

THE MOSCOW TRIAL

(APRIL, 1933)

Compiled by

W. P. COATES

Secretary, Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee

Preface by

A. G. WALKDEN

Chairman, Trades Union Congress General Council

Foreword by

D. N. PRITT, K.C.

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**ANGLO-RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY
COMMITTEE**

5, Robert Street, Adelphi, London, W.C.2.

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Sir Stafford-Cripps, K.C., M.P., in the course of a speech in Bristol on Saturday, May 6, 1933, said :

“People quite legitimately might take two opinions as to whether they liked British Engineers in Russia to be taken into custody by the police to be tried according to Russian law and two of them to be sentenced.

“He had read through part of the verbatim report shorthand notes of the trial of the engineers in Russia, and his view and the view of many lawyers with whom he had discussed the matter was, that it was impossible to say through reading the notes that the men were not guilty.

“Clearly, there was no possible justification for taking political action against the Russian Government on the strength of the trial. . . .”

“Sir Stafford Cripps, who returned to London last night, said to a Press representative : ‘The speech I delivered at Bristol on Saturday night has been correctly reported. I was referring specifically to the two sentenced men, Messrs. Thornton and MacDonald.’ ”

“Morning Post”, May 8, 1933.

Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., was Solicitor-General, October, 1930-August, 1931.

Preface

Although jurisprudence is as old as the first beginnings of social life, probably no trial in human history has attracted such attention in this country as the recent trial in Moscow.

For some undisclosed reason, before the charges were even known, our Government declared that the arrested Britishers were innocent.

At the conclusion of the trial, two British subjects were sentenced to imprisonment, but with the right of appeal to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union.

Again, for some undisclosed reason our Government (with the ostensible object of helping the sentenced men), without waiting for the results of that appeal, placed an embargo on 80 per cent. of Russia's exports to Great Britain, a step which in the opinion of most foreign observers in Moscow, seriously jeopardised a speedy and lenient outcome of the appeal of the imprisoned Britishers.

As a result of the blockade, at least 60,000 workmen have been sentenced to unemployment, which means that 180,000 persons (i.e., men, women and children) have been affected, relations between the two countries have been seriously strained and world peace endangered.

Surely, in view of such happenings, it behoves all serious citizens to make themselves more conversant with the facts of the trial and particularly *the events surrounding it* than they were able to do by a perusal of the daily press.

In the course of the following pages no attempt is made to hold a brief for either side, but a serious and successful attempt is made to hold a brief for honesty and truth.

For these, among other reasons, I recommend the study of this booklet to the British public and, in particular, to the members of the working-class Movement of this country.

A. G. WALKDEN.

Foreword

The recent trial in Moscow has excited the greatest public interest, and the British Government's reaction to it has for the moment destroyed commercial relations and imperilled relations generally between two peoples, comprising populations of over 200,000,000, at a time in the world's history when both international trade and friendly international relations are in more urgent need of encouragement than ever before.

In those circumstances every thoughtful citizen should secure the best and most reliable information as to the course of the trial, and should form to the best of his ability an impartial opinion of its conduct. In the nature of things, the contemporary Press did not convey accurate or complete reports, and the only true account hitherto available to English readers has been the three-volume verbatim report published by the State Law Publishing House in Moscow.

This document, the substantial accuracy of which is amply established by the very triviality of the criticisms made on its correctness in the more or less hostile Press, is far too long for the general reader, and there is very real need for some shorter and equally accurate account at once cheap enough in price for wide circulation and short enough to be read by the average hard-worked citizen.

It seems to me beyond doubt that this pamphlet of the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee supplies the need. I have read it very carefully, after a full study of the verbatim report itself, and in my view it gives a perfectly fair summary of that report, and consequently a perfectly fair description of the trial.

I commend it to all who seek the truth, be they hostile, friendly, or indifferent to the Soviet power; and I am confident that those who read it will come to the conclusion that the trial was fairly and properly conducted, and that there was no justification for the action taken by the British Government as the ostensible result of it.

D. N. PRITT.

Procedure in a Soviet Court

(The following article by Mr. D. N. Pritt, K.C., the well-known barrister, who had made a special study of Soviet Law, appeared in the "New Leader" of April 14, 1933, on the eve of the Moscow Trial. With the kind permission of the "New Leader" we reprint it here to give our readers a general idea of Soviet jurisprudence.)

The forthcoming trial of certain English engineers in Moscow has naturally stimulated interest in the legal system of U.S.S.R. . . . The sane citizen naturally inquires what are the main features of the legal system of Soviet Russia. To attempt to answer this question by fresh study in the present atmosphere of hysteria would indeed be difficult, but I have the modest advantage of having studied the system in Russia last summer, of forming my views then to the best of my ability, and of committing them to print whilst my impressions were still fresh. Following the recent events with care, I have seen nothing to make me change my views, and I will now express as briefly as I can what struck me as the salient characteristics of the system.

The method of investigation and trial of criminal charges in Soviet Russia, in sober truth, bears an unexpectedly close resemblance in its main features to that prevailing in many non-Communist countries; indeed, the distinctions between the methods of Russia and those of, say, Denmark are perhaps smaller than the distinction between those of England and Denmark.

Investigations into serious criminal charges are in the hands, in their earlier stages, of investigating officers, who are neither judges nor policemen, but are civil servants working under the Commissariat of Justice, or in some cases the G.P.U. Such investigation may, of course, begin before any particular person is suspected, but so soon as the evidence casts suspicion on any individual, he may be arrested and questioned; he cannot at this stage have the assistance of an advocate, but is entitled to refuse to answer questions, and has a right of appeal to the Procurator against any decision of the investigating officer. No formal charge can be made against him until the investigation has proceeded far enough to provide justification for an accusation of a definite offence.

When the charge is made and the investigation is concluded, the accused is entitled to be represented by an advocate, whether he can afford to pay or not, and he and his advocate have full access to the whole dossier of the case; in the preparation of the dossier, moreover, it is the duty of the investigating officers to

search for and to incorporate statements and other material which tend in favour of acquittal as fully as those which tend to show guilt.

After the charge is made, release on parole or on bail is granted, on the whole more freely in Russia than in England. It would be easy but tedious as to each feature of the proceedings prior to trial, to point to several Western European countries in which the procedure is less favourable to the accused than it is in Russia.

Even if the investigators regard the case as sufficiently strong to go to trial, it cannot proceed unless the Procurator, on independent examination, makes up his mind that there is a proper case for trial. (The Procurator is a somewhat remarkable official. Whilst, on the one hand, he is the public prosecutor, and will have to present the case for the prosecution in court if it goes to trial, he has also a general controlling power not only over officials of the Commissariat of Justice, but over most other Government organs, including the G.P.U. itself, checking any abuse of their powers and generally "keeping them in their places.")

What of the trial itself? The trial court generally consists of one professional judge and two lay assessors, who all sit together and decide questions both of law and of fact; they form, on the whole, a nicely balanced combination of professional knowledge and impartial common-sense, and escape many of the difficulties of misunderstanding that sometimes beset a large and wholly untrained jury sitting separately and conferring in private without any assistance from the judge beyond the formal summing-up.

The hearing itself is remarkable for ease and simplicity, the court does not dominate either the accused or the advocates; accused who prefer not to be represented are not confused either by technical rules of evidence or by the strange atmosphere of the elaborate courts of some countries, and have in all cases the advantage of the "last word." The foreign observer gets the impression of an informal, friendly, and even easy-going trial, conducted without heat and with the real co-operation of all concerned, and with a real desire to arrive at the truth.

The right of appeal is, in practice, pretty broad, the court consisting, on appeal, of three professional judges without assessors.

Looking at the Soviet judicature with all the impartiality I can command, I am unable to find in it any features which justify the criticism and abuse levelled at it by the Government and the Press in recent weeks. It has, of course, often been asserted, by way of criticism, even by way of reproach, that the Soviet courts are designed and established to protect society as it is constituted in U.S.S.R. In this respect the position seems to

me identical with that in other countries. All courts claim to protect society; and in all countries society means, in effect, the prevailing system of government.

In countries which attach great importance to property, offences against property are dealt with severely by the law and by the courts which administer it. In countries which find it necessary to look to their armies to keep their population from revolt, the laws provide, and the courts impose, severe penalties for any attempt to undermine the discipline of the army. And in the same way Soviet Russia, attaching great value to the maintenance of the civilisation which it has established in the last fifteen years, is determined to protect it by its laws and by the proper enforcement of those laws.

The only true standard by which to form an estimate of the Russian, as of any other, legal system is the homely one as to whether it gives what the ordinary sane citizen regards as a fair trial. Nobody can complain that the law is framed to protect the social system; the real test of merit is this: when any individual is accused of anti-social activities against that system, does he have an adequate opportunity of knowing the charge against him, proper assistance in meeting it, and an impartial consideration from the court which tries him? On all these points, it is not in human nature that any country should be perfect, but in my considered judgment Soviet Russia is better than most countries, and not far short of the best.

The Arrests and the British Government

On Sunday, March 12, 1933, the following six British subjects were arrested in Russia on charges of espionage and sabotage :—

Mr. Allan Monkhouse
Mr. Leslie Charles Thornton
Mr. William MacDonald
Mr. John Cushny
Mr. Charles Nordwall
Mr. A. W. Gregory

Before proceeding further it is well to make clear the legal position of a British subject when abroad and when involved in legal proceedings abroad. That position was clearly laid down by Mr. George Canning (British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) on February 27, 1823 :—

“ It is one of the most important principles of the Law of Nations that a stranger visiting a foreign country, virtually binds himself to a temporary and qualified allegiance to its laws and submits to their observance, however unwise such laws may appear to be to him, however harsh and oppressive they really are, and however they may be at variance with his own notions of political liberty or with the impressions of a happier experience. Such an individual has no right to complain of the operation of the laws of a foreign state upon himself if they are executed impartially and in the same manner in which they would operate among native subjects. The fundamental principle is this: An Englishman going into a foreign country accepts the authority of its legislation, abdicates for a time the benefits of British jurisprudence, and subjects himself to all the consequent inconveniences.”

But to come more up to date, the same principle was thus expounded by Sir Austen Chamberlain (then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) on December 12, 1924 :—

“ British subjects who go to a foreign country are subject to the local law as they find it, and the fact that something may constitute an offence in one country and not in another affords no ground for protesting against the conviction of a British subject in the former case.”

Presumably these and similar statements were known to His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Esmond Ovey. However, that gentleman on March 12, 1933, before he knew anything of the charges, before he had even seen any representative of the Soviet Foreign Office, cabled our Foreign Office :—

“ It is inconceivable that Soviet Government can produce credible evidence of any criminal malpractice on the part of the company. There may conceivably be of course some minor question of insignificant douceurs, tipping or presents which might consequently be distorted into ‘ bribery.’ ”

“ On the assumption that Soviet Government do not at once liberate prisoners I am inclined to suggest at the risk of His Majesty's Government incurring an accusation of participation in prejudging an issue of which legal remedies have not been exhausted, that Soviet Ambassador, London, should be frankly warned that if his Government wish to continue to entertain friendly relations with His Majesty's Government they must refrain from being drawn by an excessive zeal on the part of the police into permitting the trumping up of frivolous and fantastic accusations against a friendly and reputable British company. Otherwise it will obviously become impossible for any British subject to conduct business in Russia, and conclusion of trade agreement will be pointless.” (White Paper, Cmd. 4286, 1933.)

This dispatch, we repeat, was sent on March 12, 1933, the day on which the arrests were made.

It seems hardly credible that a man with ordinary understanding of human nature, let alone a trained diplomat, could fail to understand that the effect of such an attitude on any foreign Government would be to stiffen their backs, that it could not possibly help the accused and that it was calculated to precipitate a crisis between the two countries.

It was bad enough to prejudice the issue privately, but to prejudice it publicly was infinitely worse, yet this was precisely what Mr. Baldwin did. In reply to questions on the subject in the House of Commons on March 15, 1933, after enumerating the people arrested and stating that “ their health appears to be generally satisfactory and permission to exercise has been promised,” he went on to say :—

“ Immediately on receipt of news of the arrests His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow made urgent representations to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, requiring to know, among other points, exactly on what charge the arrests had been made, and what facilities for their defence would be granted them. As he has received no categorical or satisfactory answer on these matters, he has been instructed to press for the fullest possible information from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Litvinov.

“ Moreover, as His Majesty's Government are convinced that there can be no justification for the charge on which the arrests were made, Sir Esmond Ovey has been instructed to represent in strong terms the grave view which they take of these proceedings against British subjects of high

standing engaged in normal commercial pursuits to the benefit of both countries, and the unfortunate consequences to Anglo-Soviet relations which may follow unless it is rectified." (*Hansard*, March 15, 1933, col. 1949.)

While it was quite right and proper for our Government to request information regarding the charges to be preferred against our nationals and to take steps to afford them every assistance for their defence consistent with Soviet laws and sovereignty in the U.S.S.R., nevertheless, how could His Majesty's Government be "convinced that there can be no justification for the charge" until they knew what this charge was and what the facts were upon which such charge was based?

Mr. J. H. Thomas, apparently in an endeavour to live up to the unenviable reputation which he has deservedly earned in connection with the British-Irish negotiations, decided to make bad, worse.

In the course of a speech at a meeting in Swansea, March 17, 1933, he said:—

"I know nothing that has stirred British public opinion more than the arrest of a number of our fellow-citizens in Russia.

"Public opinion in this country is satisfied that the men who have been arrested are respectable and harmless British subjects engaged in their normal commercial vocations. It seems absurd to suggest that such men should lend themselves to any measures calculated to destroy their own livelihood. It is not understood here what motive underlies these arbitrary proceedings, but on one thing I think the whole country will agree, and that is that British subjects must not be made the subject of any shortcomings in official projects.

"Heresy hunting is not countenanced here. I do not know what is the object of this apparently foolish act on the part of Russia. I do know that in past times Governments, in order to divert attention from home affairs, got embroiled in foreign difficulties, and if that is the real object of Russia in this matter, I have no hesitation in saying that no one in this country will be deceived. Commercial relations must always be to the benefit of both parties, and if these are to be facilitated these subjects must not be exposed to unwarrantable hindrances and hardships in the pursuit of them.

"We have already given abundant evidence of our anxiety not to interfere with Russia, however much we may disagree with her political aims, but clearly it would be a profound mistake to assume that the relationship of a commercial and diplomatic character which is essential

between two nations could be continued if our people were subject to the petty tyranny and punishment and indeed agonising mental strain that these men are now undergoing." (*The Times*, March 18, 1933.)

The *Referee*, March 19, 1933, referring to this statement rightly says:—

"It seems that Mr. J. H. Thomas cannot—to use a vulgarity—open his mouth without putting his foot in it.

"It is the duty of our Ambassador in Moscow to do what he can to assist the men in the matter of obtaining justice, while at the same time maintaining good diplomatic relations.

"But Mr. Thomas's blundering reference to the motives of the Moscow Government are not likely to do anybody any good. It may be true that the Soviet is staging the trial in order to cover its domestic troubles; that remains to be seen. But publicly to threaten Moscow with a breach of diplomatic and commercial relations over a case which is still *sub judice* is folly bordering on impertinence."

Similarly the *Manchester Guardian*, March 18, 1933, says:—

"... If it is true that we have demanded withdrawal of the accusations by the Russian Government we may doubt whether we are going the best way about achieving our purpose. We may have our own opinion about the merits of the Russian Government, about the tyranny of the O.G.P.U., about the methods and the motives of trials for sabotage and counter-revolution; but the reaction of the Moscow Government to a demand from a foreign Government for the repudiation of an official act is likely to be much the same as the reaction of any other Government to a similar demand from Moscow . . .

"It is unfortunate that on any difficult and delicate question Mr. Thomas should be allowed to speak."

The joint efforts of Sir Esmond Ovey, Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Thomas produced the results which anyone could have foreseen. Mr. Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, replied on March 17, 1933, to the threats of our Government as follows:—

"No pressure and no threats can cause the Soviet Government to relax the law in favour of British citizens. If the British Government and the British Embassy are so certain of the innocence of the arrested men, the alarm they have expressed over their fate is incomprehensible.

"Concretely and practically the claims of the Ambassador in this case reduce themselves to a proposal for the exemption from Soviet jurisdiction of all British subjects, granting them immunity for any crime or delinquency and providing that in the event of any Englishman being accused of a crime the

proceedings against him shall be stopped immediately, in spite of the available data and proofs, even the accused's own depositions, as soon as his Government expresses a conviction of his innocence.

"It is sufficient to formulate such proposals to make it obvious to the Government of an independent country that they are unacceptable and cannot be discussed.

"In the event of the existence of data and proofs that a crime was being committed by a certain person the authorities responsible for the observance of the law and the safety of the country are obliged to take measures to prevent the crime and verify the data and proofs; only in this way can they establish the guilt or innocence of the arrested party or establish the motives of the crime. Such is the inevitable procedure in all countries.

"The arrests of foreigners happen not only in the U.S.S.R. Quite recently there have happened abroad such cases of the arrests and sentencing of people occupying prominent posts, including the representatives of important banks. Such cases cannot be avoided and should not be allowed to influence international relations determined by more important and profound considerations than the interests of individual citizens or firms.

"In the U.S.S.R. are living hundreds and thousands of Germans, Americans and citizens of other countries who suffer no persecution. Hundreds of Englishmen have arrived in the U.S.S.R., lived here and left without one of them being arrested. Finally the representatives of Metro-Vickers themselves have lived in Russia for nearly ten years, and hitherto nothing has happened to them.

"Such measures as arrest and prosecution have been adopted by the Soviet authorities only in the face of serious causes and in the interests of the safety of State property. It would be wrong if such episodes affected political and economical relations between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain which were equally profitable to both countries."

At the same time our "Die-hard" Press was not behindhand with efforts to stir up a public panic and anti-Soviet feeling.

With one accord the Conservative Press spoke of the charges (about which they demanded information) as "ridiculous" and "monstrous," &c.

The *Morning Post*, March 16, 1933, in a leader approving Mr. Baldwin's statement, finishes a violent anti-Soviet tirade thus:—

"It will be necessary to break off diplomatic relations altogether with a Government that shows itself so patently indifferent to the comity of nations. On the strength of its communistic basis Soviet Russia claims large privileges and

exemptions in its intercourse with the outside world. But it cannot be allowed a complete dispensation from civilised practice and international law."

In a previous leader, March 15, 1933, after the usual hotch-potch of frenzy, the *Morning Post* called the Government of the U.S.S.R. "Ruffians."

The *Daily Telegraph*, March 16, 1933, spoke of "Trumped up allegations against British subjects."

The *Daily Express* said that Mr. MacDonald should immediately return to London and—

"... Teach the Russians that we will not submit to the maltreatment of our nationals on Soviet territory.

"He should place a ban on all Russian trading, detain Russian imports at the Customs, withhold Government credits for British exports here.

"The British Government, through the mouth of its head, should say to Moscow: 'Until you have explained, and justified if you can, your outrageous conduct, you shall enjoy none of the privileges accorded by this country to a civilised nation.'" (*Daily Express*, March 16, 1933.)

"Four innocent British subjects are held in Soviet prisons falsely accused of a crime equivalent to train-wrecking." (*Daily Express*, March 17, 1933.)

The *Daily Mail* accused the Soviet Government of seeking a way to repudiate its indebtedness to Metropolitan-Vickers and said:—

"... failing an explanation there is bound to be a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The British Government really take a serious view of the present incident." (*Daily Mail*, March 17, 1933.)

Whilst the *Evening News* went absolutely the whole hog:—

"Having secured the release of these men, the next thing for the British Government to do is notify the Soviet Government that its antics are intolerable and its judicial methods uncivilised, and that the bed-rock price of any further dealings between the two countries must be the setting up in Moscow of extra-territorial courts, such as are now maintained in the far more civilised countries of Egypt and China!" (*Evening News*, March 16, 1933.)

In spite of numerous and convincing evidence to the contrary, wild charges were made in the "Die-hard" Press of the application in a Soviet prison of third degree methods, torture, &c., to our helpless fellow countrymen.

Fortunately for the honour of British statesmanship some powerful voices were raised in opposition to our Government's policy. Thus, referring to the case in an interview with the *Daily Herald*, March 18, 1933, Mr. G. Lansbury said:—

"The Labour Party will be as determined as anyone else that justice shall be done, but it cannot take the line taken by the Government—that of prejudging the questions at issue before the case has been heard.

"Speaking on behalf of myself and my friends, I will rely on the Russian Government acting as honourably and as impartially as would the British Government under similar circumstances. Before passing any judgment on the matter the Labour Party will await the trial."

Similarly, Mr. W. M. Citrine, General Secretary, Trades Union Congress said :—

"I share with other people the anxiety attendant on these men's arrest.

"None the less, I cannot conceive that any good will be done by uttering threats to break off trading or diplomatic relations with Russia.

"One feels confident that no one appreciates the gravity of the situation more than the Russian Government itself. We must all guard against any hasty step which will prejudice the issue."

The *Daily Sketch* in an article entirely anti-Soviet and affirming its conviction of the innocence of the accused Englishmen, nevertheless said :—

"Whichever be the true explanation, our Government must use every effort to secure a fair trial. And one would add that those efforts are not assisted by any attempt to make political capital out of the plight of these Britons or by the language of insult and violence into which some newspapers have allowed themselves to be betrayed by their indignation." (*Daily Sketch*, March 18, 1933.)

Now to turn for a moment to the six men arrested, two were released after being detained for forty-eight hours, and Mr. Monkhouse, one of the men released, has himself stated that :—

"I have no criticism to make of the way they treated me. I had a comfortable, roomy cell and fine meals brought in from outside with caviare and soup. They gave me smokes, but no drinks." (*News-Chronicle*, March 15, 1933.)

The Moscow Correspondent of the *News-Chronicle* (March 15, 1933) also reported :—

"Mr. Nordwall also said he was treated 'extraordinarily nicely,' and I have since been officially assured that the four other Englishmen still held are treated equally well."

Mr. Monkhouse is also stated to have said :—

"My examiners seemed first-rate technical men who knew their job. They were extraordinarily nice to me, and exceedingly reasonable in their questioning.

"The G.P.U. prison is the last word in efficiency, entirely clean, orderly and well-organised. This is the first time I have ever been arrested, but I have visited English prisons and can attest that the G.P.U. quarters are much superior." (*Daily Herald*, March 15, 1933.)

Finally, it was reported in the *News-Chronicle*, March 20, 1933 :—

"The British Consul in Moscow, Mr. T. Rapp, and the acting Third Secretary of the Embassy, Mr. G. Walton, saw all four of the prisoners this evening.

"They indicated that they are being well treated and sent messages to their families, assuring them that they are as comfortable as possible, considering the situation. All four appeared in good health, although somewhat tired."

As to the release of the other prisoners ; it is necessary to deal with the matter somewhat at length.

On March 19, 1933, Sir Esmond Ovey had a discussion on the subject with Mr. Litvinov, who made the following offer :—

"I was ready as soon as the Prosecutor had studied the case and had questioned the prisoners, to ask the Prosecutor whether or not it would be possible to modify the measures of detention in the case of some of the prisoners and to release them on bail which the firm would no doubt readily offer. I was ready to use all my influence to obtain the Prosecutor's consent to this, but I could count on success only under the circumstances that the British Government would not hamper my efforts by further public declarations of their intention to exert pressure.

"In reply to his query about the amount of bail required, I explained that there was as yet no decision whatever about bail, that I had still to arrange this and in the event of the Prosecutor agreeing to the principle, I could then find out the sum, which would probably not be identical for all the arrested men."

One would have imagined that in view of Mr. Litvinov's efforts, and the obvious failure of the "big stick" policy, that our Government would by this time have learned the need of restraint. Such was not the case : they surrendered completely to the "Die Hards." On March 20, 1933, Mr. Eden (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) announced in the House of Commons that as a result of the arrests the negotiations for a new Anglo-Soviet Commercial Agreement had been suspended.

On this subject, the *News-Chronicle* (March 21, 1933) rightly said :—

"The suspension of the commercial negotiations, announced by Mr. Eden yesterday, may do some harm in Russia ; it will undeniably also do harm to this country's trade ; and it

must provoke an acute ill-feeling between the two countries which may have the gravest consequences, and which must at least complicate the efforts for a stable European settlement.

"We see nothing in the facts so far as they are known to justify so enormous a hazard. We have the gravest doubts whether either Mr. Baldwin or Mr. Eden really know what the real charges against these men are or what evidence can be brought in support of them. It is the duty of the British Government to watch carefully what is happening in Moscow. But it is no less its duty not to allow itself to be swept by prejudice into hasty action which it may have heavy cause to repent."

But our Government seemed to have had no intention of considering the matter coolly. On the contrary, from the Soviet *Red Paper* we learn that on March 28 Sir Esmond Ovey called on M. Litvinov and informed him that:—

"... he had been entrusted to tell me the contents of the Bill which his Government proposed to place before Parliament."

In reply to this M. Litvinov said:—

"I expressed surprise that the British Government was polite enough to consider it necessary to inform me as to its Bills before placing them before Parliament. Drawing out a paper, Sir Esmond said that he had instructions from his Government 'to give me the following information should he not receive from me a satisfactory answer about the stopping of the trial.' He then began to read the paper to me.

"I stopped him, saying: I could save his time and could state right away that, according to the opinion of the Prosecutor, the trial would take place and that the trial could under no circumstances be stopped, irrespective of what the British Ambassador might tell me. If what Sir Esmond wanted to read to me had for its purpose to influence the Prosecutor's decision, then I could see no reason for listening to this information, since it would have no influence whatever on the decision."

After further conversation, Sir Esmond Ovey made another attempt to frighten M. Litvinov with the consequences, but the latter interrupted and said:—

"Permit me, Sir Esmond, to tell you that even if such methods of diplomacy might perhaps be successful, let us say, in Mexico, they are doomed in advance to complete failure in the U.S.S.R., and the sooner you realise this the better it will be for all. We do not bargain with our independence."

Again to return to the case of the remaining prisoners. For some reason which has never been explained our Government did not take advantage of Mr. Litvinov's offer. In fact, the next step was taken by the Soviet Government. On March 23, 1938, the Soviet Embassy informed Sir Felix Pole (Chairman of Metro-Vickers) that the Moscow authorities were prepared to release on bail (25,000 roubles on account of Mr. Thornton and 15,000 roubles each for Mr. Gregory and Mr. Cushny) three of the four Britishers. As regards the fourth man (Mr. MacDonald) it was considered that the preliminary investigation of his case had not been completed, but probably he too would eventually be released on bail.

In reply to this offer the Metropolitan-Vickers Co., on March 24, 1938, sent the following amazing message to their representative, Mr. A. Monkhouse, in Moscow:—

"The Company has had under consideration the Russian Public Prosecutor's offer, through the Soviet Embassy in London, to release Messrs. Thornton, Cushny and Gregory on bail.

"Please see the Public Prosecutor immediately, and thank him for the offer.

"But point out that the company do not think it just to make a bargain covering only three Englishmen, and leaving MacDonald and the Russian staff in prison, as they are confident that all accused, of both nationalities, are equally innocent.

"We hereby authorise you to accept a reasonable bail for all our employees, English and Russian, on the understanding that this does not imply approval of trial."

If the object of the company had been to stiffen the backs of the Soviet authorities, to increase their suspicions and to prevent the possibility of lenient treatment for their employees, they went exactly the right way to bring about such a result.

How on earth could the London office of the company be absolutely sure that all their employees, both British and Russian, were innocent until the evidence against them had been sifted? In any case when bail is granted to an accused it by no means signifies that the authorities or even that the one who stands surety is convinced of their innocence before the trial has taken place.

We could understand and even applaud the company in wishing to help, and offering bail for all their employees, both British and Russian, but in every country it is the judicial authority which decides whether bail can or cannot be granted in any given case.

But to accompany a request for bail by a declaration of their conviction of the innocence of all the accused and by an expression

of disapproval of the impending trial was, to say the very least, a most improper proceeding and certainly not calculated to help the accused.

The result of this extraordinary message was, as might have been expected, a blank refusal by the Soviet Public Prosecutor to consider it on the grounds that the cable contained "unacceptable and unwarranted expressions of opinion regarding the innocence of the accused, as well as an unwarranted expression of disapproval of the trial."

Commenting on the Metropolitan-Vickers message to their representative, March 24, 1933, the *Izvestia*, March 27, 1933, says:—

"The wire from the British firm to their representative in Moscow is a splendid illustration of the mental condition of certain representatives of the British bourgeoisie and of the way they cannot comprehend the most simple things.

"The Soviet judicial authorities expressed their readiness to liberate on bail a number of British citizens who are accused of a serious crime. The British firm considers it necessary to declare that if it agrees to offer this bail then 'this does not imply approval of the trial.' Who has asked you, Gentlemen, for your approval and what need have the Soviet courts for such an approval?

"In addition, the firm considers it necessary to declare that it does not approve the liberation of only some of the accused on bail and that it considers it just that all should be liberated. We again ask, do these gentlemen understand that they are dealing with a court of an independent country and that to express to this court the views of the British business men as to what they consider just or unjust is, to say the least, uncalled for?

"The attempt to speak to the Soviet Union as one would to a dependent colony has failed before although it cost British Imperialism a cool £100,000,000. One might have thought that experience bought so dearly would not have been in vain, but it is evident that deep-rooted ideas are difficult to eradicate. However, the sooner representatives of the British bourgeoisie will give up such ideas, the better for themselves."

Messrs. Metropolitan-Vickers seem to have forgotten that in Great Britain groups of arrested persons are not released on bail as groups. The Court decides which of the accused shall be released and the amount of bail to be administered in each individual case and whether some of the accused should be retained in custody and bail refused, as happened in the Scottish Silks trial and the conspiracy fires trial in London.

Finally, on April 4, 1933, Mr. Thornton, Mr. Gregory and Mr. Cushny were released on bail, but Mr. MacDonald was kept in custody.

On April 3, 1933, Mr. J. Ramsay MacDonald announced that the Government would present a Bill to the House of Commons on April 5, 1933, empowering the Government to place an embargo on Soviet exports to this country after April 17, 1933, when the Anglo-Soviet Commercial Agreement would have expired as a result of its denunciation by the British Government on October 17, 1932.

Next day, April 4, 1933, the *Daily Telegraph* stated in a leader:—

"It will certainly be said in Russia that the British Government is taking these enabling powers as a means of putting pressure upon the Soviet Court."

And the *Financial News* in the course of its leader, April 5, 1933, said:—

"Out of small beginnings, the Anglo-Russian disagreement has grown to the proportions of a serious diplomatic crisis, and to the ordinary man it seems strange that the situation should have been allowed to get out of hand as it has done. The Metro-Vickers employees had scarcely been arrested when protests began in the most violent form and threats of an embargo on Russian goods started to be broadcast with complete abandon. . . .

"The Russians, as we shall see later, have everything to lose and very little to gain from a commercial rupture with this country; and if the object was to repudiate debts owing to British firms, it would have been an unthinkable clumsy method of going to work, since no plausible repudiation could possibly be undertaken except on account of a commercial rupture as the immediate excuse. As it is, a temporary rupture at least seems inevitable. The trial could not be called off, after the attitude the British Government has taken, by any self-respecting Government."

And, as regards the financial effects of the proposed embargo the *Financial News* in the same issue declared:—

"The main danger, however, is financial. Russia owes this country probably around £13,000,000 for goods supplied, of which, according to an official announcement a month ago, about £10,000,000 is represented by credits guaranteed under the Trade Facilities Act. The Government's liability on this £10,000,000 is about £7,000,000. And, in the event of an embargo, we could count this as dead loss.

"As regards Germany, outstanding credits to Russia are estimated at about \$250,000,000, and we should remember that credits given by foreign banks to Germany have been

to no small extent used ultimately for the financing of Russian business. Under the last Standstill Agreement, again, a plan was concluded for the loan of blocked Reichmarks (of an amount reported to be Rm.85,000,000) by English banks to Russian importers from Germany, the credits to be secured on timber shipments from Russia to this country. Such transactions have now, it may be noted, ceased completely."

However, despite these warnings Sir John Simon on behalf of the Government introduced the Embargo Bill on April 5.

As to Sir John Simon's speech, we cannot do better than quote here the comments of the *New Statesman and Nation*, of April 8, 1933:—

"The debate on the Russian Embargo Bill showed the House of Commons at its worst. The sympathy and anxiety for the prisoners in Moscow which everybody feels, was overwhelmed in an orgy of prejudice and passion, and to this the Foreign Secretary pandered disastrously. His only object, and the object of the Bill, he insisted, was to help the accused men; but it would be difficult to conceive anything more harmful to their interests than the manner and much of the matter of his speech, and the furious cheers with which his supporters greeted it.

"In the early stages of the affair the British Government behaved with an insolence to the Russians which it would never have dreamed of in the case of any other country; it continues, despite the obvious effects in Moscow, to treat them as irredeemable knaves and fools. Sir John Simon and other members of the Government profess that they do not want a complete breach with Russia; but a large section of their party would obviously welcome it, and for these infatuated anti-Bolsheviks it seems that peace, trade and even the safety of the arrested engineers, are bagatelles as compared with the chance of venting their spite."

Moving the Labour Party amendment to the Embargo Bill, Sir Stafford Cripps gave a crushing reply to Sir J. Simon and a powerful exposure of the untenable position taken up by our Government. We draw attention to only a few of the more pertinent passages in this fine speech:—

"The House is being asked to grant powers to the Government as against a particular foreign nation, powers which, as far as I know, are unprecedented in any recent years in the history of this country. . . ." (*Hansard*, April 5, 1933, Col. 1781.)

"Every country which is recognised by this country as an equal in status, internationally, is, by that very recognition, acknowledged to have the right to be treated fully in

accordance with the comity of nations. At the present time, as has been the case for some years past, Russia is so treated by this country. The mutual exchange of Ambassadors is the outward sign of that recognition. Therefore, apart from any special circumstances which may be urged—and the Foreign Secretary has urged none to-day—Russia is in the same international position *vis-à-vis* this country as Germany, the United States, or any other great nation in the world. If that be so, it behoves the House to inquire what are the necessary conditions precedent to the interference by one country in the internal affairs of another and to the taking of reprisals if that interference is not successful." (*Hansard*, April 5, 1933, Col. 1782.)

Sir Stafford then quoted historical precedents for his contention that "until a decision has been given by the local court, it is not in accordance with the comity of nations that any interference should be embarked upon by a foreign State." (Col. 1784.) Turning to the arrests, Sir Stafford said:—

"It will be noticed that the proceedings started in a perfectly regular way, just as they might in this country, with a search warrant which was issued for the searching of these offices. Certain documents were taken, and receipts were given for the documents by the police who conducted the search, and as a result of the search, apparently two or more of the members of the staff were put under arrest." (*Hansard*, April 5, 1933, Col. 1786.)

After analysing a number of the despatches in the White Paper, Sir Stafford comes to the conclusion that:—

(1) "There was no undue delay in replying to our Ambassador's questions." (*Hansard*, April 5, 1933, Col. 1789.)

(2) "There was no suggestion of any sort throughout the White Paper that anything has been done as regards any of these persons other than would be done to any other accused person in Russia. That, after all, is the absolutely fundamental basis of any interference, namely, that we must before interfering establish the position that something unusual, unfair and improper has been done to our nationals which would not be done to the ordinary person who has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Russian courts." (Col. 1790.)

(3) "There does not seem to me to be anything in the White Paper which could entitle a Minister of the Crown to get up in this House and say that His Majesty's Government were convinced that there could be no justification for the charges." (Col. 1790.)

After pointing out that the U.S.S.R. was not the only country in which considerable delay sometimes occurs in the formulation of charges, Sir Stafford rightly says:—

“ I venture to suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that, if that demand had been made by the Ambassador of the United States as regards a national of the United States in this country, he would have been the first person to resent it. There is no way out of that argument except by saying that we ought not to acknowledge Russia as an equal in the comity of nations.” (Col. 1792.)

He concluded by a warning that this sort of emergency legislation was jeopardising both future relations with Russia and the fate of the arrested Britishers, and appealed for a more reasonable attitude and even a gesture of goodwill on the part of our Government in order to minimise this danger.

It is worthy of note that not only did Mr. MacDonald (April 3, 1933), when announcing that the Enabling Bill would be introduced, state that it was meant primarily to deal with the situation which would arise as a result of the lapsing of the Anglo-Soviet Commercial Agreement, but when the Bill was being discussed (April 5, 1933) other members of the Government avoided giving a clear pledge that this Bill would not be used also as a measure for dealing with the regulation of our trade relations with the U.S.S.R.

It was only after persistent pressure by the Labour and Liberal members and after a plea by Sir A. Chamberlain, that Mr. Runciman (President, Board of Trade) gave a pledge that the Bill would not be used for any other purpose than that of helping the arrested Britishers, when, on April 6, 1933, in the course of the debate, he said:—

“ I will at once, therefore, give an undertaking on behalf of the Government that we shall not use these powers for any other purpose.” (*Hansard*, April 6, 1933, Cols. 1949, 1950.)

The Attorney-General and Sir J. Simon later repeated this pledge. The way in which such a pledge had to be almost extorted from the Government is an indication of the fact that there was something other than concern for the safety of our fellow-countrymen behind the “ sabre rattling ” of our Government in their dealing with the U.S.S.R.

However, it is not surprising in view of the present composition of the House of Commons that the Bill was passed by an overwhelming majority.

THE EFFECTS OF THE EMBARGO

After the conclusion of the trial events moved rapidly. On April 18, 1933, at 11.30 p.m. British time, the sentences were pronounced.

At 9.30 a.m. on April 19, 1933, the British Government, without waiting for the result of the appeal to the Central Executive Committee—which it had been decided to make on behalf of the two men sentenced to imprisonment—without even waiting for an official report of the proceedings of the trial and of the sentence from our Embassy, issued a Proclamation prohibiting as from April 26 the importation of about 80 per cent. of the Soviet commodities that this country had latterly imported.

