would have an excellent income but a bad reputation. For him the former is of more importance than the latter.

But as it is he is able to put to the use of the Department of State his talent for small and large blackmail. He is highly valued for just this ability, and, indeed, Durbrow with his intrigues is just as important to the State Department anti-Soviet clique as is George Kennan with his "philosophy." It takes all types to poison the atmosphere and Durbrow is one of the experts at it.

Elbridge Durbrow is a junior partner of the State Department anti-Soviet clique. For many years he was never completely and wholeheartedly accepted by this group which is jealous of every newcomer seeking entrance into their midst.

He began his diplomatic career with assignments at Warsaw and Bucharest and was introduced to the Soviet Union only in 1934. He served in Moscow for three and a half years and established firm connections with Loy Henderson and George Kennan.

However, Durbrow had not sufficiently impressed Henderson to justify further assignments in Soviet affairs. Only after the outbreak of war was he called back and that apparently as an experiment in view of a general shortage of personnel trained for this particular activity.

He justified this experiment so well, however, that in 1944 he was in rapid succession made Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European

Affairs in the State Department and then Chief of the Division.

In 1946 he was named Counsellor of the Embassy in Moscow.

Americans who work in the Embassy know full well that it is Durbrow, and not the Ambassador who ran the Embassy until recently and that it is Durbrow who actually decided all questions of personnel and who authored the most important telegrams sent to the State Department.

Permanent State Department employees also know that Durbrow is in the State Department for life and certainly will remain a power to be reckoned with for a long time, while they also know that the Ambassador will sooner or later leave the State Department. It is natural, therefore, that they pay more attention to Durbrow than to the Ambassador.

Durbrow, since his arrival in Moscow, has done his utmost to construct and maintain an "iron curtain" between Russians and the Americans in the Embassy. He does this in the first place because he lives in abject fear of Russian influences and their possible effect on members of his staff.

In the second place, the greater the extent to which he can isolate his own fellow citizens from the society around them, the easier it is for him to obtain among them credulity for his anti-Soviet purposes. Only in an atmosphere of complete isolation from the Russians about him can Durbrow carry out his "hate Russia"

program without risk of having internal conflicts develop within the Embassy.

For it must be said that in spite of very careful selection by the State Department of Americans for work in Moscow on the basis of their unquestioning loyalty to the State Department line, in spite of the thorough propagandizing and indoctrination which these Americans constantly undergo within the Embassy and State Department, some who are fair-minded, honest individuals at heart slip through the "loyalty checks." These persons would never accept Durbrow's distortions nor assist his "hate Russia" line if they themselves were to become acquainted with the Russian people, their attitudes and objectives.

Durbrow, therefore, with the full support of the Ambassador and the State Department, by direct and indirect pressure endeavors to prevent the development of long-term contacts by his staff members with Russians.

In some cases individuals maintaining such long-term contacts have been called in when they became known to Embassy officials and told to break them off with the alternative that they will otherwise be sent home in disgrace. In other cases such individuals have simply been transferred to other posts, or sent back to the United States under false pretexs.

On occasion Durbrow, who never in his life has done anything aboveboard which he could do in an underhand fashion, has waited until staff members contravening his orders are outside the

U.S.S.R. on vacation, or for other reasons, and while they were away arranged their transfer to prevent their return.

I am convinced that it was hardly a coincidence that my roommate, Celia Was, did not return to Moscow from Berlin where she had gone for hospitalization.

Durbrow, of course, in his prohibition against American long-term contacts with Soviet citizens makes notable exceptions for the many American agents who are engaged in collecting espionage information. These agents of whom there are many not only among the military and naval personnel of the Embassy but also among civilians employed there, not only have permission to develop such contacts, but are under positive orders to do so and also to report to the Embassy fully on such contacts.

Durbrow's mainstay in this control over Embassy personnel is a system of stool pigeons who report to him regularly on the activities of other Americans, their political views, their personal lives, their friendships, and who particularly interest themselves in anyone who inclines to show any deviation from Embassy and State Department policy in the strictest sense. The Ambassador also, I was told, is a great believer in this "informer" system.

Particularly useful in this system have been some of the wives of Embassy officers and employees. An outstanding example was Mrs. John Davies who deliberately encouraged some of

the girls among the Embassy employees to be "frank" with her and then systematically informed her husband and Durbrow of their reactions and the gossip they gathered from other people in the Embassy.

It should be added that, according to Embassy opinion, Robert Magidoff was also useful in this regard. As an "independent" outsider who frequently expressed views rather favorable to the Soviet Union, he was able to collect and report the attitudes of some "dissenters" who trusted him.

During his stay in Moscow Durbrow has successfully rid himself of all persons who were for some reason or other distasteful to him in the Mission. Sometimes he has made use of the stool pigeon reports received in order to cast doubts on the "loyalty" of persons whom he did not like. Other times he used cruder methods.

There was once a security guard in the Embassy who was too energetic in his work. He regularly made the rounds of all the offices after work hours. Twice he found Durbrow's safe open when the office was unguarded and twice stated that he would inform the State Department of this serious security violation. Shortly thereafter this security guard went on a vacation outside of the Soviet Union and was transferred to another post while still outside the country—unexpectedly.

Durbrow, like others of the Russian affairs monopoly in the State Department, is quite energetic at twisting and distorting his reports on the So-

viet Union. Factually Durbrow reports only information which fits with his policy—i.e., information slandering Russia. Although it is my information and impression that Durbrow's work in this respect is of a fairly crude manner, he finds a ready audience since the persons in Washington who receive and read his telegrams and reports are quite prepared to believe any lie he sends them. He loves this "work" and whenever he gets a new piece of anti-Soviet gossip or some fact which can be distorted in an anti-Soviet trend he is like a child with a new toy.

That this "expert" on Russian affairs who does not even know the Russian language except sufficiently to explain to his cook what he wants for dinner, and who knows almost nothing about the Soviet Union, finds a ready audience in Washington for such "reporting," is both a tribute to the gullibility of his audience there and an indication of the degree to which wishful thinking arising from anti-Soviet sentiments has overcome objectivity.

When new employees come to the Embassy from America, Durbrow, as I became convinced from my own experience, begins training them with great fervor in an anti-Soviet spirit and more or less continues this work depending on the degree of anti-Soviet views revealed by the newcomer.

From conversations with progressive-minded Embassy employees I got the impression that some

of them, perhaps naively, consider that if the Embassy had another counsellor, who is actually in charge of the Embassy political work, the whole atmosphere would be different.

From what I have seen and heard in the State Department concerning the former Embassy's Counsellor, Kennan, I became convinced that Durbrow is his worthy successor.

Durbrow stimulates ill feelings between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., absolutely in the same way and by the same methods as Kennan did.

From my own experience, as well as from that of others, I became aware that all major documents proceeding from the Embassy to the State Department are edited personally by Durbrow. The Embassy staff are very well acquainted with his political and literary style and know that if their reports do not contain two or three anti-Soviet attacks, if they are not wholly directed against the Soviet Union in both form and content, Durbrow will not allow these documents to reach the State Department.

Anxious to keep their position and gain Durbrow's favor, and consequently the favor of the reigning clique of the State Department, the Embassy employees write their reports in this particular style. Despite this Durbrow on his own initiative adds anti-Soviet interpretations to almost every document concerning Soviet life.

Anti-Soviet information garnered from the Embassy employees, military representatives, correspondents and other persons is treated in the

same manner and only after Durbrow's approval is presented for the Ambassador's signature for dispatching to Washington.

Durbrow, like most of his colleagues, has no respect for the American system of government and frequently expresses himself, even among his own employees, in derogatory terms directed at Congress and at the President of the United States.

Like all of his fellow monopolists of Russian affairs in the State Department, he would prefer to see the present government in the United States replaced by an authoritarian anti-Communist regime which would make it possible for his group to carry out their Wall Street-inspired policy without any interference whatsoever.

In general, however, Durbrow has no independent political convictions; he has only emotional reactions. He hates the Soviet Union and every other attitude in his make-up is determined by this primary and all-important fact.

"Freddy" Reinhardt is the First Secretary of the United States Embassy in Moscow. Tall, dark and handsome in a slippery sort of way, Reinhardt is what most Americans think all diplomats are. He lacks only the traditional monocle.

He is most at home at a "diplomatic" tea, at diplomatic receptions, and at cocktail parties which somebody else pays for. He always knows with whom he should be friendly from the point of view of advancing his career, and he always knows just how best to go about this.

Reinhardt is a ladies' man and knows it. He is equally at ease in pleasing influential old ladies and in flirting with 20-year-old girls.

His capital is his sex appeal and he has discovered that the key to success, or at least one of the keys, in the American diplomatic service is the art of influencing the wives of men necessary to his career.

Reinhardt is an excellent example of a "denationalized" American. He received much of his schooling in Western Europe, even elementary schooling. He speaks French, German, Italian and Russian fluently. He knows practically nothing of America, and probably cares less. He has not lived in the United States very much and spends his vacations in Switzerland every year.

If Reinhardt cares little for "crude" Americans, he cares a great deal for the "cultured" Germans. He, like George Kennan, is a pro-German. When he was in Moscow before the war, in 1940-1941, in spite of the fact that it was on the very eve of its outbreak, in spite of the frequently expressed hostility of the United States Government to Hitler, Reinhardt found his best friends in the German Embassy in Moscow. He was their boon companion and, if the truth were known, was probably a valuable source of information on United States policy towards Germany and the Soviet Union for their intelligence operators.

It is in the light of these natural sympathies of Reinhardt that judgment can be passed on the significance of the fact that Reinhardt, like Ken-

nan, is considered one of the leading experts of the U.S. State Department, not only on the Soviet Union, but also on Germany.

The chief motivating force in Reinhardt's character is, however, not sympathy for Germany nor Russophobia, no matter how important these are to him.

Reinhardt is chiefly concerned with his career. He is the careerist pure and simple, always seeking promotion and advance no matter what it costs and no matter how low he has to stoop to attain it.

It is well known in the United States Embassy in Moscow that Reinhardt when he was here before the war was very much in love with an American girl of Finnish extraction. It is also well known that the result of this love affair was a child which died shortly after birth.

Reinhardt did not, however, marry this girl, despite the fact that he undoubtedly in his own fashion loved her, because he considered that in view of the fact that she had neither fortune nor social position this marriage would "ruin" his career. It is not just clear how marriage to an American girl, even without wealth and position, would have hindered Reinhardt's advance. The fact that he thought it would, however, gives a view of his general acumen on matters concerning his own career.

Reinhardt began his career in the State Department foreign service in 1937. Already by 1939 he was skirting the field of American-So-

viet relations when he was sent to the American Legation in Tallinn. In 1940 he was sent to the American Embassy in Moscow where he remained until 1942 as a third secretary. In 1942 he was sent back to the State Department where he was placed in the division dealing with Russian affairs under Loy Henderson.

It would be judged that this contact with Henderson was sufficient to secure him immediate acceptance into the group of anti-Soviet officials of the "Russian affairs monopoly" in the State Department.

Henderson was in an acutely difficult position. As I have written elsewhere, he had officially predicted in 1941 that the Germans would win the war with Russia and had propogandized this view extensively throughout the State Department.

Because of these predictions, Henderson had, by 1942, become the laughingstock of the State Department, and, what is more, it had become apparent in the White House itself that Henderson was attempting to sabotage American-Soviet relations at this critical juncture. Roosevelt therefore was preparing to remove Henderson from Soviet-American affairs.

Henderson felt this and was anxious to strengthen the position of the "Russian experts" clique, if only in his own unit in the Department, so that he would still be able to operate as before even though in temporary "exile." Reinhardt suited admirably for this purpose. He was in Washington in the Division and he had not com-

promised himself to the extent that some of the other Soviet affairs "experts" had. He could be counted on to push an anti-Soviet policy to its limits.

He was initiated into the anti-Soviet clique and ever since has been one of the guiding personalities in Soviet-American affairs, less important to be sure than Kennan, Bohlen, or Durbrow, but at any rate a person destined for an important future in this field.

It would be a mistake to assume that even within this small group of Soviet affairs "experts" all is well. Reinhardt detests Durbrow, as is well known, and does not hesitate to so express himself in private conversations among his most intimate acquaintances in the Embassy.

There is every reason to suspect that Reinhardt's feelings are reciprocated by Durbrow. Face to face, however, they are the best of friends. They are in any case in fundamental and thorough agreement on American policy towards the Soviet Union.

Reinhardt hates Russia nearly as much as Durbrow does. He would no doubt like to wipe the Soviet Union off the face of the earth with atom bombs and does not hesitate to make himself completely clear on this point within Embassy circles. He has a deep-set fear for everything Soviet.

Until recently Reinhardt directed the affairs of the Press Section which is engaged in reporting to Washington the day to day news published in the Soviet newspapers.

In this position Reinhardt assigned a diplomat who is said to be a relative of his, David Henry, to the position of Chief of the Press Section. Reinhardt manages the work in such a fashion as to concentrate a maximum of attention on developments which can be twisted in interpretation so as to distort to the greatest possible extent Soviet policy and political life. His reports are constantly designed to support the anti-Soviet policies of the Embassy in the State Department and to conceal such facts and developments from the Department in Washington as may contradict these policies. His is, of course, an important position in the Embassy.

Reinhardt was further assigned the task of cultivating relations with foreign diplomats for the purpose of extracting from them information that could be used to slander the Soviet Union. He is one of the most eager searchers of gossip and rumors in Moscow and promptly reports such of this gossip and rumor as fits in with his reporting program to the State Department. He is highly valued for his abilities in this field of "diplomatic" work which he assiduously cultivates.

It is considered in the Embassy to be extremely likely that Reinhardt was also assigned to espionage work among Soviet citizens. It is thought that he has very close ties with the military and civilian intelligence organizations of the United States and that he has been given various assignments by these organizations which re-

quire someone with high diplomatic rank and a knowledge of the Russian language. Suffice it to say that Reinhardt—although he made every effort to conceal this from other Embassy personnel—eagerly sought contacts with certain Soviet citizens.

