PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF JUSTICE OF THE U.S.S.R.

REPORT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS

IN THE CASE OF THE

ANTI-SOVIET TROTSKYITE CENTRE

Heard Before The

MILITARY COLLEGIUM OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.S.R.

Moscow, January 23-30, 1937

IN RE:

Y. L. Pyatakov, K. B. Radek, G. Y. Sokolnikov, L. P. Serebryakov, N. I. Muralov, Y. A. Livshitz, Y. N. Drobnis, M. S. Boguslavsky, I. A. Knyazev, S. A. Rataichak, B. O. Norkin, A. A. Shestov, M. S. Stroilov, Y. D. Turok, I. Y. Hrasche, G. E. Pushin, V. V. Arnold

Accused of treason against the country, espionage, acts of diversion, wrecking activities and the preparation of terrorist acts, *i.e.*, of crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{8}, 58^{9} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

VERBATIM REPORT

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СУДЕБНЫЙ ОТЧЕТ

по делу

АНТИСОВЕТСКОГО ТРОЦКИСТСКОГО ЦЕНТРА

рассмотренному

ВОЕННОЙ КОЛЛЕГИЕЙ
ВЕРХОВНОГО СУДА СОЮЗА ССР
23—30 января 1937 г.

ПО ОБВИНЕНИЮ

Пятакова Ю. Л., Радека К. Б., Сокольникова Г. Я., Серебрякова Л. П., Муралова Н. И., Лившица Я. А., Дробниса Я. Н., Богуславского М. С., Князева И. А., Ратайчака С. А., Норкина Б. О., Шестова А. А., Строилова М. С., Турок И. Д., Граше И. И., Пушина Г. Е. и Арнольда В. В.

визмене родине, шпионаже, диверсиях, вредительстве и подготовке террористических актов, т. е. преступлениях, предусмотренных ст.ст. 58[1а], 58[8], 58[9], 58[11] УК РСФСР

ПОЛНЫЙ ТЕКСТ
СТЕНОГРАФИЧЕСКОГО ОТЧЕТА

Издание
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This is a translation of the verbatim report of the proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., January 23 to January 30, 1937, in the case of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre.

Re the session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. held *in camera* on January 27, 1937, this volume contains a communication for the press approved by the President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

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COMPOSITION OF THE COURT

PRESIDENT:

Army Military Jurist
V. V. ULRICH
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

MEMBERS OF THE COURT:

Army Corps Military Jurist
I. O. MATULEVICH
Vice-President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

Divisional Military Jurist
N. M. RYCHKOV
Member of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY:

Military Jurist of First Rank
A. F. KOSTYUSHKO

STATE PROSECUTOR:

A. Y. VYSHINSKY

THE DEFENCE:

I. D. BRAUDE N. V. KOMMODOV
S. K. KAZNACHEYEV
Members of the Moscow Collegium of Defence

MORNING SESSION, JANUARY 23, 1937, 12.05 P. M.

Commandant of the Court: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: I hereby open the Court session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

The trial is of Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov, Livshitz, Muralov, Drobnis, Boguslavsky, Knyazev, Rataichak, Norkin, Shestov, Stroilov, Turok, Hrasche, Pushin and Arnold on charges of treason against the country, espionage, committing acts of diversion, and the preparation of terrorist acts, *i.e.*, of crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{8}, 58^{9} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

[At the request of the President, the Secretary reports that all the accused in the trial are present in the dock, that the witnesses summoned—D. P. Bukhartsev, V. G. Romm, F. F. Loginov, L. E. Tamm and A. M. Stein—are in the witnesses' room and that engineers P. A. Lekus, B. N. Pokrovsky and Y. M. Monosovich, who have been summoned as expert witnesses, are present in Court.]

The President: Accused Pyatakov, Yuri (Georgi) Leonidovich, born 1890, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Pyatakov: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Sokolnikov, Grigori Yakovlevich, born 1888, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Sokolnikov: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Radek, Karl Berngardovich, born 1885, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Radek: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Serebryakov, Leonid Petrovich, born 1888, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Serebryakov: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Livshitz, Yakov Abramovich, born 1896, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Livshitz: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Muralov, Nikolai Ivanovich, born 1877, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Muralov: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Drobnis, Yakov Naumovich, born 1891, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Drobnis: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Boguslavsky, Mikhail Solomonovich, born 1886, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Boguslavsky: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Knyazev, Ivan Alexandrovich, born 1893, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Knyazev: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Rataichak, Stanislav Antonovich, born 1894, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Rataichak: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Norkin, Boris Osipovich, born 1895, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Norkin: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Shestov, Alexei Alexandrovich, born 1896, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Shestov: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Stroilov, Mikhail Stepanovich, born 1899, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Stroilov: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Turok, Yosif Dmitrievich, born 1900, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Turok: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Hrasche, Ivan Yosifovich, born 1886, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Hrasche: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Pushin, Gavriil Yefremovich, born 1896, have you received a copy of the indictment?

Pushin: Yes, I have.

The President: Accused Arnold, Valentin Volfridovich, alias Vasilyev, Valentin Vasilyevich, is your real name Vasilyev or Arnold?

Arnold: Vasilyev.

The President: Name and patronymic?

Arnold: Valentin Vasilyevich.

The President: Born 1894?

Arnold: Yes.

The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?

Arnold: I have.

The President: I announce the composition of the Court: President—Army Military Jurist, President of the Military Collegium, V. V. Ulrich, Members of the Court—Army Corps Military Jurist I. O. Matulevich and Divisional Military Jurist N. M. Rychkov. Are there any objections to the composition of the Court? [The accused reply in the negative.]

The prosecution is conducted by the Procurator of the U.S.S.R., Comrade A. Y. Vyshinsky.

The accused Knyazev is defended by Counsel Braude, Member of the Collegium of Defence; the accused Pushin is defended by Counsel Kommodov, Member of the Collegium of Defence; the accused Arnold is defended by Counsel Kaznacheyev, Member of the Collegium of Defence.

Upon receiving the indictment, the accused Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov, Livshitz, Muralov, Drobnis, Boguslavsky, Rataichak, Norkin, Shestov, Stroilov, Turok and Hrasche declined the services of counsel for defence and declared that they would conduct their own defence. I consider it necessary once more to ask the accused I have named, who previously declined the services of counsel for defence, whether they desire to be represented by counsel. (Turning to the accused.) Perhaps any of you has changed his mind and desires counsel for defence?

Vyshinsky: I request that you ask each one separately.

The President: Accused Pyatakov, do you desire counsel for defence?

Pyatakov: No.

The President: Accused Sokolnikov, do you desire counsel for defence?

Sokolnikov: No.

The President: Accused Radek, do you desire counsel for defence?

Radek: No.

The President: Accused Serebryakov, do you desire counsel for defence?

Serebryakov: No.

The President: Accused Livshitz, do you desire counsel for defence?

Livshitz: No.

The President: Accused Muralov, do you desire counsel for defence?

Muralov: No.

The President: Accused Drobnis, do you desire counsel for defence?

Drobnis: No.

The President: Accused Boguslavsky, do you desire counsel for defence?

Boguslavsky: No.

The President: Accused Rataichak, do you desire counsel for defence?

Rataichak: No.

The President: Accused Norkin, do you desire counsel for defence?

Norkin: No.

The President: Accused Shestov, do you desire counsel for defence?

Shestov: No.

The President: Accused Stroilov, do you desire counsel for defence?

Stroilov: No.

The President: Accused Turok, do you desire counsel for defence?

Turok: No.

The President: Accused Hrasche, do you desire counsel for defence?

Hrasche: No.

The President: I must explain to the accused who have declined counsel for defence that in addition to the other rights of the accused which I will presently explain, they are entitled to speak in their defence after the speech for the prosecution.

I must explain to all the accused that they have the right to put questions to the witnesses, experts, and to the other accused, and also to submit explanations on any question that may form the subject of investigation by the Court.

Has the State Prosecutor any request to make?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: Have the Counsel for Defence?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: Have the accused any requests to make regarding the summoning of witnesses or the inclusion of any documents in the materials of the trial?

The Accused: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: Comrade Secretary, read the indictment, please.

[The Secretary of the Court, A. F. Kostyushko, reads the indictment.]

INDICTMENT

in the case of *Y. L. Pyatakov, K. B. Radek, G. Y. Sokolnikov, L. P. Serebryakov, N. I. Muralov, Y. A. Livshitz, Y. N. Drobnis, M. S. Boguslavsky, I. A. Knyazev, S. A. Rataichak, B. O. Norkin, A. A. Shestov, M. S. Stroilov, Y. D. Turok, I. Y. Hrasche, G. E. Pushin* and *V. V. Arnold,* accused of treason against the country, espionage, committing acts of diversion, wrecking activities and the preparation of terrorist acts, *i.e.,* of crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{8}, 58^{9} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

The investigation of the case of the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite terrorist centre, members of which were convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. on August 24, 1936, established that in addition to the above-mentioned centre, there existed a so-called reserve centre, formed on the direct instructions of *L. D. Trotsky,* for the eventuality of the criminal activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc* being exposed by the organs of the Soviet government. The convicted members of the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre, *Zinoviev, Kamenev* and others, testified that the reserve centre consisted of *Y. L. Pyatakov, K. B. Radek, G. Y. Sokolnikov* and *L. P. Serebryakov,* all known for their past Trotskyite activities.

The preliminary investigation of the present case established that the so-called reserve centre was actually a parallel Trotskyite centre, organized and operating under the direct instructions of *L. D. Trotsky,* now in emigration.

The Trotskyite parallel centre developed its criminal activities most energetically after the dastardly murder of Sergei Mironovich *Kirov,* and the subsequent break-up of the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre.

The main task which the parallel centre set itself was the forcible overthrow of the Soviet government with the object of changing the social and state system existing in the U.S.S.R. *L. D. Trotsky,* and on his instructions the parallel Trotskyite centre, aimed at seizing power with the aid of foreign states with the object of restoring capitalist social relations in the U.S.S.R.

These treasonable designs against the Soviet Union were expounded by *L. Trotsky* in their most outspoken form in his letter of instructions to the parallel Trotskyite centre, received by the accused *K. B. Radek* in December 1935.

The accused *Radek,* during his examination on December 22, 1936, testified on this point as follows:

> "It must be understood, *Trotsky* wrote, that without to a certain extent bringing the social structure of the U.S.S.R. in line with that of the capitalist states, the government of the *bloc* will not be able to maintain itself in power and to preserve peace. . . .
>
> "The admission of German and Japanese capital for the exploitation of the U.S.S.R. will create important capitalist interests on Soviet territory. Those strata in the villages which have not outlived the capitalist psychology and are dissatisfied with the collective farms will gravitate towards them. The Germans and Japanese will demand that we relieve the atmosphere in the rural districts; we shall therefore have to

make concessions and allow the dissolution of the collective farms or withdrawal from the collective farms."

(Vol. V, pp. 142, 143.)

And further:

"*Pyatakov* and I arrived at the conclusion that this directive sums up the work of the *bloc,* dots all the *i*'s and crosses all the *t*'s by bringing out very sharply the fact that under all circumstances the government of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc* could only be the government of the restoration of capitalism."

(Vol. V, p. 146.)

The accused *Pyatakov,* in his turn, relating his conversation with *L. Trotsky* near Oslo in December 1935, testified that *L. Trotsky,* in demanding that the diversive, wrecking and terrorist activities of the Trotskyite organization in the U.S.S.R. be intensified, emphasized that as a result of an agreement with capitalist states, it was necessary, as he put it, to retreat to capitalism. According to the testimony of the accused *Pyatakov, L. Trotsky* said:

"This means, it will be necessary to retreat. This must be firmly understood. Retreat to capitalism. How far and to what degree, it is difficult to say now—this can be made concrete only after we come into power." (Vol. I, p. 269.)

That the program of the parallel Trotskyite centre was a program of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. was testified to by the accused *G. Y. Sokolnikov* during examination on November 30, 1936:

"This program provided for the renunciation of the policy of industrialization and collectivization, and, as a result of this renunciation, the revival in the villages, on the basis of small farming, of capitalism, which, combined with the capitalist elements in industry, would develop into capitalist restoration in the U.S.S.R.

"... All the members of the centre were agreed in recognizing that in the existing circumstances there could be no other program, and that it was necessary to carry out precisely this program of the *bloc.*" (Vol. VIII, p. 225.)

Proceeding from this program, *L. D. Trotsky* and his accomplices in the parallel centre entered into negotiations with agents of foreign states with the object of overthrowing the Soviet government with the aid of armed intervention.

As a basis for these treasonable negotiations, *L. D. Trotsky* and the parallel centre put forward: the permission in the U.S.S.R.

of the development of private capital, the dissolution of the collective farms, the liquidation of the state farms, the leasing of a number of Soviet enterprises as concessions to foreign capitalists, and the granting to such foreign states of other economic and political advantages including the surrender of a part of Soviet territory.

On this point, *L. D. Trotsky,* according to the statement of the accused *K. Radek,* wrote in his aforementioned letter to *K. Radek:*

"It would be absurd to think that we can come to power without securing the favourable attitude of the most important capitalist governments, particularly of the most aggressive ones, such as the present governments of Germany and Japan. It is absolutely necessary to have contacts and an understanding with these governments right now...."

(Vol. V, p. 140.)

The investigation has established that *L. D. Trotsky* entered into negotiations with one of the leaders of the German National-Socialist Party with a view to waging a joint struggle against the Soviet Union.

As testified by the accused *Pyatakov, L. Trotsky,* in his conversation with the accused in December 1935, informed him that as a result of these negotiations he had concluded an agreement with the said leader of the National-Socialist Party on the following terms:

"1) to guarantee a generally favourable attitude towards the German government and the necessary collaboration with it in the most important questions of an international character;

"2) to agree to territorial concessions;

"3) to permit German industrialists, in the form of concessions (or some other forms), to exploit enterprises in the U.S.S.R. which are essential as complements to German economy (iron ore, manganese, oil, gold, timber, etc., were meant);

"4) to create in the U.S.S.R. favourable conditions for the activities of German private enterprises;

"5) in time of war to develop extensive diversive activities in enterprises of the war industry and at the front. These diversive activities are to be carried on under *Trotsky's* instructions, agreed upon with the German General Staff.

"These principles of the agreement, as *Trotsky* related, were finally elaborated and adopted during *Trotsky's* meeting with Hitler's deputy, *Hess.*

"Likewise, said *Trotsky,* he had well-established connections with the —— government." (Vol. I, pp. 267, 268.)

The nature of this agreement and the extent of the territorial concessions proposed were communicated by *L. Trotsky* in his letter to the accused *Radek* in December 1935.

In that letter, as testified by the accused *K. Radek, L. Trotsky* wrote the following:

> ". . . We shall inevitably have to make territorial concessions. . . . We shall have to yield the Maritime Province and Amur region to Japan, and the Ukraine to Germany.
>
> "Germany needs raw materials, foodstuffs and markets. We shall have to permit her to take part in the exploitation of ore, manganese, gold, oil, apatites, and to undertake to supply her for a definite period with foodstuffs and fats at less than world prices.
>
> "We shall have to yield the oil of Sakhalin to Japan and to guarantee to supply her with oil in case of war with America. We shall also have to permit her to exploit goldfields. We shall have to agree to Germany's demand not to oppose her seizure of the Danube countries and the Balkans, and not to hinder Japan in her seizure of China. . . ."
>
> (Vol. V, pp. 142, 144.)

Not confining himself to his own negotiations with representatives of foreign states, *L. Trotsky* instructed the members of the parallel centre to enter into communication with the representatives of these states in the U.S.S.R.

As testified by the accused *Pyatakov, L. Trotsky* in his letters to the parallel centre

> ". . . demanded that *Radek* and *Sokolnikov,* who had the appropriate opportunities, probe for the necessary contacts with the official representatives of the powers, and support what he, *Trotsky,* was actually carrying out."
>
> (Vol. I, p. 257.)

In accordance with this directive of *L. D. Trotsky,* the accused *K. Radek* and *G. Sokolnikov* entered into communication with the representatives of the said states.

On this point the accused *Radek,* during examination on December 4, 1936, testified:

> ". . . *Trotsky's* assertion about his communication with the representatives of the —— government was not idle talk. I was able to convince myself of this from conversations I had had at diplomatic receptions in 1934-35 with the military attaché Mr. —— and the press attaché of the —— embassy, Mr. ——, a very well informed representative of Germany.
>
> "Both of them, in a cautious way, gave me to understand

> that the —— government was in communication with *Trotsky.*"

And further:

> "I told Mr. *K*—— that it was absolutely useless expecting any concessions from the present government, but that the —— government could count upon receiving concessions from the realist politicians in the U.S.S.R., *i.e.,* from the *bloc,* when the latter came to power." (Vol. V, pp. 119, 121.)

The accused *Sokolnikov* also admitted that, taking advantage of his position as Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, he, on *L. D. Trotsky's* instructions, carried on secret negotiations with representatives of a certain foreign state.

The accused *Sokolnikov* testified:

> "At the conclusion of an official conversation held in my office, when Mr. —— and the secretary of the embassy were about to leave, Mr. —— stopped awhile.
>
> "At that time both interpreters had already left my office. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Mr.——, while I escorted him to the door, exchanged a few sentences with me. Mr. —— asked me: 'Are you aware that Mr. *Trotsky* has made certain proposals to my government?'
>
> "I replied: 'Yes, I have been informed of this.'
>
> "Mr. —— asked: 'How do you appraise these proposals?'
>
> "I replied: 'I think the proposals are quite serious.'
>
> "Then Mr. —— asked: 'Is this only your personal opinion?'
>
> "I replied: 'No, this is also the opinion of my friends.' "
>
> (Vol. VIII, pp. 235, 236.)

L. D. Trotsky and his accomplices in the U.S.S.R. placed their main hopes of coming into power on the defeat of the Soviet Union in a forthcoming war with the imperialist states. Accordingly, in his negotiations with the agents of foreign states, *L. D. Trotsky* personally, and the parallel centre through the accused *Radek* and *Sokolnikov,* strove in every way to hasten an armed attack by these states on the U.S.S.R.

This is confirmed by the testimonies of all the accused in the present case.

Thus, the accused *Radek,* during examination on December 22, 1936, cited the following excerpt from a letter addressed to him by *L. D. Trotsky.*

> "It must be admitted that the question of power will become a practical issue for the *bloc* only as a result of the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in war. For this the *bloc* must make energetic preparations. . . . Since the principal condition for

the Trotskyites coming into power, if they fail to achieve this by means of terrorism, would be the defeat of the U.S.S.R., it is necessary, as much as possible, to hasten the clash between the U.S.S.R. and Germany."

(Vol. V, pp. 143, 117.)

L. D. Trotsky and his accomplices in the U.S.S.R. considered it necessary, during the forthcoming war, to adopt an active defeatist position and to do all they could to assist the foreign interventionists in their fight against the U.S.S.R.

For example, the accused *Pyatakov*, relating the conversation he had with *L. Trotsky* in December 1935 near Oslo, testified:

"As regards the war, *L. D. Trotsky* spoke of this very explicitly. From his point of view, war is inevitable in the near future.

"He, *Trotsky*, considers it absolutely necessary to adopt a distinctly defeatist attitude in this war. He considers that the *bloc's* coming into power can certainly be hastened by the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in war." (Vol. I, p. 258.)

In accordance with this plan of preparing the defeat of the U.S.S.R. with the object of seizing power, *L. D. Trotsky, Y. Pyatakov, K. Radek, G. Sokolnikov, L. P. Serebryakov, Y. Livshitz*, and the other accused in the present case carried on wrecking, diversive, espionage and terrorist activities for the purpose of disrupting the economic and military power of our country, thus committing a number of the gravest crimes against the state.

The investigation has established that under direct instructions from *L. Trotsky*, and under the immediate guidance of the parallel Trotskyite centre, a number of the accused in the present case: *Turok, Knyazev, Rataichak, Shestov, Stroilov, Hrasche*, and *Pushin* were directly connected with diversive agents of the German and Japanese intelligence services, systematically carried on espionage on behalf of Germany and Japan, and committed a number of wrecking and diversive acts in socialist industrial enterprises and on the railways, particularly in enterprises of importance for the defence of the country.

These espionage, diversive and wrecking activities were carried on by the aforementioned accused in accordance with agreements which the Trotskyites had with agents of foreign intelligence services.

For example, the accused *Radek*, confirming *Pyatakov's* testimony, testified during examination on December 22, 1936, that one of the points of the agreement reached between *Trotsky* and the representative of the German National-Socialist Party was the obligation

"... during Germany's war against the U.S.S.R. . . to adopt a defeatist position, to intensify diversive activities, particularly in enterprises of military importance . . . to act on *Trotsky's* instructions agreed upon with the German General Staff." (Vol. V, p. 152.)

Carrying out the obligations undertaken towards the representatives of Germany and Japan, the parallel Trotskyite centre organized in a number of industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union and on the railways diversive and wrecking groups, which were charged with the task of carrying out diversive and wrecking acts.

The accused *Pyatakov*, during examination on January 4, 1937, testified:

"I advised my people (and did so myself) not to scatter their wrecking activities, but to concentrate their attention on the principal big industrial enterprises of defence and national importance.

"On this point I acted on *Trotsky's* directives, namely: 'To strike palpable blows at the most sensitive places.' "

(Vol. I, p. 287.)

Following the line given by the accused *Y. Pyatakov*, the groups organized by the parallel centre carried out a number of diversive and wrecking acts in industrial enterprises and on the railways.

For example, as was established at the trial on November 19-22 1936, in the case of the Trotskyite diversive group at the Kemerovo mine, an explosion was organized on the instructions of the accused *Drobnis* at the "Tsentralnaya" pit, as a result of which ten workers were killed and fourteen suffered grave injuries.

(See materials and documents of the court investigation in the Kemerovo case of November 19-22, 1936, submitted in the present case.)

Three acts of diversion were organized under the direction of the accused *Rataichak* at the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works, of which two were explosions entailing the loss of human life and enormous material damage to the state.

Similar diversive acts were committed, on the instructions of *Rataichak*, by members of the Trotskyite organization at other chemical enterprises of the Soviet Union as well (the Voskressensk Combined Chemical Works and the Nevsky Plant).

The diversive nature of these explosions has been established by the findings of the special technical experts, and by the confessions of the accused *Rataichak, Pushin* and *Hrasche* themselves.

(Vol. XL, pp. 30, 39, 50.)

(See the findings of the technical experts.)

The most energetic diversive and wrecking activities on the railways were carried on by the accused in the present case: *Y. A. Livshitz, Y. D. Turok, I. A. Knyazev,* and *M. S. Boguslavsky.*

Thus, on direct instructions of the parallel Trotskyite centre, the accused *Knyazev* organized and effected the wrecking of a number of trains, mostly troop trains, which entailed great loss of human life. Of these cases of train wrecking the most serious are:

a) the wreck of a troop train at Shumikha Station on October 27, 1935, at which 29 Red Army men were killed and 29 injured;

b) the train wreck on the Yakhino-Ust-Katav section in December 1935;

c) the train wreck on the Yedinover-Berdyaush section in February, 1936.

The accused *Knyazev* organized the wrecking of troop trains not only on the instructions of the parallel centre and, in particular, of the accused *Livshitz,* the leader of the diversive and wrecking activities on the railways, but also on direct instructions from Mr. *H.* ——, an agent of the Japanese intelligence service.

In this connection, during examination on December 14, 1936, the accused *Knyazev* testified:

> "As regards espionage and striking at the Red Army by organizing the wrecking of troop trains with consequent loss of human life, I took up this work only after I had ascertained the attitude of the Trotskyite organization towards espionage and diversive activities against the Red Army on behalf of the Japanese intelligence service.
>
> "With regard to developing diversive and wrecking activities on the railways and the organization of the wrecking of trains I carried out instructions in full, since in this matter the instructions of the Japanese intelligence service fully coincided with the instructions I had received somewhat earlier from the Trotskyite organization."
>
> (Vol. XXXII, pp. 61, 57.)

Collaboration with agents of the Japanese intelligence service was also testified to by the accused *Y. D. Turok.*

(Vol. XXIII, p. 106.)

In committing diversive acts in collaboration with agents of foreign intelligence services, and organizing the wrecking of trains, explosions and fires in mines and industrial enterprises, the accused in the present case did not scruple to resort to the vilest

methods of struggle and deliberately and wilfully perpetrated such monstrous crimes as poisoning and causing the death of workers for the purpose of provoking discontent among the workers against the Soviet government.

Thus, during examination on December 4, 1936, the accused *Pyatakov* on this point testified:

> "We realized that if it became necessary to resort to acts of diversion for the purpose of carrying out our wrecking plans, the loss of human life would be inevitable. We took this into account and accepted it as inevitable."
>
> (Vol. I, pp. 196, 197.)

The accused *Drobnis* was even more cynical in his testimony on this point:

> "It will be even better if human life is lost in the mine, for that will certainly rouse the anger of the workers, and that is what we need." (Vol. XIII, p. 66.)

That these enemies of the people deliberately resolved to cause great loss of human life in organizing acts of diversion is also proved by the following testimony of the accused *Knyazev,* given on December 26, 1936:

> "*Livshitz* gave special instructions to prepare and carry out a number of acts of diversion (explosions, wrecking of trains or poisoning), which would cause great loss of human life."
>
> (Vol. XXXII, p. 92.)

Similar testimony was given by the accused *Y. D. Turok.*

(Vol. XXIII, p. 73.)

The Trotskyite centre and the diversive groups operating under its direction in industrial enterprises and on the railways were to develop particularly active destructive work in industrial plants and on the railways by means of explosions, fires, train wrecking, etc., in time of war, when these monstrous acts of treason would strike a particularly palpable blow at the defence capacity of the Soviet Union.

Thus, the accused *Pyatakov* instructed the accused *Norkin* to prepare to set fire to the Kemerovo Combined Chemical Works when war broke out.

When examined on this point, *Y. L. Pyatakov* testified:

> "Yes, I confirm it. I did in fact give such instructions to *Norkin.* This was soon after my meeting with *Trotsky,* at which the latter urged that it was necessary to carry out

on the outbreak of war acts of diversion in enterprises working for defence. It was in this very connection that I spoke with *Norkin* of providing for the possibility of committing such an act of diversion in Kemerovo."

(Vol. I, p. 309.)

In his turn, the accused *Knyazev,* during examination on December 14, 1936, testified that in agreement with the parallel centre he accepted from Mr. *H*——, an agent of the Japanese intelligence service, the following instruction to be carried out in the event of war:

"... to organize incendiarism at military stores, canteens and army sanitary centres." (Vol. XXXII, p. 68.)

Still more monstrous instructions aimed against the people of the Soviet Union were received by the accused *Knyazev* from the same agent of the Japanese intelligence service, Mr. *H*——.

"... The Japanese intelligence service strongly stressed the necessity of using bacteriological means in time of war with the object of contaminating troop trains, canteens and army sanitary centres with highly virulent bacilli...."

(Vol. XXXII, p. 68.)

The accused *Knyazev's* treasonable communication with the Japanese intelligence service has been established not only by *Knyazev's* own testimony, but also by his correspondence with Mr. *H*——, found in his possession together with photographs (letters from Mr. *H*——, one marked "15/XII" and another of 23/VIII-36). (Vol XXXII, p. 121.)

The materials of the preliminary investigation, and the admissions of the accused *S. A. Rataichak, I. A. Knyazev, Y. D. Turok, G. E. Pushin, I. Y. Hrasche, A. A. Shestov* and *M. S. Stroilov* establish that in addition to diversive and wrecking activities, the Trotskyite parallel centre attached no less importance in the struggle against the Soviet Union to the organization of espionage for foreign intelligence services.

All the aforesaid accused, being in communication with representatives of the German and Japanese intelligence services, regularly supplied them with secret information of the utmost state importance.

For example, the accused *I. A. Knyazev* supplied the Japanese intelligence service, through the aforesaid agent of this intelligence service, Mr. *H*——, with secret information on the technical condition of the Soviet railways, their preparedness for mobilization and about the transport of troops. (Vol. XXXII, p. 103.)

The accused *S. A. Rataichak, G. E. Pushin* and *I. Y. Hrasche* admitted that they were in communication with the German intelligence service, to which they handed secret information on the condition and the operation of our chemical plants.

Examined on this subject, the accused *Hrasche* testified that:

"The organization of which I was a member conducted, on the instructions of the German intelligence service, not only diversive activities, but also espionage activities in chemical plants." (Vol. XXI, p. 40.)

The accused *G. E. Pushin,* after admitting that he had taken part in espionage work, testified that he and the accused *S. A. Rataichak* were in communication with the German intelligence service through the medium of *Lenz,* a fitter of the firm of Linde.

The accused *G. E. Pushin,* during examination on October 26, 1936, testified:

"The following materials were handed to *Lenz:*

"1) figures of the output of all Soviet chemical enterprises during 1934;

"2) the program of work of all Soviet chemical enterprises for 1935;

"3) the plan of the construction of nitrogen works which comprised construction work up to 1938.

"I personally handed all these materials to *Lenz* at different times in the first half of 1935.

"Moreover, *Lenz* informed me that he had received directly from *Rataichak* figures of the output of the military chemical plants during 1934 and the program of their work for 1935. In addition to this, I systematically supplied *Lenz* with information on stoppages, breakdowns and the condition of the equipment of nitrogen plants."

(Vol. XIX, p. 31.)

Similar espionage work for the German intelligence service was also carried on by the accused *A. A. Shestov* and *M. S. Stroilov,* who are convicted of criminal communication with a number of intelligence service agents who arrived in the U.S.S.R. in the guise of foreign specialists; for example, engineer *Stickling,* who was sentenced in the Kemerovo case for espionage and diversive work.

The espionage activities of the Trotskyites on behalf of the German intelligence service were covered up in a number of cases by their connections with certain German firms.

The investigation in the present case has established that an agreement was concluded between *L. Trotsky* and certain German

firms by virtue of which these firms financed the Trotskyites from a fund formed by raising the price of goods imported into the U.S.S.R. from Germany.

On this point the accused *Pyatakov,* referring to his conversation with *Trotsky's* son, *L. L. Sedov,* now in emigration, testified:

> ". . . *Sedov* conveyed to me *Trotsky's* instructions to try and place as many orders as possible with the firms Demag and Borsig, with whose representatives *Trotsky* has connections.
>
> "You, added *Sedov,* will have to pay higher prices, but this money will go for our work." (Vol. I, p. 227.)

In their plans to overthrow the Soviet government and seize power, *L. Trotsky* and the parallel centre attached prime importance to terrorist acts against the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet government.

The preliminary investigation in the present case has established that on direct instructions from *L. D. Trotsky* received by *Y. L. Pyatakov* and *K. B. Radek,* the parallel Trotskyite centre organized a number of terrorist groups in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Rostov, Sochi, Novosibirsk, and other towns.

According to the testimony of accused *K. Radek, L. D. Trotsky* demanded

> ". . . the organization of a small group of reliable people to carry out terrorist attempts on the lives of the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and primarily against *Stalin.*" (Vol. V. p. 102.)

L. D. Trotsky gave similar instructions to the accused *Pyatakov* during their conversation in 1935.

The accused *Pyatakov* testified that

> ". . . during this conversation *Trotsky* said: 'You must understand that without a whole series of terrorist acts, which must be carried out as soon as possible, *Stalin's* government cannot be overthrown.
>
> " 'The struggle must be sharpened still more, must be extended. We must, literally, stop at nothing to overthrow *Stalin.*' " (Vol. I, pp. 263, 264.)

These are the instructions that *L. D. Trotsky,* the agent of fascism, gave the Trotskyite organization, which was preparing a number of terrorist acts against the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet government.

In organizing the aforementioned terrorist acts, the Trotskyite centre tried to take advantage for this purpose of the visits leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet government made to various places in the country.

Thus, in 1934, when Comrade *V. M. Molotov,* the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., was in Siberia, the Trotskyite terrorists, under the leadership of the accused *Shestov,* attempted to kill Comrade *V. M. Molotov* by causing an automobile crash.

The accused *Arnold,* a member of the Trotskyite terrorist group, the direct perpetrator of this dastardly crime, testified during examination on this point on September 21, 1936:

> "In September 1934, I do not remember the exact date, *Cherepukhin* called me into his office and warned me that *Molotov* was to arrive in Prokopyevsk. . . . He thereupon stated that I must sacrifice myself, and at all costs cause the car I was driving, which would be placed at *Molotov's* disposal, to crash. I agreed and replied that everything would be done." (Vol. XXXVI, pp. 32, 33.)

The accused *Shestov* confirmed this by testifying as follows:

> "In 1934, on *Muralov's* instructions, I made active preparations for a terrorist act against *Molotov,* the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., and *Eiche,* the secretary of the West-Siberian Territory Committee of the Communist Party." (Vol. XV, p. 157.)

The attempt on the life of Comrade *V. M. Molotov,* the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., by overturning the car in which he rode from the dispatch office of Pit No. 3 (Prokopyevsk mines administration) to the workers' settlement, was in fact made, but with no results.

(Vol. XXXVI, p. 48.)

Such are the vile, treasonable, anti-Soviet activities of the Trotskyites, the contemptible fascist hirelings, traitors to their country and enemies of the people.

Having suffered utter defeat in their prolonged struggle against the Party and the Soviet government, deprived, as a result of the complete victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., of all support among the masses of the people, and constituting an isolated and politically doomed group of bandits and spies, branded with universal contempt by the people of the Soviet Union, *L. D. Trotsky* and his accomplices—*Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov, Livshitz,* and the others accused in the present case, outrageously betrayed the interests of the working class and the peasantry,

betrayed their country and became an agency of the German and Japanese fascist forces for espionage, diversive and wrecking activities.

DEFINITION OF THE CHARGE

The investigating authorities consider it established:

1) that, on the instructions of *L. D. Trotsky,* there was organized in 1933 a parallel centre consisting of the following accused in the present case: *Y. L. Pyatakov, K. B. Radek, G. Y. Sokolnikov,* and *L. P. Serebryakov,* the object of which was to direct criminal anti-Soviet, espionage, diversive and terrorist activities for the purpose of undermining the military power of the U.S.S.R., accelerating an armed attack on the U.S.S.R., assisting foreign aggressors to seize territory of the U.S.S.R. and to dismember it and of overthrowing the Soviet power and restoring capitalism and the rule of the bourgeoisie in the Soviet Union;

2) that, on the instructions of the aforesaid *L. D. Trotsky,* this centre, through the accused *Sokolnikov* and *Radek,* entered into communication with representatives of certain foreign states for the purpose of organizing a joint struggle against the Soviet Union, in connection with which the Trotskyite centre undertook, in the event of its coming into power, to grant these states a number of political and economic privileges and territorial concessions;

3) that, moreover, this centre, through its own members and other members of the criminal Trotskyite organization, systematically engaged in espionage on behalf of these states, supplying foreign intelligence services with secret information of the utmost state importance;

4) that, for the purpose of undermining the economic strength and defence capacity of the U.S.S.R., this centre organized and carried out a number of wrecking and diversive acts at certain enterprises and on the railways, which caused loss of human life and the destruction of valuable state property;

5) that this centre prepared a number of terrorist acts against the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet government, and that attempts were made to carry out these acts;

6) that besides its leaders—the accused *Y. L. Pyatakov, G. Y. Sokolnikov, K. B. Radek* and *L. P. Serebryakov*—the following accused took an active part in the aforesaid criminal activities of this centre: *Y. A. Livshitz, N. I. Muralov, Y. N. Drobnis, M. S. Boguslavsky, I. A. Knyazev, Y. D. Turok, S. A. Rataichak, B. O. Norkin, A. A. Shestov, M. S. Stroilov, I. Y. Hrasche, G. E. Pushin* and *V. V. Arnold.*

All the accused have pleaded guilty to all the charges preferred against them and stand convicted by the documents in the file, by the material evidence, and by testimony of witnesses.

On the aforementioned grounds the following persons:

1) *Pyatakov,* Yuri (Georgi) Leonidovich, born 1890, employee;
2) *Sokolnikov,* Grigori Yakovlevich, born 1888, employee;
3) *Radek,* Karl Berngardovich, born 1885, journalist;
4) *Serebryakov,* Leonid Petrovich, born 1888, employee

—are accused of having, as members of the anti-Soviet underground Trotskyite centre, committed treason against their country by committing the crimes enumerated in paragraphs 1-6 of the Definition of the Charge, *i.e.,* crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{8}, 58^{9} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

5) *Livshitz,* Yakov Abramovich, born 1896, employee;
6) *Muralov,* Nikolai Ivanovich, born 1877, employee;
7) *Drobnis,* Yakov Naumovich, born 1891, employee;
8) *Boguslavsky,* Mikhail Solomonovich, born 1886, employee:
9) *Knyazev,* Ivan Alexandrovich, born 1893, employee;
10) *Rataichak,* Stanislav Antonovich, born 1894, employee;
11) *Norkin,* Boris Osipovich, born 1895, employee;
12) *Shestov,* Alexei Alexandrovich, born 1896, employee;
13) *Stroilov,* Mikhail Stepanovich, born 1899, employee;
14) *Turok,* Yosif Dmitrievich, born 1900, employee;
15) *Hrasche,* Ivan Yosifovich, born 1886, employee;
16) *Pushin,* Gavriil Efremovich, born 1896, employee;
17) *Arnold,* Valentin Volfridovich (alias *Vasilyev,* Valentin Vasilyevich), born 1894, employee

—are accused of having, as active members of the aforesaid anti-Soviet underground Trotskyite organization, committed treason against their country by committing crimes enumerated in paragraphs 1-6 of the Definition of the Charge, *i.e.,* crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{8}, 58^{9} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

L. Trotsky, and his son, *L. L. Sedov,* now in emigration, once again convicted by the materials in the present case as the direct leaders of the treasonable activities of the Trotskyite centre, in the event of their being discovered on the territory of the U.S.S.R. are subject to immediate arrest and trial by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

On the aforementioned grounds, and in accordance with the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. of July 10, 1934, all the aforementioned persons are subject to trial by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

The present indictment was drawn up in Moscow on January 19, 1937.

A. VYSHINSKY
Procurator of the U.S.S.R.

The President: Accused Pyatakov, do you plead guilty to the charge brought against you?

Pyatakov: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Sokolnikov, do you plead guilty to the charge brought against you?

Sokolnikov: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Radek, do you plead guilty?

Radek: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Serebryakov, do you plead guilty?

Serebryakov: Yes.

The President: Accused Livshitz, do you plead guilty?

Livshitz: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Muralov, do you plead guilty?

Muralov: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Drobnis, do you plead guilty?

Drobnis: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Boguslavsky, do you plead guilty?

Boguslavsky: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Knyazev, do you plead guilty?

Knyazev: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Rataichak, do you plead guilty?

Rataichak: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Norkin, do you plead guilty?

Norkin: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Shestov, do you plead guilty?

Shestov: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Stroilov, do you plead guilty?

Stroilov: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Turok, do you plead guilty?

Turok: I do.

The President: Accused Hrasche, do you plead guilty?

Hrasche: Yes, I do.

The President: Accused Pushin, do you plead guilty?

Pushin: I do.

The President: Accused Arnold, do you plead guilty?

Arnold: Yes, I do.

The President: Adjournment for 15 minutes.

* * *

The President: The session is resumed. Comrade Procurator, what proposals have you to make as to the procedure of the court investigation?

Vyshinsky: I propose that the court investigation should begin with the examination of the accused; the witnesses should be questioned in the course of the court investigation and of the examination of the accused, whenever it is found necessary to ascertain

or to clarify any particular circumstances of the case. I would request that the accused be examined in the following order: that Pyatakov be examined first, followed by Radek, Sokolnikov and Serebryakov; that after them we examine Drobnis, Muralov, Boguslavsky, Norkin, Shestov and Stroilov; that then we examine the railway group: Livshitz, Knyazev and Turok; then Rataichak, Hrasche, and Pushin and conclude with the examination of Arnold.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any objections?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: Have the accused any objections?

The Accused: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: The Court confirms the proceedings for the court investigation proposed by the Procurator.

The first to be examined is the accused Pyatakov. Has the Procurator any questions?

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Tell us, when did the last period of your underground Trotskyite activities begin?

Pyatakov: In 1931—this was the last period, not counting 1926-27.

Vyshinsky: What did your activities consist of?

Pyatakov: In 1931 I was in Berlin on official business. At the same time there were several Trotskyites there, among them I. N. Smirnov and Loginov. I also was accompanied by Moskalyov. Shestov was there too. In the middle of the summer of 1931 Ivan Nikitich Smirnov told me in Berlin that the Trotskyite fight against the Soviet government and the Party leadership was being resumed with new vigour, that he—Smirnov—had had an interview in Berlin with Trotsky's son, Sedov, who on Trotsky's instruction gave him a new line, which was that mass methods of struggle should be abandoned and that the principal method of struggle that should be adopted was the method of terrorism and, as he then expressed it, the method of counteracting the measures of the Soviet government.

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Pyatakov: I cannot now remember the month exactly, but it was in the middle of the summer.

Vyshinsky: Where were you working then?

Pyatakov: I was then working in the Supreme Council of National Economy as Chairman of the Central Administration of Chemical Industries.

Vyshinsky: And where was Smirnov working?

Pyatakov: Smirnov was working on the Central Administration for the Transportation Machinery Industry.

Vyshinsky: Which Smirnov are you referring to?

Pyatakov: The well-known Trotskyite, Ivan Nikitich Smirnov.

Vyshinsky: The one who was put on trial?

Pyatakov: Yes, the one who later belonged to the united Zinovievite-Trotskyite centre.

Vyshinsky: How did you meet him—in connection with business or specially in connection with your underground affairs?

Pyatakov: I find it difficult to answer this question because I also met him on a number of occasions in connection with official business. During one of these meetings, when there was nobody in my office, he began to tell me about the resumption of the Trotskyite struggle and of Trotsky's new line.

It was then that Smirnov told me that one of the reasons for the defeat of the Trotskyite opposition in 1926-27 was that we confined ourselves to one country, that we did not seek support abroad. It was then also that he conveyed to me that Sedov wanted very much to see me, and he himself recommended me to meet Sedov, because Sedov had a special message for me from Trotsky.

I agreed to this meeting. Smirnov gave Sedov my telephone number and we made arrangements about the meeting over the telephone. There is a café known as "Am Zoo" not far from the Zoological Gardens, on the square. I went there and saw Lev Sedov sitting at a small table. We had known each other very well in the past. He told me that he was not speaking to me in his own name, but in the name of his father—Trotsky, and that Trotsky, learning that I was in Berlin, gave him categorical orders to look me up, to meet me personally and to have a talk with me.

Vyshinsky: I have one question to ask before you go on to describe your conversation with Sedov. After the conversation with Smirnov of which you just spoke, how much time elapsed before you went to Germany?

Pyatakov: The conversation with Smirnov took place in Germany, in Berlin. We were all there on official business.

Vyshinsky: Prior to your departure for Germany and prior to your meeting there with Smirnov, did you meet Smirnov in Moscow or anywhere on the territory of the Soviet Union?

Pyatakov: Yes, there were such meetings, but these meetings were of a business character. The meetings in Moscow did not bear a definitely counter-revolutionary Trotskyite character. The first frank conversation with Smirnov took place in Berlin.

Vyshinsky: And it was there that he put you in touch with Sedov?

Pyatakov: Yes, Sedov said that Trotsky had not for a moment abandoned the idea of resuming the fight against Stalin's leadership, that there had been a temporary lull owing partly to Trotsky's repeated movements from one country to another, but that this

struggle was now being resumed, of which he, Trotsky, was hereby informing me. Further, that there was being formed, or had already been formed—I cannot now recall—a Trotskyite centre. It was a question of uniting all the forces capable of waging a fight against Stalin's leadership. The possibility was being sounded of restoring the united organization with the Zinovievites.

Sedov also said that he knew for a fact that the Rights also, in the persons of Tomsky, Bukharin and Rykov, had not laid down their arms, that they had only quietened down temporarily, and that the necessary connections should be established with them too.

This was a prelude, one might say, a testing of the ground. After this Sedov asked me pointblank: "Trotsky asks, do you, Pyatakov, intend to take a hand in this fight?" I gave my consent. Sedov made no concealment of his great delight over this. He said that Trotsky had never doubted that despite our quarrel in the beginning of 1928, he would nevertheless find in me a reliable comrade-in-arms.

After this Sedov went on to outline the nature of the new methods of struggle: there could be no question of developing a mass struggle in any form, of organizing a mass movement; if we adopted any kind of mass work we would come to grief immediately; Trotsky was firmly in favour of the forcible overthrow of the Stalin leadership by methods of terrorism and wrecking. Sedov further said that Trotsky drew attention to the fact that a struggle confined to one country would be absurd and that the international question could not possibly be evaded. In this struggle we must also have the necessary solution for the international problem, or rather, inter-state problems.

Whoever tries to brush these questions aside, said Sedov, relating what Trotsky said, signs his own "testimonium pauper-tatis."

This, in fact, brought my first meeting with Sedov to a close, and, in fact, I ought to date my re-entry into the Trotskyite counter-revolution from this meeting.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell any of your confederates about this meeting?

Pyatakov: Yes, I did, I told it to Vladimir Loginov, who was manager of the Coke Trust; I told it to Bitker, who was working in Berlin; I told it to Shestov, who was on the same commission that was placing orders for the coal industry; I told it to my secretary, who was not only my secretary but also a man I trusted—Moskalyov.

Vyshinsky: May I question Shestov?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky: Accused Shestov, you have heard Pyatakov's testimony?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet Pyatakov in Berlin in 1931?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Were you at that time a member of his commission?

Shestov: Yes, I represented the Eastern and Siberian Coal Syndicate on Pyatakov's commission.

Vyshinsky: Did the accused Pyatakov inform you of his meeting with Sedov?

Shestov: Yes, he did.

Vyshinsky: Did he tell you what he discussed with Sedov?

Shestov: Yes, that was what we talked about.

Vyshinsky: Do you confirm what the accused Pyatakov just stated as regards his conversation with Sedov?

Shestov: Yes, I do.

Vyshinsky: It was this that Pyatakov told you about at the time?

Shestov: Yes, but he spoke of it in a more extended form.

Vyshinsky: How did he extend that form?

Shestov: He said the following, that the industrialization being carried out by Stalin won't stand any criticism.

Vyshinsky: Who was it that told you that?

Shestov: It was Pyatakov that told me that at the time.

Vyshinsky: Were they his own words, or was he conveying the words of Sedov?

Shestov: As I understood it, Pyatakov was conveying his own words and this coincided with what I learned from the talk with Sedov just previously.

Vyshinsky: Who had a talk?

Shestov: I personally.

Vyshinsky: Of this later. Now, what do you know about the conversation between Pyatakov and Sedov?

Shestov: Pyatakov said at the time that the construction of giant mines, Stalin's idea of the Urals-Kuznetsk Complex was built on sand. To prove this he began, pencil in hand (he actually took up a pencil), to calculate how much a ton of metal would cost obtained at Magnitka with coal from the Kuznetsk Basin, a ton of metal at the Kuznetsk Works secured from ore. . . .

Vyshinsky: And what was the conclusion?

Shestov: The conclusion was that these plants would not pay.

Vyshinsky: Whose opinion was that?

Shestov: I understood that it was Yuri Leonidovich's opinion.

Vyshinsky: When he told you of his conversation with Sedov,

did Pyatakov agree with Sedov, or did he reproduce this conversation photographically?

Shestov: He undoubtedly agreed.

Vyshinsky: Did he try to convince you?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You were still not convinced at that time?

Shestov: I had been sufficiently convinced by my conversation with Sedov, and then there were two conversations with Smirnov.

Vyshinsky: Did I rightly understand you to say that when informing you of his conversation with Sedov, Pyatakov fully agreed with Sedov's line?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And he tried to influence you to accept this line?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions to ask Shestov. Permit me to ask Pyatakov a question. Accused Pyatakov, do you agree with what Shestov said?

Pyatakov: Shestov perhaps talked with somebody, but not with me when he says that somebody with pencil in hand calculated the cost of ore. There was no such conversation with me.

Vyshinsky: When you told Shestov of your conversation with Sedov, did you lend it the character of a mere communication, or did you at the same time state what your own attitude was?

Pyatakov: Both with Shestov and with Vladimir Loginov, I discussed the carrying out of this directive.

Vyshinsky: Do I rightly understand you to say that you met Sedov in Berlin in 1931 and talked about fighting the Soviet government and the Party, that you expressed the opinion that industrialization would fail, and so on?

Pyatakov: About the failure of industrialization I did not yet at that time say what my stand was, but at any rate I spoke about resuming the fight against the leadership, and on this question I did say what my stand was.

Vyshinsky: You considered it necessary to resume this fight?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How is it to be explained that you so quickly consented to resume this fight against the Party and the Soviet government?

Pyatakov: The talk with Sedov was not the cause of this, it only served as a fresh impetus.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, you held your old Trotskyite position even before this?

Pyatakov: Unquestionably, the old Trotskyite views still survived in me, and they subsequently grew more and more.

Vyshinsky: And by 1931 had grown sufficiently?

Pyatakov: By 1931 there had taken shape in my mind definite differences with the leadership of the Party on the grounds of the complete removal of Trotsky from the leadership and his banishment abroad, and because Kamenev and Zinoviev were not being given any leading Party and government work.

Vyshinsky: Such was your first conversation with Sedov?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Were you to meet Sedov again in Berlin?

Pyatakov: During the first meeting we agreed not to meet again because it was rather difficult for me to do so. I was fairly well known in Berlin, portraits of me were published in the newspapers, and it was therefore not very convenient for me to meet. . . .

Vyshinsky: That is, for reasons of secrecy?

Pyatakov: Yes, for those reasons. However, some time after the first meeting, I think it was three weeks later, four weeks at most, Ivan Nikitich Smirnov again came to me and said that Sedov asked, despite our agreement not to meet, to meet a second time for a very brief and very necessary talk.

Vyshinsky: So Smirnov all the time played the part of contact man, of go-between?

Pyatakov: It was apparently easier for him to meet Sedov, so that in that sense he was a go-between for Sedov and me. At any rate, I endeavoured to meet him as little as possible for reasons of secrecy, but agreed to this meeting because Sedov was very insistent about it. And we met in the same place as the first time. This time the conversation was very brief.

Vyshinsky: Was the time and place of meeting arranged by you directly with Sedov or through Smirnov?

Pyatakov: I told Smirnov that in order not to make any further arrangements about where to meet, we would meet in the same place.

Vyshinsky: Where you had met the first time?

Pyatakov: This second conversation was very brief; it lasted not more than 10 or 15 minutes, perhaps even less, and amounted to the following.

Without any beating about the bush, Sedov said: "You realise, Yuri Leonidovich, that inasmuch as the fight has been resumed, money is needed. You can provide the necessary funds for waging the fight." He was hinting that my business position enabled me to set aside certain government funds, or, to put it bluntly, to steal.

Sedov said that only one thing was required of me, namely, that I should place as many orders as possible with two German firms, Borsig and Demag, and that he, Sedov, would arrange to receive the necessary sums from them, bearing in mind that I would not be particularly exacting as to prices. If this were deciphered it was clear that the additions to prices that would be made on the Soviet orders would pass wholly or in part into Trotsky's hands for his counter-revolutionary purposes. There the second conversation ended.

Vyshinsky: Who named these firms?

Pyatakov: Sedov.

Vyshinsky: Did you not enquire why he named these firms particularly?

Pyatakov: No. He said that he had connections with these firms.

Vyshinsky: You had connections with other firms as well?

Pyatakov: Yes, I had very many connections. But Sedov mentioned these firms, apparently because it was with them that he had connections.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, it was clear to you that these particular firms were mentioned by Sedov for specific reasons?

Pyatakov: Of course, that is what he said.

Vyshinsky: And what was the nature of these connections?

Pyatakov: I have just said that I do not know. He, Sedov, said that since I, Pyatakov, could not steal money, what was required of me was to place as many orders as possible with the firms I have mentioned.

Vyshinsky: And those firms were named by Sedov himself?

Pyatakov: Yes, and he added that he would secure the necessary sum from them.

Vyshinsky: You did not ask how, through whom?

Pyatakov: I considered it inconvenient to ask that.

Vyshinsky: Were you personally connected with representatives of these firms in a conspiratorial way?

Pyatakov: No. True, I had connections with the chief of the Demag firm, but I never permitted myself to speak of these subjects in order not to compromise myself and give myself away.

Vyshinsky: And you did what Sedov advised?

Pyatakov: Quite correct.

Vyshinsky: Tell us, what form did this take?

Pyatakov: It was done very simply, particularly since I had very many opportunities, and a fairly large number of orders went to these firms.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps orders were given to these firms because that was more advantageous to us?

Pyatakov: No, not for that reason. As to Demag, it could be done very easily. Here it was a question of prices; it was paid more than, generally speaking, it should have been paid.

Vyshinsky: That means that you, Pyatakov, by virtue of an

arrangement with Sedov, paid the Demag firm certain excessive sums at the expense of the Soviet government?

Pyatakov: Unquestionably.

Vyshinsky: And the other firm?

Pyatakov: As regards the Borsig firm, a certain amount of effort was required.

Vyshinsky: It was more advantageous to place the orders with other firms?

Pyatakov: Demag in itself is a high-class firm and no effort was required in recommending that orders be placed with it.

Vyshinsky: All that was required was to make a big addition in prices?

Pyatakov: Yes. But as regards Borsig it was necessary to persuade and exercise pressure in order to have orders passed to this firm.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, you also paid Borsig excessively at the expense of the Soviet government?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, from the standpoint of the interests of our industry and our state, it was not advantageous to place orders with Borsig, and it was advantageous to place orders with other firms, but nevertheless you, guided by criminal motives, deliberately placed orders with the Borsig firm.

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: By virtue of your agreement with Sedov?

Pyatakov: With Sedov.

Vyshinsky: And did not Sedov tell you that Trotsky had an arrangement with these firms?

Pyatakov: Of course, that is what he began with. Only he did not say what exactly the conditions were, what the technique was, how it would be done.

Vyshinsky: And what did he say?

Pyatakov: He said that if I placed orders with these firms he would receive money from these firms.

Vyshinsky: By agreement?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: This conversation took place at the second meeting?

Pyatakov: Yes, at the second meeting.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell anybody about this meeting with Sedov?

Pyatakov: This meeting was of a strictly secret character and it would not do to say much about it.

Vyshinsky: Did Sedov at this meeting tell you anything that might be of interest to you in connection with your counter-revolutionary work in the immediate future?

Pyatakov: Not at this meeting. At this meeting I told Sedov that I had certain interesting questions that I wanted transmitted, since I was interested not in his, Sedov's, opinion, but in the opinion of Trotsky, and Sedov could not give me the explanation I wanted. This concerned, as Sedov at the time expressed it, "counteracting the measures of the Soviet government." As a matter of fact it was a question of wrecking activities. I requested that on this subject he should get me supplementary explanations from Trotsky. Sedov said that he had sent a letter to Trotsky and was awaiting a reply.

Vyshinsky: He had not yet got a reply?

Pyatakov: No. I told him that there were certain Trotskyites in Berlin, and that if he would not be able to give me the reply directly, in the event of my departure he could transmit the reply to me through trusted persons. I then named Shestov. In addition, I named Bitker and Loginov.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell Shestov himself anything about this?

Pyatakov: That I cannot recall now. Shestov himself received commissions from Sedov.

Vyshinsky: Did you receive anything from Sedov through Shestov?

Pyatakov: Yes. In December 1931 I was in Moscow. On his return from Berlin, Shestov came to see me in the Supreme Council of National Economy, in my office, and handed me a letter.

Vyshinsky: What post did you occupy at that time?

Pyatakov: I cannot now recall what post I held.

Vyshinsky: The post can be ascertained by enquiry. Did Shestov come to see you on business?

Pyatakov: He came to hand over Trotsky's letter and to discuss once more the development of Trotskyite work in the Kuznetsk Basin.

Vyshinsky: At whose orders was he sent there?

Pyatakov: He had worked there previously.

Vyshinsky: He had no official business with you?

Pyatakov: No, but he could always find a business pretext.

Vyshinsky: Shestov did not come to see you because business required it?

Pyatakov: No, he came to execute the commission he had received and to discuss once more the organization of Trotskyite work in the Kuznetsk Basin.

Vyshinsky (to Shestov): Did you go to see Pyatakov?

Shestov: Yes, I did. It was in November 1931.

Vyshinsky: In November or December?

Shestov: It was after the holidays, because roughly between November 20 and 30 I was already in Novosibirsk.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Is it possible that he came to see you at that time?

Pyatakov: It is possible.

Vyshinsky: We must make this point clear. In what month did he come to see you?

Pyatakov: It is possible that he came in November; I cannot recall precisely.

Vyshinsky (to Shestov): You assert that you went to see Pyatakov in November. How do you make sure that it was in November?

Shestov: I recall that I came to Moscow on November 7, because the trams were not running. I remember that fact very well. I remember equally well that in the early days of December I was already working as Chief of the Mine Construction Trust in the Kuznetsk Basin.

Vyshinsky: Therefore you could not have visited Pyatakov in December?

Shestov: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: We can therefore regard it as established that your meeting with Pyatakov took place in the middle of November 1931?

Shestov: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any business purpose?

Shestov: No, I went to fulfil Sedov's commission—to hand over a letter. That was the first reason, and the second reason was to obtain brief instructions in organizing Trotskyite activities.

Vyshinsky: And you received these instructions?

Shestov: Roughly what Pyatakov then said was: "Go and set the work going as quickly and energetically as possible."

Vyshinsky: Undermining work, was it?

Shestov: Undermining work and wrecking activities.

Vyshinsky: And as to the rest, you would see for yourself on the spot?

Shestov: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: You handed over a letter? From whom did you receive it?

Shestov: I received the letter from Sedov in Berlin.

Vyshinsky: Through somebody else?

Shestov: No, from Sedov personally.

Vyshinsky: Where did you receive the letter?

Shestov: I received it in the Baltimore Restaurant, a place pre-

viously agreed upon. I learned about this meeting place from Schwartzmann. I recall that when I came from England I went to Schwartzmann and told him that I must see Sedov.

Vyshinsky: Why did you need Schwartzmann?

Shestov: I had met Sedov in January, and Sedov then acquainted me with this Mr. Schwartzmann.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, you had had meetings with Sedov and Schwartzmann before?

Shestov: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: So you met Sedov through this Schwartzmann?

Shestov: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: But in 1931 you received the letters not from Schwartzmann, but from Sedov personally?

Shestov: Yes, from Sedov.

Vyshinsky: In a place previously agreed upon?

Shestov: It was in the Baltimore Restaurant, a place previously agreed upon.

Vyshinsky: And how did you arrange the time for the interview in this conspiratorial meeting place?

Shestov: I told Schwartzmann that I wanted to see Sedov.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, through Schwartzmann you arranged to meet Sedov?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What did Sedov tell you?

Shestov: He simply handed over to me then not letters, but, as had been agreed upon, a pair of shoes.

Vyshinsky: So you did not receive letters but shoes?

Shestov: Yes. But I knew that they contained letters.

Vyshinsky: So you were given letters contained in shoes?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In which shoe were the letters—in the right or the left?

Shestov: A letter was secreted in each shoe. He said that there were marks on the envelopes of the letters. On one there was the letter "P"—that meant that it was for Pyatakov, and on the other was the letter "M"—that meant that it was for Muralov.

Vyshinsky: You gave a letter to Pyatakov?

Shestov: I gave him the letter marked "P."

Vyshinsky: From which shoe, from the right or the left?

Shestov: I cannot say exactly.

Vyshinsky: And the other letter?

Shestov: The other letter marked "M" I gave to Muralov.

Vyshinsky: May I question Muralov? Accused Muralov, did you receive the letter?

Muralov: I did.

Vyshinsky: With a shoe or without a shoe?

Muralov: No, he brought me only a letter.

Vyshinsky: Did he bring you the letter sealed or unsealed?

Muralov: Sealed.

Vyshinsky: What was on the envelope?

Muralov: The letter "M."

Vyshinsky: Did you unseal it in Shestov's presence or later?

Muralov: I do not remember now.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions to put to Muralov and Shestov. (*To Pyatakov.*) What more can you tell us of your criminal Trotskyite, anti-Soviet activities?

Pyatakov: I received a letter which looked like the one Shestov has just described, and on opening it I was extremely surprised: I had expected a note from Sedov, but it turned out that the envelope contained not a note from Sedov, but from Trotsky, and the letter was written in German and signed "L. T."

Vyshinsky: That is to say, you received a letter from Trotsky through Sedov and Shestov?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What was in this letter?

Pyatakov: In this letter, which was written in German. . . .

Vyshinsky: You know German fairly well?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you write and read it quite fluently?

Pyatakov: I do not write it quite grammatically, but I read it quite fluently and also converse.

Vyshinsky: What did the letter say?

Pyatakov: The letter, as I now recall, began as follows: "Dear friend, I am very glad that you have followed my requests . . . ." It went on to say that fundamental tasks were facing us, which he briefly formulated. The first task was to use every means to remove Stalin and his immediate assistants. Of course, "every means" was to be understood above all as violent means. Secondly, in this same note Trotsky spoke of the necessity of uniting all anti-Stalin forces for this struggle. Thirdly, of the necessity of counteracting all the measures of the Soviet government and the Party, especially in the economic field.

Vyshinsky: And how was it to be counteracted?

Pyatakov: That was left to our discretion here.

Vyshinsky: What did you do with this letter or in connection with this letter?

Pyatakov: Here I must make a fairly long digression. I am at present testifying to my connections with Trotsky and Sedov. I will then go on to testify to what I did here in the Soviet Union.

Vyshinsky: That would be the right thing to do, because that will best elucidate the character of your activities at that period. You received this letter at the end of November 1931?

Pyatakov: Yes, at the end of November 1931.

Vyshinsky: Shortly after receiving this letter you again went abroad; in what year was that?

Pyatakov: In 1932.

Vyshinsky: When exactly?

Pyatakov: It was in the second half of 1932 and I then met Sedov for the third time.

Vyshinsky: What did you do in the interval between the receipt of the letter from Trotsky in 1931 and your second appearance in Berlin in 1932?

Pyatakov: At that time I was engaged in restoring the old Trotskyite contacts. I concentrated chiefly on the Ukraine. When I spoke to Loginov in Berlin we came to an agreement regarding the organization of a Trotskyite centre in the Ukraine. The contact with this centre was my principal contact, if we do not count a very important contact I subsequently had with Western Siberia and with N. I. Muralov which began through Shestov.

Vyshinsky: When did these contacts start?

Pyatakov: From the time Shestov went there.

Vyshinsky: What interests me is another question. The interval between the end of 1931 and your journey to Berlin; I understand that you devoted this time to restoring the Trotskyite cadres.

Pyatakov: The connections.

Vyshinsky: Connections with the scattered Trotskyite cadres?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Concretely, what was this expressed in?

Pyatakov: First of all we restored the Ukrainian connections. These were, Loginov, Golubenko, Kotsyubinsky and Livshitz, accused in the present case. We arranged, first with Loginov and later with the rest, that they form the Ukrainian "four."

Vyshinsky: With whom of the four did you speak about this?

Pyatakov: With all four.

Vyshinsky: Including Livshitz?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: This was in 1931?

Pyatakov: I think it was even 1932.

Vyshinsky: Where did the meeting with Livshitz take place?

Pyatakov: In my office at the People's Commissariat.

Vyshinsky: Did you invite him, or did he come of his own accord?

Pyatakov: I do not remember.

Vyshinsky: Where was Livshitz working at that time?

Pyatakov: In the Ukraine, as chief of a railway.

Vyshinsky: You had no official business with the chiefs of railways. Why did he come to see you at the Supreme Council of National Economy?

Pyatakov: I had had long-standing and personal relations with him.

Vyshinsky: Personal relations don't interest me.

Pyatakov: We had long been connected in counter-revolutionary, Trotskyite work.

Vyshinsky: What reason was there in 1931 for a chief of a railway to visit you, the Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy? Was there any official business reason for this?

Pyatakov: There was no need for that. I used to have many visitors and he dropped in too.

Vyshinsky. But he did not merely come to see you as an acquaintance?

Pyatakov: Of course, he had been informed by Loginov.

Vyshinsky: Hence, he came to see you, Pyatakov, as the man who, on Trotsky's instructions, was getting together Trotskyite cadres?

Pyatakov: No. He came because he wanted to get from me personally a confirmation of what Loginov had told him.

Vyshinsky: And did you say anything to him about this?

Pyatakov: I told him about my meeting with Sedov and conveyed to him Trotsky's directives about terrorist methods of struggle, about wrecking.

Vyshinsky: As a visitor, as Livshitz, your personal acquaintance, or as a participant in your underground work?

Pyatakov: Formally, as a personal acquaintance, but actually we discussed the Ukrainian Trotskyite group.

Vyshinsky: After your return from Berlin?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Hence, after your return from Berlin, you met Livshitz twice?

Pyatakov: I think more than twice because he came to talk with me at the People's Commissariat whenever he was in Moscow, but I cannot remember the various conversations.

Vyshinsky: Accused Livshitz, do you confirm this part of Pyatakov's evidence concerning your meeting with him?

Livshitz: Yes, I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: You met him after his return from Berlin; did you go to see him or did he come to see you?

Livshitz: I went to the Supreme Council of National Economy.

Vyshinsky: Did he invite you, or did you go of your own accord?

Livshitz: I went to verify the correctness of the instructions Loginov had conveyed to me from Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: Hence, Loginov conveyed to you, from Pyatakov, Trotsky's instructions?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Where?

Livshitz: In Kharkov.

Vyshinsky: And you, when in Moscow, decided to verify this?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And for this purpose, what did you decide to do?

Livshitz: I came to Pyatakov to hear it from him.

Vyshinsky: And he?

Livshitz: Pyatakov told me the same thing that Loginov told me: that the methods of struggle that we had employed before had been ineffective and that we must now adopt new methods, that is, terrorism and work of destruction.

Vyshinsky: Who told you that?

Livshitz: Pyatakov told me that.

Vyshinsky: In 1931?

Livshitz: No. In 1932.

Vyshinsky: After his return from abroad?

Livshitz: After his return from Berlin. And in 1931 I had a meeting with Pyatakov in my railway car which took place before his departure for Berlin.

Vyshinsky: The second time?

Livshitz: I cannot say for certain whether it was the first or the second time; but apparently that was in November or December 1931. He was in my railway car, had dinner, but no conversation of a Trotskyite-counter-revolutionary character took place.

Vyshinsky: At that time?

Livshitz: At that time, because there were many people in the car.

Vyshinsky: But besides that time, had he been in your car on other occasions?

Livshitz: Besides that time, as far as I remember, he never was in my car, he was there only once.

Vyshinsky: Did any other Trotskyite conversations take place between you after that?

Livshitz: Certainly.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions to Livshitz. Accused Pyatakov, perhaps you are tired?

Pyatakov: No, I can go on.

The President: I propose to adjourn at 3 o'clock.

Vyshinsky: I do not object, but perhaps it is tiring for the accused?

Pyatakov: How much longer?

The President: Fifty minutes.

Vyshinsky: And so, let us take up the question of your second visit to Berlin.

Pyatakov: I visited Berlin a second time in the middle of 1932. Sedov learned of my arrival in Berlin and decided to see me in order to receive from me, as he said, necessary information for Trotsky.

When I began to relate to him what I then knew about the activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite organization which were beginning to develop he interrupted me and said that he knew all about that as he had direct contacts in Moscow and he wanted me to tell him what was being done in the provinces.

I told him about the work of the Trotskyites in the Ukraine and in Western Siberia, about the contacts with Shestov, N. I. Muralov and Boguslavsky who were in Western Siberia at that time.

Sedov expressed extreme dissatisfaction, not his own, as he said, but Trotsky's dissatisfaction with the fact that things were moving very slowly, particularly in regard to terrorist activities. He said, "You are engaged all the time in organizational preparations and conversations, but you have nothing concrete to show." And he also said to me: "You know the sort of man Lev Davidovich is, he is roaring and raving, burning with impatience to have his instructions carried out as quickly as possible, and nothing concrete is visible from your report."

Vyshinsky: Did you stay long in Berlin that second time?

Pyatakov: About six or eight weeks. In the autumn of that year I returned to Moscow and here my meeting with Kamenev took place, which was very important from the point of view of forming the reserve centre, what became later the parallel Trotskyite centre.

Kamenev came to visit me at the People's Commissariat on some pretext or other. He very clearly and distinctly informed me about the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre which had been formed. He said that the *bloc* had been restored; then he mentioned the names of a number of people who belonged to the centre and informed me

that they had discussed the question of including in the centre people who in general had been prominent Trotskyites in the past, such as myself—Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov and Serebryakov, but they had come to the conclusion that this was inexpedient. As Kamenev said, they were of the opinion that the danger of the chief centre being exposed was very great as its members were all "very besmirched" people. That is why it was desirable, in case the main centre was exposed, to have a reserve Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre. He had been authorized officially to ask me whether I would agree to join that centre.

Vyshinsky: Reserve, as he expressed it?

Pyatakov: Reserve. I gave Kamenev my consent to join the reserve centre. This was in the autumn of 1932. Kamenev informed me of the main lines of the work of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre. First of all, he said, the fundamental thing was the question of overthrowing the government by terrorist methods. And then he conveyed to me the directives on wrecking. Continuing his information, he said that they had established closest connections, not merely contact, but connections, with the Rights: Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov, and immediately added: "As you, Yuri Leonidovich, are on very good terms with Bukharin, it would do no harm if you, too, maintained the necessary contact with him." Which is what I subsequently did.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you established contact with Bukharin?

Pyatakov: Yes. In reply to my question: "But, how is it that we are establishing contact with the Rights?"—Kamenev bluntly said that I was just betraying a certain amount of childishness in politics, that yesterday's disagreements could not disunite us, as there was unity of aim: the overthrow of Stalin's leadership and abandonment of the building of socialism with a corresponding change in the economic policy. During the same conversation Kamenev also spoke about "inter-state" relations and said that without the necessary contact with the governments of capitalist countries we would never come into power and that these contacts had to be maintained. As for details, he said that I, Pyatakov, was not a "foreign affairs man," and that Radek and Sokolnikov were better informed on these matters.

Vyshinsky: What does it mean—you are not a foreign affairs man?

Pyatakov: In Trotskyite circles I was regarded more as a specialist in economic matters and not as a specialist on international questions.

Vyshinsky: Who, then, were regarded as foreign affairs men?

Pyatakov: I have already told you: Radek and Sokolnikov.

Vyshinsky: Although you are not a foreign affairs man, you, nevertheless, discussed international questions.

Pyatakov: I have said briefly that there were three conversations: the first with Smirnov, and then with Sedov and with Kamenev.

Vyshinsky: With the united centre as represented by Kamenev?

Pyatakov: That is all I said.

Vyshinsky: Continue.

Pyatakov: So that was the conversation with Kamenev in 1932.

Vyshinsky: The end of 1932?

Pyatakov: Yes, end of 1932.

Vyshinsky: What did you negotiate about with them in 1932?

Pyatakov: In 1932 I had a conversation with Radek. During this conversation he said that we ought to adopt the methods of struggle adopted by Trotsky and the main united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre.

It was during this conversation with Radek that we discussed the question about the very great predominance of Zinovievites in the main centre, and whether we should not raise the question of making certain changes in the composition of the main centre.

Vyshinsky: In which direction?

Pyatakov: In the direction of introducing more of the Trotskyite faction in the Trotskyite-Zinovievite united *bloc.*

We arrived at the conclusion that the question of changing the composition of the centre could not be raised then as it would give rise to absolutely unnecessary disputes in the Trotskyite underground organization.

The idea occurred to us that in addition to the main centre consisting of Kamenev, Zinoviev, Mrachkovsky, Bakayev, Smirnov, Evdokimov and others, we ought to have our own Trotskyite parallel centre which could serve as a reserve centre in case the main centre was exposed, and which at the same time would carry on practical work independently in accordance with Trotsky's directives and his lines. It is true that at that time there was already no particular difference between our line and that of the Zinovievites. But at that time Radek and I were disturbed by the thought that in the economic retreat after we had seized power the Zinovievite section of the *bloc* would go too far, and something had to be organized to counteract it.

At all events, we then agreed to ask Trotsky's opinion about this. A little later (this was already in 1933), during one of my meetings with Radek, he informed me that he had received a reply from Trotsky, that Trotsky categorically urged the necessity of preserving complete unity as well as the *bloc* with the Zinovievites since there were no disagreements with them whatever in-

asmuch as the terrorist and wrecking platform had been accepted. As for the retreat, Trotsky wrote that Radek and I were mistaken in thinking that the retreat would be inconsiderable—we would have to retreat very far, and on this was based the *bloc,* not only with the Zinovievites, but also with the Rights. As for converting our centre into a parallel centre, he said that this would accelerate the gathering of forces and preparation of the necessary acts of terrorism and wrecking.

At the end of 1933 I met Serebryakov. We then agreed that, in the main, I would be in charge of the work in the Ukraine and Western Siberia, and in industry, and he would take Transcaucasia and transport.

I met Sokolnikov much later, in the middle of 1935, when we spoke concretely about converting the reserve, or parallel, centre into an operating centre, since at that time the main centre had been broken up and its members arrested and sentenced. Sokolnikov came to see me at the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry and said that it was time to become active as a certain lull had set in after the arrests.

Vyshinsky: You will speak about 1935 later. For the present let us deal with your conversations with Radek and your conversations with Serebryakov. Thus, you, already at that time, that is in 1933, informed Radek and Serebryakov about your criminal activities, about your intentions and undertakings?

Pyatakov: Of course, I did not inform them about all the details, because at that time, and for a considerable time after, the organization was built on the basis of personal contacts, which were not communicated by one to the other; but I informed them about what we had in the Ukraine, what we had in Western Siberia; by that time a group had been formed in the Urals and also in Moscow. I informed them in general outline.

Vyshinsky: Did you see Radek before the letter was sent to Trotsky asking for his opinion about these questions, or after?

Pyatakov: About the parallel centre?

Vyshinsky: Yes.

Pyatakov: No; it was during the conversation with Radek that we both decided to send this letter.

Vyshinsky: And later you received a reply from Trotsky?

Pyatakov: Yes, in the affirmative.

Vyshinsky: Who received this reply?

Pyatakov: Radek, and Radek conveyed it to me. He came to my apartment and said that he had received a reply from Trotsky in which the latter categorically brushed aside all doubts about the *bloc* with Zinoviev and, on the contrary, raised the question of a *bloc* with the Rights; he said that our line concerning the ex-

tent of the retreat was wrong. In regard to converting the "reserve centre" into a "parallel centre" he gave us his blessing. This was in 1933.

Vyshinsky: Hence, we can take it that the "parallel centre" had been operating since 1933?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: It was a parallel centre precisely because it operated simultaneously with the main centre?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Accused Radek, what have you to say about this part of Pyatakov's evidence?

Radek: I fully confirm it.

Vyshinsky: You discussed the question of asking Trotsky's opinion about the "parallel centre"?

Radek: Yes. We examined this question from the point of view of the composition of the main centre and from the point of view of our political distrust towards the Zinovievite section, notwithstanding the fact that there was a *bloc* between us.

Vyshinsky: How is that to be understood?

Radek: We became convinced that this *bloc* could hardly stand the strain of a serious test. One of the first things Zinoviev would be concerned about would be to push aside the Trotskyites: the personal factor would play an important role. Kamenev and Sokolnikov would go considerably farther in that economic retreat which we considered necessary, while Zinoviev would fall into utter panic. It was necessary, while outwardly preserving the *bloc,* to have our own organization to counter-balance it.

Vyshinsky: To pursue your own policy?

Radek: Our own policy, or our own corrective to that policy. To have our own organization.

Vyshinsky: So as to keep the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre in hand?

Radek: Yes, but needless to say this differentiation between the Rights, Sokolnikov, ourselves and the Zinovievites, was pure illusion. This illusion was soon wrecked by the facts, but at that time we proceeded from this, and this was the subject of the conversation between Pyatakov and me. On the strength of this conversation during which we also examined the economic prospects, we decided that we must abandon all idea of placing a larger number of Trotskyites on the old centre, or of effecting changes in its composition.

If you take the composition of the old centre you will find that the Trotskyites did not have a single one of the old political leaders on it. There were Smirnov, who was more of an organizer than a political leader; Mrachkovsky, a soldier and a fighting

man and Ter-Vaganyan, a propagandist. We fully trusted them personally, but we did not think they were capable of really leading, in case anything happened. We thought that since the centre had already been formed, any changes in it would give rise to disagreements with the Zinovievites and that is why we tried to apply the idea of a reserve centre in the form of a parallel centre. We decided to ask Trotsky's opinion.

Vyshinsky: Who wrote to Trotsky?

Radek: I wrote the letter.

Vyshinsky: How did you convey this letter to him?

Radek: I established communication through Vladimir Romm, an old friend of mine, who at that time was a Tass correspondent abroad. I also received the reply through Romm. I burned the letters as soon as I received them, but Pyatakov knows about all the details concerning our communications with Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: Hence you confirm this part of Pyatakov's evidence?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Serebryakov): What have you to say about that part of Pyatakov's evidence in which reference is made to your participation?

Serebryakov: It is true, at the end of November 1933 I met Pyatakov in Gagri.

Vyshinsky: What did you talk about?

Serebryakov: Pyatakov briefly informed me about his meeting with Sedov and about the work he was carrying on in the Ukraine and in Western Siberia. He asked me to undertake the work of directing the contacts with Georgia and in the transport system.

Vyshinsky: Why did he turn to you for contacts with the Georgian Trotskyites?

Serebryakov: I was on good terms with the Georgian Trotskyites, particularly with Mdivani; I visited Georgia, Transcaucasia, frequently. And as for transport, I was an old transport man.

Vyshinsky: And did you consent?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: He told you that you were invited to participate in the reserve centre?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you also consented to that?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you confirm this part of Pyatakov's evidence?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Pyatakov: I ask permission to make a remark.

The President: You may.

Pyatakov (to Vyshinsky): Serebryakov did not reply to your question quite exactly. My relations with him were not as between leader and subordinate. It was not that I made proposals to him and he consented; we simply came to an agreement about this.

Vyshinsky: Who was more influential in your "four," you or Serebryakov?

Pyatakov: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: What does Serebryakov think?

Serebryakov: I do not speak from the point of view of division of responsibility. From that point of view I bear full responsibility for the activities of the centre; but I must say that for me Pyatakov is an authority. And, to some extent, I was an authority for him.

Vyshinsky: Did you have direct communication with Trotsky?

Serebryakov: No.

Vyshinsky: And he?

Serebryakov: He had communication.

Vyshinsky: This also affected authority?

Serebryakov: It did.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): In your "parallel centre" no one had the leading role in relation to the rest?

Pyatakov: No, no one.

Vyshinsky: All were equal members, and each one was fully responsible for the whole centre?

Pyatakov: Yes, each one in his own sphere. In the sphere of international questions Sokolnikov and Radek were the authorities. In the sphere of industry and economy, apparently I was the authority.

Vyshinsky: What interests me is, under whose leadership did the "parallel centre" operate?

Pyatakov: Trotsky's.

Vyshinsky: Who on behalf of the centre had direct communication with Trotsky?

Pyatakov: Radek; and later, I personally met Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: A personal meeting with Trotsky belongs to the sphere of communication with Trotsky?

Pyatakov: Of course.

Vyshinsky: Hence, the centre, through you and Radek, was in direct communication with the principal leader of your criminal activities?

Pyatakov: Correct.

Vyshinsky: It is only in this sense that I put the question. Have you any other corrections to make?

Pyatakov: No.

Vyshinsky: Thus, 1933 is the year in which the activities of the parallel centre took shape?

Pyatakov: Quite correct.

Vyshinsky: What practical measures did the centre carry out in the course of 1933-34?

Pyatakov: It was precisely in 1933-34 that organizational and preparatory work was developed in the Ukraine and in Western Siberia; later the Moscow group was formed. Work was developed in the Urals, and all this work began to assume the form of the practical fulfilment of Trotsky's instructions, which I mentioned before, concerning the application of wrecking and diversive methods.

Vyshinsky: Hence, in 1933-34, under the direction of the "parallel centre," local Trotskyite nuclei arise and take shape, particularly in Western Siberia, in the Urals and in the Ukraine?

Pyatakov: By that time Trotskyite groups had appeared in Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, Odessa and Kiev.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, the centre already had its nuclei?

Pyatakov: Yes. And they proceeded to carry out measures of a criminal character.

Vyshinsky: Which measures?

Pyatakov: In the Ukraine the work was carried on mainly in the coke industry by Loginov and a group of persons connected with him. Their work, in the main, consisted of starting coke ovens which were not yet really ready for operations, and of holding up the construction of very valuable and very important parts of the coke and chemical industry. They operated coke ovens without utilizing those very valuable by-products which are obtained in coking and thereby huge funds were rendered valueless.

Vyshinsky: That was in the Ukraine. What about the other places?

Pyatakov: In Western Siberia, in Kemerovo, Norkin, one of the accused in the present case, operated. He was assisted by his chief engineer, Kartsev; later, in 1934, I sent there Drobnis, also an accused in the present case, to accelerate our work as Norkin had complained to me that he found it difficult to cope with it alone.

Vyshinsky: You sent Drobnis to Kemerovo especially for the purpose of intensifying the wrecking activities?

Pyatakov: I assigned Drobnis wider tasks. In sending him to Western Siberia (I had discussed with Sedov the question of sending Drobnis, as Trotsky knew him personally very well) I pursued a double aim: on the one hand to activize the work of the West-Siberian centre, and on the other hand, to give Norkin the neces-

sary assistance in carrying out wrecking work at the Kemerovo plant.

Vyshinsky: As far as wrecking was concerned, we can formulate it as follows: that Drobnis was sent for the purpose of intensifying criminal wrecking activities?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In what capacity did you send Drobnis there?

Pyatakov: Drobnis was sent as assistant chief of construction.

Vyshinsky: You sent him as assistant chief of construction only formally?

Pyatakov: It was necessary to send an assistant there in any case.

Vyshinsky: There was such a vacancy?

Pyatakov: Yes, and I took advantage of that to send Drobnis there for our Trotskyite purposes.

Vyshinsky: You sent him as assistant chief of construction and at the same time for the purpose of destroying construction?

Pyatakov: Yes. In the Kuzbas wrecking work was being actively carried on by Shestov, who had received direct instructions from Sedov and from myself. In the Urals, Yulin's underground group was being formed, and by that time was already connected with Mednikov's group, and others.

Vyshinsky: All these groups were organized, took shape and carried out their criminal activities under your direct guidance?

Pyatakov: Of course.

Vyshinsky: Through an intermediary link like the West-Siberian centre?

Pyatakov: No. The West-Siberian centre was directly connected with me. Each one had his own group.

Vyshinsky: So this was a sort of ladder system?

Pyatakov: It was a very complicated system. Here, and during the preliminary investigation I testified on this; the thing is not always clearly pictured. It was a very complicated, illegal organization, in very complicated and difficult conditions, for it was based on personal contacts as well as on illegal meetings. This work was carried on in great conspiracy. That is why I was not informed about many contacts. In fact I had a limited circle of people with whom I permitted myself to have dealings.

Vyshinsky: To what extent were the other members of the centre informed about your activities?

Pyatakov: Radek and Serebryakov were informed about them. I informed Sokolnikov later, only in 1935.

Vyshinsky: Hence, we can draw the following conclusion: this was the practical activity, not only of yourself, but of the whole parallel centre?

Pyatakov: Of course.

Vyshinsky: What was your official position in 1933-34?

Pyatakov: I was Assistant People's Commissar of Heavy Industry.

Vyshinsky: Hence, it was easier for you to utilize your contacts for Trotskyite machinations?

Pyatakov: Yes, I plead guilty to this.

The President: The procedure of the session will be as follows: We shall start the morning sessions at 11 a.m., adjourn for dinner at 3 p.m. to 6 p.m., resume at 6 p.m. and continue until 10 p.m.

The Court will now adjourn until 6 p.m.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

EVENING SESSION, JANUARY 23, 1937, 6.00 P.M.

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: The session is resumed. Comrade Vyshinsky, have you any questions?

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Tell us of the specific wrecking work of the Trotskyite organizations you know about.

Pyatakov: I have already testified that wrecking activities were developed in the Ukraine, chiefly in connection with the coke and chemical industry. The wrecking activities consisted in the fact that newly-built coke ovens were put into operation in a still unfinished condition, as a result of which they rapidly deteriorated, and, chiefly, the chemical sections of these plants were being delayed or almost not being built at all, thanks to which the vast means invested in the coke and chemical industry were rendered valueless to the extent of one-half, if not two-thirds their worth. The most valuable part of the coal, its chemical content, was not utilized and was allowed to escape into the air. On the other hand, new coking batteries were damaged. The West-Siberian Trotskyite group carried on active wrecking work in the coal industry. This activity was carried on by Shestov and his group. There was a fairly large group there which chiefly worked along the lines of causing fires in the coking-coal mines. Wrecking work was conducted in the Kemerovo Combined Chemical Works. At first the work consisted in delaying the putting into operation of newly-built units, funds were diffused on secondary units, with the result that vast structures were in a perpetual state of construction and were not brought to a state where they could be put into operation. With regard to electric power stations, work was performed aiming at reducing the effective power resources of the whole Kuznetsk area.

Vyshinsky: Did Norkin, Kartsev and Drobnis know of this work?

Pyatakov: Yes, they did. Muralov and Boguslavsky of course knew about it.

In the Urals there were two main objects on which wrecking activities were concentrated. One was the copper industry and the other was the Urals Car Construction Works.

In the copper industry efforts were chiefly directed towards

preventing the copper plants that were in operation from being utilized to their full capacity. The Krassno-Uralsk Copper Works and the Karabash Copper Works did not fulfil their program of production; there was a tremendous waste of the copper delivered to the works and there were tremendous losses. The Karabash Works were in a perpetually feverish state. At the Kalatinsk Works the concentration plant worked badly all the time; wrecking activities were being carried on there too.

Vyshinsky: And who specifically, personally, carried on the work of wrecking?

Pyatakov: In the main this work was carried on by Kolegayev—the manager of the Central Urals Copper Trust.

Vyshinsky: Did he carry it on on his own initiative, or on instructions?

Pyatakov: In general all this was not done on these people's own initiative but on Trotsky's instructions, and then on my own personal directives.

A big copper plant, the Central Urals Copper Works, was being built in the Urals, which was to increase the copper supply of the country very considerably. But at this plant, first Yulin—the chief of the Central Urals Copper Construction—and then Zharikov carried on wrecking activities which chiefly aimed at dissipating resources, not carrying construction work to completion and generally dragging it out.

It must be said that when I visited this construction site in the spring of 1935 I saw that the wrecking work was being carried on so unscrupulously crudely that even the most superficial observer could see that all was not right on the job. I was obliged to instruct Zharikov, chief of the construction, to be more cautious, to manœuvre in some way or other, to show at least some energy on the construction job, to begin construction work, but at any rate so calculated as not to complete it.

Also in the Urals criminal activities were being carried on in connection with the copper industry and the living conditions of the workers at the Central Urals Copper Construction, and in Krassno-Uralsk, chiefly in respect to the location of the workers' residential settlement. We brought it one or two kilometres nearer to the plant, which, generally speaking, is forbidden by the sanitary law, inasmuch as this is a production injurious to health. On the other hand, the building of the workers' residential settlement was generally delayed, and an intolerable situation was created on the Central Urals Copper Construction. The whole idea of the Central Urals Copper Works project was that it should combine the metallurgical part and the chemical part. The chemical part was not being built at all. I arranged it so as to separate

the chemical part by handing it over to Rataichak at the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry, where it was completely pigeon-holed. But if the construction of the plant itself went badly, the ore supply base was even in greater arrears. I personally, in addition to all the rest, separated this ore base from the construction of the plant with the idea that the ore base should not be made ready.

Now as regards the car construction works in the Urals, where the chief of construction was Maryasin, a Trotskyite and a member of the Urals group. The government devoted great attention to this plant and assigned it very considerable funds so as to get it completed as soon as possible, because this plant alone was to turn out more cars than all the other car construction works put together.

Maryasin carried on the wrecking work along the following lines. First of all he sank money in piling up unnecessary materials, equipment and so on. I think that by the beginning of 1936 about fifty million rubles were frozen in the form of materials.

Then as to the quality of the building work. Building work was systematically delayed on the large-part construction department, the tool department and the central car assembly department.

The wrecking activities in the last period assumed new forms. Despite the fact that, after a delay of two or three years, the plant began to enter on its operation stage, Maryasin created intolerable conditions, fomented intrigues, and in a word did everything to obstruct operation.

On the whole, this is perhaps all there is to be said about the Urals.

As to Moscow, definite work was carried on here in the chemical industry by Rataichak.

Vyshinsky: Cannot you be more explicit? What does "definite work" mean?

Pyatakov: I am coming to it now. I want to fix exactly the date on which my work with Rataichak commenced. Before being connected with me, Rataichak was connected with Loginov.

Vyshinsky: From what date?

Pyatakov: Strictly speaking, he disclosed himself to me in 1934, and in 1934 I arranged with him that he would take charge of wrecking activities in the chemical industry and would carry them on. As I knew Rataichak, I did not interfere in his affairs very much, but I had a general idea of what was going on there.

Vyshinsky: Did you know Rataichak before 1934?

Pyatakov: In the course of our ordinary business relations.

Vyshinsky: How long had you known him?

Pyatakov: In the course of ordinary business relations?

Vyshinsky: Well, put it that way.

Pyatakov: Since 1932, I think. In general, I knew him; but at first, of course, I was wary with him until he disclosed himself to me.

Vyshinsky: What gave Rataichak reasons for disclosing himself to you?

Pyatakov: Two persons had spoken to me about Rataichak: Loginov spoke to me and Yulin spoke to me.

Vyshinsky: Did he disclose himself to you, or did you disclose yourself to him?

Pyatakov: Disclosure may be mutual.

Vyshinsky: Did you disclose yourself first?

Pyatakov: Who first, he or I—the hen or the egg—I don't know.

Vyshinsky: In short, you disclosed yourselves to each other?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And that was in 1934?

Pyatakov: Yes. We came to an arrangement. You know, I may not be able to tell everything now. Rataichak will supplement me later.

Vyshinsky: Yes, later on we will question Rataichak.

Pyatakov: I can recall the following cases in this connection. First of all an absolutely faulty plan of development was drawn up for the war-chemical industry . . . a plan providing for a smaller output capacity and, consequently, for a larger outlay of capital than was required. This led to . . . I don't know, Citizen Procurator, this is connected with certain military questions.

The President: That must be left for the session to be held *in camera.*

Pyatakov: Then, in the sulphuric acid industry the chief thing was that the capacities of the plants were concealed and minimized, with the result that the quantity of sulphuric acid which could be produced was not produced.

As to the soda industry, despite the fact that our country abounds in salt and raw materials for soda, and that the process of manufacturing soda is very well known, there is a shortage of soda in the country. The construction of new soda plants was delayed.

Vyshinsky: What was the cause of that?

Pyatakov: My activities and those of Rataichak.

Vyshinsky: What activities? You had two kinds of activities—official and secret.

Pyatakov: I am of course referring now to criminal activities. The new plants that were projected, like the ones at Usolye, Baskunchak and so on, were delayed in every way.

As regards the nitrogen industry. Here both Rataichak and

Pushin, but chiefly Rataichak, had a hand in the wrecking activities with my direct participation. Here plans were continually revised, continually delayed, and in this way construction work was delayed.

Vyshinsky: Artificially?

Pyatakov: Well, of course. In spite of the decision of the government several plants were not being constructed at all.

Vyshinsky: Tell us about your diversive activities.

Pyatakov: As a matter of fact, it was all done on our instructions and mine in particular. The line was indicated, but I cannot say that I gave instructions to perform this or that particular diversive act.

Vyshinsky: But was not this the case with Kemerovo?

Pyatakov: No, that also is putting it too definitely. I have confirmed Norkin's testimony, and I now confirm that, in accordance with the directives I received from Trotsky, I told Norkin that when war broke out Kemerovo would apparently have to be put out of action by one means or another.

Vyshinsky: By one means or another, or did you speak of definite means?

Pyatakov: I cannot exactly recall now.

Vyshinsky: Comrade President, allow me to put a question to Norkin.

The President: Accused Norkin.

Vyshinsky: Accused Norkin, do you recall the conversation with Pyatakov about putting the chemical works out of action in case of war?

Norkin: It was said quite clearly that preparations must be made so that the enterprises in the defence industry could be put out of action by means of incendiarism and explosions.

Vyshinsky: And do you remember when he told you this?

Norkin: In 1936, in Pyatakov's office in the People's Commissariat.

Vyshinsky: Do you remember the details? Was there any talk of loss of human life?

Norkin: I remember it being pointed out that in general loss of life was inevitable, and that in carrying out diversive acts you could not avoid workers being killed. Such an instruction was given.

Vyshinsky: Accused Pyatakov, do you remember whether you said this to Norkin?

Pyatakov: That is correct; I do not remember what words were used, but this was the idea. The idea was to put the Kemerovo Combined Works out of commission in war time; perhaps we talked about special methods of doing this, and, of course, there

was also talk about loss of life. I said to Norkin that since this will be done, there will be loss of life, and we will have to reckon with this.

Vyshinsky: So that you regarded this as something inevitable?

Pyatakov: Of course.

Vyshinsky (to Norkin): Do you remember whether during the preparations for the explosions and in connection with the instructions given on this—that workers may be killed—whether Pyatakov spoke to you about it?

Norkin: He said sharply something to the effect that it was no use being squeamish; there would be loss of life in carrying out undermining work; what is there to embarrass you, what are you worrying about! The working class in Leningrad and Moscow is not what it was, let alone Kemerovo. You have nothing to hesitate about. That, approximately, was how he put it.

Vyshinsky: And was there any talk about sheep?

Norkin: It is in general difficult to recall the exact formulation, but it was quite sharp in the sense that we must stop at nothing and pity nobody.

Vyshinsky: Was there anything said about the degeneration of the working class?

Norkin: He said that the working class in Moscow and Leningrad was not such as to deserve pity, let alone the workers in Kemerovo.

Vyshinsky: Is that exactly the way he put it: Not such as to deserve pity, let alone the workers in Kemerovo? Do you remember this conversation, Pyatakov?

Pyatakov: I don't know, perhaps Norkin's memory is deceiving him, but I remember very well that I talked about loss of life being inevitable, and talked about it quite sharply.

Vyshinsky: What he said was sufficiently sharp. How was this sharpness expressed?

Pyatakov: The sharpest thing was acts of diversion. It was impossible to commit acts of diversion without sacrificing human life.

Vyshinsky: Did you say that the working class in general was not what it had been?

Pyatakov: In general, this does not fit in at all with my ideas, it is improbable, I spoke in other terms.

Vyshinsky: In other terms?

Pyatakov: Since our line was to commit acts of diversion we could not bother about any particular group of people who might suffer.

Vyshinsky: Accused Norkin, was there any talk as to who was to bear responsibility for these things?

Norkin: There was.

Vyshinsky: What was said?

Norkin: It was said that the responsibility would fall not on those who performed the diversive acts but on the leaders of the Party and the government.

Pyatakov: This was said.

Vyshinsky: Were the members of your organization connected with foreign intelligence service organizations?

Pyatakov: Yes, they were. I must return to the line Trotsky laid down in order to make it clearer. As I have already testified, I had fairly close and direct connections with Radek. Radek directly established and maintained connections with Trotsky and more than once received instructions from Trotsky on various fundamental questions. Radek kept me continuously informed. Whenever directives were received from Trotsky he would come to see me the very same day or a few days after and tell me that such and such directives had been received.

Vyshinsky: What did Radek tell you about these directives?

Pyatakov: There were no new directives specially about terrorism; it was considered that this directive had been adopted for execution. But there were repeated demands and reminders that this directive should be carried out.

Vyshinsky: Was this mentioned in the letter to Radek?

Pyatakov: It was. Trotsky said that we were just talking.

Vyshinsky: What then did Trotsky demand?

Pyatakov: He demanded that definite acts should be committed both in the way of terrorism and wrecking. I must say, that as the directive about wrecking activities encountered fairly serious resistance even among Trotsky's followers, it gave rise to perplexity and dissatisfaction and did not go smoothly. We informed Trotsky of the existence of this state of mind. But Trotsky replied in a letter couched in rather definite terms that the instruction about wrecking activities was not something fortuitous, not simply one of the sharp methods of struggle he proposed, but an essential part of his policy and of his present line. In the same directive he raised the question—this was in the middle of 1934—that now that Hitler had come to power it was quite clear that his, Trotsky's line on the impossibility of building up socialism in one country alone had been completely justified, that war was inevitable, and that if we Trotskyites wished to preserve ourselves as a political force of some sort, we must in advance, having adopted a defeatist position, not merely passively observe and

contemplate, but actively prepare the way for this defeat. But in order to do so, cadres must be formed, and cadres could not be formed by talk alone. Therefore the necessary wrecking activities must be carried on now.

I recall that Trotsky said in this directive that without the necessary support from foreign states, a government of the *bloc* could neither come to power nor hold power. It was therefore a question of arriving at the necessary preliminary agreement with the most aggressive foreign states, like Germany and Japan, and that he, Trotsky, on his part had already taken the necessary steps in establishing contacts both with the Japanese and the German governments.

Here Trotsky expressed dissatisfaction with our actions. He had learned that Sokolnikov, in response to the direct demarche of ——, the ambassador of —— . . .

The President: Accused Pyatakov, I categorically forbid you to mention the names of foreign representatives in Moscow. If you want to testify on this subject, you can do so at the session to be held *in camera.*

Pyatakov: Very well. Trotsky expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Sokolnikov had no clear understanding of the steps that were being taken by Trotsky and that he did not support them energetically enough.

I further know that in accordance with Trotsky's instructions Radek had meetings and conversations on the lines of which Trotsky had spoken.

Vyshinsky: With whom? Foreigners?

Pyatakov: With Germans, to put it plainly.

Vyshinsky: What conversations did Radek have with these persons?

Pyatakov: Radek and I were constantly discussing this directive and, in general, we adopted the following position: since we were not quite clear as to what Trotsky was doing abroad, what connections he had, evidently, we here, if we met the official or unofficial representatives concerned, would have to confirm that Trotsky was acting not only individually, in his own name, but also in the name of the *bloc.* And this is what Sokolnikov did in conversation with one person, and what Radek did in conversations with other persons.

Vyshinsky: How do you know this?

Pyatakov: As regards Radek's meetings and conversations, Radek told me about them himself; and as regards Sokolnikov, I first learned about it from Trotsky's note, then Radek told me about it, and later, in the middle of 1935, Sokolnikov himself told

me of this step of his and recounted the conversation in which he had sanctioned Trotsky's negotiations with the Japanese government.

Vyshinsky: Before you went abroad, had you no other conversations with Radek on this subject?

Pyatakov: The characteristic feature of our criminal work in the period from the middle of 1935 to the end of 1935 and the beginning of 1936 was that this was a period when the "parallel centre" endeavoured to convert itself from a parallel centre into the main centre and to intensify its work in accordance with the directives we had received from Trotsky, since at this time we had a number of meetings here with Sokolnikov and Tomsky. In a word, we endeavoured to carry out the decision of the main centre which in 1934 had been transmitted to all the four members of the reserve centre: by Kamenev to me and Sokolnikov, and by Mrachkovsky to Radek and Serebryakov.

Vyshinsky: This was the time when Sokolnikov came to see you and said: "It is time to begin"?

Pyatakov: Yes. Just then the new phase began. This was the first conversation in which I told Sokolnikov what we had, what terrorist groups and Trotskyite organization we possessed. I told Sokolnikov, too, in general outline that wrecking activities were being carried on along the lines required. Sokolnikov in turn told me of the connections he had. He mentioned the Zaks-Gladnyev and Tivel groups.

I remember that during this same conversation much attention was paid to the question of expanding the *bloc*. Both Sokolnikov and I knew from Kamenev that the main centre had direct and immediate organizational connections with the Rights. On the other hand, as I have already said, I had direct contact with Bukharin, which was afterwards maintained by Radek.

Sokolnikov and I discussed the question at the time and decided that it was absolutely necessary to give form to these relations in some way, so as to organize the work directed towards overthrowing the government in conjunction with the Rights.

We said at the time that it was absolutely necessary to meet one of the leaders of the Rights, *i.e.*, Rykov, Tomsky or Bukharin. All three were discussed, but in the end the choice fell on Tomsky because we had information that Tomsky had the most numerous and organized cadres and was best fitted to perform such illegal organizational work.

Sokolnikov undertook to meet Tomsky, and did meet him. During the same period I met Serebryakov. And also in my conversation with Serebryakov we discussed the question of increasing wrecking work on the railways and stimulating the work of

the Transcaucasian group, which was to assume very definite character at that time.

I repeat that I met Radek on more than one occasion in 1935 and conversed with him.

After this first meeting with Sokolnikov he met Tomsky. I also met Tomsky. I went to see him, I don't remember now when that was. Then I met him again in the middle or end of November. I met Sokolnikov again either at the end of November or the beginning of December 1935. He told me that Tomsky had fully agreed to on organised joining of the *bloc*. I on my part told Sokolnikov of the conversation I had had with Tomsky on this subject. In conversation with me, Tomsky had told me that he considered it absolutely necessary to organize terrorist and all other kinds of work, but that he would have to consult his comrades, Rykov and Bukharin. This he did later, and then gave me a reply in the name of all three.

Vyshinsky: Were negotiations conducted with any member of this group besides Tomsky?

Pyatakov: I did not conduct such negotiations. Radek had connections with Bukharin. I had had connections with Bukharin until 1934, *i.e.*, until the time he left the People's Commissariat. While he was in the People's Commissariat it was easy for me to meet him, but when he was transferred to *Izvestia* this connection passed to Radek. He maintained and continued counter-revolutionary connections with him.

About the end of 1935 Radek received a long letter—instructions from Trotsky. In this directive Trotsky advanced two possible variants of our coming into power. The first variant was the possibility of our coming into power before a war, and the second variant, during a war. Trotsky visualized the first variant as resulting from a concentrated terrorist blow, as he said. What he had in mind was the simultaneous performance of terrorist acts against a number of leaders of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet government, and of course in the first place against Stalin and his immediate assistants.

The second variant, which in Trotsky's opinion was the more probable, was a military defeat. Since, as he said, war was inevitable, and moreover in the very near future—a war in the first place with Germany, and possibly with Japan—the idea therefore was to reach the necessary agreement with the governments of these countries and thus ensure that they would regard the coming to power of the *bloc* favourably; and that meant obtaining the necessary support to maintain ourselves in power by making a number of concessions to these countries on terms to be agreed upon beforehand. But since the question of defeatism, of military

wrecking activities, of inflicting telling blows during wartime both to the rear and to the army was here put pointblank, this very much disquieted Radek and myself. It seemed to us that the reason why Trotsky was staking on the inevitability of defeat was largely because of his isolation and ignorance of the real conditions, his ignorance of what was going on here, his ignorance of what the Red Army was like; and that was why he cherished such illusions. Both Radek and I therefore decided that it was necessary to endeavour to meet Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: Accused Radek, did you in 1935 or somewhat earlier receive two, or perhaps more, letters from Trotsky?

Radek: One letter in April 1934 and another in December 1935.

Vyshinsky: Do their contents tally with what Pyatakov has stated here?

Radek: In the main, yes. The first letter in substance spoke of expediting war as a desirable condition for the coming to power of the Trotskyites. The second letter elaborated on these so-called two variants—coming to power in time of peace and coming to power in the event of war.

The first letter did not deal with the social consequences of the concessions which Trotsky proposed. If a deal was to be made with Germany and Japan, then of course it would not be made purely for the sake of Trotsky's beautiful eyes. But he did not set forth any program of concessions in this letter. The second letter spoke of the social and economic policy, which Trotsky considered an essential part of such a deal for the coming to power of the Trotskyites.

Vyshinsky: What was this policy?

Radek: Putting it in the shape of a formula, it was the return to capitalism, the restoration of capitalism. This was veiled. The first variant would strengthen the capitalist elements; it meant handing over considerable economic interests to the Germans and Japanese in the form of concessions and assuming obligations regarding deliveries of raw materials, foodstuffs and fats to Germany at less than world prices. The internal consequences of this were clear. The interests of private capital in Russia would concentrate around the German and Japanese concessionaires. Furthermore, this whole policy was connected with a program of restoring the individual sector, if not in the whole of agriculture, at least in a considerable part of it. But while the first variant involved the restoration of capitalist elements to a considerable degree, the second variant involved indemnities and their consequences, handing over to the Germans, if they demanded it, those factories which would be particularly valuable to their economy. Since in this same letter he fully realized that this meant the

revival of private trade on an extensive scale the quantitative interrelation of these factors already presented a picture of a return to capitalism, under which only remnants of socialist economy would be left, and even these would be transformed into elements of state capitalism.

The first letter did not contain a social program, the second did. The first letter was brief—about expediting war; the second letter contained an estimate of the international situation. It discussed tactics in the event of war. While the first letter must be regarded as a stimulus to defeatist tactics, the second letter presented a detailed program, and that is why it differed from the first letter in length. The first letter consisted of two or three pages, the second of eight pages of fine English paper, a detailed letter.

Vyshinsky: In the main, what Pyatakov has said coincides with what you said?

Radek: In the main it does. I must say that there was no third letter in which, it is alleged, the conditions orally conveyed to Pyatakov were put in writing. Pyatakov is mistaken on this point. After his return, two letters arrived simultaneously, but these referred precisely to wrecking and to the situation in the international working class movement. These letters were in reply to the enquiry I sent in the autumn of 1934, but evidently, while in transit they were delayed in London and arrived late, in January. I had no written document confirming the conclusion of the preliminary agreement with Trotsky or its contents. I heard about it from what Pyatakov said, and since Pyatakov's impressions of the conversation were still fresh, and as I pressed him very hard with my questions from the point of view of my appraisal of the international situation, I managed to obtain quite a lot from him.

Vyshinsky: You will be able to supplement this when you are called to testify. For the moment it was important for me to hear from you what you could say about Pyatakov's reference to what you said about the contents of the letter received from Trotsky.

Radek: In the main I fully confirm it.

Vyshinsky: The line of defeat, and so forth?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In this second letter, which has been called a detailed program of defeatism, was there anything about the conditions which, on coming to power, the group of the parallel centre were to fulfil for the benefit of foreign states?

Radek: The whole program was directed towards this.

Vyshinsky: Trotsky did not outline the conditions themselves?

Radek: He did.

Vyshinsky: Did he speak concretely of territorial concessions?

Radek: It was stated that this would probably be necessary.

Vyshinsky: What exactly?

Radek: Territorial concessions would probably be necessary.

Vyshinsky: Of what kind?

Radek: If peace was to be made with the Germans, we would have to satisfy them in one form or another, to consent to their expansion.

Vyshinsky: To hand over the Ukraine?

Radek: When we read the letter we had no doubt of this. Whatever it would be called, a Hetman Ukraine or something else, it was a question of satisfying German expansion in the Ukraine.

As regards Japan, Trotsky spoke of ceding the Amur region and the Maritime Province.

Vyshinsky: Accused Sokolnikov, do you confirm Pyatakov's testimony as regards the part which concerns the conversation with the person who was referred to and whose name the President requested not to mention?

Sokolnikov: Yes, I do.

Vyshinsky: And do you confirm the contents of this letter?

Sokolnikov: Yes, that's right.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Tell me, under what circumstances did you go abroad? What was the official reason for your going abroad and what took place there unofficially?

Pyatakov: I have already testified that during my conversation with Radek at the end of 1935 the question arose that it was necessary to meet Trotsky by one way or another. As I had that year to go to Berlin on official business for a few days, I agreed that I should attempt to see Trotsky, whereupon Radek recommended me when in Berlin to apply to Bukhartsev, who had connections with Trotsky, to help me to arrange this meeting. I went to Berlin and met Bukhartsev.

Vyshinsky: When was this approximately?

Pyatakov: It was on December 10, in the first half of December. That same day, or the next, I met Bukhartsev, who, taking advantage of a moment when nobody was about, told me that he had heard of my arrival a few days before, had informed Trotsky of it and was awaiting news from Trotsky on the matter. The next day Trotsky sent a messenger, with whom Bukhartsev brought me together in the Tiergarten, in one of the lanes, literally for a couple of minutes. He showed me a brief note from Trotsky which contained a few words: "Y.L., the bearer of this note can be fully trusted." The word "fully" was underlined, from which I gathered that the person Trotsky had sent was an agent of his.

I do not know the name of this man, I can't say exactly now what he called himself, either Heinrich, or Gustav, I think it was Gustav, that may have been a nickname, or Heinrich. He had received instructions from Lev Davidovich to arrange a meeting for me, to go and visit Trotsky, as Trotsky strongly insisted on having a talk with me.

As it transpired later this particular insistence was caused by the last letter Radek had sent to Trotsky.

He asked me whether I was prepared to travel by airplane. I said that I was prepared, although I realized how risky such an operation was; but since I had had such a conversation with Radek and, generally speaking, the problems confronting us were extremely serious and acute, I thought it was better to take the risk of flying and meeting Trotsky than to shirk the risk and remain in the state of perplexity we were in.

In short, I decided to go, although, I repeat, for me it meant taking a very great risk of discovery, exposure, and anything you like; nevertheless, I decided to make the journey.

Vyshinsky: Did your conversation with him end there?

Pyatakov: He arranged to meet me next morning at the Tempelhof Airport.

Vyshinsky: And is that all?

Pyatakov: That was all at that meeting.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell anyone in Berlin about this meeting?

Pyatakov: Absolutely no one, of course.

Vyshinsky: Did Bukhartsev know?

Pyatakov: Bukhartsev was present. This was in Bukhartsev's presence. I don't think he heard the whole of the conversation, but he brought us together.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you were in the Tiergarten with Bukhartsev?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And there, while you were with Bukhartsev, you met this person?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Who arrived first?

Pyatakov: Bukhartsev and I arrived together, and he was waiting for us.

Vyshinsky: That conversation did not last long?

Pyatakov: One and a half or two minutes, not more.

Vyshinsky: What happened next day?

Pyatakov: Early next morning I went straight to the entrance of the airdrome. He was waiting at the entrance and led the way. He first showed me a passport which had been prepared for me. The passport was a German one. He saw to all the

customs formalities himself, so that all I had to do was to sign my name.

We got into an airplane and set off. We did not stop anywhere, and at approximately 3 p.m. we landed at the airdrome in Oslo. There an automobile awaited us. We got in and drove off. We drove for about 30 minutes and came to a country suburb. We got out, entered a small house that was not badly furnished, and there I saw Trotsky, whom I had not seen since 1928. It was here that my conversation with Trotsky took place.

Vyshinsky: Was there anyone present at that conversation?

Pyatakov: Absolutely nobody, because the whole thing was arranged very secretly by both of us, and even the man who had brought me to the door did not come in. The conversation was conducted strictly between ourselves.

Vyshinsky: How long did your conversation last?

Pyatakov: About two hours.

Vyshinsky: Tell us what you talked about.

Pyatakov: The conversation began, first of all, by my giving some information. I told him what the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre had already done. Trotsky had already received Radek's letter and he was particularly excited. During the conversation he kept interrupting me, interjected cutting remarks about conciliationism and about not understanding the situation, such as, "you are living in the old way," and similar biting remarks, and displayed obvious signs of dissatisfaction. When we came to the subject of wrecking activity, he delivered himself of a veritable phillipic, made cutting remarks, such as: "You can't break away from Stalin's navel cord; you take Stalin's construction for socialist construction."

At the same time he formulated very sharply, I would say perhaps for the first time, so clearly and precisely, his position with regard to wrecking activities. That is why he made those scathing statements. He said that socialism could not be built in one country alone, and that the collapse of the Stalin state was absolutely inevitable. On the other hand, capitalism was recovering from the crisis, was beginning to grow stronger, and clearly could not tolerate the growing strength, especially of the war industry, of the defensive power of the Soviet state very much longer. A military clash was inevitable, and if we remained passive, all the Trotskyite cadres as well would perish in the ruins of the Stalin state. It was for this reason that he considered the wrecking method not merely one of the sharp forms of struggle, one that might be applied or might not, but as something absolutely inevitable that logically followed from the very essence of his position.

The question was what attitude the Trotskyite cadres should adopt: would they tie up their fate with the fate of the Stalin state, or would they resist and organize themselves for other tasks, for the overthrow of the government and pave the way for the coming to power of another government—a Trotskyite government. And here (I give it to you as I got it) he drew the analogy which I quoted at the preliminary investigation: Look: there was a time when we Social-Democrats, Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky all regarded the development of capitalism as a progressive, as a positive phenomenon. But there was a difference between our position and that of Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky, whose conclusions were different from ours. Struve advocated serving capitalism. But we Social-Democrats were different, we had different tasks, namely, to organize the struggle against capitalism, to rear its grave-diggers. And so we should now go into the service of the Stalin state, not, however, to help to build the state, but to become its grave-diggers—therein lies our task. He further said that many of us Trotskyites were still suffering from the illusion that mass methods, the organization of the masses was possible. The organization of a mass struggle was impossible, in the first place because the worker masses and the peasant masses were in the main at present under the hypnotic influence of the huge constructive work that was going on in the country, constructive work which they took to be socialist construction. Any attempt on our part in this direction would be quite hopeless, would rapidly lead to complete failure and to the destruction of the comparatively insignificant Trotskyite cadres at present in the country. Therefore, something else was necessary—a coup d'état in the fullest sense of the word, with all its consequences as regards tactics and as regards methods of struggle.

Naturally, having adopted this stand we cannot reject the methods which logically follow, as he had said before, from his appraisal of the general situation, from the general policy which would help most effectively to solve this problem, that is to say, to overthrow the existing government by means of a coup d'état and to establish another government. He repeatedly returned to the subject. I can only give you the substance of the conversation, for it is very difficult for me now to convey it to you verbatim. He repeatedly came back to the point saying that we were too slow, that we did not have a lot of time at our disposal, that it was a matter of a relatively short period, and if we missed this opportunity, the danger would arise, on the one hand, of the complete liquidation of Trotskyism in the country, and, on the other hand, as he put it, of the existence of that monstrosity, the Stalin state for decades, supported by certain economic achievements,

and particularly by the new, young cadres who had grown up and had been brought up to take this state for granted, to regard it as a socialist, Soviet state—they did not think of any other state and they could not conceive of any. Our task, he said, was to oppose ourselves to that state. This is Trotsky's philosophy.

Vyshinsky: And the practical part?

Pyatakov: One is very closely connected with the other. In this connection Trotsky again said that in his opinion war was imminent, that he knew for a fact that it was a question not of, say, a five-year period, but of a short time. He then told me outright that it would be in 1937. Apparently, he had not invented this information himself. And in this respect these wrecking and diversionist cadres were to be trained, not in any general way, but in order to draw a line of demarcation between the Stalin state and the Trotskyite organization, so that we might say, if anything happened, that we are not the Soviet state. That was one task. The other task was a more practical one: to train cadres for the event of war, that is to say, to train diversionists and those who would engage in destruction, helpers for the fascist attack on the Soviet Union.

Vyshinsky: That was the practical part?

Pyatakov: Strictly speaking, both parts were practical, only the second part was more despicable. Then he again set forth the two variants.

Here he spoke to me more definitely and more frankly, since it was not a written document but an oral statement; very probably he spoke more frankly for this very reason, warning me, however, that he did not think it expedient or possible not only to make it public, but even to communicate it to any considerable number of Trotskyites; only a very small, restricted group of people could be informed about this line. And, properly speaking, this was comprehensible because, as will be evident from what I am going to say next, what we were discussing was downright, undisguised high treason.

Vyshinsky: In what was this expressed?

Pyatakov: I'm coming to that now. Whoever knows Trotsky, knows that he always liked to utter some peculiar phrases, to round up the talk. He said: Do you remember our controversy about the possibility of building up socialism in one country; it is quite clear that in this controversy we were in the right, and not Stalin.

As to the international situation, he said that the proletarian revolutionary movement was being destroyed and that fascism was triumphant. If we intend to come to power, the real forces in the

international situation were in the first place the fascists, and with these forces we must establish contact in one way another, in one form or another, we must maintain this contact and ensure that the attitude towards us should be favourable if we came to power, whether without a war or, and in particular, in the event of a war and the defeat of the Soviet Union, which Trotsky considered inevitable. He thereupon told me that he was aware of the conversations which Radek and Sokolnikov were conducting. Trotsky was dissatisfied because they were not active enough, because they were over-cautious. He told me what he had specially undertaken.

Vyshinsky: To what conversations are you referring, with whom?

Pyatakov: I am referring to the conversations which Radek and Sokolnikov conducted with persons representing certain foreign states, whom Citizen the President has forbidden me to name.

Vyshinsky: About these conversations?

Pyatakov: Yes. On his part Trotsky said: Of course, you over there are spending too much time discussing international problems; you would do better to devote yourselves more to those affairs of yours that are going badly. He had in mind terrorist, wrecking and diversive activities. As for international affairs, he said, I know more about these things than you and will do more. Then he told me . . . I don't know, I cannot vouch that he told all that he had done, I can only tell you what he told me.

Vyshinsky: He said that you were talking and discussing a lot instead of engaging in practical diversive and wrecking work?

Pyatakov: And terrorist . . .

Vyshinsky: That is, you again talked specially about engaging in these activities?

Pyatakov: We did not discuss this specially, but the conversation was packed with expressions of utter dissatisfaction and nasty and sarcastic remarks to the effect that we had done little in this direction, that is, in connection with practical wrecking, diversive and terrorist work. This was said in reply to what I had told him about what was going on over here.

Vyshinsky: In saying that you had done little, what else did he talk about?

Pyatakov: In connection with the international question Trotsky very emphatically insisted on the necessity of preparing diversionist cadres. He rebuked us for not engaging energetically enough in diversive, wrecking and terrorist activities.

He told me that he had come to an absolutely definite agree-

ment with the fascist German government and with the Japanese government that they would adopt a favourable attitude in the event of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc* coming to power. But, he added, it went without saying that such a favourable attitude was not due to any particular love these governments cherished for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc*. It simply proceeded from the real interests of the fascist governments and from what we had promised to do for them if we came to power.

Vyshinsky: What did you promise?

Pyatakov: Here I must first make one explanation. Trotsky again said that from this standpoint, too, from the standpoint of the negotiations he was conducting and of what he had already achieved, it was extremely important to build up an active, concrete and real force. He then told me that he had conducted rather lengthy negotiations with the Vice-Chairman of the German National-Socialist Party—Hess. It is true I cannot say whether there is an agreement signed by him, or whether there is only an understanding, but Trotsky put it to me as though an agreement existed, one which it is true still had to be given definite shape by certain other persons, of whom I shall speak *in camera*.

What, properly speaking, does this agreement amount to if formulated briefly? First, the German fascists promise to adopt a favourable attitude towards the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc* and to support it if it comes to power, either in time of war, or before a war, should it succeed in doing so. But in return the fascists are to receive the following compensation: a general favourable attitude towards German interests and towards the German government on all questions of international policy; certain territorial concessions would have to be made, and these territorial concessions have been defined—in particular, mention was made of territorial concessions in a veiled form which were called "not resisting Ukrainian national-bourgeois forces in the event of their self-determination."

Vyshinsky: What does that mean?

Pyatakov: It means in a veiled form what Radek spoke about here: should the Germans set up their Ukrainian government, ruling the Ukraine not through their German Governor-General but perhaps through a hetman—at any rate, should the Germans "self-determine" the Ukraine—the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc* will not oppose it. Actually, this meant the beginning of the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.

The next point of the agreement dealt with the form in which German capital would be enabled to exploit in the Soviet Union the raw material resources it needs. It concerned the exploitation of gold mines, oil, manganese, forests, apatites, etc.

In short, it was agreed in principle between Trotsky and Hess that German capital would be allowed to come in and obtain a necessary economic complement but the definite forms which this was to assume would evidently be worked out later.

The last point I remember was concessions. I think that was so.

Vyshinsky: And what about diversive acts in case of war?

Pyatakov: That was the last point. That I remember very well. And lastly, the hardest point—which, generally speaking, reveals our face without any camouflage or adornment whatever—was also formulated in this agreement between Trotsky and Hess. True, I would not undertake to assert now that it was part of the conception of the agreement between Hess and Trotsky I spoke about before; this was a special, separate agreement. But it did enter into the general conception of the agreement, which means that, since Hess and Trotsky had discussed the question of war and a military *coup d'état,* accession to power, that is to say, the defeat of the U.S.S.R.—Hess, of course, quite naturally raised the point: Well, you are fighting over there; while in this case we are a much better organized and a better armed force. It is clear once we negotiate you must go the whole length. In the event of military attack the destructive forces of the Trotskyite organizations which would act within the country must be co-ordinated with the forces from without acting under the guidance of German fascism. The diversive and wrecking activity which is being conducted by the Trotskyite-Zinovievite organization within the Soviet Union must be carried out under the instructions of Trotsky, which are to be agreed upon with the German General Staff.

Towards the end there was talk to the effect that, say, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc* comes into power with the aid of certain external forces, they put us into power. What about these concessions that we outlined in addition to a number of others that we also had in mind, and also the need for a certain pacification of the forces which we would mobilize for the fight against Stalin, that is to say, hostile forces? What I mean is the hostile sections, the kulaks. In this connection also it would be necessary, for considerations of home policy, to effect a fairly big retreat, in addition to concessions to foreigners. Radek quite justly mentioned this retreat in town and country, such as permitting capitalist trade and so forth. To put it simply, Trotsky explained that it would be a very serious retreat. This is exactly what he said: you and Radek are still under the sway of the old ideas of 1925-26 and you are unable to see that in essence our coming to power will mean that we will have to retreat very far in the direction of capitalism. In this conection Trotsky said that in essence our

program was the same as that of the Rights in so far as the Rights had adopted a diversive wrecking program and considered that it was necessary to retreat towards capitalism. Trotsky expressed very great satisfaction when I told him about Sokolnikov's conversation with Tomsky and my conversation with Tomsky, and also about the contacts Radek and I had with Bukharin. He said that this was not only a tactical measure, that is to say, unity in the struggle against one and the same enemy, but that this unity had some significance in principle.

Vyshinsky: And so, what was there new in what Trotsky said in 1935, compared with what you were told before, and what you had been guided by in your criminal activities?

Pyatakov: What was new, if you like, was formulated distinctly enough: in essence, the Trotskyite organization was being transformed into an appendage of fascism.

Vyshinsky: Did you learn that only at that time?

Pyatakov: To me it became clear only then.

Vyshinsky: But it was clear to you that all that you were doing was a grave crime against the state?

Pyatakov: During that conversation it was not clear to me.

Vyshinsky: In 1931, when you received the line on terror—was that a grave crime against the state?

Pyatakov: Yes, of course.

Vyshinsky: In 1932 this line was confirmed and you undertook to carry out this task. Was that a grave crime against the state?

Pyatakov: It also was.

Vyshinsky: That is to say?

Pyatakov: Also a grave crime against the state, that is clear.

Vyshinsky: You were given a line, through Radek or directly, on wrecking?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You accepted?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How do you describe that?

Pyatakov: In the same way.

Vyshinsky: That is to say?

Pyatakov: As a grave crime against the state.

Vyshinsky: You received a line on diversive activities?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How do you describe that?

Pyatakov: In the same way.

Vyshinsky: You were given a line on defeatism?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How do you describe that?

Pyatakov: In the same way.

Vyshinsky: You were given a line on espionage? How do you describe that?

Pyatakov: In the same way.

Vyshinsky: For whose benefit?

Pyatakov: Here I do not say for whose benefit.

Vyshinsky: On whose behalf, for what political aims? Was that clear when you, in 1931, accepted the line on wrecking, when you accepted the line on diversive activities, when you accepted the line on espionage, on connections with the intelligence services of certain foreign states? Or was it not clear to you whither that led? How do you describe that?

Pyatakov: If this had all been clear then, probably everything would have been a little different.

Vyshinsky: After all, you are a grown man. Let us retrace our steps. In accepting the line on terrorism, did you not understand that this meant killing the leaders of our Party?

Pyatakov: Of course, I understood.

Vyshinsky: And is this not a grave crime against the state?

Pyatakov: Of course, it is clear.

Vyshinsky: Why, then, did you say that it was not clear to you?

Pyatakov: Not that side.

Vyshinsky: But that side interests me as the representative of the State prosecution. Why do you say it was not clear? What is there unclear: go to the U.S.S.R., organize terrorist groups here, organize the murder of the leaders of the Party and the government. Is that clear or unclear?

Pyatakov: Clear, of course.

Vyshinsky: What then is not clear to you?

Pyatakov: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: In my opinion it is clear, and it is clear to the whole people and probably it is clear to you.

Pyatakov: But I told you it became clear.

Vyshinsky: That is what I am asking you: Was that clear to you?

Pyatakov: Clear, of course.

Vyshinsky: Expediting war—was that the line?

Pyatakov: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: Helping the aggressor—was that the line?

Pyatakov: It was.

Vyshinsky: Helping the aggressor means helping fascism?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Helpers of fascism are an appendage of fascism?

Pyatakov: Not always.

Vyshinsky: But in the present case?

Pyatakov: In the present case, undoubtedly.

Vyshinsky: So it is clear? I have no more questions.

The President: What aim did you pursue in August 1936 when you wrote your letter about the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre, the letter that was published in our press in Moscow? What was then clear to you, and what was unclear at the time of writing that letter?

Pyatakov: At that time, generally speaking, I was seeking a way out of the situation that had arisen, and I thought, falsely thought, wrongly thought, that I could crawl out, or get out of this counter-revolutionary fascist morass some way other than the only way a person in such a situation has, that is to say, by fully giving away the organization, the deeds that it was perpetrating, and exposing oneself. I could not make up my mind to do that, and went another way.

The President: Which way?

Pyatakov: I wrote that article then. I thought it would help me to break off and withdraw somehow. But that was wrong.

The President: How is that to be understood? What does "help" to get away mean? Did you want to cover up your actions?

Pyatakov: I have already said that it was wrong.

The President: You wanted to show by your letter that you had nothing in common with the Trotskyites?

Pyatakov: No, I wanted something else. What I achieved is another matter.

Vyshinsky: On your return from Berlin did you talk with anybody about the meeting with Trotsky?

Pyatakov: I had meetings with Radek and Sokolnikov.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell them about this conversation with Trotsky?

Pyatakov: I did.

Vyshinsky: Approximately in the way you related it today?

Pyatakov: Probably in greater detail, since at that time I was under the immediate impression of that conversation.

Vyshinsky: But in the main, as you related it here?

Pyatakov: Why, of course.

Vyshinsky: How did Radek react to it?

Pyatakov: These last formulations, the dotting of the *i*'s that was done during that conversation caused an unpleasant reaction both in Radek and in me, and we thought of doing something: but we did not reject it, and continued to carry on with what we were doing. But on the other hand, we thought to ourselves that we four, Serebryakov, Sokolnikov, Radek and I, could not, generally speaking, take responsibility for all this business, that in this connection we ought to convene a conference of the

centre, which we had not convened, to discuss what should be done further, because, as far as I understood Radek—it is true I did not speak to him in any particular detail, but so I understood him—that he, too, had the feeling that we had got into a blind alley, and I felt that too, and we thought that we ought to speak with the centre and with some of the close comrades in the provinces in order to define ourselves somehow. Moreover, there was a vague idea that these conferences might have as a result that the attitude here would be opposed, at all events, on these acute questions. I must say that both he and I, to a certain extent, pursued an ostrich-like policy—we hid our heads in the sand, but did nothing of importance.

Vyshinsky: Did that last meeting you had with Trotsky change anything in your criminal activities?

Pyatakov: It changed nothing.

Vyshinsky: And in the criminal activities of Radek and Sokolnikov?

Pyatakov: Nothing.

Vyshinsky: The instructions which Trotsky gave you in December 1935, did you accept them as his wishes, or as a directive?

Pyatakov: In so far as, in general, the main directive which the parallel centre followed was what came from Trotsky, of course it was a directive.

Vyshinsky: The conversation you had with Trotsky in December 1935 and the line he gave, did you accept it as a directive or simply as something said in a conversation, but not binding for you?

Pyatakov: Of course as a directive.

Vyshinsky: Hence, we can take it that you subscribed to it?

Pyatakov: We can take it that I carried it out.

Vyshinsky: And carried it out.

Pyatakov: Not "and carried it out," but "carried it out."

Vyshinsky: There is no difference in that whatever.

Pyatakov: There is a difference for me.

Vyshinsky: What is it?

Pyatakov: As far as action is concerned, particularly criminally liable action, there is no difference whatever.

Vyshinsky: After your conference with Trotsky you continued your criminal activities in the same way as before?

Pyatakov: Undoubtedly.

Vyshinsky: In accordance with the directions given before and after? To this question do you answer in the affirmative or the negative?

Pyatakov: In the affirmative.

Vyshinsky: Did Radek act in the same way?

Pyatakov: Probably; I did not meet him after January 1936.

Vyshinsky: You, however, continued in the old way?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Now I want to ask you about your criminal activities in the sphere of the organization of terrorist acts. Concretely, what was that expressed in?

Pyatakov: First of all it was the organization of the terrorist groups in Western Siberia through the West-Siberian centre.

Vyshinsky: For what purpose were they organized in Western Siberia?

Pyatakov: In Western Siberia there was an attempt to kill Molotov.

Vyshinsky: Further?

Pyatakov: In the Ukraine, to kill Kossior and Postyshev. In the Ukraine there was talk with the Ukrainian Trotskyites to the effect that if it were necessary to transfer Trotskyite terrorist cadres to Moscow that would have to be done.

Vyshinsky: With whom was this talk?

Pyatakov: With Loginov.

Vyshinsky: Which cadres?

Pyatakov: No definite persons were mentioned.

Vyshinsky: Whom was that left to?

Pyatakov: That was left to them.

Vyshinsky: To transfer to Moscow, for what purpose?

Pyatakov: For the purpose of committing terrorist acts.

Vyshinsky: Against whom?

Pyatakov: It was not stated specifically.

Vyshinsky: Who was included in your plan?

Pyatakov: The Moscow leaders.

Vyshinsky: Against whom?

Pyatakov: Against the leaders of the Party and the government: Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Orjonikidze. It was a question of committing a number of terrorist acts more or less simultaneously. Trotsky insisted upon this particularly strongly.

Vyshinsky: These were the leaders of our Party and the government whom you had in mind?

Pyatakov: Of course.

Vyshinsky: So in your plan you arranged to bring in terrorists from the Ukraine?

Pyatakov: Yes, if that were needed.

Vyshinsky: For what purpose would it be necessary to bring in terrorists from the Ukraine?

Pyatakov: For the following purpose: we discussed among ourselves. . . .

Vyshinsky: Who are "we"?

Pyatakov: Sokolnikov, I, Radek and Serebryakov, and later it was discussed with Tomsky.

Vyshinsky: What discussions, what did you discuss?

Pyatakov: We discussed the question of carrying out Trotsky's directives to the effect that not scattered blows, but a concentrated terrorist blow was needed.