Moreover, we learn from the *Daily Herald*, April 19, 1933. that:—

“ Within an hour of the announcement of the sentences the decision was taken in Downing Street.”

Commenting on the imposition of the embargo, the *Manchester Guardian* declared:—

“ The Government's object now, one would think, should be to secure the commutation of the sentences of Mr. Thornton and Mr. Macdonald and their early release. If this is what the Government has in mind—as it properly should have—it is making it as difficult as possible for the Russian Government to do the right thing. It must have occurred to everyone that the only realistic interpretation of the sentences is that the Russians' are extremely anxious not to break with this country, and that there was at least a strong probability that as a final gesture the two imprisoned men would be sent home. That probability will not be strengthened by a blundering threat which makes any concession by the Soviet Government appear as extorted by force and under humiliation.

“ It is not too much to say that the Government is gambling with the liberty of Thornton and MacDonald.” (April 20, 1933.)

Moreover, the *Daily Herald* (April 20, 1933) informed us that when our Government took their decision to place the embargo on Soviet goods coming into this country:—

“ It was (when it took the step) already in possession of information that any sentences of imprisonment passed by the Court would probably be commuted by the Soviet Government.”

The *Daily Herald* also reported that on April 19, 1933, directly Sir John Simon returned from Windsor, where the King had signed the Embargo Proclamation . . . he received Mr. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador, at the Foreign Office."

Mr. Maisky "expressed to Sir John Simon his deep regret at the precipitate action that had been taken.

"He warned Sir John that the issue of the proclamation would make it far more difficult for the Soviet Government to exercise a clemency that would now be widely interpreted as a surrender to intimidation.

"If, he said, the sentences were not commuted, if Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Thornton had to serve their sentences, the responsibility, in his view, would lie with the Foreign Secretary."

And the *Daily Herald* (April 20, 1933) explained the action of the British Government as follows:—

"Had its only care been for the lives and liberty of the sentenced men, had it genuinely desired to avoid forcing a dangerous crisis, it had only to wait forty-eight hours.

"But in that case the commutation would have appeared plainly to the world as an act of clemency. The Soviet Government would have gained credit for it. The British Government would indeed look a little ridiculous.

"If, on the other hand, it launched its proclamation before the Soviet Government could act, its action could be represented as a surrender by Moscow to the firm diplomacy of Sir John Simon."

If this was indeed the explanation then this "Gambler's Throw," as the *Daily Herald* well called it, was petty and cruel beyond words. And indeed it was reported that:—

"Foreign opinion in Moscow is to-day inclining to the fear that the trade embargo proclaimed by the British Government will influence the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union, to whom the petition must be made, against remitting the sentences." (*Daily Telegraph*, April 21, 1933.)

The *Financial News* (April 20, 1933), in the course of a leading article, says:—

"It would, admittedly, be absurd to presume that the matter could have been settled quietly if the original British protests had been less precipitate and violent; but there must have been a chance of it; for there are strong grounds for believing that the seeds of the case were sown in a blunder on the part of the O.G.P.U. It is, however, certain that the British attitude made it impossible for Russia, where spectacular trials of this kind are 90 per cent. political, to call off the trial, to acquit all the prisoners, or even to limit itself to deportation.

"No country would dare to give the appearance of grovelling to that extent. And now, when far milder sentences have been announced than were generally anticipated and there should be some hope of securing the exit from Russia of the two men sentenced to imprisonment, the British Government has repeated its initial error; for the Communist bosses must be much less likely to be accommodating when they are being threatened. As before, the British Government seems to be suffering from an unusual inability to wait for a week. Just as it acted unwisely before in officially asserting the Britons' innocence and demanding their release before they had heard a word about the charges, so its case would be much stronger now if it had waited for full details of the trial."

The *News-Chronicle* (April 19, 1933) said:—

"The relative mildness of the sentences suggests that, properly approached, the Soviet Government may be induced without too much difficulty to commute the sentences passed on Thornton and MacDonald. Everything, no doubt, depends on the form of approach. Threats are useless for the purpose. The embargo is worse than useless. But it seems clear that the Soviets are not looking for trouble; and if the British Government will in this one respect emulate their example, it should be possible to secure the return of these unfortunate men to this country and to close the entrance to a quarrel between two countries from which both parties have much to lose and neither anything to gain."

The *Spectator* (April 21, 1933) argued:—

"To declare the defendants innocent in advance and then threaten an embargo was to demand a complete acquittal under menace. It is, of course, arguable that the Embargo Bill was responsible for the lightness of the sentences, but it is equally arguable that without it they would have been lighter still. The actual imposition of an embargo now makes it next to impossible for the Soviet Government to revise the sentences. For what the Cabinet's action amounts to is a confident assertion that Thornton and MacDonald are completely innocent, and a claim to dictate the verdict of a foreign court. That is an impossible attitude for any Government to adopt."

So much for the efficacy of the embargo in helping our imprisoned fellow-countrymen. But in one matter the embargo will be extremely efficacious, *i.e.*, in injuring Soviet-British trade.

April 20, 1933, the day following the announcement of the embargo, the Chairman of the Soviet Trade Delegation, M. Ozersky, and his two assistants, M. Kharigonov and M. Bessonov, were recalled to Moscow for consultation.

This means that there is now no Soviet Trade Delegation in London, *i.e.*, no Soviet commercial organisation empowered to negotiate and sign contracts on behalf of the Government of the U.S.S.R. Needless to say, until the return of the Trade Delegation, no more big contracts can be concluded.

The statistics of our exports (excluding re-exports) to Russia during recent years were :—

	£
1928	2,715,990
1929	8,748,489
1930	6,771,946
1931	7,291,319
1932	9,274,534

It will be noticed that our exports to Russia were at their lowest ebb in 1928 and that since the resumption of diplomatic relations, in 1929, they have steadily and considerably risen, a fact which cannot be said of any other big (and potentially bigger) market in the world.

Our exports to Russia might have been much larger had our Government and banks assisted our manufacturers with credits in the same way as the German Government and banks have assisted their manufacturers.

Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland (ex-Minister of Labour in the last Conservative Government), after returning from Russia, wrote in the *News-Chronicle* of October 22, 1932, that our export trade with Russia "can easily be trebled. It might well be multiplied manifold." Sir Arthur's opinion is shared by many competent business men and financiers.

As just mentioned, our exports to Russia last year amounted to £9,274,534, and Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland avers that every foreign order for £1,000,000 placed in this country provides work for a year for 6,000 to 7,000 men.

On this calculation, Russian orders for 1932 provided employment for about 60,000 men.

Needless to say, if Russia is deprived of the means of payment, she cannot, apart from the fact that she naturally would not, place orders here. The enforcement of the embargo means condemning 60,000 men to the misery of unemployment, to say nothing of the additional number of men who might be employed on still larger orders. These figures do not include the number of seamen and dockers engaged in the transport and handling of our entrepôt trade with the U.S.S.R.

There are other important considerations. At the moment, Russia's commercial debt to this country amounts to between £12,000,000 and £18,000,000. To date the Soviet has honoured every commercial debt most meticulously. Our manufacturers

when they accepted Soviet orders and the Export Credits Guarantee Department when it guaranteed Soviet Bills banked on the normal acceptance by this country of Russian exports to provide the means of payment. But if our Government, by the imposition of the embargo, makes it impossible for Russia to pay, what then? But that is not all. The *Financial News* of April 5, 1933, stated :—

"As regards Germany, outstanding credits to Russia are estimated at \$250,000,000 (£50,000,000) and we should remember that credits given by foreign banks to Germany have been to no small extent used ultimately for the financing of Russian business."

The *Daily Telegraph* (April 20, 1933) commented on these facts thus in its City columns :—

"It (City opinion) is, however, fully alive to the consequences which may be involved and the sequel to the Moscow trial, however necessary politically, adds yet another to the already formidable list of financial complications. The possibility arises that the effect of the embargo may be to deal a shattering blow at Russia's already weakened financial position. It may put into jeopardy the debts which the Soviet have actually outstanding in the City, and the much larger debts that the Soviet have incurred in Germany, thereby in turn rendering more difficult Germany's task of meeting her foreign obligations."

What would be the value of British foreign credits in Germany, if, as a result of the embargo, the U.S.S.R. were compelled to default on her German commitments?

It is often readily assumed that, except as a means of payment, Russian exports to us are not of importance. This is not so. To take one commodity alone, timber. Mr. R. Coppock, General Secretary of the National Federation of Building Trades' Operatives, said :—

"The speculative house builder uses Russian soft woods almost exclusively.

"He does so because it is the best at the price. The ban will seriously menace the speculative builder, and particularly those who are taking on housing schemes under the arrangement with the building societies.

"The net effect of the ban is to deal another blow at housing." (*Daily Herald*, April 20, 1933.)

Considerations of space preclude us from dealing with our other imports from Russia.

As regard our exports to the U.S.S.R., the expected has happened. The Soviet Government retaliated in kind, and as a reply to the British embargo on the entry of her goods into this country it issued decrees whereby :—

- (1) All Soviet trading organisations are forbidden to place orders with or make purchases from Britain.
- (2) Soviet citizens are forbidden to charter ships flying the British flag.
- (3) Measures to limit to the utmost the transporation of British products through Soviet territory will be promulgated.
- (4) The use of British ports or sea bases by Soviet export organisations must be limited.

Simultaneously the Commissariat of Water Transport ordered the imposition of higher dues and taxes on British ships in Soviet waters instead of the reduced rates hitherto in force under the Trade Agreement which recently expired.

What this will mean to the engineers, dockers and other Britishers who will be thrown out of employment will soon become apparent.

The imposition of the embargo is a terrible case of the cutting off of our nose to spite our face. True, the other fellow's nose is also being cut off by it, but this can be only poor consolation for the painful wound on our own face and the terrible wounds which may be inflicted as a result of it on the world as a whole.

THE TRIAL *

The trial began at twelve o'clock on April 12, 1933. The world Press was well represented; as to the British Press, the *Daily Telegraph*, *Observer*, and *Manchester Guardian* had their resident correspondents who reported the trial, the *News-Chronicle* specially sent Mr. Cummings, and *Reuters* sent an additional representative.

Further, Messrs. Metropolitan-Vickers sent a London solicitor, Mr. Robert R. J. Turner, to watch the case of the accused men on behalf of the firm. All the accused, Russian and British, were represented by Russian Counsel.

Respecting the opening stages of the trial, Mr. Cummings made some enlightening remarks:—

“ . . . Indeed, the opening stages of the trial have been a model of calmness and correctitude. There have been no demonstrations inside or outside the court building.

“ During the reading of the indictment, which lasted for more than three hours, I heard not a single ejaculation or muttered comment.” (*News Chronicle*, April 13, 1933.)

As to the charges against the Britishers, these were contained in a very long indictment,† but in brief it was alleged that:—

“ They have organised or taken part in a system of military and economic espionage; in wrecking machinery belonging to the State, and

“ In deliberate concealment of organic defects in machinery supplied by the British firm they represent.” (*News-Chronicle*, April 13, 1933.)

MORNING SESSION, APRIL 12, 1933

12 o'clock noon

After the indictment had been read, the President of the Court asked each of the accused individually whether they pleaded guilty to the charges made against them.

The accused Russians and Mr. MacDonald pleaded “ guilty.”

The Public Prosecutor, M. Vyshinsky, then suggested the following procedure, to which the defence raised no objection, and which was approved by the Court:—

“ First, to examine the facts set forth in the indictment in connection with the Zlatoust Power Station, then the

* In this chapter we give both summaries and verbatim quotations from the published report of the trial. In the case of the quotations, passages which are mainly repetition of matters already recorded or which contain comparatively unimportant details have been omitted.

† A summary of this indictment is given in the Appendix.

Cheliabinsk Power Station, then the Zuevka Power Station, then the Ivanovo Power Station, then 'Mosenergo,' the Baku Power Station, and finally, the examination of the activity of the Moscow office of Metro-Vickers as represented by those of the accused who are charged in this case: Kutuzova, Monkhouse, and Thornton. Then to examine the accused in the following order: In connection with the Zlatoust Station, Gussev, Sokolov, MacDonald, Thornton; in connection with the Cheliabinsk Station, Gussev, Vitvitsky, Oleinik, and Thornton; in connection with the Zuevka Power Station, Kotlyarevsky and MacDonald; in connection with the Ivanovo Power Station, Lobanov, Nordwall, Lebedev, Zivert; in connection with the 'Mosenergo,' Sukhoruchkin, Krashennikov, Zorin, and Thornton; in connection with the Baku Power Station, Oleinik, MacDonald, and Cushny. Thereupon to examine the accused, in the following order: Kutuzova, Monkhouse, and Thornton.

The Court adjourned at 3.30.

EVENING SESSION, APRIL 12, 1933 6.15 p.m.

The evening session began with the examination by the State Prosecutor of Gussev, chief of the Zlatoust Power Station.

Gussev testified: During the Bolshevik revolution he had been hostile toward the Soviet power, he had served in Kolchak's White Army as volunteer, which he deserted only after having realised the hopelessness of the cause of the Whites when forced to retreat East, pressed by the Red Army.

After the civil war, when engaged on Soviet work at Zlatoust, he had not abandoned his anti-Soviet sentiments; he mixed mostly with people holding anti-Soviet views, some of whom had been subsequently convicted for wrecking activities. Under the influence of this environment he himself became an active counter-revolutionary. His activities were wreckage and espionage, instigated, he alleged, by the English engineer MacDonald, with whom he had become acquainted in December, 1929.

After several months, acquaintance with MacDonald developed into friendship, and conversations turned on political subjects, particularly regarding the needlessness of the development of the machine-building industry of the U.S.S.R., the position of the technical intelligentsia under the Soviet regime, and so on.

Gussev alleged that finally MacDonald suggested that he (Gussev) should give him information of the production at Zlatoust electrical plant, and the mechanical works, particularly of work having military importance, such as manufacturing aircraft steel, ball bearings for munitions, also production of shells, particularly the number of shells turned out and their type, as well as plans for the extension of shell production.

The Prosecutor then turned to Mr. MacDonald and the following dialogue ensued:—

Vyshinsky: Accused MacDonald. You heard the testimony of Gussev? Do you corroborate what he said regarding your acquaintance in 1929?

MacDonald: Regarding our acquaintance, yes.

Vyshinsky: You corroborate that during this time, from 1929 and on, your relations with Gussev were of friendship, of intimacy?

MacDonald: From 1930 on.

Vyshinsky: You did indeed ask Gussev to furnish you the information of which he just spoke?

MacDonald: Yes, in my personal interests.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps you will explain more exactly what you mean by your own interests? Did you ask Gussev for information on the power supply?

MacDonald: I did.

Vyshinsky: Military information?

MacDonald: I did.

In the course of further questioning by the Public Prosecutor, Gussev enumerated a number of wrecking acts committed by himself or by others (particularly the accused Sokolov who, said Gussev, had been mentioned to him by Mr. MacDonald as useful for the work of causing breakdowns) on his instructions, including damage of a number of boilers, freezing one boiler, disarrangement of 1,400 h.p. motor upon which depended the entire work of munition plants, &c.

Gussev's above confessions were confirmed by Sokolov, Assistant Chief at Zlatoust Electric Power Station, when questioned by the Prosecutor.

M. Vyshinsky then turned to Mr. MacDonald and asked: "Do you corroborate this part of Gussev's testimony; to which Mr. MacDonald replied, "I do."

Gussev further stated that being a non-family man and receiving 500 to 600 roubles salary monthly, he had no pecuniary interests in the 3,000 roubles which he alleged MacDonald gave him for committing wrecking acts. His wrecking activities were chiefly prompted by ideological motives, namely, hostility towards the Soviet Power.

The following dialogue then took place:—

Vyshinsky: Accused MacDonald, do you corroborate Gussev's testimony in this part, or not?

MacDonald: I gave him money.

Vyshinsky: How much?

MacDonald: About 3,500 roubles.

Vyshinsky: Where did you get it?

MacDonald: From the firm. From the Moscow office.

Vyshinsky: From whom personally?

MacDonald: Through Chief Engineer Thornton.

In the course of further examination, Gussev described a plan he had worked out together with Sokolov for dismantling a coal conveyor, and which he alleged he had communicated to Mr. MacDonald.

The latter was questioned on this :—

Vyshinsky : One question to MacDonald. Accused MacDonald, do you or do you not confirm the evidence of Gussev that the plan for dismantling the coal conveyor was known to you ?

MacDonald : It was not known to me.

Vyshinsky : Did Gussev discuss it with you ?

MacDonald : No.

Vyshinsky : But he told you about it ?

MacDonald : I heard about it afterwards.

Vyshinsky : You heard about it afterwards ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : When ?

MacDonald : When I met him.

Vyshinsky : And you were acquainted with this question ?

MacDonald : It was news to me.

Vyshinsky : When you met him and he had told you, then from that time you were acquainted with the question ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : And until then you knew nothing ?

MacDonald : No.

Gussev further said that Mr. Thornton, after his arrival at Zlatoust, was informed about their wrecking plans. Gussev also stated that he met Thornton only during work because he was warned by MacDonald that meetings outside work were undesirable. Gussev was introduced to Thornton in Gussev's room at the electrical station.

When discussing plans submitted by Gussev at Zlatoust Station, the question arose that the supply of electric energy by the Cheliabinsk Station, which partly fed the Zlatoust plant, might disarrange the plan of lowering the productivity of the Zlatoust plant and the partial suspension of its separate shops ; Thornton, however, is alleged to have said that one could be sure about Cheliabinsk Station because the station was under their influence.

Soon after that, Gussev became connected with the Chief Engineer of Cheliabinsk Station, Vitvitsky, with whom he afterwards maintained regular relations. In his turn, Vitvitsky informed Gussev of his acquaintance with Thornton, to whom he alleged he had already given information about work at the Cheliabinsk Station.

Questioned by the State Prosecutor, Gussev declared that during a meeting with Thornton in Zlatoust he had acquainted Thornton with the mobilisation plan for the electric supply from Zlatoust plant in case of war.

After the departure of MacDonald from Zlatoust in April, 1931, Gussev said that he did not discontinue his connection with him, but carried on correspondence. In this correspondence Gussev said he used false names for his information. Thus, when informing him about the weekly output of shells by the plant he wrote "production of canned goods." His letters he signed with false names.

The State Prosecutor was informed by Gussev that he had received from MacDonald a parcel which was sent through the accused, Kutuzova, Secretary to the Moscow office of Metro-Vickers. Kutuzova confirmed that she had sent a parcel also under a false name.

In accordance with Gussev's evidence and replies to the State Prosecutor, it appears that members of the counter-revolutionary group at Zlatoust used false names ; for instance, Raibinin was called "wood," another was called "fitter," &c.

Gussev said he was afraid to write detailed letters about State wrecking activities, and only after arrival at Zuevka in the second half of September, 1932, did he give MacDonald a detailed report.

M. Roginsky (Assistant Public Prosecutor) then had the following dialogue with Mr. MacDonald :—

Roginsky : A question to MacDonald. Do you confirm Gussev's evidence about his visit to you at Zuevka and the detailed information he gave you about the wrecking activities carried out by him at the Zlatoust Power Station ?

MacDonald : Yes, he said that such breakages did take place.

Roginsky : He informed you that there was a breakdown of the coal conveyor, and the boilers, that there was delay in the installation of the boilers ?

MacDonald : Only about the breakages.

Roginsky : Do you confirm that you asked him by a special letter to come to Zuevka ?

MacDonald : Not on this business.

Roginsky : On what business, then ?

MacDonald : I wanted to see him.

Roginsky : What for, and on what matter ?

MacDonald : On no definite matter.

Roginsky : Have you heard Gussev's evidence that he went with the object of giving you information about the counter-revolutionary work which he carried out in Zlatoust ? Is that evidence correct ?

MacDonald : No, he received no such invitation from me.

Roginsky : But he gave you this information upon his arrival ?

MacDonald : Yes.

The President : The Court will adjourn for twenty minutes.

After the interval, the examination of Gussev continued. Gussev stated that he had also personally reported about the

wrecking activities to Thornton when meeting him at the station at Khartsisk.

Then came the following dialogue:—

Roginsky: Accused Thornton, do you confirm Gussev's evidence about his meeting you at Khartsisk Station?

Thornton: Yes, I do.

Roginsky: This meeting did take place?

Thornton: Yes, it did.

Roginsky: Do you confirm having met him twice at Zlatoust?

Thornton: Yes, I do.

Roginsky: So your testimony, so far as it concerns your meetings with Gussev, is correct?

Thornton: Yes, it is correct.

Roginsky: I have no more questions to put to Thornton. Accused Gussev, your departure from Khartsisk to Zlatoust was connected with some new tasks or instructions in connection with your wrecking activities?

Gussev: I was to take measures to keep the capacity of the power station at the level to which it was reduced in consequence of our wrecking activities, *i.e.*, half the normal, and then, in the event of military complications, in the event of war, to cause breakdowns which should bring about a stoppage of production at the Zlatoust works affecting the output of high-grade steel as well as the output of shells.

Roginsky: So the task set was to keep the station running at half of its capacity and prepare a number of very serious wrecking acts against the event of war. Is that so?

Gussev: That is so.

Vyshinsky: I have a question to put to the accused Gussev. Accused Gussev, I am interested in the following question. First you said that the information you supplied about the Zlatoust works was being transmitted to MacDonald. Is that so?

Gussev: Yes, that is what I said.

Vyshinsky: Did Thornton know you were passing on information to MacDonald?

Gussev: I have already said that on Mr. Thornton's first visit he knew that I was engaged in espionage work on the instructions of Mr. MacDonald.

Vyshinsky: So Thornton knew about it when he paid his first visit?

Gussev: Yes, he did.

Vyshinsky: Allow me to put a question to Thornton. Accused Thornton, do you confirm Gussev's evidence in this part?

Thornton: No.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, you did not know that Gussev was supplying MacDonald with information?

Thornton: Allow me to ask—information about breakdowns?

Vyshinsky: No, spying information.

Thornton: Spying information—no; but information about the general condition of the station—yes, in so far as it interested the firm.

Vyshinsky: We do not say, in so far as it interested the firm, we say in so far as it interested you. You and the firm are not one and the same thing. I am asking whether you knew that Gussev had connection with MacDonald through which he, Gussev, gave MacDonald information of a nature that he described as spying information. Do you understand my question?

Thornton: I do not confirm the word "spying."

Vyshinsky: Let us leave this word out for the moment. Accused Thornton, is Gussev's evidence that you, Thornton, knew that he, Gussev, was giving MacDonald information about the Zlatoust works correct?

Thornton: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Well, was the evidence which you gave when you were confronted with Gussev on March 15 correct or not? Do you remember the occasion, or shall I remind you of that?

Thornton: I would like to be reminded.

Vyshinsky: Let me remind you. Page 71 of the dossier, Volume XVIII, a question put to Thornton: "In your deposition of March 12 you stated that Engineer Gussev of the electric power station of the Zlatoust works was connected with MacDonald who for a period of several years transmitted to you detailed information regarding the situation in the Zlatoust district and regarding the technical condition of the power station and power installations. Do you confirm this? Reply: 'Yes, MacDonald transmitted to me such information, received by him from Gussev.'"

Do you confirm this?

Thornton: This I confirm.

Vyshinsky: We can say, then, that you confirm this part of the record of the investigation of March 15 when you were confronted with Gussev?

Thornton: Yes.

Vyshinsky: The second question. You know that Gussev's connection with MacDonald was not accidental, but was of a regular nature, and he was regularly and systematically supplying him with various information?

Thornton: I didn't know that.

Vyshinsky: Then perhaps I should remind you of what you said during that confrontation?

Thornton: Yes, please.

The President: The same confrontation?

Vyshinsky: Yes.

Page 71, Volume XVIII. "Do you admit that Engineer Gussev was your and MacDonald's agent in the Zlatoust district as you deposed?" You replied: "Yes, I think it is right."

Do you confirm this ?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : Why did you say it, then ?

Thornton : I do not say that I was forced to say it.

Vyshinsky : Then permit me to ask—did you say it ?

Thornton : Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky : That is to say, what is written in the records is actually what you said ?

Thornton : Yes, that is what I said.

Vyshinsky : Did you speak the truth, or was it an untruth ?

Thornton : In this case it was an untruth.

Vyshinsky : Do you usually speak the truth, or not ?

Thornton : In this case I did not speak the truth. I was excited.

Vyshinsky : That is to say, when you are excited you don't speak the truth ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : You are not excited now ?

Thornton : No, I am not excited.

Vyshinsky : That is to say, you are now speaking the truth ?

Thornton : Now I am speaking the truth.

Vyshinsky : Why, then, did you write this and not something else ? You said : " I think it is right." You did not affirm, but you thought. I ask why, when you were excited, you thought precisely this and not something else ? Were you forced to do it ?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : You said this voluntarily ?

Thornton : Voluntarily.

Vyshinsky : Perhaps some special methods were applied to you ?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : Were you tortured ?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : Third degree ?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : I have no more questions.

The President : Has the Prosecution any more questions to put to the accused Gussev ?

The Prosecution : No.

The President : Does the Defence wish to put any questions to the accused Gussev ?

In the course of questions by the Defence lawyers, Gussev related how at times he wavered and desired to give up his wrecking work—partly because of its danger, but mainly because he began to feel that he was along a wrong path. Gussev also related how he had been visited by the O.G.P.U. after one

damage had occurred. When he reported this incident to MacDonald, the latter, so Gussev alleged, promised to arrange his (Gussev's) flight abroad should his position become hopeless.

In reply to Braude (Counsel for Mr. Thornton), Gussev stated that Vitvitsky had told him that at the suggestion of Thornton, he had agreed to give information concerning the work of the Cheliabinsk Power Station, whereupon the following dialogue ensued :—

Braude : Accused Thornton, do you confirm that you met Vitvitsky and had a conversation with him as Gussev had just stated ?

Thornton : I was in Cheliabinsk and saw him . . .

Braude : Did any conversation take place in the nature of those mentioned ?

Thornton : Absolutely none.

Braude : The accused Gussev testifies that you gave instructions and tasks of a wrecking character. Did this take place, or not ? Had you any information to the effect that wrecking actions of this kind were being done by Gussev, and in connection with whose tasks ?

Thornton : I did not know this.

Braude : You did not know it, because you did not give such instructions ?

Thornton : No.

Braude : During the examination did you say anywhere, at any time, that you knew, or that you gave instructions, or had been informed about wrecking acts, or did you say nothing anywhere ?

Thornton : I never said anything.

Braude : You said nothing. In this respect your testimony does not differ from your previous testimony ?

Thornton : I never said that I gave instructions or knew anything concerning wrecking.

Braude : In the beginning you mentioned here that you were aware of the fact that information was being collected by Gussev for your employees. State more precisely what sort of information, what kind of data, and why it was collected.

Thornton : Information about electric power stations.

Braude : About what in particular ? Not about the painting or about their outward appearance. What sort of information ?

Thornton : The work of our equipment. About the work of that which feeds our equipment, viz., the boilers. About that which takes the energy from our equipment, i.e., the construction of the transformers. This was necessary so that, should there be a breakdown with a machine, we should have every opportunity of finding the cause.

Braude : Who received this information ?

Thornton : I received it from MacDonald.

Braude : So certain types of information were received by you, but it was limited to the sort of which you have just informed us ?

Thornton : Yes.

Braude : Did you hand money over to the apparatus for this information ?

Thornton : For the information, no. I only once gave money to MacDonald.

The President : I do not understand the character of the questions to the accused. We have not yet finished examining the accused Gussev. We have not yet examined MacDonald and Thornton. The questions you are asking concern MacDonald and Thornton.

Braude : In connection with Gussev's deposition I have no other questions.

Vyshinsky : Since a question connected with Thornton has been touched upon here, I would ask to be allowed to put a few questions to Thornton.

The President : Granted.

Vyshinsky : Accused Thornton. I did not quite comprehend your answer to the question put by Braude, Counsel for the Defence, as to whether Zlatoust interested you or not ?

Thornton : It interested me.

Vyshinsky : You personally, or as a representative of your firm ?

Thornton : As a representative of the firm.

Vyshinsky : Perhaps you would explain why during the preliminary examination you said that you were not much interested in Zlatoust. You said that ?

Thornton : I did say so.

Vyshinsky : It would appear that the one contradicts the other.

Thornton : Of course, I was more interested in the big power station.

Vyshinsky : I am asking you how do you explain the fact that at the preliminary examination you said that in the interests of your firm, Zlatoust was not of much interest to you.

Thornton : Allow me to speak through an interpreter.

The President : All right.

Vyshinsky : How is it that Mr. Thornton at the preliminary examination stated the following. Allow me to read the passage from his deposition : "I was not much interested in receiving information from Zlatoust."

Thornton : Please translate this : I want to say that Zlatoust is of comparatively small interest.

Vyshinsky : In comparison with what ? I am now interested in the degree to which the information which Thornton collected about Zlatoust interested him and whether it interested him at all. Here there are two testimonies. In one place it says that

it interested him as representative of the firm, and in the other place it says that it was not of much interest to him as a representative of the firm. How do you explain this ?

Thornton : Any contradictions ? There is, yes. There is, yes.

Vyshinsky : How do you explain this contradiction ?

Thornton : The contradiction is this : that what is written in the Russian is apparently that I took no interest in the Zlatoust station.

Vyshinsky : You said not much interested.

Thornton : At all power stations, one and the same information is interesting to my firm.

Vyshinsky : I know that it is the same information.

Thornton : Since there was only one small turbo-generator station in Zlatoust, it interested me less than a station of a larger size.

Vyshinsky : True. There was only one small turbine there, consequently you were less interested in Zlatoust than in the others. Is that so ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Then there is the next question. Did you give MacDonald 1,500 roubles in connection with the information received from Zlatoust ?

Thornton : Yes. During the preliminary examination I did not know the exact sum, but since then I have been able to check up the sum paid.

Vyshinsky : How much money did you give MacDonald in connection with Zlatoust ?

Thornton : I gave 2,000 roubles.

Vyshinsky : You said before 1,500 roubles, we will make a correction, not 1,500 but 2,000. You gave this money for receiving information about Zlatoust ?

Thornton : That is not correct. I said during the examination that it was different.

Vyshinsky : Then what ?

Thornton : It was like this. First of all it was . . . (tries to read from notes).

Vyshinsky : Can you not answer without notes ?

The President : What notes ?

Vyshinsky : Thornton is answering from notes.

The President : The question does not refer to figures or statistics so I see no reason for the notes. Are you tired ?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : Why did you give this money if Zlatoust did not interest you ?

Thornton : I gave MacDonald the money for Zuevka.

Vyshinsky : Then I do not understand what you said before.

Thornton : I said that I gave MacDonald 1,500 roubles, but I gave 1,900 roubles, and I made that correction when the

examination took place with Assistant Prosecutor Vyshinsky. I gave this money in 1932 for Zuevka.

Vyshinsky: This is of no interest to me. I am interested in something different. I will read the deposition of March 27:—

Volume XVIII, on page 338 of the dossier. You said the following: "I gave 1,500 roubles to MacDonald at his request. Since Zlatoust was not of much interest to me as representative of the firm, I cannot explain why MacDonald required so much money and where and on what he spent it." Do you confirm this?

Thornton: I confirm that.

Vyshinsky: I am through.

Thornton: I wanted to explain the affair in more detail.

Vyshinsky: You will explain this in more detail later.

After further questioning of Gussev both by the Prosecutor and the Defence, the accused were asked whether they had any questions and, on their replying in the negative, the Court adjourned at 10 p.m. (Moscow time).

MORNING SESSION, APRIL 13, 1933,

10.15 a.m.

At the morning session, April 13, the trial was reopened with the examination of the defendant Sokolov, Assistant Head of the Zlatoust Plant, who related his autobiography. Amongst other things he stated that he had fought against the Bolsheviks in the ranks of the White Army. After the destruction of the White Armies he specialised in electrical erection work. In 1925 he arrived at Zlatoust, where he subsequently occupied various positions on the electric plant.

Sokolov stated that he had always been anti-Soviet, and became even more so at Zlatoust, where he met the defendant Gussev, whom he had known before. Since 1927 he had carried out wrecking acts at Zlatoust from time to time with the object of delaying various erection works, plant, &c., but he had not belonged to any counter-revolutionary organisation. However, his active organised counter-revolutionary work, alleged Sokolov, commenced in 1930 at the moment of his acquaintance with MacDonald, Gussev having introduced him.

Sokolov told of drinking parties which, he stated, took place at MacDonald's flat where anti-Soviet talks prevailed. Sarcastic, ironic toasts, said Sokolov, were drunk, such as "To the Five-Year Plan in Ten Years!" In other surroundings, said Sokolov, he conversed with MacDonald on the difficult position of the workers, engineering intelligentsia, the impossibility of the industrialisation of the U.S.S.R., and the possibility of foreign complications and intervention.

However, their wrecking activity, their development of plans for diversion* in case of war, the charging of Sokolov and Gussev with the execution of these plans in the event of war by MacDonald, all this was done, stated Sokolov, in a sober state. He stated further that he gave MacDonald information as to the number of workers, and regarding the grades of high-grade steel produced for war purposes.

The State Prosecutor then turned to Mr. MacDonald and the following dialogue ensued:—

Vyshinsky: Accused MacDonald, did you hear Sokolov's testimony?

MacDonald: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What have you to say about Sokolov's testimony to the effect that you gave out commissions for the organising of breakdowns and acts of diversion and the collection of espionage information?

MacDonald: To whom?

Vyshinsky: To Sokolov and Gussev.

MacDonald: No.

Vyshinsky: Then to whom did you give them?

MacDonald: I had dealings with Gussev.

Vyshinsky: That means you said this to Gussev?

MacDonald: Yes.

Vyshinsky: It follows that you here confirm your deposition at the preliminary investigation, where you deposed to this effect.

MacDonald: I do not understand.

Vyshinsky: On page 205, Volume XIX, April 2, 1933, Sheinin, the Investigating Judge on Important Cases, questioned MacDonald, who deposed: "In addition to the testimonies I have given before, I state as follows: I confirm that in my conversation with Sokolov at the end of 1930, I have not given him definite instructions on wrecking of equipment, but I told him that he and Gussev had to undertake the taking out of service of plant and that he (Sokolov) had to come to an understanding directly with Gussev."

MacDonald: I did not give Sokolov orders to carry out breakdowns.

Vyshinsky: Then why did you depose to this effect at the preliminary investigation?

MacDonald: Because I considered that it was convenient to make that statement under those circumstances.

Vyshinsky: Under what circumstances? Were any special methods of examination applied to you?

MacDonald: No.

* In Soviet legal terminology, *diversion* means criminal acts, punishable by Articles 58-9 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., which consist in the destruction, damaging and similar acts against State property important for the defence of the country.

Vyshinsky : Were you forced to write this ?

MacDonald : No, but I signed it because it was not the open court.

Vyshinsky : Were you compelled to do so ?

MacDonald : In the beginning I refused to do it.

Vyshinsky : Where ?

MacDonald : Before the investigator—when the investigator said, "Sign," I said, "No." But he did not allow me to do otherwise.

Vyshinsky : He forced you to ?

MacDonald : (No answer.)

Vyshinsky : At the close of the preliminary investigation, did you receive the record from the Public Prosecutor where you were declared accused ; and was it proposed to you at the same time, according to the law, to make any statement, if you so cared to do, about the procedure of the preliminary investigation ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : You were notified that you have the right to put forward any claims you may have in connection with the preliminary investigation. Did you make any statement to the effect that your deposition does not correspond to the fact ?

MacDonald : No.

Vyshinsky : And why didn't you tell anyone ?

MacDonald : As I didn't want to state to anybody.

Vyshinsky : Why didn't you want to make statements you are prepared to make now ?

MacDonald : I do not want to discuss this point.

Vyshinsky : Do you understand the significance of this written deposition ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Perhaps you will at least answer one question. Yesterday, in reply to the question as to whether you consider yourself guilty of the charges brought against you, you declared : "Yes, guilty." Do you deny this to-day, or do you confirm that you are guilty ?

MacDonald : According to the testimony given by myself, I plead guilty ; in actual fact, not guilty.

Vyshinsky : I am not asking about that. Yesterday, did you say that you consider yourself guilty or didn't you ? Perhaps I dreamed it all.

MacDonald : Yesterday I pleaded guilty.

Vyshinsky : And to-day ?

MacDonald : To-day in accordance with what I have just said, not guilty.

Vyshinsky : It follows that we may expect that perhaps to-morrow you will do the opposite.

MacDonald : No.

Vyshinsky : Yesterday you said that you gave Gussev instructions about the breakdown of the 1,400 h.p. motor. Did you give Gussev such instructions, or not ?

MacDonald : The remarks that I made to Gussev about the motor were to the effect that the motor was in such a bad condition, it needed replacement. How he interpreted this, I cannot answer.

Vyshinsky : It is definitely known how Gussev interpreted it. He obtained direct instructions from you to the effect that the motor should be put out of service by means of a breakdown. In reply to my question to you as to whether you confirm this or not (this is fixed in the stenogram), you declared yesterday, "Yes, I confirm it." I now ask, do you confirm this now or not ?

MacDonald : I agree that it was written in my testimony. What I wrote was in agreement with my statement of yesterday.

Vyshinsky : True. Do you agree with it ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : In order to finish the dialogue on this question, I want to know whether you received information from Sokolov or not ?

MacDonald : What sort of information ?

Vyshinsky : That about which you spoke yesterday, about which Gussev spoke yesterday, and about which Sokolov spoke to-day.

MacDonald : Sokolov told me of a number of people employed in the various works, and general remarks of such a nature.

Vyshinsky : Let us stop at that. Did you pay for this ?