He was also in close touch with the Consular Section of the Embassy, a section in which intelligence agents attempt to obtain information from claimants to American citizenship.

Reinhardt was recently appointed American Consul in Leningrad. This post was always viewed within the Embassy as having primary significance for intelligence work. Reinhardt did not, however, go to Leningrad, because he was too lazy to make the arrangements. This is well known within the Embassy, although the Embassy has falsely reported to the Department that the Soviet authorities have made "difficulties" about the establishment of a consulate in Leningrad.

Actually, of course, it is obvious that work could be begun in temporary quarters there even if it were necessary to wait for a month or so for a permanent building to be made ready for occupancy. This would hardly be according to Reinhardt's taste, however, so he did nothing about the matter.

Reinhardt was assigned to live at Spasso House, and personally assist the Ambassador in the management of the house, in entertainment, and in other "work." Reinhardt hated this arrangement and also thoroughly disliked the Ambassador, a

fact which, after several outbreaks at late parties, became the common talk of the Embassy.

Reinhardt is worth writing about at such length because he is one of the key young men in the State Department anti-Soviet clique. In his middle thirties, he has before him a long career of advocating anti-Soviet policies in various posts to which he may be assigned in Moscow, Washington and other parts of the world.

He is almost certain in the long run to occupy highly important positions in the State Department itself. His extraordinary ability at pushing himself ahead almost guarantees his position for the future.

The firm position of such a person as Reinhardt, who follows in the steps of Henderson, Kennan and Durbrow and at the same time is busy training little Hendersons, Kennans, Durbrows, and Reinhardts to occupy themselves with American-Soviet relations in the future, is one of the clearest demonstrations of the fact that the State Department has committed its destinies to people who have staked all on their ability to continually deteriorate American-Soviet relations.

It is hopeless to expect an improvement of these relations without a fundamental political change within the United States which will at the same time clean out the State Department.

Such persons as Reinhardt know that their careers will come to a dismal end at the very moment that America and the Soviet Union be-

come friendly again. They will therefore do everything in their power to prevent the settlement of outstanding difficulties between these two nations and condemn both the American and the Soviet peoples to perpetual hostility until such a day as the American people decide to throw these "diplomats" out of their key posts and replace them with objective persons who place national interests above their own selfish careers.

I have characterized only a few of the leading personnel of the American Embassy in Moscow without dwelling in detail on others, as the leading posts at the Embassy are always held by the representatives of Washington's anti-Soviet clique of the State Department, a detailed description of which will be found in other chapters.

Thus American public opinion and the American people are almost wholly dependent on a small reactionary group, which include Embassy officials and reactionary correspondents, who are monopolizing all the channels of information concerning the Soviet Union and causing great damage to the interests of the American and Soviet peoples.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY

The United States Embassy in Moscow, as I have already mentioned, arranges its work so as to obtain prejudiced information on the Soviet Union. This work is naturally not planned in Moscow. I know of certain instances when the Embassy received coded telegrams containing instructions to collect tendentious and prejudiced information that could be of use in the active anti-Soviet propaganda campaign in the American press and radio broadcasting. These cabled instructions were signed by the Secretary of State or his acting deputy.

The State Department repeatedly pressed the Embassy to intensify the collection of the sort of information that could be utilized as propaganda against the Soviet Union and its growing international influence, in the United States as well as in other countries, through the channels of the United States Information Service.

These instructions were cynical and shameful. The State Department leaders made a special point of facts and data on the standard of living

of the Soviet population, which they suggested should be garbled and twisted for purposes of anti-Soviet propaganda.

Sometimes I had a feeling that I was working in some intelligence outfit. Take, for instance, even the USIS where I was employed. It contained, for the last couple of years and up to the present, almost exclusively professional intelligence officers who could not, or rather did not, have the least desire to abandon their intelligence habits.

I have in mind such professional intelligence operators as Willis and Williams, formerly of the U.S. Navy Intelligence, Melville Ruggles, the former chief of the USIS, and Joseph Hanson, who were regular employees of the Office of Strategic Services.

I saw how the employees of the Embassy, acting on the orders of the Embassy and of the State Department, used every possible opportunity to obtain prejudiced information on the standard of living and morale of the Soviet people, data on industry and agriculture in the U.S.S.R. and so on.

When Embassy employees, for instance, would take business or pleasure trips to various parts of the Soviet Union, they were supposed (on their return to the Embassy) to write detailed reports on everything seen and heard during their journey, about all conversations with Soviet people whom they chanced to meet, on information gleaned from these conversations. They were in-

structed to emphasize even insignificant pieces of information of an unfavorable nature that might be used for anti-Soviet propaganda purposes.

I personally know of many instances when Embassy employees exaggerated certain shortcomings which they noticed during their trips or, in other cases, when they just invented episodes which gave a distorted slant to certain aspects of Soviet life.

The reason for all this is that the more anti-Soviet slander there is in a report or memorandum of an Embassy employee, the higher that particular employee is valued.

During the war, employees of the Embassy often undertook trips over the Soviet Union under the pretext of maintaining contact with American representatives in Odessa, Byelorussia and the Ukraine (UNRRA), or to Murmansk, Archangel, Vladivostok. After the war, their eventual destination was mostly Vladivostok, where an American Consulate General was maintained. All these various trips were and are still exploited to obtain tendentious intelligence information.

I could cite numerous examples. Two will be sufficient to prove the point.

A former major of the U.S. Navy Intelligence, Louise Luke, who was an attaché of the American Embassy, took a trip to Vladivostok. Supposedly, she went to carry diplomatic mail. Actually, under the orders of Embassy authorities, she was to utilize her trip for the collection of intelligence data.

She was instructed to make acquaintances on the way, as well as to register any military installations she found on the Trans-Siberian railroad. She was also to obtain doctored information on living standards in Siberia and the Soviet Far East, that could be used for the anti-Soviet propaganda in the United States.

When she arrived in Moscow, Louise Luke wrote a detailed report on what she had seen and heard during her trip. She wrote of all the people she met on her way, of her conversations with them, and a lot of other details, including even the prices of food at all large stations where her train stopped. All this "extensive" information was written up in the most slanderous expressions. As I happened to find out, Luke invented some of the episodes she described in her report in order to make it more sensational and interesting.

Luke herself admitted she invented many of the facts, because, during her trip from Moscow to Vladivostok she had met some pleasant people with whom she spent all her time enjoying herself—drinking and playing cards. As a matter of fact she did not see a single thing worth mentioning.

I might also mention Freers, a third secretary of the Embassy, who distinguished himself in the same way. Freers made a similar trip recently to the Urals, Middle Asia and the Caucasus. He also made many acquaintances during his journey and tried his best to obtain information from them, and then wrote it up in the most colored way in a report to the State Department.

These American "diplomats" not only collected general information that could (after being processed) be used for the anti-Soviet campaign. They also attempted to obtain as much information as they could of a purely military nature.

Freers, for example, carefully counted and wrote down the names of all the airfields he passed on his way, and noted the number of planes on each of them. He tried to ascertain the location and strength of military units on his line of route, as well as other data of a purely military character. In other words, Freers engaged in military espionage in the direct sense of the word.

The American Embassy in Moscow is divided into sections for the convenience of gathering intelligence information: economical, political, press, agricultural, consular and some technical and administrative sections which are necessary for the service of the specialized sections and the needs of the employees.

The names of these sections define the direction of their intelligence work. For instance, the Economic Section gathers information on Soviet industry, quantity and quality of goods produced; it keeps a card index on the Soviet economy, in which all information gathered by Embassy employees and from the Soviet press is filed. The work of the Agricultural Section is carried on similarly. It gathers information on past harvests in the U.S.S.R. and the prospects of the coming harvests.

The visitors to the Consular Section are usually people without citizenship or ex-American citizens now residing in the Soviet Union. They come with various problems. Some wish to locate relatives in America with a view to renewing correspondence; others, mostly old folk, want to know what possibility there is of joining their children in America. The employees of the Consular Section are mostly intelligence officers, who make it their business to worm out of these visitors intelligence information about the Soviet Union.

Before such a visitor gets his request attended to, he is subjected to a deft interrogation by the intelligence adepts of the Consular Section. They pry for information on the location of army units, on living standards and conditions, especially if the visitor comes from some other city, and anything else of intelligence value. Without noticing it himself, the applicant is turned into an informant of the Americans.

The consular officers stick at nothing. Whether the applicant gets his request attended to depends on the frankness of his answers to their queries. They are always on the alert for the unwary, simple type and cleverly get him involved. They will delay settling his business so as to make him visit the Consular Section more often, then set him espionage assignments, and insist upon their fulfillment.

Such cases are known to me, and this heartless inveigling of old men and women into espionage

work against the U.S.S.R., always aroused my deep indignation.

The intelligence officers of the Consular Section are not deterred by the fact that by entangling their visitors in espionage activities they place them in serious danger of being prosecuted by the Soviet authorities.

They care for only one thing—to gather all the intelligence they can, regardless of the inevitable risk it is bound to involve for their informants.

It was this cynical attitude towards these people that aroused my indignation most, but in my position in the Embassy there was nothing I could do to stop these hardhearted activities of the American intelligence officers.

I was told by friends among the staff of the Embassy that these American intelligence officers posing as diplomats preferred to involve visitors to the Embassy in espionage work rather than do the work themselves, because of the great difficulty of spying in the U.S.S.R. and the big risk it involved.

The difficulty of enlisting Soviet citizens as spies is a standing complaint with the American intelligence officers. It often lands them in unpleasantnesses and as a result they are sometimes compelled to retire from the U.S.S.R. in a hurry.

Because of this, American intelligence men anxious to win favor with their chiefs in Washington, who insist on intelligence activities

in the U.S.S.R. being intensified, seek to recruit their agents among degenerate types and the scum of Soviet society who have inherited a slavish worship of "Western culture."

When any of these dregs working as American spies happened to fall into the hands of the Soviet security authorities, the American intelligence men circulated rumors in their own Embassy and in other diplomatic missions in Moscow that "innocent people" were being arrested in the Soviet Union.

This is really the height of cynicism!

When Lieutenant-General Smith, an intelligence professional, came to Moscow as Ambassador, many of the ways left behind by Harriman, for whom intelligence was a vocation rather than a profession, were not to his liking. Intelligence work in the Embassy, in Smith's opinion, was much too elementary and naive, and he radically reorganized it.

Smith made every member of the staff, down to the last clerk, no matter to what section he was attached, engage in intelligence. He made it the duty of all Embassy employees to establish brief contacts with Soviet citizens, to talk with them on various aspects of Soviet life, and then prepare lengthy and detailed memoranda on all the information they gathered, important or unimportant. For this purpose even the unspoken rule, warning members of the Embassy staff against associating with Soviet citizens, was somewhat relaxed.

Both Ambassador Smith and Counsellor Durbrow in their conversations with Embassy employees constantly emphasized that in intelligence work no information was insignificant or unimportant; every detail that could be picked up about the Soviet economy and every aspect of Soviet life was of interest.

Following Smith's and Durbrow's instructions, officials of the American Embassy poked about Moscow and the Moscow environs trying to discover the location of military objects. If they failed in this, they nosed about markets, shops, restaurants, cafés, and railway stations picking up gossip and rumors, which they then worked up in anti-Soviet form and passed off as information obtained from secret agents. In this form it is dispatched to Washington.

Counsellor Durbrow sometimes went so far as to insist that Embassy employees even write down anecdotes they happened to hear from Soviet acquaintances in the city and present them in the form of memoranda.

It was the special business of one of the employees of the Embassy, Martha Halleran, to summarize the memoranda received from members of the staff—senior and junior. She also kept a file of information gathered by Embassy employees on Soviet industry, agriculture and transport.

I know of many cases when Embassy employees, in order to win favor with their superiors, invented "facts" casting discredit on the

Soviet Union, working them up into memoranda and pretending they were learned in the course of conversation with a Soviet citizen.

All this was summarized and entered in the file. This file was freely drawn upon by the Embassy staff when writing their reports. One can imagine what a biased and tendentious picture of Soviet realities must have been given by information based upon the gossip and scrappy data gathered in this way.

There were progressive-minded employees of the Embassy who resisted the attempts to draw them into intelligence work.

Durbrow repeatedly suggested that I compose intelligence memoranda telling about my acquaintances, my conversations with them, and so on.

I spent a vacation in Odessa and when I returned, Durbrow requested me to write a detailed report on what I had seen and heard there. I declined, as I had done on previous occasions, telling him that my vacation was my own affair and I saw no reason why I should write a report on how I spent it.

Some Embassy employees are very zealous in this sort of work. There was Elizabeth Eagan, former acting chief of the Information Bureau, for instance. With Embassy permission, she went about actively establishing contacts with Soviet citizens. All her conversations with them, on every imaginable subject, she wrote up in minutest detail and submitted, in the form of intelligence

memoranda, to the Embassy chiefs. This made her very popular with them.

Incidentally, on her return to the United States, Elizabeth Eagan began to write slanderous articles about the Soviet people for American reactionary periodicals. She had a long story in the **Coronet** with the "intriguing" title—"Russian Men I Knew." This was simply a malicious lampoon of Soviet life and Soviet people. She tells of various love affairs she is supposed to have had with Russian men and of "facts" she learned in the course of them—all sheer imagination.

Along with libelling Russian men, Eagan casts cynical jibes at the heroic Soviet women. She ridicules the way the splendid women of Moscow and Leningrad dressed during the grim and austere years of war, when they were such staunch comrades-in-arms of their husbands, sons and fiancés fighting at the front, not only replacing them in factories and farms, but, many of them, taking an active part in the battle operations of the Red Army. One must be morally corrupt and degraded to speak in this jeering and derisive way of the wonderful Soviet women.