Vyshinsky: What does a concentrated terrorist blow mean?

Pyatakov: It means, as I have stated already, committing terrorist acts against a number of the leaders of the Party and the government more or less simultaneously. For this purpose it would obviously be necessary to bring in terrorists from outside: from the Ukraine and other places.

Vyshinsky: There was also talk about Transcaucasia?

Pyatakov: Yes, there was also talk about the Transcaucasian terrorists.

Vyshinsky: About this too you talked to the leaders of these groups?

Pyatakov: Not the groups, but with the leaders of the centres. At that time we spoke to Loginov from the Ukraine, and to the Transcaucasian leaders.

Vyshinsky: Who from Trancaucasia did you speak to?

Pyatakov: To Mdivani; Serebryakov spoke to Mdivani about sending Transcaucasian Trotskyite terrorists to Moscow if it were necessary.

Vyshinsky: Comrade President, permit me to question the accused Serebryakov.

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky: Accused Serebryakov, do you confirm Pyatakov's evidence concerning your conversation with Mdivani?

Serebryakov: Yes, this had in view a terrorist act against Yezhov.

Vyshinsky: Especially against Comrade Yezhov?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And it was about this particular case that you spoke to Mdivani?

Serebryakov: Exactly.

Vyshinsky: Did you mention Comrade Yezhov's name to him?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Hence, we have already counted a number of terrorist acts which were being prepared with your participation.

Pyatakov: Quite true.

Vyshinsky: Who operated under your immediate direction in Moscow?

Pyatakov: In Moscow, operating under my immediate direction was the group of Yulin, which included Oskoldsky, Dokuchayev, Koloskov.

Vyshinsky: What object did it pursue?

Pyotakov: The assassination of Stalin and Kaganovich.

Vyshinsky: And you were in immediate charge of this?

Pyatakov: Yes, immediate, as a member of the centre. Further I knew of the existence of terrorist groups connected with Sokolnikov and Radek. One was the group of Zaks-Gladnyev and Tivel, which was connected with Sokolnikov, and the other was the Prigozhin group, which was connected with Radek. Moreover, all the time we intended to call Dreitzer here as we knew that he had terrorist connections.

Vyshinsky: Did you talk about Dreitzer to anybody?

Pyatakov: I talked to Radek.

Vyshinsky: Comrade President, permit me to question the accused Radek.

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky: Accused Radek, tell me, did you have a talk about Dreitzer?

Radek: There was a talk in July 1935.

When we first gathered together after the murder of Kirov there arose the question that it was senseless killing single individuals. This would produce no political results but would only lead to the destruction of the organization. It was therefore necessary to ascertain precisely whether forces were available for serious action or whether there were no such forces.

Vyshinsky: Do I understand you rightly: it was not enough to have killed Comrade Kirov, others must be killed also?

Radek: Either abandon terrorism altogether, or start seriously organizing mass terrorist acts which would give rise to a situation bringing us nearer to power.

Vyshinsky: Hence, it is as I say: it was not enough to limit it to one murder but, either murder a number of leaders, or give it up entirely?

Radek: It is not a question of number, because if three were to be killed one after the other in the course of seven years nothing would come of it; the question stood as follows: if terrorist acts were to serve as a means to seizing power, then the question had to be seriously raised of destroying the leadership of the government.

Vyshinsky: As a whole?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And what did you decide?

Radek: We decided that such a question could be settled on

the basis of a knowledge of the available forces, or on the basis of the prospect of organizing the new forces we needed, and we decided to call Ephim Dreitzer, who, as we knew, had large connections and in the past had many groups of which we were not aware before. Our idea was that our decision would depend on the picture which we would get from Dreitzer (concerning the Trotskyite organization and concerning connections between the Trotskyite terrorist organization and the Rights).

Vyshinsky: Here there is a discrepancy between you and Pyatakov. Pyatakov states the following: an agreement was arrived at with Loginov, an agreement was arrived at with Mdivani, to collect forces and to carry out your criminal designs. Did I understand you correctly, accused Pyatakov?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: But according to Radek, you were still ascertaining what forces were available in order to decide whether to act in this way or to abandon it.

Pyatakov: It refers to what I was saying about preparing the terrorist groups. Serebryakov dealt in this matter with Mdivani, and I with the Ukrainians and Siberians; and here I became convinced, and we agreed with Radek, that the situation being what it was, the forces were still inadequate. . . .

Vyshinsky: This was a conversation with Radek concerning preparation for this terrorist act against a whole group?

Pyatakov: Yes.

I must say that all this was done in the course of carrying out the main directive of Trotsky, who demanded the execution of a group terrorist act. Whether this was to take place all on one day, or within a short period of time, was another matter. Trotsky did not raise this question.

Vyshinsky: It was no longer considered necessary to decide whether to organize this terrorist act or not? That question was regarded as settled?

Pyatakov: Depending on the possibilities available for it.

Vyshinsky: You regarded this question as settled, and it was only a matter of ascertaining the technical possibilities?

Pyatakov: Not only technical.

Vyshinsky: Or did you have to discuss the question in itself?

Pyatakov: The question was whether the terrorist cadres available could do it or not.

Depending on the possibilities at hand, that is how Radek also put the question. Of course, we had no need to discuss the question in itself. The point was that the terrorist acts that were planned were to be carried out depending on the cadres available. The question was considered depending on this. I remember very

well; this was in 1934-35, Serebryakov had a talk with Mdivani. There was a reproach made that counter-revolutionary work was not being developed with sufficient energy. He said that the murder of Beria should be approved. I, from a more criminal point of view, said that such isolated actions would be senseless.

Vyshinsky: You said that there must be more serious preparation?

Pyatakov: Of course.

Vyshinsky: My question concerns the essentials: what was the object of your negotiations with the Ukrainian terrorist group, the Transcaucasian, and the others?

Pyatakov: The object was to commit terrorist acts. We set this task to the terrorist regional centres, and among ourselves, we considered the question of when and how it was to be decided.

Vyshinsky: Now I want to question the accused Radek on this matter.

Radek: Pyatakov is mixing up all the dates.

Vyshinsky: There is a discrepancy between what you two say?

Radek: There is a disagreement between what is recorded in the investigation material.

Vyshinsky: The facts in the investigation material were received from you.

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Our investigation material is also your material.

Radek: I assert that not one of us is refuting the investigation material. It was testified that Trotsky's directive concerning a group terrorist act arrived in January 1936.

Vyshinsky: Trotsky's directives concerning terrorist acts, group acts, were received by you?

Radek: They were.

Vyshinsky: Is that a fact?

Radek: Yes, it is a fact.

Vyshinsky: There is no dispute about that?

Radek: No.

Vyshinsky: Before that directive, were preparations for terrorist acts being made in our country?

Radek: Before we received Trotsky's directives we took our own bearings. In July 1935 the question was raised of it being necessary to ascertain the available forces, whether they were sufficient to proceed in this direction or not. At that time Dreitzer was not here, and we were in a quandary. We were faced with a problem in the sense that without Dreitzer we could not solve it.

Vyshinsky: I would like to clear up the question from the point of view of the disagreements on the first question.

Radek: I do not know when Pyatakov talked to Loginov and

Mdivani, and the others. I understand that it was at the time we summoned Dreitzer.

Vyshinsky: I want to say this: Do you deny, accused Radek, that Loginov was making preparations in the Ukraine for terrorist acts against the Party leaders, Comrades Kossior, Postyshev?

Radek: I do not deny it because I know that Loginov was engaged in preparing terrorist acts against the leaders of the Party.

Vyshinsky: You knew about this?

Radek: I learned about it in January 1935.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, two years ago you knew that Loginov was engaged in preparing terrorist acts against the leaders of the Party and the government?

Radek: For a long period of time.

Vyshinsky: You knew that in Moscow there were groups engaged in preparing terrorist acts?

Radek: One group was under my direction.

Vyshinsky: A group was under your direction?

Radek: In Moscow there was one group which was subordinated to me personally.

Vyshinsky: What was it engaged in?

Radek: This group, subordinated to me personally, was engaged in preparing cadres for the event of an order arriving, to commit a terrorist act.

Vyshinsky: Hence, this was a terrorist group? Do you know that Mdivani was preparing cadres and had set himself the task of committing terrorist acts?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What is the difference?

Radek: The difference revealed itself later. You see, the existence of such groups, the creation of such groups for terrorist acts against a whole group of people—I think it is not in the interest of the state prosecution to develop here how these acts are committed, and it does not correspond to the views with which I am speaking in this Court.

Vyshinsky: These views interest me less than the views you held then.

Radek: But you do not want to hear.

Vyshinsky: In 1931 there was isolated preparation of single terrorist groups?

Radek: Work was carried on in so far as preparing cadres was concerned and in so far as the objects were already decided on, although, it is true, without dates.

Vyshinsky: What were these objects? You say that the objects of the terrorist acts were decided on. What does that mean from your professional criminal point of view? That there were marked

out certain leaders of the Party and the government against whom terrorist acts were being prepared?

Radek: From the moment the *bloc* was formed the circle of persons against whom it was intended to carry out terrorist acts was known.

Vyshinsky: And this is what you are talking about?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Further, I ask you: group preparation—is this a new stage?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What was the disagreement about then?

Radek: The disagreement was that we discussed this new stage, but did not yet decide, not knowing what the line was to be.

Pyatakov: That is what I say, we called Dreitzer for the purpose of ascertaining the possibility of carrying it out.

Vyshinsky: And to decide whether it was possible to commit terrorist acts against groups or whether to stand on the old position?

Radek: We regarded the old position as a stage that had been passed. If it was impossible to go forward, then it were better not to put forward the possibility at all.

Vyshinsky: Where was this discussed? Where was this question raised?

Radek: Pyatakov and I discussed whether we could carry out what, from the point of view of the objects we had set ourselves, was reasonable, or whether we could not?

Vyshinsky: Hence, in January 1936, the question of expediency already arose among you?

Radek: This was not in January 1936, all this refers to January 1935.

Vyshinsky: And so this question arose and you settled it?

Radek: We did not settle it. We did not settle it because we had no grounds upon which to settle it; we had no contact with Dreitzer, he had not shown up for six months, and he was the leader of the terrorist organization.

Vyshinsky: So it depended on Dreitzer?

Radek: It depended on the existence of facts which would enable us to adopt a decision.

Vyshinsky: Hence, had there been cadres you would have adopted one decision; had there been no cadres, owing to technical conditions, you would have adopted another decision?

Radek: Correct. We did not abandon the position of terrorism.

Vyshinsky: Thus you did not abandon the position of terrorism. In principle you were in favour of terrorism?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: But you did not know whether, in the given concrete conditions, you would succeed in carrying out mass terror?

Radek: We tried to ascertain what already existed, and on the other hand, we tried to collect new cadres.

Vyshinsky: Can this be qualified as preparing to organize group terror?

Radek: Preparations were going on all the time; in 1935 these preparations entered the stage of preparing for a group terrorist act, as a new, expanded tactic.

Vyshinsky: You call it a "new expanded tactic," but in the language of the Criminal Code, it is called murder, covered by Article 58[8].

Now then, did you, in the course of 1935 and the beginning of 1936, prepare for a group terrorist act or not?

Radek: I do not know the Criminal Code, so I cannot speak in the language of the code.

Vyshinsky: I think you will know it after the trial.

Radek: I don't think I will know much about it after the trial.

Vyshinsky: That will depend upon the verdict of the Court. At all events, you will know more about it than you know now.

Radek: In the second half of 1935 the first steps were taken to ascertain the possibilities for this act. In 1936, after instructions had been received from Trotsky, and after Pyatakov's arrival from Berlin, I had no more dealings with regard to this matter.

Vyshinsky: You are still avoiding a direct answer to the question. I shall permit myself to repeat my question and ask you to give a straight answer: in the second half of 1935 up to Pyatakov's return from Berlin in 1936, were preparations being made in your midst for a group terrorist act?

Radek: Yes, there were.

Vyshinsky: You confirm this?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions. I ask that the witness Bukhartsev be called to give evidence.

The President (to the Commandant): Please ask witness Bukhartsev to come in.

(Witness Bukhartsev enters the Court.)

The President (to Bukhartsev): You are Bukhartsev, Dmitri Pavlovich?

Bukhartsev: Yes.

The President: Your last position and occupation?

Bukhartsev: Izvestia correspondent in Berlin.

The President: You have been called as a witness in the case of Pyatakov, Radek and others. You must pledge yourself to give true evidence.

Comrade Vyshinsky, since the witness Bukhartsev has been called at your request, please put your questions.

Vyshinsky: Witness Bukhartsev, do you know Radek?

Bukhartsev: Yes, I do

Vyshinsky: A long time?

Bukhartsev: I know him approximately since 1924.

Vyshinsky: Do you also know Pyatakov?

Bukhartsev: I made Pyatakov's acquaintance in 1935.

Vyshinsky: Who introduced you to Pyatakov?

Bukhartsev: I made Pyatakov's acquaintance under the following circumstances. When he was in Berlin I went up to him and introduced myself. He already knew about me.

Vyshinsky: Did you have occasion to enter into relations with Pyatakov in connection with Trotskyite underground work?

Bukhartsev: At the beginning of December 1935, I learned that Pyatakov was coming to Berlin. A few days later a certain Gustav Stirner rang me up on the telephone. I had been put in touch with him some time earlier by Radek.

Vyshinsky: Why did he telephone?

Bukhartsev: He telephoned me and we met. He was Trotsky's man.

Vyshinsky: How do you know that?

Bukhartsev: I know it because when I left Moscow in May 1934, Radek told me that when I arrived in Berlin I would receive a letter in which it would be stated that a journalist who arrived from Vienna was to convey to me greetings from Karl—that would be Trotsky's man.

Vyshinsky: What does Trotsky's man mean?

Bukhartsev: It means a man to whom I could pass on anything Radek entrusted me with for Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: Further, concerning Pyatakov?

Bukhartsev: When Gustav Stirner telephoned me I told him that Pyatakov was expected to arrive within a few days. He said that this was very interesting, that he would try and inform Trotsky of this, and that probably Trotsky would want to see him. A few days later he telephoned again and when I met him he said that Trotsky wanted to see Pyatakov without fail, that he, Stirner, had a letter, or a note, for Pyatakov, and that as soon as Pyatakov arrived he must meet him without fail.

When Pyatakov arrived I went to see him and, choosing a moment when he was alone in his room, told him that there was a man from Trotsky who wanted to hand him a letter and who would arrange for him to meet Trotsky. Pyatakov said that he was very pleased to hear this, that it fully coincided with his intentions, and that he would willingly agree to this meeting.

I saw Stirner and made the arrangements with him, told him that Pyatakov was willing to make the trip, and a meeting with Stirner took place in the Siegesallee, in the Tiergarten.

Vyshinsky: Were you present during the conversation?

Bukhartsev: Yes, I was present. After that I went away and a few days later, probably before Pyatakov's departure from Berlin for Moscow, I met Pyatakov in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin and asked him whether his journey had been successful. He said that he had been and seen.

Vyshinsky: Permit me to ask Pyatakov: Did you give your photograph?

Pyatakov: I did.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Did you have a conversation with Bukhartsev on your return from Oslo?

Pyatakov: Strictly speaking, there was no conversation; I only said that I had been and seen.

Vyshinsky: A question to Bukhartsev: Do you know where Stirner obtained the passport, where he obtained the airplane? How is it so easy to do this in Germany?

Bukhartsev: When I talked to Stirner I asked him how he would obtain a passport. Stirner said: "Don't worry, I will arrange the matter. I have connections in Berlin."

Vyshinsky: What connections?

Bukhartsev: He did not tell me. I imagined they were connections in circles which could do these things.

Vyshinsky: Which circles?

Bukhartsev: German government officials.

Vyshinsky: Did Stirner hint that to you?

Bukhartsev: No, he did not say anything; he said: "I have sufficient connections."

Vyshinsky: And were you not curious about this?

Bukhartsev: He did not tell me anything, did not go into details.

Vyshinsky: But were you curious about this?

Bukhartsev: Since he did not reply. . . .

Vyshinsky. But did you try to ask him?

Bukhartsev: I did, but he did not reply.

Vyshinsky: And the airplane?

Bukhartsev: I asked him how Pyatakov could travel and he said that a special airplane would take Pyatakov to Oslo and back.

Vyshinsky: A special airplane. And you did not ask what special airplane it was?

Bukhartsev: I asked, but he gave me an evasive answer.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet Stirner afterwards?

Bukhartsev: No.

Vyshinsky: He vanished without a trace as far as you were concerned?

Bukhartsev: He did not live in Berlin.

Vyshinsky: Where did he live?

Bukhartsev: The address he gave me was Oslo, General Post Office, *poste restante.*

Vyshinsky: Did you have no occasion to write to this address?

Bukhartsev: No.

Vyshinsky: Hence, he was somebody's man too?

Bukhartsev: He was Trotsky's man.

Vyshinsky: But it was not Trotsky who arranged for the flight across the frontier?

Bukhartsev: That I do not know.

Vyshinsky: You are an experienced journalist; you know that a flight across a frontier from one country to another is not a simple matter?

Bukhartsev: I understood that Stirner was able to do this through German official persons.

The object was a visit to Trotsky. They did not do it for the sake of Stirner's beautiful eyes.

Vyshinsky: Could they not dispense with you in this matter? Why did you take part in this operation?

Bukhartsev: I took part in this operation because some time before that, Radek, who had drawn me into the organization, told me that I must carry out every commission of this nature that he would assign to me. And he then also informed me that Pyatakov was a member of the centre.

Vyshinsky: So you knew that Pyatakov was a member of the centre?

Bukhartsev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you were informed about the criminal activities of the centre?

Bukhartsev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You knew about this?

Bukhartsev: Yes. I was a member of the Trotskyite organization.

Vyshinsky: And at the same time you were the special correspondent of *Izvestia*?

Bukhartsev: Yes, I was the special correspondent of *Izvestia.*

Vyshinsky: Permit me to question Radek.

The President: If you please.

Vyshinsky: Accused Radek, here Bukhartsev testifies that you drew him into this business?

Radek: Yes, it is true.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: Have the accused any questions to put to Bukhartsev? Accused Pyatakov, have you any questions to put to Bukhartsev?

Pyatakov: No.

The President: Accused Radek, have you any questions to put to Bukhartsev?

Radek: No.

The President: Have counsel for defence any questions to put to Bukhartsev?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: According to the rules of procedure we still have 15 minutes. Has the Procurator any questions to put to the accused Pyatakov?

Vyshinsky: Permit me to revert to the examination of Pyatakov during the subsequent stages of the trial if necessary. And for today, I think the session might be adjourned at this point.

The President: The Court adjourns until 11 a. m. tomorrow.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

MORNING SESSION, JANUARY 24, 1937, 11:00 A.M.

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: The session is resumed. We shall proceed to the examination of the accused Radek.

Accused Radek, do you confirm the testimony you gave during the preliminary investigation in December?

Radek: I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: Tell us briefly of your past Trotskyite activities.

Radek: During the Party struggle in 1923 I joined the Trotskyite opposition and belonged to it and to its leadership until the time of my exile in January 1928. While I was in exile I continued to adhere to the Trotskyite position until the time I made the declaration to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in July 1929. All this time I belonged to the political centre of the Trotskyite organization.

Vyshinsky: What dictated your declaration?

Radek: My declaration was dictated, firstly, by the conviction I had come to at that time. I thought over, while in exile, the whole past and the falsity of Trotsky's general position. As regards the fundamental principles of Trotskyism, about the impossibility of building up socialism in one country alone—I had abandoned that position.

The second reason that induced me to make the declaration was the conviction that the accusation of Thermidorism we had made against the Central Committee of the Party was unfounded and that the program of the Five-Year Plan was a program for a great step forward.

But I must say that I still had differences with the Party on questions of internal Party democracy and when I returned to the Party these questions temporarily receded into the background as far as I am concerned, but they were not entirely eliminated by the progress of events. I was convinced that in the future the development of the Five-Year Plan would either lead to the voluntary expansion of internal Party democracy, by the voluntary action of the Party leadership, or would be the cause of a split in the Party.

Thus, summing up my return to the Party, I must confess that since it was not based on a complete concurrence of my views with the views of the Party, there was an element of tacit reservation

in it, of duplicity, although I did not return to the Party with the idea of fighting the Party.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, you returned to the Party while retaining a certain part of your old Trotskyite views?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you said nothing about it?

Radek: Yes, in the declaration which I, Smilga and Preobrazhensky signed, we hinted at this. The leadership of the Party at the time spoke of these hints and pointed them out to us, that we still had certain hangovers, and that if we did not get rid of them they would trip us up. This was what we were literally told. But to speak explicitly, I must say that these hangovers did exist, but that I returned without any intention of fighting the Party.

Vyshinsky: This continued until when?

Radek: When I returned I made a mistake which was the main cause of everything that followed. The current of the sum of views is the sum of human relationships, and you cannot break with the current without breaking with the people together with whom you fought for anti-Party aims.

During the time I belonged to the Trotskyite *bloc* I formed very close relations with a large number of participants in this struggle, and some of these relations dated back to an earlier period, but they grew stronger. For example, my relations with the accused Pyatakov. And when we returned to the Party we maintained these relations—unconcealed—I never concealed them—and constantly visited each other; and this became a stumbling block, because a large number of Trotskyites who had returned to the Party were working in key positions in various parts of the country at a time when the fight for the Five-Year Plan had become acute, when it had assumed the very acute form of clashes with kulaks in some parts of the country and with those elements among the middle peasants who followed the lead of the kulaks, and these former colleagues in the struggle began to flood me with information of the most pessimistic character, information which most fatally affected my opinion of the situation in the country.

Vyshinsky: In what year was this?

Radek: This was in 1930-31. And here there were those transgressions which would have justified my being brought to trial even if I had not belonged to the *bloc*. There was the fact that, knowing from these talks of their vacillations—which already exceeded the bounds of vacillations—I did not consider it possible to inform the leadership of the Party of it. For example, if you were to ask me about my responsibility for the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov, I must say that this responsibility began not from the moment I joined the leadership of the *bloc,* but from that moment

in 1930 when a man with whom I had close relations—Safarov—came to me looking black in the face and tried to convince me that the country was on the verge of ruin, and I did not report this—and what were the consequences? Safarov was connected with Kotolynov. If I had told the Party about Safarov's frame of mind, the Party would have got at the group of the former leaders of the Leningrad Young Communist League who later became the leaders of the assassination of Kirov. And so I declare that my responsibility dates not only from the time I joined the *bloc*, but that the roots of this crime lie in the Trotskyite views with which I returned and which I had not thoroughly abandoned, and in the relations I had retained with the Trotskyite-Zinovievite cadres.

Vyshinsky: With which of the Trotskyites did you retain connections?

Radek: I was connected by ties of friendship with Mrachkovsky. I was connected by old friendship with I. N. Smirnov. I was connected with Dreitzer and with his close assistant, Gayevsky, not to mention the old personal friends with whom I was connected —Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Smilga, and Serebryakov. What formed the second storey in our Trotskyite centre in the period of 1924-27 was all connected with me, I was bound with these cadres by relations of personal intimacy.

Vyshinsky: This was in 1930-31?

Radek: Yes, this was in 1930 and 1931. I appraised the situation as follows: the gains of the Five-Year Plan were enormous, an important step had been made in the direction of industrialization. To a certain extent, the collective farms were already a definite fact. But at the same time, on the basis of the information I then possessed and the appraisal of the situation then made by the Trotskyite economists I was intimate with—I will mention Smilga and Preobrazhensky—I believed that the economic offensive was being conducted on too wide a front, that the material forces available (number of tractors, etc.) would not permit of universal collectivization, and that if this general offensive were not slowed down this would, as we defined it by a catch-phrase, "end like the march on Warsaw," that at this fast rate industrialization would produce no results, but would only cause huge expenditure.

Already at that time, in 1931, I thought it was necessary to hold back the offensive, and to mass resources on definite sectors of the economic front. In short, I dissented on the main question: on the question of continuing the fight for the Five-Year Plan. To analyse these disagreements from the social angle—of course, I then believed the tactics which I regarded as correct to be the best Communist tactics—but if one were to ask for the social analysis

of this thing I would have to say: history's joke was that I overestimated the power of resistance, the ability, not only of the mass of the kulaks, but also of the middle peasants, to pursue an independent policy. I was scared by the difficulties and thus became a mouthpiece of the forces hostile to the proletariat.

This brought me right up to the question of internal Party democracy. People begin to argue about democracy only when they disagree on questions of principle. When they agree they do not feel the need for broad democracy, that goes without saying.

Vyshinsky: That is already an explanation of the fact; I want first to establish the fact itself. This was in 1930-31, and then in 1932 the united centre was organized?

Radek: I knew nothing about it.

Vyshinsky: When did you learn about the existence and the activities of the united centre?

Radek: I learned of its formation in November 1932.

Vyshinsky: From whom?

Radek: Preliminarily, that preparations were being made, I learned from the letter Trotsky wrote to me in February-March 1932. I learned about the actual formation of the organization from Mrachkovsky in November 1932.

Vyshinsky: And in February 1932 you learned from Trotsky that the *bloc* was projected. Was this your first message from Trotsky?

Radek: The first.

Vyshinsky: What was the reason that made Trotsky venture to write to you at a time when you were already in the Party? There are two questions in this question. The first question: did Trotsky know that you had returned to the Party?

Radek: He knew it.

Vyshinsky: Why did he venture to write a letter containing fairly intimate political information to a Trotskyite who had returned to the Party? And the second question: how did you receive it, what were the actual circumstances?

Radek: The explanation is as follows: the Trotskyite leaders who maintained relations with me and who were at that time in communication with Trotsky, knew that I was in favour of holding back the offensive.

Vyshinsky: Namely?

Radek: Mrachkovsky, Dreitzer and Gayevsky. I did not discuss matters at length with Smirnov, but Mrachkovsky knew what my sentiments were.

Vyshinsky: Before 1932?

Radek: Before 1932. They knew that I was for holding back the offensive.

Vyshinsky: That is, that you had retained the old Trotskyite views?

Radek: But at the same time they knew that when any of them insinuated the question of organizing the struggle, I replied in the negative, that nothing could be done, that it was a question of mass processes, and they themselves feared to approach me with what was being prepared.

Vyshinsky: But you already realized that they had begun to prepare something?

Radek: With regard to some of them I was convinced from the very beginning that they had something in the back of their minds when they returned, and, moreover, something was already apparent from certain symptoms. For instance, once when I was walking home from the offices of the *Izvestia,* I saw Smirnov on the Tverskaya with his former, if one may so express it, "Chief of Staff"—Ginsburg. Observing me, they turned down Gnezdnikovsky Pereulok. And I immediately realized that something was in preparation, that something was brewing. But they did not come to me, and did not speak to me openly.

Vyshinsky: In a word, you already at that period noticed that they were engaged in some underground preparatory work?

Radek: I noticed that something was thickening, that sentiments were leading somewhere. But they did not speak openly, because, since the split with Trotsky in 1929 was connected with a great straining of personal relations between me and Trotsky, who regarded me as responsible, or one of those most responsible for the split of the Trotskyites, they feared to address me themselves and considered that this could be overcome only by relations between Trotsky and myself. And to all appearances they informed Trotsky, and, knowing of my frame of mind, requested him to take the first step so as to make it easier for them to approach me.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, it may be formulated in this way: after you had noticed that something was brewing with Mrachkovsky and Smirnov, they in their turn noticed that something was brewing with you?

Radek: They sensed that I was in a depressed frame of mind and that this frame of mind might crystallize into definite actions.

Vyshinsky: That is, in other words, that you too, to some extent, represented soil for action of some sort?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Now it is clear why your correspondence with Trotsky arose. This was in 1932?

Radek: Yes, in February 1932 I received a letter from Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: What did Trotsky write to you then?

Radek: Trotsky wrote that the information he possessed led

him to conclude that I had become convinced that he was right, and that without the realization of the Trotskyite demands the policy would find itself at an impasse. Trotsky further wrote that since he knew me to be an active person he was convinced that I would return to the struggle.

Vyshinsky: And did Trotsky summon you to the struggle?

Radek: At the end of the letter Trotsky wrote approximately as follows: "You must bear in mind the experience of the preceding period and realize that for you there can be no returning to the past, that the struggle has entered a new phase and that the new feature in this phase is that either we shall be destroyed together with the Soviet Union, or we must raise the question of removing the leadership." The word terrorism was not used, but when I read the words "removing the leadership," it became clear to me what Trotsky had in mind.

Vyshinsky: Did you reply to that letter?

Radek: No.

Vyshinsky: How did you take this letter?

Radek: Trotsky informed me that not only the Trotskyites but also the Zinovievites had decided to return to the struggle and that negotiations for union were under way. I sent no reply, believing that the matter must be thought over very thoroughly. Approximately at the end of September or of October 1932, I decided to return to the road of struggle.

Vyshinsky: Did you think this over carefully; did you consult anybody?

Radek: I did not consult anybody.

Vyshinsky: What did you do in a practical way when you decided to take up the struggle again?

Radek: I knew that the leaders of the organization were also waiting and would take certain steps, that Trotsky had also informed them that he had written me, and I expected to meet them. Of course I expected Ivan Nikitich Smirnov or Sergei Vitalyevich Mrachkovsky to come.

Vyshinsky: Did they approach you?

Radek: I knew that one of them would come, and they came, and I gave them a reply in the affirmative.

Vyshinsky: What followed next?

Radek: I had a talk with Mrachkovsky and asked him: where and how do you intend to act? This was at the end of October or beginning of November 1932.

Vyshinsky: Mrachkovsky put questions to you and you put questions to him?

Radek: He asked me: have you received a letter from the old man?

Vyshinsky: Who is the old man?

Radek: He meant Trotsky. He asked me: what have you decided? I replied: if you had not guessed what I had decided you would not have put that question to me. I have decided to go with you. Then I asked him how they visualized the struggle, and what progress had been made in the matter of joining with the Zinovievites.

Vyshinsky: What did Mrachkovsky reply?

Radek: He replied quite definitely that the struggle had entered the terrorist phase and that in order to carry out these tactics they had now united with the Zinovievites and would set about the preparatory work.

Vyshinsky: What preparatory work?

Radek: It was clear that since terrorism was the new position, the preparatory work must consist in assembling and forming terrorist cadres. Later Mrachkovsky told me that since the struggle would be a very severe one and the sacrifices would be enormous, they would like to preserve certain cadres in the event of defeat, that is to say, in the event of arrest, and he said that "this is why we have not included you in the first centre." He said this in reference to me, Pyatakov and Serebryakov.

Vyshinsky: And did he speak to you about Sokolnikov?

Radek: He spoke to me about him later. At this juncture the talk was about Trotskyites. During the first conversation he expressed the following idea: you must break off connections with all the people that used to come and see you, and he said: I forbid Dreitzer to visit you.

Vyshinsky: And was he in a position to forbid Dreitzer to visit you?

Radek: We regarded him as an organizer, the principal one, but although he was not a politician he was a man who gave instructions and who indicated a number of persons who must be held in reserve. We did not stop at this conversation. The first plan was that in the event of their arrest we were to go into action.

Vyshinsky: After the new meeting in 1932 did you have other meetings with Mrachkovsky?

Radek: I met him in the spring and autumn, when he came to Moscow on the pretext of official business, which he had the opportunity to do, and did do. During his visits he would inform me of the state of affairs. He came again in April 1933.

Vyshinsky: Did he tell you anything about Bakayev and Reingold?

Radek: When he later outlined the scheme of organization of the *bloc,* he named Dreitzer as the direct leader of the terrorist

organization on our side, and Bakayev as the leader on the Zinovievites' side.

Vyshinsky: The direct leader of the terrorist organization?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you know anything about the preparations for the assassination of Sergei Mironovich Kirov?

Radek: When we discussed the projected terrorist struggle, the question arose against whom it should be directed in the first place.

Vyshinsky: This was in 1932?

Radek: When the question arose against whom terrorism should be directed, it concerned terrorism directed against the leading core of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet government. And although not a single name was mentioned during this conversation, I know very well who are the leaders and did not have the slightest doubt that the acts were to be directed against Stalin and his immediate colleagues, against Kirov, Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich.

Vyshinsky: Were these your deductions or did he say this?

Radek: There was no necessity to say it because I knew very well who lead the Party and the Soviet government.

Vyshinsky: I request that the accused Radek be presented his testimony (Vol. V, page 106), the record of December 4, which contains a rather different reply to this question.

Allow me to read it. I read from a certified copy of the record:

"Regarding the activities of the Zinovievite-Trotskyite group the information given to me by Mrachkovsky at various times coincides with what was revealed at the trial. He told me. . . ." Who is this "he"?

Radek: Mrachkovsky.

Vyshinsky: ". . . of the role of Bakayev and Reingold, of the preparations for a terrorist act against Stalin in Moscow and Kirov in Leningrad."

Radek: But I said: at various meetings. And it says there: at various meetings. You are now asking me what was said in the conversation in November 1932, and I answer what was said later in the conversation.

Vyshinsky: Did you know from Mrachkovsky about the preparations for terrorist acts against the leaders of the Party and the government?

Radek: In April 1933. Mrachkovsky. . . .

Vyshinsky: Excuse me, so as to adhere to procedure—do you confirm this testimony?

Radek: That I knew that preparations were under way for an assassination?

Vyshinsky: What I have just read to you. "He (that is, Mrachkovsky) told me (that is, you) of the role of Bakayev and Reingold, of the preparations for a terrorist act against Stalin in Moscow and Kirov in Leningrad." Do you confirm that Mrachkovsky told you that?

Radek: If you do not mean that particular meeting, then I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: I do not know what meeting this refers to, that one or another.

Radek: I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: Hence, it transpires that Mrachkovsky did not tell you this in November 1932, but when?

Radek: The conversation about Kirov was connected with the fact that in April 1933 Mrachkovsky asked me whether I could mention any Trotskyite in Leningrad who would undertake the organization of a terrorist group there.

Vyshinsky: Against whom?

Radek: Against Kirov, of course.

Vyshinsky: He requested your assistance?

Radek: Naming a person is assistance, that is clear.

Vyshinsky: And then?

Radek: I named such a person.

Vyshinsky: You named?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Who was it?

Radek: Prigozhin.

Vyshinsky: Prigozhin? Who could find a murderer?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: This was in April 1933?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And when was Kirov killed?

Radek: Kirov was killed in December 1934.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, many months before this villainous crime, you, Radek, knew that the Trotskyites were preparing to murder Kirov?

Radek: I can say even more. I knew that it was being prepared in general, and by the Zinovievites, because since it had been decided to strike at the leaders—Kirov was one of the most prominent leaders, and the Zinovievites had their main centre in Petrograd—it was clear that their terrorist organization intended to strike at Kirov. Moreover, Mrachkovsky told me then that we had nothing in Leningrad; the Zinovievites were preparing there and of course we ought to have our own group. That much in this connection he told me; but he did not tell me when and what would be. He only told me that the Zinovievites in Leningrad

were preparing for an assassination. He told me that, and I very clearly, without any ambiguity, knew that this concerned Kirov.

Vyshinsky: When you say here that Mrachkovsky informed you of the role of Bakayev, what do you mean by that?

Radek: He did not tell me that Bakayev personally directed the assassination of Kirov, but he named him as the leader of all the terrorist groups of the Zinovievites. I did not know whether Bakayev would commit this assassination or entrust it to somebody else, but it was clear to me that the preparations for the assassination could not proceed without Bakayev.

Vyshinsky: And in Moscow?

Radek: It was also from Dreitzer that I learned about the Zinovievites, about the fact that in Moscow Reingold was the leader. When Dreitzer, at Mrachkovsky's request, had to come to see me to inform me concretely, I asked him, what are you doing? This and that. . . .

Vyshinsky: What do you mean by this and that?

Radek: He described to me what the Trotskyites already had, and said that matters were in the stage of the formation of cadres. They were organizing a number of groups and were making it their aim to wage a common struggle with the Zinovievites, to utilize these groups when the period of organization was completed. I asked him who would lead this preparatory work in Moscow on the Zinovievites' side. He said that on the Zinovievites' side the general leadership was in the hands of Bakayev, just as it was in the hands of Mrachkovsky on our side, while Reingold was in charge in Moscow.

Vyshinsky: Thus you were fully informed of the activities of these terrorist groups?

Radek: Of course, as a member of the centre I was fully informed.

Vyshinsky: And you were informed of the fact that practical preparations for assassination were being made?

Radek: I knew about the practical preparations, the assemblage of cadres, the organization of these cadres, the training of these cadres, as a participant of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc* from its very beginning.

Vyshinsky: And also as a participant in the terrorist acts, one of which was the assassination of Kirov?

Radek: And also in the terrorist acts, one of which was the assassination of Kirov.

Vyshinsky: Whom did you meet at that time, and what was the subject of your conversations?

Radek: We agreed that we should meet as little as possible.

Therefore, of the Trotskyites who were members of the first centre, Mrachkovsky was the only one I used to meet. Ivan Nikitich Smirnov was arrested at the beginning of 1933, I think in January. Ter-Vaganyan I had not met since 1932, or since 1931, and in general Ter was not allowed to see me because he had a large circle of acquaintances and it was feared that Ter might cause my detection. Of the members of the Zinovievite centre, until 1932 I met Zinoviev and Kamenev casually. After I joined the movement, in 1933, I did not see them at all. They were at that time in exile because of their part in and connection with the opposition platform. After they returned, Zinoviev came to see me twice in 1934. Furthermore, I saw Kamenev once in the offices of the *Bolshevik*. But I saw them only in public or in our editorial offices, at a banquet in behalf of an antiquarian bookshop with which we writers were all connected. I never discussed these things with Kamenev. If it is a question of my connection with the Zinovievite part of the *bloc,* before the assassination of Kirov this connection consisted in three meetings with Zinoviev. And there was one meeting in the summer of 1934 with G. Y. Sokolnikov, not a member of the first centre but a member of the reserve centre. If it is a question of my meetings with my colleagues of the reserve centre—Trotskyites—I saw Pyatakov in December 1932, a second time at the end of 1933; in 1934 I saw him in the summer, in July; in 1935 I saw him in July and December; in 1936 I saw him in January. Serebryakov I saw in 1933, in 1935 and in 1936. I saw Sokolnikov three times.

Vyshinsky: And so it may be considered established that you learned about terrorism from Mrachkovsky?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: This was before you received the letter from Trotsky?

Radek: This was after I received the letter from Trotsky. The letter from Trotsky was received in February or March 1932.

Vyshinsky: That is, in February 1932 you received a letter from Trotsky in which he already spoke of the necessity of getting rid of. . . .

Radek: Removing.

Vyshinsky: . . . of the necessity of removing; consequently, you understood that terrorism was meant?

Radek: Of course.

Vyshinsky: If the materials of the preliminary investigation are correct, you were in Geneva in the spring of 1932?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In Geneva did you meet with anybody and speak of subjects of this kind?

Radek: The only Trotskyite I met in Geneva was V. Romm. He brought me a letter from Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: That is, you received this letter from Trotsky in Geneva?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How are these dates to be reconciled—February 1932 and the spring?

Radek: February in Geneva is already the beginning of the spring, and so I conceived this period as the spring. It may have been in March.

Vyshinsky: And so, let us get all these facts right. You received the letter from Trotsky in Geneva in the spring of 1932 through V. Romm. Did you receive the letter from Trotsky through Romm unexpectedly?

Radek: About Romm's connections with Trotsky I personally knew nothing until that moment. I know Romm since 1922. During the period of the Party struggle, when the Trotskyite opposition was formed, he was not active in a general sense, in the general Trotskyite work. He adhered to us on the Chinese question. He is an expert on foreign policy. He is interested in the Far East. Through the differences with the Comintern on the Chinese question, he became preoccupied with this question, and since we had been close in work on foreign affairs, I was the person closest to him, from whom he took his bearings. When I returned from exile, about a year after that, Romm, who had been in Tokio, came to Moscow. We said nothing definitely about the struggle against the Party, but I told him that the situation in the country was fraught with upheavals and said to him: "Volodya, we may have to become active again."

Vyshinsky: This was in 1931?

Radek: In 1931, probably. Therefore Romm is quite right when he says in his testimony that when he was asked to transmit this letter, he considered that by transmitting the letter to me he would be executing my wishes. And when Romm says that I am responsible for his return to the opposition, it is true. It was I who led him into a Soviet prison.

Vyshinsky: What do you know about the terrorist activities of other groups?

Radek: I cannot fix the dates of the first period. I understand your question to be: what do I know about the whole period. I will mention the groups. I had unspecified information in the period of 1933-34 about the existence of groups, of the organization of a number of groups in Moscow. They were led by Dreitzer, but I did not know their personnel. That was the preparatory stage. Apart from Moscow I knew in 1934 about the formation of a

group which we, among ourselves, called the "historical or hysterical" group. It was a group consisting of historians under the leadership of Friedland. I learned about this group because in 1934 Dreitzer's deputy, Gayevsky, informed me that a group of serious people was being formed, that it would not operate now and would be kept in reserve in case of discovery.

I knew of the existence of the Zinovievite organization in Leningrad.

About the Trotskyite organizations I knew that Prigozhin was forming a group there, but I did not know of whom. When he reported to me in 1934 he mentioned three or four names, which meant nothing to me, and I cannot say who they were. I recalled one during the preliminary examination and I mentioned it.

About the Ukraine, Yuri Leonidovich Pyatakov told me that the Ukrainian centre—he named Kotsyubinsky, Golubenko and, I think, Loginov—was forming a terrorist group which would act against the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet government of the Ukraine.

As regards the Siberian group, Pyatakov told me that it was being formed there. I think that he mentioned the name of Muralov in this connection.

In addition, he said that some kind of terrorist group had been formed, or was being formed in Tula.

Vyshinsky: Did Pyatakov mention names?

Radek: He did not mention names and leaders but said that this group was connected with Dityateva. Moreover, much later, in 1935, I heard of the formation of a group in Rostov-on-Don by Byeloborodov. It was also known that Mdivani had formed a group.

In 1935 I heard about the Zinoviev group, this was the Zaks-Gladnyev group with which my assistant, Tivel, was connected in Moscow. He came to me and stated, on Sokolnikov's instructions, as he said, that as he was working in my office he was subjecting me to great danger as he was connected with this group. He came to me and said that this group existed, that he was connected with it, that apparently it was broken up in Petrograd and had transferred its activities to Moscow where it was engaged in preparing for a terrorist act against the leaders of the Party and the government. At first they intended to make an attempt in the very premises of the Central Committee, as he told me. When I told him that this was sheer madness he agreed with me and said that simultaneously they were watching outside the building of the Central Committee, keeping track of the routes used by the members of the government and members of the Central Committee of the Party.

Vyshinsky: A whole lot of groups?

Radek: Yes. I did not know about all of them, I was not in immediate charge of this act. But if we are to speak of political, juridical and moral responsibility, you may hold me responsible for all the groups, even for those of which I did not know.

That means that I must bear responsibility for all the centre did through the medium of its organs.

Vyshinsky: Do you know about the terrorist group which operated in Tula?

Radek: I knew of its existence.

Vyshinsky: Did you know that it existed as a terrorist group?

Radek: Of course.

Vyshinsky: That it was preparing an attempt on the lives of the leaders of our Party and government?

Radek: Why, clearly.

Vyshinsky: That was clear to you?

Radek: That is all a terrorist group is engaged in.

Vyshinsky: And you knew that?

Radek: Of course.

Vyshinsky: From whom did you hear that?

Radek: From Pyatakov. He did not tell me anything definite about the personnel, but he said there was a group in Tula under the direction of Dityateva.

Vyshinsky: Hence you heard of this from Pyatakov?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And what about the Urals?

Radek: I don't remember anything about the Ural group; I cannot mention any names. I had heard about the Yulin group.

Vyshinsky: What about Western Siberia?

Radek: About Western Siberia. One of the leaders mentioned was Muralov.

Vyshinsky: From whom did you hear about him?

Radek: From Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: What about the Byeloborodov group?

Radek: I had heard about the existence of the Byeloborodov group from two sources: from Pyatakov and from Evgeny Preobrazhensky.

Vyshinsky: What about the Zaks-Gladnyev group in Moscow?

Radek: I heard about it first from Tivel, and later I had confirmation of its existence during a conversation with Sokolnikov.

Vyshinsky: And lastly the Prigozhin group?

Radek: The Prigozhin group of Leningrad. I learned of its existence from the fact that at Mrachkovsky's request I sent Dreitzer to Prigozhin, and when Prigozhin arrived in Moscow I asked him: "What have you done with the people you had over there?" He

replied that he had put them in touch with the Trotskyite, Zeidel. It was he whom I instructed to get in touch with Friedland.

Vyshinsky: Who directed the Prigozhin group?

Radek: As it did not go into action and existed three or four months, during which they only negotiated, evidently the question of leadership in the technical sense never arose among them.

Vyshinsky: Who was responsible for this organization?

Radek: Prigozhin was responsible to us for this group.

Vyshinsky: Who was responsible for the organization of this group?

Radek: Prigozhin.

Vyshinsky: And who directed Prigozhin?

Radek: Prigozhin was subordinated to Dreitzer, but as Dreitzer never got to him, obviously, if it were necessary to give him any instructions, I would have given them.

Vyshinsky: If you give instructions you are the leader?

Radek: If I give instructions I am the leader, but what I did so far was to give instructions to create this group. I had no occasion to direct it; but had there been occasion to do so I would have directed it.

Vyshinsky: You created the group?

Radek: The group was created by Prigozhin.

Vyshinsky: But Prigozhin was suggested by you?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: He was the man you sent for that purpose?

Radek: He was the man I found for the purpose of organizing a terrorist group.

Vyshinsky: On your instructions did he get in touch with the Zinovievites, or with Mrachkovsky, or with Dreitzer?

Radek: I cannot say what actually happened. Mrachkovsky asked me, but as regards Prigozhin I said that this fellow was no use for any sort of serious terrorist work, either as an executor or as an organizer—a terrible squabbler, who would upset the group from the very start; but he was to look for people. The question arose of testing these people. We thereupon agreed that Dreitzer should test this group either himself or through this man. Neither Dreitzer nor Mrachkovsky ever told me what they did about this. As for Prigozhin, he reported to me in the summer of 1934 that he had found, as he thought, some suitable people, but they had no time to do anything as he was transferred to Moscow.

Such was the concrete situation.

Vyshinsky: But did he apply to you frequently during this period of time concerning terrorist affairs?

Radek: I saw him in 1933 when I gave him instructions, and in the summer of 1934 when he moved to Moscow. His statement

that he saw me in 1935 is untrue, as are three-quarters of Prigozhin's statements regarding other persons.

Vyshinsky: Let us take those facts which are true according to you.

Did you see Prigozhin in the autumn of 1934?

Radek: That was in July or August, but in 1934 I only saw him once. He told me that he had begun to prepare people, to select them, but he was transferred and they had no time to do anything.

Vyshinsky: Why was it necessary for him to tell you rather than anyone else that he had selected people?

Radek: Because I had given him these instructions.

Vyshinsky: So it was you who found Prigozhin? You sent Prigozhin to Leningrad?

Radek: He lived in Leningrad.

Vyshinsky: With whom did you put him in touch?

Radek: He was to put me in touch, not I him.

I said to him: "The task of the centre is to form a terrorist group in Leningrad; select the people and then let me see how things are going."

Vyshinsky: Hence, as far as this part is concerned, the responsibility for directing Prigozhin's work in preparing for this act lies on whom?

Radek: On me.

Vyshinsky: Who then directed Prigozhin in this preparatory work?

Radek: I, Radek.

Vyshinsky: In the autumn, when he told you that he was transferred to Moscow, what was the upshot of your conversation with him at that time?

Radek: That he would be transferred to the Friedland group and see to it that it was not exposed. This was a terrorist group. I did not know all its members, but three names were mentioned to me: Friedland, Vanag and Piontkovsky. The group was under the direct supervision of Gayevsky and he said to me: "This will be your reserve." Gayevsky was Dreitzer's deputy.

Vyshinsky: Who represented the centre?

Radek: Dreitzer was directly connected with Mrachkovsky.

Vyshinsky: And who in this group had connection with your special centre?

Radek: Mrachkovsky attached Gayevsky to me for contact purposes.

Vyshinsky: Hence Prigozhin represented you, and you are responsible?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you found him, established connection with him and put him on terrorist work?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was Gayevsky connected with Dreitzer's terrorist group?

Radek: I must explain.

Vyshinsky: Give me a straight answer.

Radek: Gayevsky was the man Dreitzer attached to me in the event of it being necessary to communicate with Dreitzer.

Vyshinsky: Hence, he was connected with you from the centre. Consequently, the line runs from the centre to Prigozhin, from you to Gayevsky. Hence, you were connected with the Dreitzer group through Gayevsky. Thus, you also directed the Dreitzer group.

Radek: No, Dreitzer was subordinated to Mrachkovsky, and Gayevsky was attached to me for contact purposes.

Vyshinsky: Who gave them their instructions?

Radek: Mrachkovsky. Up to Mrachkovsky's arrest, Dreitzer was subordinated to Mrachkovsky.

Vyshinsky: And after Mrachkovsky's arrest you established connection with Dreitzer?

Radek: After Mrachkovsky's arrest I did not manage to establish any connection with Dreitzer; I did not see him and was unable to obtain any information or intimations from him.

Vyshinsky: But these connections were to have passed to you?

Radek: Yes, to me.

Vyshinsky: As a member of the reserve centre?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You were to have established connection with Friedland as a member of the terrorist group. In that period who directed all the activities?

Radek: If you ask me who directed, then, of course, had Prigozhin come and told me about the preparatory work I would have had to reply.

Vyshinsky: Hence, Prigozhin had to receive instructions on the preparatory work in that period from you and he was not connected with the other members?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is why you say that you personally directed his terrorist activities and personally guided him?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: With whom else did you discuss the question of terrorism?

Radek: I discussed it with the members of the centre whom I

had occasion to meet and with whom I had to settle certain questions.

Vyshinsky: Whom can you name?

Radek: I have named Preobrazhensky. I can also state with whom there was a conversation along general lines—that was Smilga.

Vyshinsky: And the group of the Rights?

Radek: It goes without saying that I was connected with Bukharin.

Vyshinsky: It goes without saying? What concrete facts can you mention concerning connections with the group of the Rights?

Radek: I had connections only with Bukharin. I saw Tomsky only in 1933 when he spoke in very sharp terms about the internal situation in the Party.

Vyshinsky: What conversations did you have with Bukharin?

Radek: If you mean conversations about terrorism I can enumerate them concretely. The first conversation took place in June or July 1934, after Bukharin came to work for *Izvestia*. At that time he and I conversed as members of two centres which were in contact with each other. I asked him: "You have taken the path of terrorism?" He said: "Yes." When I asked him who was directing this activity he mentioned Uglanov and himself, Bukharin. During the conversation he said to me that it was necessary to prepare cadres from among the academic youth. Technical and other concrete matters were not discussed in our conversation. Mrachkovsky once tried to put this question to Bukharin, but Bukharin replied: "When you are appointed commander-in-chief of all the terrorist organizations we will put it all out on the table for you."

Vyshinsky: So Bukharin kept things secret?

Radek: Kept things secret in the same way as I kept things secret from him in these matters, apart from what Mrachkovsky related; but there was no doubt that Mrachkovsky was directing these activities in our centre.

Vyshinsky: What other conversations did you have?

Radek: That was one conversation about terrorism.That was all he told me on that occasion. The next conversation regarding terrorism—in fact, two or maybe three conversations—took place at the end of December 1934, after the assassination of Kirov. These conversations took place under great difficulties, because the editorial staff at that time was working all night almost without a break. Bukharin's office was continually frequented by a large number of people, and only on the second day or on the third day —I cannot exactly say which—did I succeed in finding a spare moment, when we first exchanged opinions. As neither he nor I knew the name of Nikolayev, did not even know that Nikolayev

was a member of the Party at the moment when he carried out the assassination, it was clear to us that the assassination was the work of one of the terrorist groups either of the *bloc* or of the Right groups. We could not for the moment decide which it had been, but it was clear to us that it was the work of these organizations.

This was the first thing we decided in the first conversation. In subsequent conversations, when the situation had become clearer, we reverted to this subject, discussing it pithily as was usually the case when we met in such a way, and exchanged opinions regarding our estimate of the political consequences of the assassination of Kirov.

We became convinced that this murder had not produced the results the organizers had expected. It was not justified by the results; it was not a blow at the Central Committee; it did not rouse sympathy among the masses of the people as the Trotskyites-Zinovievites had expected it would; on the contrary, it resulted in the masses of the people uniting around the Central Committee; it led to the arrest of a large number of Zinovievites and Trotskyites.

Already at that time we said to ourselves: either this act, the result of the tactics of individual terrorism, demands the cessation of terrorist actions or it demands that we go further and commit a terrorist act against a whole group.

These were the first ideas we exchanged under the impression of the situation that had been created by the assassination of Kirov.

Bukharin informed me that in their centre there were many who considered that it would be frivolous and cowardly to give up terrorism altogether because of the results of Kirov's murder; that, on the contrary, it was necessary to pass on to a systematic, thought-out, serious struggle, to pass on from guerrilla tactics to planned terrorism.

Vyshinsky: I am interested in this very question about guerrilla tactics. It is just the subject which you touched upon yesterday.

Radek: All of us who were closely associated with the leadership of the Rights or with the leadership of the Zinovievite-Trotskyite *bloc* could not fail to talk, could not fail to think about this matter from the moment when we were confronted with the lesson of the assassination of Kirov; and I must admit that I had thought about it even before that.

Vyshinsky: And from what angle, exactly, did you think about it?

Radek: I have no practical experience whatsoever in the sphere of terrorist struggle, but I know from history, from books—

not only the history of Narodnaya Volya, I know the great practical experience of the Polish terrorists—and so I had to ask myself whether it was possible for the *bloc* to achieve the aims it had set itself by firing at individual people, and firing, moreover, at long intervals. Moreover—in answer to this question—I knew something about the difference of our organs of state security from other such organs in other countries and in the old days. I knew that, as distinct from the latter, our organs of state security have the tremendous support of the broadest masses of the people, who will inform them about any suspicious case; and while they might let themselves be taken unawares on one occasion, they are sufficiently versed in sociology to understand that such things as the assassination of Kirov are not like pimples which burst out for a short time and then disappear, but that they are the expression of certain incipient groups and tendencies. I was therefore convinced that the organs of state security would take all measures to render impossible the carrying out of individual terrorist acts.

In addition to this, I stood in too close proximity to the leadership not to see that these measures were already being taken in practice. And it was clear to me that we were therefore confronted with the question: either this individual terrorist action could be carried on at random in the hope that something would come of it—and this was a senseless idea—or the fighting side must understand and face the question of what it could do. And such an idea about what to do was present in our minds. The gist of these ideas, if we take the political side of the matter, was that here it was a question of selecting persons of quite a specific type from a specific point of view, that this was decisive—a specific selection connected with this plan.

I discussed this question in July 1935 with Bukharin, with Pyatakov and Sokolnikov.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you were not a supporter of guerrilla methods of action?

Radek: I was an opponent of guerrilla tactics from the very beginning.

Vyshinsky: You did not consider this method a serious one? Permit me to ask you, and you will answer afterwards. I ask you: were there, then, two systems of terrorist struggle? One, which you call the guerrilla system, and another, which you have called planned and serious work?

Radek: Yes. Therefore I did not consider the path of individual terrorism a serious one.

Vyshinsky: Did you stand for the first or the second system of terrorist struggle?

Radek: I stood for the old system until I became convinced that

this struggle was just a guerrilla struggle. Then I stood for a systematic terrorist struggle.

Vyshinsky: When you were informed about the activities of the Tivel group, about the Zaks-Gladnyev group, about the Prigozhin group or about his activities, about the Zeidel group, about the Byeloborodov group, about the Muralov group—what was your point of view then?

Radek: These were groups which arose at various times. Permit me, therefore, to split up my reply.

Vyshinsky: I am referring to the period as a whole.

Radek: You are referring to two periods: up to the end of 1934 and after.

Vyshinsky: In what period did the Muralov group arise?

Radek: I heard about it in 1935.

Vyshinsky: Very well, we will ask Muralov. Accused Muralov, were you the leader of the terrorist group in Western Siberia?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Since when?

Muralov: Since 1931.

Vyshinsky: Until. . . .

Muralov: Until the day of my arrest.

Vyshinsky: Were you a supporter of the guerrilla system or of the organized, planned system?

Muralov: Generally speaking I am not a guerrilla fighter, and took measures to prevent guerrilla methods and to have organized action.

Vyshinsky: Ever since 1931?

Muralov: Later, approximately, as Radek says, after 1934.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, after the murder of Kirov?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And before that murder you were not clear about the system?

Muralov: No.

Vyshinsky: But you had a group and were engaged in preparations?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Radek): When did you hear about the Byeloborodov group?

Radek: I heard about it in 1935.

Vyshinsky: And about the Zeidel group?

Radek: I heard about it at the end of 1934; I did not know exactly whether it was definitely formed, or whether it referred only to Zeidel personally. I had no precise information.

Vyshinsky: What about the Mdivani group?

Radek: I heard about it in December 1935.

Vyshinsky: So that you knew of most of them after the murder of Kirov?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In that period all the groups existed, all were making preparations?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you still called this guerrilla tactics?

Radek: Guerrilla tactics in every way.

Vyshinsky: Hence, your position was the same as that adopted by these groups, you were in agreement with these groups, gave instructions to these groups; nevertheless, you thought they would not lead to the proper results and that the tactics ought to be changed?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Hence, in that period, in 1934-35, your position was that of organized, systematic, perpetration of whole groups of terrorist acts?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you discuss this with other members of the centre?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: With whom in particular?

Radek: I distinctly remember that I discussed it with Pyatakov and Sokolnikov.

Vyshinsky: Hence, your position at that time was that you recognized the necessity of a systematic, regular, organized group struggle?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: But you did not regard these groups as the organized group struggle you were thinking about?

Radek: That is so—neither in personnel nor in the tasks they set themselves.

Vyshinsky: Having come to the conclusion that it was necessary to pass to committing terrorist acts against groups, did you take any measures to organize this struggle?

Radek: I did. In July 1935 I raised the question, first before Pyatakov, and later before Sokolnikov in a conversation I had with him: either we continue the struggle or we abandon it.

Vyshinsky: What was the reply?

Radek: The answer was: "We shall continue." In that case it was necessary to know what forces we had at our disposal.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, the first point was to take stock of your forces?

Radek: Yes, the first point was to take stock of our forces. The second point: when we knew what forces we had at our disposal,

we had to draw up a plan of action, and in accordance with this plan of action, decide whether these forces were suitable or whether we had to create new forces to carry out the plan.

Vyshinsky: If these forces were suitable, set them to work, and if unsuitable. . . .

Radek: If unsuitable, then there was no sense in setting them to work. These were not specialists who could engage in nothing but terrorism.

Vyshinsky: I am not interested to know what kind of specialists they were or what they could do besides. If these forces were unsuitable, what had to be done?

Radek: In that case we had to form new forces, from the viewpoint of our objectives.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, either set these forces to work after testing their qualities, or prepare new forces? You, as a member of the centre, had the task of taking stock of the forces, ascertaining their fighting capacity, and setting them to work or preparing new ones as the case might be?

Radek: Yes, that was how matters stood.

Vyshinsky: What measures did you take?

Radek: Then we decided to put an end to the situation in which nobody bore responsibility for the terrorist work. We decided to call Dreitzer, whom, after Mrachkovsky's arrest, we regarded as the most suitable person to direct terrorist acts, to ascertain what he intended to do and jointly with him to draw up a plan.

Vyshinsky: Hence, first of all you wanted to unify the leadership of the terrorist groups?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And whom did you think of as leader?

Radek: Dreitzer.

Vyshinsky: Did you establish contact with him?

Radek: I wrote a letter to Dreitzer. I could not go to Krivoy Rog myself. I wrote in veiled language. In such cases it is customary to send a postcard with a love message. I wrote him that after the disaster that had befallen father we had to settle what to do next. You do not know how much we have left, we do not know what you are doing, and so forth. Be sure to come. This family tangle must be straightened out.

In answer, I received a letter from him saying he was lying sick; no one came to visit him, and he could not leave; as soon as he got well he would come. At first I thought that Dreitzer had some information of a conspirative character which prevented him from acting at that moment, that perhaps he knew he was under suspicion—so I said to myself. But several months passed and no answer came from Dreitzer. And then I began to grow suspicious;

I knew Dreitzer too well to think that it was a case of cowardice or excessive caution, and I did not believe that Dreitzer was unable to find a way of getting in touch with me.

At first we, too, did nothing after the assassination of Kirov, but months passed—July, August, September, October—and not a word from Dreitzer. Then I decided to arrange to go to Dniepropetrovsk to speak there, so that I could get there in this way and see Dreitzer. I was frequently receiving applications from Dniepropetrovsk to deliver a lecture in Zaporozhye and Krivoy Rog, so I resolved that at one of the forthcoming Party plenums I would have a talk with one of the secretaries either from Dniepropetrovsk or from Krivoy Rog, and say I wanted to see the Dnieper Power Station again, so that they would invite me to come there and I would thus be able to see Dreitzer. Then came a new event: Trotsky's December directives, which presented all the problems in their full scope. It was no longer a question of the plan now, but of something much broader.

Vyshinsky: In what year was this?

Radek: In 1935. But notwithstanding this, we decided to call a conference. And before this—in January, when I arrived—Vitaly Putna came to see me with some request from Tukhachevsky. I said: "This is no way for a leader to act. There has been no news of this man for six months. Get hold of him, dead or alive." Putna promised. But when I received no answer from Putna, I wrote Dreitzer a letter telling him categorically that "by the end of February or the beginning of March you must be here." And I received the reply from him: "I'm coming." So from this appraisal that I had made of guerrilla tactics, I drew practical conclusions, endeavouring to find out the exact position in order to put an end to guerrilla tactics and to see whether we could go on to something more decisive that would give us certain prospects from the viewpoint of terrorist action. I must say that whereas before receiving Trotsky's directives my endeavours to get Dreitzer to come had been made with the positive aim of getting him for a planned terrorist action, the situation underwent a decisive change for me from the moment of Trotsky's last directive, about which you will probably ask me specially.

Vyshinsky: While you were ascertaining what forces you had and were looking for Dreitzer, all these groups continued to exist and function?

Radek: They continued to exist and function.

Vyshinsky: And you knew about this?

Radek: I knew about it in part.

Vyshinsky: Very well. Now let us pass to your work in the sphere of foreign relations.

The President: Adjournment for 20 minutes.

* * *

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: The session is resumed. Are there any questions?

Vyshinsky: Accused Radek, will you please tell the Court about the contents of your correspondence with Trotsky concerning questions of, if one may so express it, foreign policy.

The President: I must warn you, accused Radek, that you must not in open court mention the names of official foreign institutions or the names of their officials.

Radek: May I mention the names of countries?

The President: I repeat, you must not mention the names of official foreign institutions or the names of officials in open Court.

Radek: I received three letters from Trotsky: in April 1934, in December 1935 and in January 1936. In the letter of 1934 Trotsky put the question in this way: the accession of fascism to power in Germany had fundamentally changed the whole situation. It implied war in the near future, inevitable war, the more so that the situation was simultaneously becoming acute in the Far East. Trotsky had no doubt that this war would result in the defeat of the Soviet Union. This defeat, he wrote, will create favourable conditions for the accession to power of the *bloc*. And from this he drew the conclusion that the *bloc* was interested in sharpening the conflicts. He reproached Sokolnikov and myself for committing ourselves in too personal a way in the struggle for peace, but, he said, if such are your duties, nothing can be done about it: but why, when talking with a certain representative of a certain Far Eastern power, did not Sokolnikov give a sufficiently clear answer, showing his solidarity with the démarche which Trotsky had already made in regard to this power? In this letter Trotsky stated that he had established contacts with a certain Far Eastern state and a certain Central European state, and that he had openly told semi-official circles of these states that the *bloc* stood for a bargain with them and was prepared to make considerable concessions both of an economic and territorial character. In his letter he demanded that we in Moscow take the opportunity to confirm to the representatives of these states our agreement with his steps. I communicated the contents of this letter to Pyatakov and asked him whether he, Pyatakov, knew about this conversation of Sokolnikov with Far Eastern diplomats which had caused Trotsky's dissatisfaction.

Pyatakov said that he knew nothing about it.

Vyshinsky: What was it that caused dissatisfaction in this conversation?

Radek: From the letter it was supposed that I knew Kamenev's instructions. I personally understood that Sokolnikov had evidently confined himself to confirming the mandate, and thought that Pyatakov knew more concretely. Here I slightly differ from what Sokolnikov has said. At all events in July 1934 Sokolnikov visited me at the *Izvestia* offices and communicated to me the substance of the conversation he had had with Mr. ——. Sokolnikov said: "Just imagine, I am conducting official negotiations at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. The conversation draws to a close. The interpreters have left the room. The official representative of a certain foreign state, Mr. ——, suddenly turned to me and asked: am I informed about the proposals Trotsky has made to his government? I replied," said Sokolnikov, "that I was, that these were serious proposals and advice, and that I and my friends were in agreement with them." Sokolnikov also said that Kamenev had warned him some time previously that representatives of foreign countries might approach him or me and that at that time, as far as I remember, there was some kind of advice which Trotsky had given them concerning the position in the Far East. And here Sokolnikov, a very restrained man in general—and still more restrained in regard to me, since our relations were purely business ones and not personal relations—showed great irritation and said to me: "How does Trotsky visualize that? How can I, as Assistant People's Commissar, conduct such negotiations? This is an absolutely impossible situation." I do not recall precisely how he expressed himself, but it was very disapprovingly in regard to this advice. Thereupon I said to him, "Don't get excited. He obviously does not understand the situation here." Pyatakov and I arrived at the conclusion that we could not go beyond endorsing the mandate for negotiations. We could not conduct negotiations here, in the first place because we would have to conduct these negotiations with third-rate persons, in the second place because we did not know just what Trotsky had said, and in the third place because we did not think it wise to conduct negotiations under the eyes of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs—we did not think that these were good conditions for the negotiations, and I was to write to Trotsky to this effect.

I draw special attention to the fact that I spoke to Sokolnikov because I was afraid that since Sokolnikov was representing the Zinovievite organization, and he and I were not on very intimate terms, a rift might be caused owing to the scolding which Trotsky had given him from abroad.

Through Romm, who went abroad in May, I sent Trotsky a letter acknowledging the receipt of his instructions and stating that we had agreed among ourselves not to take any steps beyond

endorsing his mandate to negotiate with foreign countries. In addition, I added: not only we officially as the centre, but I personally approved of his seeking contacts with foreign states. But while still at Geneva I was told that if, in the light of old experience, we wanted to avoid the aggravation of disagreements that might arise in the course of our work, he asked me to write with complete frankness if I had any doubts about his proposals and steps. I wrote that what I regarded in his directive as indisputable was the fact that if the *bloc* was reckoning with the possibility of coming to power in one way or another as a real possibility, this could not happen in a vacuum, for the U.S.S.R. existed among other states, and we must therefore know what the enemy wanted, what he was aiming at, what he could demand, how far he was ready to go, and that therefore not only we officially, as a centre, but I personally approved of the fact that he was seeking contact. But on my own part I would take the liberty of drawing his attention to the following: that in the first place, considering the state in which the *bloc* was, it would only compromise itself completely by establishing such contact directly, would deliver itself into the enemy's hands.

As the third point concerning aims, I told him the following: that it was one thing to take the stand that war would create the conditions under which the *bloc* would come to power, and another thing to try to bring about this war; that, leaving on one side the whole political significance of the endeavour to bring about war, I drew his attention—this was my private opinion, as I wrote—to the fact that the *bloc,* which existed in 1933, could do very little, because owing to the exile of Zinoviev and Kamenev, it had wound up its activities and was in the first stage of organization; and that even if this war were to begin now, it would lead to defeat, but we would be engulfed by the war and would not play any role whatever. I wrote this to him, for I thought that none of the others would venture to voice these warnings, and so I deemed it necessary to write to him.

Vyshinsky: This was in May 1934?

Radek: This was in May 1934. In the autumn of 1934, at a diplomatic reception, a diplomatic representative of a Central European country who was known to me, sat down beside me and started a conversation. Well, he started this conversation in a manner that was not very stylish. He said (speaking German): "I feel I want to spew. . . . Every day I get German newspapers and they go for you tooth and nail; and I get Soviet newspapers and you throw mud at Germany. What can one do under these circumstances?" He said: "Our leaders" (he said that more explicitly) "know that Mr. Trotsky is striving for a rapprochement

with Germany. Our leader wants to know, what does this idea of Mr. Trotsky's signify? Perhaps it is the idea of an émigré who sleeps badly? Who is behind these ideas?" It was clear that I was being asked about the attitude of the *bloc.* I could not suppose that this was an echo of any of Trotsky's articles, because I read everything that was written by Trotsky, watched what he wrote both in the American and in the French press; I was fully informed about what Trotsky wrote, and I knew that Trotsky had never advocated the idea of a rapprochement with Germany in the press. If this representative said that he knew Trotsky's views, that meant that this representative, while not, by virtue of his position, a man whom his leader treated confidentially, was consequently a representative who had been commissioned to ask me. Of course, his talk with me lasted only a couple of minutes; the atmosphere of a diplomatic reception is not suited for lengthy perorations. I had to make my decision literally in one second and give him an answer, and I told him that altercation between two countries, even if they represent diametrically opposite social systems, is a fruitless matter, but that sole attention must not be paid to these newspaper altercations. I told him that realist politicians in the U.S.S.R. understand the significance of a German-Soviet rapprochement and are prepared to make the necessary concessions to achieve this rapprochement. This representative understood that since I was speaking about realist politicians it meant that there were realist politicians and unrealist politicians in the U.S.S.R.: the unrealist politicians were the Soviet government, while the realist politicians were the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc.* And he also understood that what I meant was: if the *bloc* comes into power it will make concessions in order to bring about a rapprochement with your government and the country which it represents. In making that reply I understood that I was committing an act inadmissible for a citizen of the Soviet Union.

Vyshinsky: This is all connected with the first letter?

Radek: This was a result of the first letter, but it was not the only result of that letter.

Vyshinsky: Did you, between April and November 1934, have any conversation with other members of the centre on the subjects connected with this letter?

Radek: I informed Pyatakov, Sokolnikov and Serebryakov about it.

Vyshinsky: I emphasize once again: precisely in that period, autumn of 1934, you fully informed them of the contents of the letter and of your opinions about it?

Radek: Yes. Of my opinions, which I communicated to Trotsky in a private letter, I did not speak for political reasons. These

political reasons were that I was one of those who was once the cause of the most serious break-up of the Trotskyite organization, and having decided to take part in this work a second time I was very cautious in expressing my own individual opinions so as not to give anybody a pretext for saying that no sooner had I joined than I began to show discontent. That is why I thought it proper to tell Trotsky, but not the others.

Vyshinsky: What, concretely, did you tell them? Something slightly different to each, but in the main the same?

Radek: I told each one that at a diplomatic reception—I mentioned the position of that diplomatic person—I was told so-and-so and so-and-so and that I replied so-and-so and so-and-so. Of course, to those of them who did not attend diplomatic receptions the name of the person meant nothing. I remember that when in 1935 I personally spoke to Serebryakov and asked him whether Pyatakov had told him anything and whether he knew anything about this matter, he said: "Yes, there was talk with some German, but I don't remember his name." But Sokolnikov must have remembered.

Vyshinsky: You are not particularly heedful of the President's warning.

Radek: I apologize, it slipped out in the heat of the moment. I will keep strictly to instructions.

Vyshinsky: Did you also tell them about the contents of Trotsky's letter?

Radek: I spoke very distinctly about the contents of Trotsky's letter.

Vyshinsky: What questions were raised in it?

Radek: The victory of fascism in Germany. The growth of Japanese aggression. The inevitability of these countries waging war against the U.S.S.R. The inevitable defeat of the U.S.S.R. The necessity for the *bloc*, if it came into power, to make concessions.

Vyshinsky: Excuse me, please. Inevitable defeat: how did Trotsky and you picture that? And what was your and Trotsky's attitude towards defeat?

Radek: The attitude towards defeat was entirely positive because it was stated there that this would create the conditions for the accession to power of the *bloc*, and it even stated more, that it was in our interest to hasten war.

Vyshinsky: Hence you were interested in hastening war and it was to your interest that the U.S.S.R. should be defeated in this war? How was this put in Trotsky's letter?

Radek: Defeat is inevitable and it will create the conditions for our accession to power, therefore, we were interested in hastening the war. The conclusion is: we are interested in defeat.

Vyshinsky: We are reconstructing the contents of the letter.

Radek: Undoubtedly that was the line of thought. It logically followed with indisputable clarity. But since I am giving you, the State Prosecution, evidence, I must draw a clear distinction between the phrase, as I remember it, and the precise phrase that was in the letter. But irrespective of whether it was couched in those terms or not, there is no doubt that this was the line of thought.

Vyshinsky: I ask you to reply to the question about what was your and Trotsky's attitude towards the defeat of the U.S.S.R.

Radek: If you are asking me about Trotsky's attitude, I have answered. If you are asking me about my own, Citizen Procurator, I must say that in so far as it is a matter of establishing juridical facts I must give an answer. In so far as it is a matter of my feelings and my ethics, which did not affect my action. . . .

Vyshinsky: I am not interested in feelings, but in facts.

Radek: The fact that I gave a visa to Trotsky's mandate. . . .

Vyshinsky: The point is not that you gave your visa to Trotsky's mandate; I am speaking of a fact: the letter which you received from Trotsky in April 1934—this letter spoke about war, about this war being inevitable, that in this war the U.S.S.R., in Trotsky's opinion, would suffer defeat, that as a result of this war and defeat the *bloc* would come to power. And now I ask you: In these circumstances were you for the defeat of the U.S.S.R. or for the victory of the U.S.S.R.?

Radek: At that time I considered defeat inevitable and thought that in the circumstances of defeat we would come to power. If you are asking me about what I wished. . . .

Vyshinsky: But were you for the defeat or for the victory of the U.S.S.R.?

Radek: All my actions during these years testify to the fact that I aided defeat.

Vyshinsky: These actions of yours were deliberate?

Radek: Apart from sleeping, I have never in my life committed any undeliberate actions.

Vyshinsky: And this, unfortunately, was not a dream?

Radek: Unfortunately this was not a dream.

Vyshinsky: It was reality?

Radek: It was sad reality.

Vyshinsky: Yes, it was reality sad for you. You spoke with the members of the centre about defeatism. Consequently, we can put it as follows: That the question of defeat was for you a practical issue.

Radek: The question of defeat was a practical issue for us at that time.

Vyshinsky: This was in April 1934?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you spoke about this to the other members of the centre?

Radek: If you ask whether we spoke about our attitude towards defeat, I must say the following in order to define the situation: With Sokolnikov there was no exchange of opinions whatever from this angle. I informed him of the directives and asked about the specific fact regarding——.

The President: Accused Radek, are you trying to provoke us?

Radek: I am not trying to provoke you; this will not occur again.

Vyshinsky: Such behaviour on the part of the accused Radek places me in a very difficult position during the course of the interrogation.

The President: Quite so.

Vyshinsky: And I am afraid that Radek will continue with such escapades, so that I shall be unable to put questions on this matter. You are a man sufficiently well versed in politics to understand that if it is forbidden to speak about certain things in Court, this must be accepted as a demand of the law.

Radek: I deeply apologize; this will not occur again.

The President: I consider that if Radek repeats anything of this kind, this question will have to be dealt with *in camera.*

Radek: I repeat that this will not occur again.

Vyshinsky: I would ask you to adhere to the factual side of the matter, then it will be easier for you to do it. You spoke with the members of the centre about defeatism?

Radek: We accepted it as something to be carried out.

Vyshinsky: Were any practical steps taken by you personally and by your accomplices to put these instructions into effect?

Radek: We took action, of course.

Vyshinsky: But this was connected not only with the letter but also with all further directives?

Radek: We did not retreat from the defeatist platform, we continued to be in agreement—this was up to the moment of our arrest; but since 1936, after the second directive of Trotsky, certain changes became noticeable which unfortunately did not lead to any result.

Vyshinsky: We will speak of that later on. At present I am interested in the period from April 1934 up to the end of the autumn of 1934. Were Pyatakov, Serebryakov and Sokolnikov informed about Trotsky's letter?

Radek: Yes.

The President: It is proposed that the interrogation of the

accused Serebryakov, Sokolnikov and Pyatakov be held after the adjournment.

Vyshinsky: I will be very brief. (*To Pyatakov.*) Do you confirm that you were informed about Trotsky's letter to Radek?

Pyatakov: I testified to this effect yesterday and hereby confirm that this is in full accordance with the facts.

Vyshinsky (to Sokolnikov): I put the same question to you.

Sokolnikov: I am also informed about it.

Vyshinsky: You also shared this standpoint?

Sokolnikov: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Serebryakov): You also shared this standpoint of defeatism?

Serebryakov: I did not object.

Vyshinsky: You said that there was a second letter in December 1935. Tell us about it.

Radek: I received this letter at the beginning of December. This time it was not a political communication any more, even if of a certain fundamental programmatic significance, but represented a draft program of this second variant.

Vyshinsky: Since we heard about this yesterday, I do not think that the Court would object either. You must tell us the main point.

Radek: The main point, in the first place, was the international perspective. It was that the victory of German fascism had ushered in a period of the fascization of Europe and the victory of fascism in other countries, the defeat of the working class and the absence of revolutionary perspectives until there was some radical change such as might be caused by an international war. That is the first thing. As far as the second is concerned, the main thing is that two alternative possibilities were contemplated.

Vyshinsky: That was mentioned yesterday.

Radek: The first was one which he regarded as impracticable—that of coming to power without a war.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, without a defeat?

Radek: Consequently the practicable plan remained that of coming to power as a result of a defeat. And this coming to power as a result of a defeat signified for him that while up to that time Trotsky abroad and we here, in Moscow, had spoken of an economic retreat within the framework of the Soviet state, a radical change was indicated in this letter. For, in the first place, Trotsky considered that as a result of the defeat there would arise the inevitability of making territorial concessions, and he specifically mentioned the Ukraine. In the second place, it was a question of the partition of the U.S.S.R. In the third place, from the economic standpoint, he foresaw the following consequences of the defeat: not only the granting of concessions on industrial enterprises of

importance to capitalist states, but also the transfer, the sale to private capitalist owners, of important economic enterprises to be specified by them. Trotsky contemplated the issue of debenture loans, *i.e.*, the admission of foreign capital for the exploitation of those factories which would formally remain in the hands of the Soviet state.

In the sphere of agrarian policy, he quite clearly stated that the collective farms would have to be disbanded, and advanced the idea of giving tractors and other complex agricultural machinery to individual peasants in order to revive a new kulak stratum. Lastly, it was quite openly stated that private capital would have to be revived in the cities. It was clear that it meant the restoration of capitalism.

In the sphere of politics, a new note in this letter was the way it posed the question of power. In this letter Trotsky said: There can be no talk of any kind of democracy. The working class has lived through eighteen years of revolution, and it has vast appetites; and this working class will have to be sent back partly to privately-owned factories and partly to state-owned factories which will have to compete with foreign capital under most difficult conditions. That means that the living standard of the working class will be drastically lowered. In the countryside the struggle of the poor and middle peasants against the kulaks will be renewed. And then, in order to hold power, we shall need a strong government, irrespective of what forms are employed to veil it.

If you want historical analogies, take that of the government of Napoleon I and think over this analogy. Napoleon I was not restoration—the restoration came later, but it was an attempt to preserve the principal gains of the revolution, to preserve what could be preserved from the revolution. This was something new. He realized that the master of the situation, with whose aid the *bloc* could come to power, would be fascism—on the one hand German fascism and on the other hand the military fascism of another, Far Eastern country.

And as regards practical conclusions, the new factor here was that this activity—meaning wrecking activity—would have to be specially agreed upon with that partner with whose help alone the *bloc* could come to power.

Finally, the new feature was—although this, far from being the essence of the matter, was only camouflage—that we were confronted with the prospect of having to accept everything, but if we remained alive and in power, then owing to the victory of these two countries, and as a result of their plunder and profit a conflict would arise between them and the others, and this would lead to our new development, our "revanche." But this was a

prospect from the realm of fiction. Such is the substance of this first directive.

There was one other very important point in these directives, namely, the formula that we would inevitably have to bring the social structure of the U.S.S.R. into line with the victorious fascist countries if we wanted to keep in power at all. It was this idea of bringing into line—a pseudonym for the restoration of capitalism which immediately struck us as something specifically new when we received these directives.

Vyshinsky: So if we briefly sum up the contents of this letter, what are the main points?

Radek: We continued to maintain our stand of 1934 that defeat was inevitable.

Vyshinsky: And what was the conclusion you drew from this?

Radek: The conclusion to be drawn from this inevitable defeat was that now the problem of restoring capitalism was openly set before us.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, this restoration of capitalism, which Trotsky called bringing the social structure of the U.S.S.R. into line with the capitalist countries, was conceived as an inevitable result of an agreement with foreign states?

Radek: As an inevitable result of the defeat of the U.S.S.R., of the social consequences of this defeat and of an agreement on the basis of this defeat.

Vyshinsky: Further?

Radek: The third condition was the most novel of all for us—that of replacing the Soviet power by what he called a Bonapartist government. And it was clear to us that this meant fascism without its own finance capital, serving foreign finance capital.

Vyshinsky: The fourth condition?

Radek: The fourth was the partition of the country. It was planned to surrender the Ukraine to Germany and the Maritime Province and the Amur region to Japan.

Vyshinsky: Was there any talk at that time about any other economic concessions?

Radek: Yes, those decisions about which I have already spoken were further amplified. The payment of indemnities in the form of supplies of food, raw materials and fats extending over a long period of years. Then—at first he said this without giving figures but afterwards in more definite form—a certain percentage of participation in Soviet imports to be guaranteed to the victorious countries. All this together meant the complete enslavement of the country.

Vyshinsky: Was there talk about Sakhalin oil?

Radek: As regards Japan, we were told she must not only be

given Sakhalin oil but be guaranteed oil in the event of a war with the U.S.A. It was stated that no obstacles must be raised to the conquest of China by Japanese imperialism.

Vyshinsky: And as regards the Danube countries?

Radek: As regards the Danube and Balkan countries, Trotsky said in his letter that German fascism was expanding and we should do nothing to prevent this. The point was, of course, to sever any of our relations with Czechoslovakia which would have contributed to the defence of that country.

Vyshinsky: Did these six conditions cover the whole contents of this letter of 1935?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I think you spoke about a more intensive form of various wrecking activities.

Radek: He did not give any specific instructions on this score, but he pointed out that war was approaching and said that even if the countries concerned could give us any assurance that they will recognize our *bloc,* this would still be only a scrap of paper unless the *bloc* was strong, and the strength of the *bloc* would be measured by its terrorist actions, by its wrecking acts and by the role it played in the army in the event of war. This letter contained instructions on the necessity of spreading and intensifying wrecking, terrorist and diversive activities.

These activities were in line with the whole program, and they were referred to as one of the main levers in coming to power. In connection with war it was pointed out that the Trotskyites must undermine the organization and the discipline of the army.

Vyshinsky: Was there no talk about these diversive acts in connection with war and with the defeat of the U.S.S.R.?

Radek: It was stated quite definitely that they would believe in our strength in proportion to the help we gave them.

Vyshinsky: And what was this help to consist of?

Radek: This help was to consist of wrecking and of developing terrorist activities, coupled with the undermining of the morale of the army by the Trotskyites.

Vyshinsky: And was anything said about the defence industry?

Radek: A special point was made of this. The diversive activities of the Trotskyites in the war industry were to be agreed upon with those partners with whom we would succeed in reaching an agreement—that is to say, with the general staffs of the foreign states involved.

Vyshinsky: To agree with the general staffs of the countries concerned upon a plan of acts of diversion?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How was this plan conceived—in a general way or concretely?

Radek: There directives were quite general, which was connected with a certain resistance they met from Moscow. Clearly, this was not a matter of second-rate importance, which one could choose or reject at will; it was the thing for which they would give everything.

Vyshinsky: Yesterday we disclosed what Pyatakov said to Sokolnikov about setting fire to the Kemerovo Combined Chemical Works in the event of war. Were these instructions of Pyatakov's to Norkin in line with this letter?

Radek: I do not know what impelled Pyatakov to have that conversation, but there can be no doubt that such instructions were given even earlier by those directing wrecking activities, that they fully conformed with the spirit of this letter and the demands it contained.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Accused Pyatakov, when you gave Norkin instructions on setting fire to the Kemerovo Chemical Works in the event of war, were you guided by any general policy?

Pyatakov: I was guided by that line of "concretization" which was given by Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: And your conversations with Sokolnikov took place after your return from Berlin in 1935, after your personal meeting with Trotsky?

Pyatakov: After.

Vyshinsky: And were these demands formulated during your personal meeting with Trotsky?

Pyatakov: Certainly.

Vyshinsky (to Radek): Was there no talk about railway transport?

Radek: The whole point of "concretization" concerned war, so that transport could not be an exception.

Vyshinsky: Accused Serebryakov, you remember your talk with Radek about Trotsky's letter in 1935?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did Radek link up Trotsky's directives with your criminal activities in the sphere of transport?

Serebryakov: It was, naturally, linked up in my mind. As early as 1934, and in December 1935 when Livshitz and I exchanged views, Livshitz being at that time Assistant People's Commissar of Railways, we said that at a certain period the questions of intensifying diversive and wrecking work in transport might arise.

Vyshinsky: You spoke with Livshitz?

Serebryakov: Yes. At that time we assumed that it would be possible to overload, to block up the most important junctions with a view to interrupting freight traffic.

Vyshinsky: And as regards the organization of diversive acts?

Serebryakov: The way the question was put was that we must speed up the recruiting of forces for diversive acts.

Vyshinsky: Accused Livshitz, what have you to say about this?

Livshitz: I confirm that we talked about speeding up the recruiting of members of the organization for acts of diversion and for carrying out acts of wrecking during war time.

Vyshinsky: You were Assistant People's Commissar of Railways and yet at the same time discussed the question of how to obstruct traffic on the railways in the event of war?

Livshitz: Yes. I considered that since we were carrying on a struggle for the coming to power of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc,* it was necessary to do this.

Vyshinsky: So these preparations were in line with the whole struggle of your *bloc* for power?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you had a special talk about this with Serebryakov?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And with Pyatakov?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: But did you not see Pyatakov at that time?

Livshitz. Yes.

Vyshinsky: Surely you must have spoken with Pyatakov about the tasks of the *bloc*?

Livshitz: He and I did not talk about such questions.

Vyshinsky: What did you talk about then?

Livshitz: We talked about the work which the Trotskyites were doing on the railways in general.

Vyshinsky: Namely?

Livshitz: About preventing the carrying out of orders which would ensure an improvement in the work of the railways.

Vyshinsky: What did you talk about with Pyatakov?

Livshitz: About the work which the Trotskyites were doing in the transport system, *i.e.,* about sabotaging those orders which would ensure an improvement in the work of railways.

Vyshinsky: Did Pyatakov give you direct instructions and directives to intensify wrecking and diversive work on the railways?

Livshitz: He did.

Vyshinsky: You accepted them?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Carried them out?

Livshitz: Yes, what I could I carried out.

Vyshinsky: You carried on wrecking activities?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Disrupted the work?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Radek): What was the gist of Trotsky's program in 1935?

Radek: In 1935 the question was raised of going back to capitalism.

Vyshinsky: To what limits?

Radek: What Trotsky proposed, was without any limits. To such limits as the enemy might require.

Vyshinsky: So, again, defeat was on the order of the day?

Radek: Yes, the new feature now was that defeat was linked up with foreign instructions.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, there was now a direct arrangement with foreign general staffs—and this was not the case before?

Radek: This was not the case before.

Vyshinsky: This made you stop and think?

Radek: What most made me stop and think was not only this, but the difference between the situation that had existed in the country previously, in 1934, and afterwards.

Vyshinsky: Pyatakov told you about his visit to Oslo?

Radek: Pyatakov's visit was decided on after we had conferred together. We had come to the conclusion that I ought to take advantage of the fact that I had on three occasions been invited to go to Oslo and deliver a lecture to students. If Pyatakov had not been sent abroad on business, I, having permission to do so, would have gone to Oslo to deliver this lecture and would certainly have gone to see Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: So you were supposed to go abroad?

Radek: Either I or Pyatakov. I must speak of the aim of this journey, which was not very clearly brought out by Pyatakov yesterday. Why did I propose this and why did he immediately agree that it was necessary to visit Trotsky? He supported it by saying that the man had completely lost all sense of reality and was setting us tasks which we were unable to carry out, irrespective of what our attitude to them was, and it had become necessary to go to see him at all costs and talk things over with him. This was how Pyatakov explained his proposal. I did not give any explanation of why I urged this visit and considered it necessary. But I must admit that I did not for one moment believe those motives which Pyatakov put forward.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Radek: For the simple reason that Pyatakov knows Trotsky far too well to think for one moment that Trotsky would ever admit, under the influence of his arguments, that he did not know the basic elements of the situation; and as to risk one's neck in order to achieve a five per cent reduction in baseness was not worth while, therefore I could not take Pyatakov's explanations seriously and thought that he probably had the same motives as myself, and my motives were very simple. After I read these directives, I thought over them at night, and came to Pyatakov only on the following day; it was clear to me that although the directives contained all the elements which had formerly been present, yet these elements had now so matured that to accept these directives meant, in the first place, that in order to carry them out I should have to inform a comparatively wide circle of people; because I had to set tasks to the organizers, and these tasks were considerably widened. I had to inform them about the matter and let them know how I myself regarded these directives, and I was personally convinced, when I closed my eyes and thought about the people in question, that a number of the most important persons, those who had sinned most deeply from the point of view of the Criminal Code, would not only fail to understand these directives but that they would respond to them by severing their connection. I did not think for a minute that Muralov would agree to a policy of supporting the partition of the U.S.S.R. Nor could I conceive this to be true of a dozen other persons with whom I was personally acquainted. I will not mention names here, lest I should appear in the role of counsel for defence, which they have refused, because I have no warrant from them to do this, but for me, as a politician, it was clear that this program was breaking up the *bloc;* in accordance with this program they were indulging in wrecking activities, terrorism and similar things which undermined the power of the Soviet Union. But to come and to say that this had to be done in order to obtain power and to become police sergeant, as a result and to establish capitalism in the country—this, I was firmly convinced, meant the collapse and death of the *bloc.* Accordingly, when confronted with the question what I had done and of going to people in order to tell them what they had to do, it was perfectly clear that if I came to Pyatakov, being convinced that he would bring still more rigorous directives—then, naturally, the question would arise that our activities had brought us to a point where we might be asked to betray the country with the aim of restoring capitalism and of making the country a colony. We decided for ourselves that as regards that formula which had become untenable for the four—that we could not take responsibility for

this formula, that we could not bear responsibility for these directives, that we could not lead people blindly, could not cause Soviet Red Army men to be shot down. We decided to call a conference. Pyatakov went to see Trotsky; I don't know why Pyatakov did not speak about this here, for it was perhaps the most vital point in his conversation with Trotsky—when Trotsky said that a conference meant exposure or a split. Now Pyatakov came back and told about his conversation with Trotsky. Then and there we decided that we would call a conference, despite Trotsky's ban. I talked it over with Serebryakov, and Serebryakov agreed to it, and Sokolnikov, who kept silent and tried to take the attitude of scrupulously obeying instructions, said that since this conference was inevitable it would have to be held. We agreed how to organize this conference, agreed upon a number of persons whom we would invite, and upon who was to get in touch with which group.

As far as I am concerned, this was my last talk with Pyatakov and with Serebryakov and with G. Y. Sokolnikov.

In connection with this it was precisely these measures that I took: to get Dreitzer to come to Moscow at all costs—I will tell why—it is perhaps the most important thing in this case; to get in touch with the people in Rostov through Preobrazhensky and get them to come to Moscow. In doing this, I did not tell these people what was on foot, but that there was to be a conference at which we would adopt a most vital decision for us, and that it was absolutely necessary that they come.

And this was the moment which for all of us, inwardly, had this meaning: we had reached a barrier.

Did we interrupt our activities after receiving the directives? No. The machine went on working. We did not accept the directives, but neither did we reject them. Accordingly, in so far as the old directives were concerned, the machine went on working—particularly since we had concealed the idea of a conference from our men. In doing this I was guided by quite definite considerations of a tactical, practical character, and I concealed it to such an extent—concealed the contents of these directives, that is—that when Bukharin met me in January and asked me during the course of our conversation what news there was and so forth, I, who on all other occasions had informed him of all Trotskyite directives, had informed him fully—did not tell him about these directives, told him about other letters, sent earlier, which had come.

And so, Citizen Procurator, I want to say the following:

Did we interrupt our activities? No. Up to the moment of arrest each of us did what he could. The fact that I was destined to

do very little during these months, is not my merit. If, let us say, that same Prigozhin had come to me (he was already arrested at that time and did not come to me) and had asked me: "Shall we continue our activities?" I would have said: "Yes, continue them." If Friedland had come to me, I would have told him too: "Continue them."

But I none the less maintain that there is a new factor here about which I shall perhaps have to give you specific answers later on, and that this factor existed not only for me but for all the others who knew these directives: these directives were the limit.

Vyshinsky: Three facts: the April letter of 1934, the December letter of 1935 and Pyatakov's meeting with Trotsky in December 1935. How was the question put in Trotsky's letter in 1934? War, working for defeat?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: A return to capitalism in substance?

Radek: No, a return to capitalism is not raised in the letter of 1934.

Vyshinsky: No? What then?

Radek: A retreat which we then thought. . . .

Vyshinsky: To where?

Radek: To the positions of the NEP, with industry strengthened in comparison with what it had been before 1928.

Vyshinsky: A retreat towards strengthening what elements?

Radek: A retreat which was to restore a part of the capitalist elements as well, but this retreat, if compared with the state of things in 1927—there would be a possibility during this retreat, on the one hand, of admitting capitalist restoration, but at the same time of strengthening industry, thanks to the First Five-Year Plan, the state farms and part of the collective farms—that is to say, we would have an economic base on which in my opinion a proletarian government could have maintained itself.

Vyshinsky: So a proletarian government could still have maintained itself? But the tendency was to go backward?

Radek: The tendency was to go backward.

Vyshinsky: In 1935 this stood out more clearly in comparison with 1934?

Radek: In 1935 the question was raised of going back to capitalism.

Vyshinsky: To what limits?

Radek: What Trotsky proposed was without any limits. To such limits as the enemy might require.

Vyshinsky: So, again, defeat was on the order of the day?

Radek: Yes. The new feature now was that defeat was linked up with foreign instructions.

Vyshinsky: This new feature was accepted?

Radek: In the first place, allow me to answer the question about defeat.

Vyshinsky: What was the new feature?

Radek: The new feature was in the way the question of this defeat was put.

Vyshinsky: This was something new in comparison with 1934?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And in comparison with Pyatakov's conversation?

Radek: The conversation tallies with the directives; it merely aggravates them.

Vyshinsky: So there is no difference between the letter in 1934 and the conversation in 1935?

Radek: There is no difference whatever; it is all one whole.

Vyshinsky: All one whole, and in this whole, defeat comes first?

Radek: Our attitude towards defeat was not due to the fact that we had become better or worse, but to objective reasons—after all, the situation in 1935 was quite different from that in 1934.

Vyshinsky: We have cleared up that point.

Radek: That point has not been cleared up, Citizen Procurator.

Vyshinsky: I will now pass on to your attitude towards the letter in 1934 and the conversation in 1935. Was there any difference?

Radek: There was no difference whatever. There was one new point: concentration.

Vyshinsky: On the question of partitioning the U.S.S.R. there was also no difference between the conversation and the letter?

Radek: No, no difference.

Vyshinsky: On the question of territorial concessions—just the same?

Radek: Just the same.

Vyshinsky: On the question of terrorist activities—no difference here either?

Radek: No.

Vyshinsky: What then was the new feature?

Radek: The new feature was that it was now linked up with foreign instructions.

Vyshinsky: So that is the difference? That is to say, we have here a direct arrangement with foreign general staffs—and was not this the case before?

Radek: That was not the case before.

Vyshinsky: That made you stop and think?

Radek: It was not that which made me stop and think as much as the situation that existed in the country before, in 1934, and after. It was this that made me stop and think. After all, we were not born in order to help the fascists defeat the Soviet Union. In

1934 we considered that defeat was inevitable. We proceeded from an overestimation of the difficulties in the countryside. In industry we considered that there was a transitional period, when even the newly-built factories were only just being put into operation. The position on the railways was at that time considered to be catastrophic. But now, towards the end of 1935, could we consider that the situation on the railways was catastrophic? Why, Pyatakov, Livshitz (we had information from Livshitz)—we all knew of the tremendous work which the railways had accomplished under Kaganovich's direction. I personally, in connection with my official business, knew of the opinion held of our railways by foreign intelligence services, who considered that our railways were prepared for war. Could I, towards the end of 1935, on the basis of what the Trotskyites told me, consider that our industry was doomed in the event of war? I know what industrial mobilization means, I know the difficulties of every industry, I know the difficulties of our industry; but I also knew that everything required for the prosecution of war would be supplied. In the case of agriculture I myself did not have a wide field of observation: every year I went to the same collective farms, in the Kursk Gubernia, and I saw that these collective farms, which I had been observing from year to year, in 1935 represented something incomparable, something absolutely different from what they were in 1933. And so, if in 1933 or 1934 we proceeded from the assumption that defeat was inevitable, and considered it necessary to assist this fact, so as to get something out of it, we now saw that the idea of the destruction of the U.S.S.R. by Western fascism and by the military-fascist circles in the East, which Trotsky took as his starting point—was now, from the standpoint of objective reality a fantasy, that all the conditions for victory existed. And so, in connection with this the question was bound to arise with us: in order that we might come to power—let the country be defeated. In 1934 we took defeat as our starting point, as a necessary fact. But in 1935 every one of us was bound to say to himself—if you are ready to do that you are thwarting a possible victory, which is already assured, even if against you. While in 1933 and 1934 we considered economic retreat as something necessitated by circumstances, as something essential for the country, and not only in order that we might come to power, we now saw that the country had emerged from its chief difficulties and that the Five-Year Plan had succeeded, not only in the fact that it had built factories, but because it had become a live reality.

Vyshinsky: And what was the conclusion?

Radek: And therefore the conclusion: restoration of capitalism in the circumstances of 1935. For nothing at all, just for

the sake of Trotsky's beautiful eyes—the country was to return to capitalism. When I read this I felt as if it were a madhouse. And, lastly, and this is no unimportant fact, formerly the position was that we were fighting for power because we were convinced that we could secure something to the country. Now we were to fight in order that foreign capital might rule, which would put us completely under its control before it allowed us to come to power. What did the directive to agree upon wrecking activities with foreign circles mean? For me this directive meant something very simple, something very comprehensible to me as a political organizer, namely that agents of foreign powers were becoming wedged in our organization, that our organization was becoming the direct representative of foreign intelligence services. We ceased to be in the slightest degree the masters of our actions. We had put up with Trotsky when he gave us directives from abroad, but in this case we were to become the agency of foreign fascist states.

This denoted in practice that if such men as Yakov Livshitz or Serebryakov, with decades of revolutionary work behind them, could descend to wrecking, now their moral fibre would have to be utterly broken, and they would act on the instructions of the class enemy. Either they would lose their bearings, or they would become spies. If they lost their bearings, I could do nothing with them; if they became agents of foreign states, others would give them their orders. As a result, if foreign fascism came in, this fascism, far from letting Trotskyites get into power—they are of no use to it—would destroy the organization because it had no need to trouble itself with this crowd of anarchist intellectuals. So that even if my attitude to the country did not weigh with me, there was pure egoism. The leader of the organization told me that for the sake of power, for the phantom of power, Trotsky was ready to sacrifice the last man capable of dying for him, and I could not demand this of people who had been my associates for fifteen years. I therefore had to ask myself: what was I to do?

Vyshinsky: What did you decide?

Radek: The first step to take would be to go to the Central Committee of the Party, to make a statement, to name all the persons. This I did not do. It was not I that went to the G.P.U., but the G.P.U. that came for me.

Vyshinsky: An eloquent reply.

Radek: A sad reply.

Vyshinsky: For what purpose did you decide to call a conference? Was it in connection with the sentiments allegedly evoked in you by the monstrosity of the crimes, which allegedly

fully revealed themselves and induced you to stop and think whether you should assume the responsibility, and how to assume it?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You decided not to take this responsibility?

Radek: I came to the firm decision not to take this responsibility.

Vyshinsky. You decided not to commit these crimes?

Radek: Not to commit these crimes.

Vyshinsky: To break with all this?

Radek: I had the idea of calling a conference. The conference would disclose the attitude of all to these things, that is, some would say, "We will not do this," others would say, "We will do this."

Vyshinsky: And then what?

Radek: And then, when those who were jointly committing a crime begin to fight among themselves, the authorities whose duty it is to fight them would lay hands on the whole affair. I was convinced that the denouement would take place in the G.P.U., but I was not the one to organize it.

Vyshinsky: But there was a short cut to this?

Radek: But the short cut is not always the easiest way, and not everybody is capable of taking the shortest cut. And this was not the shortest cut for another reason: I was convinced that the authorities must and would differentiate between us. We, the leaders, bear full and final responsibility, but I was convinced that if some of our subordinates changed their minds and decided to lay down their arms, the attitude toward them would be different. And I considered that by placing these questions before them I would give them the opportunity of deciding for themselves. And in this connection I must say what I have not yet spoken about; I want to speak about the role of Dreitzer, why we made these things so secret, and so forth.

Vyshinsky: You will tell us about this later. You are now describing all those mental perplexities and vacillations which made you think it necessary to summon a conference. What was the cause of this perplexity and these vacillations?

Radek: The realization that this directive was a directive to commit treason against the socialist fatherland, which might be victorious in a war, and to assist foreign capital in restoring capitalism in Russia, which restoration was not dictated by any objective necessity.

Vyshinsky: That means that the following conclusion may be drawn: as long as you assumed that socialism in our country was feeble, you considered treachery permissible, that it was permissible to work for war, that it was permissible to work for the

defeat of the Soviet Union, and so on. But when you saw that socialism was sufficiently powerful and strong, you decided that neither war nor defeat were possible.

Radek: You are a profound reader of human hearts, but I must nevertheless comment on my thoughts in my own words.

Vyshinsky: I know that you have a fairly good stock of words behind which to conceal your thoughts, and it is very difficult for a man, even a good reader of human hearts, to understand you and induce you to say what you are really thinking. But I would ask you not to reason here so much as a journalist who has specialized in international affairs, but as a man accused of treason. And it is from this standpoint that I ask you the question: were you in favour of defeat in 1934?

Radek: I have already answered that question.

Vyshinsky: Repeat it once more, if you don't mind.

Radek: In 1934 I considered defeat inevitable.

Vyshinsky: Were you in favour of defeat in 1934?

Radek: I considered defeat inevitable.

Vyshinsky: Were you in favour of defeat?

Radek: If I could avert defeat, I would be against defeat.

Vyshinsky: You consider that you could not have averted it?

Radek: I considered it an inevitable fact.

Vyshinsky: You are answering my question incorrectly. Did you accept the whole of Trotsky's line given to you in 1934?

Radek: I accepted the whole of Trotsky's line in 1934.

Vyshinsky: Was defeat part of it?

Radek: Yes, it was a line of defeat.

Vyshinsky: Trotsky's line included defeat?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you accept it?

Radek: I did.

Vyshinsky: Hence, since you accepted it you were in favour of defeat?

Radek: From the standpoint. . . .

Vyshinsky: You headed for defeat?

Radek: Yes, of course.

Vyshinsky: That is, you were in favour of defeat?

Radek: Of course, if I say yes, that means we headed for it.

Vyshinsky: Which of us then is putting the question rightly?

Radek: All the same, I think that you are not putting the question rightly.

Vyshinsky: In 1934 you were not against defeat, but in favour of defeat?

Radek: Yes, I have said so.

Vyshinsky: I want you to repeat it once more.

Radek: As you please, you are the State Prosecutor and may demand that I repeat it ten times.

Vyshinsky: It will be enough for me if you repeat it once clearly. In 1934—in favour of defeat, in 1935—the question of defeat is raised. . . .

Radek: It was raised in the December letter.

Vyshinsky: Did you accept it?

Radek: No.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Radek: Because in 1934 I considered defeat inevitable, whereas in 1935 I considered that the country had every ground to be victorious and therefore. . . .

Vyshinsky: In 1934 you considered defeat inevitable. Why?

Radek: I considered that the country could not defend itself.

Vyshinsky: That is, you considered that it was weak?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, you proceeded from the weakness of the country?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, proceeding from the assumed weakness of the country, you accepted defeat?

Radek: I considered it inevitable and accepted it.

Vyshinsky: And in 1935 you saw the country was strong and that this would not come true?

Radek: Not that defeat would not come true, but that it would not happen, that this was an unreal program, and therefore I was against the program, which was based on unreal foundations.

Vyshinsky: Was it because it was unreal that you were against it?

Radek: I will not speak of other motives.

Vyshinsky: Is it correct to say that in 1935 you were opposed to a program of defeat because you considered it unreal?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That means that in 1934 you considered it real and were in favour of it, but in 1935 you considered it unreal and were opposed to it?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That was all my question amounted to.

In 1935, after Pyatakov's meeting with Trotsky, about which you learned in January 1936, you were disturbed by the too frank way in which the question of becoming an appendage of fascism was put?

Radek: Not by the too frank way in which it was put, but by the fact itself.

Vyshinsky: Was it that which disturbed you?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you did not accept it?

Radek: No.

Vyshinsky: You said that this was already a proposal for direct treason against the country?

Radek: There was treason in the first case and in the other.

Vyshinsky: You said that the way the question was put by Trotsky in December 1935 in the conversation with Pyatakov and in the letter amounted to a proposal for treason against the country?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Your conversation in November 1934 with this Mr. —— of one of the Central European states if I am not mistaken was. . . ?

Radek: About treason against the country.

Vyshinsky: You accepted this? And you held this conversation?

Radek: You have learned it from me, that means that I did hold it.

Vyshinsky: What was this, treason against the country?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And did it not disturb you?

Radek: It goes without saying. Of course, it disturbed me. Do you think I have trained myself for treason against the country? It disturbed me very profoundly.

Vyshinsky: But you continued to adhere to the position of defeat?

Radek: Yes, my position was one of carrying out Trotsky's directive.

Vyshinsky: Even though this directive meant treason against the country?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, in one case it was treason against the country, and in 1935 also?

I am now interested in knowing what distinction you were making here on the question of treason against the country—not quantitatively, but qualitatively.

Radek: You have already drawn the conclusion, Citizen Procurator.

Vyshinsky: You admit that the fact of the conversation with Mr. —— in November 1934 was treason against the country?

Radek: I realized this at the time of the conversation and characterize it now as I did then.

Vyshinsky: As treason?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And the fact that Pyatakov brought you the directive, was that treason too against the country?

Radek: That was also treason against the country. What is the difference, perhaps it was treason against the country, perhaps it was not. A man may be capable of one thing and may not be capable of the other.

Vyshinsky: Did you commit treason against the country?

Radek: I did not want to betray my country, or to betray it completely.

Vyshinsky: You consider that to betray is one thing, and to betray completely or not completely is another?

Radek: I must add here that when I realized it I did not want to admit it.

Vyshinsky: Allow me to remind you of your testimony (Vol. V, page 119). Do you confirm this testimony?

Radek: I confirm it, even in full.

Vyshinsky: Do you confirm your testimony to the effect that you told Mr.—— that to expect concessions from the present government was useless?

Radek: Such was the gist of my testimony.

Vyshinsky: Do you confirm it?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And that the —— government could count on concessions from the "realist politicians" in the U.S.S.R.?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You told Mr. —— that the *bloc* could consent to such concessions?

Radek: Yes, we confirmed Trotsky's mandate to negotiate as to what these concessions should be.

Vyshinsky: I ask you, did you in the name of the *bloc* promise Mr. —— real concessions, or not?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Real concessions? Those concessions were to be real, it must be presumed?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, concessions of real things?

Radek: Yes, yes.

Vyshinsky: Was it a question of territorial concessions as you conceived it?

Radek: But without knowing then whether they would be necessary. These negotiations had only begun.

Vyshinsky: Did you think about what Mr. K—— regarded as real concessions?

Radek: I thought of the fact that I did not know at what stage there would be war, when there would be war, why, what concessions would have to be made, what particular concessions, what the plan would be.

Vyshinsky: Nevertheless, these were to be concessions of something real? Does that include territory?

Radek: It may include, but not necessarily includes.

Vyshinsky: Is that treason?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Is that treason?

Radek: It is treason, of course.

Vyshinsky: The whole question amounts to this: You thought that, having committed treason once, that was enough, and that you would not necessarily be committing treason all your life. And so the moment arrived when you decided not to commit treason. Have I understood you right?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And what did you do to carry this line into effect?

Radek: I have already said what I did.

Vyshinsky: Briefly.

Radek: I was creating conditions that would stop others from committing treason.

Vyshinsky: You wanted to summon a conference to persuade people not to commit treason any more?

Radek: People would change their views—those who would listen to me—and we would then decide what to do next.

Vyshinsky: And what else?

Radek: To decide what to do next.

Vyshinsky: You knew what would be done?

Radek: I knew what I intended to do.

Vyshinsky: And what would you have proposed?

Radek: To go to the Central Committee and tell.

Vyshinsky: Did you count on that?

Radek: Yes, I was convinced that a number would agree to it.

Vyshinsky: But you did not want to go alone?

Radek: As I was one of the leaders who was not deciding his own personal problem but the problem of those who had entrusted him with the leadership.

Vyshinsky: But in that case there is one other question that is not clear to me, probably the last in this morning's interrogation.

You received a letter from Trotsky in 1934; you received a letter from Trotsky in 1935; Pyatakov had a conversation with Trotsky and brought a personal communication on this subject. This treasonable activity, this treasonable line was clear to you. Did you in any degree reduce your political, counter-revolutionary, criminal, anti-Soviet activity?

Radek: In 1936?

Vyshinsky: In 1935 and 1936.

Radek: In 1935 and 1934?

Vyshinsky: In 1935 and 1936.

Radek: In 1935 I was a leader who was conducting all the work.

Vyshinsky: And in 1936?

Radek: In 1936 I did nothing to undo what had been done until then, but I did not take any further steps, especially as regards carrying out this directive, on going deeper into this.

Vyshinsky: That is, in 1936 you took no steps to carry out this directive?

Radek: No.

Vyshinsky: Did you take any steps to undo the work which had been done until then?

Radek: No.

Vyshinsky: Not by your conference?

Radek: No, because I had not seen a single member of the *bloc* ever since March. In January I had seen Pyatakov.

I was inactive at that period; I did not undo anything. I was a member of the centre until the time of my arrest. If people had come to me at that time for instructions, I would have told them what directives I had received but I would have said: "Go home and wait." But I engaged in no activities in 1936.

Vyshinsky: Very well, will you confirm the description of your activities you gave when examined in the Procurator's office before January 17, 1937?

Permit me to read Vol. V, page 119:

"The new and more far-reaching instructions Trotsky issued in December 1935 carried his defeatist and restoration policy to extreme limits. . . ."

Do you confirm this?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: ". . . and the diminution of the prospects of the *bloc* coming to power converted the Trotskyite organization into a network of spies and diversionists for the German General Staff. . . ."

Radek: Yes, I fully confirm it.

Vyshinsky: And further:

"And therefore it is not surprising that the centre of the *bloc* grew nervous, I emphasize it, was afraid. . ."

Radek: Yes, yes.

Vyshinsky: . . . of taking responsibility for this platform arrived at by Trotsky himself with Hess and decided to summon a conference of the active members of the organization. That is, the chief motive was fright?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You personally were of the opinion that this position should be rejected?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And that you ought to go to the Central Committee in order to lay down your arms? But you did not go?

Radek: I did not.

Vyshinsky: And then you were arrested?

Radek: I was arrested, but I denied everything from beginning to end. Maybe you will ask me why?

Vyshinsky: I know that you will always find an answer. You were arrested and questioned. You gave answers?

Radek: I denied everything from beginning to end.

Vyshinsky: You knew everything, you had the opportunity to go and tell everything?

Radek: I had, but I decided that I would do that in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. . . .

Vyshinsky: Comrade President, will you please ask the accused to answer questions and not to make speeches?

President: Accused Radek, you may make your two speeches: one—your speech in defence, and the other—your last plea.

Vyshinsky: I do not propose to engage in a shouting match with accused Radek. I am interrogating you, putting questions to you. Answer the questions, if you please, and do not make speeches. I would ask you not to try to shout me down and not to speak on questions that have nothing to do with the case.

In December 1935 and in 1936 you no longer accepted Trotsky's position. You were repelled by the treason that now became clear to you in all its immensity. You therefore decided the question for yourself in the negative and wanted to discuss with your accomplices what was to be done next?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You further said that you had the desire to go and confess.

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And that you did not go only because they came for you and arrested you. Am I putting it right?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Now I ask you: on September 22 you were interrogated and told that you were arrested on a charge of counter-revolutionary, Trotskyite activities. Before they proceeded to accuse you on the basis of the evidence in possession of the investigating authorities, you had the opportunity to tell all?

Radek: I did not do so.

Vyshinsky: The investigating official put the question. Did you tell?

Radek: No.

Vyshinsky: After your arrest you were asked during examination whether you had sinned against the Party and the Soviet state. What did you reply?

Radek: I replied that I had not.

Vyshinsky: Were you asked whether you had concealed in secret places or at home any illegal documents? What did you reply?

Radek: I was asked and I replied that I had not concealed anything in secret places.

Vyshinsky: You were asked about that—and did you tell the truth?

Radek: I denied it, and this was the truth.

Vyshinsky: Were you further asked whether you had connections with other persons—with Tivel?

Radek: I was asked.

Vyshinsky: Did you admit it?

Radek: I denied everything from beginning to end.

Vyshinsky: Don't hurry, answer each part. Did you deny connections with Tivel?

Radek: I denied it.

Vyshinsky: Did you deny connections with Friedland?

Radek: I denied it.

Vyshinsky: Were you asked about connections with other members of the terrorist group? What did you reply?

Radek: I denied it.

Vyshinsky: That was on September 22, 1936?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Were you confronted with Sokolnikov?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did Sokolnikov expose you?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you?

Radek: I denied everything from beginning to end.

Vyshinsky: That was on September 22. Were you confronted with Tivel?

Radek: I was.

Vyshinsky: What did he say?

Radek: He said partly what was true and partly what was not true, but I denied everything.

Vyshinsky: Both what was true and what was not true?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Were you on November 4 questioned about various facts concerning your activity?

Radek: Yes. I was questioned until December 4, and I denied everything.

Vyshinsky: For how many months did you deny everything?

Radek: About three months.

Vyshinsky: The fact remains that you, who wanted to tell everything, only could not make up your mind, as you say, to surrender your people to justice, when you yourself fell into the hands of justice categorically denied everything. Is that a fact?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Does that not cast doubt on what you said about your vacillations and misgivings?

Radek: Yes, if you ignore the fact that you learned about the program and about Trotsky's instructions only from me, of course, it does cast doubt on what I have said.

Vyshinsky: The important thing for me is to establish the fact. Has the fact been established?

Radek: It has.

Vyshinsky: How can it be proved that after receiving the letter from Trotsky in December 1935 and after the conversation with Pyatakov you did not accept the line which you had fully and unreservedly accepted until then? Have you such facts?

Radek: No.

Vyshinsky: And you do not intend to try to prove it?

Radek: No.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: The court is adjourned until 6 p.m.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

EVENING SESSION, JANUARY 24, 1937, 6.00 P.M.

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: The session is resumed. Have Counsel for Defence any questions to put to Radek?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: Accused Radek, in one of the statements in your testimony you say: "It is useless trying to guess what the conference would have led to. The fact remains that even after Trotsky's directives were received the centre continued its wrecking activities just as it did before the directives were received." Do you confirm this?

Radek: I do.

The President: Has the Procurator any questions?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: We will now proceed to examine the witness Romm. (*To the Commandant.*) Please ask witness Romm to come in.

(*Witness Romm enters the Court.*)

The President: Is your name Romm?

Romm: Yes.

The President: What was your official position?

Romm: Journalist.

The President: What was your official position?

Romm: I was the correspondent of *Izvestia* in the United States.

The President: You are summoned as witness in the case of Pyatakov, Radek and others. You must give truthful evidence. For false evidence you are liable to criminal prosecution.

Has the Procurator any questions?

Vyshinsky: How long have you known accused Radek?

Romm: Since 1922.

Vyshinsky: What were your ties with Radek in the past?

Romm: At first I was acquainted with him in connection with literary work and later, in 1926-27, I was connected with him in joint Trotskyite anti-Party work.

Vyshinsky: What sort of work was that?

Romm: Trotskyite anti-Party work.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you were a Trotskyite?

Romm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: For a long period?

Romm: From the latter part of 1926 up to the time I temporarily left them about 1927.

Vyshinsky: And then you returned to them?

Romm: I returned in 1931.

Vyshinsky: Under anybody's influence, or independently?

Romm: I am not inclined to put on others the responsibility for my own actions, but to the extent that anybody's individual influence was decisive, it was Radek's influence.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you were fairly closely acquainted?

Romm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Were you connected by political interests?

Romm: Yes, and also by friendly relations.

Vyshinsky: Were you ever in Geneva?

Romm: Yes, I was Tass correspondent in Geneva and also in Paris. In Geneva from 1930 to 1934.

Vyshinsky: What interests me is your Geneva period: while in Geneva did you have occasion to meet Radek?

Romm: Yes. In the spring of 1932. When Radek arrived in Geneva I handed him a letter from Trotsky which I had received from Sedov not long before that in Paris.

Vyshinsky: Tell us how you received the letter from Trotsky, what commission you were given, and how you carried out that commission.

Romm: During our meeting in 1930, or 1931, Radek, while not giving me any definite commission of a concrete character, said that the former Trotskyites must keep together and, in particular, he expected me to be prepared to serve as liaison man if necessary, and to take advantage of my position as a foreign correspondent.

Vyshinsky: When did that conversation take place?

Romm: In the autumn of 1930 and spring of 1931, when I came to Geneva from Moscow.

Vyshinsky: What prompted that conversation?

Romm: A general interchange of opinion on the situation in the Party and in the country.

Vyshinsky: What was it that prompted Radek to appeal to you to keep together and to be prepared, as you say, to render political services?

Romm: Yes, if necessary, services as a liaison man. This followed logically from our conversations, from which it became clear to me that his sentiments were more strongly opposed to the Party than ever, and when my own sentiments, influenced by the difficulties of socialist construction, once again flowed into the old Trotskyite channel. He led me to understand in a general way that the struggle had not ended, that the Trotskyites would have to become

active again, and it was precisely from this general stand that the things I spoke about followed.

In the summer of 1931, in passing through Berlin, I met Putna who offered to put me in touch with Sedov. I met Sedov and in reply to his question as to whether I was prepared, if necessary, to serve as liaison man with Radek, I consented and gave him my addresses in Paris and Geneva.

A few days before my departure for Geneva, while in Paris, I received a letter posted in Paris, containing a short note from Sedov asking me to convey a letter enclosed in the envelope to Radek. I took this letter with me to Geneva and handed it to Radek when I met him.

Vyshinsky: In handing over the letter did you say who it was from?

Romm: I did not know who it was from.

Vyshinsky: Who handed it to you?

Romm: I received it by post with the request to hand it to Radek. It was addressed to me at the Tass office in Paris.

Vyshinsky: What was written on the envelope, the address and name? How did you know that the letter had to be handed over?

Romm: With the letter there was a note from Sedov.

Vyshinsky: From Sedov. So you knew that the letter came from Sedov?

Romm: The letter was enclosed in an envelope; at that time I did not know who it was from.

Vyshinsky: When did you learn who it was from?

Romm: After handing over the letter I learned from the subsequent conversation with Radek that the letter was from Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: The fact that the letter was from Trotsky was clear to you when you received it from Sedov?

Romm: It was clear to me that Sedov was asking me to hand Radek the letter that was enclosed in the envelope.

Vyshinsky: Did you know that this letter was from Sedov?

Romm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is what I ask: in handing over the letter which was enclosed in the envelope did you say: Here is a letter from Sedov?

Romm: Yes, I said that and told him of my meeting with Sedov in Berlin.

Vyshinsky: Did Radek read the letter in your presence, or after you had gone?

Romm: He glanced through it quickly in my presence and put it in his pocket.

Vyshinsky: Hence, when you handed the letter to Radek it was clear to you that the letter was from Trotsky?

Romm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you know what Trotsky had written in that letter to Radek?

Romm: Only in general outline.

Vyshinsky: I ask you, did you know, or not?

Romm: I knew the general contents.

Vyshinsky: When did the general contents become known to you?

Romm: From the conversation with Radek after he had read the letter.

Vyshinsky: That day, or the day after?

Romm: No, that very day.

Vyshinsky: What did Radek tell you about the contents of that letter?

Romm: That it contained instructions about uniting with the Zinovievites, about adopting terrorist methods of struggle against the leaders of the C.P.S.U., in the first place against Stalin and Voroshilov.

Then Radek left for Moscow and I did not see him until the autumn of 1932.

Vyshinsky: What happened in the autumn of 1932, and where were you at that time?

Romm: I was Tass correspondent in Geneva and Paris. I went to Moscow on official business and met Radek who informed me that in pursuance of Trotsky's directives, a Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc* had been organized, but that he and Pyatakov had not joined that centre.

Radek went on to say that the idea had arisen of creating a reserve, or parallel, centre, on which the Trotskyites were to predominate, in order to have a reserve centre in the event of the functioning centre being discovered. He said that he wanted to get directives from Trotsky on this matter and would like to send a letter with me.

Vyshinsky: Did he mention any others of the same views?

Romm: He spoke about himself and Pyatakov; the names of Sokolnikov and Serebryakov were mentioned.

Vyshinsky: Hence, he spoke to you about Pyatakov, Serebryakov and Sokolnikov?

Romm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In what connection were these names mentioned?

Romm: I understood that all these were to be members of the reserve centre if it were organized; but it was clear to me from the conversation that the enquiry would come from him and Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: Did he mention any other names?

Romm: I think he only mentioned the names of Serebryakov and Sokolnikov.

Vyshinsky: At all events, you said that he mentioned these names in connection with the creation of the parallel centre?

Romm: That is so. Only the two of them, Radek and Pyatakov, were going to write to Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: To write about what?

Romm: I understood that it was to be a request for directives concerning the idea of creating a parallel centre.

Vyshinsky: What does that mean: whether to create or not to create?

Romm: Evidently, whether to create or not to create, and of whom it was to consist.

Vyshinsky: Did Radek tell you at the time what arguments they used in urging the necessity of creating such a centre, or perhaps, on the contrary, they argued against the formation of such a centre? Did he mention that, or not?

Romm: He did not advance any arguments against. He advanced the arguments I have already mentioned, namely, first, that the Zinovievites predominated in the functioning centre, and second, that it was desirable to have a second centre which could be preserved in the event of the first being exposed.

Vyshinsky: Hence, they had decided to organize such a centre and only wanted sanction, or did they ask for advice on the question, how to decide?

Romm: My impression was that they had decided the question in the affirmative, that is to say, that it was necessary to do it, and that the letter would be written in order to obtain sanction.

Vyshinsky: What was written in that letter, did you know?

Romm: Yes, because the letter was handed to me and then concealed in the cover of a German book before my departure back to Geneva in the autumn of 1932.

Vyshinsky: In the autumn of 1932 you were returning to Geneva and, taking advantage of your departure for Geneva, they gave you this commission?

Romm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Who gave you this commission?

Romm: Radek. Passing through Berlin on my way to Geneva I posted the book to the agreed address which Sedov had given me: *poste restante* at one of the Berlin post offices. At the same time I sent a brief letter indicating that there was a letter in the book and where it was concealed.

Vyshinsky: To the address agreed upon?

Romm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Both the book and the letter to the address agreed upon?

Romm: The letter also to the address agreed upon.

Vyshinsky: Do you remember the address?

Romm: The address was, *poste restante*, Französische Strasse Post Office, box number—I do not remember the card number, but it is the sort of *poste restante* address that does not require any name or surname, it only requires a card number with which you come and receive your mail.

Vyshinsky: Did you know the box number?

Romm: I did know it, but I have now forgotten it.

Vyshinsky: Did Sedov receive that letter? Do you know that?

Romm: I presume he did because at our next meeting it was clear to me that he had received it.

Vyshinsky: Had you any other meeting with Sedov?

Romm: My next meeting with Sedov took place in July 1933.

Vyshinsky: What was the occasion, where and how did you meet again?

Romm: In Paris. I had arrived from Geneva and a few days after Sedov telephoned me and made an appointment to meet me in a café on the Boulevard Montparnasse. Sedov said he wanted to arrange for me to meet Trotsky. A few days after he telephoned me and made an appointment to meet me in the same café. From there we went to the Bois de Boulogne, where I met Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Romm: At the end of July 1933.

Vyshinsky: How long did that meeting with Trotsky last?

Romm: Twenty to twenty-five minutes.

Vyshinsky: For what purpose did Trotsky meet you?

Romm: As far as I could understand, in order verbally to confirm the instructions contained in the letter I was taking to Moscow. He started the conversation with the question of creating the parallel centre. He said there was a danger in the predominance of the Zinovievites, but that the danger would be great only if the Trotskyites were not sufficiently active. He agreed with the idea of the parallel centre, but only on the imperative condition that the *bloc* with the Zinovievites was preserved and also on the condition that the parallel centre shall not be inactive but shall actively engage in gathering around itself the most stalwart cadres. Then he went on to say that not only terrorism, but wrecking activities in industry, and in the national economy in general, were assuming special significance. He said that, apparently, there was still wavering on this point, but it had to be understood that loss of life was inevitable in carrying out acts of wrecking, and that the main object was, by means of a number of wrecking opera-

tions, to undermine confidence in Stalin's Five-Year Plan, in the new technique, and in that way, to undermine confidence in the Party leadership. Emphasizing the necessity of extreme measures, Trotsky quoted the Latin proverb to the effect: "What medicine cannot heal, iron will heal, and what iron cannot heal, fire will heal." I remember that, somewhat perplexed, I suggested that this would undermine the defence capacity of the country at a time when, with the accession of Hitler to power, the danger of war, and particularly the danger of an attack on the U.S.S.R. by Germany, was becoming particularly acute. To this question I did not get a comprehensive reply, but Trotsky hinted that it was precisely the growing acuteness of the war danger that may place defeatism on the order of the day.

Then he gave me a book, Novikov-Priboï's novel, *Tsusima,* and said that a letter to Radek was concealed in the cover. I took this book with me to Moscow and on arrival handed it to Radek in his apartment.

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Romm: That was in August 1933.

Further, I told Radek about my conversation with Trotsky. He said that probably when I had returned from my vacation he would give me a reply for Trotsky. When I returned from my vacation, I received from Radek a letter to Trotsky, also concealed in the cover of a German book, which I was to hand to Sedov.

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Romm: At the end of September 1933.

I handed this letter, or rather the book with the letter concealed in it, to Sedov in Paris in November 1933.

My next meeting with Sedov took place in Paris in April, 1934.

Vyshinsky: What was the occasion?

Romm: He telephoned me and expressed a desire to meet me. I met him in the Bois de Boulogne. I informed him that I would soon be assigned to America and that I could no longer serve as liaison man. He expressed regret at this and, learning that I was going to Moscow shortly, asked me to bring back from Radek a detailed report on the situation, about the work of the whole organization.

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Romm: This meeting took place in April 1934.

Vyshinsky: Did you convey this message?

Romm: Yes, I did. I gave Radek the message and, in May 1934, prior to my departure for America, he handed me a letter, again concealed in a book—as far as I remember it was an Anglo-Russian technical dictionary. The letter, he said, contained a detailed report from the active centre, as well as from the parallel centre, about the development of political and diversive work. I handed this letter, or rather the book containing the letter, to Sedov in Paris.

Vyshinsky: Was this all you delivered?

Romm: Altogether I delivered five letters from both sides.

Vyshinsky: Suppose we count how many messages there were?

Romm: In Geneva I handed Radek a letter from Trotsky. That was in the spring of 1932. Then I received a letter from him in September 1932. Then I received a letter from Trotsky in July 1933 and received a letter from Radek in September 1934.

Vyshinsky: No, 1933.

Romm: Yes, 1933. And one other letter in May 1934.

Vyshinsky: In April?

Romm: No, in May, for in April I was in Paris.

Vyshinsky: And the technical dictionary?

Romm: That was in May 1934.

Vyshinsky: So altogether there were five messages?

Romm: Five messages.

Vyshinsky: This is apart from the conversations you had with Sedov, which you informed Radek about when you met him?

Romm: Evidently the contents of these conversations were covered, and even more than covered, by the contents of the letters.

Vyshinsky: That is a question of detail. I am concerned about establishing facts: a number of parcels and a number of verbal messages?

Romm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When you met Sedov, you conveyed to him the information given you by Radek. When you met Radek, you conveyed Sedov's information, and you handed over a number of documents from one to the other?

Romm: The main point in the conversations was an outline of the general attitude.

Vyshinsky: In any case this policy concerned your anti-Soviet work?

Romm: In this sense, undoubtedly.

Vyshinsky: You received an appointment to America?

Romm: Yes, I received an appointment to America.

Vyshinsky: In what capacity?

Romm: As correspondent of the *Izvestia.*

Vyshinsky: As the correspondent of Tass or of the *Izvestia?*

Romm: As correspondent of the *Izvestia.*

Vyshinsky: And before that?

Romm: Before that I was Tass correspondent in Japan, Geneva and Paris. The handing over of Radek's letter to Sedov in May 1934 was actually the last commission which I fulfilled. Since then I have not fulfilled any commissions.

Vyshinsky: What was the gist of your conversations with Sedov regarding your appointment to America?

Romm: Sedov told me that in connection with my going to America Trotsky had asked to be informed in case there was anything interesting in the sphere of Soviet-American relations. When I asked why this was so interesting, Sedov told me: "This follows from Trotsky's line on the defeat of the U.S.S.R. Inasmuch as the date of the war of Germany and Japan against the U.S.S.R. depends to a certain extent on the state of Soviet-American relations, this cannot fail to be of interest to Trotsky."

Vyshinsky: To whom?

Romm: To Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: In other words you received through Sedov a proposal to inform Trotsky about relations between America and the Soviet Union, from the viewpoint of Trotsky's orientation and his line?

Romm: From the viewpoint of his defeatist position.

Vyshinsky: So you received, in effect, a proposal to be his correspondent?

Romm: His request was not to send him information, but to watch out for anything especially important which he could not learn otherwise, and to write him about it.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, not just a correspondent, but a special correspondent?

Romm: Quite so.

Vyshinsky: So you fulfilled a dual function as the correspondent of the *Izvestia* and special correspondent of Trotsky? So?

Romm: Yes. I agreed to send Trotsky information which interested him.

Vyshinsky: You fulfilled this commission of Trotsky's?