MacDonald : No.

Vyshinsky : Accused Sokolov, did you receive any money from MacDonald ?

Sokolov : I received a thousand roubles through Gussev.

Vyshinsky : Accused Gussev, did you hand a thousand roubles to Sokolov ?

Gussev : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Accused MacDonald, did you hand a thousand roubles to Gussev ?

MacDonald : In general I gave money to Gussev.

Vyshinsky : What did you give Gussev money for ?

MacDonald : At various times the workmen employed on the erection of the Metro-Vickers turbine worked very much overtime, sometimes twenty-four hours.

Vyshinsky : So it was for overtime work ?

MacDonald : Yes.

The President : Accused MacDonald, was Gussev in your service ?

MacDonald : No.

The President : Why, then, do you speak of overtime work ?

MacDonald : For overtime work, for work 24 hours on end.

Vyshinsky : Were they paid wages?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Besides this, you paid them also ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Through Gussev ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : And you paid big sums of money ?

MacDonald : As far as I can remember, for the whole time, I used about 2,500 roubles.

Vyshinsky : Then you confirm that you paid 2,500 roubles for so-called overtime work ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Where did you get the 2,500 roubles for overtime work ?

MacDonald : Part of the money was my own and part of it I received from the Moscow office of Metro-Vickers.

Vyshinsky : From whom precisely in the Moscow office of Metropolitan-Vickers ?

MacDonald : From the chief engineer of the erection department, Mr. Thornton.

Vyshinsky : So part came from Thornton and part from your personal funds ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : So in order to pay for overtime work put in by the mechanics at the Zlatoust Station, you used your own money and paid for the work of the mechanics out of your pocket ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : And you think that this is a plausible explanation, that you paid with your money ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Very good. Did you have a great amount of such personal funds ?

MacDonald : No, I cannot remember.

Vyshinsky : But did you have a great deal ?

MacDonald : All the money I had was 600 or 700 roubles.

Vyshinsky : So out of 600 to 700 roubles you paid 2,500 ?

MacDonald : The 600 to 700 roubles was my own money.

Vyshinsky : And then ?

MacDonald : I also had money which I obtained from the office of Metro-Vickers.

Vyshinsky : From Thornton ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : And did Thornton give you much ?

MacDonald : No, I cannot remember exactly, but I think I had about 1,500 roubles.

Vyshinsky : About 1,500 roubles and a further 600 makes 2,100. Is that right ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : The six hundred roubles of your own money that you paid the workers out of your own pocket, were they refunded by the Moscow office or were they lost ?

MacDonald : They were lost.

Vyshinsky : When were you arrested ?

MacDonald : The 11th of March.

Vyshinsky : When were you questioned for the first time ?

MacDonald : The following day.

Vyshinsky : Please listen to this part of the deposition—the second paragraph of the first page. I will ask the translator to read it in English.

The Interpreter (reads the above-mentioned deposition in English) : “Whilst I was there I made it my business to find out all I could about the political, economical and military state of the country. In this I was greatly helped by engineer Gussev of the power station and various men employed by him, Sokolov and others.”

Vyshinsky : What have you to say about it ?

MacDonald : What I said before, that under the circumstances I considered it was necessary to make the statement after other testimony was presented.

Vyshinsky : What testimony ?

MacDonald : The first testimony which I saw was written by Mr. Thornton.

Vyshinsky : So you spoke under the influence of the deposition of Thornton ?

MacDonald : I was shown the deposition of Mr. Thornton.

The President : Of what date ?

Vyshinsky : He was arrested on the 11th ; evidently it was the 12th. I do not yet know what your answer to my question is : “Under whose influence did you make such a deposition ?”

MacDonald : After reading the text of Mr. Thornton’s testimony which was shown to me in the dossier, and after having seen all this, I decided that under those circumstances, having so much evidence against me, it was necessary to give such deposition.

Vyshinsky : So it was Thornton’s deposition which made you give such a deposition ?

MacDonald : Not the evidence given by Mr. Thornton, but the fact that there was such evidence.

Vyshinsky : Accused MacDonald, you made a deposition on March 18 owing to the fact that you were confronted with the deposition of Thornton. Will you please tell us what was contained in this deposition of Thornton ?

MacDonald : In Thornton’s deposition it is written that Thornton had used me to gather information in the Zlatoust district, and that Gussev was also used for the same purpose. The names of some English engineers were also mentioned.

Vyshinsky: In the deposition of March 13, MacDonald says: "Whilst I was there I made it my business to find out all I could about the political, economic and military state of the country. In this I was greatly helped by engineer Gussev of the power station and various men employed by him, Sokolov and others."

I am interested in this part—about the military situation of the country. Why did you make this deposition on March 13? It would seem that you were first shown Thornton's deposition which exposed the same thing. Have I understood you right?

MacDonald: I wish to be understood in this way. I saw the deposition of Mr. Thornton, and I also saw a large book which was said to contain other depositions and so decided that it was no use on my part to deny the charges.

Vyshinsky: You decided that it was useless to deny any longer. Is that right?

MacDonald: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to the Court): I wish to question the accused Thornton.

The President: Certainly.

Vyshinsky: Accused Thornton, did you hear the interrogation?

Thornton: Yes, I heard it.

Vyshinsky: MacDonald here stated that when he was examined on March 13 regarding the military situation of the country, and when he made his deposition, he did it under the impression of your deposition, the deposition of Thornton. Did you make such depositions in which you said that you or MacDonald gathered military information?

Thornton: There was such a deposition: page 26, March 13.

Vyshinsky: So it was not the day before, March 12, but the same day.

Thornton: It was late at night or early in the morning.

Vyshinsky: The 14th?

Thornton: No, I think it was the 13th.

Vyshinsky: Did you make such a deposition?

Thornton: I made it, but I wish to state that this deposition was not correct?

Vyshinsky: And under whose influence did you make this deposition? MacDonald made it under your influence and you evidently did so under his influence? Why did you make an untrue deposition?

Thornton: Because I was very excited and lost my courage.

Vyshinsky: Why did you lose your courage?

Thornton: Under the influence of events.

The President: What events?

Thornton: My arrest.

Vyshinsky: So you were arrested and the arrest made an impression on you.

Thornton: Not the arrest, but this terrible charge.

Vyshinsky: Yesterday you gave three replies to three of my questions as to whether you were compelled to make a deposition. You said, no.

Thornton: Nor do I say it now.

Vyshinsky: And were you shown depositions previously?

Thornton: Summaries of depositions were read to me.

Vyshinsky: Whose?

Thornton: Monkhouse's.

Vyshinsky: Did he also give you away?

Thornton: And MacDonald's.

Vyshinsky: So MacDonald made a deposition under the impression of your deposition which was shown to him. But you made a deposition under the impression of MacDonald's deposition which was shown to you. Which of these depositions came first?

Thornton: I don't quite understand.

The President: In other words, who gave the other away? Did Thornton betray MacDonald, or MacDonald, Thornton?

Thornton: I don't know.

Vyshinsky: Let me record the following fact: MacDonald explains his deposition of March 13 by saying that he was previously confronted with the deposition of Thornton. Under the influence of this deposition, he decided that there was no use in denying the matter any longer and began to say what he did say. Is that true, MacDonald?

MacDonald: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Thornton states that he gave his deposition under the influence of the deposition of MacDonald which was presented to him. Is that so?

Thornton: And other depositions.

Vyshinsky: At present I am interested in MacDonald. Is that true?

Thornton: Not entirely.

Vyshinsky: In this part? In the military part?

Thornton: I gave a plainly false deposition.

Vyshinsky: We shall examine later whether it was false or not.

Thornton: I say that it was false. You can say what you like.

Vyshinsky: I shall say nothing more than you do. MacDonald says that he made his deposition on March 13 under the influence of your deposition. Did I understand you rightly that in this part you made your deposition under the influence of MacDonald's deposition which was shown to you?

Thornton: And others.

Vyshinsky: Quite so. Is that right?

Thornton: Right.

Vyshinsky : It remains undecided which deposition was first. It seems that you influenced each other. But something preceded something. Can you explain this ?

Thornton : It was not given into my hand. A dossier was taken and read to me.

Vyshinsky : Accused MacDonald, in this same deposition of March 13, you confessed to having received "... secret information relative to: (1) the work of military shops of the mechanical and metallurgical work, including the production of the shell shops, the quality, the quantity of the shells made, their types and other data; (2) the development of military shops". . . . Do you confirm that you said this ?

MacDonald : Yes, I said so.

Vyshinsky : Correct, you said so. But that was not really the case ? You did not receive this information ?

MacDonald : Gussev said that they make large shells and small ones.

Vyshinsky : So in this part you confirm that you received information on shells from Gussev. Am I correct ?

MacDonald : Correct.

Vyshinsky : And so you really received this information about shells from Gussev ?

MacDonald : Yes, he told me that they were being made there.

Vyshinsky : Has this information about shells any relation to the Metro-Vickers Company or not ?

MacDonald : None whatever.

Vyshinsky : None whatever. Why then did you, an employee of the Metro-Vickers Company, receive information which has no relation to the Metro-Vickers Company ? For whom did you receive it ?

MacDonald : For no one. For myself.

Vyshinsky : Why were you interested in shells ?

MacDonald : Out of curiosity.

Vyshinsky : Curiosity is a great vice.

I have no further questions for MacDonald at present.

The President : I have a question. Why did you decide to make yourself ridiculous to-day in the eyes of the Court and the public present ?

MacDonald : I do not think that I look ridiculous.

The President : I have another question wherewith to check the accused Thornton this time. You stated in reply to the question of the Public Prosecutor that you made your deposition on March 12, the second day after your arrest, because you lost your courage. Do you remember when your courage returned and on what date ?

Thornton : My courage returned on April 4.

The President : At what hour ?

Thornton : At six o'clock.

After further questioning of Sokolov, M. Vyshinsky summed up the position as follows :—

And so, Sokolov received 1,000 roubles from Gussev. Gussev received 1,000 roubles and over, from MacDonald. Sokolov, Gussev and MacDonald confirmed it.

Secondly, Sokolov gave information of a military character of State and military importance. This is confirmed by Sokolov and MacDonald, that he received such information. Am I right ?

Sokolov : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Gussev, is that right ?

Gussev : Yes.

Vyshinsky : MacDonald, is that right ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : I have no further questions.

The President : Has the Defence any questions to ask Sokolov ?

Defence : No.

The President : Have the accused any questions to ask Sokolov ?

The Accused : No.

The President : The court will take a recess for twenty minutes.

We have quoted here very fully because Mr. MacDonald's retractions were given great prominence in the Press, but his subsequent replies and admissions at the same sitting of the Court both before the twenty minutes interval above mentioned and after were only published in very summarised forms.

There was nothing extraordinary about this 20 minutes interval. Such intervals, as the official records show, occurred at every session of the Court.

Shortly after the re-assembly, Mr. MacDonald's turn to give evidence arrived, and he was examined as follow :—

Vyshinsky : You arrived in Leningrad towards the end of 1928, or in the beginning of 1929 ?

MacDonald : At the end of 1928.

Vyshinsky : When in Leningrad, did you collect any information ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : What information ?

MacDonald : As indicated in my depositions.

Vyshinsky : Perhaps you will allow me to state what it was. If necessary, it will be translated. You said that you engaged in systematic economic espionage. Do you confirm this ?

MacDonald : I confirm it.

Vyshinsky : Political—do you confirm that ?

MacDonald : I confirm it.

Vyshinsky : And military ?

MacDonald : I confirm it.

Vyshinsky : And where did you get the information of a military character ?

MacDonald : Near our electric power station there was the "Bolshevik" Works.

Vyshinsky : What information did you get from the "Bolshevik" or about the "Bolshevik" ?

MacDonald : Aeroplane motors are made there, and tested there.

Vyshinsky : And besides aeroplane motors, did you receive information about the firing ranges where artillery is tested ?

MacDonald : Whatever there was to hear.

Vyshinsky : So you obtained information about the testing of guns. Is that so ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : For what purpose did you collect this information, what was it required for ?

MacDonald : These inquiries were of interest to me.

Vyshinsky : Very well. At the preliminary investigation you testified that not you alone and not only you personally were engaged in this intelligence work, but that you carried on this intelligence activity under the guidance of certain other persons. Do you confirm this ?

MacDonald : All that I found out there, I passed on in conversation to Mr. Thornton.

Vyshinsky : Including the information about the firing range, guns, aeroplane motors ? You communicated this also to Thornton ?

MacDonald : Yes, this also.

Vyshinsky : It follows then that you confirm your testimony to the effect that intelligence work was carried on in the U.S.S.R. under the guidance of Thornton ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Do you also confirm that besides Thornton, several other engineers of the Metro-Vickers' firm were participants in this intelligence work ?

MacDonald : I did not know, but I assumed as much.

Vyshinsky : I have this question : did you speak to Gussev about wrecking equipment ? Your preliminary deposition about the 1,400 h.p. motor, do you confirm it or not ?

MacDonald : I confirm what I deposed.

Vyshinsky : Did Thornton give you any instructions to carry out ?

MacDonald : What instructions ?

Vyshinsky : That you should collect various information.

MacDonald : Yes, he spoke about that to me.

Vyshinsky : Permit me to ask you this now : at the preliminary investigation you testified that Thornton was interested in certain questions—political, economic, military—and that you had collected information about the food situation, about the functioning of the "Bolshevik" Works, about aeroplane motors, about the production of guns, and that all this information you passed on to Thornton in December, 1929, is that right ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Thornton) : You have heard MacDonald's testimony where he says that in December, 1929, he gave you information about aeroplane motors, about the functioning of the "Bolshevik" Works. Do you confirm this ?

Thornton : I do not remember him having said that, but I knew myself that the "Bolshevik" Works makes guns.

Vyshinsky : And you do not remember whether there was any conversation with MacDonald about guns, motors, &c. ?

Thornton : I do not remember.

Vyshinsky : So, when he says that he informed you—

Thornton (interrupting) : He is not telling the truth.

Vyshinsky : Then you say—

Thornton (interrupting) : I do not remember him saying that.

Vyshinsky : But you cannot say that he is not telling the truth : you cannot assert that this is not true.

Thornton : I say that I do not remember that, but I say that I knew about the functioning of the "Bolshevik" Works and about the firing range. When they shoot there all the windows shake in the power station.

Vyshinsky : But not all those who hear the shooting know all that is to be known about these guns.

Thornton : They know what I know. I know that there is a firing range there, and nothing more.

Vyshinsky : That is rather little.

Thornton : Yes, that is very little.

Vyshinsky : MacDonald tells a different story. Of course, when it is a question of guns, well, all right, everybody hears them. But when it is the question of an aeroplane motor ?

Thornton : The motor is tested opposite the power station on the other side of the Neva and these motors make a lot of noise, so that everybody can hear that noise as well.

Vyshinsky : So you only heard the noise, and nothing more ?

Thornton : Nothing more.

Vyshinsky : Then MacDonald gave you no information ?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : And yet MacDonald asserts that he did. (To MacDonald) : You did say that, did you not ?

MacDonald : Yes, we had such a conversation.

Vyshinsky: MacDonald, at the examination you deposed that: "Thornton asked me to obtain information about the manufacture of munitions." Do you confirm this?

MacDonald: I confirm it.

Vyshinsky (to Thornton): Perhaps you will recollect?

Thornton: I never asked for military information to be collected.

Vyshinsky: When confronted with MacDonald, he declared that you were interested in and obtained information from MacDonald concerning matters of military defence and offence characterising the military defensive and offensive possibilities of the Soviet Union.

Thornton: As far as I remember, MacDonald did say that.

Vyshinsky: And you confirmed it?

Thornton: No.

Vyshinsky: You did not confirm it then?

Thornton: No.

Vyshinsky: Here is the tenth question to Thornton on page 121, Vol. XVIII: "You stated that you received from MacDonald information regarding the offensive and defensive possibilities of the Soviet Union. Do you confirm this testimony?" And Thornton's reply: "Yes I confirm that I received from Mr. MacDonald information regarding the offensive and defensive possibilities of the Soviet Union."

What have you to say?

Thornton: I had in mind that MacDonald told me—

Vyshinsky (interrupting): I read out what he said. And you confirmed it?

Thornton: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You confirmed it; then how can you now say that you did not confirm it? MacDonald, you were asked a question as to whether you had given information to Thornton concerning the defensive and offensive possibilities, and which precisely. You answered: "Yes." Is this so? Do you confirm it?

MacDonald: It is true.

Thornton: And what did I say?

Vyshinsky: And you said: "I confirm that I received from MacDonald information concerning the offensive and defensive possibilities of the Soviet Union."

Thornton: I absolutely deny the point about the shells.

Vyshinsky: You only said that motors make a noise, guns shoot and nothing more?

Thornton: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why did you speak otherwise before?

Thornton: I have already explained that to you.

The President: You lost your courage?

Thornton: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Next you were asked: "Do you confirm that MacDonald gave you this information?" Your answer was: "He told me that in general they are making shells at Zlatoust." Did he say that?

Thornton: I knew that myself.

Vyshinsky: That is not written down; further on it says: "He told me that many troops were concentrated in Leningrad."

Thornton: That is true.

Vyshinsky: And did he talk about shells?

Thornton: Perhaps, as gossip.

Vyshinsky: Was there any such gossip with anyone else?

Thornton: There were many people.

Vyshinsky: For example, with Monkhouse about war shells?

Thornton: No, with Russians.

Vyshinsky: And so there was special gossip with the Russians about shells?

Thornton: No, with MacDonald. He said that they made shells. I knew that myself.

Vyshinsky: Let us check up a few facts again. Gussev is MacDonald's friend. Gussev collects certain information for MacDonald. Did you know about that?

Thornton: Information that might be of interest to our firm.

Vyshinsky: I do not know what information might interest your firm. We shall discover that later with your assistance. I ask you whether you know that Gussev was collecting certain information for MacDonald?

Thornton: MacDonald received information from Gussev thanks to their friendly relations.

Vyshinsky: And also thanks to money? Money was paid, was it not?

Thornton: I have heard here that money was paid.

Vyshinsky: Aha! Here! But you did not hear of it before? Did you give 2,000 odd roubles to MacDonald?

Thornton: I gave MacDonald 2,000 roubles to straighten out his unfavourable balance.

Vyshinsky: Well, then, did he squander the money?

Thornton: No, he did not squander it.

Vyshinsky: Why then did he have an unfavourable balance?

Thornton: Because he took a lot of money in advance.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Thornton: I don't know why. He owed several thousand roubles.

Vyshinsky: And you wanted to straighten out his financial affairs?

Thornton: I will tell about this in detail.

Vyshinsky: Why did Gussev have to give this information? MacDonald was there and he could give it.

Thornton : When MacDonald himself was there, it was another matter.

Vyshinsky : But you do not deny that the information he gave covered more than merely the work of the station ?

Thornton : Perhaps he gave it a little more extensively. He spoke about Zlatoust in general and, also, about the stability of the local government.

Vyshinsky : The local Soviet Government in Zlatoust, or in general ?

Thornton : General and local.

Vyshinsky : Did you know the mechanic Marin ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Where did you meet him ?

Thornton : At the First Moscow Power Station.

Vyshinsky : Did you give any money to this Marin ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : A lot ?

Thornton : Three hundred or four hundred roubles, perhaps.

Vyshinsky : And why did you give it ?

Thornton : To put right some small defects, possibly without the knowledge of the management, and, in general, for our equipment.

Vyshinsky : Perhaps it was because Marin did not inform the management about these defects ?

Thornton : That is saying too much.

Vyshinsky : You said this.

Thornton : I might have said anything, but the trial is taking place here.

Vyshinsky : The Court does not examine anything detached from the rest. The Court examines what went before. In Volume XIX, page 337, you said that "the erector Marin of Moges has received from me a total of about 4,000 roubles. I gave him this money so that if small defects arose in our equipment or plant he would not inform his superiors; the firm would not receive complaints and claims." Do you confirm this ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Was that actually the case ?

Thornton : It is a little stretched.*

Vyshinsky : You said this about Marin in your depositions. Let us proceed further. You wrote at the same time : "I confirm that money was given to all the engineers and technicians mentioned in the deposition of March 13, so that they would conceal various defects found in our equipment." Did you so depose ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Is it true ?

* Thornton used here the Russian idiomatic expression "zagnuto" which cannot be translated literally into English.

Thornton : Not altogether.

Vyshinsky : But it is written in the record and definite persons are mentioned there.

Thornton : Not engineers, this one is an engineer.

Vyshinsky : To which engineer did you give money ?

Thornton : I did not give it to any engineer.

Vyshinsky : You said there was one engineer.

Thornton : I gave it as a loan.

Vyshinsky : What was the name of the engineer ?

Thornton : Dolgov.

Vyshinsky : How much did you lend him ?

Thornton : Three thousand roubles.

Vyshinsky : Your own money ?

Thornton : No, the company's.

Vyshinsky : How did you enter this money in the books ?

Did you write—loan to Dolgov ?

Thornton : It was not entered that way.

Vyshinsky : These were the "suspense" accounts ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Does that mean, accused Thornton, that you had a system in the office by which, when you gave loans, you entered in the books something which was not actually the case ? Why did you enter it in the suspense account ?

Thornton : Because we thought it was a loan.

Vyshinsky : You ought to have opened an account to Dolgov loaned three thousand roubles.

Thornton : That would have been better.

Vyshinsky : Which technicians received money ?

Thornton : Erectors. Technicians did not receive any.

Vyshinsky : So that is also correct. What is it that is not correct in this deposition ? Dolgov received money, the erectors received money, so everything is correct ?

The President : Have you any more questions to put to Thornton ?

Vyshinsky : No, I have a question to put to MacDonald.

Thornton : Comrade President, I want to complete my say, because otherwise the Press would not get the full meaning. I ask you to allow me to state how things were.

The President : In half an hour you will tell us, but at present we must finish with the examination of MacDonald.

Vyshinsky : So you partly confirm and partly deny the deposition you gave when confronted with the other accused ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : And you, accused MacDonald, do you confirm the deposition made when confronted with Thornton ?

MacDonald : Yes.

Vyshinsky : I have no more questions to put to MacDonald.

Roginsky: A question to Thornton. In reply to Comrade Vyshinsky's question, you stated that you did not collect any information of a military nature.

Thornton: I did not.

Roginsky: What deposition did you make on this question, not on March 13, not on the 15th, and not on the 19th, but on the very day when, according to your statement to the President, your courage returned to you? You do not remember? When you were being examined by the Investigating Judge on Important Cases on April 4?

Thornton: By mistake I signed that I was guilty.

Roginsky: I am not speaking of whether you signed by mistake. I ask you about the nature of the information which you collected. You spoke about this: Volume XIX, page 343 on reverse side.

Thornton: I do not understand the question.

Roginsky: I ask you, do you confirm your words: "I obtained espionage information of a military character about the Putilov works."

Thornton: Yes, but this does not apply to MacDonald.

Roginsky: Is that right?

Thornton: The Putilov works? Yes.

Roginsky: And from the Mytischy works?

Thornton: Yes.

Roginsky: That means that you collected information of a military nature?

Thornton: This was common gossip.

Roginsky: Did you collect this common gossip that had State and military importance?

Thornton: No, I did not collect it. It came casually.

After a number of other questions the examination continued thus:—

Vyshinsky: Thornton stated on March 19:—

"These testimonies were given by me wholly on my own free will without outside influence or pressure. The testimonies were given by me in the English language and were written in my own handwriting.

"The protocols of interrogations first in Gussev's, mine, and each other's presence, and then in Kutuzova's, mine, and each other's presence, that were shown to me during this interrogation and in which I confess facts about my spying activities and my connections with other persons I have read. I can make no additional remarks about the records of these protocols. The protocols are taken down correctly and are confirmed by my signature.

"This protocol was read by me and I confirm its accuracy.

"(Signed) LESLIE C. THORNTON.

"19/3/1933."

Do you confirm this?

Thornton: No, it was written, and I signed it.

Vyshinsky: Do you confirm that you made it voluntarily without being influenced, without any pressure?

Thornton: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Everything that you read?

Thornton: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Then you signed?

Thornton: Yes, and now the Court will examine it.

The President: But why did you give such information?

Thornton: I did it because, as I have said, I was frightened.

The President: How were you frightened? By whom were you frightened? Where and when were you frightened?

Thornton: I was not frightened by arrest and by the consequences, but simply this way.

The President: No, you give a straight reply so that it will be clear and plain to everybody who frightened you, when did they frighten you, in what room?

Thornton: I want to speak through the interpreter.

The President: When you find it difficult to reply you always resort to the aid of the interpreter. But very well, you may.

Thornton: No, I will speak in Russian. I was simply afraid, but of what I do not know myself.

The President: And you were afraid on March 11, March 12, March 13, and April 4. You were evidently afraid also on April 10, the day before the trial, because you made no statement.

Thornton: Some of the points there are right, but some of them I want to withdraw, and I was told that this would have to be done during the trial.

The President: Who told you that? Give his name.

Thornton: I was told by . . . (tries to remember).

Vyshinsky: Well, let that pass. Let me ask something else. I am interested in the circumstances in which you were questioned in the office of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic by my assistant Roginsky, in my presence. Were the facts which are set down here written down exactly as you told, or not?

Thornton: As I spoke. Yes, correctly.

Vyshinsky: Nothing was distorted?

Thornton: No, you did not change anything.

Vyshinsky: But perhaps Roginsky did?

Thornton: No.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps the O.G.P.U. distorted it?

Thornton: No, I signed it with my own hand.

Vyshinsky: Let us finish with this record. It is important to establish the facts. We will draw conclusions later; at present it is important for me to confirm from the deposition which was made on March 19 that the facts which are here set down were really told by you, that there was no falsification and no juggling.

Thornton: That is so.

After further questioning of Mr. MacDonald both by the Public Prosecutor and Defending Counsel, the following dialogue ensued :—

Braude : I have a question to put to the accused Thornton. You have heard MacDonald admit to the Court, and at the preliminary investigation, that he undertook a series of wrecking acts to cause breakdowns, that he participated in espionage. Did he do this on your orders or on his own responsibility ?

Thornton : I gave no instructions.

Vyshinsky : And did you know that he was doing it ?

Thornton : No, or I would have dismissed him. If I had known that he was wrecking, I would have dismissed him.

The President : And if he had engaged in military espionage, would you have dismissed him ?

Thornton : I would also have dismissed him.

Vyshinsky : And for gossip about shells, would you have dismissed him or not ?

Thornton : Why for gossip ?

Vyshinsky : For information about shells. You remember that you received what you call gossip information about shells. Would you have dismissed him for that ?

Thornton : Of course not. Anybody could have got this information.

Vyshinsky (To MacDonald) : Did Thornton know of these breakdowns or not ?

MacDonald : I confirm my deposition.

Vyshinsky : Did he know or not ?

MacDonald : He knew.

After further questions, the Court adjourned at 8.05 p.m.

EVENING SESSION, APRIL 13, 1933,

6.10 p.m.

Roginsky : Tell me, please, accused Thornton, when you sent your installation engineers to the various electric power stations, did you or any other leading person in the office of Metro-Vickers in Moscow instruct them to collect information, data, facts, and so forth ?

Thornton : Yes. Yes, they gave me information.

Roginsky : And did you instruct them to collect such information ?

Thornton : I think not, but they supplied me with such information.

Roginsky : Did they supply it on their own initiative, or by your orders ?

Thornton : When I asked them they gave me information.

Roginsky : And when they left for their place of work did they know that you would subsequently ask for such information ?

Thornton : All our installation engineers working abroad would have collected such information as I require anyhow.

Roginsky : At the confrontation did you corroborate Gussev's deposition ?

Thornton : I do not remember.

Roginsky : I will refresh your memory. It is in Volume XVIII of the Thornton dossier. Confrontation between Thornton and Gussev, March 15, 1938, on page 71. Thornton was asked :—

“ In your testimony of March 12, you stated that Engineer Gussev of the electric power station of the Zlatoust works was connected with MacDonald, who for a period of several years transmitted to you detailed information regarding the political situation in the Zlatoust district and regarding the technical condition of the power station and power installations.

“ Do you confirm this ?

“ And Thornton's reply : ‘ Yes, Mr. MacDonald submitted me this information, received from Mr. Gussev.’ ”

Thornton : Yes, but I should like to add that I received information from MacDonald regarding Zlatoust while MacDonald was at Zlatoust, but when he left Zlatoust I received no information.

Roginsky : I am not asking now what happened before, or what happened after. I ask you, were you aware of the fact that MacDonald was receiving information from Gussev ? I also ask, did you confirm that during the confrontation with Gussev ?

Thornton : I knew that MacDonald was receiving information from Gussev.

Roginsky : Did MacDonald receive such information from Gussev systematically ? I will put it in another way. Did he receive information frequently ?

Thornton : Whenever I saw MacDonald.

Roginsky : That is to say, whenever you saw MacDonald he supplied such information ?

Thornton : I saw MacDonald there twice.

Roginsky : Are these depositions correct ?

Thornton : It is stated there—for a period of several years.

Roginsky : It is stated here : “ Yes, Mr. MacDonald submitted to me this information, received from Mr. Gussev.”

Thornton : That is correct.

Roginsky : Let us establish the following fact before the Court : MacDonald was the person who collected information and data for you concerning the Zlatoust district ?

Thornton : Concerning the Zlatoust electric power station.

Roginsky : Gussev was the person who collected information concerning the Zlatoust power station for MacDonald, and that was known to you ?

Thornton : Yes, I knew it.

Roginsky : If MacDonald was the person who transmitted information to you concerning the Zlatoust electric power station, it follows that that information was the information to which MacDonald referred here. Is that so ?

Thornton : In my opinion that is so.

Roginsky : You just said that MacDonald was the person who supplied you with this information ; you also said that it was the information of which MacDonald spoke. In order that it may be clearer to you, I asked MacDonald what kind of information that was.

Thornton : I understand how it was, but I did not receive any military information from MacDonald.

Roginsky : What kind of information did you receive ?

Thornton : Information that could be obtained for our firm.

Roginsky : What kind of information was of interest to your firm ?

Thornton : Information of the following kind : Regarding new business, new construction works, also whether there was any intention of placing new orders at the Zlatoust station, how machinery was being handled, such as machinery received from us, what condition they were in, and also what was the condition of the installation which supplied steam to the turbines. Also gossip such as how the workers were living.

Roginsky : Was your firm interested in gossip, but uninterested in factual information that was not gossip ?

Thornton : Gossip is information that may or may not be correct. I used the wrong word. By "gossip" I meant information that was not a State secret.

Roginsky : Were you interested in the way the workers are living from the point of view of the interests of your firm ?

Thornton : Yes.

Roginsky : Was there any other kind of information, or only such as you mentioned ?

Thornton : I think that was all.

The Prosecutor questioned other accused from time to time ; these included Mme. Kutuzova, Messrs. Oleinik, MacDonald, and Monkhouse, and from their replies the Prosecutor concluded that such information was collected by Thornton not only through his subordinates at Metro-Vickers, but also through a number of persons engaged by him and not employed by the firm, but who gave Mr. Thornton the said information.

This deduction was stated as being accurate by Oleinik, an old employee of the Moscow office of Metro-Vickers, who, according to the alleged statements of Mr. Thornton and Mr. Monkhouse—Manager, Moscow office, Metro-Vickers—was regarded as a close friend before whom secret negotiations could be carried out.

It was alleged by the prosecution that according to Mr. Thornton's evidence he had worked out, from information thus received, a general picture, and transmitted same during his visits to London to Mr. Richards, the managing director of the export department of Metro-Vickers.

After questioning Mr. Thornton and Mr. Monkhouse, the Prosecutor drew the conclusion that Mr. Richards had participated in the British expedition to Archangel in the capacity of "intelligence officer," attached to the general staff of the British regiments at the front fighting against the Soviet Government in 1918. During the intervention Richards secretly passed the frontier from Finland into Soviet Russia. Thereafter he visited Soviet Russia annually.

The following dialogue then took place :—

Vyshinsky : Now I have a question to Thornton. Would you please permit me to submit Thornton's deposition made by him on March 13 written in his own hand ? Is this your deposition ? Take it, please, and examine it carefully from beginning to end ? and then we shall have it read.

Is it your deposition ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : In your own hand ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Did you write it ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : So we shall have to read it in full. If necessary, in English first.

The President : We shall read the deposition written by Thornton himself on March 13, 1933.

Member of the Court, Martens (reads the following deposition written and signed by Thornton) :—

"All our spying operations on U.S.S.R. territory are directed by the British Intelligence Service, through their agent, C. S. Richards, who occupies the position of managing director of the Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Export Company, Ltd.

"Spying operations on U.S.S.R. territory were directed by myself and Monkhouse, representatives of the above-mentioned British firm, who are contractors, by official agreements, to the Soviet Government, for the supply of turbines and electrical equipment and the furnishing of technical aid agreements. On the instructions of C. S. Richards, given to me to this end, British personnel were gradually drawn into the spying organisation after their arrival on U.S.S.R. territory and instructed as to the information required. During the whole period of our presence on U.S.S.R. territory,

from the total of British staff employed, twenty-seven men were engaged in spying operations. Of the above, fifteen men, which included :—

Monkhouse	Annis, A.
Cox	Annis, H.
Thornton	Shipley
Teasle	Pollitt
Shutters	Waters
Burke	Nordwall
Riddle	Clark
MacDonald	

were engaged in economic and political spying, also in the investigation of the defence and offence possibilities of the Soviet Union.

“The remaining twelve men, who included the following :—

Jule	Gregory
Jolley	Smith, A.
Cornell	Fallows
MacCracken	Noel
Richards, C. G.	Charnock
Cushny	Whatmough

were engaged in political and economic spying.

“On March 11, 1933, the following men were engaged in spying operations :—

Nordwall—economic, political, defence and offence investigation.

Gregory—economic and political.

Pollitt—economic, political, defence and offence investigation.

Whatmough—economic and political.

Riddle—economic, political, defence and offence investigation.

Thornton—economic, political, defence and offence investigation.

Monkhouse—economic, political, defence and offence investigation.

Cushny—economic and political.

“Facts above (about ?) the spying activities of the above-mentioned men who were under my direction I shall give in a further protocol.

“ (Signed) LESLIE C. THORNTON.

“ March 13, 1933.”

Mr. Thornton admitted that he had written the above confession, but he now denied the facts stated in the document, declaring that he had written it while excited. The Prosecutor analysed the document point by point, and contended that Thornton was not as excited when writing as he now claimed ;

the Prosecutor pointed out that Thornton had remembered at that time the exact number of employees of Metro-Vickers concerned, namely, twenty-seven, and that of these twenty-seven, according to his written testimony, fifteen were engaged in collecting information as to the facilities of the U.S.S.R. for defence and attack, and twelve in political economic espionage.

The following dialogue then occurred :—

Vyshinsky : And what was your object in doing that ? I ask—
for what purpose ?

Thornton : I simply didn't know, but I was asked to confess.

Vyshinsky : And you have gratified that request ?

Thornton : Yes, I gratified that request.

The Court then adjourned for twenty minutes.

On reassembling, Mr. Thornton, in reply to a question by the defence, stated that although he belonged to a well-to-do family, he personally had no property and lived on his work only. He lived under good conditions in the U.S.S.R. and had no reason to complain of the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards him.

Questioned by *Mr. Libson* (Barrister for the Defence of Kutuzova and Kotliarevsky), Mr. Thornton said that *Mme. Kutuzova* had acted as secretary to his company since 1927, that she was trusted by himself and his colleagues, and that she understood English.

Then there was the following dialogue :—

Libson : Now your conversations concerning the information which you were receiving when you talked with Monkhouse, were they carried on in the presence of Kutuzova ?

Thornton : If we knew that something was going to be built we might have said it in her presence.

Libson : You did not conceal that ?

Thornton : No.

Libson : And, in general, were there any subjects which you concealed from her in these conversations ?

Thornton : Yes, perhaps. She did not know our business affairs.

Libson : All kinds of confidential letters, confidential correspondence which was carried on with London—was that carried on through Kutuzova ?

Thornton : We have two kinds of confidential letters. There are letters addressed to department managers. This correspondence is put in separate envelopes. This concerns salaries, increase of salary to employees. These letters always passed through the hands of *Anna Sergeevna Kutuzova*.

Libson : So you trusted her to carry on this correspondence ?

Thornton : With this kind of confidential correspondence we trusted her.

Libson : Accordingly, what secrets do you refer to? You said before that you were reserved in her presence. In what cases?

Thornton : For instance, regarding the salaries of our Board. She did not know what salary I was receiving.

After further questions to various accused the examination proceeded as follows:—

Roginsky : I have a question to Kutuzova in connection with the examination of Thornton. Tell us, please, you knew about the payments for that illegal activity which Thornton was carrying on?

Kutuzova : Yes. He told me.

Roginsky : What did he tell you?

Kutuzova : He told me in a general way that he was enlisting Russian engineers, technicians, and mechanics to collect information. Of course he paid them.

Roginsky : And how were these payments made to the Russian engineers and technicians enlisted by Thornton? Did he tell you that?

Kutuzova : Yes, he did.

Roginsky : What did Thornton tell you, what kind of accounts and sums did he enter in his notebook?

Kutuzova : He did not tell me at once. At first he was evasive and said that this did not concern me, but then gradually he began to tell me that he was entering expenditures for payments to Russian citizens who furnished him with information.

Roginsky : And where are these notebooks at present?

Kutuzova : In England. But this was not one notebook, there were a number of them.

Roginsky : How were these notebooks sent there?

Kutuzova : He took them with him himself on December 20, 1932.

After further questioning:—

Roginsky : I am asking about Kutuzova's depositions. Question to Kutuzova: "In what way was the money spent on spying operations covered in the accounts?" Kutuzova answered: "The sums paid for this work were not officially entered in the books. Engineer Thornton kept his accounts at his villa." Do you confirm these depositions made by Kutuzova?