To return to the intelligence activities of employees of American diplomatic missions. American espionage in the Soviet Union has had a series of bad discomfitures. There have been numbers of arrests of spies in the American service, and several instances lately of expulsion from the U.S.S.R. of professional intelligence agents operating under the protection of diplomatic pass-

ports or newspaper correspondents' cards. Yet, it must be stressed, the espionage activities of American intelligence agents in the U.S.S.R. are continuing unabated.

The reactionary bosses of the U.S.A., through their agents in the State Department and the armed forces, are putting increasing pressure on their intelligence representatives in Moscow to get them to intensify their espionage activities. Compromised and expelled intelligence officers are replaced by others, and the espionage goes on.

The methods of the intelligence professionals in the American Embassy and military attaché's office may be illustrated by a few recent ignominious exposures.

George Rullard, an American intelligence officer who served in the Soviet Union as Assistant Naval Attaché, was extremely active in espionage.

In the early years of the second world war Rullard worked in Archangel as head of the American Naval Mission. His official function was to assist the Soviet authorities in the receipt of lend-lease supplies from America. But this was only his secondary job. His chief purpose in Archangel was to obtain secret military information.

On arriving in Archangel Rullard eagerly strove to fulfill instructions received from ONI.

In 1943 Rullard was appointed to an independent post as Assistant Naval Attaché at the American Consulate General in Vladivostok. For Rullard this post was a promotion, because the

Soviet Far East was of very great interest to American Intelligence, especially in view of the importance of the Pacific theater of war.

Rullard obtained the assignment to Vladivostok together with himself of Irene Matusis, who had worked as his interpreter in Archangel. Rullard had good reason for insisting on the transfer of Matusis to Vladivostok as he had involved her in espionage and she was indispensable to him.

If in Archangel Rullard had, in carrying on his work, used some measure of discretion and care and adjusted himself to Soviet conditions, this was not the case in Vladivostok. Having already acquired a certain amount of experience, he tried to develop his intelligence activities on a broad scale. As in Archangel, Matusis, for whom he got a job as an interpreter in the American Consulate, helped him actively in this work.

On Rullard's orders Matusis established contacts among military personnel of the Red Army, workers of the port, captains of Soviet ships, etc. She sought out and found persons of interest to Rullard and acquainted him with them.

Rullard was often spoken of by employees of the U.S. Naval Mission in Moscow as a talented intelligence officer who, while pretending to be friendly to the Soviet Union and thus favorably impressing his acquaintances among Soviet citizens, would extort secret information from them in casual conversations over a glass of liquor.

Rullard sometimes succeeded in involving inexperienced people in a network of spy intrigue.

In order to achieve his aims, Rullard did not hesitate to resort to blackmailing and bullying of some of his acquaintances, who, having become aware that he was an intelligence agent, were unwilling to permit themselves to be used as spies.

It is known to me that Rullard's work in Vladivostok was praised by the heads of the Embassy.

As I have already pointed out, Irene Matusis was his most highly trusted assistant in espionage. Like her chief, Matusis constantly associated with Soviet citizens, made personal "friends" among them, liberally entertained them and made small gifts to them.

After undertaking active intelligence work in Vladivostok, Matusis saw that the Soviet security authorities had her under observation. Uneasy because of this surveillance and realizing she might be caught, Matusis began to take measures to go to America.

But it was too late. In 1947 Soviet security authorities arrested Matusis and liquidated the spy nest which Rullard had created in Vladivostok.

This incident caused unprecedented alarm in the Embassy in Moscow, especially in the Naval Mission, because the Americans there feared exposure of the Embassy's espionage activity.

Nevertheless this serious failure in the operations of American Navy Intelligence in the Soviet Union did not stop intelligence officers of the Embassy and the Navy Section from continuing their improper activities.

Another "rising star" of American Intelligence in the Soviet Union was a career officer of Navy Intelligence, Assistant Naval Attaché Robert Dreher. He exercised his abilities in Odessa, where in 1946-47 he worked in the American Naval Mission.

Dreher complained of difficulties in carrying out espionage in Odessa, as Soviet authorities had him under close observation and did not permit him to organize his espionage as it should be.

Dreher's special merit was the acquisition of a spy who was an official in the Odessa Customs House and who, because of his work, had official contact with American representatives.

From my Embassy friends I learned that Dreher was caught red-handed, and I understood that this incident involved that very spy who had been enlisted by Dreher in Odessa and who had come to Moscow to turn over intelligence information to him.

The Soviet reader already knows of the expulsion from the U.S.S.R. of the American correspondent, Robert Magidoff, on the charge of espionage. Here I want only to point out what I know of Magidoff's activity, because he used to be a constant "guest" in the Embassy and was well known to all Americans here.

Robert Magidoff had lived in the Soviet Union for many years. He was well acquainted with the country and the Russian language. He had married a Russian and thus acquired family connections here.

In the American Embassy Magidoff was considered to be a well-informed person. He was useful and was appreciated there, because he systematically contributed information about the Soviet Union.

The Embassy people spoke of him as a skilful person who was able to penetrate everywhere and get information, owing to the fact that he always tried to create an impression on his Russian friends that he was loyal and friendly towards the U.S.S.R.

In reality Magidoff never was a friend of the Soviet Union. He masked his views for the purpose of making friends with Soviet citizens in order to get various and sundry espionage information from them.

I consider that the American intelligence officers who acted under the cover of the McGraw-Hill publishing house deliberately chose Magidoff and asked him to collect espionage information on the Soviet Union. American Intelligence was very well aware of the fact that Magidoff had a good knowledge of Soviet conditions, and experience in espionage.

Magidoff did his best to carry out orders of American Intelligence. He constantly wandered about the city, trying to penetrate into Soviet scientific institutions and making the acquaintance of Soviet scientists who were working on new scientific research. Magidoff collected and gave the Embassy even the most minute details which he had discovered.

His connection with intelligence organizations as a rule Magidoff maintained through Embassy diplomatic pouches. I remember how several times when I was the duty officer of the Embassy, Magidoff turned over to the pouch room his dispatches to be sent to the United States. The Embassy by this means encouraged and assisted Magidoff in his espionage and in doing so was guilty of a serious violation of diplomatic postal privileges.

I was not at all surprised when I found out that the Soviet authorities had decided to bring this scandalous situation to an end.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE AND AMERICAN PROPAGANDA

In addition to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Office of War Information (OWI) was created in June 1942. Although they were closely connected, the OSS and OWI had different functions.

Although formally the OWI was a propaganda organ, it actually had intelligence functions.

The official task of OWI during the war was the dissemination of propaganda, information and misinformation in the United States, the territories of the Allies and neutral and enemy countries.

Elmer Davis, the journalist and radio commentator, was appointed chief of the OWI.

A special committee was created for the OWI consisting of representatives of the War, State, Navy and other departments.

The OWI used its official branches and press representatives in allied and neutral countries for the furthering of its intelligence and propaganda activities.

Besides intelligence and propaganda work in the United States and abroad, the OWI also had censorship functions in the U.S. and acted as a sort of an official information bureau for the American Government through which it issued official communiqués and statements.

Branch offices of the OWI were set up in all American Embassies abroad. One of them was organized in the American Embassy in Moscow. Under the guise of distributing American publications and movies, its employees were active in intelligence work. Under the pretence of cultural and propaganda work they would strike up acquaintances among Soviet citizens and attempt to glean from them information of interest to American intelligence organizations.

After the war, the OWI as well as part of the OSS was transferred to the State Department creating the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs. In accordance with this reorganization the OWI branch at the Embassy was also reorganized to a certain extent. A bureau of information was set up in the Embassy which was subordinated to the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs of the State Department.

I am best acquainted with that section of the Embassy in Moscow which is known as the United States Information Service (USIS). This organization is officially engaged in spreading American propaganda in the Soviet Union. It maintains an office on Vesnin Street in Mos-

cow and its activities are directed by the U.S. Embassy.

I worked in U.S. Information Service setups approximately two and a half years. During this period I was connected with administrative and other responsible work and naturally became very well acquainted with all phases of this organization's work as well as with its program.

The two principal channels of American official propaganda in the Soviet Union are the Russian language magazine **Amerika** and the radio programs in the Russian language broadcast by the Voice of America.

The propaganda material for both of these channels is produced principally in Washington and New York by a large organization employing many White Russians.

The Voice of America uses Russian Whiteguard elements not only as radio announcers, but also as experts on Russia and consultants on radio broadcasts. It is not difficult to surmise the type of consultation the Voice of America receives from these "experts" who specialize in systematic foul provocations against the Soviet people. The Voice of America does not understand what an awkward position it places itself in by daily polluting the ether with the odious fabrications of its Whiteguard consultants.

It may be worth noting that not only the division of the State Department having to do with Voice of America broadcasts turns to the services of these vile provocateurs; leading members of

the State Department anti-Soviet clique also maintain close contact with representatives of Russian Whiteguard organizations in America.

It is indeed very symptomatic that the ringleader of the Russian fascists in the U.S.A., Vonsiat-sky, was released from prison in 1947 without completing his sentence. He had been sentenced in 1942 to a long term in prison by a Federal Court for espionage against the United States in the interests of Germany and Japan.

A member of the anti-Soviet clique of the State Department, Francis Stevens, is married to a White Russian émigrée. It is also known that Mrs. Stevens was instrumental in getting another White Russian emigrée, Xenia Barnes, into the State Department. The Department lost no time in sending her, together with her husband, to work in the American Embassy in Moscow.

Xenia Barnes was employed in the Embassy at the same time that I was. She was, in fact, representative of U.S. White Russian circles in the American Embassy in Moscow. Her attitude was extremely anti-Soviet and she not only had great influence over her husband who was the chief of the Economic Section of the Embassy, but very effectively carried out the orders of the State Department pertaining to the anti-Soviet indoctrination of the other employees of the Embassy.

While she was in Moscow Xenia Barnes told me that her mother lives near New York on Reed Farm with ex-Countess Tolstoy. Xenia Barnes too was very close to ex-Countess Tolstoy. Both

were actively engaged in anti-Soviet provocations. The past of Xenia Barnes is not without piquancy. She is a former torch singer of an Odessa cabaret and fled abroad during the Civil War in Russia.

One cannot deny that the U.S. State Department has quite "liberal ideas" as to what it takes to make a "Russian expert." Side by side we see a former countess who has disgraced the name of her great father and a former torch singer of an Odessa cabaret.

Besides their provocational activities as "consultants" of the American diplomatic service, the Russian Whiteguard elements in America who are on the pay roll of the American authorities perform another, and no less disgusting function. They are the middlemen in the anti-Soviet indoctrination and export to countries of North and South America of cheap labor under the guise of so-called displaced persons among whom are Soviet citizens forcibly held abroad. In other words they are actually assisting the American reactionaries in their slave trading.

The sweet words used by top-level leaders of American diplomacy are not adequate in covering up the real situation. Their hypocritical speeches attempt to hide the support that they give and the active use that they make for anti-Soviet purposes of the small gang of traitors that were thrown out of their country.

But these comments on the personnel of the Voice of America have brought me away from my main theme.

The Moscow office of USIS plays an important part in directing the policy of American propaganda, advising and reporting on the effectiveness of the magazine and the radio program and also in distribution of the magazine **Amerika**.

It is true that the USIS office in Moscow has other functions. It is trying to realize a so-called program of "cultural relations" implemented with motion pictures, jazz records, samples of American "art," etc.

A large portion of these expensive items paid for by American taxpayers may be found in the private collections of various Embassy employees and practically none of them ever furthered "cultural relations." This is also true of the large funds that were once spent on entertainment.

In general, it should be pointed out that the United States Information Service, and specifically the Moscow office, has wasted government money. Expensive books and other property have disappeared without trace. Facts revealed by an inventory were carefully hushed to avoid scandal. Much of this went on before my time, and although I endeavored to stop some of it, there is reason to believe that this foul practice still goes on.

Large funds are spent on the publication of the magazine **Amerika**. It is issued on slick magazine paper from cover to cover and is filled with full-color reproductions. This was done on the commendation of the Embassy in order to make

the magazine as "luxurious" as possible and to impress "naive Soviet citizens" with American "wealth."

The magazine is portrayed by the bosses of American propaganda as self-sustaining by the simple device of not including in its cost the government-paid salaries of editors, writers and others. These salaries are over and above all the other expenses of publishing the magazine.

The USIS office in Moscow is overstaffed. This is largely the result of the fact that the highly paid attachés who nominally man the organization in fact do little but occupy themselves with their personal business and intrigues and get in the way of subordinate personnel who do all the work. It is true that these persons do have some "functions" which will be discussed later, but they do not help with the nominal activities of the USIS office.

From the point of view of the American people this extravagance cannot be justified in any manner.

The American Embassy in Moscow does not even know whether the 50,000 copies of the magazine which are sent here every month are read or not. Like the losses of Embassy property, the fate of **Amerika** is a carefully concealed fact, and especially concealed from the American public which ultimately foots the bill.

Facts which are well known to the Embassy, but carefully concealed from the public in the United States are that **Amerika** is not read on

a large scale in the Soviet Union and those who do read it do not think much of it.

Its articles cater to a naive mentality. It pictures an America wrapped in cellophane and hermetically sealed, an America where the farmers never get dirt on their hands and industrial workers send congratulations to the board of directors when the latter announce that profits are at a level of fifty per cent, where everyone lives in a fifteen-room house and receives twenty thousand dollars a year tax-free as a gift for doing nothing.

It neither deceives Soviet readers nor does it appeal to them. The Russian does not like to be taken for a sucker.

Under these circumstances it becomes a major event in the American Embassy when a Russian is discovered who is reading **Amerika** or has seen it. If an American is travelling in the provinces and meets a Russian somewhere who has read **Amerika** it is cause for a full report to the Embassy and a special telegram to the Secretary of State to be shown confidentially to Congressmen. From this they conclude that **Amerika** is meeting with great success in the particular locality where this unusual Russian was encountered.