Romm: No. The first months of my stay in America were wholly devoted to getting my bearings in the new and strange surroundings, and there was nothing to report, while afterwards, even if there had been anything, I would not have reported it, because after the murder of Kirov I resolved to stop active work.

Vyshinsky: Did you receive the address to which the correspondence was to be sent?

Romm: Yes, Sedov gave me the address: *poste restante*, Poste Centrale, Paris, Rue du Louvre.

Vyshinsky: You promised?

Romm: I agreed. I said that I did not reject the proposal and agreed to send information which interested Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: Previously during the investigation you said as follows: "I told Sedov that if I had any information that would interest Trotsky, I would report it to him."

Romm: Yes, quite right.

Vyshinsky: Did you have occasion to meet anyone from the parallel centre apart from Radek?

Romm: No.

Vyshinsky: Pyatakov?

Romm: No, I did not meet him.

Vyshinsky: Only Radek?

Romm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was Radek justified in telling the Court that Romm was his secret liaison man?

Romm: I think that is correct inasmuch as I had nothing to do with anyone save Radek; only Putna might have known besides him, and he only in the initial stage.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions to put to Romm.

Accused Radek, you have just heard Romm's explanations. It seems to me that Romm's statements tally with yours.

Radek: Yes. In general there are some inexactitudes, but only of a very minor character.

Vyshinsky: But is the factual side correctly given?

Radek: The factual side is correct in the main. Only one point is incorrect. In Trotsky's first letter the names of Stalin and Voroshilov were not mentioned, since we never mentioned names in our letters, or if we did, then in concealed form, using a special code for this purpose. And since we did not yet have this code at the time of the first letter, Trotsky could not possibly have mentioned the names of Stalin and Voroshilov in the first letter.

Vyshinsky: But this letter spoke about terrorism?

Radek: Yes, I do not dispute the sense of the letter, but since it is a question of exactitude, I must say that these two names were not mentioned.

Vyshinsky: And has Romm told the truth about the five cases? About Novikov-Priboi's book, about the English technical dictionary?

Radek: All quite true.

Vyshinsky: So it is all true?

Radek: Yes.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: Have the accused any questions to put to the witness Romm? Has Radek any questions?

Radek: No.

The President: Witness Romm, you are released from giving further evidence. (*To the Commandant.*) Please lead witness Romm out.

Vyshinsky: May I put a question to the accused Radek?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky: Accused Radek, in your testimony you say: "In 1935 . . . we resolved to call a conference, but before this, in January, when I arrived, Vitaly Putna came to me with a request from Tukhachevsky. . . ." I want to know in what connection you mention Tukhachevsky's name?

Radek: Tukhachevsky had been commissioned by the government with some task for which he could not find the necessary material. I alone was in possession of this material. He rang me up and asked if I had this material. I had it, and he accordingly sent Putna, with whom he had to discharge this commission, to get this material from me. Of course, Tukhachevsky had no idea either of Putna's role or of my criminal role. . . .

Vyshinsky: And Putna?

Radek: He was a member of the organization, and he did not come to talk about the organization, but I took advantage of his visit to have this talk.

Vyshinsky: So Putna came to you, having been sent by Tukhachevsky on official business having no bearing whatever on your affairs since he, Tukhachevsky, had no relations with them whatever?

Radek: Tukhachevsky never had any relations whatever with them.

Vyshinsky: He sent Putna on official business?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you took advantage of this in order to engage in your own particular affairs?

Radek: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Do I understand you correctly, that Putna had dealings with the members of your Trotskyite underground organization, and that your reference to Tukhachevsky was made in connection with the fact that Putna came on official business on Tukhachevsky's orders?

Radek: I confirm that, and I say that I never had and could not have had any dealings with Tukhachevsky connected with counter-revolutionary activities, because I knew Tukhachevsky's attitude to the Party and the government to be that of an absolutely devoted man.

The President: We shall now proceed to examine the accused Sokolnikov.

Comrade Vyshinsky, have you any questions?

Vyshinsky: Accused Sokolnikov, please tell about your relations with the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite terrorist centre.

Sokolnikov: I knew the personnel of the united centre, I knew its terrorist aims, I knew that as early as the autumn of 1932 the united centre was planning preparations for terrorist acts against Stalin and Kirov. I knew that Bakayev was charged with the work of concentrating all the connections with the terrorist groups of the united centre. I knew that the Moscow terrorist groups were under the charge of Reingold.

Vyshinsky: Reingold?

Sokolnikov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: From whom did you know about this?

Sokolnikov: From Kamenev.

Vyshinsky: As regards the preparations for terrorist acts, you have told the court that you knew that the united terrorist centre was conducting preparations for terrorist acts against Comrades Stalin and Kirov. In what year did you learn of this?

Sokolnikov: As a general task I knew about it in 1932.

Vyshinsky: And about the preparations, about concrete steps?

Sokolnikov: I think it was in the autumn of 1934 that Kamenev told me about this, without going into details. But he said that the centre had been organizing an attempt on Stalin's life in Moscow.

Vyshinsky: But that this attempt had ended in failure?

Sokolnikov: Yes. And he said that an attempt on Kirov's life was being prepared in Leningrad.

Vyshinsky: After the assassination of Kirov in Leningrad you did not happen to speak with Kamenev about this?

Sokolnikov: A few days later I happened to meet him in a bookshop where there were other people at the counter; here we talked only about the latest news in the papers; there was no other talk between us.

Vyshinsky: You accepted Kamenev's proposal regarding the organization of the reserve centre and regarding its composition, or did you not discuss its composition?

Sokolnikov: Kamenev told me at that time—this was at the end of the summer of 1932—that he would conduct negotiations on the formation of the reserve centre.

Vyshinsky: He would conduct negotiations? With whom—did he tell you?

Sokolnikov: No.

Vyshinsky: And you did not bother to ask who else would be in it?

Sokolnikov: He told me in general terms that he would speak

with Tomsky. But he did not say with whom personally he was going to speak besides.

Vyshinsky: And what do you think, with whom could he have spoken?

Sokolnikov: Regarding possible candidates for the centre? Those were the same persons who were afterwards made members of the parallel centre.

Vyshinsky: But which of these candidates did Kamenev specifically mention to you in that conversation?

Sokolnikov: I cannot recall if he named all of them.

Vyshinsky: But whom did he name?

Sokolnikov: I recollect that he named Pyatakov and Radek.

Vyshinsky: And they afterwards joined the centre?

Sokolnikov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When did you speak with Pyatakov and Radek about your practical work in the parallel centre?

Sokolnikov: My work in the parallel centre began in the summer of 1935. Up to then it had consisted only in carrying out a commission regarding negotiations with a certain diplomatic representative.

Vyshinsky: And when did you have your talk with this representative of a foreign state?

Sokolnikov: That was in the middle of April 1934.

Vyshinsky: And in 1934 did you happen to have conversations with anyone regarding the defeatist position of the *bloc?*

Sokolnikov: I had a conversation with Kamenev in the beginning of 1934. During this conversation Kamenev informed me about the defeatist position taken by Trotsky and about his own defeatist views. Incidentally, one definite result of this conversation was that Kamenev warned me that someone might approach me with inquiries.

Vyshinsky: Who might do this?

Sokolnikov: The diplomatic representative of a certain country.

Vyshinsky: Kamenev warned you about this?

Sokolnikov: Yes, Kamenev warned me about this.

Vyshinsky: Did Kamenev tell you what inquiries would be addressed to you?

Sokolnikov: Yes, he told me that I would be asked for confirmation of the fact that the negotiations which were being carried on by Trotsky abroad were not being carried on by him in his own name, but that behind Trotsky there really was an organization of which he was the representative.

Vyshinsky: You were to confirm this if inquiries in this sense were addressed to you?

Sokolnikov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Such a question was addressed to you?

Sokolnikov: Yes, in the middle of April after one of my official talks with the representative of a certain country with whom I had frequent meetings in connection with my official duties. The conversation took place after the official talk was over, when the interpreters had withdrawn to the neighbouring room. While I was showing my visitor to the door he asked me whether I knew that Trotsky had addressed certain proposals to his government. I confirmed that this fact was known to me. He asked further whether these proposals were serious. I confirmed this too. He asked whether this was my own personal opinion. I said that this was not only my opinion but that of my friends as well. I understood this question of his as a confirmation of the fact that the government of that country had really received Trotsky's proposals, and wanted to make sure that Trotsky's proposals were really known to the organization and that Trotsky's right to conduct these negotiations was not disputed.

Vyshinsky: What official post did you hold at that time?

Sokolnikov: Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell anybody about this conversation with the representative of the foreign country?

Sokolnikov: I spoke about this conversation about a month later to Radek, and then to Pyatakov. This was shortly after my conversation with the diplomat. I had another meeting with Radek —in July 1935. In July 1935 Radek informed me that Trotsky had expressed dissatisfaction at the fact that I had performed this commission in a formal way, that is to say, that I had confirmed the mandate but had not confirmed the proposals themselves, had not defended them, had not championed them.

Pyatakov has told about this and Radek has told about it, so I do not know if it is necessary for me to dwell upon it further. I can say what I considered to be the commission that was assigned to me alone: to confirm the proposals Trotsky made at the end of 1933; whether they still held good in the spring of 1934; I considered that it was a matter of confirming his authority to negotiate, to enable him to continue negotiations. At what stage these negotiations were, I do not know.

Vyshinsky: What happened after that?

Sokolnikov: Pyatakov asked me about this considerably later —in 1935. I confirmed the fact to him too. We did not see each other until 1935. But in 1935, when we met after the parallel centre had commenced its activities, Pyatakov, in a conversation about

which I shall speak later, asked me, among other things, what our conversation had been about. I told him.

Pyatakov (to the President): May I give an explanation concerning the question raised by Sokolnikov?

The President: You may.

Pyatakov: Was it on his own initiative that Sokolnikov spoke to Radek? Sokolnikov's memory might have betrayed him, because there was no special conversation between us; I merely told him briefly that Radek had asked him to ring him up.

Sokolnikov: Possibly.

Vyshinsky (to Sokolnikov): Proceed.

Sokolnikov: In the summer of 1935, several months after the arrests of the Zinovievites and a part of the Trotskyites, knowing that I had been appointed to the parallel centre, I considered it my duty to get into contact with its members.

I did not at first speak to Pyatakov, but about three weeks or a month before that, I met Radek.

The questions which Radek and I discussed concerned the carrying out of the terrorist line and problems of organization in connection with it. We then discussed certain questions of program.

Vyshinsky: Which, for example?

Sokolnikov: Questions of program in connection with the change in the international situation.

I forgot to say that I knew of the negotiations which the members of the united centre had conducted with the Rights.

Vyshinsky: With whom personally?

Sokolnikov: I know that Kamenev conducted negotiations with Bukharin and Rykov. I know that Zinoviev and somebody else, I cannot now recall who, conducted negotiations with Tomsky and Uglanov.

In the course of these negotiations it was established that an agreement existed on fundamental questions of program and the tactical line and, in particular, with regard to the adoption of terrorist methods of struggle.

But the Rights did not join the *bloc*. They declared that while they agreed with everything, they wanted to retain their own separate organization, their central group, and only maintain contact with the united centre.

As regards the principles of the program, as early as 1932 the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites and the Rights had all come to agree in the main on the program which previously had been described as the program of the Rights.

This was the so-called Ryutin platform. As early as 1932 it

expressed to a large extent just these principles of program which were common to all three groups.

As regards the further development of this program, the leading members of the centre considered that, as an isolated revolution, our revolution could not remain a socialist revolution, and that Kautsky's theory of super-imperialism and the kindred Bukharin theory of organized capitalism had proved to be correct.

We considered that fascism was the most organized form of capitalism, that it would triumph, would seize Europe and stifle us. It was therefore better to come to terms with it, it was better to consent to a compromise in the sense of retreating from socialism to capitalism. All this was explained by the following argument: better make certain sacrifices, even very severe ones, than lose everything. I should explain, emphasize this principle, because without it, it would be quite impossible to understand how the *bloc* and the centre of the *bloc* could have entered upon the course of terrorist struggle, of wrecking struggle, of diversive acts, on a defeatist position. There had to be a certain meaning in all this. This meaning is contained in this very position which was also a defeatist position, but one of a somewhat different type, *i.e.*, it was defeatism in regard to the socialist character and to the socialist gains of our revolution. The *bloc* renounced them, and having renounced this—I do not want to speak now about other points of view, I am explaining the point of view to which the members of the united centre and, so far as I understand, the members of the parallel centre adhered —they considered that by this principle everything should be guided and that it justified everything; but in reality, of course, all this led to the policy of the *bloc,* which I will not characterize now.

Vyshinsky: I take it, you have just set forth your conversation with Radek?

Sokolnikov: No, I am now summarizing everything.

Vyshinsky: Then we have somewhat digressed from our subject.

Sokolnikov: Yes. Allow me to revert to the conversation with Radek so as to finish with this question of program. During this conversation we spoke of the changes that had taken place. We said that while in 1933 and 1934 the principal military menace to the Soviet Union lay in the Far East, in 1935, the principal military menace, the most serious, was offered by Germany. Next, during this conversation we discussed the fascists' successes, the spread of fascism in Europe and the new factors which must be considered in our policy on account of this. Such was the conversation on questions of program which we had in July 1935.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any conversations with Radek after July 1935?

Sokolnikov: Yes. It was in the winter of 1936, approximately at the end of January 1936.

Vyshinsky: Did you know that Radek at that time had received a letter from Trotsky?

Sokolnikov: You see, I can say nothing about the letter because it happened that Pyatakov's return after his meeting with Trotsky overshadowed as it were the information contained in that letter, so that I cannot recall that any prominence was given to this letter in the conversation I had with Pyatakov when he told me of this meeting, or in the conversation with Radek.

Vyshinsky: So you had two conversations on this subject, with Pyatakov and Radek?

Sokolnikov: Yes, within a very short interval.

Vyshinsky: Had you spoken to Pyatakov first or to Radek?

Sokolnikov: To Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: You spoke to Pyatakov after he had returned from abroad?

Sokolnikov: Yes. That was in January 1936. Pyatakov told me that Trotsky had been negotiating with Hess. In these negotiations Hess was empowered to put forward demands which concerned not only German interests but also the interests of another country. Pyatakov told me that he had understood Trotsky to say that these were negotiations on a number of questions, and that agreement had been reached on them. Of course it was assumed that this draft agreement would be submitted to official circles as well and would not remain merely an agreement between these two persons.

That is to say, the first alternative was designed for the contingency of power passing into the hands of the *bloc* irrespective of anything arising before the outbreak of the war. To put it plainly, in such an event the other side undertook to give the government of the *bloc* its friendly support. As regards the *bloc,* it undertook a number of obligations of an economic character which secured economic advantages to the other side.

Vyshinsky: Is it this that Radek and Pyatakov spoke about?

Sokolnikov: Yes. The second alternative envisaged that the *bloc* would come to power as a result of a war and as a result of the defeat of the Soviet Union. In this event the parties to the agreement pledged themselves to establish relations with the government of the *bloc,* thus, strictly speaking, I think, ensuring their advent to power, and hence withholding support from rival groups. The *bloc* undertook to conclude peace immediately and recognize territorial concessions.

Vyshinsky: Namely?

Sokolnikov: In this agreement they were stated as follows: that Japan, in the event of her taking part in the war, would receive territorial concessions in the Far East in the Amur Region and the Maritime Province; as regards Germany, it was contemplated to "satisfy the national interests of the Ukraine." Beneath this transparent veil was understood the establishment of German control over the Ukraine coupled with the secession of the latter from the U.S.S.R. Moreover, a number of economic concessions were contemplated, going somewhat farther than the economic concessions of the first alternative. But none the less I would not say that the peculiarity of the second alternative lay in the character of these economic concessions. The basis of these negotiations of Trotsky with Hess was—and this of course must be acknowledged with complete clarity—Trotsky's undertaking to ensure that the *bloc* pursued a defeatist line of action. This was what Trotsky on his side had to offer on behalf of the *bloc* in those negotiations —otherwise it is clear that they would never even have talked with him. Pyatakov told me that when he heard this project for the agreement in its finished and fully developed form, very grave doubts arose in his mind as to whether it was necessary to make such an agreement. He warned Trotsky that he thought it necessary on his return to Moscow to convene a conference, or several conferences, limited to the most trusted members of the *bloc,* in order to inform them about this project for the agreement and to give Trotsky a final answer after this exchange of opinions.

Vyshinsky: What was Pyatakov's attitude to this proposal and to Trotsky's agreement?

Sokolnikov: Pyatakov was strongly opposed to a number of points in the agreement just as I and Radek were; but Pyatakov, as far as I know, did not object to Trotsky continuing the negotiations pending the centre's reply—that is, he was in favour of negotiations being continued. As far as I know, there was no ban on the part of the centre of the *bloc* or on Pyatakov's part.

Vyshinsky: Negotiations on what basis?

Sokolnikov: The negotiations which Trotsky had conducted with Hess were continued on the same basis as before. Certain points still remained to be specified and so forth. True, Trotsky said that he was reckoning—that in the further course of the negotiations he thought that he would succeed in driving a better bargain in some respects, but of course what mattered were not these individual amendments but the basis.

Here, when we talked with Pyatakov in Moscow after his return, then, as I say (of course, this may be of no importance at the trial but in expounding our sentiments it may be of importance) both Pyatakov and I hesitated, of course, when we saw this agreement in its amplified and finished form—an agreement which, properly speaking, summed up everything we had been doing for a number of years or a number of months, and to which we had been gradually slipping.

But I must say none the less that I think our conclusion in this conversation was that we did not contemplate any other course than this.

Vyshinsky: Other than what course?

Sokolnikov: Than the course which Trotsky was already advocating. The point is that in analyzing this agreement point by point we could not fail to see that after all it contained nothing new.

Vyshinsky: Nothing new in comparison with what?

Sokolnikov: In comparison with what we had had, to some extent, since 1932 and, in the main, since 1934, when the defeatist attitude of the *bloc* finally took shape.

Vyshinsky: So there was nothing new in comparison with the principles which had previously been laid down?

Sokolnikov: You see, I must correct myself. It is not that there was nothing new—that is incorrect.

Vyshinsky: In principle?

Sokolnikov: In principle there was nothing new.

Vyshinsky: That is just what I am talking about. Quantitatively perhaps, but qualitatively?

Sokolnikov: Of course, quantity passes into quality.

Vyshinsky: Under certain conditions.

Sokolnikov: In a certain measure. Here we had, sad though it is to confess it, a sort of concentrated essence, and all these elements were derived from one source, strengthened one another, of course, confronted us with a problem of the following nature. After all, we reasoned as politicians. We understood that it was not a question of our feelings, good or bad; we reasoned as politicians, and, consequently, we had to decide a political problem which consisted of only one point: could we by adopting this most painful course, which in regard to the existing Party leadership, in regard to the Soviet power, in regard to the Soviet Union represented, as we understood full well, a series of the most heinous crimes, of the most shameful crimes, represented treason and so forth—we had to decide whether after paying this price we would be able to utilize this hostile force.

Vyshinsky: Or they would utilize you?

Sokolnikov: Or they would utilize us, if we became simply an appendage of German fascism, which would utilize us and then throw us away like a dirty rag, we would be condemned, disgraced and proved to be utter nonentities.

Vyshinsky: And did you expect any other fate than to be utilized by fascism and then thrown away like a useless rag?

Sokolnikov: Of course. If we had counted only on such an end we ought to have liquidated the *bloc* completely.

Vyshinsky: You thought you could retain some independence?

Sokolnikov: I am saying what we thought at that time. We figured that we had certain chances. Where did we see them? We saw them in the play of international contradictions. We considered that, let us say, complete sway in the Soviet Union could never be established by German fascism because it would encounter the objections of other imperialist rivals, that certain international conflicts might occur, that we could rely on other forces which would not be interested in strengthening fascism.

We considered that within the country we could rely upon certain strata. I must say that we realized that in our line of policy we must return to capitalism and must advance a program of capitalism, for then we could rely upon certain strata in the country.

Vyshinsky: Specifically on what forces within the country did you calculate? On the working class?

Sokolnikov: No.

Vyshinsky: On the collective farm peasantry?

Sokolnikov: Of course not.

Vyshinsky: On whom then?

Sokolnikov: To speak quite frankly, I must say that we reckoned on being able to rely on the elements of the peasant bourgeoisie. . . .

Vyshinsky: On the kulaks, on the few remnants of the kulaks?

Sokolnikov: That is so. The *bloc* was to lead to the growth of these few remnants. I repeat that, of course, our program of a deal with German fascism that would ensure the *bloc* coming to power would also involve big social changes in the Soviet Union and the appearance of forces which would support the government of the *bloc.*

Vyshinsky: Changes in what direction?

Sokolnikov: Changes in the direction of the restoration of capitalism. The elements which would be interested in this and would accept it as a blessing would be satisfied with such a policy and would support the *bloc.* But I want to say that this prospect was

not very much better than the prospect of proving to be a mere appendage of German fascism. But this offered a prospect of the *bloc* being able to maintain power in the country, again by manoeuvring in a definite way between the various classes, relying on certain classes as against others.

Vyshinsky: In a word, to put it briefly, through what stages lay your path to power according to your idea?

Sokolnikov: The path to power lay through the gradual restoration of capitalist elements, which would squeeze out and to a certain extent replace the socialist elements.

Vyshinsky: And what about the aggressors?

Sokolnikov: We were prepared to come to an agreement with them, the result of which would be that in the course of war and as a result of the defeat of the Soviet Union, the government of the *bloc* would come to power.

Vyshinsky: It would therefore be correct to say that you were banking on help from foreign interventionists?

Sokolnikov: You see . . . perhaps it is something worse. . . .

Vyshinsky: I am not speaking of what is worse or of what is better. I am not passing moral judgment. I am establishing facts. I, as the representative of the State prosecution, assert that you were directly staking on the assistance of foreign aggressors, on the assistance of foreign interventionists. Is my assertion correct?

Sokolnikov: It is correct that we calculated on the help of foreign aggressors. Interventionists—I would not say.

Vyshinsky: The aim was one that the aggressors would set?

Sokolnikov: They have their own aim. . . .

Vyshinsky: That is true, they have their own aims, and you had yours. But you counted on achieving your aims by helping them to achieve theirs. Is that right?

Sokolnikov: It is right.

Vyshinsky: Therefore, was I right when I formulated it in the indictment as follows: "The main task which the parallel centre set itself was the forcible overthrow of the Soviet government with the object of changing the social and political system existing in the U.S.S.R. . . ." Is that formulation correct?

Sokolnikov: Yes, correct.

Vyshinsky: Further on in the indictment I say: "L. D. Trotsky, and on his instructions the parallel Trotskyite centre, aimed at seizing power with the aid of foreign states with the object of restoring capitalist social relations in the U.S.S.R. . . ." Is that formulation correct?

Sokolnikov: Correct.

The President: Adjournment for 20 minutes.

* * *

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: The session is resumed. (*To Vyshinsky.*) Have you finished?

Vyshinsky (to Sokolnikov): You said that you proceeded from the necessity of relying upon certain social strata of the population. You named the kulaks as a support of the *bloc.* Is this formulation correct?

Sokolnikov: Yes, as such a force which, if it received definite advantages from the government of the *bloc,* would be interested in preserving the power of this *bloc.*

Vyshinsky: What other elements did you count on in addition to these? Did the *bloc* expect to confine itself in the struggle to its own forces only, or did it intend to unite with other anti-Soviet elements in the country?

Sokolnikov: Undoubtedly. This followed from the economic policy outlined by the *bloc.* Naturally, if the *bloc* proposed to grant concessions to foreign capital, to lease certain factories to foreign capital, if it had in view, at least at first, the partial dissolution of collective farms, it is obvious that this would create not only direct elements of large-scale capitalism, but also a petty-capitalist environment, petty traders, a petty bourgeoisie, which would be interested in preservation of this regime and would therefore support the *bloc.*

Vyshinsky: Now with regard to what you say about the social and economic plans: what was the attitude of the *bloc* towards the policy of industrialization?

Sokolnikov: A negative one. The *bloc* considered that the policy of industrialization would be cut short, that part of the enterprises would be handed over to concessionaires.

Vyshinsky: That is, you wanted to renounce the policy of industrialization?

Sokolnikov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And the policy of collectivization?

Sokolnikov: It was proposed to renounce the present policy of collectivization, to put a stop to that policy.

Vyshinsky: And what was your attitude towards the existing collective farms?

Sokolnikov: Of course, it was not proposed to dissolve all the collective farms forcibly; part of the collective farms might be able to hold on.

Vyshinsky: Was it proposed to adopt any government measures to strengthen, or, on the contrary, to destroy the collective farms?

Sokolnikov: It was proposed to stop giving government support to the collective farms.

Vyshinsky: That meant renouncing the policy of collectivization?

Sokolnikov: Leaving the collective farms to their own fate.

Vyshinsky: The nature of a policy is that a state in its activities supports a certain tendency. Well then, renunciation of the policy of industrialization?

Sokolnikov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Renunciation of the policy of collectivization?

Sokolnikov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: This was part of the plan of social and economic measures outlined by the *bloc*?

Sokolnikov: I think I have already spoken of that. It formed part of the plan of the *bloc,* and we also realized that what followed from this was the renunciation of the policy of directly building a classless society.

Vyshinsky: That means the restoration of the class division of society?

Sokolnikov: The restoration of capitalism is the restoration of classes.

Vyshinsky: Different classes, including the class of exploiters?

Sokolnikov: Of course, the kulaks are the worst kind of exploiters.

Vyshinsky: Well then, for the sake of complete clarity, we establish the following: you conceive the ensemble of these measures to constitute a program of capitalist restoration?

Sokolnikov: This program is an inevitable and necessary inference from the program of the Rights, or to put it plainly, from the program of retreat or of the restoration of capitalism.

Vyshinsky: Were the formulations of this program as you give them now discussed by you with the other members of the centre?

Sokolnikov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: With whom specifically?

Sokolnikov: I recall such a conversation in 1933 with Kamenev. I recall similar conversations with other members of the centre. As to particular points, there were talks with Pyatakov about industrialization, and talks with Tomsky about collective farm policy in the autumn of 1935.

Vyshinsky: Was the attitude of your centre as a whole favourable or unfavourable to this?

Sokolnikov: I consider that the centre adopted this program. It was not written down. It was the program of the centre, and it was Trotsky's program also. I was told that when speaking of a *bloc* with the Rights, Trotsky emphasized the idea that there were no differences with the Rights.

Vyshinsky: No differences on this question?

Sokolnikov: No.

Vyshinsky: Were there in your centre no vacillations, no doubts, were there not varying conceptions of these problems?

Sokolnikov: I find it difficult to answer this question. I beg you to understand why. I do not want to say that I was in a special position and to separate myself from the other members of the organization; but it was mentioned here, and it was so in fact, that between the members of the centre of Trotskyite origin there were closer, more intimate and more trustful relations than there were with me. The relations with me were of a rather official character.

Vyshinsky: The question of program is not a personal matter.

Sokolnikov: Judging by all the conversations I had and by Trotsky's instructions, I consider that no unclarity existed.

Vyshinsky: And you consider that all the members agreed with this point of view, that this was the common viewpoint expressed in the program?

Sokolnikov: In a number of communications—which were confirmed here—made to me in the name of Trotsky, who not only guided the parallel centre, but also gave instructions to those members of the centre with whom he had close relations—in a number of directives he emphasized this.

Vyshinsky: And this program defined the elements on which you could rely?

Sokolnikov: Of course.

Vyshinsky: How would you, in the most exhaustive and complete form, describe the elements upon whom you proposed to rely?

Sokolnikov: To speak without any circumlocution or reservation, it must be said that this program for the restoration of capitalism meant the creation of elements of a new bourgeoisie, and this new bourgeoisie, of course, would welcome all the concessions which the *bloc* would make.

Vyshinsky: Were you aware of the enlistment in your Trotskyite, anti-Soviet criminal activities of non-members of the Trotskyite organization, of other people with an anti-Soviet attitude of mind?

Sokolnikov: Pyatakov told me that the directive given by Trotsky about the development of wrecking activities pointed out that the group of the *bloc* which conducted wrecking activities must establish connections with other counter-revolutionary groups.

Vyshinsky: With which groups?

Sokolnikov: I cannot say specifically. With other counter-revolutionary groups conducting similar work. It was pointed out that former wrecking organizations among the specialists should be found.

Vyshinsky: Among the former wreckers of the period of the

Industrial Party and the Shakhty trial? Well then, what was your line?

Sokolnikov: Trotsky's line, which permitted the wrecking groups of the *bloc* to establish contact with these groups.

Vyshinsky: Did you know that one or another of your Trotskyite groups had established contact with some of the wreckers among the old Shakhty crowd or among the former adherents of the Industrial Party, and so forth?

Sokolnikov: No, I did not know that. The point is that I did not know about the wrecking work. I knew about the directive before that, but about the wrecking activities I was informed by Pyatakov in the autumn of 1935.

Vyshinsky: Did you yourself take part in wrecking activities?

Sokolnikov: No.

Vyshinsky: In whose hands was that?

Sokolnikov: The direction of wrecking activities?

Vyshinsky: Yes.

Sokolnikov: In Pyatakov's hands.

Vyshinsky: Mainly?

Sokolnikov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Or exclusively?

Sokolnikov: I understood that the general direction of this work was in the hands of Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: Comrade President, permit me to question Shestov.

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky: Accused Shestov, we will examine you later on. For the moment in connection with my question to the accused Sokolnikov, I would ask you to reply to the same question. What have you to say about using various wreckers—non-Trotskyites—for your undermining Trotskyite work? Did that take place?

Shestov: Yes, that took place. I remember quite well my conversations in Berlin in May 1931.

Vyshinsky: With whom?

Shestov: With Sedov, with Smirnov, with Yuri Leonidovich Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: You say: with Sedov, with Smirnov, with Pyatakov. What was this, a conference of you four, or did you have separate conversations with each of them?

Shestov: I conversed with each of them separately.

Vyshinsky: You spoke with Sedov?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Tell me briefly what you discussed with Sedov.

Shestov: Sedov then formulated the point that it was necessary to enlist all the forces hostile to the Stalin leadership.

Vyshinsky: What was meant by that?

Shestov: Before that I had given him a brief report on the situation in the Kuzbas. My work is in the Kuzbas. I told him that I knew that among the old engineers there were remnants of the Shakhty wreckers, members of the Industrial Party, who were carrying on wrecking, counter-revolutionary activities.

When Sedov talked about enlisting the so-called forces hostile to the Stalin regime, he said: "There you have the human material." Later on Yuri Leonidovich Pyatakov said the same thing to me.

Vyshinsky: In what connection did he say this?

Shestov: When he gave me instructions to carry on undermining and destructive work in the Kuzbas. It is true that Pyatakov did not put it in that way then. He said that all means and efforts must be exerted to put a stop to Stalin's industrialization game.

Vyshinsky: What year was that?

Shestov: In 1931. I had a definite talk on this subject with Y. L. Pyatakov in June. But before that I had had two fairly comprehensive conversations with Sedov and Smirnov on this subject. I recall quite well that when Sedov raised the question of counteracting Stalin's industrialization I asked him: "What do you mean, counteracting? After all I am a human being, I would have to do this work, I don't understand. I can understand wrecking; but wrecking cannot be so effective. I know examples from our Soviet life, examples from the life of the Donbas, the Shakhty wrecking activities." He said: "Don't you really understand? The question is being put more firmly, more sharply, and my father bluntly speaks about carrying out a number of measures of this kind which, in their totality, will put a number of enterprises out of action." "In other words," I said to him, "work of destruction, is that what you mean, Lev Lvovich?" He replied: "Why, of course, what else can it mean?" Later I asked Smirnov and he also formulated it distinctly both in regard to forces hostile to the Stalin regime, and the carrying out of destructive and undermining measures in industry.

Vyshinsky: I am asking about enlisting non-Trotskyite anti-Soviet people.

Shestov: Sedov told me that, and later on Smirnov said that in the struggle against the Stalin government all means are justified, and in the present case it was necessary to enlist all the hostile forces in the country. All those who were against Stalin were with us. I considered that I understood well enough what there could be in the country that was opposed to Stalin.

Vyshinsky: Hence, this line was given you in 1931.

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And in this connection did you do anything in the

way of carrying out this directive? Did you yourself have occasion to recruit any of these forces?

Shestov: Not only that but when I returned to the Kuzbas I started my destructive work there, because I had then told Sedov, Smirnov and Pyatakov that we had no support whatever among the workers and peasants, and to hope that I would be able to recruit active wreckers among them—on that score I had no illusions whatever. I could only recruit kulaks, that I could see; but as for workers and peasants, I could not conceive of it, and I did not have it in my thoughts to bring up such a question. In understood that for destructive and undermining work, to be able to organize it in such a way as to have all the measures accomplished and to prevent the Trotskyite organization from being exposed, it was necessary to recruit highly skilled forces for the purpose of carrying out precisely destructive work. What if I could recruit a highly skilled worker who at most could put a machine out of action? When it came to the question of whole enterprises, it was clear to me that we must have first class people.

Vyshinsky: Were such directives and instructions given you?

Shestov: Yes, and specific reference was made to engineer wreckers.

Vyshinsky: Hence, such directives were given?

Shestov: Yes. I received them from Pyatakov, but not in a comprehensive form. He said: "You in the Kuzbas have sufficient material of that kind."

Vyshinsky: Accused Pyatakov, do you confirm Shestov's explanation?

Pyatakov: Yes. I recall that there was a conversation on this subject; I remember it was with Sedov and Shestov.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you were then discussing the enlisting of anti-Soviet forces?

Pyatakov: Yes, we were discussing the enlisting of anti-Soviet forces from among the engineers.

The President (to Vyshinsky): You have no more questions to Shestov?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: And none to the accused Sokolnikov?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: Tell me, accused Sokolnikov, which terrorist groups were you connected with in 1935-36?

Sokolnikov: In 1935 Tivel came to me and informed me that he was connected with the Zaks-Gladnyev terrorist group. Tivel asked for instructions about the further activities of this group. Then he told me about his meeting with the Zaks-Gladnyev group and reported that this group had been in existence for several

months and that it numbered several persons, six I think; and he also said that he had instructions from Zaks-Gladnyev, who was leader of this group. Through me the instructions that had existed previously were kept in force.

The President: Did you confirm that?

Sokolnikov: Yes, I confirmed it.

The President: On whose life was this group preparing to make an attempt?

Sokolnikov: Tivel told me then that they had instructions to prepare for a terrorist act against Stalin.

The President: When was the last time you met the representatives of this terrorist group?

Sokolnikov: I did not directly meet the members of this group. As far as I can remember, Tivel came to see me again in the beginning of 1936 and told me that the group was continuing its work in Moscow. Up to that time they had been keeping watch in the suburbs, and now they were keeping watch in Moscow.

The President: Did you know who were the members of that group?

Sokolnikov: I did not know who were the members of the group except for one member whom Tivel mentioned to me, a person whom I had met previously in the course of my work. That was Fligeltaub. I did not know any of the others.

The President: In addition to this group, what other terrorist groups did you know of?

Sokolnikov: I was not in any way directly connected with other groups.

The President: Were you not connected with the Friedland group?

Sokolnikov: I was not connected with this group of Friedland's, but I was personally acquainted with Friedland. This was at the end of 1935. But in view of the fact that arrests had begun among the historians, he told me that he, too, expected to be arrested, as he, as far as I remember, so he said, was a member of a terrorist group. He told me that he had learned of my belonging to the organization from Radek, with whom he was connected.

The President: You knew that there was a terrorist group, one of the leaders of which was G. S. Friedland?

Sokolnikov: No, I did not know of the existence of this group. I knew that he was a member of a group.

The President: In your testimony you say the following:

"I knew of the existence of a terrorist group of which Friedland was a member. . . . I learned from Friedland that this group was preparing to commit a terrorist act against the leaders of the Party and the government."

Sokolnikov: Yes, I confirm this, but I do not know whether this was called the Friedland group; but he told me that he was a member of this group, that such a group existed, that it was connected with Radek.

The President: What do you know about the terrorist activities of the group headed by Dreitzer, and generally, about the terrorist activities of Dreitzer in the period 1935-36?

Sokolnikov: I knew that Dreitzer was the person in the Trotskyite organization who had general direction of the terrorist groups. In particular, Dreitzer was discussed at a meeting I had with Radek in the summer of 1935 when Radek said that he considered it necessary to call Dreitzer in order to obtain from him information about his work, about the groups that were in existence, and so forth, but I do not know anything definite about the groups that were connected with Dreitzer.

The President: Did you know that Dreitzer was himself directing the preparations for an attempt on the lives of Comrades Stalin and Voroshilov in 1934?

Sokolnikov: Under the old centre?

The President: Yes, yes.

Sokolnikov: Yes. At that time Kamenev mentioned Dreitzer's name to me.

The President: Who was connected with this group's preparations for an attempt on the lives of Comrades Stalin and Voroshilov?

Sokolnikov: I do not remember that now, but undoubtedly Dreitzer's name was mentioned to me then as the man who had the most responsible commissions from the centre, so that there can be no doubt that it was on the lines of the principal leaders of the Party and the government.

The President: In your testimony you say as follows:

"In the terrorist activities of the organization in 1935-36 Dreitzer's role was similar to that of Bakayev in the period 1933-34.

"Dreitzer held in his hands the preparations for an attempt on the lives of Stalin and Voroshilov, but I do not know the details of these activities."

Sokolnikov: I confirm this.

The President: Did you know that a terrorist group existed in 1935 headed by Zaks-Gladnyev?

Sokolnikov: In a conversation with Radek and Pyatakov, I would hesitate now to make it more exact, a number of provincial groups were mentioned to me. As far as I recall, Pyatakov told me about them. Such a group was mentioned and it was said that

there was a terrorist group in Leningrad headed by Zaks-Gladnyev.

The President: The group which was preparing an attempt on the life—of whom?

Sokolnikov: The group which was preparing an attempt on the life of Zhdanov. Then there was a group in Siberia headed by Muralov, which was preparing an attempt, had instructions to prepare an attempt on the life of Eiche. Besides that, I also heard at that time of the existence of the Byeloborodov group in Rostov. I do not remember what task it had. Then I learned from Pyatakov that the Ukrainian centre had received terrorist commissions. Of the members of this group Loginov and somebody else were mentioned to me.

The President: During the preliminary investigation you mentioned the name of Schleifer.

Sokolnikov: There was Golubenko.

The President: Did you hear of the existence and activities of the Ukrainian terrorist group from Pyatakov, or from somebody else?

Sokolnikov: Yes, I heard of it from Pyatakov.

The President: Now, was there any terrorist group under your own personal direction?

Sokolnikov: As a member of the centre I was directly approached by Tivel on the instructions of Zaks-Gladnyev.

The President: Can the conclusion be drawn from this that the Zaks-Gladnyev group was under your personal direction, since you were approached for advice?

Sokolnikov: I did not direct its operations, but I personally sanctioned the continuation of its activities.

The President: How many times, and when, did you have conversations with the representative of this Zaks-Gladnyev group?

Sokolnikov: In the beginning of 1936, the spring of 1936.

The President: Thus, in the spring of 1936, in the period of your "wavering," you were personally connected with the activities of a terrorist group, with the group which was preparing an attempt on the life of Comrade Stalin?

Sokolnikov: I was personally connected with Tivel, Tivel was personally connected with the Zaks-Gladnyev group. Whether Tivel himself was a member of this group, I do not know.

The President: Did you know of the preparations in 1934 for the assassination of Comrade Kirov? Did you know who were the members of the terrorist centre which prepared and carried out the assassination of Comrade Kirov?

Sokolnikov: I knew in the beginning of the autumn, or the end of the summer of 1934, I cannot say definitely, that an at-

tempt on the life of Kirov was being prepared in Leningrad. As to who was to carry it out, that I did not know. I was not informed about the details of this affair. But in 1932 I heard who the members of the Leningrad centre were.

The President: Thus, you confirm your testimony that you knew of the existence in Leningrad of the terrorist centre, and in particular, that the members of this centre were Levin, Kotolynov, Mandelstamm and others. You confirm this?

Sokolnikov: Yes, I confirm it, I knew that in 1932.

The President: Did you know that the preparations for the terrorist act against Comrade Kirov were carried out under Bakayev's personal direction?

Sokolnikov: I was not told about that directly, but I knew that the direction of the preparation of a terrorist act was entrusted to Bakayev.

The President: To what extent were you connected with Reingold and his activities?

Sokolnikov: Reingold directed the terrorist groups in Moscow. I used to meet him, but he gave me no information about his work. About the functions that he was carrying out I learned from Kamenev.

The President: Reingold had more direct connections with you than with Kamenev?

Sokolnikov: But he gave me no information about his activities.

The President: Reingold frequently visited you and discussed things with you more than he did with Kamenev. How is it that you did not know about his activities?

Sokolnikov: I met him, but he gave me no information about his terrorist activities, and I cannot testify to the details of his work.

The President: If you did not know the details of Reingold's terrorist activities, how is it you knew such a detail as the fact that in November 1934 Bakayev went to Leningrad personally to prepare the murder of Comrade Kirov?

Sokolnikov: I had no connection whatever with the preparations for the murder of Kirov except that, as a member of the organization, I bear responsibility for all the actions and all the crimes committed by the organization. The reason why I knew about Bakayev is that Kamenev mentioned him to me. I had known Bakayev for a long time, and evidently Kamenev, in conversation with me, mentioned him.

The President: Thus, Kamenev informed you at that time, in 1934, that in November 1934 Bakayev was going to Leningrad in order to prepare a terrorist act against Kirov?

Sokolnikov: I will not undertake to say that this was in November. I think that was an error in my original testimony. In the beginning of the autumn Kamenev informed me about this, and evidently mentioned Bakayev. I cannot recall any later conversation. I received this information from Kamenev.

The President: In your testimony of August and September you speak vaguely about your connection with the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre. According to one statement it appears that you were a member of this centre, but in another statement you deny it. Did you regard yourself as a member of the united centre to which Zinoviev, Kamenev and others belonged?

Sokolnikov: No, evidently that is a technical error. I was never a member of the united centre. From the very outset I was selected, appointed and gave my consent to becoming a member of the reserve centre. I did not take part in any of the decisions of the united centre, and was never a member of the united centre. As far as I remember, when I was confronted with Kamenev, he also said that I was not a member of the united centre.

The President: But you stood close to and were informed about the activities of the united centre?

Sokolnikov: I was intimate with Kamenev, and he informed me about some of the actions of the united centre. He partly informed me *post factum.*

The President (to Vyshinsky): Have you any questions?

Vyshinsky: In connection with your last question. (To Sokolnikov.) When you were confronted with Kamenev, how was the question of your participation in the *bloc* put?

Sokolnikov: Kamenev stated that he had had conversations with me in the summer of 1932, that they did not want to put me on the united centre because they thought it was necessary to preserve me, since I enjoyed the confidence of the Party and the government, held a responsible post, had not been exposed, so that I could be utilized in the event of the united centre being exposed. As far as I remember, Kamenev said then that this was precisely why I did not go on the united centre but was selected for the reserve centre; and this corresponds with the facts.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, you were included against the event of exposure?

Sokolnikov: Against the event of the united centre being exposed. But I took no part whatever in its activities, and testified to that at the preliminary investigation.

Vyshinsky: Does this testimony of Kamenev's correspond with the facts?

Sokolnikov: Yes. I can say categorically that I was not a member of the united centre and did not take part in its activities.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions to Sokolnikov. I ask the court to refer to Vol. VIII, page 45, containing Kamenev's testimony and his reply to the question put to him by the examining official concerning negotiations about Sokolnikov taking part in the criminal activities of the *bloc,* where Kamenev's testimony is worded as follows:

"In conversations with Zinoviev we became convinced that it was necessary to create a leading group of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite organization in the event of our being exposed. It was precisely in this connection that I conducted negotiations with Sokolnikov and obtained his full consent." Do you confirm this?

Sokolnikov: Yes, that is correct.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: We will now proceed to examine Serebryakov.

Accused Serebryakov, do you confirm the testimony you have given?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Tell me, please, when did you resume your anti-Soviet criminal activities?

Serebryakov: In the autumn of 1932. Mrachkovsky came to see me and informed me about the creation of a Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc,* told me who were the members of this centre, and then informed me that the centre had decided to create a reserve centre in the event of its being exposed.

Vyshinsky: What was your attitude towards this proposal?

Serebryakov: It did not come as a surprise to me. Although I had retired from the counter-revolutionary activities of Trotskyism, nevertheless, I retained counter-revolutionary sentiments, notwithstanding the declaration I sent in in 1929.

Vyshinsky: When you sent in your declaration in 1929 you had really remained a Trotskyite?

Serebryakov: Yes, at heart I remained a Trotskyite. In the autumn of 1933 I met Pyatakov in Gagri and he urged me then to take an active part in Trotskyite work. In particular, he told me that he was conducting wrecking activities in industry and that he was also confronted with the task of developing wrecking work on the railways.

I am an old railway man, I had retained my connections, I raised no objections and I undertook this part of the work, and it was on these lines that I came to an arrangement with Pyatakov. In addition, I undertook to maintain connections with and direct the work in Georgia through Mdivani.

In 1934, perhaps at the end of 1933, on my arrival in Moscow, I went to the People's Commissariat of Railways and there saw A. M. Arnoldov. I had known him in 1926 and 1927. He expressed complete readiness to take it upon himself to carry out and direct wrecking activities on the railways. We set ourselves a very concrete and definite task: to disrupt freight traffic, to reduce daily loadings by increasing the runs of empty cars, by refraining from increasing the very low running norms for cars and engines, and by refraining from making full use of the traction power and capacity of engines, and so forth.

In 1934, on Pyatakov's proposal, Livshitz came to see me at the Central Road and Motor Transport Administration. He was the Chief of the Southern Railway. I informed him about my conversation with Arnoldov. He informed me that on the Southern Railway he had an assistant, Zorin, who could develop this activity. In 1934 also, I recruited for wrecking activity on the railways the Chief of the Tomsk Railway, Mironov, whom I had known in the People's Commissariat of Railways in 1926-27. He too agreed to take part in wrecking activities. In 1934 I had information that Fufryansky, who was employed at the People's Commissariat of Railways, and also Yemshanov, Deputy Chief of the Moscow-Donbas Railway, had been enlisted. Knyazev was also mentioned as a member of the organization.

In 1935, when L. M. Kaganovich took charge of the railways, and apprehensions arose in my mind about the possibility of the whole group being exposed, Arnoldov reassured me and said that the wrecking activities on the railways were very well camouflaged by those "norms of ours." The "maximum norms" had, so to speak, received right of citizenship on the railways. Although the "maximum norms" had received right of ciitzenship, Kaganovich exposed all that.

Arnoldov not only carried out this work himself, but he was also assisted by the theoreticians of these "maximum norms," among whom were people other than members of the organization. He was connected with them in some way or another. He did not tell me their names. Kaganovich dismissed Arnoldov after the "maximum norms" people were exposed. Then Arnoldov told me that Livshitz was to be appointed Assistant People's Commissar of Railways, and he proposed that all the contacts on the railways be passed on to him.

This in brief is approximately all I can say about wrecking activities on the railways.

In 1934 Mdivani came to Moscow and expressed the wish to meet me and Pyatakov. And so, on a week day, after office hours, we went to Tverskaya Street; opposite the Post Office

there is a little restaurant, and there our conversation took place.

Mdivani reported that the work was developing, that they had drawn up a list of names for a centre, and asked for our sanction.

We knew three of the men—Mdivani, Kavtaradze and Misha Okudjava—but two—Chikhladze and Niko Kiknadze—we did not know at all, neither I nor Pyatakov. Mdivani described them to us as old Trotskyites and very militant, and asked that we show them some confidence. We raised no objection, and by that, as it were, endorsed the centre.

The question of committing a terrorist act against Beria was raised, but Pyatakov and I advised them not to do it. We argued that a terrorist act against Beria might interfere with the terrorist act against Stalin. We proposed that, if the forces were available, they should prepare a terrorist act against Stalin, while continuing with their preparations for a terrorist act against Beria.

Vyshinsky: While continuing?

Serebryakov: While continuing. We advised them in every way not to commit the act against Beria before the terrorist act against Stalin had been committed.

Vyshinsky: Hence, in 1934, you and Pyatakov came to an agreement with Budu Mdivani about a plan of terrorist acts and about carrying them out.

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You agreed among yourselves that it was necessary to co-ordinate these operations?

Serebryakov: Yes, that the Georgian terrorists could form a group and could undertake the organization and preparation of a terrorist act.

Vyshinsky: In Moscow?

Serebryakov: No, over there—outside of Moscow.

Vyshinsky: Did Budu Mdivani agree to this?

Serebryakov: He agreed.

Vyshinsky: And what about the attempt on the life of Comrade Beria?

Serebryakov: It was not abandoned, nor were the preparations abandoned; it was suspended.

Vyshinsky: In order to co-ordinate the operations?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Hence, I rightly understand that, instead of one attempt at assassination which Mdivani proposed, you proposed two attempts?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: This was in 1934?

Serebryakov: In 1934. Now in regard to the terrorism connected

with Georgia it may be added that when I met Pyatakov again in 1935, our discussion culminated with the question of making preparations for yet another terrorist act, namely against Yezhov.

Vyshinsky: Was this also connected with the Georgian terrorists?

Serebryakov: Yes, with the possibility of their detailing a group to be sent here, to Moscow, to prepare for, organize and execute this terrorist act. This was in the middle of 1935.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell Pyatakov this?

Serebryakov: Budu Mdivani was in Moscow after that. I put this question to him. He said that Chekvadze had charge of terrorist activities there and that he had assigned this task to Chekvadze. As soon as the group was organized, he promised to send word to me in Moscow, but I did not see him after that.

Vyshinsky: You did not see him?

Serebryakov: No.

Vyshinsky: So you know nothing about the further developments?

Serebryakov: I do not. I had two more meetings with Radek—in December 1935 and in January 1936. At that time I received information from him about the letter and about Pyatakov's journey to see Trotsky, and at that time I received the following impression.

At all events it is unquestionable that Radek was in a perplexed state of mind and was at a loss as to how to define his position; this perplexity affected me too. It is not a matter of what is stated in the indictment. The indictment correctly formulates all the questions and puts them correctly. But inasmuch as the reserve centre did not think out the problems seriously, deeply and in an organized way, and Trotsky did the thinking for it, presenting the results to the reserve centre in concentrated form, it is natural that this produced a psychological shock, and perplexity was bound to ensue. And then Radek—I agreed with him in this—decided that it was necessary to call a conference. After that I did not see either Radek or Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: And what was the object of calling a conference?

Serebryakov: In order, for once, to ponder over all these problems seriously and deeply.

Vyshinsky: Was it decided beforehand what line this conference was to take?

Serebryakov: It was not decided, but everybody felt very bad about it.

Vyshinsky: Everybody was feeling very bad about it and the line had not been decided?

Serebryakov: The agenda and organization of the conference were decided upon beforehand, but from conversation with Radek one gathered the impression that he did not take to the idea, or did so with reluctance. Of course, Radek might have arrived at this same conclusion from my reply, but there was no decision taken beforehand. That seems to be all, in the main.

Vyshinsky: That is all?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What about the *bloc* of the Georgian Trotskyites with the Mensheviks and nationalists?

Serebryakov: I was in a hurry, because I wanted to be brief, and did not tell about that. I think I have already said that the organization gave instructions.

Mdivani was instructed to raise the question of the possibility of uniting with the Dashnaks in Armenia, with the Mussavatists in Azerbaijan and with the Georgian Mensheviks in Georgia.

Vyshinsky: What, concretely, was done to carry out this decision?

Serebryakov: At the end of 1935 Mdivani informed me that with the Dashnaks and Mussavatists he had only found some contacts, but with the Mensheviks he had concluded an agreement. The basis of the contact with the Mensheviks was the agreement that Georgia was to obtain predominant influence in Transcaucasia.

Vyshinsky: Georgia would subordinate Armenia and Azerbaijan to her influence?

Serebryakov: Yes. She was to be an independent state playing the leading role in Transcaucasia.

Vyshinsky (to Livshitz): Does Serebryakov's evidence concerning connections with you, accused Livshitz, call for any remark? All that Serebryakov has said—was it really so?

Livshitz: Yes, it was so.

The President: Tell me, accused Serebryakov, did Pyatakov in 1935 tell you that it was necessary to enlarge the network of terrorist organizations on the railways?

Serebryakov: Not Pyatakov, but Livshitz told me referring to what Pyatakov had said.

The President: During that conversation, did Livshitz point out the special importance of your work during the premobilization period? In your testimony you say: "Livshitz and I discussed the matter and came to the conclusion that in addition to the actions of the organizations in the centre and in the provinces, the effect of which would be to cause confusion and chaos on the railways, it was also necessary to ensure the possibility of blocking the most important railway junctions in the

first days of mobilization by creating on them such jams as would lead to the dislocation of the transport system and reduce the capacity of the railway junctions." Do you confirm this?

Serebryakov: Yes.

The President: Further: "Livshitz and I then tried to figure out which junctions should become the objects of our work. . . ."

Serebryakov: That must not be divulged.

The President: I continue: ". . . On these grounds Livshitz and I considered which junctions should become the objects of our undermining work, considering that undermining activities should be developed at such and such points. . . ." Do you confirm this?

Serebryakov: Yes, I confirm it.

The President: Accused Livshitz, do you confirm the conversation you had with Serebryakov on this subject?

Livshitz: I confirm the conversation.

The President: I am not talking about the junctions. I ask you whether you had a conversation with Serebryakov about having to cause jams at a number of railway junctions in the premobilization period.

Livshitz: There was such a conversation.

The President: When did that conversation with Serebryakov take place?

Livshitz: In 1935.

The President: That conversation arose out of Pyatakov's instructions?

Livshitz: Yes.

The President: Accused Pyatakov, do you confirm that you gave Livshitz such instructions?

Pyatakov: Yes, of course.

The President: Accused Serebryakov, do you confirm this sentence in one of the statements in your testimony (concerning what Pyatakov said): "Wrecking in industry must be combined with undermining activity on the railways—this is what must be done if we want to strike a shattering blow at the Stalin leadership"?

Serebryakov: Yes, approximately.

The President: Accused Pyatakov, do you confirm that you gave Livshitz such instructions?

Pyatakov: Yes, of course.

Vyshinsky: Accused Serebryakov, what connection had accused Knyazev with this, your anti-Soviet work on the railways?

Serebryakov: About Knyazev I only heard from Arnoldov that he was a member of the organization, but Arnoldov could not tell me who recruited him, or how he appeared on the scene.

Vyshinsky: But during the preliminary investigation you spoke more precisely and definitely about Knyazev.

Serebryakov: I testified that Arnoldov had informed me about the member of the organization, Knyazev, but Arnoldov had not told me definitely who had recruited him.

Vyshinsky: Your words where you say that "breakdowns, train wrecks, idle engines, bad repairs and so forth, were all brought about by"—you mention names and go on to say—"also by Knyazev directly through his people, members of the organization"—did you know this yourself, or did you hear it from Arnoldov?

Serebryakov: Yes, from Arnoldov.

Vyshinsky: And you had no direct connections with Knyazev?

Serebryakov: No.

Vyshinsky: Do you know who of those near to the centre was directly connected with Knyazev?

Serebryakov: No. I do not know.

Vyshinsky: Accused Livshitz, were you closely connected with Knyazev in this work?

Livshitz: I was.

Vyshinsky: Were you connected individually, on your own initiative, or was this connection maintained through the centre, from Serebryakov?

Livshitz: As far as I remember, it was Serebryakov who told me that Knyazev was working.

Vyshinsky: Hence, to a certain extent you were connected with Knyazev through your connections with Serebryakov?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Serebryakov): Don't you recall this?

Serebryakov: No.

Vyshinsky: But you spoke to Livshitz about Knyazev?

Serebryakov: Yes, I told him what Arnoldov said.

Vyshinsky: Hence, Knyazev took part in this undermining activity?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: With you, or alone?

Livshitz: In the last period I had two conversations with him on this subject.

Vyshinsky: What does "the last period" mean?

Livshitz: The period in which I worked in Moscow.

Vyshinsky: What does "the last period" mean?

Livshitz: 1935-36.

Vyshinsky: Hence, already in 1935-36 you had meetings with Knyazev connected with your criminal activity?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What was the character of these meetings, what were they arranged for, what called them forth?

Livshitz: The first meeting was called forth by the necessity of establishing connections.

Vyshinsky: And the second?

Livshitz: During the second meeting we talked about what was being done and what had to be done.

Vyshinsky: Did Arnoldov correctly describe Knyazev's participation in this undermining, wrecking and every other kind of activity on the railways?

Livshitz: Correctly.

Vyshinsky: Did you discuss Knyazev's work on the railways with Serebryakov apart from what he told you about Knyazev?

Livshitz: As far as I remember, no.

Vyshinsky: Hence, the only information you obtained from Serebryakov was what you obtained in the first conversation about Knyazev; after that you were connected with the latter directly?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Serebryakov): Is that right?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: The Court is adjourned until 11 a.m.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

MORNING SESSION, JANUARY 25, 1937, 11.00 A. M.

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: The session is resumed. We shall proceed to the examination of the witness Loginov. (To the Commandant) Please ask witness Loginov to come in.

(Witness Loginov enters the Court.)

The President: Is your name Loginov?

Loginov: Yes.

The President: Vladimir Fyodorovich?

Loginov: Yes.

The President: Your last position was that of manager of the Coke Trust in Kharkov?

Loginov: Yes.

The President: You have been summoned as witness in the trial of Radek, Pyatakov and others.

Vyshinsky: What do you know about Pyatakov's Trotskyite underground activities?

Loginov: I met Pyatakov in the beginning of 1928. I had been expelled from the Party at the time and sent to Verkhne-Udinsk. I travelled with Livshitz and Golubenko. In Moscow we went to see Pyatakov to receive instructions as to what we should do. Pyatakov's directives were that apparently in the near future we would have to submit a double-dealers' statement to the effect that we had broken with the opposition, so as to get back into the Party and thus secure the opportunity of again rallying the Trotskyite cadres and continuing the struggle against the Party.

Vyshinsky: In what year was that?

Loginov: It was in the beginning of 1928.

Vyshinsky: Had you known Pyatakov before that?

Loginov: Before that I knew Pyatakov from the time he returned from emigration abroad, approximately from April 1917.

Vyshinsky: Under what social and political conditions and circumstances did you know him in 1917?

Loginov: I knew him in 1917 as the leader of the Kiev organization.

Vyshinsky: What do you know about Pyatakov's position with

regard to the seizure of power in October 1917 and with regard to the Constituent Assembly?

Loginov: I have known Pyatakov's position since he returned from abroad, where he had lived as a political exile. Pyatakov at that time actively opposed Lenin's theses on the slogan of "Power to the Soviets."

Vyshinsky: Do you know whether before that he had opposed Lenin on the subject of the right of nations to self-determination?

Loginov: I know that in 1915-16 Pyatakov repeatedly opposed Lenin on the question of the right of nations to self-determination.

Vyshinsky: Go on.

Loginov: I knew Pyatakov in the period of the struggle against the German occupation in 1918-19. I was sent by Pyatakov to do underground work in Kharkov, and then, in 1918, to do underground work in Odessa. For years after this I met Pyatakov very rarely and met him again only in 1928.

Vyshinsky: Did you follow Pyatakov's advice about submitting a deceitful statement?

Loginov: It was agreed with Pyatakov that if the struggle should assume a protracted character he himself would submit a statement to the effect that he had broken with the opposition and this was to be a signal for the filing of similar statements by us in the provinces. That is what we did; that is to say, when Pyatakov published a statement of this kind, we in the provinces—myself, Golubenko and Livshitz—submitted a statement that we associated ourselves with Pyatakov's statement, and we were reinstated into the Party.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Do you confirm this testimony of the witness?

Pyatakov: I confirm it as regards the facts.

Vyshinsky: I am interested in the factual side of the testimony of the witness Loginov. Do you confirm this?

Pyatakov: Loginov, Golubenko and Livshitz came to see me in January 1927 and we spoke about submitting a statement. That is in accordance with the facts. Since this was in January, and I had not yet made up my mind, I told them that we must refrain for the present from submitting a statement and must think it over. I said nothing about a policy of deliberate duplicity.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, Loginov is stating his subjective view of the matter?

Pyatakov: It is an interpretation of my words in the light of the subsequent years. I made up my mind to submit a statement in January 1928.

Vyshinsky: You submitted the statement for the purpose of duplicity?

Pyatakov: Duplicity wasn't my purpose, but inasmuch as I had not revealed to the Party my accomplices, the concealed Trotskyites, and inasmuch as I still harboured dissent on internal Party questions, in particular on the question of the repressions against the opposition. . . .

Vyshinsky: Did you say that?

Pyatakov: In that sense I did not express myself fully.

Vyshinsky: And in that sense your conduct was one of double-dealing?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Loginov): I want to ascertain, was there at that time any talk of duplicity, or not? Loginov, you affirm that there was?

Loginov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Pyatakov, you deny it?

Pyatakov: I spoke from the standpoint of high treason—the crime which I committed. What is the sense for me to deny what actually happened?

Vyshinsky: I am not forcing this opinion on you, all I want is to ascertain the facts.

Loginov: After that I met Pyatakov in 1931 in Berlin, where I had gone to place orders for coking industry equipment.

Vyshinsky: Who proposed that you should go there?

Loginov: The Coke Industry Syndicate.

Vyshinsky: Who was at the head of this syndicate?

Loginov: Rataichak.

Vyshinsky: That is, it was Rataichak who proposed it?

Loginov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was Rataichak connected with you in Trotskyite underground activities?

Loginov: He was not connected with me, but I had already had a number of conversations with him and he was at that time in full agreement with me on a number of questions of an anti-Party character.

Vyshinsky: And anti-Soviet?

Loginov: And anti-Soviet.

Vyshinsky: Did Rataichak regard you as a man he could trust?

Loginov: I regarded Rataichak as a future reliable worker in our anti-Party activities.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any meetings when you were abroad?

Loginov: I had a number of meetings with Pyatakov. During one of these meetings Pyatakov asked about the state of mind of the former Trotskyites whom Pyatakov knew very well, such people as Kotsyubinsky and Livshitz.

Pyatakov then put it to me that it was necessary to restore the Trotskyite organization. At a subsequent meeting Pyatakov said that henceforth the principal form of struggle must be terrorist activity; and Pyatakov added that this was not his own personal viewpoint, but the viewpoint of Trotsky.

Vyshinsky: Did Pyatakov tell you against whom the terrorist acts were to be aimed?

Loginov: Yes, Pyatakov said that a terrorist act must be aimed first and foremost against Stalin.

At later meetings Pyatakov told me that in accordance with Trotsky's instructions, definite elements of organization must be brought into this whole struggle. Pyatakov suggested the formation of a Trotskyite centre in the Ukraine consisting of Kotsyubinsky, Golubenko, Livshitz and myself.

Vyshinsky: In what year was that?

Loginov: It was approximately in the summer of 1931.

Vyshinsky: Did you have meetings with Pyatakov after 1931, where, when and what were the subjects of the meetings and conversations?

Loginov: After 1931 I met Pyatakov at the end of 1932. I informed Pyatakov that the Ukrainian centre had been formed consisting of the people Pyatakov had named, and that we had already started underground activities in the Ukraine. Pyatakov then told me that in accordance with Trotsky's directives, the Trotskyites and Zinovievites had already actually united, mainly on the basis of terrorist activities, and that in Moscow the work had already assumed fairly wide dimensions. He proposed that we in the Ukraine too should stop talking about terrorism and proceed to practical action.

Vyshinsky: Who proposed this to you?

Loginov: Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: When did he propose it?

Loginov: He proposed it to me at the end of 1932.

Vyshinsky: At the end of 1932. Did he in this connection refer to the receipt of any new instructions from Trotsky, or was he acting on the basis of previous instructions?

Loginov: At that time he had received no new instructions from Trotsky. These were transmitted at subsequent meetings. I did not see Pyatakov in 1933. In 1932, when I began to inform Pyatakov about the situation in the Ukraine, he told me that he had during this period seen Kotsyubinsky, Livshitz and Golubenko and that he was more or less acquainted with the situation in the Ukraine.

Vyshinsky: Had he seen them himself?

Loginov: Yes, he had already seen them in the course of 1932.

Vyshinsky: He did not confine himself to the connections with you, but extended these connections?

Loginov: These connections were not confined to me; he was also connected with Livshitz, Kotsyubinsky and Golubenko, of which I also knew.

Vyshinsky: This was in 1933?

Loginov: I did not see Pyatakov in 1933, because I was not in Moscow and had no opportunity of meeting Pyatakov even once.

Vyshinsky: Did you know that Pyatakov had again been abroad in 1932?

Loginov: Yes, I learned about it in 1934 when I met Pyatakov. Pyatakov informed me of a number of entirely new instructions from Trotsky. He expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that our terrorist struggle was still being confined to general talk. Pyatakov said it was to terrorism that chief attention must be devoted, and that one man who acts was far more valuable than a number of wide organizations. Pyatakov further said that the prestige of the Central Committee and the confidence its policy enjoyed in the country had grown considerably, and that Trotsky was therefore demanding very insistently that the efforts to discredit the policy carried out by Stalin should be intensified.

Pyatakov especially pressed and emphasised the point that in this respect a particularly great role must fall to us—to people working in industry. It was in industry above all that we must employ all means to discredit the policy of Stalin. We must employ all means to slow down the rapid growth and development of industry which in 1934 was already evident to every citizen of the Soviet country. At the same period Pyatakov raised the question of. . . .

Vyshinsky: In the same conversation or at the same period?

Loginov: In that very conversation. It was in the spring of 1934. These were not quite such perfectly clear and perfectly exact instructions as I received during my meeting with Pyatakov in 1935 concerning wrecking and undermining activities; but this was, so to speak, the first step towards adopting this course.

At the same period Pyatakov pointed out that in the struggle against the Soviet state we must not rely on our internal forces alone, that these forces would hardly be sufficient. I remember this was how Pyatakov put it, pointing out that this was just how Trotsky thought, that we could not, that it was impossible to rely on the workers and proletarian masses within the country, that we ought, therefore, to try to enlist large numbers of engineers

in our work. I pointed out at that time that we would hardly be able to attract the younger generation who had been brought up under the Soviet power; main attention must be devoted not to the young engineers but to the older ones, especially those who had taken part in the struggle against the Soviet power in the 1930-31 period. Pyatakov pointed out that since we did not enjoy particularly wide support and would not be able to address a large public owing to our being in illegal conditions, we ought, therefore, to rely on help from foreign powers. And here he told me that in this respect we could reckon on help and support from Germany and Japan.

Vyshinsky: This conversation was in 1934?

Loginov: Yes. These statements were repeated by Pyatakov in 1935 in a considerably more precise and clear form.

At the beginning of the summer of 1935 Pyatakov asked me whether we were really prepared for a terrorist struggle. I replied that we were, that we—the Ukrainian centre—had selected a number of people who had agreed to perform terrorist acts. These persons were prepared and were only awaiting the signal from the centre. Pyatakov said that the Trotskyite parallel centre was now preparing a simultaneous terrorist blow. He said that we must quite definitely make preparations for terrorist acts against Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich, and in the Ukraine, against Kossior and Postyshev. I replied that our principal forces were intended for the purpose of committing terrorist acts in the Ukraine, except for a number of people who were held in readiness in case of a summons from Moscow.

Vyshinsky: Were there many of them?

Loginov: In Odessa, under Golubenko's leadership, a group of people had been organized headed by Kalashnikov which was preparing to commit a terrorist act against Stalin. In Dniepropetrovsk Zhukov headed a group which was preparing to commit a terrorist act against Voroshilov.

Vyshinsky: And they were to be transferred to Moscow at the required moment?

Loginov: Yes, Pyatakov arranged with me about the form, about the technique. I was to be summoned here to Moscow and to receive instructions from him.

Vyshinsky: And you mentioned Zhukov and Kalashnikov to Pyatakov?

Loginov: Yes, I mentioned Zhukov and Kalashnikov to Pyatakov and also the names of other persons who were to take part in terrorist acts against the Ukrainian leaders.

Vyshinsky: And did not Pyatakov instruct you to prepare cer-

tain other groups in the Ukraine for attempts on the lives of any other people?

Loginov: Pyatakov did not give us any other instructions in regard to this.

Vyshinsky: He gave instructions only in regard to the persons you have just mentioned?

Loginov: Yes, apart from that I did not mention just now those who were to act in the Ukraine.

Vyshinsky: This was in the summer of 1935?

Loginov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet Pyatakov again in the summer of 1935?

Loginov: No, but during this same meeting Pyatakov raised the question not only of discrediting the policy of the Party, but of definite wrecking and undermining activities on our part, giving perfectly clear instructions on this matter.

Vyshinsky: What kind of instructions?

Loginov: Instructions to the effect that we must not only wait until the time was ripe for the main diversive activities, which were to come at the moment of an armed conflict, according to one of the alternatives, but that we must at once undertake widespread activities in destroying the achievements of heavy industry, at the places where we were working. Here I received instructions from him to commence these activities without delay in the branch of industry in which I was working—the coke and chemical industry.

Vyshinsky: You received special instructions from him?

Loginov: Yes, special instructions.

Vyshinsky: What did Pyatakov instruct you to do in this field?

Loginov: He said that chief attention should be devoted to the chemical branch of the coke and chemical industry, because it was of importance for defence purposes. Therefore, Pyatakov said, the chemical industry must be disrupted by every possible means. We began to delay the construction and starting of new departments in chemical plants.

In conjunction with Yanovsky, manager of the Coke and Chemical Construction, we arranged new construction work in such a way that the chemical departments started operations a year or two later than the coking ovens. This we did in the case of the Mariupol plant. At this plant too, the coking ovens were started without a single auxiliary department, that is, without the coal shed, which made it absolutely impossible to supply coke of a proper quality, without the auxiliary workshops, chemical laboratories, and so forth.

A system of wrecking measures was applied at the Novo-Yenakievka coke and chemical plant and at the Krivoy Rog plant.

The temperature there was raised considerably above 1400° and in this way the regenerators of the coking ovens were fused. The result of this was that for nearly three months the plant fulfilled only 70 per cent of the monthly coke plan, whereas before this the plant had worked well. There was a corresponding loss in chemicals, of course. And in addition 200,000-300,000 rubles had to be spent on repairs to restore the regenerators of the coking ovens. This wrecking act was performed by Situlin and the director of the plant, Kholyavko, and the assistant-director of the oven-heating department was also enlisted. Similar acts were performed at the Gorlovka Works.

Vyshinsky: And does the Gorlovka Works come under the same trust?

Loginov: It comes under the Coke Trust, which was under my charge.

Vyshinsky: Let us confine ourselves to your confirming that wrecking acts took place, or to your denying it. You need not tell us about the details just now. Did you also organize wrecking activities at the Gorlovka coke plant?

Loginov: Yes.

The construction of the washing installation at the Staro-Yenakievka coal concentration factory was delayed.

Vyshinsky: Did your organization commit any diversive acts?

Loginov: At Zaporozhye—fusing of the regenerators of the coking ovens.

Vyshinsky: In what year was that?

Loginov: In 1935-36. The Zaporozhye affair was at the end of the summer of 1935.

Vyshinsky: Wrecking and diversive activities?

Loginov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet Pyatakov at the end of 1935 or the beginning of 1936?

Loginov: I met him at the beginning of 1936.

Vyshinsky: Did you learn anything new from him?

Loginov: Yes. Pyatakov again inquired about the morale of our active forces and said that far from there being any intention to discard this aspect of activities, it was now assuming great significance.

Vyshinsky: Was there any talk between you and Pyatakov regarding his latest journey abroad?

Loginov: Pyatakov said that he had again been abroad in 1935.

He said that he had received from Trotsky confirmation of the directive that contacts with foreigners—fascists in the Soviet Union—should be established more determinedly than heretofore. Pyatakov told me that there was a very definite agreement between Trotsky and the fascist organizations in Germany and an agreement with the ruling circles in Japan on the subject of joint struggle against the Soviet power.

Vyshinsky: On what conditions?

Loginov: I questioned Pyatakov in detail as to what this would mean and where all this policy would lead to—that we would practically cease to exist as a country. It seemed to me absurd that this vast country was to be destroyed as a state. He said that it was not this that was intended, but big territorial concessions both in the East and in the Ukraine, and that Trotsky had an arrangement to this effect. Yes, Pyatakov also spoke about the attitude that we must adopt in case of armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the fascist countries, Germany and Japan.

Vyshinsky: Did you say attitude?

Loginov: Yes, attitude. I would say that it was reminiscent of the attitude of our Party at the time of the imperialist war—a defeatist policy, although that would not be quite exact.

Vyshinsky: The comparison is quite out of place and there is no analogy here at all.

Loginov: We were now to help in every way to bring about the defeat of the Soviet Union, and our principal activity should be destruction and diversion, which were to be carried out at that very period.

Vyshinsky: When did he tell you this?

Loginov: He told me this at the beginning of 1936.

Vyshinsky: But did he tell you that this directive was so monstrous that even he, Pyatakov, was disturbed by it, and did Pyatakov show signs of any hesitation whether to accept or not to accept this directive?

Loginov: It made me waver.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, it made Pyatakov waver too?

Loginov: I remember the conversation; I drew an analogy with 1917.

Vyshinsky: I am not interested in your analogy. What I am interested in is to get a reply to the following question. When Pyatakov spoke to you on this subject, did this subject and this monstrous attitude disturb Pyatakov? Did it seem to you that he was hesitating on this point, or did it not seem so to you on this occasion? You said that you yourself were stunned by it. But Pyatakov, who conveyed this to you, was he, in your opinion, also shaken

and stunned by it, or not? I request you to give an objective reply.

Loginov: The impression I got was that Pyatakov was no less stunned than I was, but he nevertheless transmitted it as a clear directive which had to be carried out.

Vyshinsky: The directive had to be carried out, but he was disturbed by it?

Loginov: Yes. After all, we had staked everything. To retreat now was impossible, said Pyatakov, because that would mean annihilation, sheer physical annihilation, and the utter destruction of all our positions. At the same time, in the way he put the question, and especially when I drew the analogy with the Ukrainian Central Rada, it could undoubtedly be felt that he was very uneasy.

Vyshinsky: Did Pyatakov at that time tell you that it would be necessary for a narrow circle of the active Trotskyites to get together, to talk it over, to discuss this directive and what was to be done next, what line was to be followed?

Loginov: Pyatakov said something different. When I myself began, if I may so express it, to shrink somewhat from this whole business, Pyatakov stated: "I understand, you are not the only one who is disturbed by the way the matter is being put. I have spoken to a number of persons and I have observed the same attitude to this matter." He said that he had spoken to a number of people on the subject, so that it is possible that a discussion had taken place, but I cannot say.

Vyshinsky: Pyatakov said nothing to you about a conference at that period?

Loginov: No, he did not.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): You said that after receiving the directive from Trotsky you wanted to get together and discuss what was to be done next. Did you speak about this to any members of the centre?

Pyatakov: I spoke about it to Radek and Sokolnikov. We intended to call a meeting at first of the centre itself, with the addition of Tomsky. And after, the centre had met to call a meeting of people who were, if one may so express it, regional organizers.

Vyshinsky: In deciding that it should consist of a limited circle of persons, were you considering the seriousness of the question?

Pyatakov: It was discussed by Radek, Sokolnikov and myself. Both Radek and I realized that if this question were submitted to the active members of the Trotskyite organization it would inevitably lead to discussion and debate, and in all likelihood to a split. And so a very limited circle of people was proposed.

Vyshinsky: In a word, you did not want to submit the question for a broad discussion; you were afraid to announce it to a more or less wide circle of members?

Pyatakov: We first wanted to take counsel in a narrower circle.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions to Pyatakov. I have a question to Loginov. In what month did your meeting with Pyatakov in 1936 take place?

Loginov: At the end of February or the beginning of March.

Vyshinsky: And you had no further meetings?

Loginov: I saw Pyatakov but we had no conversations.

Vyshinsky: Is this all you have to say about Pyatakov?

Loginov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Now about Rataichak. Tell us, how were you connected with him in your criminal activities? What were your points of contact with him?

Loginov: Since Rataichak was very well acquainted with the coke and chemical industry, I told him about the measures we were proposing to take.

Vyshinsky: Measures of a criminal nature?

Loginov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And was Rataichak informed about them?

Loginov: Rataichak knew about them from what I told him.

Vyshinsky: And why did you speak to Rataichak about your criminal designs?

Loginov: I knew of the big part he was playing within the chemical industry.

Vyshinsky: What of that, somebody else might be playing the same part. Why then discard secrecy in this matter? Did you ask him for advice?

Loginov: Not that I asked for advice, but I wanted to discuss a number of questions with him.

Vyshinsky: Questions relating to the chemical industry?

Loginov: Yes. Moreover, I had a number of points of contact with him.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, although the branch of industry—the coke and chemical—of which you had charge did not come within his sphere, but had its own independent, parallel relations with the centre, you had certain points of contact with the chemical industry which brought you close to Rataichak in your work?

Loginov: Yes, we had points of contact in criminal activity. When the question arose of establishing connections with fascist organizations, I also told Rataichak, as a man who was acquainted with the personnel in the coke and chemical industry, that Pyatakov had told me to get in touch with the German engineers working in the coke and chemical industry; but there were

no such engineers now; they had been here in 1931-32 but had nearly all left the coke and chemical industry at the beginning of 1933. I mentioned the name of one German technician with whom I proposed to establish connections. I told Rataichak that he ought to have a talk with Hrasche whom I did not know but had heard about from Moskalyov.

Vyshinsky: Then, we have a perfectly definite fact: you and Rataichak discussed the question of drawing into wrecking activities—whom?

Loginov: As to myself, I suggested the German specialists working in the Gorlovka Works, and I knew that Hrasche had connections. . . .

Vyshinsky: From whom did you know it?

Loginov: From Moskalyov.

Vyshinsky: And to whom did you speak about Hrasche?

Loginov: To Rataichak.

Vyshinsky: And it turned out that Rataichak knew Hrasche, or did he not?

Loginov: He knew him, because he was working in the same branch of industry.

Vyshinsky: What did Rataichak tell you about Hrasche?

Loginov: He did not tell me anything, because I did not return to the subject any more and I do not know how he established connection with him.

Vyshinsky: Did he himself tell you that he had such connections?

Loginov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Of a legal or illegal nature?

Loginov: Illegal.

Vyshinsky: Illegal connections with whom?

Loginov: Hrasche. He worked in the chemical industry and he was connected with and knew a number of German engineers. I said that I had heard from Moskalyov that this man might be useful in establishing connections between Rataichak and some German intelligence service agents. It was this that I discussed with Rataichak. But whether he subsequently established connections with German intelligence service agents through Hrasche I do not know.

Vyshinsky: What did you say to Rataichak about connections with Hrasche and foreign intelligence service agents?

Loginov: I told him that it was our task to establish connections with foreign intelligence service agents.

Vyshinsky: To whom did you say this?

Loginov: To Rataichak.

Vyshinsky: How did Rataichak react to this statement?

Loginov: As a matter of fact, Rataichak was at that time looking for somebody through whom connections could be established with foreign intelligence service agents, and I drew his attention to Hrasche.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, you mentioned Hrasche as a man through whom might be established—what?

Loginov: Connections with the foreign intelligence service agents in the U.S.S.R.

Vyshinsky: Comrade President, may I question Rataichak?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky (to Rataichak): Will you tell us whether you had such a conversation with Loginov?

Rataichak: Yes, I had.

Vyshinsky: Of the kind Loginov says?

Rataichak: Yes, approximately.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, Loginov told you through whom you could establish connections with the German intelligence service?

Rataichak: I recall that in the course of the conversation the question arose through whom connections could be established with the German intelligence service. He said it could be done through a man named Hrasche who had come to work with us recently and who knew many German engineers.

Vyshinsky: That is, you were interested in finding a man through whom connections could be established with the German intelligence service?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And why with the German?

Rataichak: Loginov told me that he had directives to that effect from Pyatakov. Soon after, I received the directives from Pyatakov myself.

Vyshinsky: Accused Pyatakov, do you confirm this testimony?

Pyatakov: In the main, I do.

Vyshinsky: What does "in the main" mean? Does it mean that you gave instructions to Rataichak to establish connections with German intelligence service agents?

Pyatakov: I do not recall whether there was any talk of German intelligence service agents, but inasmuch as I had conveyed to Loginov and Rataichak Trotsky's and my own instructions on the necessity of their Trotskyite organization linking with hostile forces in the Soviet Union, I consequently also had this kind of connection in mind.

Vyshinsky: So you had in mind also the kind of connection of which Rataichak speaks.

Pyatakov: I gave the instruction in a more algebraical formulation, in a general form, without being specific, because I also had in mind the remnants of the former wrecking groups among the specialists and other. . . .

Vyshinsky: It is not this that I want to know. I know what you mean by algebra, but I must now deal not with algebra but with facts.

Pyatakov: I cannot be concrete on everything on every occasion. But I confirm this.

Vyshinsky: But please understand me too: I cannot merely listen, I must also verify.

Pyatakov: That is why I began by saying that this testimony is correct.

Vyshinsky: Claiming that it was on your instructions, Loginov said that Rataichak asked his advice on how to find a person through whom connection could be established with German intelligence service agents. Was Rataichak right in referring to you?

Pyatakov. He was.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, I may take it that you instructed Rataichak to look for contacts with German intelligence service agents.

Pyatakov: I did not say specifically: "Look for a contact with German intelligence service agents." I did not give such an instruction, but I also had such connections in mind.

Vyshinsky: You had in mind that he would look for connections with the German intelligence service?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Now let us continue about Rataichak.

I request the witness Loginov to continue what he has to say about Rataichak and what he knows of his criminal activities.

Loginov: Strictly speaking, that is all I have to say.

Vyshinsky: So there the matter ended as far as Hrasche was concerned? Apart from this conversation with Rataichak, did you have any other conversations regarding specific criminal actions?

Loginov: I had another conversation with Rataichak about the forms of wrecking activities in the coke and chemical industry.

Vyshinsky: About the forms?

Loginov: The forms.

Vyshinsky: The methods?

Loginov: The methods.

Vyshinsky: The ways?

Loginov: The ways.

Vyshinsky: The means?

Loginov: The means.

Vyshinsky: That is what you call the form?

Loginov: Yes. In 1935 I pointed out to him what methods we were employing with regard to wrecking activities in the coke and chemical industry. The main thing was delay and disruption by holding up the construction of these plants.

Vyshinsky: We shall not talk about the methods just now.

Loginov: I told him specifically on what construction jobs and in what plants we contemplated carrying out these measures. I did not encounter any objection from Rataichak.

Vyshinsky: Did Rataichak give you any advice regarding this criminal activity of yours, or you did not require this?

Loginov: I do not recollect any particular advice.

Vyshinsky: To proceed. Is that all about Rataichak?

Loginov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you talk to Rataichak about terrorist tasks?

Loginov: I talked to Rataichak concerning terrorist tasks, pointing out that these tasks had been set before us, before the Ukrainian centre. I told him that we were carrying on work accordingly.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, Rataichak was informed about what?

Loginov: About my terrorist activities in the Ukraine.

Vyshinsky: What else do you know about Rataichak?

Loginov: That is all.

Vyshinsky: Do you not recall a conversation with Rataichak about the fact that Pyatakov had set Rataichak the wrecking task of holding up the development of the nitrogen industry?

Loginov: Yes, both Rataichak and Pyatakov told me this.

Vyshinsky: What was said first by Rataichak and then by Pyatakov about this matter?

Loginov: Pyatakov talked to me about this matter, and pointed out that in regard to wrecking work it was intended to carry out extensive acts of wrecking in disrupting the nitrogen industry program. I talked to Rataichak about this, inquired about the forms employed in carrying out this work, with a view to adopting these forms for my own use in the coke and chemical industry, and I recall that Rataichak pointed out to me that these were the forms employed to disrupt the nitrogen industry program—disruption of construction by diffusing the funds allotted for the nitrogen industry.

Vyshinsky: So you confirm this too?

Loginov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Do you know anything about the criminal activities of Livshitz?

Loginov: When I came back from Berlin in 1931, in late summer or in early autumn, I met Livshitz and passed on to him

the directives I had received from Pyatakov in Berlin. I told Livshitz that Pyatakov had formed an Ukrainian Trotskyite organization, of which Livshitz was to be a member.

In 1932 and 1933 I was conducting joint work with Livshitz in the Trotskyite underground organization in the Ukraine. I knew about the work which Livshitz had begun to carry out in Kharkov on the railways. I knew the persons who had been recruited into the Trotskyite underground organization by Livshitz. Livshitz agreed with the position on terrorism. He left the Ukraine in 1933, at a time when we had not yet commenced practical terrorist activities. I met Livshitz again early in 1936, and learnt from him that he was working quite successfully on the railways, that he was connected not only with the persons whom I had met in the Ukraine, but that he also had many contacts with other people.

Vyshinsky: Did Livshitz know of your terrorist work?

Loginov: He knew of the terrorist instructions I had received from Pyatakov in Berlin.

Vyshinsky: And about your practical work?

Loginov: He did not know about the practical work in 1933, 1934, and 1935, because I did not see him during those three years.

Vyshinsky (to Livshitz): Have you any remarks to make on the testimony of the witness Loginov?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: Have you any corrections to make?

Livshitz: Small ones, of no importance. The conversation took place at the beginning of 1932, and not in 1931.

Vyshinsky: But there was such a conversation?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And do you confirm the contents?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions to put to the witness?

Kommodov (to Loginov): In what year did you have your conversation with Rataichak about Hrasche?

Loginov: In the latter half of 1934.

Kommodov: The wrecking acts about which you have spoken, in particular at the Gorlovka Works took place before this conversation?

Loginov: That was in 1935.

Kommodov: Did Moskalyov mention any other names apart from Hrasche?

Loginov: No.

Vyshinsky: Do you know that Hrasche was implicated in wrecking activities in 1935?

Loginov: No, I do not know, I only know what I have told here.

Vyshinsky: So you only know what you have stated here?

Loginov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, you indicated Hrasche as a man with whose aid you could make connections?

Loginov: Yes, with some German engineers who were undoubtedly acting as intelligence service agents here.

Vyshinsky: You know about this only from Moskalyov's words?

Loginov: Yes, from Moskalyov's words.

Vyshinsky: Permit me to question the accused Rataichak.

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky (to Rataichak): After your conversation with Loginov you afterwards got in touch with Hrasche?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, the opinion that Hrasche could make the connections with German intelligence service agents proved correct?

Rataichak: It proved correct.

The President: Have the accused any questions?

The Accused: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: Adjournment for 20 minutes.

* * *

The President: The session is resumed. We will proceed to examine accused Boguslavsky.

Accused Boguslavsky, do you confirm the statements you made at the preliminary investigation?

Boguslavsky: Yes, I confirm them.

Vyshinsky: Tell us, what were your criminal Trotskyite activities in Siberia?

Boguslavsky: In Siberia my activities date from the beginning of February 1928, when I arrived there after being expelled from the Party at the Fifteenth Party Congress. In Novosibirsk, where I was appointed to work, there were several active Trotskyites who had been prominent in the past. There were Muralov, Krol, Sumetsky, Surnov. In addition, there was Sosnovsky in Barnaul, Smilga in Minussinsk, and Radek arrived in Tomsk shortly after.

At the end of February 1928 I received directives from Trotsky through Sosnovsky about the formation of the Siberian Trotskyite underground centre. The tasks which were set before this centre at that time consisted, in the first place, in doing everything possible to preserve those Trotskyite forces in Siberia who had not been subjected to any penalties by the government authorities or to penalties of a Party nature—expulsion and so forth. In the second place, to unite and direct the underground activities of the Trotskyites living in various places in Siberia. In the third place, to circulate illegal documents, primarily in the districts where the exiled Trotskyites were concentrated, and finally, to organize material aid for the Trotskyites who were living in exile in Siberia.

This centre was composed of the following members: N. I. Muralov, the leader of the centre, myself—Boguslavsky, Sumetsky, Krol, Surnov, Sosnovsky, Byeloborodov and, after his arrival, Radek.

Vyshinsky: Radek was told about this?

Boguslavsky: Yes, he was told. I should add that current questions not of a fundamental character were decided by those members of the centre who resided permanently in Novosibirsk, while questions of a fundamental character were settled by referring them in one way or another to those members of the centre who did not live in Novosibirsk but in other districts of Siberia. I speak about the various ways in which this was done. Sometimes members of the centre residing permanently in Novosibirsk were sent to those places where Sosnovsky, Byeloborodov and Radek were living—these were the nearest and most convenient connections for us; as for Minussinsk, where Smilga was, the latter was not made a member of the centre. Then there were the visits of these persons—Sosnovsky, Byeloborodov and Radek—to Novosibirsk, and Sosnovsky, for example, came to Novosibirsk quite frequently. Radek, too, came to Novosibirsk several times, and so did Byeloborodov. By taking advantage of these visits or by other methods, we managed to solve this problem.

Vyshinsky: You have enumerated the members of your Siberian centre of 1928. Have you enumerated them all? And Drobnis, was he not a member?

Boguslavsky: Drobnis was not a member of the centre at that time. To finish with the centre it should be said that Drobnis was a member of the centre in 1934, when he was in Siberia.

Vyshinsky: Whom were you connected with in Moscow?

Boguslavsky: In Moscow this centre was connected with old man Eltsin up to the time of his arrest.

Vyshinsky: And in 1929?

Boguslavsky: In 1929 we had no connections in Moscow, for Eltsin was arrested, and we had no other connections.

Vyshinsky: And in 1930?

Boguslavsky: I ought to say that here there was a break in the work of the centre, because. . . .

Vyshinsky: I must make the following point clear: trial pro-

cedure requires that there should be interrogation; interrogation consists of questions and of answers to these questions and explanations, after which the accused may say anything they want to. For the present I will ask you to answer the questions which interest me, and afterwards you can put any questions that interest you to anyone you wish. Now I am asking you: Did you have connections in Moscow in 1929?

Boguslavsky: No, we had no connections.

Vyshinsky: And in 1930?

Boguslavsky: We had connections with Ivan Nikitich Smirnov.

Vyshinsky: In what capacity did Smirnov act in his dealings with you?

Boguslavsky: In 1930 he acted in the capacity of a man who enjoyed our confidence, who had authority among us.

Vyshinsky: As an individual?

Boguslavsky: Yes, as an individual.

Vyshinsky: And in 1931?

Boguslavsky: In 1931 we were also connected with him, also as an individual.

Vyshinsky: And in 1932?

Boguslavsky: In 1932 I personally and the other members of the centre maintained connections with Smirnov as a member of the new centre.

Vyshinsky: What centre?

Boguslavsky: The united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre in Moscow.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, when the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre was organized, Smirnov, as its representative, got in touch with you?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: From whom did you learn that such a centre had been organized?

Boguslavsky: I learnt it first from Smirnov.

Vyshinsky: And afterwards did you know what this centre was doing?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: From whom did you learn this?

Boguslavsky: Partly from Smirnov himself, partly from Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: When did you hear from Pyatakov?

Boguslavsky: In the beginning of 1932.

Vyshinsky: What was Pyatakov's relation to the united centre?

Boguslavsky: He was not a member of the united centre, but (as I believed) he was informed about the work of the united centre.

Vyshinsky: When and where did you meet Pyatakov?

Boguslavsky: Early in 1932, I don't recall in what month—it must have been in February, in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, in Pyatakov's private office.

Vyshinsky: You only met him once in 1932?

Boguslavsky: Only once.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet him in the following years?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When and where?

Boguslavsky: In 1933 I met him again in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, and in 1934 in Pyatakov's apartment.

Vyshinsky: And in 1935?

Boguslavsky: I did not see him in 1935. My last meeting with Pyatakov was in 1934.

Vyshinsky: Can you recollect what you talked about with him in 1932, 1933, and 1934?

Boguslavsky: In 1932 Pyatakov informed me about the meeting that had taken place in Berlin between Pyatakov, Smirnov and Shestov on the one hand and Sedov on the other. He told me that during these meetings directives had been received from Trotsky switching the work of the Trotskyites on to new lines: the principal method of work was now to be terrorism, that is to say, the committing of terrorist acts against the leaders of the Party and the government, and moreover, as he told me at that time, our task was to create all kinds of difficulties in the economic life of the Soviet Union.

Pyatakov's instructions regarding terrorism did not greatly surprise me, for I had learnt about this from I. N. Smirnov at the end of 1931. Here I must say something about the formation of the new Siberian centre. This took place in 1932.

Vyshinsky: What was it about?

Boguslavsky: It happened in connection with the following. In 1929 Smirnov had transmitted Trotsky's directive to us, to the effect that while not laying down our arms, while not disarming ideologically, we were to disarm organizationally, to declare that we would put a stop to factional work, and return to the Party, while preserving in our declarations, as far as possible, something of our old Trotskyite ideas—which is what I. N. Smirnov and I actually did. In connection with Trotsky's new directives about which I am speaking—the directives regarding terrorism were transmitted to me by Smirnov and the other part by Pyatakov—the question arose of re-establishing the Trotskyite Siberian centre in one form or another. Smirnov said outright that this centre was to consist of N. I. Muralov, as its leader, myself—Boguslavsky,

and Sumetsky, who were members of the old Trotskyite centre, since this would ensure continuity in the work.

Later, in 1934, Drobnis was also made a member of the Siberian centre.

The work in 1932 mostly amounted to re-establishing our lost connections and preparing for the organization of terrorist acts; the direction of this work was undertaken by the leader of the centre, Muralov.

At the same time I personally was engaged in ascertaining the possibility of putting into effect the second part of the directives concerning the creation of so-called difficulties for the economic policy of the Soviet government and of the Party. My work gave me contact with leading men in the economic life of Siberia, and I was entrusted with this task.

The construction of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Works was at that time in full swing. Accordingly, wrecking activities in industry were to be conducted in the Kuzbas, and, simultaneously with this, on the railways.

In giving me directives on how to create difficulties in the way of the economic policy of the Party and the government, Pyatakov said that Shestov, a man well known to him, was working in the Kuzbas, and that this Shestov had directives to commence wrecking activities in the Kuzbas, in the coal mining industry and on the principal construction jobs.

On returning to Novosibirsk, I told Muralov about my conversation. He confirmed that he really had directives, and suggested that I engage in carrying on wrecking work on the railways. I set about this work then and there. In the same year, 1932, I learned from Muralov that a terrorist group had been organized in Novosibirsk under the leadership of Khodoroze, and that he had instructed this terrorist group to prepare for and carry out, when the order was given, an attempt on the life of the secretary of the West-Siberian Territory Committee of the Party, Eiche. Apart from the terrorist group which I have mentioned—Khodoroze's group—Muralov informed me in 1933 that a terrorist group had been formed in the Kuzbas and given the task of preparing for attempts on the lives of Party leaders while the latter visited the Kuzbas. Muralov also told me that the leader of the first group, Khodoroze, had sent one of the members of this group, Nikolai Ivanov, to Moscow to carry out the assassination of Stalin. In 1933 I formed nuclei on the Omsk railway.

Vyshinsky: For what aims, specifically?

Boguslavsky: In order to carry out all the measures we had planned on the railways. At the end of 1933 I had a conversation

with the leader of this organization on the Omsk railway, Finashin, who told me that activities had been started in several locomotive depots on the Omsk line, main attention being paid to the locomotive service. As regards the Tomsk railway, a group was organized there in 1933, the leader being Obertaler, with Zhitkov, the head of the locomotive service of the Tomsk railway, and Eidman, the chief engineer. Obertaler reported that wrecking had also been started on the Tomsk railway.

Vyshinsky: Who is Obertaler?

Boguslavsky: He was the head of construction work on the line. Obertaler told me of depots where nuclei of Trotskyites had been formed and where wrecking activities were being carried on, the main objective here too being the locomotive service.

In 1934 the work of the Siberian centre, and my work in particular, entered upon a new path. In 1934 I had my second meeting with Pyatakov, this time visiting him in his apartment. Pyatakov said that our work was completely unsatisfactory, and set us tasks which, though not new, had a new sound. In 1934, for the first time, the word "wrecking," uttered in full voice, appeared in our vocabulary.

Then during the same conversation, when I complained that we had very few people, Pyatakov informed me, firstly, that in addition to Shestov, Norkin—chief of construction of the Kemerovo Combined Works, a member of our organization, and one of the accused in this trial—had already been carrying on wrecking work in the Kuzbas for two years. In addition to Shestov, Norkin had his own group of specialists and non-specialists who were carrying on this work. But in view of the role and significance of the Kuzbas, and the necessity of reinforcing the work there, Pyatakov informed me that in the near future he would send to the Kuzbas Drobnis, also one of the accused in this trial, who was to carry on activities in the Kuzbas on a larger scale and to establish contact with Norkin on the one hand and with Shestov on the other.

It was during this conversation too that it became clear to me that wrecking activities were being carried on in the Kuzbas by Stroilov, chief engineer of the Kuzbas Coal Trust, also accused in this trial.

In response to my pessimism, occasioned by the arrest of I. N. Smirnov and a number of other people in 1933 (this conversation took place early in 1934), Pyatakov said: "We have to get down to work, especially as Trotsky has been sending letters and directives. He accuses us of inaction bordering, as he then said, on the sabotage of his, Trotsky's, directives."

Vyshinsky: Did you do anything in pursuance of these directives in 1934?

Boguslavsky: At the occasional meetings which I had with Muralov and Sumetsky, the members of the centre, I learned that Drobnis had established contact with Norkin, that a fairly large group of engineers and technicians had been enlisted, and that this work was being pushed forward there.

As regards work on the railways, which I was directing myself, the number of accidents on the line considerably increased in 1934, these being organized by Zhitkov. In 1934 there was a considerable increase in the number and percentage of locomotives put out of action. And finally, especially important wrecking activity was carried out in 1934 on the construction of new railway lines, in particular the Eiche-Sokol line.

In 1934 I learned that in addition to the terrorist groups I have mentioned—the groups of Khodoroze and Shestov—Muralov had commissioned Kudryashev, manager of one of the state farms, to perpetrate a terrorist act against the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov, who was expected to come to Siberia and to visit this farm in particular. Muralov told me about this.

Vyshinsky: Who made preparations for this terrorist act?

Boguslavsky: Kudryashev, on Muralov's orders.

Vyshinsky (to Muralov): Accused Muralov, was there such a case?

Muralov: What part of Boguslavsky's statement are you referring to?

Vyshinsky: I am interested in this last statement of Boguslavsky's to the effect that you, Muralov, made preparations for a terrorist act against Comrade Molotov.

Muralov: This task was assigned not to Kudryashev but to Shestov and Khodoroze.

Vyshinsky (to Shestov): Do you confirm Muralov's statement that he commissioned you to organize an attempt on the life of Comrade Molotov?

Shestov: Yes, I confirm it.

Vyshinsky (to Boguslavsky): Accused Boguslavsky, explain.

Boguslavsky: The preparations for terrorist acts were conducted in such a way that they were not concentrated in one place. Shestov was commissioned to organize a terrorist act against Molotov if he came to the Kuzbas, as was in fact done by the accused Arnold. But parallel with this, Kudryashev was given the same commission. I maintain this; Kudryashev told me about it himself. The organization of terrorist groups by Shestov in such a way that they might be able to carry out a terrorist act in any place in the Kuzbas does not preclude preparations for such an act on this state farm.

Vyshinsky: Who gave Kudryashev this commission?

Boguslavsky: Muralov.

Vyshinsky: Accused Muralov, do you know Kudryashev?

Muralov: I know him as the manager of a state farm which I organized. But I categorically declare that Kudryashev was not given any commissions.

Vyshinsky: Kudryashev was a member of your Trotskyite organization?

Muralov: No.

Vyshinsky: But Boguslavsky says he was?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Muralov: I did not know that Kudryashev was a member of the organization.

Vyshinsky: And Boguslavsky had direct connections with Kudryashev?

Boguslavsky: No.

Vyshinsky (to Boguslavsky): You say you know about this from Kudryashev himself?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I emphasize once again: you are now relating the episode concerning Kudryashev only from the words of Kudryashev himself?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you have no other proofs as yet?

Boguslavsky: No.

Vyshinsky: From whom did you hear about the preparations for an attempt on the life of Molotov by Shestov?

Boguslavsky: From Muralov.

Vyshinsky: And did you hear about this from Shestov?

Boguslavsky: No, I had no connections with him.

Vyshinsky: This does not come within the sphere of your department?

Boguslavsky: We had no divisions into departments.

Vyshinsky: How is that? You had charge of wrecking affairs and Muralov had charge of terrorist affairs. What came within your charge—terrorism or wrecking?

Boguslavsky: Wrecking.

Vyshinsky: While Muralov had charge of terrorism?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And did Muralov have charge of wrecking as well?

Boguslavsky: Partly.

Vyshinsky: What were Muralov's main functions?

Boguslavsky: He was the leader of the whole centre and in addition he directed that part of the work.

Vyshinsky: Terrorism?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Muralov): Do you also confirm this?

Muralov: I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: That is just what I am talking about. (*To Boguslavsky.*) Proceed.

Boguslavsky: In connection with the dispute that has arisen, I want to mention yet another terrorist act that was being prepared against Molotov, namely, by Zhitkov, whom I have mentioned before in connection with wrecking work. . . .

Vyshinsky: How do you know about Zhitkov's preparations for such an act?

Boguslavsky: He told me about it himself.

Vyshinsky: Where did he tell you, when?

Boguslavsky: In Novosibirsk.

Vyshinsky: When?

Boguslavsky: That was in 1934, when Molotov. . . . Excuse me, I have made an incorrect statement. I was mistaken; no other attempt on Molotov's life was prepared for.

Vyshinsky: But on whose life did Zhitkov prepare to make an attempt?

Boguslavsky: That was to have been an attempt on the life of Kaganovich for which Zhitkov made preparations, but this was later—in 1935.

Vyshinsky: And did anyone else besides Zhitkov prepare for an attempt on the life of Comrade Kaganovich?

Boguslavsky: Yes, Shestov did. He trained groups which were to take action if any of the members of the government, including Kaganovich, came to Siberia.

Vyshinsky: And are you aware that Bermant was preparing for an attempt?

Boguslavsky: Yes. But Bermant was here, in Moscow.

Vyshinsky: All the same, you knew of some other terrorist acts that were being prepared against the members of the government and against members of the leading organs of our Party?

Boguslavsky: Yes. Shestov made preparations for an attempt on the life of Molotov.

Vyshinsky: So Shestov planned an attempt against Molotov?

Boguslavsky: Zhitkov against Kaganovich and Khodoroze against Eiche.

Vyshinsky: And Bermant?

Boguslavsky: Bermant told me. . . .

Vyshinsky: Answer the question, did Bermant make preparations for a terrorist act or not?

Boguslavsky: He did.

Vyshinsky: Whom did you learn that from?

Boguslavsky: From Bermant himself.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any connection with these preparations?

Boguslavsky: No.

Vyshinsky: Who was in charge of the preparations?

Boguslavsky: I do not know. The fact is that Bermant was not in Western Siberia but in Moscow.

Vyshinsky: Why did he tell you about it?

Boguslavsky: Because he had connections with me and had known me since 1928.

Vyshinsky: But apparently he was connected not only with you, and he was not bound to tell every Trotskyite about it.

Boguslavsky: He knew that I was a member of the centre, and he knew about Trotsky's directives.

Vyshinsky: Have you known him, and has he known you for long?

Boguslavsky: Since 1928.

Vyshinsky: That is, you were connected with him for a number of years.

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Go on.

Boguslavsky: The work along both lines continued in 1935. And, as I have already said, I had no more meetings with the leaders of the Moscow centre. I forgot to mention that in the conversation with Pyatakov at his home in 1934, he told me of the existence of this parallel or reserve centre consisting of the persons who are figuring as the centre at this trial. He said that this was necessitated by the arrest of Smirnov and other members of the main centre. So he told me then about the formation of this centre, but I did not meet anybody after 1934, and this meeting with Pyatakov in 1934 was the last.

Vyshinsky: Did you continue your work as a member of the Siberian centre?

Boguslavsky: Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky: What did it consist of?

Boguslavsky: The same as in 1935: exclusively in directing wrecking activities on the railways. . . .

Vyshinsky: So you specialized along this line?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Until?

Boguslavsky: Until my arrest.

Vyshinsky: Up to the very time of your arrest?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Is that all?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You knew Bermant as a member of the Trotskyite underground organization since 1928. Did you know that Bermant had firearms?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What did he have?

Boguslavsky: Three revolvers.

Vyshinsky: Did he have cartridges?

Boguslavsky: He also had cartridges.

Vyshinsky: How many?

Boguslavsky: Perhaps fifty, perhaps eighty or a hundred.

Vyshinsky: That is, a fairly large quantity for a private person?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, he had something in the nature of a small arsenal? And how did you know about this?

Boguslavsky: He told me about it.

Vyshinsky: And was there no talk about him sending these firearms to you in Siberia?

Boguslavsky: There was a special instruction that he should send these firearms to Western Siberia. And he left with the firearms, but he was arrested and the firearms taken away in August 1936. I had made that suggestion to him in July 1936.

Vyshinsky: He was prevented from bringing the firearms by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs?

Boguslavsky: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why did you conceal this at the preliminary investigation and say nothing about it?

Boguslavsky: I did not conceal it. It is in my testimony.

Vyshinsky: Allow me to verify it. You were arrested . . . ?

Boguslavsky: On August 5, 1936.

Vyshinsky: Did you begin to give frank testimony at once?

Boguslavsky: No, not at once, but very soon.

Vyshinsky: You held out for some time, less than Radek?

Boguslavsky: I first began to testify on August 14.

Vyshinsky: You testified on September 6, 1936, and in this testimony I find—I request the Court to allow me to read it—Vol. XXXIV, page 30; you dealt there with this Bermant. You were asked the following question: "With what purpose did you induce the member of your organization, Bermant, to dispatch to you from Moscow the firearms he had in his possession?" Your reply: "It is true that Bermant was a member of our Trotskyite organization. Until very recently he had organizational connections with me personally; but I never instructed Bermant to bring from Moscow the firearms he had in his possession." Question: "You are not telling the truth. On August 10 of this year (*i.e.*, 1936), when Bermant was searched, three revolvers and 80 live cartridges

were discovered. Bermant testified that he had brought these firearms from Moscow on your instructions." Reply: "I confess that I found it very hard to give Bermant away at once, because he was my best friend." Is that what happened?

Boguslavsky: Yes. But this means that I did testify.

Vyshinsky: It means that you denied it.

Boguslavsky: I denied it.

Vyshinsky: It means that then, having been exposed, you confessed.

Boguslavsky: I confessed.

Vyshinsky: I ask you, why did you at first deny it?

Boguslavsky: I did not deny it.

Vyshinsky: You have just said that you denied it at first and gave as your reason that you did not want to give away your best friend. Is that true?

Boguslavsky: It is.

Vyshinsky: Tell me, recently, in the last few months before your arrest, were you as sure of the justice of your cause as you had been formerly, or were you already wavering, were you seized by certain doubts, by uneasiness?

Boguslavsky: I would say that there were waverings and uneasiness.

Vyshinsky: Nevertheless, you continued your activities?

Boguslavsky: I did.

Vyshinsky: At first you would not testify at all, and then you began to testify. Perhaps this is to be explained by some specific conditions of your arrest, perhaps pressure was brought to bear on you?

Boguslavsky: No.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps it was suggested that you should testify in the way you subsequently did, in return for which your sentence would be mitigated?

Boguslavsky: No.

Vyshinsky: Consequently you began to give this testimony quite voluntarily and sincerely, because of your internal personal convictions?

Boguslavsky: Quite true; if the Court permits me I would like to explain my motives.

Vyshinsky: What motives induced you, Boguslavsky, an old Trotskyite, who for some ten years had devoted yourself to the fight in the ranks of the Trotskyites against the Party and against the Soviet government, and who continued your anti-Soviet Trotskyite activities until the very day of your arrest, what motives have induced you to say what you are saying, to expose people, to lay down your arms, etc. What has led you to this?

Boguslavsky: What has led me to this? In reply to the question of the Citizen Procurator, I must say that the interval of nine days between the time of my arrest—even eight days, because it was on the 6th rather than the 5th—and the 14th, was a time during which, if I may so express it, owing to my arrest, I recovered my balance and I was able to bring my still largely, if not utterly, criminal ideas, in order. This explains my stubbornness of these eight days. I must frankly say here in Court that in the last few years, I mean in 1934, 1935 and 1936, the position of a criminal, in which I found myself, not only disturbed me, but weighed on me heavily.

Despite the fact that I have waged a struggle for many years, I request the Court to believe me when I say that not everything had been obliterated of that which the class I came from had given me and which had transformed me from a homeless waif into a man of politics and leader in those positions to which the Party had assigned me.

In this connection I want to mention the absolutely intolerable and incredible rottenness within the Trotskyite organization, which I could not help feeling at every step. I must confess that many things have become clear to me only at this trial, in the course of these two days, things that were absolutely unknown to me before. I cannot refrain from confessing here in Court to the feelings of revulsion and disgust I experienced when Radek related here how, when the *bloc* with the Zinovievites had hardly been formed, the fear began to be expressed that certain people in this *bloc* might cheat others.

The second thing is that we who conducted the work on the spot were absolutely unaware that our country was being sold to foreign capital behind our backs. I learned something about this when I was handed the indictment. But everything became clear to me only here, when I heard the testimony of Pyatakov and Radek.

Vyshinsky: Did Pyatakov and Radek conceal it from you?

Boguslavsky: They have testified here that they particularly concealed Trotsky's last directive of the end of 1935 and told nobody about it, including me.

Of course, even so I should have realized at least what every worker and collective farmer in our country realizes—where this was leading. We who held the view that it is impossible to build up socialism in one country and adopted the path of terrorism and wrecking, we should have realized that if it wasn't socialism we were intending to build, what was it? Why, there is only socialism and capitalism.

Vyshinsky: But you realized this before?

Boguslavsky: Yes, true, that is what I say. When I was arrested I felt like a man who is on the verge of an abyss and knows that he must fall into it. For eight days, until the time I first began to give testimony, it was already quite clear to me that the time had come to put a stop to it. Of course, I realized it too late. And, indeed, everything we did was repulsive, beginning with these abominable diversive activities. "Fish begin to stink from the head down," the proverb says. And we ought to have cut off this head, but we did not. And we engaged in wrecking activities and diversive acts in order to ensure the defeat of our Union. I have committed a crime. I was guided only by what I have already spoken about. Notwithstanding the fact that my fate is now in the hands of the Court of the Soviet state, I beg the Court to believe that I was guided by this, and only this.

The President (to the Prosecutor): Have you any questions?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: Have the accused any questions to Boguslavsky?

The Accused: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: We shall now proceed to the examination of the accused Drobnis.

Accused Drobnis, do you confirm the testimony you gave during the preliminary investigation and before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. in Novosibirsk?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Do you confirm the testimony given by Boguslavsky that you were a member of the West-Siberian Trotskyite centre?

Drobnis: Since the end of July 1934, I was put in charge of all the wrecking and diversive activities in the whole of the Kuzbas.

Vyshinsky: In the whole of the Kuzbas?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And before that did you take any part in underground Trotskyite criminal activities after 1927?

Drobnis: After I was reinstated in the Party in 1929, my Trotskyite activities were resumed at the beginning of 1932. I harboured a number of doubts, which provided the source of my subsequent criminal activities. Knowing my frame of mind, I. N. Smirnov spoke to me of the necessity of resuming Trotskyite counter-revolutionary activity, of Trotsky's new directives, of the adoption of terrorist tactics. I accepted the line set forth by Smirnov.

Smirnov told me that I ought to get in contact with Pyatakov, who would give me somewhat more detailed information. Owing to the fact that I was absent for a long time on official business in 1932, I did not get into contact with Pyatakov until February 1933.

In Central Asia, where I went to work, I got into contact on Pyatakov's instructions with Smilga and Safonova. Smilga, when giving me information, told me that the task was to organize and expand terrorist groups who could be dispatched to Moscow should the centre demand it.

It should be said that my work in Central Asia kept me chiefly travelling all over Central Asia, and that I took no actual part in the Trotskyite work there. But here I want to say, not in order to minimize the vile work I performed, and not in order to mitigate my guilt, that my travels in Central Asia were due not so much to the character of my work as to the doubts I felt about terrorism. I could not assimilate this somehow.

I lived in Central Asia throughout 1933 and left in May 1934 because the Trotskyite centre decided to transfer me to Western Siberia. Since Pyatakov was in a position to transfer me from one job in industry to another, this problem could be solved very easily.

Vyshinsky: That is, Pyatakov took advantage of his official position and transferred you wherever he thought necessary?

Drobnis: Well, of course, that goes without saying. In 1934, before leaving for Western Siberia, I had a conversation with Pyatakov in his private office. Pyatakov stressed and confirmed the necessity of my going to Western Siberia in order to strengthen the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary activities there, and at the same time he outlined an entirely new task: not only terrorism, but also diversive acts and wrecking activities. What reasons did Pyatakov give for this task? He said that terrorism was a drastic method, but that it was far from enough. It had to be supplemented by wrecking and underground activities in order to undermine the achievements gained by the Soviet power, to undermine the prestige of Stalin's leadership and to disorganize economic life; because successes raised the prestige of the leaders, strengthened their influence among the working masses, and if we did not now transfer our energies to disorganizing the economic life of the country, it was obvious that we could not arrive at power by terrorism alone. That was why activities in the Kuznetsk Basin had to be developed in the most energetic fashion. And he added that here we must act with the utmost determination. He repeated the already known expression: "the worse, the better." He repeated that we must act energetically and persistently, and stop at nothing.

All means were useful and fair; such was Trotsky's directive, which the Trotskyite centre subscribed to.

Pyatakov also said that we must enlist for this work specialists from among the former wreckers and those who were counter-

revolutionary minded, and that in Western Siberia I should establish connections with Shestov, Leonov and Vladimir Kosior.

Pyatakov justified diversive and wrecking activities solely by considerations of internal policy. He never, either then or later, at our second meeting, said a word to me about the new line, about the agreements with the various foreign states which Trotsky was negotiating and for which he had received the approbation of the centre. He did not say a word to me about the existing agreements and understandings for the partitioning of the country, and so on and so forth. I learnt this only from the indictment, I learnt this only from the evidence which Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek and Serebryakov gave here. At that time he gave reasons which exclusively concerned internal affairs. I left for Western Siberia. I was told that since I was a member of the West-Siberian centre. I must get into contact with the West-Siberian centre. On my way to Kemerovo, whither I had been appointed as assistant chief of the Kemerovo Works Construction, I had a talk with Muralov, the leader of the West-Siberian centre. Muralov told me that he himself was in direct charge of the terrorist work, that the groups of Khodoroze, Shestov and others had been formed, that there were terrorist groups in Tomsk, chiefly in the higher educational institutions. Muralov also told me that he was in direct charge of wrecking activities in agriculture in Western Siberia and that one of his immediate helpers was Meyerchenko, that the wrecking activities on the railways were being conducted by Boguslavsky, and that I would have to devote my attention to the work in the Kuznetsk Basin.

I asked Muralov what was Rakovsky's attitude towards this centre. Muralov replied that up to the moment of his recantation Rakovsky had not been a member of the West-Siberian centre, but that he had been directly connected with it and that he was thoroughly informed of the new tactics, of Trotsky's new directives regarding terrorism and diversive acts.

Vyshinsky: When did you arrive in Kemerovo?

Drobnis: I arrived in Kemerovo on August 3rd or 4th, 1934.

Vyshinsky: Did you get in touch with the local Trotskyites in Kemerovo?

Drobnis: In Kemerovo I endeavoured to earn the confidence of the Party and Soviet organizations, so as to weaken the suspicious and cautious attitude towards me. Thus it should be said that it was along these lines, and chiefly along these lines that my considerable efforts were directed. I endeavoured to be active, to fulfil all tasks assigned to me. I took upon myself commissions, and it should be said I gained the confidence of the Party organizations, and this greatly facilitated my subsequent work.

Further, I must say that in the distribution of duties between the chief of construction and his two assistants, I was assigned exclusively administrative work. This hampered my activities, since I was limited to the sphere of my work and it was difficult for me to gain direct access to construction, installation and operation of the enterprises already functioning. This was in charge of Norkin, accused here in this trial, and of Kartsev, the assistant chief engineer, who has also been arrested. And so, this was concentrated in their hands, which made it difficult for me to carry on any work. I therefore directed my efforts to creating necessary conditions for myself, so that later, having acquainted myself with the surroundings and people, to begin the recruiting work. In March 1935 Pyatakov summoned me to Moscow to hear my report on my wrecking and diversive activities in the Kuznetsk Basin and especially at the Kemerovo Chemical Works. Pyatakov informed me that at the Kemerovo Chemical Works, Norkin, chief of construction of the works, had on his instructions already started rather serious wrecking activities, and that this work was being carried on by the chief engineer, Kartsev. During this same conversation Pyatakov said that Trotsky was demanding more forward and energetic work, and he emphasized that we were not to be particular about means.

I returned to Kemerovo, got in touch with Norkin and we began to develop our activities. Norkin told me that he had a plan of wrecking activity, although an unwritten one. I made no objection to this plan, all the more so that certain parts of it had already to a large extent been realized.

Vyshinsky: That is, it was the plan which was drawn up by Norkin and agreed upon with Pyatakov in Moscow?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How was it agreed upon? Also verbally?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: By making a report?

Drobnis: By making a report. Norkin made frequent visits to Moscow, so he could inform him more often.

Vyshinsky: And from whom do you know this? From Norkin or from someone else?

Drobnis: From Norkin.

Vyshinsky: But what did Norkin tell you, concretely? On what grounds do you affirm that this plan was agreed upon?

Drobnis: I know this both from what Norkin told me and from conversations with Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: What did Norkin say?

Drobnis: He said that there was such a plan, explained it and said that this plan had been approved by Pyatakov and that we must commence this work along these lines. Do you agree to this? he asked me. I said that I accepted this plan.

Vyshinsky: A question to the accused Norkin.

Accused Norkin, did you hear this part of the testimony?

Norkin: I did.

Vyshinsky: Have you any corrections to make?

Norkin: Only minor ones.

Vyshinsky: I am interested in one question: was such a plan of wrecking really drawn up by you and was this plan agreed upon or was it approved by Pyatakov?

Norkin: There was no such plan drawn up in a regular way.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, it was not in written form?

Norkin: And not drawn up in detail.

Vyshinsky: Drobnis says that in a talk with him you indicated the main questions contained in it. . . .

Norkin: That is quite true. In a conversation with Drobnis and Kartsev—and we had frequent talks—we told each other about the work, and everything was previouly agreed upon with Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky (to Drobnis): And what did the plan consist of?

Drobnis: One of the wrecking tasks in the plan was to diffuse funds on measures of secondary importance. Another was to delay construction work in such a way as to prevent the launching of important departments on the dates fixed by the government.

Vyshinsky: That is, to upset the schedule as well?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Chiefly in enterprises of importance for the defence of the country?

Drobnis: Yes. Then there were frequent revisions of the building designs, and delays in payments to the designing organizations, so that the designs were received very late.

Needless to say, this retarded the speed and progress of construction work. It must be said that this was done rather cleverly. For example, there were plans for the main, basic buildings of the Combined Fertilizer Works, but for things like the gas mains, the steam supply pipes and so forth, which might appear of secondary importance but were really of very great importance for starting the plant on schedule, plans were not prepared in time, and of course this constant fussing in dealings with the organizations responsible for the designs led to the plans arriving much too late.

Of the enterprises already in operation, a number of things were deliberately left uncompleted in the departments of the coke

and chemical plant, and this seriously affected the work of the plant, lowering the quality of the product and resulting in the production of coke with an excessive moisture and ash content.

As the Kemerovo Combined Coke and Chemical Works supplied the industry of the Urals with coke, this in its turn affected the quality of the metal. At one time, in 1935, this even led the metal workers of the Urals to send a delegation to Kemerovo in order to point out to what an extent the low quality of coke produced by the Kemerovo Combined Coke and Chemical Works affected the quality of the metal, prevented them from developing the Stakhanov movement there, delayed the tempo of production and the work of the metallurgical plants. Although the workers in the Coke and Chemical Works strove to improve the work, they could not succeed because of the wrecking activities that were going on there.

The district power station was put into such a state that, if it were deemed necessary for wrecking purposes, and when the order was given, the mine could be flooded. In addition, coal was supplied that was technically unsuitable for fuel for the power station, and this led to explosions. This was done quite deliberately.

Such, approximately and in general outline, were the measures of a wrecking character that were planned and put into effect.

In addition, breakdowns were arranged. There were two breakdowns of a very serious nature. There was no loss of life, it is true, but a number of workers were seriously injured.

As regards the auxiliary enterprises, that is those with which I was directly concerned, wrecking work was conducted in the automobile transport department. This chiefly consisted in increasing the idle periods in the work of the trucks and reducing the number of trucks in operation. Furthermore, housing construction was conducted at such a slow rate that engineers, technicians and workers were left without dwellings, which would give rise to a difficult and grave situation when operation started. This, so to speak, is roughly what concerns the plan of wrecking measures and its realization.

Vyshinsky: Go on.

Drobnis: According to the instructions of the centre I was also to establish connections with Shestov. Shestov came to see me in Kemerovo in the autumn of 1935. At this meeting Shestov told me what measures he intended to carry out, chiefly to disrupt the construction of new mines and to lower the output of coal and a number of other measures. He advised me to utilize for wrecking activities at the Kemerovo mine a former wrecker named Peshekhonov.

Shestov, apparently, was unable to cope with the Kemerovo mine. I was therefore obliged to take it under my direct charge.

I managed to establish connections with the assistant chief, later chief, of the "Tsentralnaya" pit, Noskov, and with Shubin and Kurov, and to carry on wrecking work with their aid.

Vyshinsky: Noskov, Shubin and Kurov—they all figured in the Kemerovo trial?

Drobnis: Yes. On this same occasion Shestov informed me that through the medium of Stroilov or directly, or through somebody else—I do not recall at the moment, Shestov will probably correct me if I am inexact—but he told me that they had contact with some foreign specialists who had been enlisted. . . .

Vyshinsky: Did Shestov tell you this?

Drobnis: Yes, Shestov, who is charged with diversive and wrecking activities.

Vyshinsky: Did Shestov mention any names to you?

Drobnis: No, he did not mention names to me, but he mentioned Peshekhonov who is working at the Kemerovo Mines.

Vyshinsky: And in regard to connections with foreign specialists, he did not mention any names?

Drobnis: No, he did not mention any names.

Vyshinsky: And you did not hear of these names afterwards?

Drobnis: Yes, I did hear of one name afterwards, but that was not from Shestov. It must be said that after I went to see Pyatakov, who demanded that the work be carried on more intensively and energetically, and pointed out that not enough was being done, I spoke about this to Shestov, telling him that things were in a bad way at Kemerovo, that no work at all was being done there. Even before I told Noskov about this, Noskov informed me that they had connections with Peshekhonov. Stroilov gave instructions to Peshekhonov to get in touch with the Trotskyite organizations existing at the mines. Noskov asked me how I viewed this matter. I said that this was altogether admissible and indispensable, for the line both of Trotsky and of the centre was that we must mobilize all forces to deliver the most telling and most powerful blow. In the course of one conversation, Noskov informed me that Peshekhonov had told him that he had enlisted in the organization for wrecking work the German engineer Stickling.

Vyshinsky: Was this the Stickling who figured in the Kemerovo case?

Drobnis: Yes. I said to Noskov: that's good. In this way activity was started in the Kemerovo mine as well. A number of measures had been planned there by Noskov, most of them measures to sabotage the Stakhanov movement. It must be said that the sabotage of the Stakhanov movement also occupied a prominent place in our plan of work at the Kemerovo Combined Works Construction. At one time, at the very beginning,

the Stakhanov movement at the mines had developed quite well, but later the pace of the development of this movement slackened somewhat, and when the Party organizations issued the call to advance the Stakhanov movement, our counter-revolutionary organization concentrated all its efforts on hindering this. The second task was to reduce the output of coal and, in addition, to damage the ventilation system, fill the pits with gas and cause explosions. In July 1935 Noskov reported to me that he had completed preparations for the explosion of the "Tsentralnaya" Mine, which was in his charge. I approved of this.

Vyshinsky: When did he say that he had completed preparations for the explosion at the "Tsentralnaya" Mine?

Drobnis: This conversation took place in the beginning or the middle of July, 1936.

Vyshinsky: And did you discuss with him under what conditions this explosion was to take place?

Drobnis: Noskov said that such a wrecking measure as allowing gas to accumulate in the mine would result in explosion and would cause loss of life. I replied: well then, we must be ready for this, too. It would even be a good thing, because it would arouse the resentment of the workers which will enable us to win their sympathies.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, you not only approved of Noskov's plan for an explosion in the mine, but even gave your sanction to the explosion taking place under conditions which would directly involve the death of workers?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: With all the consequences?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You said that workers were bound to be killed?

Drobnis: I asked Noskov whether such a wrecking act could be performed without loss of life. He told me that it was out of the question. Thereupon I said that there was no use being finicky and that we must be ready for this.

Vyshinsky: How did you explain that?

Drobnis: I said that . . . that we must . . . I already explained that we must be prepared for this too, that it would even . . . and even if it did cause loss of life it would also arouse the resentment of the workers, and that would be in our favour.

Vyshinsky: But this is not what you tried to assert here. You just said that you asked Noskov whether the sacrifice of life could not be avoided. But it follows from what you said that, far from being opposed to sacrifice of life, you thought, to the contrary, that the more lives lost, the better for you.

Drobnis: Well, yes, that's so, more or less. . . .

Vyshinsky: Well, I realize that it is of course somewhat inconvenient for you to speak of such things here in public. But there is nothing to be done about it. Did you say that there was nothing to shrink from?

Drobnis: I did.

Vyshinsky: And that meant that if workers were to perish as a result, well, let them perish. Did you encourage Noskov?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You encouraged him with regard to the killing of workers, and even said that the more there were killed the better. Did I understand you to say that?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, I am exaggerating nothing?

Drobnis: You are exaggerating a little.

Vyshinsky: Let us make this clear, let us recall the facts. Did you say to Noskov that the more victims, the better?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What, then, am I exaggerating?

Drobnis: I did not mean by this that he should kill more.

Vyshinsky: Did you think that if you said "more," he would understand you to mean "less," that he would understand you to mean that you wanted to reduce the loss of life?

Drobnis: I wanted to reduce. . . .

Vyshinsky: Yet you said, let there be more, and even explained why more deaths were necessary. You said, let there be more victims, since that would arouse the resentment of the workers. The greater the number of victims, the less the resentment?

Drobnis: No, on the contrary.

Vyshinsky: The greater the number of victims, the greater the resentment?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Is that what you wanted?

Drobnis: Yes, in effect, that is what I wanted.

Vyshinsky: In effect—or did you want it? Speak plainly.

Drobnis: I fully and completely confirm the testimony I gave at the preliminary investigation.

Vyshinsky: Why confirm? You are now in court and you can give testimony without confirming the old testimony.

Drobnis: I am not quibbling; I fully and completely confirm my earlier testimony.

Vyshinsky: Did you speak to Noskov about preparations for an explosion in the "Tsentralnaya" Mine?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did Noskov ask you, or did you ask him, what about the people? Who asked the question?

Drobnis: Noskov.

Vyshinsky: He asked you what about the workers? Is that true?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you first said that you asked whether loss of life could not be avoided. What did you answer?

Drobnis: I said that we must be prepared for this.

Vyshinsky: "For this," for what?

Drobnis: For the sacrifice of workers.

Vyshinsky: What does "sacrifice" mean?

Drobnis: It means murder.

Vyshinsky: And how did you justify it?

Drobnis: The more victims the better.

Vyshinsky: For whom?

Drobnis: For the wrecking work.

Vyshinsky: For the Trotskyites?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Drobnis: Because this might arouse the resentment of the workers against the Soviet government.

Vyshinsky: Arouse the resentment of the workers against the Soviet government, was that your aim?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And it was for this that you were willing to resort to any means, even the murder of workers?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What then am I exaggerating?

Drobnis: Nothing.

Vyshinsky: Then this explosion was effected?

Drobnis: I was arrested on August 6 and the explosion took place on September 23.

Vyshinsky: But you sanctioned the explosion?

Drobnis: I sanctioned it at the end or in the middle of July.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, your arrest did not prevent the explosion from being effected, because Noskov remained at the mine?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And could it have been prevented?

Drobnis: Prevented? Of course it could.

Vyshinsky: Who could have prevented it?

Drobnis: I could have prevented it.

Vyshinsky: You did not prevent it?

Drobnis: I did not prevent it.

Vyshinsky: The explosion was effected?

Drobnis: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: Accused Drobnis, did you advise Noskov, in case everything came out and he was questioned, on whom he was to lay the blame for these diversive and wrecking acts?

Drobnis: Yes.

The President: What instructions did you give Noskov if he should be called to account?

Drobnis: To lay all the blame on the non-Party specialists.

The President: Even on those who were in no way involved?

Drobnis: Well, of course.

The President: The Court is adjourned until 6 o'clock.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

EVENING SESSION, JANUARY 25, 1937, 6.00 P.M.

Commandant: The Court is coming. Please rise.

The President: The session is resumed.

Comrade Procurator, have you any questions to put to Drobnis?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: Accused Muralov will now be examined.

Accused Muralov, do you confirm the testimony you gave in December and January?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Tell us about the part you played in the West-Siberian underground Trotskyite centre.

Muralov: I will begin with 1928. I arrived in Novosibirsk in November 1928. Here I want to make a slight correction regarding the date mentioned by accused Boguslavsky. He said that he found me in Novosibirsk in January. I only arrived in Novosibirsk at the end of November. All the rest that he said was quite correct. I confirm it.

As for what he said about the further activities, when the Siberian centre was re-established, Boguslavsky is somewhat wrong about the dates. He said that the directive was received in 1932. The centre was re-established at the end of 1931. But this too, perhaps, is not of great importance. When the first Novosibirsk centre fell to pieces and I was the only. . . .

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Muralov: In the beginning of 1931. While I was on an official business trip in Moscow I met Ivan Nikitich Smirnov. He told me that he had been abroad and had seen Sedov. He told me about Trotsky's new line about resorting to terrorism against the leadership of the Communist Party and the government.

Smirnov advised us to re-establish the Siberian centre to consist of persons known to me and him, those who returned to the Party in 1929. These names were mentioned—Sumetsky and Boguslavsky. The first task of this centre was to gather Trotskyite forces and to organize serious terrorist acts. On my arrival in Novosibirsk I arranged to meet Sumetsky and Boguslavsky and told them what Ivan Nikitich Smirnov had proposed, which I accepted as proper. They also agreed with me and we three be-

gan to function as the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary centre in Siberia. I was the leader; Sumetsky was to gather the cadres, chiefly among the young people in the universities. I instructed the Trotskyite Khodoroze to organize a terrorist group. He formed it in 1932. The designated object of the terrorist act was the secretary of the Territory Committee of the C.P.S.U., Eiche. In the same year, 1932, Shestov arrived in Novosibirsk and brought a letter from Sedov.