Thornton : No, they were in my expenditure sheets.

Roginsky : Do you confirm the deposition that besides the entries in your official bookkeeping accounts you entered your accounts in your own notebook?

Thornton : Yes.

Roginsky : To the question: "Do you confirm this?" you answered: "I did not carry any official books, but I made entries into a diary to aid my memory in order later to write these sums off. This I did by entering these sums in the books of the firm as some non-existent expenses."

Thornton : That is correct.

Roginsky : And these notes you later sent to England?

Thornton : These notebooks are at present in England. Nine books.

Roginsky : You sent to England those books in which you entered the payments to the fitters and to the engineer for the information which you had been receiving? Is that correct?

Thornton : Yes.

Roginsky : I have no more questions.

Vyshinsky : I am interested in the sum of 3,000 roubles which you loaned to Dolgov. If it was a loan, was it repaid later?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : Was it written off as expense?

Thornton : It was.

Vyshinsky : With whose permission?

Thornton : Monkhouse and Richards.

Vyshinsky : When Richards arrived was a special report made to him on this question?

Thornton : Yes, we asked what to do.

Vyshinsky : And he permitted you to write it off?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : I wanted first to question Monkhouse about this. (To the Court) Permit me to do so. (To Monkhouse): Tell us, please, do you also assert that this sum was a loan?

Monkhouse : This was the sum which Dolgov himself asked for as a loan.

Vyshinsky : How was it that you found out about the fact that Dolgov asked for this sum as a loan?

Monkhouse : Thornton told me that Dolgov asked for it.

Vyshinsky : Did he consult you?

Monkhouse : He told me.

Vyshinsky : On the 26th of March you were already released?

Monkhouse : I was.

The President : You do not deny that this deposition of April 1 was written by you in your own hand?

Monkhouse : I wrote it.

Vyshinsky : (To Martens) Please read what Monkhouse wrote in his own hand.

Martens : (Reads the deposition) "I do not recognize myself guilty of the charge made against me, with the exception of point 4 of the resolution containing the said charge, in which point I plead guilty since I shared in the special sum, i.e., the sum of 3,000 roubles given as a bribe by Thornton to Dolgov."

Monkhouse : There was no bribe.

Vyshinsky : What do you mean—there was no bribe?

Monkhouse : It was a present.

Vyshinsky : Let it be a present. You call it a present, we call it a bribe. And now permit me to show you another deposition

of March 26. "I presume that Thornton, when he gave Dolgov the money, allegedly as a loan, wanted in this way to secure Dolgov's favourable disposition to the firm in those cases when Dolgov, as the manager of the installation department, would be called upon to decide on disputes which occurred in connection with compensation claims for defects in the equipment which we are supplying." Did you say that?

Monkhouse : You wrote it and I signed it.

Vyshinsky : I did not write it. It was written from your words by the Investigating Judge on Important Cases.

Monkhouse : More or less so.

Vyshinsky : Now do you admit this more or less?

Monkhouse : I admit that Thornton gave the money to Dolgov as a loan.

Vyshinsky : You admit that this money was given as a loan, but before you said it was given as a present.

Monkhouse : I gave it as a loan. I have never in my life given bribes.

Vyshinsky : This is beside the point. But we may record that the sum given to Dolgov is nowhere entered in the documents as a sum given as a loan, but on the contrary it is artificially covered up by some reference to a suspense account. Is that correct?

Monkhouse : When we decided to write this sum off.

Vyshinsky : How did you decide to enter it in the books?

Monkhouse : We decided to enter it as a commercial transaction.

Vyshinsky : Under what account did you enter this in the books as a transaction? How was it entered in the books?

Monkhouse : At first it was Thornton's personal account. This is his personal affair. Then Thornton wanted to close his account and this sum was written off in the suspense account. And there it was suspended for five months.

After a few further questions the Court adjourned at 10 p.m., Moscow time.

MORNING SESSION, APRIL 14, 1933, 10.15 a.m.

The third day of the trial opened with the examination of the witness Engineer Dolgov, who is a non-party specialist and manager in control of the Import Department of electrical equipment.

The witness declared that Thornton invited him into his office and offered him 3,000 roubles which he understood to be a bribe in return for concealing defects in machinery supplied by Metro-Vickers and for not demanding satisfaction of legal claims.

Dolgov stated that he had never expressed any need for more money than he was earning as an engineer and as writer, and he also said that "when Mr. Thornton gave me the money he

reassured me, telling me that I need not worry, that only he and Mr. Monkhouse knew about it, so that there was no need to worry, and everything was in order."

The witness declared that he was very indignant, but he took the money and on the same day handed it to the competent authorities with the necessary explanations.

The Prosecutor then turned to Mr. Thornton and the following dialogue ensued :—

Vyshinsky : You have heard the evidence of Dolgov. You do not deny the fact of giving the money?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : You confirm that you have actually given 3,000 roubles to Dolgov in your office?

Thornton : Yes.

Mr. Thornton, however, affirmed that he gave the money as a loan and the following questions and answers are particularly interesting.

Vyshinsky : And you still affirm that this money was given as a loan?

Thornton : He asked for the money himself. But, at first, he asked whether we could give it to him in foreign currency because he had relatives abroad through whom he could return it. I refused.

Vyshinsky : So you gave it as a loan?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : For what period?

Thornton : We did not speak about that.

Vyshinsky : So it was given for good?

Thornton : Never.

Vyshinsky : When you give a loan, don't you state the time of repayment?

Thornton : This was to buy an apartment, because he had a very poor and damp apartment.

Vyshinsky : And how did you know that he had a poor apartment?

Thornton : He said so himself.

Vyshinsky : Possibly he said where he intended to buy an apartment?

Thornton : I did not ask him. I asked Monkhouse whether I could give him money and he gave his consent very reluctantly, but when I spoke later with Dolgov and said that it would be better to get a receipt, he said that it was quite impossible to do anything of the sort.

Vyshinsky : Why?

Thornton : I don't know.

Vyshinsky : So Monkhouse warned you not to get a receipt?

Thornton : Not at all. Monkhouse said it was better to get a receipt.

Vyshinsky : Comrade Dolgov, were you asked to give a receipt?

Dolgov : I absolutely deny everything which Thornton has said. I have no relatives abroad. All my relatives live here, and I could not have spoken about this. How could I speak of it when I have no relatives abroad?

Vyshinsky : Thornton says so.

Thornton : I have forgotten whether it was relatives or acquaintances.

Vyshinsky : Have you some acquaintances abroad, who are in close relations with you?

Dolgov : No. Merely some of my colleagues from Electro-Import work abroad.

Vyshinsky : Was it your personal money?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : So we can record one more fact—that the money belonged to the firm. Who was responsible for it?

Thornton : I was.

The prosecutor then turned to Mr. Monkhouse and in the course of the questioning the following passages occurred :—

Vyshinsky : Accused Monkhouse, you have heard the explanation of Dolgov? Do you still insist on what you said before?

Monkhouse : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Do you confirm what you said : “ I suppose that the money given to Dolgov in the form of a loan was given so that he . . . ” and so forth.

Monkhouse : It was written down this way.

Vyshinsky : You confirm that it was so written?

Monkhouse : I wrote it because I saw that Dolgov regarded it as a bribe.

Vyshinsky : You confirm that Dolgov regarded this as a bribe?

Monkhouse : It had to be understood that way, because he did not want to give it back.

Vyshinsky : And do you confirm that you gave him this money as a bribe?

Monkhouse : No.

Interrogation was continued by Mr. Roginsky in the course of which there was the following dialogue :—

Roginsky : Here is your deposition of March 26 : “ I learned when I returned from my vacation and when I found a sum of 2,000 roubles on my account that Thornton had taken 3,000 roubles in Soviet currency from the office. Thornton had entered 1,000 roubles to some other account. I don't know exactly which. When I asked Thornton for an explanation, he told me that he had lent this money, that is 3,000 roubles, to Dolgov, an employee of Electro-Import.”

Monkhouse : That is correct.

Roginsky : This was after you returned from vacation?

Monkhouse : It was after I had visited Dnieprostroy.

Roginsky : After your return from your journey. Now, did you agree about giving this money or not?

Monkhouse : There was no agreement on the actual sum.

Roginsky : But about giving a loan?

Monkhouse : There were preliminary conversations.

Roginsky : So you change your deposition made at the preliminary investigation?

Monkhouse : I supplement it.

Roginsky : You change it, because at the preliminary investigation you stated that you only knew about it when you returned from a business trip. Later, at the second investigation, you made the following correction : “ My statement that the 3,000 roubles lent by Thornton to Dolgov were put to my account proved to be incorrect. I discovered from the bookkeeper that the whole 3,000 had been put to Thornton's account. A different sum of 2,000 had been put to my account, which, however, related to expenses for a trip in the U.S.S.R. of directors of Metro-Vickers, who had come from England at that time.”

Further you state that you asked Thornton for an explanation of why this sum was given to Dolgov. Do you remember this deposition?

Monkhouse : It is correct.

Roginsky : If you knew that this money had been lent, why did you ask Thornton for an explanation?

Monkhouse : I asked why it was needed.

Roginsky : But wasn't the money given as a loan?

Monkhouse : He said that Dolgov wanted to buy himself a new apartment.

Roginsky : If you knew that Dolgov wanted to buy an apartment, that the money was given to get Dolgov out of some difficulty, why did you ask Thornton for an explanation of why he gave this money?

Monkhouse : I don't know why.

Roginsky : Then what has the explanation to do with the matter?

Monkhouse : You are taking advantage of my poor knowledge of Russian.

Roginsky : I don't want to take advantage of anything. I don't want to take advantage of your poor knowledge of Russian. I ask you a question and I want an answer. If it is difficult for you to reply in Russian, and you do not understand my question in Russian, there is an interpreter who can translate for you.

Monkhouse : I don't want to talk through an interpreter.

Roginsky : Then there is no need to claim that you know Russian badly. I will read out page 226, Volume XIX : “ When I asked Thornton what he had spent this sum on,” etc. Is that your deposition?

Monkhouse : Yes.

Roginsky : Did you ask Thornton ?

Monkhouse : Yes.

Roginsky : Why did you want to know on what Dolgov spent this money ?

Monkhouse : If a person asks for 3,000 roubles, it is unexpected.

Roginsky : What interest was it to you what he spent it on ? To buy an apartment, an automobile or a motor-cycle ? What interest had you in the question ?

Monkhouse : I asked Thornton why Dolgov needed the money. Thornton replied that he wanted to buy an apartment.

Roginsky : This is how you replied to this question at the preliminary investigation : " I asked Thornton what he had spent this sum on. He replied that it was better for me not to know."

Monkhouse : Oh, no.

Roginsky : Then we shall have to submit your deposition at the preliminary investigation.

The President : Accused Monkhouse, please come here. These are the depositions spoken about.

Roginsky : I call your attention to the fact that there are signed texts both in Russian and in English.

Later, Mr. Monkhouse confirmed the similar explanation he had put upon " gifts " given by Mr. Thornton to other Soviet engineers.

At the examination regarding wrecking activities alleged to have taken place at the Zuevo Electro-Station, the accused, Kotliarevsky, related that while working as the Zuevo Capacity Manager of the Turbine Department, he became friends with MacDonald who, said Kotliarevsky, after discussing general topics at the beginning of their acquaintance, later turned the subject of conversation to the possibility of utilising the accused in espionage wrecking work.

Kotliarevsky affirmed that, upon instructions by MacDonald, he handed over to the latter information regarding the scheme of the proposed extension of the station and building projects.

He also gave an incorrect appraisal of the failures which had occurred.

Executing a concrete diversionary order which Kotliarevsky averred was given him by MacDonald, namely, to put out of operation a turbine, Kotliarevsky said that he put a bolt into the air gaps of a generator which caused the suspension of the work of the turbine for ten days.

MacDonald, stated Kotliarevsky, informed him of an impending breakdown of the oil pumps, suggesting that he (Kotliarevsky) should conceal the actual causes of the breakdown and explain it by other reasons.

Kotliarevsky said that he had received from MacDonald 1,000 roubles for his espionage and wrecking work.

Mr. MacDonald, questioned, confirmed all Kotliarevsky's statements.

Mr. Monkhouse then questioned Kotliarevsky and the following dialogue ensued :—

Monkhouse : I have a question. Did Citizen Kotliarevsky conceal this defect in the oil pumps ?

Kotliarevsky : Yes.

Monkhouse : Then how can he explain that a telegram was sent to Moscow about it and we immediately communicated with England, from where two new oil pumps were sent, which were sent to the Zuevka Station and unpacked ?

Kotliarevsky : I do not understand what telegram you are speaking about.

Monkhouse : The telegram which I think MacDonald sent himself.

Kotliarevsky : But that was after the breakdown.

Vyshinsky : But you discovered the defects also after the breakdown ?

Kotliarevsky : After the breakdown I agreed with the opinion of the commission.

Vyshinsky : After the breakdown took place, could the defects have been concealed ?

Kotliarevsky : No, they spoke about them there.

Vyshinsky : Did your commission sit immediately after the breakdown, or later ?

Kotliarevsky : I don't remember ; I think it was immediately.

Monkhouse : He says that he gave the plans of the station building to MacDonald. Can he say exactly what plans he handed over ?

The President : That is not important. The accused Kotliarevsky is not charged with espionage.

Monkhouse : Then, another question about this bolt which was found in the air gap of the generator. Can he say what size this bolt was ?

Kotliarevsky : I don't remember. You see I took the first bolt I found in the workshop which in my opinion would go in—about a half-inch bolt, with a nut and a head. It was found later broken in two.

Monkhouse : Can you explain how you inserted the bolt there ?

Kotliarevsky : That is very simple. When the cover was open (I sometimes was delayed at the station until late at night) this was in the evening or at night. In any case, there was nobody at the third machine. The other machines were working, and I put the bolt in this machine. That is not a hard thing to do.

Monkhouse : Did you see that a bolt was missing on the cover ? Where is the bolt which had been taken out of the cover ?

Kotliarevsky : I don't know exactly what he is speaking about. I think he is speaking of the following. We found a bent edge on

one of the covers. I do not know whether it was found that some bolt was missing there. I only know that MacDonald and Elliott and Taylor—electricians—went over the whole generator and did not find that a bolt was missing anywhere, as far as I know. I do not know what Mr. Monkhouse is speaking about now. It is known that the edge was bent. You can see from the photograph.

Vyshinsky: Was there a case when all kinds of extraneous objects were found in the generator, besides a bolt?

Kotliarevsky: Yes.

The Court then adjourned for 20 minutes.

After the interval the Chief of the Thermo-Technical Department of the Ivanovo Station, Engineer Lobanov, on being examined testified that he had participated in the activities of a wrecking group. He had managed to bring about a number of injuries, such as over-heating turbine motors, stopping the work of boilers, &c. He stated that he was incited to carry out this wrecking by Nordwall, Metro-Vickers' erecting engineer, when he came to Ivanovo.

As a result of his acquaintance with Nordwall, Lobanov said that he had organised a wrecking group. He had also worked out a plan of injuries and carried out the same. He had further worked out at Nordwall's suggestion, said Lobanov, a plan of diversional activity in case of war, consisting of the explosion of a dam of a pond feeding the water power station, loosening the water in order to stop the station. He stated that he had received from Nordwall, personally, for diversional work, 5,000 roubles, half of which he handed to his accomplices; he had also received a fur coat.

Mr. Nordwall denied Lobanov's statements completely and declared that he had not paid the money nor had he made a present of the coat. He stated that he had only been a mediator in the sale of the coat by an employee of Metro-Vickers, named Mr. Taylor.

He also admitted that his evidence to-day differed from the evidence he gave at the preliminary examination when he stated that the sum of the sale was 400 roubles. While to-day he said it was 500 roubles.

Replying to questions, he said at first that he had paid Mr. Taylor through Metro-Vickers, but on being contradicted by verification of the office cash book in which this sum was not entered, he subsequently stated that he had remitted the money through an English bank.

The next accused examined in the case of the Ivanovo Station, Foreman Lebedev, enumerated wrecking actions carried out with his participation.

In the course of his evidence he stated:—

“Lobanov told me that Nordwall had promised to pay well for this.”

Among other things he declared:—

“My next wrecking work was performed in the boiler house on Boilers 1, 2, and 3. There I damaged the cable in order to stop the motors that drove the reducers. There were many breakdowns with these motors. Several of the breakdowns resulted in very long stoppages of the boilers, that is to say, in the main, the motors became overheated and the furnace of the boiler had to be dismantled, which took approximately a week to do. The boiler was put out of action. There were approximately five such stoppages. There were other stoppages, but of shorter duration, that is to say, the motors were cut off, but they were quickly switched on again. . . .

“My fourth act of wrecking was on the centrifugal pump of the house turbine.

“I have said that the breakdown with the fire-brigade pump occurred in August. And in the beginning of September the fourth breakdown occurred with the centrifugal pump of the house turbine. A short circuit occurred in the plug box. An explosion occurred. Part of the cable that emerged from the coupling was burnt out. The motor was stopped for about three days.”

Vyshinsky: Is that all?

Lebedev: Yes.

He further stated that the Metro-Vickers' Erecting Engineer, Elliot, had collected information regarding the work of the war equipment section of the neighbouring machine-building plant. He had received the same through an employee of the plant, Balkin, meetings with whom took place in Lebedev's apartment.

The Court adjourned at 8.10 p.m.

EVENING SESSION, APRIL 14, 1933, 6.15 p.m.

Nordwall on being examined claimed that all his work had been carried out honestly and efficiently. Among other things he stated:—

“I was sent to the Tomsy Works at Makeyevka, where I superintended the installation of the electrical equipment of the first Soviet blooming mill. In connection with this work I was presented at the November festivities with a testimonial as the best shock-brigade worker of Makstroy. . . .

“At the gala meeting, at the evening organised after the starting of the turbine, Comrade Orjonikidze was also present. The construction committee invited me to the presidium and asked me to explain the Makeyevka construction, how well it works, that it works just as well as in England and in other countries.

"For this work I was officially given a premium of 1,000 roubles.

"After that I continued working on this construction right up to the day of my arrest."

Engineer Oleinik, who had been employed about twenty years by Metro-Vickers, and who had worked at a number of places jointly with Nordwall, told about a number of accidents which he alleged had occurred at the power stations Motovilkha and Makeevka, where Nordwall worked, and he alleged it was through the latter's fault.

According to Oleinik, the system had been turned out defectively at the Manchester plant of Metro-Vickers and the work was wrongly carried out in Russia by Nordwall. In starting the turbine at Motovilkha, during the test, an impact was caused, resulting in an accident.

During the inspection carried out by Oleinik in Makeevka, defects were discovered which might have caused accidents.

Oleinik alleged that Nordwall, although his attention was drawn to the defects, did not prevent the accidents nor take steps to eliminate the defects, saying: "This is not our business." The result was, said Oleinik, a serious accident which caused the disablement of two motor-generators simultaneously, at which Nordwall, so Oleinik said, rejoiced malignantly.

Oleinik stated that Thornton had warned him that he must be very cautious with Nordwall "because he was, if not a Bolshevik, then almost a Bolshevik," but he (Oleinik) did not consider him a Bolshevik.

Mr. Nordwall admitted that breakdowns had occurred, but he absolutely denied having any hand in these or maliciously rejoicing at them.

The accused Zivert, a foreman at the Ivanovo Power Station, stated that he had got into touch with Thornton in 1925-26 when working at Nizhni-Novgorod Station.

Zivert said that:—

"Thornton seemed to me an extremely valuable man. From the very first day Thornton, as a British engineer, explained to me the structure of the transformers and all the instruments of Metro-Vickers, their installation and the installation of the oil circuit-breakers, and so forth, which we saw for the first time in Russia.

"After giving a whole lecture, he gave practical explanations concerning the inspection of the cores, explained every connection, every screw, explained how carefully one must handle things while installing so as not to break anything, and so on.

"I began to respect Mr. Thornton very much, firstly because we were told to treat foreign specialists with respect, and secondly because he was a man from whom the Russian workers could learn very much. My ardent desire was to learn how to handle these machines and I set myself this task."

In February, 1930, Zivert was at work at the Ivanovo Power Station, where all the equipment had been supplied by Metro-Vickers. Here he again came into touch with Mr. Thornton, who after carrying out tests on transformers which he (Zivert) had installed thanked him publicly, and then in the course of a private talk said:—

"Comrade Zivert, here is some money [500 roubles]; you may be in need of some. Thank you for your work; you will continue to work with me in the sense of giving assistance to the engineers who will come from England, but it is important that you should supply information." Zivert alleged that Thornton had also said:—

"You must not work at such a rapid rate as you did at the Nizhni Power Station, but slow up the work and do not examine the quality of the work so carefully because our installation is so reliable that this is not necessary. In short, there is no need for hurry.' His words implied that it was necessary to try to hamper the work of construction in one way or another and that all information could be passed on to Engineer Elliott in the engine-house, who would take my information when he was away. . . ."

Zivert admitted carrying out various wrecking activities and said he received a further 300 roubles for this from Thornton.

Mr. Thornton on being questioned denied ever giving instructions to Zivert to do damage, conceal defects or to delay work. The following dialogue then ensued:—

Vyshinsky: But you gave him money?

Thornton: I gave him 250 roubles for the installation of a transformer.

Vyshinsky: Was he employed by your firm?

Thornton: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Accused Zivert, were you an employee of the firm?

Zivert: No.

Thornton: He was not our employee.

Vyshinsky: Why did you give him money, then?

Thornton: He carried out the work well.

Vyshinsky: Whose work?

Thornton: The work he was doing.

Vyshinsky: Was he doing this work as your employee?

Thornton: He received this for doing his installation work well.

Vyshinsky: Wasn't it his duty to do it as an employee in the Soviet State service?

Thornton: I consider that he could have refused.

Vyshinsky (to Zivert): Could you have refused?

Zivert: I could have refused.

Vyshinsky: Being in State service, in the Soviet State service, carrying out definite duties which also included supervision of the installation, did you have a right to refuse?

Zivert: I don't understand.

Vyshinsky : Were you obliged to do this work because of your position in the State service ?

Zivert : Yes, I was obliged to do it.

Vyshinsky : If you were obliged to do it, then how could you refuse ?

Zivert : No, I could not.

Vyshinsky : Had you a right to receive money from outside sources, apart from the money which you received in your official position as salary ?

Zivert : No.

Vyshinsky : And you didn't have the right to receive that remuneration about which Thornton spoke here ?

Zivert : No, I had no right.

Vyshinsky : Did you receive the money because you did the installation well, or because you hampered the work ?

Zivert : Probably because I hampered the work.

Roginsky : Let us specify the sum. Thornton says 250 roubles. What do you say ?

Zivert : 500 roubles and 800 roubles.

Continuing his evidence, Zivert stated that the accused Gregory, an erecting engineer at Metro-Vickers, carried out erection work with intentional slowness.

At the conclusion of Zivert's evidence the following incident occurred :—

Gregory : I want the court to listen to my statement.

The President : Certainly.

Gregory : This man Zivert is fouling my reputation and you are taking his statement without proof. Is that fair towards me ?

The President : Translate to Gregory that we have heard the testimony of the accused Zivert, and now we will hear the explanation of Gregory. He will know by our decision whom we believe.

Gregory : "I went to Dnieprostroy to erect some very large switches. These switches are the largest switches that have ever been made by our company. The largest switches erected in Russia. Now, when I left Moscow office, they told me that they were the largest switches going in Russia and that in the past no switches of ours had broken down. Therefore they wanted me to take every care and see to every part of the erection myself. Although that meant far more work for myself, it meant my getting into the tanks in the very hottest part of the year. But still, for my own reputation, and the reputation of the firm, and the reliability of the plant, I went into the switches and saw to every part of the work myself. Now, I am coming to the part which I think affects Zivert. Zivert wanted to do some of these switches himself in another sub-station. I had never met him before and I did not know him. I could not place confidence in him, but found out later that the man was better than I first estimated him. Before leaving, I came down to Dnieprostroy for

temporary work. From there I went to Dzerzhinka which was the plant I really came to work for. While I was at Dnieprostroy I completed one switch. Another switch was completed, and there were two switches half finished. Now, that really amounted to three switches fully completed. That is from the 16th of July, 1932, to the 3rd of September. Now I would like to point out to the President this : that in the beginning there was a lot of work being done at Dnieprostroy. The oil filters necessary to the job were very difficult to obtain. So it really amounted to this, that in spite of the delays there were three switches completed in 48 days. These switches were 45 tons each.

"So now I will leave that to the technical expert to judge whether those switches were done in good time, and whether if done in a shorter time they would be done properly. Will you please thank the President for listening to me."

The Court then adjourned for 20 minutes.

When the Court reassembled, Engineer Sukhoruchkin, the Manager of the Operating Department of the First Moscow Power Station, was examined. He told about a number of serious injuries which had been carried out by him personally between 1927 and 1932. He also related how he carried out damage to five generators and testified that he had not paid proper regard to the precise fulfilment of the agreement entered into by the firm. He also enumerated a number of defects in generators, oil safety switches, etc., supplied by Metro-Vickers which he had concealed, and some of which still exist.

In consequence of this, said Sukhoruchkin, the station received defective equipment ; this was all done, he said, intentionally and consciously with the object of injuring the Soviet economy, at the instruction of Thornton, the representative of Metro-Vickers, and who paid for that wrecking work.

He further alleged that he had received 2,500 roubles in Soviet currency and 350 roubles in Torgsin cheques.

Accused also declared that he had worked out jointly with Thornton a plan of injury which would be easy to fulfil but would have serious consequences in case of a future war.

The plan provided for cutting off the current from a number of the most important metallurgical plants in Moscow, such as the "Serp and Molot," also from the Kremlin, Government buildings, the Moscow military barracks, the Central Aviation Institute and Radio Stations.

Sukhoruchkin also asserted that Thornton, who, as representative of Metro-Vickers, had no connection with the Moscow Power Station personally, nevertheless had carefully studied the switchboard station room with the help of Riazinov, the technical manager of the station, subsequently convicted for his wrecking work.

This, said Sukhoruchkin, enabled Thornton to work out the above-mentioned plan of diversion in case of war.

Thornton denied all Sukhoruchkin's statements, but admitted that he had visited the station with Sukhoruchkin, and examined the switchboard room.

The Court adjourned till the following morning.

MORNING SESSION, APRIL 15, 1933, 10.15 a.m.

As soon as the Court sitting opened, the accused Monkhouse stated :—

“ May I make a statement relative to Sukhoruchkin's evidence ? ”

The President : You may.

Monkhouse : I want to speak in English so as to be more exact.

The President : You may.

Monkhouse : After hearing the testimony of Sukhoruchkin and other Soviet citizens during yesterday and the day before—

The President : Do you want to make some explanation concerning Sukhoruchkin's testimony, or do you want to make a statement ? Is it an explanation or a statement ?

Monkhouse : An explanation.

The President : Concerning yourself ?

Monkhouse : Concerning myself.

The President : Then you may continue so far as Sukhoruchkin's testimony is concerned. But what has the testimony of other Soviet citizens to do with it ?

Monkhouse : Well, after the showing which Sukhoruchkin made last night, it is perfectly clear to me that this case is a frame-up against the Metro-Vickers, based on the evidence of terrorised prisoners.

The President : Accused Monkhouse, did Sukhoruchkin refer to you in his testimony or not ?

Monkhouse : Yes, he referred to me.

The President : Then speak on that point, and the rest will speak for themselves. You are not a counsel for defence, and every one of the accused has his own counsel, who will defend him.

Monkhouse : As I understand the law, I have the right to make a statement.

The President : It cannot be made now, but at the end of the Court's examination—in the final speeches every one of the accused will have the right to make the declarations he desires. This morning Krasheninnikov is to be examined, then Zorin, but not Monkhouse. When your turn comes, you will be able to make statements concerning the charges against you.

Monkhouse : I wish to continue, Sir, and to say that the evidence given by these persons, and I know from my own

experience, when I was arrested and subjected to an eighteen hours' examination—

The President (interrupting) : We shall examine you this evening or to-morrow morning. In so far as you are trying to make a statement on behalf of all the accused, I cannot allow you to speak. Therefore I call upon the accused Krasheninnikov, whom we shall now examine, and this evening, or to-morrow morning, you will have an opportunity to state what you find necessary concerning previous testimony.

The accused Krasheninnikov, Chief of the Repairing and Erection Department of the First Moscow Power Station, on being examined stated that during the period 1928 to 1932, in accordance with instructions he had received from the Metro-Vickers' engineers, Jolley, Thornton and Oleinik, he had repeatedly concealed defects in the erecting work carried out by the firm.

For this, he alleged, he had received a bribe from Thornton through Oleinik and had hoped to get more in the future in view of the promises he had received.

The Prosecutor here addressed Thornton : “ You, of course, deny this ? ”

Thornton answered : “ Of course I deny it.”

The Metro-Vickers' employee, Oleinik, then affirmed that Monkhouse had told him “ at the First Moscow Power Station there are people supporting the firm's interests.” He had named them, and characterised Krasheninnikov as a “ good chap.”

Both Oleinik and Krasheninnikov admitted that defects in turbine No. 27 were concealed by testing turbine No. 26 (which was in better condition) and then affirming that the results applied equally to the former turbine.

Oleinik further stated that :—

“ I already knew before that in other turbines there were cracks discovered in these bearings. When turbine No. 28 was opened it was found that there were cracks in this case also. In this connection Engineer Thornton was called, the question had already been raised by the operating department, that there was the danger that if a little piece of the babbitt should fall out it would cause the metal of the bearing to melt. Thornton came and brought with him another English installation engineer, I think it was Bell ; I had met him once. They assured us that there was no danger. I, of course, also confirmed this.”

Roginsky : And didn't you testify that Thornton came to an agreement with Krasheninnikov that these cracks were not dangerous, and that Krasheninnikov did not raise the question any more ?

Oleinik : That is so.

Roginsky : Accused Krasheninnikov, did this take place ?

Krasheninnikov : Yes, it took place.

Mr. Thornton then questioned Krasheninnikov, who in reply enumerated these defects, namely, regulating valves being "not properly heat-treated at the works," which stopped the work of the turbines; big differences in the gapping; insufficiently reliable turbine blades which caused them to fly out; cracks in the babbit of the bearings, &c.

The following dialogue then ensued:—

Thornton: And when the blades flew off, did the management of the Moscow Power Station know about this?

Krasheninnikov: It did.

Vyshinsky: Why did they fly off?

Thornton: In my opinion, owing to defects of construction.

Thornton: About the bearings of which Oleinik spoke . . . Did the management know about all three turbines?

Krasheninnikov: Yes.

Thornton: You did not conceal that?

Krasheninnikov: I did not conceal it, but I knew the attitude of the firm to every kind of defect. I concealed this attitude of the firm.

Vyshinsky: Accused Krasheninnikov, you are asked by accused Thornton whether the management knew about the various defects, and so forth. You answered that it knew, but did not know the causes, and I want to ask you along somewhat different lines. Was Ryazanov then in the management?

Krasheninnikov: He was.

Vyshinsky: Was he a wrecker?

Krasheninnikov: He was.

The accused Monkhouse asked Krasheninnikov why, knowing about these defects, he had not told the firm's representatives, to which the answer was that the representatives of the firm had instructed him (Krasheninnikov) to conceal them and not to speak of these defects.

Then ensued the following dialogue:—

Vyshinsky: I am interested in whether there really were defects in your equipment?

Monkhouse: There were.

Vyshinsky: And you knew of these defects?

Monkhouse: I knew. I knew after the breakdowns, I did not know before the breakdowns.

During the examination of Zorin (one of the Russian accused), who declared that he had participated in wrecking acts with the knowledge of Mr. Thornton, the following dialogue took place:—

Roginsky: What task was given you by Thornton during this last, fifth, meeting?

Zorin: Since Thornton had clearly seen during the previous meetings that it was very easy to enlist me in his work, he immediately began with the statement that he intended to use me in the interests of the firm and of those organisations which

had been formed at the various stations, both of Mosenergo and in the Soviet Union in general. Then he said during this conversation that he noticed that I was not showing up the defects in the equipment of Metro-Vickers as I should; accordingly, to a certain extent I was his ally. Then he said that the breakdowns which had occurred with the turbines of Metro-Vickers at the First Moscow Power Station and at other stations in the Union were not the result of purely accidental and operational causes, but were the result of organic defects which were deliberately allowed to pass during the construction of the turbines at the works. . . .

Roginsky: What acts have you perpetrated in the way of concealing the direct acts of diversion carried out by the members of the wreckers' group?

Zorin: I knew from Thornton that he had organised the breakdown at the First Moscow Station, the one that took place in November, by filling up the blades with lime and boiler foam. This breakdown had been concealed.

Roginsky: How about the breakdown of turbine No. 11 at the Shatura station?

Zorin: I heard from Thornton that this breakdown was engineered by him. This breakdown put the turbine out of service for about 14 days. But this happened at the time when I did not know that such an organisation was in existence.

Vyshinsky: And now tell us, did this wrecking activity of yours remain without remuneration?

Zorin: No. During our last meeting I received 1,000 roubles from him.

Vyshinsky: Where?

Zorin: Again in the firm's office.

Later in Zorin's examination when questioned by the defence the following dialogue took place:—

Braude: May I understand you in this way, that quite apart from Thornton you would have committed acts of wrecking just the same because these acts and acts of diversion were in accord with your convictions?

Zorin: Well, I said so before.

(The Court then adjourned for twenty minutes.)

The next accused examined was Mr. Cushny, who stated that he had worked at Baku from 1927 to 1930. In reply to questions by the Prosecution Mr. Cushny averred that the only written information which he had sent to Mr. Thornton and Mr. Monkhouse was in connection with his (Cushny's) work. The following dialogue then took place:—

Vyshinsky: And what about the unwritten form, that is, verbally?

Cushny: When we met we certainly spoke about all sorts of things.

Vyshinsky : You conversed for instance about politics ?

Cushny : Probably we spoke about politics too, about things that are common knowledge.

Mr. Cushny next admitted that he had had conversations with Mr. Thornton respecting many matters "concerning the Soviet State," but he definitely declared that "There was no special collecting of data from anybody, but general talk when meeting somebody. I passed on to Thornton my impressions which I gathered not from somebody in particular, but in general."

In reply to various questions, Mr. Cushny denied that he had shown any special interest in the Red Army, he denied giving presents to his acquaintances among the workmen, but that he had loaned them at various times petty sums. Then the following dialogue followed :—

Vyshinsky : You testified at the preliminary investigation that Yemelyanov took some money from you.

Cushny : Would you please read this deposition to me ?

Vyshinsky : I shall read it to you : "I remember having lent some money to Kislyakov, it is possible that I gave some to Yemelyanov also."

Cushny : It is possible that I gave some to Yemelyanov.

Vyshinsky : And now you say that you do not remember ?

Cushny : It is not a denial, if I say it is possible that I gave money.

Vyshinsky : Consequently it is possible that you gave money to Yemelyanov ?

Cushny : It is possible, yes.

Mr. Cushny admitted that there was a breakdown of a turbine in 1928, but added : "The water got inside because of the faulty working of the boilers. The boilers were not my business. They were not supplied by Metro-Vickers. It was soon after the starting up of the first of our turbines. The boilers were new and all the equipment was new. The boilers were different from those which the staff of the station had charge of before, so that it is possible that someone of the staff committed an error, a big error, in regard to the boilers. But this was not my business and I do not know how this mistake occurred, if it was a mistake in the boiler house."

The Russian accused Oleinik was next called on and there ensued the following dialogue :—

Vyshinsky : I am asking whether the breakdown in 1928 at the Baku Power Station was accidental or whether it was organised by someone deliberately ?

Oleinik : At the time all thought that it was accidental.

Vyshinsky : At that time, in 1928 ? And subsequently it turned out that it was not accidental ?

Oleinik : I learned that in 1932.

Vyshinsky : From whom ?

Oleinik : When Thornton gave me instructions about acts of diversion. At first I couldn't make up my mind to take up these acts of diversion, I said that acts of diversion with our machines are very dangerous because first of all the firm will be held responsible. This is one thing. Then secondly, I was afraid. He told me that one must know how to organise things, and as an example he referred to the case of the breakdown in Baku and said that Cushny knew how to organise it in such a way that there could be no suspicion and that no connection could be established with the personnel of Metro-Vickers.

Vyshinsky (to Cushny) : Did you hear this evidence ?

Cushny : I heard it. Oleinik is lying.

Vyshinsky : All right. Are you speaking the truth ?

Cushny : I am speaking the truth.

Vyshinsky (to Thornton) : Thornton, is Oleinik lying ?

Thornton : He is not telling the truth.

Mr. Cushny was next questioned by his counsel, M. Lidov, respecting his relations with the workers in Baku. In reply to a question Mr. Cushny said :—

"I always take an interest in what is going on around me. And since I was closer to these workers than the others, because they worked directly under me, I dealt directly with them, and had less to do with other people, was further removed from them. And furthermore they all liked me very much."

Next the following dialogue took place :—

Lidov : So you assert that all the time you stayed in Baku you maintained some personal relations with the fitters and workers who surrounded you ; you took an interest in and conversed about general questions of life, but you did not specially collect information through them—you emphatically deny that ?

Cushny : Quite true.

Lidov : Now, as regards the office as such, did you get any requests or instructions from any of the persons who worked there or with whom you came in contact to collect information—not with any definite aim in view—but simply to collect information as to the living conditions about you, around the place where you worked, the sentiments of the people, whether the workers were pleased or not ?

Cushny : Never. Maybe they asked me to explain technical questions concerning our installation, but what you said—never.

Mr. Cushny was firm that when he met Mr. Thornton in Moscow the latter had not put to him any questions respecting or relating to the Red Army.

