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A Biographical Study of Stalin's Successor by

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The death of Josef Stalin removed a known and relatively stable factor from the world's scene. The appointment of Georgi M. Malenkov as Stalin's successor naturally awakened international interest in the obscure figure who had become the new Soviet Premier. Mr. Ebon, an experienced student of the U.S.S.R. and author of a penetrating study of world Communism today, has rendered a notable service to all those anxious to know something of the personality, career and past policy of the man who formally at least inherited the dual position of Stalin as head of the Russian Government and Communist Party. By drawing on his own researches in the recent history of Russia, especially on the phase of the struggle for power between the late Zhdanov, once Stalin's successor-designate, and the other contenders for power, and by skilful analysis of published Soviet material, he succeeds in sketching a lifelike and plausible picture of Malenkov, who has ascended to power with greater responsibilities and greater opportunities for striving after and helping to attain world peace than almost any other political figure in recent history.

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MALENKOV

A BIOGRAPHICAL STUDY
OF STALIN'S SUCCESSOR

by Martin Ebon

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE death of Joseph Stalin removed a known and relatively stable factor from the world scene. The appointment of Georgi M. Malenkov as Stalin's successor awakened intense international interest in the obscure figure who had become the new Soviet Premier. This book does not pretend to be an exhaustive or definitive study of Premier Malenkov and the questions which his new eminence must necessarily arouse. Such a book, at this time, could not be written; few people in a position to speak, on either side of the Iron Curtain, have been favoured by so much as a single brief conversation with the new Soviet Premier. I have, rather, sought to provide an accurate presentation of fact and a tentative analysis, designed to fill, at least partly, the gap which has existed in public knowledge of Premier Malenkov's career, personality, outlook, and relationships with other important Soviet officials.

The analysis of personalities and events in the Soviet Union offers unique problems. Over more than three decades the Soviet government has perfected a system of censorship and propaganda which has no parallel, anywhere on earth. It is especially designed to hide the realities of life in the Soviet Union and to project abroad an image of the nation and its rulers that will work to the utmost advantage of Soviet power.

The observer of the Soviet scene has two major sources: the Soviet press and radio, and reports of emigrées who, during the past few years, have reached the free world in large number. Soviet media of public opinion are subject to strict control; but the change in emphasis, the selection of subject matter, the relative prominence of personages in

the news, and the character of subjects that are played down —all this provides clues to the analyst. Emigrées, for the most part, led lives of isolation. They could not, by the nature of life in the Soviet Union, obtain information from outside their immediate circle; but they *can* provide data on events within that circle. Eventually, as this disconnected information is assembled, it creates definite patterns: evidence begins to point toward certain events, to confirm them, and to provide detail.

The margin for error, in analyzing Soviet personalities and events under these conditions, is naturally wide. One can only allow for such a margin by carefully separating fact from conjecture. The facts herein are accurate; only future events can decide the validity of my hypotheses.

And future events seem already upon us. At the moment of this writing, the intensive Soviet peace offensive, with its possible repercussions on the situation in Korea, on allied co-operation, on the economic stability of America and of the world, represents a return to Communist tactics that served Moscow well in the 1930s and during the second World War. Throughout the fluctuation of events one basic conviction must remain stable: that the free world in dealing with the Malenkov régime cannot for one moment relax its vigilance.

MARTIN EBON.

The author is indebted to the ideas and work of Alexander Barmine, Boris I. Nicolaevsky, Lazar M. Pistrak, and Bertram D. Wolfe. He has also drawn on writings of Harry Schwartz and C. L. Sulzberger which appeared in *The New York Times*.

CHAPTER I

The Danger of Success

"THERE is such a thing as success for the bold. Think of me what you like, but follow me."

Thus spoke Pugachov, the rebel who pretended to be Czar Peter the Third, in Alexander Pushkin's novel *The Captain's Daughter*. Pushkin's story dealt with rebellion in 1773, in the southern Urals town of Orenburg.

Another rebel from Orenburg entered the Kremlin of the Czars a hundred and eighty years later. His name was Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov.

The state he inherited from Premier Joseph Stalin was far vaster than the czarist Empire had ever been; like the thirteenth-century realm of the Mongol Emperor Genghis Khan, it reached from China into eastern Europe. Its more than 200 million people included Great Russians, Ukrainians, White Russians, Mongols, Turks, people from the Baltic states, men and women of dozens of racial and religious origins.

Georgi M. Malenkov succeeded Stalin, who died on March 6, 1953, after twenty-nine years in power. Malenkov, the next day, became Premier, a post known formally as that of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He was then fifty-one years old.

Throughout his career, Malenkov has lived by the tenets of Pugachov, the rebel of Orenburg. He has boldly and cunningly striven for success; he has asked not for affection, but for allegiance.

The Kremlin he entered is heavy with history. Peter the Third, whom Pugachov pretended to be, was murdered at the behest of his wife Catherine, so she could become

Empress. The Empress Elizabeth held the child Czar Ivan VI imprisoned until he was killed by guards. In the Kremlin itself, Ivan the Terrible murdered his own son, and then went mad with guilt. Here Boris Godunov gave the order to kill the child that stood between him and czardom.

Against such a background, the very excess of detail in the Stalin death communiqués, each signed by no less than eight physicians, could not fail to arouse questions. Stalin died less than two months after his own medical staff had been removed, charged with causing and plotting the death of others.