I know of many cases when Embassy employes have been sent out to travel in remote regions, with all expenses paid, in order to collect just such information. Most of them count themselves fortunate if they found one **Amerika** reader between Moscow and Vladivostok. Such "information" on

Russian reactions to **Amerika** is valuable to the Embassy because it is used to support demands for additional funds to spend on this fraud.

I remember the tremendous sensation that was caused in the Embassy by the "discovery" that several copies of **Amerika** were allegedly stolen from the Vesnin Street house and sold on the "black market." This also was cause for an urgent confidential telegram to the Department of State with the suggestion that Congressmen ought to be informed of such a "major event." It was pictured as illustrating the tremendous demand for **Amerika**, whereas all it indicated was a brisk demand for nearly free paper which could be—and in fact was—used for all sorts of purposes.

The Department was told that the stolen copies were being "sold illegally for a large price" which was certainly not true. Actually, these particular copies were intentionally left exposed by an USIS employee so that they would be stolen.

Another trick—copies of **Amerika** were thrown in waste bins throughout Moscow in the hope that the street cleaners and charwomen would show them to their friends.

Americans from the Embassy were told to travel on buses, streetcars and subways all over Moscow and to "forget" copies of **Amerika** on the seats where they would be found by a presumably "eager" public.

Several copies of this "ingenious" publication of the State Department were left on park benches in Moscow. Americans travelling on Soviet rail-

ways were told to take several hundred copies of **Amerika** with them and leave them in station buffets en route.

A letter to the editor received at Vesnin Street is cause for an immediate trip by the chief of the office to the Ambassador. This is especially so if the letter (which rarely happens) approves or praises one of the articles. Such letters come so infrequently that, as I learned, from time to time certain USIS employees have been tipped handsomely to write a few of them, sign them with pseudonyms, and mail them to Vesnin Street. Thus the U.S. Government pays with the taxpayers' money for such letters praising the magazine.

In the same manner Soviet "reactions" are collected for the Voice of America radio programs.

Not even the most optimistic leaders of the Embassy believe in **Amerika's** effectiveness. The radio program, however, was looked upon with great hope by the leading clique. They valued it so highly that Charles Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and one of the leaders of the Russian affairs monopolists, arranged for the assignment of his brother-in-law, Charles Thayer, to direct the editing for the Russian language broadcasts.

In the vision of these "experts" on Russian affairs this radio program was to become the bedtime lullaby for millions of Russian families. It was to "sell" American "culture" and American foreign policy to the Soviet people the way

the American networks sell soap to the American public.

The essential difference between the American radio public and that of the Soviet Union, however, was overlooked by the State Department.

An American turns off one program selling soap and—to his disgust—tunes in another which is also selling soap. In fact, most of the programs on the American radio advertise soap, soft drinks, cigarettes and other such items, so the radio listener has very little choice.

In the Soviet Union, however, it is always possible to tune out the American program sent by the Voice of America and to tune in an operetta, concert, lecture, news program, play, etc.

No normal person will listen to naive and second-rate American propaganda spoken in antiquated Russian, when he can hear a concert by his favorite Soviet artists.

The fact remains that the Voice of America is not successful in the Soviet Union. It has practically no audience, although anyone can buy a radio and listen to it as long and as frequently as he pleases.

This is known to the Embassy and is concealed from the American public. Congress is told in confidential talks by State Department representatives that the program is popular and that it is listened to all over the Soviet Union.

It is true, of course, that the U.S. Government's program of official propaganda directed at the U.S.S.R. has its more absurd aspects and wastes

American money. But it would be a mistake to conclude from these facts that it does not have more serious implications.

The USIS program is a part of U.S. official policy towards the Soviet Union. It is a weapon against the Soviet Union and its people and it is controlled by the same people in the State Department and outside it who control the whole program of official American relations with Russia.

Therefore, through this relatively small area of the total activity of the State Department it is possible to see American official policy as the officials of the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow themselves conceive and execute it.

In furtherance of their principal task these broadcasts intentionally are designed to propagandize false pictures and concepts of American life and subtly suggest to Soviet listeners that only under capitalism is such a "heaven on earth" possible.

For instance, the Voice of America presents an interview with an American worker who tells of his new five-room home. He does not say that the house is mortgaged for ninety per cent of its value, that it will take him thirty years to pay for it, and that if in the meanwhile he should become unemployed, he will lose his home and everything that goes with it and be thrown out in the street. He does not speak of the millions of American workers who pay thirty to forty per cent of their incomes for rent

and often live in slums the miseries of which are difficult for a Soviet person to comprehend. He says that he owns a new Ford car. He does not say that he bought the car on installment payments and that when he becomes unemployed he will lose his car and all the money he invested in it. He does not relate that most American workers do not have new Ford cars.

In short, the Voice of America "interview" gives a distorted and doctored version of American life. The State Department broadcasts picture an America which never existed and never could exist under capitalism.

The *Amerika* magazine gives its readers the same distorted version of American life. That is why its articles picture an effortless and carefree existence filled with the finest luxuries, complete for the asking.

The Voice of America presents a deliberately false picture of American foreign policy. The State Department is depicted in these broadcasts as an angel of peace constantly rebuffed by a "warlike" Soviet Union.

Of course even the bland liars of the American propaganda program have found it difficult to explain why the U.S. Government is so unwilling to sit down at a council table with the Soviet Government and actually settle American-Soviet differences. It is also difficult to explain the other features of current American foreign policy in which one aggressive fact is bound to speak louder than a million insinuating words.

The fact is that not even the most optimistic of the American officials who have conceived these "clever" programs believe that they have any chance of convincing any large number of people in the Soviet Union either that American foreign policy at the present time is "peace-loving," or that capitalism is better than Socialism.

They realize that Soviet people are patriotic and loyal and, above all, politically educated, that they believe in their Government and in Socialism. They realize that the overwhelming majority of the Soviet population are completely unsusceptible to American propaganda and are not in the slightest deceived by their necessarily naive "line."

Nevertheless they maintain the USIS office in Moscow not so much for propaganda as for intelligence work.

It is no coincidence that most of the directing personnel of the USIS office in Moscow have been men with intelligence training.

Joseph Phillips who managed this office for Ambassador Harriman (at that time it was known as OWI—the Office of War Information) is a graduate of West Point, a regular army officer who "retired" and took up journalism in the Soviet Union, Italy and other countries during the 'thirties, and who resumed his army commission as a full colonel during the war. Phillips apparently maintained close connections with the military throughout his career. It is well known, of course, that "retired" army and navy officers are frequently important espionage agents for

American Intelligence and it is extremely probable that Phillips falls into this category.

Elizabeth Eagan who directed the USIS office in Moscow for a considerable period after Phillips' departure was an extremely active person in seeking contacts among Russians. Under cover of "love affairs" with Russian men she obtained information which she reported to certain individuals in the U.S. Embassy.

Eagan was replaced by Armond Willis who headed USIS in Moscow until he left in early 1947. Willis was trained in the Russian language at the Naval Intelligence School in Boulder, Colorado.

Manning Williams who was the Assistant Chief of the USIS office was trained in the same school. He was forced to leave Moscow in 1947 after the "Willis scandal."

Joseph Hanson who replaced Williams was at one time connected with the Office of Strategic Services.

Melville Ruggles, who replaced Armond Willis and who until recently was head of the USIS office, was sent to Moscow by American intelligence organizations to "purchase Soviet books."

Thus, apparently every person who has occupied a directing position in the USIS office since it was set up here during the war has had close connections with intelligence operations, or at least has had intelligence training. In view of the nature of the USIS program this is, of course, not

surprising, but in any case it is a vivid commentary on the United States Government's idea of "cultural relations" between the United States and the Soviet Union, even at a period when these two countries were intimately associated in a joint war effort against Hitler.

I have pointed out that such persons as Willis and Williams "did not understand their task well" and had to be gotten rid of. The fact remains that they were picked apparently because of their qualifications, including intelligence training, and the fact that they did not pan out indicates only that the persons who chose them made mistakes—mistakes which were quickly rectified.

I have also pointed out that the persons whom I have mentioned were engaged in fulfilling orders given by other people on top. But these persons on top also have close connections with intelligence operation and with the intelligence organizations. Davies, Durbrow, Thayer, Allen are themselves spies and closely connected with other spies. The American Foreign Service as a whole is an intelligence organization.

During the period of my work in the USIS and in the State Department in Washington I discussed with many of the most important figures in this propaganda program, including both Durbrow and Davies, the function of the Voice of America and the **Amerika** magazine. I saw how material was edited and saw the comments on USIS work sent to the State Department from Moscow. I saw how close the connection was between Amer-

ican espionage and the Voice of America broadcasts. I was not the only one to see this. Armond Willis made a statement which contained not only the facts I have mentioned, but which showed up some of the other aspects.

The case of Armond Willis throws light on the methods and the objectives of those Embassy and State Department officials who control the Voice of America and **Amerika**.

Willis, who was dispatched to Moscow by the State Department in 1946 to head the USIS office, naively thought that he had been sent in order to further cultural relations and contacts between the Soviet and American peoples.

It is difficult to understand how Willis could have misunderstood his task, how he could have thought that he would be allowed to do his job as he understood it, how, in short, he could have come with such inadequate "political preparation" and indoctrination. It is only possible to conclude that someone in the State Department had made a serious mistake which evoked a veritable storm in the Embassy. It revealed very completely the hand of the Embassy leaders. Willis was dismissed and sent home.

Willis was presumably selected for propaganda work because it was thought by those who chose him that as a former naval officer trained in the Russian language at the Naval Intelligence School he would understand discipline in terms of executing Embassy directives on USIS activities and the intelligence aspects of this work.

Willis, however, although an altogether conservative person in political views, was of an independent cast of mind and refused to direct his activities towards the disruption of Soviet-American friendship as he was expected to do. He made the extremely serious mistake, from the point of view of his career, of believing the public utterances of State Department spokesmen that they wished to further mutual understanding and cultural contacts between Russia and America. He thought that these statements were more authoritative than the instructions given him by the U.S. Embassy authorities in Moscow (instructions which ran absolutely counter to the "friendly" public statements). He did not comprehend that these statements were actually just a smoke screen to hide from the American people the preparations for aggressive anti-Soviet policy.

The Embassy, of course, was unable either to understand or tolerate this "absurd naiveté."

In the first place efforts were made to undermine Willis' position in the Embassy, set his own employees against him and prevent him from directing his own office. In the second place action was taken to "arrange" his "transfer" out of Moscow at the earliest possible opportunity.

Willis sensed what was going on around him. He was neither a meek person nor a coward and fought back to the best of his ability.

When the Embassy finally told him that he had been transferred to Budapest, he sensed their intention—namely to get him out of

Moscow to a quieter spot from whence he could be fired without risk of scandal. Instead of going, he resigned from the State Department and before departing from Moscow made a scathing statement to an American correspondent, criticizing the Embassy leadership and revealing that the career officers in the Embassy were making their careers on "anti-Sovietism" and "Russian hating."

The State Department at this point, as is well known, made great efforts to prevent the dissemination of the Willis statement on a wide scale. They also threw into action machinery for slandering Willis.

Ambassador Smith took the position that Willis had been transferred because "he was not good enough for his job"—a strange statement since Willis had never been given a chance to do his job.

He tried to laugh off the Willis case publicly. Privately, Embassy officers took the line that Willis was actually a "Communist" and spread this rumor among the numerous correspondents who had come to Moscow for the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting which was going on at the time.

Simultaneously, the Embassy, in "revenge," took steps to blacklist Willis with U.S. security authorities so that he could never hold a job for any length of time with the U.S. Government again. Leading Embassy officials even admitted in private conversations with me and other persons that they had done this in order to thoroughly frighten any other possible "Willises."

I personally was fully acquainted with the Willis case since I was in the USIS office in Moscow at the time, and saw in the day to day instructions which were given me by John Davies, First Secretary of the Embassy, how the USIS was being run without reference to Willis. I also saw how Davies over a period of many months devoted a major part of his energy treacherously attempting to "put Willis on the spot" and blacken his reputation.

Time and again I was closely questioned by Davies about my knowledge of Willis' activity in the office and about his personal life and political views. Other employees of USIS underwent the same questioning.

Davies was working on several lines as I sensed from his questions. In the first place he was attempting to get data to prove that Willis was "lazy and a poor worker." In the second place, he was attempting to get material which would enable him to report to Embassy authorities that Willis was pro-Communist or actually a Communist. In the third place, he was adopting a common tactic with persons of his type of mentality and was attempting to get someone to assert that Willis was either a homosexual or engaged in irregular sexual relations with Embassy employees. This last was a desperate attempt and extremely futile, since Willis lived a normal family life, as was obvious to everyone.

Davies finally picked on a report which Willis had written on a trip he took to Kiev. Willis had in this essay reported everything exactly as he

had seen it. He did not add anything to what he had seen and heard in a visit to a collective farm and in interviews with various prominent persons in Kiev. Handing in this kind of report was like waving a red rag before a bull. Davies was beside himself with fury, since he had always insisted that every report be "interpreted"—of course in an anti-Soviet light—before it was transmitted to the State Department. Davies slandered this report with the assistance of some of the sycophantic "experts" from the Embassy staff and pictured it as incompetent and pro-Soviet. This particular trick actually played a major role in arranging Willis' transfer.

Direct and indirect pressure was brought on Manning Williams, Willis' Assistant Chief of USIS in Moscow. Williams was given to understand, in so many gentle and not so gentle hints, that if he were to furnish information which could be used against Willis, he could expect to be appointed to Willis' position after Willis was transferred.

Williams made the mistake of trying to be neutral. As a result he, like Willis, was later dismissed and lost his opportunity to make an "excellent career" in the State Department.