Mr. Cushny at the conclusion of his examination said :—

"I wish to make a statement concerning the evidence."

The President : Your evidence is in no way different from the evidence given before. Perhaps not all the accused among the British subjects know the mode of procedure in our Courts. Our

procedure is as follows: There is an examination by the Court; the accused are examined in a definite order fixed at the first session. In the course of this examination the accused may make any statements. After the examination of all the accused, there follow the speeches by the Public Prosecutor, then the speeches of Counsel for Defence, and after that each of the accused is allowed to put in his final plea, in the course of which he can make any statement he wishes; after that the verdict is pronounced. This is our procedure. So to make any statements now in violation of the established court procedure would be inopportune.

Cushny: So I will be given an opportunity.

The President: This is our procedure as laid down in the Code of Procedure in Criminal Cases. I repeat in case you did not understand properly. This evening or to-morrow morning we shall complete the examination of all the accused, because there are only four persons to come. Then probably there will be an adjournment to prepare the speeches and we shall probably hear the experts. Then there will be the speech by the Public Prosecution. After that the speeches of Counsel for Defence, followed by the final pleas of all the accused. Then the Court will retire to deliberate on the verdict. This is always the procedure and there will be no exception in this case.

Cushny: Thank you, I have understood.

The Court next proceeded to examine the Russian accused Oleinik, the oldest employee of Messrs. Metro-Vickers, and the following are the most important extracts from his examination:—

Roginsky: Have you any savings abroad?

Oleinik: Yes.

Roginsky: How did they originate?

Oleinik: It was in 1930. I was working in Moscow; Engineer Thornton began to talk to me saying that the situation of the Soviet Government was unstable, the value of money was falling, and maybe the Government would fall any day. If I had any savings it would be better to put them into an English bank. I told him that I had saved 2,000 roubles. I gave this money to Monkhouse, because Thornton was not in the office when I came, and he put it into an English bank when he was in England and brought me a cheque-book from there, but he said that it was dangerous to have a cheque-book at home in case of a search. Therefore it would be better for the cheque-book to remain with him. So I left it at that.

Roginsky: So it would be correct to say that in 1930 or thereabout you sent all your money to England through the agency of Thornton and Monkhouse?

Oleinik: Yes. In addition, I forgot to say that Engineer Thornton said to me at the time that it would be better not to draw all my salary here, but to make arrangements to have about

100 roubles, or 10 pounds per month, put to my current account in England.

Roginsky: I intended asking you this question. So you sent your savings to England and in addition by agreement with Thornton a certain part of your salary also was to be paid to your current account in England?

Oleinik: Yes.

Questioned as to his wrecking work, Oleinik stated that he had concealed defects in equipment and collected information on the technical condition of electric power stations, the enlargement of stations and works, proposed orders, the sentiments of the masses. Also information about the movement of troops and munitions. He had also engineered breakdowns. He further asserted that he had been given instructions by his chiefs, Mr. Thornton and Mr. MacDonald, to conceal defects and collect information.

The Assistant Prosecutor then turned to Mr. Thornton:—

Roginsky (to Thornton): Do you deny the evidence of Oleinik?

Thornton: I deny it.

Roginsky (to Monkhouse): And do you also deny the evidence of Oleinik in the part affecting you?

Monkhouse: I deny it and I ask the Court to allow me to produce some documents.

Roginsky: You can ask the Court later, but now let us return to the evidence which Oleinik gave about you. Do you deny it?

Monkhouse: I deny it.

After further questions to Oleinik, the Court adjourned at 3 p.m.

EVENING SESSION, APRIL 15, 1933,

6 p.m.

The evening session commenced with the continuation of the examination of the Russian accused Oleinik, who was first questioned by M. Nikolai Kommodov, Counsel for Mr. Monkhouse. The following are extracts from the dialogue:—

Kommodov: At the preliminary investigation, and I believe also here, you mentioned two cases: the collection of information on the definite instructions of Monkhouse at the time you went to the Nadezhdinsk Works in 1928 and, if one may express it so, the dragging out of the testing dates of the turbines up to the moment when the guarantee limit for the Shterovka State Power Station had expired.

Oleinik: More correctly, obstructions of the tests so that the tests should not be made at all. If the test is dragged out and the guarantee period has passed, then the test is futile—so I understood.

Kommodov: In order to drag out the tests so that they should not take place at all, or only to delay them?

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Oleinik : Once the guarantee period has passed, the purchaser has no right to demand a test.

Kommodov : But can the test take place ?

Oleinik : Yes, it can take place, but it would not be valid.

Oleinik was next questioned by M. Dolmatovsky, Counsel for Messrs. Nordwall and Gregory.

The following are the most important extracts from the dialogue :—

Dolmatovsky : Have you had instructions about wrecking acts, espionage activities, and so forth from Nordwall ?

Oleinik : I did not get instructions, but was asked questions and received assistance.

Dolmatovsky : Did you ask him for assistance, or did he ask you ?

Oleinik : He asked me.

Dolmatovsky : What did his requests consist of ?

Oleinik : When he came to Motovilikha, he asked me the following : first, he asked me several questions in relation to the production of the works and then, as I had been there for a long period of time and he had just arrived, he asked me to introduce him to local engineers from whom he could receive information.

Dolmatovsky : It means that Nordwall demanded illegal information ; you understood this and you gave it to him ?

Oleinik : Yes, I gave it to him.

Dolmatovsky : You knew that he (Nordwall) was your man ?

Oleinik : In Makeyevka I did not know. I stated that regarding Nordwall—I had had a warning.

Dolmatovsky : What kind ?

Oleinik : I thought that this was simply camouflage because Nordwall impressed me as a very experienced spy. From his actions in both Motovilikha and Makeyevka he gave the impression of being very experienced.

Dolmatovsky : Then I absolutely cannot understand you. You had a task from Thornton of an espionage nature. Then Nordwall came and duplicated tasks of the same nature.

Oleinik : He gave his own and did not duplicate theirs. He asked me to acquaint him with the personnel which could give him information.

Dolmatovsky : In Makeyevka what was the attitude towards Nordwall—and towards you ?

Oleinik : This was the basis on which Nordwall carried on agitation all the time. When I wanted to carry on work, Nordwall incited the workers against me. The job superintendent, a friend of Nordwall's, carried on espionage work. He is not here, and perhaps he should not be named ; he brought in very much information and this information was very important. He was a friend of Nordwall's and Nordwall maintained this friendship

with him just for this purpose and paid him money. Through this job superintendent he acted—bribed the workers, and not only bribed, but also agitated.

Dolmatovsky : In what sense did he agitate ?

Oleinik : He agitated that they should not submit to or carry out my orders, that they should delay the work. Here he talked about shock brigade work. This was pulling wool over the eyes, because the work which we put out in four and a half months could easily have been done in two months with a smaller expenditure of labour, with half the labour. Now if this work was completed—and in Dzerzhinka they were still behindhand—it means that the wrecking was even greater there than in Makeyevka.

Dolmatovsky : Were you or weren't you afraid of him (Nordwall) as a man who might go to the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and complain ?

Oleinik : I was not afraid that he would go to the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and complain. I stated that I was warned about this by Engineer Thornton, but I was not afraid because I saw that this was simply a bluff, a mask.

The next to be examined was Mr. Monkhouse, the representative of Metro-Vickers in Moscow, who related his biography in detail. He had been in Russia prior to and after the revolution for seventeen years, including one year in the capacity of captain of the railway troops of the British Army in occupation of the Archangel district during the period of intervention.

Mr. Monkhouse was questioned about the work upon which Mr. Richards was engaged in Archangel during the period of foreign armed intervention :—

The President : Did you meet your schoolmate, Richards ?

Monkhouse : I visited Archangel once a month and almost every time met Richards, who was attached to the General Staff. There was an officers' mess room there, I had my lunch there, and met him. He was a good friend of mine and so I almost always saw him.

The President : Was he an officer of the Counter-Intelligence Service ?

Monkhouse : Counter-Intelligence or Intelligence, I don't know.

The President : How is it that you don't know ? There is a difference between Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence.

Monkhouse : In my opinion, it was Counter-Intelligence.

The President : Intelligence seeks information and Counter-Intelligence seeks Intelligence agents. What was Richards looking for—information or Russian Intelligence agents ?

Monkhouse : It seems to me that he did both. I don't know whether Richards did this work personally or not.

Mr. Monkhouse was next questioned regarding his work in the U.S.S.R. since 1924 :—

Vyshinsky: Accused Monkhouse, I am interested in several questions in order to throw light on the charges against you.

First question: Did you gather information or receive it from various persons connected with you through service and other relations?

Monkhouse: I received information; perhaps it would be more correct to say, not information, but impressions.

Vyshinsky: You received information, perhaps we should call it information.

Monkhouse: Information. This, of course, I needed because every time I come to London I report to my head office.

Vyshinsky: On various questions connected with your work?

Monkhouse: On various questions connected with our work, and our head office always asks us to report on the situation in the country.

Vyshinsky: But from whom did you receive it mainly?

Monkhouse: This is very difficult to state. I read all the Russian papers every day, all the technical papers.

Vyshinsky: And besides newspaper information?

Monkhouse: I knew many leaders—

Vyshinsky: In a word, you utilised all opportunities to gather information?

Monkhouse: Of course, this was my business.

Vyshinsky: Of course it was your business to utilise all information, every meeting, conversations, and so on.

Monkhouse: To utilise it only in that sense of which I have spoken—in order to carry on our business here.

Vyshinsky: It's clear, to carry on business here. Was Thornton among your informants and your sources of information?

Monkhouse: Of course Thornton was, because I saw him every day.

Vyshinsky: At the preliminary examination you deposed that this information was supplied by Thornton and Cushny who frequently travelled to the construction jobs.

Monkhouse: Quite so.

Vyshinsky: What you deny is only its espionage nature?

Monkhouse: I deny the espionage nature of this information.

The Prosecution next questioned Mr. Monkhouse in regard to some of the equipment supplied by Metro-Vickers.

Vyshinsky: Were there defects in the installation supplied by your firm?

Monkhouse: Yes, there were defects.

Vyshinsky: And in consequence of these defects, there were breakdowns?

Monkhouse: There were breakdowns.

Vyshinsky: Serious breakdowns?

Monkhouse: To my mind they were not very serious. I do not know what you call serious. I consider it a serious breakdown when the turbine flies through the roof.

Vyshinsky: But if it does not fly through the roof and is only put out of action—this is not a serious breakdown? Our conceptions of seriousness are somewhat different.

Monkhouse: When the turbine has to be stopped for two or three days and the blades repaired, this is not a very serious breakdown.

Vyshinsky: I do not say that this is very serious, but between two days of stoppage and a turbine flying through the roof there is a big difference.

Monkhouse: Of course, for the reputation of the firm it is serious, but, in general, the breakdown is not serious.

Vyshinsky: Your firm is not on trial, we are speaking here to you. Therefore the reputation of your firm is of little interest to me, but what I am interested in is your deeds. . . . You confirm that at a number of stations—Ivanovo, Zuevka, Cheliabinsk and the First Moscow Power Station—there were a number of defects in the regulation as well as in the turbines and the diaphragms.

Monkhouse: Quite true, but I must say that all these defects were repaired, and repaired very quickly. These were all defects which depended either on the material or on the design, but not on the installation.

Vyshinsky: In short, these were defects in some cases of greater importance and in others of less importance. Is that so or not?

Monkhouse: You may put it that way if you wish.

Vyshinsky: In consequence of these defects there were breakdowns and stoppages of machines?

Monkhouse: There were stoppages.

After further questions on the subject the Prosecutor started to read the deposition given by Mr. Monkhouse at the preliminary investigation when the latter interjected:—

“Wait a moment, I retracted that deposition. I said that this deposition was made after an examination of eighteen hours' duration.”

The dialogue continued:—

The President: Accused Monkhouse, how many hours were you in confinement in Moscow?

Monkhouse: Only forty-eight hours.

The President: And you became panicky so soon?

Monkhouse: It was enough under such methods of examination.

Vyshinsky: And so if you had been in the service of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry you would not have taken these machines?

Monkhouse : I would not have taken them.

Vyshinsky : And who sent these machines ?

Monkhouse : Our firm.

Vyshinsky : So your firm was selling.

Monkhouse : We did not select the machines.

Vyshinsky : So our people were taking and your people were getting rid of ?

Monkhouse : We did everything that was possible.

Vyshinsky : Did you do all that was possible that our people should not take them, and did they take them nevertheless ?

Monkhouse : We did everything to satisfy our clients in regard to machines.

Vyshinsky : But which you yourself as a representative of the firm would decline ?

Monkhouse : We did everything to satisfy the demands of our clients. We sent machines which we guaranteed and these machines we shall rebuild.

Vyshinsky : What you will do is one thing, but what you did is another. And, however unpleasant, it is a fact with which we have to reckon.

Monkhouse : Every firm which undertakes such business may have to reckon with that.

Vyshinsky : It is clear to me now that there were such machines which you were selling but which you yourself would not have bought.

Monkhouse : This is my personal opinion.

Vyshinsky : True, it is your opinion, not mine. I want you to confirm once more at the open trial whether this is correct or not.

Monkhouse : I personally would not have bought these machines, would not have selected them.

Vyshinsky : Why ?

Monkhouse : That would be a long technical talk.

The President : Because they are good or bad ?

Monkhouse : It is a new system.

Mr. Monkhouse was next questioned by counsel for the Defence, M. Kommodov and M. Lidov. Mr. Monkhouse admitted that there were defects in the machinery, but said that he had taken all necessary steps to correct the defects speedily. On one occasion he had cabled to England and the firm's experts came to Russia and "made a full investigation of the defects on the spot."

Mme. Kutuzova (Mr. Monkhouse's Russian Secretary) attested that she had been working with the firm for about eight years, that she had lived in the same house with Mr. Monkhouse and Mr. Thornton for about four years and that she was on good terms with them. The following dialogue then ensued :—

Roginsky : Do you confirm that in addition to espionage, the substance of those criminal activities was the organised damage

of machinery, as you testified you had learned from conversations between Thornton and Monkhouse ?

Kutuzova : Yes, I also confirm the acts of diversion of that group.

Roginsky : Do you confirm your evidence to the effect that you were aware of the bribing of several Russian engineers and technicians for committing such criminal actions as you have just mentioned to the Court ?

Kutuzova : Yes.

On being called by the Prosecutor, the Russian engineers enumerated by Mme. Kutuzova immediately confirmed her assertions. The examination continued :—

Roginsky : Accused Kutuzova, do you also confirm that part of your evidence where you refer to the manner in which these sums were recorded in the respective books ?

Kutuzova : That is not quite correct. There were no books : engineer Thornton kept the records in diaries in his apartment.

Roginsky : That means that the records of sums spent in payment of espionage and wrecking activities were entered by Thornton in special books kept in his apartment.

Kutuzova : Yes.

Roginsky : Where are those books ?

Kutuzova : I know that he took them away with him to England.

Roginsky : When ?

Kutuzova : About December, 1932, when he went away for Christmas.

Roginsky : I have a question to ask Thornton. Do you deny Kutuzova's evidence ?

Thornton : I do.

Mme. Kutuzova was next questioned by Counsel for the Defence, M. Braude and Kammodov, but she maintained that her evidence was accurate. Mr. Thornton in reply to the prosecution denied that he had told Mme. Kutuzova that he had other duties besides his duties to the firm.

In connection with Mme. Kutuzova's testimony the Prosecutor questioned Thornton, who denied Mme. Kutuzova's declaration, saying she had got mixed up and that no conversations had been held between himself and Monkhouse regarding wrecking activities.

The Prosecutor read the records of the confrontation between Mme. Kutuzova and Thornton, when Thornton had confirmed all that Mme. Kutuzova had said.

Thornton admitted that he had given all this testimony and added : "It was a mistake on my part to sign."

Thornton also admitted the existence of notebooks and admitted they were taken to England, adding, however, that only the small

expenditures and payments which he had incurred were entered in these notebooks.

The examination continued thus :—

Roginsky : Next is the record of the decision of the Investigating Judge, dated April 4, 1933, the record of the charges presented. It contains :—

- (1) The charge that Thornton engaged in economic and military espionage.
- (2) He enlisted a number of Soviet engineers and technicians for spying work and paid them various sums of money for the information supplied.
- (3) Both personally, and through the medium of MacDonald and other engineers of the firm in question, who were subordinate to him, he systematically gave bribes to a number of Soviet engineers for concealing defects in the equipment supplied by the firm of Metropolitan-Vickers.
- (4) Gave instructions to Monkhouse and other of the firm's engineers to organise and carry out, through the medium of specially chosen Soviet engineers and technicians, the damage to equipment and also breakdowns in a number of power stations connected with enterprises in the U.S.S.R., which breakdowns and damage to equipment were subsequently carried out ; for which Thornton paid various sums to the persons directly carrying out his tasks of diversion.

This is from the record of the charges brought against you by the Investigating Judge of the Public Prosecution.

Thornton : Who wrote that ?

Roginsky : The Investigating Judge on Important Cases.

"*Thornton* (answer) : 'I admit that I am guilty according to the charge presented to me as the accused with the exception of paragraph 4.'"

That is to say, you admit that you drew a number of Russian engineers and technicians into economic and military espionage, and admit giving bribes to Russian engineers and technicians for concealing defects in equipment, and only do not admit the organisation and carrying out of breakdowns.

Thornton : I withdrew the part about espionage in connection with military information.

Vyshinsky : You withdrew it here, before the Court. And why ?

Thornton : It is not true.

Vyshinsky : And why did you say what is not true ?

Thornton : That was not in the office of the Public Prosecutor, but in the O.G.P.U.

Vyshinsky : But it was the Investigating Judge on Important Cases of the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic. Did you say that there ?

Thornton : He wrote it.

Vyshinsky : But did you say it ?

Thornton : I signed it.

Vyshinsky : Did you say it or not ?

Thornton : He wrote and I signed.

Vyshinsky : Were you shown it ?

Thornton : Yes, it was shown to me.

Vyshinsky : Did you read it through ?

Thornton : Yes.

Vyshinsky : Signed it ?

Thornton : Yes.

In the course of further questioning, Mr. Thornton said : "I was questioned for a very long time. It was suggested to me that if I confessed, 'Vsyo budet khorosho,' that everything would be all right."

Vyshinsky : And if you did not confess ?

Thornton : Further, if I did not confess I should be of no use in Soviet Russia or Eng'and. Then I was so tired and brow-beaten by the whole thing that I signed this.

The President : Wrote it or signed it ?

Thornton : They dictated it in Russian, and I wrote it in English.

The President : You were so tired that you could translate from Russian into English on the spot ? Do you know the Russian language so well that when you were tired you could write in English straight away when dictated to in Russian ?

Thornton (Continues in Russian) : It was so in this instance.

Vyshinsky : Then ?

Thornton : Since this was so, I had to sign.

The Prosecutor submitted that although Thornton had been questioned almost daily, his alleged low spirits during the first days passed later and his mood improved ; nevertheless, Thornton had not denied the confessions before, which he had made during the preliminary investigation, neither had he retracted them here in the Court during the first days of his examination.

The dialogue continued :—

Vyshinsky : Here at the Court when I examined you during the first days of the trial about the explanation you wished to make did you declare that this record was written under pressure ? Answer my question.

Thornton : No, I didn't.

Vyshinsky : I put three questions to you—was pressure brought to bear on you ? You answered—no.

Thornton : I answered no.

Vyshinsky : I asked you—were you tortured ? You answered—no.

Thornton : That is so.

Vyshinsky : I asked you—were you subjected to the third degree during your interrogation ? What did you answer ?

Thornton : No.

Vyshinsky : And now what do you say ?

Thornton : I understood it to mean—was I tortured physically.

Vyshinsky : Physically or morally—torture is torture. I ask you, who of the Englishmen in Moscow has taught you not to tell the truth now ?

Thornton : I am speaking the truth.

Vyshinsky : I understand who could teach you and who has taught you, and why you are now saying this.

The accused Mr. Monkhouse requested Mme. Kutuzova to tell how the money was transmitted to her through the Consulate, saying that this document signed by Kutuzova and purporting to show that she received money from the English Consulate could be shown.

Mme. Kutuzova stated that she had not signed any such evidence.

Vyshinsky : Even if Citizen Kutuzova had given such testimony anywhere, concerning the activities of any official institution of any foreign State located on our territory, this document cannot be made public at a public session. Therefore, I categorically object to the reading of such a document.

The President : Quite correct. Are there any more questions for Kutuzova ? (There are none.)

The accused Mr. Gregory, on being questioned, said that he came to Moscow in July, 1932, and had worked on the Dnieprostroy and Kamenskoye.

Questioned by the Prosecutor as to what he had to say respecting the evidence of Zivert about his alleged sabotage in assembling machinery, Gregory denied Zivert's allegations, and said that he came to the U.S.S.R. for *bona fide* work.

After Counsel for Defence had presented a letter of Oleinik's which was added to the file, the Prosecutor, Vyshinsky, made the following statement :—

“ In the first place at the end of to-day's session before the adjournment, Monkhouse mentioned, as if accidentally, that he had felt tired and he referred to the 18-hour interrogation. Although I do not attach any serious political importance to this, nevertheless, since it is possible that this motive may be used for organised attempts to discredit certain acts in connection with the preliminary investigation—and the further behaviour of Thornton (about which, of course, before the interval I could know nothing) shows that such attempts have already taken place—I have already obtained the files concerning the accused, taken from the O.G.P.U. prison, and which contain first of all the warrant for arrest and the order assigning the accused to the prison.

“ Also some forms containing not only the dates, but also the hours of leaving for and returning from the interrogation of each accused who was taken from his cell to the place of investigation.

“ On examination of this material which I shall have the honour of presenting to the Court with the request that it be admitted as evidence and included in the files up to such time as there shall be no further need for it, since it has to be returned to its proper place, I find it necessary to draw attention to the fact that Monkhouse's statement to-day concerning his 18-hour interrogation is a false statement, as is equally the statement made by Thornton about the prolonged interrogation as a result of which he was seized with extreme fatigue, which is also false. The proof of this lies in the following: Monkhouse was arrested at night, between the 11th and 12th, and at 3.15 a.m. was placed in his cell. He was called up for interrogation on the 12th at 11.15 a.m. Consequently he had full opportunity to rest. The interrogation continued until 3.15 p.m. after which there was an interval for dinner, which was brought there into the Investigating Judge's room to the accused Monkhouse and which took him a very considerable time, since it consisted of three courses. The interrogation was renewed at 5.10 p.m. It was brought to a close at 1.10 a.m. During this interrogation there was also an interval of 40 to 45 minutes for supper, in the same room. Monkhouse dare not deny these facts.

“ Moreover, during this period of time, Monkhouse was not only interrogated for the number of hours indicated, but his interrogation was translated by him into English in his own handwriting, after it had been originally taken down in Russian by the Investigating Judge. That is to say, a three-fold process took place in this period of time: the interrogation in Russian, the record written in Russian, and Monkhouse's translation of the interrogation into English. For all this a period of time was required, which may be calculated at 12 hours and 30 minutes as the maximum including the intervals indicated by me.

“ I take it that these facts are sufficient to refute this entirely objectionable attempt to discredit the preliminary investigation by allegations of any kind of abnormal conditions in connection with it, not to mention the fact that there remained always the possibility of making a concrete declaration, so that by direct investigation facts could be established which would contradict the explanation given by me just now to the Court.

"As for Thornton, inasmuch as I obtained all the files in order to be sufficiently equipped to meet any declarations that might be made after Monkhouse's sortie, the matter stands in this case just as unfavourably for the statements of the accused.

"Thornton, as can be seen from his dossier No. 597, was arrested and put into his cell at the same time. His first examination took place also on March 12 at 11.45 a.m. It lasted for 4 hours and 15 minutes. The second interrogation was at 5 p.m. and finished at 1 a.m., that is, it lasted for 7 hours 55 minutes, in all 12 hours.

"This is the maximum period of time during which any interrogation took place, including all the intervals for dinner, for supper, for breakfast, the time required to go from the cell to the Investigating Judge's Office and from there back to the cell, which distance requires an eight to ten minute walk. These data prove that the organised attempt of the accused, both Thornton and Monkhouse, to try in this manner to get out of the evidence presented to them, must be rejected as unscrupulous and completely overthrown by all the existing data.

"I ask the Court to include these files in the file of the present investigation until no longer required, when they should be returned to their proper place." (He hands the files to the President.)

Mr. Monkhouse asked to be allowed to make a declaration concerning Vyshinsky's statement.

Whilst not denying the statement of the Prosecutor, Mr. Monkhouse explained his declaration about his eighteen hours of examination by the fact that he had no watch with him and could not know how long he was at the examination. Mr. Monkhouse said: "I see I made a mistake and I tender my apologies."

Vyshinsky replied: "You apologise for your mistake; I am very glad to hear it."

The Court adjourned at 8.35 p.m.

MORNING SESSION, APRIL 16, 1933,

10.30 a.m.

At the opening of the session, Mr. Monkhouse, through his Counsel, M. Kommodov, asked for the following ten questions to be put to the expert commission:—

"(1) Could a piece of metal found under a valve get into a turbine when there is a safety net on the steam chest?

"(2) Could the quality of the installation work on a generator be the cause of the varnish dripping from the stator, since the winding of the stator is done at the works and the stator is sent complete?

"(3) Does the Commission of Experts consider that the heating of the generator at the Cheliabinsk Electric Power Station was normal and in agreement with technical norms, if we take into account the investigation made by the All-Union Electrical Institute?

"(4) Does the Commission of Experts consider that the Metro-Vickers 24,000 kw. turbo-generators installed at the Ivanovo Electric Power Station showed on testing the steam consumption guaranteed by the firm?

"(5) Does the Commission of Experts consider that the measures taken by the staff of the firm to remove defects in the blade setting were sufficient?

"(6) Does the Commission of Experts know that the safety valve arrangement on the regenerative feed-water heater for Metro-Vickers turbines is used in foreign stations and works satisfactorily?

"(7) Can it be considered big damage if the pressure regulator on the second transformer group of the First Moscow Power Station was put into operation within eight hours after the breakdown?

"(8) Are the representatives of the firm who install a turbo-generator responsible for the state of the drain channel at the Orekhovo-Zuevo Station?

"(9) Can the representatives of Metro-Vickers be regarded as being responsible for the bad condition of the insulation in the rotor leads on the generators at the First Moscow Power Station, if it is remembered that all the electrical connections were made by Russians and from Russian materials?

"(10) Does the Commission of Experts know that house turbine No. 17 at the First Moscow Power Station was not supplied by Metro-Vickers?"

The Court resolved to submit eight of the questions to the Expert Commission, but disallowed two on the following grounds:—

"Questions 8 and 9, as originally enumerated by Counsel for the Defence, are deleted because the Court is not trying the firm, nor is it trying individual representatives of the firm, but is trying individual British and Soviet citizens on charges of committing definite actions provided against by our Criminal Code."

At 11 a.m. the President decided to adjourn the Court until 7.0 p.m. to give the Expert Commission time to formulate their reply.

EVENING SESSION, APRIL 16, 1933,

7.20 p.m.

The Court duly resumed and the Commission of Experts gave the following conclusions:—

Question No. 1: Could a piece of metal found under a valve get into a turbine when there is a safety net on the steam chest?

Answer: The Commission considers that under very unfavourable conditions it is possible that pieces of metal found under the valve and in front of the safety net could in time, under the influence of the passing current of steam, partially destroy the net and penetrate the turbine. Nevertheless, the Commission considers that the main danger from the iron entering under the valve lay in the fact that the iron did not permit the complete closing of the stop valve. In the case of the main regulating arrangement refusing to work, when the load was being thrown off (which is not unusual with the Metro-Vickers turbine) the speeding up of the machine must be forestalled by means of the closing of the stop valve. The impossibility of its closing on account of the pieces of metal finding their way into it could be a reason for a large speeding up of the turbine and even a breakdown.

Question No. 2: Could the quality of the installation work on a generator be the cause of the varnish dripping from the stator, since the winding of the stator is done at the works and the stator is sent complete?

Answer: The quality of the installation of the generator, in conditions where it has been sent complete from the works, cannot be the cause of the varnish dripping out. Nevertheless, errors in the assembly and installation of the generator ventilation and of the equipment connected with the ventilation may cause the temperature of the stator winding to rise, as a result of which the drip of varnish will increase.

Question No. 3: Does the Commission of Experts consider that the heating of the generator at the Cheliabinsk Electric Power Station was normal and in agreement with technical norms, if we take into account the investigation made by the All-Union Electrical Institute? (Page 31.)

Answer: According to the agreement between Arcos and Metro-Vickers in regard to the generator of the Cheliabinsk Station, the maximum increase in temperature above the temperature of the surrounding air (35° C.) with a maximum protracted load of 24,000 kw. (30,000 kw. amperes) should not exceed: for the stator winding, when measured with a thermometer, 50° C. and when determined by the resistance method 80° C. (for the rotor winding when determined by the resistance method 80° C.).

During the testing of generator No. 2 at the Cheliabinsk Power Station, carried out by the All-Union Electrical Institute from June 11 to 27, 1932, it was ascertained that, in regard to the heating of the copper of the rotor and the iron of the stator, the generator came up to the standards of the Association of German Engineers (VDE), but in regard to the heating of the copper of the stator the generator does not comply with these standards of the Association of German Engineers (VDE): also in regard to the heating of the copper of the stator, the generator does not satisfy the technical conditions of the agreement since the temperature increase of the winding of the stator when measured with a mercury thermometer instead of the 50° permitted by the agreement, reached 60° at a stator current of 1,541 amperes. Consequently for a normal stator current 1,578 amperes, the temperature increase would be even larger.

Question No. 4: Does the Commission of Experts consider that the Metro-Vickers 24,000 kw. turbo-generators installed at the Ivanovo Power Station passed the regulation tests? (Page 89 of the Indictment.)

Answer: On the basis of the materials examined, which were placed at the disposal of the Commission of Experts, the latter has ascertained that:—

(1) According to the agreement the change in the number of revolutions for an instantaneous throwing-off of the load from full load to no load should not exceed +5 per cent. and +3 per cent. for the steady state.

(2) For an instantaneous throwing-off or for a change of 25 per cent. from full load, the number of revolutions should not exceed +5 per cent. and +2 per cent. for the steady state.

(3) On October 22, 1931 (see the record of November 12, 1931), representatives of the Ivanovo Power Station, in the presence of the firm's representative Shipley, carried out tests of the regulation of turbine No. 2 for the throwing-off of the load and in all cases the number of revolutions rose approximately to 3,300 r.p.m. and the safety valve came into action.

(4) At the technical conference on December 11, 1931, in the presence of the firm's representative Thornton, the following defects were noted in the regulation of the turbines:—

- (a) The necessity of hand regulation by means of the by-pass valve on the steam pipe at no load, for the maintenance of a constant number of revolutions.
- (b) The increase in the number of revolutions above 5 per cent. for a partial throwing-off of the load (10-15,000 kw.) and the switching off of the machine by the automatic safety device.

(5) In the report regarding the tests of turbines Nos. 1 and 2 carried out by the Orgenergo in January, 1932, the following was pointed out in regard to the regulation of the turbine :—

- (a) When throwing-off 17,000 kw. of turbine No. 1 the automatic safety devices began to act. The increase in the number of revolutions during this test amounted to 7 per cent.
- (b) During the test of the automatic speed regulating device for the same machine, by means of an artificial increase in the number of revolutions through tightening the valve sleeves, the automatic safety device began to act when the number of revolutions increased by 9.5 per cent.
- (c) On turbine No. 2 for a load throw-off of 60,000 kw. the increase in the number of revolutions amounted to 7 per cent.
- (d) For a load throw-off of 11,600 kw. for the same machine the number of revolutions increased by 6 per cent.

The measurements of the increase in the number of revolutions for the throwing-off of the load, as well as during the test of the automatic safety device, were carried out by means of the previously calibrated tachograph (recording tachometer). (The tachograms of these tests are in the materials.)

On the basis of the above, the Commission of Experts notes the unsatisfactory work of the regulation of both machines and considers that the "guarantee in regard to the regulation has not been carried out."

Question No. 5: Does the Commission of Experts consider that the measures taken by the staff of the firm to remove defects in the blade setting were sufficient? (Page 39 of the Indictment.)

Answer: On the basis of the memoranda and materials examined, which record the breaking of the blade setting of the turbines at the Ivanovo Power Station and other stations, and also on a basis of the examination of the materials relating to the design and stress analysis, the Commission comes to the conclusion that the measures which were taken for the elimination of these defects were not sufficient. The design of the blades is unsafe, since the blades are weak, have excessive stresses due to steam loading and break as the result of metal fatigue caused by resonance vibrations. The introduction of a restraining wire serves only as a palliative measure directed to the bettering of the working conditions of the blades by preventing the resonance of one of the types of tangential vibrations of blades (*i.e.*, one definite order of tangential vibrations).

Having in mind the possible resonance of axial vibrations, the excessive stresses in the blades of the given design due to axial vibration and the insignificant effect of the wire on the

axial vibration, it is necessary to recognise that the installation of blades with wire bindings as well as the installations of new blades of the same design, in place of the broken ones (which has been practiced several times) is an insufficient measure.

The Commission would consider an effective measure to be the radical redesigning of the blade setting in the direction of a considerable reduction of the stresses in the active blades in order to avoid the fatigue of the metal with the existing vibrations of the turbine blades.

Question No. 6: Does the Commission of Experts know that the safety valve arrangement on the regenerative feed-water heater for Metro-Vickers turbines is used in foreign stations and works satisfactorily? (Page 41 of the Indictment.)

Answer: The Commission of Experts does not have at its disposal documents corroborating the reliable and irreproachable work at foreign stations of the safety valve arrangement for the feed-water heater of the Metro-Vickers turbines. Nevertheless, the available materials regarding the work of the safety valve arrangement of the feed-water heater No. 2 for the 24,000 kw. turbine at the Ivanovo Power Station testify to cases when the device refused to work during the filling-up of the heaters with water (the float of the device filled up with water and did not work).

This circumstance testifies to the unreliable work of the safety device at the Ivanovo Power Station.

Question No. 7: Can it be considered big damage if the pressure regulator on the second transformer group of the First Moscow Power Station was put into operation within eight hours after the breakdown?

Answer: During the breakdown with the regulator of the second 47,000 kw. transformer group at the First Moscow Power Station which took place on October 1, 1932 (Mosenergo memorandum of April 16, 1933), four bushings of the oil throw-over switch, the throw-over switch contacts and the contacts of the oil circuit breaker were damaged. The transformer was equipped with Translay's safety device. The relay was tightened up too much and during the breakdown the transformer safety device did not work and the generator, used in the test, was switched off by hand.

The Commission of Experts finds that :—

- (1) The damage to the equipment at the breakdown did not assume extensive proportions.
- (2) The interruption in the work of the transformer group was approximately eight hours.

(3) Part of the damaged equipment was replaced from stock at the station and a part, due to the lack of parts in stock, was remounted after being cleaned and repaired.

Nevertheless, the Commission of Experts considers that :—

(1) An interruption in the work of such a large unit as the 47,000 kw. transformer group even for a few hours may cause great disorganisation in the electric power supply system.

(2) If the transformer group, during its trial connection to the circuit, had not been gradually loaded from a specific generator but had been directly placed under a load, the extent of the breakdown would have been considerably larger, the damage to the equipment considerably more serious and would have caused the discontinuation of the work of the transformer group for a considerable period.

Question No. 8 : Does the Commission of Experts know that house-turbine No. 17 at the First Moscow Power Station was not supplied by Metro-Vickers ? (Page 53 of the Indictment.)

Answer : The Commission of Experts knows that house turbine No. 17 at the First Moscow Power Station is not one supplied by the Metro-Vickers firm.

Members of the Commission of Experts :

GOLUBTSOV
BRAILO
NOVIKOV
ULATOV
SNETKOV
SMIRNOV.

The President : Has the Defence any questions ?

Defence : No.

The President : Has the Prosecution any questions ?

Roginsky : No.

The President : Accused Monkhouse, have you any questions to put to the Commission of Experts ?

Monkhouse : I have no questions, but I consider that it is not all quite correct ; there are certain points which are debatable. I think that there is room for argument with the Commission, but this is not the place for argument. If cases occurred when we did not carry out the guarantee, if there were such cases, they should have been made known to our firm through the Electro-Import and Arcos. I think that in this decision there is room for argument.

Roginsky : I presume that if accused Monkhouse has a basis for refuting any assertion made by the Commission of Experts, it will be necessary to do so immediately at this session ; moreover, this refutation must relate to the concrete facts of the

charges against Monkhouse. We have repeatedly pointed out here, and the Court has borne us out in this, that the questions connected with the supply of equipment by the firm generally are not the subject of the investigation by this Court. We are exclusively investigating the concrete facts of the crimes charged to each one of the accused sitting in the dock. Only from this point of view can the conclusions of the Commission of Experts be considered.

Monkhouse : If the conclusions of the Commission of Experts must be considered from this point of view, I have no more questions, since I think that you will agree that in the majority of cases the answers given by the Commission of Experts point to defects which could not in any way be attributed to the accused.

Roginsky : This is a question of the evaluation of the facts and the evaluation will be made in the argument between the parties in the case.

After a few further questions, the Court adjourned for half-an-hour. When the Court reassembled the President called on the Public Prosecutor. The following are the most important points from M. Vyshinsky's summing-up speech :—

“ This summing up should be and will be very important, because, even compared with other cases that have come before the Supreme Court in previous years, the present case has exceptional significance ; the present case must be characterised as a case which has exceptional, even world significance, as a case upon which the attention of the whole world, of the toilers of this country, of the toilers of all countries, of all our friends and of all our enemies, is concentrated.