This letter contained a lot of fiction and was written in the ordinary way, but what was not fiction was written with antipirin and when made visible was found to be Trotsky's directive to proceed to terrorist activities. The letter confirmed what Smirnov had said.

Vyshinsky: And had you known Sedov before that? Had you known him a long time?

Muralov: I knew Sedov—Trotsky's son, Lev Lvovich Sedov. The first time I saw him was in Moscow about 1919 or 1920, and since I knew that he was the executive and so to speak the business manager of Trotsky, I often came in touch with him in the period of our Moscow organization. I knew him very well, often met him in Trotsky's apartment, and I knew everything about him, including his physical defect—a fact which Shestov confirmed. So I made sure that this letter was not a forgery; I recognized the handwriting.

Vyshinsky: You know his handwriting?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: The handwriting was like his?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So your doubts disappeared?

Muralov: All my doubts disappeared then. In the next year, when I met Ivan Nikitich Smirnov in Moscow, Ivan Nikitich, after asking me what we had done—I informed him and asked him what about the future and what the news was—told me that there was now something new, namely the program of economic terrorism. I did not understand this term, not knowing what economic terrorism was. He explained to me that in effect, it was wrecking. Whose line is it? I asked. He said it was also Trotsky's.

After returning to Novosibirsk, I told my centre about this, and we thereupon arranged that Boguslavsky should take this job and Shestov do the same in the Kuznetsk Basin. In 1932 I received another letter from Sedov brought by Seidman, a Trotskyite engineer. This letter was also outwardly concerned with imaginary everyday matters; enquiries after people's health and so forth. The business part was written in code, and it was meant, properly

speaking, not for me but for I. N. Smirnov. I cannot give the contents of this letter word for word, but the sense of it was that I was to convey it to I. N. Smirnov. This letter instructed us to accelerate terrorist acts against Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Kirov.

In 1933, I again received a letter from Sedov in which it was stated that "the old man is pleased with our activities."

After 1933 I received no more letters, and after the arrest of I. N. Smirnov, having heard previously from I. N. Smirnov that a parallel centre, a reserve centre had been organized, I endeavoured to get in touch with Pyatakov on my arrival in Moscow in 1934.

In 1934 I communicated with Pyatakov and informed him of our activities. And incidentally at that time, in fact before that year, Drobnis arrived in Novosibirsk, having been appointed to the Kemerovo Combined Chemical Works as assistant chief of construction; he came to see me and pointed out that he, too, had been sent by Pyatakov from Moscow, and that he could and should carry out wrecking jobs. So this part of industry was likewise covered by us—by the Siberian centre in the person of Drobnis. Pyatakov informed me that he had come to an agreement with the Rights. At first it surprised me to hear that the Rights had come over to our position also in regard to terrorism and in regard to wrecking, and that they had their own centre consisting of Tomsky, Rykov and Bukharin. This news surprised me, firstly, because I regarded them as opportunists, and secondly, as cowards, incapable of drastic action. Pyatakov told me that they had changed, and here I learned of the composition of the reserve centre, which consisted of Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov.

I saw Pyatakov again in 1935. I think it was at the beginning or in the middle of October 1935. He did not tell me anything new, but mentioned that as regards terrorist acts I had better not be too impetuous. We had a talk on this subject and reproaches were uttered. I blamed them because they had done nothing here in this respect since the assassination of Kirov.

Vyshinsky: In what sense had they done nothing?

Muralov: I mean they had carried out nothing, no new acts.

Vyshinsky: Not murdered anyone?

Muralov: No. Nor had we. I told about the unsuccessful attempt on the life of Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, but he told me not to be so much of a soldier and not to allow myself to be carried away so easily.

Vyshinsky: Who told you not to be so much of a soldier and not to allow yourself to be carried away so easily?

Muralov: Pyatakov. After this meeting with Pyatakov, I did not have any more meetings with him, I did not see him again.

This was at the beginning or in the middle of October. I did not receive any new instructions from him, nor did our whole Novosibirsk centre. True, he pointed out that we must bring pressure to bear on Drobnis, since he was not very active, and when I met Drobnis in Novosibirsk I told him that the centre was not very well satisfied, that he must brace up a little. So much for the wrecking work.

Regarding the organization of terrorist groups and acts, as I have already stated, the first group was organized by Khodoroze under my personal direction and consisted of three or four persons in Novosibirsk. Then there was a group in Tomsk consisting of Kashkin (director of the Industrial Institute) and Nikolayev (his assistant). I met them, gave them instructions, and approved their plan for an attempt on the life of Eiche if he arrived there. Groups were organized by Shestov in Prokopyevsk and Anzherka. In Prokopyevsk we attempted in 1934 to commit a terrorist act against Molotov, but the attempt failed. So that, actually, no terrorist acts were committed in Western Siberia.

Vyshinsky: You failed?

Muralov: Yes, we failed.

Vyshinsky: But you prepared?

Muralov: Yes, we prepared.

Vyshinsky: You failed because you abandoned the attempt, or for a reason over which you had no control?

Muralov: No, at that time we just failed.

Vyshinsky: But an attempt was made?

Muralov: There was an attempt on the life of Molotov, but the attempted automobile accident failed.

Vyshinsky: Tell us please in detail how the attempt on the life of Comrade Molotov was organized: to whom did you give such a task, and who organized it?

Muralov: I charged Shestov with this. He told me that he had a group that was already prepared, headed, I think, by Cherepukhin, and that he had prepared a chauffeur who was ready to sacrifice his own life in order to kill Molotov. But at the last moment the chauffeur funked—he would not risk his own life and so Molotov's life was saved.

Vyshinsky: How was the attempt made?

Muralov: The car was to turn into a ditch while at full speed. Under such circumstances the car by its own momentum would overturn and get smashed, while the people. . . .

Vyshinsky: Was the attempt made to overturn the car in the ditch?

Muralov: The attempt was made, but then the chauffeur funked and the car did not fall into the ditch.

Vyshinsky: Who was this chauffeur?

Muralov: Arnold, I think.

Vyshinsky: Did you instruct Shestov to organize this affair?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Permit me to ask Shestov. Accused Shestov, do you confirm this part of Muralov's testimony?

Shestov: Yes. The first conversation took place in November 1931. At that time Muralov set me the task of carrying out a terrorist act only in regard to the secretary of the West-Siberian Territory Committee, Eiche. Later, when I reported to him that the Prokopyevsk terrorist group was ready to commit terrorist acts, Muralov gave me wider instructions for terrorist acts. He told me that it was necessary to prepare the Prokopyevsk terrorist group for terrorist acts not against Eiche alone, but if other members of the government came to the Kuznetsk Basin, this must be done in regard to them too. That was in May 1933.

In the summer of 1934 I had a talk with Muralov in Novosibirsk. Muralov told me on that occasion that it was to be expected that some of the members of the government would come, as had happened in previous years; in particular he said (I do not know how he knew this) that the arrival of Molotov was expected and that we must therefore carry out a terrorist act against Molotov. I also recall that in the beginning of June 1933 I told Muralov that Orjonikidze was expected in the Kuznetsk Basin and Muralov gave me instructions to commit a terrorist act against Orjonikidze.

Vyshinsky: Muralov gave you instructions?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Having received direct instructions from Muralov to prepare for terrorist acts, what practical steps did you take?

Shestov: When I heard that Molotov was coming I ordered Cherepukhin to go immediately to Prokopyevsk personally to direct the terrorist act against Molotov. This he did. As he informed me later, he instructed Arnold to commit this terrorist act. The preliminary plan provided for the act to be committed by means of a car accident, and two suitable spots were selected for it. One spot—for those who know Prokopyevsk—was near Pit No. 5 on the way to the Mine Management office, and the second spot was between the workers' settlement and Pit No. 3. There is a gully there, not a ditch, as Muralov said, a gully, about 15 metres deep.

Vyshinsky: A "ditch" 15 metres deep! Who chose this spot?

Shestov: I myself, and Cherepukhin.

Vyshinsky: You yourself selected this spot?

Shestov: At that time I was working in Prokopyevsk and knew the topography of the place very well.

Vyshinsky: You chose two spots, and that was the instructions you gave to the executors—either one place or the other?

Shestov: Only those spots, other places were out of the question.

Vyshinsky: Who told the executors about these spots?

Shestov: Cherepukhin told the executors. He told me that he had succeeded in putting Arnold at the wheel.

Vyshinsky: What was Arnold at the time?

Shestov: Arnold was manager of the garage. He is an experienced chauffeur. Moreover, as Cherepukhin had told me, he had even provided for additional guarantees. These were that, in the event of Arnold funking it for any reason, a truck was to drive up and collide with the passenger car, hitting it in the side so that both car and truck would crash into the gully.

Arnold did indeed drive Molotov, but he turned the wheel and so misled the truck driver, who, thinking that Arnold had fallen into the gully, drove past. As a matter of fact, although he turned towards the gully, he did not turn sharply enough, and the guards in the car that followed literally caught the machine with their hands. Molotov and the others in the car, including Arnold, got out of the already overturned car. This is what Cherepukhin reported to me at the time.

Analyzing this situation with Cherepukhin, we arrived at the conclusion that Arnold had not put enough speed on, and had not turned sharply enough.

Vyshinsky: At what speed was he to have made the turn?

Shestov: At high speed, but he did it at a low speed.

Vyshinsky: And slowly slid down?

Shestov: No, not slowly, but he did not turn sharply enough, with the result that the car lost momentum and did not fall with the speed it would have had had he turned more sharply. Had he done that the rear car would not have been able to catch it.

Vyshinsky: The rear car managed to come to the assistance of the front car. Who related this?

Shestov: Cherepukhin.

Vyshinsky: And Arnold?

Shestov: Arnold told the story on the same lines later.

Vyshinsky: And did it coincide?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Permit me to ask Arnold.

Accused Arnold, you heard Shestov's testimony? Is his testimony correct?

Arnold: The technical details are not sufficiently depicted.

Vyshinsky: But the fact as such, did it occur?

Arnold: Yes, it occurred.

Vyshinsky: Do you confirm that?

Arnold: Yes.

The President: We shall resume the examination of the accused Muralov.

Muralov: Permit me to say something about Shestov's explanation. I will not argue with Shestov about whether it was a ditch or a gully. . . .

Vyshinsky: Have you yourself been at the spot where this ditch is?

Muralov: No, I have never been there.

Vyshinsky: So you have not seen it?

Muralov: No, but there are many gullies in Prokopyevsk, gully upon gully, hill after hill.

Vyshinsky: If you have not seen the place you cannot argue about it.

Muralov: I will not argue about it.

Secondly, about 1932 and Shestov's reference to the attempt on the life of Orjonikidze. I categorically declare that this belongs to the realm of Shestov's phantasy. I never gave such instructions.

Vyshinsky: He is mixing things up?

Muralov: I do not know whether he is mixing things up or whether he is simply letting his phantasy run away with him.

Vyshinsky: Permit me to ask Shestov. Accused Shestov, have you heard that Muralov repudiates your testimony?

Shestov: I most emphatically insist on my testimony. All the more do I confirm this because I received exact instructions from Sedov, from Pyatakov and Smirnov that my activities must be exclusively under the control of Muralov and that I must receive from him practical instructions against whom to carry out terrorist acts.

Vyshinsky: Do you confirm that in regard to Molotov, Muralov gave you direct instructions?

Shestov: Yes, and he gave direct instructions in June 1933 about carrying out a terrorist act against Orjonikidze as well.

Vyshinsky: These instructions were given before instructions concerning a terrorist act against Molotov were given?

Shestov: This was exactly a year earlier.

Vyshinsky: And afterwards, what instructions did you receive

from Muralov and did you speak to him about what you had done?

Shestov: I told him that I had a terrorist group ready in Prokopyevsk. I precisely conveyed Muralov's instructions to Cherepukhin, who accepted them for guidance. Later Cherepukhin reported to me that he had not committed the terrorist act only because the group which was to fire the revolver in the coke pit wavered, and because Orjonikidze did not use a car then.

Vyshinsky: There were two variants—either to shoot, or a car smash?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Hence, in reply to Muralov's categorical statement you declare that this did take place?

Shestov: Yes, it did take place.

Vyshinsky: And did you speak to any of the accused?

Shestov: No. I had to do only with Cherepukhin.

Vyshinsky: Accused Muralov, do you confirm the references to the attempt on the life of Comrade Molotov?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: On this point there is no divergency between you and Shestov, you confirm this?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: After the attempt on the life of Comrade Molotov failed, did anybody inform you of it, report on the reasons for the failure? And what did you do after that?

Muralov: Shestov reported on the failure. Well, what of it, if it failed, it failed. Later I organized a group in Tomsk. In that period of time either Eiche did not arrive or they were not ready, at all events, things remained in the stage of preparation.

Vyshinsky: Also in the stage of preparation?

Muralov: Yes, by Kashkin and Nikolayev. About the groups which Shestov directed I confess I do not know. I knew the personal composition to some extent of Khodoroze's in Novosibirsk, but this group did not commit a single terrorist act.

Vyshinsky: But did it prepare for any?

Muralov: It prepared for an attempt on the life of Eiche.

Vyshinsky: Did you know that at that time preparations were under way for other terrorist acts in other towns, particularly in Moscow?

Muralov: I knew what was the line in general. Since we had received such directives and confirmation had come from the centre, the united centre, then evidently the parallel centre also acted; but I did not know the composition of the groups or what was going on in other towns. I do not know whether the members of

the Siberian centre knew. I knew nothing about these groups, either personally or organizationally.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet Pyatakov, and in what years?

Muralov: At the end of 1927, when we were expelled at the Congress, I parted from him and after that we met for the first time in 1934 and later in 1935. After that I neither met nor saw him.

Vyshinsky: When you met Pyatakov did he tell you anything about his terrorist activities?

Muralov: He did not tell me any details.

Vyshinsky: Not details, but, in general, did he tell you?

Muralov: In general, he told me that there was such confirmation and that groups were being organized. But I had already heard from Ivan Nikitich that Dreitzer was engaged on this special task.

Vyshinsky: You knew that?

Muralov: That I knew.

Vyshinsky: And did you also know who Dreitzer was?

Muralov: I also knew Dreitzer. He was a military man.

Vyshinsky: Tell the Court please, did you meet Pyatakov after the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov?

Muralov: I did.

Vyshinsky: In Moscow?

Muralov: In Moscow.

Vyshinsky: And did you discuss the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov?

Muralov: We did, we discussed the impression this act had left on everybody, and noted that after all, the directive was being carried out; one man had already been removed.

Vyshinsky: One had been removed!

And did not Pyatakov say that now it was the turn of the others?

Muralov: He did not say that now it was the turn of the others; on the contrary, he said that it was necessary to do this in an organized way. Generally speaking, we did not say that it must be each in turn, or all at once; at all events we said that we must be well prepared, and reproaching me in this respect, he said that we must not act in this blunt soldier-like fashion, but cautiously, in an organized way, and so forth.

Vyshinsky: Cautiously, in an organized way, but act?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: At the preliminary investigation, when you were examined at the office of the Procurator of the U.S.S.R., you testified as follows. Permit me to read Vol. XXV, p. 109:

"In 1934, after the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov, I met Pyatakov in Moscow and in conversation with me he said: 'One of those listed in the plan has been wiped off, now it is the turn of the rest; but we must not be impetuous.' "

Is that right?

Muralov: I confirm it, that is what I said.

Vyshinsky: Is that exactly what was said?

Muralov: In my opinion there is no contradiction in what I said.

Vyshinsky: There is no contradiction; I merely want to make it clear.

Muralov: Only there is the word "plan." Well, of course, he is a planning expert.

Vyshinsky: This is of some importance. Do you confirm it?

Muralov: Yes, I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: I have a question to Pyatakov. Accused Pyatakov, what have you to say on this matter?

Pyatakov: Generally speaking, Muralov's testimony is very exact. The words, well, this is his own peculiar terminology, his phraseology, but in substance, he has conveyed it correctly. We were discussing exactly what I testified to, that it was not a matter of single acts, but of organized preparation.

Vyshinsky: It is not merely a matter of words, the content is different. Here it was said that one of those who had been listed in the plan had been wiped off. This referred to the foul murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov. Accused Muralov, is that not so?

Muralov: I do not guarantee that the wording is exact, but that was the meaning.

Vyshinsky: If we are not to cling to words, what is the meaning?

Muralov: Kirov was one of the four concerning whom Trotsky had given instructions, and the organization of one murder according to that program had been carried out.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): That was the meaning?

Pyatakov: In substance, it is conveyed correctly.

Vyshinsky: It is not a matter of phraseology. The meaning is that persons were listed, and one of the persons on the list had already been murdered.

Pyatakov: I related exactly what I discussed with Muralov, what I discussed with Radek, namely, that it was necessary to renounce individual acts and to proceed to the preparation of organized acts, so you don't act on your own.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you deny what Muralov ascribes to you?

Pyatakov: In substance I confirm what Muralov has said. As for this or that sentence—I repudiate these sentences.

Vyshinsky: I do not insist on particular words. What is important for me is the meaning of what you said. We are now in 1937 and that was in 1934.

Pyatakov: In 1935.

Vyshinsky: Quite a long time has elapsed, and words may escape memory. When was that?

Pyatakov: That was in 1935.

The President: It was at the end of 1934.

Vyshinsky: The foul murder of Comrade Kirov was committed on December 1, 1934. Consequently, it was either in December, that is, at the end of 1934, or in January 1935. He said that one had already been wiped off, one listed in the plan had already been removed, and now it was the turn of the rest, and he added—"but we must not be impetuous." Is that right, accused Muralov?

Muralov: Yes, that's right. That he spoke about not being impetuous, about terrorism on a large scale to be carried out in an organized way, that's true.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions to Pyatakov. Accused Muralov, was it also said that you must act in an organized way?

Muralov: Yes, it was.

Vyshinsky: But was it not said that terrorism in general produces no result if only one is killed and the others remain, and therefore it is necessary to act at one stroke?

Muralov: Both I and Pyatakov felt that it was no use working by Socialist-Revolutionary, guerrilla methods. We must organize it so as to cause panic at one stroke. We regarded causing panic and consternation in the leading ranks of the Party as one of the means by which we would come into power.

Vyshinsky: What did Pyatakov advise you to do?

Muralov: He asked me: "How are things going with you?" I said: such-and-such is the position. I asked him: "And how is it with you?" He said: "Not bad." I said: "If things are not bad with you, they are not bad with us." It was then he said to me that we must not act soldier fashion; that this matter had to be organized. We could not let ourselves be exposed all at once, secrecy had to be maintained; it was not the business of Pyatakov to commit terrorist acts himself, but of people who could

somehow cover up their traces. The conversation on this subject was short.

Vyshinsky: Short, but the meaning was fairly long.

The President: How did you, accused Muralov, maintain communication by letter with Sedov?

Muralov: Communication by letter with Sedov was maintained through Shestov. Shestov saw Sedov when he was in Berlin and brought a letter from him. The second letter was brought by an engineer, a member of the Party—Seidman, a covert Trotskyite who had also been abroad and had seen Sedov. The third letter I also received with the assistance of Shestov, who had commissioned some German specialist.

The President: Which specialist?

Muralov: I do not know.

The President: What role did this German specialist play?

Muralov: I don't know. I sent the letters in code, and I informed. . . .

The President: I am not asking you about the contents. What interests me is the technique of sending letters from Novosibirsk to Berlin and *vice versa.*

Muralov: I handed the letters to Shestov. The third letter I received was brought by a specialist.

The President: In what branch was he a specialist?

Muralov: Mining, he worked in the Kuzbas.

The President: You say that Shestov was connected with German specialists who frequently went to Berlin. I want to ascertain which German specialists you mean, and what role they played in maintaining communications between you and Sedov.

Muralov: I sent all the correspondence through Shestov.

The President: And did you not inquire how Shestov ensured the delivery of the letters, whether they reached their destination?

Muralov: Judging by the replies I used to receive, my letters reached their destination.

The President: But who carried these letters abroad and into this country: Shestov or other persons?

Muralov: Other persons.

The President: Shestov was only an intermediary?

Muralov: Yes, he only passed them on.

The President: But who travelled to Berlin with these letters, and who brought you letters from Berlin? Were there any intermediaries?

Muralov: There were no intermediaries. They were persons who were sent on business.

The President: On what business?

Muralov: Business in the Kuzbas.

The President: Why were they sent there?

Muralov: I don't know.

The President: And when you heard about these German specialists, did you not inquire what connection these German specialists had with the Trotskyite organization in the Kuzbas?

Muralov: I regarded it merely as an opportunity. Shestov vouched that he would do all he could to get the letters to their destination.

The President: Shestov vouched that the German specialists would deliver all these letters at their destination?

Muralov: Yes.

The President: But why did these German specialists take upon themselves the function of postmen?

Muralov: I don't know. Seidman is not a German specialist, he is a Russian.

The President: Accused Shestov, tell the Court briefly: which German specialists did you speak to Muralov about?

Shestov: I spoke of spies and diversionists.

The President: Why did these German specialists carry Muralov's letters to Sedov and *vice versa*?

Shestov: Muralov knew very well when I first reported to him about my negotiations with Sedov, and in repeated communications I made to him later that I had entered into an agreement with the German firm Fröhlich-Klüpfel-Dehlmann, had entered into an agreement with the director of that firm; and one of the points in that agreement was that they would punctually deliver mail from Western Siberia to my chief, Lev Sedov, and back to me, addressed to me under my pseudonym, "Alyosha."

The President: How did you establish connections with the German specialists working in the Kuzbas, what address did you use, why did they carry out your commissions?

Shestov: They carried out my commissions because, as I have already stated, I entered into an agreement with that firm. Secondly, even before my return from Berlin, engineer Stroilov was the representative of that firm. When I arrived I got in touch with engineer Stroilov and enlisted him for diversive, undermining, destructive work.

The President: Do you know the names of the foreign specialists who carried the letters?

Shestov: Yes.

The President: Very well. You will tell the Court about it

in greater detail when you are examined. What interests me now is the following: did Muralov know that certain German specialists were engaged in carrying his letters to Sedov and *vice versa?*

Shestov: Absolutely.

The President: Did you mention the names of these specialists to Muralov?

Shestov: I told him that the arrival of a spy and diversionist was expected.

The President: But did you mention his name?

Shestov: No.

The President: So that he did not know them, and did not meet them personally?

Shestov: No.

The President: And those German specialists never failed you? They carried out all your commissions?

Shestov: Yes, very precisely.

The President: Accused Muralov, do you know what kind of work Drobnis and Norkin were doing at the Kemerovo Chemical Works and at the Kemerovo coal mines? What was the substance of their diversive work?

Muralov: Inasmuch as Drobnis was a member of the West-Siberian centre he, of course, informed the centre, including myself. I think he said that in court today.

The President: He said it, but what I am interested to know is whether you knew about this work. You were not there as the leader of the West-Siberian Trotskyite centre for nothing.

Muralov: I knew.

The President: Did you know that at the Kemerovo coal mines the Trotskyites had gassed the pits and had created absolutely intolerable conditions of work?

Muralov: Drobnis was at the Chemical Works—these are under one trust, and the mines are under another trust.

The President: I understand, I am speaking about the Kemerovo mine.

Muralov: I did not know that there they had adopted the course of gassing the Tsentralnaya Pit, and Drobnis did not report this to me. This occurred when I was already in prison.

The President: One of the passages in your testimony contains this sentence: "At the Kemerovo mine the Trotskyites gassed pits and created intolerable conditions for the workers."

Muralov: I learned about that while I was in prison as being a result of all the undermining Trotskyite work.

The President: Under the direction of Drobnis and Norkin the

Trotskyites working in the Kemerovo Chemical Works developed intense wrecking activities. Is that so?

Muralov: Yes.

The President: That was under Drobnis' direction?

Muralov: Yes. So I was informed.

The President: They, that is, Drobnis and Norkin, held up the construction of the main departments. Did Drobnis and Norkin inform you of this?

Muralov: Only Norkin.

The President: But you did know that the wrecking organization was operating in Kemerovo?

Muralov: Yes.

The President: Were the principal wrecking activities of the Trotskyites at the Kemerovo mine known to you at the time you directed the West-Siberian centre?

Muralov: That I don't know.

The President: But you did know that there was a group conducting wrecking activities at the Kemerovo mine?

Muralov: I knew it from Drobnis.

The President: That is, Drobnis told you, but you did not know the composition of this group?

Muralov: No.

The President: What did they do there concretely?

Muralov: What they did at the time Norkin was there I do not know.

The President: What do you know about wrecking activities on the Omsk and Tomsk Railways at the time you were in the West-Siberian Territory?

Muralov: Only what Boguslavsky told me. He reported that he was trying to cause jams at the stations.

The President: At what stations?

Muralov: At Eiche Station on the Novosibirsk junction. In addition they put locomotives out of commission prematurely.

The President: Your testimony contains the following: "Boguslavsky, who was connected with the Trotskyite organization on the railways, informed me that Trotskyites on the railways acting on the basis of directives given by our Siberian centre, were putting locomotives out of commission, disrupting the traffic schedule and causing jams at the stations, thereby delaying the transportation of urgent freight." Is that right?

Muralov: It is.

The President: And quite lately Boguslavsky carried on wrecking activities on the construction of the Eiche-Sokol line?

Muralov: Yes.

The President: And as a result disrupted the construction job?

Muralov: Yes.

The President (to Vyshinsky): Have you any questions?

Vyshinsky (to Muralov): When were you arrested?

Muralov: On April 17, 1936.

Vyshinsky: Prior to April 17, 1936, from the time of your arrival in Novosibirsk had you ever been arrested?

Muralov: No, never.

Vyshinsky: But during that time you carried on Trotskyite work?

Muralov: I have said that it was interrupted in 1929 when part of the Trotskyites were arrested and part capitulated, such as Radek, Boguslavsky and Sumetsky, and no work was carried on.

Vyshinsky: And afterwards?

Muralov: It was resumed in 1931.

Vyshinsky: What prompted you to fight the Soviet power in such acute forms as the organization of terrorist acts?

Muralov: My fall should be traced back to the time I signed the first document against the Party. This was the Declaration of the Forty-Six made in 1923. That was the beginning of my fall, and then I was drawn into the Trotskyite organization until I was expelled from the Party and exiled to Western Siberia. I was, of course, motivated by resentment on behalf of myself and others. I was, so to speak, embittered.

Vyshinsky: Was this the main reason for your subsequent work?

Muralov: No, I would not say that. It was the dissent of a political worker. Political differences counted with me first of all and not personal ones.

Vyshinsky: Are your political views determined by your adherence to Trotskyism?

Muralov: Yes, they were set forth in the well known platform submitted to the Fifteenth Congress.

Vyshinsky: And you continued to adhere to this up to the most recent time, and, remaining on these political positions, you waged the struggle?

Muralov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I am interested in knowing why you decided to give truthful testimony. Examining the record of the preliminary investigation, I see that at a number of interrogations you denied any part in underground work. It that so?

Muralov: Yes, up to December 5. Eight months.

Vyshinsky: Why, then, in the end did you decide to give, and

did give, truthful testimony? Explain the motives that led you to the decision to lay everything on the table—if you have laid everything on the table.

Muralov: I think there were three reasons which held me back and induced me to deny everything.

One reason is political, and profoundly serious; two are of an exclusively personal character. I shall begin with the least important, with my character. I am very hot-tempered and resentful. That is the first reason. When I was arrested, I became embittered with resentment.

Vyshinsky: Were you badly treated?

Muralov: I was deprived of my liberty.

Vyshinsky: But perhaps rough methods were used against you?

Muralov: No, no such methods were used. I must say that in Novosibirsk and here I was treated politely and no cause for resentment was given: I was treated very decently and politely.

Vyshinsky: Was it the fact of arrest itself?

Muralov: Instead of using other methods, they took me and put me in prison. Such is my nature.

Vyshinsky: You do not like to be put in prison?

Muralov: No, I do not. The second reason is also of a personal nature. It is my attachment to Trotsky. It began when he was People's Commissar and I was commander of the Moscow Military Area. Then there were political affairs: a whole group of my comrades were in opposition to the Party, the majority of them being authoritative comrades well known to me, like I. N. Smirnov whom I greatly respected, V. N. Yakovlyeva, whom I regarded as a very clever woman, and quite a number of people who supported Trotsky. Of course I too was drawn into this business and began to meet them and in the course of the work not only came close to them politically, but became friends. This was the second circumstance which restrained me, so to speak. I considered it morally inadmissible to betray Trotsky, although I did not subscribe to the directive on terror and destruction. I had heartpangs all the time at the very thought of it; I considered it wrong. Friendship and political motives were involved. The third point was—well, as you know, in every affair something is carried too far.

And I reasoned that if I continued to remain a Trotskyite, especially when the others were quitting—some honestly and others dishonestly—at any rate they were not standard-bearers of counter-revolution, but I—there was a "hero" for you! . . . If I kept on this way, I might become the standard-bearer of counter-revolution. This frightened me terribly. At that time cadres, in-

dustry, the national economy were growing up before my eyes. . . . I am not blind and I am not such a fanatic.

And I said to myself, almost after eight months, that I must submit to the interests of the state for which I had fought for twenty-three years, for which I had fought actively in three revolutions, when my life hung by a thread dozens of times.

Was I to remain and continue to aggravate the affair? My name would serve as a banner to those who were still in the ranks of counter-revolution. This was what decided me, and I said: Very well, I will go and tell the whole truth. I do not know whether my answer has satisfied you or not.

Vyshinsky: There were no prospects in the struggle?

Muralov: The danger of remaining in these positions, danger to the state, to the Party, to the revolution.

Vyshinsky: That's all quite clear. I have no more questions to ask.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative).

The President: Adjournment for twenty minutes.

* * *

Commandant: The Court is coming. Please rise.

The President: We shall proceed to examine the accused Shestov.

Vyshinsky: Accused Shestov, will you tell the Court of your criminal activities as briefly as possible?

Shestov: My criminal activities began at the end of 1923. As a student of the Workers' Faculty of the Moscow Mining Academy I was an active advocate of the Trotskyite platform.

In 1924 I deceived the Party for the first time, when in the autumn I declared at a Party meeting that I had abandoned Trotskyism. At the end of 1925 I again began to fight the Party actively. I was at that time placed in charge of an illegal printshop. I printed Trotskyite literature.

In 1930 I worked in Novosibirsk, and in 1931 I was sent to Moscow on official business. About the end of February I learned that a large group of directors were about to go to Germany. I was a member of the board of the Eastern and Siberian Coal Trust. I got in touch with the chairman of the board and asked him to help me go to Germany. I had heard that Pyatakov would head the group. I received permission to go. I reached Germany in the beginning of May.

I must go back a little to say that in 1926 I met Trotsky several times personally. That same year I met Pyatakov. And so, at the beginning or in the middle of May I was in Berlin.

I was alone with Pyatakov in his office, and when our business was over I asked him: "How should one interpret your statement that was published in the press? Was it a result of genuine renunciation of Trotskyism, or was it a forced step?"

Pyatakov asked me whether I had read the latest literature on sale in Berlin. I said that I hoped to acquaint myself with it. "And as to the question you asked," Pyatakov said, "I advise you to discuss the matter with I. N. Smirnov."

That is what I did. Some two days later I got in touch with Smirnov.

What Smirnov then told me was this: the situation in the Soviet Union has sharply changed, and I must understand that an open struggle was impossible. The task of the Trotskyites now was to win the Party's confidence and then to renew the attack with doubled and trebled force.

He told me that negotiations were going on in Berlin and that there was no doubt that by the time we left for the Soviet Union new program and tactical questions would be elaborated, as he then expressed it, for the very latest course.

He asked me whether I remembered Sedov. I replied that I had had no organizational contacts with Sedov, but that I remembered that in 1926 I attended several secret meetings in the Bauman District at which Sedov was present, and that I remembered his face. He said: Sedov also remembers you.

Smirnov advised me to discuss the new and latest course in detail with Sedov. I readily consented. During my meeting with Sedov I asked him what our leader, Trotsky, thought, what were the specific tasks he placed before us Trotskyites. Sedov began by saying that it was no use sitting and whistling for fair weather; we must proceed with all forces and means at our disposal to an active policy of discrediting Stalin's leadership and Stalin's policy.

Further, Sedov said that his father held that the only correct way, a difficult one but a sure one, was forcibly to remove Stalin and the leaders of the government by means of terrorism.

Then I remarked that this was partly true because we had really got into a blind alley. Therefore it was necessary either to disarm or to map out a new path of struggle.

Seeing that I was being influenced by his words, he switched the conversation to a new subject. He asked me whether I knew any of the directors of German firms, Dehlmann in particular. I told him that I remembered such a name, that he was a director of the firm of Fröhlich-Klüpfel-Dehlmann. This firm was rendering technical assistance, under a contract, in sinking mines in the Kuzbas. Sedov advised me to get in touch with that firm and make the acquaintance of Herr Dehlmann.

I asked him why I should get in touch with him. He said that this firm was of help in sending mail to the Soviet Union. I then said: "Are you advising me to make a deal with the firm?" He said: "What's terrible about that? You must understand that if they are doing us a favour why should not we do them a favour and furnish them with certain information."

I said: "You are simply proposing that I should become a spy." He shrugged his shoulders and said: "It is absurd to use words like that. In a fight it is unreasonable to be as squeamish as that. If you accept terrorism, if you accept destructive undermining activity in industry, I absolutely fail to understand why you cannot agree with this." I said: "It is hard for me to solve this problem, I will discuss this subject with I. N. Smirnov and then I will give you a reply one way or another." After this there was a conversation with Sedov in which the probability of my meeting Sedov again was mentioned. He asked me when I was going to the Soviet Union. I said that I intended to go in the autumn. He said: That's good, I can send several letters, particularly to Muralov; the old man will be very glad to hear from Lev Davidovich. I asked: How can I get in touch with you? He said: I will connect you with a trusted person and you will always be able to get in touch with me through him. With this my conversation with Sedov in the Nikolai Restaurant came to a close and we went to Berlin. We got out of the car in the neighbourhood of Wittenberg Platz and went into the Baltimore Restaurant and sat down at a table. Sedov went out for a while and came back with a man dressed as a waiter and introduced him to me as Mr. Schwartzmann. He introduced me as Alyosha. We looked at each other and he said: when you want to get in touch with me Mr. Schwartzmann can convey your messages. With this the conversation came to an end as Sedov said that we could not stay at that place long.

In the beginning of June 1931, after I had assimilated all that I had heard from Smirnov and Sedov, I arrived at the conclusion that it was too late to retreat. Smirnov and the others knew me as a convinced Trotskyite, the more so that personal association with Sedov, Smirnov and Pyatakov made us more intimate and I decided that I would be at the side of my leaders.

I met Smirnov about the middle of July and he asked me bluntly: "Well, how is your mood?" I told him that I had no personal mood, but I did as our leader Trotsky taught us—stand at attention and wait for orders. Smirnov then said that the negotiations had come to an end, that definite decisions had been adopted which could be summed up as follows: first, that Pyatakov had proved that the industrialization carried out by the Stalin government had failed, that the factories did not pay and that they

could not exist without large state subsidies, that these large overhead costs would be a heavy burden on the working class, that we are morally fully justified in carrying on destructive undermining work and in enlisting for this purpose all the hostile forces, particularly the counter-revolutionary minded section of the engineers. Then he passed on to the question of terrorism. He said that a decision had been adopted to get into power by organizing assassinations, by acts of violence against Stalin, his Political Bureau and his government. On receiving a reply from me in the affirmative, that I agreed wholeheartedly to carry on this work, he said that I would receive practical instructions regarding terrorism and undermining work from Pyatakov. He wanted to go, but I detained him and asked: But Ivan Nikitich, Sedov ordered me to establish connections with the firm of Fröhlich-Klüpfel-Dehlmann; he bluntly told me to establish connection with the firm that was engaged in espionage and diversive work in the Kuzbas. In that case, I said, I will be a spy and a diversionist. To this he replied: Stop slinging big words like "spy" and "diversionist" about. He then went on to say that every convinced Trotskyite understood the meaning of the word "terrorism," and that our people would not engage in special discussions on this; but if the question of destructive undermining work were put to them not everybody would agree to it; they would start a discussion; meanwhile time is passing and it is necessary to act more quickly. What is there that surprises you in that we consider it possible to overthrow the Stalin leadership and mobilize all the counter-revolutionary forces in the Kuzbas? He said: What do you find terrible in enlisting German diversionists for this work, the more so that German specialists are made a fuss of in the Soviet Union, and everybody literally stands in awe of every word they say. In his conversation with me he used a number of other words. He insisted that there was no other way. We needed very strong connections with Trotsky and his bureau and, whether we liked it or not, we had to agree to this. After this conversation I consented to establish connection with this firm.

Vyshinsky: What year was that?

Shestov: That was about the middle of June 1931.

Vyshinsky: Did both meetings take place in 1931?

Shestov: Yes, in the spring.

Vyshinsky: Did you stay in Berlin after that?

Shestov: I remained abroad until the beginning of November; I went to London.

Vyshinsky: And then you met Sedov before you returned to the Soviet Union? Generally speaking, did you try to meet Sedov?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And did you hold similar conversations during those meetings, or did you talk of other things?

Shestov: As I agreed with him at the time. . . .

Vyshinsky: You must answer that question briefly. You are giving a lot of details which at present, it seems to me, do not interest us particularly. I ask you, when you remained in Berlin until November 1931, did you or did you not meet Sedov again?

Shestov: Yes, I met him again twice.

Vyshinsky: What was the subject of your first meeting?

Shestov: At the first meeting I gave him a brief account of all the conversations I had had subsequently with Smirnov and Pyatakov. I told him briefly how I intended to begin the practical organization of terrorist and undermining activities, and whom I intended to draw into this work. And he then told me that he would request me to bring letters for Muralov and Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: And at the second meeting after that?

Shestov: We agreed then that I would receive these letters concealed in the soles of shoes. . . .

Vyshinsky: That you have already told. You received two shoes in which letters were concealed and brought them to Moscow. You have already told this here.

Shestov: No, I have not yet told the following: I had a meeting with Pyatakov in the middle of June 1931 at which Pyatakov specified the tasks I would have to perform in the Kuznetsk Basin.

Vyshinsky: Where was this meeting?

Shestov: In Berlin.

Vyshinsky: In Berlin?

Shestov: Yes. The second meeting. . . .

Vyshinsky: What did he specify?

Shestov: He also spoke of the necessity of adopting measures to stop the industrialization of the country—to stop, is what he said. He also said: "You personally are entrusted with the execution of a terrorist act against Eiche."

Vyshinsky: He told you that while you were still in Berlin?

Shestov: Yes. I was given this job of committing a terrorist act and terrorist activities by Pyatakov in Berlin. He also spoke of the necessity of enlisting all hostile forces, particularly engineers and technicians. He said bluntly that there was plenty of human material to be found in the Kuzbas, including people with counter-revolutionary tendencies.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any more meetings with Sedov after the meeting with Pyatakov?

Shestov: I do not understand the question.

Vyshinsky: After this meeting with Pyatakov, did you have any other meetings with Sedov?

Shestov: I have already spoken of this. That was a meeting in October.

Vyshinsky: Very well. Is that all?

Shestov: Those were all the conversations I had in 1931 with leaders of the Trotskyite organization.

Vyshinsky: After that you left for the Kuzbas via Moscow?

Shestov: Yes. In November I left for the Kuznetsk Basin, but in accordance with Sedov's and Smirnov's instructions, I had talks with the firm of Fröhlich-Klüpfel.

Vyshinsky: What were your instructions and how did you carry them out?

Shestov: Before my departure I met the director of this firm, Dehlmann, and his assistant Koch.

Vyshinsky: What was the essence of your conversation?

Shestov: The essence of the conversation with the heads of the firm of Fröhlich-Klüpfel-Dehlmann was as follows: first, on supplying secret information through the representatives of this firm working in the Kuznetsk Basin and on the organization of wrecking and diversive work together with the Trotskyites. It was also said that the firm in its turn would help us.

Vyshinsky: Who advanced this proposition?

Shestov: This proposition was advanced during the conversation by the director of the firm, Dehlmann, Sedov's friend.

Vyshinsky: You talked to him about diversive and criminal activities in the Kuzbas?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did Dehlmann say by what means they would help you?

Shestov: He said that they already had their people. . . .

Vyshinsky: Where?

Shestov: In the Kuznetsk Basin. And that they could send more people upon the demand of our organization, while the Trotskyite organization would render every possible assistance to these diversionists. In its turn, the firm undertook to maintain communications with the organizations of the Trotskyites in the Soviet Union, including me.

Vyshinsky: That was on one side, and with whom on the other?

Shestov: On the other with Sedov. The firm undertook punctually to deliver to me letters marked "Alyosha," as well as return letters. They would in every way help the Trotskyites to come to power, and we were to sign a contract with the firm

for planning the sinking of mines and for fairly large orders for equipment. Then I was told that they had their agent, Stroilov, in the Kuznetsk Basin and that I should get in touch with Stroilov when I arrived.

Vyshinsky: What I would like to know, is why this firm which promised assistance in the coming into power was interested in a contract for sinking shafts.

Shestov: By that time the contract with this firm had been annulled.

Vyshinsky: And so you promised to assist?

Shestov: Yes, I promised to assist in concluding a new contract.

Vyshinsky: In whose name did you promise?

Shestov: In the name of the Trotskyite organization.

Vyshinsky: That was unofficially; but could you render any assistance officially?

Shestov: At that time I was a member of the Board of the Eastern and Siberian Coal Trust and therefore I could certainly render the required assistance.

Vyshinsky: Officially, as a member of the Board of the Eastern and Siberian Coal Trust? And you promised that?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Because at that time the contract had been annulled?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was it Dehlmann who told you that?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That Stroilov was in the Kuznetsk Basin?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And that he was Dehlmann's agent?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And were you not interested in knowing how Stroilov, who was in the Kuznetsk Basin, had become Dehlmann's agent?

Shestov: Before that Stroilov had lived in Germany a fairly long time.

Vyshinsky: You knew that?

Shestov: Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky: You knew it. In any case there was no special talk on the subject?

Shestov: No, I accepted it as plausible.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any special talk with Dehlmann that time?

Shestov: No, it was pointed out that people who came from Germany should be directed to Stroilov and would be sent to the various mines according to his instructions.

Vyshinsky: In what capacity did Stroilov work?

Shestov: As chief of one of the departments.

Vyshinsky: Why was it necessary for the people whom Dehlmann was to send to you in the Kuzbas to go to Stroilov and not to you directly?

Shestov: In the first place in the conversation with Dehlmann I said that I did not speak German. In the second place for Stroilov, as a specialist, it would be more convenient to deal with specialists. In the third place I had already marked out for myself the way I would carry on my undermining activities—I would go to one of the main mines of the Kuznetsk Basin—to Prokopyevsk.

Vyshinsky: And where did Stroilov work?

Shestov: Stroilov worked in the head office of the Kuzbas Coal Trust in Novosibirsk. I said to Dehlmann that we would have to organize this through Stroilov, through Novosibirsk.

Vyshinsky: That means you considered it would be more convenient to conduct this operation through Novosibirsk than, say, through Prokopyevsk?

Shestov: Certainly.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any more meetings with that firm afterwards?

Shestov: I met them but we did not carry on conversations regarding diversive acts and espionage.

Vyshinsky: So your conversation was frank?

Shestov: Yes, it was plain talk.

Vyshinsky: In what language was the conversation conducted?

Shestov: He spoke German and I Russian. Koch acted as interpreter; he had lived in the Soviet Union for quite a long time and spoke fairly fluently.

Vyshinsky: Koch was well informed about the matter?

Shestov: Yes. He was a close assistant and had been the firm's representative in the Donetz Basin.

Vyshinsky: For matters which concerned the firm, matters concerning production and all other matters as well?

Shestov: Certainly.

Vyshinsky: Didn't you have any further conversations with Dehlmann on this subject of diversive acts and espionage?

Shestov: No.

Vyshinsky: You left for the U.S.S.R. after that?

Shestov: No. I left at the beginning of November 1931.

Vyshinsky: And when did you leave for England?

Shestov: In the middle of November 1931.

Vyshinsky: Before the conversation with the firm of Dehlmann or afterwards?

Shestov: I concluded my conversation with the firm and then I left for England.

Vyshinsky: Afterwards you returned from England and left for the U.S.S.R.?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How long were you in Berlin on your return trip?

Shestov: About three weeks.

Vyshinsky: And during those three weeks you did not see Dehlmann any more?

Shestov: Maybe I did see him but again I repeat that I held no further conversations with him on the subject of diversive acts and espionage.

Vyshinsky: During the three weeks you were in Berlin after your return from England did you see either Pyatakov, Sedov or Smirnov?

Shestov: No. By that time Pyatakov wasn't there and Smirnov wasn't there.

Vyshinsky: Was Sedov there?

Shestov: I met Sedov twice at the end of October.

Vyshinsky: Now that is all clear. And after that you left for the U.S.S.R. with those shoes and the letters?

Shestov: Quite right. I brought the shoes across safely and transmitted the letters.

Vyshinsky: We've already heard about that. Where did you go after that?

Shestov: To the Kuznetsk Basin, to Novosibirsk.

Vyshinsky: After that conversation with Pyatakov to which you also testified previously?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Briefly, what was the gist of this conversation with Pyatakov? We have already heard about it, we only need it now for the sake of the continuity of your story.

Shestov: The conversation was very brief. I transmitted the letter, he wished me success and that was the end of the conversation.

Vyshinsky: Did you speak about Dehlmann?

Shestov: I didn't mention it to him. Nor did I mention it at our second meeting.

Vyshinsky: For what reason?

Shestov: It was clear to me that Smirnov had commissioned. . . .

Vyshinsky: You simply did not consider it necessary?

Shestov: Quite true.

Vyshinsky: And was Smirnov in Moscow at the time?

Shestov: That I do not remember. Smirnov did not advise me

to get in touch with him and said that even if there were letters in his name I should transmit them to Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: I understand. I'm interested in the following question: did you get in touch with the Dehlmann firm upon Smirnov's and Sedov's instructions?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you reach an agreement with the firm?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was Smirnov in Berlin at the time of your final agreement with the firm? You saw Sedov only in October? Did you talk to him about Dehlmann?

Shestov: Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky: But Smirnov, who had given you the instructions, did not know how you had carried them out?

Shestov: No.

Vyshinsky: When you reached Moscow didn't you consider it necessary to hunt up Smirnov and tell him how you had carried out the instructions?

Shestov: No. There was no necessity for it. I remembered Smirnov's words that I should not get in touch with him unnecessarily and there was no need for it.

Vyshinsky: That means for reasons of secrecy?

Shestov: Exclusively.

Vyshinsky: And then you left for the Kuznetsk Basin?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Proceed.

Shestov: Upon my arrival in Novosibirsk I got in touch with Muralov.

Vyshinsky: You spoke of that too.

Shestov: Yes, but I wish to make one important correction to Muralov's testimony. When I handed over the letter I gave him a detailed report, particularly on connections with Pyatakov, Sedov and Smirnov, and also the spying firm. When I gave him this information Muralov said that perhaps my assistance would be required in deciphering the letter, and for this reason he asked me to come to Obskaya Street the next day. I came to that street at 10 p.m. Muralov was already there.

Vyshinsky: What was located on Obskaya Street?

Shestov: The street runs along the riverside. . . .

Vyshinsky: That place was agreed upon; was someone's apartment located there?

Shestov: No. We simply met on a street corner. In one of our first meetings we had met at the same place on the side street and this time we agreed to meet at the same place.

Vyshinsky: That means you agreed?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: On the date and hour?

Shestov: I transmitted the letter to him one day and he told me to come around on the following day.

Vyshinsky: Does that mean the time was agreed upon?

Shestov: Yes. I already said, 10 p.m.

Vyshinsky: At 10 p.m. you turned up on Obskaya Street and Muralov also turned up?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Proceed.

Shestov: Muralov told me that he had managed to decipher the personal note from the old man Lev Davidovich, but that the long letter with its arithmetic made his eyes hurt. He asked me to decipher the letter. He then gave me the letter and the code. In three days I deciphered the letter.

So first of all two letters had been received then: a letter from Trotsky and a letter from the foreign bureau which I personally deciphered. The gist of the letter was as follows: it was a decision of the foreign bureau for the members of the Union centre. The letter consisted of three sections: the first section was an introduction where the internal situation in the Soviet Union was depicted in very dark and gloomy colours. It was stated that the railways were in a ruined state, agriculture was declining, etc., etc. What was the conclusion drawn from this? It was stated that it was now necessary to develop destructive and undermining work on a broad scale. They based themselves on the same considerations which, as I have testified, I had heard from Sedov and from Pyatakov and from Smirnov.

The second part affirmed the necessity of forcibly removing the existing leadership—Stalin and the Stalinist Political Bureau. In the same letter group terrorist acts were recommended.

Vyshinsky: You deciphered this and informed Muralov?

Shestov: I passed it on to Muralov.

Vyshinsky: When?

Shestov: Three days later I met Muralov and transmitted the letter to him.

Vyshinsky: What happened next?

Shestov: Next I commenced concrete practical work. I began by recruiting the engineer Stroilov. Coming to his apartment I put the question bluntly. I said that I knew of his connections with the Fröhlich-Klüpfel-Dehlmann firm. Therefore I told him pointblank that there was no need for him to lay down his arms but that he must again begin active destructive and disruptive work. It wasn't important for me to enlist Stroilov alone. What was important was to enlist his confederates. I knew that he

enjoyed considerable authority among a number of engineers. I was quite sure that they were also linked by counter-revolutionary work. I warned him: Don't think of informing the G.P.U. about me. I possess sufficient authority in the West-Siberian Territory and nobody will believe you. But if I tell what I know about your work, you are sure to be arrested immediately.

Stroilov was perplexed and told me he would give his answer on the following day. The next day Stroilov said that he agreed to take part in our organization. I told him that we must not scatter our efforts in our undermining and destructive work, but should concentrate our work in the three principal mines: the Anzhero-Sujensk, the Lenin and the Prokopyevsk. As for the Kemerovo Mine, we arranged with him that we would keep it in bad grace, and as we had our people in the office of the Kuzbas Coal Trust we would try to retard the development of this mine so as to deprive the chemical industry of a local fuel base. We would not need people on the spot as this work could be carried on in the office of the Kuzbas Coal Trust. The main line then adopted was that the undermining and destructive work would be carried on by Stroilov, on the one hand, and by a Trotskyite organization that I would form, on the other. Stroilov was to draw up a plan along the following lines.

1) To disrupt new mine construction and the reconstruction of old mines that was being carried on.

2) To strive to organize construction work on new mines and on mines under reconstruction in such a way that the new units would commence operation piecemeal. We had in mind to delay production reaching the designed capacities.

3) To introduce such systems of coal cutting as would result in maximum losses and were calculated to cause underground fires.

4) Deliberately to disrupt the preparation of new levels and new mining fields, for the purpose of dealing a crushing blow not only to the collieries and iron mines of the Kuznetsk Basin, but to the iron and steel industry of the Urals and Western Siberia as well.

5) Deliberately to disrupt preparatory work for the purpose of creating a lapse of time between clearing work and preparatory operations.

6) To intensify the destruction of machinery by more effective measures, especially the machinery directly employed for delivery, hauling and hoisting of coal. By these acts we not only intended to disrupt the plan of coal output, but to arouse the anger of the workers.

7) Finally, the last point was to sabotage shock brigade work

and subsequently sabotage the Stakhanov movement, and mistreat the workers.

As we had arranged with Stroilov, he was to have drawn up this plan, specified for each enterprise, according to object by January or February. I came to Novosibirsk at that time. Stroilov showed me the plan. I went through it. I reported on it to Muralov and afterwards returned it, but I had the whole scheme in my head just as well as Stroilov had it. We are old hands in the coal business, we know every nook and cranny in the Kuzbas, and we said: the plan has been endorsed, it is time to set to work. And so we selected the people who were to carry out the plan. At the Anzhero-Sujensk Mine, Stroilov was to enlist the chief engineer Andreyev. My friend Oleshko, an old Trotskyite, was also there, and he was to ensure that the destructive work would be carried out.

As for Prokopyevsk, I undertook the destruction work on the new mine construction jobs. In regard to mining operations, we decided that we ought to enlist Ovsyannikov. We arrived at this conclusion because, although Ovsyannikov was not a member of our organization, he was the sort of manager who left everything to the engineers and did not do anything himself, and he could quickly be converted into a Trotskyite. Stroilov and I did all we could to get Ovsyannikov transferred. At that time I spoke about Ovsyannikov to the directors, to Kokin and to Moissey Lvovich. The latter helped me. We used to go round saying that Shevchenko could not handle a mine that was developing so fast as the Prokopyevsk mine. It is true that Shevchenko was not capable enough to handle such a job, and so, in May 1932, Ovsyannikov came to Prokopyevsk. Now I will deal with what we did to carry out this plan.

Vyshinsky: What positive results did you get from Stroilov?

Shestov: As I have said already, he drew up the plan and this elaborated plan was accepted; we reached an agreement and all that sort of thing.

Vyshinsky: You said that he would give his answer on the following day?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you immediately set down to business?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Stroilov): Accused Stroilov, I want to verify this part of Shestov's statement. Were you a long time in Germany?

Stroilov. Over a year.

Vyshinsky: How were you enrolled there?

Stroilov: Not by the Dehlmann firm but by engineer Wüster. He was a prominent engineer with a high social position. He told

me that he had contact with certain political and industrial circles. He enrolled me.

Vyshinsky: In what capacity?

Stroilov: As a person who was to carry out destructive and wrecking work on behalf of Germany.

Vyshinsky: On behalf of what institution? It is not just a question of the state; a state consists of various institutions. To put it plainly, you were connected with the German intelligence service?

Stroilov: Directly?

Vyshinsky: No, through this engineer Wüster.

Stroilov: Through the medium of others?

Vyshinsky: Well, through the medium of others if you like.

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: But where does the Dehlmann firm come in?

Stroilov: The Dehlmann firm also knew me.

Vyshinsky: It also knew you, or it also enrolled you?

Stroilov: No, it was Wüster who enrolled me. But apparently the Dehlmann firm knew that I had been enrolled by engineer Wüster.

Vyshinsky: And so the Dehlmann firm was entitled to regard you as its agent? That is how I understand you.

Stroilov: Another firm might have done so if Wüster had given it my name.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, what Shestov said here was correct, or was it not?

Stroilov: As a matter of fact I was enrolled not by Dehlmann but by Wüster, but substantially it was correct.

Vyshinsky: Now for the second question: when Shestov came to the Kuzbas after his return from abroad, did he really come to see you in your apartment and propose that you do wrecking work jointly with him?

Stroilov: Yes, now as regards Shestov, when he came to see me in my apartment: in answer to my puzzled objection that I was far removed from their Trotskyite work within the Party and that I could not conceive what contact there could be between myself, a non-Party engineer, and the Trotskyite organization, he replied that this question, the work within the Party, was a survival from a stage already passed, and that now the tasks that had been set them by the Trotskyites and the Germans were the same as those that confronted me. There was no difference whatever.

Vyshinsky: Did you agree with this?

Stroilov: Yes, I was convinced by it. What Shestov spoke about was diversive and wrecking work which had really nothing in common with any kind of ideas—he spoke to me about this too,

referring in particular to the Ramzin trial—that it had nothing in common whatever and that he was just as much a wrecker as I.

Vyshinsky: Did *this* convince you?

Stroilov: No, it was not this that convinced me. What convinced me was that, knowing what type of man he was. . . .

Vyshinsky: What type of man?

Stroilov: He would have handed me over to the G.P.U. I was simply scared.

Vyshinsky: So he just terrorized you?

Stroilov: That's what he said. In this respect he is right.

Vyshinsky: So what did he tell you, how did he get a hold over you?

Stroilov: By main force, so to speak. He mentioned the firm to which I had given some assistance before Shestov's arrival.

Vyshinsky: What kind of assistance?

Stroilov: The assistance I gave was as follows: this firm had been conducting certain jobs in the U.S.S.R., at Solikamsk and in the Kuzbas; it had to renew its contract and undertake certain new jobs. Accordingly, the technical consultation which I gave in connection with the sinking of shafts at Shcheglovka and Plovuny—in making this consultation I gave preference to the Dehlmann firm as compared with the Thyssen firm.

Vyshinsky: Did you receive anything for doing this?

Stroilov: No, absolutely nothing.

Vyshinsky: But why did you do it then, just for love?

Stroilov: No, not just for love. Certain things had happened before that which forced me to do this.

Vyshinsky: Mention the most important and essential of them. What were they?

Stroilov: There were a number of important and essential factors.

Vyshinsky: Why did you give them such preference free of charge?

Stroilov: Citizen Procurator, in order to answer this question I must deal with the main subject; that will be a long story.

Vyshinsky: You were in the hands of this firm? How did you fall into their clutches?

Stroilov: I fell into their clutches . . . on the recommendation of two Germans—von Berg and Dehlmann. These were persons who were trying—well, how should I put it?—to break me in. The method they employed was as follows: von Berg accused me of carrying on Communist agitation on occasions when I visited the mines to invite foreign specialists. I will not deny that in general I did talk about the good sides of life in the Soviet Union, such as problems of daily life, trade union movement, and so forth.

Berg stated that he was aware of a case where I had talked with workers. There were cases of my having talked with workers. . . .

Vyshinsky: Did you actually carry on Communist agitation?

Stroilov: No. We were categorically forbidden to engage in any political work abroad, but Berg said there had been two cases of my speaking about this when I was inviting specialists. I remember that during one such meeting with specialists two plain-clothes men of the German criminal police had appeared.

Vyshinsky: That is the secret police?

Stroilov: They were in plain clothes, how could I tell? This was in the presence of a comrade, the Communist Fritch, and he talked with them. And in the second case, as I have already stated here, there was a passport examination, which was a very unusual thing for the Germans. They take things easy in this respect. In Dortmund also a plain-clothes man approached me in the lobby of the hotel and asked me to show him my passport. That is why I gathered from what Berg had said and from these two cases —one before the conversation with Berg and the other after it— that I was being shadowed, that I was being intimidated. But the main thing which caused me to stumble was a certain conversation in September when visiting the Walram firm, which produced hard alloys and had certain connections with Krupp. I had a very nasty conversation with Berg during lunch. There were no counter-revolutionary statements made either on his part or on mine. But, seeing that I was in complete agreement with the Five-Year Plan and with everything that was being done in our country, he said: "You say this because you are young, but I have lived in Russia fifteen years, I know the state of mind and the situation there very well, and I tell you that if you had read Herr Trotsky, you would speak differently." I must confess that after that I did read Trotsky's book *Mein Leben*. During one of his visits von Berg suddenly asked me: "Have you read the book?" And I told him I had.

Vyshinsky: What book?

Stroilov: Mein Leben—My Life.

Vyshinsky: How did he know that you were to read that book?

Stroilov: He recommended it to me. This is the book *My Life,* the period starting from 1917.

Vyshinsky: Continue.

Stroilov: I said that I had read it. He asked me whether I liked it. I said from the literary point of view he, as a journalist, wrote well, but because of the infinite number of "I's" in it, I did not like it.

On one of my visits to the Ruhr Valley the elder Dehlmann, his son and engineer Begemann of the Eichhof firm came to see me in

my hotel. During the conversation they said that we Russians in general and I, Herr Stroilov in particular, did not in the least appreciate the hospitality of the Germans, who let us go everywhere, study everything and so forth, and that we repaid them with black ingratitude, for the Russians were transferring their orders to England and America. They demanded that I should do all I could to popularize their goods in the technical press and at the Trade Representation. I replied that this was not in my power. In the end they resorted to plain threats. "We know," they said, "that in the U.S.S.R. you have engaged a certain number of people who are our representatives." I said I knew nothing about this. They mentioned the names of certain people. I agreed this was true; I had engaged them. They said: "We know that you are carrying on Communist agitation." I said this was quite untrue.

They presented me with the following alternative: either they would forbid me to make any visits, or during the next visit I made they would put me in prison. "Your Trade Representation may intercede for you," they said, "but they won't risk a conflict on your account."

And then they again began harping on the theme that "after all, we are a good firm; even if you do recommend us, there will be nothing suspicious about it." And after that I gave them help.

Vyshinsky: All the same, these are insufficient grounds for becoming an intelligence service agent.

Stroilov: Of course they are insufficient. I became an intelligence service agent in 1931. And this conversation about which I am now speaking took place towards the beginning of November or the end of October 1930.

Vyshinsky: In 1930?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So this was not the last stage?

Stroilov: No.

Vyshinsky: And I was speaking about the last stage.

Stroilov: Shall I tell about the last stage?

Vyshinsky: Tell how you became an intelligence service agent.

Stroilov: Well, you see. . . .

Vyshinsky: What you have said paves the way for the answer to this question, but it is not an answer in itself.

Stroilov: At the end of November 1930 I came to Moscow to attend a session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee as an alternate member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. I paid a visit to the collective farm where my parents live. It seemed to me at that time that what was being done in regard to collectivization was on the wrong track. At any rate, regarding the tempo that was set. It seemed to me at that time that

both the tempo and scope of industrialization that were undertaken by us in the Soviet Union were too great. I began to waver. I began to doubt.

Perhaps it also seemed to me to be so because of the outward pompousness which I saw in Germany. That is why the second stimulus, besides the shadowing and provocation that went on in Germany, was my journey to the U.S.S.R., where my convictions were shaken.

I will not say that I had lost faith in everything, but I wavered, my faith was shaken and I lost confidence in the rapid industrialization of the country. I began to doubt.

Vyshinsky: Was that after you had read Trotsky's book?

Stroilov: Yes. But it is difficult to say what exercised most influence.

Vyshinsky: All of it taken together.

Stroilov: Perhaps it was reading Trotsky's book, or it may have been the conversations with the Germans.

Vyshinsky: Both the conversations with the Germans and Trotsky influenced you?

Stroilov: Yes. After attending the session, I returned to Germany.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell anybody that you had begun to waver through Trotsky's fault and after your meeting with the Germans?

Stroilov: No.

Vyshinsky: And you were elected an alternate member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee?

Stroilov: Yes, I was already an alternate member.

Vyshinsky: And you combined all this: member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and at the same time conspired with the German agents, and read Trotsky? Did you combine all this?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you return to Berlin?

Stroilov: Yes, I returned to Berlin.

Vyshinsky: Did you have a desire to remain in Germany, not to return to the U.S.S.R.?

Stroilov: At once?

Vyshinsky: I am not speaking in terms of hours. Did you or did you not?

Stroilov: A desire did arise in me to remain in Germany.

Vyshinsky: A desire arose to remain in Germany. Did you inform anybody about it?

Stroilov: Any Soviet citizen?

Vyshinsky: No matter who, anyone.

Stroilov: I not only said so, I wrote a note.

Vyshinsky: What sort of note, to whom?

Stroilov: I handed a written statement to Wüster saying that I had decided to give up the idea of returning to the Soviet Union and expressed the wish to remain in Germany, working energetically together with them and carrying out their orders.

Vyshinsky: What is that called?

Stroilov: Betrayal . . . of my country.

Vyshinsky: Betrayal of your country. A Russian! A Soviet citizen! Into whose hands did this note fall—Wüster's?

The President: This is where you ought to have started; it would have been simpler.

Vyshinsky: I don't know if it would have been simpler from Stroilov's point of view; he has the main say in this matter. To continue: what did Wüster do about this note of yours?

Stroilov: It then happened that some eight or ten days after I handed him this note, I received a telegram from Moscow that I was to return to the U.S.S.R. Within two days I packed up and left. I could not understand why I was being summoned to Moscow, since I had been there not long before and had been able to make all kinds of official reports, had done all I could. So it seemed to me strange. . . .

Vyshinsky: Why were you summoned to Moscow?

Stroilov: On the other hand I thought that perhaps it was in connection with some other circumstances in Novosibirsk, but when I arrived it turned out it was not so.

Vyshinsky: Briefly, what was the matter?

Stroilov: It seemed to me that after receiving this written statement, the Germans utilized me and then cast me aside.

Vyshinsky: How do you mean—cast you aside? You were summoned to Moscow?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: By whom?

Stroilov: By Shestov.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps this was done in agreement with Wüster?

Stroilov: That I don't know, it is possible.

Vyshinsky: But still, how did you become an intelligence service agent?

Stroilov: When this written statement was in Wüster's hands—I will not report the whole conversation that took place, it lasted about five hours.

Vyshinsky: Of that later.

Stroilov: Wüster declared that I was now in their hands, and if I did not fulfil the commissions and tasks they set me, I would be handed over to the Soviet authorities, who would be presented with this written statement of mine.

Vyshinsky: What did you decide?

Stroilov: I had a three hours' conversation on this subject. But I was afraid to fall. . . .

Vyshinsky: Into the prisoners' dock, in which you did get?

Stroilov: To get into the hands of the G.P.U., I feared the penalty.

Vyshinsky: And that is why . . . ?

Stroilov: That is why I agreed to Wüster's proposals, that is to say, become a traitor.

Vyshinsky: Such is the end. Sit down.

May I continue putting questions to Shestov?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky: And so you, Shestov, approached Stroilov, already knowing that he had been enrolled in the German intelligence service?

Shestov: Yes, but I am not in agreement with some of the points mentioned by Stroilov.

Vyshinsky: Meaning what? Did you not take part in enrolling him then?

Shestov: No. He stated that he received a telegram signed by me to return to the Soviet Union. That is wrong. At that time I was not yet a traitor to my country.

Vyshinsky: Who can tell?

Shestov: I received a telegram from Novosibirsk telling me that Stroilov must be recalled from Germany.

Vyshinsky: Excuse me. Do you remember who recalled Stroilov from Germany?

Shestov: Yes, I do.

Vyshinsky: Do you remember how this happened?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Tell us about it.

Shestov: It happened as follows: a telegram was received from Abramov, the chairman of the board, instructing us to recall Stroilov from Germany. At that time arrests began among the engineers in the Kuzbas. I knew about this, so I came to the chief of the Foreign Department in the Supreme Council of National Economy and expressed my view that Abramov was probably recalling Stroilov for one of two reasons: either in order to fill a gap and set him to do practical work, or on suspicion that he was implicated; accordingly he had to be recalled, and I asked the chief to sign a telegram to that effect.

Vyshinsky: So it was done with your participation?

Shestov: Yes, but the telegram was not signed by me.

Vyshinsky: The point is not who signed the telegram. This means that Stroilov is right when he says that Shestov had a hand in his recall.

Shestov: No, he is not right. I remember quite well that when Stroilov came back, he tried to arrange to be sent to Germany again.

Vyshinsky: What he was trying to arrange is another matter. What I am talking about is: that you were trying to get him back from Germany.

Shestov: Correct.

Vyshinsky: What did your espionage work consist in?

Shestov: The espionage work was as follows: at the end of 1932. . . .

Vyshinsky: Be brief and bear in mind the President's ruling with regard to certain state requirements and state institutions.

Shestov: At the end of 1932 I saw Stroilov in Novosibirsk, and he told me that a new and fairly large group of German specialists who were to engage in diversive activities had arrived.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, they had come in the guise of specialists?

Shestov: Yes. At that time a large number of engineers were invited to the Kuzbas, and they also arrived.

Vyshinsky: Mention their names.

Shestov: The time to mention names has not come yet.

Vyshinsky: No, the time to mention names has come now.

Shestov: No, excuse me. A plan was drawn up for the Kuzbas. . . .

Vyshinsky: I ask you: were you in touch with any of the spies and diversionists?

Shestov: In Prokopyevsk I was in touch with Schebesto, Floren and Kahn. In 1934 I was working as manager of another mine, and there I got in touch with Stein—no, excuse me—it was Baumgartner, who was employed by him for this purpose.

Vyshinsky: Did you learn this from Stroilov?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And Schebesto? Who put you in touch with him?

Shestov: Stroilov told me that engineer Schebesto had arrived.

Vyshinsky: And Floren?

Shestov: Floren formerly worked in Prokopyevsk and he came to my office as an interpreter. I learned about him through Schebesto.

Vyshinsky: How did you get in touch with Kahn?

Shestov: Schebesto told me that Kahn was taking part in his work.

Vyshinsky: And Stein?

Shestov: I got in touch with Stein through Floren.

Vyshinsky: And through whom did you get in touch with Baumgartner?

Shestov: I heard about that man from Stroilov.

Vyshinsky: And so, in the last resort, Stroilov is the source. Schebesto—Stroilov, Kahn—Stroilov, Baumgartner—Stroilov, and so forth. Always Stroilov?

Shestov: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: Permit me to put a question to Stroilov. Accused Stroilov, is this correct?

Stroilov: He has mixed up the names. Not Baumgartner, but Sommeregger.

Vyshinsky: Yet another one, then. And the rest? Is he right about Schebesto?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Is he right about Floren?

Stroilov: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: Is he right about Kahn?

Stroilov: There was a specialist of that name.

Vyshinsky: Did you mention their names?

Stroilov: I only mentioned Schebesto's name to him.

Vyshinsky: And Stein?

Stroilov: I mentioned Stein to him so that he should bear him in mind, when I was at Anzherka.

Vyshinsky: You mentioned him so that he should bear him in mind—and was that all? Schebesto led to Stein, Floren led to Kahn, Floren led to Schebesto. And what about Baumgartner?

Stroilov: I recollect there was some such talk.

Vyshinsky: There are so many of them that you have mixed up all their names.

Shestov: I remember quite well that Stroilov spoke about Baumgartner.

Vyshinsky (to Shestov): Did Stroilov speak to you about Baumgartner?

Shestov: I heard of him from Stroilov. In answer to my direct question as to how he maintained contact, he told me: through engineer Baumgartner.

Vyshinsky (to Stroilov): Was there any such talk?

Stroilov: Talk about maintaining contact through. . . .

Vyshinsky: Was there such a person as Baumgartner?

Stroilov: There was.

Vyshinsky: Did you have conversations with him?

Stroilov: In general I was dealing with Shestov, but as contact man we had Baumgartner and others as well.

Vyshinsky: Including Sommeregger?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And did you talk to Shestov about Baumgartner?

Stroilov: I did, but I did not say he was a contact man.

Vyshinsky: As what then?

Stroilov: As one. . . .

Vyshinsky: As one of many?

Stroilov: Yes, of many. . . .

Vyshinsky: Agents?

Stroilov: Agents.

Vyshinsky (to Shestov): So you had a fairly numerous crowd?

Shestov: Schebesto asked me to give him a plan with the key structures marked on it, so that he could commence a campaign of diversive work. I gave him this plan. He made use of it for diversive work in the Prokopyevsk district. For example, he made an attempt to blow up the shaft and the headframe at Pit No. 5. He laid a charge of dynamite. A fuse was attached, and it only remained to ignite this fuse.

But the explosion did not take place for the sole reason that when the charge was being laid beneath the headframe and in the shaft, someone came along. On the following night a worker who was clearing away rubbish near the headframe discovered the charge, and it was removed.

Vyshinsky: So it was removed? But Schebesto was not removed?

Shestov: No.

Vyshinsky: Why not?

Shestov: I did not give him away.

Vyshinsky: You did not give him away?

Shestov: No.

Vyshinsky: Proceed. What happened next?

Shestov: At my instructions and with the help of the technician Kahn, we stole dynamite from the storehouse and made our own secret dynamite dump.

Vyshinsky: The dynamite was stolen with your assistance?

Shestov: No, I had no hand in the matter. He discussed the question of the place with me.

Vyshinsky: You provided a place to keep the stolen dynamite?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You took part in the stealing?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That means that you and he stole it together?

Shestov: I knew about it.

Vyshinsky: No, excuse me, not knew, but helped?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You were his accomplice?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That means you were stealing together?

Shestov: Yes, together.

Vyshinsky: That is what I said.

Shestov: In 1934 this dump blew up. Some miners' children were playing not far from the spot, and they probably started digging and struck this dynamite. The result was a dreadful explosion.

Vyshinsky: And what happened to the children?

Shestov: They were killed.

Vyshinsky: Many of them?

Shestov: Several. That was the end of Schebesto's doings in Prokopyevsk.

Vyshinsky: And for what purpose was the dynamite stolen? You have not told us that. For causing similar explosions?

Shestov: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: In order to prepare for blowing up the mines?

Shestov: Quite right. In May 1933 there was an attempt on the part of Schebesto to set fire to the Kuznetsk power station at the instructions of the German intelligence service and at my instructions.

Vyshinsky: Who gave instructions to blow up this power station?

Shestov: The instructions were mine.

Vyshinsky: You spoke to Schebesto about this?

Shestov: No. He simply told me he was taking steps to set fire to the place. I knew of this fact.

Vyshinsky: What form did the attempt to set fire to the station take?

Shestov: I knew quite well from Schebesto that the station had been set on fire.

Vyshinsky: So it was not an attempt but an act of incendiarism?

Shestov: Yes, actual incendiarism. Further, I know from Floren that in the autumn of 1934 he set fire to the bunkers of Pit No. 9.

Vyshinsky: But there was an attempt?

Shestov: Yes. Similarly there was an attempt to set fire to the coal dumps at Pit No. 5-7.

Vyshinsky: When?

Shestov: In the autumn of 1934. And only due to the fact that the manager of the pit, who was not a member of the Trotskyite organization, quickly appeared on the scene, and because the fire-brigade arrived in quick time, the fire was localized.

Vyshinsky: Did you talk to Stroilov about these activities of Schebesto, Floren and others?

Shestov: Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky: So he was also informed about the matter?

Shestov: Yes, he was.

Vyshinsky: Accused Stroilov, did you hear this last part of Shestov's testimony?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Do you confirm that you were informed about the diversive work of Schebesto, Floren and others?

Stroilov: Yes, I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: Did you happen to talk to Shestov about this?

Stroilov: Several times.

Vyshinsky: In what connection did these conversations of yours take place? Did he inform you or you him?

Stroilov: We kept each other informed, since the plans for wrecking work were drawn up jointly with him.

Vyshinsky: So you had talks in order to check up on the fulfilment of the plans?

Stroilov: In order to keep each other informed about the work that had been done.

Vyshinsky: About the crimes that had been jointly committed?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Sit down please. (*To Shestov.*) Proceed.

Shestov: I cannot now recall any other facts. Stroilov told me about the Lenin Mines, but there, as far as I recall, disruptive activities were not being conducted by the German spies; disruptive work there was done by Andreyev, the chief mechanic of this mine, and he made an attempt to set fire to the Yemelyanov Pit.

Vyshinsky: But what about your activities? Your wrecking work in the installation of the mine machinery and so forth?

Shestov: I am just coming to that. This is a very large chapter. In the Prokopyevsk Mines the chamber-and-pillar system was employed without filling in the worked-out cavity. As a result of this system we had over 50 per cent loss of coal instead of the usual 15-20 per cent. Secondly, as a result of this, we had about sixty underground fires in the Prokopyevsk Mines up to the end of 1935.

Vyshinsky: This as a result. . . .

Shestov: Of the work of wrecking and destruction that was done.

Vyshinsky: Did you organize these underground fires?

Shestov: We did not organize them, but we introduced a system of coal extraction which caused underground fires.

Vyshinsky: Caused them?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I mean "organized" in this sense, that you put

into effect such a system as must inevitably result in the outbreak of fires.

Shestov: Quite correct.

Vyshinsky: And it was for this purpose that you employed this system?

Shestov: Solely for this purpose.

Vyshinsky: In order to cause fires?

Shestov: Yes, in order to cause big losses of coal.

Vyshinsky: Who aided you in this criminal work?

Shestov: I was aided by Stroilov, by the manager of the Prokopyevsk Mines, Ovsyannikov, and by the chief engineer of these mines, Mayer. With their assistance the deepening of the shafts was begun at the wrong time, in particular at the Molotov Pit; the hundred-metre level of the "Koksovaya" Pit was deliberately left unworked from 1933 onwards, and the deepening of the "Meneikha" Pit and Pit No. 5-6 was not begun at the right time. It was held up for as long as two years. Further, in the Prokopyevsk Mines two large shafts, Nos. 7-8, were sunk at my personal instructions on a coal bed which, as I knew previously, would present great difficulties for the working of these pits. All this was done deliberately.

At the "Koksovaya" Pit and at Pit No. 5-6, in the installation of the equipment and in the installation of the underground power station and of other machinery, disruptive work was performed on a large scale. This was done by engineer Schneider, who had been recruited by me, together with a group of his assistants.

Vyshinsky: Is that all?

Shestov: In Anzherka, the starting of Pit No. 5 was delayed for two years. Similar extensive wrecking operations were carried on in Pit No. 9-15.

Besides this, measures of a wrecking and destructive character were carried out on a large scale on the machinery already in use, both at the Lenin Mines and at the Anzhero-Sujensk Mines, as a result of which these mines did not fulfil their plans for five years running.

And finally, at all the mines—the Prokopyevsk, the Anzherka and the Lenin Mines—the Stakhanov movement was sabotaged. Instructions were issued to worry the life out of the workers. Before a worker reached his place of work, he must be made to heap two hundred curses on the heads of the pit management. Impossible conditions of work were created. Normal work was rendered impossible, not only for Stakhanov methods but even for ordinary methods.

Vyshinsky: You have already spoken about your terrorist activity.

The President: It is nearly ten o'clock.

Vyshinsky: Two more questions. In the first place, in addition to the crimes about which you have just spoken, do you not have on your record what I might simply call crimes of banditry in the direct sense of this word? For example, robberies and murders?

Shestov: Murders, yes.

Vyshinsky: Not terrorism, but plain murder?

Shestov: I recollect that at Prokopyevsk engineer Boyarshinov was murdered by the terrorist group.

Vyshinsky: Why was he murdered?

Shestov: He was murdered on my instructions. He had reported to me that there was something wrong in the work of the Coal Mine Construction Trust. He called my attention to this. At that time I enjoyed the confidence of the engineers and technicians. Boyarshinov himself was a former wrecker of the Donbas, but he was working honestly in these mines.

Vyshinsky: He applied to you as an authoritative person in charge?

Shestov: Yes. He wanted to open my eyes to the state of things. I told him I would take note of what he said, thanked him, and added: "I will inform the right people. Don't say anything for the present." And then I summoned Cherepukhin and gave him instructions to murder him, and this was done.

Vyshinsky: So he was murdered?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: An honest engineer?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And who murdered him?

Shestov: As I was away Cherepukhin did not tell me who did it.

Vyshinsky: You acted through Cherepukhin?

Shestov: Yes. Cherepukhin reported to me.

Vyshinsky: Tell us, was Arnold a member of Cherepukhin's group?

Shestov: He was.

Vyshinsky: And this group was intended for terrorism and for murders such as this?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Who was the actual murderer?

Shestov: I cannot give his name. This was in 1933. I did not know all the Trotskyites in Prokopyevsk.

Vyshinsky: In short, you were the organizer of the murder?

Shestov: Quite true.

Vyshinsky: Through the group which acted under your direction?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Now for the second question. What about robberies?

Shestov: The Anzherka bank was robbed with my participation, at my instructions.

Vyshinsky: How did this happen?

Shestov: It was in 1934. I had won over Figurin, the manager of the Anzhero-Sujensk district branch of the State Bank; he enlisted the head cashier Solomin into the organization, and they took 164,000 rubles from the bank for the use of our organization and handed over this money to me.

Vyshinsky: And what did you do?

Shestov: I distributed it as follows: part of the money, about 30,000 rubles, I set aside for the Anzherka organization, for the terrorist group which was there—the group of Schumacher and Fedotov—and for other purposes. 40,000 rubles I handed over to Muralov for the other organizations under his personal charge, and he asked me for another 30,000 for Kemerovo. Muralov received 70,000. The rest of the money I handed over to the Prokopyevsk organization. I gave Cherepukhin about 15,000 and Ovsyannikov about 30,000.

Vyshinsky: Did anyone keep check of the expenditures?

Shestov: I trusted our men.

Vyshinsky: All the more so since the money belonged to the state. I have no more questions.

The President: The Court is adjourned till 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

MORNING SESSION, JANUARY 26, 1937, 11.00 A.M.

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: The session is resumed.

Kaznacheyev: May I put a few questions to the accused Shestov?

The President: You may.

Kaznacheyev: Accused Shestov, when testifying yesterday, you related how you enlisted Stroilov. Tell us, when you enlisted Arnold did you use the same methods, or other methods?

Shestov: With regard to Arnold I employed another method of enlistment.

Kaznacheyev: Namely?

Shestov: In the summer of 1932 Arnold came to see me at the Coal Mine Construction Trust to seek employment as a mechanic at one of the mines. When examining his application form I noted that he had not concealed the fact from me that he had been dismissed from the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Works Construction Trust for anti-Soviet propaganda among the foreign specialists. This induced me to employ him and then to work to enlist him in our Trotskyite organization. I thought then of using him for undermining activities. From my subsequent acquaintance with him in the summer and autumn of 1936 I learned that Arnold was, as far as I can remember, by nationality a Finn, that his name was Kelken or Kilgan, or something like that—Arnold will tell you—but at any rate he had a Finnish name. In tsarist days he lived under the name of Vasilyev. . . .

Vyshinsky: I do not quite understand why Shestov should relate Arnold's biography.

The President: And the question was not about that; the question was how Shestov enlisted Arnold.

Vyshinsky: Let him describe the method of enlistment, but I object to Shestov relating the biography of Arnold, who is sitting here in the dock, before the accused Arnold relates it himself. That is not right.

The President: What question did the Comrade Counsel for Defence ask you? He asked you what methods you employed to enlist the accused Arnold in your group. He did not ask you to relate his biography. Answer the question as put.

Shestov: I have already said that when Arnold began to work in the Coal Mines Construction Trust he already had firm convictions as an anti-Soviet element.

Kaznacheyev: That is, you got to know that he was an anti-Soviet element and proceeded to enlist him? Did you know it, or not?

Shestov: No, I negotiated with him over the course of several months.

Kaznacheyev: Over the course of several months? How many?

Shestov: Five or six months.

Kaznacheyev: And during this period you were breaking him in?

Shestov: Yes, I was breaking him in. I told him that I was a Trotskyite, a member of a Trotskyite organization, and persuaded him to take the path of terrorism. He agreed. And later I asked him whether he would undertake to commit a terrorist act. After some time and further discussions, he consented to this.

Kaznacheyev: Did you have to threaten him with anything when recruiting him, as you did with Stroilov?

Shestov: No, Stroilov was different, but how could I threaten Arnold when I knew very well that I needed a man who would undertake to commit a terrorist act?

Kaznacheyev: When you talked to Stroilov, did you not threaten to denounce him to the authorities?

Shestov: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: Did you have to resort to similar threats in the case of Arnold, or not?

Shestov: No.

Kaznacheyev: But you said you knew about his anti-Soviet sentiments. Knowing about them, did you not take advantage of them?

Shestov: I did. It gave me a reason for enlisting him for the execution of terrorist acts. I put him in touch with Cherepukhin.

Kaznacheyev: You raised that question, but there were no threats?

Shestov: No.

Kaznacheyev: Now tell me, when did you first instruct him to commit a terrorist act?

Shestov: I myself did not give the instructions.

Kaznacheyev: You did not give them personally?

Shestov: No, I put him in touch with the man who was in practical charge of terrorist acts.

Kaznacheyev: What is the name of that man?

Shestov: Cherepukhin.

Kaznacheyev: Consequently, it was Cherepukhin who gave the direct instructions?

Shestov: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: Did not Cherepukhin report to you what Arnold said?

Shestov: He said that Arnold had not only agreed to commit a terrorist act but was also prepared to die in the attempt.

Kaznacheyev: Did the first commission given by Cherepukhin to Arnold refer to a terrorist act, and against whom?

Shestov: Against Orjonikidze, but it did not come off, because Orjonikidze did not use the car.

Kaznacheyev: That is, for an absolutely unforeseen reason?

Shestov: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: What was the second commission?

Shestov: To commit a terrorist act against Molotov.

Kaznacheyev: Did Cherepukhin later report to you about this terrorist act?

Shestov: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: How did Arnold explain his failure to carry it out?

Shestov: Cherepukhin said that Arnold funked it.

Kaznacheyev: And did you see Arnold after that?

Shestov: Yes, I did.

Kaznacheyev: At once, or after some time?

Shestov: Not at once. It was some time later, when he came to work at the Anzhero-Sujensk Mine at the end of 1934.

Kaznacheyev: At that time, during this meeting with Arnold, did you talk about the unsuccessful terrorist act?

Shestov: As far as I recall, we did.

Kaznacheyev: What did Arnold tell you: that he had failed to commit the terrorist act, or that he became scared?

Shestov: He explained that he had failed.

Kaznacheyev: And you suspected that he became scared?

Shestov: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: From what Cherepukhin had reported to you?

Shestov: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: Was this the last commission Arnold received from you or through Cherepukhin?

Shestov: I do not quite understand. I commissioned Arnold through Cherepukhin to commit a terrorist act against Molotov.

Kaznacheyev: Apart from this commission, did Arnold receive other commissions?

Shestov: No.

Kaznacheyev: Did you commission him to recruit anybody else for the organization or not?

Shestov: No. The whole work of recruiting terrorists in the Prokopyevsk district, after I had recruited Cherepukhin for this work, was conducted entirely by Cherepukhin.

Kaznacheyev: And by nobody else?

Shestov: With the exception of Arnold, with whom I had dealings and recruited.

Kaznacheyev: And no instructions at all were given to Arnold to recruit anybody?

Shestov: Possibly, but I do not remember. . . .

Kaznacheyev: That is all I have to ask at present.

The President: We shall now proceed to examine the accused Stroilov. Accused Stroilov, do you confirm the testimony you gave at the preliminary investigation and at the proceedings of the Visiting Session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court in November?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Can you add anything to the testimony you gave yesterday?

Stroilov: I was sent for two years to Germany and was there employed as chief engineer of the mining section of the Technical Bureau of the Trade Representation. In this capacity I visited many factories, engineering works, mines, show rooms, and so forth. Consequently, a fairly large number of people knew me. Moreover, for six months I was in charge of engaging specialists for the U.S.S.R. My work consisted of testing their technical knowledge and of assigning them on the basis of this testing to the various jobs in the U.S.S.R. Thus, about 250 men passed through my hands, but only 70 were engaged. From these two circumstances one must conclude that some representatives of factories and representatives of engineers' societies in the Ruhr basin, in Silesia and Saxony knew me.

In addition, although this did not come within the functions of our Technical Bureau, which rendered technical assistance to the Soviet Union and which at that time was the base for raising qualifications, we were approached by the Imports Department of our Trade Representation for technical consultation on machinery that was ordered in Germany.

I gave a number of consultations, and in this way a number of firms, I will not enumerate them as they were many, got to know me. I say this because it is evident that as a result of my visits to these enterprises I became known as an engineer.

The thing started gradually with my meeting von Berg, to whom I referred in passing yesterday. It is hard to say what particular firm von Berg represented, but he said that he knew everything in Germany. He spoke Russian excellently because he had lived in Russia, in St. Petersburg, 15 or 20 years before the revolution. This man visited the Technical Bureau several times and had talks with me on business matters, in particular about hard alloys manufactured by the firm of Walram.

Yesterday I mentioned that in visiting laboratories and works to see the manufacture of these alloys and their use in mines, where they produce good results, I had a conversation with Berg about our construction work. Berg, who had doubts about our construction and about everything else, advised me to read Trotsky's book, as I have already said. Evidently, Berg, too, was known, for when I visited firms and reference was made to the fact that I had already done something, mention was also made of my far from pro-Soviet sentiments, for I had already read Trotsky's *My Life.* From this I drew the conclusion that Berg was an informer for a number of other bodies.

I had a talk with Berg about our construction work. Berg advised me to read Trotsky's book, of which I spoke yesterday.

When I was in the Soviet Union at the end of November or the beginning of December in 1930, this Berg was also in Moscow. He urged me over the telephone to come and see him. I did not go. He then asked me to send him a postcard saying when I would return to Germany, which I did. On my return to Germany I saw Berg several times. During one of our conversations he said that in the Soviet Union it was known that I had given certain assistance to the firms of Walram and Eichhof. At another meeting he added that apparently I was being watched and that my anti-Soviet utterances were known in the Soviet Union and I must therefore remain in Germany.

At the end of March 1931 I got in touch with Wüster, whom von Berg had recommended, as a man who could arrange a trip for me to Czechoslovakia and France to clear up certain questions regarding the working of thick coal seams. Wüster told me that "it could be arranged, but since you are not a German, there must be some written statement to the effect that you are our man and will not let me down." And I gave him the document about which I have already spoken, that is, my consent not to return to the Soviet Union and to remain and work in Germany with them and to carry out their instructions. About three or four days later, this was on April 2, I went to see him on Armstrasse, I think it was No. 59, second floor. Wüster said to me: "There can be no question either of your remaining in Germany or of your going to France and Czechoslovakia." I must confess I was rather taken aback and said that this was simply dishonest. He answered, "There is nothing dishonest about it. You gave us your personal note, Herr Stroilov, and you must carry out our instructions as you bound yourself to do." He declared in a loud voice that he was now speaking not in his own name, but in the name of those political circles who could do one of two things: either, on the basis of a number of facts regarding propaganda I was alleged to have carried on, to put

me in a German prison, or on the basis of this note, to put me in a Soviet prison. I consented to carry out Wüster's instructions, that is, to put it plainly, to become a traitor. During this same conversation he told me that my immediate task was to help German specialists, and especially those who came to me with the password, "Greetings from Wüster"; I was to help in every way to place them in definite jobs in the U.S.S.R., to help them in their work and not to pay any attention to technical shortcomings.

He also told me that I must take measures to hinder the development of the coal industry of the Soviet Union. In plain words, this was an instruction to carry on wrecking work.

On April 11 a telegram was received recalling me to the U.S.S.R.

In Novosibirsk I was first appointed deputy-chief of the Rationalization and Research Work Department and in 1932 chief of this department. About two months later some of the German specialists began to come to me with the agreed password. Until the end of 1934 six men came to see me: Sommeregger, Wurm, Baumgartner, Maas, Hauer and Flessa. These intelligence service agents, as I found afterwards, were placed in the most important key positions. In August one of them started a conversation with me about a certain official person. . . .

At the beginning of 1931 he told me that this official person knew me. And about a month and a half later, approximately in April, 1931, I was told that this official person sent his greetings and requested me not to forget the obligations I had undertaken. I was thus caught in a second noose. The instructions I received from this official person differed very little from Wüster's instructions. They were a sort of reminder.

I sent Wüster three reports. In reply I received instructions.

Vyshinsky: What instructions did you receive?

Stroilov: Counter-revolutionary instructions, directives to commit acts of destruction.

My first report, made in January 1932 through engineer Flessa, and telling of the vast plan of development in the Kuznetsk Basin, was in effect espionage. Flessa returned in August and said that Wüster demanded that I should proceed to form an organization of counter-revolutionary minded specialists. In 1933 I conveyed to Wüster through Sommeregger that I had started to form the organization.

In 1934, approximately in June, I reported through Sommeregger, who was going abroad on vacation, how many specialists, Soviet citizens, I had drawn into the counter-revolutionary organization and in what mines, and informed him that the method by which mines were being put into operation and run was assuming a wrecking character. To this I received the reply

that I should proceed to decisive wrecking and destructive acts.

As for diversive acts, Sommeregger himself should have reported about that because he knew not less, but more than I about the matter. Moreover, I pointed out (it is true it was not as striking then as it was in 1935) that in several of the mines, for example in the Prokopyevsk Mine, a number of fires were caused as a result of the natural subsidence method employed, and these fires were endangering the output of coking coal for the iron and steel industry in the East. To this he replied that the directives which I had received as far back as 1933—which I forgot to mention—to proceed to determined wrecking operations and acts of destruction—had not been carried out. He called this armchair wrecking and said that it was necessary to accelerate the work; he also said that I was not being honest in the matter, I was not carrying out my promises, that they were simply losing time, they could be using India or China (they counted on us for equipment) and you, they said, are conducting trade negotiations with America.

He was particularly angry about the fact that we had failed to carry out the diversive acts mentioned by Shestov and about which I will speak. Moreover, Sommeregger (perhaps this is a detail) spoke not in the name of Wüster when he gave instructions, but always said, "we."

The last report I made, approximately in September 1935, pointed out that mining operations in the principal pit in Prokopyevsk were in a very bad way, underground fires were very common, that this was restricting output, and that a number of mines were not being used to full output capacity.

As for specialists, a number of whom had been discharged by that time, I said I could do nothing because some of the specialists had behaved in too blatant and insolent a manner. I received no instructions in reply to this report. Wüster was not in Berlin, he was away. He said that he had passed the matter to a reliable person; but I did not hear any more either in the way of information or instructions.

As to the official person, all his instructions mainly concerned the placing of people. In particular, on the demand of this official person, engineer Stickling was sent to Kemerovo and was recommended by me for the purpose of maintaining connection with the counter-revolutionary organization.

I was warned not to think of starting anything in the nature of a revolt against the carrying out of purely provocative measures.

The President: By whom?

Stroilov: By the official person.

The President: In Novosibirsk he did not speak about the actions of this official person.

Vyshinsky (to the President): In the present instance we have a statement by the accused Stroilov about the actions of a certain official person. I consider that for the reasons you have mentioned this person need not be named, but it is essential that he should state what the actions of this official person were. The warning you made previously, it seems to me, works as far as the accused Stroilov is concerned.

The President: Accused Stroilov is raising this question in open court.

Vyshinsky: Without naming the person in question.

The President (to Stroilov): Do you desire to repeat the testimony you gave in Novosibirsk during the proceedings at the Visiting Session, or do you wish to say something else?

Vyshinsky (to the President): Pardon me, but the procedure lays down specific rules and to ask the accused what he wants to say is to hamper the accused.

The President: That is absolutely not so.

Vyshinsky: I request to have it entered in the record, as a circumstance hampering the accused.

The President: Accused Stroilov, do you wish to speak of the actions of the official person you named during the proceedings at the Visiting Session in Novosibirsk?

Stroilov: Yes, of the official person.

The President: Bear in mind that in open court you must not mention the names of official persons of foreign state institutions.

Stroilov: Very well. On the demand of this official person, efforts were made to incense Soviet and foreign workers against the Soviet government.

I can quote the following examples. In inviting foreign workers the object of the Soviet Union was to adopt such methods of work as to enable the Soviet workers working side by side with them to learn how to improve the organization of production and use advanced methods of labour. Therefore the most rational method would have been to put the foreign workers with the Soviet workers so that our Soviet workers could learn to become skilled workers. It was deliberately arranged to carry on agitation with a view to preventing this. The foreign workers not only worked separately, but enjoyed far better conditions: tools, compressed air, electric power, overalls, etc. After this workers said: this is the way the Soviet workers are treated. If you want to work properly you must have the same conditions that we have. In other words this was simply inciting the Soviet workers against the Soviet government. Of course, the Soviet workers said that it was easy to work well under the conditions the foreign workers enjoyed in regard to pay, overalls and the rest. It looks, they said, as if we were

merely floor sweepers and not like those who were invited from abroad. There were brigades like this all over the place, particularly in Pit 5-6 and Pit 5-7 in the Anzhero-Sujensk mine, where these workers were concentrated.

In the second place our Party and Soviet organizations could not let the foreign workers remain outside of the general workers' public life in the mines. Also they saw that a number of foreign workers were in many cases not disinclined to work in the Soviet Union as Soviet citizens. I know that fierce agitation, almost unconcealed, was carried on with slogans about Germany's rebirth and so forth, in short, with fascist slogans about the workers who remained in the Soviet Union remaining in slavery, and so forth. I will not go into details concerning this malicious agitation but it was carried on, and I know this from information received from official persons.

Third, endless disputes were deliberately provoked. We have our own disputes, they are inevitable: about piece rates, overalls, conditions of labour and so forth. But this was mere fault-finding, and there were disputes during which some foreign workers stopped work for 5, 10, 15 and 20 days. The rumour was spread, nobody knows by whom, that these people, saboteurs and undisciplined, were taken back and the Soviet workers used to say: the law is applied to some but not to others: if we miss work for a day or two we are discharged.

Then there is the point about the demand to submit some of our inventions. These are the points I asked the Court to permit me to communicate.

This then was the criminal line I pursued in my connections with the foreigners.

Now I ask permission to speak about connections with the Trotskyites.

Vyshinsky: Wait a moment, you said that when von Berg was in Moscow he rang you up, and you do not even know why?

Stroilov: He rang me up on the telephone.

Vyshinsky: And you say that you did not know why he rang you up?

Stroilov: I did not. Perhaps simply to show that we were on familiar terms. I cannot to this day explain why he rang me up.

Vyshinsky: And did you ring him up?

Stroilov: No.

Vyshinsky: And did you not intend to ring him up?

Stroilov: I sent him a postcard.

Vyshinsky: What did you send him a postcard about?

Stroilov: I wrote: Hermann Vasilyevich, I thank you for greet-

ing me in my home country. I shall be returning to Germany in about two weeks.

Vyshinsky: He greets you and you greet him. What then do you not understand when he greets you?

Stroilov: I do not understand why he rang up. He did not give me any commissions.

Vyshinsky: I suppose he had a reason.

Stroilov: He is an old hand, he would not have rung up for nothing.

Vyshinsky: And you would not have written for nothing?

Stroilov: When I wrote him the postcard I had nothing bad in mind.

Vyshinsky: Only good?

Stroilov: There was nothing good in the connections with von Berg.

Vyshinsky: That is what I say, and yet you say that you had nothing bad in mind. And so you had no intention of writing and phoning, apart from the postcard. Did you have his telephone number?

Stroilov: He told me it.

Vyshinsky: When?

Stroilov: Why, when he spoke on the telephone.

Vyshinsky: And did you write it down?

Stroilov: I cannot recall now; it is in my notebook.

Vyshinsky: Don't be in a hurry, we shall come to your notebook.

Stroilov: I wrote it down.

Vyshinsky: Why did you write it down if you had no intention of ringing up?

Stroilov: He said if you want to ring up—write it down.

Vyshinsky: Why do people write down telephone numbers?

Stroilov: In order to ring up.

Vyshinsky: And did you write it down in order to ring up?

Stroilov: I did not ring him up.

Vyshinsky: I do not know whether you rang up or not, but you admit that you wrote down Berg's telephone number? Allow me to hand the accused a book to look at. On page 317-319—the numeration is rather strange—we have: von Berg, 8-50, ext. 223. Is that right?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Do you know where von Berg was staying?

Stroilov: Either at the Grand Hotel or the Savoy.

Vyshinsky: What month was that?

Stroilov: At the end of November or the beginning of December.

Vyshinsky: What year?

Stroilov: 1930.

Vyshinsky: I request the Court to have attached to the records a statement by the Savoy Hotel: "Foreign tourist H. V. Berg, born 1874, German subject, merchant by profession, Hotel Savoy, Room 223 (it is identical with the telephone number), December 1-15, 1930, arrived from Berlin." How long did he stay?

Stroilov: I think not less than a month, or about a month.

Vyshinsky: Where did he go to after that?

Stroilov: Back to Germany.

Vyshinsky: Did you know when he left?

Stroilov: I did not know at the time, but later. . . .

Vyshinsky: Did you know when he left?

Stroilov: No.

Vyshinsky: Then why do you say he was here for a month?

Stroilov: Because when he returned he said he was here for a month.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps it was for a fortnight?

Stroilov: Perhaps, I do not know exactly.

Vyshinsky: The statement says that he arrived on December 1 and left on December 15. Is that possible?

Stroilov: It is.

Vyshinsky: "In the room occupied by Berg there was a telephone, No. 8-50, ext. 223. Director of the hotel. Seal and reference number." Is that all correct?

Stroilov: It is.

Vyshinsky: So Berg is a real live person, not a myth?

Stroilov: No. The others I mentioned are also real live people.

(At the request of the State Prosecutor, accused Stroilov's notebook containing von Berg's telephone number when the latter visited the Soviet Union is handed to Stroilov.

Stroilov certifies that the book belongs to him, Stroilov, and that he himself had made the entry in question in the book.)

Vyshinsky: Very well. Now as to Wüster. Is this little book yours? Hand it to him, please. (Stroilov is handed a book in a dark red binding.)

Stroilov: Yes, this book is mine.

Vyshinsky: And is what is written in the book in your handwriting?

Stroilov (reads from the book): "Wüster, Armstrasse. . . ."

Vyshinsky: Is that Wüster's home address?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why have you Wüster's home address?

Stroilov: Because he said, when he was. . . .

Vyshinsky: Did you visit him at this address?

Stroilov: I have already testified that I visited him at his home on April 2.

Vyshinsky: You visited him once?

Stroilov: Once.

Vyshinsky: Was it after you wrote down his address or before?

Stroilov: After. He told it to me in Berlin and I went to this address.

Vyshinsky: He told it to you in Berlin and you wrote it down then?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: For what purpose, why did you visit him at his home? Where were you supposed to meet him on business?

Stroilov: On business, on neutral territory.

Vyshinsky: What does that mean, neutral territory?

Stroilov: Let us say, in the lobby of a hotel.

Vyshinsky: Was it necessary for you, a Soviet engineer sent abroad on official business, to visit the private homes of foreign citizens and to enter into intimate relations with them?

Stroilov: No.

Vyshinsky: Yet you visited Berg's home?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I request the Court to have attached to the record this address and telephone number taken from this official publication (hands to the Court a big book in a red binding). On page 206, against No. 8563 there is Wüster, Armstrasse, and the address of this Wüster, which is mentioned also in Stroilov's notebook.

Do you confirm this, Stroilov?

Stroilov: Yes, I do.

Vyshinsky: An official publication.

The President: Of what year?

Vyshinsky: It is mentioned there.

Next, please hand to the accused Stroilov this black book. (Stroilov is handed a book of an office journal type in a black binding.)

What is that black book?

Stroilov: It is my diary.

Vyshinsky: Where did you keep it?

Stroilov: I kept it while I was abroad.

Vyshinsky: In what year?

Stroilov: All the time I lived there.

Vyshinsky: Is it in your handwriting?

Stroilov: Everything here. . . .

Vyshinsky: Please look first, do not take it for granted.

Stroilov: Everything here is mine.

Vyshinsky: Yours?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And is the meeting with Wüster and Berg recorded in your handwriting?

Stroilov: All this was written when I was in Germany, and when I returned to the Soviet Union I continued it probably for about two months. That was already here in the Soviet Union.

Vyshinsky: When did all this happen?

Stroilov: In 1930-31.

Vyshinsky: And it was then that you wrote it?

Stroilov: Immediately.

Vyshinsky: Very well. Let me have that book back again.

This book has been attached to the files as material evidence. I request the Court to look at page 23, which contains a reference to the meeting with Berg; page 27, which contains a reference to a conversation with Berg; page 37, which contains a reference to a letter from Wüster; page 33, which also contains a reference to Wüster; page 35, which contains a reference to Wüster; page 43, which contains a reference to Sommeregger. The character of these meetings and conversations was explained to you by the accused Stroilov yesterday. I want to draw your attention to the fact that these meetings are confirmed in the diary of 1931.

Stroilov: Of 1930 and 1931.

Vyshinsky: Now let us turn to your wrecking and diversive activities.

Stroilov: With the Germans?

Vyshinsky: You couldn't do without the Germans, then?

Stroilov: No, you see, there were Germans, Trotskyites. . . .

Vyshinsky: And all the rest?

Stroilov: No, not all the rest, but those specialists.

Vyshinsky: I want to know about the criminal activities, and of course when you speak about any particular crime, you should say where it was committed, when it was committed, by whom it was committed, and why and wherefore. Please elucidate these points. Take at least the principal, most important details. If you begin to enumerate everything, it seems to me that even two sittings will not be enough.

Stroilov: Shestov already spoke about that yesterday, and he could not avoid telling about it, because the plan of wrecking and destructive work was drawn up together with him as the representative of the West-Siberian Trotskyite organization.

What was the nature of this work?

First of all about diversive measures, about acts of diversion, although I must say that it is hard to distinguish certain wrecking measures from diversive measures. I confirm that there was an attempt and preparations to blow up the headframe of pit 5-6.

This was to be done by the foreign specialist Schebesto. I received notice about Schebesto's coming in 1932 from Sommeregger, who said that Schebesto had to be put in touch with Shestov. I wondered why Schebesto was mentioned, but I did not ask any questions. When Shestov was in Novosibirsk I said to him: Schebesto will visit you and mention my name, you must help him. There was a message also to Schebesto, not directly from me but through Sommeregger.

Repeated attempts were made to steal from the head offices designs and sketches of machinery of Soviet inventions being tested under actual industrial conditions. This refers to a pneumatic pick, drilling machines and so on. Then it was planned to set fire to the power station. According to what Sommeregger told me later, the central partition in the machinery room was actually set on fire.

Underground headings in Pit No. 5-6 were driven in such a way as to make electric hauling absolutely impossible. Then there was proposed what was called the "Shebflo" system, after the names of its initiators—Schebesto, Flessa and Otto—which involved a loss of 80 per cent of the coal.

Further, attempts were made to stop work on the upper level in Prokopyevsk. The scraper hoists were deliberately designed in a criminal way. At the "Koksovaya" Mine the foundations of the compressors were built in solidly with the foundation of the building. This led to so much vibration of the walls of the building that they might collapse at any moment.

At the Rukhimovich Mine, engineer Weber deliberately delayed the sinking of a dip heading to open up the lower level, which resulted in an under-output of coking coal. For two years engineer Hauer, ignoring the advantages of English and American equipment, was engaged in making new drawings for only such equipment as is manufactured by German firms in the hope that we would purchase this equipment from them. Flessa endeavoured in every way to discredit the equipment supplied by the Kulakov Works and insisted on ordering electrical equipment from abroad.

I will not say that all the seventy German citizens who worked with us were wreckers and diversionists. By no means. These wrecking activities were conducted by the six persons I have enumerated, and also by those persons mentioned by Shestov. One may also mention Stickling, who worked in the Severnaya Pit.

I must now say something about our planning. This work was headed by the Trotskyite Vershkov, but I was in touch with it. Every pit was planned and designed as though the outlets belonged to separate owners, without reference to approaches, electric power and roads, with the result that pits were handed over for operation but actually they could not work.

Vyshinsky: To what state did you reduce the Kemerovo Mine?

Stroilov: The last time I was there was in 1935. I was summoned by the manager of the mine because the social and Party organizations were beginning to look askance at the way the work was being done. I found the mine in a bad way. The heading was so low that it was impossible to open up stopes, while the tubs and electric locomotives did not permit the normal supply of props. No relation at all was maintained between the seams. Ventilation was neglected. Capital construction work for the second level was not being performed. I had never seen work in such a state anywhere. This was the result of the wrecking activities carried on by Peshekhonov's group. I was obliged to tell him to use his brains and to stop being so crude. My instructions were not observed.

In reply to the question why he had taken no measures, when I had given personal instructions both as the leader of the counter-revolutionary organization and as chief engineer, he said that he had spoken to my deputy, Andreyev—chief of construction—and they had decided not to improve the state of the mine, assuming that I would not object.

Vyshinsky: And you?

Stroilov: I objected.

Vyshinsky: Why did you object?

Stroilov: Well, it was much too crude.

Vyshinsky: Too much of it?

Stroilov: Too much.

Vyshinsky: Dangerous?

Stroilov: Dangerous, because all around there are people with heads on their shoulders, who understood that work should not be done in this way.

Vyshinsky: They overdid it?

Stroilov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you wanted. . . .

Stroilov: No, I did not want what was there.

Vyshinsky: What did you want?

Stroilov: I?

Vyshinsky: Yes, you.

Stroilov: I wanted the output to be about 5 per cent lower.

Vyshinsky: A little lower?

Stroilov: And cost of production about 50 kopeks higher.

Vyshinsky: Why did you calculate in this way: output, 5 per cent lower, and cost of production, 50 kopeks higher, and so forth?

Stroilov: Because that would not be so noticeable.

Vyshinsky: For safety's sake?

Stroilov: Yes, to put it that way, that's right, for safety's sake.

Vyshinsky: Proceed.

Stroilov: Well, really, that's the main point.

The President: The Court grants the application of the State Prosecutor to include in the materials of the case the certificate of the manager of the Hotel Savoy stating that the foreign citizen Berg stayed at the hotel from December 1 to 15, 1930. The certificate is signed by the hotel manager, and bears a seal.

Similarly, the Court grants the application of the State Prosecutor to include in the materials of the case the Telephone and Address Directory of the German Reich, VII edition, Vol. II, containing Wüster's Berlin address, which is identical with the address in Stroilov's notebook.

Adjournment for 20 minutes.

* * *

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: The session is resumed. Comrade Vyshinsky, have you any questions?

Vyshinsky: I have no questions to put to Stroilov.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions to put to Stroilov?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

Vyshinsky: I want to ask the Court, in connection with accused Stroilov's testimony concerning his connections in Moscow with a number of German engineers, in particular, with Wüster, Berg, Flessa and Schebesto, to include in the materials of the case two entry permit files of the Foreign Section of the Administrative Department of the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Executive Committee, concerning the entry and place of residence of these engineers in the U.S.S.R. That is the first request.

Secondly, I want to ask the Court to submit to Stroilov 20 photographs of various foreigners and to ask him to identify the photographs of Wüster, Berg, Flessa and Schebesto in order that there may be no doubt whatever that these persons really exist and had the connections referred to by Stroilov in his testimony. Thus, 4 entries and 20 photographs; none of the photographs bears a name. I want this established.

The President: The Court deems it advisable for Stroilov, in the event of his identifying the persons, to write their names in his own hand on the back of the photographs.

Vyshinsky: I ask that Stroilov write the names of these persons

on the back of the photographs. I also ask that the same also be submitted to Shestov for identification.

The President: The same photographs?

Vyshinsky: The same photographs.

The President: The Court grants the Procurator's application to include in the materials of the case 4 entry permit files of the Foreign Section of the Administrative Department of the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Executive Committee concerning the issue of right of entry and residence in the U.S.S.R. to Reinhold Wüster, an entry file concerning Schebesto, an entry file concerning the issue of an identity certificate for residence in the U.S.S.R. to Hermann Berg and a fourth file of the same Foreign Section of the Administrative Department of the Moscow Soviet concerning right of entry in the U.S.S.R. for Wilhelm Flessa.

Comrade Secretary, submit these 20 photographs to accused Stroilov.

[Secretary Kostyushko submits the photographs to accused Stroilov.]

The President: Accused Stroilov, on the back of the photographs of the persons you recognize, write their names and your signature and date.

Stroilov (examining the photographs): I think this is Schebesto.

The President: Do you think that, or are you quite sure that this is Schebesto?

Stroilov: Yes, this is Schebesto.

This is engineer Dehlmann, son of the manufacturer Dehlmann.

Vyshinsky: Do you know the initials of the manufacturer Dehlmann?

Stroilov: No.

This is von Berg. Only, usually I saw him in a grey suit; here he is wearing a black one.

This is Wüster.

This is Flessa.

Vyshinsky: Thus, of the 20 photographs you can identify only four?

Stroilov: Five: von Berg, Schebesto, Flessa, Dehlmann's son and Wüster.

Vyshinsky: I am interested in four persons. I ask that it be certified whether the persons identified in these photographs by Stroilov, whether these photographs correspond to those attached to the official documents in the entry files, or not.

The President: The Court certifies that the photograph identified by Stroilov as that of von Berg is identical with the photograph in the entry permit file of the Administrative Department of

the Moscow Soviet and attached to a foreigner's identity certificate.

Vyshinsky: I ask that the number of the entry permit file be mentioned.

The President: The number of the identity certificate is 257199. The identity certificate is made out to the German citizen Hermann Berg, granting right of temporary residence in the U.S.S.R. for one month as from October 24, 1929.

Vyshinsky: Year of issue of the identity certificate?

The President: Issued by the Moscow Administrative Department on October 24, 1929. The photograph attached to this identity certificate is quite identical with the photograph submitted to Stroilov, and which the latter identified as that of Berg.

The photograph which accused Stroilov identified as that of Wüster is identical with the photograph attached to the entry permit file of the Foreign Department of the Moscow Soviet containing a number of questionnaires and other documents concerning the German subject Wüster. The file bears the number 186929, dated June 1931.

The photograph which accused Stroilov identified as that of citizen Flessa is quite identical with the photograph attached to the questionnaire and signed by Wilhelm Flessa. The questionnaire was filled in by Flessa, if I am not mistaken, on September 11, the year is not very clear, either 1930 or 1931.

There is another document dated April 1935 concerning the same citizen Wilhelm Flessa. The photograph identified by Stroilov is quite identical with the photograph attached to the questionnaire signed by citizen Flessa.

The entry permit file of the Administrative Department of the Moscow Soviet for foreign citizen Schebesto contains a photograph attached to a questionnaire signed Schebesto. This photograph is quite identical with that submitted to Stroilov and which he identified as Schebesto's.

(*To Vyshinsky.*) You asked that the photographs be submitted to accused Shestov?

Vyshinsky: I ask the Court to certify that in Berg's entry there is an application for registration of his entry visa dated November 30, 1930.

The President: Yes, I certify that in citizen Berg's entry there is an application dated November 30, 1930, addressed to the Administrative Department of the Moscow Regional Executive Committee.

Vyshinsky: The photographs will have to be submitted to Shestov.

The President: Other copies will have to be submitted.

[The Secretary submits the photographs to Shestov.]

Shestov: On this photograph I recognize Flessa. On this photograph I recollect Schebesto.

Vyshinsky: How very modest, recollect! Is it he, or not?

Shestov: Yes, it is he. Schebesto is the director of the firm of Fröhlich-Klüpfel-Dehlmann.

The President (reads): I certify that the photograph identified by Shestov as that of Flessa is the same as that in the entry permit file of the Administrative Department of the Moscow Soviet. . . . The photograph which accused Shestov identified as that of Schebesto is in the entry permit file of the Administrative Department of the Moscow Soviet. . . . As for the photograph of the director of the firm of Fröhlich-Klüpfel-Dehlmann, I have no document with which to compare it.

Are there any other questions?

Vyshinsky: I have not a question but a request to the Court: to note Vol. LV, p. 432. I will not read it; it refers to what Stroilov said in April 1933. The record speaks about the cause of the fire—the fire was caused deliberately by contact of electric wires.

The President (to Stroilov): Accused Stroilov, have you any questions?

Stroilov: No.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: We will now proceed to examine accused Norkin.

Accused Norkin, do you confirm the testimony you gave in January this year?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What was your position at Kemerovo?

Norkin: I was chief of the Kemerovo Combined Works Construction.

Vyshinsky: Hence, on the Kemerovo Combined Works Construction you were the principal person?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Who appointed you to that post?

Norkin: The People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry.

Vyshinsky: No, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry is a huge institution. Who personally?

Norkin: Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: For what purpose?

Norkin: At that time the question did not stand like that.

Vyshinsky: What do you mean, "like that"?

Norkin: I was sent there because in the chemical industry, in which I had worked until then, I had had some difficulties and trouble, and evidently I was sent to Kemerovo for a certain purpose which became clear to me later, but I did not know it at the time I was sent there.

Vyshinsky: When did it become clear to you, and what became clear to you?

Norkin: In 1933 it became clear to me that the reason I was sent to Kemerovo was that I was supposed to carry on destructive work in the most important plant of the chemical industry, which is of enormous importance for defence purposes.

Vyshinsky: It was clear to you that you were sent there for that purpose?

Norkin: It became clear.

Vyshinsky: What circumstances made this clear to you?

Norkin: It became clear to me from the instructions I received in 1933 as a member of the Trotskyite organization from the person who was immediately directing my work, Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: What did Pyatakov tell you?

Norkin: In the main, his instructions were to work in the direction of retarding this construction work for the purpose of undermining the power of the state.

Vyshinsky: That is the main thing?

Norkin: The main thing in a few words.

Vyshinsky: Was anything said about capital investments, and the attitude you were to take?

Norkin: To invest large amounts of capital with the least effect, and to invest the capital not in the principal objects, but in those of less importance.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, to tie up the capital?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was anything said about the mobilization preparedness of the various installations which were important for defence?

Norkin: I confirm what I have said. The whole plant is important for defence. Inasmuch as part of the capital was diverted, this led to the weakening of the units that are important for defence. The principal method of our work was to alter the designs of the various plants mainly on the pretext of increasing their capacity, or of rationalizing them, to delay the designing work, to delay construction.

Vyshinsky: It was put as clearly as that?

Norkin: I have somewhat deciphered it. There was no need

for us in our conversations to talk about this in detail, it was sufficiently clear.

Vyshinsky: All these instructions were given you by Pyatakov?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In what year?

Norkin: In 1933.

Vyshinsky: When were you appointed to Kemerovo?

Norkin: In 1932.

Vyshinsky: How long after you were appointed, approximately?

Norkin: Approximately, about a year, or a little less, about ten months.

Vyshinsky: When you were appointed, did Pyatakov talk to you about the criminal organization to which he and you belonged?

Norkin: I had been drawn into the organization before that.

Vyshinsky: I am not asking you that, we know when you were drawn into the organization. What interests me is this: when you were appointed to Kemerovo, did Pyatakov talk to you about your underground, criminal activities, or not?

Norkin: This I cannot say, I do not remember.

Vyshinsky: Say what you can say.

Norkin: As far as I remember I did not speak to Pyatakov before my departure, but I spoke to another official of the People's Commissariat, Comrade Pavlunovsky. . . .

Vyshinsky: What about?

Norkin: . . . who actually was, as it were, officially in charge of this construction work, and who was sending and fitting me out for Kemerovo.

Vyshinsky: Fitting you out in an official capacity?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What did you talk about?

Norkin: He gave me instructions how to carry on the work in accordance with the tasks which had been set for the construction.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, about your work in Kemerovo, for which you were officially appointed?

Norkin: I emphasize that I did not speak to Pyatakov before my departure; I received instructions from Pavlunovsky, who had nothing to do with our counter-revolutionary activities.

Vyshinsky: Pavlunovsky had nothing to do with your activities?

Norkin: No, I am speaking of official activities.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you went to Kemerovo with the old instructions you had received from Pyatakov before? When, precisely?

Norkin: I count my membership of the organization from 1931.

Then it was that the main directives of the Trotskyite organization were received.

Vyshinsky: After Pyatakov's return from abroad?

Norkin: While I was listening to accused Pyatakov's testimony I was turning over in my mind how it occurred, and I must say that I cannot dispute the fact that it was after his arrival from abroad. Although in my testimony I mentioned an earlier date, I do not insist upon it. At that time I made the reservation that I did not remember the exact month. It seemed to me that it was some what earlier. Now, I must confirm that there was a certain inaccuracy.

Vyshinsky: Hence, this was, evidently, as you now recall. . . .

Norkin: It was at the end of 1931 and not in the first months.

Vyshinsky: And in 1932, did you meet Pyatakov?

Norkin: I had many meetings with Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: And in 1932?

Norkin: In 1931 and in 1932 and in 1933. . . .

Vyshinsky: And during your conversations did you discuss these criminal activities?

Norkin: I think that, as a rule, we discussed these activities at every meeting.

Vyshinsky: What was the subject of your conversations?

Norkin: In 1932 I did not receive any special instructions from Pyatakov about Kemerovo, the more so, that I left in 1932, at the end of the year. I remember there were very severe frosts, such as occur in the last ten days of December, or in the first ten days of January.

Vyshinsky: And at subsequent meetings?

Norkin: The most definite conversation at which the concrete tasks at the Kemerovo Combined Works Construction were formulated for me took place in 1933. Of subsequent conversations concerning our joint activities I must mention the conversation in the middle of 1935 when more drastic instructions were given to increase destructive activity, and the conversation which took place recently, before my arrest, at which I was instructed to organize explosions and fires during war.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any connection with Rataichak?

Norkin: I had no direct connections with Rataichak. Subsequently, I learned that Rataichak was one of our men.

Vyshinsky: When, subsequently?

Norkin: That must have been after Rataichak had been in Kemerovo. That was at the end of 1935.

Vyshinsky: How did you learn this, why?

Norkin: I received an instruction from Rataichak and it turned out that he was pursuing the same object that I was, only his tactics were different. I am referring to the construction of a factory on the right bank. It was our intention to retard this construction work by our usual methods. Rataichak proposed new methods, but this entailed blowing up the foundations and very big alterations. In short, this meant a lot of noise, but no effect. I tried to protest, but I received instructions to obey Rataichak because he was one of our men.

Vyshinsky: What have you done concretely in the matter of wrecking?

Norkin: In this respect I wanted. . . .

Vyshinsky: Summarize it.

Norkin: Summarized, it is as follows: most important construction works, of major importance for defence purposes, were retarded. One very palpable result was that there were cases of disruption of the electrical supply in the Kuznetsk Basin.

Vyshinsky: What have you to say about acts of diversion?

Norkin: In 1935 I received instructions from Pyatakov to concentrate on the main units so as to achieve, without scattering our forces, the maximum results.

Accordingly, I planned to put the State District Power Station out of action by means of explosions. In February 1936 there were three explosions.

Vyshinsky: Actually occurred?

Norkin: Yes. After that I had to abandon this operation because there was enormous pressure from the workers, and, moreover, I received instructions to stop using volatile coals, and I had to abandon this method. On the contrary, I already thought it time to take measures to ward off the blow against myself, that is to say, to bring up very sharply the question of the Kuznetsk Basin electrical supply and to carry out several measures really directed towards its improvement.

Vyshinsky: What did you do that for?

Norkin: After the three explosions—for although they only count two, actually there were three, as the first occurred in the early part of February, and the second a few days after and the two were counted as one—in order to preclude the possibility of exposure which would draw attention, this is clear, I decided to raise the question of alleviating the electrical supply problem in the Kuznetsk Basin, but this did not materialize, and my request was rejected.

Vyshinsky: Were you approached by safety inspectors and warned that what you were doing might lead to dangerous explosions?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was there, for example, a case when Ponomaryov and Monosovich approached you?

Norkin: I do not remember Monosovich, but I do know Ponomaryov. He was chief of a department.

Vyshinsky: Did you know that on January 26, 1936, Ponomaryov sent the chief of the boiler room a note warning him about this. I ask the Court's permission to read p. 1106 of Vol. CLXIX.

The President: Very well.

Vyshinsky: This note reads as follows: "that the crushing of certain coals is dangerous and may cause a big explosion leading to the destruction of equipment and injury to the staff."

Norkin: I saw this document.

Vyshinsky: Let us first discuss what is correct in this document and afterwards we will single out what is an exaggeration, what is a departure from the truth, and so forth. Was there such a fact?

Norkin: Yes, yes.

Vyshinsky: Was such a warning given?

Norkin: It was. There is an official regulation prohibiting the use of volatile coals in the plant, signed by the chief engineer. . .

Vyshinsky: Did the fact mentioned in this note occur?

Norkin: It did.

Vyshinsky: Is it an official note?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you were warned that such a system of coal feeding created the danger of explosions and that the measures of precaution you were taking were inadequate?

Norkin: This note was not addressed to me, but to the manager of the State District Power Station; and measures were not taken by me, but by Ponomaryov.

Vyshinsky: I know. But there was a note addressed to you, Norkin, chief of the Kemerovo construction work, couched in the following terms:

"Herewith I enclose a memorandum addressed to me by the manager of the boiler room, Ponomaryov, about the danger caused to the station by burning certain coals. Having your verbal instruction concerning the burning of coals, on the basis of which I, in my turn, gave orders to the manager of the boiler room, in violation of existing written regulations, and, bearing in mind that the crushing of certain coals may cause explosions dangerous for the equipment, I ask you to give orders to stop supplying us with these coals." Is this a fact?

Norkin: Yes, I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: Do you know that on January 31, 1936, the labour inspector wrote to the manager of the boiler room, this same

Ponomaryov, an order, indicating "term of execution—immediately," stating that, in pursuance of Art. 148 of the Code of Labour Laws: "I once again order you to carry out instructions contained in such and such reports to stop burning coals so as to avoid explosions. . . ." Is this also a fact?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What else need there be said from the point of view of the factual side? For a certain period, from 1936, you or people subordinated to you, were warned about explosions?

Norkin: I was warned by all these people. This work was done in the face of great resistance on the part of the workers. I must confirm that.

Vyshinsky: But did these facts occur?

Norkin: They did.

Vyshinsky: Were warnings given?

Norkin: They were.

Vyshinsky: Did the explosions take place?

Norkin: I have already said that.

Vyshinsky: Continue.

Norkin: This is the principal act of diversion which I personally committed.

Vyshinsky: Algebra again!

Norkin: But I translated this into the language of the concrete conditions of Kemerovo and displayed a certain amount of independent initiative myself.

Vyshinsky: Diversion was easier to carry out arithmetically than algebraically?

Norkin: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: Did Pyatakov give you any instructions about this act of diversion?

Norkin: I have said already that I received instructions in a more general form, and the choice of the unit in this case. . . .

Vyshinsky: Was left to you?

Norkin: I emphasize that in the present case it was left to me, for I received a number of instructions expressed in arithmetical terms.

Vyshinsky: Was that simpler?

Norkin: No, it was equally complicated. I only want to emphasize that there is a difference.

Vyshinsky: A difference in initiative?

Norkin: Yes. I could not refrain from saying that, from emphasizing this circumstance.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any connection with the terrorist activities of your underground organization?

Norkin: I had no direct connection.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any indirect connection?

Norkin: I knew that such work was carried on.

Vyshinsky: From whom did you hear it?

Norkin: I had direct connections only with Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: I ask you: from whom did you hear it?

Norkin: All that I could learn about guiding instructions I learned from Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: What did you know about these terrorist activities?

Norkin: I knew that the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov was a terrorist act committed by the organization. I knew that the Trotskyite organization had planned and was preparing to carry out a number of other acts against the leaders of the Party and the government. Presented in that way, I knew about these questions.

Vyshinsky: What was the last position you held in the Party?

Norkin: I was a member of the Territory Committee of the Party, and a member of the Bureau of the City Committee of the Party.

Vyshinsky: A member of the Bureau of the City Committee and a member of the West-Siberian Territory Committee?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And simultaneously, you were a member of the underground Trotskyite, anti-Soviet, terrorist, diversive, espionage and wrecking organization?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Were there any occasions on which you rendered members of your underground organization certain services by taking advantage of your position as member of the Territory Committee of the Party?

Norkin: I do not remember any cases of that kind.

Vyshinsky: In regard to Drobnis, for example?

Norkin: What about Drobnis?

Vyshinsky: Then I will remind you of what the records of the preliminary investigation enable me to remind you. You learned something concerning Drobnis. . . .

Norkin: Oh! . . . You are talking about material assistance to Drobnis?

Vyshinsky: I said: did you render any assistance to members of your underground organization, taking advantage of your, Norkin's, position as member of the Territory Committee?

Norkin: I took advantage of my position in the Party and consequently, in the Territory Committee, for the purpose of concealing my criminal activities. Of course, I used it in every way in the interests of my organization.

Vyshinsky: Specifically?

Norkin: Why, everything that was done.

Vyshinsky: Was there a case where you, having learned that Drobnis had been exposed as a Trotskyite, took measures to warn him about it?

Norkin: Of course. As soon as I heard that the situation was becoming tense—the question of his arrest had not yet arisen. . . . In short, I immediately passed on everything I learned in the Territory Committee about the activities of the members of the organization.

Vyshinsky: And about the measures taken against these activities?

Norkin: Everything I heard in the Territory Committee that endangered the Trotskyite organization or any of its members, I of course immediately utilized either to communicate further or to guide myself by.

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Norkin: I would not undertake to say exactly when that was.

Vyshinsky: It was in 1936.

Norkin: Yes, it was in 1936, shortly before Drobnis' arrest, approximately in July 1936.

Vyshinsky: When were you arrested?

Norkin: On September 30.

Vyshinsky: Did you begin to testify at once?

Norkin: No, not at once.

Vyshinsky: You refused?

Norkin: Yes, I refused.

Vyshinsky: Did you refuse for a long time?

Norkin: Yes, for a fairly long time; I refused to testify for approximately two months or so.

Vyshinsky: Why, what restrained you?

Norkin: Very many reasons.

Vyshinsky: Mention the most important.

Norkin: I want to mention one of the reasons. Other accused have stated here the reason for that resistance. I want to mention one fact which is not taken into account. I refer to Pyatakov's article in *Pravda* in which he expressed his attitude towards the first trial.

Vyshinsky: The trial of the Zinoviev-Kamenev united centre?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why the first? There were other trials, for example the trial of Nikolayev.

Norkin: I have in mind the trial of our organization.

Vyshinsky: You are speaking about the article in *Pravda.*

Norkin: I am speaking about the article in *Pravda* in which Pyatakov shouted "Bravo, bravo, Chekists." This article played an

important part in the sense of resistance, in the sense of my attempts to disarm and to do what I did subsequently.

Vyshinsky: In what sense, precisely?

Norkin: I could not interpret that article otherwise than as a signal to keep firm, as an instruction to "hold tight." I thought that Pyatakov had means of continuing the struggle. Although, when I was arrested, and even before that, the hopelessness of the fight was clear to me, nevertheless, I held out a fairly long time after my arrest.

Vyshinsky: Under the influence. . . .

Norkin: I quoted this in addition to the ordinary reasons which make it difficult to give up the game when you have committed crimes. But apart from the usual factors mentioned here, that article was for me a restraining factor which compelled me to hold out: I could not assimilate the meaning of some of the phrases in that article in any different sense.

Vyshinsky: Which phrases?

Norkin: I have already said: "Bravo, bravo. . . ." The jaunty and breezy style in which that article was written could not be otherwise explained except as a clearly understood hint to "hold tight"; and I kept tight.

Vyshinsky: And why did you afterwards decide to give way?

Norkin: Because there is a limit to everything.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps pressure was brought to bear upon you?

Norkin: I was questioned, exposed, there were confrontations.

Vyshinsky: You were confronted with evidence, facts?

Norkin: There were confrontations.

Vyshinsky: How were you kept? What were your prison conditions like?

Norkin: Very good. Are you asking me about outward pressure?

Vyshinsky: Yes.

Norkin: There was no pressure whatever.

Vyshinsky: A man can be deprived of good food, deprived of sleep. We know this from the history of capitalist prisons. He can be deprived of cigarettes.

Norkin: If that is what you are talking about, there was nothing like it.

Vyshinsky: Did they feed you well?

Norkin: They were extremely attentive.

Vyshinsky: The evidence brought against you was weighty enough? Did that evidence play any role?

Norkin: Of course, what played a role was that I realized the hopelessness of the struggle, and realized that it was necessary to bring the whole thing to light.

Vyshinsky: But you did not realize this on the eve of your arrest?

Norkin: I did. This is a process that is not completed in a day. I did not arrive at the position in which I find myself now in one day. It was not that I was a member of the Party one day and became a diversionist the next. This is a prolonged process of remoulding of the brain and of the perception of things. The process of returning and the process of giving up the fight were, of course, also prolonged; but I have replied to your direct question as to why I kept firm. I have mentioned the factor which played a definite role in my case.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: I have two questions. Accused Norkin, you had repeated conversations with Pyatakov on the methods of seizing power. On which forces, internal and external, were you calculating: at all events, which forces did you discuss in your conversations with Pyatakov in 1935-36?

Norkin: I have already said that I had very many conversations with Pyatakov, scores of conversations, on a variety of subjects.