Personally I did not like Armond Willis and I was not one of his friends. I cannot, however, help but admire him for his courage in issuing a statement to the press which threw light, or could have thrown light, on Embassy intrigues and "Russian hating."

Willis' statement cost him his career in the government service; he has had to look for work outside the government to make his living. This was the price of his attempting to cross swords with the State Department monopolists on Soviet-American affairs.

The Willis' case is one of the best illustrations I can think of—and one of which I was an eye-witness—of the sordid intrigues and vilification to which the Embassy leadership was and is willing to stoop in order to impose their policies and crush dissent within the State Department.

Willis was replaced with a personal choice of John Davies—Melville Ruggles who occupies this post at the present time.

Ruggles is a person with the mentality of a combination of bookkeeper and private detective. He was sent to Moscow, as I have already pointed out, in order to buy books for American intelligence agencies working on the Soviet Union and to acquire all sorts of available literature, including, particularly, technical literature, which was to be thoroughly combed in Washington for possible intelligence information. Very likely he had been given other assignments as well.

Ruggles was an ideal selection from the point of view of Davies and Durbrow because he has no independence of character. He is a petty careerist who possibly could not find work outside the State Department, and would never do anything except what he was told to do.

His function was to act as a figurehead, keep

out of everyone's way, and execute such orders as Durbrow chose to give him directly. He was, of course, to have the right to make suggestions. It was felt that his intelligence experience might make his comments useful.

Once Willis had been evicted the Embassy vented its spite on Williams for not cooperating with their anti-Willis slander campaign. About three months after Willis left, Williams was called in and told that his job was "abolished" and that he must return to the United States.

He was not told that at the same time he was being sent home another person was being sent to take his place and do exactly the work to which he had been previously assigned. Just how a "replacement" could be sent to take a job which had been "abolished" was never made clear. Everyone, including Williams himself, understood, of course, that this was simply a device to get rid of him.

Williams, who had witnessed what had happened to Willis, saw the handwriting on the wall and surrendered. Without making any undue scandal, he left and went to Germany where apparently he has a job in the American Military Government. By keeping quiet he saved his career. He had thoroughly learned his lesson.

The person sent to take Williams' place was Joseph Hanson, a close friend of Ruggles. Hanson had previously worked in the U.S. Embassy and was well known to the Embassy as a person from whom no resistance could be expected.

The replacement of Willis by Ruggles, and Williams by Hanson, finally established directly and beyond the possibility of any dispute the control of the Russian affairs monopoly of the State Department over the Moscow USIS office.

Indeed, Willis was never any actual barrier to Embassy leaders in exercising day to day control over all USIS affairs. Orders were simply issued directly to subordinates and they were told not to pay any attention to anything which Willis might suggest. Willis' very presence, however, was a daily reminder of an America which Davies, Durbrow and Co. wished to forget—an American people, large sections of which are independent, form their own opinions without any particular respect for their government's political aims, an American people, which even with many conservative elements among it, deeply desires friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union.

As I have already mentioned, the Office of War Information of the Embassy, and later the USIS, from the beginning of its work in Moscow, always gave cover to a great number of regular intelligence officers.

Such operators in the past were Colonel Phillips, Elizabeth Eagan, Armond Willis, and until quite recently, Melville Ruggles and Joseph Hanson. The latter two are former regular employees of the OSS. Their work in the USIS was only a cover for their active intelligence work.

In 1944 Ruggles was chief of the Editorial Reference Section of the OSS in which were

concentrated all official publications dealing with the Soviet Union.

According to rumors circulating in the Embassy, Ruggles arrived in the Soviet Union with special instructions to work in the field of technical intelligence.

During my work with Ruggles as his administrative assistant in USIS I became quite convinced that he used his official position as a cover for his main work.

On the basis of my observations I can state that he took steps to collect intelligence information on the Soviet Union for transmission to Washington.

The attitude of Ruggles, as of all leading members of the Embassy, toward the Soviet Union and its people was extremely unfriendly. I recall, for instance, a conversation in which Ruggles predicted that there would be war between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and that America would be victorious. He said that in that case he would like nothing better than to return to the U.S.S.R. as an "occupation mayor" of some Russian town or city. Then he would show the Russians what he really thought of them! In speaking of the Russians Ruggles did not hesitate to refer to them in most disrespectful terms.

This is a short profile of an American intelligence operator who was supposed to direct American information work in the Soviet Union and bring about "closer cultural" relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

At the same time as the dispute over Willis

took place in Moscow, a struggle for control over the U.S. propaganda program was being waged in Washington.

The monopolists on Russian affairs won one major point when they obtained the assignment of Charles Thayer to the direction of the Russian language broadcasts.

Another victory, and a more serious one, was scored when they obtained the appointment of George Allen, who had been U.S. Ambassador to Iran, to the post of Under Secretary of State in charge of the USIS program as a whole all over the world.

Allen had distinguished himself while in Teheran by writing telegrams more bitterly anti-Soviet than anything which was coming out of the Moscow Embassy at the time. Having proved his talents as an anti-Soviet diplomat in Teheran by personal intervention in Iranian internal politics, Allen was rewarded with this job. William Benton, who had previously occupied it and who had failed to meet foreign service requirements, was relieved.

The secret, and to some degree personal, intrigues of the American Embassy in Moscow, or of groups within the State Department in Washington, would not be of importance or worth telling if they did not have political significance, or if they were not a weapon for strengthening the power of a self-willed and ambitious clique of men who are determined that there shall never be peace between the Soviet Union and the United States.

AMERICAN EMBASSY SPECULATORS

In America there is no boundary between business and speculation. Indeed, to buy at the lowest price and sell at the highest price, legally when possible, or illegally when necessary, honestly when useful, but dishonestly and with a maximum of deceit when more profitable, is called not speculation, but business. It brings with it a high income, and in the United States income brings with itself social position.

The important thing in America is money, regardless of how it was come by. And for every American who came by his gains by "honest effort," within the framework of the law, there are three who became rich by means of what in any other society would frankly be regarded as piracy or banditry.

It is well known that the descendants of John Rockefeller, who obtained his wealth by means of hard-bitten, dishonest, scoundrelly chicanery and theft (which not even tens of millions of dollars devoted to charity can wash away), rate higher in the social register than the descendants of Thomas Edison, though the latter are not

poor either. In America a man is considered a fool if he can sell something for twice as much as he had paid for it and does not.

Speculation penetrates into the heart of the Government in Washington. Last year it was revealed that some of the highest-placed men in the nation's capital (including Pauley, whom Truman had intended to be Secretary of War, and also the President's own personal physician, as well as hundreds of "small fry") used confidential information on government grain sales and purchases to speculate in the grain market. These persons were criticized by the Republicans since election year was approaching, but not one has suffered any punishment or any real inconvenience as a result of his activity.

Americans abroad are given particularly to speculation. In the United States itself speculation is, to a certain extent at least, a profession and is restricted to a relatively small percentage of the population. Abroad, the speculative fever seems to seize all Americans, old and young, high-ranking and low, government workers and employees of private firms. This has been true all over Europe since the beginning of the war and still continues.

Some of these Americans deal in coffee and cigarettes; others purchase whole firms, buying cheap or for nothing and selling for fortunes.

Every Italian knows who supplied the black market in Italy and who supplies it now. Certainly every German knows who makes use of his

difficulties and hunger in Bizonia to force him to sell his family heirlooms in return for cigarettes and coffee. Many Austrians know who is buying up their whole country, again literally for cigarettes made in Virginia and North Carolina. American businessmen of all types seem to be seized with a fear that if they do not steal it all today another American will steal it first.

Honest and decent Americans abroad who see all this going on about them are disturbed and concerned with this situation but are powerless to do anything about it.

Those who attempt to interfere with it are usually caught from behind, even before they get started, and dismissed or transferred somewhere else. Those who try to resist the system, often end up by joining it wholeheartedly and speculating overtime in order to make up for the time they lost getting started.

In this atmosphere it is hardly surprising that American diplomatic personnel, from top to bottom, are also engaged in large- and small-scale speculation, and it is not at all surprising that they have attempted to import this type of American morals into the Soviet Union.

Nearly every person in the American Embassy in Moscow has engaged, in one degree or another, in speculation, either by means of illegal importation of Soviet currency under diplomatic lock and seal, or by importing tax-free goods such as liquor and cigarettes under diplomatic tariff exemptions and selling them at an immense profit.

Some Embassy officers operating on a large scale have literally taken home with them tens of thousands of dollars worth of illicit profits, oftentimes concealed in the form of valuable art objects (exported under diplomatic immunity), sometimes in the form of cash or checks. Although this is generally known to everyone in the Moscow Embassy, it is also known that no person has ever been fired from the State Department for such speculation, certainly not the biggest operators who travel on diplomatic passports.

It is impossible to break this up by action within the Embassy at Moscow despite the nominally rather severe rules which have been proclaimed from time to time. These rules are meant for face-saving, and no one expects that speculation will be abolished in the Embassy.

Why is this so?

One instance will suffice to show why speculation still continues on a large scale.

Late in 1947, an investigation was held in the Embassy to find out who was speculating, with what, and with what results. The investigation took place, it ought to be noted, at a time when the Soviet currency reform had in itself made speculation much more difficult and therefore less attractive. It was, in other words, an ideal example of "locking the barn after the horse had been stolen." And besides it was held not for the purpose of finding out anything real about speculation, except about a few small-time opera-

tors who could be made the goats for the whole Embassy, but particularly for the purpose of whitewashing the top personalities of the Embassy who had been up to their neck in big-time operations.

A board was set up consisting of representatives of the Embassy, the Navy and the Army. This board called in all the Embassy employees and officers and questioned them concerning speculation, encouraging them to tell on their fellow Americans (particularly if the latter were low-ranking employees).

The Embassy representative on this board was the highest-ranking diplomatic career officer in Moscow, Counsellor Durbrow. Many employees of the Embassy knew that he was one of the most active speculation operators in the Embassy.

For instance, it was definitely known to certain of the employees that Durbrow came to the Soviet Union through Warsaw and purchased there on the black market a whole suitcase full of rubles at rates ranging up to about one-tenth of the legal rate of exchange. He brought these into Moscow under diplomatic immunity and used them here for his own purposes, and also probably for sale and conversion into dollars by various means open to a man who was close to the Embassy accounting system.

A girl who lived in the same apartment with me for a considerable period not only knew of this transaction directly, but had reported it to

the State Department. The girl was feared by Durbrow because of her knowledge, and he eventually was able to arrange her transfer out of Moscow.

Other phases of Durbrow's profiteering activities were known to many of the Embassy employees and it was hardly surprising that under these circumstances the investigation did not get very far, nor inspire much respect.

When questioned by this committee I declined to give any information on the subject, since it was clear that they would try to pin some charge on some very minor and defenseless individual and inform the State Department that the investigations had proved that no "diplomatic personnel" were involved in speculation.

In fact that was the result. The victim selected was a rather likable and harmless person, the dentist's assistant. He was officially accused in the report of being the chief agent for speculation. One or two other persons were also accused of being implicated in similar activities and all were sent home. All persons with "diplomatic rank" were exonerated of any blame and remain in the U.S.S.R. or elsewhere today to continue their speculation.

I cite this example because it illustrates the extent to which the highest levels of the Embassy are involved in this speculative activity and are unable to prevent its being stopped because of their personal interest in its continuance. Since these persons speculate, and it inevitably becomes

known to lower-ranking personnel, they must tolerate speculation by the lower-ranking personnel, too. In fact they often use lower-ranking personnel in their own machinations.

Even Ambassador Smith is not free from guilt in disgusting speculative operations. He was engaged in certain shady deals that were extremely unbecoming to the high position of Ambassador of the United States to the U.S.S.R.

Once the "jack-of-all-trades" of the Embassy, Bender, who also ran personal errands for the Ambassador, told me of certain failures in his business ventures, stating that there was no special demand for the suits, fountain pens and cigarettes that Ambassador Smith gave him to sell on the market. Nevertheless his boss was demanding payment for the stuff.

Another employee of the Embassy, Zagorodny, who worked as a messenger, told me that he frequently, on the personal orders of Ambassador Smith, disposed of gold coins—American ten-dollar pieces and Cuban ten-peso coins—as well as watches. Zagorodny bragged that he had recently disposed of twenty-five thousand rubles worth of gold coins and watches that W. B. Smith gave him for that purpose.

This is known to many Americans in Moscow and, of course, sets the pace for the whole group.

What are the methods of speculation among Americans in Moscow?

The first is (or rather was, for since the currency reform this has become almost impossible)

the illegal import of currency under diplomatic immunity. Prior to December 1947, diplomats could travel to Teheran, Warsaw, Bucharest, Budapest and other capitals where they could purchase Soviet rubles, most of them counterfeit. The rates ranged from sixty to one hundred rubles per one dollar, as compared with the legal rate for diplomats in Moscow of twelve to the dollar. These could then be imported under diplomatic immunity and used for personal expenses here and also resold to other Americans at the rate of twenty to thirty-five to the dollar. Some Americans in the Embassy had various means of turning these rubles back into the State Department at twelve to the dollar. The result was that many Americans made large sums of money in dollars.

Secondly, there was the illegal sale of imported commodities which were tariff-free. For instance, a carton of cigarettes could be purchased for one dollar postpaid to Moscow—the equivalent, at the diplomatic rate, of twelve rubles—and resold in Moscow for about one hundred or one hundred and fifty rubles—the equivalent of from eight and one-third to twelve and one-half dollars. The rubles could then be converted back into dollars, or could be used to purchase antiques and objects of art, some of which were very valuable.

Americans in the last decade have illegally exported many Russian ikons in violation of Soviet export regulations. The ikons were later sold at tremendous profits.

It is not an exaggeration to state that some Americans—many in fact—leave the Soviet Union with from two to three dozen trunks and large bags, often totaling a ton or two. All of this baggage is under diplomatic immunity and not subject to inspection by Soviet customs authorities.