“ All those enemies who are blinded by their class hatred, who are seized with feelings of class enmity and rage ; who on the eve of this trial forgot the bounds set by the sovereignty of our State, went beyond the limits of what is permissible in international relations, and tried to exercise upon the trend of this trial, of this case, moral pressure that revealed that frequently anti-Soviet circles, convulsed in hysterics, lose their necessary and highly extolled coolness and step over the boundaries of what is permissible, and of course receive a proper and deserved rebuff.

“ I have no doubt that in future, too, they will receive a similarly determined rebuff which will compel them to understand that the land where socialist society is being built, that the land which fifteen years and more ago threw off the yoke of the capitalists and landlords, will ignore every demand that runs counter to the interests of the proletariat, of the proletarian revolution, of the proletarian dictatorship, no matter whence these attempts may come. . . .

"We never permitted, we do not permit and never shall permit anyone to interfere in our internal affairs, no matter what manoeuvres, hysterics, cries, noise and clamour they may raise. . . .

"These gentlemen, you see, do not like our Constitution, our Soviet system, our Soviet Court and they express their dislike of our Constitution and our Soviet system, and our Soviet Court by slander, insinuation, distortions, falsifications—in a word, by the methods they usually employ to bring 'moral pressure' to bear upon public opinion in their own countries, to protect their narrow, crude, cruel, inhuman, capitalist class interests. They do not like our Soviet Court because it is a class court, and they try to slander it by saying that since it is a class court, that is, a court that guards the interests of the working class and of the proletarian State, it is not a court, and that in the country where the court consists of toilers, where the court acts in the interests of the toilers, where the court directs its moral and political influence against the exploiters, against the enemies of the toilers—in that country there is no justice. . . .

"We have never concealed and do not conceal the genuine class nature of our court, the genuine class tasks which confront our judiciary. . . .

"And when we are told that our Soviet Court is a class court and that you who are sitting in this Court are doing your work unjustly because you stand on the basis of a class doctrine, these utterances are nothing more than the usual attacks which bear witness to the methods of falsification and slander which the exploiters usually resort to in order to gloss over the real class and exploiting nature of their own courts, as well as of the whole of their state. . . .

"Nor do these capitalist gentlemen like our court procedure and our trials, which are directed against counter-revolutionaries and wreckers—who always and without fail meet with the warm support, sympathy and protection of definite circles of the bourgeoisie and particularly—I must say this precisely at this trial—of certain definite circles of the British bourgeoisie.

"Speaking about this trial, that is, this very case which is the subject of our present deliberations, Mr. Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, said :—

'The staging of trials such as this on charges of sabotage occurs frequently in Russia. Careful search has been made, and we have been unable to discover a single instance where one of these trials has not resulted in a condemnation.'

"What can this mean? It can mean only this, that we do not put people in the dock for nothing. The prosecution authorities and organs of preliminary investigation, before putting any

citizen, their own or of another country, in the dock on the charge of any crime, very carefully weigh all the circumstances and adopt an extremely cautious attitude towards this act.

"But if the British President of the Board of Trade intended to say that not in a single one of these trials can we find a case of acquittal, then this already comes within the bounds of direct misrepresentation of facts. And in order not to dwell on this question too long, in order, in passing, as it were, to refute assertions of this kind, I shall turn to an historical fact concerning one of our great trials, and incidentally, one of our great trials of wreckers, that is, to the Shakhty trial, at which Potemkin, Schtelbrink, Otto and Meyer were acquitted."

M. Vyshinsky next referred to cases in British Courts, particularly to the famous case of the Meerut Prisoners in which the preliminary investigation had dragged on for four years.

"I am dealing with this question only because all the general talk that was heard in the House of Commons about our justice and our judicial system, about our method of procedure, was not abstract talk—it took place in connection with the present case, and certain circles of the English bourgeoisie hope to discredit both the preliminary investigation of this case and the Court itself, which, of course, must also bear in mind the material of the preliminary investigation.

"More than that, we witnessed here how certain of the accused—I will name Thornton, I will name Monkhouse—at all events, tried to pursue here, before our Court, in the process of this judicial investigation what was properly speaking the line they were ordered to pursue and which found expression in the first part of the so-called White Paper about which we have all heard. Thornton's fable about the "moral pressure," on which he came a scandalous cropper, and Monkhouse's fable about his eighteen-hour examination, which was lengthened to nineteen-hour examination in the British Parliament (they stuck another hour on), the story—I don't know who set it going—but the story which Monkhouse publicly tried to use here as a method of defence, for which he had to pay by having to apologise to the Supreme Court—all this, Comrade Judges, directly corresponds with a telegram published in the White Paper, signed by Sir R. Vansittart, and sent to Sir Esmond Ovey, which I would like to quote here—this is a document bearing the number 27. This telegram raises the curtain upon the incident of Monkhouse's action in this Court. 'The Soviet Ambassador,' telegraphs Sir R. Vansittart to Sir Esmond Ovey, 'came to see me to-day at my request.' This is what he says in document No. 27, published in the White Paper :—

'I said that he would be aware, from what had passed yesterday in the House of Commons, of the reason for this

interview. Indignation in this country (in England) at the arbitrary arrest and harsh treatment of British subjects in Russia was growing, would grow, and would grow rightly. Feeling was widespread that the allegations against these men were grotesque and hysterical; and that these arrests were a stage performance, and a very bad one at that, mounted simply to disguise, by serving up scapegoats' (it is Thornton and Monkhouse who are the scapegoats), 'the ill-success of certain industrial undertakings in Russia. The Soviet Government' (says this document) 'might say what they liked; but public opinion here would never look upon this performance in any other light.'

"And so on March 16 this telegram bearing the number 27, which has become part of the history of this trial and of British diplomacy, was sent, and yesterday, April 15, at the morning session, Monkhouse tried to declare that: 'this trial was a frame-up against Metro-Vickers' based on the evidence of terrorized prisoners. But even a 'timid' man like Thornton could not quote a single fact to indicate precisely how he was terrorized and the only thing that he could say in this case was the following: 'I don't know myself what frightened me.'

"I have already said that I do not know who is inspiring whom in this case, but there is one thing about which I have no doubt, and that is, that British public opinion has been misled by a number of cleverly carried out manoeuvres. I think that one of the great services this trial will render will be that it has exposed these distortions, that it has established the truth as it really is, that it has shown public opinion in England and even those circles which are hostile to our State that they have been cruelly misled. Indeed, we have the declaration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that Monkhouse, 'having had no charge made against him and being carried off to prison in the early hours of the morning, was subjected to a first examination which began at 8 o'clock in the morning. It went on for nineteen consecutive hours without a break.'

'I,' said the Secretary of State, 'have inquired from our Ambassador about the examiners. On the side of the examiners there were three teams of examiners which took one another's place, but on the side of the person examined he was, of course, the same person all the time.'

"An interesting communication, and one which could, of course, rouse sad thoughts even in the minds of gentlemen who are quite unprejudiced against our method of procedure. Indeed, nineteen hours of uninterrupted questioning of the poor victim of this examination, the gentleman Monkhouse, one against three teams of examiners—all of them, one after another, attacking this unfortunate Monkhouse!

"Nineteen hours! Probably the first one to prevaricate, the first one to lie, was Monkhouse himself. It was he who lied, it was he who started the story about the nineteen hours. It was caught up by those to whom it was convenient and advantageous; it was broadcast far and wide; public opinion was mobilised and on this they wanted to base their demands in connection with this trial—demands which we indignantly rejected.

"And when yesterday Monkhouse here declared: 'I admit my mistake. I apologise,' it seemed to me that he apologised not to you, Comrade Judges, but that he apologised to those whom he had deceived.

"But what actually was the position? We discussed this in sufficient detail yesterday, but permit me to touch upon it briefly to-day. I will continue reading the communication which was made in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

'Mr. Monkhouse was taken back to his cell about 3 o'clock in the morning on March 13, where he remained until 7.30 in the morning, when a second examination started and this examination continued for about seventeen hours.'

"So this makes thirty-six hours during two days—thirty-six hours of almost uninterrupted examination.

"Thirty-six hours! But what actually transpired? It transpired that Monkhouse had lied, that nothing of the sort took place, that all that which was said in the House of Commons, that all that which the honourable gentlemen worried over in connection with this declaration, represents 'sheer loss,' and if I were in their place I would certainly bring a civil action against Monkhouse for . . . loss of time."

Vyshinsky recalled Stalin's words characterising the desperate class struggle being waged by the dying capitalist world against the country where socialism was in the course of construction and pointing out that the wrecking activity was headed by sections of the bourgeois intelligentsia.

He recalled Stalin's description of the savage struggle of the kulaks in the villages and the sabotage of the bureaucratic elements in the State apparatus who were agents of the class enemy; of how this struggle was not isolated from the outside world, but on the contrary met with support on the part of the capitalist world, which was always ready to support it morally and materially by financial blockade and by military intervention.

"It would be a great mistake, however, to assume that the trial of these wreckers of power stations is evidence of the same thing that the Shakhty trial evidenced—that at the present time we have to deal with widespread wrecking among the technical intelligentsia. The Shakhty trial was evidence of the fact that

wrecking was a sort of fashion—some engaged in wrecking, others concealed these acts, still others assisted. The Shakhty trial reflected what was then a rather widespread phenomenon among the technical intelligentsia, to its shame be it said. To-day the situation is different. It will be a great mistake to draw a parallel in this respect between this trial and the Shakhty trial, between the attitude of our technical intelligentsia towards wrecking at that time and their attitude at the present time.

“There is no doubt that during these years, as a consequence of the great processes that have taken place in our country, which has achieved gigantic victories in socialist construction, a change has taken place in the mood and minds of broad circles of the technical intelligentsia. This conclusion cannot be in the least degree shaken by the fact that this group of wreckers was still to be found in 1931-32, that not all the wreckers in our Soviet land have become extinct. There is nothing unexpected or surprising in this. But these are mere insignificant apostates, the dregs of the technical intelligentsia. . . .

“We must note a certain diminution in calibre among them, which indicates that wrecking is apparently living its last days in our country. Of course, it will continue to flicker up here and there in so far as classes will remain, in so far as class antagonism will yet not have disappeared and have been removed, in so far as we shall still live in a capitalist environment, which inevitably causes relapses into counter-revolutionary wrecking in the U.S.S.R. It is precisely for that reason that we must continue in the future to preserve our class vigilance and not in the slightest degree abate our determination in the struggle against these phenomena, not in the slightest degree abate our ruthlessness in annihilating these shameful counter-revolutionary phenomena. . . .

“And indeed in spite of all the efforts of the wreckers, in spite of all their destructive work, we have achieved astonishing successes in the sphere of electrification. . . .

“In 1928 we had only 18 district stations with a capacity of 610,000 kw.; in 1932 we had 44 power stations with a capacity of 2,500,000 kw. At the present time, the capacity of all our power stations amounts to 4,600,000 kw., as against 1,875,000 kw. at the beginning of the Five-Year Plan.

“In 1928 the output of electrical energy amounted to 5,000,000,000 kw. hrs. and in 1932 the total output of electrical energy amounted to 13,500,000,000 kw. hrs.

“Well, now, you wreckers—what have you got to say to that? All your efforts have failed, and they could not but fail, because against you stands the unshakable wall of the proletariat, against you stands the unshakable wall of the honest Soviet intelligentsia, who jointly with the working class is building socialist society; against you stands in full armour the proletarian

dictatorship, and you are merely a miserable group of apostates of the technical intelligentsia, a group branded with the mark of shame.”

Vyshinsky proceeded to discuss the methods of wrecking employed: firstly, the deliberate concealment of defects, the elimination of which was their primary direct duty; secondly, delaying the work by all kinds of artificial means such as protraction in the periods of starting, endeavours to delay testing periods, direct damage to units, etc.; thirdly, criminal administration, *i.e.*, appointing unskilled persons to responsible posts, knowing that they were capable of damaging the units owing to their ignorance.

Acting thus, pointed out M. Vyshinsky, they expected to have greater impunity, since such wrecking activity performed every day dulls vigilance and permits the explanation of wrecking by all kinds of objective causes independent of any evil human intent. This showed the deep moral decay of this section of the intelligentsia, particularly as against the salient background of the unprecedented cultural development of the toiling masses who are building up a new human culture.

This degeneration, ranging from direct frontal blows by the defeated class to slow sapping of the energy of the workers, represents, said Vyshinsky, a great danger. The responsibility of State employees who committed these crimes is, therefore, particularly heavy, and all their attempts to explain their crime by their being drawn into it or influenced by other parties, particularly by the British engineers, cannot in any degree be considered as extenuating circumstances.

Vyshinsky recalled the decree of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. of March 14 of the current year, stressing the heavy responsibility of employees of State institutions committing wrecking acts.

“In this case, the State Prosecution regards the State employees to be the main and principal offenders, and it is against these, in the first place, that the Prosecution will turn the edge of their evidence, proof and demands for severe criminal repression. . . .

“Of course the crimes committed by the Thorntons, the Monkhouses, the Cushnys and the MacDonalDs are repulsive and atrocious crimes. But there are no words with which to express all the feelings of indignation, to formulate the contempt one feels in speaking of the responsibility of State employees in our country who forgot their duty to their country, who betrayed their socialist fatherland. . . .

“I want to take the opportunity of this part of my speech in order resolutely to rebuff every attempt made by Monkhouse to drag the Prosecution on to the path of attacking certain

foreign firms and particularly the firm of Metro-Vickers. A number of questions Monkhouse put to the expert witnesses to-day, properly speaking, cannot be otherwise appraised than as an attempt to provoke us, an attempt to make this case appear as if it were not Monkhouse that was in the dock, but Metro-Vickers. I immediately uttered a warning against such misunderstandings, and I must emphatically warn you against this now. If we had sufficient facts to formulate a charge against the firm of Metro-Vickers, we would not stop half way; but in this case we must say that we have no grounds for this, that we had no intention, and have no intention, in connection with the present case, of bringing criminal or any other proceedings against Metro-Vickers outside of those provided for in the agreements with that firm. . . .

“On the question of military espionage there has been much talk in the course of the present investigation and certain of the accused pretended that, strictly speaking, they did not properly understand the meaning of this term. . . .

“I think we must introduce clarity into this question. We do not play with the word ‘espionage.’ We have an absolutely precise and clear conception as to what espionage is as a counter-revolutionary crime, and we have the right to demand that everyone who comes to the territory of our country shall have an equally clear and precise conception of the interpretation which our laws and our State put upon this word, the significance and content of this crime. . . .

“But first of all, a few words about the manner in which various foreign States regard the question of espionage. If we turn to English law we will find a reply to this question in the material provided by the Official Secrets Act of August 22, 1911, and by a similar Act under the same title of 1920. Clause 2 of the Official Secrets Act of August 22, 1911, which represents an amendment to the Act of 1889, reads as follows:—

‘On a prosecution under this section, it shall not be necessary to show that the accused person was guilty of any particular act tending to show a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, and, notwithstanding that no such act is proved against him, he may be convicted if, from the circumstances of the case, or his conduct, or his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State.’

“That is how the bourgeoisie protects the interests of its State, its class interests, when it raises the question of responsibility in clauses about espionage.

“And further on it reads:—

‘. . . if any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information relating to or used in any prohibited place

within the meaning of this Act, or anything in such a place, is made, obtained or communicated by any person other than a person acting under lawful authority, it shall be deemed to have been made, obtained or communicated for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state unless the contrary is proved.’

“That is how the bourgeoisie protects its interests in this sphere.

“And what from the point of view of the English Act of 1911 are these ‘prohibited places,’ that is, places prohibited ‘within the meaning of this Act’? A very clear answer to this question is given by Clause 3, which consists of a number of sections including a section containing the following list:—

‘. . . any railway, road, way or channel, or other means of communication by land or water (including any works or structures being part thereof or connected therewith), or any place used for gas, water, or electricity works or other works for purposes of a public character . . .’ and so forth, and so on.

“That is what is stated in this clause which probably is well known to Thornton as an ex-military man and as a present military spy.”

Referring to the question of economic espionage and the laws thereon in capitalist States, M. Vyshinsky said:—

“We have no industrial secrets within the meaning of capitalist law, but we have the concept economic espionage by which is meant the collecting and communicating of economic information which is especially guarded by the State and which is enumerated in a list especially indicated in the corresponding legislative acts, in this case, in the decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. of April 27, 1926, which contains an exhaustive list of the kind of information which, if communicated, gives ground for accusation of a crime coming under the term economic or military espionage. . . .

“Of course the concept bribery, the concept larceny, like other concepts to which I have already referred, very often differ in our society and in bourgeois society, and this is quite natural.

“There is a passage in the works of Lenin which speaks of this difference. Permit me to quote this eloquent example. Lenin said:—

‘When a worker steals a loaf of bread in a bourgeois country, he is sent to prison for it; but when a rich man steals a railway, he is appointed to the Senate. . . .’

“This, indeed, bears witness to the great difference in principle between views of things: in the eyes of the bourgeoisie the theft of a loaf of bread by a poor man is a crime, but the theft of a whole

railway by a rich man is regarded as the manifestation of great statesmanship, of great political virtuosity, deserving of promotion to the Senate. . . .

"Citizens Monkhouse and Thornton, all your talk about this being a 'present' because it was 'a little one,' because it was given as a reward for 'work done,' for this and for that, is not at all convincing. We regard such 'presents' as bribes, because the effect of this act diverts attention, energy, strivings, desires and obligations from the interests of the State to private interests, frequently, in definite cases, in opposition to the interests of the State. . . .

"I want to mention here several Acts in English Statutory Law dealing precisely with this question of bribery. I have here, for example, The Public Bodies (Corrupt Practices) Act of 1889. From this Act it will be seen that the bourgeoisie are able to guard their public bodies, their public organisations much more strictly and strongly than private enterprises when these private enterprises and organisations dare to come into conflict with the interests of the State. . . .

"According to the Act of 1889, bribery is defined as:—
' . . . soliciting corruptly or receiving, or agreeing to receive, for oneself or for any other person' (that is what it says, Citizen Monkhouse) 'any gift, loan, reward, or advantage, as an inducement to any member or servant of a public body to do or forbear to do anything in respect of any matter in which the public body is concerned.'

"That is how the position is put. If a State official guards the interests of the institution in which he fulfils any function, then any kind of gifts, any consideration that can induce him to do, or forbear to do, anything contrary to his duties is bribery, which according to this Act is regarded as a crime."

M. Vyshinsky stated that the same applied to the Acts of 1906 and 1917, and continued: "Bribery is bribery no matter what you call it, its nature is not changed either by laws of a bourgeois State, or still less by our laws. . . ."

At 11.45 p.m. the President declared the session adjourned until the following morning.

MORNING SESSION, APRIL 17, 1933, 11.15 a.m.

When the Court re-assembled, M. Vyshinsky, the Public Prosecutor, continued his speech. After enumerating the stations at which criminal activity was alleged to have taken place, M. Vyshinsky said:—

"Permit me, then, briefly to describe the condition of affairs created at each of these power stations in connection with, and

partly as a direct result of, criminal wrecking, counter-revolutionary activity of counter-revolutionaries and wreckers, connected with and working at these stations, who are now being prosecuted in the present case."

He dwelt on the proved accidents which had occurred at Zlatoust Station, where a series of accidents had made it possible to understand the real causes and the methods of the wreckers. Here, said Vyshinsky, through the systematic damage of motors, boilers, coal feeders, &c., definite counter-revolutionary diversionary activity had been carried out, as well as intentional destruction, with the object of discontinuing the work of the war sections of the plants for the country's defence.

"Thus we have a number of breakdowns all of which were the result of deliberate counter-revolutionary acts of diversion of people who, placed by the authorities, by the working class, by the proletarian revolution, in positions in which they were entrusted with State property, not only did not guard and protect it, but tried to damage and cripple it, prepared and perpetuated acts of diversion, waged, if in a concealed masked form, a genuine war against the working class by methods of destruction, by methods of destroying our State property."

Vyshinsky quoted from the Expert's Report which attributed the damage and negligence to "the presence of malicious intent or at least criminal negligence."

Speaking of the Zuevo Power Station, the Prosecutor characterised it as a monstrous situation when active wreckers put a bolt into a machine in order to cause an accident, when pieces of board, brushes, &c., were found in other places put there, so Vyshinsky said, for wrecking purposes. This, said the State Prosecutor, had been proved by the judicial examination.

On this point M. Vyshinsky quoted the following excerpt from the report of the Commission of Experts:—

"Cases in which various extraneous articles (bolts, pieces of board, stone, &c.) were found in generator No. 5 cannot be regarded otherwise than as the result of criminal negligence on the part of the staff installing the machines, or deliberate malice on the part of some person."

The Prosecutor further affirmed that it was proved that there had been intentional burning of the pumps, the stoppage of machinery with sand, the breaking of cables, the disorganisation of the telephone station, &c., at the Ivanovo Station.

As regards Baku, M. Vyshinsky said:—

"I would like now briefly to refer to the Baku State District Power Station where we also had a number of systematic breakdowns on turbo-generators Nos. 11 and 12, a number of stoppages of machines commencing in 1928 and continuing to 1930—the

breakdown of March 11; and to 1931—the breakdown of February 15; and again in 1931—the breakdown of February 21; and again in 1931—the breakdown of March 22. . . .

“The motor was installed in this station by the accused Cushny. It is true that the last breakdowns occurred when he was already in Moscow. But the heritage he left, connected with the breakdowns that occurred in 1928, obviously played its part subsequently.

“And finally, the last power station, or rather the group of power stations united by what I have already told you is called the Mosenergo, also testifies to systematic breakdowns throughout the whole of the period of the Five-Year Plan. One can say that the wreckers’ group at the Mosenergo had their own Five-Year Plan, commencing from 1927-28 and, let us hope, utterly disrupted by the arrest of the wreckers now standing trial. . . .

“The power stations of the Mosenergo are not only connected with individual enterprises, individual institutions in our Red Capital, but they are also connected with some of the largest industrial centres of the Moscow Region—Kolomna, Yegorovsk, Podolsk, Sergiyev, Tula, Zaraisk, Ryazan, Noginsk and Kashira—a whole system of large enterprises of military State importance, upon the work of which rests to a certain extent the strength and might of our Soviet economy, of our Socialist industry. . . .”

Regarding the men who carried out these wrecking acts, M. Vyshinsky said:—

“These are experienced, cool men, who do not lose their courage as some of their accomplices did, who are able to conceal their wrecking operations, their ‘work,’ their ‘activities,’ are able to understand each other by a mere word, I will say no more, by a mere glance. . . .

“What do we see at the Mosenergo? I have said—breakdowns at the first Moscow State Power Station, at the Shatura Electric Power Station, at the Orekhovo-Zuevo State Electric Power Station. Thus, we have a fairly long list of breakdowns organised by fairly able and experienced hands. . . .

“We are confronted with the fact that a number of people have confessed. Under other circumstances, this might have relieved us of the necessity of investigating other proof. We know that according to the laws of procedure in every capitalist State, and particularly according to the laws of procedure in England, the mere confession to the Court by an accused is sufficient to give the Court the right to refrain from entering into a judicial investigation. . . .

“But it must be emphasised, Comrade Judges, that in this exceedingly important trial, in addition to the confessions of the

accused we have a whole sum of objective proof which no forces hostile to us can withstand. . . .

“I would ask the Special Session of the Supreme Court, when it discusses its verdict, to pay attention precisely to this aspect of the case, and once again to examine—if only for the purpose of appraising the position of the Prosecution on this question from this point of view—the indictment which we have submitted to the Supreme Court, in which we take as a basis the Experts’ report, in which we take as a basis of our charges firmly established facts and in which we take as a basis material from the technical point of view, from the point of view of technical experts, the very facts, the analysis of which leads to the appraisal of subjective evidence and subjective confessions. . . .”

The Prosecutor went on to describe Gussev as a fully-fledged counter-revolutionary, who calmly and consciously engaged in the organisation of accidents and military espionage. He said that Gussev was an ex-volunteer of the “White” Army, one of the chief criminals in the present case who deserved severer punishment because he attempted not only to collect information concerning the production of shells, steel for arms—this was fully proved—but strove to hold up the work of the war equipment plants.

The Prosecutor continued:—

“We are not preparing for war; but we are prepared for war. And from this point of view we must appraise these acts of diversion which were intended to weaken our defence; for it is this—I think it opportune to say once again, and it is testified by Thornton’s depositions of March 18 concerning his network of spies—that greatly interested Thornton when he spoke about the defence and offence possibilities of the Soviet Union.

“Good possibilities! Strong possibilities! Try them, Messrs. spies! . . .

“Sokolov and Gussev were old friends even in the Kolchak army; both volunteered for the White army. They ceased to serve in that army when like rats scurrying from a sinking ship, they deserted it when all the cards of Kolchak’s generals were beaten, when at the same time, the cards of certain foreign generals who supported Kolchak were also beaten. Then, these ‘brave warriors’ showed a clean pair of heels and made for the woods. From the woods they came to us, to our enterprises; but having come from the woods they, like wolves, yearned for the woods. . . .”

The Prosecutor next read the following extracts from Mr. MacDonald’s depositions:—

“In the summer of 1929 I was at Thornton’s villa, and in conversation with me he said that he was interested in

information about the political and economic situation of the U.S.S.R., and he asked me to collect and to convey to him this information.

"When I returned to Leningrad I began to collect information, and in addition to information about the mood and the living conditions of the workers, I began to collect special information, namely, information about the work of the 'Bolshevik' Munition Works, information about the production of aeroplane motors, and also about the production of guns."

The Prosecutor continued:—

"And MacDonald pointed out concretely who gave him this information—Khrustchev, Samarin, Redkin, that is, persons who were caught and convicted in another espionage case. . . .

"It must be said that MacDonald himself realised that it was necessary to give this evidence because Gussev had already talked, because Sokolov had already talked, because Kutuzova had already talked, and finally, because Thornton himself had already talked. And here I must recall the touching scene that was played here when the attempt was made to retreat, in disorder it is true, but nevertheless to retreat from an occupied position. MacDonald said that he talked because he was shown Thornton's depositions, but it transpires that Thornton talked because he was shown MacDonald's depositions, he talked under the influence of MacDonald's depositions! Finally, it was impossible to understand who influenced whom, who spoke under the influence of whose depositions! One blamed the other, and both got mixed up. . . .

"MacDonald obtained information very cautiously. You remember that we established here the methods by which this information was communicated by Gussev. Gussev did not write: so many shells are being produced. He wrote MacDonald friendly love letters: we are producing so many 'tins.' He did not send his letters in the ordinary way, but used couriers messengers, a tenth-rate person it is true, but nevertheless a person who is being prosecuted in this case and concerning whom further investigations are being made, namely, Maria Fedorovna Ryabova. MacDonald, through Ryabova, whom he has special reason to trust, receives letters from Gussev who, seeing the confidence MacDonald places in Ryabova, himself places confidence in this counter-revolutionary letter carrier. Nevertheless, he writes in code: not *shells* but *tins*.

"And the people connected with them figure, not under their own names but under fictitious names. One is called "Derevo" (tree) another is called "Slessar" (fitter), while still others are called by names by which people are usually called—Vassily, Ivan, but which did not belong to the person concerned. . . .

"But of course, Comrade Judges, we must bear in mind that in these matters we cannot fail to take into account the circumstances that all this is done secretly, is done cautiously, that documents are burned, that documents are destroyed, that as far as possible no documents are written, while those which in other cases were written were sent where Thornton sent his nine secret diaries—to the city on the Thames, to London. They were safer there. . . ."

"MacDonald is an experienced spy, and I would not say that he is less clever than his partners in the dock, on the contrary, I would say very definitely that in several instances he seems to be much cleverer. . . .

"In 1930, says MacDonald, before my departure for Zlatoust, Thornton had a second conversation with me, when he asked me to collect for him information about the production of military supplies at the Zlatoust works, and also about the state of the power supply at those works. In his deposition MacDonald says: In rather a veiled form, *i.e.*, not as a direct order, he gave me the task of organising breakdowns at Zlatoust in order to interrupt the work at the plant. He told me that if money was wanted it would not present any difficulty, I could get it from him.

"These are the three main points: military espionage, the organisation of breakdowns, corruption, money, bribes—the three points, the three main links of this chain of guilt which closes around MacDonald and the others, about whom I will speak later on. . . ."

The Prosecutor next read the following extracts from Mr. MacDonald's deposition:

"I have handed Kotliarevsky, Vassiliev and Fomicheff from Zugres about 2,000 roubles for their spying and damaging activities. Money was given to each of them separately. I gave Kotliarevsky about 1,000 roubles. Kotliarevsky had given me information that I have mentioned in my previous testimonies."

"This breakdown took place as a result of the insertion of a bolt in the air gap of the generator. This was done under my instruction by Fomicheff and Kotliarevsky."

(This refers to the breakdown of a generator in June-July, 1932.)

The Prosecutor continued:

"We asked Kotliarevsky about this and he replied: "Yes, I did it, I inserted the bolt and caused a breakdown. The circle of evidence is complete. MacDonald is caught, caught red-handed. . . ."

As regards the charges made against Mr. Nordwall, the Public Prosecutor said:

"In 1981-2 Nordwall worked at the Ivanovo Power Station as Metro-Vickers installation engineer. There he came into contact with a group of local wreckers, primarily with Lobanov, and carried on wrecking operations, gave instructions to a group of engineers and technicians at the Ivanovo Power Station—Lobanov and others—to commit wrecking and acts of diversion with the aim of damaging equipment, causing breakdown, which were carried out by these people on his instructions, and also to conceal defects in the equipment, which was done by Lobanov, Lebedev, and others. As a reward for this, Nordwall systematically paid through this same Lobanov bribes amounting to the sum of 5,000 roubles.

"Against Nordwall we have first of all the depositions of Lobanov, who here and at the preliminary investigation stated that he had frequently talked with Nordwall, had discussed his discontent with the existing Soviet system and his material position, and gave utterance—as Nordwall himself confirmed here—to anti-Soviet views. . . .

"More than that, Lobanov testified that Nordwall warned him to damage equipment that was not supplied by Metro-Vickers, but if they did damage equipment that was supplied by Metro-Vickers, and for which the period of guarantee had expired, then they were to damage it in such a way as to prevent the blame from falling upon Metro-Vickers. . . .

"We not only have Lobanov's depositions, we also have the depositions of such an authoritative witness on these questions against Nordwall as the accused Thornton, we have his list of spies in which, among the twelve out of the twenty-seven agents of the Intelligence Service, is the name of Nordwall as an agent who was engaged in economic and political espionage in collecting information about the defence and offence possibilities of our Red Army, of our State. . . .

"Lobanov. I have spoken about him already. Of course he is a corrupt type. This is a second-rate type of wrecker and spy. . . .

"This is what Lobanov relates about himself: 'I systematically put out of action the motors of the boiler chain grating by cutting the cable drive of the motor. I did this in conjunction with Lebedev.' . . .

". . .there cannot be the slightest doubt about the part played by the wreckers' group in the fulfilment of these wrecking operations by Lobanov with the co-operation of Lebedev, and with the co-operation of Nordwall who paid money, the first time 3,000 roubles, the second time 2,000 roubles, which Lobanov distributed among all the accomplices. This is also corroborated by Lebedev. . . ."

The Prosecutor stated that :

Lebedev had confirmed that the most immediate object of the work of the counter-revolutionary group was the disorganisation of the work at the Ivanovo Power Station with the final object of completely stopping the supply of current to the plants dependent on the Ivanovo Station.

The Prosecutor said that, in his opinion, the crimes charged against Zivert were very petty and that he, by his subsequent work, had made good his crime to a certain extent; the Prosecutor therefore urged the court to regard his punishment as covered by his preliminary imprisonment.

Speaking of the accused in the case of the Moscow Power Station, the Prosecutor said that, in his opinion, Sukhoruchkin, Chief of the Exploitation Department of the Moscow Station, was one of the most important figures in the case.

Whilst occupying a responsible post he had participated in the counter-revolutionary group. He had incapacitated aggregates, upset the normal work of the Station, carried out a series of wrecking measures, and concealed defects in equipment delivered by the firm, thereby causing numerous accidents.

Being a convinced conscious enemy of the Soviet Government he must suffer the punishment he deserved.

Krasheninnikov, said the Prosecutor, began his wrecking work by concealing defects in equipment. This, at first glance, does not seem an important crime, but he did not disclose and eliminate the defects in time, which shows that he consciously and intentionally strove to cause harm and to disorganise production by means of accidents.

The Prosecutor continued :

"This same Krasheninnikov was connected with Oleinik, and through Oleinik with Thornton. Again the clue leads to Thornton. This same Krasheninnikov receives money through the same Oleinik and from this very same source—Thornton."

After referring to five meetings between Mr. Thornton and Mr. Zorin, the Prosecutor continued :

"These five meetings prove how, gradually, the criminal counter-revolutionary wrecking connections developed between Thornton and Zorin, and how the latter undertook definite obligations paid for by Thornton, in the same way as everything that was done on Thornton's instructions was paid for. . . ."

As regards Mr. Oleinik, M. Vyshinsky declared :—

"It was under the direct guidance of Citizen Monkhouse and Citizen Thornton, these gentlemen who are so much concerned about Oleinik's fate, that Oleinik's wrecking 'services' were rendered. . . ."

As regards Mr. Cushny, the Prosecutor said that he was "exposed by the depositions of Mr. Yemelyanov. . . . Mr.

Thornton . . . and Mr. MacDonald” Mr. MacDonald “in his deposition of March 12th, 1933, declared” :—

“The leader of the reconnaissance work in the U.S.S.R. disguised under the shield of Metropolitan-Vickers, was Mr. Thornton, who worked in Moscow in the representation of the firm as chief erecting engineer. The head of the representation was Mr. Monkhouse, who also took part in this illegal work of Mr. Thornton. The assistant of Mr. Thornton for travelling purposes and his associate in the espionage work was engineer Cushny, officer of the British Army, now an engineer of the firm Metropolitan-Vickers. This is the main group of reconnaissance workers which did the espionage work in the U.S.S.R.’

The coincidence of Thornton’s and MacDonald’s evidence, said Vyshinsky, was very dangerous for Cushny but, continued Vyshinsky, “Cushny behaves like a tried and experienced spy. He begins and ends with the usual trick of the secret agent, namely, the refusal to give any explanations whatsoever. Being exposed, he is forced to admit that he did actually engage in espionage, but afterwards absolutely refused to give any explanation whatever.”

M. Vyshinsky then read the following extracts from the records of Mr. Cushny’s examination of March 23, 1933.

Q. “Do you confirm the evidence you gave when confronted with Thornton on March 22nd to the effect that you engaged in collecting espionage information of an economic and political character in the U.S.S.R.?”

A. “I confirm the facts deposed by me when confronted with Thornton on March 22 to the effect that I did really arrange to have such information collected.”

Q. “Through whom among the Russians did you collect your espionage information?”

A. “I do not wish to reply to that question.”

Q. “What are the reasons for refusing to tell about your spying operations in the U.S.S.R.?”

A. “I do not wish to reply to that question.”

Q. “Why do you refuse to reply to the questions put to you previously?”

A. “I do not wish to reply to that question.”

Cushny, said the Prosecutor, had admitted having transmitted important espionage information, but he refused to say through whom. Vyshinsky called this the stubborn denial “of a man caught on the spot.”

Thornton, Monkhouse, and Oleinik, affirmed Vyshinsky, had confirmed that Cushny had engaged in espionage work, and although Cushny bethought himself and had said “I will not say

any more,” M. Vyshinsky declared that they had quite sufficient ground for supporting the charge of diversion and espionage against Cushny.

In order to explain her close relations with Thornton and Monkhouse, Kutuzova, said Vyshinsky, had invented the excuse that Soviet citizens working at Metro-Vickers were, to a certain extent, isolated. The Prosecutor declared that this was a lie. There had been no isolation seeing that these accused had spoken of dances, parties and meetings.

“Kutuzova,” said Vyshinsky, “was not only the responsible secretary of the office of the firm, but also the responsible secretary of the counter-revolutionary wrecking group. . . . Kutuzova had sold herself for money, and must answer for this.” The Prosecutor said, however, that he considered that there were some extenuating circumstances in her case, since she had given frank, sincere explanations, and this should be taken into consideration in the verdict.

The Prosecutor dealt next with the accusations against Messrs. Monkhouse, MacDonald and Thornton, and declared that the Prosecution did not regard them as the central figures in the case since, as was pointed out from the very beginning and shown by the indictment and the preliminary investigation, the prosecution has held that the central figures have been the Soviet citizen employees.

Referring to the charges against Monkhouse, the Prosecutor stated that through the medium of English and Russian engineers connected with him, he collected secret information which was important for the defence of the State, participated in wrecking, diversional work, and bribery for the concealment of defects of Metro-Vickers’ equipment. The Prosecutor continued: “The system of bribery practiced by Thornton with the co-operation of Monkhouse was corroborated by the episode of the attempt to bribe Dolgov, which neither Thornton nor Monkhouse can deny. Why was a bribe given to Dolgov? The bribe was given to Dolgov to induce him to forbear from fulfilling his duties to his proletarian fatherland. They tried to buy Dolgov, but they failed. . . .

“Hence, we can draw the conclusion that not only was Monkhouse aware of this bribery which Thornton engaged in, but took a direct part in giving bribes, as was the case with Dolgov, when 3,000 roubles were written off the books with the special permission of Monkhouse and Richards, etc.

“However, I am obliged here to say several unpleasant things, not only about Monkhouse, but also about several unpleasant traditions of the Metro-Vickers office. I have in mind Monkhouse’s depositions, not about himself, it is true, but about a certain predecessor, named Anton Antonovich Simon. This

Anton Antonovich Simon, in the period from 1928 to 1928, was director of business between the U.S.S.R. and Metro-Vickers. He is very interestingly described by this very Monkhouse, Simon's successor, and, one can say, successor in the fullest sense of the word. How does Monkhouse describe the fruitful activities of Anton Antonovich Simon? This is what he said: 'I knew that Simon had a special fund which he used for bribes.' What a revelation, like the 'Secrets of the Court of Madrid'!