The President: I said: which forces did you calculate on?

Norkin: On different forces at each different period.

The President: I am speaking of 1935-36.

Norkin: In 1935-36 we did not discuss this subject. Perhaps there were such discussions in the beginning of 1935. In short, I do not undertake to relate it in chronological order. At all events, I for one avoided such discussions because they cannot be conducted without coming up against very serious contradictions. At first there were such discussions, in 1934, and perhaps in 1935. The question was perfectly clear.

The President: I want to know what conversations you had with Pyatakov about the methods of seizing power, not in the 1931-32 period but in the following years?

Norkin: The methods were as follows: terrorism, at first resistance and obstruction, then wrecking and diversive acts, and also invitation of foreign capital on some basis or other, technical aid, concessions; then there were hints at an alliance.

The President: Whose hints, what alliance? Did Pyatakov hint at it?

Norkin: Yes, it was Pyatakov. Pyatakov of course gave me guidance in these questions, especially when they passed beyond the bounds of home affairs. I could never claim to have an independent stand on international questions.

The President: On what forces were you reckoning—internal or external?

Norkin: Both on internal and on external forces.

The President: What were the internal forces?

Norkin: As for internal forces, we had reckoned on the masses, at first to a greater extent. Subsequently the masses disappeared, and we began to reckon on elements who had an interest in a change of policy—that is to say, on kulak and capitalist elements.

The President: So you reckoned on kulak elements within the country? And on what others?

Norkin: On no others.

The President: In your testimony this has been put in a somewhat more explicit way: "We could not reckon on the sympathy of the working masses or the peasantry; they sided with the Central Committee. Consequently we did not hope for any aid from within the country in seizing power." You placed your hopes on the remnants of the kulak class, its left-overs?

Norkin: Yes, on the remnants of the kulak class.

The President: On whose aid within the country were you reckoning, apart from the kulaks?

Norkin: On no other aid.

The President: And outside?

Norkin: In recent years I did not talk about that.

The President: I am not asking about that. On whose forces were you reckoning at the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935?

Norkin: On attracting aid from without, on foreign capital.

The President: At what price?

Norkin: The question of price was not discussed. Besides that. . . .

The President: But Pyatakov hinted at the price at which aid might be given?

Norkin: There were no hints at all.

The President: Was there any talk about admitting foreign capital?

Norkin: There were very many conversations about admitting foreign capital, even quite specific conversations.

The President: How was this specified?

Norkin: There was talk of concessions, of calling in technical aid, of extension of the intercourse with foreign countries, of modification of our foreign trade policy with a view to expanding it, and so forth. All this was spoken of. Apart from this, the question of an alliance cropped up at one of the last conversations. I took this in an abstract sense, but it was also put concretely; there was talk about Germany.

The President: But did Pyatakov hint that certain negotiations were being conducted by the Trotskyite centre with certain foreigners?

Norkin: Such negotiations unquestionably did take place, and I have given testimony to this effect.

The President: Do you confirm your testimony on this point? Did you know in 1934, 1935 and 1936 what negotiations were being conducted by leading Trotskyites, and with which foreign personages?

Norkin: I confirmed this in my testimony and am confirming it now, but this was not stated specifically.

The President: You did not oppose this?

Norkin: I accepted this formula.

The President: As a directive?

Norkin: I accepted it; it seemed to me to fit in with the general trend of these ideas.

The President: The last question. When Pyatakov in July 1936 gave instructions to consider the question of the organization of arson at the chemical works, did you express the fear that workers might be killed?

Norkin: I testified about this.

The President: I recollect that you personally expressed your fears that workers might be killed?

Norkin: This is recorded in my testimony, and I said it not once but many times.

Vyshinsky: How did Pyatakov answer you?

Norkin: Pyatakov answered that sacrifices were inevitable, and it was here that he used that phrase of his which I corroborated yesterday about "wasting my pity."

The President: And he added: "And then it isn't us they will blame."

Norkin: I confirm all this, painful though it is.

The President: At the end of this sentence of yours you have the following words: "To tell the truth, Pyatakov always regarded the working class with contempt."

Norkin: You see, I did feel a kind of arrogance about him—that I must say. I could never feel that our attitude was the same.

The President: What form did this arrogance take?

Norkin: It found expression in a great many facts. This is difficult to explain. You see, it is a matter of feeling to a large extent. That is my conviction. Now it is clear; and even then I felt it. I explained it by the fact that the man had lost contact with the masses. I felt this very keenly, especially at the end of 1935 and the beginning of 1936. In short, I do not think that I am exaggerating; I am giving sufficiently objective testimony. I have no need now to make false statements.

The President: Have the Counsel for Defence any questions to put to Norkin?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: There remains one more accused of the Siberian group—Arnold, and the witness Stein. Do you think it expedient to examine the accused Arnold or the witness Stein?

Vyshinsky: I think it necessary to examine the witness Stein.

Before examining the witness, permit me to ask the Court to give a ruling on a number of questions which were referred by me in court today to the expert, Comrade Lekus, in connection with the testimony of the accused Shestov and Stroilov. If there is no objection on the part of the accused, I would ask the Court to define its attitude to these questions and thereby enable the expert to prepare an answer to these questions.

And I have the same request in regard to the expert Pokrovsky, in connection with the criminal activities of Norkin and Drobnis on the Kemerovo Combined Chemical Works construction.

In addition to this, my request is that if there is no objection on the part of the accused, the experts should give by this evening or by tomorrow morning their answers to the questions put to them.

The President: I think it expedient to give a copy of your questions to the accused Shestov, Stroilov, Norkin and Drobnis.

Vyshinsky: In view of the fact that formulations of a legal character may occur, I would even request that the counsels for defence taking part in the trial, even if they are not defending these particular accused, should also study these questions and assist the accused in the formulation of their answers to these questions.

Counsel for Defence: (Agree.)

The President: The Court has no objection.

The President (to the Commandant): Please ask witness Stein to come in.

(Witness Stein enters the Court.)

The President: Witness Stein, what is your first name and patronymic?

Stein: Alex Mikhailovich.

The President: You have to give evidence on the case of the accused Shestov. In what language do you want to give evidence—in Russian or German? We have an interpreter here.

Stein (in Russian): In German.

The President: Very good. Tell me please, you were born in 1882?

Stein (in Russian): Yes.

The President: Were you born at Riga and are you a German subject?

Stein (in Russian): Yes, a German subject.

The President: Where have you been working of late in the Soviet Union?

Stein (through the interpreter): At Leninsk.

The President: In what capacity?

Stein: I was engineer in charge of installation work.

The President: What post did you occupy?

Stein: I was engineer in charge of installation work at the electric power stations in Leninsk.

The President (to the interpreter): Convey to him that he has been summoned for this examination at the request of the Prosecutor.

Vyshinsky (to the interpreter): Will you please ask the witness Stein whether he knows Shestov?

Stein: I first met Shestov in 1934.

Vyshinsky: Have you met him often since then?

Stein (in Russian): I have met Shestov several times.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps you will answer in Russian, since you have command of Russian to some extent?

The President: The witness has declared that he wants to speak in German, and he answered in Russian involuntarily. For us it is all the same in what language he answers.

Stein (through the interpreter): I understand Russian.

Vyshinsky: Then why did you ask for an interpreter?

Stein: For the sake of exactitude.

Vyshinsky: A perfectly legitimate demand. If he can answer in Russian and wants to do so, let him answer in Russian. It is a matter of complete indifference to us. Obviously, if a man does not know Russian perfectly, he will make slips.

The President: Since the witness understands Russian, he will correct the interpreter if he finds that the latter does not translate quite correctly.

Vyshinsky: Did you see Shestov often?

Stein: Often.

Vyshinsky: And over a period of several years?

Stein: In 1934, 1935 and once in 1936.

Vyshinsky: I ask the witness Stein to confirm whether this is the Shestov whom he knows.

The President: Witness Stein, please look at the accused (indicating Shestov).

Vyshinsky: Is this Shestov?

Stein: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Shestov): Is this the same Stein whom you mentioned?

Shestov: Yes, this is Alexei Mikhailovich Stein.

Vyshinsky: Why Alexei Mikhailovich?

Shestov: At Anzherka all of us called him "Alexei Mikhailovich."

Vyshinsky: And what is Stein's real first name and patronymic?

Stein: Alex Mikhailovich.

Vyshinsky: What do you know about Shestov's criminal actions? Do you know anything about the crimes that Shestov committed?

Stein: Shestov asked me to work for him along the lines of diversive activities.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, only along the line of diversive activities?

Stein: Yes, only.

Vyshinsky: And where were you working officially at that time?

Stein: At Anzherka.

Vyshinsky: In what capacity?

Stein: As superintendent of installation work.

Vyshinsky: Under what circumstances and on what occasion did Shestov make such proposals to you?

Stein: To begin with, I must tell about my work with the German engineers who worked with me along these lines earlier, before I met Shestov.

Vyshinsky: Do.

Stein: The first time I talked about this work was with engineer Wurm.

Vyshinsky: "About this work"—what does that mean?

Stein: About complicity in diversive activities.

Vyshinsky: What do you understand by diversive activities?

Stein: Wrecking work.

Vyshinsky: What do you understand by wrecking work?

Stein: I mean stoppages at the factories, breakdowns and damaging of machines, incorrect laying of cables.

Vyshinsky: So the breakdowns and damaging of machines, the incorrect laying of cables, etc.—this is how you understood the work which Wurm proposed?

Stein: Wurm made other proposals to me besides this.

Vyshinsky: What proposals?

Stein: May I tell the whole story about Wurm, about how I was brought to do this work?

The President: I must explain that the witness Stein may not name official foreign institutions at the open session of the Court, nor the names of persons working in these institutions.

Vyshinsky: I ask the President to explain to the witness Stein that these institutions and persons may be named by the witness at a session *in camera.*

[The President explains this.]

Stein: May I begin to tell about the commencement of my work with engineer Wurm?

The President: I have given you an explanation. Have you understood it? Apparently we shall have a session *in camera* towards the end and there you can tell about it in greater detail.

Stein: In 1932 engineer Wurm and Sommeregger arrived. Engineer Wurm came to see me in my apartment, as one German to another, and on this pretext he struck up an acquaintance with me. Engineer Wurm said that we had not come to the Soviet Union to help the Bolsheviks. We had come here in order to help the German state, German firms.

The point was that we must at all costs damage the machines that were being imported from Germany, in order that we might have a chance to import more machines to this country. For this purpose, we must at all costs destroy the machines in such a way that the damage would not be attributed to the quality of the machines but to the incapacity of the Russian workers. We must begin by damaging Russian machines.

He told me that this was the duty of every German, and a man who did not do this had no right to be a German.

At the same time, in 1932, engineer Flessa arrived. He asked me whether I had done any wrecking work as yet. I told him I had not. Thereupon he called me a coward and a traitor to Germany.

Vyshinsky: Who?

Stein: Engineer Flessa. He gave me direct instructions to start work. I was to get in touch with Shestov, the manager of the mine, and Floren, who were to arrive at Anzherka before long.

The President (to the interpreter): What are you talking about?

Interpreter: He wants to mention the names of foreign state officials, and I am telling him that he must not, since he has been warned accordingly.

The President: I said that the names of official representatives of official institutions must not be mentioned. Do you understand me exactly?

Stein: He told me that he was in touch with many foreign engineers who had made very frequent visits to Germany recently, that he was in touch with these foreign engineers and had heard from his acquaintances who had come to the Soviet Union from Germany that Germany wanted to regain her former strength at all costs, and we Germans living here in the Soviet Union ought to do wrecking work in order to help Germany in this way.

We had to weaken the Soviet Union by this wrecking work of ours. As regards practical work, he said it was necessary to dis-

organize the electric power system in the Soviet Union, and at the place where I worked, to destroy the storage batteries and electric locomotives so that the mine haulage system would stop functioning and mines would be flooded. In answer to my question, Flessa said that he was receiving instructions from a certain person closely associated with Germany, and that this same person would help us in the event of these wrecking acts ending in failure.

Vyshinsky: Was this person then within the borders of the U.S.S.R.?

Stein: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did this person occupy any official position?

Stein: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

Stein: In addition to this, Flessa advised me to join the Communist Party in order to have greater opportunities of access to various jobs, so that the wrecking work might thus be intensified.

Vyshinsky: Flessa advised you to do this?

Stein: I am speaking only about Flessa.

Vyshinsky: And did you take any steps by way of attempting to join the Communist Party?

Stein: Yes, Flessa advised me to apply to Shestov.

Vyshinsky: So you applied to Shestov? What came of this?

Stein: I want to tell about my acquaintance with Shestov from the start.

Vyshinsky: I am not interested in that, but if you want to, you may tell about it.

The President: A definite question has been put: how did Shestov help you?

Vyshinsky: Perhaps it is more convenient for him to tell this in connection with the story of their relations.

Stein: I went to see Shestov, and Shestov gave me a form to fill out.

Vyshinsky: An application form?

Stein: Yes, an application form.

Vyshinsky: Did you fill it out?

Stein: Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky: To whom did you give it?

Stein: I handed in the application to the Party organizer.

Vyshinsky: And what was the result?

Stein: I was not accepted into the Party, because the Party purge began at that time.

Vyshinsky (to Shestov): Accused Shestov, was there such an episode with Stein, when you wanted to foist him upon the Party?

Shestov: I recall there was a conversation regarding this matter.

Vyshinsky: Was there an occasion on which you wanted to foist Stein upon the Party? Can you answer yes or no?

Shestov: Yes, I talked to Stein about this.

Vyshinsky: About what?

Shestov: About his wanting to enter the Party.

Vyshinsky: Did he say so himself?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And was there a conversation with Flessa?

Shestov: I did not have any conversation with Flessa.

Vyshinsky: You did not talk personally about this matter?

Shestov. No.

Vyshinsky: And in general, were there any conversations with Flessa on matters connected with underground activities?

Shestov: I was not in touch with Flessa, but I recall that Floren spoke to me about Flessa as a wrecking agent.

Vyshinsky: And you had contact with Floren along these lines?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So from whom might Flessa have known?

Shestov: From Schebesto, from Stroilov, from Floren.

Vyshinsky: Stein applied to you to help him get into the Party?

Shestov: I helped him.

Vyshinsky (to Stein): You applied to Shestov yourself?

Stein: I came to see Shestov in his apartment and applied to him about this matter.

Vyshinsky (to Shestov): Did you promise to help him?

Shestov: Yes, I promised.

Vyshinsky: What form did this assistance take?

Shestov: Most likely I brought him an application form, and probably, being a member of the bureau of the city committee of the Party, I would have given him the required testimonial.

Vyshinsky: And did you know what sort of a man Stein was?

Shestov: Yes, I knew.

Vyshinsky: And you gave him a testimonial?

Shestov: No, I did not give him one.

Vyshinsky: You proposed to do so, you promised?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Stein): Proceed.

Stein: During this meeting Shestov made me the following proposal: I was to try at all costs to flood some of the pits and hinder the extraction of coal. I agreed to do this. Shestov told me there was a shortage of people for the organization. I asked

for what organization. He answered me that it was mainly a question of the Trotskyite organization.

Vyshinsky: Did you have a talk with Shestov during which he told you that he needed people from among the foreigners and that he was short of Soviet people?

Stein: Not only foreigners. When I called on him he told me it was a very good thing I had come to see him.

Vyshinsky: Did he not tell you that it was difficult for him to recruit young Soviet engineers?

Stein: He said that there were engineers at his mine who worked very honestly and whom he could not use for this purpose.

Vyshinsky: And so he was very pleased that you had come to work with him?

Stein: Yes, I was to take charge of this work.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet Shestov in Novosibirsk in 1936?

Stein: This conversation took place in May 1936.

Vyshinsky: This same conversation in which Shestov extended you this invitation?

Stein: Yes, it was the same conversation, and Shestov then proposed that I work for him. I want to say something about Floren.

Vyshinsky: What do you want to say about Floren?

Stein: Floren made me the same proposal as Flessa. Floren himself had already committed several acts of wrecking at the mines and was making preparations for a big explosion at Pit No. 5-7, where he was in touch with the Russian Trotskyites. I do not know why this explosion for which Floren was making preparations did not take place, but I know that Floren took a very considerable part in the wrecking acts at the mines.

Vyshinsky: And do you know what sort of people Floren and Flessa are?

Stein: No, they did not tell me openly what party they belonged to, but I made sure, while talking with them, that they were fascists.

Vyshinsky: And were they connected with any official person within the territory of the Soviet Union?

Stein: I do not know about Floren, but in regard to Flessa I know that he was in touch with an official person residing in the Soviet Union.

Vyshinsky: How was he connected with him—as a citizen of one state with a citizen of another state?

Stein: I declare that this same official person knew about Flessa's wrecking activities, because Flessa himself told me about this.

Vyshinsky: And was that person connected with the German intelligence service?

Stein: Flessa told me nothing about this.

Vyshinsky: And you could not conclude that this was so by all their actions, by their conduct?

Stein: I thought all the time that all the orders which Flessa and Floren received were received by them from Germany. Only in his last talk with me Flessa told me that he was receiving these instructions from a certain official person who is now in the Soviet Union.

Vyshinsky: Is this official person of foreign origin?

Stein: I am not personally acquainted with this person.

Vyshinsky: Is he a Soviet citizen?

Stein: He is a man who works for Germany.

Vyshinsky: Works for Germany in an official capacity?

Stein: He is an official person and works in an official capacity.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: Has the defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: Have the accused any questions to put to Stein?

The Accused: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: Comrade Commandant, please lead out the witness Stein.

(Witness Stein is led out of the Court.)

The President: What is the opinion of the defence regarding the questions put by the prosecutor to the experts?

Braude: We consider that the questions are correctly framed from the legal point of view and conform in essence to the facts of the case. But as regards the possibility of assistance on our part, we submit that if the accused deem it necessary to add any questions, we will assist them with the legal formulation of these questions.

The President: Have the accused studied the questions for the experts? Not yet? Please study them during the recess.

The Court is adjourned till 6 o'clock.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

JANUARY 26, EVENING SESSION, 1937, 6.00 P.M.

Commandant: Please rise, the Court is coming.

The President: The session is resumed.

Accused Shestov, have you any corrections or additions to make to the questions for the experts?

Shestov: No.

The President: Accused Stroilov?

Stroilov: Neither have I.

The President: Have the Counsel for Defence any additions to make?

Braude: No, we have none.

The President: Accused Norkin, have you any additional questions?

Norkin: No.

The President: Hasn't Drobnis any either?

Drobnis: No.

The President: The following questions are submitted to the expert witness, Engineer Lekus (reads):

"*Questions Submitted to the Expert Witness Lekus in Connection with the Criminal Activities of Shestov and Stroilov in the Kuzbas*

"A. *Pit Fires in the Prokopyevsk Colliery*

"1. What were the causes of the fires?

"2. What were the consequences of these fires?

"3. Could these fires have been averted?

"B. *State of the Ventilation in the Prokopyevsk Colliery*

"1. What were the causes of the bad state of the ventilation?

"2. What were the consequences of the bad state of the ventilation?

"3. Was it possible to improve the ventilation?

"C. *Capital Construction and Reconstruction Work of the Kuzbas Coal Trust in 1932-36*

"1. Did the plans of construction work carried out correspond to the interests of the development of the coalfield?

"2. What were the consequences of the incorrect planning of the construction work?"

Aproximately how much time will you need to prepare answers to these questions?

Lekus: Could I be allowed to present them at tomorrow's evening session?

The President: Why, couldn't we have them by the dinner recess?

Vyshinsky: Comrade President, please allow the experts to be absent from the evening session; at present they are not required by the proceedings at all. They will use this evening to prepare their answers and would be able to present them by the end of the day tomorrow.

The President: Very well, this means that on condition that you are released from attending today's evening session you will present your answers by tomorrow's evening session.

I will read the question submitted to the expert witness, engineer Pokrovsky (reads):

"*Questions to Pokrovsky, Chairman of the Commission of Experts, in Connection with the Criminal Activities of the Accused Norkin and Drobnis at the Kemerovo Combined Works Construction*

"A. *Explosions at the Kemerovo District Electric Power Station on February 3 and 9, 1936*

"1. What were the causes of the explosions at the Kemerovo District Electric Power Station?

"2. Could the explosion have been averted?

"3. Was the explosion due to accident or to malicious intent?

"B. *Breakdowns at the Nitrogen Plant Construction on March 22 and April 5, 1936*

"1. What were the causes of the breakdowns?

"2. Could these breakdowns have been averted?

"3. What were the consequences of these accidents?

"4. Were the breakdowns due to chance or to malicious intent?

"C. *State of Construction Work at the Kemerovo Combined Works Construction*

"1. Is the state of readiness of the construction units in accordance with the schedule fixed by the government?
"2. Does the financing correspond with the importance of the items under construction?
"3. What is the quality of the construction work?
"4. How do the experts explain the non-fulfilment of the schedule, incorrect financing and the low quality of construction work?"

Comrade Pokrovsky, how much time approximately will you need to prepare the answers to these questions?

Pokrovsky: I also shall require until 6 p.m. tomorrow, *i.e.*, until tomorrow's evening session.

The President: Very well.

Thus the experts Lekus and Pokrovsky are released from attending today's session. We shall proceed to the examination of the accused Arnold. Accused Arnold, do you confirm the testimony which you gave in the latter part of 1936 and in January 1937 at the office of the Procurator of the U.S.S.R.?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Accused Arnold, what is your real surname?

Arnold: Vasilyev.

Vyshinsky: And your first name and patronymic?

Arnold: Valentin Vasilyevich.

Vyshinsky: Why do you call yourself Valentin Volfridovich?

Arnold: First of all I should like briefly to tell you my life story.

Vyshinsky: No, you will relate it in due course. First tell us why you call yourself Valentin Volfridovich when your name is really Valentin Vasilyevich?

Arnold: It happened this way. When I acquired citizenship in America, my name, according to my passport, was Aimo Volfrid.

Vyshinsky: Are you an American citizen or a Soviet citizen?

Arnold: Now I am a Soviet citizen.

Vyshinsky: Did you land in America as a Soviet or as an American citizen?

Arnold: I landed there as a Finnish citizen.

Vyshinsky: That means that in America you were given the name and patronymic Valentin Volfridovich?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Arnold: Because the passport I had with me gave my name as Aimo and my father's name as Volfrid.

Vyshinsky: But that applied to the person whose passport you used.

Arnold: To the person from whom I took the passport.

Vyshinsky: That means that you arrived in America with a passport that was not your own?

But what was your surname when you were born?

Arnold: From the time I first went to school I was called Vasilyev.

Vyshinsky: But weren't you called Ivanov?

Arnold: Yes, I started school at the age of seven.

Vyshinsky: And before the age of seven?

Arnold: Before the age of seven no one asked me my surname and I knew nothing.

Vyshinsky: That means that until you were seven you lived without any surname whatever?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That means you were born without a surname?

Arnold: I was born without a surname.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps it is indiscreet, but I must ask you where you were born and what was your father's surname?

Arnold: I was born in Leningrad, my father's surname was Efimov.

Vyshinsky: And your mother's surname?

Arnold: My mother's surname was Ivanova.

Vyshinsky: This is just what I am asking you. So Ivanova takes part in this matter. But why were you called Vasilyev till the age of seven?

Arnold: At the age of seven, when I entered school, my grandfather did not want to give me his surname—he's my mother's father.

Vyshinsky: That's plain.

Arnold: And he hated my father; that was why it was decided to give me the surname Vasilyev.

Vyshinsky: But why Vasilyev and not Petrov?

Arnold: Because my godfather's name was Vasilyev.

Vyshinsky: That means by the time you were seven you had accumulated three surnames: Ivanov, Vasilyev and Efimov and you chose one—Vasilyev?

Arnold: It was not I who chose it, my elders chose it for me.

Vyshinsky: Did you receive any documents to this effect?

Arnold: I received no documents, later I had a birth certificate.

Vyshinsky: But what makes you think you are Vasilyev?

Arnold: Because they called me Vasilyev at school.

Vyshinsky: And why did they call you Vasilyev at school?

Arnold: I don't know why.

Vyshinsky: Of course, it's hard to understand such matters at the age of seven. That means that until the age of thirteen you went by the surname of Vasilyev. Is that so?

Arnold: No, at the age of thirteen I left Finland.

Vyshinsky: Where were you born?

Arnold: In Leningrad.

Vyshinsky: What school did you go to?

Arnold: I went to elementary school for three years and to municipal school for four years, in the city of Vyborg in Finland.

Vyshinsky: And how did you happen to get to Finland?

Arnold: When I was ten months old my mother was unable to take care of me and sent me to her father, who was the sexton at a church in the city of Vyborg. Afterwards I went to Leningrad.

Vyshinsky: How old were you then?

Arnold: I was in my fourteenth year.

Vyshinsky: Under what surname?

Arnold: Vasilyev.

Vyshinsky: What part of Leningrad did you live in?

Arnold: For about a week I lived in Kudryavtsev's sheet-iron workshop in Apraksin Pereulok, but I had no passport and the boss did not want to keep me. All I had were my school certificates. I knew I had been born in Leningrad and baptized at the Vladimir Cathedral and the workmen advised me to go there to find my birth certificate. With this certificate I could get a job. I found the church, hunted up the deacon and he found me in the records and gave me the birth certificate.

Vyshinsky: In what name?

Arnold: It certified that Valentin, this was the infant's name, was the son of the soldier's daughter Evdokia Mikhailovna Ivanova, but my surname wasn't given.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any sort of passport?

Arnold: I was only thirteen years old. They arranged for me to get a job at the factory on the birth certificate.

Vyshinsky: As the son of Ivanova?

Arnold: No, as Vasilyev, because my school certificates were in the surname of Vasilyev, while the birth certificate gave the name Valentin and no surname whatever.

Vyshinsky: But your mother's surname was Ivanova?

Arnold. Yes. I began working in that factory as an upholsterer's apprentice. It was a furniture and fixtures factory.

Vyshinsky: How many years did you live in Leningrad?

Arnold: Two years.

Vyshinsky: How old were you when you left?

Arnold: I was in my sixteenth year.

Vyshinsky: Where did you go then?

Arnold: I went to Finland, to Vyborg.

Vyshinsky: To your grandfather?

Arnold: My grandfather was dead. I went to live with my uncle. I started working in a furniture factory.

Vyshinsky: As Vasilyev?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How long did you stay with your uncle?

Arnold: Not long. I went to Helsingfors.

Vyshinsky: Why did you go to Helsingfors?

Arnold: Because I wanted to work in a big factory and earn more.

Vyshinsky: So it was poverty that compelled you to go?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: To Helsingfors?

Arnold: To Helsingfors.

Vyshinsky: What did you take up there?

Arnold: I went to work in a furniture factory.

Vyshinsky: How long did you work there?

Arnold: A year and a half.

Vyshinsky: And then?

Arnold: I felt a desire to go to Germany.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Arnold: I wanted to go abroad and try my luck there.

Vyshinsky: How did you manage it?

Arnold: Very simply. I arranged it with a friend of mine. He gave me his passport. He had just managed to secure it, but had not gone himself.

Vyshinsky: And he let you have it?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What was his name?

Arnold: His name was Karl Rask.

Vyshinsky: First Vasilyev, then alternately Vasilyev and Ivanov, and then Karl Rask.

Arnold: My surname never was Ivanov, that was my mother's surname.

Vyshinsky: Where did you go under the name of Rask?

Arnold: I got a job as a cabin-boy on a boat. I went to Hamburg and worked for three or four months in a garage. But from childhood I had dreamed of getting to America.

Vyshinsky: And then?

Arnold: I set out for Rotterdam in Holland, but I did not reach the border. Here I was detained by the police and they deported me back to Russia. I returned to Vyborg.

Vyshinsky: Still under the name of Rask?

Arnold: Still as Rask.

Vyshinsky: In what year was that?

Arnold: That was at the beginning of 1913. I worked in Vyborg until 1914 and then I went to Helsingfors and got a job at the Sveaborg port under the name of Vasilyev and put Rask in my pocket for the time being.

Vyshinsky: Why didn't you like Rask?

Arnold: Because I was in Vyborg and everybody knew me there, and for that reason I couldn't be Rask any longer.

Vyshinsky: How is it everybody knew you? What was the population of Vyborg?

Arnold: Not more than fifteen or twenty thousand at that time.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps your arithmetic is at fault?

Arnold: Maybe there were more.

Vyshinsky: But in any case you were a well-known figure there?

Arnold: Rask was not known.

Vyshinsky: But Vasilyev?

Arnold: But Vasilyev was known because lots of people used to come to church and I went to church.

Vyshinsky: Were you a churchgoer?

Arnold: I lived in the church.

Vyshinsky: You said that you went to school?

Arnold: I went to school in Vyborg.

Vyshinsky: And so you put Rask in your pocket and turned up in Vyborg again as Vasilyev? Did you stay long in Vyborg under the name of Vasilyev this time?

Arnold: I worked there till the beginning of 1914 and then I went to Helsingfors. When the war broke out I learned that I would soon have to join the army and it occurred to me that I had better clear out of Finland. With the passport in Rask's name in my pocket I went to Sweden and from there I landed in Norway.

Vyshinsky: Your passport in Rask's name was valid for travel abroad?

Arnold: It was.

Vyshinsky: For an indefinite period?

Arnold: For five years.

Vyshinsky: So you were abroad again?

Arnold: Yes, I was, in Norway.

Vyshinsky: And then?

Arnold: Then I shipped on a Swedish boat, made a voyage to England and from there we sailed to Stockholm.

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Arnold: That was at the beginning of 1915. From there I felt

like going to Vyborg, to my uncle. I arrived in Vyborg on a fishing boat. My uncle told me that I must join the army. I was immediately issued a passport in the name of Vasilyev. With this passport I went to enlist. I was taken into the army and assigned to the Alexander III barracks on Malaya Okhta in Leningrad. I remained there about a month and a half, but I didn't like the soldier's life. In general I did not want to fight. Because of this I skipped the army and went to Helsingfors. Now that I had seen that army life was bad, I decided to leave the country. But in Helsingfors I was arrested for desertion and sent under escort to Leningrad. In Leningrad I was tried and sentenced to six months.

After I had served the sentence, I was sent with the very first company to the front and landed in the village of Stotsmanshof, near Riga. Here I contracted pneumonia and remained at the front only for about a month, then I was sent to the rear.

Vyshinsky: Why didn't you tell the story at the preliminary investigation the way you are telling it now?

Arnold: You see, it's very hard for me to remember, because I have had so many adventures in my life.

Vyshinsky: Let us take the points in their proper order. Did you go to Finland before 1913?

Arnold: Why, at the preliminary investigation I . . . .

Vyshinsky: No, answer the question. Did you go to Finland in 1913?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Under what name?

Arnold: I told you that Karl Rask was good till 1916.

Vyshinsky: Well, at the preliminary investigation on September 13 you said that you went abroad for the second time under the name of Aimo Kulpenen—Was that so?

Arnold: It's very hard to recollect.

Vyshinsky: When were you telling the truth? At the preliminary investigation or now?

Arnold: Now it has all come back to me.

Vyshinsky: You undertook to recall things and mixed up everything. What guarantee is there that you are telling the truth now? Further, you said something altogether different at the examination at the Procurator's Office of the U.S.S.R. You said that your name was Ivanov, which was your mother's name and that you were given the name of Vasilyev, which was your godfather's name; that tallies, but how about your mother's name?

Arnold: I did not adopt my mother's name. But my mother bore that name.

Vyshinsky: Next, the birth certificate was in the name of Ivanov?

Arnold: No, it read—the son of a soldier's daughter, Ivanov.

Vyshinsky: That means you are Ivanov.

Arnold: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: Further, before the revolution . . . when was our revolution?

Arnold: In 1917.

Vyshinsky: You said at the investigation that before the revolution you had been a vagabond. Is that true?

Arnold: It's true and one can feel this from my biography.

Vyshinsky: Further, you said that you joined the 13th Siberian regiment and that you served in it. Did you say that?

Arnold: I was telling you that I was sent to the neighbourhood of Riga, but you didn't let me finish. I served there in the 13th Siberian regiment.

Vyshinsky: And you deserted from the 13th Siberian regiment?

Arnold: It was not the 13th Siberian regiment that I deserted from.

Vyshinsky: When were you in the 13th Siberian regiment, before or after your arrest?

Arnold: After. Before my arrest I was not in the 13th Siberian regiment. You may have made a mistake.

Vyshinsky: Of course it's not much use quoting now what you yourself read and signed.

Arnold: I signed it thinking that you had the story straight.

Vyshinsky: That means that I am to blame for this mixup.

Arnold: You have made a mistake. I said that in Leningrad I was at the Alexander III barracks.

Vyshinsky: Your testimony tells a different story.

Arnold: Read it, please.

Vyshinsky: Very well, I shall read it once more: "In 1915 I joined the army. I served in the 13th Siberian regiment. The regimental commander's name was Ivanov. . . ."

Arnold: It doesn't say that this was the first time I deserted. Why, I deserted twice.

Vyshinsky: No, this isn't mentioned here.

Arnold: Well, now I'm adding it.

Vyshinsky: Just as I said, now we're getting additions.

Arnold: The first time, I was sent to the Alexander barracks.

Vyshinsky: And what did they do to you?

Arnold: As a recruit they put me through all sorts of exercises. Before my training was completed I ran off to Finland. I was caught and sent back to the Alexander barracks. After I was caught, I was assigned to the remand squad, pending trial.

Vyshinsky: They sentenced you. . . ?

Arnold: They sentenced me and sent me to the 13th Siberian regiment with a company of reinforcements.

Vyshinsky: Now, that is not what you told us. Did you reach the regiment?

Arnold: I did.

Vyshinsky: The name of the regimental commander was Ivanov?

Arnold: That's right, Ivanov.

Vyshinsky: And the name of the company commander was Vasilyev?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: But you wrote: "I don't remember the name of the company commander."

Arnold: I told you afterwards, but you forgot.

Vyshinsky: No, accused Arnold, you are not such a simpleton as you pretend to be. You know how to submit statements rectifying the errors committed by accused persons. You submitted a statement to the court saying that the name Arnoldov is mentioned here and asking that it be made clear that you are not Arnoldov, but Arnold.

So you don't remember the name of the company commander. Or have you recollected it?

Arnold: First I did not remember and then I did recollect it. I said it at the time and you even expressed surprise: "Also Vasilyev?" you asked. And I answered: "Yes."

Vyshinsky: And who was the sergeant?

Arnold: I don't remember.

Vyshinsky: Strange. Of all people, one is more likely to remember his sergeant than his company commander.

What happened then? Did you serve in the regiment?

Arnold: I did.

Vyshinsky: At the front?

Arnold: At the front.

Vyshinsky: And then?

Arnold: And then they sent me to the rear.

Vyshinsky: How long were you at the front?

Arnold: A month or two. I don't remember exactly.

Vyshinsky: Do you remember the exact place where you were?

Arnold: In the neighbourhood of Stotsmanshof.

Vyshinsky: Was it close to the front?

Arnold: Yes, the front line ran right there, along the river.

Vyshinsky: Was there any fighting where you were? Was there any firing?

Arnold: There was.

Vyshinsky: Did you take part in the firing?

Arnold: I did.

Vyshinsky: Did you take part in the fighting?

Arnold: I did not go into bayonet charges, but I did take part in the firing.

Vyshinsky: Why did you say at the investigation that you did not take part in the fighting?

Arnold: Because I call it fighting when you go into a bayonet charge.

Vyshinsky: Just why is it fighting if there is a bayonet charge, but if you don't charge, but take part in firing, that isn't fighting? In short, when were you telling the truth: now or then?

Arnold: Both then and now. At first I said that I didn't take part in the fighting, as I didn't go into bayonet charges, but when you explained to me that firing is also fighting, then I said that in that case I did take part in fighting.

Vyshinsky: That means you did take part?

Arnold: It means I did.

Vyshinsky: All right, then. You were sent to the hospital. What year was that?

Arnold: That was in 1915, the end of 1915.

Vyshinsky: What name were you going under at the time?

Arnold: It was even the beginning of 1916.

Vyshinsky. Under what name?

Arnold: Under the name of Vasilyev.

Vyshinsky: And why did you say at the investigation that in 1916 you went to work under the name of Kulpenen?

Arnold: Why, I'm still in the army now, I haven't arrived yet, wait a bit, when I arrive, my name will no longer be Vasilyev, but Kulpenen.

Vyshinsky: I am asking you what your name was in 1916. Now you say Vasilyev. Why did you state at the investigation that at the end of 1916 you went to work under the name of Kulpenen?

Arnold: That's right. At the beginning of 1916 I was still in the army and went by the name of Vasilyev, but at the end of 1916 I went to work under the name of Kulpenen.

Vyshinsky: That means that at the end of 1916 you went by the name of Kulpenen?

Arnold: No, you had better take up everything in proper order. You skip things and leave unfilled gaps.

The President: Accused Arnold, I call you to order. Answer the questions of Citizen the Procurator as he puts them to you.

Arnold: I am doing so, but Citizen the Procurator himself skips over things. . . .

The President: I must again explain to you that the Procurator puts the questions and you must be good enough to answer them in the same order in which he puts them.

Arnold: I will. I beg your pardon.

Vyshinsky: I realize, accused Arnold, that it is certainly inconvenient for you when gaps are left. Did you have a different name for every gap?

Arnold: No, but two or three months play a tremendous part in my life.

Vyshinsky: You would prefer me to put questions in such an order as to leave no gaps in your biography?

Arnold: You had better conduct the examination the way you like. Excuse me for having disturbed you.

Vyshinsky: So then, what do we find out, at last? In 1915 you got to the front under the name of Vasilyev. How many months were you there? A couple of months?

Arnold: That's about right, a few months.

Vyshinsky: Did you fall sick or desert?

Arnold: No, first I took sick and was sent to a field hospital. After that they transferred me to Pereyaslav-Zalessky to a hospital; and from the hospital I landed in Nizhni-Novgorod. I was there for two weeks, then they began recruiting for the Lettish battalion. I expressed a desire to join and was transferred to the Lettish battalion at the city of Yuriev.

Vyshinsky: Why did you join the Lettish battalion? Are you a Lett?

Arnold: Because I intended to run away from the army again and therefore I moved nearer to St. Petersburg.

Vyshinsky: Why did you have to join the Lettish battalion for this? You could have gone to Leningrad on your own. You went to Nizhni-Novgorod on your own?

Arnold: No, I was transferred there.

Vyshinsky: In what capacity were you transferred?

Arnold: I had a note from the hospital.

Vyshinsky: To whom was the note addressed? By whom and to whom?

Arnold: I no longer remember; to a barracks somewhere.

Vyshinsky: And so you arrived in the barracks.

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That means you were in the army?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You came there as a soldier?

Arnold: Yes, even as a corporal.

Vyshinsky: But when did you manage to become a corporal?

Arnold: I sewed on the stripes while on the way.

Vyshinsky: That means that you made yourself a corporal?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why didn't you promote yourself to a higher rank?

Arnold: I was afraid I couldn't manage a higher rank.

Vyshinsky: But did you manage the rank of corporal?

Arnold: I did.

Vyshinsky: How did you manage it?

Arnold: I went to Nizhni-Novgorod, and when I recovered, they detailed me, or rather they didn't detail me, but asked who wanted to join the Lettish battalion. I expressed a desire and went.

Vyshinsky: So you went?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: With what rank did you go—as a corporal?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: The documents state that.

Arnold: Yes, it was written there that I was a corporal.

Vyshinsky: That is, you forged the documents.

Arnold: Yes, of course.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, with false documents you entered the Lettish battalion as a corporal?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Where did that Lettish battalion go?

Arnold: The 2nd Lettish battalion was transferred to the town of Yuriev and here I was detailed to the drill squad and drilled recruits.

Vyshinsky: How could you train others? What did you know yourself?

Arnold: What you've read or learned sticks in your ear.

Vyshinsky: How did you come to know anything? Weren't you in hospitals or on the run most of the time?

Arnold: Yes, but what you see and hear, you remember. All that I am saying is the sincerest truth.

Vyshinsky: I cannot believe that you, having been sick and in the hospital, turn up in the battalion, and are suddenly assigned to train recruits; or were you able to manœuvre somehow, to throw dust in people's eyes?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you were not training recruits, but pretending to do so?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When was that, and where?

Arnold: This was at the end of 1915, or the beginning of 1916.

Vyshinsky: As every month is precious to you, tell me when and how it happened, otherwise you will blame me again.

Arnold: It was at the end of 1915, approximately in November or December.

Vyshinsky: Where were you with that rifle battalion?

Arnold: In the town of Yuriev.

Vyshinsky: At the end of 1915, approximately in October-November?

Arnold: Yes, in November-December, 1916. Sorry. 1915. Here I served until the beginning of 1916.

Vyshinsky: What happened to you after that?

Arnold: After that, in August, I got leave of absence and went to Finland.

Vyshinsky: Why then did you make wrong statements at the preliminary investigation, to me at the Office of the Procurator of the Union, and at the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs? You confirmed that in October-November 1915 you were in Yuriev, in the Lettish Rifle Battalion, served until the beginning of 1916, and then went to Finland?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And where did you go from Finland?

Arnold: Here I changed my name to Aimo Kulpenen and went to Minsk.

Vyshinsky: Why did you at the preliminary investigation write: "I must add" (you even thought it necessary to add) "that already in 1915 I deserted the Finland Regiment, but was caught and court-martialed."?

Arnold: That was a mistake.

Vyshinsky: Another mistake? You have got yourself mixed up.

Arnold: It is hard to place each month.

Vyshinsky: You yourself recalled that in 1915 you joined the rifle battalion, were there until 1916, then went to Finland, changed your passport for a new one in the name of Kulpenen and went away; but here you write: "In 1915 I deserted the regiment, was caught and court-martialed."?

Arnold: That was at the beginnng of the year. It works out that way.

Vyshinsky: You said that at the beginning of the year you were in Nizhni, there you signed up in the rifle battalion, that you made yourself a corporal, then went to Yuriev. That is what happened at the beginning of the year. You are muddling things. And so, you adopted the new name of Aimo Kulpenen?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How did you get the passport?

Arnold: I knew that comrade well.

Vyshinsky: Well, and what of it?

Arnold: I went to the parish office, presented a certificate and said that I wanted a birth certificate.

Vyshinsky: With his consent?

Arnold: He did not know.

Vyshinsky: So, when you said that you had obtained the birth certificate by fraudulent means, it was true?

Arnold: I can't see what fraud has got to do with it. He reported me when I deserted the army and I thought that if I used his passport it would not be too high a compensation.

Vyshinsky: You took his passport by fraudulent means?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Took revenge on him?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Incidentally, that was to your advantage?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And where did you go with this passport?

Arnold: To Minsk, as an interpreter. Then I was a clerk in the Statistical Section, and then I went to Vladivostok.

Vyshinsky: Well, and how did you get to Vladivostok?

Arnold: With an army railway pass.

Vyshinsky: Where did you get it?

Arnold: At the Headquarters of the Western Front; I appropriated several of them.

Vyshinsky: You stole them?

Arnold: Yes. In Vladivostok I signed up as a stoker on the S.S. "Tula." I worked on the Kamchatka-Japan trip and back to Vladivostok. Then I went from Vladivostok to Archangel.

Vyshinsky: No.

Arnold: I wanted to go to Leningrad, but landed in Archangel.

Vyshinsky: That means, from Vladivostok you went to Leningrad, and from Leningrad you went to Archangel?

Arnold: That's right.

Vyshinsky: Tell us, what year was that?

Arnold: 1917, August.

Vyshinsky: What government was there then?

Arnold: I did not know what government it was; I did not understand which was which.

Vyshinsky: How is that? The revolution had taken place, and you did not know. Were they Whites or Reds?

Arnold: A White government.

Vyshinsky: So you did understand?

Arnold: They walked about in tsarist uniforms, I couldn't help understanding.

Vyshinsky: Hence it was a White government?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What did you do next?

Arnold: I signed up on an American ship. Arrived in New York.

Vyshinsky: Under what name?

Arnold: Aimo Kulpenen.

Vyshinsky: What did you start doing in New York?

Arnold: I was in New York a few days and then joined the army. The American army.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Arnold: I was recruited.

Vyshinsky: What do you mean, recruited? You, a Russian subject?

Arnold: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: But you did not understand those things?

Arnold: I did not understand, a comrade understood. We found ourselves on 20th Street, they gave us a night's lodging, and it turned out that it was an Army and Navy Home. There they recruited us.

Vyshinsky: In what capacity?

Arnold: As a raw recruit.

Vyshinsky: You were not a corporal there?

Arnold: No, I could not speak English.

Vyshinsky: How long were you in the American army?

Arnold: Altogether, the first time, one year, and then I was discharged.

Vyshinsky: We will get to "then" later. You arrived in the beginning of 1918?

Arnold: At the end of 1917.

Vyshinsky: At the end of 1917 you arrived in New York and got into the American army?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How long were you in it?

Arnold: Exactly a year.

Vyshinsky: Until the end of 1918?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Under what name?

Arnold: Aimo Kulpenen. As soon as we were taken into the army we were naturalized, made American citizens.

Vyshinsky: Against your wishes?

Arnold: With my consent.

Vyshinsky: With your consent?

Arnold: Why not? Since I was in the army. In every army a soldier must be a subject of that country.

Vyshinsky: With your consent, or without your consent?

Arnold: With my consent. And then I changed my name to Valentine Arnold.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Arnold: When I filled out my citizenship papers I asked them to change my name from Aimo Kulpenen to Valentine Arnold.

Vyshinsky: That is when you became Arnold?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In order to appear like an American?

Arnold: Yes, because two persons cannot have the same name.

Vyshinsky: Whose name?

Arnold: Well, Kulpenen was still in Finland, wasn't he?

Vyshinsky: Did you serve a sentence in prison there?

Arnold: I did.

Vyshinsky: How long?

Arnold: Five or six months.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Arnold: I was suspected of appropriating government property.

Vyshinsky: Hence, as soon as you arrived in America, you were at once taken into the army. Is that so?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And then from the army you landed in prison?

Arnold: No, it was in 1922 that I landed in prison.

Vyshinsky: A second time? I am asking you about the first time.

Arnold: No, I was not in prison the first time.

Vyshinsky: You were not in prison the first time?

Arnold: No.

Vyshinsky: You served in the army for a year, and then where did you go?

Arnold: I was demobilized and I wanted to return to Finland.

Vyshinsky: With what passport?

Arnold: I did not yet have a passport in the name of Arnold because I was to have gotten that later.

Vyshinsky: How was that, you said that you were given papers in the name of Arnold?

Arnold: I got my citizenship papers in 1918.

Vyshinsky: Did you have papers in the name of Arnold?

Arnold: No, not yet. I received the first papers in the name of Arnold at the time—I don't know whether there is a document in the records, there is some correspondence dealing with the time I was in the American army the second time, only that was four years later.

Vyshinsky: I am asking you about the first time. The first time

you joined the army at the end of 1915 under the name of Aimo Kulpenen and served until the end of 1918?

Arnold: Until the beginning of 1919.

Vyshinsky: Even until the beginning of 1919? Under the name of Aimo Kulpenen?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: At that time you adopted the name of Arnold?

Arnold: I had already changed my name then, but I had not received my papers.

Vyshinsky: You were demobilized in the beginning of 1919 and you went to Finland. Is that right, or not?

Arnold: No, I did not go to Finland, I wanted to go.

Vyshinsky: With what passport?

Arnold: In the name of Aimo Kulpenen.

Vyshinsky: Thus you had a passport in the name of Aimo Kulpenen?

Arnold: Yes. I had kept the old passport.

Vyshinsky: Had you adopted the new name of Arnold?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And kept the old passport for any contingency?

Arnold: I kept the old one for any contingency.

Vyshinsky: Did you get to Finland?

Arnold: I did not get to Finland, but to South America.

Vyshinsky: How did you get there, by accident?

Arnold: I signed up as a sailor on the sailing boat "Viscount" and got to South America, Buenos Aires. Then I signed up on an American ship and went to Scotland; from there, in January 1920 to New York, and there I again landed in the army.

Vyshinsky: How is that, you landed in the army again?

Arnold: While I was away my citizenship papers were made out in the name of Arnold, and when I arrived I got my papers and citizenship.

Vyshinsky: Hence, while you were travelling your papers were being made out, and when you arrived they were ready for you, and you received them. Is that how it was?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you serve a sentence in prison there?

Arnold: Twice.

Vyshinsky: How many years did you serve in the army?

Arnold: From 1920 to 1923. Then I went to Los Angeles, in California.

Vyshinsky: How is it that you were serving in the army and were in prison?

Arnold: I was in the army and was in prison six months. I was serving in the army and was in prison.

Vyshinsky: When were you in prison the second time?

Arnold: I was not in prison the second time, I was a Commandant.

Vyshinsky: But you said just now that you served prison sentences twice?

Arnold: No, you are mistaken, I was in prison only once.

Vyshinsky: In the first place, you said this during the preliminary investigation.

Arnold: During the preliminary investigation I also said that I had served a prison sentence once.

Vyshinsky: Were you shown your Party file? You were a member of the Party, were you not?

Arnold: I deceived the Party.

Vyshinsky: But at the investigation you also said that you had served prison sentences twice.

Arnold: At the investigation I did not say what I am saying here.

Vyshinsky: As far as I could understand you, you said here that you had served prison sentences twice.

Arnold: But the first time was in Russia, and the second time in America.

Vyshinsky: So it is twice, after all: once in America for appropriating other people's property, and the second time in Russia—what for?

Arnold: For desertion. I was in the remand squad, in Fontanka, No. 80.

Vyshinsky: But there was no such unit. What was this remand squad?

Arnold: I was under arrest and I thought it was the remand squad.

Vyshinsky: But didn't you state in an official document that you had been arrested in Minsk?

Arnold: Oh, that was a lie.

Vyshinsky: It's all lies with you, so that even you cannot tell whether you are lying or telling the truth. Hence, in 1923 you again returned from America to Europe?

Arnold: In 1923 I was in Los Angeles, I made application to join a society that was called Technical Aid Society to Soviet Russia. My application was accepted and I was sent to Siberia in the second industrial group. . . .

Vyshinsky: So you were in the American army from the end of 1917 or the end of 1918.

Arnold: Four years altogether.

Vyshinsky: No, wait, we can't have "altogether." That won't do. At the end of 1917 to the end of 1918 or the beginning of 1919 you were in the American army. Is that right?

Arnold: That's right. Then from 1919 to 1920 I was discharged.

Vyshinsky: Did you take part in the fighting anywhere?

Arnold: No.

Vyshinsky: When you were in America did you do any fighting anywhere?

Arnold: No. In France I was. . . .

Vyshinsky: Where does France come in? You said that from the end of 1917 to the beginning of 1919 you were in the American army, then you were demobilized, then you went to Helsingfors, or wanted to, but did not get there. Instead of that, where did you go?

Arnold: To South America.

Vyshinsky: You were there eight months. Then in 1920, where did you go?

Arnold: Back to America.

Vyshinsky: And, you say, you were there three years: 1921, 1922, and 1923?

Arnold: That's right.

Vyshinsky: And where does France come in?

Arnold: But you did not ask me what I was doing during that year, and so I didn't tell you.

Vyshinsky: No, I did ask you: were you in America? You said: "Yes." You said that you were in America in 1920, were in America in 1921, were in America in 1922 and in 1923. Is that right?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: But where does France come in? France is not America?

Arnold: No.

Vyshinsky: When did you go to France?

Arnold: In 1917 or 1918. I was in the American army.

Vyshinsky: Accused Arnold, you would try even the greatest patience, the patience of an ox. I am not losing patience yet. You may deny what you said at the preliminary investigation on January 9, and what you said at the preliminary investigation in September, but you will not get away from what you said only five minutes ago.

Arnold: You did not understand me.

Vyshinsky: I asked you: while in America from the end of

1917 to the end of 1918 or the beginning of 1919, did you do any fighting? What was your answer?

Arnold: You did not ask me whether I did any fighting. I did not understand you. Between 1917 and 1918 I was in France, but not for long, four months.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you were in America, but during that period you were sent to France?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: With any unit?

Arnold: I was sent to reinforce the Ninth Field Artillery.

Vyshinsky: To the front?

Arnold: I never got to the front.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you did not take part in any fighting?

Arnold: No.

Vyshinsky: Then why did you write that you were wounded in the leg by a shell splinter at Verdun?

Arnold: That was when I was being sent to the front, I did not manage. . . .

Vyshinsky: But Verdun was the front?

Arnold: I consider the front when you are already on the positions.

Vyshinsky: But Verdun was the front, was it not?

Arnold. It was.

Vyshinsky: Were you wounded at Verdun?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: By a shell splinter?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Where did the splinter come from?

Arnold: A bomb was dropped from an aeroplane and I was wounded by shrapnel.

Vyshinsky: Yet you say you were not at the front?

Arnold: Maybe I cannot distinguish between what is a front and what is not a front.

Then I got acquainted with some Russian comrades who belonged to the Technical Aid Society to Soviet Russia, which I had joined, and decided to go to Russia.

Vyshinsky: That is, you also decided to give technical aid to Soviet Russia?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What aid did you give?

Arnold: I came to Kemerovo.

Vyshinsky: With what document?

Arnold: A letter of recommendation written in English.

Vyshinsky: Who gave it to you?

Arnold: The Technical Aid Society to Soviet Russia.

Vyshinsky: And how did they know you wanted to help Russia?

Arnold: I made an application and filled out questionnaires.

Vyshinsky: Yes. That you know how to do. What did you write in the questionnaires?

Arnold: I wrote where I was born, my name and so on.

Vyshinsky: What, did you mention all your names?

Arnold: No, by that time I had only one name—Arnold. Since I joined the American army my name was Arnold.

Vyshinsky: And where was the passport in the name of Kulpenen?

Arnold: I kept it, as an old document.

Vyshinsky: You kept it all the same?

Arnold: I kept it, well, as a museum piece.

Vyshinsky: So you think museums will be interested in your passport?

Arnold: I kept it as a souvenir, because it contains seals from all over the world.

Vyshinsky: Well, to go on, you say you came to Kemerovo. Were you a member of this Technical Aid Society to Soviet Russia?

Arnold: I was not a member, but only handed in an application. Generally speaking, when I came to Kemerovo I was a member of this colonist's organization.

Vyshinsky: What was your religion at that time?

Arnold: I was a Lutheran.

Vyshinsky: Were you never a member of a masonic lodge?

Arnold: I was.

Vyshinsky: How did you manage to get into a masonic lodge?

Arnold: That was when I was in America; I made an application and joined a masonic lodge.

Vyshinsky: Why a masonic lodge, and not something else?

Arnold: I wanted to get into higher society.

Vyshinsky: Did you get into the Technical Aid Society to Soviet Russia while you were still a freemason? Did the masonic lodge help you to get into this society?

Arnold: No.

Vyshinsky: And when you joined this society, did you say that you were a freemason?

Arnold: No, I kept it secret.

Vyshinsky: You kept it secret?

Arnold: Yes, and until I was arrested nobody knew about it.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Arnold: Because I did not need it any more.

Vyshinsky: And when was it needed?

Arnold: It was needed then. In America it was needed but in Soviet Russia it was not needed.

Vyshinsky: I am speaking about America. Did you tell your acquaintances in America that you were a member of a masonic lodge?

Arnold: My acquaintances knew that I was a freemason.

Vyshinsky: Did you attend religious meetings, masonic meetings in America?

Arnold: When I was in America I attended meetings, and later masonic lodges.

Vyshinsky: And did you perform all the masonic rites?

Arnold: I performed what was required.

Vyshinsky: And when you joined the Technical Aid Society did they know about this?

Arnold: I said that I was not a member of any masonic organization, that I did not attend a lodge, and when I joined the Technical Aid Society I did not say I was a freemason.

Vyshinsky: You concealed the fact?

Arnold: I did not exactly conceal it, but nobody asked me about it.

Vyshinsky: In a word, the freemasons did not help you in this matter?

Arnold: No, I got on without them.

Vyshinsky: You came to Kemerovo? And who sent you there from Los Angeles?

Arnold: I was sent as a colonist.

Vyshinsky: What does that mean, as a colonist?

Arnold: Because they were sending a group of American specialists.

Vyshinsky: That is, you too came to the colony which was in Kemerovo?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you were accepted as a member?

Arnold: Yes, that is to say, I was accepted as a member while I was still in America, otherwise they could not have sent me.

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Arnold: That was in October 1923.

Vyshinsky: How long were you in the A.I.C.?

Arnold: All the time the A.I.C. existed. Until 1926, I was only in the Kuzbas.

Vyshinsky: And where did you work?

Arnold: I worked in Kemerovo.

Vyshinsky: On what job?

Arnold: On various jobs: I worked as translator, office manager, and in the commercial department. If it is necessary to enumerate all, I can.

Vyshinsky: Did you join the Communist Party of the Soviet Union when you came from America?

Arnold: I joined the Party in 1923.

Vyshinsky: And at that time you were still a freemason?

Arnold: Yes, but I told nobody about it.

Vyshinsky: That is, you wormed your way into the Party and concealed the fact that you were a freemason?

Arnold: I considered that I had automatically ceased to be a freemason. Since I was not attending and not paying dues I had automatically lapsed.

Vyshinsky: But when you joined the Party you concealed the fact?

Arnold: Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky: And then it was discovered?

Arnold: Yes, it was.

Vyshinsky: What was discovered?

Arnold: It was discovered during the search.

Vyshinsky: And what did the search disclose?

Arnold: There was a small card which showed that I had been a member of a masonic society.

Vyshinsky: And what happened to you next?

Arnold: I was questioned and I said that I had been a freemason.

Vyshinsky: Well, and what next?

Arnold: And now I am answering for it.

Vyshinsky: Accused Arnold, you are not being tried for freemasonry, and you have no business to say that. Tell us, what lodge did you belong to?

Arnold: To the third lodge, third degree, third stage.

Vyshinsky: How was it called?

Arnold: In English or in Russian?

Vyshinsky: No, you had better say it in Russian so that I and everybody in Court may understand.

Arnold: The Ancient Order of Free Masons, the Ancient Free Order, and that I was a Master Mason of such and such a lodge.

Vyshinsky: What lodge?

Arnold: No. 183.

Vyshinsky: Very well. You were not called to account by the Party in this connection?

Arnold: I passed through three purges.

Vyshinsky: Successfully?

Arnold: Successfully. I managed to keep it dark, only I mixed up my biography.

Vyshinsky: And was there not an occasion when for anti-Soviet agitation . . .?

Arnold: That was in Kuznetsk in 1930.

Vyshinsky: Were you called to account or expelled from the Party?

Arnold: I was near to being expelled. I was removed from my job.

Vyshinsky: What for?

Arnold: It was said in the Control Commission that there were rumours that Arnold was carrying on anti-Soviet propaganda among the foreign specialists. I was expelled from the Party for this.

Vyshinsky: And did you really carry on propaganda?

Arnold: And at the same time it was said that I belonged to an organization alien to the Party—the freemasons—but I managed to get out of this.

Vyshinsky: You are a fairly resourceful man in that respect?

Arnold: Resourcefulness does not always help.

Vyshinsky: Whom, you? I ask you, are you a resourceful man?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did it help you?

Arnold: It did.

Vyshinsky: Were you connected with the Communist Party in America?

Arnold: I was, I took part in the work of the Communist Party in 1919.

Vyshinsky: And in the masonic lodge?

Arnold: I was at the same time a member of the masonic lodge.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps the Communist Party helped you to get into the Technical Aid Society to Russia?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, you used your connections along this line too?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: The freemasons did not help you? And what were you really by conviction, a freemason or a Communist?

Arnold: I was just a man.

Vyshinsky: There are various kinds of men. Were you a Communist at the time?

Arnold: I was according to the documents, but I was also a freemason.

Vyshinsky: And according to the documents you were also a corporal.

Arnold: No, I was a sergeant.

Vyshinsky: That was later. I ask you, were you a Communist in reality, by conviction and in views?

Arnold: By conviction I was and I was not.

Vyshinsky: And were you a freemason by conviction?

Arnold: No.

Vyshinsky: That is, you were never one by conviction?

Arnold: No. If the freemasons had known that I was a Russian and not a Lutheran, they would never have accepted me.

Vyshinsky: And are you really a Lutheran?

Arnold: I belonged to the Orthodox Church.

Vyshinsky: Why then do you regard yourself as a Lutheran?

Arnold: There are Roman Catholics, and Greek Catholics, the Lutherans are something else.

Vyshinsky: They are neither Greek Catholic nor Roman Catholic.

Arnold: At any rate, you understand that the Russian religion is something quite different from Lutheranism.

Vyshinsky: That's so. But you were not regarded as a Lutheran?

Arnold: No. As a matter of fact I was christened in the Russian Church.

Vyshinsky: Yet you joined the freemasons as a Lutheran?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That you understand very well. And if you had said that you were Russian they would not have accepted you?

Arnold: No.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Arnold: Because it is against the religion of the Catholics.

Vyshinsky: But not against Protestantism?

Arnold: No.

Vyshinsky: Do you understand these things well?

Arnold: Yes, excellently.

Vyshinsky: You knew that before you joined the freemasons?

Arnold: Yes, I knew it, of course.

Vyshinsky: That is, you had studied the question before?

Arnold: I understood the question very well, because they question you there as they do everywhere else.

Vyshinsky: When did you get into touch with the Trotskyites?

Arnold: In 1932.

Vyshinsky: With whom?

Arnold: When I worked in Prokopyevsk the manager was Shestov. That was where I first got into touch with the Trotskyites.

Vyshinsky: Who put you in touch with them?

Arnold: I was working as manager of the garage. The manager was Shestov, and that is where I got in touch with them.

Vyshinsky: In 1932?

Arnold: In 1932.

Vyshinsky: Did you discuss any Trotskyite affairs with him?

Arnold: When I got to know him I would often go to his office, and he asked me why I was dismissed from the Kuznetsk Combined Works Construction.

Vyshinsky: Why were you dismissed?

Arnold: For anti-Soviet propaganda among foreign specialists.

Vyshinsky: Did he know that?

Arnold: He did. He also knew that I belonged to an organization alien to the Party, to the freemasons. He knew that I was a Finn, that I had changed my name several times. . . .

Vyshinsky: He knew that too?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did he know all your names?

Arnold: No, he knew only Aimo Kulpenen and Arnold.

Vyshinsky: Let us count up how many names you had. Do you remember them all?

Arnold: I do.

Vyshinsky: Vasilyev, Rask, Ivanov intervenes, there was a birth certificate.

Arnold: I was never Ivanov.

Vyshinsky: Then Aimo Kulpenen. Next?

Arnold: Arnold.

Vyshinsky: Is that all?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, four names?

Arnold: Four names.

Vyshinsky: And you were first Vasilyev, then Kulpenen, then again Vasilyev, then again Kulpenen, then Arnold, then again Kulpenen?

Arnold: It works out that way.

Vyshinsky: Did Shestov know these names?

Arnold: He did not know all, he only knew two names.

Vyshinsky: And when did he let you into his criminal plans, into his crimes?

Arnold: I would often go into his office. He said: "I could have handed you over to the authorities long ago. But I do not want to do so because I think that you will be a good man for our organization." Then he said that the organization worked very well.

Vyshinsky: What does it mean—well?

Arnold: Splendid, in a word, that it was developing, our members were already working all over the Kuzbas.

Vyshinsky: How were they working?

Arnold: Performing all sorts of wrecking acts. . . .

Vyshinsky: That is, that their affairs were going splendidly?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And then?

Arnold: And then he told me that they shortly intended to overthrow the present leadership. (*A pause.*)

Vyshinsky: And then?

Arnold: And that it was possible that leaders would also visit our district, and that it was our chief task to commit terrorist acts against the leaders of the government.

Vyshinsky: Well, and what then?

Arnold: He then told me: "I have been testing you for three months. I consider you a man of energy and will. Therefore you have been assigned to perform terrorist acts. I will put you in touch with Cherepukhin for this purpose." He put me in touch with Cherepukhin and said: "Here is a man for the work."

Vyshinsky: For what work?

Arnold: For the performance of terrorist acts. (*A pause.*)

Vyshinsky: What next?

Arnold: Then he left. (*A pause.*)

Vyshinsky: Why have you stopped?

Arnold: At that time, it was in 1933. . . . (*A pause*) What is it you want me to relate?

Vyshinsky: The work to which Shestov assigned you. Your present work?

Arnold: In 1934 several leaders of the government visited our district. I was the manager of the garage and it fell to me to perform terrorist acts.

Vyshinsky: Who instructed you?

Arnold: Cherepukhin.

Vyshinsky: And who instructed Cherepukhin?

Arnold: Cherepukhin was instructed by Shestov.

Vyshinsky: And did you speak to Shestov personally about it?

Arnold: Only later.

Vyshinsky: You did speak to him?

Arnold: I did.

Vyshinsky: What acts did you prepare for?

Arnold: I was told of two places where to commit the terrorist acts: one place was at Pit No. 3, the other place was at Pit No. 8.

Vyshinsky: Well, go on with your story. Why have you suddenly lost your voice? When did you organize the terrorist acts?

Arnold: The first terrorist act was in 1934, at the beginning of the year, or rather in the spring.

Vyshinsky: Against whom?

Arnold: Against Orjonikidze.

Vyshinsky: What was the nature of it?

Arnold: Its nature was that Cherepukhin definitely told me: "Orjonikidze is coming tomorrow. Look here, you must perform the terrorist act and stop at nothing."

Vyshinsky: Well, what then?

Arnold: I agreed to the proposal. The next day I drove up in the car, because, as the manager of the garage, and as a member of the Party, I was above suspicion. I drove to the station. Orjonikidze, Eiche and Rukhimovich got in. I drove them to the German Colony, and they asked me to drive from there to Tyrkan, and when we got to the top of the hill they asked me to stop so that they could take a look at the whole of Prokopyevsk. We then stopped at the combined pit, No. 7-8-9. Cherepukhin had warned me that everything was in readiness there: "You will see an obstacle there and on this obstacle you will cause an accident." And so, when I descended the hill I went at a great speed, about 70 or 80 kilometres an hour, and I saw an obstacle about one and a half kilometres ahead. It flashed into my head at once that this was the place where I was to cause the accident. Not knowing the place, I did not know what would happen to me. . . . So I slowed down and soon stopped, and then turned on to the bridge on the left, although I was to have driven straight ahead.

Vyshinsky: You did not dare?

Arnold: I could not do it.

Vyshinsky: You could not do it, you did not dare? That is our luck. And the second case?

Arnold: One morning Cherepukhin came to my office and said: "Molotov is coming today. Look here, see that you don't muff it this time." I told him that I had not muffed it. He said: "I know how you did not muff it." I then realized that somebody was keeping an eye on me. I replied that I would do it, I drove up to the dispatch office. I knew the place where I was to cause the accident very well; it was near the rise from Pit No. 3. There is a curve there. On this curve there is not a gully, as Shestov called it, but what we call an embankment, the edge of the road, about 8 or 10 metres deep, a drop of nearly 90°. When I came to the station, Molotov, Kurganov, Secretary of the District Committee of the Party, and Gryadinsky, Chairman of the Territory Executive Committee, got into the car. . . .

I was told to drive to the workers' residential quarter through Komsomolskaya Street. I did so. Just as I was leaving the dirt road for the highroad, a car suddenly came dashing towards me. There was no time to think; I had to commit a terrorist act. I see that the other car is flying towards me. Then I realized that Cherepukhin had not trusted me and had sent a second car. I had not much time to think, but I got scared. I managed to turn to the side, into the gully. At that moment Gryadinsky seized me and said: "What are you doing?"

Vyshinsky: What stopped you?

Arnold: Cowardice stopped me.

Vyshinsky: And this thwarted your criminal plans?

Arnold: Yes.

Vyshinsky: I have a question to ask Shestov. Accused Shestov, do you confirm Arnold's testimony regarding the preparations and the attempt on the life of Comrade Molotov?

Shestov: Yes, in the main that is what Cherepukhin told me.

Vyshinsky: On whose instructions was it organized?

Shestov: It was organized on my instructions.

Vyshinsky: On your instructions?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Through Cherepukhin?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And did you speak to Arnold personally before this incident?

Shestov: No, I was at that time working at the Anzhero-Sujensk mine, and therefore Cherepukhin was in charge of all the practical work.

Vyshinsky: The practical work?

Shestov: Yes, the murder.

Vyshinsky: Cherepukhin was in charge?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And did you learn about this act from Arnold after it was over?

Shestov: Yes, it was not until the autumn that he told me about it, at the end of 1934.

Vyshinsky: And under what circumstances did he tell you about it?

Shestov: He came to work at the Anzhero-Sujensk mine.

Vyshinsky: Well, and what of it, why should he tell you about it?

Shestov: I wanted to know how it happened.

Vyshinsky: Did he know that it was done on your instructions?

Shestov: I wanted to know about the matter from the point of view of the technique, why and how.

Vyshinsky: You wanted to know?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, you asked him?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And he explained?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And did you give him instructions to organize an attempt on the life of Comrade Molotov?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: On whose instructions?

Shestov: I had received the directives from Muralov.

Vyshinsky: From Muralov?

Shestov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: May I put a question to the accused Muralov?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky: Muralov, I must verify the testimony on this point once more. Do you admit that you gave instructions to Shestov to organize an attempt on the life of Comrade Molotov?

Muralov: I have already testified that I confirm this.

Vyshinsky: Please understand that I am questioning you in connection with the examination of the accused Arnold. Shestov gave him instructions to organize an attempt on the life of Comrade Molotov. In his turn, Shestov refers to you, and I must verify it.

Muralov: I admit, I confirm it.

The President: Counsel for Defence, Comrade Kaznatcheyev.

Kaznacheyev (to Arnold): Please tell us more precisely how long you belonged to the Trotskyite organization?

Arnold: From 1932 to 1934.

Kaznacheyev: From 1932 to 1934?

Arnold: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: During that time what orders did you carry out? Were they these two attempts to commit terrorist acts?

Arnold: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: What other orders?

Arnold: I did not receive any other orders.

Kaznacheyev: Did you receive orders to recruit people?

Arnold: Yes, that's true, I did. I quite forgot about it. Citizen Procurator, may I tell about this briefly?

Vyshinsky: You may.

Arnold: While I was working in Prokopyevsk, I was ordered by Shestov to find reliable people to work in the garage, that is, chauffeurs. I agreed to this. But I did not engage in this recruiting work. It is true that I took on people, but they were mostly specialists. I took on the foreign specialists. But I did not tell him (Shestov) about this. I took on these men for the repair shop so as to improve the quality of the repairs. When he asked me, "Have you found the people we need?" I said that I had. He said: "When necessary I will tell you, and when necessary you will put me in touch with them." But as he went away, this did not happen.

Kaznacheyev: That is, one may conclude that you were instructed to undertake recruiting, but you took on two employees whom you did not bring into the organization. Consequently, you deceived the person who gave you these instructions. When you committed the terrorist attempt, did you also in both cases deceive, or attempt to deceive? The second incident happened in such a way, as the saying is: he came—and funked it. That is what Cherepukhin said.

Did you talk to Shestov very soon after this act was committed?

Arnold: Very shortly after this act was committed I was summoned to the Regional Committee of the Party. Here my case was discussed, and I was given a reprimand for negligent driving. I tried to get away from this place as soon as possible. Before that I had sent an application to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry to be assigned to work in one of the districts of European Russia. The Commissariat replied, "We can offer you work, report immediately." I reported at the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry about the end of September and they appointed me to Tashkent, where I arrived and requested permission to go to fetch my family. But as I did not like it there, I went to Novosibirsk and met Shestov in the Kuzbas and asked him whether he had any kind of work for me, because I did not like it there. He said that there was work and proposed that I should temporarily take the job of assistant manager of the supply department and that he would afterwards put me into the garage. I put off my departure for Tashkent and went to Anzherka. At first I was assistant manager of the supply department and then I was appointed manager of the garage, which was the last job I held.

Kaznacheyev: When you were instructed to commit the terrorist act, were you warned that if you did not carry it out your life would be in danger?

Arnold: When I gave my consent to commit such an act I was afraid that if I did not carry it out they would suspect me as unreliable and put me out of the way.

Kaznacheyev: That is, you feared revenge?

Arnold: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: And did anybody threaten you?

Arnold: Cherepukhin and Shestov did not say that directly, but they said that if I betrayed them they would put me out of the way.

Kaznacheyev: These hints were made to you by whom?

Arnold: By Cherepukhin, also by Shestov. Shestov also spoke to me in this spirit and warned me.

Kaznacheyev: May I, in passing, put a question to the accused Shestov? Do you confirm this part of Arnold's explanation?

Shestov: Yes, I can confirm that a hint was made to Arnold about his bad past.

Kaznacheyev: Was this hint made when he was being recruited?

Shestov: Somewhat later.

Kaznacheyev: At what time was it? When he was being given the commission, or when he was being recruited?

Shestov: At the end of the recruiting period, that is, when the time was approaching to give him a definite commission.

Kaznacheyev (to Arnold): Now a few questions about your biography. You have said where you were roughly until 1923. And what was your history after that time and until 1933-34?

Arnold: My history was as follows. I worked at Kemerovo eight years, and then in Kuznetsk Works Construction. I worked in Kemerovo as office manager for three years, I was then in charge of water transport, then worked in the commercial department a whole year, and was then in charge of the telephone system.

Kaznacheyev: This was all at Kemerovo?

Arnold: Yes. When the reorganization took place in 1928 and the chemical industry was separated from the Kuzbas, I was assigned to the Kuznetsk Works Construction. This was at the end of 1929 and I worked there until I was dismissed.

Kaznacheyev: So it was for a fairly long period of time?

Arnold: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: Did you join the Party in the Soviet Union or in America?

Arnold: I joined again in the Soviet Union in 1923.

Kaznacheyev: You said at the preliminary investigation that while in America you had connections with the Communist Party. Were you a member of the Communist Party, or not?

Arnold: I was considered a member of the Party, but in Russia I joined again.

Kaznacheyev: And in America you were at one and the same time a member of the Party and a member of a masonic lodge?

Arnold: Yes.

Kaznacheyev: From what motives did you join the masonic lodge in America?

Arnold: On the one hand, I thought that I would mix in better society, and then, purely for the reason . . . how shall I put it, the masons generally enjoy a good reputation and so I joined them.

Kaznacheyev: And what were your motives for joining the Party after that?

Arnold: My motives were that after all I was a worker, and I ought to be together with the workers, so I applied to join the Party.

Kaznacheyev: When you were recruited for the Trotskyite organization, had you any idea, even an elementary one, about their program?

Arnold: They assured me that the Trotskyite organization was strong, that it would come to power, and that I would not be among the last people then.

Kaznacheyev: That is, they said that they would come to power and they would not forget you? I have no more questions to ask.

The President: Adjournment for 20 minutes.

* * *

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: We shall now proceed to the examination of the accused Livshitz.

Vyshinsky: Accused Livshitz, tell us when you resumed your underground, Trotskyite, criminal activities?

Livshitz: Actually, from 1933.

Vyshinsky: Under what circumstances?

Livshitz: I learned about the first meetings and the first conversations on the resumption of Trotskyite work from Loginov at the beginning of 1932.

Vyshinsky: How are we to understand, "I learned about the first conversations on Trotskyite work from Loginov"?

Livshitz: When Loginov returned from Berlin at the beginning of 1932 he told me about his meetings with Pyatakov and about the new instructions he had received from Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: And was this the first fact connected with the resumption of your Trotskyite activities?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Tell us please, what exactly did Loginov tell you about this new line?

Livshitz: Loginov told me the following: that he was in Berlin in 1931 at the time the orders were being placed for industry, and that there he met Pyatakov. Pyatakov had known us for a long time.

Vyshinsky: Whom do you mean by us?

Livshitz: Myself, Loginov, Golubenko, Kotsyubinsky. He told us about the meetings he had had with Smirnov and Sedov, that the struggle which was waged in the period 1923-28 had not yielded any results, and that in view of this Trotsky had now given instructions to adopt other methods of struggle, the methods of terrorism and destructive activities in the economic sphere.

Vyshinsky: Is that what Loginov told you?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Quoting whom?

Livshitz: Quoting Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: Do you mean that Pyatakov instructed Loginov to convey this to you?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, this was not just a conversation between you and Loginov, but Loginov was delivering a message?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And he transmitted this to you as the new line?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What was your attitude towards it?

Livshitz: I did not give Loginov a definite reply, but said that I would meet Pyatakov and hear what he had to say. In the second half of 1932 I met Pyatakov and he repeated in effect what Loginov had told me.

Vyshinsky: And did he speak about terrorism?

Livshitz: About terrorism and destructive work. After my conversations with him, I agreed to resume the active struggle.

Vyshinsky: Let us establish the exact time.

Livshitz: Please.

Vyshinsky: You say that this was in 1932?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When exactly?

Livshitz: In the autumn, or the end of 1932.

Vyshinsky: Either the early autumn or the late autumn?

Livshitz: At any rate in the second half of 1932.

Vyshinsky: Did Pyatakov tell you where he had received Trotsky's new instructions?

Livshitz: He did.

Vyshinsky: Namely?

Livshitz: Namely, that he had met Smirnov in Berlin. There had been conversations with Smirnov and Sedov about this directive of Trotsky's, which he had accepted and had undertaken to transmit and to enlist people whom he knew and with whom he was connected by personal friendship and by Trotskyite counter-revolutionary activities in the past.

Vyshinsky: What post were you then holding?

Livshitz: Chief of the Southern Railway.

Vyshinsky: Did you give your consent?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And what happened next?

Livshitz: When I arrived in Kharkov, I talked it over with my assistant, Zorin.

Vyshinsky: What was his post?

Livshitz: He was my assistant.

Vyshinsky: On the same railway?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why did you talk to him about things of this kind?

Livshitz: I knew him to be secretly a Trotskyite, and that was why I spoke to him. In my conversation with Pyatakov it was agreed to begin by hindering the loading of coal.

Vyshinsky: That is, you began by disrupting the program?

Livshitz: Yes. We had too few cars, not enough for the whole freight. And, in addition, I did not load all the coal and utilized the cars for freight of secondary importance.

Vyshinsky: Did you do this deliberately as part of the plan for carrying out this aim?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What did you achieve by it?

Livshitz: As a result of this, coal accumulated at the pitheads. From time to time commissions from Moscow would come to me and compel us to get the coal away. We would do so, but we would then allow coal to accumulate again.

Vyshinsky: That is, you consciously and deliberately disrupted the transportation of coal?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When did you begin to do this?

Livshitz: During the winter of 1933. I met Pyatakov at the end of 1933 and told him what was happening on the railway. On his part he told me of the existence of the united centre and of the reserve centre, the so-called parallel centre. He then told me that Serebryakov, a member of the centre, had been put in charge of the wrecking counter-revolutionary work on the railways, and proposed that I should get in touch with him.

Vyshinsky: Did you get in touch with Serebryakov?

Livshitz: I did, at the end of 1933 and the beginning of 1934. I told him of what I had been doing on the Southern Railway. At that time I was already appointed chief of the North Caucasian Railway. Serebryakov told me then that he had enlisted for wrecking work on the railways A. M. Arnoldov and Mironov. He also mentioned Rosenzweig or Mirsky.

Vyshinsky: At the preliminary investigation you said both Rosenzweig and Mirsky. Was that a slip?

Livshitz: I might have made an omission at the preliminary investigation. Perhaps I mentioned both.

Vyshinsky: That is, you are now being more exact? At the pre-

liminary investigation you said (Vol XXVIII, p. 27): "Serebryakov told me that he had already begun to restore connections with Trotskyites working on the railways, that he was already connected with Mirsky, Rosenzweig and Arnoldov, who, like myself, had started undermining, wrecking work." So that at the preliminary investigation you spoke rather more definitely about these two—Rozenzweig and Mirsky?

Livshitz: I at that time did not mention the name of Mironov, but I am mentioning it now.

Vyshinsky: Then whom did you discuss with, Serebryakov? And I must warn you that you must speak only what you are certain about, what you quite firmly remember. What names did Serebryakov mention?

Livshitz: Arnoldov, Mironov. . . .

Vyshinsky: That you remember quite firmly? At that time you omitted to mention Mironov?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Accused Livshitz, do you affirm that these two names—Rosenzweig and Mirsky—were also mentioned by Serebryakov, or are you confusing them with other persons?

Livshitz: I affirm that, I hold to what I say.

Vyshinsky: So that you consider that Serebryakov mentioned these names, but that they slipped your memory?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What next? You came to an arrangement with Serebryakov?

Livshitz: At this meeting Serebryakov told me of the work performed by Arnoldov, who was employed in the People's Commissariat of Railways.

Vyshinsky: What was his position at the time?

Livshitz: He was chief of the Car Administration.

Vyshinsky: Very well. Proceed.

Livshitz: He also said that on Serebryakov's instructions Arnoldov was carrying on wrecking work in the traffic department, and that Serebryakov had discussed with him the question of disrupting the freight traffic plan. Then Arnoldov worked to disrupt the exploitation of cars.

Just at this time it was decided to build four new car-repair works. Arnoldov gave the opinion that each of these works would cost from 15 to 20 million rubles and that they could be built and put into operation in one and a half years. It turned out in the end that each of these works cost over 50 million rubles and took about three years to build.

Vyshinsky: Were they deliberately delayed?

Livshitz: Yes. During the same conversation, Serebryakov proposed that the consignments of oil for the spring sowing campaign should be disrupted on the North Caucasian Railway, where I was working. We did not do this, because the consignment of oil was under very strict supervision.

Vyshinsky: You did not succeed in doing this?

Livshitz: We did not succeed because the consignment of oil was under very strict control.

Vyshinsky: But were attempts made to do it?

Livshitz: During my conversation with Serebryakov I told him that this was a very difficult matter. Actually, nothing could be done because a representative of the Council of Labour and Defence was keeping an eye on the consignments. Another job we performed on the North Caucasian Railway was to retain empty cars needed by the Don Railway and the South Eastern Railway, and for coal loadings. On the North Caucasian Railway I enlisted several people in the work, among them Kolokolkin, former chief of the Political Department of the Rostov Traffic Department, who later became the assistant chief and then chief of the Political Department of the North Caucasian Railway.

Vyshinsky: Did you speak to Kolokolkin about other aims and objects, apart from wrecking?

Livshitz: I talked to Kolokolkin about everything. Then I was transferred to Moscow, to the Moscow-Kursk Railway. I did not work there long and was appointed Assistant People's Commissar of Railways.

Vyshinsky: In what year?

Livshitz: In 1935.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet Serebryakov in 1934?

Livshitz: I have spoken about the meeting with Serebryakov in 1934.

Vyshinsky: And that exhausts the subject?

Livshitz: During the second meeting with Serebryakov he mentioned people with whom he was connected.

Vyshinsky: Very well. During this second meeting, did he speak about disrupting the oil consignments in 1934?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Very soon after this you were transferred to a third railway?

Livshitz: I was transferred in May 1935 and remained there two months.

Vyshinsky: You were chief of the Moscow-Kursk Railway?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, in July 1935 you were appointed to the People's Commissariat of Railways?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: While Assistant People's Commissar of Railways, did you continue your connection with the Trotskyite organization and your wrecking activities?

Livshitz: Yes. When I came to Moscow I had meetings with Pyatakov, we discussed the fact that Kaganovich would now get at all the details that were hampering the work of the railways. Pyatakov proposed that the wrecking activities should be conducted more energetically, because although Kaganovich had been only a few months at the People's Commissariat of Railways, the railways had already made pronounced progress. Pyatakov then proposed that I should see Serebryakov once more and discuss what was to be done. The conversation with Serebryakov took place and Serebryakov declared that the chief task was to frustrate the fulfilment of Kaganovich's order setting forth the methods of improving the work of the railways. He explained this by the fact that the railways were the central nerve of the country. Serebryakov further said that he had not broken off connections with Arnoldov, Mironov, Yemshanov and others. He had told them to get in touch with me. In 1935 and in 1936 these people formed connections with me without discontinuing connections with Serebryakov. Mironov, Mirsky and Kupryansky formed connections with me in 1935, and Rosenzweig in 1936. They had received directions from Serebryakov and I repeated the instructions to frustrate Order No. 183, which enumerated the principal measures to be taken to improve the work of the railways.

Vyshinsky: And what did Order No. 183 principally deal with?

Livshitz: Order No. 183 dealt principally with the work of locomotives; it mentioned the chaotic work of the locomotives, described how the work of the locomotive brigades was to be organized, how the work of the depots was to be organized. . . .

Vyshinsky: And finally?

Livshitz: Then there was the question of maintaining constant minimum supplies of spare-parts for locomotives, the question of technical running speed, the terminal-to-terminal time of locomotives, and so forth.

Vyshinsky: Did you personally transmit instructions for disrupting Order No. 183, or did you act only through Serebryakov?

Livshitz: No, no, I also transmitted them. I also repeated these directives.

Vyshinsky: You repeated them. And did all these people, members of the Trotskyite organization on the railways, take measures to carry out your instructions to disrupt the Order, or did they not?

Livshitz: On a number of railways this Order was carried out very badly. On the Tomsk Railway. . . .

Vyshinsky: Was it in connection with your instructions, or independently of you?

Livshitz: Both independently and in connection with.

Vyshinsky: That is, you helped to prevent the carrying out of the order?

Livshitz: Yes. The Tomsk Railway carried it out very badly.

Vyshinsky: And in your capacity of Assistant People's Commissar of Railways, you ought to have done the very opposite?

Livshitz: Not quite. It must not be thought that as Assistant People's Commissar I was engaged only in wrecking work, in that only.

Vyshinsky: No, of course, not in that only.

Livshitz: I also performed useful work. I do not want to talk about that now, because that is not the question. . . .

Vyshinsky: I put that question. I said that in relation to Order No. 183 of the People's Commissar, you should have, as I understand it. . . .

Livshitz: Yes, and not everything I did in connection with Order No. 183 was to disrupt it.

Vyshinsky: And why did you not do everything to disrupt it when that was your aim, when you organized people to disrupt it, when you gave these people instructions to disrupt it? Why did you not do everything to disrupt it, but did some things not to disrupt it? Why?

Livshitz: If I did all that alone, I might be in a position to decide to disrupt everything. But millions, thousands of people are working on the railways.

Vyshinsky: That is, it did not depend upon you?

Livshitz: And not only because it did not depend upon me. I repeat, not everything I did was bad.

Vyshinsky: What induced you to do something good? After all, you were a member of the Trotskyite organization and did that organization set itself the aim of doing good work on the railways, or disruptive work?

Livshitz: Disruptive work.

Vyshinsky: That was your aim? Naturally, you could not do everything in pursuit of this aim; you could not destroy everything. Why?

Livshitz: The aim was not to destroy the railway system to such an extent as to bring it to a standstill.

Vyshinsky: What aim did you set yourselves?

Livshitz: To complicate and hamper the work of the railways.

Vyshinsky: Did you do that? Did not your position as Assistant People's Commissar hinder you doing that?

Livshitz: It did hinder, but I did it.

Vyshinsky: Did you betray your duty to the state?

Livshitz: If I had not betrayed it, I should not now be here in the dock.

Vyshinsky: It happens that people betray for a time and escape getting into the dock.

Livshitz: As you see, I did not escape.

Vyshinsky: You did not escape, because there happened to be vigilant people who put you in the dock. You did not come of your own accord, you were dragged here. I ask you, did you endeavour to frustrate Order No. 183 of the People's Commissar?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you take measures to carry it into effect, or not to carry it into effect?

Livshitz: Since I say that I endeavoured to frustrate it, that means that I worked to frustrate it.

Vyshinsky: And thereby you betrayed the duty you owed to your position. Is that right?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Who helped you in frustrating the Order, who were your immediate assistants?

Livshitz: I have already said, I named Mironov, Knyazev. . . .

Vyshinsky: What were your relations to Knyazev?

Livshitz: Before passing to Knyazev, I want to tell the Court the following. At the preliminary investigation I denied . . . I denied one very hideous thing. . . .

Vyshinsky: Namely?

Livshitz: The question of espionage.

Vyshinsky: True, you did deny it.

Livshitz: A hideous thing, a vile thing.

Vyshinsky: Even worse.

Livshitz: You may call it what you like.

Vyshinsky: You may call it what you like, the question is not what you call it.

Livshitz: The question is not what you call it, but what it is in fact.

Vyshinsky: What do you now want to tell?

Livshitz: For those same reasons I denied at the preliminary investigation my connections with the accused Turok. I want to make a clean breast of it to the Court, although it is a heinous crime, the crime which is called treason to the country. I want to

tell the Court that I knew about this connection of Knyazev and Turok with the agents of a certain foreign power. . . .

Vyshinsky: You knew about it?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How long have you known about it?

Livshitz: From 1935 until my arrest. And not only that, at Knyazev's request I gave him certain materials for transmission to. . . .

Vyshinsky: While you were . . . ?

Livshitz: Assistant People's Commissar.

Vyshinsky: To proceed. When did you learn from Knyazev about this criminal connection, what did you learn from Knyazev, what did you do in connection with what you learned, what assistance generally did you give Knyazev in this crime, how active was the part you took in this crime of Knyazev?

Livshitz: I have already said that in 1935, When Knyazev formed connections with me. . . .

Vyshinsky: Tell us how Knyazev formed connections with you, where, why, under what circumstances, in what connection and in what form?

Livshitz: I already knew about Knyazev from Serebryakov. I knew that he was a secret Trotskyite and belonged to an organization in the Urals. During a conference of railway chiefs, I cannot now recall whether I approached him or he approached me, and we then discussed his activities on the South Urals Railway.

Vyshinsky: What did they consist in?

Livshitz: They consisted in destructive, wrecking, diversive work on the railways. He told me of the train wrecks he had organized.

Vyshinsky: And did other members of the Trotskyite organization on the railways also organize train wrecks?

Livshitz: Apparently, they did.

Vyshinsky: Why "apparently"? Did you yourself give instructions to organize train wrecks?

Livshitz: I did.

Vyshinsky: So not "apparently organized," but organized on your instructions.

Livshitz: I have already said that if I am to answer, yes, I did organize them, then I must say where, when, which.

Vyshinsky: Well, take a concrete case: did Knyazev organize train wrecks on the railways?

Livshitz: He did.

Vyshinsky: Did you give Knyazev instructions to organize train wrecks?

Livshitz: I did.

Vyshinsky: While you were . . . ?

Livshitz: While I was Assistant People's Commissar.

Vyshinsky: You gave instructions to organize wrecks on the railways. And did you talk with Knyazev about loss of life, which is bound to happen in railway accidents?

Livshitz: I do not specifically recall any such talk, but since wrecks are caused on the railways—and there are passenger, military trains and freight trains on the railways—naturally there will be loss of life.

Vyshinsky: You were prepared to incur loss of life?

Livshitz: I was prepared.

Vyshinsky: You were prepared for it. Deliberately?

Livshitz: Since I gave instructions to cause train wrecks, that means I knew what the consequences would be.

Vyshinsky: When you spoke about organizing train wrecks in this same talk with Knyazev, did Knyazev tell you that he was connected with the intelligence service of a certain foreign state?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did he say that this intelligence service was demanding that he, Knyazev, should organize train wrecks?

Livshitz: I cannot now recall. Possibly he did.

Vyshinsky: Comrade President, may I put a question to Knyazev?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky: Accused Knyazev, you had talks with Livshitz?

Knyazev: Yes, I had.

Vyshinsky: Did you talk about the organization of train wrecks?

Knyazev: It was in August 1935.

Vyshinsky: You talked about organizing train wrecks?

Knyazev: That was the initial stage of the talk.

Vyshinsky: Did you propose this method of struggle or did Livshitz?

Knyazev: No, when I met him. . . . Is it necessary to explain how the meeting took place?

Vyshinsky: It is not necessary. You will speak about that in detail when we come to examine you.

Knyazev: When I met him I was already a member of the Trotskyite organization. That was in April 1934.

Vyshinsky: What was your official position?

Knyazev: Chief of a railway.

Vyshinsky: And Livshitz, was he Assistant People's Commissar?

Knyazev: He had only just been appointed Assistant People's Commissar.

Vyshinsky: And you, chief of a railway, meet with your superior and discuss with him how to organize train wrecks?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: And when this talk about train wrecks took place, was he already Assistant People's Commissar?

Knyazev: No, he was not, but I knew that he was about to be appointed Assistant People's Commissar, because during the conference there was already talk in the lobbies that he was selected for appointment as Assistant People's Commissar.

Vyshinsky: And did you have occasion to meet him when he was Assistant People's Commissar?

Knyazev: I did.

Vyshinsky: Did you have occasion to discuss train wrecks with him?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, there was such a situation when you, the chief of a railway, discussed with your superior, the Assistant People's Commissar, how to organize train wrecks on the railways?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: And at that time, did you discuss the fact that the intelligence service of a certain foreign state was also interested in these train wrecks?

Knyazev: We did.

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Knyazev: When we met, as I have said, I had already been a member of the Trotskyite organization for about a year and, consequently, I had already received instructions about disruptive wrecking activities before I met Livshitz. These instructions were to organize train wrecks which put locomotives out of action.

Vyshinsky: That is too detailed.

Knyazev: What I want to say is that this was the general form of disruptive work, and that later I received specific instructions from Livshitz to organize train wrecks on the railway.

Vyshinsky: Was this the Trotskyite line, or the line of the Japanese intelligence service?

Knyazev: It was the line both of the Trotskyite organization and of the Japanese intelligence service.

Vyshinsky: And were you, Knyazev, already enrolled as an agent of the Japanese intelligence service?

Knyazev: I had been enrolled in September 1934.

Vyshinsky: What position did you hold in the Japanese intelligence service since September 1934?

Knyazev I was connected with the Japanese.

Vyshinsky: And at the same time held the position of agent of the Japanese intelligence service?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell this to Livshitz? Did he know about it?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When you talked to Livshitz about the organization of train wrecks on the railways, did you mention that the Japanese intelligence service was demanding the organization of such train wrecks?

Knyazev: I put the matter to him thus: that later, when I had established connections with the Trotskyites, about half a year later, connections were established with a Japanese agent, because during the first conversations I had with this agent. . . .

Vyshinsky: He figures in the indictment, and under what name? Have you read the indictment?

Knyazev: I have.

Vyshinsky: How is he described, as a spy?

Knyazev: No, as Mr. X followed by a dash.

Vyshinsky: Not X——, but H——.

And who is "Georgi Ivanovich?"

Knyazev: That is his agent.

Vyshinsky: What is his nationality?

Knyazev: I think he is a Russian.

Vyshinsky: And what is your nationality?

Knyazev: I am also a Russian.

Vyshinsky: So, "Georgi Ivanovich" was an agent of the Japanese intelligence service and you were an agent of the Japanese intelligence service. Well, proceed.

Knyazev: When I met Livshitz I told him that the line of the Japanese coincided with the line of the Trotskyites with regard to disruptive activities. But the Japanese were demanding secret information, and I simply could not grasp that.

Vyshinsky: What did you not understand, why they were interested in secret information?

Knyazev: Yes. I said that this was going beyond the instructions I had formerly received from Turok.

Vyshinsky: That is, the instructions about disruptive activities?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What did Livshitz reply?

Knyazev: He said that the circumstances of the struggle of the Trotskyite organizations against Stalin's leadership were such that not only must we carry on disruptive activities, but that we must also establish connections with foreign powers.

Therefore, if such connections might facilitate our struggle, then it is quite clear that we have to maintain such connections. Naturally, the information demanded by the Japanese was chiefly pursuing military aims. I told Livshitz what that information was. Livshitz replied that since the Trotskyite organization was connected with foreign governments, this information should be given in order to maintain connections with the Japanese. That was the character of our conversation.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, Livshitz sanctioned your connection with the Japanese intelligence service, linking it up with the aims of the Trotskyite organization, and you continued to act along those lines?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: May I question the accused Turok?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky (to Turok): What do you know about the connections with the Japanese intelligence service?

Turok: I had established connections with the Japanese intelligence service while I was working on the Kaganovich Railway, formerly Perm Railway, in 1934. I had instructions which were agreed upon with Maryasin, to whom I used to report on my Trotskyite activities.

Vyshinsky: And what connections did you have with Knyazev?

Turok: He informed me that he had established connections with the Japanese intelligence service, and I informed him.

Vyshinsky: Why did you have to tell other people of such secret matters?

Turok: Because both I and he were members of the Trotskyite organization and we were in close contact.

Vyshinsky: Where were you working?

Turok: As Assistant Chief of the Traffic Department of the Perm Railway.

Vyshinsky: And Knyazev?

Turok: Knyazev was chief of the South Urals Railway.

Vyshinsky: That was rather far away.

Turok: Yes, but if necessary I can relate how in general connections were established with him in the Trotskyite work.

Vyshinsky: You can tell that later. Do you confirm what Knyazev said about his connections with the Japanese intelligence service?

Turok: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And did you know that Livshitz knew of this?

Turok: I went to see Livshitz on September 15, 1935, and had a talk with him and told him that I was connected with the Japanese intelligence service. Livshitz replied that this connection should

not be broken off, but it should be maintained in the interests of the Trotskyite organization.

Vyshinsky: Accused Livshitz, do you confirm the statements made on this head by Knyazev and Turok?

Livshitz: They are correct in the main.

Vyshinsky: Although at the preliminary investigation you denied them?

Livshitz: I have told the Court why.

Vyshinsky: I only want to make it perfectly clear that when confronted with Knyazev at the preliminary investigation you denied this.

Livshitz: I was not confronted with him.

Vyshinsky: You were not; but you were shown Turok's statement during the interrogation in the office of the Procurator of the U.S.S.R. You denied this point.

Livshitz: I have declared why I now think it necessary to make these statements to the Court.

Vyshinsky: I do not in the least want to minimize the importance of the fact that you have made this declaration; I only want this matter to be cleared up at the trial.

Livshitz: I formerly denied it, but now I have declared to the Court, I have testified to it.

Vyshinsky: You are now giving a truthful statement and confirming what Knyazev and Turok say?

Livshitz: Correct.

Vyshinsky: Tell me: after learning about Knyazev's connections from him, did you have any talks with him, give instructions concerning connections with the intelligence service?

Livshitz: I said that there were not only connections, but that in 1936 he asked me for some material for the Japanese intelligence service, and I gave him the material.

Vyshinsky: Well, and apart from giving him this material then, was there any other occasion on which you saw Knyazev?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: And you did not revert to this with Knyazev any more?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: But did you know that the Japanese intelligence service paid money for the receipt of this information?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: May I put a question to Turok? Accused Turok, are you aware that the Japanese intelligence service paid money for this information?

Turok: No, they did not pay us money for this information, but

in general for the organization of Trotskyite diversive activities we received money.

Vyshinsky: From whom?

Turok: From the Japanese intelligence service.

Vyshinsky: So the Japanese intelligence service met their notes, and in addition paid you in cash?

Turok: I paid out the money. . . .

Vyshinsky: Wait with the paying out, and tell us first: did you receive money?

Turok: Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky: From the Japanese intelligence service?

Turok: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When did you receive money?

Turok: In January 1935—35,000 rubles.

Vyshinsky: What did you do with it?

Turok: I kept 20,000 rubles for my own organization and gave 15,000 for Knyazev's organization.

Vyshinsky: To whom did you hand it over?

Turok: To Knyazev in person, in May 1935.

Vyshinsky: Accused Knyazev, is this correct?

Knyazev: Yes, I received it.

Vyshinsky: Tell me, accused Livshitz, what did you know about the terrorist activities of the Trotskyites?

Livshitz: I knew about the preparations for attempts on the lives of Stalin, Kossior and Postyshev. Nothing else.

Vyshinsky: From whom did you know about this?

Livshitz: From Pyatakov, Serebryakov and Loginov.

Vyshinsky: When did you know about this?

Livshitz: In 1933 and 1935. I knew in 1933 that preparations were being made for an attempt on the lives of Postyshev and Kossior, and in 1935 for an attempt on the life of Stalin.

Vyshinsky: Did you know what preparations were being made for these attempts and who was making them?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: And did Loginov speak to you in general about preparations, or did he tell you that their group was preparing?

Livshitz: He said he was preparing.

Vyshinsky: So you knew who was preparing attempts against whom?

Livshitz: No, he said that the Ukrainian centre—he and Golubenko—were making the preparations.

Vyshinsky: Well, that is just what I am saying—that he, Loginov, and Golubenko were directly preparing a terrorist act.

Livshitz: Organizing it.

Vyshinsky: Yes, organizing it. In regard to Kossior and Postyshev you knew about this directly?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In regard to Comrade Stalin, who was making the preparations?

Livshitz: I did not know who was making the preparations. I knew about the preparations from Pyatakov and Serebryakov.

Vyshinsky: Did Pyatakov and Serebryakov tell you what organization was making the preparations?

Livshitz: The organization of the parallel centre.

Vyshinsky: That the parallel centre was making the preparations?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Who were the members of the parallel centre?

Livshitz: Pyatakov, Serebryakov, Radek and Sokolnikov.

Vyshinsky: Who was making the preparations then?

Livshitz: The parallel centre—Pyatakov, Serebryakov, Radek and Sokolnikov.

Vyshinsky: Also well known people?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you personally know those people who had direct charge of organizing attempts on the lives of Comrades Kossior and Postyshev, and in 1935 on the life of Comrade Stalin?

Livshitz: I understood your question to refer to those persons who were to carry out the attempts. Or to those who were organizing them?

Vyshinsky: Those who were the organizers.

Livshitz: I did not know who were to carry out the attempts in person, but I knew those who organized them.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: Tell us, accused Livshitz: to which of the members of the Trotskyite organization enumerated by you did you give direct instructions regarding the organization of train wrecks?

Livsitz: To Knyazev, Yemshanov, Arnoldov, Turok, Fufryansky, Rosenzweig.

The President: How was your directive regarding the organization of train wrecks carried out by all the persons you have enumerated?

Livshitz: I cannot say at the moment, because I did not receive a report about the train wrecks which they effected, but I know that there were wrecks.

The President: Did Fufryansky engineer wrecks at your instructions, or was he engaged in diversive and wrecking activities?

Livshitz: As regards train wrecks, I cannot say at the moment; I do not know.

The President: In your testimony at the investigation you said that Fufryansky informed you.

Do you confirm these statements of yours?

Livshitz: Yes.

The President: Did these persons whom you have named make you a report about their counter-revolutionary wrecking activities, or did they not?

Livshitz: You were asking about the train wrecks.

Vyshinsky: I want to put in a question: Did they report to you about their activities?

Livshitz: Fufryansky did.

The President: And the others? You had no time to get reports from them?

Livshitz: No, I had no time.

The President: Do you confirm that Serebryakov talked with you on the subject of diversive activities in a pre-mobilization period, with a view to obstructing the movement of troops?

Livshitz: Yes.

The President: When did this conversation take place?

Livshitz: In 1933.

The President: In what month?

Livshitz: In September or October.

The President: On whose initiative did this conversation take place—yours or Serebryakov's?

Livshitz: Serebryakov's.

The President: Did you immediately agree with him?

Livshitz: That is of no matter today.

The President: I ask you: did you agree?

Livshitz: I agreed, but that is of no matter today.

The President: I have asked what I have asked, and you listen attentively to what I am saying. Did you report to your leader Pyatakov about Knyazev being a Japanese spy and Turok also being a Japanese spy, or did you not?

Livshitz: In my opinion Pyatakov knew.

The President: Did he know about it from you?

Livshitz: I did not tell him.

The President: But how did you know that Pyatakov knew that Knyazev was a Japanese spy?

Livshitz: Seeing that Knyazev was in touch with Maryasin, and Turok was in touch with. . . .

The President: With whom?

Livshitz: (Remains silent.)

The President: What were the last diversive instructions about

wrecking activities on the railways which you received from your leader Pyatakov or from Serebryakov before your arrest? What were the last instructions?

Livshitz: I do not remember.

The President: There were instructions which you received in 1933, 1934 and 1935, but in 1936 you had no instructions?

Livshitz: They were the same. There were no new instructions.

The President: But what were the last instructions, if there were no new instructions? What did Pyatakov talk to you about? About wrecking and diversive activities or about some other?

Livshitz: About wrecking and diversive activities.

The President: About diversive activities in the field of railway transport. What were Pyatakov's instructions?

Livshitz: He gave instructions about train wrecks.

The President: Train wrecks—that's number one. What else?

Livshitz: Train wrecks, wrecking of the locomotives.

The President. Wrecking of the locomotives. What else?

Livshitz: Wrecking of the track.

The President: Wrecking of the track—and what else? What methods?

Livshitz: Here it was a question of the non-fulfilment of the plan.

The President: The plan is linked up with repairs. That means not carrying out repairs properly and when required. What other methods of work were contained in the plan of your activities?

Livshitz: There was nothing else.

The President: Now regarding the period of mobilization or a pre-mobilization period: what measures were you contemplating in conjunction with Pyatakov and Serebryakov—without mentioning either stations or lines?

Livshitz: I do not remember.

The President: You don't remember? But perhaps you will think and tell us?

Livshitz: I do not remember.

The President: Did you give definite instructions to Knyazev that it was necessary to organize wrecks, in particular of military trains and troop trains?

Livshitz: In particular, I did not give such instructions—in particular; in general I did.

The President: Did Knyazev report to you that he had succeeded in effecting a wreck at one station, as a result of which 29 Red Army men were killed and 29 Red Army men injured?

Livshitz: Yes, I knew about that.

The President: In general, may I ask, what did Knyazev report about the wreck, and you, did you praise him or censure him?

Livshitz: I did not censure him.

The President: And you did not praise him?

Livshitz: I neither praised nor censured him.

The President: You merely took cognizance of it as an account of activities?

Livshitz: Yes.

The President (to Vyshinsky): Have you any questions?

Vyshinsky: Accused Livshitz, seeing that you have further frankly confessed in court today that you are guilty of espionage, that is to say, have acknowledged yourself guilty to the full extent of all the charges made against you, perhaps you wish today to give more detailed statements in regard to terrorism as well. For example, did you not know more specifically from Loginov what preparations were made for the attempt on the lives of Kossior and Postyshev, who made these preparations?

Livshitz: No, I did not know.

Vyshinsky: Did Loginov tell you only about the fact of the preparations, or did he say anything more specific?

Livshitz: Loginov said yesterday in his testimony in court that there were only general instructions. I confirm what I said at the preliminary investigation.

Vyshinsky: So you did not have more detailed conversations or more detailed information? Loginov did not tell you anything more specific?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: And in regard to the attempt on Comrade Stalin's life in 1935?

Livshitz: No, he did not tell me about that either.

Vyshinsky: Do you not recollect what Serebryakov, for example, told you, who was preparing the attempt?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: There is not very much point in simply knowing what is on foot. You are a member of an organization, and a fairly prominent one. Either you should not have been told at all, or, if you were admitted to the secret, there was some practical aim in view. Otherwise there is no point.

Livshitz: If I had known, I would say so.

Vyshinsky: I ask you to search your memory once again. Is a man named Dedzievsky known to you?

Livshitz: He is.

Vyshinsky: Were you not in touch with Dedzievsky?

Livshitz: He worked on the Southern Railway.

Vyshinsky: Did you know that he was also a member of the Trotskyite terrorist organization?

Livshitz: I knew.

Vyshinsky: Did you give him specific commissions, guiding lines, instructions?

Livshitz: No, I did not. If he received instructions, it must have been from my assistant, Zorin.

Vyshinsky: And you are not aware that Loginov gave him terrorist instructions?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: You are not aware that Dedzievsky was also connected with the terrorist group?

Livshitz: Dedzievsky was in touch with Loginov.

Vyshinsky: Knowing that he was in touch with Loginov, and knowing that Loginov was making preparations for a terrorist act, did it not occur to you that Dedzievsky might have a hand in this affair?

Livshitz: No, I went away. . . .

Vyshinsky: You knew that Loginov was making preparations for a terrorist act; you knew that Dedzievsky, while working in your immediate proximity, was in touch with Loginov. Are these not grounds for assuming that you also knew that Dedzievsky was taking part in Loginov's activities, and Loginov was making preparations for a terrorist act?

Livshitz: But I say that I did not know this.

Vyshinsky: And you did not guess?

Livshitz: I did not know and I do not know.

Vyshinsky: You only know that he was in touch with Loginov?

Livshitz: Yes, but Loginov was not engaged only in terrorist activities.

Vyshinsky: You knew that Loginov was engaged in preparing terrorist acts?

Livshitz: I knew.

Vyshinsky: You knew that Dedzievsky was connected with Loginov.

Livshitz: I knew.

Vyshinsky: Did not this give you grounds for assuming that Dedzievsky was connected with Loginov by terrorist designs?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: And by others. So it did not even occur to you, and Loginov did not speak to you specially about Dedzievsky?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: Very good. Now as regards Glebov-Avilov, did you not know that he was engaged in terrorist activities?

Livshitz: Glebov-Avilov told me about this.

Vyshinsky: So this fact was also known to you from Glebov-Avilov?

Livshitz: Yes, yes.

Vyshinsky: Don't be offended. I am merely verifying the statement made at the preliminary investigation. It is my duty to do this.

Livshitz: I am not offended, I understand.

Vyshinsky: Don't get excited.

Livshitz: I am not excited.

Vyshinsky: So it may be concluded that Glebov-Avilov and Byeloborodov were making preparations for terrorist acts in Rostov?

Livshitz: I knew from Glebov-Avilov that Byeloborodov was making preparations for a terrorist act.

Vyshinsky: Against whom was he making preparations for a terrorist act?

Livshitz: Against Stalin.

Vyshinsky: You knew this?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So Glebov-Avilov together with Byeloborodov were making preparations for a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin, and Loginov against. . . ?

Livshitz: Against Kaganovich and Postyshev.

Vyshinsky: And then you heard from Pyatakov and Serebryakov that another terrorist act was being prepared against Comrade Stalin, but they did not tell you who was to do it and how?

Livshitz: That's so.

Vyshinsky: And you did not try to ascertain yourself?

Livshitz: No.

Vyshinsky: And Byeloborodov?

Livshitz: I am not acquainted with Byeloborodov.

Vyshinsky: So you heard about Byeloborodov from Glebov-Avilov?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So now it will be necessary to ask Byeloborodov himself?

Livshitz: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Nevertheless a certain complex of terrorist facts has accumulated around your case.

Livshitz. All these facts are in the preliminary investigation.

Vyshinsky: I am not saying that I am revealing anything new. I am merely verifying the material of the investigation.

Livshitz: I understand.

Vyshinsky: May I put a question to the accused Serebryakov?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky: Accused Serebryakov, do you confirm the conversation with Livshitz concerning the preparations for a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin?

Serebryakov: If that conversation occurred, it could only have taken place in a most general form.

Vyshinsky (to Livshitz): When did Serebryakov tell you about this?

Livshitz: In 1935 during our conversation in my railway car.

Vyshinsky: Accused Serebryakov, were you in Livshitz's railway car in 1935?

Serebryakov: I was.

Vyshinsky: Did you have a conversation with Livshitz?

Serebryakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What about?

Serebryakov: Mainly about wrecking work on the railways.

Vyshinsky: Were questions of terrorism mentioned there among other things?

Serebryakov: No.

Vyshinsky: You do not remember?

Serebryakov: No.

Vyshinsky: Livshitz?

Livshitz: Yes, I say what I remember.

Serebryakov: I am not saying that such talk might not have taken place.

Vyshinsky: You merely plead that you do not recollect?

Serebryakov: Yes.—Yes, the more so since my conversation took place before I had heard from Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: In this connection I want to ask Pyatakov, since Serebryakov pleads forgetfulness. Accused Pyatakov, do you confirm this?

Pyatakov: I did not inform Livshitz about this specially, but he was informed about the terrorist aims and preparations; but I did not inform Livshitz about any particular preparations.

Vyshinsky: I am not referring to any special organization. Livshitz says that he learned from you that preparations were being made for a terrorist act against Stalin. Did you speak to Livshitz about this?

Pyatakov: I do not remember.

Vyshinsky: You spoke to Livshitz about terrorist acts?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you say against whom the preparations for this terrorist act were being made?

Pyatakov: I spoke to Livshitz about terrorism, but I did not say against whom.

Vyshinsky: You confirm this?

Pyatakov: I confirm it, but as regards preparations for a terrorist act against Stalin, I do not confirm it.

Vyshinsky: Livshitz says he learned that the centre was making preparations for a terrorist act against Stalin. Do you confirm this?

Pyatakov: No.

Vyshinsky: So you did not speak with Livshitz?

Pyatakov: I do not think I did.

Vyshinsky: But Livshitz says that he heard about this from you. You do not confirm this then?

Pyatakov: No, I do not confirm it.

Vyshinsky: Then permit me to ask you: were preparations being made for a terrorist act against Stalin?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You took part in these preparations?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So it is a fact, as Livshitz says, that preparations were being conducted for a terrorist act against Stalin? This is true?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, it follows that Livshitz might have learned about this from someone else?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: But you confirm the fact that preparations were being made for a terrorist act?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky (to Livshitz): Serebryakov and Pyatakov insist that they did not have this conversation with you. Perhaps you did not have the conversation with Pyatakov and Serebryakov, but perhaps with someone else—perhaps with Sokolnikov, or perhaps with Radek?

Livshitz: I did not speak with Sokolnikov, and I made Radek's acquaintance for the first time here, in the dock.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, you did not know of his existence, did not know that Radek existed?

Livshitz: No, I knew of him, knew of his existence, but I was not acquainted with him.

Vyshinsky: If Pyatakov and Serebryakov deny this, then, looking at the question objectively, who of the accused now seated here—or perhaps of those who will sit here in the future—who may know, who knew about this and could have told you?

Livshitz: I can answer that both have forgotten about it, because I did not talk to other people on this matter, so that if I knew I could only have learned it from them.

The President (to Radek): You raised your hand. Do you want to say something in connection with this?

Radek: Yes.

The President: You may.

Radek: When we, the members of the centre, spoke with the members—with such important members of the organization as Livshitz—we did not speak about details, we mentioned neither place, nor time, nor group. We mentioned however the group of persons against whom the acts were aimed. Just for this reason the difference of opinion may lie in the fact that Serebryakov or Pyatakov did not say that the act would be carried out at once, or in a month, or in six months, but among persons as important as Livshitz we used to talk, and just for this reason Livshitz cannot be telling an untruth about such things as an attempt on the life of Stalin.

Vyshinsky: Accused Livshitz, were you confronted with Pyatakov on January 17, 1937? Incidentally this will have bearing on the accused Pyatakov, so I will ask him to pay attention to this declaration. At the confrontation the question of terrorism was also referred to. *(Reads):* "*Question to Pyatakov:* Did you give Livshitz directives concerning terrorism and wrecking on that occasion? *Answer:* It is difficult to recall exactly at what time I gave Livshitz these directives. *Question to Pyatakov:* Is this to be understood in the sense that in general you gave such directives to Livshitz? *Pyatakov:* Of course, this conversation with him took place."

At the end: "*Question to Pyatakov:* Did you inform Livshitz about the preparations that were being made for terrorist acts against the leaders of the C.P.S.U.? *Pyatakov's answer:* Whether I spoke specifically about this, I do not recall, in any case Livshitz knew about the terrorist activities which the centre was carrying on." Is this correct?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, you confirm that Livshitz knew about the preparations of terrorist acts against the leaders of our Party and government, and, consequently, against Stalin.

Pyatakov: I confirm that this was directed against certain persons, among them being Stalin.

Vyshinsky: How did Livshitz learn this?

Pyatakov: From me, among others.

Vyshinsky: So it may be said that Livshitz could state that he knew?

Pyatakov: No.

Vyshinsky: For me the question is clear. Livshitz spoke with you about terrorism?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That the parallel centre was making preparations for terrorism?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That preparations for terrorism were being made against the leaders of the C.P.S.U. and, consequently, against Stalin?

Pyatakov: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So there was such a conversation with Livshitz?

Pyatakov: Of course.

Vyshinsky: So Livshitz could conceive that when speaking about the terrorist act, you informed him that this terrorist act was being prepared against Stalin as well?

Pyatakov: That is just what I am talking about.

Vyshinsky: In my opinion the question is clear.

The President: The Court is adjourned till 11 tomorrow morning.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

MORNING SESSION, JANUARY 27, 1937, 11.00 A.M.

Commandant: The Court is coming. Please rise.

The President: The session is resumed. Comrade Vyshinsky, have you any questions to put to Livshitz?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions to put to the accused Livshitz?

Braude (to Livshitz): During the first conversation with Knyazev regarding his relations with the Japanese intelligence service did you mention the names of the persons from whom you had learned about this?

Livshitz: No.

Braude: And you did not mention Pyatakov?

Livshitz: No.

Braude (to Knyazev): Did Livshitz tell you that the source of this information was Pyatakov?

Knyazev: I recollect precisely that when I saw Livshitz he knew about my connections with the Trotskyite organization and my relations with the Japanese. Pyatakov told him about this.

Braude: Accused Livshitz, when Knyazev came to you and told you that the Japanese intelligence service demanded that train wrecks be effected, did he tell you this by way of information, or did he ask for sanction?

Livshitz: By way of information.

Braude: Accused Knyazev, how was this? Did you come with the information or in order to find out how the Trotskyite organization regarded the proposal made to you by the Japanese intelligence service?

Knyazev: I told Livshitz as follows: that in connection with the Japanese the latter stipulated two conditions—to carry on undermining work and to provide a number of data. Although Turok said that it was absolutely necessary to do this, nonetheless I wanted to make sure once again whether it had to be done.

Braude: So you asked for sanction from the Trotskyite organization? The stand to be taken was not quite clear to you? What did Livshitz answer?

Knyazev: He told me that this resulted from the logic of the struggle of the Trotskyite organization.

Braude: Accused Livshitz, tell me please: in connection with the question put by Knyazev as to whether the Trotskyite organization would sanction the wrecking of trains, did you not speak about the stand which the Trotskyite organization would take in the event of war against the Soviet Union?

Livshitz: I do not recall any such conversation with Knyazev.

Braude: Accused Knyazev, do you not remember what Livshitz said regarding the stand the Trotskyites would take in the event of war?

Knyazev: (Remains silent.)

Braude: Did he not tell you that the members of the Trotskyite organization would themselves fight against the Soviet government with arms in their hands?

Knyazev: At the investigation I made a detailed deposition. This question came up between us during lengthy conversations with Livshitz, and his answer—or rather the way he explained these connections with the Japanese—was that now all hopes were banked on bringing matters to a head, in the form of a war with some one of the foreign powers.

Braude: You said this yesterday.

Knyazev: That in this war the Trotskyites would pursue a defeatist line and by combining all internal forces hostile to the Soviet power and to the Party, utilizing these forces, the Trotskyites would even be compelled to deliver a stab in the back in order to undermine the success of the war in this way. That was the spirit in which he spoke.

Braude: I have no more questions either to Livshitz or to Knyazev.

The President: Have you any questions, Comrade Vyshinsky?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: We will pass on to the examination of the accused Knyazev. Accused Knyazev, do you confirm the depositions which you made at the preliminary investigation regarding your counter-revolutionary activities?

Knyazev: I confirm them fully.

The President: Comrade Vyshinsky, have you any questions?

Vyshinsky: Accused Knyazev, when did you begin your counter-revolutionary activities?

Knyazev: In April 1934. Up to then I had never belonged to the Trotskyite grouping, but I experienced waverings as early as 1930-31 on questions of industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture and the work of the railways. And from these waver-

ings I lapsed into views which did not separate me from the views of the Trotskyites.

Vyshinsky: That was as early as 1930?

Knyazev: Yes, in 1930-31.

Vyshinsky: So at that time it was the bad work of the railways that upset you and aroused your doubts? Right?

Knyazev: All the time I held high posts as traffic manager on a number of railways, and I more than any other of the railway officials came in contact with that branch of the managerial work which is decisive in railway transport. And for my part I regarded this question from the viewpoint that it was impossible to improve the work of the railways by the methods that were then being employed.

Vyshinsky: And did you know at that time that there were people on the railways who were endeavouring in every way to aggravate the situation on the railways?

Knyazev: Permit me, I want to give details.

Vyshinsky: No, no details. Answer the question.

Knyazev: And besides this I knew that at that time Turok. . . .

Vyshinsky: In 1930?

Knyazev: Yes, in 1930 Turok, with whom I was working on the Kazan Railway and with whom I more than once had such conversations of an anti-Party and anti-state character—I knew that Turok had belonged to the Trotskyite opposition since 1926, but I did not know whether he was taking active part in the Trotskyite struggle.

Vyshinsky: I am not asking you about Turok just now. In 1930 did you know that there were all sorts of wrecking groups on the railways?

Knyazev: I knew this; there were trials going on at that time.

Vyshinsky: So you knew that the railways were working badly because they were made to work badly?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: Why did you say that you were influenced in your waverings by a lack of confidence in the strength of the railways, when you could see that these railways were being deliberately wrecked by anti-Soviet people?

Knyazev: These waverings of mine were fostered and developed in me, as I have said, systematically in conversations with Turok.

Vyshinsky: So Turok made systematic attempts to influence you in an anti-Soviet direction?

You were not yet in the Party at that time?

Knyazev: I was in the Party. I do not want to accuse Turok in any way, I only want to state the facts.

Vyshinsky: When did you enter the Party?

Knyazev: I have been in the Party since 1918.

Vyshinsky: Were you unable to offer any opposition to Turok on your part? Why did you yield to his attempts to influence you?

Knyazev: I don't know why I yielded, but at that time I was still working honestly.

Vyshinsky: I am not asking you how you were working at that time. I put another question to you. I ask you: why did you yield to the anti-Soviet influence of Turok? Can you answer my question?

Knyazev: I considered that the Trotskyites—as Turok told me about the views of the Trotskyite opposition—were right in their struggle against the Party, and that they could solve these problems on the railways in another way. That was it, mainly.

Vyshinsky: In 1926 were you against the Party and against the Soviet state?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: Did you take part in this struggle of the Trotskyites against the Party?

Knyazev: I took part in the struggle against the Trotskyites.

Vyshinsky: So at that time you were not yet a Trotskyite?

Knyazev: I was not.

Vyshinsky: How did Turok feel out your weak spot so as to convert you into a Trotskyite?

Knyazev: You see, at the time when we saw each other in 1934, he was already working in the Urals, while I had also come to the Urals and was appointed chief of the South Urals Railway, and during the splitting up of the Perm Railway I had, as far as I can remember, three conversations with him. Turok recommenced in the same strain the talk about the policy of the Party on industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. I well remember each of these conversations.

Vyshinsky: You had several conversations during which Turok tried to influence you? What sort of conversations were these?

Knyazev: In effect, these were counter-revolutionary conversations.

Vyshinsky: And they exercised a certain influence over you?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Do you not think that you were to some extent prepared for this by your past?

Knyazev: Since 1930.

Vyshinsky: And prior to 1930?

Knyazev: Not further back than that.

Vyshinsky: Tell me, were you not a member of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries?

Knyazev: I was a sympathizer of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Vyshinsky: And before the Lefts?

Knyazev: The Socialist-Revolutionaries had a Left wing at that time.

Vyshinsky: The Left wing—is not that the same as the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries?

Knyazev: I was merely a sympathizer.

Vyshinsky: From what year to what year?

Knyazev: From 1917 for about sixteen months, I believe.

Vyshinsky: So you adhered to the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, in particular to the Left wing? Right?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: Where were you living at that time, in what town?

Knyazev: In the army, at Yaroslavl.

Vyshinsky: At Yaroslavl? In what year was that?

Knyazev: In the latter half of 1916.

Vyshinsky: And where were you at the time of the Whiteguard Socialist-Revolutionary Menshevik mutiny?

Knyazev: I was also in Yaroslavl.

Vyshinsky: Did you take part in the mutiny?

Knyazev: No, I was at that time in hiding.

Vyshinsky: And did you take part in the suppression of the mutiny?

Knyazev: Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky: So at that time you adhered to the platform of Soviet power?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And later you entered the Party?

Knyazev: Yes. Because the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries took action, and this criminal act I forsook the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and joined the Party.

Vyshinsky: So up to 1930 you had waverings, and in 1934 you joined a group of Trotskyites under the influence of Turok?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Permit me to ask Turok. Accused Turok, do you confirm Knyazev's reference to you as the man who drew him into the Trotskyite organization?

Turok: No, as regards 1931 I do not confirm this; as regards 1934, I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: You drew him in?

Turok: I did.

Vyshinsky: And did you have a conversation in 1930 on the subject of Trotskyism?

Turok: No, that was in 1931.

Vyshinsky: You were already a Trotskyite at that time?

Turok: I was.

Vyshinsky: An active one?

Turok: No, I had not officially joined any group, but I adhered to Trotskyite views.

Vyshinsky: You were a concealed Trotskyite?

Turok: Yes, a concealed one.

Vyshinsky: Being concealed means that you did not come out openly? Did you try to influence anyone?

Turok: I had conversations with Knyazev on the subject.

Vyshinsky: You did not talk with anyone else?

Turok: I do not recall any other people at that time.

Vyshinsky: You did not try to influence anyone at that time?

Turok: No.

Vyshinsky: During your whole life you only tried to influence Knyazev?

Turok: In 1931 Knyazev was the only one; afterwards there were a number of others about whom I will speak later.

Vyshinsky: Since you tried to influence people, to draw them into the Trotskyite organization, does this mean you were an active Trotskyite or not an active one?

Turok: An active one.

Vyshinsky: And so you enticed Knyazev?

Turok: In 1934—yes; I drew him into the organization.

Vyshinsky: And when did you begin to entice him?

Turok: Properly speaking, I did not entice him. My talks with Knyazev regarding Trotskyite views were mutual.

Vyshinsky: So it was he who enticed you?

Turok: I do not know who enticed whom, but in general we did not have any great arguments.

Vyshinsky: The ground was prepared?

Turok: Unquestionably.

Vyshinsky: But a conversation in 1931 did take place?

Turok: Yes, there was a conversation in January 1931.

Vyshinsky: Do you not remember on what grounds you began your attempts to influence Knyazev?

Turok: On questions of the industrialization of the country and collectivization.

Vyshinsky: I am not asking on what questions you talked. Why did you turn your attention to him?

Turok: We were working together on the Kazan Railway at the beginning of 1931. During one of our conversations I spoke to him about there being very great complications and difficulties in our country in connection with collectivization, difficulties of food supply in the countryside and the towns. Knyazev also gave me

to understand that he regarded these complications as a result of the incorrect policy of the Party.

Vyshinsky: And on this basis began your closer acquaintance?

Turok: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Sit down, Turok. Accused Knyazev, proceed. In 1934 you joined the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary underground organization?

Knyazev: Permit me first to tell something about internal activities the Trotskyite organization was connected with, and then proceed to its external connections.

Vyshinsky: First of all, tell me what you did as a member of the Trotskyite undermining organization, and whether you did anything?

Knyazev: I will deal with this in detail.

Vyshinsky: Did you take part in diversive and wrecking activities on the railways?

Knyazev: I did.

Vyshinsky: What kind of activities?

Knyazev: The organization of train wrecks, damaging the permanent way and locomotives; the aim pursued was to undermine the work of the Urals industry, especially metallurgy. The Trotskyites on the South Urals Railway sabotaged the program for the repair of the railway track. Instead of investing the funds assigned in the reconstruction of the track by whole sections, we diffused them on work on separate kilometres.

Thus they did not give the required effect, and the track continued to deteriorate. The aim in view was to bring about a large number of train wrecks.

The second form of undermining work was disorganizing the repair of locomotives, paying less care to the locomotives, so as to put them out of action in the long run. All these methods of undermining work were endorsed by Livshitz in 1935. At the same time Livshitz said that we must now pass from general methods of undermining activity to train wrecks involving loss of human life. I thereupon asked Livshitz whether we Trotskyites could really be against the working class, against the population in general. Livshitz said that it was a question of a very fierce struggle against Stalin, that we must cause the Party leadership to become completely discredited in the eyes of the people, and, by a number of separate blows against the population, cause embitterment against Stalin, against the government, and create the impression among the population that the government, was to blame for all this.

Such was his stand regarding the new policy of train wrecks with loss of life.

After my return to the line I told the members of the organization who were on my line at that time; on the line administration were Levin, assistant manager of the traffic department, Dolmatov, manager of the maintenance department, Bochkarev, my inspector, and engineer Shcherbakov. At my instructions these persons formed an organization on the line directly at the place of work. I knew the leading members of these organizations on the line. In particular there was the permanent way manager of the Vyazovaya-Zlatoust section, Korolkov, the permanent way manager of the Shumikha section, Bordovich, the station master on the same section, Markevich, a number of his assistants—Vaganov, Rykov, Rodin; at Kurgan, the permanent way manager Novikov, and the permanent way manager of the Ufaleya section, Pavlovsky. These were the men in the maintenance department.

In the traffic department there was Lizunov and a number of his assistants, and Shibayev, the station master at Kurgan. As I said, there was the Shumikha station master, Markevich, the traffic inspector Kuznetsov, Khrebtov on the Zlatoust section, the assistant station master Romanov, and Fadeyev, the station master at Kosyrevo. That is all, in so far as the traffic department was concerned.

In the traction department the following were drawn into Trotskyite undermining counter-revolutionary work: on the Kurgan section—Nikolayev, chief of the depot, Andreyev, his assistant, and engineer Starostin, besides Mogilny, a foreman of the locomotive service. On the Zlatoust section there was the locomotive foreman Sumin, and in the Chelyabinsk depot engineer Kolbik. As far as I remember, engine-driver Granin.

These persons formed the cadres of my Trotskyite organization on the South Urals Railway.

When I told Levin, Bochkarev, Shcherbakov and Dolmatov, after my return from Moscow and my meeting with Livshitz, that the task now was to organize train wrecks with loss of human life, Levin said there and then that this could be organized with the help of Markevich, the station master at Shumikha.

On October 27 (our conversation had been in the latter half of August) a train wreck took place at Shumikha. It was organized in the following way: Markevich had a number of assistants. . . .

Vyshinsky: What kind of train was wrecked?

Knyazev: A troop train.

Vyshinsky: Do you remember the number of the train?

Knyazev: No. 506 or 504.

Vyshinsky: Troop train No. 504, according to the findings. Did you draw up these findings?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did these findings of yours reflect the real state of affairs?

Knyazev: I gave an incorrect explanation, a false one. I concealed the fact that this train wreck was done by the Trotskyite organization.

Vyshinsky: What circumstances helped to conceal the real state of affairs?

Knyazev: As far as I remember, I was in Kurgan at the time. I was told there had been a train wreck at Shumikha. I thereupon left for Shumikha by special train, and went straight to look at the scene of the smash. When I arrived there, the assistant station master Vaganov came up to me and from the hints he dropped I understood that this was the work of Markevich.

I grasped at once that this was the work of our organization. It had been organized directly by Kolesnikov, the head switchman on duty at the arrival switches. He had ordered Chudinova, a girl apprentice on duty at that time, to turn arrival switch No. 14 onto a track that was occupied. Since this apprentice did not understand what the correct position of the switches should have been, she carried out his instructions.

An old skilled switchman who was standing at the switch on the track along which the train should really have arrived was meanwhile sent off by Kolesnikov to clean the glass on the lamps.

Vyshinsky: And who was left at the switch?