I know of practically no Americans who have been in the Moscow Embassy that have gone home without valuable books, jewelry, antiques, cameras, etc.

A third method was the illegal sale of dollar currency in Moscow among Americans themselves, or among the personnel of other foreign missions, who engaged in such operations. Dollar bills usually brought from three to six times the legal rate before the currency reform was introduced in the U.S.S.R.

How can these charges be proved? In the first place, any honest American who has been here can confirm this situation. Everyone who has worked in the Embassy knows about it or knows Americans who were always able to offer rubles for sale at half the legal value in apparently unlimited quantities. But there is other and more concrete proof.

For instance, an inspection of Embassy officials' accounts, up until the late summer of 1946, will show that throughout the war and for nearly a year and a half after it, Americans working in the Embassy in many cases purchased no rubles at all through official agencies (the Embassy and the

Soviet bank), and in some instances purchased only nominal amounts to keep up "appearances."

This is sufficient proof of international black-market operations, since the only legal source of rubles at the special diplomatic rate was through the Embassy and the Soviet bank. Consequently, the rubles were being obtained elsewhere (it is well known that Embassy personnel were liberal spenders) at better rates. This means that the United States taxpayer was being filched, since the government was paying very high special allowances all this time to Americans in Moscow on the basis of a twelve-to-one rate for the ruble. In other words the Embassy personnel were getting special grants on false pretences, of which everyone in the Embassy was aware.

In the late summer of 1946, all employees were ordered to purchase rubles to the extent only of their living allowance. The records since that date will show that at least until the end of 1947, practically no one purchased more than he was absolutely required to buy.

The amount of legally purchased rubles was not sufficient for Americans to live on at this time. This can be proved by a check with the cost of living reports submitted by most Americans to the Embassy in order to enable it to demand from the State Department still higher allowances to personnel in Moscow. These reports listed expenses of most individuals in the Embassy, and if studied and compared with the amounts of rubles they actually were purchasing

individually, they will show that approximately from one-fourth to one-half of their ruble needs were being met by legal purchase, and the remainder through speculative operations. At the present time speculation by foreigners in Moscow continues, but these activities have been made more difficult by the Soviet Government.

Another check can be made by an examination of the itineraries of diplomatic personnel, including the military, during the last two or three years. The record will show that a very large portion of officers possessing diplomatic immunity came to Moscow through Warsaw or other points where currency black markets were operating. Almost all of these diplomats took frequent trips to Warsaw, Budapest, Bucharest and other points where black market currency was available. The diplomats worked in groups. One would be sent out to buy rubles for three or four individuals. This was well known to lower-ranking employees in the Embassy who did not possess diplomatic immunity. It was a source of great dissatisfaction and caused ill feeling since low-ranking employees had to buy rubles from these diplomats at higher rates.

Still another proof is provided by the immense quantity of goods shipped to Moscow, addressed to the Embassy and to members of its staff. Soviet customs would undoubtedly have interesting figures on these shipments. They would show that until recently Americans in Moscow were receiving goods at the rate of several tons and more

per year for each man, woman and child in the Embassy. They would show, furthermore, that on the average, Americans were buying over one, and possibly two, cases of liquor per month, and probably from two to three cartons of cigarettes per week. They would likewise show that despite extremely liberal rations of foodstuffs granted all Americans while rationing was in effect—rations averaging from twice to three times the rations granted in Great Britain, for instance, and above the average per capita food consumption in the United States—the American Embassy was importing a quantity of food much larger than its Russian rations, perhaps twice as large. It is clear that Americans were importing for speculation purposes and selling enormous quantities of liquor, cigarettes and food on the market.

In addition, tremendous quantities of furniture, clothing and other personal effects were being imported. Customs records will also show that practically no furniture and automobiles were being taken out of the Soviet Union when Americans left, despite the fact that the State Department pays the freight on these items. In other words, they were being sold on the market.

During 1948, these operations sharply declined. This, it should be stressed, is not the result of any initiative on the part of the American Embassy, despite show-window investigations and trumpeting of drastic rules which no one wishes to enforce, or can for that matter, as long as the top diplomats are the chief figures in the specula-

tion ring. The decline of speculation is the result of the initiative of the Soviet Government which took steps to prevent the unlimited duty-free import of goods into Moscow by Americans.

At present the Embassy has an import quota and within that quota it can freely import what it pleases. It is a large quota, amounting to nearly two hundred thousand dollars a year—over one thousand dollars for every man, woman and child attached to the Embassy.

The Soviet Government has not interfered with imports within that quota, but it has introduced measures to stop the tremendous illegal imports that formerly took place.

In addition to quota imports, which are duty-free entirely, every new arrival is permitted to import his total household effects which may run to five or ten tons, also duty-free. Besides, diplomatic personnel can and do bring in usually at least one ton of goods under diplomatic seals. Lastly, the diplomatic pouches coming to the Embassy every month often amount to several tons, over fifty per cent of their contents consisting of clothing and various items intended for the private use of the Embassy personnel.

This has not prevented the Embassy from attempting to make a big international issue of the question of the Soviet Government's refusal to permit unlimited duty-free imports to the American Embassy for purposes of speculation. Several individuals were heard even threatening to break off diplomatic relations, using these defen-

sive measures of the Soviet authorities as a pretext. Others complained that they cannot live without duty-free imports and have even ventured to try to make the matter an issue in the American press picturing themselves at the point of starvation.

The issue is, of course, not one of any hardship for Americans in the Embassy, since they have the privilege of living in one of the few de-rationed nations of Europe where food is plentiful. The question is whether Americans in Moscow shall be allowed to carry out unlimited black-market operations and speculation with duty-free contraband imports, and thus try to operate their capitalistic system of morals and practices in a socialist state where speculation is punishable as a crime.

The difficulties of Americans in their speculative operations at present are also due to the currency reform in the Soviet Union which deprived them of the opportunity to purchase large quantities of counterfeit rubles abroad for illegal import and resale in the U.S.S.R.

However, American diplomats are stubborn and can be expected to do everything in their power to resume their speculative activities on the former scale. Throughout their careers they have drunk tax-free whiskey and smoked tax-free cigarettes and enjoyed tax-free living allowances and lived in rent-free apartments. But in addition to that, they want to engage in speculative "business" transactions. American diplomats engage

in speculation in all countries of Western Europe, the Middle East, South America and Africa, where they are able to force the governments to consent to their import of unlimited amounts of American goods for resale. They consider this their sovereign right, and are attempting to carry over this practice to the Soviet Union.

I write mostly about American practices in Moscow because I have been in the Embassy and listened night after night to what are called "black-market conversations" on the prices of cigarettes, dresses, automobiles and flour in retail and wholesale lots. It is a sad fact that this goes on in every American Embassy throughout the world in varying degree.

It is worth devoting so much space to this problem, if only because it illustrates the moral degeneration of American diplomats. It shows the depths to which even a highly selected and generally well-to-do group, raised in a country where such banditry is honored, has fallen. These people cannot discard their native psychology even when on socialist soil. The facts I have cited show how little these men care to be worthy representatives of the American people, and how top-flight diplomats are seized by the speculative fever to an almost incurable degree. Such are the moral standards of official U.S. representatives in the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER SEVEN

WHY ARE AMERICA'S RULERS BRANDISHING THE BIG CLUB?

When I recall life in the United States, one sad and somber impression overwhelms all others. I remember the large black newspaper headlines predicting a new war, preaching a new war, calling for a new war. I still hear the speeches of the shameless war propagandists who, following in the footsteps of Goebbels, glorify war as the happiest and most profitable business. Regardless of how bitter it may be for me to do it, I must acknowledge that the postwar United States is in the grip of an unparalleled war psychosis.

I am not an economist or sociologist by profession, nor do I even pretend to be an "expert" on United States society and economy. I can talk only about the same facts which are known to any ordinary person who can read and observe objectively and independently. From the position of an ordinary individual, I will attempt to explain what is taking place in the United States today.

Three years have passed since Germany and Japan were defeated and the war ended. But the

United States army, navy and air forces are maintained at mobilization strength. Our troops are literally all over the world.

Postwar America is spending tens of billions of dollars on munitions. Atomic bomb plants continue to operate. Enormous new funds have been voted for the air force. The U.S. navy is at wartime strength in many respects. A draft law has been voted for the first time in the peacetime history of the United States. War expenditures eat up most of our huge budget.

Lastly, it is widely known that propaganda for a new war has reached unheard-of proportions in the United States. Warmongers not only go unpunished, but are encouraged in all ways and manners.

I am not speaking only of such newspaper gangsters as Drew Pearson, Walter Winchell, and the Alsop brothers, who daily praise and advocate a new war in the press and over the radio. Leading United States Government officials, including leaders of the armed forces, openly call for "dropping atomic bombs" on "enemies" without warning as "preventive" measures. Listening to the speeches of our generals, one is surprised to learn that the treacherous examples of Port Arthur and Pearl Harbor are now part of American, rather than Japanese, traditions.

I am quite sure that my Russian friends will understand that all this dangerous play with fire is in no sense in accordance with the spirit of the

American people. I am positive that my Russian friends will be able to draw a dividing line between the American people and the clique of loud-mouthed adventurists who have the insolence to speak in the name of all the people of the United States. That is precisely the reason why I want to tell the whole truth about the war psychosis in the United States as well as to show its actual motives.

All this sword brandishing and armament building is publicly justified by the warmongers by reference to a would-be "threat" to world peace on the part of the Soviet Union, which, they claim is aiming at "world supremacy." And yet even the most renowned "Russian experts" in the United States, including some of the most reactionary journalists and State Department representatives, who are ardently supporting the American program of militarization, know perfectly well that the U.S.S.R. does not want war. I happen to know that this has on many occasions been acknowledged privately by the most rabid anti-Soviet elements in the American Embassy in Moscow.

Indeed, who can deny the fact that the Soviet Union has demobilized its war armies and that demobilized veterans are at work in fields, factories and other peaceful pursuits? How can you hide the fact that the Soviet Union, for three years running, has reduced its military budget as against the previous year and has not voted special war credits? How can one fail to appre-

ciate that the Soviet Union has announced its economic plans in broad outline for fifteen to twenty years in advance, and in detailed outline for five years in advance?

The ruling clique of the United States knows perfectly well that the Soviet people are devoting every effort to economic restoration and development—despite the myth circulated by U.S. Government leaders that the Soviet Union is devoting a large part of its national income to war preparations. The Soviet Union's armed forces are not scattered over the world, like the American forces; they are at home, in the U.S.S.R. Only some Soviet occupation troops remain, for the time being, in Austria and Germany, in keeping with international agreements. The Soviet Government has formally proposed to withdraw its forces from these areas in the very near future, after the conclusion of the peace treaties—providing American and other occupation forces follow suit. Lastly, Soviet leaders did not make, and are not making, threatening public statements against anyone, either in the press, radio, or at meetings. Nor do ordinary Soviet citizens make such statements.

Thus, the Russians do not want war and the U.S.S.R. does not want war. No one in his right mind can doubt this. Then who does want war? Why the feverish armaments drive in the United States? The answer to this question should be sought in the evils of the American social and economic system.

For ten years, from the crash of 1929 through 1939, the United States was in a state of uninterrupted depression. Industrial production was low. All industries were operating at a fraction of their productive capacity. On the other hand, agricultural products could not find a market and, the prices paid to farmers were disastrously low.

Throughout the whole ten years there was continual unemployment. Five to fifteen million able-bodied persons, who wished to work but could not, even at the starvation wages typical of that period, were affected. The country was going from bad to worse. Crops were plowed under at a time when many were hungry, and production was limited at a time when everyone needed consumer goods. Only the advent of war set the economy of the United States running at full speed and full production capacity. War was a blessing for the American capitalists, for they made hundreds of billions of dollars. Hundreds of newly built plants were flooded with war orders. The industrial capacity of the United States had grown tremendously.

What happened, however, when the war came to an end? The war plants and factories lost their military orders. Production was cut down.

Some naive reader, not knowing the laws of a capitalist economy, might ask: "What of it? The only thing that has to be done is to switch over from war orders to peacetime civilian orders. Let the war plants produce goods for the people in-

stead of cannon!" That precisely is how the Soviet Union solved its reconversion problem. But in the U.S., a capitalist country, things are quite different. The capitalists are chiefly interested in their profits. A capitalist wants to produce only a certain amount of goods, and at only the specific price that will guarantee him a fat profit. When prices rise and the incomes of the common worker and farmer fall, there is no market for produced goods. The result is the specter of a new crisis, another depression, worse than the one we went through during the years of 1929-1939.

These are the roots of the adventurist schemes of those in the United States who have plunged the country into a new armaments drive, of those elements that are nursing plans for the attainment of world supremacy.

The Wall Street magnates would like to become the undisputed masters of all the trade markets of the world. They dream of finishing off their competitors and flooding the whole world with American goods. And, last but not least, their profits are climbing thanks to the tremendous war orders that the U.S. Government is turning over to the industrial concerns at the expense of the American taxpayer. Their profits are rapidly rising as they did during the "good old war days."

Another thing that should not be forgotten is that the advent of militarism presupposes a direct change to a semi-fascist, or even a purely fascist,

internal political system under which "radicals," "Communists" and other dissatisfied elements, actively protesting against the adventurist policies of the United States ruling circles, can be energetically repressed by police action and arrests.

It is well known that never before in the history of the United States was this point better illustrated than at present. Postwar America is characterized by wild spy hunts, numberless arrests of progressive-minded Americans, the passing of a series of anti-labor laws, the denial to American citizens of elementary political freedom. It is with a feeling of bitterness and shame for my people that I must admit that the postwar course of the United States resembles in every horrible detail the course which led Germany to World War II.

I might be asked why the activities of the propagandists and organizers of a new war go unpunished in the United States, which likes to broadcast to the whole world that it is the sanctum of democracy.