"I firmly believe," continued Monkhouse, "that he was interested in certain counter-revolutionary movements, but I did not enjoy his confidence. He did not trust me for certain personal and political reasons. I cannot give exact information about his activity in this direction. Simon died in 1927, and immediately afterwards I was appointed Metro-Vickers' manager in the U.S.S.R. Right from the beginning of my work to the present day my chief was Mr. Richards, whom I knew in our student days, because he graduated at the same time as I did."

". . . You have his (Monkhouse's) depositions in which he says that he really did receive spying information, principally from Cushny, about whom we have just spoken sufficiently, and from Thornton, whose role in this connection has also been sufficiently exhaustively described."

The Prosecutor next reminded the Court that Mr. Monkhouse in 1917 had "served in Archangel in the British Interventionist force which waged war against our Soviet Government."

Waving aside Monkhouse's statement regarding the length of examinations as a means of pressure, Vyshinsky claimed that under the influence of facts Monkhouse had already repudiated that slanderous statement, and begged to be excused.

But M. Vyshinsky said that he must also mention the published conversations between M. Litvinov and Sir Esmond Ovey, which clearly shows that the Soviet judicial bodies had acted under the pressure of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which demanded the speediest completion of the preliminary investigation and most important of all, in the same conversation Sir Esmond Ovey himself urged the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to hasten the completion of the preliminary investigation.

"Thus, the officers carrying out the investigation were only fulfilling their duty when they speeded up the examination. . . .

"Thornton is charged with the following: with organising through a widespread network of installation engineers and technicians, employed by the Metro-Vickers office, economic and military espionage. Secondly, with having enlisted for espionage work a number of Russian engineers and technicians; with the organisation of breakdowns at a number of power stations in the Soviet Union; with giving bribes for the organisation of these

breakdowns, and for concealing defects in the equipment installed by the installation staff of the Metro-Vickers office in the persons of certain members of this counter-revolutionary group. . . .

"What grounds have we for asserting and insisting upon Thornton's guilt? We have the following material. Firstly, Thornton's own confession. Thornton pleaded guilty to organising economic and military espionage. Thornton pleaded guilty to collecting information of an espionage character through a wide-spread network of agents, of several employees of Metro-Vickers and people not employed by Metro-Vickers, but working in contact with them. He confessed to giving bribes for espionage to Russian engineers and technicians, which bribes were paid either by himself or through certain engineers and technicians employed by the firm. He confessed to giving bribes for wilfully concealing defects in equipment. That was at the preliminary investigation. . . .

"Secondly, he has admitted that in particular he received information from Zlatoust. Thirdly, he has admitted that he received this information from Zlatoust, from Gussev and MacDonald. Fourthly, he admitted that he received no information, except that which he received through these persons. This too, is incontrovertible."

M. Vyshinsky argued that Thornton did not deny having received information at Mytische Plant regarding the manufacture of military wagons. Oleinik had special instructions to watch troop trains going to Irkutsk. Thornton also admitted in his depositions having given Richards information for example, about the Putilov Plant, also that he instructed Oleinik to organise in the Ukraine a small but compact group of ex-officers who might be useful in the event of intervention.

Speaking of the moral pressure to which Mr. Thornton claimed he had been subjected, the Public Prosecutor said:

"Permit me also to bring such 'moral pressure' to bear upon you and to say: Citizen Thornton, you are already useless both here and there, because as a spy you have proved your utter bankruptcy, because you, twenty-four hours after your arrest, betrayed your agents and did that because you are a coward and a traitor by nature, so that even your own British spying organisation can no longer trust you. And here, in the U.S.S.R. you are useless, because after all that has passed nothing useful can be expected of you. . . .

"One more remark. You say that your deposition of March 18 contains an untruth. Let us suppose it does. But have you thought about the fact that when you communicated what you did on March 18, you were playing with people's heads, with the

heads of your own comrades? Did you appreciate that? No, you will not succeed in discrediting this document. Let it remain on your conscience."

Respecting the reference to Mr. Gregory in Mr. Thornton's depositions, the Public Prosecutor said:

"I must say that a denunciation by an accused, or by any other person, can have significance in our Courts only when it is accompanied by some objective evidence, when it does not remain a bare denunciation. . . .

"I must say that Thornton's bare statement, unsupported by any other facts, is insufficient to support the charge against Gregory: I think that a verdict of acquittal can be passed on Gregory."

Concluding his speech for the Prosecution, M. Vyshinsky said:

"The charges are based on Article 58 of the Criminal Code, which categorically demands the supreme measure of social protection—death by shooting. And the activities of these people deserve that this sentence be pronounced upon them.

"But our Court is a Soviet Court in which the formal demands of the law are not the only motives. Our Court weighs up all the circumstances of the case. . . .

"The most important circumstance in this case which I, as the representative of the State authorities, am in duty bound to remind you of, is that notwithstanding the wrecking activities of these groups of wreckers, the power and the might of our State has not been shaken. . . .

"In passing sentence, we are never guided by considerations of cruelty and revenge. But that does not mean that when you finally decide the fate of the accused and if you find it necessary to pronounce the sentence of the supreme measure of social defence upon any one of the accused, that you will hesitate to do so. You of course will pronounce it, and your hand will not tremble when you sign it."

The President then declared the Court adjourned till 7.0 p.m.

EVENING SESSION, APRIL 17th, 1933.

7.20 p.m.

At the evening session, Counsel for the Defence spoke.

M. Kaznachev, defending Gussev, Sokolov, and Oleinik, admitted the gravity of the crimes to which his clients had pleaded guilty, and said when considering the trial one should remember its international importance. As an illustration of this importance, he referred to the campaign waged in sections of the English Press.

There, certain individual journalists went so far as to aver that the trial was a completely staged affair.

Luckily, continued M. Kaznachev, the Court proceedings showed that there was no foundation at all for such statements, and at the same time he mentioned the methods of self-defence used by the British citizens, who employed sharp expressions in connection with the statements of some of the defendants, particularly "about my clients."

M. Kaznachev declared he did not doubt the sincerity of Gussev's, Sokolov's, and Oleinik's confessions, the facts corroborating their words being on hand.

Counsel stated he did not agree with the Prosecutor about the social and political conditions wherein his clients committed the crimes.

M. Kaznachev admitted that his clients were anti-Soviet in their attitude, but contended that the decisive role in their evolution and activities were played by the English engineers. For example, Oleinik turned out to be a weak agent of Thornton.

Pointing out that the Prosecutor had failed to mention what measure of social defence should be applied to his clients, Counsel declared that capital punishment was an exceptional measure, necessary only when the regeneration of defendants is impossible. Such not being the fact in this case, therefore, Counsel begged the Court to substitute for shooting some milder measure of social defence.

Counsel for the Defence, M. Schwarz, defending Sukhoruchkin, Krashennikov, and Zorin, dwelt on the psychological circumstances which served as the foundation of the crimes committed by his clients.

Acknowledging that all his clients came from the social layer from which wreckers had come, he said that he found it necessary to point out that the main rôle, in passing to active wrecking acts was played by Jolley and Thornton, who contrived skilfully to make use of these feelings and to weave around them a fine web of liaison.

Therefore, continued M. Schwarz, he considered it a quite proved manifestation of evil intent on the part of the foreign engineers.

Discussing the question of what punishment should be meted out to his clients, M. Schwarz pointed out that the Soviet Criminal Code being advanced, aims not at punishment but at measures of social defence. Naturally, the application of these measures must comply with Article 9 of the Criminal Code, but considering the repentance of the defendants, which is to be trusted, M. Schwarz begged lenience for his clients.

Counsel for the defence, M. Pines, defending Lobanov, Lebedev and Zivert, thought that when the Prosecutor averred his disbelief in Lobanov's version about being Nordwall's victim, he

must protest that in the circumstances of the case he gave very convincing proofs to the contrary.

M. Pines argued that due to his social past, Lobanov naturally belonged to anti-Soviet elements, and Nordwall's arrival, he contended, had excited him and made him an active wrecker.

M. Pines mentioned the youth of the defendant Lobanov and begged the Court to give him an opportunity, by his future life, to prove by his activity that he can work for the building up of Socialism.

Concerning Lebedev, Counsel said that he was not a second category wrecker, but of a much lower grade; that his weakness had been played on, and therefore he deserved lenience.

M. Pines, thought that Zivert was best defended by the Prosecutor himself, and asked for lenience; his crimes were minor ones.

At this juncture the Court adjourned for twenty minutes.

The President next called on Counsel for the Defence, M. Smirnov, defending Mr. MacDonald.

M. Smirnov made a detailed analysis of the whole life of MacDonald and came to the conclusion that MacDonald was a typical representative of a British petty bourgeois family whose representatives in going through life meet with great difficulties. These difficulties and the struggle for existence leave a certain stamp on the ideas of these people.

M. Smirnov continued :

"We know that William MacDonald, at the age of seventeen, without having completed a higher education, went to work at a salary of three pounds a week. . . .

"And now, a few years later, thanks to his father's friends, as William MacDonald deposed, he was offered work in the U.S.S.R., and here they paid him twelve pounds a week. What is Russia? What is Soviet Russia? What was Russia in 1928? How is William MacDonald to know that? . . .

"What did he know about it and what could he know about it, except that some Bolsheviks were ruling the country, that it is a technically backward country which is striving at all costs to overtake and surpass even the most technically and economically advanced capitalist countries, that they need foreign technical equipment, and therefore are in need of foreign mechanics, technicians, engineers, and that these mechanics, technicians, engineers are being paid good money, and that they are valued; that one can live well here, that one can earn so much money that part of it, a considerable part, could be saved and deposited in the bank. . . .

"When the accusation is made, not by the representative of the Public Prosecution, but I regret to say, from the table of the Counsel for the Defence, that MacDonald was the one who

corrupted Gussev, I say : It is not true ! Whom did MacDonald corrupt? Did he have to corrupt a voluntary henchman of Kolchak who fought in the ranks of the White army against the Bolsheviks; who in 1922 came to the Zlatoust Power Station in the capacity of assistant foreman, and whom these same Bolsheviks gave the opportunity during seven years to rise to the post of chief of that station? Was this Gussev the one whom it was necessary for MacDonald to corrupt? Is it at all possible to corrupt a person who is capable of selling his own country for a few hundred roubles? . . .

"Now permit me to deal with MacDonald from another angle.

"Who was MacDonald? What was the position he occupied in the firm? Was he of any importance in their Moscow office? Was he ever called upon to take part in any conferences? Nobody has ever said that. We are told he was given definite instructions : Go to Zlatoust, go to Zuevka—and he obediently went from place to place when he was told to do so, he did that which he was told to do. At the same time he was assigned tasks and he was told : Remember you are working for the firm, you are working for a private enterprise, the interests of your employer should be above everything else. . . .

"Yes, he collected information. He was told : 'Collect information,' and he collected it. When I am told that MacDonald is a cunning and subtle person I say : No it is not so. But even if he is a cunning person, he is not such in this case, not at this moment, and was not when he appeared before the investigating judges. There this MacDonald did not resort to any cunning, he did not resort to any tricks, and I think that the lines of one of his last depositions are truthful from beginning to end. . . .

"If you take into account the subordinate position MacDonald held, if you think of the fact that he had to testify not only against Russian engineers, not only against Russian wreckers, but also against his own countrymen, who were his patrons during his stay in Russia, who perhaps will be in a position to decide his career in the future, and whom he looked up to as important personages in his own good old England—then you will agree that it took genuine real courage to make such a confession. . . .

"There is a document in the case, one that has not been made public, but which I am certain you will examine in your consulting room. It is on page 62 of MacDonald's dossier, where MacDonald says to the Public Prosecutor of the Republic : Yes, I realise now what I have done, I understand now that I committed a sin against the Soviet Government, that I committed a crime against the Soviet Government, and I give a solemn oath that I will not do it again.

"I think that we should give credence to this oath, to this promise. That there is every ground for believing him. I think that you, Citizen Judges, in your sentence will help this man, who has stopped at the cross-roads, to take the honest road of toil and perhaps to become useful in the future to our Socialist country."

The Court then adjourned till next morning.

MORNING SESSION, APRIL 18th, 1933.

10.30 a.m.

Counsel for the defence, M. Braude, defending Mr. Thornton, spoke next :

M. Braude pointed out that his client had pleaded guilty only to the collection of economic data, and had categorically denied all the other charges. This mere denial would be insufficient because the statements of other defendants, as well as the documents and facts, speak in contrary terms, especially when the personal confession of Thornton at the preliminary inquiry is taken into consideration.

Thus, the evidence advanced against the defendant would appear to be, from the point of view of formal Court evidence, what is called, "a closed circle of evidence."

Counsel said he deemed it necessary to introduce a number of corrections to the charge. Counsel insisted that it was impossible to shift all the charges on to the shoulders of Thornton only, as some of the defendants and some Counsel were trying to do.

Counsel declared that it could not be admitted that the instigator and tempter of all was Thornton, that he dictated to them and that under his influence they began wrecking and spying.

"In his speech Comrade Vyshinsky explained in a very interesting manner what wrecking is in our country. I would like to be permitted in a few words to touch on this point once more. Wrecking, indeed, is not a new thing to us. From the moment the bourgeois intelligentsia turned away from counter-revolutionary sabotage and found themselves compelled to take up work with the Soviet Government, a section of the bourgeois intelligentsia began to resort to wrecking and, throughout the history of the existence of the Soviet Government, wrecking, as a form of class struggle, has assumed the most varied forms which, finally, merged into one united wrecking organisation, with its leading centre in the U.S.S.R.—remember the bloc between the 'Promparty,' the Toiling Peasant's Party, the Mensheviks, and the united emigrant centre abroad, known as the 'Torgprom,' led and subsidised by the most aggressive imperialist circles. . .

"It is no accident that certain of the accused were compelled to confess that even before meeting Thornton they had wrecking inclinations, wrecking convictions—the wreckers' psychology. And this is quite comprehensible, because the social roots of some of the accused, the bourgeois survivals of others stimulated by the fierce class struggle that is still going on in our Soviet Union, serve them as sufficient stimulus to continue their wrecking and diversional activities against the only workers' state in the world, against their own fatherland. . . .

"Involuntarily I have to ask: Can we consider that they needed Thornton? It seems to me (theoretically, of course, but it is confirmed also by my psychological considerations) that they could have committed these crimes without any instigation from outside. . . .

". . . And if Thornton, in reply to several questions put to him by the Prosecutor and others, had to confess that he collected economic information, then from the point of view of our law, he is guilty, of course, of economic spying. But he denies military spying, and on this point permit me to express some views which, I think, will, to a certain degree, confirm this denial.

"First of all, in order to answer the question as to whether Thornton was engaged in military spying or not, I would draw your attention to his testimony which lies in the files. He has there several depositions, and in comparing these depositions (I shall not quote them, in order not to burden your attention) only one thing becomes obvious, and that is that his conception of spying is extremely confused, that his conception of espionage information is extremely indefinite and diffused. In one place he speaks about offence and defence possibilities, and in another place about the collection of political information, but gives as examples only economic information, in a third place he speaks about economic information, but gives examples of political information. It is clear that a man, the product of another environment, of another State system, alien to us, alien to the conditions prevailing in our country, cannot quite understand or appreciate what espionage information is. . . .

". . . . Owing to the fact that he had already started on the path of illegally collecting economic information, forbidden in our country, and in view of the psychological peculiarities which I have mentioned, he could not determine the boundary between the permissible and the forbidden, between economics and politics, between politics and military secrets. . . .

"The second factor which convinces me that he obtained military information independently of his subjective desires is the sight of those people who had fallen so low as to betray the interests of their country and, for the sake of a few miserable

penance, gave foreigners information, which they accepted for the benefit of a commercial firm, or perhaps to be used in some other manner. People who start on such a business do not care a scrap what kind of information they give, they would sell anything they could get hold of, military or non-military—and bring it to the person who is paying them, even if the latter did not ask for it. . . .

“ . . . But did he give a bribe or did he pay money for wrecking activities? Here I must revert to the views that have been expressed here. I do not agree with the statement made by the accused Thornton because I think that the collection of information ought to be paid for; no one will collect economic and political information for nothing. But caught at economic espionage and wrecking, could they not, I put this question to the Court, try to mitigate their guilt by arguing that the money they got for information was given to them as a bribe to commit acts of wrecking?”

Counsel for the defence, Mr. Dolmatovsky, defending Mr. Gregory and Mr. Nordwall, was called on next. Mr. Dolmatovsky said:

“Comrade Judges, I am defending Gregory and Nordwall. I will not have to speak much about Gregory inasmuch as the evidence presented at the trial proved insufficient, according to the opinion of the Prosecutor, for him to be convicted.

“I believe there is no need for me to speak on the subject . . .

“My task is much more complex with regard to the accused Nordwall. Evidence against Nordwall was given here by a number of persons. Particularly, there is the very important testimony of the accused Lobanov, Oleinik and Thornton, and the circumstances in connection with which the testimony was given. . . .

“I must recall what the representative of the Prosecution said here regarding the accused Lobanov and Oleinik. He used against them sharper expressions than against any of the other accused. . . .

“In the general part of his speech he characterised them as wreckers by nature. . . .

“If we were to assume for a moment that Nordwall is innocent, that he did not participate in the organisation which aimed at such grave crimes, if we assume and recall that he was also a foreign specialist who showed himself in a particularly favourable light in the Soviet Union, then the wrecking work these people carried on, their mischief with regard to Nordwall can be understood. . . .

“Oleinik characterised Nordwall as a person who was almost a Bolshevik, who might go to the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection and complain, as one who sympathised with the Soviet

Government, as a man whom he, Oleinik, regarded with antipathy. He was forced to state why he regarded him with antipathy—because in Makeyevka, where his last activities were carried on, Nordwall was very much respected, was very much appreciated for the good work he carried on there. . . .

“And it is interesting that Lobanov was also forced to admit at the trial (to be sure he said this in a very disparaging way): ‘Yes, he did say something to the effect that one should carry out one’s duty as an employee.’ In this connection, he spoke, to be sure, very guardedly and evasively, of some objections on the part of Nordwall in conversation. Hence, again we must rather believe Nordwall, who stated that he had not expressed anti-Soviet opinions, that he had objected to the anti-Soviet arguments of Lobanov. . . .

“There remains another serious piece of evidence against Nordwall—this is, in the first place, Thornton’s list and his depositions concerning Nordwall, particularly in the matter of the 112 roubles, and in general all his deposition about Nordwall. But again, if we take up these depositions in detail we will arrive at the conclusion that there is nothing that can incriminate Nordwall. . . .

“What was Thornton’s further statement about Nordwall?

“In my opinion Nordwall was and is sympathetic towards the Government of this country. He once told me his opinion about the Red Army. I do not remember what it was exactly, but his opinion coincides with mine.’

“If Nordwall is sympathetic towards the Soviet Government, what he said about the Red Army could only have been something flattering; but what was added by Thornton is irrelevant to the case.

“Then further:

‘Nordwall was for a short time in Kuznetsk with MacDonald. Nordwall considers the Soviet Government stable.’

“That is what Thornton said about Nordwall. I think that this evidence must be to Nordwall’s advantage, and not the reverse.

“It is also characteristic that Oleinik, warned by Thornton, says that it was necessary to beware of Nordwall, who was alien to them and almost a Bolshevik. This, of course, should be turned to Nordwall’s advantage, and we must consider that this characterises him not as a wrecker, but rather as a man who is to be trusted. . . .

“Thus I think that all the charges which were made here against Nordwall, charges which are of course serious and are based on certain data, must, nevertheless, after the tests to which they were subjected in the Court investigation, be rejected, and I

think that if Oleinik considers him to be a dangerous man, we for our part need not consider him dangerous. If Lobanov treats him with contempt, considering that Nordwall is inferior to him, I think he should be placed on a different plane from Lobanov.

"I ask the Court to acquit Nordwall."

Counsel for Defence, M. Lidov, defending Mr. Cushny, was called on next. M. Lidov said :

"... The main charge against Cushny is the commission of an act of diversion in Baku in 1928. . . . Oleinik . . . told us the following : 'The case happened in this way. The stokers changed shifts ; instead of experienced stokers in one of the shifts there were inexperienced stokers who joined the shift on their own without the knowledge of the manager. The stokers had no relation whatever to Cushny, they were not in his charge, and he was not giving them any orders. The stokers pumped the water, but more than was necessary ; the water got into the turbine and caused a stoppage.'

"This is Oleinik's evidence. This scanty material does not justify us in saying definitely and exactly what happened in Baku in 1928. . . .

"Can we speak of bribery in the present case ? I think I have the right to assert that we cannot. . . .

"Is it conceivable that a Russian worker, who is absolutely uncorrupted, with no anti-Soviet inclinations, and who is not a counter-revolutionary, could be bought for 40 roubles lent to him ? Under these conditions can we regard this as proof ? under these conditions, from the point of view of judicial proof, can we consider Yemelyanov's evidence to be reliable judicial proof on this point ? . . .

"I will not repeat what the Public Prosecutor has already said in reference to Article 58-6 of the Criminal Code. That Article of the Criminal Code quite distinctly refers to information that constitutes a State secret, and not to the collecting of information in general. . . .

"Cushny would be a liar, and we would not believe it if he had said : 'I was a narrow specialist, I worked on turbines, I watched the screws and nuts and blades to see how they were working and then went to bed.' Of course he was not like that. Cushny has worked in the U.S.S.R. since 1925. He came over here when he was a young man. He has been working here for the last eight years. He cannot get away from life. It would have been unnatural. Of course he conversed, of course he took an interest in things. Comrade Judges, you are faced with an extremely complicated task. I understand the Public Prosecutor's suspicion. It could not be otherwise, but I repeat that

the scanty data before us is not sufficient evidence to convict a man on the charge of collecting information which was a State secret. Sometimes such a conclusion can be drawn because a man buys information and pays for it. With regard to Cushny it is quite different. He paid nobody any money. The petty sums he gave to the workers are not worth talking about. . . .

"You remember what Vyshinsky said : At the preliminary examination Cushny declined to answer questions. Cushny behaved like a tried and experienced spy. And he contrasted Cushny with Thornton, who had immediately told everything. True, the conclusion from this is an unfavourable one ; because Thornton told everything, he is an agent, though a bad one, while Cushny, because he told nothing, is also an agent. . . .

"Don't we say in Court to every accused that he has a right to refuse to answer any question he does not wish to answer ? And does such a refusal to answer serve as proof of guilt ? Never ! . . .

"If the verdict contains the statement that, in spite of the request of the Public Prosecutor, the Court finds that Cushny has not been clearly proved guilty of wrecking activities and of military espionage, it will be an additional proof that the road from a Soviet Court leads not only to prison, as is the opinion expressed in London, to which the Public Prosecutor referred, but also to freedom. The prison doors must close on those whose guilt has been irrefutably and fully established, because the State must deal thus with everyone who tries to damage and undermine its power. But for those whose guilt is in doubt, the path to freedom must be open, however forcibly and authoritatively the Public Prosecutor may plead, because where there is doubt a Soviet Court does not convict."

At this juncture the Court adjourned for twenty minutes. The President next called on Counsel for the Defence, M. Kommodov, defending Mr. Monkhouse.

Mr. Kommodov, referring to the foreign specialists working in the U.S.S.R., said :

"I am convinced that some of them are working with no less enthusiasm than the whole country is working ; they are sincere friends of the Soviet Union, who understand that the ideal which is the life and soul of the Soviet Union is the ideal of the whole of humanity, that the society which is being built, sooner or later, will be inevitably achieved, that it will become the life of all. . . .

"We find that instances of prosecution of foreign specialists are indeed rare exceptions here. . . .

"What is the main basis of the charge in the present case ? . . .

"The chief basis of the charge is the Zlatoust affair. That is my viewpoint. Gussev's testimony, Sokolov's testimony, MacDonald's testimony, the information given by different people, at different times, and complementing and corroborating each other, sealed by incontestable facts, and the findings of the Commission of Experts—all this forms the basis which, for us of the Defence, is damning in the sense of the conflict of evidence presented. . . .

"You heard the testimony given here by Gussev, Sokolov, and MacDonald, with exhaustive fullness, with absolute sincerity; and though this sincerity may be the best argument in their defence, be they Englishmen or Russians, the fact remains that they scourged themselves. And, after all, in these testimonies, which were not mere statements, but gave facts, is there a single reference to Monkhouse?"

As regards the evidence of Mr. MacDonald, M. Kommodov stressed the fact that the former in his testimony was only "supposing the participation in these activities" of Mr. Monkhouse.

Respecting M. Oleinik's evidence, Counsel said :

"Permit me to make one general remark concerning Oleinik's evidence. Oleinik declared here, and it is indisputably established, that he had dealings with Monkhouse before 1929. After 1929, he ceased to have any direct business dealings with him, but such dealings were established between him and Thornton. I next put the question: Did you commit any wrecking acts before 1929? He answered in the negative, and this is the truth. Thus, in this case also, we come to the conclusion that during the time when Oleinik was in direct touch with Monkhouse, he committed no wrecking acts. . . .

"But Oleinik said something more important in his evidence.

"The investigator not only asked him what instructions were given of a spying nature, but also what instructions were given of a diversionary nature. To this Oleinik replied: 'I was not given any tasks by Monkhouse in regard to acts of diversion.'"

Counsel contended that Madame Kutuzova's evidence could not be accepted, because it did not contain "a single fact" and because it was contradictory. Madame Kutuzova spoke of "the degree of confidence which both Thornton and Monkhouse felt towards me," and yet said Counsel :

"Can it be said that Kutuzova's testimony bears evidence of the complete confidence of which she speaks? Can it be said that, with the confidence in her which she talks about, it was necessary to lock themselves up in an office to carry on secret conversations? Would it then have been necessary to peer and pry into the nature of the secret conversations, would it have been necessary to guess at them? . . .

"In another place, Citizen Kutuzova says: 'I suppose that Thornton and the other workers in the firm's office gave their information to Richards and carried on their espionage under him. I drew this conclusion from the fact that when Richards came over, secret talks were held with him, and besides this, Thornton and Monkhouse mentioned the name Richards in their secret conversation'. . .

"If you take this evidence as a valid legal argument, and believe it, then it is not a question of Monkhouse, but of Thornton. . . .

"Recall the nine notebooks which, as Thornton himself testifies, were taken by him to England. Recall all the payments made for wrecking, which went on, not here, and not through Monkhouse, but through Thornton. . . .

"I will now turn to the Dolgov bribe. Two versions were given here by Monkhouse. One, which he gave during the preliminary investigation, amounted to an admission that he is guilty also of having given bribes. Now he says that this was money given as a loan. . . .

"The first thing is that the bribe was given when Monkhouse was not in Moscow. Thornton gave it in the absence of Monkhouse. Thus, the latter was faced with an accomplished fact. Second, the money was paid out of Thornton's private account, and third, the money was written off by Monkhouse by order of Richards, his superior. . . .

"These are the considerations which I wished to put forward in defence of Monkhouse. His case is very complicated; there is strong evidence against him, still it is not conclusive. This obliges me, as his Counsel, to raise before you the question of the extent to which the actual commission of crime has been proved, and I feel confident that you will answer this question with all the care and circumspection that distinguishes our Court. Your reply will reflect the truth that will come to light as a result of our legal arguments, and as a result of an examination of all the evidence submitted in the present case."

M. Libson, counsel for Kutuzova and Kotliarevsky, spoke last. He stated that Kotliarevsky accidentally fell under the influence of Thornton and MacDonald, with whom he was very friendly; that he had got into their debt, thereby enabling them to blackmail him and demand information.

Kotliarevsky, however, soon understood the criminal nature of such a connection and went to live at another place where he did honest work. This gave one reason to believe in his sincerity and to assume that he would work honestly in future. Counsel begged the Court to give his client that chance.

Describing Kutuzova, M. Libson contradicted the Prosecutor's statement that she was a frivolous woman, striving after material welfare. He said she belonged to a worker's family and had worked all her life, having established a reputation as a good business woman capable of responsible work.

Counsel pointed out that she had not played an active part in criminal activity; her actions did not correspond with the charges mentioned in the indictment clauses. Affirming that the utmost which could be charged against Kutuzova was the concealment by her of the criminal actions of others, counsel begged the Court to show lenience.

The Court asked the Prosecutor whether he wished to avail himself of the right of reply, but the Prosecutor refused to use his right, saying: "There is no need for a reply."

The Court then proceeded to hear the last pleas of the accused.

All the Russian accused pleaded guilty and asked for an opportunity to atone for their crimes by honest work in the future. The Court proceeded.

The President: "Accused MacDonald?"

MacDonald: "I plead guilty, and I have nothing more to add."

The President: "Accused Cushny, do you desire to make a final plea?"

Cushny: "I want to speak in English."

The President: "You may."

Cushny: "After hearing the very able defence put up by my Counsel to-day, there is really very little left for me to say. He has torn to shreds the flimsy fabric put up by the Public Prosecutor. I have said all through that I am not guilty. There has not been a shred of real evidence brought forward against me. And whatever the verdict, I shall leave this court an honest man as I came in."

The President: "Be seated. Accused Nordwall?"

Nordwall: "I wish to speak in English."

The President: "You may."

Nordwall: "It has been very painful to me to listen to the Public Prosecutor's speech. I am a man that takes interest only in his work, and I always do my utmost. I have always supported the interests of the Soviet building plan, and have done every possible thing to help them. My private life in Russia has been purely in connection with my own family and living among the Russian people. After the evidence I have heard in this Court against me and after the fairness I received in the G.P.U. after I have been arrested, and as I said before, I have always been a friend of the Soviet Union, and I think this Court has documentary evidence to this effect. I feel sure

that after the evidence put before you, the Judge and the jury can only pass one verdict, that is, not guilty. And at this moment I am still a friend of the Soviet Union, and I am not afraid to say so even in front of all the press."

The President: "Accused Thornton?"

Thornton: "At the beginning of this trial I pleaded not guilty. And I still plead not guilty. I assert that the evidence brought against me is unreliable. That is all I have to say."

The President: "Accused Monkhouse?"

Monkhouse: In addition to the severe charges which are on the charge sheet against me, in the course of yesterday's summing up by the Public Prosecutor, he added another which I regard as a very serious charge, maybe unofficially, but he added a very serious charge, inasmuch that he accused me of deliberately deceiving the British Government in the communication which I made when I was released from Lubyanka. That is a very unfair statement to me. Because I have made no statements at all which are in adverseness to facts; except the difference in the time, which I can explain, is due to the fact that apparently I was given special consideration when I was in prison. For the conditions I must thank you, but they misled me. Because on the walls of my cell there is a notice about the times meals are served and other regulations observed. That was my only means of judging the time. The Public Prosecutor also accuses me of giving the wrong information as to the number of people who examined me. I stated I was examined by three men. And I still state that. And I can name the men. It is not necessary, I assume. He also stated that time was given me for meals. That those meals were excellent meals brought in from the outside; that is true, but I was not left alone at the meals, and one of the chief men of the Examining Department had his meal with me. And I cannot be persuaded that the conversation which took place was not part of my examination. I only wish to make those remarks because I very much disliked the insinuation that I deceived the representative of His Majesty's Government.

"Now in reference to the charges which are made against me on the sheet; the first charge is that of spying. And the only serious evidence that I can see against me, accusing me of spying, is a document which has been referred to here as number 26, which was signed by Mr. Thornton. And I would like to say that I have known Mr. Thornton for 22 years, and I am perfectly certain that he could not sign a document like that voluntarily. That document contains the names of 27 people, all of whom are accused by him of being in a spying organisation. One of those men has confessed in this Court that he is associated

with Mr. Thornton. Four have not. And I am perfectly certain that the remaining 22 would also not. So that, not in any Court of Law, I think I am right in saying it, would it be held as a proof.

"Finally, with regard to the charge of spying, I deny having done any spying whatever. I understand spying as a collecting of secret and State information; that I have not done.

"The second charge against me is of wrecking. In implicating this charge the Public Prosecutor surprised me very much in taking up the attitude that the interests of my Company and of the Soviet Government are opposed to each other. That is not so, and cannot be so. I would ask the Court to remember that the Soviet Government at the present time owes our Company 15,000,000 gold roubles—one and a half million English pounds—and our Company had hoped to get more orders."

"The President: This question does not concern the Court. We are not examining a civil action.

Monkhouse: "I wish to say, Sir,—The conclusion that I wish to make, Sir, is that it would be cutting our own throats to engage in any wrecking activities which would destroy or lessen the capacity to pay of the Soviet Union. I have been very proud in the last eight years to take part in the enormous development which is the electrification of this country. I have been proud, and very proud, to be associated with such men as the present head of Glavelektro and Glavenergprom and other similar institutions. And it has always been; and I have done everything I possibly could to help in the work. And in doing so I have taken a natural pride in being associated with it. Therefore, it is to me quite ununderstandable how it can be brought against me that I am associated with wrecking that work.

"Engineers, when they build works of this kind, they look upon them as their own children. And I know of no parents who would put a dagger into the heart of their own child.

"The third charge against me is of bribery. I have never given a bribe myself in my life. And I will not give a bribe. The Public Prosecutor yesterday made another reference which I would like to refer to. He said that the Moscow Bureau of our Company had a bad tradition when I took it over. That is quite incorrect, because there was no Moscow office when I was made manager here. And all my office books have already been to the Public Prosecutor. All of my private diaries for the last nine years have been examined by the O.G.P.U., all my expense accounts, my personal and private expense accounts for the last eight years, have all been in the hands of the G.P.U. And because nothing had been said to me, they have not found one

figure that indicates any form of bribery. I was very much shocked by the charge of bribery because it is against my principles.

"I have nothing whatever to add, except that I stand before you, Sir, absolutely innocent of the charges brought against me."

After all the accused had spoken, the Court retired at 8.35 p.m. April 18, 1933, to consider the verdict.

NIGHT SESSION, APRIL 18-19, 1933. 1.0 a.m.

When the Court reassembled, the sentences were pronounced. The following is an extract from the official pronouncement:—

I

1. Gussev, Vassily Alexeyevich,
2. Sukhoruchkin, Leonid Alexeyevich,
3. Lobanov, Alexander Timofeyevich, State employees, citizens of the U.S.S.R., to ten years' deprivation of liberty with loss of rights for five years, and confiscation of all their property. In selecting this measure of repression instead of the sentence of shooting, the Court was guided exclusively by the fact that the criminal wrecking activities of the aforesaid convicted persons bore a local character and did not cause serious damage to the industrial power of the U.S.S.R.

II

4. Sokolov, Vassily Andreyevich,
5. Zorin, Nikolai Grigorievich,
6. Kotlyarevsky, Moisei Lvovich, State employees, citizens of the U.S.S.R., for the same reason as above, to eight years' deprivation of liberty, with the aforesaid consequences.

III

7. Krashennnikov, Michael Dmitrievich, State employee, citizen of the U.S.S.R., for the same reason as above, to five years' deprivation of liberty, with loss of rights for five years, without confiscation of property.

IV

8. Lebedev, Vyacheslav Petrovich, State employee, citizen of the U.S.S.R., taking into consideration that he was merely a tool in the hands of Lobanov and guided by Article 51 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., the Court sentences him to two years' deprivation of liberty without loss of rights and without confiscation of property.

V

- The employees of the Moscow office of Metropolitan-Vickers.
9. British subject, Thornton, Leslie Charles, to three years' deprivation of liberty.

10. In the case of British subject, MacDonald, William Lionel, in so far as he acted on the direct instigation of his immediate superior, Thornton, on the one hand, and in view of his frank confession to his criminal acts at the Court, on the other, and by virtue of Article 51 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., the Court decides to commute the measure of repression demanded by the law to two years' deprivation of liberty.

In the cases of British subjects :

11. Monkhouse, Allan,

12. Nordwall, Charles, in so far as they did not take a direct part in causing breakdowns at the power stations, and

13. Cushny, John, in view of the lapse of time since the crime, of which he is guilty, was committed (1928) and by virtue of Article 51 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., the Court decides to confine itself to ordering their deportation from the territory of the U.S.S.R., and to prohibit their entry into the U.S.S.R. for a period of five years.

The convicted Monkhouse, Nordwall and Cushny must leave the territory of the U.S.S.R. within three days from the moment of the passing of this sentence.

14. Oleinik, Peter Yeremeyevich, citizen of the U.S.S.R., taking into consideration the fact that he was subordinate to Thornton, and that he was an employee of a private firm, the Court decides that he be sentenced to three years' deprivation of liberty without loss of rights and without confiscation of property.

15. Kutuzova, Anna Sergejevna, citizen of the U.S.S.R., for the same reasons as above, to be sentenced to eighteen months' deprivation of liberty, without loss of rights and without confiscation of property.

In regard to all the convicted, the period of preliminary confinement shall be counted as part of the period of deprivation of liberty.

VI

16. In the case of Zivert, Yuri Ivanovich, State employee, citizen of the U.S.S.R., taking into consideration that by the work he has done since 1931 he has proved that he has sincerely broken off all connections with the wreckers, and by virtue of Article 8 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., the Court decides that no measures of repression be applied to him, and that he be released.

17. Gregory, Albert William, British subject, in view of the inadequacy of the evidence, the Court decides that he be acquitted.

IS SABOTAGE A REALITY?

It has been urged repeatedly that the trials for sabotage which have taken place from time to time in the U.S.S.R. have been merely staged affairs for political purposes, and that the accusations were unfounded.