Knyazev: There was no one at the switch. The train, travelling at high speed, about 40 or 45 kilometres an hour, sped off down the eighth track, on which a freight train of ore was standing.

Vyshinsky: How many were killed?

Knyazev: Twenty-nine Red Army men, and 29 were also injured.

Vyshinsky: Injured severely or slightly?

Knyazev: I cannot say at the moment.

Vyshinsky: This did not interest you?

Knyazev: I was interested, but I cannot say exactly just now.

Vyshinsky: You, the chief of the line, were not interested how many men were injured and how?

Knyazev: I undoubtedly knew this.

Vyshinsky: You, the chief of the railroad?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You arrived at the scene of the wreck?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: Here was a train wreck quite out of the ordinary,

involving a large number of victims—Red Army men killed, Red Army men injured—and you, the chief of the railroad, do not know whether the injuries were severe or slight?

Knyazev: At that moment I undoubtedly knew.

Vyshinsky: If you knew, you ought to remember, or was this not the only such train wreck on your line? Don't evade the question.

Knyazev: There were train wrecks, but not such big ones as this.

Vyshinsky: You do not remember if these twenty-nine Red Army men were badly mutilated?

Knyazev: About fifteen were badly mutilated.

Vyshinsky: But what sort of serious injuries were there?

Knyazev: They had arms broken, heads pierced. . . .

Vyshinsky: Heads pierced, arms broken, ribs broken, legs broken?

Knyazev: Yes, that is so.

Vyshinsky: This happened by the grace of you and your accomplices?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And do you know how the preparations for this train wreck were organized?

How were forces distributed, how was the train wreck itself organized?

Knyazev: Rykov, the acting station master, received word from the dispatcher at Chelyabinsk that a troop train was coming through, and he told Kolesnikov, the head switchman, to "get ready to receive it."

Vyshinsky: What did Rykov say?

Knyazev: Rykov said that a troop train was coming, and we must cause a train wreck, route it so as to "prepare it wrongly."

Vyshinsky: Not "prepare it wrongly," but receive it wrongly?

Knyazev: Prepare it wrongly and thereby see that it was wrongly received.

Vyshinsky: Did not you say it more simply: "The train must be wrecked"?

Knyazev: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: Can't you remember?

Knyazev: I do not remember.

Vyshinsky: Let me remind you. (*Reading.*) "Two or three stations before Shumikha station, the acting station master Rykov received a message from the man on duty at Chelyabinsk station that train No. 504 was due to arrive at Shumikha station. Having received this message, Rykov informed Markevich that a troop train was coming, saying: "We'll start action at once."

"After this Rykov summoned the head switchman Kolesnikov and warned him that a troop train was coming and it had to be wrecked."

Not "get ready to receive it"—it was said directly, exactly, specifically: "Wreck the train." Consequently, direct instructions were given: "Get ready for mass murder." And whom did you utilize for this purpose?

Knyazev: The apprentice switchman Chudinova.

Vyshinsky: Was she also one of the conspirators?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: So you chose as your tool a person quite aside from the organization? Had she started work on the railway shortly before?

Knyazev: Only about two weeks before.

Vyshinsky: And so you sent an apprentice with two weeks' experience to receive a troop train? According to railway service regulations, is that permissible?

Knyazev: Impermissible.

Vyshinsky: So you violated the law, violated the regulations in the eyes of everyone?

Knyazev: Correct.

Vyshinsky: But why was such a violation of railway service regulations possible? Was it not because the administration of the station was in league with the Trotskyites?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: Name these persons.

Knyazev: Markevich, the station master, Rykov, the acting station master, Vaganov, assistant station master, Rodionov, assistant station master, Kolesnikov, head switchman.

Vyshinsky: Five.

Knyazev: Switchman Bezgin.

Vyshinsky: Six.

Knyazev: And then there was also the permanent way manager of that section, Brodovikov.

Vyshinsky: Yes, and the chief of the railroad himself. Correct. So twenty-nine plus twenty-nine—fifty-eight casualties. Twenty-nine killed and the rest maimed. Proceed.

Knyazev: Seeing that there had been such a bad train wreck. . . .

Vyshinsky: No, is that all as regards the organization of the train wreck?

Knyazev: No. I want to tell about. . . . The question arose how to cover up the traces of this affair.

Vyshinsky: We will pass on to that somewhat later; for the

present I want to ask the Court's permission to include in the findings of the case a report about the train wreck at Shumikha station, during which one locomotive and eight cars were smashed, a report where it is recorded that twenty-nine Red Army men were killed: Kryuchkov, born 1910, collective farmer; Sochilin, born 1913, collective farmer; Kolesnikov, born 1912, collective farmer; Terekhov, born 1913; Khrapunov, Agapkin. . . . All, except the workers Ivanov, Kolesnikov and Ginkin, were collective farmers, all were born in 1913. And twenty-nine Red Army men injured. All Red Army men of the Ryazhsky district, Moscow region. Are these names familiar to you?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You made inquiries? You looked through the list?

Knyazev: I drew up the list myself.

Vyshinsky: You expressed regret? Sighed and groaned? Grew angry? Were indignant? As the former chief of the railroad who engineered train wrecks, who murdered passengers, workers, collective farmers, Red Army men?! I have no more questions now.

Member of the Court Rychkov: I am interested in the question of whether you were enlisted first in the Trotskyite organization or as an agent of the Japanese intelligence service.

Knyazev: The Trotskyite organization.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Were there attempts to enlist you as an agent of the Japanese intelligence service before you joined the Trotskyite organization?

Knyazev: Yes, in 1931, when a group of Japanese specialists were working on my railroad, but I categorically refused.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Categorically refused?

Knyazev: Yes.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Did you report this to the proper authorities?

Knyazev: No, I did not.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Why?

Knyazev: I find it hard to say why I did not report it, but two days after the conversation this Japanese specialist left for his native country, so I considered that the conversation had come to an end of itself.

Member of the Court Rychkov: So you do not deny that attempts were made to enlist you in the Japanese intelligence service as an agent in 1931?

Knyazev: No.

Member of the Court Rychkov: But you refused and did not report this to anyone?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Member of the Court Rychkov: And after 1931 did you correspond with the man who tried to enlist you?

Knyazev: I did not write to him, but I received two or three letters from him.

Member of the Court Rychkov: From the depositions of Turok at the preliminary investigation it appears that he enlisted you in the Trotskyite organization knowing that you were an agent of the Japanese intelligence service. Was this so?

Knyazev: He did not speak about my being an agent of the Japanese intelligence service, but he knew of this conversation, and Turok himself told me that this person had told him to bear me in mind.

Member of the Court Rychkov: At the preliminary investigation you stated that you gave your consent to take part in the activities of the Trotskyite organization only because you were afraid that Turok would inform against you as an agent of the Japanese intelligence service. Correct?

Knyazev: No, he did not tell me that he would expose me as an agent of the Japanese intelligence service. During the course of all these conversations he spoke about our previous conversations, and then gave me to understand that he knew about my conversations with this Japanese, and that if he wanted to make use of this conversation for the purpose of proving my connection with the Japanese, it would be difficult for me to prove that I was not connected with the Japanese.

Member of the Court Rychkov (to Turok): When you enlisted Knyazev in 1934, did you know of his connections with the Japanese intelligence service?

Turok: It was known that in 1930, when he was working on the Kazan Railway and a group of Japanese specialists were working there, these negotiations were conducted with them.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Well, so was he enlisted or not?

Turok: I do not know that. I know that such conversations were held and that the person who had these conversations with me frequently spoke well of him and was on good terms with him, but I do not know whether he was enlisted or not.

Member of the Court Rychkov (to Knyazev): What spying information was handed over to the agent of the Japanese intelligence service by you in person? Was information given regarding mobilization plan?

Knyazev: It was given.

Member of the Court Rychkov: So you revealed to the Japanese intelligence service certain data on mobilization plans?

Knyazev: A number of data.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Concerning one railway?

Knyazev: Concerning the South Urals, Perm, Transbaikal, Ussuri and East Siberian Railways.

Member of the Court Rychkov: How many train wrecks were engineered by the Trotskyite organization under your leadership?

Knyazev: From thirteen to fifteen train wrecks were organized directly by us.

Yes, but the increase in train wrecks was undoubtedly connected with the wrecking activities of the Trotskyite organization in the other branches of industry as well. I remember in 1934 there were altogether about 1,500 train wrecks and accidents.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Along what lines were your wrecking activities directed?

Knyazev: Along the lines of disrupting track maintenance. Seeing that the traffic on the South Urals Railway consisted of heavy rolling stock, I understood very well that if. . . .

Member of the Court Rychkov: What did you do specifically in the way of wrecking the permanent way?

Knyazev: The ballast of the roadbed was weakened, which led to the subsidence of the track. This resulted in rails snapping.

Member of the Court Rychkov: And as a result were there train wrecks?

Knyazev: From these causes there were train wrecks on the stretch between Yakhino and Ust-Katav in December 1935, also between Yedinover and Berdyaush in February 1936.

Vyshinsky: Were there any victims as well?

Knyazev: There were, among the train guards.

Member of the Court Rychkov: A head guard and a senior guard were killed?

Knyazev: Yes.

Member of the Court Rychkov: That is to say, in the first place wrecking of the permanent way?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Member of the Court Rychkov: And secondly?

Knyazev: In the traffic department.

Member of the Court Rychkov: How was wrecking work carried on to destroy the locomotives?

Knyazev: Powerful locomotives of the FD type were introduced in the Kurgan depot. Taking advantage of the fact that not much was known about them in this depot, the management deliberately slackened the supervision of current repairs, frequently compelled the engine-drivers to leave before repairs were completed. Almost all the water gauges were reduced to a ruinous condition. As a result of this neglect, a boiler burst in January 1936

on the Rosa-Vargashi stretch. As far as I remember, the engine-driver's mate and the fireman were killed, while the engine-driver was thrown about 30 metres away. The engine was put completely out of action. All these undermining, wrecking activities in the Kurgan depot were conducted by Nikolayev, Andreyev, Starostin and Mogilny, and in the Zlatoust depot by the locomotive foreman Sumin.

Member of the Court Rychkov: The Party and the government supplied the railroad with powerful locomotives, and you Trotskyites spoiled them, put them out of action?

Knyazev: Yes.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Put them out of action?

Knyazev: Yes.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Tell me, did Livshitz give you no instructions as regards a sabotage policy on questions of wages?

Knyazev: He did not.

Member of the Court Rychkov: On not paying wages at the right time?

Knyazev: No, he did not.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Accused Livshitz, when you were chief of the North Caucasus Railway, did you engage in sabotage in regard to wages, in regard to the financial policy?

Livshitz: Yes.

Member of the Court Rychkov: Through whom did you do this?

Livshitz: Through the head of the finance department.

Member of the Court Rychkov: His name?

Livshitz: Krein.

Member of the Court Rychkov: In what did your sabotage consist, regarding the wage policy?

Livshitz: Not remitting the money in time.

Member of the Court Rychkov: So you deliberately held up the workers' wages. Correct?

Livshitz: Yes.

Member of the Court Rychkov: What were you trying to achieve by this?

Livshitz: Discontent.

Member of the Court Rychkov: The discontent of the workers? And on whom did you lay the blame?

Livshitz: Not on anybody. They laid it on us. On the management.

Member of the Court Rychkov: How did you explain to the workers that you did not pay wages for two or three months at a time?

Livshitz: No explanation was made.

Member of the Court Rychkov: You did not explain and you did not even want to explain it? And Knyazev did not give such a line?

Livshitz: No.

Member of the Court Rychkov: I have no more questions.

The President: Has the defence any questions?

Braude: Yes. Tell us, accused Knyazev, did you have three conversations with Turok regarding your activity?

Knyazev: Yes, we met in 1934 and afterwards also.

Braude: Did you consent when Turok first proposed that you follow up your statement by joining the Trotskyite organization?

Knyazev: The first time I refused.

Braude: The first time you refused. Now, between April 10 and 15, according to your testimony, you had a second conversation with Turok regarding the work of the Japanese intelligence service. At that time you consented to join the organization?

Knyazev: At that time I gave my consent.

Braude: Did I understand you to say you would not have joined if Turok had not mentioned that he knew about your conversation with agents of the Japanese intelligence service and that he would expose you?

Knyazev: Allow me to relate. . . .

Braude: Tell us, did this play an important part in your joining the organization?

Knyazev: Of course, it played a part.

Braude: But what actually happened, what conversations did you have in 1929 and 1930 with representatives of the Japanese intelligence service? Were they in the form of concrete proposals to work for them or were they preparatory to your subsequent work?

Knyazev: These conversations were in 1931, as I have stated, two days before the final departure of a group of Japanese specialists from the Soviet Union upon termination of their contracts with the Soviet government. One of the groups of Japanese specialists which were in the Soviet Union came to me. This group, as is known, consisted of the following specialists. . . .

The President: You do not have to mention names.

Knyazev: And a number of other specialists. These other specialists came to me to thank me for our joint work and for the facilities that had been provided for the Japanese specialists on the Kazan Railway. They told me that the Japanese government would like the feeling of good will which they had encountered here on the Kazan Railway and especially on my part, to remain as a pleasant recollection, and they expressed their thanks for all

this to the government as well. Then, at the close of the conversation, Mr. H—— said to me: "Perhaps you would not refuse at times to undertake to supply certain data regarding Soviet railways for the Japanese government?" I sensed that this was a perfectly undisguised question of espionage and categorically refused, declaring that I would not abuse my business connections and there could be no talk of other proposals. With this our conversation ended.

Braude: Relate briefly how this recruiting was carried on.

Knyazev: In September 1934 a man, 40 to 45 years of age, came to visit me in Chelyabinsk and said that he had come on behalf of Mr. H——. I met Mr. H—— himself in 1935, and in Moscow in 1936 when he arrived for diplomatic work, to occupy a diplomatic post at . . .

Vyshinsky: I would ask that the accused be warned. . . .

The President: Accused Knyazev, there have been repeated warnings concerning the manner in which the open sessions are to be conducted.

Knyazev: But I am not mentioning any names.

Braude: Accused Knyazev, tell me please, did the stranger who visited you at your office and described himself as the representative of Mr. H—— invite you to join in a categorical form?

Knyazev: He told me that he had arrived on the instructions of Mr. H—— and said that he wanted to continue the conversation that was broken off in 1931. I told him that there could be no conversations on this subject and ordered him to clear out immediately, otherwise, I said, I would inform the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

Braude: How did he react to that?

Knyazev: He then tried, as we railwaymen say, "to put the wind up" me, but I would not yield. Seeing that nothing was coming of it he said that Mr. H—— had asked him to say that connections with the Japanese would no longer be maintained as separate individual action but that it followed logically from the methods of struggle employed by the organization with which I was connected, and as far as he could understand from the information he had received from Mr. H——, this organization also had some connections with Japan. Consequently, my connections with Mr. H—— would no longer bear the character which frightened me in 1931. Connections of the organization were already a fact. Then he went on to say that the forms and the tasks which would be set later on did not run counter to the tasks of this organization. I asked the stranger what sort of tasks these were. He enumerated the same things that Turok had, namely undermining work on the railways, wrecks, damaging of locomotives, sabotage

in industry. And for the first time I remember he said it would be desirable to obtain information on how many troop trains had gone through to the Far East during 1934.

Braude: You did not answer my direct question. When you tried to refuse and said that you would turn the unknown citizen over to the authorities of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. did he make any direct threats to you?

Knyazev: He told me bluntly that I was connected with the Trotskyite organization.

Braude: And what would happen if you refused?

Knyazev: That it would not be to my advantage.

Braude: What precisely?

Knyazev: That in one way or another the Party and organs of justice would be informed.

Braude: You were told that the Japanese intelligence service would expose your belonging to the Trotskyite organization?

Knyazev: Yes.

Braude: At the preliminary investigation you gave a fairly specific answer in this connection. (To the President.) Allow me to read it.

The President: You may.

Braude: You, accused Knyazev, in the preliminary investigation said: "Having been placed in a hopeless position and fearing that my criminal activities as a member of the Trotskyite organization would be exposed, I gave my consent to work on behalf of the intelligence service." Is that right?

Knyazev: That is right.

Braude: You informed the Court that when Turok recruited you for the Trotskyite organization he intimidated you and threatened to expose your connections with the Japanese intelligence service.

Knyazev: Yes.

Braude: Next, when Turok recruited you for the Trotskyite organization he referred to the fact that he had information regarding your conversations with the representatives of the Japanese intelligence service?

Knyazev: Yes.

Braude: And now the representative of the Japanese intelligence service, when he recruited you, referred to the fact that he already knew of your organizational connections with the Trotskyite organization?

Knyazev: Yes.

Braude: Who reported this reciprocal information, who established this close connection of information between Turok and the Japanese organization?

Knyazev: I think that in one conversation that I had with the representative of Mr. H——. . . .

The President: Accused Knyazev, I call you to order.

Braude: But let us assume that this conversation with this Mr. H—— became known to Turok.

Knyazev: When I had my conversation with Mr. H—— he did not refer to Turok. But afterwards, when I met Turok, in the latter half of September, 1934, and told him that a representative from Japan, from Mr. H—— had been to see me and asked him his opinion of the matter, Turok said that he was also connected with this Japanese and that he had duly reported the fact to Maryasin. Maryasin had told him that this connection was properly established and that it was approved of by Pyatakov. Therefore (that was what he told me) I consider that there were no other ways of informing the Japanese who belonged to the Trotskyite organization.

Braude: Did you have any meetings with Mr. H—— himself after your conversation with that representative of Mr. H——?

Knyazev: In April 1935 I received a letter from Mr. H——.

The President: Citizen Knyazev, I think you ought to know how to refer to this representative of the Japanese government. In the indictment he is referred to as Mr. H——. Why do you trip up on this every time?

Knyazev: It is very hard.

The President: Try to remember.

Knyazev: Very well. I received this letter from Japan, from Mr. H——, in which he wrote that he was going to London on diplomatic business and asked me to meet him when he passed through Sverdlovsk. This I did. In Sverdlovsk I received a telegram saying what train he was travelling on and giving the number of the train. I went to Sverdlovsk to meet him but first I went to Turok and asked him whether he knew that this Japanese Mr. H—— was coming. Turok said that he knew about it, but since a meeting in the train was not a very convenient matter, Turok refused to go, as everyone knew him, and we agreed that I would go and meet him personally. I met Mr. H—— on the train in his compartment. In our conversation Mr. H—— told me that he well knew of my connections with the Trotskyite organization and that the Trotskyite organization was now carrying on activity in the Soviet Union with the assistance of Japan. "We," he said, "help each other, consequently what we shall ask from you is nothing more than a return for the help which we render the Trotskyite organization."

He also told me that undermining work did not satisfy the Japanese and that it was necessary to undertake acts of diversion, especially with regard to troop trains bound for the Far East, in order to demoralize the Red Army. As a matter of fact, the activities outlined by Mr. H—— were later confirmed by Livshitz.

The Japanese described this as pursuing the object of demoralizing the army when it moves to the East, whereas the Trotskyite organization describes this diversive work as undermining the authority of Stalin and the Party leadership, inciting the people against the Party and thus rousing anger among the people, although I must say frankly that this anger was roused, not against the Party, and not against Stalin, but against those who engaged in wrecking trains.

Braude: Thus, you engineered train wrecks upon the instructions of the Japanese intelligence service and of Livshitz, the Assistant People's Commissar of Railways.

Knyazev: Yes.

Braude: Did you report on what you carried out to any one of your superiors or to both at once?

Knyazev: After I had established connections with Livshitz I mostly followed the instructions Livshitz gave me, because he had the most authority for me.

Braude: But you also reported to the Japanese?

Knyazev: Yes.

Braude: Briefly tell us about yourself. Who was your father?

Knyazev: My father came of peasant stock. He worked for hire all his life.

Braude: Your father was a coachman, and your mother worked on a farm?

Knyazev: Yes.

Braude: Where did you work?

Knyazev: In the first years I was a tailor and a carpenter, then at the age of 20 I went to work on the railways, and beginning as a clerk I rose to the post of chief of a railway line and assistant chief of a Central Administration of the People's Commissariat of Railways.

Vyshinsky: You were a tailor at one time?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you have your own workshop?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: But a card of yours was found with the inscription "Knyazev, tailor." What is the meaning of that?

Knyazev: That was merely a card, nothing more. I was 20 years old then.

Vyshinsky: You had no workshop?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: And how did you, a tailor, happen to become a railwayman?

Knyazev: At the age of 20 I was taken on at the Vspolye station as a car recorder. During this time, beginning with 1917, when I returned from the army. . . .

Vyshinsky: I must return to a number of questions dealing with Knyazev's spying activity.

The President: Have you many questions? Perhaps you will ask them after the recess?

Vyshinsky: I relinquished my turn, but I did not relinquish the interrogation; naturally it will take a good deal of time.

The President: Certainly, but in that case perhaps you will do it after the recess?

Vyshinsky: As you wish.

The President: Adjournment for 20 minutes.

* * *

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: Comrade Vyshinsky, have you any questions?

Vyshinsky: I want to go back to the train wrecks. You mentioned here quite a number of cases of wrecking. The train wreck on February 7, 1936, on the Yedinover-Berdyaush section was carried out on your instructions?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was anyone prosecuted for that train wreck?

Knyazev: I think not, except for the fact of a reprimand.

Vyshinsky: No one was prosecuted?

Knyazev: No, no one.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Knyazev: As I have already said, all the traces were covered up, to put it plainly, in railway traditions. . . .

Vyshinsky: No, not railway traditions, but criminal, counter-revolutionary activity.

Knyazev: Railwaymen have a notion that if a rail splits no one on the road is to blame.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, they attribute it to objective causes?

Knyazev: They did not find the culprits.

Vyshinsky: Have they found them now?

Knyazev: Now they have found them.

Vyshinsky: Who was to blame?

Knyazev: I was.

Vyshinsky: How about the wreck on the Yakhino-Ust-Katav section?

Knyazev: The same thing.

Vyshinsky: On your instructions?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was anyone prosecuted?

Knyazev: No one was prosecuted.

Vyshinsky: For the same reasons?

Knyazev: For the same reasons.

Vyshinsky: It was covered up?

Knyazev: Exactly.

Vyshinsky: On February 27 there was a train wreck at Chistaya Chumlyak station; was that also on your instructions?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Your organization?

Knyazev: Our organization.

Vyshinsky: Was anyone prosecuted?

Knyazev: I believe not.

Vyshinsky: It was covered up?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You covered it up?

Knyazev: It was not I who covered it up.

Vyshinsky: Who was the chief of the line?

Knyazev: It was covered up by those who conducted the investigation.

Vyshinsky: Who was the chief of the line?

Knyazev: Knyazev.

Vyshinsky: There is an order to the effect that the chief of the line himself must go to the scene of the train wreck and investigate.

Knyazev: My assistant went.

Vyshinsky: But there was nothing for you to investigate. You knew all about it?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Then, there was a train wreck at Logovushka station in 1936. Was anyone prosecuted?

Knyazev: I believe that a foreman was removed for a short time.

Vyshinsky: As regards criminal prosecution?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: It was covered up?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: It was concealed?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was the train wreck on May 13, 1936, on the Rosa-Vargashi section also on your instructions?

Knyazev: Yes, I already spoke of it.

Vyshinsky: Were the actual culprits or anyone else prosecuted?

Knyazev: I believe Nikolayev, a foreman, was prosecuted.

Vyshinsky: Was he tried?

Knyazev: He was tried.

Vyshinsky: Was he to blame?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: Did you have a hand in that matter?

Knyazev: I did.

Vyshinsky: So an innocent man was tried?

Knyazev: I don't remember, I. . . .

Vyshinsky: That means you not only organized train wrecks that caused loss of human life, but you framed innocent people like Chudinova, like the engine-driver Fedorov. You shuffled the facts of the evidence and put innocent men on trial. Is that right?

Knyazev: As far as I know the engine-driver Fedorov was not tried in that case.

Vyshinsky: As far as I know, he was tried.

Knyazev: Nikolayev and Andreyev were tried.

Vyshinsky: The whole blame was laid on Fedorov?

Knyazev: It was.

Vyshinsky: That's just what I am saying. On January 18, 1936, the wreck of train No. 910 at Chumlyak station was engineered—on your instructions?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: By members of your organization?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Were criminal proceedings instituted against anyone?

Knyazev: I believe an engine-driver was prosecuted.

Vyshinsky: No one was prosecuted?

Knyazev: Greine, I believe, was prosecuted.

Vyshinsky: As far as I know no one was prosecuted because you and your accomplices presented the matter as though objective causes were responsible and no one was to blame.

Knyazev: I cannot affirm that.

Vyshinsky: But you can affirm the previous cases?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That means that we may draw the following conclusion: you not only organized train wrecks, but taking advantage of your position as chief of the line, you deliberately fabricated incorrect documents which misled the investigating organs and the courts. Is that right?

Knyazev: Citizen Procurator, I think I have replied to everything, and have spoken clearly, I do not deny things.

Vyshinsky: This "everything" does not satisfy me. I do not want "everything." I want each one separately. "Everything" will be said by the Court in its verdict. At present, the case is being tried, and "everything" is not enough for me. Am I right?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: In a number of cases, some of which have been mentioned now, you acted in a criminal manner in order to hide the real culprits, in order to lay the blame on individuals who were actually not to blame. Is that right or is it not?

Knyazev: It is quite right. I can add that the underlying purpose of all the undermining activities was not the purpose which Serebryakov spoke of here, it was aimed at organizing a disruption of transportation and organizing the causes. I cannot understand why Livshitz is silent and Serebryakov continues to deceive the Supreme Court.

Vyshinsky: Don't get indignant over Serebryakov. Just at present we are discussing your crime. Were you chief of the South Urals Line throughout 1935, at the time when the train wrecks occurred?

Knyazev: Yes, until October 1936.

Vyshinsky: Is it true that in 1935, 46 persons were killed and 51 were injured in train disasters which you organized? Do you confirm these figures?

Knyazev: That is correct.

Vyshinsky: And in 1936, 17 persons were killed and 103 injured?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Total: 63 persons killed and 154 injured in train disasters which you personally organized?

Knyazev: Not personally, but most of them were connected with the activities of our Trotskyite organization.

Vyshinsky: Most of them, did you keep count of them?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: The figures I have mentioned, are they probable?

Knyazev: I confirm them.

Vyshinsky: Now, as regards connections with the Japanese intelligence service. And so you saw George or "Georgi Ivanovich" in 1935 and Mr.—— in. . . .

Knyazev: I saw Mr. H—— in May, and in December I saw "Georgi Ivanovich."

Vyshinsky: Is he the same as George or is that someone else?

Knyazev: The same.

Vyshinsky: And in 1936?

Knyazev: In 1936 I saw "Georgi Ivanovich" and Mr. H——.

Vyshinsky: I ask that the accused be called to order.

The President: Accused Knyazev, I call you to order for the fourth time, I warn you not to mention names.

Knyazev: It's that letter H. . . . If you only used some other letter.

Vyshinsky: If you are worried by the surname H——, then

call him X. This Mr. X met you in 1936 as you said in reply to the question of your counsel?

Knyazev: Yes, on October 23, 1936.

Vyshinsky: The same Mr. X that tried to recruit you in 1931?

Knyazev: That's right.

Vyshinsky: You refused?

Knyazev: I refused.

Vyshinsky: Why did you refuse?

Knyazev: Because if I had not subsequently become involved in the Trotskyite struggle I would never have formed connections with the Japanese.

Vyshinsky: That means that you became connected with the Japanese as a member of the Trotskyite organization, that is, not because of your individual personal character, but carrying out a definite policy?

Knyazev: That's right.

Vyshinsky: In 1936 you corresponded with this Mr. X?

Knyazev: In August I received a letter from Mr. X. He wrote that. . . .

Vyshinsky: Did he say in that letter that he wanted to see you?

Knyazev: He did.

Vyshinsky: Did he say in that letter that he wanted to see you in Moscow?

Knyazev: He did.

Vyshinsky: Did he not say in that letter that he hoped that an opportunity would soon present itself?

Knyazev: He did.

Vyshinsky: Thus, he wrote you that he wanted to renew his meetings with you?

Knyazev: Yes, renew them.

Vyshinsky: Did he write that he was coming to Moscow to work in a certain institution of his government?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: He wrote you all that?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did he write that he expected an answer from you soon?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you receive such a letter?

Knyazev: I did.

Vyshinsky: Did you keep the letter?

Knyazev: No, I did not keep it. When I received it I left it in my desk drawer.

Vyshinsky: It disappeared?

Knyazev: It disappeared from my desk.

Vyshinsky: We have a certified photostat of that letter that was taken at the time from your desk. I ask the Court to bear this out. I would like this photostat to be shown to the accused Knyazev. Let him say whether he recognizes the handwriting of Mr. X. Accused Knyazev, the full name beginning with the letter H is written there, so that you will kindly forget about it; and it also contains the address. Kindly do not mention it. Tell us whether that is the letter, whether that is the handwriting.

Knyazev (examining the photostat of the letter): Yes, that is it. Can I mention the telephone number?

Vyshinsky: The telephone number? What for? You aren't going to talk to him by phone now. You seem to have acquired a sort of conditioned reflex.

And here is an original letter dated December 15, addressed to you—to Comrade I. A. Knyazev: "I would very much like you to send me . . ." etc. . . . "My best wishes." Signature. On the right side is an annotation in the language of the nation to which the writer belongs. Is it your annotation or his annotation?—December 15.

What year does the letter belong to and do you likewise recognize the writing of this Mr. X? (He hands a letter to the members of the Court. Then the Commandant hands the letter over to the accused Knyazev who examines it.)

Knyazev: If I remember rightly it belongs to 1931.

Vyshinsky: This letter was in your possession?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You kept it from 1931?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Out of carelessness?

Knyazev: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: Why did you not destroy it?

Knyazev: I do not know.

Vyshinsky: It got stuck away somewhere among papers?

Knyazev: In a book somewhere.

Vyshinsky: And how did it happen to be in a book?

Knyazev: Obviously I read it and stuck it there.

Vyshinsky: So that now we may consider that we have documentary confirmation of your activity in conjunction with Mr. X, not only based on your testimony and on the testimony of Turok but also on the documents now in our possession.

Did these gentlemen give you instructions on what to do in case of war?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Through whom? Through "Georgi"?

Knyazev: Through "Georgi Ivanovich." And then in October

1936 when I met Mr. X here in Moscow he again told me that "evidently you deliberately do not want to prepare for anything and in the first place we set you the task of preparing cadres for wartime so that by means of these cadres it will be possible to organize a number of diversive acts during the movement of troop trains bound for the Far East."

Vyshinsky: And he spoke to you about arranging to set fire to military depots in case of war?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did he mention anything else to be done in case of war?

Knyazev: Yes, we had a long conversation. Allow me to set it forth in detail.

Vyshinsky: No, we will have a long talk about it at the session *in camera,* but for the present answer briefly, did he mention anything else to be done in the event of war?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What was it you talked about?

Knyazev: About setting fire to military depots, about setting fire to the supply points for troop trains and as far as I remember, in October, when my conversation with Mr. X took place, he strongly stressed the necessity that "we not only set the task of merely causing fires, but if necessary, of even contaminating the cars which are assigned for the transport of military detachments."

Vyshinsky: Contaminating with what?

Knyazev: Bacteria.

Vyshinsky: What bacteria?

Knyazev: He told me that they would provide these means.

Vyshinsky: But what were they to be used for?

Knyazev: To contaminate the troop cars.

Vyshinsky: To infect them?

Knyazev: Yes, to infect them.

Vyshinsky: The troop trains and canteens?

Knyazev: And points of embarkation.

Vyshinsky: But sanitary treatment was mentioned here.

Knyazev: That's just what I am saying, before the troops are embarked. The cars are made ready 24 hours ahead of time, at specific points where they are washed with hot water and then dried, and in the course of this sanitary treatment. . . .

Vyshinsky: That is to say, they are cleaned?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And what must you do?

Knyazev: Infect them.

Vyshinsky: And then fill those cars with people, infect the people, so that they will get sick and die?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Mr. X proposed this to you?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: He promised to provide the bacteria at the proper time?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What was the gist of his conversation with you regarding the event of war, at that time?

Knyazev: According to data in his possession, war between Japan and the U.S.S.R. is inevitable. . . .

Vyshinsky: When?

Knyazev: He did not mention a definite date.

Vyshinsky: Approximately when?

Knyazev: I figured in 1937.

Vyshinsky: In the near or distant future?

Knyazev: In the near future.

Vyshinsky: He prepared you and the whole Trotskyite espionage organization to help them?

Knyazev: Not only through me, he evidently had extensive connections.

Vyshinsky: He had other connections besides you?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And did he inform you of the purpose?

Knyazev: For the purpose of properly organizing forces for Trotskyite destructive activities. He emphasized that these forces were extremely weak.

Vyshinsky: Where were you working then?

Knyazev: I was in Chelyabinsk in December and in 1936 I was transferred to Moscow, to the Traffic Department.

Vyshinsky: When did this conversation take place?

Knyazev: In 1936, when I was working in Moscow.

Vyshinsky: What post did you hold?

Knyazev: Assistant chief of the Central Traffic Department.

Vyshinsky: Had you many levers in your hands for the carrying out of your criminal designs?

Knyazev: When I was transferred to the People's Commissariat of Railways, I had fewer levers, because I was not connected with the lower personnel, but regardless of this my organization on the line remained.

Vyshinsky: Tell me, what department is in charge of servicing cars in operation for the run?

Knyazev: The traffic and rolling stock divisions.

Vyshinsky: It does concern the traffic division?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you were assistant chief of the traffic division?

Knyazev: Of the department.

Vyshinsky: Through the department you managed the service on the road?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That means that this was directly related to your official duties?

Knyazev: Partly.

Vyshinsky: Who was chief of the traffic division?

Knyazev: Golovin.

Vyshinsky: He also took part?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: Who took part among your subordinates?

Knyazev: The forces on the spot.

Vyshinsky: Was Serebryakov concerned in this matter?

Knyazev: I do not know whether Serebryakov was or not, since this conversation was in 1935—at the time I was concerned with various data which, as Livshitz confirmed, had been handed over to me. I told him then that the Japanese were after us to get ready for wartime.

Vyshinsky: Did Serebryakov say that?

Knyazev: No, it was Livshitz.

Vyshinsky: I am asking you, did you learn it from Serebryakov?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: A few minutes ago you said that you were indignant because Serebryakov and Livshitz. . . . What made you indignant? Or what do you know of Serebryakov's activities in connection with the matter which caused your indignation?

Knyazev: I say that Serebryakov stated in his testimony that increase of empty runs was resorted to as a means of sabotage, that is, he mentioned the least important means. I do not believe that Serebryakov was unaware of more effective means, which vitally damaged communications.

Vyshinsky: You know that he knew?

Knyazev: I am convinced.

Vyshinsky: Your convictions are of little interest to us; have you any facts?

Knyazev: No. But to me Livshitz was always quoting the leading centre and in 1936, in April, when we met, Livshitz spoke of the existence—excuse me, it was in 1935—he spoke of the existence of a parallel centre composed of Pyatakov, Radek, Serebryakov. Consequently, since he said that he was connected with this centre, and received leading instructions from it, I considered that he knew. These instructions were formulated with precision by Livshitz and they were handed down from above in this form.

Vyshinsky: That means Livshitz was the source of your information?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You know nothing directly, except for the general understanding that Serebryakov and Livshitz are the leaders?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You admitted yesterday that you received 15,000 rubles through Turok from the Japanese intelligence service.

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why did this money have to be handed over through Turok and not directly? Perhaps you also received some directly?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: Why? Would it have been awkward for you?

Knyazev: This is not the place to appeal to ethics.

Vyshinsky: What have ethics to do with it?

Knyazev: I believe that inasmuch as Turok had his connections in this respect. . . .

Vyshinsky: Inasmuch as, and whereas and so forth. You were connected with Mr. H——, you were connected with "Georgi Ivanovich." Were you connected with the Japanese intelligence service?

Knyazev: I was.

Vyshinsky: The Japanese intelligence service paid its agents?

Knyazev: I do not know whether it paid its agents.

Vyshinsky: Did it pay Turok?

Knyazev: It did not pay Turok personally, but it paid the Trotskyite organization.

Vyshinsky: Again personally or not personally. No accounts were kept. He took money, put it in his pocket, paid it out or did not pay it out—that is unimportant. What is important is that they paid, and what stayed in your pocket was between you and your conscience, so to speak.

Knyazev: I categorically object to that.

Vyshinsky: I am asking you, did the intelligence service pay money to its agents for the Trotskyite organization, or was it for the agents personally?

Knyazev: Evidently.

Vyshinsky: Did you know of such cases?

Knyazev: Only as regards what I got from Turok and nothing more.

Vyshinsky: You yourself got money from Turok. The question occurs to me why did you have to be paid through Turok and why could not Mr. H—— pay you personally, or through "George."

Knyazev: I think, simply, that their connections were formed earlier and in this respect were more direct.

Vyshinsky: That means that you think the financial side was centralized and went through the "minister of finance" Turok?

Knyazev: I do not think the financial side was concentrated in Turok's hands.

Vyshinsky: But in whose hands?

Knyazev: Higher up, I dare say.

Vyshinsky: In the hands of the former People's Commissar of Finance perhaps?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In Sokolnikov's hands?

Knyazev: No. Sokolnikov possibly. . . .

Vyshinsky: Where else? In Pyatakov's hands?

Knyazev: No. I don't know who of those higher up was directly connected with the Japanese government, although I tried to find that out many times.

Vyshinsky: They didn't tell you. But will you tell us what you do know? Do you know Turok?

Knyazev: I do.

Vyshinsky: Turok received money?

Knyazev: He received it once.

Vyshinsky: He gave you some?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: It seems strange to me that they didn't hand the money over to you personally, directly.

Knyazev: I cannot even explain that.

Vyshinsky: You cannot give explanations? Perhaps you yourself received some more?

Knyazev: No.

Vyshinsky: And perhaps you had occasion to be wined and dined at the expense of Mr. H—— or of someone else.

Knyazev: No. No.

Vyshinsky: Never?

Knyazev: Never. And when I was in Japan the question was raised not by Mr. H—— but by the Japanese government.

Vyshinsky: Kindly leave the government out of it. What has the government got to do with it? We are dealing with certain gentlemen. How did you use the 15,000? Will you give us an account of how you used the 15,000, ruble for ruble?

Knyazev: That is recorded in my testimony.

Vyshinsky: Plenty of other things are also recorded in the testimony. I would like to have this brought out in court.

Knyazev: I gave 4,500 to Dolmatov.

Vyshinsky: How did he spend them?

Knyazev: I cannot say.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps Dolmatov kept the money?

Knyazev: I don't think so.

Vyshinsky: Why? Is he an honest man?

Knyazev: It is not that he is honest. . . .

Vyshinsky: Is he honest or dishonest?

Knyazev: I knew him as a man who was not prompted by personal interests.

Vyshinsky: Personal interest is one thing, but ethics, which you mentioned, are something else.

Knyazev: But money is a personal interest.

Vyshinsky: No, it's broader than personal interest. Very well, then, 4,500 to Dolmatov. Who else?

Knyazev: Next 4,000 to Levin.

Vyshinsky: So, that means 8,500. And then?

Knyazev: Next 2,500 to Sherbin.

Vyshinsky: Well, and then?

Knyazev: 4,000 to Bochkarev.

Vyshinsky: And is that all?

Knyazev: That is all.

Vyshinsky: And you had no organizational expenses?

Knyazev: All my organizational work was conducted through these individuals, I had no other channels.

Vyshinsky: How were they to spend the money?

Knyazev: As remuneration in certain cases, as pay for those individuals who were drawn into undermining activities.

Vyshinsky: As remuneration?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, as a bribe?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: For example?

Knyazev: Since a considerable part of the forces had nothing in common with the Communist Party.

Vyshinsky: That's clear.

Knyazev: Even as far as their past was concerned. They were people who were formerly connected with the kulaks or the old specialists.

Vyshinsky: And with whom else?

Knyazev: With Kolchak elements.

Vyshinsky: And with whom else?

Knyazev: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: And how about such types as the accused Arnold?

Knyazev: Well, you know, he is a rare masterpiece.

Vyshinsky: With what types were you connected?

Knyazev: In my opinion, types like Arnold you can only find one in ten million.

Vyshinsky: Not very many. But nevertheless, as the saying goes, "birds of a feather flock together."

Knyazev: That's how it turns out.

Vyshinsky: That means that somebody had to be bribed. Was that what the money went for?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you take any personally?

Knyazev: Personally, I didn't require it, I was getting 1,600 rubles. I could not even do that, otherwise the secrecy of the organization would have been exposed.

Vyshinsky: When Mr. X said to you, "Give me certain information," and this was information of an espionage nature, did he offer you money?

Knyazev: I did not take any money.

Vyshinsky: Didn't he say that certain expenses might arise for which they would pay you?

Knyazev: He said to me: bear in mind that we are giving a lot of assistance to the Trotskyite organization.

Vyshinsky: He said that?

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What assistance?

Knyazev: Financial, material.

Vyshinsky: That means that you discussed with Mr. X the fact that the intelligence service was furnishing financial aid. Did you have such a conversation?

Knyazev: The way I understood it, they helped financially and in the preparation of forces.

Vyshinsky: You were just now saying that Mr. X told you that they helped the Trotskyites materially.

Knyazev: No, not materially, but they helped. You see, he said: We are helping the Trotskyites a great deal.

Vyshinsky: And how did you interpret this?

Knyazev: I understood that this was partially in the form of financial aid.

Vyshinsky: Hence, we may consider it established that you carried on conversations with Mr. X about money and material aid, which must be interpreted as financial aid?

Knyazev: I repeat, Citizen Procurator, that there was no discussion of personal money matters, but what he said to me was that they are helping the Trotskyites a great deal. I understood that this meant partly material aid.

Vyshinsky: And partly financial aid?

Knyazev: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, the work was paid for.

Knyazev: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you did not ask where material aid could be obtained?

Knyazev: This question was of little interest to me.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Knyazev: Because I had little occasion to resort to that; the funds which Turok supplied me with were adequate.

Vyshinsky: Not for yourself, but for the organization?

Knyazev: The funds which Turok gave me in 1935 were enough to cover organizational expenses.

Vyshinsky: The conversation with Mr. X took place after you received the money from Turok, or before?

Knyazev: After.

Vyshinsky: And did you say that assistance was being given?

Knyazev: No, I put the question to him differently.

Vyshinsky: How?

Knyazev: He said to me: as we see it you do not sufficiently utilize your official position to enable us to receive what we expect from you, you do not consciously utilize it, and I am convinced that evidently you simply do not want to understand that we are helping your organization a great deal and that your influential members are in close contact with our Japanese government.

Vyshinsky: Again you bring that up. I am asking about money.

Knyazev: We only spoke of money in the form that I mentioned.

Vyshinsky: But you did not tell him that you had received a certain amount of money and distributed it to this and that organization?

Knyazev: No, I said that I would do everything in my power and that I had no other means whereby to satisfy their demands.

Vyshinsky: You justified yourself like a diplomat?

Knyazev: Of course. I am not a diplomat, that's why I either kept quiet or gave a wrong reply.

Vyshinsky: But you nevertheless carried on diplomatic conversations?

Knyazev: That is true.

Vyshinsky: You confirm that you received nothing besides the 15,000?

Knyazev: Not a thing.

Vyshinsky: And those 15,000 did not burn your fingers?

Knyazev: They did.

Vyshinsky: But this did not hinder you?

Knyazev: If you combine this with wrecking and high treason, why. . . .

Vyshinsky: Your counsel asked who you are; you answered: "the son of a peasant."

Knyazev: Yes, that is quite right.

Vyshinsky: That is not right. I have no more questions.

The President: Have Counsel any questions?

Braude: No questions.

The President: Accused Knyazev, please sit down.

Knyazev: I would like to make a number of other statements.

The President: You may do so in your defence plea.

Knyazev: I do not want the Citizen Procurator to accuse me of having withheld anything. I would like to tell about what I know of Livshitz's connections and about my last meeting with Mr. X.

The President: By way of supplement to what has already been said?

Knyazev: Yes.

The President: You may.

Knyazev: I confirm that when I met Yakov Abramovich Livshitz in 1935 he told me at the time that a serious Trotskyite organization was in existence on the railways. In particular he mentioned Mironov, Zorin and Mirsky. As for the other responsible functionaries whom I heard mentioned yesterday during his testimony—Fufryansky, Rosenzweig and Arnoldov—I had not heard of these individuals from him. I heard him mention them yesterday for the first time. That is the first point. In the second place, in 1936, when we had our second conversation he told me that he had learnt from the parallel centre that between those higher up in the Trotskyite organization and the Japanese contacts—this has been definitely proved now—had been established. These contacts with the Japanese government were now maintained not only by the middle links (this applied to our circle) but by the leading sections of the political organization as well.

Vyshinsky (to the President): The accused Knyazev persists in naming the government of a country with which we have official relations. I ask that Knyazev's examination be either transferred to a session *in camera* or that he stop mentioning in open court what is not subject to publication.

Knyazev: But I haven't mentioned any names.

The President: Accused Knyazev, before you started giving evidence I warned you not to speak on questions which must be discussed *in camera.*

Vyshinsky: Perhaps it will be more convenient if the examination in so far as Knyazev is concerned be continued *in camera?*

Knyazev: Very well.

The President: We shall proceed to examine the accused Turok.

Accused Turok, do you confirm the testimony you gave in

December regarding Trotskyite counter-revolutionary and espionage work?

Turok: I do.

Vyshinsky: Since we have already examined Turok at length in the course of the proceedings, I have no direct questions to put to him now. Perhaps they will arise as a result of the explanations he may wish to make; I shall then question him.

The President: So as not to drag out the examination, perhaps a few supplementary questions may be asked?

Vyshinsky: Very well.

The President: Accused Turok, when and by whom were you recruited for the Trotskyite anti-Soviet organization?

Turok: In 1934, by the manager of the Urals Car Construction Works, Maryasin.

The President: With what duties were you entrusted?

Turok: To form an organization of Trotskyites and of other elements who might help in the struggle against the Party and the government, for the purpose of organizing destructive work on the Perm and Urals Railway.

The President: What was your position at the time?

Turok: Assistant manager of the Traffic Department.

The President: What work did you have to perform during recent years along the lines of the Trotskyite organization?

Turok: I recruited a number of persons: Burlakov, Meyerson and Dolmatov.

The President: Did all the persons named by you immediately give their consent to work in the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary organization, or not?

Turok: Each of the persons whom I recruited had for two or three months spoken to me in a counter-revolutionary spirit, and it was on this basis that I enlisted them.

The President: From whom personally did you receive instructions to perform Trotskyite anti-Soviet wrecking work on the railways?

Turok: From Maryasin. In March 1935 I received confirmation of our wrecking and undermining work from Pyatakov, who visited Sverdlovsk at the time. On September 14, 1935, I attended a meeting of the commission of the People's Commissariat of Railways sitting in Moscow to endorse the new train schedule. On September 15 Livshitz called me into his office and told me that wrecking and undermining work must now consist of disrupting the new train schedule. In addition to causing the railways to work badly, this would affect the wages of the workers and would discredit the leadership of Kaganovich.

The President: Did Livshitz give you any concrete instructions to organize accidents?

Turok: Yes. He said that it would be a good thing to organize train accidents involving loss of life.

The President: Did he stress this?

Turok: Yes.

The President: Did you not inquire why loss of life should necessarily be involved?

Turok: I did not inquire because I was told the same thing in greater detail by Maryasin, who gave as a reason that it was necessary in order to arouse resentment against the government.

The President: After these instructions were given by Maryasin, Livshitz and Pyatakov, did the number of accidents caused by your organization increase on your railway?

Turok: I cannot give the figures just now, of course, but at any rate a number of serious accidents to freight trains and one passenger train was organized by us.

The President: How many train accidents were deliberately organized by members of your Trotskyite organization?

Turok: I know of approximately 40.

The President: During what period of time?

Turok: From the end of 1934 to the day of my arrest.

The President: Were any lives lost?

Turok: Yes, chiefly among the crews of the freight trains, but also in the case of the passenger train.

The President: How many lives were lost then?

Turok: One was killed, five seriously injured and fifteen slightly injured.

The President: When did your last meeting with Livshitz take place?

Turok: A meeting at which counter-revolutionary matters were discussed took place in 1935, in September.

The President: Was that the last?

Turok: No, I met him afterwards, but casually.

The President: Did your counter-revolutionary Trotskyite organization engage in preparations for terrorist acts?

Turok: Yes. In the autumn of 1934 Molotov was to have passed through Sverdlovsk, and Burlakov, a member of the Trotskyite organization who was connected with Mrachkovsky, personally prepared to commit a terrorist act against Molotov, but it did not come off.

I learned from Burlakov that he had prepared to commit a terrorist act against Kaganovich too in February 1936. He enlisted Mikhetko, who was a Japanese agent, as immediate executant of this terrorist act.

The President: Do you confirm your testimony about your connections with Japanese agents, Mr. H——, Mr. U—— and "Georgi Ivanovich"?

Turok: I do.

The President: Do you confirm everything stated in the testimony you gave in January?

Turok: I do.

The President: How much money did you receive for the work you performed on behalf of the Japanese intelligence service?

Turok: In February 1935 they brought me 35,000 rubles. . . .

The President: Well, what next? From whom?

Turok: I had been told beforehand by "Georgi Ivanovich," who maintained contact with me, that I would receive this money.

The President: How did you distribute this money?

Turok: I gave 15,000 rubles to Knyazev.

The President: Do your testimonies agree?

Turok: Yes. Of the remaining money, I gave 4,000 rubles to Burlakov for the organization of undermining work.

The President: A terrorist?

Turok: Yes. I gave 4,500 rubles to Alexin, 3,000 rubles to Naumov, 1,500 rubles to Meyerson and 1,500 rubles to Bondarenko.

The President: We have no more questions. Comrade Vyshinsky, have you any questions?

Vyshinsky: You spoke of a train accident in which one person was killed, five seriously injured, and slightly injured. . . ?

Turok: Fifteen.

The President: Twenty in all?

Turok: Yes.

Vyshinsky: This was on April 26, 1936?

Turok: Yes.

Vyshinsky: At what station was this, on what stretch?

Turok: Between the Sverdlovsk Passenger Station and the Sverdlovsk Sorting Station.

Vyshinsky: Was it on your instructions?

Turok: Yes, it was. It was carried out by Perrov, sectional road maintenance chief, and Popov, road master.

Vyshinsky: Was Popov sentenced for this?

Turok: He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for negligence.

Vyshinsky: Why only for negligence?

Turok: Knyazev has explained how investigations are made on the railways. Everybody tries to throw the blame on others to prevent the truth from coming to light. The traffic man will blame

the maintenance man, the maintenance man the traffic man, only not to stain one's own uniform.

Vyshinsky: This was done so as to cover up the tracks?

Turok: To cover up the tracks from the point of view of service discipline, and in cases like these, from the criminal point of view as well.

Vyshinsky: Was the train disaster in June 1935 on the Sagre-Iset stretch caused on your instructions?

Turok: On our instructions.

Vyshinsky: That is, your instructions and whose else?

Turok: You see, Citizen Prosecutor, I did not give instructions, for example, to wreck train No. 930, but said that a train accident should be organized. And so when I said "our instructions" there were the immediate executants and there were intermediaries. It is in this respect that I say "on our instructions."

Vyshinsky: But you checked up afterwards how your instructions were carried out?

Turok: I have already said in reply to the question of the President that I know of forty cases . . . .

Vyshinsky: I am not asking how many cases there were, but what the system was. Did the executants afterwards report to you?

Turok: Yes, I knew about the accidents. When any train accident was caused by a member of our organization, I was afterwards informed.

Vyshinsky: Why do I ask this? Certain train wrecks may have been due to accident. How did you distinguish between a wreck caused deliberately and a wreck caused by accident?

Turok: Well, for example, Alexin, sectional road maintenance chief, would come to me and say that such and such a train accident on such and such a stretch was caused by us. I would report this and regard it as the work of our hands.

Vyshinsky: By way of reporting the results of criminal activity?

Turok: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was your group definitely organized? Did you have a party organizer or secretary, or anything like that?

Turok: We did not keep minutes, of course.

Vyshinsky: I am not asking about minutes, but about the organization. Were you not the leader of the organization?

Turok: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And who appointed you leader of the organization?

Turok: Maryasin.

Vyshinsky: And what right had he to appoint you leader?

Turok: Formally, he had no right to appoint me. But I was a Trotskyite and he was a Trotskyite, we would talk things over and he knew about my counter-revolutionary sentiments.

Vyshinsky: Where did he work?

Turok: At the Urals Car Construction Works.

Vyshinsky: Was he connected with you along business lines?

Turok: No.

Vyshinsky: How was it then that Maryasin could appoint you, and not you appoint him, or anybody else? Why?

Turok: Because when I was recruited for the organization by Maryasin. . . .

Vyshinsky: Did he recruit you?

Turok: Yes. And he told me that there was a centre in Moscow, a member of which was Pyatakov, of whom I knew, and that he, Maryasin, was Pyatakov's representative here.

Vyshinsky: That is, he cited the authority of Pyatakov?

Turok: Yes, Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: As a member of the centre?

Turok: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was the accident to train No. 756 on the stretch Sverdlovsk Passenger Station—Sverdlovsk Sorting Station in March 1936, which was accompanied by loss of life, organized on your instructions?

Turok: Yes, on our instructions.

Vyshinsky: Did you also make a practice of throwing the blame on innocent persons?

Turok: (Maintains a long silence.)

Vyshinsky: I will remind you of a case: train No. 930, at Monzino station, on September 30, 1935.

Turok: Yes, I remember it. Simakov, the assistant station master, wanted to take advantage of the inexperience of Zayakina, the woman who attended the switch.

Vyshinsky: Did he lay the blame on her?

Turok: He attempted to, but it did not come off.

Vyshinsky: It did not succeed?

Turok: No.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps it was Zhernov and not Simakov?

Turok: Yes, yes, now I recollect, it was Zhernov.

Vyshinsky: Who was he?

Turok: Assistant station master.

Vyshinsky: That is, such things were practised.

Turok: I remember the case.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions to put.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: We shall now proceed to the examination of the accused Rataichak.

Accused Rataichak, do you confirm the testimony given by you during the preliminary investigation at the Procurator's office?

Rataichak: I do.

Vyshinsky: Accused Rataichak, a few questions of a biographical character. During the interrogation on October 2, in answer to the question what was your nationality, you said that you were a German; in reply to the question what was your native language, you said that it was German. Why did you state in questionnaires relating to the years 1920-22 that you were a Pole and that your native language was Polish?

Rataichak: As a matter of fact, I wrote that I was a Pole ever since I was a prisoner of war.

Vyshinsky: What were you when you were taken prisoner?

Rataichak: I was taken prisoner as a soldier of the German army.

Vyshinsky: And what were you by nationality?

Rataichak: A German. I wrote a "Pole" from purely personal motives. In the old days the tsarist government looked askance on Germans, and I therefore concealed my origin.

Vyshinsky: Consequently, by concealing your German origin you renounced your nationality?

Rataichak: The tsarist government used to look askance at Germans.

Vyshinsky: The tsarist government was responsible for many things, but was it responsible for the fact that you renounced your nationality?

Rataichak: That has no bearing on the case.

Vyshinsky: Permit me to know what has bearing on the case and what has not. In general, you should know that it is the President who directs the examination in court. I request the President to call the accused to order and to point out that such conduct is impermissible in court.

The President: Accused Rataichak, such a posture is not in keeping in court.

Vyshinsky: I am not referring to his posture.

The President: I understand that very well, but I noticed that the accused Rataichak had assumed a somewhat peculiar posture.

Rataichak: I request it to be noted that I did not adopt any posture, but merely bent over to hear what was being said.

The President: I warn you that you must give clear and precise answers to the questions put by the Court and the Procurator.

Rataichak: I replied that this had no bearing on the case because I considered that the reference to the tsarist government in connection with my biography had no bearing on the case.

The President: If the Procurator or the President of the Court put questions, they have a reason for doing so. Be good enough to answer the questions as put.

Vyshinsky: That is, you wanted to deceive the tsarist government?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When you joined the Communist Party, you deceived it, concealed the fact that you were a German.

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Can you explain why?

Rataichak: It was without any self-seeking ends.

Vyshinsky: It may have been without self-seeking ends, but there may have been other ends. How do you explain it?

Rataichak: Just as I filled in the questionnaires at first, so they remained.

Vyshinsky: Why during the preliminary investigation, in answer to the question, how do you explain that you deceived the Party by stating that your native language was Polish, you replied that you could not explain it?

Rataichak: I can be more specific. I wrote in the questionnaires that I was a German and that my native language was Polish.

Vyshinsky: Permit me to read what Rataichak testified at the preliminary investigation, Vol. XVII, p. 24. In reply to the question, why in the questionnaires relating to 1920-22 you said that you were a Pole and that your native language was Polish, you replied that this was not true. In answer to the question, what induced you to deceive the Party and to write what was not true about your nationality, you replied that you could not explain it. Was this so?

Rataichak: I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: Was there any other false information in the questionnaires?

Rataichak: I wrote something else in the questionnaires that was inexact. I stated that I had taken part in the revolutionary movement since 1915. As a matter of fact, this was not so.

Vyshinsky: Where was that?

Rataichak: In my home country at the time.

Vyshinsky: When?

Rataichak: Before the revolution, in 1915.

Vyshinsky: And during the revolution?

Rataichak: I wrote that I was an agitator at the time when I

was still not a member of the Party. As a matter of fact, nobody assigned me to this work. I worked among prisoners of war, but I could not call myself an agitator.

Vyshinsky: Did you state in the questionnaire that you were an agitator in prisoner-of-war camps?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: You said in the questionnaire that you were an agitator. You wrote: "Immediately after the October Revolution I joined a Red Guard detachment which had been formed." And you go on to write: "This does not conform to the truth."

Rataichak: I remember that after the October Revolution. . . .

Vyshinsky: Did you give such testimony?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: I request to have handed to the accused Rataichak the testimony signed by him (Vol. XVII, p. 25, October 2). I will read what is written there: "I am obliged to confess that when filling up the questionnaire and writing my autobiography I falsely stated that during the October Revolution I was an agitator in prisoner-of-war camps. I also made a false statement regarding the dissolution of the prisoner-of-war camps. In my autobiography it is stated: 'Immediately after the October Revolution . . .'" Then it goes on to say what I have just read. And then you said: "this does not conform to the truth." Were you asked this, did you say this, did you write this, did you sign this?

Rataichak: I do not deny this fact. I confirm it.

Vyshinsky: That is, it was untrue?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That settles the question.

You write: "I wrongly stated that in Germany in 1913 I was appointed member of the district committee of the Metal Workers' Union." Did you state this?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: Was it false?

Rataichak: No, I was the secretary.

Vyshinsky: Elected secretary?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: You just worked as a hired employee?

Rataichak: No. I was working as a fitter in a factory. I was co-opted and invited to work as secretary in the district Metal Workers' Union.

Vyshinsky: But in general the post of secretary in the union was an elected one?

Rataichak: It was.

Vyshinsky: You stated: "I did not occupy any elected posts in the Metal Workers' Union." How then could you occupy the post of secretary, if it was an elected post and you had occupied no elected posts?

Rataichak: I find it difficult to explain now what happened in 1913, but I quite definitely remember that.

Vyshinsky: Did you bungle your testimony?

Rataichak: I affirm that I answered quite correctly to the question.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell an untruth?

Rataichak: In the biography of 1922?

Vyshinsky: Yes. Did you tell an untruth?

Rataichak: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: You stated that you led three strikes. Is that true?

Rataichak: I took part in them.

Vyshinsky: But you wrote that you led them.

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You stated that you escaped from prison camp three times. What was the truth?

Rataichak: I made three attempts, but I escaped once.

Vyshinsky: Did you state that you escaped three times?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell the truth?

Rataichak: No, but I want to make a reservation. I made several attempts to correct. . . .

Vyshinsky: No, excuse me, you might have tried to escape from prison camp 200,000 times, but you wrote that you escaped three times.

Rataichak: I made all these corrections in my biography not at the preliminary investigation but in April 1936. Since April 1936 I have had a new autobiography.

Vyshinsky: That is, the old autobiography no longer satisfied you? Very well, we shall also speak of your new autobiography; it will be directly associated with your crime. But meanwhile we are speaking of your old autobiography, that is, of the one that served you from 1922 to 1936, and in which there were a number of false statements.

Rataichak: I would say—inaccuracies.

Vyshinsky: Why did you state in the questionnaire that you had been an agitator, that you had escaped three times from a military prison camp, that you had led three strikes, that you had been secretary of a Metal Workers' Union, and so on? What was your purpose? In the testimony you gave at the preliminary investigation you replied as follows: "I wanted to ascribe to my-

self revolutionary services which had never actually existed." Is that right?

Rataichak: It is.

Vyshinsky: What do we call people who ascribe to themselves non-existing revolutionary services?

Rataichak: They deceive. . . .

Vyshinsky: They deceive, they represent themselves as something they are not?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: May one call it adventurism?

Rataichak: I cannot call it that.

Vyshinsky: Of course not, and I do not expect you to.

Tell me, please, did the Secretary of the Central Committee of our Party, Comrade Yezhov, summon you in February 1936 to come and explain your autobiography?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you make these corrections to him, or did you continue to deceive him?

Rataichak: Yes, he summoned me.

Vyshinsky: Did you write an autobiography in his office?

Rataichak: I did not write it there, but after a couple of days I wrote a new autobiography as I had been told to.

Vyshinsky: And did you submit it?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you draw up the biography correctly?

Rataichak: The new one—yes. I left out everything unnecessary.

Vyshinsky: Be good enough to answer my questions. Did you draw up an autobiography in February 1936?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: Did you draw it up correctly?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: Did you deceive the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Yezhov?

Rataichak: Yes, I did deceive him.

Vyshinsky: You deceived him in February 1936?

Rataichak: Undoubtedly.

Vyshinsky: What was your position in February 1936?

Rataichak: If I may explain. . . .

Vyshinsky: No, answer.

Rataichak: It is very difficult to answer in this way.

Vyshinsky: You understand Russian very well, although you are a German and a Pole?

Rataichak: Comparatively well.

Vyshinsky: What position did you hold in February 1936?

Rataichak: Chief of the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry.

Vyshinsky: With such an autobiography?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: May I question Pyatakov?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Was Rataichak a close assistant of yours?

Pyatakov: Like all the Chiefs of Administrations.

Vyshinsky: I ask you, was Rataichak your close assistant in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry?

Pyatakov: He was.

Vyshinsky: Did you know of this autobiography?

Pyatakov: I heard it here for the first time.

Vyshinsky: So you did not know who your assistant was?

Pyatakov: I did not.

Vyshinsky: Sit down. (*To Rataichak*): Did you tell anybody that you were an airman in the German army?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: Or that you were an airman at all?

Rataichak: I remember there was once such talk.

Vyshinsky: I ask you, did you tell anybody or not?

Rataichak: When there was talk of politics. . . .

Vyshinsky: I am not asking you when there was a talk, I am asking you whether you told anybody, or not.

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: Were you an airman?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: Tell me, why, not having been an airman, did you say that you were an airman?

Rataichak: I remember that there was talk among comrades of flights in connection with business affairs, and in the course of the talk I several times said that I was an old airman.

Vyshinsky: Who said that?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: Not only an airman, but even an old airman?

Rataichak: Yes, meaning that I stood flying very well.

Vyshinsky: And what helped you?

Rataichak: Nothing.

Vyshinsky: Are you a dentist?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: Then why did you not say that you were a dentist, but did say that you were an airman? Were you an airman?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: Then why did you say so? So, in February there was an incorrect biography?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And when did you write a correct one?

Rataichak: After the talk with N. I. Yezhov.

Vyshinsky: After February?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In what month?

Rataichak: Immediately after the conversation.

Vyshinsky: That is, you first submitted an incorrect one?

Rataichak: I did not submit anything. The old autobiography was in the file. Nikolai Ivanovich during the course of a very brief conversation put several questions. I said that there were over-statements, inaccuracies. Nikolai Ivanovich said, take the autobiography away with you, leave out everything unnecessary and submit it as it should be. That was the whole conversation.

Vyshinsky: You took it and altered it?

Rataichak: In altering the autobiography, I deceived the Central Committee by the fact alone that I did not mention that there were a number of inaccuracies in it. That is the whole point about the autobiography.

Vyshinsky: So, you had one autobiography, in February another, and in May you corrected it and there was a third?

Rataichak: I did not correct it.

Vyshinsky: That is, you did not deceive the Secretary of the Central Committee?

Rataichak: Yes, I did deceive him, because in reply to Nikolai Ivanovich's question. . . .

Vyshinsky: You gave an incorrect answer?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And then?

Rataichak: In the questionnaire I stated what was absolutely correct.

Vyshinsky: That again is only on the basis of what you say. You began to alter it when you began to be detected?

Rataichak: I have already described the conversation.

Vyshinsky: You began to correct it after you had been summoned to the Central Committee?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is, after that autobiography had aroused suspicion?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That means that the new autobiography may also have to be altered?

Rataichak: I do not know.

Vyshinsky: And now?

Rataichak: Now I am telling everything that is true and that I know. To what extent the corrections I made were important can be judged from the fact that after I handed the questionnaire to Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov we had no other conversations.

Vyshinsky: Did you know Krapivsky?

Rataichak: I did. He was employed in the Volhynia Provincial Council of National Economy, where I was assistant chairman.

Vyshinsky: What was Krapivsky's job?

Rataichak: He was chief of the supply department.

Vyshinsky: And was occupied with his own work?

Rataichak: And was occupied with his own work.

Vyshinsky: Was he occupied with anything else apart from this?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: Pardon me, apart from this, did he occupy himself with anything else unofficially?

Rataichak: In my opinion, he did.

Vyshinsky: In your opinion and in my opinion.

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What did he occupy himself with unofficially?

Rataichak: Profiteering in government property.

Vyshinsky: And what else?

Rataichak: Profiteering, strictly speaking, was all.

Vyshinsky: I cannot hear a word you are saying, speak louder.

Rataichak: I am speaking loudly.

Vyshinsky: Not at all loudly, you could speak loudly on certain occasions.

Rataichak: He was engaged in profiteering, and that was all that might have been expected.

Vyshinsky: He was employed as stores manager in an institution of which you were assistant chairman, and he engaged in profiteering. What did he profiteer in?

Rataichak: I do not quite know, but he profiteered in government property.

Vyshinsky: In order to profiteer in government property, one must have government property. That is to say, he had government property?

Rataichak: He was employed as chief of supply. . . .

Vyshinsky: Take your time, or else we shall again be at odds. Speak calmly, and tell us exactly how it was.

Rataichak: It is not easy to speak calmly about everything.

Vyshinsky: That's true. I understand your position, it is difficult to speak. To put it briefly, he stole government property?

Rataichak: Yes, that is so.

Vyshinsky: That is true?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You knew about it?

Rataichak: Partly, yes.

Vyshinsky: Only partly?

Rataichak: Yes, I cannot say that I knew everything, I did not know the extent.

Vyshinsky: I am not asking you that. Did you know that he was stealing government property?

Rataichak: I had a feeling that he was, unquestionably.

Vyshinsky: No, you knew about it.

Rataichak: No, but I had a distinct feeling that this was the case.

Vyshinsky: I will produce your testimony at the preliminary investigation. Did you know about it, or did you not?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: That is, you did not "feel," but you knew. There is a difference, is that not so?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why did you, the assistant chairman of the Provincial Council of National Economy, keep in your employment a swindler who was stealing government property?

Rataichak: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: Why do you employ an old swindler in an institution under your charge? Did you not know that he was a swindler and profiteer? Why not? You, the Chief of the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry. Why not?

Rataichak: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: Were you in any way connected with him materially?

Rataichak (in a barely audible voice): I was. I lived in his house.

Vyshinsky: You did not live in his house, but lived at his expense?

Rataichak: It can be put that way.

Vyshinsky: That is, you confirm that you shielded the criminal offences of Krapivsky while you were assistant chairman of the Council of National Economy because he shared the stolen money with you. Is that right?

Rataichak: Perhaps it is not quite exact, but on the whole, that is the sense of it.

Vyshinsky: Now tell us about your Trotskyite activities.

Rataichak: Shall I relate them?

The President: Comrade Vyshinsky, shall he relate them, or do you prefer to question him?

Vyshinsky: Let him relate them.

Rataichak: My active Trotskyite work began in 1934.

Vyshinsky: When did you join the Party?

Rataichak: In 1918. I was officially registered on January 6, 1919.

Vyshinsky: Who recommended you?

Rataichak: I was recommended by Gavrilyuk, Rubtsova, Novikov and also. . . .

Vyshinsky: Did they know your biography?

Rataichak: We lived together.

Vyshinsky: Did they know your biography?

Rataichak: They did, because we fought together in the same detachment and lived together.

Vyshinsky: Did they know what sort of a person you were? At that time you had your old autobiography. Did they know your old autobiography?

Rataichak: They knew what I had written in the questionnaire.

Vyshinsky: And not what conformed with reality?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: That is, you deceived them too?

Rataichak: They recommended me. . . .

Vyshinsky: Pardon me, pardon me. Did you deceive them?

Rataichak: So it would appear. They recommended me because of my active work under the Soviet power.

Vyshinsky: They saw your biography, they saw your "revolutionary services," and so recommended you? It appears that you deceived them as you did everybody who read your biography?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When did you become connected with the Trotskyites, when did you become one of the Trotskyite cadres?

Rataichak: In 1934.

Vyshinsky: Who brought you into the Trotskyite organization?

Rataichak: All the preparations took place. . . .

Vyshinsky: Who brought you into the Trotskyite organization?

Rataichak: Pyatakov. My first conversation with Pyatakov took place at the beginning of 1934, while active work began with wrecking activities connected with the construction plan for 1934.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps we had better proceed by questioning. Did you join the Trotskyite organization?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: Did you receive instructions regarding wrecking work?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: Did you receive instructions regarding diversive acts?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: Were you connected with espionage?

Rataichak: I was.

Vyshinsky: Through whom?

Rataichak: Through Pushin and Hrasche.

Vyshinsky (to Pushin): Accused Pushin, is it correct that Rataichak was connected through you with espionage organization?

Pushin: Through me, and also directly.

Vyshinsky: There, he did not say the last point. (Turning to Hrasche): Accused Hrasche, was he connected through you with agents of the German intelligence service?

Hrasche: Yes, he was connected with agents of the German intelligence service.

Vyshinsky: And were you connected with them?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: As an agent?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What did that consist in?

Hrasche: In transmitting materials, secret information regarding the work of the chemical industry.

Vyshinsky: Was this known to Rataichak?

Hrasche: Yes, he was my chief.

Vyshinsky (to Rataichak): Consequently, you transmitted to the German intelligence service espionage material which you possessed by virtue of your office?

Rataichak: Yes, I was the Chief of the Central Administration of the Basic Chemical Industry.

Vyshinsky: Were there wrecking activities?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Were there diversive acts?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was there espionage?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you take part in terrorist organizations?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: Did you know about the terrorist organization?

Rataichak: I knew about Trotsky's line from Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: Did Pyatakov tell you that he was a member of the

terrorist organization, did he inform you of Trotsky's directives, including the directive about terrorism?

Rataichak: He did.

Vyshinsky: Terrorism against whom?

Rataichak: Against the leaders of the Party and the government.

Vyshinsky: That is, you knew that your organization was making preparations to commit terrorist acts against the leaders of the Party and the leaders of the government? Did you know it?

Rataichak: I did.

Vyshinsky: And what was your attitude towards terrorism?

Rataichak: I stated that at the preliminary investigation.

Vyshinsky: I am not asking you about what you said at the preliminary investigation. Answer the question. What was your attitude towards terrorism?

Rataichak: I did not agree with it.

Vyshinsky: Why did you not agree with it?

Rataichak: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: What did not please you? Wrecking pleased you, diversive acts pleased you, espionage pleased you? Why did terrorism not please you, why did you not agree with it?

Rataichak: All the things you have enumerated are vile.

Vyshinsky: All are vile. But at any rate you did not dissociate yourself from the group which was engaged in terrorism, you did not leave it?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: Did you ever attempt to inform anybody of these abominable things?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: Did you never attempt to disclose all this treacherous, devilish work?

Rataichak: If I had disclosed it, I would not be sitting here in the dock. I endeavoured to get away from this work.

Vyshinsky: You did endeavour to get away?

Rataichak: At the end of 1935 and in 1936 I no longer carried on any practical activities.

Vyshinsky: What did your diversive work consist in?

Rataichak: In accordance with my instructions, transmitted through Pushin, three breakdowns were arranged, one diversive act at the Gorlovka Works and two other breakdowns—one at the Nevsky Works and the other at the Voskressensk Combined Chemical Works.

Vyshinsky: Let us take the Gorlovka Works. What was this breakdown?

Rataichak: Owing to this breakdown certain of the installations were put out of action.

Vyshinsky: Was there a breakdown at the Gorlovka Works?

Rataichak: There was.

Vyshinsky: Namely?

Rataichak: An explosion. The department and the works as a whole were put out of action for several days. Three workers lost their lives.

Vyshinsky: Do you know their names?

Rataichak: I have forgotten them.

Vyshinsky: Did you ever inquire?

Rataichak: I knew them very well from the findings, but I have now forgotten them.

Vyshinsky: I will remind you: Kurkin, Leonid Feodorovich, 20 years old, Young Communist League member, shock worker, Stakhanovite; Mostetz, Nikolai Ivanovich, fitter; Strelnikova, Irina Yegorovna, 22 years old, filter-tender. Who murdered them?

Rataichak: We did.

Vyshinsky: You—the Chief of the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry?

Rataichak: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: When was the second case?

Rataichak: The second case did not involve loss of life. It was the collapse of a reserve gas line. The plant worked very unevenly for several days.

Vyshinsky: What was the third case?

Rataichak: The third case was in November 1934; it was an explosion in one of the departments of the air chambers, as a result of which one of the chambers was put out of action.

Vyshinsky: This was on the Linde installations?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you organize it?

Rataichak: It was organized on my instructions.

Vyshinsky: Was anybody killed?

Rataichak: Two workers, I think.

Vyshinsky: You do not remember? I will remind you: Lunev, Ivan Yegorovich, shock worker, one of the best apparatus-tenders in the department; Yudin, Vladimir Andreyevich, 26 years old, student in his last year at the Tomsk Polytechnical Institute, then on industrial practice. Do you remember?

Rataichak: That is so.

Vyshinsky: Was the diversive act at the Voskressensk Combined Chemical Works performed on your instructions?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was there any loss of life?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: What about the 17 workers killed and 15 injured?

Rataichak: That was on another occasion, Citizen Procurator.

Vyshinsky: Well, let us see. When did the fire take place?

Rataichak: In 1936.

Vyshinsky: Was it on the night of August 1?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you arrange the fire?

Rataichak: No.

Vyshinsky: Who arranged it?

Rataichak: I do not know.

Vyshinsky: You do not know?

Rataichak: No. I was referring to the diversive act which took place in April-May, 1934, when one of the acid departments was put out of action in accordance with my instructions.

Vyshinsky: That is, there were two diversive acts: one on your instructions to put one of the departments out of order; and the other the fire on the night of August 1, 1936?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And when was one of the departments put out of action?

Rataichak: In 1934, in April-May.

Vyshinsky: And did you say anything about the fire in August 1936?

Rataichak: I did not testify about that because I had nothing to do with it.

Vyshinsky: Did you speak about it without reference to yourself?

Rataichak: I had nothing to do with that fire.

Vyshinsky: And is it a fact that immediately after the fire you gave orders to proceed to the clearance work, although it involved danger to the lives of the workers?

Rataichak: I demanded the immediate liquidation of the consequences.

Vyshinsky: Pardon me, not liquidation. Did you demand that clearance work should be immediately proceeded with, although it involved extreme danger to human life?

Rataichak: Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky: Do you know that on your demand the workers undertook the clearance work?

Rataichak: I do.

Vyshinsky: Do you know that the wall caved in?

Rataichak: I was on the spot and directed the work from the start.

Vyshinsky: Don't hurry, don't run ahead. Answer the question: do you know that the wall caved in and the tower collapsed?

Rataichak: I do, I was on the spot myself.

Vyshinsky: And that 17 workers were killed?

Rataichak: That is so.

Vyshinsky: And that 15 were injured?

Rataichak: That is so.

Vyshinsky: Is that a fact?

Rataichak: Yes, it is.

Vyshinsky: And you say that you had nothing to do with it?

Rataichak: No, but I had to do that, Citizen Procurator, because if we had not taken this measure of precaution there was a danger that the lives of hundreds of workers might have been lost. That is why I myself directed the clearance work on the spot.

Vyshinsky: You directed it in such a way that 17 workers were killed and 15 were wounded. Is that so?

Rataichak: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: You directed the clearance operations in such a way that 17 workers were killed and 15 injured.

Rataichak: That is true, but it was the only thing to do.

Vyshinsky: And was it the only thing to do when you blew up departments and installations and committed other diversive acts?

Rataichak: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: Who commissioned you to engage in espionage work?

Rataichak: Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: May I put a question to Pyatakov?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Do you confirm this?

Pyatakov: No.

Vyshinsky (to Rataichak): Tell us, when did Pyatakov instruct you to engage in espionage?

Rataichak: Prior to my conversation with Pyatakov on this question, I have already stated this during the preliminary investigation, and also in my testimony in connection with Loginov, I had a conversation with Loginov. This was approximately at the end of 1934; I hesitate to say whether it was August or September. During this conversation Loginov told me that he had just spoken to Pyatakov and that Pyatakov had instructed him to establish contacts with an intelligence service. During this conversation, as I have already testified, I asked Loginov how this could be done, and what about people. The name of Hrasche was then mentioned

as having connections with foreign representatives, with foreigners; and he then spoke about Pushin also. With respect to Hrasche, Loginov spoke affirmatively, and with respect to Pushin he spoke presumptively that Pushin might have connections . . .

After this I had a talk with Pyatakov, in the course of which he confirmed the directives.

Vyshinsky: Personally?

Rataichak: Yes, he confirmed Trotsky's directives transmitted to me by Loginov. And accepted them and began to carry them out.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Do you now recall the conversation with Rataichak about espionage?

Pyatakov: No, I deny it.

Vyshinsky: And with Loginov?

Pyatakov: I also deny it.

Vyshinsky: And that members of your organization were connected with foreign intelligence services?

Pyatakov: As to the fact that there were such connections, I do not deny; but that I knew about the establishment . . .

Vyshinsky: Did you give instructions to establish connections with fascist forces?

Pyatakov: Yes, I communicated the instructions we had received regarding the establishment of connections with fascist forces.

Vyshinsky: And is the foreign intelligence service a fascist force?

Pyatakov: That is logic. I have said that I knew nothing about this.

Vyshinsky: It must be assumed that the intelligence service is part of the fascist forces.

Pyatakov: That must be assumed.

Vyshinsky: I have no further questions to put to Rataichak.

The President: Has the Counsel for Defence any questions?

Kommodov: I have.

The President: If you have many questions, perhaps you will leave it until after the recess?

Kommodov: As you like.

Vyshinsky: Since the Court investigation is drawing to an end, and will probably be finished this evening or tomorrow morning, I would request that the questions to Monosovich, the expert witness, be confirmed, so as to give him a few hours to prepare his answers to the questions.

The President: Very well.

Vyshinsky: I have submitted to the expert witness Monosovich a number of questions in written form (reads):

"1. *In Connection with the Explosion which Occurred on November 11, 1935, in the Hydrogen Department of the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works*

"*a.* What were the immediate causes of the explosion of the nitrogen apparatus in the chambers of the hydrogen department of the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works on November 11, 1935?

"*b.* Could this explosion have been averted?

"*c.* Was the explosion due to accident or to malicious intent?

"*d.* Do the explanations given at the preliminary investigation by the witness Tamm as to the circumstances and causes of the explosion correspond to the actual technical information in the possesion of the experts?

"2. *In Connection with the Explosion which Occurred on April 7, 1934, at the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works*

"*a.* What were the immediate causes of the explosion?

"*b.* Does the testimony given at the preliminary investigation by the witness Tamm and the accused Pushin as to the circumstances and causes of this explosion correspond with the technical information in the possession of the experts?

"*c.* Was the explosion due to accident or to malicious intent?

"3. *In Connection with the Collapse of the Gas Line at the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works on November 14, 1934*

"*a.* What were the causes of the collapse of the gas line at the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works?

"*b.* Does the testimony given at the preliminary investigation by the witness Tamm and the accused Pushin as to the circumstances and causes of the collapse correspond to the actual technical information in the possession of the experts?

"*c.* Was the collapse due to accident or to malicious intent?"

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any additions to make?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: I presume that the final replies of the expert witnesses can be given after the testimony of Pushin and Tamm.

(To expert witness): You are requested to submit your conclusions in written form by the end of the evening session.

The Court is adjourned until 6 p.m.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

EVENING SESSION, JANUARY 27, 1937, 6.00 P.M.

Commandant: The Court is coming. Please rise.

The President: The session is resumed. Has Counsel for Defence Kommodov any questions?

Kommodov (to Rataichak): Please tell us exactly when you entered the Trotskyite organization?

Rataichak: Early in 1934.

Kommodov: Whom did you personally draw into this organization?

Rataichak: The first person whom I drew into the work of the Trotskyite organization was Pushin, then Karnissky.

Kommodov: Under what circumstances, where and when did you draw Pushin into it?

Rataichak: In regard to each one of them there was a special approach, quite special conditions. I can deal in detail with Pushin, who is seated here in the dock.

Kommodov: It is he I want to know about.

The President: Tell us about Pushin.

Rataichak: I have known Pushin since 1927, from my former work in one of the industrial syndicates, the Coke Syndicate. Pushin's state of mind and his conduct became perfectly clear to me as far back as 1929. This was revealed during one of the Party purges, when Pushin was expelled from the Party. Subsequently, since he was a man with no small knowledge in the field of industry, an engineer, I was one of those who petitioned the commission for Pushin's reinstatement in the Party. Pushin was reinstated after a certain time.

After that I met Pushin quite frequently, both in connection with his work at the plant and with the work in the head office. I had occasion to talk with him frequently. Moreover, from my talks with Pushin I discovered that Pushin, to put it mildly, had extremely little in common with the Party. And in 1933 when I began working with Pushin in the head office, I was sure that Pushin was a concealed Trotskyite; and, accordingly, in 1934, after a conversation with Pyatakov, I talked quite definitely with Pushin regarding his political views, his frame of mind. Nor did Pushin deny that his frame of mind was not like that of a Party

member, and he gave his consent to participate in the Trotskyite organization, since he fully shared the views of the Trotskyites.

Kommodov: Under your guidance Pushin climbed the rungs of the official ladder from 1928 onwards?

Rataichak: Pushin did so partly under my immediate guidance and partly in organizations under my charge.

Kommodov: Pushin's transfer from the provinces to Moscow took place with your permission?

Rataichak: With my knowledge.

Kommodov: What services did you render Pushin when Pushin was prosecuted for negligence—do you remember such a case?

Rataichak: I remember that in 1928 Pushin was to be prosecuted for crime of office. On that occasion I personally studied this case, went to the place where Pushin was to be prosecuted, and pleaded that criminal proceedings should not be instituted against Pushin, for I considered that his offence was not a criminal nor a malicious one, that there was every reason for not instituting criminal proceedings against him. For this very reason the judicial organs of investigation agreed with me that Pushin should be brought before a court of his comrades and that there was no need for criminal proceedings.

Kommodov: Tell the Court: in 1934, while you were drawing Pushin into the Trotskyite organization, did you point out to Pushin that he was in a certain measure indebted to you, both as concerned his career and personal matters, seeing that he had been in such an unpleasant position?

Rataichak: I do not remember any such conversation, because it could not have had any influence on the course of Pushin's enlistment, since I knew his sentiments very well.

Kommodov: I am only interested to know whether such conversations took place or not.

Rataichak: I repeat that I do not remember any such conversations.

Kommodov: You do not remember?

Rataichak: No.

Kommodov: Did you point out to Pushin, when you were drawing him into the organization, what would be the field of his activities in the organization?

Rataichak: I told Pushin quite specifically about the tasks with which we, with which I was confronted, and about the task that would confront him, as a member of this organization.

Kommodov: But what field of wrecking or diversive activity did you plan for Pushin?

Rataichak: Pushin was assigned a field with which he was

very well acquainted, being an expert in this matter—namely the Gorlovka Works, of which he was the chief engineer, chief of construction and that is why he was assigned this position.

Kommodov: Now those acts were committed at the Gorlovka Works, and you were kept posted on those acts, you personally?

Rataichak: I was informed after the commission of each act, because I received the official findings of the case and knew that these acts were the result of Pushin's work.

Kommodov: And before committing a diversive act, did Pushin receive instructions from you and, so to speak, your sanction for the commission of that act?

Rataichak: I did not give Pushin instructions in each particular case to commit a specific act. I have pointed out that early in 1934 after the commission of these acts Pushin twice informed me that the act had been committed by him and his associates.

Kommodov: Was it you who selected and appointed the members of the commission which went to Gorlovka to investigate the last diversive act?

Rataichak: No.

Kommodov: And who did?

Rataichak: My assistant.

Kommodov: With your knowledge?

Rataichak: I would hesitate to assert that, because I was ill at the time and because it was not until after the commission of that act that I came back to work.

Kommodov: Do you recall who were the members of the commission?

Rataichak: I remember that the commission included Yushkevich, Golovanov, Pushin.

Kommodov: Was Yushkevich in the organization?

Rataichak: Yes.

Kommodov: Was Golovanov a member of the organization?

Rataichak: Likewise.

Kommodov: Was Pushin a member of the organization?

Rataichak: Yes.

Kommodov: Was this commission formed with your knowledge?

Rataichak: I again repeat that I could not appoint a commission, since I was ill at that time.

Kommodov: Who was your assistant?

Rataichak: Yushkevich.

Kommodov: So Yushkevich selected the members of this commission?

Rataichak: At all events Yushkevich had the main say in the selection of the commission.

Kommodov: And did you know of whom the commission was composed?

Rataichak: I again repeat that after receiving the findings I learned about the composition of the commission but I could not have had any influence in the matter of selection, since at that time I was ill, I did not go to the office.

Kommodov: Did you know that Golovanov had been convicted before?

Rataichak: I did.

Kommodov: Did you give him a recommendation for work in Moscow?

Rataichak: He came to Moscow with my knowledge.

Kommodov: The handing over of information to Lenz went on with your sanction, with your consent?

Rataichak: With my consent.

Kommodov: Did Pushin tell you what information Lenz demanded?

Rataichak: On the first occasion.

Kommodov: And you permitted this?

Rataichak: Yes.

Kommodov: Were you yourself directly connected with Lenz?

Rataichak: No.

Kommodov: Only through the medium of Pushin?

Rataichak: Yes.

Kommodov: What instructions did you give Pushin as regards wrecking work?

Rataichak: Nothing concretely; only general guiding principles.

Kommodov: Tell the Court, when was the last diversive act at Gorlovka?

Rataichak: At the end of 1935.

Kommodov: In 1936 what was done concretely under all the three counts on which Pushin is being charged?

Rataichak: Nothing.

Kommodov: You confirm this?

Rataichak: Yes, because I sent Pushin to a construction job in the Caucasus.

Kommodov: When was he sent to the Caucasus?

Rataichak: At the end of 1935.

Kommodov: While there, in the Caucasus, did he maintain only business connections, or counter-revolutionary ones too?

Rataichak: Not directly with me.

Kommodov: Under whom did he work?

Rataichak: He worked there under Golovanov.

Kommodov: I have no more questions to put to the accused.

Vyshinsky: I have a question to put to Rataichak. Who was directly connected with you in the matter of wrecking and diversive activities?

Rataichak: Kozinitsky, Yushkevich, Golovanov, Todorsky.

Vyshinsky: What post did Kozinitsky hold?

Rataichak: He was chief engineer superintending construction work.

Vyshinsky: And Todorsky? Where did he work?

Rataichak: As one of my assistants.

Vyshinsky: In the All-Union Committee of the Chemical Industry, or in the Central Administration?

Rataichak: In the Central Administration.

Vyshinsky: Did you know Lenz?

Rataichak: I knew Lenz as an installation mechanic of one of the foreign firms, as a member of a wrecking organization connected with the German intelligence service.

Vyshinsky: Whom else did you know?

Rataichak: I knew also—Meyerowitz.

Vyshinsky: Was he also an agent of the German intelligence service?

Rataichak: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did he visit the U.S.S.R.?

Rataichak: Fairly often.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet him?

Rataichak: Yes. Once he came to see me on official business, and afterwards I talked to him as to a member of the wrecking organization.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions to put to Rataichak. If the Counsel for Defence have no questions, I have a request to make.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

Vyshinsky: I want to produce a number of photographs of various people before Rataichak for him to identify Meyerowitz. The photos are without any inscriptions or marks whatever. Will he identify him here or not? Permit me to hand these photographs to Rataichak.

The President: Accused Rataichak, ten photographs will be handed to you. Look at them and say whether the citizen whom you call Meyerowitz is among them.

(The commandant presents the photographs to Rataichak for his inspection.)

Rataichak: This is Meyerowitz.

Vyshinsky: Do you recognize him?

Rataichak: Yes.

The President: I certify that the photograph in the likeness of which the accused Rataichak recognized the citizen Meyerowitz is completely identical with that attached to the residence permit for a foreigner issued in November 1932 to the German subject, Paul Meyerowitz. The said residence permit for a foreigner is in the entry permit file of the Foreign Section of the Administrative Department of the Moscow Regional Executive Committee.

We will now proceed to the examination of the accused Hrasche. Is your name Hrasché or Hrásche?

Hrasche: Hrasché.

The President: Do you confirm the testimony which you gave at the preliminary investigation and when being examined by the Procurator of the Union?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When did you first come to Russia?

Hrasche: In 1909.

Vyshinsky: From where?

Hrasche: Bohemia.

Vyshinsky: To what town?

Hrasche: To the town of Yeisk, in the Kuban region.

Vyshinsky: You were a subject of what country at that time?

Hrasche: A subject of Austria-Hungary.

Vyshinsky: That was in 1909?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What was your occupation?

Hrasche: I came as a teacher of French, afterwards of German. I gave lessons in Yeisk in a secondary school, and also private lessons. I stayed in Yeisk up to the end of 1917. In May 1917 I joined the Bolshevik Party there.

Vyshinsky: In May 1917?

Hrasche: Yes, approximately.

Vyshinsky: You were a subject of what country at that time?

Hrasche: At that time I was a civilian prisoner of war.

Vyshinsky: But how did you become a prisoner of war? You arrived and gave French and German lessons, and suddenly in 1917 you became a prisoner of war?

Hrasche: I was a civilian prisoner of war from 1914 onwards.

Vyshinsky: A civilian prisoner of war? That is to say, in other words, you were interned in connection with the imperialist war?

Hrasche: Yes, quite right.

Vyshinsky: Where were you interned?

Hrasche: I arrived in Kiev and was arrested there. Then, because I was a Czech, I was released and ordered to leave for the Kuban region.

Vyshinsky: And you went there?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why to the Kuban region?

Hrasche: Because I declared that I had worked and was working there.

Vyshinsky: So in 1917 you were still a subject of Austria-Hungary?

Hrasche: A subject of Austria-Hungary and a civilian prisoner of war. Early in November 1917 I took on Russian citizenship in the town of Yeisk.

Vyshinsky: In what way did you take this citizenship? What government existed there at that time?

Hrasche: There was the same government at that time as under Kerensky.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, the Kerensky government.

Hrasche: Yes, the Provisional Government. The act itself was performed in the town militia station in the presence of the Chief of Militia and a representative of the town council.

Vyshinsky: So from that moment on you have been a Russian subject, a Russian citizen? Do I understand you correctly?

Hrasche: The question is rather hard to answer.

Vyshinsky: Why?

Hrasche: Because right then I was told that the case would afterwards be sent on to the gubernia centre in Yekaterinodar, from where I was to receive a passport. For the time being I was given a temporary certificate.

Vyshinsky: Of what state did you consider yourself a citizen at that time?

Hrasche: I considered myself a Russian citizen.

Vyshinsky: Of the Russian state?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That was in 1917?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And in 1918?

Hrasche: In November I left for Kiev. . . .

Vyshinsky: I am not asking where you went. Of what state did you consider yourself a subject in 1918?

Hrasche: Also Russian.

Vyshinsky: And in 1919?

Hrasche: In 1919 I considered myself a Czechoslovakian.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, being a subject of Austria-Hungary and having acquired Russian citizenship, you declared yourself to be a Czechoslovakian? Correct?

Hrasche: Yes. In 1919 I left for Czechoslovakia.

Vyshinsky: And returned?

Hrasche: I returned from there in the guise of a former Russian prisoner of war.

Vyshinsky: What does that mean?

Hrasche: I returned to Russia from Czechoslovakia with a group of former Russian prisoners of war.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, as if you had been a prisoner in Czechoslovakia and were returning?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In what year was that?

Hrasche: At the end of 1920 or the beginning of 1921.

Vyshinsky: Where did you live in 1921?

Hrasche: In Moscow.

Vyshinsky: Did you live in Moscow in 1922 also?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you live in Moscow in 1923 also?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: On what passport?

Hrasche: In 1922 I was given a labour registration book.

Vyshinsky: As a citizen of what country?

Hrasche: As a Soviet citizen.

Vyshinsky: And what was your real citizenship? You came here in 1909 as a subject of Austria-Hungary. Was that your real nationality?

Hrasche: Austria-Hungary has not existed since 1918.

Vyshinsky: But it did then. And then in 1917 you became a Russian citizen?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In 1919 you became a Czechoslovakian citizen?

Hrasche: Quite right.

Vyshinsky: Then you returned in the guise of a prisoner of war and became a Russian citizen?

Hrasche: Soviet.

Vyshinsky: And received a passport?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So you consider yourself a Soviet citizen?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Then why do you keep with you a document that you are a citizen of the Czechoslovakian Republic? Two documents. Do you know this document? *(Showing a document.)*

Hrasche: Yes, I know it well.

Vyshinsky: Here are all the visas both in French and in Czech. Here it is certified in the name of the Czechoslovakian Republic that Hrasche, Jan Yosifovich, teacher, of middle height, of such-and-such an age, cleanshaven, is a citizen of the Czechoslovakian Republic, 1919. Why did you have with you this document that

you are a citizen of the Czechoslovakian Republic if you are a Soviet citizen? A second document.

And the third document. In 1919 you had a certificate saying that you were a citizen of Austria-Hungary. That is to say, in 1919 you simultaneously had two documents—one from the Czechoslovakian Republic, the other from Austria-Hungary, which, as you say, did not exist. Why?

Hrasche: In Kiev, when I decided to leave for Czechoslovakia in the summer before Kiev was occupied by Denikin's troops, the affairs of the former prisoners of war there were in charge of the Austro-Hungarian Soviet of War Prisoners.

Vyshinsky: You received this in the Soviet?

Hrasche: In the Soviet I received not only this certificate but also a paper with which I intended to leave for Czechoslovakia while the Soviets were still in power.

Vyshinsky: No, this is another paper, from the mobilization commission, saying that you had been found unfit for military service. Here you are described as an Austro-Hungarian subject; 1919, valid up to August 17, 1919. Was this certificate given you in Kiev under the Whites or under the Soviet government?

Hrasche: Under the Soviet government.

Vyshinsky: So in 1919 you have a document saying that you are a Czechoslovakian citizen; then you receive a document saying that you are an Austro-Hungarian citizen; and after that you consider yourself a Soviet citizen? Correct?

Hrasche: Not altogether.

Vyshinsky: What is wrong? Did you have a document saying you were a Czechoslovakian citizen?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did you have a document dated 1919 saying that you were an Austro-Hungarian citizen?

Hrasche: Yes, I did.

Vyshinsky: Then, in 1922, you receive a passport as a Soviet citizen. On what grounds was this passport issued to you?

Hrasche: I was given this passport on the ground of the paper I received in the Commission for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

Vyshinsky: And the paper was issued to you on the basis of the fact that you were a prisoner of war?

Hrasche: A paper was given me by some Russian prisoners of war whom I knew, on the basis of my false statement that I was being persecuted.

Vyshinsky: When you arrived from Czechoslovakia, you passed yourself off as a Russian on the basis of the paper which you received thanks to the certification of certain Russian persons?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why is it written in your labour registration book that your place of birth was the Kuban region?

Hrasche: In the certificate which I received in Czechoslovakia as a former Russian prisoner of war. . . .

Vyshinsky: But you never were a Russian prisoner of war, and now you talk as if you were really convinced that you had been a Russian prisoner of war.

Hrasche: I came in the guise of a Russian prisoner of war.

Vyshinsky: Is it true that you were born in the Kuban region?

Hrasche: No.

Vyshinsky: In the paper it says the Kuban region—is that correct or not?

Hrasche: Incorrect.

Vyshinsky: A forged document?

Hrasche: Forged.

Vyshinsky: And what is the year of your birth?

Hrasche: 1886.

Vyshinsky: And why does it say 1880 in the passport?

Hrasche: In 1920 I was given a paper in Czechoslovakia.

Vyshinsky: In 1920?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So in this paper the year of birth is incorrectly given as 1880? Tell me, in what year were you born?

Hrasche: In 1886.

Vyshinsky: Why is it given as 1880 in the passport? From your words?

Hrasche: That was taken from the document which I produced.

Vyshinsky: And that document was based on your words?

Hrasche: That document I received in Bohemia.

Vyshinsky: How did they know that you were born in 1880? Why did they write that?

Hrasche: That year was given in the paper which I had as a Russian prisoner of war.

Vyshinsky: You were issued a passport not on the strength of the Czechoslovakian document but on the strength of that paper?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: What was written there was incorrect, a forgery?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Place of birth wrong. Year wrong. What is your first name?

Hrasche: In Czech, Jan.

Vyshinsky: And in Russian?

Hrasche: And in Russian Ivan.

Vyshinsky: So here you thought it necessary to write in Russian

—not Hrasche, Jan, but Hrasche, Ivan? And cannot Jan be written in Russian?

Hrasche: I was persuaded that Jan and Ivan were just the same.

Vyshinsky: The same as being born in the Kuban region or in the Czechoslovakian Republic?

Hrasche: No, that is different.

Vyshinsky: Your basic profession?

Hrasche: I was a teacher for seven or eight years.

Vyshinsky: Is that your basic profession?

Hrasche: No, later I dropped this profession; I was a journalist, then an economist.

Vyshinsky: Which profession do you consider your basic one: teacher, journalist or economist, or politician?

Hrasche: I have been an economist for over ten years.

Vyshinsky: And why does your passport say journalist?

Hrasche: That was in 1922 or 1921.

Vyshinsky: In 1922 or 1921 you were merely a prisoner of war.

Hrasche: No, I was already working here.

Vyshinsky: What was your profession at the time when you were taken prisoner?

Hrasche: Teacher.

Vyshinsky: And you were taken prisoner?

Hrasche: A civilian. . . .

Vyshinsky: No, not a civilian, but a Russian prisoner of war in Czechoslovakia.

Hrasche: No, I was not actually a Russian prisoner of war.

Vyshinsky: So you were not taken prisoner by the Czechs?

Hrasche: No.

Vyshinsky: And I am asking you what was your profession when you were "taken prisoner by the Czechs"?

Hrasche: In the Czech document it says teacher.

Vyshinsky: And in the Russian document journalist?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So the profession does not tally either?

Hrasche: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: I am interested in the following: You arrived from Czechoslovakia as a Russian soldier who had been taken prisoner during the war?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you did not leave for Czechoslovakia again as a Czech prisoner who had been taken prisoner by the Russians?

Hrasche: No, I did not.

Vyshinsky: You went twice to Czechoslovakia?

Hrasche: I was not in Czechoslovakia after 1920.

Vyshinsky: And before 1920? The first time you got to Czechoslovakia from Russia—as who, in what capacity?

Hrasche: The first and only time I got there was as a Czechoslovakian who had been made a civilian prisoner of war.

Vyshinsky: That's just it. You had been a prisoner in Russia, and you got to Czechoslovakia in the capacity of such a prisoner of war; then, from Czechoslovakia, you got to Russia as a Russian prisoner of war. Have I understood you correctly?

Hrasche: Not quite.

Vyshinsky: But you yourself said that you were not imprisoned in any way in Czechoslovakia. Or were you?

Hrasche: I have already said that I left Czechoslovakia in a fraudulent manner.

Vyshinsky: That is just what I am asking about. You left in a fraudulent manner, pretending to be a Russian prisoner of war?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That is all. Did you say this to anybody when you were joining the Party?

Hrasche: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: Did you say who you really were? Did you show your true face?

Hrasche: No.

Vyshinsky: And did you keep these precious documents with you?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Tell the Court about your Trotskyism.

Hrasche: I have never had anything to do with Trotskyism.

Vyshinsky: Never had anything to do with it?

Hrasche: I came in contact with it on the basis of my espionage and wrecking activities.

Vyshinsky: Ah, I see! From espionage to Trotskyism, then, and not the other way about. In that case it will be better for you to tell the Court how you became an agent of the intelligence service. What intelligence service?

Hrasche: When I arrived the first time. . . .

Vyshinsky: What intelligence service?

Hrasche: The last time. . . .

Vyshinsky: Of what intelligence service were you an agent?

Hrasche: Of the German intelligence service.

Vyshinsky: So that's it! In what year?

Hrasche: That was in 1932.

Vyshinsky: Very good, but before 1932 where did you work, in what institutions?

Hrasche: Before 1932 I first worked after my arrival in the People's Commissariat of Education.

Vyshinsky: In the People's Commissariat of Education?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In what capacity?

Hrasche: I worked there in the information department as one of the contributors to the *Bulletin of the Unified School.* Then I worked in the Comintern as a translator from Czech.

Vyshinsky: In the Comintern?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: In what year was that?

Hrasche: That was from May 1921 to May 1922.

Vyshinsky: And before that you did not engage in espionage?

Hrasche: Yes, I want to say. . . .

Vyshinsky: Simply answer: did you or not? Were you engaged in espionage before that?

Hrasche: I used to receive commissions to execute.

Vyshinsky: Had you already made contacts as a spy?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When you started work in the People's Commissariat of Education, were you already connected with an espionage organization?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: When you started work in the Comintern, were you already connected with an espionage organization?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And here you say that you did not become an intelligence service agent until 1932. I ask you pointblank: Did you come to the U.S.S.R in 1920 for the purpose of spying?

Hrasche: Yes, quite right.

Vyshinsky: And that was why you performed that manipulation with the prisoners of war, in order to achieve this more easily?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Well then, everything is clear now. In what year did you finally become connected with the German intelligence service?

Hrasche: With the German intelligence service I became connected in 1932.

Vyshinsky: And before that, with what intelligence service were you connected?

Hrasche: Before that—with the Czechoslovakian intelligence service.

Vyshinsky: So what is your basic profession?

Hrasche: It would seem that no answer is required. . . .

Vyshinsky: An answer is required. You say you were a teacher, but you are not a teacher; you say you are an economist, but you are not an economist; then you make a correction and say that you

worked as a journalist, and now I see that you have another profession. What is it?

Hrasche: A spy.

Vyshinsky: With whom of the German intelligence service did you have personal contact?

Hrasche: Of the German intelligence service I was in touch with Meyerowitz, who has already been mentioned here.

Vyshinsky: In order to make it easier for us to conduct the examination, I ask leave to hand these photographs to the accused Hrasche to see if he will recognize his old acquaintance among them.

The President: Accused Hrasche, ten photographs are handed to you. Is that of Meyerowitz among these photographs?

(The Commandant presents the photographs to the accused Hrasche. Hrasche looks at the photographs and makes an inscription on one of them.)

Vyshinsky: And is there no other acquaintance there? Show me please; perhaps there are other familiar faces among them.

(The accused Hrasche, after looking at the photographs, makes an inscription on another of them.)

Hrasche: I have also recognized the installation mechanic of the Linde firm—Lenz.

Vyshinsky: What kind of person is he?

Hrasche: He is also an agent of the German intelligence service.

Vyshinsky: Were you connected with him?

Hrasche: Yes, I got him work at the Komsomoletz Plant in Tambov.

Vyshinsky: In what capacity?

Hrasche: I got him work there at the instructions of Meyerowitz, as one of the agents of the German intelligence service for gathering espionage information and for diversive activities.

Vyshinsky: Well, did he gather the information for you, or did you gather it for him, or did he gather it for Meyerowitz?

Hrasche: He gathered it for Meyerowitz.

Vyshinsky: And what did you do?

Hrasche: In this case or in general? If you mean in general, then I too was to gather material for Meyerowitz.

Vyshinsky: Did you gather it?

Hrasche: I handed over the material which I received from various German spies working in the factories in the guise of foreign specialists.

Vyshinsky: And on the other hand?

Hrasche: From Rataichak.

Vyshinsky: Were you and Rataichak connected as Trotskyites or as intelligence service agents?

Hrasche: I was connected as an intelligence service agent.

Vyshinsky: And were you already a Trotskyite at that time?

Hrasche: No, I was not a Trotskyite.

Vyshinsky: But adhered to Trotskyism?

Hrasche: I regard Trotskyism as the sum of certain convictions, and I, as a spy, am not entitled to have such convictions.

Vyshinsky: I think you said yourself that you were drawn into a Trotskyite group?

Hrasche: It was here, I may say, that I learned about it for the first time.

Vyshinsky: So you were simply connected with Rataichak as with an intelligence service agent?

Hrasche: Yes, I supposed that material interest, money interest was the main thing here.

Vyshinsky: Why, did you receive money for this?

Hrasche: Yes, I received it from Meyerowitz. Once I received 300 marks from him. He assured me that he had sent another 500 marks to an address agreed upon. However, I received no confirmation of this.

Vyshinsky: And did you have relatives?

Hrasche: I had and still have.

Vyshinsky: And was not money sent to your relatives?

Hrasche: Yes, I gave him the address of a relative in Czechoslovakia.

Vyshinsky: Whose, exactly?

Hrasche: There was a certain distant relative of mine in Prague who was to forward the money to my mother.

Vyshinsky: And where did your mother live?

Hrasche: My mother also lived in Prague.

Vyshinsky: And what is the name of that distant relative of yours?

Hrasche: Prohaska.

Vyshinsky: And the money was sent through him?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Meyerowitz sent this money?

Hrasche: As regards the 300 marks he sent in 1932, I received confirmation that they had been received. Then, in 1935, he assured me that he had sent 500 marks, but I received no confirmation of this.

Vyshinsky: He sent them to the same place, to your mother?

Hrasche: Yes, in the meantime my mother fell ill and died.

Vyshinsky: But who sent money to your mother? Meyerowitz?

Hrasche: She had contact with Prohaska.

Vyshinsky: And did Figler send money?

Hrasche: Also.

Vyshinsky: You are not saying everything. Each answer has to be dragged out of you. I asked whether you received money several times. You said twice—the first time you received it, and the second time it was promised. But it is well known that, in the words of our Russian saying, "a promise will keep you waiting seven years." It turns out that Figler did send money.

Hrasche: He also handed it on to my mother.

Vyshinsky. Well, and how much did your mother receive in this way?

Hrasche: Probably from 7,000 to 8,000 Czechoslovakian kronen.

Vyshinsky: And then you found yourself enlisted for the German intelligence service.

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: So your mother received this money not from the German, but from the Czechoslovakian intelligence service?

Hrasche: She received money through Figler direct.

Vyshinsky: Did you have connections with Trotskyites?

Hrasche: No.

Vyshinsky: Before you found yourself in the dock?

Hrasche: I had connections with one Danish Trotskyite—that is, not with one but with two or three.

Vyshinsky: Did you have connections with the Trotskyites in Moscow?

Hrasche: With engineer Wienfeld.

Vyshinsky: And who else?

Hrasche: Then there were Lund and Nielsen.

Vyshinsky: How did you establish connections with them?

Hrasche: I first established connections with Wienfeld.

Vyshinsky: Through whom?

Hrasche: Wienfeld went to work at the All-Union Committee of the Chemical Industry as a foreign specialist. He was enlisted in Berlin by Davidson, the former vice-chairman of the All-Union Committee on Chemical Industries, and, as was said in a letter which I afterwards found by chance, Davidson wrote to Norkin that this man was close to us in his views.

Vyshinsky: In what views? You said you were not entitled to have any views?

Hrasche: This letter did not refer to me: it was addressed to Norkin.

Vyshinsky: So Norkin is entitled to have views?

Hrasche: (Remains silent.)

Vyshinsky: To proceed. Did you live in Moscow in 1935?

Hrasche: I did.

Vyshinsky: Did you have a flat?

Hrasche: I had a flat.

Vyshinsky: Did you let anyone make use of your flat for conspirative purposes?

Hrasche: Wienfeld made use of this flat as a rendezvous. Wienfeld had previously lived in this flat himself, and he warned me that various people arriving in Moscow would come there, and said: "Send them on to me, or render them assistance if I leave."

Vyshinsky: Assistance in what respect?

Hrasche: In the demands which they might address to me.

Vyshinsky: Did they address any demands to you?

Hrasche: There was such a case in 1935—in September, if I am not mistaken. A Danish railwayman arrived in the guise of a foreign tourist, brought me a note from this Wienfeld, and said that he wanted to see Pyatakov, that he had a letter for him, and asked me to take him to Pyatakov.

Vyshinsky: Well, and how did you do that?

Hrasche: I recollect that this was in the morning; I was going to my office in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, took him along and told him how to get a pass and find Pyatakov's private office.

Vyshinsky: Who was this citizen?

Hrasche: I do not at the moment recall his name; he called himself a Danish railway employee.

Vyshinsky: And he had come to see Pyatakov?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinky: Tell the Court, did Rataichak ever come to this rendezvous in your apartment?

Hrasche: No, he did not.

Vyshinsky: Did you arrange any secret meetings for Rataichak?

Hrasche: I arranged for Rataichak to meet Meyerowitz in Rataichak's own office.

Vyshinsky: That is to say, you took Meyerowitz to that office? Were you not afraid of being caught there?

Hrasche: The interview with Meyerowitz was arranged to look like a business talk.

Vyshinsky: How, exactly?

Hrasche: Meyerowitz at that time offered on behalf of a certain firm equipment for a nitrogen plant. This served as a pretext for the interview.

Vyshinsky: Why could he not manage without you? He could have written them a note, offered them his services somehow?

Hrasche: I was there in charge of foreign affairs. . . .

Vyshinsky: Very convenient.

Hrasche: And it was easier for me to make an appointment with Meyerowitz by telephone, etc., than it would have been for him.

Vyshinsky: So you were managing the foreign department as an expert in your special line?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: May I question Rataichak?

The President: You may.

Vyshinsky (to Rataichak): Do you remember the meeting with Meyerowitz arranged by Hrasche?

Rataichak: The conversation was about placing orders for equipment.

Vyshinsky: Was this the real reason for the interview?

Rataichak: Meyerowitz, who had been suitably coached by Hrasche, asked whether he could see the plans for the new construction jobs and I answered in the affirmative and told him that he could get the necessary information from Hrasche. There the conversation ended, and I told Hrasche in his turn to give the necessary data to Meyerowitz.

Vyshinsky: Did Meyerowitz himself tell you that he was acquainted with Yushkevich?

Rataichak: No, his acquaintance came about later, roughly in March 1935.

Vyshinsky (to Hrasche): Do you know Yushkevich?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Through intelligence work?

Hrasche: In intelligence work I was connected with him approximately since the middle of 1935.

Vyshinsky: Did you take part in any diversive acts?

Hrasche: I personally did not take part, but I know that one of the German specialists, director Wainow, was apparently the man who engineered the breakdown at the Berezniki Combined Chemical Works.

Vyshinsky: How do you know this?

Hrasche: I know that after all that, he returned to Moscow in a very excited state and asked me to get him across the border as quickly as possible.

Vyshinsky: And did you do this?

Hrasche: I did it.

Vyshinsky: Why did you try to get him across quickly?

Hrasche: Because I had received appropriate instructions on this matter.

Vyshinsky: That he had to be packed off as quickly as possible?

Hrasche: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And you did this?

Hrasche: I did.

Vyshinsky: And there was no direct participation in diversive acts on your part?

Hrasche: Not personally on my part.

Vyshinsky: Did you know about it?

Hrasche: I heard about the breakdowns, but I was not sure that they were the result of acts of diversion.

Vyshinsky: Did not Rataichak tell you anything about diversive or wrecking work?

Hrasche: At the first meeting he spoke about it in general, but not explicitly.

Vyshinsky: What did he say?

Hrasche: That the organization was pursuing this sort of wrecking and diversive aims.

Vyshinsky: Was that when he recruited you?

Hrasche: It was the time when he said that he was aware of my connection with Meyerowitz, which had started before my conversation with him, and that I must continue to carry out this work, must carry out espionage work.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: The Court certifies that the photograph of the citizen whom the accused Hrasche has indentified as Meyerowitz is quite identical with the photograph attached to the entrance permit file of the Foreign Section of the Administrative Department of the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Executive Committee and with the photograph on the certificate.

Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

Norkin: I have a question. I heard Hrasche mention my name in connection with some letter.

The President: Accused Hrasche, will you repeat what you said about Norkin.

Hrasche: I said that in the middle of 1932, on my return from my vacation, I found in my desk a letter belonging to my predecessor addressed to "Dear Boris" and signed "Davidson," in which Davidson, who was abroad, among other things, informed Norkin that he had enlisted a specialist, "a man who stood close to us in his views," and asked Norkin to secure his appointment through Y. L. Pyatakov.

The President (to Norkin): Are you satisfied with the reply?

Norkin: When was that letter received?

Hrasche: In all probability Davidson despatched that letter from Berlin in May, or the beginning of June, 1932. I found it at the end of July, or beginning of August, when I returned from my vacation.

Norkin: Permit me to say something.

The President: Put it briefly, please.

Norkin: I understood that this was an instruction from foreign specialists who were connected with espionage activities. In this connection I want to say the following: In the first place, as far as I know, Davidson never had any connection with Trotskyism.

Vyshinsky: Do you know all those who were Trotskyites?

Norkin: I do not know. . . .

Vyshinsky: Nobody is accusing you of that.

Norkin: This somewhat compromises me, the fact that I was connected with this man.

Vyshinsky: You have been compromised quite a bit. Have you read the indictment?

Norkin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: You are accused of what is stated in the indictment.

Norkin: But not of this?

The President: Accused Hrasche, what is the correct date of your birth? When the indictment was handed to you, you told the secretary that you were born in 1886, and not in 1880. You altered it. To-day you said, not 1886, but 1880. When were you really born?

Hrasche: Permit me to explain. When the indictment was handed to me I found that the date of my birth was given as 1890. I said that the date of birth in my passport was 1880, but that actually I was born in 1886.

The President: That is why we put your date of birth according to what you say it is: 1886.

Vyshinsky: And so, when were you finally born?

Hrasche: Finally, in 1886.

The President: We shall now proceed to examine the accused Pushin. Accused Pushin: do you confirm the testimony you gave at the preliminary investigation and in the office of the Procurator of the Union in January this year?

Pushin: Yes.

The President: Comrade Vyshinsky, have you any questions to put to the accused?

Vyshinsky (to Pushin): What do you plead guilty to?

Pushin: I plead guilty to the fact that having been recruited for the counter-revolutionary, Trotskyite organization by Ra-

taichak in the beginning of 1934, I remained a member of this organization until my arrest; that on the instructions of Rataichak I committed three acts of diversion at the Gorlovka Works, took part in the wrecking work that was carried on in connection with factory designing, and lastly, that, on the instructions of the same Rataichak, I handed to the German spy, the fitter Lenz, three secret documents. This briefly, so to speak, in the briefest possible terms, is what I plead guilty to.

Vyshinsky: And to the fact that you also recruited various persons for the Trotskyite organization? Which of the persons you recruited for undermining work can you name?

Pushin: The technical director of the Gorlovka Chemical Works, engineer Tamm.

Kommodov: I have a question to put to Pushin. When did you commit the act of diversion at the Gorlovka Works?

Pushin: In November 1935.

Kommodov: And did you commit any wrecking or diversive acts in 1936?

Pushin: No. After December 1935 I did not commit a single act of a criminal character. I made great efforts to resign from work at the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry and went to Georgia.

Kommodov: In your new situation, did you utilize your position in a bad direction?

Pushin: On the contrary, I tried to work as well as possible in order to wipe out this criminal stain.

Kommodov: I have another question to put to you. Did you have dealings only with Rataichak, or with anyone in a higher position? Did you have any dealings with Pyatakov?

Pushin: No.

Kommodov: Did you have occasion to speak with anybody higher than Rataichak?

Pushin: No.

Kommodov: When were you arrested?

Pushin: I was arrested on October 22, and from the very first moment I was brought up from my cell for interrogation I confessed.

Kommodov: Did you confess under interrogation, or did you write your own statement?

Pushin: Before any evidence or questions were put to me I asked for paper and pen and wrote a statement to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Yezhov, in which I confessed all my crimes.

Kommodov: I have no more questions.

The President: The Court certifies that there is in the records

in Pushin's own handwriting a statement addressed to Comrade Yezhov and dated October 22, 1936, in which Pushin says the following: "Being arrested on the night of October 22, 1936, I consider it my duty immediately, without pondering long over the matter, to tell about the counter-revolutionary organisation in the chemical industry into which I was drawn, to tell about its criminal activities, and about the part I took in them. By my confession and sincere repentance I hope to expiate the crime I committed against the Party and against my country. Pushin."

Vyshinsky (to Pushin): How long did you carry out the functions of informer for the German intelligence service?

Pushin: I was informer for the German intelligence service during the first part of 1935 to the middle of 1935.

Vyshinsky: From what date?

Pushin: From the end of 1934 or beginning of 1935 to the middle of 1935.

Vyshinsky: When did you carry on your diversive activities?

Pushin: There were three acts of diversion. One was in April 1934.

Vyshinsky: And before that?

Pushin: I was only recruited for the organization in February 1934.

Vyshinsky: At that time you were a member of the Party?

Pushin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And when did you engage in espionage work?

Pushin: Up to the middle of 1935.

Vyshinsky: What stopped you?

Pushin: I had no practical instructions, as the person with whom I was connected, Lenz, had gone.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you ceased your activities, not because of remorse but because no practical proposals were made to you?

Pushin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Why did you not engage in espionage work in 1936? Of course, I welcome the fact that you retired from it, but I would like to know why.

Pushin: Since I am given the opportunity of speaking, not only about facts, but also moods and sentiments. . . .

Vyshinsky: We will leave moods and sentiments aside. What interests me are facts. Why did you not carry out any espionage tasks or commissions in 1935? You have already told us that there were no practical proposals. But were there any proposals of this kind in 1936?

Pushin: I left the place and received no instructions; I never operated on my own initiative.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you had no occasion to do so?

Pushin: No.

Vyshinsky: Did you tell anybody that you had sins, crimes, on your soul before you were taken to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs?

Pushin: I kept all my feelings to myself. . . .

Vyshinsky: I am not asking you about your feelings, I am asking you whether you told anybody or not.

Pushin: I did not tell anybody.

Vyshinsky: Hence, before your arrest you made no statement at all on this matter?

Pushin: No.

Vyshinsky: So it was only when you found yourself in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs that your "feelings" began to assert themselves?

Pushin: That is correct.

Vyshinsky: Thus, the statement you sent to Comrade Yezhov was made, not before your arrest, but after your arrest?

Pushin: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Perhaps at that time you began to fear the outcome, that you would have to meet your bills.

Pushin: I must give a different explanation. The point is that by the end of 1935 the very fact of my being in the organization had clearly revealed to me what an abyss I had reached, and my sufferings at the time, I felt. . . .

Vyshinsky: Having realized that, what should you have done? You should have gone and made a statement. But you did not do that?

Pushin: No.

Vyshinsky: And since you did not go and make a statement, all the rest loses significance.

Pushin: Quite true. But since you asked me whether I made my statement in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs because I was frightened. . . .

Vyshinsky: I did not say you were frightened; what I said was, perhaps you began to feel a sense of responsibility.

Pushin: Do you consider that was fear of punishment?

Vyshinsky: You will tell us about that in your last plea. What interests me is only one question: what objective facts, circumstances, can you bring forward to prove that you had rid yourself of these crimes in the middle of 1935.

Pushin: I can point to one objective fact. In April 1936 I arrived at the Kamensky Works where, as I said at the beginning, I had recruited two men.

Vyshinsky: What for?

Pushin: For wrecking work. Had I retained the convictions that I had had before, when I recruited them, I would have taken advantage of my being at the works to speak to them, to give them definite tasks and instructions. All I did was to greet them from a distance and go away.

Vyshinsky: Did you inform anybody about them at that time?

Pushin: I have already said that I did not inform anybody.

Vyshinsky: Hence, you simply did not think it wise to speak to them?

Pushin: Not that. I did not think it was unwise to speak to them the first time. And the second time I could not speak to them for other reasons.

Vyshinsky: In a word, you have no objective facts?

Pushin: If by objective facts you mean only coming to confess before arrest, then I have no such facts.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President (to the Commandant): Please, ask witness Tamm to come in.

(Witness Tamm enters the Court.)

The President: Is your name Tamm?

Tamm: Yes.

The President: Leonid Evgenievich?

Tamm: Yes.

The President: What was the last post you occupied?

Tamm: Deputy Chief Engineer of the Central Administration of the Nitrogen Industry.

The President: You have been called as a witness in the case of Pyatakov, Radek, Serebryakov and others and you must give truthful evidence.

Tamm: Permit me, Citizen President, to make a statement. I would ask that I be examined *in camera* as I have weighty grounds for this. If you will allow me, I will put them in writing.

The President: There are a number of questions that we will have to examine *in camera,* but there are a number of questions which comrade the Procurator will put to you which can be examined in open court.

Vyshinsky: I consider that we can deal in open court with the part which is not secret: connections between the witness and the accused Pushin, acts of diversion, and so forth, without going into details and the rest can be examined *in camera.*

The President: Please put your questions.

Vyshinsky (to Tamm): Tell me please, how old are you?

Tamm: Thirty-five, I will be thirty-six.

Vyshinsky: If you are thirty-five, of course you will be thirty-six.

Tamm: I mean that I will be thirty-six within a few days.

Vyshinsky: How many years have you been engaged in the nitrogen industry?

Tamm: Since 1928.

Vyshinsky: Until lately you occupied the post of Chief of the Production Department?

Tamm: Until lately I occupied the post of deputy chief engineer of the nitrogen industry.

Vyshinsky: In Moscow?

Tamm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: How long were you employed at the Gorlovka Works?

Tamm: From 1932 to February 1936

Vyshinsky: Did you know Pushin?

Tamm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Who introduced you to him?

Tamm: I made Pushin's acquaintance when I first arrived at the Gorlovka Nitrate Fertilizer Works, if I am not mistaken, in June or July 1932, when Ulanov invited me to work with him in the capacity of technical director of that plant.

Vyshinsky: How did you learn of Pushin's criminal activities?

Tamm (remains silent for a few moments): I worked with Pushin from the autumn of 1932, from September, approximately, until his departure from Gorlovka, until the middle of 1933.

Vyshinsky: I am asking you, where did you learn about Pushin's criminal activities, and do you know about them?

Tamm: I will come to that in a moment.

Vyshinsky: But you are not coming to it.

Tamm: He himself told me.

Vyshinsky: In what connection did Pushin start to tell you about his crimes?

Tamm: Pushin and I had had a number of anti-Soviet talks.

Vyshinsky: How did you come to have these talks?

Tamm: I knew that his sentiments were anti-Soviet.

Vyshinsky: How did you know?

Tamm: It was evident from all his conversations, from the remarks he dropped.

Vyshinsky: Was he a member of the Party?

Tamm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And were you?

Tamm: I was non-Party.

Vyshinsky: And you, being non-Party, suddenly noticed that a member of the Party was expressing anti-Soviet opinions?

Tamm: Yes. On one of my visits to Moscow, this was in February 1934, I went to see him at the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry on business connected with my plant, and there he definitely invited me to engage in diversive activities. I consented.

Vyshinsky: You agreed with him?

Tamm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Did he give you any commissions to carry out? Did you carry them all out?

Tamm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: That was in 1934?

Tamm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: And in 1935?

Tamm: In 1935 he gave me another commission to carry out.

Vyshinsky: Which you also succeeded in carrying out?

Tamm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was that at the beginning of 1935 or at the end?

Tamm: I received the commission in the middle of the year and carried it out at the end.

Vyshinsky: What do you think: can we take it that Pushin adhered to the diversionist position during the whole of 1935?

Tamm: I think we can.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet him at any time during 1935?

Tamm: I met him after the last act of diversion; in November 1935.

Vyshinsky: And where did Pushin go after that?

Tamm: He went to the Rion.

Vyshinsky: What were his sentiments when he went to the Rion.

Tamm: I had no opportunity of speaking with Pushin about that.

Vyshinsky: Did you meet Pushin after that?

Tamm: I met him twice at the Central Administration of the Nitrogen Industry in 1936.

Vyshinsky: Was there any talk about diversive acts?

Tamm: No, we did not discuss that.

Vyshinsky: What were his sentiments?

Tamm: The meetings were very short, so we hardly had any opportunity to talk.

Vyshinsky: You met as old acquaintances, friends?

Tamm: We met at the Central Administration of the Nitrogen Industry for a few minutes only and we held no conversation.

Vyshinsky: Did you regard him as an old conspirator, or did

you think, or did you have reason to think, that he had ceased these activities?

Tamm: I did not talk to him about that.

Vyshinsky: So you cannot say anything to characterize Pushin in 1936?

Tamm: No.

Vyshinsky: Have you met him since then?

Tamm: The last time I saw him was shortly before my arrest.

Vyshinsky: When was that?

Tamm: I think the last time I saw him was in the beginning of October 1936.

Vyshinsky: In the beginning of October 1936?

Tamm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Had anything changed, did you notice any symptoms?

Tamm: I had no opportunity to speak to him.

Vyshinsky: The acts of diversion on Pushin's instruction were carried out under your personal direction?

Tamm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Who carried them out?

Tamm: They were carried out by Assinovsky, Khalezov, Dratch, Kruschelnitsky.

Vyshinsky: Did you report to Pushin how they carried them out?

Tamm: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Was he pleased?

Tamm: He did not express displeasure.

Vyshinsky: Did he give you any further commissions?

Tamm: Not after the last one.

Vyshinky: No, after the first one?

Tamm: After the first one he did.

Vyshinsky: He did after the first one, but after the last one, since it was executed, he did not give any more, hence he was satisfied, hence he regarded it as right, and was satisfied. I have no more questions.

The President: Adjournment for 20 minutes.

* * *

The President: The examination of the accused is finished. The examination of the witnesses is also finished. Are there any supplementary questions?

Vyshinsky: I have a question to put to Pyatakov. Accused Pyatakov, please tell me, you travelled in an airplane to Norway to meet Trotsky. Do you know in which airdrome you landed?

Pyatakov: Near Oslo.

Vyshinsky: Did you have any difficulties about the landing or admission of the airplane to the airdrome?

Pyatakov: I was so excited by the unusual nature of the journey that I did not pay attention.

Vyshinsky: Have you heard of a place called Kjeller or Kjellere?

Pyatakov: No.

Vyshinsky: You confirm that you landed in an airdrome near Oslo?

Pyatakov: Near Oslo, that I remember.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions. I have an application to the Court. I interested myself in this matter and asked the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to make an inquiry, for I wanted to verify Pyatakov's evidence from this side too. I have received an official communication which I ask to have put in the records. (Reads.)

"The consular Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs hereby informs the Procurator of the U.S.S.R. that according to information received by the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Norway the Kjellere Airdrome near Oslo receives all the year round, in accordance with international regulations, airplanes of other countries, and that the arrival and departure of airplanes is possible also in winter months."

(To Pyatakov.) It was in December?

Pyatakov: Exactly.

Vyshinsky: I ask that this be placed in the records. Now a question to accused Radek.

The President: Ask it.

Vyshinsky: Accused Radek, tell us, did a certain person visit you at your country house near Moscow?

Radek: As I have already testified, in the summer of 1935 I was visited by that very diplomatic representative of that Central European country who first sounded me in his conversation with me in 1934.

Vyshinsky: Did he arrive and converse with you in anybody's presence, or were you alone?

Radek: No, Bukharin was with me at the time. We were sitting on the veranda when a car drove up and through the window I saw this gentleman whom I knew, and two other persons unknown to me. As I had not received any previous warning of this visit I was surprised. He began to explain his visit by stating that he had been visited by two persons who would probably interest me, a professor at the Königsberg University and the adviser to one of the leaders of one of the pro-

vinces of that country, who ought to interest me because the attitude of Königsberg towards Russia is different than, say, Rosenberg's because Prussia is afraid of Poland, does not trust her and that is why she is more interested in active relations with the U.S.S.R.

I listened to all he said and as we had agreed not to enter into any negotiations with these representatives here except to give our visa to Trotsky's mandate, and as I could not tell him why, the only thing I could do was to start to make fun of him. We started a wrangle over the race question. Then, these representatives, realizing that we did not intend to enter into the conversation for the sake of which they had some to see me, departed.

This visit had a sequel. Either the diplomatic agent could not understand why he was received in this way, or the persons at the back of him wanted to find out what this meant, whether any change had taken place in the attitude of the *bloc* towards that country. Several months later, approximately, November 1935, at one of the regular diplomatic receptions, the military representative of that country. . . .

The President: Do not mention his name or the country.

Radek: . . . approached me and began to complain about the complete change of atmosphere between the two countries. After the first few words he said that during Mr. Trotsky's time the relations between the armies of the two countries were better.

He went on to say that Trotsky had remained true to his old opinion about the need for Soviet-German friendship. After speaking in this strain for a little while longer he began to press me hard as one who had formerly pursued the Rappalo line. I replied to this by uttering the same formula which I had uttered when I was first sounded, namely, that the realist politicians of the U.S.S.R. appreciate the significance of Soviet-German friendship and are prepared to make the necessary concessions in order to ensure this friendship. To this he replied that we ought at last to get together somehow and jointly discuss the details, definitely, about ways of reaching a rapprochement.

I told him that when the circumstances permitted I would be glad to spend an evening with him. This second conversation revealed to me that there was an attempt on the part of military circles to take over the connections which Trotsky had established with certain circles in Germany, or that it was an attempt to verify the real content of the negotiations that were being conducted. Perhaps, also, it was an attempt to ascertain whether we knew definitely what Trotsky had proposed.

Vyshinsky: Did you ever speak to Pyatakov, or with someone else, about the date when the possible war would approach?

Radek: When Pyatakov returned from Oslo I put a number of questions to him concerning foreign policy. He informed me that, first, Trotsky had told him that it was not a matter of a five-year period, not a matter of five years, but of one year, or, at most, of two years. It was a matter of war in 1937. Then I asked Pyatakov: "Did Trotsky tell you this as his own assumption?" Pyatakov replied: "No, Trotsky said that he had got this in his conversation with Hess and other semi-official persons in Germany with whom he had dealings." Hence it was a directive giving an orientation for a very definite date.