To answer that question we will again have to consider certain specific aspects of America. As I have already noted elsewhere, America made a lot of money out of World War II. The Wall Street magnates were, of course, the first to enlarge their riches. But it would be wrong to close our eyes to the fact that other classes of Americans, too, received a certain share of the wartime profits. This circumstance, to some

degree, influences the whole political situation in the United States.

I will try to illustrate this by concrete examples.

John Jones is a banker in New York. He and his partners have their fingers in all sorts of enterprises throughout the United States. John Jones himself sits on the board of directors of an automobile company, an aircraft manufacturing company, and a large motion picture company. He has close personal contacts with the advertising business and with newspapers to whose owners he extends credits. He is a close personal friend of Senators and Cabinet members for whom he frequently does various "favours."

During the depression, John Jones' firms were losing money and John Jones himself felt the effects of the depression. His personal income dropped from a million dollars in 1929, to a few tens of thousands of dollars some years later. During the war he recouped his depression losses and is wealthier than before the fatal year 1929. Firms in which he had personal investments, and which his banking firm controlled, sold billions of dollars worth of goods to the government.

He is now again operating at an immense profit and expanding his operations abroad, buying up interests in England, France, Germany and getting a strong foothold in Japan and the Middle East. John Jones is in favor of militarism because every dollar spent on guns and ammunition

means more profits for the companies he represents and for himself. He is naturally in favor of the Marshall plan because the Marshall plan guarantees him freedom of action in Western Europe, for expanding his financial and commercial activities there. He is in favor of U.S. economic and political expansion abroad because he is personified in this expansion. He is not against the idea of war with the Soviet Union, because he knows that the Soviet Union has the greatest natural resources in the world and he would like to lay his hands on them.

He knows that only by building up a war psychosis in America can the idea of militarism be "sold" to the American people. And a war psychosis is being built up by the newspapers Jones and his firm finance, by the motion pictures which the company he has interests in produces, by radio programs from stations financed by Jones' banking firm and existing on advertising provided by Jones. His opinions are reflected in the actions of Senators and Congressmen to whose campaign funds Jones may make contributions.

And Jones is not alone, for there are thousands of Joneses, some larger and some smaller, who all think the same way, who live in terror of an economic crisis and see the way out in a policy which will lead to war. Jones and his friends influence public opinion.

Let us now leave Jones at the top of the social ladder to study some of the "lower echelons."

John Smith works in a factory. He reads papers which reflect the views of banker John Jones. He is confused, and cannot find his way about in politics. But he knows that he walked the streets for years in the 1930's, hungry and bitter.

He remembers that he found a job only in 1940, after the outbreak of war. He worked full normal time and received high wages, with double pay for overtime. He is now working thirty-five hours a week, but he knows that if his factory gets war orders he will work fifty or sixty hours a week and nearly triple his income. He is against war in principle, but he is definitely in favor of seeing his income tripled even if it means harder work. He prefers, therefore, not to think of the uses the guns his plant is turning out in peacetime can be put to.

Jane Doe's husband is a farmer. In the 1930's they lost the farm they owned and became renter-farmers. They worked hard and struggled, but never got ahead of the tax collector. When the war came, however, food prices went up and there was a market for all the farm could produce. Farmer Doe did not go to war; he was exempted from conscription as a producing farmer. They bought their farm, bought new farm machinery and put \$10,000 in the bank.

After the war, farmer Doe and Mrs. Doe began to wonder whether they would be able to sell their wheat. They are for the Marshall plan because they are told it means a market for their

wheat. Like John Smith, they read the newspapers reflecting Jones' views and asserting that Russia wants to start a war. They are not for war, but during the last war wheat was fetching such a high price! So they vote for people who carry out a policy leading to war.

I do not by any means want to give the impression that all American workers think along the same lines as John Smith, and all farmers—as the Doe family. But it would be wrong to ignore the sad fact that we still have quite a few people who think as they do. These ignorant and deceived people, by their passivity, let the Joneses run the show.

It goes without saying that there are in America millions of other people who comprehend that in this atomic age war for the United States would be equivalent to national suicide. Every day more and more people in America are beginning to understand where the fatal policy of the Wall Street adventurers can lead them. They are beginning to raise their voices. I am positive that this other, progressive America will still have its say. Nevertheless, in the America of today the Joneses give the orders. They are the real masters of the country, and run it like they run their own offices. The political power is theirs and it is used by them to urge the United States along a road that eventually may lead to national suicide. I think that is precisely what took place in Germany in the 1930's, when Hitler started the program of militarization.

That is the principal impression which comes to my mind when I think of America now. That is the main reason I do not want to live in America today, the reason why I have chosen to stay in a country which is striving in every way for peace throughout the world, which has found it possible to maintain a continuous and rapid rate of progress along the path of peace, despite all difficulties.

CHAPTER EIGHT

MY IMPRESSIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION

I had been told in the State Department before I came to Moscow that Russians would be afraid of me and unwilling to talk with me.

Within a few weeks of the time I arrived here, I found that not only were many Soviet citizens with whom I came in contact not afraid to see me and to talk with me freely, but that they were cordial, friendly and openhearted people. They were, in fact, as I came to realize, much more hospitable than I or any other employee of the American Embassy in Moscow had any right to expect, considering that the Embassy was daily directing its policies toward the disruption of friendly relations between the Soviet and American peoples and spending great sums of money on espionage and hostile propaganda directed against the Soviet people and their Government.

I had been told before I came to Moscow that once I arrived in Moscow it would be impossible to travel outside the city, and that the Soviet authorities were doing everything to prevent Amer-

icans in Moscow from seeing the Soviet Union and becoming acquainted with Soviet life.

When I arrived in Moscow I found that not only was it possible to travel outside Moscow freely and without interference, but also that local authorities, the administration of hotels, museums, cultural institutions, historical monuments, etc., outside of Moscow, and in Moscow itself, were helpful and hospitable to foreigners who sought their assistance.

I found that many Americans had been taking trips in various regions of the Soviet Union without interference, and that they had been given every assistance by the authorities and met with hospitality on their journeys. I myself visited with Soviet and American friends many of the cities and cultural monuments about Moscow. I stayed in hotels, visited museums, monasteries and churches and never was refused admittance or treated with anything but the greatest of consideration. I visited country schools and the teachers always invited me and the other members of our group to partake of their hospitality and told us of their work and problems.

I remember well sitting at the table in the home of a collective farmer near Moscow. We had sought shelter in his house when we were caught in the rain. He had invited us in and offered us a lunch of black bread, bacon, tomatoes, cucumbers and tea and vodka.

He told us his son had been killed at the front; he himself had also fought the Germans, and then

returned to his village to rebuild his house destroyed by the Germans. He told us of his hopes for a better life and how he was going to achieve it. He raised a toast to friendship between America and the Soviet Union. When we were about to leave he invited us to visit him again.

I remember, as if it were only yesterday, my visit to the Black Sea shore near Odessa in the summer of 1947, and the hospitality which I enjoyed in a Ukrainian home there for several weeks, the heartfelt farewells bade me when I left and the request to return again.

Soon after my arrival in Moscow I found that many Americans were abusing Soviet hospitality in the grossest fashion, using their freedom to travel outside of Moscow for espionage purposes. Their trips were made on government funds specially allotted to bring back information which was later sent to the State Department. These reports were slanderous to a people which had entertained and assisted their authors as friends.

To my indignation I found that the very Americans who were travelling freely about Moscow and on longer trips were the ones who were spreading the lie that they were "not being allowed to travel or to become acquainted with Soviet life." And if some of these Americans now find it less easy to travel than in 1946 and 1947, they have only themselves to blame. Soviet people evidently understand that these "guests" visit them in order to fabricate foul slanders and worm out intelligence information from them.

I was told in Washington, and in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, that Russia was preparing for war against the United States to attain world supremacy.

I found that every Soviet citizen with whom I talked had, without exception, a fervent desire for permanent world peace. In talking to Russians from every walk of life I found that members of the Communist Party and officials of the Soviet Government were just as intense in their desire for long-term peace and friendly relations with the United States as all other Soviet citizens.

I found that Russians were unanimously friendly towards Americans, notwithstanding the frank hostility of anti-Soviet-minded U.S. Government officials towards the U.S.S.R.

In Washington, as well as in the Embassy, I was often told that Soviet citizens were being systematically misinformed about the United States and the American people.

I discovered that many Russians had an intimate knowledge of American life, culture and politics. I found that many American authors were as well known, and as frequently read, in the Soviet Union as in the United States.

The other day a sixteen-year-old girl, my friend's daughter, visited us. She asked me about life in America and about American literature. She discussed such authors as Mark Twain, Fenimore Cooper, Theodore Dreiser, Upton Sinclair, Sinclair Lewis, John Steinbeck, with a facility which really surprised me. She went away disap-

pointed, I am sure. She had expected to learn about American authors whom she had not read, but instead she found herself explaining to me authors whom I had not read.

I found that the ordinary Soviet citizen has an incomparably larger fund of accurate information on the United States, and far less misinformation about American life, than has the average American citizen about Soviet life. I found that in the Soviet Union there is no press campaign designed to compel the Soviet public to hate the American people, while in the United States—as we all know—the entire power of the press and radio is being directed against the Soviet people.

I was told in Washington that all Soviet citizens “hate and fear their own Government.” This turned out to be a falsehood. In talking to dozens of Soviet citizens I discovered that they had the utmost confidence in and respect for their own Government, the Communist Party and their leaders.

I want to note in particular that Soviet citizens are the most ardent patriots in the world, that in many cases they had risked their lives for their country at the front and in the rear, and that they are prepared at any time again to defend the Soviet Union against any enemies, no matter where they might come from.

I discovered that Soviet citizens had a tremendous love and respect for their leader, Generalissimo Joseph Stalin, and that this reverence is based on the fact known to every Soviet citizen

that Stalin has dedicated his whole life to the Soviet people, that by his insight and decision he saved the Soviet Union from disaster at the most critical moments of history.

On a sunny day a year ago I visited a girl friend in Moscow. The large and spacious room in which her family lived was furnished very simply. On the wall was a picture of Generalissimo Stalin. It was the only picture in the room. I asked her father just what feelings led him to hang that picture there.

He answered with firmness and pride: "Comrade Stalin and I—we stayed in Moscow during the trying days of October 1941. Many weak-nerved people were frightened. Some of them were saying that Moscow was certain to fall to the Germans. We all knew what that would mean to us; we had heard from others, who had fled from the Germans, what murder and robbery other Soviet cities had suffered at the hands of the enemy. I don't mind saying that I was nervous too, but I stuck to my lathe for I knew where the munitions I was making were going."

He continued: "We knew that Comrade Stalin was with us. He headed the defense of Moscow. I was in the factory when I heard the news, and I remember how I and the other workers in my shop reacted. We knew that Comrade Stalin was leading us and millions of other workers and soldiers in the defense of our capital. We worked twelve, fourteen, sixteen hours a day producing shells. We worked until we dropped in our tracks, slept a few hours right in the shop, and

started again. We knew that Comrade Stalin was leading us through the greatest ordeal to victory. He led us to victory in the war. He is leading us to victory in peace. He saved us from German slavery. I am not a member of the Communist Party, but to live under such a leader is a privilege of which I am proud. That's why Comrade Stalin's picture is always in a place of honor in my home."

I was told in the State Department that all Soviet citizens live in constant mortal fear of the Soviet secret police. This too was a falsehood. I discovered, from my own observations and from conversations with many Russians, that they consider themselves free, and that they are free; that they consider their Government just, and that it is just.

I discovered that an infinitely small percentage of Soviet citizens, who are endeavoring to enrich themselves at the expense of the welfare of fellow citizens, do not sleep peacefully at night because they know that Soviet justice will inevitably catch up with and punish the guilty.

I found that citizens who endeavor to betray the interests of the Soviet state, although such individuals are rare, are also severely punished. And I found that honest Soviet citizens, constituting the overwhelming bulk of the nation, sleep very peacefully and feel very secure in their rights and freedoms because the Soviet state vigilantly guards them against treason and exploitation by criminal elements.

I was told in the State Department that in the U.S.S.R. the Russians exploit all the other nationalities. I saw for myself that the Soviet Union is the only nation in the world which maintains, actually as well as in law, complete racial equality.

All Soviet citizens, regardless of religion, nationality or color, have the same rights, the same privileges and the same obligations. I found that people of all nationalities have the opportunity to engage in any kind of useful activity without discrimination or favoritism.

I found that the Soviet Union is a state in which dozens of nationalities live together in peace and enjoy every opportunity to develop their national cultures.

I remember an evening spent in a Moscow restaurant celebrating the birthday of a Soviet friend. Sitting at the tables were Mongolians and Kazakhs, Estonians and Ukrainians, Jews, Russians and Armenians, dining in one room and enjoying themselves in their own way. Each felt himself a part of one whole, and the doors to this restaurant were barred to no one because of black or brown skin, or because of racial prejudice. An Armenian who was sitting alongside a Russian friend started an argument about the merits of the climate in Moscow and Erevan. He spoke in loud tones and could be heard in every corner of the room. The argument progressed to the relative merits of Russia and Armenia in general, and as the ardor of this patriotic Caucasian made itself felt I was convinced that they would come

to blows. The argument had become so heated that it attracted the attention of the entire restaurant and alarmed even the management of the restaurant. Then I turned round and saw the two "opponents" shaking hands. The Russian, with a glass of Armenian cognac in his free hand, and the Armenian, with a glass of Moscow vodka, were proposing a toast: the Armenian to Moscow and the Russian to Erevan.

I heard the famous singer and actress Tamara Khanum, in her gorgeous costumes, sing the folk songs of sixteen nationalities. She performed each song in the picturesque costume of the respective nationality. For me, Tamara Khanum was a symbol of the place which the peoples of Central Asia have attained in Soviet life. The applause which her songs aroused in a predominantly Russian audience was eloquent evidence that the people of the Soviet Union regard the cultures of all Soviet nationalities as their own. It was also proof that they admire and respect the culture of other peoples.