This is very far from being the truth—nor is the U.S.S.R. the only country in which sabotage in the various forms of disorganisation, wrecking, treason and betrayal has manifested itself. Such sabotage is, one might say, a recognised form of struggle pursued by the defeated class in every revolution. In our own history we can find many examples of such sabotage; here we need but mention a few instances during the period of the Commonwealth. J. R. Green, in his "History of the English People", speaking of the attempt of Cromwell to bring about certain reforms, says:—

"The general amnesty claimed by Ireton and the bill for the Parliament's dissolution, still hung on hand; the reform of the courts of justice, which had been pressed by the army, failed before the obstacles thrown in its way by the lawyers in the Commons." (page 1215).

And referring to the Parliament of the time (subsequently known as the Rump) which refused either to dissolve or to bring about the necessary reforms, Green speaks of the members:

". . . selfish greed of houses and lands, the scandalous lives of many, their partiality as judges, their interference with the ordinary course of law in matters of private interest, their delay of law reform, above all in their manifest design of perpetuating their own power." (page 1227.)

On the other hand, royalist secret intrigues were a constant source of trouble and danger throughout the existence of the Commonwealth.

Finally, no mean part was played in the restoration of Charles II to the throne of England by the treacherous Monk, Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth armies, who, whilst pretending loyalty to the Commonwealth, adroitly dispersed the troops over the country and himself behind their backs, carried on negotiations with the exiled Court.

Again the history of the French Revolution teems with examples of treachery, treasons, and betrayals, and of the activities of agents provocateurs.

We need but recall the notorious treason of General Dumouriez, who, in 1793, was at the head of the French revolutionary armies in Belgium. In view of suspicious conduct on

his part, the Convention had sent a Commission of inquiry to the front. His reply was the arrest of the Convention Commission, he handed them over to the enemy, and then made an attempt to march on Paris with the object of overthrowing the revolutionary Government.

Speaking of the activities of the Royalists, Aulard—the distinguished historian of the French Revolution, says : —

“We may say that royalism in France concealed itself at the beginning of the first Republic, during the military successes of September, 1792, to December, 1793. After the reverses, and the treason of Dumouriez, it threw off the mask, and held the Republic at bay in the west, at Lyons, and at Toulon. It spread its doctrines here and there in other regions, always commingling with movements of another nature, religious or anti-Parisian, and without making serious progress with the mass of the population.”

(“The French Revolution”, Vol. II, page 322.)

“The holding up and robbing of diligences and stage coaches was one of the means systematically recommended by the royalist leaders; means in general employment of delaying the complete re-establishment of order and security. The mobile columns which patrolled the country, and the soldiers who escorted the coaches, could not prevent the almost daily thefts and assassinations. France was almost terrorised. It was felt that the government which could not establish the security of the highways was not sound. This absence of confidence was one of the chief reasons why the impost was so irregularly paid during all this period; and it may be noted in passing that the terrible financial difficulties from which the Directory suffered were due to the anxiety caused by the royalists and the refractory priests.”

(“The French Revolution”, Vol. IV, page 111.)

Indeed, many of the authenticated acts of sabotage of various kinds during both the British and, still more, the French revolution bear a very striking resemblance to those which are brought to light from time to time in the U.S.S.R.

Nor is direct wrecking of machinery unknown in countries other than the U.S.S.R., when the State by its enterprise threatens private interests.

Thus we learn from the “World Telegram” that in May, 1933, the U.S.A. Ministry for Justice instituted an investigation into charges of wrecking at the State hydro-electrical station at Muscle Shoals (Tennessee). This Station, which belongs to the American War Department, was partially rented out to private electrical companies. The latter are now accused of wrecking

the equipment of the State Station, and it is reported that the private companies have spoilt valuable equipment (including turbines and transformers) and have endeavoured to discredit the work of the State Power Station.

In Soviet Russia, sabotage has assumed a variety of forms. In the early days of the revolution it was both of an economic and military nature.

The history of Russia in the last 15 years is a history not only of achievement in the economic and educational field, but it is also a history of a fierce class struggle in which the enemies of the Soviets have not scrupled to use any and every weapon to prevent the ultimate establishment of Socialism in that great country.

Soon after the Soviets assumed power they had to fight foreign intervention and subsidised civil war on a number of fronts. Although the rank and file of the Russian army, in the main, supported the Soviets, by far the greater part of the officers and commanders bitterly opposed them. Many of these officers, for a variety of reasons, took service in the subsequently organised Red Army and Navy, and much as the workers distrusted these officers, they were compelled to utilise them for want of experienced military leaders of their own.

Hence the formation of workers' commissions and supervisors to keep a watch on the commanding staffs of the army and navy, and to prevent them from betraying the interests of the workers and peasants. Many of the Soviet leaders still have vivid memories of those days and of the acts and attempts of betrayal and sabotage of these class enemies.

In this connection, the following example is interesting : The late Boris Savinkov (Minister for War in the Kerensky Government) related in his diary, entitled “The Black Horse”, how he and his confederates carried on espionage and sabotage against the Soviet Government in the Spring of 1921. Thus he says :

“Fedia's name is no longer Moshenkin, but Kovaleff. He is in the service of the *Ve-Cheka*, the all-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of the Counter-revolution. Egoroff is not Egoroff, but Larionoff. He works as caretaker in the Commissariat of Public Health. Vrede is not Vrede, but Laso. He commands a squadron in the Red Army. All three have false passports, so-called ‘dead’ documents, that is, documents of people who have been killed. All three are members of the Bolshevik Party—‘convinced Communists’. Ivan Lukitch is a speculator. He lives under his own name and keeps in

contact with the 'Committee,' that is to say, our conspirative organisation. As for myself, nameless and unseen, I hide at the houses of different people, who of course thereby risk their lives." [page 100.]

And in subsequent pages he describes one of the actual acts of sabotage and destruction, as follows :—

February 6.

"The landlady, Pelagea Petrovna, takes out the empty samovar . . . Egoroff frowns at her.

'Is she a she-devil, too?'

'No, she's one of us. Listen, Egoroff—'

'Yes, Colonel.' [Savinkov]

'At Kuntzevo, on the third reserve track, there stands a train. It is loaded with munitions for the Moscow garrison. To-morrow you are not on duty at the Commissariat. Go and blow up the train at dinner-time.'

He nods with his long beard. 'Now, that's sense, thank God,' he says, with deep satisfaction. And adds distinctly, as receiving military orders, 'Yes, sir'."

February 7.

"Kuntzevo. A frosty morning. The glitter of the snow blinds the eyes. To the right—the park, the fluffy triangles of fir-trees. . . . To the left—the station and the tracks. The third reserve track.

"Five minutes to one. Watching, I saw a spark flash in the third car from the engine. It flashed, then went out. Then all of a sudden a flame broke out. There was a rumbling sound, dull and short. And immediately a tongue of fire leapt into the air, carrying with it chips and debris. Like a fountain it rose to the skies and spread into a huge, oblong ring. A vast cloud of smoke settled in the heavens, hanging darkly over the forest." [pages 103-4.]

On the economic field, sabotage in all its various forms was no less real and dangerous.

Immediately on the establishment of the Soviet Government a large section of the Russian intelligentsia refused to work the State machine, and some of those who remained at their posts deliberately sabotaged the instructions of the Soviet authorities in the hope of making it unworkable.

Commenting on the strike of the Bank officials at that time, the British Government "White Paper" Cmd. 1240 on page 39 declared :—

"This strike of the Bank staffs was financed by some of the prominent industrial magnates in Petrograd."

When, however, the heroic, self-sacrificing work of the section

of the loyal intelligentsia and the millions of workers who supported the Soviets had built up the Soviet State machine and had smashed the military and civil opposition of the "Whites" (the anti-Soviet elements) larger and larger numbers of the intelligentsia took service with the Soviets—some of these intelligentsia had by now really become pro-Soviet, others, only concerned with making a living, were ready to serve honestly enough, if with no great fervour, any administration so long as it was a going concern—whilst others, a diminishing number it is true, but not wholly eradicated even now, went into Soviet service with the definite object of sabotaging, of wrecking the work of the Soviets. These elements maintained, and as far as they can still maintain, connection with Russian "Whites" and foreign sympathisers abroad. The object of the latter is to overthrow the Soviets. They make no secret of this—we need only give here a few examples culled from our own press.

In an effort to raise funds, Col. J. Ward wrote :—

"The purpose of our work is not only to save the lives of these young people, but to educate and train them as thoroughly as possible with the means at our disposal that they may be ready to play a great part in the regeneration and reconstruction of their country. I think that most thoughtful people will agree that there can be no greater work than this." ["Daily Telegraph", May 26, 1923.]

And Lord Ullswater wrote :

"It would be a grave failure if these children were again left desolate at the very time when their dependence upon us is nearing its end, and their value as sound citizens in the Near East just beginning. For these children are of the type on which we depend to combat Bolshevik principles there and to re-establish the peace and security which the Russian Revolution took from them."

["Manchester Guardian", January 22, 1925.]

Then even acts of charity for the children of the emigrés were undertaken with a counter-revolutionary object.

The Paris correspondent of the "Daily Mail", April 6, 1926, reported :—

"Anti-Bolshevist Russians are holding an unofficial 'Parliament' in Paris with a view to uniting all exiles from their native land to try to free Russia from the Soviet regime.

"Four hundred delegates have assembled from every country in Europe and from the United States. They include members of the former Russian Imperial Family, clergy, aristocrats, and workmen representing every profession or trade adopted by the exiles, from bankers to the Russian taxicab drivers who swarm in Paris."

The Conference was timed to take place at about the same time as the Franco-Soviet Conference of that year.

A year later, April 1927, the Soviet Press announced the discovery and breaking up of a monarchist group which had received financial support from abroad, which was largely engaged in military espionage work for certain foreign intelligence services, and had been endeavouring to create an anti-Soviet organisation within the U.S.S.R.

In connection with reports of the arrest of British and other spies in the U.S.S.R., the Diplomatic Correspondent of the "Morning Post," September 24, 1927, said :—

"There are many secret organisations of Tsarist refugees, and it is well known that they have British sympathisers and that wealthy people and institutions all over the world have subscribed to their funds. The British Government would naturally be given credit for any subscriptions coming from this country."

A little later in the same year a plot to forge chervonetz notes was discovered in Berlin and Paris. The Berlin Correspondent of the "Times," November 21, 1927, said :—

"Forged *Chervonetz notes began to appear in Berlin during August. They were traced to a Georgian refugee named Sadathieraschwili, who was arrested. A search of his luggage revealed five plates for the printing of Chervonetz notes. Sadathieraschwili is understood to have told the examining magistrate that he was involved in the forging operations for political reasons. In repeated examinations the authorities obtained information which led to the discovery of the press employed in Frankfurt and the arrest of some ten more persons, mainly belonging to extreme reactionary circles."

And the Berlin Correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph", November 21, 1927, stated :—

"According to the hints of some papers and the direct categorical assertions of the chief Communist organ, this capital was actually furnished in English money and from English sources—in fact, by 'British petroleum magnates.' But then, even the police incline to the view that this prodigious forgery plot was not a common criminal affair, but had far-reaching political aims—possibly the double aim of embarrassing the Soviet Government generally, and financing the Georgian anti-Bolshevik movement in particular."

*The Chervonetz is a Soviet note of value 20 roubles (about £1 at par.)

Again in 1928, we read :

"Plans for the invasion of Russia, when the 'Day' comes, by a 'White Army' now being organised in Britain, France, Germany and elsewhere, have been disclosed to the British United Press by General Lucomsky, who was Under-Secretary for War in Russia in 1915-16, a commander of the First Russian Corps under the Tsar, and later General Denikin's Minister for War.

"An elaborate organisation for the training of officers has been prepared, and already plans are in existence in many cities of Europe among the Russian emigres."

["Daily Herald", November 7, 1928.]

Similarly in 1929 :

"Anti-Soviet leaders in Paris have informed the British United Press correspondent there that they are making preparations for a military counter-revolution in Russia on a gigantic scale.

"Guns, ammunition and war material, they say, are being smuggled over the Polish and Rumanian frontiers and stored in large warehouses in every big city and throughout the country.

"These munitions are being purchased in Great Britain, France, and Germany. They will be sent in increasing quantities 'until the hour arrives for striking a decisive blow.' Then the 100,000 men of the Military Union will 'pour over the frontiers' and overthrow the Soviets."

["Daily Herald", February 14, 1929.]

On August 12, 1930, the "Morning Post" reported a secret meeting in Paris under the presidency of General Miller (head of the Russian "White" Military organisation abroad). Quoting the Paris edition of the "Chicago Tribune" the "Morning Post" (August 12, 1930) said :

"The chief decision reached, says the 'Chicago Tribune', was that the Russian emigres in Europe would undertake the raising of a large sum of money, at least several millions of dollars.

"It was also resolved, this paper says, that General Diteries, who has been carrying on guerilla warfare against the Bolsheviks for five years, be appointed commander of the White Forces in the East with headquarters in Shanghai."

The following day (August 18, 1930) the "Morning Post" reported :—

"The real significance of Saturday's meeting of Russian emigres, mentioned in the 'Morning Post' yesterday, was explained to me by General Miller, leader of the ex-Officers' Union, to-day.

"The object of the conference, he stated, was not, as reported in an American paper published in Paris, to launch a new White militarist movement, but to devise means to support the Siberian peasants, who are in revolt against the Soviet regime. Representatives of all parties of emigrés, including their professional associations, reached complete agreement on the necessity of raising a fund to assist the insurgents."

Actually the Siberian peasants were not in revolt at all, but that, of course, was a detail not worth considering—it served as an excuse for the organisation of support from abroad for the bourgeois and kulak elements at home.

The formation of a smaller but evidently no less determined anti-Soviet Society was reported as having been formed by M. G. Bessedovsky, former Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, in the "Daily Telegraph", February 18, 1931:—

"The total membership is less than 100, and every member is pledged to exert all his energies towards the overthrow of the Soviet regime in Russia."

More recently there has been much activity among the Ukrainian emigrés supported by certain German Nazi leaders and by anti-Soviet circles in a number of other countries, including Great Britain, with the object of separating the rich Ukraine and other Southern districts from the U.S.S.R.

Naturally all these movements have sought and seek to form some basis within the U.S.S.R. itself. Not all the former bourgeoisie, former nobles, police and officer class have emigrated. Many have, of course, remained at home. Some have gone over sincerely to the Soviet—this is undoubtedly true of a very large section, now a majority, of the technical intelligentsia—others, a smaller section, have merely sought to make a good career for themselves in Soviet service; another section, not large, but none the less active, having become convinced that the Soviets were too strong to be overcome in open fight, have curried favour with the Soviet authorities, have by a show of zeal wormed themselves into positions of authority in Soviet enterprises, in Soviet institutions, in Soviet administrative departments, in important departments of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in order to be the better able to sabotage or to wreck Soviet planning, and Soviet Socialist construction. And as we have shown above there were elements abroad ready to help them in this.

On the industrial field this sabotage has expressed itself in a variety of forms. Numerous cases might be cited of disloyal managers who have sought to wreck plans and enterprises by drafting unworkable plans, by discrediting good plans, drawn up by higher Soviet authorities, by minimising the possibility of the

enterprises under their control, etc. Cases have been disclosed of wilful bad organisation, by the placing of men in responsible positions who had no experience and were not fit for the work assigned to them. Amongst other examples of sabotage may be mentioned neglect to carry out the labour protection measures required by Soviet law; the wilful bad organisation of the workers' food supply and factory dining rooms, failure to pay wages punctually and the use of the money for other non-authorised purposes, the hounding out of office of loyal workers who sought to carry out honestly Government instructions and plans, and so on.

In the early days the Soviets fought against such disloyal elements by placing authority in a supervising commission composed of workers, or in the factory workshop committees which acted as a check upon dishonest or hostile managers. But with the expansion of Soviet industry this method became unwieldy—moreover, the steady increase in the number of young Soviet-trained loyal specialists made this unnecessary and one-man management and personal responsibility was established. However, where a disloyal manager or official obtained a position of trust—the new organisation gave him additional opportunity to sabotage the State enterprises and such active sabotage has been disclosed from time to time.

A striking illustration of this was provided in the case of the so-called Shakhty Trial, in which many of the defendants who were employed as experts in the Shakhty mines of the Donetz pleaded guilty to belonging to a counter-revolutionary organisation, the centre of which was at Kharkov and which was stated to have been financed by the former owners of the coal mines and some foreign undertakings.

The existence of sabotage in Soviet industry is well known to foreign specialists who have worked there. Thus, Mr. W. A. Rukeyser, an American specialist, describing his personal experiences in his book "Working for the Soviets,"* says:—

"That there is a great deal of premeditated sabotage going on in Russia (to-day to a much lesser degree) on the part of those antagonistic to the present regime is obvious to most of the American specialists in Russia with whom I have discussed the matter. Certainly not all the mistakes or slowing down of *tempo* can be attributed only to red tape, lack of practical experience, or ignorance." [page 233].

A still more fertile field for sabotage was, however, provided in the villages. In every country the village population is, as a rule, the most backward politically. In the early days the rural enemies of the Soviets agitated against and tried to prevent the successful carrying out of State grain collections. When

* Jonathan Cape, 80 Bedford Square, London.

the Soviet authorities, in order to organise agriculture on large-scale modern lines, began a big drive for the formation of collective farms, the anti-Soviet elements—the kulaks and former landowners—changed their tactics in accordance with the changing situation.

At first they did all they could to dissuade the peasants from joining the collectives, and at the same time organised vendettas, molestations, and even murders of Soviet and Party officials who took an active part in the formation of the collectives.

When in spite of these efforts more and more peasants saw the advantage of collective farming, the hostile elements changed their tactics; instead of open enmity to the collectives, they now joined them with the object of carrying on subversive work from within. They also pretended excessive zeal, won posts of importance in Soviet and Party organisations, and in a number of districts, in direct violation to Soviet policy and law, they forced peasants to join collectives against their will and illegally and forcibly collectivised the herds, even the poultry and single cow of the individual peasant farmer. In this, it should be added, they were helped by some honest but over-zealous Soviet officials. This caused tremendous loss to the State by the slaughter of animals and the justified irritation and discontent of the forcibly collectivised peasants.

However, the authorities by energetic action put a stop to these illegalities, and again the hostile elements changed their tactics. Playing upon the still largely individualistic, petty bourgeois psychology of many of the peasant members of the kolkhozy, they did and do everything they can to sabotage the work of the kolkhozy.

For instance, in the Northern Caucasus cases have been disclosed in which former kulak and former Tsarist officials or their children had joined the kolkhozy* and obtained leading positions therein. They then drastically cut down the sowing plans of the kolkhozy so that the amount of grain raised was no more than enough for the needs of the kolkhoz itself and there was none left for State grain collection purposes. In other cases, having by the falsification of accounts, by direct theft and hiding away of large stocks of grain, created an apparent scarcity, they “proved” to the rank and file that there was not sufficient grain for the kolkhoz, let alone selling any to the State in accordance with the grain collection plans.

* The kolkhozy are collective farms formed by the pooling of the resources of a number of individual peasant farmers. They vary in the degree of collectivisation of their resources. Some are simple associations of peasants to work their land in common. In others, the herds, or some of them, and all or part of the implements are also collectivised. Whilst in the complete form they are organised in communes in which everything used for production is owned in common.

Other methods of sabotage employed included the insistence on alleged “scientific” grounds that early preparatory ploughing and early spring sowing gave a bad yield. This happened in the Urals where they were aided by saboteurs in some Agricultural Research Institutes. The result was indeed a very poor yield. These and similar examples might be multiplied.

Speaking in the House of Commons, April 5, 1933, Sir J. Simon raised ready laughter when he said that in the U.S.S.R.

“... some forty Russians had been arrested for a crime which the House will see goes by the rather curious description of ‘agricultural sabotage.’ In the newspaper which reported the arrest of these men details were given of the charges, and the House may be interested to know that one of the charges was ‘deliberate propagation of weeds in the fields and lowering of crop yields.’” (*Hansard*, April 5, 1933, col. 1767.)

But for the U.S.S.R. this is not a laughing matter. The statement in the Soviet Press (March 5, 1933) referred to by Sir J. Simon points out that:—

The G.P.U. had discovered and suppressed a number of counter-revolutionary wrecking organisations in certain departments of the Commissariats for Agriculture and for sovkhozy†—particularly in the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, and White Russia.

Most of those participating in these counter-revolutionary and wrecking organisations were State employees—the majority being of former bourgeois and landlord origin.

Those arrested were accused of wilfully damaging and destroying tractors and agricultural machinery; wilfully propagating weeds and lowering crop yields; incendiarism in machine tractor stations and flax works; theft of kolkhoz grain reserves; the disorganisation of sowing and harvesting operations, and the destruction of herds.

Sir J. Simon, for obvious reasons, quoted only one point of the indictment.

The material in the hands of the authorities showed that the object of the accused was to damage peasant collectives and to cause a famine.

It must be realised that what is going on in Soviet villages is a fierce struggle to the finish between collectivisation in the interests of the masses of the peasantry on the one hand, and the remnants of rural private capitalism on the other. It is no accident that most of the plotters and saboteurs are of landlord, bourgeois, or former Tsarist official origin. Driven to the last ditch by the steady success of collectivisation in agriculture,

† The Sovkhozy are State collective farms.

these former rich and influential elements are ready to use any and every means to discredit and to obstruct the progress of collective farming. They realise, and quite rightly, that if they cannot win the masses of the peasantry to support private capitalism now when life in the kolkhozy is still hard (even though for the most part better than on their former tiny individual farms) they will never win them when the kolkhozy have developed and taken firm root in the habits and psychology of the peasantry.

At all costs they must demonstrate that the kolkhozy are unworkable—hence their continuous untiring work to make them so.

We repeat, agricultural sabotage, like sabotage in other departments, is a very real and a very dangerous thing in the U.S.S.R. which the Soviet authorities cannot tolerate. Although occurring from time to time in other countries, it is more prevalent in the U.S.S.R. at the present time, precisely because the U.S.S.R. is living through a revolutionary period, through a class struggle between the forces of socialism and the remnants of capitalism and landlordism in which the latter are waging a life and death struggle against extinction.

APPENDIX

Summary of the Indictment

Investigation by G.P.U. of unexpected, consistently repeated failures of the Moscow, Cheliabinsk, Ivanovo, Zuevka, Zlatoust Electric Plants has established the failures to be due to the wrecking activities of a group of criminal elements among State employees, whose object was the destruction of the electric plants of the U.S.S.R. and the frustration of State plants fed by these stations. Investigation established that the counter-revolutionary activity of the wrecking group consisted of damage to equipment for the purpose of undermining the strength of Soviet industry, weakening the Soviet State, the compilation and utilisation against the State of secret information of military and State importance, and bribing individual employees of State electric plants in connection with the realisation of wrecking counter-revolutionary activity.

The prosecuting magistracy, R.S.F.S.R., organised an Expert Commission consisting of engineers: Brailo, heating engineer; Golubtzov, turbine engineer; Smirnov, technological engineer; Snedkov, Novikov, and Ulakov, turbine experts, to check technical evaluation of all documents available in the case. The Commission came to the conclusion that the basis of all investigated cases of failures was either due to criminal negligence or direct wrecking.

Further, the indictment dwells in detail on wrecking and espionage activity by defendants at each individual station separately. Investigation of the failures by Expert Commission at Zlatoust revealed criminal negligence or evil intent of staff, a number of failures the result whereof was that the plant yielded only half the rated capacity of the turbo-generators was due to evil intent, or at least criminal negligence.

Defendant Gussev, Head of Zlatoust Electric Plant, acknowledged his guilt and declared his acute hostile attitude to the Soviet power, began his active counter-revolutionary activity in 1929, at the time of the arrival of MacDonald who, after *rapprochement* with Gussev, candidly proposed that the latter should undertake to gather data for political purposes hostile to the U.S.S.R. MacDonald recognised the correctness of Gussev's statements, and confronted with Gussev, admitted that he told Gussev bluntly: "I need data of military production in the Zlatoust plants."

MacDonald instructed Gussev to gather secret information of work in military shops and mechanical metallurgical plants, including the capacity of the munition shops, number of produced shells and their types; concerning enlargement of military shops and output of special steels used by military works for the production of munitions. He also asked for information on questions concerning the uninterrupted activity of military shops.

MacDonald stated further that Thornton, having given him to understand that in addition to business activity there would be illegal tasks, soon gave MacDonald the concrete task of discovering information about State military works and military industry, and of organising Zlatoust failures involving interruption of industrial plants.

The data received was copied into notebooks while the originals were burnt. Gussev further stated that he met Thornton at Khartsissk Station and transmitted secret data of military State importance; he also acknowledged simultaneously that some other Russian engineers also transmitted data to MacDonald through him.

However, the main feature of Gussev's counter-revolutionary activity was the organisation of failures, of delays in the work on the enlargement of the Zlatoust electric plant for the purpose of undermining the industrial and military power of the U.S.S.R. MacDonald gave direct instructions to Gussev concerning the necessity to proceed with the realisation of failures liable to delay the activity of work for the production of munitions and high-grade steels.

These statements of Gussev's were corroborated by Sokolov, Assistant Chief of the electric plant, and also by MacDonald, who instructed Sokolov to damage equipment, negotiating in this matter directly with Gussev.

Under MacDonald's instructions Gussev carried out wrecking acts at Zlatoust metallurgical plant; five or six times he put out of order a motor of 1,400 h.p. driving large rolling mill, freezing electric plant, and boilers.

MacDonald acknowledged that he instructed Gussev as to the necessity of damaging motors, putting out of order the coal supply, electric plant, and a number of boilers, declaring that "my object was the direct frustration of the power supply of Zlatoust metallurgical and mechanical plants in order to reduce the activity of the military industries."

As a means of realising this he selected the reduction of the capacity of the electric plant from 12,000 to 6,000 kw. In these circumstances the least failure would result in the complete paralysis and stoppage of the plants. According to the conclusions of the Expert Commission this problem was practically fulfilled. The wrecking group directed its activity to the preparations of diversions in the event of war.

MacDonald corroborated Gussev's statements that he gave the latter instructions for the purpose of undermining the military industries in war time, "being perfectly aware that through Gussev others would be able to accomplish great damage to military production." Schemes of failures in war time were developed, including the frustration of boiler installations, coal supplies for electric plants, &c.

MacDonald paid for counter-revolutionary wrecking activity to Russian engineers various sums up to 4,000 roubles. In connection with Gussev's and MacDonald's statements, Thornton, face to face with both, declared that MacDonald collected data under his instructions for him; that he involved MacDonald in espionage in 1930, was receiving information from MacDonald, and knew that Gussev was collecting data, being engaged by MacDonald for this purpose.

Thornton recognised as correct Gussev's and MacDonald's statements about meetings at Khartsissk Station, where Gussev reported the

wrecking acts accomplished, and confirmed having given MacDonald money to pay "men" who gave intelligence.

Analysing Thornton's statements the indictment states that Thornton was receiving not only data "liable to interest or be useful to his firm" but also secret intelligence constituting State war secrets, that he participated in the organisation of wrecking acts putting out of order and damaging machines and equipment. In the Cheliabinsk electric plant, where stoppages and failures, according to statements of some defendants "could not have been accidental," were the result of "obviously malicious acts."

Thornton arrived at Cheliabinsk to examine one failure, and came in contact with the defendant Vitvitsky, Chief Engineer of the Cheliabinsk Plant, which was easy in view of the previous anti-Soviet political attitude of the latter.

In conversation with Vitvitsky, Thornton offered to operate machinery in such a way as to increase its wear, and promised to pay well for information (as a matter of fact Vitvitsky received 6,900 roubles) which he instructed should be transmitted through MacDonald. Vitvitsky gave the latter at different periods summaries of a scheme for wrecking and a schedule of measures taken for the preparation of diversion in the event of war.

The main task of the Cheliabinsk group consisted in delaying the further development of the plant and its operation with interruptions and stoppages. This task was actually realised.

The wrecking group had also worked out a programme of action in the event of war. The Expert Commission having checked the failures of the Zuevka electric plant, came to the conclusion that such were "the result of criminal negligence by the erecting staff or direct evil intent." The results, says the Commission, of "obviously dishonest attitude of persons engaged in erection." MacDonald, transferred to work on Zuevka station, acknowledged "his task was to create conditions of failure for the longest possible periods."

Defendant Kotliarevsky, Head of the Turbine Department, confessed to a realisation of the wrecking activity jointly with MacDonald, who also acknowledged this. MacDonald confirmed that he paid Kotliarevsky himself about 1,000 roubles remuneration for wrecking counter-revolutionary activity.

Investigation led the Commission to the conclusion that wrecking acts at Ivanovo electric plant were perpetrated by a counter-revolutionary wrecking group, consisting of representatives of engineering technical staff on the plant in complicity with the employee of Metro-Vickers—Nordwall.

Lobanov, an engineer at Ivanovo plant, whose attitude and views were definitely anti-Soviet, received from MacDonald a direct proposal to "proceed with business," consisting of the organisation of deliberate damage to equipment; a promise was also stated to have been made that Lobanov and other accomplices "will not be forgotten." Nordwall, it is stated, also gave outlines of systematic damage to equipment for the purpose of creating interruptions to the power supply to industry; moreover, paying attention to damaging all equipment except that supplied by Metro-Vickers, or such equipment where the guarantee period had not yet elapsed, so as to avoid responsibility on the part of Metro-Vickers.

In this connection several practical measures of damage to turbines were outlined. As a matter of fact, Lobanov systematically put out of order motors, valuable boiler grills, and clogged bearings. He also provided poor insulation to transformer for winding purposes, putting out of order the electric locomotives; telephone lines were systematically put out of order, &c.

The criminal wrecking group at the Ivanovo electric plant had also worked out a scheme of action in the event of war. According to statements of members of the group, Nordwall's aim was the preparation for putting out of order all turbines and for the suspension of electric power supply in the event of a declaration of war. All these actions, it is alleged, were accompanied by bribery on the part of Nordwall.

Here, also, in the Ivanovo plant, wrecking was carried out in the erection of turbines supplied by Metro-Vickers by Zivert, who said that he had been drawn into wrecking activity by Thornton.

Zivert said that he was given his first task by Thornton in 1930, consisting of a proposal to "handicap the erection of transformers for transmission of electric power to peat fields, also to neglect the superintendence over the quality of erection."

All these instructions were carried out by Zivert, the result being delay in starting electric locomotives transporting peat, also deliberately wrong erection of transformers and oil switches.

Baku electrical plant also had a number of failures in the turbo-generators supplied by Metro-Vickers. In this connection, defendant Oleinik, worker at Metro-Vickers, stated that at the "end of 1928, there occurred the failure of a turbine." When in 1932 Thornton spoke with Oleinik concerning diversion activity he cited this very case at Baku by way of example, pointing out this failure was organised by Engineer Cushny.

This, says the indictment, was corroborated by Cushny, face to face. Cushny himself acknowledged the cause of the failure which occurred at Baku in 1928 as being due to water thrown through the turbine, which, according to the Expert Commission, could happen only by evil intent.

The witness Emelianov stated that Cushny spoke of the necessity of damaging equipment, particularly the electric plant "Red Star" in order to suspend the work of the electric plant and check the development of the oilfields.

Cushny, says the indictment, did not confine himself to wrecking activity at Baku electric plant, but systematically engaged in spying. In this connection the indictment stated that MacDonald acknowledged the "Intelligence activity carried out in the U.S.S.R. under cover of the firm of Metro-Vickers, guided by Thornton. Monkhouse, head of Metro-Vickers office in Moscow, also participated in this illegal activity of Thornton. Travelling assistant of Thornton and participator in espionage was Engineer Cushny. This main group of intelligence agents engaged in espionage in the U.S.S.R."

Thornton and Cushny confronted, both acknowledged, says the indictment, that the data collected by Cushny and transmitted to destination could interest not only Metro-Vickers in a direct business sense, but could be utilised for definite political purposes.

During the period 1927-1932, a number of failures occurred at

electric plants belonging to Moscow electric stations. Investigation revealed that these failures were caused by wrecking activities of engineers Sukhoruchkin, Krashenninikov, Zorin, acting in complicity with employees of Metro-Vickers.

Sukhoruchkin stated the following:—

"In the middle of 1929, in addition to giving different kinds of data, I was already concealing a number of defects in equipment supplied by the firm. In 1931, under Thornton's instructions, I personally proceeded to direct diversion activity."

Sukhoruchkin further stated: "Under direct instructions of Thornton for the purpose of creating a failure in one of the generators of the First Moscow Electric Plant, I personally short-circuited the lead cover of the single-phase cables of generators Nos. 26 and 27 with an iron rod, which could have resulted in complete failure of one generator. This did not happen only because of the vigilance of the workers."

In 1930-1931, Sukhoruchkin and Thornton, says the indictment, repeatedly discussed numerous diversion acts which they intended to undertake in the event of war. Simultaneously, said Sukhoruchkin, wrecking activity was to be carried out on the Moscow First Electric Plant.

Krashenninikov, who began with the concealment of defects in equipment at the end of 1929, entered into contact with Oleinik, Chief Erector of Metro-Vickers, who arrived at the erection of the turbines and paid him on behalf of Thornton 500 roubles for his work, pointing out that Thornton expected from him a continuation of this activity in the future.

Senior Engineer Zorin gave information about the prospective plan of development of the Moscow Electric Stations. He then assumed that his duty was to hide defects in the equipment supplied by Metro-Vickers. Zorin, like Krashenninikov, concealed some defects in turbines which resulted in a number of failures.

They received from Thornton various sums at certain periods. A special rôle was played by Oleinik, Senior Erector of Metro-Vickers, who served Metro-Vickers almost twenty years, with short intervals, and who was closely connected with the firm. Oleinik carried out wrecking activity and played the rôle of connecting link between certain employees and their agents.

Having dealt with the list of the alleged wrecking activities at the various electric plants, the indictment act dwells on the particular rôle of Kutuzova, who was Secretary of the Moscow Branch of Metro-Vickers. She was living at the same country house at Perlovka, together with the British employees of Metro-Vickers. In her statements, Kutuzova says:—

"Already in 1930 I began to notice that Thornton, Cushny, MacDonald, Monkhouse and others, in addition to matters connected with the interests and tasks of the firm, engaged in some illegal activity. They had secret conversations with some Soviet citizens and often locked themselves up, made secret notes, &c."

Kutuzova states further: "Thornton told me that he and other British engineers were collecting secret data of a political nature through enlisted Russian engineers and technicians who were paid for it."

Then Kutuzova took part directly in paying engineers and technicians engaged in espionage and diversion activity, these payments being recorded by Thornton, not in the bookkeeping departments of Metro-Vickers' office, but in his notebooks. She was kept posted as to the number and circumstances of espionage diversion, and the activity of English and Russian engineers, and also a number of persons who worked on Thornton's instructions. Further Kutuzova stated:—

"I suppose that in his espionage activity Thornton and others in transmitting information obeyed Richards who, during his visits to the U.S.S.R., had secret negotiations and whose name Thornton and Monkhouse mentioned in their secret conversations."

According to Kutuzova's statements, Thornton guided the espionage activity in the U.S.S.R.

Monkhouse, states the indictment, corroborated the fact of the receipt of data expected from him by Richards, concerning not only Metro-Vickers' activity but also the general status of the U.S.S.R. at large and large State construction jobs. He also acknowledged the existence of serious defects which caused serious failures in the machines erected by Metro-Vickers' staff and in a number of electric plants in the U.S.S.R., just those plants where active wrecking and spying groups were connected with separate employees of Metro-Vickers.

Monkhouse denied firstly his participation in the collection of data bearing the nature of State or war secrets; secondly, his complicity in bribing for concealing defects in the equipment erected by Metro-Vickers; thirdly, his complicity in the organisation of damage to equipment and engineering failures of electric plants in the U.S.S.R.

However, states the indictment, Monkhouse could put forward nothing but a bare denial of the facts obtained by the investigation. Thornton gives a sufficient idea of the nature of the data collected and their importance, having stated that:—

"According to Richards' proposals, through Metropolitan-Vickers' employees living in different parts of the country, data was collected concerning the political situation inside the country and transmitted verbally to Richards by Monkhouse or myself. Espionage activity in U.S.S.R. territory was headed by me and Monkhouse."

The indictment further points out that Monkhouse's denial of his complicity in giving bribes to Russian engineers and technicians for concealment of defects in the equipment supplied by the firm is refuted by Monkhouse himself, who acknowledges his complicity in giving a bribe to Dolgov, a person who could act in

the interests of the firm in placing orders for equipment and submitting reclamation claims to the firm in connection with defects discovered in the equipment.

In connection with the data obtained, the investigation proceeded to a more detailed inquiry into the personality of Monkhouse and Thornton, when it was discovered that prior to the Revolution Monkhouse lived in Tsarist Russia for a long time as an erecting engineer on behalf of the firm of Dick Kerr. After the October Revolution Monkhouse went to Vladivostock and thence to London.

In the summer of 1918, during the intervention, he was sent to Archangel to fight the Bolsheviks, being captain of the engineering troops of the Interventionist Army. Richards was on the same expedition and was captain of an intelligence service detachment.

Together with English troops, Monkhouse evacuated Archangel via Murmansk to London. Concerning his relations with Richards, Monkhouse stated he had been on friendly relations with him since 1913. In 1917 they met in Moscow and in 1918 at Archangel.

According to the indictment, Monkhouse said that he knew that in April or May, 1918, Richards was in Moscow, having secretly crossed the border at Finland. In 1923 Richards was appointed Director of Metropolitan-Vickers' Export Company.

In the autumn of 1924 Monkhouse again arrived in the U.S.S.R. as representative of the firm Metro-Vickers, as direct subordinate to Richards in this office.

Thornton is a son of a large cloth manufacturer and was born in Russia. In 1911 Thornton worked for the firm of Dick Kerr, the same as Monkhouse. In 1918, together with Monkhouse, he was evacuated to England, via Vladivostock.

In 1924 he was engaged by Richards to work for the firm Metro-Vickers, expressly for work in the U.S.S.R., where he arrived in 1924.