I asked him: "So it is a matter of a separate war against the U.S.S.R.?" To this Pyatakov replied that Trotsky had spoken about war in 1937 in general without separating the attack on the U.S.S.R. from the general developments. And when I asked Pyatakov how did Trotsky exactly picture to himself the development of events, Pyatakov replied that Trotsky had said: Military preparations had been completed and now it was a matter of securing to Germany the diplomatic means. That would take a year. And he said that the object of these diplomatic strivings were, first, to secure British neutrality. Secondly, either Germany would come to an arrangement with France, or, relying upon the growing fascist movement which would weaken the democratic government of France, she would be able, under favourable circumstances, to put France out of action for a long time by a swift blow, and strike at the U.S.S.R. with concentrated forces. This was the second fact communicated by Pyatakov.

The third point that emerged from Trotsky's conversation with Pyatakov was that Germany demanded complete freedom of action for the advance of Germany to the Balkan and Danube countries. This is also a very important fact.

Vyshinsky (to Pyatakov): Did you say that? Do you confirm that?

Pyatakov: Yes. Radek is relating it very exactly. It is all quite true.

Vyshinsky: I have no more questions.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any supplementary questions to put to the accused?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: Comrade Monosovich, are the answers ready to the questions submitted by the Procurator?

Monosovich: They are ready. (*Reads.*)

"Answers of the Expert Witness Monosovich to the Questions Submitted by Comrade Vyshinsky, Procurator of the U.S.S.R.

"1. *In Connection with the Explosion which occurred on November 11, 1935, in the Hydrogen Department of the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works.*

"a. *What were the immediate causes of the explosion of the nitrogen apparatus in the chambers of the hydrogen department of the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works on November 11, 1935?*

"Reply:

"The immediate cause of the explosion of the nitrogen apparatus in the chambers was the accumulation of acetylene in the condensers and in the isolating material of the apparatus.

"The accumulation of acetylene was due to the following causes:

"1. The fan for the intake of air from higher layers of the atmosphere was not functioning, and as a result the air was sucked in from the room itself, and therefore had a major acetylene content.

"2. Owing to the fact that the fan was not functioning, a vacuum was formed in the suction line of the air compressors, which resulted in the intake of air contaminated with acetylene from the surrounding atmosphere along the whole air line. This air was contaminated with acetylene especially owing to the fact that welding operations with the help of acetylene generators were being performed in the vicinity of the department.

"3. According to the technical record of the factory and the explanation given by engineer Tamm, before the explosion occurred the nitrogen apparatus had been working for fifteen days with the auxiliary condenser cut out, and furthermore no analyses for determining the acetylene content in the liquid oxygen were made (for several days there were even no reagents available). The draining of the liquid oxygen from the main condenser was either not performed at all, or not frequently enough.

"b. *Could this explosion have been averted?*

"Reply:

"Unquestionably. All that was required was to observe the regulations obligatory during operation which ensure normal and safe work on these installations, namely, that

the intake of the air must be from higher layers of the atmosphere, that systematic analyses of the liquid oxygen must be made, and that the liquid oxygen must be systematically drained from the condenser.

"c. *Was the explosion due to accident or to malicious intent?*

"Reply:

"If the obligatory regulations governing operations had been observed and an explosion had taken place, it might have been attributed to accident. In the present case, when the regulations were absolutely ignored and every condition favouring an explosion was thus created, it cannot be called an accident. That there was malicious intent is beyond dispute.

"d. *Do the explanations given at the preliminary investigation by the witness Tamm as to the circumstances and causes of the explosion correspond to the actual technical information in the possession of the experts?*

"Reply:

"Yes, on the whole they do.

"2. *In Connection with the Explosion which occurred on April 7, 1934, at the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works.*

"a. *What were the immediate causes of the explosion?*

"Reply:

"The explosion was caused by the oxy-acetylene cutting of the connecting pipes for the recording instruments. Since the mixture is explosive, the welding or cutting of pipes filled with gas, unless they are preliminarily blown through, is categorically forbidden. In the present case the cutting was performed without the line having been preliminarily blown through, which led to an explosion.

"b. *Does the testimony given at the preliminary investigation by the witness Tamm and the accused Pushin as to the circumstances and causes of this explosion correspond with the technical information in the possession of the experts?*

"Reply:

"It does.

"c. *Was the explosion due to accident or to malicious intent?*

"Reply:

"In view of the existence of strictly prohibitive instruc-

tions and special permission to perform such work from the technical director or the superintendent of the department—the fact that these instructions were ignored cannot be regarded as accidental, but must be regarded as due to malicious intent.

"3. *In Connection with the Collapse of the Gas Line at the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works on November 14, 1934.*

"a. *What were the causes of the collapse of the gas line at the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works?*

"Reply:

"The collapse of the gas line was due to an excessive accumulation of water inside the pipes (nearly 13 tons). The accumulation of water was due to the fact that the condensate was not drained off from the gas line. Two of the draining outlets were closed. The water accumulated in the lower part of the gas line, the accumulated water filling as much as two-thirds of the internal cross section of the gas line and increasing the velocity of the gas to 16-20 metres per second.

"The resulting vibration of the whole construction and the hydraulic impact increased the tension of the metal beyond the flow point, with the result that the gas line was shattered.

"b. *Does the testimony given at the preliminary investigation by the witness Tamm and the accused Pushin as to the circumstances and causes of the collapse correspond to the actual technical information in the possession of the experts?*

"Reply:

"It does.

"c. *Was the collapse due to accident or to malicious intent?*

"Reply:

"The collapse of the gas line cannot be regarded as due to accident. The drumming noise in the gas line due to excessive accumulation of water was heard in the plant for 3½ hours before the gas line collapsed. The immediate drainage of the water and the stopping of the compressors until the condensate had been drained off were indispensable technical measures. The fact that these measures were not taken by skilled engineers like Tamm and Khalezov points to the malicious intent of their actions, which resulted in the collapse of the gas line."

Vyshinsky (to Monosovich): I request you to explain the reply to the following question *(reads):* "Do the explanations given at

the preliminary investigation by the witness Tamm as to the circumstances and causes of the explosion correspond to the actual technical information in the possession of the experts?"

The expert witness, Monosovich, says: "Yes, on the whole they do." What does this mean?

Monosovich: I want to say the following: that in his testimony the witness Tamm stated that for three or four days before the explosion no analysis had been made to ascertain the content of acetylene in the liquid oxygen, whereas in the technical report which we found among the materials of the plant it is stated that no records of analyses were to be found in the journals since September 2, so that, according to the entries, no analyses were made for nine days. According to the witness Tamm, however, no analyses were made for three or four days. Hence, in the main, the technical material coincides, but there is a discrepancy on this point.

Vyshinsky: This means that on the whole actually no analyses were made?

Monosovich: Yes.

Vyshinsky: But there is a discrepancy as to the period. So, according to the explanation of the accused Pushin, the period was a fairly short one?

Monosovich: Yes.

Vyshinsky: Is it advisable to have analyses made over longer periods or shorter periods in order to avoid accidents?

Monosovich: In order to avoid accidents it is advisable to have them in shorter periods.

Vyshinsky: Can it be taken to mean that these analyses were made three days before the explosion?

Monosovich: According to his statement analyses were made three or four days before the explosion.

Vyshinsky: But according to the materials?

Monosovich: According to the materials it appears that no analyses had been made for eleven days before the explosion, and the longer the period the greater the danger.

Vyshinsky: Hence, in your opinion the situation was even worse and more dangerous than depicted by the accused?

Monosovich: Actually more dangerous.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Kommodov: What period is stipulated in the regulations?

Monosovich: According to the regulations there should be two samplings in every shift.

Kommodov: That means twice a day.

The President: Accused Pushin, have you any questions?

Pushin: This was not the testimony of the accused but that of

the witness Tamm. In my testimony I stated that no analyses had been made for ten days.

Monosovich: This was shown in Tamm's documents.

Vyshinsky: I ask you to note the fact that the question itself was formulated as follows: is the explanation given by witness Tamm at the preliminary investigation in accordance with the circumstances and the causes of the explosion. The reply: "In the main it is," applies to Tamm, Pushin has nothing to do with it.

Kommodov: In another instance we have Tamm and Pushin.

Vyshinsky: But Pushin confirms that no analysis had been made for ten days.

Kommodov: Am I to understand that in the other instance where we had the testimony of both Pushin and Tamm, their explanations coincide?

Monosovich: They coincide.

The President: Have you any more questions?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: Comrade Lekus will give his findings.

Lekus: On the request of the investigating authorities a number of committees of experts made investigations in the Kuzbas during the months of October, November and December 1936, in connection with the criminal activities of accused Shestov and Stroilov in the Kuzbas, as had already been formulated. These committees of experts have studied a large quantity of factual material collected at the offices of the mines. In addition they visited all the pits they considered it necessary to visit in the process of their investigations and themselves examined the workings to which the particular material referred.

And there was the committee which studied all the material collected at the mines in the Kuzbas. This committee consisted of mining engineer Gorbachov, mining technician Dmitrov, and myself.

In connection with the questions put by the State Prosecutor, Procurator of the Union, Comrade Vyshinsky, and confirmed by the Court, in order to find the reply to these questions I examined all the material which I now submit to the Court.

I will now give my answer. (Reads)

"Answers to the questions submitted by the State Prosecutor, Comrade Vyshinsky, Procurator of the U.S.S.R., and endorsed by the Court, to the expert witness Lekus in connection with the criminal activities of the accused Shestov and Stroilov in the Kuzbas.

"A. *Pit Fires in the Prokopyevsk Colliery*

"1. *What were the causes of the fires?*

"The underground fires arose as the result of:

"*a.* The use of the chamber-and-pillar system of mining with natural subsidence of the roof, and of the system of zones with inter-zonal pillars and with natural subsidence of the roof in the working of rich seams.

"The coal remaining underground was subject to conditions favouring spontaneous heating followed by spontaneous combustion.

"*b.* The incorrect technical application of the above-mentioned systems of mining, natural subsidence, which results in a sharp increase in the number of emergency removals of rock. (See records, Vol. XLIV, pp. 68, 73-74.)"

Then there is a paragraph which I request should be read *in camera.*

The President: Very well.

Lekus: I have an explanation to make in connection with point b) of my findings. The fact of the matter is that the system itself was incorrect and inexpedient, but it might have been used if care had been taken to organize the work as well as possible, whereas here we have a bad system badly applied. (Reads)

"c. Non-application of the methods of filling in the worked-out cavities."

The President: Read us your table.

Lekus (reads):

"Worked-out	By the filling-in system per cent	By the subsidence system per cent
"In 1934	5.12	94.88
"In 1935	3.12	96.88
"In 1936	4.17	95.83

"(See Vol. XLVI, p. 20.)"

Comrade President, need I read the reference to the corresponding volumes and pages, or is that not necessary?

The President: It is not necessary to read the references.

Lekus: "Point 2—Consequences of these fires."—In view of the confidential character of the first paragraph, permit me to read it *in camera.*

In view of the confidential character of the first paragraph of the second question (on asphyxiation), I request permission of the Court to read it *in camera.* (Reads):

"2. *What were the consequences of these fires?*

"*a. In camera.*

"*b. In camera.*

"*c.* The presence of so many underground fires in the upper levels of the rich steeply-inclined seams of the Prokopyevsk Colliery renders it extremely difficult to work the lower levels. Furthermore, until the underground fires are extinguished, work in the lower levels under the seats of the fires is accompanied by extreme danger to the people working in the mines.

"*d.* Both the outbreak of new fires and the existence of old fires complicate and disorganize mining work, disrupt the fulfilment of the plans of coal-getting and increase the cost of the coal.

"3. *Could these fires have been averted?*

"As a rule, the adoption of rational systems of mining, and in particular the filling-in of the worked-out cavities, practically eliminates all possibility of the outbreak of underground fires.

"At the Prokopyevsk Colliery it was possible to perform filling-in work by the most elementary methods until such time as equipment was installed for the mechanical filling-in of worked-out cavities. (Vol. XLIV, p. 56.)

"It was possible to expedite the installation of temporary mechanical filling-in methods, yet the money assigned for this purpose was not utilized. (Vol. XLIV, p. 43.)

"Hence it was possible to avert the fires. This possibility was not utilized deliberately.

"B. *State of the Ventilation in the Prokopyevsk Colliery*

"The ventilation of the pits at the colliery is in an extremely bad and disorganized state and cannot ensure the normal performance of mining work.

"1. *What were the causes of the bad state of the ventilation?*

"*a.* The construction of the ventilation shafts lagged far behind the sinking of the main shafts, resulting in the creation of blind stopes without artificial ventilation.

"*b.* The air supplied by the main fans was distributed to the sections and stopes extremely unevenly.

"*c.* The portable fans were so placed as to create the circulation of a current of vitiated air.

"*d.* Ventilation partitions and doors were not built and

not repaired in time, the result of which was a leakage of air and disturbance of the ventilation system.

"*e.* The adoption of artificial ventilation was delayed.

"2. *What were the consequences of the bad state of the ventilation?*

"*a. In camera.*

"Asphyxiation with fatal results: in 1935—two cases; for the first nine months of 1936—two cases. (Vol. XLVI, p. 26.)

"*b.* From 1933 to October 1936 there were ten explosions of gas and coal dust, as a result of which twenty-one persons received burns to face and hands and one person died. (Vol. XLVI, pp. 139-141.)

"*c.* The existence of gas-filled mines tended to disorganize the work and to diminish the fulfilment of the plan of coal output.

"3. *Was it possible to improve the ventilation?*

"It was possible to improve the ventilation. As will be seen from No. 1, Point B of the present findings, such elementary measures as the sinking of ventilation shafts, the even distribution of the air supplied by the main fans, the rational placing of the portable fans and normal care of the underground ventilation installations, might have greatly improved the ventilation of the mines in the Prokopyevsk Colliery.

"The fact that the measures indicated were not adopted can only be due to malicious intent.

"C. *Capital Construction and Reconstruction [Work of the Kuzbas Coal Trust in 1932-36*

"1. *Did the plans of construction work carried out correspond to the interests of the development of the coalfield?*

"*a.* The principal purpose of the Kuzbas is to supply the coke and chemical industry of the East with coal of a special kind. The development of the coalfield demands the construction of a number of pits to work the coal of the required kind, so that these pits may ensure the development of the coalfield projected for the near future.

"The 'Kapitalnaya No. 1' Mine of the Kiselyov District, on which over 7,000,000 rubles were spent, and which possesses rich seams of coal of mark 'K,' was put into conservation in 1935. The 100-metre level of the Stalin Mine in the Prokopyevsk Colliery, which possesses rich seams of coal of mark 'K,' was put into conservation in 1934. The reason

given for the conservations was lack of funds. (Vol. XLVIII, pp. 326 and 331.)

"At the same time work involving an expenditure of 6,315,000 rubles was undertaken on the construction of four inclined pits in Kiselyov, which pits contained only 30 per cent coal of this mark 'K.' (Vol. XLIV, p. 132.)

"The diversion of funds from the construction of secondary pits to the construction of pits of prime importance, within the limits of the appropriations made for the Kuzbas Coal Trust, would have made it possible to put into operation in good time a sufficient number of pits with seams of coal of mark 'K.'

"2. *What were the consequences of the incorrect planning of construction work?*

"*a.* Six mines with an aggregate estimated capacity of 12,500,000 tons of coal per annum have been put into conservation. 15,657,000 rubles have been expended on these pits. (Vol. XLIV, p. 134.)

"*b.* A number of the collieries of the Kuzbas, such as the Kiselyov, Osinovka, the Kuibyshev and Lenin Collieries, and partly also the Prokopyevsk Colliery, have been transformed into collieries of small pits, which do not ensure the fulfilment of the plan of these collieries, and therefore of the Kuzbas as a whole, even for the immediate future. (Vol. XLIV, p. 132.)

"*c.* The principal source of coal of mark 'K'—the Prokopyevsk Colliery—is in a very serious state, since the temporary filling-in equipment and the designs for this equipment have not been completed, and the colliery is not equipped and not prepared for working the secondary (lower) levels on the filling-in system.

"*d.* The available pits producing coal of mark 'K'—are not sufficient to ensure the output of coal of this quality which will be required in the next few years."

The President: Comrade Vyshinsky, have you any questions?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: Have the accused any questions?

Shestov: I have no questions; the experts' findings are correct.

The President: You are not an expert on this question. Does Stroilov have any comments to make?

Stroilov: I have.

The President: Please make them.

Stroilov: My first comment refers to the use of the chamber-and-pillar system of equipment. I take full responsibility for using this system without adopting the necessary rationalization and technical measures. But it was not the wreckers' organization which initiated this system. Our wrecking consisted in maintaining this system, which gives very considerable effects temporarily and so aroused no suspicion when used on a wide scale.

My second comment refers to ventilation. Speaking of Prokopyevsk, the state of ventilation was the principal and almost the main consequence of using this system of natural subsidence, as a result of which it was impossible to concentrate the fans either on blowing or on suction, and we had to have deconcentrated airing. The second cause is the adoption of mechanized extraction almost exclusively by means of shot firing, and not with the aid of coal-cutters or pneumatic picks. But as the use of explosives gave a better economic effect than the coal-cutters, it made a very good impression on technical public opinion. The impression was created that everything was as it should be, and the necessary measures were not introduced in the schedules of work. Add to this the wilful and malicious intent which existed, the results, of course, are as reported by expert Lekus. But I would ask the Court to note the following: I confirm the correctness of the report on these two questions, the full correctness of the findings of the experts in regard to future results if the necessary measures are not taken. But the technical reasons are somewhat different.

In 1935 I took measures to start a fully mechanized pneumatic gallery in Koksovaya Pit and this was done under my personal direction with Soviet equipment and the fully mechanized gallery was started.

I would ask the Court to take this into account. That is one point. Beginning with 1935 and in 1936 measures were taken for the artificial subsidence of the chambers with more intensive flooding. The number of fires in 1935-36 was smaller. Thus, certain measures to reduce them were taken, but, of course, they were inadequate compared with the results of our wrecking work.

With regard to planning I fully agree with the experts' findings to the effect that the situation in regard to coking coal is serious. However, in 1935 enormous progress was shown in the development of coking coal and a five-year plan has been drawn up to 1942.

I would ask the Court also to take this into account. Above all, a question was also raised as to what limits the development of coal. It is due to the fact that the power stations are under the Power Administration.

And lastly about designing. Here much more wrecking was done than is enumerated in the findings of expert Lekus. Again I ask the Court to take into consideration that in 1935 the general estimates were completely revised, the designing was standardized according to type and eleven pits were started in a much better condition than in previous years. The work was given "good" marks and even higher. Of course, had our wrecking work in designing new plants ceased, the two per cent increase in cost would not, of course, have taken place, and the technical organization and readiness of the pits would have been much better.

On the whole, I think that the remarks and the findings of the experts reported by Lekus are correct. I know nearly all the members of that committee of experts.

Vyshinsky: I would ask that the accused be informed that if they have any amendments or supplementary questions concerning the experts' report, they may make them. If there are no such questions we may consider the matter closed.

The President: Accused Stroilov has been given permission to speak. He has no questions to put, but wishes to make a comprehensive statement.

Stroilov: I have not commented on the experts' report, I have given my conclusions to the Court.

The President: That means there are no more comments?

Vyshinsky: I have none.

The President: We will now take the third experts' report. Comrade Pokrovsky.

Pokrovsky (reads):

"Answers of Pokrovsky, Chairman of the Commission of Experts, to the questions submitted by the State Prosecutor, Comrade Vyshinsky, Procurator of the U.S.S.R., and endorsed by the Court, in connection with the criminal activities of the accused Norkin and Drobnis at the Kemerovo Combined Works Construction.

"The present findings are based on the materials of a commission of experts which worked at various construction units of the Kemerovo Combined Works Construction from October 29 to November 14, 1936, consisting of:

"1. Belgorodsky, technological engineer;
"2. Pakuro, construction engineer;
"3. Ivanov, construction engineer;
"4. Kotlyar, technological engineer;
"5. Shutikov, technological engineer;
"6. Gerasimov, finance expert;

"7. Vezenitsyn, technological engineer;
"8. Bondar, technological engineer;
"9. Uvarova, technological engineer;
"10. Smirnov, construction engineer;
"11. Trofimenko, technological engineer;
"12. Orzherovsky, electrical engineer;
"13. Voitsekhovsky, technological engineer;
"14. Pokrovsky, technological engineer, Chairman of the Commission of Experts."

The committee was split up among the numerous works of the Kemerovo Works Construction and its auxiliary enterprises; investigations were made on the spot and photographs of various objects were taken. In addition a quantity of material was documented, which material I will submit to the Court, and on the basis of which the findings on the questions submitted to me were drawn up. But before proceeding to reply to the questions, I would ask Comrade President to permit me to answer a number of questions *in camera* because of their secret nature.

The President: Answer the questions which are not secret.

Pokrovsky: The first group of important questions (reads):

"A. *Explosions at the Kemerovo District Electric Power Station on February 3 and 9, 1936.*

"1. *What were the causes of the explosions at the Kemerovo District Electric Power Station?*

"*Reply:*

"The furnaces of the boilers of the Kemerovo District Electric Power Station are designed for pulverized fuel. The milling installation of the power station is designed to pulverize coal with a volatile content not exceeding 25 per cent.

"Gas coal (from the Lenin Colliery), which has a volatile content of 42 per cent, when pulverized and dried at a temperature of 120°-140° C gives off large quantities of volatile substances with a low ignition point.

"The whole pulverizing system becomes filled with a large quantity of inflammable gases mixed with air. A small spark is sufficient to produce an explosion which might lead to the destruction of the boilers, loss of life and protracted interruption of the electricity supply.

"Sparks may be easily formed when the pulverizing is done by a ball-mill. Moreover, the dust of such coals as the gas coal of the Lenin Colliery may spontaneously ignite at a comparatively low temperature—140° C.

"Hence the cause of the explosions at the Kemerovo District Electric Power Station on February 3 and 9, 1936, was the ignition of coal with a volatile content of 30.1 per cent. (See records 1106, Vol. III, pp. 377-388.)

"2. *Could the explosion have been averted?*

"*Reply:*

"Yes, it could. All that was required at the Kemerovo District Electric Power Station was not to use as fuel coal with a volatile content exceeding the standard 25 per cent for which the pulverizing system of the power station is designed.

"3. *Was the explosion due to accident or to malicious intent?*

"*Reply:*

"The explosion cannot be regarded as accidental. The Commission of Experts are in possession of documents which show that the manager of the Kemerovo Combined Works Construction was repeatedly warned of the danger of explosion, in particular by Skripkin, Director of the Kemerovo District Electric Power Station, by Ponomaryov, superintendent of the boiler department, and by the state technical inspectors (see the documents in Vol. LV, pp. 369, 370, 371, 372, 374, 375 and 378). In spite of these warnings by technical men, Norkin, manager of the Kemerovo Combined Works Construction, gave written instructions to continue burning coal with a high volatile content.

"In view of the above, the Commission of Experts find that the explosion at the power station was due to malicious intent. All the documents referred to will be found in the file of the preliminary investigation. (See Vol. LV, pp. 369, 370, 371, 373, 374, 375 and 378.)

"B. *Accidents at the Nitrogen Works Construction on March 22 and April 5, 1936*

"1. *What were the causes of the accidents?*

"*Reply:*

"On March 22, 1936, at the moment when the concrete work on the ceiling was being finished, the whole ceiling collapsed. The collapse was due to the fact that the scaffolding supporting the concrete framework of the roof was not estimated: the timber from which the scaffolding was made was unfit for use. (Vol. LV, p. 354.)

"On April 5, 1936, the scaffolding of the air blower collapsed owing to the fact that the scaffolding was built of old

timber unfit for use, and without estimation and technical instructions. (See Vol. LV, p. 357.)

"2. *Could these accidents have been averted?*

"*Reply:*

"If preliminary calculations of the scaffolding had been made, if new material had been utilized, and if there had been technical supervision of the building of the scaffolding, there would have been every possibility of averting these accidents.

"3. *What were the consequences of these accidents?*

"*Reply:*

"These accidents resulted in material loss, delay in the construction of a department, and injury to six workers (in the accident on the air blower).

"4. *Were the accidents due to chance or to malicious intent?*

"*Reply:*

"Having examined the character of both accidents and on the basis of the following considerations, namely 1) that the use of unsuitable and rotten material as scaffolding, when this scaffolding had to be used by workers, was impermissible both from the technical and managerial standpoint, and 2) that the lessons were not drawn from the first accident and fourteen days later a second accident occurred from the same cause, the Commission of Experts considers that these accidents cannot be regarded as being due to chance, but are the result of malicious intent."

I request that the answers to the remaining questions be heard *in camera.*

The President: Comrade Vyshinsky, have you any questions or comments?

Vyshinsky: No.

The President: Accused Drobnis, have you any questions?

Drobnis: No.

The President (to Drobnis): No comments?

Drobnis: No.

The President. Accused Norkin, have you any questions or comments?

Norkin: I have no particular questions, only technical amendments which are not very important.

The President: Has Comrade Vyshinsky any supplementary questions to put to the accused?

Vyshinsky: Concerning the conclusion of the Court investiga-

tion? I would ask that the investigation be not concluded today. At present I have no more questions.

The President: Have Counsel for Defence any questions?

Counsel for Defence: (Reply in the negative.)

The President: The session will now proceed on the basis of Article 19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, *in camera.*

I must inform all present that the next open session of the Court will take place tomorrow at 4 p.m. Comrade Vyshinsky, Procurator of the U.S.S.R., will begin his speech.

Adjournment for 20 minutes.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

* * *

On the evening of January 27, at the close of the public session, a session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court was held *in camera.*

At this session the experts, Comrades Lekus and Pokrovsky, presented to the Court their findings on the questions confirmed by the Court, which were not subject to discussion in open Court.

Further, the witness Stein gave evidence on his connections with the official representatives of a foreign state.

The accused Pyatakov, Sokolnikov and Radek were examined as to their connections with official representatives of foreign states and the negotiations with representatives of these states which they conducted in conformity with Trotsky's line to expedite war against the U.S.S.R. and to help foreign states to inflict defeat upon the U.S.S.R. and dismember its territory. The examination of the accused Radek and Sokolnikov, and also the documents appertaining to the matter submitted to them, established the identity and official positions of the representatives of the foreign states with whom Radek and Sokolnikov had conducted negotiations.

The examination of Rataichak, Knyazev, Turok, Hrasche, Shestov and Stroilov established their definite connections with the agents of foreign intelligence services in the espionage and undermining activities in which they engaged in the U.S.S.R. on the instructions of these intelligence services as well as on the instructions of the anti-Soviet, Trotskyite centre—in pursuance of Trotsky's line.

The examination of the accused and the submission and reading of the documents appertaining to this matter established the names and official positions of Mr. K——, Mr. H—— and other persons mentioned in the indictment and also referred to during the court investigation without their names being divulged.

At the same *in camera* session the accused Pyatakov and Rataichak were interrogated on their criminal, wrecking activities in the defence industry.

EVENING SESSION, JANUARY 28, 1937, 4.00 P.M.

Commandant: The Court is coming. Please rise.

The President: The session is resumed. Comrade Vyshinsky, Procurator of the U.S.S.R., will speak for the Prosecution.

Vyshinsky: Comrade Judges and members of the Supreme Court of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In proceeding to perform my last duty in the present case I cannot but deal with several highly important specific features of the present trial.

In my opinion these specific features are, first of all, that the present trial, in a certain sense, sums up the criminal activities of the Trotskyite conspirators who for many years have systematically, and with the assistance of the most repulsive and despicable weapons, fought against the Soviet system, against the Soviet state, against the Soviet power and against our Party. This trial sums up the struggle waged against the Soviet state and the Party by these people, who started it long before the present time, started it during the life of our great teacher and organizer of the Soviet state, Lenin. While Lenin was alive these people fought against Lenin; and after his death they fought against his great disciple, that loyal guardian of Lenin's behests and the continuator of his cause—Stalin.

Another specific feature of this trial is that it, like a searchlight, illuminates the most remote recesses, the secret by-ways, the disgusting hidden corners of the Trotskyite underground.

This trial has revealed and proved the stupid obstinacy, the reptile cold-bloodedness, the cool calculation of professional criminals with which the Trotskyite bandits have been waging their struggle against the U.S.S.R. They stuck at nothing—neither wrecking, nor diversions, nor espionage, nor terrorism, nor treason to their country.

When several months ago, in this very hall, in this very dock, the members of the so-called united Trotskyite-Zinovievite terrorist centre were sitting; when the Supreme Court, represented by the Military Collegium, was trying those criminals, all of us listened to the story of their crimes that unfolded itself like a nightmare scene before us, with horror and revulsion.

Every honest man in our country, every honest man in every country in the world could not then but say:

This is the abyss of degradation!

This is the limit, the last boundary of moral and political decay!

This is the diabolical infinitude of crime!

Every honest son of our country thought to himself: such hideous crimes cannot be repeated. There cannot be in our country any more people who have fallen so low and who have so despicably betrayed us.

But now we are again overcome with the sentiments that we felt not long ago! Once again across our anxious and wrathful vision pass frightful scenes of monstrous crime, of monstrous treachery, of monstrous treason.

This trial, at which the accused themselves have confessed their guilt; this trial, at which side by side with the leaders of the so-called parallel Trotskyite centre—the accused Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek and Serebryakov, sit in the same dock prominent Trotskyites like Muralov, Drobnis, Boguslavsky and Livshitz; where side by side with these Trotskyites sit mere spies and secret service agents like Rataichak, Shestov, Stroilov and Hrasche—this trial has shown to what depths these people have sunk, in what an abyss counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, which long ago became transformed into the advanced and most vicious unit of international fascism, has become completely submerged.

This trial has revealed all the secret springs of the underground criminal activities of the Trotskyites, the whole mechanism of their bloody, treacherous tactics. It has once again revealed the face of real, genuine Trotskyism—this old enemy of the workers and peasants, this old enemy of socialism, loyal servant of capitalism.

This trial has shown once again whom Trotsky and his henchmen are serving, what Trotskyism really represents in practice.

Here, in this hall, before this Court, before the whole country, before the whole world, has passed a whole string of crimes committed by these people.

Whom did their crimes benefit? For what purpose, for the sake of what ideas, and finally, for the sake of what political platform or program, did these people commit their deeds? For the sake of what? And finally, why did they become traitors to their country, betrayers of the cause of socialism and of the international proletariat?

I think this trial has exhaustively answered all these questions, has clearly and precisely revealed what brought them to this.

Like a reversed cinema reel, this trial has reminded and shown us all the main stages of the historical path traversed by the

Trotskyites and Trotskyism, which spent the more than thirty years of its existence on preparing for its final conversion into a storm detachment of fascism, into one of the departments of the fascist police.

The accused themselves have told us whom they served. But this was told us still more eloquently by their deeds, by their sordid, sanguinary criminal deeds.

Many years ago our Party, the working class, our whole people, rejected the Trotskyite-Zinovievite platform as an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist platform. Our people banished Trotsky from our country; his accomplices were expelled from the ranks of the Party as traitors to the cause of the working class and socialism. Trotsky and Zinoviev were routed, but they did not subside; they did not lay down their arms.

The Trotskyites went underground, they donned the mask of repentance and pretended that they had disarmed. Obeying the instructions of Trotsky, Pyatakov and the other leaders of this gang of criminals, pursuing a policy of duplicity, camouflaging themselves, they again penetrated into the Party, again penetrated into Soviet offices, here and there they even managed to creep into responsible positions of state, concealing for a time, as has now been established beyond a shadow of doubt, their old Trotskyite, anti-Soviet wares in their secret apartments, together with arms, codes, passwords, connections and cadres.

Beginning with the formation of an anti-Party faction, passing to sharper and sharper methods of struggle against the Party, becoming, after their expulsion from the Party, the principal mouthpiece of all anti-Soviet groups and trends, they became transformed into the vanguard of the fascists operating on the direct instructions of foreign intelligence services.

The connections the Trotskyites had established with the Gestapo and the fascists were exposed by the trial of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre last year. The present trial has gone even further in this respect. It has provided exceptionally convincing material which has once again confirmed the existence of these connections and has brought it out more definitely; it has fully confirmed and definitely brought out, by due process of law and in its fullest scope, the treacherous role of Trotskyism, which has utterly and unreservedly passed into the camp of the enemy, which has become transformed into one of the departments of the "SS" and the Gestapo.

The Troskyites, Trotskyism, have reached their destination. Throughout the whole of their deplorable and shameful history the Trotskyites tried to strike and did strike at the most sensitive

and dangerous places of the proletarian revolution and of Soviet socialist construction.

The directive received from Trotsky, which Pyatakov spoke about here: "To strike the most palpable blows at the most sensitive spots," this directive represents the old Trotskyite attitude towards the Soviet government, towards socialist construction in our country.

The Trotskyites were particularly active, revealed particular determination, persistence and perseverance in their fight against the Soviet government in the period which coincided with the final victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. This is quite natural. To achieve this victory we had to overcome enormous difficulties. These difficulties, particularly those we encountered on our path in the period of 1929-31, especially in the rural districts, encouraged the Trotskyite-Zinovievite underworld which began to stir, to put out their feelers and, on Trotsky's instructions, tried to strike at the most sensitive place.

Sensing their inevitable doom, the remnants of the exploiting classes which were destroyed by the proletarian dictatorship, and their agents, adopted new tactics, new forms, a new line of struggle against the Soviet power, which the accused have explained and talked about fully enough in this Court.

The intensified resistance of the classes hostile to the proletarian dictatorship encouraged the Trotskyite-Zinovievite gang; moreover, it was inspired and instigated to commit crimes against the U.S.S.R. by the capitalist system which still exists and encircles the U.S.S.R.

Calculating on weakening the Soviet rear international counter-revolution hastened its preparations for intervention. It is well known that the interventionists prepare to strike their blow against the Soviet Union every year. The fragments of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyite-Zinovievite group knew that side by side with them were operating other champions of the restoration of capitalism, other detachments of capitalist agents in our country: the "Industrial Party," Kondratyev's "Toiling Peasants' Party," a kulak party, the "Union Bureau of the Mensheviks," the activities of which were examined by the Supreme Court—all these organizations exposed as organizations of wreckers and groups of diversionists who welcomed Trotsky's struggle against our Party, against the Soviet government, knowing that in the Trotskyites they really had champions of the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat like themselves, only more cynical and more insolent.

What does the restoration of capitalism in our country mean? In 1932 the Trotskyites increased their consolidation with the counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet groups, they established connec-

tions with the Right opposition for the purpose of waging a joint struggle against the Party, against the Soviet government. The real nature of these connections was exposed by Comrade Stalin at the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Congresses of our Party; he showed that the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites and Zinovievites and "the undisguised defeatists," as he expressed it, are united by the striving to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R. Comrade Stalin then described this program as the program of contemptible cowards and defeatists, a counter-revolutionary program of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

In the light of the events of today it has become particularly clear what an enormous historical service Comrade Stalin performed when in 1931 he revealed the real nature of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite counter-revolutionary organization in its "new" quality. In his letter to the *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* Comrade Stalin wrote: "As a matter of fact, Trotskyism is the vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie which is fighting against Communism, against the Soviet government, against the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R." Comrade Stalin branded Trotskyism as the vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, which received precisely from the hands of the Trotskyites spiritual, tactical and organizational weapons for their fight against Bolshevism, against the building of socialism.

In the light of the present trial the exceptional historical significance of this statement becomes particularly clear. In the light of the present trial the role of the underground, anti-Soviet Trotskyite groups, of this principal channel of anti-Soviet sentiments, hopes and aspirations of every description, the principal lever, the battering ram with which the enemies of the Soviets are trying to cause a breach in the ramparts of our state, to demolish the fortress of socialism which we have built up, comes out in particular relief.

It is not an accident that the Trotskyites are playing this role of vanguard of the anti-Soviet fascist forces. The descent of Trotskyism into the anti-Soviet underworld, its conversion into a fascist agency, is merely the culmination of its historical development.

The conversion of the Trotskyite groups into groups of diversionists and murderers operating on the instructions of foreign secret services and of General Staffs of aggressors merely crowns the struggle Trotskyism has been waging against the working class and the Party, against Lenin and Leninism, for decades. Trotskyism started out on its path with this disgusting struggle, on this path Trotskyism stands now, and along this path it is moving further and further, knowing no bounds to its hatred and rage.

The whole history of the political activities of the Trotskyites represents an uninterrupted chain of betrayals of the cause of the working class, of the cause of socialism.

As we know, in 1904 Trotsky came out with a most despicable pamphlet entitled *Our Political Tasks*. This pamphlet was packed full of filthy insinuations against our great teacher, the leader of the international proletariat, Lenin, against the great Leninist teaching regarding the paths of the Bolshevik victory, the victory of the toilers, the victory of socialism. In this pamphlet Trotsky squirts venomous saliva at the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism. With it he tried to poison the proletariat, tried to turn the proletariat from the path of irreconcilable class struggle, slandered the proletariat, slandered the proletarian revolution, slandered Bolshevism, slandered Lenin by calling him "Maximilian," after Robespierre, the hero of the French bourgeois revolution, and thereby tried to humiliate the great leader of the international proletariat.

Knowing no limits to his insolence and political shamelessness, this gentleman permitted himself to call Lenin the leader of the reactionary wing of the working class movement. While Lenin and Stalin were choosing the best people, training them in political battles against the autocracy, against tsarism, against the bourgeoisie, cementing them into the core of the Bolshevik Party, Judas-Trotsky knocked together a united front of the lackeys of capitalism for the purpose of fighting the cause of the proletariat. In 1911-12, Trotsky also organized a *bloc* as he later organized the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc*; he organized the so-called "August *bloc*" consisting of the lackeys of capital, of Mensheviks, of those who had been expelled from the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, of flabby intellectuals, and the refuse of the working class movement. Concerning this *bloc*, Comrade Stalin wrote: "It is well known that this patch-work 'party' pursued the aim of destroying the Bolshevik Party."

Lenin wrote that this *bloc* was "built up on lack of principle, on hypocrisy and empty phrases." Trotsky and his co-adjutors retaliated with a stream of filthy slander; they hurled abuse at Lenin and the Bolsheviks, and called them "barbarous," "fiercely sectarian" Asiatics. Concerning Trotsky, Lenin wrote: "Such types are characteristic as the wreckage of yesterday's historical formations, or systems, of the time when the mass working class movement in Russia was still sleeping." Twenty years ago Lenin warned the Party and the working class against such a "type," as he then called Trotsky. In his article "Violating Unity Under Cover of Cries for Unity" Lenin wrote: "The young working class generation must know very well with whom it is dealing."

This trial will help millions and millions of young workers and peasants, the toilers of all countries, clearly and distinctly to realise with whom we are really dealing. Of course, that contemptible Trotskyite *bloc* failed to destroy the Bolshevik Party, but even after the collapse of the *bloc* the Trotskyites continued to attack the Bolshevik Party in every way they could. The whole period of the history of our working class movement, from 1903 to the very eve of the revolution, is filled with the struggle Trotsky and the Trotskyites waged against the growing revolutionary attitude of the masses in Russia, against Lenin, and against his Party.

In 1915 Trotsky came out in opposition to Lenin's doctrine of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country. Thus, he completely capitulated to capitalism over twenty years ago!

In his fight against Lenin Trotsky in turn served Economism, Menshevism, Liquidationism, Kautskyism, Social-Democracy and national-chauvinism, just as he is now serving imperialism and fascism in the fight against the U.S.S.R.

Is it an accident that the Trotskyites, as Comrade Stalin pointed out some time ago, in the end became transformed into a nest and a hotbed of degeneration and Thermidorism? Is it an accident that Trotsky, who found himself in the ranks of our Party after the revolution, again broke away and slipped into the counter-revolutionary position, was flung out from our state, from our Soviet Union? Is it an accident that Trotskyism has become transformed into a storm detachment of capitalist restoration?

It is not an accident, because Trotskyism gravitated towards this from its very inception. It is not an accident because even before the October Revolution Trotsky and his friends fought against Lenin and Lenin's Party, just as they are now fighting against Stalin and the Party of Lenin and Stalin.

Comrade Stalin's forecast has fully come true. Trotskyism has indeed become the central rallying point of all the forces hostile to socialism, the gang of mere bandits, spies and murderers who placed themselves entirely at the disposal of foreign secret services, became finally and irrevocably transformed into lackeys of capitalism, into restorers of capitalism in our country.

And here, in this Court, it was precisely this despicable essence of Trotskyism that became revealed with exceptional fullness and clarity. They reached this shameful end because they had marched along this road for decades, singing the praises of capitalism, never believing in the success of socialist construction, in the victory of socialism. That is why they finally adopted a comprehensive program of capitalist restoration; that is why they went so far as to betray and sell our country.

Things were already moving towards this when Trotsky, as

was the case in 1922, proposed that our industrial enterprises, our trusts, be permitted to mortgage our property, including our basic capital, to private capitalists in order to obtain credits, which the Soviet state really needed at that time.

Already at that time this proposal of Trotsky's was a step towards the return to the rule of the capitalists, towards once again making the capitalists, the financiers and the manufacturers the owners of our factories and mills, and towards robbing our workers of the rights they had won under the Soviet power. These gentlemen asserted that Soviet economy "was coalescing more and more with capitalist economy," that is to say, that it was becoming transformed into an appendage of world capitalism. They said that "we shall always be under the control of world economy," that is to say, they asserted what the capitalist sharks were dreaming of.

Comrade Stalin at that time exposed this attitude of sabotage adopted by Trotskyism, when he said: "Capitalist control, that means first of all, financial control . . . financial control, that means implanting in our country branches of the big capitalist banks, that means forming so-called 'subsidiary' banks. But are there such banks in our country?" asked Comrade Stalin. "Of course not! And not only are there no such banks, but there never will be as long as the Soviet power exists."

Capitalist control, which the Trotskyites and the heads of the Trotskyite *bloc* now sitting here in this dock talked about, dreamed of and demanded, means the right of the capitalists to dispose of our country, of our markets, as they please. Capitalist control means, finally, as Comrade Stalin said, political control, the destruction of the political independence of our country, adapting the laws of the country to the interests and tastes of international capitalist economy. This is the meaning of the so-called capitalist control for which Trotsky and a section of the leaders of the so-called anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre sitting here in the dock longed for.

Exposing the anti-Soviet nature of such proposals, Comrade Stalin said: "If they mean this real, capitalist control . . . then I must say that there is no such control in our country, and there never will be as long as our proletariat is alive, and as long as the dictatorship of the proletariat exists in our country." That is why it is not an accident that these two tasks: preparing for capitalist restoration and fighting the dictatorship of the proletariat, are bound so organically together.

Is it an accident that, having started with *capitalist control,* these people sank to a frank platform of *capitalist restoration,* to open struggle for the purpose of carrying out this plat-

form in alliance with the capitalists against the dictatorship of the proletariat?

We know that at the turning points of our struggle, at the sharp upsurges of our proletarian revolution, the Trotskyite leaders were always, as a rule, found in the camp of our enemies, on the other side of the barricades.

The repudiation of the socialist character of our revolution, the repudiation of the possibility of building socialism in our country, determined and predetermined the hostile attitude of the Trotskyites towards the cause of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R.

This, however, did not prevent the Trotskyites from masking themselves with the name of socialism, any more than it has prevented many enemies of socialism from masking themselves with this name today.

This has always happened in history. We know that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, these most bitter enemies of socialism, always masked themselves with the name of socialism. But this did not prevent them from grovelling at the feet of the capitalists, the landlords and the White generals. We remember how the Mensheviks in Petlura's "Rada" government invited the troops of Wilhelm II to the Ukraine, how they traded in the liberty and honour of the Ukrainian people;

How under the signboard of Tchaikovsky's Socialist-Revolutionary government, the interventionists were operating in Archangel;

How the so-called "socialist" "government of the Committee of the Constituent Assembly" led to the rule of Kolchak;

How the Menshevik government of Noah Jordania faithfully served the foreign interventionists!

All these gentlemen called themselves socialists, they all masked themselves with the name of socialism; but we all know that there have never been more consistent, more cruel and brutal enemies of socialism than the Mensheviks and "Socialist-Revolutionaries."

Trotsky and the Trotskyites have for a long time been a capitalist agency in the working class movement. They have now become transformed into a fascist vanguard, into the storm battalion of fascism.

In 1926-27 they took the path of open anti-Soviet crime, that is, of actions liable already to criminal prosecution. They carried their struggle against the leadership of our Party, against the Soviet government, into the streets or at least tried to. That was a difficult and complicated period in the life of the Soviet state. It was the period of transition from the restoration to the reconstruction of our industry and agriculture on the basis of high technique. That period could not but give rise to serious difficulties, which reflected the complexity of the struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements in our economy.

The "Opposition *Bloc*," the so-called "New Opposition" headed by Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, and assisted by nearly all the accused sitting in the dock here—Pyatakov, Radek, Serebryakov, Sokolnikov, Muralov, Drobnis, Boguslavsky—at that time tried to take advantage of these difficulties to make another attempt to stab the Soviet state in the back, and as violently as possible.

The Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc* of 1926 was a *bloc* which turned the edge of its struggle against the cause of socialism in our country and for capitalism. Under cover of false and sometimes outwardly seeming "Left" phrases about "super-industrialization," and so forth, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite gang in 1926-27 put forward proposals which, if adopted, would have undermined and broken the alliance between the workers and peasants, would have undermined the foundation of the Soviet state. They put forward such proposals as increasing the pressure on the peasantry, as ensuring "primitive socialist accumulation" by ruining and robbing the peasantry; they advanced a number of demands which if conceded would have broken the bond between town and country and thereby would have made real industrialization utterly impossible. Strictly speaking, these proposals and demands were on a line with the present acts of diversion and wrecking. Strictly speaking, there is only a difference in form between the wrecking and diversive acts of 1926-27 and those of the present time. Already at that time the Opposition *Bloc* tried to break the bond between the working class and the peasantry by means of their pseudo-"Left," but in reality counter-revolutionary proposals, in a manner which corresponded to the conditions of the class struggle prevailing at that time. That, too, was a special form of diversion, a form of destructive acts directed against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the cause of socialist construction. These proposals advanced by the then Opposition were merely a special form of the struggle against the Soviet state corresponding to the historical situation at that time. Ten years have elapsed and we see that they have taken to the path of direct diversion, the path of wrecking, the path of destructive work, but in much sharper forms, corresponding to the new conditions, to the conditions of the fierce class struggle against the remnants of the capitalist elements.

It is not an accident that the "New Opposition," as that *bloc* called itself, united a "super-industrializer," such as Trotsky was,

with an opponent of industrialization, such as Sokolnikov was ten years ago and has remained to this day. By the very nature of things, the "New Opposition" stood for a definite political and social-economic program, which, if carried out, would inevitably have led to the liquidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and this, in turn, would inevitably have led to the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

Comrade Judges, when today we hear in Court, in the testimony of the ringleaders of this gang, of the ringleaders of the Trotskyite underground organization, when we hear confessions that they really did receive from Trotsky directives for the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R., that they accepted this line, and that, in carrying it out, they conducted wrecking, diversive and espionage work, a question may arise which, indeed, some people have actually raised, namely: How can these people who fought for socialism for so many years, people who blasphemously called themselves Bolshevik Leninists, be accused of these monstrous crimes? Does it not prove that the accusation is unfounded, that these people are being accused of crimes they cannot possibly be accused of because of the very nature of their past socialist, revolutionary, Bolshevik activities?

I will reply to this question. The accused in the present case are charged with having attempted by the most repulsive and dishonest methods to re-impose upon our country the yoke of capitalism. We accuse these gentlemen of having betrayed socialism. And we support this charge not only with evidence of what they committed today—that is the subject of the indictment—but we say that the history of their fall began long before they organized the so-called "parallel" centre, this offshoot of the criminal Trotskyite-Zinovievite united *bloc*. Organic connection is proved. Historical connection is proved. And what I have said would be sufficient to remove all doubt that the principal charge made by the State Procurator against the accused sitting in the dock of attempting to restore in our country the capitalist system which was overthrown 19 years ago is fully proved, proved documentarily. This accusation condemns the criminals in this dock to eternal disgrace and to the eternal execration of all honest toilers, of all the honest people in our country, and throughout the world.

From the platform of 1926, from anti-Soviet street demonstrations, from illegal printing plants, from alliance with Whiteguard officers to which they too resorted at that time, to diversion, espionage, terrorism and treason in 1932-36, there is only one step. And this step they took!

We have already seen this in the case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite united *bloc,* in the case of the political fate of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, Ter-Vaganyan and the others who ended their lives in disgrace, branded as mercenaries of foreign intelligence services.

And now we see it in the fate of the accused in the present case, the majority of whom for many years before and after the October Revolution fought against Lenin and Leninism, against the Party of Lenin and Stalin, against the building of socialism in our country.

Pyatakov, K. Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov, Drobnis, Muralov, Livshitz, Boguslavsky, Shestov—have all, for a number of years, fought against the cause of socialism, against the cause of Lenin and Stalin.

Already at that time these gentlemen directed their efforts towards, as Stalin put it, "breaking the Party's back," and at the same time breaking the back of the Soviet government, the inevitable doom of which all the counter-revolutionary ravens used to croak about.

In this fight against the Soviet power these gentlemen sank lower, I think, than anyone has sunk before.

Lenin foresaw the inevitability of the shameful end which the accused have reached, and which everyone who takes the path they trod must reach. The resolution adopted on Lenin's proposal by the Tenth Congress of our Party (which then still called itself the Russian Communist Party), uttered the stern warning that those who persist in factionalism and in errors under the Soviet system must inevitably slip into the camp of the enemies of the working class, into the camp of the Whiteguards and imperialists. These gentlemen, by all their activities, have proved the justness of this historical forecast.

What is the political past of the members of the centre? Pyatakov, Radek, Serebryakov, Sokolnikov, Boguslavsky, Drobnis, Muralov and Shestov for many years nursed a hatred for the Soviet system, for socialism. They knew how to camouflage, they knew how to conceal their real sentiments and views, they resorted to duplicity and deceit, as they have now confessed. Some of them say that at certain times they had retired from Trotskyism. This is hard to believe. We know that all the activities of the accused in this case were highly consistent. Such workers of merit for Trotskyism, I would call them, as Pyatakov, Radek, Drobnis, Serebryakov and Boguslavsky camouflaged themselves, resorted to blackmail, cheated their own people and others. Only in a milieu such as that created by the Pyatakovs and Radeks—these most unprincipled and utterly degraded people who used their highly responsible

posts in the Soviet state system for the purpose of perpetrating their shameful, sordid and bloody crimes—only in such a milieu could a Trotskyite *actif,* so to speak, consist of adventurers and scoundrels like the Rataichaks, Knyazevs, Shestovs, Arnolds, Stroilovs and Hrasches.

You, Comrade Judges, have seen these gentlemen, you have heard them, you have studied them. Take Rataichak. Whether he is a German or a Polish spy is not clear, but that he is a spy there cannot be any doubt; and as is appropriate to his profession, a liar, a swindler and a rascal. A man who, on his own confession, has an old autobiography and a new autobiography. A man who, according to circumstances, forges and re-shuffles these autobiographies. A man who, while vice-chairman of the Provincial Council of National Economy in Volhynia, not only connives at the robbery, theft and profiteering of his subordinate, but actually takes part in these downright, sordid crimes. On his own confession he was kept by this thief, embezzler and speculator. And this Rataichak, with all his remarkable qualities as revealed by the preliminary investigation and in this court, becomes Pyatakov's closest assistant in the chemical industry. A remarkable chemist!

Pyatakov knew whom he chose. One might say: a good hunter easily finds his game. Rataichak climbs into high posts. He says nothing about the motives which prompt him, and he is not as talkative as Arnold, who confessed that he was tortured "by a desire to get into high society." Rataichak is reticent. Of course, he is more cunning than Arnold. He knows that speech is silver and silence is golden. And so this Rataichak, with all his moral qualities, turns out to be a man capable of rising to distinction. He is Chief of the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry. One must ponder over the meaning of the words: Chief of the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry of our country.

Even if Pyatakov had committed no other crimes, the mere fact that he allowed this man to come within a kilometre of the chemical industry would be sufficient to earn him the severest punishment.

In the responsible post of Chief of the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry, Rataichak, this super-wrecker, develops his criminal talents, starts out on a long voyage of crime, unfurls his sails to the full, causes explosions, destroys the fruits of the labour of the people, kills people.

Or take Drobnis, an old professional Trotskyite, this exterminator of workers in accordance with the formula "the more victims the better." Or take Knyazev, the Japanese spy who has

wrecked dozens of trains. Or Livshitz, ex-Assistant People's Commissar of Railways, and simultaneously Pyatakov's assistant in criminal affairs on the railways. The system of concurrent jobs was extensively practiced by this company. . . . Finally, take the Trotskyite "soldier" Muralov, one of Trotsky's most loyal and steadfast aides—he, too, confessed that he was a wrecker and diversionist. And beside him is Arnold, alias Ivanov, alias Vasilyev, alias Rask, alias Kulpenen, and how many more names he had nobody knows. This hardened scoundrel, who had gone through fire and water, a rascal and an adventurer, also turns out to be a trusted Trotskyite agent—and a first class bandit. Or take Hrasche, a man not only of three dimensions, but at least of three citizenships, who himself described his principal occupation by the eloquent, but not very pleasant word, *spy;* and he added that as a spy, he was not supposed to have any opinions.

This, then, is a running characterization of the cadres who have filed past the Court, past the whole country, past the whole world—cadres who were gathered together by the "parallel" centre, the army which this "parallel" centre organized on the instructions of Trotsky, which it trained and hurled into the Trotskyite struggle against the Soviet power and Soviet state.

Speaking of cadres, special reference must of course be made to their ringleaders, their chieftains. We will start, of course, with Pyatakov, who, after Trotsky, was the first chieftain of this brigand gang. Pyatakov did not stray into the company of the Trotskyites accidentally. Pyatakov, who up to now has persistently and skillfully camouflaged himself, has always been an old enemy of Leninism, an old enemy of our Party and an enemy of the Soviet power. Let us trace Pyatakov's political path.

In 1915 he and Bukharin advanced an anti-Leninist platform on the question of the right of nations to self-determination, a question which is of fundamental importance in determining the position of Bolshevism. Incidentally, he insultingly called Lenin a "talmudist of self-determination."

In 1916 this person, under the *nom de plume* of P. Kievsky, comes out as a mature ideologist of Trotskyism. He argues that the social revolution (he said—the social process) can be conceived only as the combined action of the proletarians of all countries, which will destroy the frontiers of bourgeois states, will pull up the frontier posts. Outwardly this is ultra-"Left"; in reality it is a purely Trotskyite presentation of the question. Here Pyatakov repeats in full the Trotskyite thesis that it is impossible to build socialism in one country. He opposes Lenin. Lenin exposes the anti-Marxian character of this Pyatakov pronouncement. Lenin already at that time describes this article by Pyatakov as one capable of

striking "a very serious blow at our movement and at our Party," as an article which might compromise the Party from within, from within its own ranks, and "convert it," as Lenin wrote, "into a representative of caricature Marxism."

The year 1917. Pyatakov again opposes Lenin's thesis on the right of nations to self-determination. He calls this right an "empty right" which diverts the revolutionary struggle to a false path. He opposes the thesis on the possibility of building socialism in one country. In 1917 Pyatakov opposed Lenin's April theses.

In 1918 he again opposes Lenin. This was the stern year of heroic struggle of the workers and peasants of our country; the year in which they waged an armed struggle for their independence in the midst of incredibly complicated and difficult conditions. This was the year in which, as Lenin said, we for the first time "entered into the very heart of the revolution." This was the year when Lenin said: "Better suffer and bear and put up with infinitely great national and state humiliation and burdens and remain at our post as the socialist unit which events had cut off from the main body of the socialist army and which is compelled to wait until the socialist revolution in other countries comes to its aid."

Pyatakov's position is that beside Radek, against Lenin's thesis, against Lenin. They, these "Left" Communists, are even prepared to surrender the Soviet power. As far back as 1918, these gentlemen, having entrenched themselves in the Bureau of the Moscow Committee of the Party, talked about the necessity, even at the cost of losing the Soviet power, which in their opinion had become merely a formal concept, of disrupting the Brest peace. Stalin has quite justly described the Brest peace as a model of Leninist strategy which provided forces with which to prepare for the repulse of the gangs of Denikin and Kolchak.

Pyatakov, Radek and their friends even at that time thought and acted in a way that later called forth from Felix Dzerzhinsky the apt and strong epithet he hurled at the Trotskyites and Zinovievites, namely, "Kronstadtites." The Pyatakovs and Radeks attached no value to the Soviet power. In their fight against Lenin they went to such savage lengths that they talked about removing the then existing Council of People's Commissars and substituting for it a Council of People's Commissars consisting of people who belonged to the coterie of the "Lefts." It was Pyatakov & Co. who in 1918, in a period of extreme danger for the land of Soviets, carried on negotiations with the Socialist-Revolutionaries with a view to bringing about a counter-revolutionary coup d'état and

arresting Lenin so that Pyatakov might occupy the post of head of the government, of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. It was through the arrest of Lenin, through a coup d'état, that these political adventurers wanted to lay for themselves the road to power.

And what are they doing now? By attempting to overthrow the Soviet power and to exterminate the leaders of our Party and of the Soviet government—Comrade Stalin and his comrades in arms —they wanted to lay a road for the restoration of capitalism with the aid of foreign interventionist, aggressors' bayonets, with the aid of terrorism, diversion, espionage, wrecking and every other grave crime against the state. Historical continuity is proved. Jointly with Trotsky, Pyatakov rose against Lenin in the stern days of Brest. Jointly with Trotsky, Pyatakov rose against Lenin at the time our Party was effecting the complicated swing towards the New Economic Policy. Jointly with Trotsky, Pyatakov opposed Lenin's plan to build socialism in our country, opposed the industrialization and collectivization of our country which was carried out under the brilliant leadership of our leader and teacher, Comrade Stalin.

1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1921, 1923, 1926 and 1927—for more than a decade Pyatakov constantly defended the Trotskyite position, waged an open struggle against Lenin, against the general line of the Party, and against the Soviet state.

1926 and 1936—this is the second decade of almost continuous, but now secret, underground struggle against the Soviet state and our Party, a struggle which Pyatakov waged systematically and untiringly until at last he was caught redhanded, detected, and placed in the dock as a traitor!

Such is Pyatakov and his portrait.

Much of what I have said about Pyatakov can be said about the accused Radek. More than once, both before and after the revolution, Radek opposed Lenin. In 1926, this Radek, in a debate at the Communist Academy, jeered and sneered at the theory of building socialism in our country, calling it the theory of building socialism in one county or even in one street. He even called it a Schedrinian idea.

Apropos of this, Comrade Stalin wrote: "Can Radek's vulgar and liberal jeering at the idea of building socialism in one country be called anything else than complete rupture with Leninism?"

Radek is one of the most outstanding, and, to do him justice, one of the most able and persistent Trotskyites. While Lenin was alive he fought Lenin, and after Lenin's death he fought Stalin. His quality as a social danger, as a political danger, is in direct

proportion to his personal ability. He is incorrigible. In the anti-Soviet, Trotskyite centre he is the holder of the portfolio of foreign affairs. On Trotsky's instructions he carries on diplomatic negotiations with certain foreigners or, as he expresses it, "puts a visa" on Trotsky's mandate. Regularly, through, so to speak, his own diplomatic courier, Romm, he corresponds with Trotsky and receives from him what he here grandiloquently calls "directives." He is one of the men who is most trusted by and intimate with the big chief of this gang, Trotsky.

Sokolnikov. In 1918 he, too, was opposed to Lenin. Even in that year he threatened Lenin that he would resign over a political dispute. In 1920 he signed Bukharin's anti-Leninist trade union platform. In 1924 he signed the "cave platform," the one that was drawn up in a cave near Kislovodsk. In 1925 Sokolnikov, slandering the Soviet state, asserted that our foreign trade, our internal trading establishments, were state capitalist enterprises. Similarly, he argued that the State Bank was also a state capitalist enterprise, that our monetary system was permeated with the principles of capitalist economy. An apologist and ideologist of capitalist economic policy!

Comrade Stalin pointed out at the time that Sokolnikov was advocating the Dawes-ation of our country. Sokolnikov was a thoroughgoing advocate of the preservation of the economic backwardness of our country, that is to say, of placing our country in bondage to the capitalist countries, of "transforming our country into an appendage of the capitalist system." As you see, Sokolnikov has not departed one iota from this position today.

In 1925, while People's Commissar of Finance, Sokolnikov complained about and slandered our Party and the Soviet government, arguing that they hindered him in his work of protecting the dictatorship of the proletariat and of fighting the kulak, of curbing the kulak. And now, Sokolnikov has confessed before the whole world that the Trotskyite centre, of which he was one of the leaders, calculated precisely on getting the support of the kulaks, or rather, the miserable remnants of the kulaks. In this court he himself said: "We realized that in our program principles we must revert to capitalism and advance the program of restoring capitalism, because then we would be able to rely on certain strata in our country."

Question: Specifically on what forces within the country did you calculate? On the working class?

Sokolnikov: No.

Question: On the collective farm peasantry?

Sokolnikov: Of course not.

Question: On whom, then?

Sokolnikov: To speak quite frankly, I must say that we reckoned on being able to rely on the elements of the peasant bourgeoisie. . . .

Question: On the kulaks, on the few remnants of the kulaks?

Sokolnikov: That is so.

Thus, Sokolnikov arrived at a frankly kulak program, the avowed defence of kulak interests, thus completing his fall. From Sokolnikov's position in 1925-26 to the program of the Trotskyite centre of 1933-36 it is quite a natural step.

Two words about Serebryakov, the fourth member of this anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre. He signed Bukharin's program during the trade union discussion in 1920; he was an active member of the Opposition in 1923; he was an active member of the Opposition in 1926-27. Actually, as he himself has confessed in court, he had never departed from Trotskyism. Clearly he had every right to claim a leading position in this anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre.

As old Trotskyites we know N. Muralov, Drobnis, Boguslavsky and Livshitz. We know that they devoted a number of years to the fight against Lenin and socialist construction in our country. Is it not clear that their participation in the anti-Soviet underground Trotskyite work, their participation in Trotskyite wrecking, diversion and terrorist groups, their treason to the country, were prepared and were the direct results of all their past Trotskyite activities, the direct results of their long years of struggle against the U.S.S.R., against the Soviet people? The accused themselves had to admit this. For a long time they waged a stubborn and a despicable war against socialism. Now they have been caught red-handed. The mask has been torn from their faces once and for all. They stand exposed as enemies of the people, as an insignificant, despicable handful of people who have become the agents of foreign intelligence services.

These gentlemen tried to pose here as a political party. In court, Pyatakov spoke of his accomplices as a "faction," talked about his "faction's" "political mistrust" towards the Zinoviev section of the *bloc*. He talked about their "own organization," employing this term in the political sense; he even spoke about Trotsky wanting to pursue his "own" policy. Radek also referred to his accomplices as political leaders. Speaking of the criminal wrecking demands Trotsky put to him in his conversation with him, accused Pyatakov referred to them as a constituent part of Trotsky's policy.

Radek, one of the "realist politicians" who realistically betrayed their country by promising its enemies real and territorial concessions, also talked here in a lofty style. Even in speaking about such prosaic things as ordinary criminal wrecking Radek tried to talk in a lofty style as if discussing political matters. During the session of January 24 Radek said: "It was clear that I was being asked about the *bloc's* attitude. I told him that realist politicians in the U.S.S.R. understood the importance of a German-Soviet rapprochement and were prepared to make the concessions necessary to achieve this rapprochement. This representative understood that since I was speaking about realist politicians there were, in the U.S.S.R., realist and unrealist politicians: the unrealist politicians were the Soviet government, while the realist politicians were the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc*." Here they are, these realist politicians, sitting under guard . . . of only three Red Army men! It is easy to understand that, strictly speaking, this lofty style was adopted out of sheer habit. It is easy to understand that this is not a political party at all; it is merely a gang of criminals, not to be distinguished, or at best for them, hardly to be distinguished from gangsters who use blackjacks and daggers on the high-road on a dark night.

This is not a political party. It is a gang of criminals, merely the agency of foreign intelligence services. To the straight question put to Pyatakov: "Were the members of your organization connected with foreign spies?" Pyatakov replied: "Yes, they were." And he related how this connection was established on the direct instructions of Trotsky. This was confirmed by Radek, the "parallel" centre's expert on "foreign affairs." This was confirmed by Livshitz, Knyazev, Shestov and a number of other accused—direct and deliberate agents of secret services. This is really what this gang is, which called itself a "political force," which wanted to be taken for such. It is not a political party, but a gang of spies, bandits, terrorists and diversionists.

The roots of this group are not in the masses of the people of our country, whom this gang fears, from which it runs away like the devil from holy water. This gang hides its face from the masses of the people; it conceals its brutal claws and ferocious fangs. The roots of this gang must be sought in the secret recesses of the foreign espionage agencies which bought these people, which kept them, paid them for their loyal, flunkey service. You have seen these official and unofficial police spies and secret service agents.

Pyatakov urges his subordinates to organize explosions and acts of diversion, preferably those causing loss of human life. Drobnis

argues that "the more victims the better" for the Trotskyites. Shestov organizes murders. Livshitz, Knyazev and Turok organize the wrecking of trains. And Radek engages in "foreign politics"; and just as the aim of Livshitz and Knyazev was to derail trains, so the aim of Radek's "foreign policy" was to derail the cause of socialism, to open the gates to the foreign enemy, to the enemy aggressor. Each one of them stands before you, immersed in this bloody morass of crime. Take separate groups: they are interwoven with foreign intelligence service agents who bought them with promises of support, or simply for hard cash.

They blow up mines, they burn down workshops, they wreck trains, they mutilate and kill hundreds of our best people, sons of our country. Eight hundred workers in the Gorlovka Nitrate Fertilizer Works, through *Pravda,* communicated the names of the best Stakhanovites in those works who died by the treacherous hand of the diversionists. Here is the list of these victims: Lunev—Stakhanovite, born 1902. Yudin—a talented engineer, born 1913. Kurkin—member of the Young Communist League, Stakhanovite, 23 years of age. Strelnikova—girl shock brigade worker, born 1913. Mosiets—shock brigade worker, also born 1913. These were killed, over a dozen were injured. Maximenko—a Stakhanovite who fulfilled his norm 125 to 150 per cent, was killed. Nemikhin—one of the best shock brigade workers sacrified his 10 days' leave to go down the Tsentralnaya Pit, and there somebody waited for him and killed him. Shot-firer Yurev—one of the men who took part in the fighting against the White Chinese, was killed. Lanin, an old miner, a participant in the civil war, was killed. And so on and so forth.

Comrade Judges! Their murderers are sitting here in front of you!

Shestov organizes a bank robbery. Shestov arranges for the foul murder of engineer Boyarshinov, who seemed likely to expose their criminal activities.

Arnold, an international tramp, who has been, I think, in every country in the world, and everywhere has left traces of his fraudulent operations. In Minsk he forges a document. In America he becomes a sergeant in the American army and is put into prison, as he himself confessed, on suspicion of stealing government property. I think that if ever that man got his hands on government property it would go very hard with that government property. This is the man who through the Freemasons wanted to get "into high society" in America, and through the Trotskyites—wanted to get into power, for which he secretly longed and sighed, under the able leadership of a mentor such as the gallows-bird Shestov.

It is a gang of bandits, robbers, forgers, diversionists, spies and murderers in the literal sense of the word! This gang of murderers, incendiaries and bandits can only be compared with the mediæval *camorra* which united the Italian nobility, vagabonds and brigands. These are the moral features of these gentlemen, morally corroded and morally depraved. These people have lost all shame, including shame before their own accomplices, and even before themselves.

These "politicians" thought nothing of pulling up rails and causing train collisions. They thought nothing of gassing a mine and of sending a dozen or several score of workers to their deaths. They thought nothing of killing an honest working engineer underhandedly; of burning down a factory, of blowing up little children who had got into a dynamite dump.

A fine political party indeed! If it were a political party it would not conceal its program from the masses. A political party does not hide its program, its political opinions. The Bolsheviks—that genuine political party, a party in the real and lofty sense of the word—never hid from the masses and never concealed its program.

At the dawn of the Russian revolution Lenin wrote of the enormous importance which revolutionary social-democracy attached to the open propaganda of its ideas, to the open declaration of its aims, to the open mass agitation on behalf of its program, tactics, organizational ideas and principles. The Party of Lenin and Stalin grew up, became strong and was transformed into an enormous and mighty force as a Party which relied on the masses, as a Party which was organically bound up with the masses. That is the mark of a real political party. Not only does it not conceal its views from the masses, it strives to spread them as far as it possibly can among the masses. But this "party," as it calls itself, was afraid, and is now afraid, to tell the people the truth about itself, is afraid to speak about its program.

Why? Because the people hate their views and their program as they hate capitalist bondage, capitalist oppression, which these gentlemen want to restore, to impose upon the necks of our people; because they became transformed into a group of outcasts isolated from the people, a gang of criminals headed by their ring-leader Trotsky, and his lieutenants Pyatakov and Radek, and other gangster "chiefs." This is not a plant of the land of Soviets. It is a plant of foreign origin, and it cannot grow, it cannot bloom on Soviet soil.

It is strange to hear these people talk about an agreement which this "party," but what is really a gang of criminals, concluded with the Japanese and German fascist forces. With a grave air Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov talked about an "agreement" which Trotsky concluded, or which Trotsky had arrived at with Germany and Japan. These gentlemen gravely told us that they calculated on utilizing these countries in their own interests. But how can one seriously talk about this when this very "parallel" centre is simply a wretched little gnat compared with a wolf.

Agreement! They should have said simply: surrender to the mercy of the conqueror. Of course it was not an agreement, but surrender to the mercy of the conqueror.

To listen to Pyatakov and Radek one would think that it really was an agreement. Radek stated that he had sent Trotsky a letter "in which I acknowledged the receipt of his directives and informed him that we had agreed among ourselves in the steps we took here not to go further than to put our visa on his mandate to negotiate with foreign states. Moreover, I added: 'Not only we officially, as the centre, but I personally approve of his seeking contacts with foreign states.' "

Radek and Pyatakov, if you please, "put their visa" on Trotsky's "mandate" to negotiate with foreign states. But that is not the chief thing. Nor is the chief thing that the centre approves of these negotiations. The chief thing is that I, Karl Radek, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the centre, personally approve of Trotsky—that Prime Minister—seeking contacts with foreign states. Of course it would all sound very funny if the position of Pyatakov and Radek were not so tragic. But to anybody who had not utterly lost his head, for anybody who possessed a grain of reason, it should have been clear that the agreement about which Pyatakov, Trotsky and Radek spoke, was not an agreement, but embroidered capitulation, the Trotskyite surrender to the mercy of the conquerors, that this was bondage, that to accept such an agreement meant crawling into the wolf's mouth while consoling oneself with the idea that the wolf is not wicked and will not gobble one up.

This agreement reminds me of Krylov's fable "The Lion Goes Hunting." In this fable the dog, the lion, the wolf and the fox came to an agreement, "entered into a covenant" to go hunting together. The fox caught a deer and they began to share it. One of the "contracting parties" says: "This part is mine according to the bond; this part surely is mine, for I am the lion, and this part is mine because I am stronger than you all; and as for this part, if any of you as much as puts his paw upon it, he will not leave this place alive."

This "covenant" is very much like your agreement, Messrs. the accused, Messrs. officers of German and Japanese fascism! This is what happened to you, with this difference, perhaps, that in

your agreement the lion figures in the role of dog. That is why I assert that this is not a political party at all. It is a gang of criminals, people who are morally worthless, morally depraved, who have lost all conscience and reason.

After what we have heard from these people in this Court, can there be any doubt that they are utterly depraved and morally degraded? No, there can be no doubt.

While the Soviet people under the leadership of our Party were toiling to strengthen their new socialist positions, our enemy —and this is its vanguard—slowly, treacherously tried to pierce the front of our victories, to outflank us and strike us in the rear. Foreign spies are working unceasingly, seeking, and unfortunately finding, allies in our country, assistants among, it is true, depraved people who are hostile to the Soviet system and, as has now been fully and precisely proved, primarily among the Trotskyites.

Why are the foreign intelligence services able to find agents among the Trotskyites? Because the whole past and present history of the Trotsykites is proof of their irreconcilable hostility to the Soviets, of their readiness to serve capital with the last remnants of their conscience, of their ability to employ the most disgusting and despicable means in the fight and to stick at nothing.

At the Fifteenth All-Union Party Conference Comrade Stalin emphasized that the Trotskyites and the *bloc* they organized at that time were distinguished precisely for their "unscrupulousness as to means, and lack of principles in politics." This unscrupulousness in the political struggle has now gone beyond all bounds, has reached monstrous proportions, has grown a thousand-fold.

Do not the articles which Pyatakov and Radek wrote about their accomplices Zinoviev and Kamenev, these despicable traitors, these downright bandits who killed our unforgettable Sergei Mironovich Kirov, testify to the extreme degree of moral depravity they have reached? Are not the articles in which Radek and Pyatakov, with an air of outraged righteousness, demanded that their own allies, friends and accomplices be shot, the acme of cynicism and mockery at the last remnants of human conscience, at the last conceptions of morality?

You want to know what the moral face of these gentlemen is like? Read their articles which were published in our newspapers only a few months ago.

For example, Radek, in No. 3 of the *Bolshevik* for 1935, exposes—what do you think? The duplicity of Zinoviev and all the heads of the Zinoviev faction, as he expresses it. Radek, a master

at this trade, reveals great knowledge of the subject in this article. With great gusto he tells his readers what duplicity is.

Permit me to quote Radek on . . . Radek's duplicity. He writes:

"Having slipped into counter-revolution, the ex-leaders of the Zinovievite-Trotskyite *bloc* have resorted to the methods of interventionist spies, dynamiters and wreckers. Duplicity proved to be camouflage enabling them to bombard the proletarian General Staff."

We know that Radek, who wrote this article, had known about the preparations for the foul murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov long in advance. We know that he, Radek, was conspiring with Zinoviev and Kamenev, the murderers of Comrade Kirov, whose death had been sealed by this very Radek and his friends now sitting beside him.

And so, covering up the traces of his own complicity in this foul deed, Radek talks about exposed double-dealers who had been handed over to the law—"which knows how to deal with those who try to shake the foundations of the proletarian revolution."

Yes, accused Radek, you were right! Soviet law knows how to deal with double-dealers and traitors like you and your friends.

What did Radek write at the time of the trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev and the others, of the trial of the traitors who had been exposed in anti-Soviet criminal struggle? He wrote about the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite fascist gang and its hetman—Trotsky" (these are his own terms), that "the stench of corpses" pervaded the court-room in which that case was tried, and he exclaimed with passion: "Crush the vipers! It is not a matter of exterminating ambitious men who have gone to the length of committing a great crime, it is a matter of exterminating the agents of fascism who were prepared to assist in igniting the conflagration of war, to facilitate the victory of fascism in order to receive from its hands at least the shadow of power."

This is what Radek wrote. Radek thought he was writing about Kamenev and Zinoviev. A slight error! This trial will rectify Radek's error. He was writing about himself!

Making grimaces, playing his double game, he wrote that in 1928 Trotsky tried to persuade him, Radek, to escape abroad and that he, Radek, "was horrified at the idea of acting under the protection of bourgeois states against the U.S.S.R. and so sabotaged the attempt to escape." In 1929, according to Radek, "he, Trotsky, having persuaded the Trotskyite Blumkin to organize the smuggling of literature into the U.S.S.R., sent his son Sedov to Radek's hotel with the instruction to organize raids on Soviet Trade Representations abroad for the purpose of obtaining money which

Trotsky needed for his anti-Soviet activities. From the expropriations which Trotsky was preparing in 1929, he, in 1931, passed to preparations for terrorism, about which he gave direct instructions to Smirnov and Mrachkovsky, to people connected with him for 18 years. Smirnov and Mrachkovsky, by raising the sword against Stalin and the Party, trampling upon the confidence that had been shown them, fell so low that one cannot recall their names without feelings of revulsion."

Comrade Judges, Radek then was not yet being tried, he was not yet in the dock. That was not in 1936, and not even in 1935; it was in 1929. And Radek states that Trotsky had instructed him to organize the raid on our Trade Representation. Radek was then at liberty, he was not being held by any Cheka, or G.P.U., or Commissariat of Internal Affairs; he was not being pestered with questions by the examining official, or the Procurator; he was a free citizen, he was a journalist, he freely smoked his pipe everywhere, blowing smoke in the eyes of others besides his interlocutors. What did he write then? He wrote that he had received instructions from Trotsky to organize raids on Trade Representations to obtain money that Trotsky needed for his anti-Soviet operations. I think we cannot disbelieve this authoritative admission made before Soviet public opinion, not from the prisoners' dock, but in the Soviet press. As you see, history repeats itself. And when we are now told that in 1935 Trotsky persuaded Pyatakov, or rather, did not persuade but ordered him, to organize the embezzlement of Soviet money with the assistance of the firms of Demag and Borsig, at the time when Sedov was arranging connections with the firm of Dehlmann for the same purpose, we see that history does repeat itself.

Further, when Radek wrote: "From the expropriation" (what does expropriation mean? In plain Russian it simply means robbery) —"From the expropriation . . . which Trotsky was preparing in 1929, he, in 1931, passed to preparations for terrorism, about which he gave direct instructions to Smirnov and Mrachkovsky, to people connected with him for 18 years"—we thought that he was writing on the basis of the official records of the preliminary investigation. It turns out, however, that what Radek wrote was an authentic interpretation, that is to say, an interpretation from the author's pen, from one of the co-authors. Further on he wrote: "Smirnov and Mrachkovsky . . . fell so low that one cannot recall their names without feelings of revulsion." Did Radek write that or not? He did. Alas, he did write it! Radek then pretended to be frank, pretended to repent, to speak sincerely. He was very indignant, swore, cursed, vowed, assured and repented. . . . Out

of pureness of heart? No, he lied. . . . Recalling 1929, when Trotsky was preparing to rob our Trade Representations abroad, he pretended to be speaking sincerely. But no, he lied; he only pretended to speak the truth. He cursed his friends in order to divert attention from himself, in order, as he expressed it in his thieves' jargon here, not to "get pinched." In spite of all that, however, he did "get pinched." He resorted to the trick of a hardened criminal. He shouted: "Stop thief" in order to escape the hand of justice himself. That is a common trick of those who speak the language of "get pinched" and "bumped off." He tried to slip out of it, to escape responsibility. He, Radek, tried to climb up on the corpses of his friends and accomplices in order to escape from the stinking pit filled with blood and mud in which he was submerged up to his ears. With artificial, false and studied affectation he exclaimed:

"The proletarian court will pass sentence on these sanguinary murderers, which they have deserved a hundredfold. People who have raised the sword against the beloved leaders of the proletariat must pay with their heads for their unparalleled crime. The chief organizer of this gang and of its deeds, Trotsky, has already been condemned by history to the pillory of shame. He will not escape the verdict of the world proletariat."

You remember, Radek, you said then that these people, *such* people, must pay for their crime with their heads? Radek wrote: The chief organizer of this gang, Trotsky, has already been condemned by history to the pillory of shame, he will not escape the execration of the world proletariat. That is true. Traitors will not escape the verdict of the world proletariat any more than they will escape the verdict of the Soviet Court, the Court of the great socialist state of workers and peasants!

And what about Pyatakov? Pyatakov also wrote articles for the newspapers in connection with the exposure of the gangster-terrorist united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre. Pyatakov raved and fumed about the despicable counter-revolutionary activities, surrounded, as he wrote, by the unbearable stench of duplicity, lies and deception. What will Pyatakov say now to brand his own moral degradation, his own "stench of lies, duplicity and deception"? Will Pyatakov find the words, and if he does find them, what is the value of such words, who will believe them?

Pyatakov wrote:

"One cannot find the words fully to express one's indignation and disgust. These people have lost the last semblance of humanity. They must be destroyed, destroyed like carrion which is polluting the pure, bracing air of the land of Soviets; dangerous carrion

which may cause the death of our leaders, and has already caused the death of one of the best people in our land—that wonderful comrade and leader S. M. Kirov."

Pyatakov sobbed over the corpse of Kirov whom he killed. He bewailed him. "The enemy in our land of victorious socialism is elusive"—wrote Pyatakov, looking at himself in the mirror. "He adapts himself to the surroundings," says Pyatakov admiring himself in the mirror. "He is dissembling." And Pyatakov says to himself: I'm a smart one at dissembling, aren't I. "Lying." Humph, thinks Pyatakov to himself, how can one help lying in such a situation? "Covering his tracks" . . . "working himself into confidence." . . .

Covering up the bloody traces of his crimes Pyatakov wrote the following:

"Many of us, including myself, by our heedlessness, our complacency and lack of vigilance towards those around us, unconsciously helped these bandits to commit their black deeds." An astonishing trick! Pyatakov was not vigilant enough! This, it appears, is what Pyatakov is guilty of! This is another old trick played by criminals. When a man is accused of murder and robbery, he pleads guilty to the charge of robbery. When a man is accused of burglary he pleads guilty to the charge of larceny. When he is accused of larceny he, at most, pleads guilty to the charge of being in possession of, or receiving, stolen property.

These are the old tactics of professional criminals. Pyatakov is afraid of being caught, of being exposed, so he writes to the newspapers attacking the enemy and does not spare himself. Oh, poor, blind Pyatakov, you don't see what is going on around you. But it is not going on around you, you are doing it yourself!

Pyatakov wrote: "It is a good thing that the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs has exposed this gang." That is true, it is a good thing. Let us thank the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs for having at last exposed *this* gang! "It is a good thing that it can be exterminated." Quite true, accused Pyatakov, it is a good thing that it can. But not only can it, it must be exterminated. "Honour and glory to the workers of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs." You are blaspheming, accused Pyatakov!

Whom did Pyatakov write about on August 21, 1936? Pyatakov wrote about himself. Pyatakov anticipated the inexorable march of events.

What do the articles of Pyatakov and Radek testify to? Do they not testify to the extreme, literally infinite, moral degradation of these people, to their moral worthlessness, to the depravity of these people? Worthless, rotten, despicable creatures who have lost the last remnants, not only of honour but even of reason, vile

manikins, "Malbroughs who to war did go" against the Soviet state: shabby politicians, petty political sharpers, and big bandits.

The united Zinovievite-Trotskyite centre and its active members persistently tried to prove that they did not advance any political program demands—that they were merely imbued with a "bare thirst for power." This is untrue. This was an attempt to deceive public opinion. There can be no struggle for power without some kind of a program, a program that formulates the aims, tasks, strivings and methods of struggle. Even at that time we refused to believe that the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite terrorist centre had no program of any kind. We knew that they were persistently concealing it. And indeed it turned out that they did have a program, just as this Trotskyite terrorist centre had a program. This program was an open assertion of the need for capitalist restoration in the U.S.S.R. Sokolnikov confirmed that, in essence, it was the old Ryutin anti-Soviet program. And that is true. Sokolnikov said:

"As for the lines of the program, as far back as 1932 the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites and the Rights all agreed in the main on a program which was characterized as the program of the Rights. This was the so-called Ryutin platform; to a large extent, as far back as 1932, it expressed the program policy common to all three groups.

"As for the further development of this program, the leading members of the centre were of the opinion that as an isolated revolution our revolution could not persist as a socialist revolution, that the Kautskian theory of ultra-imperialism and Bukharin's kindred theory of organized capitalism had proved to be correct. We were of the opinion that fascism is the most organized form of capitalism, it is conquering, seizing Europe, strangling us. Therefore, it would be better for us to come to an agreement with it, better to arrive at some compromise in the sense of retreating from socialism to capitalism."

But how to "come to an agreement"? Will the fascists be willing to "come to an agreement"? Will they not prefer to act without an agreement, as they act everywhere, all over the world, by grabbing everything, throwing themselves upon, crushing and exterminating the weak? Radek said that it was clear that:

"The masters of the situation would be fascism—German fascism on the one hand, and the military fascism of a Far-Eastern country, on the other."

And, of course, Trotsky, their teacher, understood this no less than they did. The whole Trotskyite centre understood it. They accepted it with open eyes. This was the second point of their "remarkable" program.

The third point was the question of war and the defeat of the U.S.S.R.

The fourth was the question of the consequences of the defeat: not only leasing as concessions the industrial enterprises which the imperialist states regarded as important, but selling outright to private owners important economic units which they had already earmarked for this purpose; the loans referred to by Radek; permitting foreign capital to penetrate those plants which would only officially remain in the hands of the Soviet state.

The fifth point was what they called the agrarian problem. The "parallel" centre solved the agrarian problem as easily as Famusov solved the cultural problem—"collect all the books and burn them." This was the manner in which they proposed to solve the agrarian problem: burn all the gains of the proletarian revolution—dissolve the collective farms, liquidate the state farms, hand over the tractors and other complex agricultural machinery to individual farmers. What for? They answer quite frankly: "In order to create a new kulak system." Was it to be a "new" one? Perhaps they simply meant the old one?

The sixth question was the question of democracy. Radek related what Trotsky had written him on this subject. It is very important for us to know this, particularly now, when our country has reached the highest point of development of proletarian, socialist democracy as expressed in the great Stalin Constitution recently adopted and confirmed by our people. How was the question of democracy presented in the Trotskyite program? What did K. Radek, who had received a letter from his teacher, say about democracy?

"In this letter Trotsky said" (I am quoting Radek's testimony):

"There can be no talk whatever about democracy. The working class has experienced 18 years of revolution" (now it is already 19 years) "and its appetite is enormous. . . ."

This is true. Such an enormous appetite that it will gobble up, as it has done more than once, any enemy.

"... and these workers will have to be put back, partly to private factories, and partly to state factories which will have to face the very severe competition of foreign capital. Hence, there will be a very serious deterioration in the conditions of the working class."

And what about the rural districts?

"In the rural districts the struggle of the poor and middle peasants against the kulaks will be resumed. And then, in order to be able to hold on, a strong government will be needed, irrespective of the forms in which it will be clothed. If you want

historical analogies take the analogy of the rule of Napoleon I and ponder over it."

In all probability Radek did ponder over it a great deal.

Finally, the seventh question was the program of foreign policy, of partitioning the country: "Give the Ukraine to Germany; the Maritime Province and the Amur region to Japan." Then we inquired about certain other economic concessions. Radek replied: Yes, we elaborated the decisions of which I have already spoken. Payment of indemnities in the form of supplies of foodstuffs, raw materials and fats over a long period of years. Then—at first he did not quote any figures, but afterwards he spoke more definitely—ensuring the victor countries a certain percentage of participation in Soviet imports. All this taken together implied the complete enslavement of the country.

I asked: was Sakhalin oil discussed?

"Radek: Concerning Japan it was said that it was necessary not only to surrender to her Sakhalin oil but to ensure her a supply of oil in the event of war with the United States of America. Reference was made to the necessity of placing no obstacles in the way of the conquest of China by Japanese imperialism."

—And what about the Danube countries?

"Radek: Concerning the Danube and Balkan countries, Trotsky in his letter wrote that German fascism is expanding and we must do nothing to hinder that. Obviously this meant the cessation of all our relations with Czechoslovakia that would help to protect that country."

These are the seven main questions of the so-called program of the centre, whose aim was violently to overthrow the Soviet power for the purpose of changing the existing social and state system in the U.S.S.R. and the restoration of the rule of the bourgeoisie in our country; whose object was to strike a blow at democracy, at the cause of peace, at peaceful democratic countries, and—to help the bloodthirsty imperialist aggressive countries of the fascist type.

What did this program mean for the working class, for the peasantry, for the cause of peace, for the interests of the Soviet people?

This program means a reversion to the past, the liquidation of all the gains of the workers and peasants, the liquidation of the victories of socialism, the liquidation of the Soviet, socialist system. The socialist system is a system without exploitation and exploiters, it is a system without merchants and manufacturers, without poverty and unemployment; it is a system

under which the workers and peasants are the masters, a system under which all the exploiting classes have been abolished, and in which only the working class, the peasant class and the intelligentsia have remained.

The Trotskyites are dissatisfied with this. They want to change the present social system in our country. They want to destroy the working class which, thanks to the victory of socialism, has become transformed into an entirely new class, into the working class of the U.S.S.R.; they want to force it back to the position it occupied before the October Revolution, to the position of slaves bound in capitalist chains.

This is what the Trotskyite platform of capitalist restoration in the U.S.S.R. means for the workers of our country and for the workers of the whole world.

Our Soviet peasantry is a new collective farm peasantry—it is quite unlike the peasantry in capitalist countries. In capitalist countries the peasantry leads a life of poverty, of semi-starvation, or even complete starvation. As Comrade Stalin said, scattered over the face of the whole country "they plough their lonely furrow in their small farms with backward technical equipment, they are slaves of private property and are exploited with impunity by the landlords, the kulaks, the merchants, the profiteers, the usurers, and the like."

"There is no longer such a peasantry in our country," said Stalin at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets. "In our country there are no longer any landlords and kulaks, merchants and usurers to exploit the peasants. Consequently, our peasantry is a peasantry emancipated from exploitation. . . ." As you see, said Comrade Stalin, the Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

The Trotskyites don't like this, and they want to change this situation too. They want to bring the kulaks and the landlords back to the rural districts, to restore the power of the kulaks, to reinstate the landlords and kulaks in the rural districts, to put the peasants in bondage to the kulaks, to deprive our collective farm peasantry of the rights they have won with their blood.

This is what the Trotskyite program of capitalist restoration means for the peasantry of our country; it means putting our country back again into the hands of the capitalists, kulaks and landlords.

And finally, the Trotskyites are dissatisfied with the fact that the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. has transformed the intelligentsia from the handmaid of capital into an equal mem-

ber of Soviet society. The Trotskyites are dissatisfied with the fact that our intelligentsia "side by side with the workers and peasants, pulling together with them, is engaged in building the new, classless, socialist society." (Stalin.) They are dissatisfied with this, too. They want to change the social and political system in the U.S.S.R. This means changing the social and political position, and the role in our state, of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, and to force them back to the position they occupied in the old capitalist society, to throw them into the swamp of exploitation, unemployment, hard, dreary and dull toil, eternal poverty and starvation.

This is what the seven points of this program of restoring capitalism mean.

That is why Zinoviev, Kamenev and the other ringleaders of the anti-Soviet united Trotskyite *bloc* concealed this program, persistently denying its existence. This program was also concealed by the chiefs of the "parallel" centre, by Trotsky, Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov and the others.

As Radek testified, Trotsky urged that "program questions must not be put before the rank and file members of the *bloc* in all their scope. It will scare them . . ." Radek said:

"It was clear to me and to Pyatakov that these directives brought the *bloc* to the last limit, that in summing up and indicating the prospects of the work of the *bloc* it removed all doubts about its bourgeois character. Of course we could not admit this openly for this would have confronted us with the necessity either of admitting that we were fascists, or of raising the question of dissolving the *bloc*." (Vol. V, p. 147.)

Incidentally, is this not the reason why Radek failed to convene the conference? What would they have discussed at this conference? The restoration of capitalism? The dismemberment of the U.S.S.R.? The partitioning of the territory of the U.S.S.R.? Territorial concessions? Selling our territory to the Japanese and German annexationists? Espionage and wrecking? They concealed these points of their program, its main points. But we know that hidden things shall be brought to light. And this shameful program of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite *bloc* was also brought to light.

The existence of this program was admitted here by Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov; they themselves told us about it in this Court.

But perhaps it is all an invention? Perhaps they said this simply because they wanted to play the comedy of repentant sinners? Since they have repented they must talk about some-

thing or other, they must expose something or other. Perhaps Trotsky never gave them such a line?

But, Comrade Judges, you know, everybody knows, that abroad, Trotsky publishes the so-called *Bulletin of the Opposition,* and if you take No. 10 of this *Bulletin,* for April 1930, you will find that it contains what, in essence, is the same thing:

". . . All the same, retreat is inevitable. It must be carried out as soon as possible. . . .

". . . Put a stop to 'mass' collectivization. . . .

". . . Put a stop to the hurdle race of industrialization. Revise the question of tempo in the light of experience. . . .

". . . Abandon the 'ideals' of self-contained economy. Draw up a new variant of a plan providing for the widest possible intercourse with the world market. . . .

". . . Carry out the necessary retreat, and then strategical rearmament. . . .

". . . It will be impossible to emerge from the present contradictions without crises and struggle. . . ."

In 1933 L. Trotsky demanded:

a) The dissolution of the majority of the collective farms as being fictitious;

b) Dissolution of the state farms as being unprofitable;

c) Abandonment of the policy of liquidating the kulaks;

d) Reversion to the concessions policy and the leasing as concessions of a number of our industrial enterprises as being unprofitable.

This program not only expressed the views, hopes and aspirations of the Trotskyite counter-revolutionaries, but, as the investigation has proved, it served as the basis of an agreement between the Trotskyites and the foreign aggressors who are gazing longingly at our Soviet land. This investigation has proved that on the basis of this program, Radek, Pyatakov and their accomplices started and carried on negotiations with the foreign aggressors, with their representatives, in anticipation of military aid from them, and promising them various economic and political advantages, including the surrender of parts of the Soviet territory. The traitors were ready for anything, even for selling their native land. They conspired to commit the blackest treason; they sank lower than the worst Denikinites or Kolchakites. The worst Denikinites or Kolchakites were superior to these traitors. The Denikinites, Kolchakites, Milyukovites, did not sink as low as these Trotskyite Judases, who sold their native land for 30 pieces of silver, and these counterfeit; who tried to place our country in bondage to foreign capital. These are facts. The investigation has established them, and no one can controvert them.

Is it surprising that our people reject such a program of treachery; that if a propagandist took this program to our factories and works, to our collective farms and our Red Army barracks, he would be immediately seized and hanged at the nearest lamppost. And it would serve him right, for traitors deserve no other fate than the gallows. This program is a program of black treason. To it we oppose our program, the program of the Soviet government. It is useless trying to make it appear that this is a struggle, a controversy between two factions, one of which was lucky and came into power, and the other was unlucky, "out of luck," and did not get into power.

This is a life and death struggle between two programs, two opposite sets of principles, two mutually hostile trends and views which reflect the respective sets of principles. As against this black program of the Trotskyites we advance our program of liquidating capitalism, of liquidating all the remnants of capitalism in our country. The whole of our Soviet country, all the workers, peasants and intellectuals, under the leadership of our great Party, the Party of Lenin and Stalin, under the leadership of our great leader and teacher, Stalin, are heroically fighting for this program, tirelessly working to strengthen our state independence, the independence and inviolability of our frontiers and of our territory.

In a great patriotic effort never witnessed in tsarist Russia or in any capitalist state, in a great Soviet patriotic effort, the heroic toilers of the U.S.S.R. are building our new, socialist motherland. All the peoples of our country are imbued with an enthusiasm, unprecedented in history, which is performing miracles. Great is our love for our country, for our motherland!

"In the past we had no motherland nor could we have one," said Comrade Stalin in 1931. "But now that we have overthrown capitalism and the workers are in power, we have a motherland, and we will defend its independence." The whole population of our country loudly repeats these words of Comrade Stalin so that the world may hear. And it is prepared at the first call of the Party and the government to rise like one man to defend our motherland.

Comrade Stalin said that "our policy is a policy of peace" and that we will "pursue this policy of peace also in future with all our might and all our means. Not a span of foreign land do we desire. But of our land, not an inch of our land shall we surrender to anybody." Let our enemies firmly bear this in mind.

Our great Russian people, our great peoples—Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Uzbek, Georgian, Azerbaijan, Armenian, Tatar, and all the other numerous peoples of the U.S.S.R. stand like a living wall

guarding our frontiers, guarding every inch of our sacred Soviet soil!

"We are filled with a sense of national pride," wrote Lenin, "at the fact that the Great-Russian nation has *also* created a revolutionary class, has *also* shown that it is capable of giving humanity great examples of struggle for liberty and for socialism and not only great pogroms, rows of gallows, dungeons, great famines and great cringing before priests, tsars, landlords and capitalists." (Collected Works, Vol. XVIII, p. 81.)

And in front of you, Comrade Judges, are sitting men who wanted with the aid of foreign bayonets to subject our country to capitalist slavery. Concerning these and similar people Lenin once wrote that they "are toadies and cads who rouse a legitimate feeling of anger, contempt and disgust." These men, these toadies and cads of capitalism tried to trample underfoot the great and sacred sentiments of our national, our Soviet, patriotic pride, they jeered at our liberties, at the sacrifices our people have made for their liberties; they betrayed our people and went over to the side of the enemy, to the side of the aggressors and agents of capitalism. The anger of our people will destroy these traitors, reduce them to ashes and wipe them from the face of the earth.

As was established at the preliminary investigation and at this trial, one of the points of the program of the anti-Soviet, Trotskyite centre was the acceleration of war, and the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in this war. Through war and defeat to come to power, to capture power, and to utilize it for the purpose of restoring capitalism.

The Trotskyite centre consisting of Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov and Serebryakov, realized, of course, the utter hopelessness of their criminal designs to overthrow the Soviet power and to seize power at a time when our Union was at peace and in the process of peaceful development. They realized, of course, that there were no forces in our country they could count upon as effective for their purposes. That is why the ringleaders of this centre placed their reliance mainly on war, on a military attack on the U.S.S.R. by an aggressor, on the outbreak of war, on ensuring the victory of the enemy and our defeat in this war, which they would help to bring about.

In his conversation with Pyatakov in December 1935, Trotsky, according to Pyatakov, spoke openly about war being inevitable in the very near future. We verified this as much as we could here. The date, 1937, was mentioned.

I cannot refrain from mentioning a fact that was examined *in camera* yesterday. Precisely in connection with Trotsky's line, and evidently with that of corresponding competent circles and institutions of a certain foreign state with which Trotsky had

come to an agreement, 1937 was chosen because it was necessary to take a number of measures that would by that date really ensure the defeat of the U.S.S.R. Yesterday, *in camera,* Pyatakov and Rataichak gave full details of what they had done to ensure our defeat in the event of war breaking out in 1937, particularly in connection with our army's supplies of the necessary means of defence. They revealed to us yesterday how profoundly and monstrously despicable were their plans to betray our country to the enemy. They revealed how they wanted by means of their plan to disarm our Red Army, our country, our people at the most important and dangerous period in the event of war breaking out.

Now we understand why their plans were so drawn up as to create a grave situation for us in regard to certain measures of defence precisely in 1937.

It was precisely for 1937 that the monstrous crime revealed *in camera* yesterday was planned. It was precisely in 1937 that they banked on our defeat.

We must remember that ten years ago Trotsky justified his defeatist position in regard to the U.S.S.R. by referring to the famous Clemenceau thesis. Trotsky then wrote: "We must restore the tactics of Clemenceau, who, as is well known, rose against the French Government at a time when the Germans were 80 kms. from Paris." Comrade Stalin subjected Trotsky, this "comic opera Clemenceau" and his "Don Quixote group" to withering criticism. It was not an accident that Trotsky and his accomplices advanced the Clemenceau thesis. They reverted to this thesis once again, but this time advancing it not as a theoretical proposition, but as practical preparation, real preparation, in alliance with foreign intelligence services, for the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in war.

L. Trotsky and the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre tried by hook and crook, by every means in their power, to hasten the aggressor's attack upon the U.S.S.R.

"Hasten the collision"—provoke war, prepare for the defeat of the U.S.S.R.—this was the program of the Trotskyite "centre" in the sphere of, so to speak, "foreign policy."

This "program" is a program of foreign spies, of agents of foreign intelligence services who, whenever they could, penetrated the very midst of their enemy and tried to disrupt his ranks from within. This is what the program of the Trotskyite centre amounted to in the sphere of so-called foreign policy.

Two programs stand confronting each other as irreconcilable mortal enemies. Two programs, two camps. On the one hand, a miserable clique, isolated from the people and hostile to the people,

a clique which had become the agents of foreign intelligence services; and on the other hand, the Soviet government, supported by the whole of the population of the U.S.S.R. Two programs, two diametrically opposite lines of struggle.

Quite naturally, therefore, their principles, their line for war, for the defeat and disruption of our state, for betraying its interests to bellicose fascism, logically led to a number of other practical steps and measures which the Trotskyite organization carried out under the guidance of its Trotskyite anti-Soviet centre.

Radek and Pyatakov confirmed in Court that in the preparations for military defeat, the principal methods resorted to by the traitors in the "centre" were wrecking and diversion.

Pyatakov testified that during his meeting with Trotsky the latter explained to him that one of the points of the agreement he had arrived at with the representatives of the German National-Socialist Party was that he undertook:

". . . during a war waged by Germany against the U.S.S.R. . . . to take up a defeatist position and intensify diversionist activities, particularly in enterprises of importance for the defence of the country . . . to act on Trotsky's instructions which were adopted in agreement with the German General Staff."

As has now been established by the investigation, in carrying out the obligations thus undertaken, the "parallel" or simply, the anti-Soviet, Trotskyite, centre, did indeed organize in a number of enterprises in the Soviet Union an extensive system of wrecking operations and even diversions carried out by diversionist and wrecking groups especially organized by them. Accordingly the "parellel" centre put their men not only in our industry, but also on our railways. We saw how this was done. If in the centre's opinion, the wrecking and diversionist operations in Western Siberia were going badly, or not satisfactorily enough: Pyatakov hastens there, sends Drobnis especially for the purpose of strengthening the West-Siberian centre which was directing the diversionist and wrecking operations there.

We know that the distribution of their forces was carried out, not haphazardly, but according to plan. There were special people to whose addresses spies who arrived from abroad were sent. These spies were also placed according to a definite plan; they were sent precisely to those places where it was thought necessary to strike the most palpable blow, as Pyatakov and Trotsky put it.

In the centre Pyatakov takes charge of the direction of diversive and wrecking operations. The direction of wrecking and diversive operations on the railways is entrusted to Serebryakov in conjunction with Knyazev, Turok and Boguslavsky.

Naturally, the criminal centre paid very considerable attention to Kuzbas, and in particular, to Kemerovo. It is not an accident that it was precisely in Western Siberia that a fairly strong territory centre is set up, consisting of the tried Trotskyites: Muralov, Drobnis and Boguslavsky. Pyatakov takes to himself as immediate assistants: Rataichak and Norkin. Muralov and Drobnis rely on Shestov and Stroilov.

The principal wrecking and diversive forces are distributed fairly skilfully, and according to a definite plan. The principal wrecking and diversionist *actif* is not scattered, but concentrated. These forces are concentrated according to all the rules of secrecy. These forces are concentrated on the largest, most important enterprises, primarily those of defence importance. Here they also take into account the numerous difficulties that naturally arise in connection with the organization of new enterprises, such as, for example, the organization of the huge Kemerovo plant. They take absolutely everything into account. We can say that they took the smallest detail into account. Everything is weighed in a "business-like" manner, if this term could be used in this connection without degrading the term business man. Pyatakov behaves here precisely like the owner, like the organizer of this wrecking business.

He is a man who leads a double life. He approaches all things, even a wrecking and a diversive act, with careful calculation, turning over in his mind what should be done, and how and when it should be done; he does not operate on guerrilla warfare lines. Pyatakov is opposed to guerrilla warfare in the sphere of terrorism, in the sphere of wrecking, and in the sphere of diversions. He works according to strict business principles, that is to say, to do wrecking work at the place, at the time and to the extent that circumstances permit and assist him. He is the man who calculates the circumstances. He is the man who takes stock of the situation. He is the man who calculates the forces. He is the man who calculates the means. He is also the man who holds in his hands the means of camouflaging the whole business. Hence the fairly wide, systematic ramifications of wrecking and diversive activities, the monstrousness of which simply causes one to shudder. At the preliminary investigation Pyatakov testified:

"I advised my people (and did this myself) not to scatter their wrecking work, but to concentrate all their attention on the principal, big industrial enterprises, which are important for defence, and of all-Union importance.

"On this point I operated according to Trotsky's instructions: 'to strike palpable blows in the most sensitive places.'"

To do him justice, Pyatakov knew how to strike palpable blows in the really sensitive places.

We have seen during the trial what this Trotsky-Pyatakov formula meant in action: it meant spoiling and destroying machines, installations and whole enterprises; the burning and blowing up of whole workshops, mines and factories; the wrecking of trains and the loss of human life.

In the course of our history we have seen not a few crimes committed against the rule of the workers, against the proletarian dictatorship. Our history contains revolting pages of atrocious conspiracies against the Soviets. We remember the "Shakhty case" and as living witnesses of those trials, we remember the "Industrial Party" case and the case of the Menshevik Union Bureau. But it will be hardly an exaggeration to say that in the art of wrecking, cynicism and despicable diversionist practice, the Trotskyites have left their forerunners far behind; that in this sphere they have excelled the most hardened and incorrigible criminals. If we compared Pyatakov with his forerunners in this sphere I think that the latter would pale into insignificance considering the magnitude of the treacherous criminal deeds which Pyatakov managed to commit while concealing his criminal activities under the cloak of his high position in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry.

In organizing wrecking and diversive acts the Trotskyite anti-Soviet centre in fact, simultaneously strove to carry out two tasks: one was the task of undermining the economic power of the Soviet state and the defence capacity of our country; the other was the task of causing disaffection among the workers and toilers, among the population of our country against the Soviet government, to incite the people against the Soviet government. They tried to carry out the second task by committing the most savage crimes. They did not shrink from committing these crimes; on the contrary, they tried to organize them on the widest possible scale, tried to increase the number of the victims as much as possible. And Pyatakov is wrong when he says that he regarded "this" as inevitable. He did not have the courage to tell the whole truth here, which Drobnis, sitting behind him, told.

The centre did not regard the explosions, arson, train wrecking involving loss of human life, as something unavoidable. The organization of crimes of this kind was part and parcel of the centre's plan. Drobnis said:

"It will even be better if there is loss of life in the mine, as it will undoubtedly cause disaffection among the workers, and this is what we want."

Knyazev said that Livshitz instructed him:

"To prepare for and carry out a number of diversive acts

(explosions, train wrecks, or poisoning) which would be accompanied by great loss of human life."

Comrade Judges, during this trial a number of atrocious scenes passed before your eyes, and I must now recall them to your mind. I must recall the explosion in the Tsentralnaya Pit which resulted in the death of 10 workers and severe injury to 14 workers. I must also remind you of the train collision at Shumikha Station which resulted in the death of 29 Red Army men and the injury of another 29 Red Army men.

It is characteristic that in committing these crimes the conspirators very coolly and deliberately covered up their traces, that is, they tried to cover them up. We saw that in the case of the poisoning of the workers in December 1935 at Section 6 in the Severny Khodok district, in Kemerovo, Peshekhonov and other members of the Trotskyite wrecking organization drew up a report which concealed the fact that the poisoning had been deliberate. Here, in this court, Knyazev and Turok had to confirm that a number of train disasters they organized went unpunished because they cynically, skilfully, and successfully destroyed all the clues.

We know that these people did not scruple to deliberately misinform the investigation authorities as to who was responsible for the train disasters they organized, that they knew how to throw the blame on absolutely innocent people, as was the case with the switch-girl, Chudinova.

Here they worked according to a monstrous gangster system which spares nobody, which did not scruple to strike not only against those whom they were actually fighting, but against everybody who crossed their criminal path.

It must be said that the organization and execution of diversive and wrecking acts was greatly facilitated by the fact that these people had succeeded, by deceiving us, in securing a number of responsible key positions in industry and on the railways. The expert technical commissions which reported their findings here, very precisely and definitely established that all the so-called break-downs, and explosions, and fires, which it was at first attempted to represent as being the result of accidents, were in fact wilfully and deliberately engineered by the wreckers. It has been established that at the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works three acts of diversion were carried out in a relatively short period of time under the direction of the accused Rataichak. These included two explosions which caused the loss of human life, besides entailing very heavy material damage to the state.

Comrade Judges, in order fully to appraise the utter monstrosity of these crimes we must not lose sight of the fact that not only were these crimes committed, but that they were com-

mitted by people who were entrusted with the protection of the interests of our State against every kind of encroachment. Rataichak, who should have been the first to protect our chemical industry from any encroachment and to safeguard it from all damage, actually betrayed it. He acted like a downright traitor. If he committed such a crime in time of war he would be liable to be shot on the spot, immediately annihilated.

On Rataichak's instructions, the Trotskyite organization also committed similar diversive acts in other chemical plants of the Union. The diversive nature of these explosions has been established and admitted by the accused; it is proved by the testimony of witnesses and by the special technical experts who here dotted all the i's and left no doubt whatever that they were the result of diversive acts.

I would like to deal briefly with the experts' answers. I asked the experts to reply to a number of questions concerning the explosion which took place in the hydrogen department of the Gorlovka Fertilizer Works in November 1935. To the direct question whether there had been any possibility of averting this explosion, the experts replied: certainly there had been. What should have been done to avert these explosions?

It transpires that very little had to be done. All that was required was to adhere to the safety regulations. The safety regulations ensure normal and safe work. But this was not done. Hence the explosion. And when we asked the experts: but perhaps, after all, the explosion was an accident? We verified the evidence of the accused. The experts replied: "Malicious intent is indisputable."

With the assistance of the experts we verified the evidence of the accused, and although we know that according to the laws of certain European countries the confession of an accused person is regarded as sufficient proof of guilt and the court does not consider itself obliged to call corroborating evidence, we, however, in order to observe strict impartiality, notwithstanding the confessions of the criminals themselves, verified their statements once again from the technical side and obtained a categorical reply concerning the explosion of November 11, the fires in the Prokopyevsk mine, and the fires and explosions at the Kemerovo plant. Malicious intent was established without any possibility of doubt.

Thus, we have a widely ramified system of wrecking and diversive measures embracing the branches of our industry which are most important from the point of view of our all-Union interests and from the point of view of defence, and the defence capacity of our state.

The Trotskyite centre organized fairly widely ramified wrecking and diversive measures also on the railways. We have already established the active role played in this nightmarish crime, or rather, in this sum of nightmarish crimes, by Livshitz, Turok, Knyazev and Boguslavsky. But here, too, I cannot refrain from singling out Livshitz because, as in the case of Pyatakov, we have here the limit of all conceivable crime. Indeed, Livshitz was not merely a worker on the railways, he was not merely one of the responsible officials of the People's Commissariat of Railways Livshitz was the Assistant People's Commissar of Railways. In this respect he differs in no way from Pyatakov, notwithstanding the fact that his was a secondary role as compared with Pyatakov's. When our industry and railways, under the brilliant direction of Comrades Sergo Orjonikidze and Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich, overcoming all sorts of difficulties, day after day, month after month, year after year rose to higher and higher levels, the men whose duty it was to assist them, insolently and treacherously deceived them, deceived us all, our Party, our people.

That is why I think that in regard to Pyatakov, ex-Assistant People's Commissar of Heavy Industry of the U.S.S.R., in regard to Livshitz, ex-Assistant People's Commissar of Railways, and in regard to Sokolnikov, ex-Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs—in regard to these three persons, as persons in whom had been vested special confidence, special state responsibility to our country—the question of their criminal responsibility should be dealt with separately even if no other monstrous crimes burdened their shoulders.

Accused Knyazev, on the direct instructions of the "parallel" Trotskyite centre, organized and caused the wreck of a number of trains, mainly troop trains, causing considerable loss of life. There was the wreck at Shumikha Station in which 29 Red Army men were killed and 29 Red Army men were injured; there was the wreck on the Yakhnino—Ust-Katav section, the wrecking of troop trains and freight trains. Knyazev organized these, as was revealed, not only on the instructions of the "parallel" Trotskyite centre and, in particular, of Livshitz, but also on the direct instructions of the agent of a foreign power—the agent of the Japanese intelligence service, Mr. H——, who was really one of the mainsprings of Knyazev's and Turok's criminal activities.

Knyazev testified that the organization of the wrecking of troop trains was a part of the series of measures intended to strike at our Red Army, and it must be admitted that these criminal measures might have dealt us a very telling blow.

This is how the interests of the Trotskyite organization became interwoven with the interests of the foreign intelligence services.

They could not but be interwoven, because they both had a common political goal and common methods of work, and were organizationally connected. This, strictly speaking, obliterated all lines of distinction between the Trotskyite organization and the organization of the Japanese or German intelligence services.

We verified the espionage and diversive connections of Knyazev and Turok *in camera* and the identity of this Mr. H——, and all the circumstances to which the accused testified in Court, were established with absolute precision.

Here I must recall two letters in the files which reveal Knyazev's connection with this Mr. H——. These letters once again, and quite objectively, confirm Knyazev's testimony.

Knyazev testified that in agreement with this Mr. H—— he gave and carried out commissions to organize, in the event of war, the burning down of military stores, army provision bases and sanitary centres. Knyazev confirmed that the Japanese intelligence service emphatically stressed the necessity of organizing diversive acts by employing bacteria on the outbreak of war for the purpose of infecting troop trains, and also army provision bases and sanitary centres, with highly virulent bacilli.

These are two of the most characteristic facts which in themselves prove the infinite depths of degradation, the real moral depravity to which the minor and major participants in this anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre have sunk. The episode at the Kemerovo plant and the instruction which Knyazev received from H—— in the event of war to infect the Red Army men with highly virulent bacilli—these two facts are sufficient to enable us to regard the charge of high treason presented here as being absolutely proved.

The criminals acted insolently and cynically. They were influenced to some extent by the positions they occupied, which caused them to think that they had so effectively secreted and camouflaged themselves that they would never be discovered. Indeed, how was it possible for them for a fairly long time to commit these crimes with impunity? This is a legitimate question, of course. But what if those very consuls whose duty it is to safeguard the state from damage (the old Roman formula which states that it is the duty of the consuls to safeguard the state from all damage) if these very consuls proved to be the principal wreckers, the principal organizers of these crimes! Under these circumstances it is possible to carry on wrecking activities for a month, for a year, for two years, five years, perhaps even for a whole decade, if one plays this most despicable game of duplicity, if one leads a double life, as the accused in this case played and lived. Yes, these crimes were possible because they were committed under protection of those who should have been the first to sound the alarm, to give the signal, and to wage a ruthless struggle against such crimes. This explains everything.

But here I want to raise another question. Notwithstanding the fact that spies and intelligence service agents like Rataichak and traitors like Livshitz or Pyatakov wormed their way into leading positions—notwithstanding all this, how was it that their efforts to undermine the power of our industry, to enfeeble the defence industry, to shake the defence capacity of our country. proved futile? This is the most important question, and it demands a precise and exhaustive reply.

Yes, for a certain period, at a certain moment, in certain sections of our industry things were tight. But notwithstanding all the wrecking and diversive blows that were delivered against us, our industry and our railway transport have always been on the upgrade, steadily rising to new levels. I will quote a few figures relating to a few branches of industry which served as the arena of the criminal activities of the Trotskyite plotters.

In the coal industry, coal output increased as follows:

Donbas: from 25,288,000 tons in 1913 to 75,202,000 tons in 1936.

Kuzbas: from 799,000 tons in 1913 to 17,259,000 tons in 1936.

Moscow Basin: from 300,000 tons to 7,201,000 tons in 1936. An enormous increase!

In nineteen years our country created a powerful chemical industry, and now occupies third place, and in some branches, second place, in the world chemical industry.

At the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan our country had been enriched by the creation of a number of new branches of industry of national economic importance, such as the aniline dye industry, the coke-benzol industry, the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, etc. The First and Second Five-Year Plans of the Soviet chemical industry were most striking stages in the development of the industry. We must bear in mind that the history of the world chemical industry in general dates from the end of the 18th century. Consequently, the modern world chemical industry had about 150 years of development. But our Soviet chemical industry has had ten years of development. And during these ten years it has travelled the distance that it took world capitalist economy 150 years to travel. We have achieved successes which have brought us in the production of sulphuric acid and soda to third place in world output, only Germany and the United States being ahead of us. In super-phosphates, we occupy first place after the United States; in nitrate fertilizers our country is moving up to fourth place in world output. These facts are very significant, par-

ticularly in the light of the monstrous crimes we heard about here, and which have roused universal indignation throughout our country. This shows the way our people, our socialist industry, are replying to the undermining work of the traitors and agents of the fascist intelligence services. In spite of wrecking activities, in spite of diversions, in spite of the loss of scores and scores of the best Stakhanovites, who were done to death by the spies and diversionists, in spite of their systematic and deliberate sabotage of the Stakhanov movement—our industry is growing at a tremendous rate and is overfulfilling its production plans.

The position on the railways is similar. Here we have enormous increase in railway traffic, which is eloquently proved by the figures of average daily car-loadings. In 1934 average daily loadings were 55,417 cars, and in 1935—68,098 cars. In 1936 the average was 86,160 cars per day! The annual total freight carried, calculated in billions ton-kilometres for the corresponding years is as follows: 205, 258, 323! The railways have heroically overcome their past difficulties.

How is this miracle, how is this phenomenon to be explained? Miracles do not happen. Why then have we such a remarkable increase? Why are our industries and railways flourishing like this? Because on the side of the wreckers there are only individuals. The damage caused by these individuals is quickly repaired by millions. Because on the side of the Soviet government and the building of socialism stand millions.

The materials of the preliminary investigation and of this trial, as well as the confessions of the accused Rataichak, Knyazev, Pushin, Turok, Hrasche, Shestov and Stroilov have established that, in addition to diversive and wrecking activities, the Trotskyite anti-Soviet centre widely and systematically engaged in espionage on behalf of foreign intelligence services. I will not dwell on this point in detail. I will only deal with the main points. Connections with the Japanese and German intelligence services were not established on the personal initiative of a Turok or a Shestov. These connections were established in pursuance of Trotsky's directives. By their espionage work, the people who under the direction of Trotsky and Pyatakov established connections with the German and Japanese intelligence services, strove to achieve results which would have very gravely affected the interests, not only of our state, but also the interests of a number of states which, with us, desire peace, and which, with us, are fighting for peace.

In his message to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain addressed to Comrade José Diaz, Comrade Stalin said: "The toilers of the Soviet Union are merely fulfilling their duty in giving all the assistance they can to the revolutionary

masses of Spain. They," said Comrade Stalin, "fully realize that the liberation of Spain from the yoke of the fascist reactionaries is not the private affair of the Spaniards, but the common cause of the whole of advanced and progressive humanity." Comrade Judges, I ask you too, in weighing all the circumstances of the present case and in appraising the significance of the crimes committed by the accused, to approach the matter from the point of view of the protection of the interests of our state, from the point of view of the protection of the interests of the whole of advanced and progressive humanity.

We are keenly interested that the government of every country which desires peace, and is fighting for peace, should take the most determined measures, to put a stop to every attempt at criminal, espionage, diversive, terrorist activities organized by the enemies of peace, by the enemies of democracy, by the dark fascist forces which are preparing for war, which are preparing to wreck the cause of peace, and consequently, the cause of the whole of advanced, the whole of progressive humanity. It has been fairly fully established precisely what was done in this sphere by the minor spies sitting in the dock here, such as Hrasche and Rataichak, and by the major spies who head this group. Knyazev, Livshitz, Rataichak, Shestov, Stroilov, Pushin and Hrasche are direct agents of the German and Japanese intelligence services. The fact that they are agents does not, of course, preclude, but, on the contrary, presumes that the chiefs of this centre who organized the agencies and set them to work bear equal responsibility with the rest.

The indictment charges the members of the Trotskyite centre and their accomplices with organizing terrorist acts.

Here I must first of all deal with the main and general question. It has been proved that the program of the Trotskyite anti-Soviet centre included terrorism, and that this terrorism was carried into effect.

We are in possession of documents proving that Trotsky, at least twice, and, moreover, in a fairly open and undisguised form, gave a line for terrorism, documents which their author has proclaimed *urbi et orbi*. I refer, firstly, to that letter of 1932, in which Trotsky issued his treacherous and shameful call "Remove Stalin," and secondly, to a later document, the Trotskyite *Bulletin of the Opposition,* Nos. 36-37, of October 1933, in which we find a number of direct references to terrorism as a method of fighting the Soviet government.

Indeed, in a programmatic article which beneath its official title carries the subtitle: "Problems of the Fourth International," Trotsky speaks quite frankly about terrorism as a method which

already in those years was put on the agenda of the practical activities of the Trotskyites. To our great grief they succeeded in employing this terrorism in 1934, when they killed Sergei Mironovich Kirov.

In that programmatic article there is a section in which the question is asked: "Can the bureaucracy be removed by peaceful methods?" Trotsky and the Trotskyites regard our Soviet apparatus as a bureaucratic apparatus. In this chapter it is stated:

"Take the important question of how to proceed to reorganize the Soviet state."

Trotsky, you see, is concerned about the reorganization of the Soviet state and, as we have seen during this trial, so also were his immediate coadjutors Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek, Serebryakov and others.

How to proceed to the reorganization of the Soviet state? Can this problem be solved by peaceful means? An absolutely clear presentation of the problem! An opponent of terrorism, an opponent of violence, should have said: Yes, peaceful means are possible on the basis, say, of the constitution.

But what do Trotsky and the Trotskyites say?

They say:

"It would be childish to think that the Stalin bureaucracy can be removed by means of a Party or Soviet congress. Normal, constitutional means are no longer available for the removal of the ruling clique." (This is what they slanderously call our government.)

"They can be compelled to hand over power to the proletarian vanguard" (they speak of themselves as a vanguard and evidently have in mind a "vanguard" like these gentlemen who engaged in murder, diversion and espionage) "only by force."

And the word "force," as one can see, is printed in bold type. A clear presentation of the question! Peaceful means? Peaceful means are impotent. The only means is force, and by force must they be removed. But we know how force removes, particularly when this force is left in the hands of a "vanguard" like the gentlemen sitting over there.

Then they go on frankly to speak about the "Stalin apparatus." They say that if, nevertheless, this apparatus, our state apparatus, resists, then it will be necessary to take special measures against it.

What I have quoted—I cannot quote more of it because of the feeling of political revulsion that overcomes me—very distinctly shows how the Trotskyites in their sheets present the question of fighting methods, shows Trotsky's line in regard to this so-called "reorganization" of the Soviet state. Incidentally, in regard to this

Bulletin of the Trotskyite opposition, Pyatakov told us that Trotsky had said to him: "Do not take everything we say in the *Bulletin* at its face value. Bear in mind that we cannot say in the *Bulletin* all that we say to you, and demand of you. Understand that sometimes, perhaps, in the *Bulletin* we shall say things which are the opposite of what we demand of you." And if under these circumstances they say what I have just quoted, what else can it be called if not a direct call for violent action against our state, against our leaders? What else can it be called if not a direct call for terrorism? I cannot call it anything else.

And this is the most objective proof of the fact that when some of them, Pyatakov, Radek and other members of this criminal gang, said that they had organized terrorist acts on the direct instructions of Trotsky, they were compelled to say what was actually true; and no chatter, no slander, no insinuations and no Trotskyite lying can obscure this fact! We are in possession of documents which objectively prove that terrorism is part of the activities of the Trotskyite organization, that terrorism was proposed by Trotsky and that it was accepted by Pyatakov.

In front of us sit terrorists who not only organized terrorist acts on their own accord, but also organized them in agreement with the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc* with whom they were competing to a certain extent. Look: the published records of the trial of the united Zinovievite-Trotskyite centre show that the Zinovievites were spurred on by the fear that the Trotskyites might "get ahead of them" in their criminal activity. Have we not heard the same thing at this trial? Did not the Trotskyites of the "parallel" centre consider it to be their duty, as Radek admitted here, to hold the Zinovievites in hand, not to permit the Zinovievites to push them out of power when they were distributing portfolios? In their sleep this "vanguard" dreamed of portfolios. Radek was to get the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rataichak, probably, was to be Minister of Public Worship, because he testified that to this day he feels bound by the vow he took before someone, somewhere. And Pyatakov was intended (we know that this is so) for the post of Minister of War, and generally, Commander-in-Chief of all the armed land forces (they had no naval forces) and—I have in mind the "old flyer" Rataichak—air forces.

The centre organized a network of terrorist groups. Pyatakov had Loginov, Golubenko and others. Radek had Prigozhin and others. Sokolnikov had Zaks-Gladnyev, Tivel and others. Serebryakov had his own group—Mdivani. Drobnis had someone by the name of Podolskaya, who was also preparing a terrorist act. Drobnis had his own group. As for Muralov—it is needless to speak about him. He is an ex-commander—how can he be without an

army? If he cannot command Soviet forces, why can't he command anti-Soviet forces? He is a "soldier," and he will command whatever forces he is given and in the manner he is ordered. Even Shestov had his own group—Arnold & Co., not a bad group, considering the tasks set before it. Not a very presentable group, it is true, but practical in its operations.

Pyatakov, through the medium of his Ukrainian representatives, prepared for a terrorist act against Comrades Postyshev and Kossior, and in 1935 against Comrade Stalin. We questioned Pyatakov about this, we called Loginov as a witness, and he confirmed it. Radek trained terrorist cadres in Leningrad; Zaks-Gladnyev and others, under the direction of Sokolnikov, prepared for a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin. Mdivani, under Serebryakov's direction, prepared for a terrorist act against Comrade Beria, collected terrorists who might be called to Moscow for the purpose of ensuring the most successful accomplishment of so-called group terrorist acts. These also prepared for a terrorist act against Comrade Yezhov. Drobnis also prepared for a terrorist act against Comrade Yezhov. Muralov prepared an act against people who visited Siberia, apart from the one against Comrade Eiche, who lives there. Such is the line: to follow up, to take advantage of the visits of leaders of the Party and the government to outlying districts and to organize their assassination. And so Muralov, who will under no circumstances agree to having the preparation of an attempt on the life of Comrade Orjonikidze attributed to him, this very Muralov, firmly and frankly (I cannot say "honestly" because this word is unsuitable for affairs of this kind) admits that he did indeed organize a terrorist act against Comrade Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of our Union. Muralov not only organized the terrorist act, but actually tried to carry it out through the medium of Shestov and Arnold.

Of course, one may say: there were many groups, but they have not much to show. But that is our good fortune! These gentlemen did not undertake to commit terrorist acts by their own hand. That is our good fortune! We met Radek, Pyatakov and Sokolnikov fairly intimately, discussed various questions with them, believing that we were sitting next to comrades. But it transpired that our would-be assassins were sitting beside us. Had they been able to advocate terrorism openly, the situation would, of course, have been much more complicated. But they pursued different tactics, which were: not to reveal the fact that the Trotskyites were preparing to commit murder. The tactics they pursued were to throw the blame, as far as possible, upon other people, on Whiteguards, as they said. Under the circumstances, it

was not easy, of course, to find people who like the enlightened navigator Arnold, would agree to undertake to commit such horrible crimes. Of course, Arnold, Shestov, Muralov, the West-Siberian centre, the Trotskyite centre as a whole, must answer for the preparation of these acts, because this was done on the general instructions, "concretely translated," as Pyatakov expressed it, "from the language of algebra into the language of arithmetic." But they forgot about the existence of another language, the language of the Criminal Code, which knows the crimes, knows the people who commit them, and knows the penalty which the law inflicts for committing such crimes. They choose Arnold as the suitable man to commit such a crime. Well, what is it for Arnold to undertake to commit one or a score of terrorist acts? You have seen this Arnold. The Trotskyite conspirators took all Arnold's qualities into account except one, that is—cowardice. . . . He organized the attempt on the life of Comrade Orjonikidze, and to our great good fortune, he funked at the last moment—and the attempt failed. He organized the attempt on the life of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade Molotov, but to our great good fortune, he funked again—and the attempt failed.

But the fact remains a fact. An attempt on the life of Comrade Molotov was made. That the car overturned on the brink of the 15-metre "ditch," as Muralov here modestly called it, is a fact.

Take the murder of engineer Boyarshinov. Who was Boyarshinov? He was a man who at one time had been convicted for wrecking. But that passed. Boyarshinov became an honest man. He refused to construct the Rukhimovich mine according to wrecking plans that were drawn up; and more than once he protested against the work being delayed, and against Stroilov's criminal activity. He exposed Stroilov.

The honesty with which Boyarshinov was working enraged the diversionist gang. They organized his murder. On April 15, 1934, engineer Boyarshinov was driving from the railway station on a horse-drawn cart. He was run into by a motor-truck, and crushed to death. This is another example of the method employed by the Shestov-Cherepukhin gang which had in its ranks Arnold, and several other persons who were discovered, tried and convicted. For example, Kazantsev, who had a hand in this affair. This is a fact, it is not a self-denunciation, it is a fact: Boyarshinov was murdered. This was the method that was employed in the attempt to kill the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade V. M. Molotov.

That is why the whole centre—from Arnold to Pyatakov and from Pyatakov to Arnold—must answer fully and on all counts,

for these terrorist activities, for preparing to commit terrorist crimes. They are all equally and jointly responsible.

I contend that the crimes enumerated in the indictment are fully proved; the criminals also stand fully convicted.

Our law demands that the Court shall appraise the proofs in the case in accordance with its conviction arrived at after examining all the circumstances of the case taken as a whole.

Article 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the R.S.F.S.R. speaks of the necessity of submitting to the Court a number of questions which it must decide in passing its verdict. Of these questions I think the most material and important are the first two: the question whether the deeds attributed to the accused were actually committed; and secondly, whether these deeds are criminal within the meaning of the law. The Prosecution replies to both these questions in the affirmative. Yes, the crimes attributed to the accused were committed. The accused committed the deeds attributed to them, and these deeds are criminal within the full meaning of the law. There cannot be the slightest doubt about these two questions. But what proof have we in our arsenal from the point of view of juridical procedure?

It must be said that the nature of the present case is such that it predetermines the peculiar nature of the proof possible in the case. We have a conspiracy, we have before us a group of people who conspired to bring about a *coup d'état*, who organized themselves and for a number of years carried on, or secured the carrying on, of activities directed towards ensuring the success of this conspiracy, a conspiracy with fairly wide ramifications, a conspiracy which connected the conspirators with foreign fascist forces. How can the question of proof be presented under these circumstances? The question can be put this way: a conspiracy, you say, but where are the documents? You say there is a program, but where is the program? Have these people a written program anywhere? They only talk about it.

You say there is an organization, that there is some sort of a gang (they call themselves a party), but where are their decisions, where is the material evidence of their conspiratorial activities—rules, minutes, a seal, and so on and so forth?

I am bold enough to assert, in keeping with the fundamental requirements of the science of criminal procedure, that in cases of conspiracy such demands cannot be put. You cannot demand that cases of conspiracy, of *coup d'état* be approached from the standpoint: give us minutes, decisions, membership cards, the numbers of your membership cards; you cannot demand that conspirators have their conspiratorial activities certified by a notary. No sensible man can put the question in this way in cases of state

conspiracy. In fact we have a number of documents to prove our case. But even if these documents were not available, we would still consider it right to submit our indictment on the basis of the testimony and evidence of the accused and witnesses and, if you will, circumstantial evidence. In the present case I can quote a brilliant authority on the law of evidence such as the old, well-known English jurist, William Wills, who in his book on circumstantial evidence shows how strong circumstantial evidence can be, and how, not infreqently, circumstantial evidence can be much more convincing than direct evidence.