I myself saw that in the cinema, in arts and letters, in science, in sport, in political life and government activities, non-Russians from all over the Soviet Union had the same opportunities to apply their creative abilities and to perform responsible work on a par with Russians.

I was told in the Embassy that Soviet women are driven by force into the factories and plants, that they are exploited.

I myself have seen, particularly since I left the Embassy and began to take my own place in

Soviet life, that only in this country do women, in fact as well as in law, have the same rights as men. Only in the Soviet Union do they receive equal pay for equal work and only here do women in practice have the full opportunity to rise to the most responsible posts. Nowhere in the world is there such a high percentage of women in the field of medical practice, science, arts, letters, yes, even engineering.

I have met dozens of women here who occupy responsible positions in various fields of life. Among my friends there is a woman scientist, a Stalin Prize winner, possessor of the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. She has won renown throughout the Soviet Union by her research, but she also finds time for her family of two children. She is perhaps exceptional because of her brilliance, but she symbolizes to me hundreds of thousands of women doing important work in Soviet science, technology and the arts.

I saw that the Soviet Government has set up a system of care for children of working mothers which permits a woman to be both a mother and follow a profession.

I myself am personally acquainted with the care which the Soviet Government takes of mothers. When I was expecting my baby I received free medical prenatal care for several months. When I was unable to go to the clinic during the last weeks, a nurse was sent to my home as to the homes of other mothers-to-be with whom I was

acquainted. When it was time for me to go to the maternity home, a car was sent to my apartment. This car is especially attached to the maternity home for the needs of expectant mothers.

In the maternity home I received complete medical care, hospital facilities, and food—all free of charge. My baby was delivered and looked after for ten days, along with myself, and I did not pay a cent. This was not some special provision being made for me, but the right of every mother in the Soviet Union. In what other country in the world could one find such splendid care?

My friends in the United States who had babies paid for their prenatal care, paid for the taxi to take them to the hospital, paid for their hospital bed, paid for their food, almost paid for the very air they breathed while they were there. When they got home, at the very time they needed most to be free of worry and care, they were sent bills running to about five hundred dollars.

Some months ago I visited an orphan home in Moscow. The director, a woman of about forty who had a family of her own and who loved children, showed me her flock and introduced me to the small boys in her charge. I have rarely seen such a healthy and happy group of youngsters, fat, sturdy, busy, playing, building, and, yes, fighting occasionally. They were growing up with all the advantages of children with parents, getting perhaps even better care than many children living at home. They were a symbol to me of the care of the Soviet state for its children.

I have found from talking to many Soviet women that they are not condemned to lives of futile and empty ennui like the wives of the rich in America, nor to the lives of drudgery led by the wives of workers and farmers in America and every other capitalist country. Soviet women know that wherever they are working, whether in factories, on farms, in offices or institutes, they are not being exploited, that they themselves will enjoy the fruits of their labor, and that they are making a great contribution to the building of a great nation and a new society.

I was told in the State Department and in the Embassy that only the children of the "privileged classes" in the Soviet Union can get a higher education.

I found that any Soviet youth able to pass his examinations can receive a higher education, and that in practice the vast majority of students are being educated at state expense and can concentrate on their studies without the fear that economic need will force them to abandon their education halfway towards their degree.

I found that only in the Soviet Union can workers attend school in their own factories after hours and become engineers and technical specialists at state expense.

There is a woman who comes to help me with the housework while I am taking it easy after confinement. She is a simple, pleasant and honest person, from a peasant family. Her husband works in a Moscow factory. They are

an ordinary Russian family like thousands of others throughout the Soviet Union. She has three children, two daughters and one son. After returning from the war with several decorations, her son is studying physics in Moscow University. He is determined to be a research worker. He has before him a long road of hard work, but he receives a state scholarship, he supports himself and is not a burden to his family. He will support himself throughout his course of study on his scholarship like thousands of other Soviet students. One daughter of hers, she tells me, has completed musical school and is now about to enter the Moscow Conservatory where she aims to become a concert pianist. The second daughter is still in secondary school but plans to go to the Institute of Foreign Languages and is already highly proficient in English. She called on me one day to practise her English.

I have observed for myself that citizens of the Soviet Union have the incentive to education which comes from the fact that they know that when they have fully prepared themselves for qualified work there will always be a place for them. They know that they are wanted, that the state guarantees them work at their own professions. They need never fear unemployment and the dreadful feeling of uselessness which comes to those in America, and all capitalist countries, who lose their jobs and are forced to live on meager government allowances or on private charity, or else starve.

I could see for myself that only in the Soviet Union can elderly workers continue in their jobs in the full confidence and knowledge that they will never be fired to make place for younger and stronger men. Only here does everyone know that there will always be a job for him as long as he is willing and able to work.

I have seen for myself that in Russia every citizen is able to receive medical care and hospitalization without cost. It is clear that Soviet workers live secure in the knowledge that no illness nor accident can deprive them of their home and savings and throw them into the street destitute and in debt. No worker in the U.S.S.R. is ever forced to rely on charity for medical assistance.

In the Embassy and in the State Department in Washington I was told that the standard of living in the Soviet Union was one of the lowest in the world. I was also told that war devastation in the Soviet Union was so vast that it would take whole decades to repair it, reconstruct the ruined cities and villages and put the vast country on its feet again, unless it received credits from the United States. I was told that the Soviet Government was directing its major energies to the production of munitions with which it planned to start a new world war.

When I arrived in the U.S.S.R., I saw what any other American in Moscow could see for himself if he wanted to. I found that despite the most serious effects of the war, already in 1946 Russians were

getting more to eat and were better off than the other peoples of Europe. I found that Russians were nowhere starving, that they all had warm clothing and a roof over their heads, that they were all employed.

I could see for myself what tremendous effort had been devoted before the war to the building of Moscow, to the transformation of what was obviously a large and sprawling village of wooden huts and cobblestone streets before the revolution into a vast, modern city with magnificent boulevards and squares, with large and beautiful apartment houses, with the most modern subway in the world, with great educational institutions possessing the most up-to-date laboratories and equipment.

I found that already in 1946 great progress had been made towards recovery from the war. I could see the rapidly increasing production of goods, though the Soviet Union was restoring its economy without outside help. In late 1946 I saw how the Soviet people met the hardships which resulted from the unparalleled drought of that year with fortitude and confidence in the future. I saw how these hopes were justified and how since then both industry and agriculture have progressed at a pace unknown anywhere else in the world.

I saw how in 1947 the Soviet Union abolished ration cards and became, at one stroke, the only large nation in Europe without a rationing system, without black markets and with plentiful foodstuffs for all.

I have seen how prices have been reduced frequently in the Soviet Union while they are continually growing in every other country in the world.

Not long ago I visited a village near Moscow, in the Istra district, which the Germans had burned to the ground. When they departed, not a house was left standing. Now it is hard to find a trace of destruction. With the help of the Soviet Government a new house was built for every house that stood previously, and in most cases better than the house it replaced. Passing through Ukrainian cities, I saw how rapidly wrecked buildings were being rebuilt. In many cases city dwellers worked voluntarily on reconstruction projects in their spare time.

In Moscow I can see something new every day. From my window I can see new streets being paved. All over the city trees are being planted and parks laid out. A new section of the subway, much of which will probably be opened this year, is being constructed not far from my home.

My friends tell me that they now have gas in their apartments. They have discarded their Primus stoves and electric hotplates which they had to use in the past. A new apartment house is being built down the street; dozens of these buildings are going up all over the city. Hundreds of families will soon move into comfortable, modern apartments. New modern motor buses run on our street and more and more new Soviet cars can be seen.

I have seen the concrete effect of the reconversion of war industry to the manufacture of peacetime goods—Soviet cars, tractors, new locomotives—all made in factories which during the war turned out tanks, guns and munitions. I have seen how rapidly new consumer goods appear on the market. I see what tremendous attention is being paid by the Soviet Government to the expansion of peacetime production.

Several months ago as I passed by the Byelorussian Railway station I saw veterans arriving from Germany, boys released from the Soviet Army there. They were returning to work in factories and on farms, and many of them will go to school. All of them had smiling faces.

On the other hand, while I was in the Embassy I knew that the Americans, by constructing bases all around the Soviet Union, by continually threatening the Soviet Government with war, by continually increasing the tremendous American navy and air force and by introducing conscription for the army were trying to force the U.S.S.R. to devote a continually larger portion of its production to military purposes and thereby slow down the progress of peacetime industry. It was obvious even to such an inexperienced observer as myself that this blackmail is not succeeding. The Soviet Government is able to maintain such armed forces as can bring this brandishing of arms to naught, and at the same time carry out its five-year plan for postwar recovery and the further development of civilian industry and agriculture.

Western European nations, which suffered only an infinitesimal fraction of the terrific war destruction that took place on Soviet soil, go whimpering like poor relations to the United States for "aid." They accept that help on conditions which will for ever subject their peoples to American economic exploitation. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, goes its own proud and independent way not only meeting its own problems successfully, but even finding resources with which to assist its allies who also choose to be independent of the U.S. State Department.

While Britishers and Frenchmen reach out their hands like miserable beggars for the charity of the American Congress, Russians forge ahead with heads high. I personally would prefer to starve than stand in line at someone else's soup kitchen, and I like and admire the Soviet people for their courage, independence and resourcefulness. They not only refused to receive "assistance" from abroad on conditions unacceptable to free men, but are feeding and clothing themselves better than the less proud nations which have accepted the American handout.

I was told in the Embassy and in the State Department that Russians were "uncultured" and "barbaric" and that they do not "understand Western civilization." I found the contrary to be true. Not only is the intellectual development of the Russians whom I met considerably higher than that of the average American, but it is in the Soviet Union that the real values of Western

civilization are being preserved and developed. Russians are not only thoroughly familiar with Western art, literature, science and culture, but have for centuries been making some of the most vital contributions to Western civilization. These are continuing in an ever-increasing stream. With their profound knowledge and understanding, Soviet citizens are adding rich contributions to Western civilization, originating in the great unique civilization of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

It is in the Soviet Union that in art, literature, music, architecture, philosophy and other branches of culture, the intelligentsia has refused blindly to accept the degraded standards which are current in Western European nations and in America. Only in the Soviet Union these branches of human endeavor are not in a blind alley. The care with which in the Soviet Union the classical values are being maintained against all attacks is best seen in the recent pronouncements of the Communist Party on Soviet music. What is expected of composers is that they return to the heritage of the great Russian and Western composers and write real music, rather than follow the path of formalism which might result in their becoming writers of meaningless music like that of the Hindemith cacophonies.

If there appears a new Beethoven or Chaikovsky in world music, it is clear that he is certain to be from the ranks of Soviet composers, and certainly not from the musical decadence of America, Britain or France.

Only in the Soviet Union the popular means of culture and propaganda, the press and the radio are not used to hammer into the heads of the readers and listeners the esthetical standards of cultural trash.

Nowhere in the world do the radio programs attain as high a standard as in the Soviet Union. While ill in bed I listened to the Soviet radio nearly twelve hours daily. Hour after hour of excellent concerts, many interesting lectures, programs for collective farmers, request programs for Soviet children, plays from the stages of Moscow theaters, operetta from my husband's theater. All this in my room. There are three different programs most of the day—without advertisements or cheap music, nobody trying to sell soap, hair tonic or Ford automobiles; no sentimental dramas of confused family life, no need to take headache tablets after listening for two hours, as one must in America.

The impressions which I have described are just a few of the things which I have noticed in the Soviet Union during my relatively short stay here.

I do not pretend to be an "expert" on Russia, as they are called in the United States. I do not pretend to be anything but an American woman who came here to see for herself and to become acquainted with the Soviet people. I speak of things which any other open-minded American or other foreigner can observe here and understand, and write about if he or she has the courage to tell the truth.

My deepest impression of my comparatively brief stay in the Soviet Union does not relate to any one branch of life, but is a general feeling about life in the U.S.S.R. as a whole.

I feel that I am now living in a type of society which is a far greater advance over capitalism, than capitalism was over feudalism.

I can see for myself that the Soviet Union is a new type of society at the very dawn of its development and that the horizons of human progress under Socialism are obviously limitless.

It is a fact that the United States of America, for the time being, produces more automobiles than the Soviet Union.

It is a vastly more important fact that the Soviet Union is developing culturally and economically at a more rapid pace than the United States ever developed even in the boom years of capitalistic growth.

It is a noteworthy fact that the Soviet Union is young, healthy and vigorous with a capacity for continuous growth, that it is developing, while the United States is confused, decadent, politically rotten, having fallen into the hands of leaders who are determined to lead the nation to ruin, repeating step for step the mistakes of Germany. Unless they are stopped in time, all this may lead the United States to suicide.

Lastly, it is an important fact that in the Soviet Union every citizen, no matter what his position in life, has the right to look forward to the future, calm in the knowledge that every

year he will live better than the year before, that he is helping to create a new age for the human race which his children, and perhaps he himself, will see.

As a mother I look ahead to what sort of a world my son will live in, and as a mother I know that the future belongs to the Soviet Union and that my son will live a richer, a better and fuller life than he could live anywhere else in the world. I know that here he will grow up to receive the best of education without having to struggle for it the way I did; that he will not have to tramp the streets looking for a job when times are bad, because there will be no bad times in the Soviet Union, despite all the efforts of its enemies to create them; that he cannot be turned into cannon fodder for munitions kings and oil monopolists; that he, like his fellow Soviet citizens, will be a free man, a participant in the greatest progressive movement on which the human race has ever embarked.

I am glad to be here. I am happy that my son was born in the Soviet Union, for his inheritance will be a rich one. I appreciate the Soviet hospitality so generously extended to me for my own sake, but even more so for his.