I think that my esteemed opponents will agree with me from the point of view of the position they, as Counsel for Defence, are taking on this question. But we also have objective proof. I spoke about a program and submitted to your attention, Comrade Judges, Trotsky's *Bulletin*, in which this very program is printed. And identification will be much easier here than was the case when you were establishing the identity of certain persons belonging to the German intelligence service from photographs.

We rely on a number of proofs which in our hands may serve as a test of the assertions of the indictment, of the theses of the indictment. First, there is the historical connection which confirms the theses of the indictment on the basis of the Trotskyites' past activity. We also have in mind the testimony of the accused, which in itself represents enormous importance as proof. In the course of the trial when one of the proofs was the evidence of the accused themselves, we did not confine ourselves merely to the Court hearing the statements of the accused; we did all we possibly could to verify these statements. And I must say that we did this here with all impartial conscientiousness, and with all possible care.

In order to distinguish truth from falsehood in court, judicial experience is, of course, sufficient; and every judge, every procurator, and every counsel for defence who has taken part in scores of trials knows when an accused is speaking the truth and when he departs from the truth for some purpose or other. But let us assume that the testimony of the accused cannot serve as convincing proof. In that case it is necessary to reply to certain questions as the science of criminal procedure demands. If the statements do not conform with the truth, it is what is called in science, a denunciation. And if it is a denunciation, the reasons for it must be explained. There may be different reasons for it. The existence of these reasons must be proved. It might be the pursuit of personal advantage, personal interest, a desire to take revenge on someone, and so forth. If the case now being heard is approached from this point of view you will, in your conference

chamber, have to analyse all the testimony and decide for yourselves to what extent the confessions of the accused are convincing: you will have to put to yourselves the question as to the motives which prompted this or that accused or witness. The circumstances of the present case, which have been examined here with all possible care, convincingly confirm what the accused have said. There is no reason to assume that Pyatakov is not a member of the centre, that Radek was not present at the diplomatic receptions and did not speak with Mr. K——, or with Mr. H——or with any other gentleman—whatever his name may be; that he and Bukharin did not treat certain persons who came to visit him unofficially to "fried eggs and sausage," that Sokolnikov did not speak to some representative or other, thus "putting a visa on Trotsky's mandate." All that they said about their activities has been verified by the evidence of the experts, by the preliminary interrogation, by confessions and testimony, and none of this can be subject to any doubt whatever.

I think that all these circumstances enable me to say that if there is any shortcoming in the present trial, it is not that the accused have said what they have done, but that, after all, the accused have not really told us all they have done, all the crimes they have committed against the Soviet state.

But, Comrade Judges, we had an example of this in previous trials and I ask you to bear this in mind when we hear the last pleas that will be made here in a few hours' time. I would like to remind you of how, in the case of the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre, say, certain of the accused vowed, right here, in this very dock, during their last pleas, some begging, others not begging for clemency, that they had spoken the whole truth, that they had said everything, that in their hearts no opposition whatever remained against the working class, against our people, against our country. And later, when the revolting skein of monstrous crimes committed by these people became more and more unravelled, we found that at every step these people had lied and deceived when they already had one foot in the grave.

If we are to speak of shortcomings of the present trial, I see only one defect: I am convinced that the accused have not said half the truth which constitutes the horrible tale of the awful crimes they committed against our country, against our great motherland!

I accuse the people who are sitting here before us of having, in 1933, on Trotsky's instructions, organized what they called a "parallel" centre consisting of the accused in the present case Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov and Serebryakov, but what was really the operating active Trotskyite centre; that this centre, on Trotsky's instructions, through the medium of the accused Sokol-

nikov and Radek, entered into communication with representatives of certain foreign states for the purpose of organizing a joint struggle against the Soviet Union; and that this centre undertook, in the event of its coming into power, to grant these states a number of political and economic privileges and territorial concessions; that this centre, through the medium of its members and other members of the criminal Trotskyite organization, engaged in espionage on behalf of these states, supplying foreign intelligence services with extremely important and extremely secret materials of utmost state importance; that for the purpose of undermining the economic power and defence capacity of our country this centre and its accomplices organized and carried out a number of diversive and wrecking acts which resulted in the loss of human life and caused considerable damage to our Soviet state.

Of this I accuse the members of the "parallel" anti-Soviet, Trotskyite centre: Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov and Serebryakov, that is to say, of crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., *viz.,* treason to the country; 58^{6}, *viz.,* espionage; 58^{8}, *viz.,* terrorism; 58^{9}, *viz.,* diversion; 58^{11}, *viz.,* forming secret criminal organizations. I accuse all the other accused: Livshitz, N. Muralov, Drobnis, Boguslavsky, Knyazev, Rataichak, Norkin, Shestov, Stroilov, Turok, Hrasche, Pushin and Arnold, of being guilty of the same crimes as members of this organization, bearing full and joint responsibility for these crimes, irrespective of the distinctive features of the criminal activities which characterize the crimes of each one of them, that is to say, of crimes covered by the same Articles of the Criminal Code.

Comrade Judges, the principal charge that is made in the present trial is that of treason to the country. The penalty for treason to the country is indicated in Article 58^{1a} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. It describes treason to the country as acts committed to the damage of the military power of the Union, of its state independence and its territorial inviolability, such as: espionage, disclosing military and state secrets and desertion to the enemy. All these elements, except the last—flight abroad—are present in this case. On those who have committed this grave state crime, which our great Stalin Constitution justly calls the worst of crimes, the law imposes the severest penalty. The law demands that, in the event of the guilt of the criminals being proved, they be sentenced to be shot, permitting clemency only under extenuating circumstances.

Comrade Judges, in your conference chamber you will have to reply to the question—are there for these accused, for each one separately, individual and definite circumstances which would

permit you to mitigate the penalty which the law holds out for them? In my opinion there are no such extenuating circumstances. I accuse the defendants on the basis of the Articles of the Criminal Code indicated in the indictment in their full scope.

I am not the only accuser! Comrade Judges, I feel that by my side here stand the victims of the crimes and of these criminals: on crutches, maimed, half alive, and perhaps legless, like Comrade Nagovitsina, the switch-girl at Chusovskaya Station, who appealed to me, through *Pravda,* today, and who, at 20 years of age, lost both her legs in averting a train disaster organized by these people! I do not stand here alone! I feel that by my side here stand the murdered and maimed victims of these frightful crimes, demanding of me, as the State Prosecutor, that I press the charge on all points!

I do not stand here alone! The victims may be in their graves, but I feel that they are standing here beside me, pointing at the dock, at you, accused, with their mutilated arms, which have mouldered in the graves to which you sent them!

I am not the only accuser! I am joined in my accusation by the whole of our people! I accuse these heinous criminals who deserve only one punishment—death by shooting!

The President: Adjournment for 20 minutes.

* * *

Commandant: The Court is coming. Please rise.

The President: Accused Pyatakov, do you desire to avail yourself of your right to speak in your own defence?

Pyatakov: No, I waive it.

The President: Accused Radek?

Radek: No, I waive it.

The President: Accused Sokolnikov?

Sokolnikov: No.

The President: Accused Boguslavsky?

Boguslavsky: No, I waive it.

The President: Accused Drobnis?

Drobnis: No.

The President: Accused Muralov?

Muralov: No, I waive it.

The President: Accused Norkin?

Norkin: No.

The President: Accused Shestov?

Shestov: No.

The President: Accused Stroilov?

Stroilov: No.

The President: Accused Livshitz?

Livshitz: No, I waive it.

The President: Comrade Braude, Counsel for Defence for accused Knyazev, will now speak.

Braude: Comrade Judges, I will not conceal from you the exceptionally difficult, the unprecedentedly difficult position in which the defence finds itself in this case. First of all, Comrade Judges, the Counsel for Defence is a son of his country. He, too, is a citizen of the great Soviet Union, and the great indignation, anger and horror which is now felt by the whole population of our country, old and young, the feeling which the Procurator so strikingly expressed in his speech, cannot but be shared by Counsel.

But, Comrade Judges, according to the Soviet law, according to Stalin's Constitution, which ensures every accused person the right to defence, irrespective of the gravity of his crime, we are obliged, it is our professional duty, to help those of the accused who have wished to avail themselves of this right, to exercise the right.

In this case, Comrade Judges, there is no dispute about the facts. Comrade Procurator was quite right when he said that from all points of view, from the point of view of the documents available in the case, from the point of view of the examination of the witnesses who were summoned here, and the cross-examination of the accused, all this has deprived us of all possibility of disputing the evidence. All the facts have been proved, and in this sphere the defence does not intend to enter into any controversy with the Procurator. Nor can there be any controversy with the Procurator concerning the appraisal of the political and moral aspects of the case. Here, too, the case is so clear, the political appraisal made here by the Procurator is so clear, that the defence cannot but wholly and entirely associate itself with that part of his speech.

While fully subscribing to the political and moral appraisal of the case given by the Procurator, what does the defence regard its task to be in this case? It is the task of the defence to seek for what the Procurator spoke of at the end of his speech, to seek for those considerations which would justify a plea for clemency. Such is the task of Knyazev's defence counsel.

Where can the defence find such material? It can seek for it in the appraisal, in the analysis of the personality of the accused, to what extent he has become demoralized; has he become so hopelessly socially dangerous that we see no gleam of hope for his reformation?

The defence might seek for arguments in order to mitigate the fate of the accused, also in the circumstances in which he was drawn into the counter-revolutionary organization. It is along these two lines that the defence will try to fulfil its duty.

I am defending Knyazev, chief of a railway, who, on behalf of the Japanese secret service, derailed trains carrying workers

and Red Army men. I will not conceal from you that when I read the material in the case, when I perused the documents, when I heard Knyazev's evidence I thought I could hear the crash of the wrecked cars and the groans of the dying and injured Red Army men. But I would be wrong if I said that there are no grounds at all for his defence.

The gravity of Knyazev's position is made still more grave by the fact that he is a person who is almost physically, directly guilty of these wholesale, sanguinary murders and wrecking of trains. Knyazev is not a politician of large calibre, he is not a theoretician of counter-revolution, and to his share fell the bloody and sordid work of execution. Hence, there is a certain psychological distortion of the perspective. Hence we have a certain psychological aberration as a consequence of which Knyazev seems to be the principal culprit in the bloody deeds that were committed on the South Urals Railway. That is understandable. Such is the psychological law. He who is closest to the concrete facts of the crime, he who stands closest to the concrete crime, appears to be most guilty. And yet the brain of this crime, the principal motive force of Knyazev's crime, is not within him, but outside of him, in the "centre" and of course, primarily, in another force. It is the one who created that disgusting phenomenon known as Trotskyism, the one who is betraying his country and organizing terrorist acts; it is the one who established contact with foreign espionage organizations—it is the contemptible Trotsky. He is the principal culprit in these disasters. And I think that these points must not be forgotten if we are to have a correct psychological perspective of Knyazev's position. Knyazev committed the gravest crimes, he was the immediate perpetrator of these crimes; but notwithstanding the fact that, outwardly, these crimes seem to be mainly connected with him, he is not the main culprit.

And the second point to which I will draw your attention, Comrade Judges, are the methods by which Knyazev was drawn into the counter-revolutionary organization. Comrade Procurator has already said that the Trotskyite organization never had, has not, never will have, and we can be absolutely certain that it never will have, the slightest mass basis. They were always generals without an army, a coterie of conspirators; and one can understand why. Is the idea of restoring capitalism with the aid of foreign interventionists, the organization of terrorist attempts on the lives of the best people in our country, including the greatest leader of the toilers of the whole world, Stalin; espionage and connection with secret services—are these ideas capable of drawing even the least healthy human material into their organizations? Of course they were always isolated. They were with those armies

to which the Procurator referred, with one, two or three persons at their command, and never could they count on gaining more.

That is why they tried to find recruits for their organizations by methods which were determined by their intimacy and connections with foreign espionage organizations. Common ideas, common aims and common tasks created the same methods of recruiting. These methods are blackmail, deceit and intimidation. And it was precisely by these methods that Knyazev was recruited for the organization.

Comrade Judges, I have not the least intention of depicting Knyazev as a plaything in other people's hands, as a victim in the hands of higher counter-revolutionary organizations, as blindly carrying out another's will. I fully understand that Knyazev is a politically-conscious person, an ex-member of the Party, a man who occupied extremely responsible posts to which the Party had appointed him. He admits full responsibility, and undoubtedly he bears full responsibility for his deeds. But the manner in which he was induced to join the counter-revolutionary organization is characteristic and cannot but deserve your attention. Knyazev has not waged a war lasting for many years against the Party as is the case with many of the accused who are in the dock with him. Compared with them he, strictly speaking, is a young Trotskyite. He is distinguished for his undoubted instability, as was revealed here during the trial when he told us about his relations with Turok and with the agents of the Japanese secret service.

Doubts arose in Knyazev's mind as far back as 1930, and a man appeared in the person of accused Turok who at that time was connected with the Japanese secret service, who at that time was a Trotskyite, who headed the Trotskyite organization on the South Urals Railway, a man who was recruiting members for the Trotskyite organization and had managed to recruit several persons for its criminal activities. And this Turok strove to take advantage of Knyazev's waverings and doubts in order to recruit him for the Trotskyite organization. You remember, Comrade Judges, how Turok and Knyazev related the manner in which this took place? Several conversations took place; according to Knyazev there were three. Turok urged Knyazev to give his waverings organizational shape and to join the Trotskyite organization. But in 1930 Knyazev categorically refused. Evidently these waverings and doubts were not so serious as to cause him to give them organizational shape by joining the Trotskyite terrorist organization. But something occurred which placed a weapon in the hand of Turok, the agent of the Trotskyites and Japanese secret service. It was the following. In 1930 several Japanese engineers arrived in the U.S.S.R. to render technical assistance on the Kazan Railway. Among these engineers

was a certain Mr. H—— who, instead of honestly fulfilling his duties, began to recruit an official of our state, with whom he came into contact, for the Japanese secret service. By methods characteristic of representatives of foreign secret services—arranging social evenings, inviting him to his lodgings, rendering him small services and sending him letters which outwardly seemed quite innocent, merely containing requests to send interesting literature, but which in fact were a request to send information of an espionage character—he tried hard to draw Knyazev into espionage service on behalf of his government. One day he bluntly and categorically made such a demand to Knyazev. But Knyazev categorically and sharply refused, as he testified at the preliminary investigation and as he told us here, and Mr. H—— was compelled to withdraw. Accused Knyazev did not inform anybody of these circumstances.

Four years elapsed. We do not know how Knyazev behaved, as far as his Party wavering is concerned, during these four years. We know that he displayed no initiative in regard to joining the Trotskyite organization. Perhaps the successes which he saw achieved all around him caused these waverings to cease.

But one day Turok visits him again, after a lapse of four years, when, perhaps, Knyazev had already forgotten his conversations with Mr. H——, and again makes his proposal to him.

It must be stated that accused Knyazev had already committed a grave crime against his country. For when Mr. H—— made that spy's proposal to him and withdrew after Knyazev's refusal, Knyazev should immediately have informed the proper authorities about the proposal made to him, and about the functions which Mr. H——, who was officially sent here to render technical assistance on our railways, was actually carrying out. But Knyazev did not do this. This was the first grave crime that Knyazev committed, not only as a member of the Party, but as any ordinary citizen of our country who is liable to criminal prosecution for failing to lay such information before the authorities.

And when after these four years Turok again visited Knyazev and again invited him to join the Trotskyite organization, Knyazev again refused. Then Turok said to him: I know about the conversations you had with the Japanese spy in 1930 and the proposals he made to you; if you do not join the Trotskyite organization I will denounce you to the authorities as a concealed Trotskyite and a spy, for you were in communication with Mr. H—— and failed to inform the authorities about it.

Forced to the wall, Knyazev agreed to join the counter-revolutionary Trotskyite organization. The first page in the revolting deeds perpetrated by Knyazev at the dictates of the Trotskyite terrorist organization was opened.

Barely six months passed, and a stranger in a grey suit, 45 to 50 years of age, called on Knyazev at his office, in Chelyabinsk. The stranger asked for a private conversation with him. Knyazev said he would have nothing to do with him. Knyazev does not know his name. This stranger told him that he had come to see him on behalf of Mr. H—— for the purpose of continuing the conversation he had had with him in 1930. Knyazev tried to repel the unknown sharply, and told him that if he did not go away he would report him to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. But instead of submitting to Knyazev's command to go away, the stranger said to him: I know that six months ago you joined the counter-revolutionary Trotskyite organization. If you do not agree immediately to the proposals of the Japanese secret service I will report you, and you will be prosecuted as a Trotskyite terrorist.

You see that both organizations used similar methods. The Trotskyite organization employed the methods of the Japanese secret service, and the Japanese secret service employed the methods of the Trotskyite organization. The unity of methods and of information is beyond doubt. Turok, who was simultaneously a spy and a member of the terrorist Trotskyite organization, had established close connection with the Japanese secret service for supplying information. It is not known where the foreign espionage agency ends and where the Trotskyite terrorist organization begins.

And, says Knyazev in his testimony, finding himself in this hopeless position and fearing that he might be really detected as a Trotskyite, he agreed to work on behalf of the Japanese secret service. So the next bloodstained pages of Knyazev's activities begin to turn over, one after another: the horrible pages of railway disasters, acts of diversion on the railways, passing information to the Japanese spies, etc., etc.

There were times, according to Knyazev, soon after the visit of the stranger, when he had doubts about the Trotskyite organization, which after all consisted of Russians, of Soviet citizens; whether they could, along with agents of the Japanese espionage organizations, have proposed and sanctioned the wrecking of troop trains, which the agents of the secret service demanded that he should carry out.

Knyazev went to Livshitz, at that time Assistant People's Commissar of Railways and a member of the Trotskyite organization, and expressed his doubts to him: "Tell me," he says, "what the Trotskyite organization will say if I carry out the demands of the Japanese secret service to disrupt our railways and to organize train wrecking?" Livshitz (he did not deny it here) began to read him a long lecture which was to serve as Knyazev's guiding star in

his path of wrecking activities. He said that in the coming war the Trotskyites would not only adopt a defeatist position, but would fight arms in hand against the Land of Soviets; he said that in this struggle all means were suitable, and "the worse things are, the better."

I will not enumerate all the hideous deeds which Knyazev committed, and which the State Prosecutor so strikingly emphasized in his speech. I will only say that I have tried truthfully to depict the horrors Knyazev has perpetrated; but at the same time I wanted to show that he is a peculiar man, that he did not join the terrorist espionage organization on his own initiative, and that owing to his pusillanimity and weakness of will he was, I would not say a victim, but only a tool and was used as such.

I see another point which I could urge in mitigation of his punishment. That is the full, really sincere confession of his guilt. As is the custom in judicial practice, we regard such confessions as some basis for taking a milder attitude towards an accused, grave as his crime may appear to be. Knyazev was sincere and truthful in all his depositions. This is what he writes in the statement with which the investigation material begins: "From the day of the disclosure of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite organization to the day of my arrest I was torn asunder by a painful internal struggle in anticipation of the inevitable discovery and exposure of my counter-revolutionary activities. I will be ruthless with myself and with all the members of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyite organization who were operating on the railways on the instructions of the Trotskyite centre and the Japanese secret service. . . . I do not expect nor do I ask for clemency. Casting aside all that is personal, I want to tell only the honest truth, and utterly to expose the whole of the criminal Trotskyite-Japanese undermining activities."

His subsequent conduct has shown that these are not mere phrases, not an attempt to deceive the investigation authorities and the Court. These are the words of a man who has broken with his past.

Comrade Judges, recall the conversation he had with Livshitz. Livshitz categorically denied this during the investigation, but he had to admit it here in Court. Knyazev was really ruthless with himself and others; he was truthful. This, to a certain degree, helped the Court to investigate this exceptionally frightful case. I have already said, Comrade Judges, that Knyazev is not a leader. In this trial he belongs to the group of accused which, perhaps, did not fully understand the depths to which its leaders have sunk. Knyazev was one of the tools who saw all the horror of

their personal deeds, but harboured illusions about the aims, prospects and all the strivings of their "leaders."

Now the veil has been torn down. . . . The confessions of the leaders of the centre have revealed a picture of treachery, of treason to their country and to the world proletariat, which before his arrest and the disclosure of the crimes Knyazev did not fully realize.

The illusions have been destroyed. . . . Only the facts have remained in all their naked horror. Instead of the pseudo-leaders whom Knyazev followed, in the dock we find political bankrupts and traitors revealed in all their revolting nakedness. This terrible lesson cannot but repel even people like Knyazev from the stench of counter-revolution, notwithstanding the gravity of the crimes they themselves have committed.

And this is the firm guarantee that Knyazev, if the Court deems it possible to spare his life, will never again take the path which led him to the abyss.

I think that Knyazev was sincere when, in concluding his statement, he wrote: "If the proletarian court deems it possible in view of my sincere repentance to spare my life, I will with all my force and by my tireless work strive to expiate my sin. I want perseveringly and unceasingly to work for the benefit of my mighty country."

One wants to believe the sincerity of Knyazev's statement, and this gives me the right to ask you to discuss the question of the possibility of sparing Knyazev's life.

The President: Member of the Collegium of Defence, Comrade Kaznacheyev, Counsel for Defence for Arnold.

Kaznacheyev: Comrade Judges, monstrous was the picture of treason and treachery which was unfolded before you in the course of these few days. The guilt of the accused in the dock is immeasurable in its gravity. The wrath of the people of the Soviet Union is understandable. The essence of the work of the Trotskyite organizations and the methods these organizations used to enlist those who it would appear had no connection with these organizations in the past, have been exposed here in the Court with utmost clarity and cogency. But the very fact of being a member of these organizations, inasmuch as the program of the organizations is perfectly clear, inasmuch as this program leads back to capitalism, to the kulak—and it is not known where the limit lies—inasmuch as the path of these organizations leads over the dead bodies of workers, over the dead bodies of the finest sons of our Soviet country—the mere fact of being a member of these organizations is a most heinous crime.

The facts of the case have been established not only by the confessions of the accused, but also by the tremendous weight of the evidence in your possession. The scope of the contentions which might be submitted to your attention, the amount of arguments which might be advanced as factors extenuating the guilt of any of the accused in this case is extremely circumscribed.

From the standpoint of appraisal of the position of each of the accused in this case, it is only to be regretted that the man who directed the activities of this organization from somewhere beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union has escaped this dock.

A great distance separates the accused Arnold from his neighbours in the dock and from Trotsky. Here we have a chain of many links.

At a first glance it seems incomprehensible how it could happen that Arnold, who properly speaking never had any political orientation—for one cannot speak of the political orientation of a man who was at one and the same time a member of a Masonic lodge and a member of the Communist Party—should have become a confederate of people who try to flaunt their past and who have a solid record of political double-dealing over a long period of years.

On the answer to this question, on the answer to the question how Arnold happened to become a member of this organization, will depend the answer to the question which is most momentous for Arnold—that of the measure of penalty he should pay. The question is put only thus—to live or not to live. I dare to assert that it was no mere chance, that it was no mere whim of fate that Arnold found himself in this organization. We know well enough, Comrade Judges, from the experience of a number of trials, that the methods of recruiting members of wrecking and all other organizations of this type are always identical. Shestov recruited Arnold, being fully cognizant of the type of human material he had to deal with!

Remember Radek's words in the course of his testimony: "historical or hysterical groups of professors" are of no use whatever for the direct execution of terrorist acts. Therefore, in his search for human material, Shestov adopted a somewhat different line. And Shestov made no mistake. Comrade Prosecutor quite rightly mentioned here that the leaders of this organization, while sending other people to commit terrorist acts, never themselves performed this "rough" work, and sought other people as executants. This is always the case in foreign intelligence services and in counter-revolutionary groups of every other description, and here in this Trotskyite group too they sought executants coming from suitable surroundings. Shestov here testified as to the kind of people among whom this material is to be sought. Recall how he recruited Cherepukhin, how he recruited Stroilov, how he recruited Arnold. Shestov's testimony regarding Cherepukhin is extremely eloquent: "I knew that Cherepukhin was a depraved man, greedy for money,"—there you have the type of human material that is required for such affairs. And as a suitable executant Shestov found—Arnold.

Who is Arnold, what is his political orientation, and whom did he serve? This question arouses doubts even in me, his Counsel for Defence. We know that before he was nineteen years old Arnold had already changed his name four times, that before he was nineteen years old he had made two foreign voyages. Later on, in the course of a very short space of time, he served in the tsarist army and in the American army, and underwent punishment both in Russia and in America.

Further, in order to form an opinion of his political orientation we must bear in mind his testimony to the effect that, while in America, he once served a sentence for some kind of talk about the Soviet government, while here, according to his questionnaire, he was punished for anti-Soviet propaganda. And under these conditions even I myself am unable to supply the proper answer to the first question—who he is? I am unable to furnish a proper answer for that very reason that you, Comrade Judges, in exercising justice cannot limit yourselves to the materials offered us by the accused himself. If the court were to pass sentence only on the strength of the testimony of the accused themselves, justice, properly speaking, could not be exercised. And we do not possess exhaustive material regarding the personality of Arnold.

At a first glance it may appear strange that I, Arnold's defending counsel, should admit these facts. But, Comrade Judges, to pass something over in silence is the worst method of defence. Certain propositions may be analyzed or disputed, but passing over obvious facts in silence will not do.

The nationality of Arnold is likewise unknown. According to certain data he is a Finn, according to others he is a Russian.

What induced Arnold in the past to make such varying statements in his biographies we do not know exactly. "I wrote many biographies. I filled out many questionnaires, and I cannot now recall what I wrote in them"—he himself says. If the accused cannot remember certain facts about himself, it is not for me to resort to guesswork. Permit me therefore in this case not to dwell on questions which cannot be answered owing to the absence of the necessary factual information, but to proceed to the questions

which can be answered on the basis of material we possess in sufficient quantity.

Comrade Judges, what did the part played by Arnold in the organization amount to, and how did he get into this organization? On this subject we have not only the testimony of the accused Arnold but also a number of objective facts which go to confirm Arnold's testimony.

In the course of his testimony Shestov cynically related how he went about drawing Arnold into the organization. He said: "I fed him gradually. I illegally placed him on the list for Insnab supply; I gave him material aid and assisted his family. I found out about his unsavory past and threatened him." And it was under the influence of these threats that Arnold joined the organization.

Arnold states: "I was forced to agree to Shestov's proposal to join the Trotskyite organization. A situation arose when in the end he held me completely in hand." Even when Arnold had already been recruited, the commission to execute a terrorist act was not given to him immediately. After he was recruited a long time was spent breaking him in. This circumstance is also borne out by Shestov's testimony and by other objective material of the case. Finally, when Cherepukhin already gave Arnold the direct commission, in the execution of which Arnold himself was to risk his own life, there followed real threats. And without inducements of an ideological or other character, who would take such a risk? Here, undoubtedly, real threats were used, and it seems to me that there are no grounds for disbelieving Arnold's testimony in this case, that at the moment of accepting this loathsome commission, Cherepukhin made it clear to him that if he refused he would be annihilated and that vengeance would be wreaked not only on himself but also on his family! I of course understand, and have no intention of denying, that this compulsion does not exculpate Arnold in any way; but this circumstance to a very large extent explains his connection with the Trotskyites and why and how he got into that organization. And to explain means to understand by what the criminal was guided. This will of course be appraised suitably when the sentence is being determined.

The next question is—how Arnold fulfilled the assignment he had received from Shestov and Cherepukhin. Shestov says that when this assignment was given Arnold was called upon to sacrifice himself: and Arnold firmly promised to sacrifice himself. But as a matter of fact, as we know from the material of the case, and as was quite rightly pointed out by Comrade Vyshinsky, thanks to Arnold's cowardice, thanks to the fact that at this

moment perhaps the instinct of self-preservation came into play, he funked it and did not dare to carry out this monstrous commission. Thanks to this, the terrorist act was not carried out. That is our good fortune, the good fortune of the Soviet people. It is in Arnold's cowardice, in the fact that in both cases he tried to deceive the Trotskyite organization, that we must largely look for the reason why these abominable acts were not committed! In this connection it seems to me Arnold has testified sincerely, for it is impossible to presume that he was guided by any other motives. "I was frightened as never before in my life. . . . I did not want to die or be crippled." There we have the motive which guided him at that moment. And, finally, there is the fact that Arnold to a large degree deceived the Trotskyite organization itself.

The question is inevitably bound to arise: after having received this assignment, did Arnold make any attempt to get away from this organization, to break with it? If such attempts were really made, then they are of some weight in this case, and at any rate should be taken into account when his fate is to be decided. We know from the case that Arnold went to Tashkent, went to Moscow, and broke with Cherepukhin. We know that this is corroborated.

And so the fact that he attempted to break away from the Trotskyite organization after the failure of the terrorist acts, and when he feared vengeance at the hands of Cherepukhin, must be regarded as established.

However unprepossessing a type accused Arnold may be, it seems to me, Comrade Judges, that this Arnold, who began life as a vagabond, was to a large degree the victim of that tragic deception of which the accused Boguslavsky spoke here. For if the members of the Trotskyite organization who are not ordinary rank-and-file members, if people who for many years occupied prominent positions in that organization, people who for many years fought in the leading circles of this organization against the Party and the government—if such people declare here in court that they were the victims of Trotsky's tragic deception, then those people who had formerly never been connected with the Trotskyite organization and were drawn into it have a still greater right to declare that they were the victims of grave and loathsome deceit. It seems to me that Arnold was one of such victims of the tragic deception of the Trotskyite generals. This to a large extent should be taken into consideration.

The accused Knyazev interjected in reference to Arnold: "Arnold is a rare masterpiece. You will find only one man like him in ten million!" This interjection, Comrade Judges, simply amazed me. The statement that only one such man can be found

among so large a number of people applies much more fittingly to the author of this statement.

I must say frankly that, whatever our opinion of Arnold's conduct may be, such a statement from one man in the dock to another sitting by his side produces a strange impression under the present circumstances, an impression, I would say, not favourable for the man who uttered it.

And if the accused Knyazev on this occasion suddenly experienced some strange fastidiousness, one is entitled to ask why a similar fastidiousness was not manifested when such Arnolds were sought for, when such Arnolds were intrusted with such abominable terrorist commissions?

Comrade Judges, these in brief are the considerations which I wanted to submit to your attention.

The incriminating aspect of the case is sufficiently clear to enable us to place the various figures in the dock in proper perspective. But it appears to me that among all members of the Trotskyite organization, both in this dock and not in this dock, the accused Arnold is one of the most insignificant and belongs to the category of those who could only have been executants in this organization and could have played no other part.

The period during which he belonged to this organization also tends to put him into the background. And the final consideration I would like to submit is that the accused Arnold really did want to break away from this organization which he had entered under compulsion. We know from experience that a number of other members of the Trotskyite organization, far more prominent members, have frequently made false declarations about such withdrawals, and that these declarations were actually not carried into effect. Such declarations in their case served to mask their continuation of the abominable Trotskyite work. In Arnold's case it was different.

From his testimony alone we know that while still a young man in America he received his first political lesson while in the military service. He stated that when he engaged in some talk about the Soviet country, this talk was immediately stopped and he himself was arrested. We cannot fully check this statement, but we must give credence to something else, namely, that in the armies of capitalist states, Comrade Judges, you are not patted on the head for talk of this kind. And of course he could not have learned any other political lesson there.

And if you consider Arnold's long life, his long wanderings in various countries of the world, which, to speak the truth, it is difficult to confine within the framework of customary testimony and customary questionnaires, we are nevertheless obliged

to admit that he never received a proper political training, and that his last political lesson he has received at this trial.

Comrade Judges, permit me to hope that, when, on retiring you come to discuss the fate of Arnold, to discuss whether Arnold is to live or not to live, you will bear all these circumstances in mind, and that the political lesson he learned at this trial will not be the last in Arnold's life.

That, Comrade Judges, is my request.

The President: The Court is adjourned till 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

MORNING SESSION, JANUARY 29, 1937, 11.00 A.M.

Commandant: The Court is coming, please rise.

The President: The session is resumed.

Accused Turok, inasmuch as you have declined counsel for defence, you are entitled to a speech in defence. Do you desire to avail yourself of the right?

Turok: No.

The President: Accused Rataichak, do you desire to avail yourself of your right to make a speech in defence?

Rataichak: No, I waive it.

The President: Accused Hrasche?

Hrasche: I waive it.

The President: Accused Serebryakov?

Serebryakov: I waive it.

The President: Member of the Collegium of Defence, Kommodov, Counsel for Defence for accused Pushin.

Kommodov: Comrade Judges, the struggle against the Soviet power, as you know, began immediately after the arrival of this power. Historically this is comprehensible; the deposed, crushed and overthrown class of the bourgeoisie in all its ramifications could not reconcile itself to the loss of its position, to the loss of its privileges, of the possibility of exploiting, to the loss of its wealth and so on. It tried to recover all this. The form of struggle at that time was armed insurrection, the military campaigns of tsarist generals supported and armed by foreign interventionists. The struggle was severe and stubborn. The young Soviet Republic literally shed its heartblood in its defence. The enemy was routed. This was of great political consequence and of great practical consequence. The victory over an enemy armed to the teeth immediately extended the circle of friends of the Soviet Union and considerably narrowed the circle of its enemies: some fell, others fled and others still—the most conscious-stricken and far-sighted—came over to the side of the Soviet Union. But the remnants of the defeated enemy did not lay down their arms. They realized that to resort to armed insurrection now would be absurd. They began to await an opportunity and to seek new forms of struggle. The opportunity arose. Exhausted, suffering, and wounded by the

imperialist war and the campaigns of the tsarist generals, Russia was in a very grave state of economic disruption. The new government, the new republic was faced with a difficult task—to restore the economic life of the country and to switch it over to the new track. The difficulties appeared insuperable. It was the great fortune of the Soviet Republic that a genius stood at its helm. The seer Lenin realized that the country needed a breathing space, and he introduced what is known as the New Economic Policy. This policy was interpreted by the counter-revolutionaries of all shades and colours as the surrender by the Bolsheviks of all their key positions; they adopted it gleefully and with great hopes—it seemed to them that under the weight of historical difficulties the Soviet power would collapse; if it could not be overthrown by force of arms, it would fall beneath the weight of the difficulties which faced it at that time, or would degenerate. Hence their watchword—to implant, develop and reinforce the New Economic Policy and to wait for favourable results.

But they miscalculated. A few years passed and the economy of the country stood on its own feet, and the socialized sector of the national economy began to wrest from the New Economic Policy one branch of economy after another, first in industry and then in agriculture, and finally drove the New Economic Policy out of its last refuge—the trading system of the country.

These victories once again considerably narrowed the circle of enemies and extended the circle of friends. The most far-sighted, the most honest ones realized that if the Soviet power could not be overthrown by force of arms, if the national economy had not collapsed beneath the weight of insuperably difficult historical conditions, this meant that the roots of this power had penetrated deep down into the life of the people. But the remnants of counter-revolution did not lay down their arms.

Towards the end of the liquidation of the New Economic Policy there began those factional moves of the Trotskyite opposition of which the State Prosecutor has spoken here. I must say that from the very outset these actions of the Trotskyite opposition began to serve as a rallying point for all counter-revolutionary forces. Counter-revolutionaries of all shades regarded Trotskyism not only as a hope for the collapse of the Soviet power, but as a hope for the complete restoration of capitalism in the form in which it had existed before the revolution.

And the last stage of the struggle of the Trotskyite counter-revolution, the stage that forms the subject of the present trial, has very vividly confirmed the appraisal of the nature of Trotskyism, given by the counter-revolutionary elements.

Many thought that the government would collapse as a result of

internal dissension within the Party. I remember that at the trial of the Union Bureau of the Mensheviks, Sokolovsky, one of the accused, described these two periods of struggle—the period of the New Economic Policy and the period of the Trotskyite actions—as "vegetarian" periods, as opposed to the succeeding stage in the struggle, in which the principal form was wrecking. The logical development of the struggle against the Soviet power enables us to understand why wrecking was resorted to in the sphere of national economy.

Every month, every day, the economic life of the country grew stronger, wider and more profound. The enemies understood that if they had not succeeded in overthrowing the power by force of arms, if the economy of the country had not collapsed under the weight of historical difficulties, then its development must be restrained by artificial means and what had been created must be destroyed. Hence the new directives and the new form of struggle —wrecking.

Wrecking, a form of artificial destruction of the national economy, undoubtedly caused great harm to the latter. It inflicted severe wounds on many sections of the national economy, but the organism was sound, and the wounds did not prove fatal.

This period embraces about three or four years, if one regards the Shakhty trial as the beginning of this period and the trial of the wreckers at the electric power stations, at the end of 1932 or the beginning of 1933, as its end.

The end of this period of struggle, of this new stage in the struggle, coincided with the success of collectivization in agriculture. Both the enemies and friends of the Soviet Union fully realized that the collectivization of agriculture was not merely the replacement of one system of land cultivation by another. They all fully realized that the collectivization of agriculture was altering the whole order of life in the countryside. They fully understood that age-old prejudices were being eradicated, that traditions were being broken, and that the incrustation, the mildew which had accumulated for centuries on illiterate and unwashed Russia, was being swept away. Not only was the face of the earth being changed, not only was the external aspect of the countryside being changed, but the whole life, the whole psychology of the people were being changed. That is why this front became the scene of a bitter struggle waged by the enemies. The struggle assumed unusually cruel forms: terrorist acts against socially-active people, village librarians, shock workers—against all those who were sincerely and devotedly in favour of collectivization. Court trials reflect the seamy side of life and I recall many a trial in which the victims of terrorism were people who had sincerely and devotedly

worked in the cause of collectivization. Such are the historical stages, including the last stage, of the struggle waged against the Soviet power during these nineteen years.

What are the principal and characteristic features of this struggle? I would say that there are three such features. First, that the struggle against the Soviet power was not a mere conflict of tendencies or political shades. Comrade Vyshinsky was profoundly right when he described the struggle as a struggle between two systems. I would say that it was a struggle between two epochs, that it was a struggle between two world outlooks, and such it remains to this day. This is the first characteristic feature, and inasmuch as the most active defender of the former system of productive relations in their worst aspect is now fascism, it is clear why fascism has extended a hand to Trotskyism and Trotskyism to fascism, and why they have concluded an alliance for joint exploitation, violence and slavery.

The second characteristic feature of this struggle is that every succeeding period of it was more cynical and more shameless than the preceding one. In this sense, the last stage of the struggle—I hope that it really will be the last stage—was the most cynical and most shameless. Here, as in a focal point, converged all the forms of struggle which had spread in these nineteen years. Diversive acts and wrecking, espionage and terrorist acts, agreements with foreign interventionists and the partition of Russia are here tied into one knot.

And the third characteristic historical feature of this process of struggle against the Soviet power is that with every year and with every stage overcome, counter-revolution degenerated more and more, faded, became ever more insignificant and petty, although ever more malicious and savage. All in any way honest and far-sighted people abandoned counter-revolution.

In the course of his testimony Pyatakov stated that Trotsky in 1931 advised that the mass struggle should be discontinued. This of course was not because he had no liking for it. On the contrary, this out-and-out demagogue wanted such a struggle. But this required the masses, and the masses were not to be had. In the course of the examination Comrade Vyshinsky asked Sokolnikov on whom they had expected to rely within the country in their struggle against the Soviet power. On what forces? Sokolnikov did not reply at once. Using the method of exclusion, he began to discard the sections of the population upon whom it would have been impossible for them to rely. And what happened? He excluded the whole working class, he excluded the whole working peasantry, and I would add for my own part, he would have to exclude the whole working intelligentsia. What then re-

mained? Sokolnikov reflected, and said: We placed our hopes on the remnants of the routed kulaks. This is what, after many years of struggle against the Soviet power, the Trotskyite counter-revolutionaries came to; this was all they were left with. Comrade Judges, they were left with the kulak remnants.

Meanwhile the young Soviet Republic was growing stronger, wider and richer every year and became the powerful Soviet Union. And I am profoundly convinced that the Soviet Republic will celebrate its twentieth anniversary as the strongest power in the world.

And what about Stalin's leadership, against which this struggle was directed? During these years it had succeeded in rallying around itself the working population of 170 million. And among these 170 million people there are no less than one hundred different nationalities. These 170 millions surround their leader with a shield of love, respect and devotion which nobody will ever pierce. Nobody and never.

I have deliberately directed your attention to this historical process of the struggle against the Soviet power. This historical aspect is of great importance to me as a defence counsel in the present trial.

Our position must be understood. It is no easy one. And if we, the defence counsel in this trial, ask you, Comrade Judges, to depart in the case of one or other of the accused from the supreme penalty which the State Prosecutor demanded, it is not for motives, not for reasons lying in the character of the crime—here we are completely disarmed—not for reasons which in the case of some of the accused might lie in their personality—because political duplicity obliterates personality no less than crime—but for reasons that follow from the very strength, might and power of the Soviet Union. And that is the main argument in our defence. To this main argument of the defence I would add in the case of the accused Pushin whom I am defending a number of considerations that follow from the less important part he played in the organization of which he was a member. I could not agree to all the accused being placed on the same footing.

If I were permitted, I would arrange the accused in concentric circles. In the centre stands Trotsky, supported by the worthy son of his father—Sedov. The first circle consists of all those who were directly connected with him by personal conversations or correspondence. These are all the leaders of the parallel centre, these are all those who fashioned and refashioned the directives that were received. The second circle consists of all those who were directly connected with the first circle and who were, I would say, the live vehicles of those directives which they received from

abroad or which were fashioned here. The third circle consists of all those who were connected with the people of the second circle and were the executors of definite and concrete tasks. Pushin belongs to this third circle.

During the examination here in court, Comrade Procurator put Pushin a question, which was a question in defence. This does honour to the impartiality of the State Prosecutor. He asked Pushin: "Did you know of the existence of the parallel centre?" A very profound and significant question from our standpoint, from the standpoint of the defence.

Pushin replied: "I did not." And this may be believed, because he was not directly connected with any of the ringleaders. I would say more: while on business matters he may have had connections with Pyatakov, with the others he was probably not even acquainted. Hence all the directives that were issued by the centre were unknown to him, he was not aware of them. Yet as regards responsibility, he shares it in the same degree as the leaders and organizers of the centre.

I do not know how Pushin, who joined the Trotskyite organization at a comparatively late date, in 1934, and had no connections with it previously, would have met the directive regarding the partition and sale of Russia. After all, one may be prepared for grave and serious crimes and yet in one's heart of hearts shrink in horror from the latest proposals, from the latest directives which Trotsky gave the centre.

Pyatakov and Radek said that they were dismayed when they received this directive and wanted to summon a conference of their friends to discuss it. Pushin was not fully informed of the Trotskyite views reflected in the last directive of Trotsky on defeatism and partition of Russia, and if he—although a wrecker—had been told of this directive, would not the sentiment of Soviet patriotism of which Comrade Procurator spoke have stirred within him? Why, he was being called upon to hack to pieces his country, his motherland, and, who knows, perhaps he would have started back in horror from the thought.

Do not overlook the fact, Comrade Judges, that in this sea of horrible villainies committed by the Trotskyite counter-revolutionaries, there is with respect to Pushin one bright spot. He was neither directly nor indirectly associated with that directive, the mere mention of which chills our blood. I am referring to the terrorist acts.

Yet as to responsibility he answers to the full. When he read the law with its severe sanctions, Comrade Procurator said that in cases of extenuating circumstances the severe penalty which is

naturally the normal penalty in cases of this kind, may be departed from.

We, the defence counsel in this case, must gather literally every grain that may speak in favour of any of the accused and may mitigate his lot—every grain, because in their sum total these grains may permit you, when you retire to consider your verdict, without compromise to your judicial conscience, to depart from the supreme penalty. And we must do this conscientiously, otherwise you would be entitled to rebuke us.

These grains in the case of Pushin in my opinion consist in the fact that his relative importance in the Trotskyite organization was insignificant. The facts of the case are clear. But I must say more. Yesterday I once again read the Indictment. I read Pushin's testimony, and I saw that everything that constitutes the subject and essence of his guilt was told by himself on October 22, the day of his arrest, and moreover put down in every detail. To me this is a very important fact. It is important because Pushin's file begins with a letter he wrote with his own hand to Comrade Yezhov. A few hours after his arrest he wrote a letter with his own hand in which he stated that he would immediately, without any hesitation, relate all that he knew of the Trotskyite organization and of its activities in the chemical industry. And he did relate it, and moreover, with such detail that no doubt can remain of the truthfulness, sincerity and frankness of his testimony.

Comrades Judges, I understand the suspicion with which every court official naturally regards the testimony of defendants. But, after all, there is a sincerity of testimony which conquers suspicion, and in this case this sincerity of testimony is accompanied by the mention of even details, even trifles, all of which were checked by the experts and found to be absolutely true.

Permit me to remind you of one episode which shows that many criminals have been remoulded in the great work of socialist construction. In this court the tragic case of engineer Boyarshinov was recounted. I remember him very well. I can see him now as he was during the Shakhty trial. He was a wrecker, a man of no ordinary ability, who, although without a higher education, had occupied a very high post, chief engineer of the Donetz Basin Coal Trust. He was at that time a wrecker. But you have seen with what sincerity and honesty this former wrecker became an excellent Soviet worker. During this trial I have read opinions given about him by his colleagues at work, who with understandable horror spoke of the monstrous villainy that was committed in Siberia when this one-time wrecker who had become an honest worker was literally crushed to death by a motor truck at the behest of Shestov, Cherepukhin and others.

Who knows, perhaps the letter written by Pushin with his own hand in the first hours following his arrest, that testimony which he gave at length and sincerely, were an echo of a change of heart which had been evolving before that.

I will be bold enough to state that he had already given up Trotskyite work in the autumn of 1935. Comrade Vyshinsky asked him: perhaps he had given it up because he was not given any more commissions? Be it so. But he could have displayed initiative himself, and he had the opportunity to do so. In July 1936 Pushin visited the Kamenka Combined Works and there met Geid and Bukoyevsky, people whom he had himself recruited for the Trotskyite organization. Could he not have given them wrecking instructions for wrecking work and diversive acts? But he endeavoured to avoid meeting them. I have checked up this testimony, and I must say that this version was not invented here in court, and is set forth in detail in his evidence of January 17, 1937. Just see with what exactness this man gave his evidence, mentioning every trifle. These trifles are important not from the standpoint of establishing any of the facts of the case but because they are characteristic of the sincerity and truthfulness of his testimony. Comrade Procurator asked one of the experts in court: "What difference is there between the findings of the experts and the evidence given by Tamm on the subject of the diversive act which was committed in November 1935 at the Gorlovka Works." The expert said: "Tamm says that four days before the explosion the regime laid down in the regulations was violated, while we experts consider that the regime was violated eleven days before the explosion." Pushin rose up and said: "I request it to be verified that in my testimony I said ten days." This perhaps is a trifle, but it should be regarded not from the standpoint of its value as a fact (is it not all the same, the explosion after all took place and he will have to answer in any case for this diversive act), but from the standpoint that this trifle is characteristic of the sincerity and truthfulness of the testimony. I verified the statement which Pushin made in Court and found that the record of his examination contains the following testimony: "... Tamm so arranged it that the check on the presence of acetylene in the liquid oxygen of the condensers, which should have been done several times in every shift, was not done for ten days, which resulted in an explosion of great violence." And here as on October 22, that is, the day of his arrest, he was truthful in every detail of his testimony. Almost a year elapsed between November 1935 and the day of his arrest, and during this year, neither with respect to wrecking nor with respect to transmitting information will you find a single fact that could incriminate him. This is also a point in his favour. True, as,

I have expressed it, it may be only one drop in an ocean of crime, but this drop exists, and when you retire to consider your verdict, it may, in conjunction with other factors, help to save his life.

Comrade Judges, do not forget that at that time he was under the influence of a strong personality—Rataichak. During the testimony he gave here Rataichak said that he recruited various people for the organization by various methods; and Pushin has testified that the method which Rataichak used to recruit him was continually to remind him of the good turn he had done him when Pushin was being tried under Articles 109 and 111 of the Criminal Code, and of the fact that his advancement in his career was due to Rataichak, and that Pushin was indebted to him. Who knows, perhaps the fact that Pushin did not commit any crime in 1936 was due to the fact that he escaped from Rataichak's influence by going to work on the construction of the Rion Combined Works.

In summing up everything that concerns Pushin, in addition to the main contention which I have mentioned, I must once more emphasize the fact that he was not aware of the existence of the parallel centre, and that he was not fully aware of the directives being carried out by the centre. He had no share in the terrorist acts, he gave up practical work in the Trotskyite organization at the end of November 1935, he acted on the instructions of Rataichak and he has now sincerely confessed and has told the whole truth. I think that this combination of small but favourable features entitles me to request you to depart from the supreme penalty which the State Prosecutor demanded in relation to Pushin, and entitles you to meet my request.

Comrade Judges, my speech is drawing to an end. Liberty is not something that can be exported or imported. Liberty is won by the blood of the people. And having won it, the people will not part with it. It is madness to think that the people of the Soviet Union, having won real freedom in the October Revolution, will surrender it to anybody voluntarily, even if that somebody is aided by foreign intervention. Such an attempt was made but even in 1919 it failed. Whoever thinks that it can succeed in 1937 has lost his reason; whoever desires it has lost his conscience; and whoever works for it has lost both reason and conscience.

The country is indignant, but it is calm. It is calm in the knowledge of its strength and might: it is calm because those bloody pages which were written by the Trotskyite counter-revolutionaries in the history of the struggle against the Soviet power are pages of the past, that have been turned over and they cannot by one iota prevent the Soviet Union from marching forward triumphantly to that bright and happy future which we all feel.

The President: Comrade Vyshinsky, do you wish to answer?

Vyshinsky: No. I do not.

The President: We shall pass on to the last pleas. Accused Pyatakov.

Pyatakov: Citizen Judges, I have waived my right to a speech in my defence because the state prosecution was correct in its establishment of the facts; it was correct also in its estimation of my crime. But I cannot agree, I cannot reconcile myself to one assertion made by the State Prosecutor, namely that even now I remain a Trotskyite. Yes, I was a Trotskyite for many years. I worked hand in hand with the Trotskyites, but the sole motive, the only motive that prompted me to make the statements that I have made, was the desire, even now, even at too late a date, to get rid of my loathsome Trotskyite past.

And therefore I understand that my confession, my story of the activities—of the infamous counter-revolutionary, criminal activities in which I and my associates engaged, came too late in point of time to have any practical results for me personally. But do not deprive me of the right to feel, only to feel that even though too late I have nevertheless shaken off this filth, this vileness.

For the most painful thing for me, Citizen Judges, is not the just sentence which you will pass. It is the realization, above all to myself, the realization at the investigation, the realization before you and the whole country, that as a result of the whole preceding criminal underground struggle I have landed in the very heart, in the very centre of the counter-revolution—counter-revolution of the most vile, loathsome, fascist type, Trotskyite counter-revolution.

It would be wrong to think that when my Trotskyite activities began, I knew what all this would lead to. It would be wrong to think—this does not in the slightest degree diminish my objective criminal actions—but it would be wrong to think that I subjectively set myself counter-revolutionary aims and realized that we would finally come to such a morass of infamy and crime.

Yes, I did once make an attempt to break with Trotskyism. That was in 1928-30, and this attempt was not carried through to completion. I did not shake off all the remnants of my past; there remained a poisoned splinter of the remnants of Trotskyite ideas. There remained a splinter which did not at first entail any great practical consequences for me, but afterwards there grew up around it that festering sore which brought me to the path of crime, treachery and treason. This sore has been lanced.

Do not think, Citizen Judges—for though I am a criminal I

am also a man—that during these years, years spent in the suffocating underworld of Trotskyism, I did not see what was happening in the country. Do not think that I did not understand what was being done in industry. I tell you frankly: at times, when emerging from the Trotskyite underworld and engaging in my other practical work, I sometimes felt a kind of relief, and of course, humanly speaking, this duality was not only a matter of outward behaviour, but there was also duality within me.

For I understood not only what was going on around me. I saw—not that this in the least diminishes the infamy of my crimes nor their objective significance—I saw that we, the small group of Trotskyites, as the State Prosecutor has truly said, were the vanguard of fascist counter-revolution, that we could not really alter by one jot the objective course of the development of industry and economic life by our wrecking actions. But so it was. And when towards the end of 1935 and in 1936 we came face to face—or rather did not come face to face, for that is incorrect, but found ourselves in the very thick of high treason, treachery and the most barefaced fascist counter-revolution, when it was clear even to us that we were turning into an agency of fascism, then I was not the only one who had a desire to depart from this. I did not find sufficient courage nor sufficient firmness in myself to take the only course that was open, namely the course of voluntarily telling about my activities, of disclosing the organization and disclosing everything I had done in the past—that is to say, of doing this earlier than I actually did.

I was arrested. My arrest had a useful effect in the sense that I gave full and exhaustive depositions about the activities of Trotskyism. But it had its effect only in the sense that whereas previously I had tried, in a wrong way, to scramble somehow out of this pit, my arrest confronted me with the choice of either remaining an enemy to the last, of remaining an unregenerate, unconfessed Trotskyite up to my last hour, or of taking the course which I have taken.

I understand that this cannot serve as a motive for clemency. I am merely explaining to the Court what it was which finally prompted me to give those exhaustive statements which, I hope, may have given some aid in unravelling this foul tangle.

I am not going to say, Citizen Judges—for it would be ridiculous to speak about this here—that of course no measures of repression or suasion have been employed in regard to me. Indeed such measures, for me personally at any rate, could not have served as a motive for making statements.

It is not fear that has been my motive for recounting my crimes. What can be worse than the very consciousness and confession of

all those crimes—the most grievous and noxious crimes, which it fell to my lot to commit?

Any punishment which you may adjudge will be lighter than the very fact of confession. That is why I could not reconcile myself to the assertion made by the State Prosecutor to the effect that even now, in the dock, I have remained the Trotskyite that I was.

And while not I alone have been brought before the Soviet Court, while I bear full criminal responsibility in accordance with Soviet law before the Soviet Court for my crimes, while we are answering in full measure for all our actions, the man for whose sake we did this, at whose direct instructions and instigation we have perpetrated all this, will not, I think—for I know him full well—find any other course than to dissociate himself from what we have done together with him and under his leadership, to slander us, to lie, to accuse us of cowardice and anything else he may please.

Trotsky will not act otherwise. I know him too well to doubt that. Instead of refuting me face to face here in court or hurling at me the accusations which he will undoubtedly make, instead of being confronted with us, it is of course easier, simpler, less dangerous for him to continue his wrecking work.

Personally I am very little affected by this, Citizen Judges. I only deeply regret that he, the main criminal, the unregenerate and hardened offender, Trotsky, is not sitting beside us in the dock.

I am too keenly conscious of my crime, and I do not venture to ask you for clemency. I will not even make bold to ask for mercy.

In a few hours you will pass your sentence. And here I stand before you in filth, crushed by my own crimes, bereft of everything through my own fault, a man who has lost his Party, who has no friends, who has lost his family, who has lost his very self.

Do not deprive me of one thing, Citizen Judges. Do not deprive me of the right to feel that in your eyes, too, I have found strength in myself, albeit too late, to break with my criminal past.

The President: Accused Radek.

Radek: Citizen Judges, after I have confessed to the crime of treason to the country there can be no question of a speech in defence. There are no arguments by which a grown man in full possession of his senses could defend treason to his country. Neither can I plead extenuating circumstances. A man who has spent 35 years in the labour movement cannot extenuate his crime by any

circumstances when he confesses to a crime of treason to the country. I cannot even plead that I was led to err from the true path by Trotsky. I was already a grown man with fully-formed views when I met Trotsky. And while in general Trotsky's part in the development of these counter-revolutionary organizations is tremendous, at the time I entered this path of struggle against the Party Trotsky's authority for me was minimal.

I joined the Trotskyite organization not for the sake of Trotsky's petty theories, the rottenness of which I realized at the time of my first exile, and not because I recognized his authority as a leader, but because there was no other group upon which I could rely in those political aims which I had set myself. I had been connected with this group in the past, and therefore I went with this group. I did not go because I was drawn into the struggle, but as a result of my own appraisal of the situation, as the result of a path I had voluntarily chosen. And for this I bear complete and sole responsibility—a responsibility which you will measure according to the letter of the law and according to your conscience as judges of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

And with this I might conclude my last plea, if I did not consider it necessary to object to the view of the trial—as regards a partial, not the main, point—which was given here and which I must reject, not from my own personal standpoint, but from a political standpoint. I have admitted my guilt and I have given full testimony concerning it, not from the simple necessity of repentance—repentance may be an internal state of mind which one need not necessarily share with or reveal to anybody—not from love of the truth in general—the truth is a very bitter one, and I have already said that I would prefer to have been shot thrice rather than to have had to admit it—but I must admit my guilt from motives of the general benefit that this truth must bring. And when I heard that the people in this dock are mere bandits and spies, I object to it. I do not object to it with the purpose of defending myself; because since I have confessed to treason to the country, it makes little difference from my point of view, from a human point of view that I committed treason in conspiracy with generals, I have not that professional pride which permits one to commit treachery in conjunction with generals, but not to commit treachery in conjunction with agents.

But the matter is this. This trial has revealed two important facts. The intertwining of the counter-revolutionary organizations with all the counter-revolutionary forces in the country—that is one fact. But this fact is tremendous objective proof. Wrecking work can be established by technical experts; the terrorist activities were connected with so many people that the testimony of these

people, apart from material evidence, presents an absolute picture. But the trial is bicentric, and it has another important significance. It has revealed the smithy of war, and has shown that the Trotskyite organization became an agency of the forces which are fomenting a new world war.

What proofs are there in support of this fact? In support of this fact there is the evidence of two people—the testimony of myself, who received the directives and the letters from Trotsky (which, unfortunately, I burned), and the testimony of Pyatakov, who spoke to Trotsky. All the testimony of the other accused rests on our testimony. If you are dealing with mere criminals and spies, on what can you base your conviction that what we have said is the truth, the firm truth?

Naturally, the State Prosecutor and the Court, who know the whole history of Trotskyism and who know us, have no reason to suspect that we, bearing the burden of terrorism, added high treason just for our own pleasure. There is no necessity to convince you of that. We must convince, firstly, the diffused wandering Trotskyite elements in the country, who have not yet laid down their arms, who are dangerous and who must realize that we speak here shaken to the depths of our souls, and that we are speaking the truth and only the truth. And we must also tell the world that what Lenin—I tremble to mention his name from this dock—said in the letter, in the directions he gave to the delegation that was about to leave for The Hague, about the secret of war. A fragment of this secret was in the possession of the young Serbian nationalist, Gabriel Princip, who could die in a fortress without revealing it. He was a Serbian nationalist and felt the justice of his cause when fighting for the secret which was kept by the Serbian national movement. I cannot conceal this secret and carry it with me to the grave, because while in view of what I have confessed here, I have not the right to speak as a repentant Communist, nevertheless the 35 years I worked in the labour movement, despite all the errors and crimes with which they ended, entitle me to ask you to believe one thing—that, after all, the masses of the people with whom I marched do mean something to me. And if I concealed this truth and departed this life with it, as Kamenev did, as Zinoviev did and as Mrachkovsky did, then when I thought over these things, I would have heard in my hour of death the execrations of those people who will be slaughtered in the future war, and whom, by my testimony, I could have furnished with a weapon against the war that is being fomented.

And that is why I contest the assertion that those who sit here in this dock are criminals who have lost all human shape. I am fighting not for my honour, which I have lost; I am fighting

for the recognition of the truth of the testimony I have given, the truth in the eyes not of this Court, not of the Public Prosecutor and the judges, who know us stripped to the soul, but of the far wider circle of people who have known me for thirty years and who cannot understand how I have sunk so low. I want them to see clearly from beginning to end why it was I gave this testimony, and therefore, in spite of the fact that I have already in part spoken of this, I feel obliged to present a picture of the events and experiences of this latest period, especially from the time of receipt of the last instructions from Trotsky.

I must explain why the decision taken in January to reveal everything was not carried out, and I must explain why I could not do that during the interrogation, why even when I arrived at the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs I did not at once carry this decision into effect. The doubts of the State Prosecutor are entirely legitimate. The external facts speak against the existence of such a decision. And, moreover, the State Prosecutor, who is aware of the fact that Kamenev preferred to die like a bandit without a political program, asks himself why it should be assumed that here we have complete sincerity, that the whole truth has been told to the end.

Without the slightest egocentrism—my personality plays the least part here—I must first of all mention the personal factors which made it easier for me to regard Trotsky's December directive as the finale, as the end, as a signal of the necessity to break before the others did and with greater internal conviction. These were personal factors. Some of my fellow-accused returned to the path of struggle as convinced Trotskyites who permanently denied the possibility of building up socialism in one country. I returned having ceased to believe this conception of Trotsky's. I returned because I shrank from the difficulties that confronted socialism in 1931-33. This only shows that to admit the building of socialism is easier theoretically than to possess the strength and firmness which was fostered only in those who followed the Party from profound internal conviction and did not combat it. Without confidence in the leaders, or with insufficient confidence, without sufficient contact with the cadres—the theory itself was a dead letter, it was a theoretical view and not a practical one. Here I stumbled and I returned to this underground work. And here I immediately became an object of deceit. I say this not in order to extenuate my guilt, but because I increased this deceit tenfold in relation to our rank and file, and in order that you may understand the personal elements which helped me to realize the necessity of a change of front.

When I joined the organization, Trotsky did not say a word

about the seizure of power in his letter. He felt that such an idea would seem to me too reckless. He only seized upon my profound perturbation and that in this state of mind I might decide to join forces with him; and then everything would turn out as he wanted. And when during my conversation with Pyatakov in December 1932, he said, "What are you thinking about, this is of course a state conspiracy," this was the first rift from the very beginning.

In September 1933 Romm brought me a letter from Trotsky in which wrecking work was spoken of as something taken for granted. And once again—and Romm spoke of this in his evidence—I was dumbfounded. Why? Because when I held these conversations not a word was said about wrecking activity, and this was done deliberately. They knew that after the period of the fight against wrecking, after its exposure in all its hideousness, I might come to grief. And so it was concealed from me. And when Pyatakov revealed these things to me, I of course realized that the door had banged to. It was absurd to start to quarrel over this. But it was the second rift.

And, finally, after receiving Trotsky's directives in 1934, I sent him the reply of the centre, and added in my own name that I agreed that the ground should be sounded, but that he should not bind himself, because the situation might change. I suggested that the negotiations should be conducted by Putna, who had connections with leading Japanese and German military circles. And Trotsky replied: "We shall not bind ourselves without your knowledge, we shall make no decisions." For a whole year he was silent. And at the end of that year he confronted us with the accomplished fact of his agreement. You will understand that it was not any virtue on my part that I rebelled against this. But it is a fact for you to understand.

And what a picture did I see? The first stage. Kirov had been killed. The years of terrorist preparation, the scores of wandering terrorist groups waiting for a chance to assassinate some leader of the Party, and the consequences of the terrorism seemed to me personally to be the sacrifice of human life without any political advantage to ourselves. We could not bring to Moscow the leaders and organizations we required for group terrorism—that showed the state of forces of the terrorist organizations. And on the other hand, I stood near enough to the government and to the leading Party circles to know that not only the precautionary measures of the organs of public security, but the masses of the people themselves had become so vigilant that the idea that the Soviet power could be cast to the ground by terrorism—even with the help of the most devoted and desperate terrorist groups—

was utopian, that we might sacrifice human life, but that this would not overthrow the Soviet power.

A second aspect of the matter. I perceived that Trotsky himself had lost faith. The first variant was a concealed way of saying: "Well, boys, try to overthrow the Soviet power by yourselves, without Hitler. What, you cannot? Try to seize power yourselves. What, you cannot?" Trotsky himself already felt his complete internal impotence and staked on Hitler. The stake was now on Hitler. The old Trotskyites had held that it was impossible to build up socialism in one country, and that it was therefore necessary to force the revolution in the West. Now they were told that a revolution in the West was impossible, and so destroy socialism in one country, destroy socialism in the U.S.S.R. Yet nobody could help but see that socialism in our country had been built. . . .

The second aspect was defeat.

I know a little about military matters and I am able to judge the international situation. And to me it was clear: 1934 was a period when I, a man inclined to pessimism, considered defeat and ruin inevitable; but in 1935 all the chances were in favour of a victory for this country, and whoever before pretended to himself that he was a defeatist by necessity, in order to save what could be saved, was now bound to say to himself: I am a traitor who is helping to subjugate the country—which is strong, growing and progressing. For what purpose? So that Hitler might restore capitalism in Russia.

All the Public Prosecutor said about the fact that not only Trotsky's directives but all the work of the Trotskyites aimed at the restoration of capitalism is incontrovertibly true. The directives themselves were directives for the complete restoration of capitalism, and they did not drop from the skies: they were a summary of the fact that when people fire at the general staff of the revolution, when people undermine the economy of the country, they are undermining socialism and, that being so, they are working for capitalism.

And this is a fundamental truth, a truth of decisive importance in forming a judgment of the Trotskyites as a social current, and the prosecutor realizes this. On the other hand, it shows that with this platform we could not even among our own followers reach as many as one hundred or so. If the State Prosecutor admits this —and he does admit it fully—and bears in mind that we did not even summon the conference which we had decided to summon in order to ascertain that even our closest followers would not accept such a standpoint, it shows that the Trotskyites, this group of criminal people who are stained in the blood of one of the leaders

of the revolution and who have committed an untold number of crimes, had nevertheless completely miscalculated when staking on restoration.

When people enter a fight in blinkers and cannot see what is in front of them, they are capable of performing, and do perform acts fraught with terrible consequences.

But when you, the judges, deliberate on each one of them in particular—and you cannot do otherwise—you cannot but bear this in mind.

Comrade Judges. . . .

The President: Accused Radek, not "Comrade Judges," but Citizen Judges.

Radek: I beg your pardon, Citizen Judges. I must now tell you about the backstage aspect of this conference we wanted to summon. Serebryakov was quite right when he said that there was no decision. The conference in fact was summoned in order to decide. Why did it not take place? Why did this conference not take place, what was concealed behind the scenes of this conference, why did I not tell about the December instructions and about Pyatakov's meeting with Trotsky even to a man so close to me as Bukharin, who knew about the contacts with representatives of West-European and Eastern powers?

I shall speak about this because it may later have a practical significance and supply the answer to the question whether something still remains undisclosed. I think it does: that something remains hidden both from us and from the authorities, and could be disclosed. It was already clear to me that it was nonsense to think that the terrorist organization would liquidate itself of its own accord. In this Trotskyite organization there were people of various kinds, people of various shades and, as it appeared, people who were directly connected with foreign intelligence services. I did not know this at the time. I had to admit the possibility that somebody was prowling around us. And the moment we allowed this secret to escape from the control of these four people, from that moment we should be absolutely powerless to control the situation.

I will return for a while to the name of Dreitzer. The State Prosecutor said that we would return to him, and I will return to him in a connection which was not examined here.

When Dreitzer failed to appear in Moscow for seven or eight months, I might have thought that this was for conspiratorial reasons. But when Dreitzer failed to appear in January and, after having received my summons to the conference, came to Moscow and did not come to see me—he was in Moscow in 1935 and did not come to see me—it became clear to me that Trotsky, on

the basis of the correspondence I had had with him, and perceiving Pyatakov's resistance and our misgivings about the defeatist line—was creating some other devilish business in addition to the parallel centre. I conclude this from the fact that Dreitzer avoided us in 1935.

When I read the record of the trial of the united centre I did not find one fact which was unknown to me, which had taken place without the knowledge of others. This meant that some third organization was operating.

And, finally, when Pyatakov returned from abroad, he casually remarked when speaking of the conversation with Trotsky that Trotsky had told him that cadres of people were being formed who had not been corrupted by the Stalin leadership. But when I read about Olberg and asked others whether they had known of the existence of Olberg, and none of them had heard about him, it became clear to me that in addition to the cadres who had passed through his school, Trotsky was organizing agents who had passed through the school of German fascism. And I found a direct reply to this when the question of the conference arose. It was clear to me that if Dreitzer learnt that we were putting the question of Trotsky's directives on such a footing that it might again lead to a split, as was the case in 1929, then before we succeeded in doing so we should be put out of the way ourselves. Not because Dreitzer bore us any ill-will, but because he was a man who was thoroughly devoted to Trotsky and had closer connections with him directly, than through us. I therefore could not tell people about the conference. When we did tell them, the arrests had begun and it was impossible to get them together.

Did I know before my arrest that it would all end in arrest? How could I help knowing it when Tivel, the manager of my bureau, was arrested, when Friedland, whom I had met very frequently in recent years, was arrested? I will not mention other names; I could mention dozens of people with whom I often met. I could not then doubt for a single moment but that this business would end in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. And so I must answer the question—why, instead of calling conferences, did I not address myself to the Party, to the authorities, and why if I did not do so before my arrest, did I not do it at the time of my arrest?

The answer to this question is a very simple one. It is the following. I was one of the leaders of the organization. I knew that Soviet justice was not a mincing machine, I know that there were people of different degrees of guilt among us, and that we—the leaders—must answer for what we had done with our heads. But I also knew that there was a large section of people whom we had

drawn into this struggle, who, I would say, did not know the principal lines of the organization, and who wandered on blindly.

When I raised the question of a conference, what I wanted was demarcation, I wanted to have separated out those who wished to wage the fight to the end—these might even be surrendered bound hand and foot—and to allow the others the opportunity to leave and of their own accord announce their guilt to the government.

When I found myself in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the chief examining official realized at once why I would not talk. He said to me: "You are not a baby. Here you have fifteen people testifying against you. You cannot get out of it, and as a sensible man you cannot think of doing so. If you do not want to testify it can only be because you want to gain time and look it over more closely. Very well, study it." For two and a half months I tormented the examining official. The question has been raised here whether we were tormented while under investigation. I must say that it was not I who was tormented, but I who tormented the examining officials and compelled them to perform a lot of useless work. For two and a half months I compelled the examining official, by interrogating me and by confronting me with the testimony of other accused, to open up all the cards to me, so that I could see who had confessed, who had not confessed, and what each had confessed.

This lasted for two and a half months. And one day the chief examining official came to me and said: "You are now the last. Why are you wasting time and temporizing? Why don't you say what you have to say?" And I answered: "Yes, tomorrow I shall begin my testimony." And the testimony I gave contains not a single correction from first to last. I unfolded the whole picture as I knew it, and the investigation may have corrected one or another personal mistake about the connections of some person with another, but I affirm that not a single thing I told the examining officials has been refuted and that nothing has been added.

I have to admit one other guilt. Having already confessed my guilt and having disclosed the organization, I stubbornly refused to testify with regard to Bukharin. I knew that Bukharin's position was just as hopeless as my own, because our guilt was the same, if not juridically, then in essence. But we are close friends, and intellectual friendship is stronger than any other kind of friendship. I knew that Bukharin was in just such a state of profound disturbance as I was, and I was convinced that he would give honest testimony to the Soviet authorities. I therefore did not want to have him brought bound to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. I wanted to enable him too, like the rest of

our people, to lay down his arms. This explains why it was that only towards the very end, when I saw that the trial was drawing close, that I realized that I could not appear for trial having concealed the existence of another terrorist organization.

And so, Citizen Judges, I will conclude my last plea with this. We shall answer in accordance with the full severity of the Soviet law, considering that whatever your verdict may be it will be a just one. But we want to meet it like conscious people. We know that we have no right to address the masses—it is not for us to teach them. But to those elements who were connected with us we would like to say three things.

The first thing: the Trotskyite organization became a centre for all counter-revolutionary forces; the Right organization which was connected with it and which was about to merge with it, is just such another centre for all the counter-revolutionary forces in the country. The government authorities will be able to cope with these terrorist organizations. On the basis of our own experience we have not the slightest doubt of this.

But there are in the country semi-Trotskyites, quarter-Trotskyites, one-eighth-Trotskyites, people who helped us, not knowing of the terrorist organization but sympathizing with us, people who from liberalism, from a Fronde against the Party, gave us this help. To these people we say, when a sea-shell gets under a steel hammer, that is not so dangerous; but when a sea-shell gets into a screw, a propellor, there may be a catastrophe. We are living in times of great strain, we are on the verge of war. Before this Court and in this hour of retribution, we say to these elements: whoever has the slightest rift with the Party, let him realize that tomorrow he may be a diversionist, tomorrow he may be a traitor if he does not thoroughly heal that rift by complete and utter frankness to the Party.

Secondly, we must say to the Trotskyite elements in France, Spain and other countries—and there are such—that the experience of the Russian revolution has shown that Trotskyism is a wrecker of the labour movement. We must warn them that if they do not learn from our experience, they will pay for it with their heads.

And finally, we must say to the whole world, to all who are struggling for peace: Trotskyism is the instrument of the warmongers. We must say that with a firm voice, because we have learned it by our own bitter experience. It has been extremely hard for us to admit this, but it is an historical fact, for the truth of which we shall pay with our heads.

This is all that I personally want to say so that the responsibility I shall be called upon to bear may not only be a physical responsibility, but may also be of some little use.

We cannot, nor can I, ask for clemency, we have no right to it. And I will say—there is no pride here; what pride can there be?—that we do not need this clemency. Life in the next few years, in the next five or ten years, when the fate of the world will be in the balance, can have meaning only under one condition, and that is if one is able to take part in the work of life, even in the roughest. But what has occurred precludes this. And in that case clemency would be only needless torture. We are a fairly closely-knit crew; but when Nikolai Ivanovich Muralov, Trotsky's closest follower, of whom I was convinced that he would rather perish in prison than say a single word—when he gave testimony and explained that he did not want to die in the consciousness that his name would be a banner for every counter-revolutionary scoundrel—that is the profoundest result of this trial.

We all realize to the full the instruments of what historical forces we have been. It is very sad that we have realized this so late, despite all our learning. But may this realization be of service to others.

The President: Accused Sokolnikov.

Sokolnikov: I do not want to use my last plea for the purpose of denying or refuting any of the materials of the investigation or the conclusions of the indictment and the State Prosecutor. I admitted my guilt and my crime at the preliminary investigation; I fully admit them here and have nothing to add. I would only like to ask the Court to believe me when I say that I am concealing nothing, that I have told not half the truth, but the whole truth. I say this because yesterday the State Prosecutor said in his speech that such facts have occurred before, and therefore I consider it my duty to stress this, and to stress it precisely in connection with what the State Prosecutor said.

He mentioned that the accused in the trial of the united centre concealed the existence of the political platform of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite *bloc*. I had occasion in my testimony to make good this omission. I did not consider it possible in this respect to leave anything unsaid, and at the preliminary investigation I related everything I knew about the political platform of the *bloc*.

What was my own attitude towards this platform, and how was it that I came to be its champion, despite the fact that in the past. for many long years, I was a faithful member of the Party? To explain this I must say that my public utterances of 1925 and 1926 undoubtedly already contained all the principal elements of a program of capitalist restoration. My utterances at that time were subjected to annihilating criticism at the Fourteenth Con-

gress of the Party, and were rebutted by the Party as a whole. This for a certain time brought me to my senses. But I must confess that I had not rid myself completely of the views I had then expressed, and in 1932 I became a recidivist.

I returned completely to these old views and again took up the fight on their behalf. What factors determined this circumstance? It was determined by the fact that at that time, in 1932, all the principal oppositionist, anti-Party groups adopted a common position. The close alliance was restored between the Zinovievites and the Trotskyites on the basis of the program of the Rights; and the closest contact had been established with the Rights in 1932-33, although they did not formally join the *bloc* at that time, but later. And this circumstance, I must say, held great weight with me. In 1932, and in 1933, and later in 1935, the fact that the Rights and the Right centre, who, in the most developed form and most consistently—perhaps not most consistently, but consistently—advocated the line of capitalist restoration, reliance on the kulaks, the fight against industrialization and the fight against collectivization, the fact that the Rights entered the struggle—this fact had great weight with me.

And later, in 1935—I testified to this at the preliminary investigation, and it must be mentioned now—when the parallel centre began to resume its work, of great importance was the fact that at this moment the Rights, as represented by Tomsky, who was empowered to do so by the whole central group of the Rights, gave their consent to joining the *bloc*. This should strengthen the position of the *bloc* immensely, furnish real opportunities to wage a struggle, and push forward the parallel centre. This, in particular, was of significance to me too.

But from this program, despite its anti-Party character, despite its being diametrically opposed to the socialist program, how did we pass to the practical activity which was conducted by the parallel centre and which placed the parallel centre in the position of leaders of a group of adventurers, as the State Prosecutor still more mercilessly characterized this group yesterday. Is there any contradiction between the character of the program, between the existence of this political program, which after all was the program of a political organization, and those forms of criminal, abominable activity to which the parallel centre sank? I think that I should explain this at least in a few words. The first explanation is that the very character of this program, the very character of the program for the restoration of capitalism, when proposed in a socialist country, could not mean anything in practice but naked adventurism.

And the second factor. Having committed itself to these views,

having set itself this aim of restoring capitalism, the *bloc* found itself at the mercy of what is called the logic of the fight. This phrase is widely used, but in this form it is of course too general. This is how it happened with us, this is what our logic of the struggle meant, a struggle that bound the members of the parallel centre by an iron necessity, and dragged them down step by step.

I do not think it is necessary for me to speak here of the various facts, for they have already been mentioned at the preliminary investigation and at the trial and are well known to you, Citizen Judges. I think that what I ought to do here is to make a brief characterization for you, for the whole country, and for all those who may be wavering, who might become criminals, who might start an anti-Soviet struggle.

It should be said that having started out with anti-Party views, we found ourselves obliged to combat socialism, we found ourselves in the position of fighting our Party, in contradistinction to the masses of the people who followed the Party.

Our program was anti-Party, anti-socialist. And therefore it immediately developed and turned out to be an anti-people program. What the State Prosecutor said here yesterday is after all true. We could not tell this program to anybody except the immediate members of the centre. We did not even dare to embody it in a single document, we did not dare to spread it, because the mere revelation of such a program would spell the bankruptcy of our *bloc*.

Our program was anti-people. We could not count on the support of the masses. And that meant that the next step was that we were bound—and such an attempt was made—to pass to conspiratorial methods of struggle. We found that we had no weapon except conspiracy. There was no possibility whatever of a mass struggle. But even for conspiracy our own forces proved inadequate. Even for conspiracy.

If we could count on our criminal plans, our program, receiving support in the country at least from coteries of conspirators, who might within the country represent a menace to the existence of the Soviet government, to the existence of the Soviet system, perhaps we might have developed conspiratorial tactics—there have been examples of this in the past. But we could not command sufficient forces even for conspiracy, and we were obliged to seek forces, to seek allies outside our organization and outside our country. We were obliged to seek any allies we could come across, and we came across such as were the bitterest enemies of those with whom we had started the struggle.

And so we passed from conspiracy to adventures, and these adventures immediately led us into the fascist pitfall because

we had found allies in the fascist organization, and they seized hold of us and we became their puppets.

That, concretely, is how one can conceive, how we at present conceive, how we at present understand—I think that this applies to the other members of the parallel centre and the organization—how we all regard this matter.

We imagined that we could utilize hostile forces, but as a matter of fact we found ourselves to be an absolutely impotent, contemptible and vile puppet in their hands. But I must say that when, in 1932, I agreed to become a member of the reserve centre, I of course did not realize the whole of this picture. . . . I do not know whether this is of any interest, of any significance to the Court at this moment, but such was the fact. Of course, I did not realize the whole of this picture, I had no idea how all this would turn out; I had no idea what the reserve centre would do. Neither did I realize that our forces would prove to be so insignificant, and that this utter insignificance of our forces would lead to ignominy, to the shameful end of our policy, to our annihilation and fall.

Of course, I think that nobody will assume that throughout these years of struggle I, for example, experienced no waverings, participated in this struggle without any internal discord, without internal difficulties. All these did exist. But I must say, that of course as long as the struggle continued I, and I think the other members of the centre, were possessed by a frenzied passion for the struggle, and we went from step to step believing that there would be, so to speak, some kind of success.

Despite these waverings, despite the fact that in each of us, in each of the members of the centre, in each of the members of the organization, there remained, and made itself felt this second soul—I am using the word in its best sense—which had been trained in him by his revolutionary work before his fall, his blindness and disgrace.

I would like also to say, Citizen Judges, that when I was arrested, when I was informed of the facts in possession of the investigating authorities regarding the existence of the parallel centre, I realized that this was complete defeat, that is, that the complete defeat of the *bloc* had arrived. But the first motive that induced me to give testimony, to confess my guilt, was precisely the fact that I realized that this was the end of the activities of the *bloc,* that any attempt to preserve any remnants of this *bloc,* and so on, might only lead to further and still worse decay; that it would be complete madness and that I must have the courage to admit my defeat and to answer for what I had done, so as, if possible of course, to repair the evil that had been done.

But I arrived at this point during the course of the investigation, all the more that during the investigation I became acquainted with a number of materials regarding the work of the organization of which I, as a member of the centre, for conspiratorial reasons was not given complete information, just as the other members of the centre did not have complete information. And I must say that the rank and file members of the *bloc,* and even certain of the prominent provincial members of course, did not know everything. But we, the members of the centre, also did not know everything. We were divided, separated from each other, by the conspiratorial conditions. And of course I cannot refrain from saying that the investigation of the activities of our *bloc* showed me what our directives (I do not deny that we are answerable for these directives) had been converted into, what had become of them, what filth, what hideousness, what political corruption. . . . I cannot but shrink in horror from this picture, from the picture of our crimes. And it was natural that it was with so much the greater sincerity and so much the greater willingness that I decided completely to reveal the activities of our organization, so as to put an end to them.

Citizen Judges, I will not speak at great length; I have very little left to say. Regarding Trotsky's role in the work of our organization I can add nothing to the information and the evaluations which were here given by the members of the centre—Pyatakov and Radek. I think that these evaluations have been sufficiently frank, and I fully share them. But I cannot add anything of my own, because I was not in direct communication with Trotsky. I was not directly connected with him, and received information through third persons.

Yesterday the State Prosecutor, Citizen the Procurator, concluded his speech by saying that we all sitting in the dock deserve the death penalty. I cannot dispute, I have no grounds for disputing, the conclusion of the State Prosecutor; that conclusion of course is justified to the maximum. But I would like to say that I think that by the facts of the indictment, by the facts of the investigation, and even by yesterday's speech of the State Prosecutor we are already politically dead and buried.

I express the conviction, or at any rate the hope, that not one person will now be found in the Soviet Union who would attempt to take up the Trotskyite banner. I think that Trotskyism in other countries too has been exposed by this trial, and that Trotsky himself has been exposed as an ally of capitalism, as the vilest agent of fascism, as a fomenter of world war who will be hated and execrated by the millions everywhere.

I therefore think that inasmuch as Trotskyism, as a counter-

revolutionary political force, ceases to exist, has been finally smashed, I think that I and the other accused, all the accused, may nevertheless plead, Citizen Judges, for clemency. I do not regard this as impossible or shameful for myself and for the other participants in the trial. Of course, every one of us has his own individual share of responsibility. I do not doubt the fairness, the absolute impartiality of the Supreme Court of the Union. I think that everything of an extenuating character, everything that speaks in favour of clemency that may be found in my own case or in the case of others, will be weighed by the Court. I therefore will not mention anything that it seems to me speaks in favour of clemency. I repeat, I await the just decision of the Supreme Court.

But as regards the general responsibility of the accused, and not their individual responsibility, I repeat that I think that the Trotskyite organization, that Trotskyism itself is dead, has come to be hated by the masses, has been buried and cannot rise again. I think that this circumstance perhaps may be regarded by the Court as a reason for clemency and, I repeat, I appeal to the Court for clemency and through the Court to our whole people, for whose forgiveness I publicly plead.

The President: Accused Serebryakov.

Serebryakov: I am using my last plea as one of the accused not in order to defend myself. I want to say here that I fully and wholly admit the justice of what Citizen the Prosecutor said yesterday about my most grievous crimes against the country, against the land of the Soviets, and against the Party. It is painful to realize that I, who entered the revolutionary movement in my early years and was an honest and devoted Party member for two decades ended by becoming an enemy of the people and find myself here in the dock. But I realize that it happened because, having once committed a political error I subsequently persisted in it, I aggravated this error, which, by the inevitable logic of fate, developed into most grievous crimes. For me, of course, it is a belated question. But it may be a lesson for all those who have not fully realized that to persist in one's error while remaining in the Party inevitably leads where it led me.

I gave sincere testimony during the investigation and in Court because I really had definitely and finally broken with the counter-revolutionary banditry of Trotsky and Trotskyism. I therefore ask the Court to believe in my sincerity, to take cognizance of it in making its decision.

The President: Accused Boguslavsky.

Boguslavsky: The trial has disclosed a hideous picture of crime, treachery, blood and treason. And in this picture I occupy a definite place, a place which is rightly defined in the language of the Criminal Code by the articles cited in the indictment and which was emphasized yesterday by the State Prosecutor as a confirmation of the court investigation. I stand before you today as a state offender, a betrayer, a traitor.

I cannot but ask myself the same question for the thousandth time, this time before you, Citizen Judges, and through you before the class which bore me, which raised me: how did it happen? It is not a rhetorical commonplace question. It requires an answer, and when I pondered over this question many many times I gave myself the following answer.

The logic of struggle is really a generality, and as I see it, explains very little. For the logic of struggle by no means must invariably lead to those loathsome crimes to which this so-called logic led me and the others accused in this particular case.

I see several causes which I consider necessary to set forth to you here, Citizen Judges.

It began with a trifle which seems innocent enough at first sight. In 1923 a group of Trotskyites, headed by Trotsky, some of whom are sitting together with me in the dock, drew up the so-called "letter of the 46" which already contained all the elements of what we ended up with. I recall my feelings, and I believe they were not mine alone, when I signed that letter. Here were before me authoritative comrades—Bolsheviks, holding extremely responsible posts, responsible positions in the Party and the government. And I forgot what Lenin had repeatedly taught the Party, that one must not believe authority alone or words alone; he taught us conscientiously to examine all documents pertaining to the dispute in order to form our opinion. I personally regard this blind faith in so-called authorities as responsible for my fall, which is not only profound but irrevocable.

The second cause is also failure to remember one of Lenin's bequests, one fundamental in Party life, to the effect that once you stray from the road, once you commit an error, you must not persist in and insist on your mistakes, for, as the State Prosecutor rightly stated yesterday, this can and does lead, as it did in our case, to the fascist counter-revolutionary swamp.

And finally the third cause. I consider it necessary to mention it again, I spoke of it in my testimony here in Court. This is the system of deceit, the system of constant deceit, and I must say that it was not only in 1934 and in 1935, when they concealed the

so-called instructions, that deceit on the part of Trotsky and his close associates was disclosed. Well, when one analyses that whole period of the struggle one sees that this deceit was practiced very often. I must tell this to the Court. Why I speak of deceit I shall say later. I must tell the Court that, for example, to many of us Trotskyites, myself included, who were in Moscow at the time and were fairly close to Trotsky and his closest companions in arms, to us the transfer of what was already then an anti-Soviet struggle to the streets on November 7, 1927, was a surprise. They concealed this from us and we were faced with the fact of the demonstration, we were faced with the fact, with the necessity of fighting for that senseless, criminal anti-Soviet step, for the first attempt to transfer the struggle to the streets. I recall this in order to say that this was not fortuitous. It is a method, it is a system, and I emphasize this again today because Trotsky is still alive, and his venomous fangs have not yet been extracted, today he continues to deceive not only his own adherents but also tries, fortunately without success, to deceive the workers. In our country he fails in this, but may he not succeed to some extent in doing so in other countries and thus the exposure of this deceit is an urgent necessity. And I consider this system of deceit as one of the causes of such a deep and final downfall. I assure you, Citizen Judges, that I do not say this in order to find extenuating circumstances, circumstances that extenuate my personal guilt, I do not know how to look for them, where to find them, although, I do not conceal it, I would like to find them and I would like you, Citizen Judges, to help me find them. I want you to help to find them, by examining the whole matter. But I consider it necessary to draw your attention to this system of deceit and warn everyone who is not yet convinced of this deceit that this system is fatal just as it proved fatal for me.

It is self-evident that there is nothing else to be said, save that the inspirer and organizer of all this criminal activity of ours was Trotsky, and the task of his exposure, complete and final, is the basic task besides the task of finding the specific criminals, his accomplices here in our country.

Citizen Judges, when you come to the question of my punishment I ask you to take cognizance of the following: I am no longer a young man, I am over fifty and not all of these years of mine are filled with a criminal content. The Party knew me as a devoted fighter both with a gun on my shoulder in the partisan and Red Guard detachments and on the front of Soviet construction, on the economic front.

I do not say this in order to crave anything for myself on the plea of my work. This work has been undone many times

over by the loathsome crimes I have committed. But I mention it for the sake of the following. When I ask myself whether I am really a hardened and incorrigible criminal, I answer: No, this cannot be. And this gives me the right to ask for clemency, to plead for mercy.

When I recall that it was not so long ago that I carried on important and honest work this also gives me the right to beg for clemency.

And when faced with the end, I ask you one thing, Citizen Judges: give me a chance, by dying a natural death, give me a chance in the years of life that still remain to me, through any work in any place, to try and make at least some amends for the crimes I have committed against the country and against the working class.

The State Prosecutor was right yesterday when he said: our country is strong and powerful. We were unable by our heinous crimes to affect even by a jot the victorious course of the revolution in our country. And in this light, against this background I ask you to give me a chance, to the limit of my strength, to make even slight amends for my crimes, to expiate my crimes. That is why I ask you for leniency. That is why I ask you to spare my life.

The President: Accused Drobnis.

Drobnis: Yesterday the State Prosecutor gave a complete and exhaustive summary of all my heinous crimes. And so I, a worker, a shoemaker, who at the age of 15 became an active revolutionary, a Party member who served six years in a tsarist prison, who survived three death sentences, sit in the dock as a grave offender, as a traitor to my country.

Raised and nurtured by the working class, I turned against that class, as its bitterest enemy and traitor. I committed crime after crime and was clearing the way for Trotsky, who was betraying and selling the land of socialism and the working class wholesale and retail, hastening the advent of a bloody war.

All of this happened because for years I continued to live in the stuffy, stinking, foul, evil-smelling Trotskyite underworld. I breathed this poisoned air and even when, for example, I went to Central Asia and evaded real activities, I lacked the resolution and will power to break with it finally. At the first summons of the reserve centre I went to Western Siberia as a reinforcement in order to perpetrate loathsome and heinous crimes, without making it clear to myself for what purpose I was doing it.

Blinded, I did loathsome and heinous things at the construction site where I worked. I saw the enthusiasm and devotion of the workers, it attracted me, but a sinister force held me back.

Arrest and imprisonment were the purgatory which enabled me completely to sweep away, to rid myself of, all that filth I did this with complete determination, with complete firmness and consistency.

Yesterday the State Prosecutor justly expressed his doubt. I ask you to believe me that I have purged myself and washed rotten putrid Trotskyism from every recess of my mind, I have dealt with it ruthlessly. The investigating authorities can confirm that I sometimes even urged them on in this connection and gave myself no respite, in order to have done with this finally and irrevocably.

I am forty-six years of age. And not long before my arrest the thirtieth anniversary of my membership in the Party passed. I have become an outcast and an accursed son of the working masses. The Court will pass sentence upon me. However severe this sentence may be I shall accept it as my due and as deserved. But if, Citizen Judges, you find it in the least possible to save me from a shameful death, and, after putting me to the severest test, permit me to return to the ranks of the class from which I came, I shall regard it as my great and sacred duty fully to justify this gift of the toiling people and to serve it to the end of my days.

The President: Accused Muralov.

Muralov: I refused counsel and I refused to speak in my defence because I am used to defending myself with good weapons and attacking with good weapons. I have no good weapons with which to defend myself.

Yesterday the State Prosecutor cast doubt upon our sincerity, the sincerity of our testimony. I applied this to myself too, because, naturally, doubt regarding criminals is quite legitimate. But I assure the Court that neither at the investigation nor here in Court did I conceal anything in my testimony, that I gave exhaustive information regarding my criminal activity and gave the proper appraisal. I have already mentioned how I arrived at this conclusion. I struggled with myself for a long time. I recalled the sayings of the great leaders of Marxism, the saying of one of the wisest men of antiquity who lived hundreds of years before our times that "every man can make a mistake but he is a fool who does not admit his mistake," and I will add, and

crimes as well. I did not want to remain a fool, I did not want to remain a criminal, for had I refused to give testimony I would have been the banner for those counter-revolutionary elements that unfortunately still remain on the territory of the Soviet Republic. I did not want to be the root from which poisonous shoots would sprout. I did not want to be the seed from which would grow poisonous tares instead of wholesome wheat, and this, plus my old, Bolshevik mettle, compelled me to admit all my crimes and this is why I did not and do not conceal anything. It would be unworthy for me to accuse anyone of having drawn me into the Trotskyite organization. Although I came from a poor toiling family and forged my own way to an education and a position, when I joined workers' circles in 1899 and the Party in 1905 and in my subsequent activity I was always a conscious, intelligent and educated man especially at the time when Trotskyism began. I do not dare to blame anyone for this, I myself am to blame. This is my misfortune. This is my guilt.

For over a decade I was a faithful soldier of Trotsky, that foe of the labour movement, that agent of the fascists, enemy of the working class and the Soviet Union, who deserves every contempt. But for more than two decades I had been a loyal soldier of the Bolshevik Party. All these circumstances compelled me to tell and relate everything honestly both at the investigation and in Court. These are not empty words on my part because in my earlier days, in the best days of my life, I was accustomed to being a faithful soldier of the revolution, a friend of the working class. I ask that this frank testimony be taken into account when passing sentence on me.

The President: Accused Norkin.

Norkin: During the investigation I told everything about my crimes without concealing anything. I fully repented. All my testimony is utterly sincere and accurate. This is enough to enable the Court, after going into all details and circumstances, to reach the necessary decision. If the Court finds any of the circumstances sufficient to mitigate the verdict and to spare my life, I declare that I shall accumulate strength with the utmost eagerness, in the hope of spending it in the struggle against fascism. And in case of a different decision, in case this plea of mine in Court is the last act of my life, I want to take advantage of it to convey my seething contempt and hatred for Trotsky. There is enough of it for Trotsky to share it liberally with all his partners and the real bosses of the fascist general staffs and intelligence services.

The President: Accused Shestov.

Shestov: Citizen Judges! For 13 years I was a member of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyite terrorist, disruptive and fascist organization. For the last five years I was actively preparing and attempted to kill the leaders of the toiling people, the leaders of the working class and of those oppressed in the capitalist world. For the last five years I carried on active destructive and disruptive work in the coal pits and mines of the Kuznetsk Basin. For the last five years I was a traitor, I was an agent of the most reactionary detachment of the world bourgeoisie, an agent of German fascism.

What forced me, a former worker, the son of a working family, to belong to the organization of murderers, to the organization of traitors to the socialist fatherland? I will not conceal that from 1923 on, step by step, stage by stage, I climbed higher and higher and came close to the organizer of the fascist agents—Trotsky and to his closest lieutenants—Sedov, Smirnov and Pyatakov. My acquaintance with them, the rapprochement and especially the last meeting in 1931 and their attention to me, flattered me and I abandoned myself fully and wholeheartedly to counter-revolutionary terrorist and espionage activities. In 1923 I first betrayed the working class. In 1923 I first began to struggle against the Party headed by Stalin, who holds and carries the banner of Marx, Engels and Lenin in his strong, firm hands. In that struggle I employed every loathsome, every filthy and every destructive method. I stand before you utterly exposed. I told of everything that brought me to the dock. I did not surrender on the first day of my detention. For five weeks I denied everything, for five weeks they kept confronting me with one fact after another, with the photographs of my dastardly work and when I looked back, I myself was appalled by what I had done.

A particle, still not killed, of working man's conscience, of the conscience of the toiling people, that I still retained, compelled me to tell the truth and I decided like a prodigal son to go to my class brothers and tell everything I knew and had done. There in Siberia, at the headquarters of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, at the preliminary investigation, in cell number 23, I often quivered like an aspen leaf when facing my crimes, and it was this that gave me the calmness with which I told you of my criminal activities. I knew what I was headed for, I knew where I was going and I knew what was in store for me if the organization I was leading were exposed. I am not asking for mercy. I do not want clemency. The proletarian Court must not and cannot spare my life. Here before you, in the face of the

whole working people, in the face of those oppressed by capitalism in all countries, to the best of my ability I shot to pieces the ideology that held me captive for thirteen years. And now I have only one desire, to stand with the same calmness on the place of execution and with my blood to wash away the stain of a traitor to my country.

The President: Accused Stroilov.

Stroilov: All my crimes and the full weight of my guilt for which there can be no justification are fully presented and proved by my own confessions as well as by the exhaustive analysis made by the State Prosecutor in his speech. Having betrayed my country, in small matters at first, I sank lower and lower, becoming an agent of the German intelligence service and carrying out its loathsome assignments. Together with this, although I had never been in the Party, although I had never been a Trotskyite, I also became an agent of the Trotskyites, whose assignments were in no way different from and often exceeded the assignments of the German intelligence service.

Although all my criminal activities resulted from this twin pressure upon me I cannot in any degree minimize my crimes and the gravity of my guilt which is very great before the country. It is further aggravated and intensified by the fact that the Party and government treated me very well. This was expressed in my social position, it was also expressed in the encouragement I received and a number of awards that were given me.

It was expressed in the fact that I was appointed to the most responsible position in the country held by a non-Party engineer. I was given such favourable material and living conditions as were several times above the concept of a well-to-do life even in the literal sense. But at the beginning of 1934 I tried to sever my criminal ties with the intelligence service of a hostile state and I encountered fierce resistance on the part of the Siberian centre of the Trotskyite organization which urged me to continue the joint work.

At the time I was puzzled by this kinship between the German intelligence service and the Trotskyites, as I had no knowledge of either the so-called platform or the so-called political goal which had been set by the parallel centre.

Here in Court it became clear to me that they are kindred people, kindred in their methods of work, people who resolved to sell piecemeal the territory of the Soviet Union.

As a person holding an official position as well as a person who

in general saw how wrecking activities were developing in their acutest form I attempted in a number of cases to put into effect organizational and technical industrial measures in the interest of work. And here again I encountered the goading of representatives of the Trotskyite organization, who accused me of liberalism, of the psychology of an intellectual, etc., and I went on with these activities. And while I severed all ties with the German intelligence service and with the foreign state in general in the second half of 1935, the pressure of the Trotskyites continued. And this double life accompanied me all the time. On the one hand I carried out the assignments coming from the source of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre. On the other hand, seeing the splendid attitude towards me of the public organizations, the Party and the government, I felt that this wrecking went counter to the creative spirit which I as an engineer could understand. I could not but carry out a number of measures which went beyond the bounds of my duties as chief engineer of the trust. I have published a number of technical studies which for the first time have appeared in print in the Soviet Union. I proposed a number of inventions, some of which were not only adopted on a mass scale in the Kuzbas but are now also being utilised by other trusts of the coal industry, inventions safeguarding workers' lives and providing great economic and technical advantages.

At the end of February 1936 I firmly resolved to leave the Kuznetsk Basin for good and go away. But while I spoke of this only to the management, I encountered opposition both in Novosibirsk and in Moscow and I had to stay in the Kuznetsk Basin and feel the burden of my criminal connections with the Trotskyites.

I shall not enumerate all my crimes in the way of wrecking activities. They are grave and extensive and they were all enumerated in the preliminary investigation and by the Procurator. At the bottom of the list I see the tremendous sum-total of my crimes. I see the tremendous bill which the Soviet land presents to me.

But I ask the Court in passing sentence upon me to take into account that as regards my origin from among small farmers, as regards my working experience which dates only from 1921, *i.e.,* I had no experience in capitalist society, and as regards my nature I am not alien to the proletariat and am not in the least hostile to Soviet power.

If I fell so low, betraying my country, this fall occurred not here but abroad, as a result of a whole conglomeration of provocations and shadowing, as also of my contacts with the Trot-

skyites, which were exclusively the result of blackmail and extortion on their part.

Likewise, I ask the Court to take into consideration the fact that I never was in the least connected with terrorist activity. I did not even know of terrorist acts and of the preparations for them. But my guilt and my crimes are great. I admit them fully and sincerely to the end.

I ask the Court to show clemency to me, to spare me, to preserve my life. I have experience and I will make every effort to mobilize my knowledge and experience so as to make at least partial amends for my tremendous guilt before the proletarian state by productive work, by constructive work.

I ask you to believe the sincerity of this declaration of mine and I ask the Court to give me a chance to return to the toiling family of Soviet peoples.

The President: The Court will adjourn until 6 p.m.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.
SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

EVENING SESSION, JANUARY 29, 1937, 6:00 P.M.

Commandant: The Court is coming. Please rise.

The President: The Session is resumed. Accused Arnold.

Arnold: Citizen Judges, from childhood I received as a heritage from tsarist Russia the shameful brand of being an "illegitimate child." In adapting myself to life, which has turned out such a tangle, I can lay sole blame for this on tsarist Russia, on the capitalist society to which I was adapting myself. As a result, as it has turned out, I—a worker, of working class parents, suddenly landed in the ranks of the Trotskyites.

I have already spoken about this in court and I stress once again that because of my weak, low political development, I was not able to get my bearings in the complicated questions of politics, and as a result I found myself under the influence of such strong Trotskyites and became a member of their organization. I took part in crimes against the foremost leaders of the Party and government, raising my hand against them. And I am very glad that I did not succeed in this. I realized my loathsome crime, and immediately left Prokopyevsk. I tried to redeem my abominable action by work.

At the preliminary investigation and here in Court I have made a clean breast of everything, and there is no more of that filth left in me. I have never felt my biography to be as clean as it is now, after I have told about everything that happened to me. Citizen Judges, I am not yet an altogether lost man. I can still work and be of use to the society from which I came. Notwithstanding the fact that I have committed a great crime, notwithstanding the fact that the Procurator demands the supreme measure of punishment in my case, I nevertheless ask you to spare me my life, and I will try to justify this not by words but by deeds.

The President: Accused Livshitz.

Livshitz: Citizen Judges! The charge advanced against me by the State Prosecutor is still further aggravated by the fact that I was raised by the Party from the ranks to a high position in state administration—to that of Assistant People's Commissar of Railways. I enjoyed the confidence of the Party, I enjoyed the confidence of Stalin's comrade-in-arms, Kaganovich. I trampled this confidence in the counter-revolutionary Trotskyite quagmire, and took the course of treachery and treason against the country.

How did this happen? How was I engulfed in the counter-revolutionary quagmire? Beginning with disagreement with the Party and support of Trotsky on the most important, the most decisive question of our proletarian revolution—on the building up of socialism in our country—I descended step by step, driven by the logic of the struggle, from factional work to underground work, and from underground work to wrecking, acts of diversion and treason against the country. I cannot maintain, I cannot plead that I did not know the whole program of Trotsky and of the centre, although in reality I did not know the whole program as it has been disclosed at this trial. The fact remains that Trotsky is the organizer, the inspirer of the restoration of capitalism in our country. Together with the most rabid and the darkest forces of fascism, Trotsky is preparing war and defeat of the U.S.S.R. in this war, and in this vile treacherous work I aided him. So I reached the extreme limit. The last boundary line is being drawn at this trial.

Citizen Judges, in examining all the material of the indictment and the investigation, I ask you to bear in mind that I am forty years old. My life is filled not only with crimes. I was devoted to the Party, to the working class and to the revolution for many years; I worked honestly and devotedly; I do not consider myself completely lost; I consider myself still capable of honestly serving the working class and the revolution. This entitles me to ask the proletarian Court, the Soviet Court to spare me my life, to give me a chance to redeem at least a part of my monstrous crimes by honest work. This is the mercy which I ask of the proletarian Court.

The President: Accused Knyazev.

Knyazev: Yesterday I listened to the speech of the State Prosecutor with the utmost attention and intensity.

Notwithstanding the fact that it was severe, speaking honestly I must frankly and courageously say that it was just, as was the way the Citizen Prosecutor characterized my crimes against the Party and the country. I can only say one thing here: that not at a single step, not for one moment during my two and a half years of criminal work in the Trotskyite organization, in my connections with the Japanese, have I ever pursued personal aims and personal interests. On this score my conscience is clear. Yes, I will say more

than was said by the State Prosecutor. I worked to prepare for war. To put it simply, I worked for the approach of war, in order to clear the path, to pave the way for the coming to power of the scoundrel Trotsky. During these two and a half years I have experienced many painful moments, but what I heard in court about how our centre engaged in wholesale and retail selling of the territory of the Soviet Union—notwithstanding all my painful experiences, I must say outright that my hair stood on end.

I am not a politician, it is true, but not a political ignoramus either. I understand perfectly well what it means to surrender the Ukraine, what it means to surrender the Maritime Province and the Amur region. It was only needed to add one thing, and this obviously was in line with the further conception, as I understood from all the charges—to surrender the Baku and Grozny oilfields and the railways, and then the whole of Russia would be a first-class colony of German fascism.

I understand perfectly well that the political power in any state is based first and foremost on its economic foundation. And who but a desperado who descends to this wholesale and retail bartering, who has turned into a first-rate fascist, could act like that?

If any of us, who worked in the provinces, who trusted the centre, had found out about this—this is no place for tragic words—but I declare outright that these realist politicians would have lost their beards pretty quickly. Obviously, we would have gone together to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. But as it is, it is they who came for us.

I sincerely declare that I had no hand in this criminal bartering away of the state, and I declare that Livshitz never spoke to me about it.

I want to add something about the train wrecks.

The Citizen State Prosecutor has quite rightly said that the whole strength of our undermining, wrecking, diversive activities was centred in these train wrecks. Why, it may be asked? Train wrecks and accidents on the railways are a field in which wreckers, diversive agents and class enemies can carry on their work with impunity, without being disclosed.

This happens because notwithstanding the tremendous constructive and creative work which Lazar Moiseyevich has done during a little more than a year and a half of work on the railways, the mentality of a number of officials and a large number of specialists is such that they have not outlived the idea that it is impossible for the railways to work without train wrecks and accidents, that train wrecks and accidents are an inevitable consequence or concomitant of the complex operations on the railways.

It is in this, what I might call conviction and psychological domination of a theory which still exists and which, I repeat, has not been completely outlived, that enemies find a place for themselves. We, too, found a field for our wrecking activities here.

Citizen Judges, my life-story is inextricably intertwined with the whole of our revolution. I have risen to high posts as chief of important railways and was on two occasions virtually the technical director of the most vital administration on the railways, the operations department. As far back as the days of Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky, who kept me close to himself, I worked together with him on the railways. I was the first who, at his instructions, concluded an agreement on international communications with foreign states.

Having risen to high posts, I enjoyed the particular confidence of the Party and of the government and of L. M. Kaganovich. I will say sincerely that in this year and a half, during which I have had occasion to meet Lazar Moiseyevich personally more than once, we have had many talks, and during these talks I always experienced a dreadful feeling of pain when Lazar Moiseyevich always said to me: "I know you as a railway worker who knows the railways both from the theoretical and from the practical side. But why do I not feel in you that wide range of activity which I have a right to demand of you?" This range of activity was at the command of my criminal work, and I repeat that it needed superhuman efforts to get through these conversations. But I had not sufficient courage to confess.

At this trial, both at the preliminary investigation and here in court, I have sincerely tried to confess everything up to the very last, without any compulsion to do so, from the first day when the investigation began. And I feel that I have fulfilled this up to the end of my trial, for despite all the severity with which the State Prosecutor characterized my crimes, he could not forbear to admit that my statements were marked by conscientiousness. I ask the Citizen Judges to take into account this sincerity of mine.

I also ask that in determining my fate you take into account the declaration which I submitted before the beginning of the investigation, in which I wrote that if my life were spared, I would try with all my power, my knowledge and devotion to redeem all my crimes, and I confirm once again that I will redeem them.

The President: Accused Turok.

Turok: Citizen Judges, I took the Trotskyite path in 1931, and of course from this path, when working in the Urals in 1934, I logi-

cally took the path of direct counter-revolutionary wrecking acts and treason to the country.

Since that time I have actively participated in that counter-revolutionary practical work, carrying out in practice the criminal program which was given by Trotsky from abroad and by our centre.

I must say here that if in 1931 I adhered to Trotskyism by chance, in 1934 my active and infamous work was no longer a matter of chance. That is why it was active.

Citizen Judges, I, whom the Prosecutor in his speech has called a bandit, comparing me and my companions in the dock and in crime with those who lurk on the highway with bludgeon and dagger—moreover this description was not the result of a chance phrase chosen by the Prosecutor but was the result of those criminal acts which I committed—I, of course, find it very hard to ask the proletarian Court, and through it, in effect, the Soviet people, for clemency to me, a traitor and a bandit. But I must declare to you that I did not carry on a struggle against the Party all my life, much less take a clearly counter-revolutionary path. Out of the twenty years of my membership in the Party, I served the cause of the revolution honestly and devotedly for fourteen years. I took active part in the civil war; I was rewarded by the government. Of course, Citizen Judges, I do not want to say—and it would be monstrous to think this—that these past services of mine in any way outweigh the monstrous crimes which I have committed and for which I am now being tried. But these small services of mine show that I can nevertheless ask you for clemency, which would give me a chance to die not as an agent of fascism. And, were my life given me, I would be able, through tenacious and honest labour, to return to the bosom of the builders of socialism. So I ask you, Citizen Judges, to take this declaration of mine into account. I have given the most merciless and the most frank testimony both about my own activities and about the activities of the organization to which I belonged. I ask once again, if it is possible, to take my declaration into account.

The President: Accused Rataichak.

Rataichak: Citizen Judges, it is painful to speak of all the crimes committed by each one of us, the members of the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary organization. It is particularly painful to speak now, after the State Prosecutor's exhaustive and correct description of all the acts committed by this counter-revolutionary organization, by all the accused seated here in the dock and by each one of them individually.

At the investigation I made exhaustive and sincere depositions about the whole work which was carried out by others at my instructions. I mentioned all the members of this vile organization who were known to me, in order not to leave any tail-ends or remnants whatever, not to leave any people who were even in the slightest degree contaminated with the rottenness of this Trotskyite morass. Prior to my connection with the Trotskyite organization, I never engaged in espionage nor in adventurism. In linking my fate with this counter-revolutionary organization, I became the agent of Trotsky, became the agent of fascism. It is very hard to draw the border-line here, for there is no border-line between the agents of Trotsky and the agents of fascism.

I carried out a number of acts, and persons connected with me carried them out at my instructions—monstrous acts of crime against the Party, against the Soviet power, against the Soviet people. In 1935 it had already become perfectly clear that this whole struggle was not a struggle against the leaders of the Party and the government, was not a struggle for a change in the policy of the Party and the government, but that it was a struggle, a real struggle against the whole Russian people who are building their new life. With our hands we were virtually destroying what had been created by the honest builders of socialism. We have been undermining, destroying what the Russian people had been creating during many long years of severe struggle for a change in their life, for the building up of socialism in the Soviet Union. It has become perfectly clear that this struggle is utterly futile, and that our actions, our criminal counter-revolutionary actions, cannot in the least change the struggle of the honest toilers of the Soviet Union for the completion of socialist construction.

Every act of ours committed at this or that factory only caused the workers there to display fresh enthusiasm; every act that was perpetrated evoked a new reaction in the work of the factories, led to new achievements. In 1935 I virtually ceased all active work in this counter-revolutionary organization. But that is not enough. Having rid myself of my associates, having virtually ceased to carry on an active struggle against the Party and the government and the people, I did not find sufficient courage in myself to tell, to disclose the whole filth and the whole counter-revolutionary work, in order to finish with it once and for all. I looked for a way out, so that I myself might sever all contact with the people who were connected with me and with whom I was connected. I repeat that this is not enough; up to the day of my arrest I did not tell about the members of my organization and about my own crimes.

My guilt, and also that of many of us who are sitting in the

dock, is aggravated by the fact that I occupied a quite responsible post, a leading post in one of the most important branches of industry. My guilt is still further aggravated by the fact that I unquestionably and continually enjoyed exceptional confidence on the part of our People's Commissar of Heavy Industry, on the part of the Party and the government. Naturally, as a man who occupied a responsible position, I must bear greater responsibility than a rank and file member or participant in all these crimes.

I only want to say, Citizen Judges, that I am not yet an utterly lost man. I am still capable of working, and if the Court finds it possible to spare my life, to give me a chance to redeem my guilt before the Land of Soviets by honest labour, to work so as to redeem in some measure all the crimes that were perpetrated by me, I sincerely and honestly declare that I shall be able to redeem my guilt to a considerable extent by honest labour. This is what I ask of the Court.

The President: Accused Hrasche.

Hrasche: Citizen Judges, I waived my right to make a speech in defence, nor in my final plea do I want to expatiate on how I came to such a life, how I descended to betraying the interests of the toiling people. The facts of my criminal activities are too striking, and any attempt even to explain them can of course only aggravate my lot. I ask the Court to believe me when I say that I have wholly and fully confessed my crimes against the toilers of the Soviet Union, that I have concealed nothing and have not tried to belittle my guilt.

I ask only that you allow me to attempt to make one correction to the words in which the State Prosecutor characterized me here. In the course of my criminal activities I have had various masters, including the fascist intelligence service and the Trotskyites. Believe me, there was an attempt on my part to take another course, but one intelligence service followed behind the other, I passed from the clutches of one to those of the other, and finally the Trotskyite, fascist secret agent, Meyerowitz delivered me into the hands of the Trotskyite Rataichak. But for all that I was not a Judas Trotskyite. I had to feel ashamed of myself for my vile treachery, and could not, as the Trotskyites are doing, conceal it beneath a kind of ideological superstructure, beneath a kind of political platform.

I ask the court to take this into account, as also my full and frank confession of my crimes, and if possible to give me a chance by honest labour to mitigate, albeit partially, the harm I have done by my criminal activities.

I ask you once again to believe that my confessions, both in court and at the investigation, were exhaustive and truthful, if only because I could not but wish to rid myself of the nightmare of inevitable responsibility which has been weighing on me for many years past.

The President: Accused Pushin.

Pushin: Citizen Judges, at the investigation and in court I have told with complete frankness everything that I know about the activities of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyite organization, told also about my own heavy crimes. I have not concealed anything from the Court, desiring in my sincere account to give an outlet to the agonizing feeling of my guilt before my country, a feeling which accumulated in me more and more as I began to understand the true essence and aims of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyite organization, and which found vent in frank confession.

And if I now ask the Court for clemency, it is only in order that, if the Court finds it possible to spare my life, I may devote this life to honest service for the benefit of my country and my people, proving this not only by words of confession and repentance but also by living deeds, by practical work.

The President: The Court is adjourned.

At 7:15 p.m. the Court retires to confer.

* * *

[The session is resumed at 3:00 a.m. on January 30].

Commandant: Please rise, the Court is coming.

The President: The session is resumed. I will announce the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

THE VERDICT

In the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., consisting of:

President: Army Military Jurist, V. V. Ulrich, President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.,

Members: Army Corps Military Jurist, I. L. Matulevich, Vice-President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., and Divisional Military Jurist, N. M. Rychkov, Member of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

Secretary: Military Jurist First Rank A. F. Kostyushko, with the participation of the State Prosecutor, A. Y. Vyshinsky, Procurator of the U.S.S.R. and I. D. Braude, N. V. Kommodov and S. K. Kaznacheyev, Members of the Moscow Collegium of Coun-

sel for Defence, in an open Court session, in the City of Moscow, on January 23-30, 1937, heard the case against:

1. *Pyatakov,* Yuri (Georgi) Leonidovich, born 1890, employee;
2. *Sokolnikov,* Grigori Yakovlevich, born 1888, employee;
3. *Radek,* Karl Berngardovich, born 1885, journalist;
4. *Serebryakov,* Leonid Petrovich, born 1888, employee;
5. *Livshitz,* Yakov Abramovich, born 1896, employee;
6. *Muralov,* Nikolai Ivanovich, born 1877, employee;
7. *Drobnis,* Yakov Naumovich, born 1891, employee;
8. *Boguslavsky,* Mikhail Solomonovich, born 1886, employee;
9. *Knyazev,* Ivan Alexandrovich, born 1893, employee;
10. *Rataichak,* Stanislav Antonovich, born 1894, employee;
11. *Norkin,* Boris Osipovich, born 1895, employee;
12. *Shestov,* Alexei Alexandrovich, born 1896, employee;
13. *Stroilov,* Mikhail Stepanovich, born 1899, employee;
14. *Turok,* Yosif Dmitrievich, born 1900, employee;
15. *Hrasche,* Ivan Yosifovich, born 1886, employee;
16. *Pushin,* Gavriil Yefremovich, born 1896, employee;
17. *Arnold,* Valentin Volfridovich, alias Vasilyev Valentin Vasilyevich, born 1894, employee,

all being charged with having committed crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{8}, 58^{9} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

The preliminary and Court investigations have established that:

In 1933, in accordance with direct instructions given by the enemy of the people, L. Trotsky, who was deported from the U.S.S.R. in 1929, there was formed in Moscow, apart from the so-called "united Trotskyite-Zinovievite terrorist centre," consisting of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Smirnov and others, an underground parallel anti-Soviet, Trotskyite centre, members of which were the accused in the present case, Y. L. Pyatakov, K. B. Radek, G. Y. Sokolnikov and L. P. Serebryakov.

In accordance with instructions received from the enemy of the people, L. Trotsky, the principal aim of the parallel anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre was to overthrow the Soviet power in the U.S.S.R. and to restore capitalism and the power of the bourgeoisie by means of wrecking, diversive, espionage and terrorist activities designed to undermine the economic and military power of the Soviet Union, to expedite the armed attack on the U.S.S.R., to assist foreign aggressors and to bring about the defeat of the U.S.S.R.

In full conformity with this principal aim, the enemy of the people L. Trotsky, abroad, and the parallel anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre, represented by Radek and Sokolnikov, in Moscow, entered into negotiations with certain representatives of Germany and Japan. During the course of negotiation with one of the leaders of the National-Socialist Party of Germany, Rudolph Hess, the enemy of the people, L. Trotsky, promised in the event of a Trotskyite government coming to power as a result of the defeat of the Soviet Union, to make a number of political, economic and territorial concessions to Germany and Japan at the expense of the U.S.S.R., including the cession of the Ukraine to Germany and of the Maritime Provinces and the Amur region to Japan. At the same time, the enemy of the people, L. Trotsky, undertook in the event of seizing power to liquidate the state farms, to dissolve the collective farms, to renounce the policy of industrialization of the country and to restore on the territory of the Soviet Union social relations of capitalist society. Furthermore, the enemy of the people L. Trotsky undertook to render all possible help to aggressors by developing defeatist propaganda and wrecking, diversive and espionage activities, both in time of peace and, in particular, in time of an armed attack on the Soviet Union.

In fulfilment of the instructions of the enemy of the people L. Trotsky, several times received by Radek, and also personally by Pyatakov during a meeting with the enemy of the people L. Trotsky, in December 1935 in the neighbourhood of the city of Oslo, members of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite parallel centre, Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov and Serebryakov developed wrecking, diversive, espionage and terrorist activities.

Local Trotskyite centres were set up in certain large cities in the Soviet Union to exercise direct guidance of anti-Soviet activities in the provinces. In particular, a West-Siberian anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre, consisting of N. I. Muralov, M. S. Boguslavsky and Y. N. Drobnis, accused in the present case, was set up in Novosibirsk on the direct instructions of Pyatakov.

Diversive and wrecking work in industry, chiefly in enterprises of importance for defence purposes, and also on the railways, was performed by the accused in the present case at the behest of the enemy of the people Trotsky, and on the instructions and with the direct participation of agents of the German and Japanese intelligence services, and consisted in disrupting plans of production, lowering the quality of product, organizing fires and explosions at factories or factory departments and mines, organizing train wrecks and damaging rolling stock and railway track.

In organizing diversive activities, the accused were guided by the instructions of the enemy of the people Trotsky "to strike palpable blows at the most sensitive places," supplemented by directions from Pyatakov, Livshitz and Drobnis not to shrink before loss of human life, because, "the more victims, the better, since this will rouse the anger of the workers."

In the chemical industry, the accused Rataichak and Pushin, on the instructions of Pyatakov, performed wrecking work with the object of disrupting the State production plan, delaying the construction of new factories and enterprises and spoiling the quality of the construction work on new enterprises.

In addition, in 1934-1935, the accused Rataichak and Pushin organized three diversive acts at the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works, and two of them were accompanied by explosions which caused the death of workers and heavy material loss.

Diversive acts were also organized at the instigation of the accused Rataichak at the Voskressensk Combined Chemical Works and the Nevsky Plant.

In the coal and chemical industries of the Kuznetsk Basin, the accused Drobnis, Norkin, Shestov and Stroilov, on the instructions of Pyatakov and Muralov, carried on wrecking and diversive work with the object of disrupting the output of coal, delaying the building and development of new mines and chemical works, to create conditions of work harmful and dangerous to the workers by allowing gas to accumulate in the galleries and pits, while on September 23, 1936, on the instructions of Drobnis, members of the local Trotskyite organization caused an explosion at the Tsentralnaya Pit in the Kemerovo mine, as a result of which ten workers lost their lives and 14 workers received grave injuries.

On the railways, the diversive and wrecking activities carried on by the accused Serebryakov, Boguslavsky, Livshitz, Knyazev and Turok in accordance with the stand of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre, aimed to disrupt the State plan of freight loading, especially for the most important freight (coal, ore, grain), to damage the rolling stock (cars and locomotives) and the railway track, and to organize the wrecking of trains, especially of troop trains.

At the instructions of Livshitz, and being commissioned therefore by an agent of the Japanese intelligence service, Mr. H——, the accused Knyazev in 1935-1936 organized and brought about the wrecking of a number of freight trains, passenger trains and troop trains involving loss of life; as a result of the wreck of a troop train at the Shumikha Station on October 27, 1935, 29 Red Army men were killed and 29 Red Army men injured.

On the direct instructions of the enemy of the people Trotsky, Pyatakov and Serebryakov, members of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre, made preparations, in the event of an armed attack on the U.S.S.R., to carry out a number of diversive acts in industries of importance for defence purposes and also on important railway trunk lines.

On the instructions of Pyatakov, the accused Norkin made

preparations to set fire to the Kemerovo Chemical Works upon the outbreak of war.

On the instructions of Livshitz, the accused Knyazev proceeded to carry out the commission given him by Mr. H——, an agent of the Japanese intelligence service, to organize during war time the blowing up of railway structures, the burning of military stores and army provision bases, the wreck of troop trains, and also the deliberate infection of trains designed for the transportation of troops, provision supply depots and sanitary centres of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army with highly virulent bacilli.

In addition to diversive and wrecking activities, the accused Livshitz, Knyazev, Turok, Stroilov, Shestov, Rataichak, Pushin and Hrasche, at the orders of the Trotskyite anti-Soviet centre, engaged in securing and handing over secret information of utmost State importance to agents of the German and Japanese intelligence services.

The accused Rataichak, Pushin and Hrasche were connected with agents of the German intelligence service, Meyerowitz and Lenz, to whom, in 1935-1936, they handed over strictly secret material relating to the condition and operation of chemical plants; Pushin in 1935 handed over to Lenz, agent of the German intelligence service, secret information on the output of products by all the chemical plants of the Soviet Union in 1934, the program of work of all the chemical plants in 1935 and the plan for the construction of nitrogen works, while the accused Rataichak handed over to the same Lenz absolutely secret material on the output in 1934 and the program of the work of chemical enterprises supplying the army for 1935.

The accused Shestov and Stroilov were connected with agents of the German intelligence service Schebesto, Flessa, Floren, Sommeregger and others, and handed over to them secret information about the coal and chemical industries of the Kuznetsk Basin.

The accused Livshitz, Knyazev and Turok regularly transmitted to Mr. H——, agent of the Japanese intelligence service, strictly secret information regarding the technical condition and mobilization capacity of the railways of the U.S.S.R., and also regarding transportation of troops.

At the direct behest of the enemy of the people L. Trotsky, the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre formed several terrorist groups in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Rostov, Novosibirsk, Sochi and other cities of the U.S.S.R., which engaged in making preparations for terrorist acts against the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government, Comrades Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Orjonikidze, Yezhov, Zhdanov, Kossior, Eiche, Postyshev and Beria; certain terrorist groups (in Moscow,

Novosibirsk, in the Ukraine and in Transcaucasia) were under the personal direction of the accused Pyatakov and Serebryakov, members of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre.

In organizing terrorist acts, the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre endeavoured to take advantage of visits paid to the provinces by leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government.

Thus in the autumn of 1934, Shestov, at the behest of Muralov, endeavoured to carry out a terrorist act against V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., during his visit to the Kuznetsk Basin, for which purpose a member of the local Trotskyite terrorist group, the accused Arnold, attempted to cause an accident to the automobile in which Comrade V. M. Molotov rode.

Furthermore, on the instructions of Pyatakov and Muralov, the accused Shestov made preparations for a terrorist act against R. I. Eiche, Secretary of the West-Siberian Territory Committee of the C.P.S.U., while the accused Arnold at the instigation of Shestov made preparations for a terrorist act against G. K. Orjonikidze.

Thus the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. has established that:

I. Pyatakov, Serebryakov, Radek and Sokolnikov were members of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre and, at the direct behest of the enemy of the people L. Trotsky, now abroad, with the object of expediting an armed attack on the Soviet Union, assisting foreign aggressors in seizing territory of the Soviet Union, overthrowing the Soviet power and restoring capitalism and the power of the bourgeoisie, directed the treacherous, diversive, wrecking, espionage and terrorist activities of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite organization in the Soviet Union—*i.e.*, have committed crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{8}, 58^{9} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

II. Pyatakov and Serebryakov, mentioned in clause I, as well as Muralov, Drobnis, Livshitz and Boguslavsky, members of an anti-Soviet Trotskyite organization, organized and personally directed the treasonable, espionage, diversive and terrorist activities of the members of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite organization—*i.e.*, have committed crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{8}, 58^{9} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

III. Knyazev, Rataichak, Norkin, Shestov, Turok, Pushin and Hrasche, while members of an anti-Soviet Trotskyite organization, carried out the instructions of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre concerning treasonable, espionage, undermining, wrecking and terrorist activities—*i.e.*, have committed crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{8}, 58^{9} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

IV. Arnold, while a member of an anti-Soviet Trotskyite organization, at the instigation of the accused Muralov and Shestov, attempted to carry out terrorist acts against Comrades Molotov and Orjonikidze—*i.e.*, has committed crimes covered by Articles 19, 58^{8} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

V. Stroilov partially carried out certain individual commissions for espionage and wrecking work—*i.e.*, has committed crimes covered by Articles 58^{6} and 58^{7} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

On the basis of the above, and guided by Articles 319 and 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the R.S.F.S.R.,

The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SENTENCES:

1. *Pyatakov,* Yuri (Georgi) Leonidovich, and
2. *Serebryakov,* Leonid Petrovich,

as members of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre who organized and directly guided treasonable, espionage, undermining, wrecking and terrorist activities, to the supreme penalty—to be shot.

3. *Muralov,* Nikolai Ivanovich,
4. *Drobnis,* Yakov Naumovich,
5. *Livshitz,* Yakov Abramovich,
6. *Boguslavsky,* Mikhail Solomonovich,
7. *Knyazev,* Ivan Alexandrovich,
8. *Rataichak,* Stanislav Antonovich,
9. *Norkin,* Boris Osipovich,
10. *Shestov,* Alexei Alexandrovich,
11. *Turok,* Yosif Dmitrievich,
12. *Pushin,* Gavriil Yefremovich, and
13. *Hrasche,* Ivan Yosifovich,

as organizers and direct executors of the above-mentioned crimes, to the supreme penalty—to be shot.

14. *Sokolnikov,* Grigori Yakovlevich, and
15. *Radek,* Karl Berngardovich,

as members of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite centre, responsible for its criminal activities, but not directly participating in the organization and execution of acts of a diversive, wrecking, espionage and terrorist nature each to imprisonment for a term of ten years.

16. *Arnold,* Valentin Volfridovich, alias Vasilyev, Valentin Vasilyevich

to imprisonment for a term of ten years.

17. *Stroilov,* Mikhail Stepanovich,

in view of the facts mentioned in point V of the defining section of the present verdict—to imprisonment for a term of eight years.

Sokolnikov, Radek, Arnold and *Stroilov,* who are condemned to imprisonment, shall be deprived of political rights for a period of five years each.

The personal property of all the condemned shall be confiscated.

Enemies of the people, Lev Davidovich Trotsky, and his son, Lev Lvovich Sedov, who were in 1929 deported from the U.S.S.R. and by the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. of February 20, 1932, were deprived of citizenship of the U.S.S.R., having been convicted by the testimony of the accused Y. L. Pyatakov, K. B. Radek, A. A. Shestov and N. I. Muralov, and by the evidence of V. G. Romm and D. P. Bukhartsev, who were examined as witnesses at the trial, as well as by the materials in the present case, of personally directing the treacherous activities of the Trotskyite anti-Soviet centre, in the event of their being discovered on the territory of the U.S.S.R., are liable to immediate arrest and trial by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

President:
[*Signed*] V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

Members of the Court:
[*Signed*] I. MATULEVICH
Army Corps Military Jurist
Vice-President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

N. RYCHKOV
Divisional Military Jurist
Member of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

The President: I declare the Court Session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. closed.

[*Signed*] PRESIDENT: V. ULRICH
Army Military Jurist
President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY: A. KOSTYUSHKO
Military Jurist First Rank

REPORT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS

THE CASE OF THE

TROTSKYITE-ZINOVIEVITE TERRORIST CENTRE

Heard Before the

MILITARY COLLEGIUM OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.S.R.
Moscow, August 19-24, 1936

In re

G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, G. E. Evdokimov, I. N. Smirnov, I. P. Bakayev, V. A. Ter-Vaganyan, S. V. Mrachkovsky, E. A. Dreitzer, E. S. Holtzman, I. I. Reingold, R. V. Pickel, V. P. Olberg, K. B. Berman-Yurin, Fritz David (I. I. Kruglyansky), M. Lurye and N. Lurye

Charged under Articles 58[8], 19 and 58[8], 58[11] of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

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MOSCOW 1936

PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF JUSTICE OF THE U.S.S.R.

REPORT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS

IN THE CASE OF THE

ANTI-SOVIET "BLOC OF RIGHTS AND TROTSKYITES"

Heard Before The

MILITARY COLLEGIUM OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.S.R.
Moscow, March 2-13, 1938

IN RE:

N. I. Bukharin, A. I. Rykov, G. G. Yagoda, N. N. Krestinsky, K. G. Rakovsky, A. P. Rosengoltz, V. I. Ivanov, M. A. Chernov, G. F. Grinko, I. A. Zelensky, S. A. Bessonov, A. Ikramov, F. Khodjayev, V. F. Sharangovich, P. T. Zubarev, P. P. Bulanov, L. G. Levin, D. D. Pletnev, I. N. Kazakov, V. A. Maximov-Dikovsky, P. P. Kryuchkov

Charged with crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{2}, 58^{7}, 58^{8}, 58^{9} and 58^{11} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R, and Ivanov, Zelensky and Zubarev, in addition, with crimes covered by Article 58^{13} of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

VERBATIM REPORT

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