Georgi Malenkov is indeed a man who may not easily inspire either affection or trust, but who can certainly command allegiance. He has rewarded his friends with high posts, and he has punished his enemies. Most of his adult life Malenkov has been the master of other people's destinies. The very structure of his power is built of men whom he carefully placed so they could strengthen his own position.

Malenkov was not thrust into the premiership of the Soviet Union by the hand of fate. He had prepared his accession to power for more than a decade; he had worked at it intensively for more than four years. In all this time he was driven by an inner restlessness that gave him no pause. Although he is married and has a son and a daughter, Malenkov has had little time for a home life. His first wife, Elena Rubatsova, whom he married in 1939, was a secretary in Molotov's foreign ministry. His present wife is the former actress and singer Elena Khrushchev, now director of Moscow University.

The man who succeeded Stalin is of medium height, about 5 feet 7 inches tall. Heavy eating has made him obese. Malenkov's most noticeable feature is a fleshy face, heavy-jowled and almost completely unwrinkled. It is a face behind which Georgi Malenkov has long learned to hide his feelings, as if it were a mask. Only his dark eyes, those who

have met him observe, seem to glitter with a multitude of emotions.

From the few outsiders who have come face to face with Georgi Malenkov, parts of a personality mosaic emerge. There is the hesitant, soft, and spongy handshake; there is unsociable reluctance to become part of a jovial crowd, which suggests arrogance born of insecurity; there is the habit of eating very heavily, and a fondness for sweet pastries; there is the pale, waxlike skin of his face, the almost feminine long eyelashes. And there is his smile, a smile of almost contemptuous joviality.

Without too much imagination, it is easy to picture Georgi Malenkov as the plump potentate in the Near Eastern and Central Asian tradition. Indeed, he is believed to be half-Bashkir by origin. His home town, Orenburg, lies at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, and the Near East, an area where the rule of the khan is yet a vivid memory. One visitor, the former Czech diplomat Anhorst Heidrich, told the columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop that, as he sat near to Malenkov during a five-hour dinner, he saw that his eyes were "small, very black, very cunning, and very cruel".

During his quarter-century of work in Moscow, Malenkov has always donned the same drab party uniform; it buttons high at the neck, and its collar points are always slightly curled up. Malenkov has been awarded a number of Soviet medals, but he disdains wearing decorations and other outward signs of distinction or power. What may have begun as a habit of being inconspicuous, seems to have developed into a contempt for the dandyish pretensions of Moscow's new society and its heavily bemedalled marshals and generals of the Soviet Army.

Malenkov walks erect, speaks clearly and sharply. He prefers to command, rather than to converse. Although he has been known to drink heavily on occasion, he appears to avoid the danger of having alcohol loosen his tongue. The overall impression is one of withdrawal among strangers, a

desire to return to the environment of his own office and staff—to the problems which he handles with masterful precision.

Malenkov's precision shows itself in his dual personality as terrorist-technocrat. During his apprenticeship he worked closely with the Soviet secret service during the years of the Moscow trials; his tutor was the notorious secret-service chief Nikolai Yezhov. During and after the war, he achieved distinction in organizing industry and transport.

But at all times, his main concern has been people: the people in the upper echelons of the Communist Party machine, the men and women who make up the structure of power. In this, as in several other respects, he followed in Stalin's footsteps; it was Stalin's control of the party machinery which guaranteed his succession of Lenin.

When Malenkov, in turn, succeeded Stalin, he was relatively unknown outside the Soviet Union. The world at large had let itself be hypnotized by Stalin's image. It had absorbed a good deal of internal Soviet propaganda, of the Stalinist cult, of the theme that Stalin was the beginning and the end of all things Russian.

Like a top executive anywhere, however, Stalin had to rely on the ideas and the actions of those below him in rank. The fact that a proclamation, like his papers on linguistics and economics, were signed by Stalin, did not exclude the possibility that they had been drafted by others. Similarly, major policy decisions were presumably made by Stalin on the basis of suggestions by other members of the Soviet hierarchy—in late years often by Malenkov.

Malenkov's antagonist, the late Andrei A. Zhdanov, apparently instigated such an unsuccessful move as the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939, and was at least partially responsible for the break with Marshal Tito in 1948. Malenkov, on the other hand, appears to have been responsible for stopping the Communist civil war in Greece after Zhdanov's death. He certainly instigated the important

science controversy that began with genetics in 1948 and continued for years. Malenkov may also have suggested, and his supporter Eugene S. Varga possibly prepared, Stalin's 1952 thesis on *The Economics of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*

Thus Georgi Malenkov, when he became Premier, did so after he had learned how to handle many aspects of his new job as one of Stalin's understudies. He had dealt with both external and internal affairs, extensively and in detail, for years. His inner restlessness had prodded him into extending his activity more and more outside Communist Party affairs as such. His days grew crowded, as affairs of world-wide espionage, of the Cominform, scientific agriculture, and greater industrial output competed with personal matters and Kremlin intrigues.

Georgi M. Malenkov is a self-made man. He got where he is by perseverance, a fabulous memory for detail, and an apparently compulsive singleness of purpose. That purpose —power over other men.

There are dangers in success. A man who has reached the top has nowhere else to go; yet he cannot afford to stand still. He must constantly anticipate and then move to fight off dangers—dangers from the outside world, dangers within his own country, dangers even within himself. As Georgi M. Malenkov stands exposed at the top of the pyramid that is Soviet society, he must see many threats to his position; but there are some which his personality and experience prevent him from seeing, and these are the most crucial.

There is, first of all, the danger of absolute totalitarianism. Malenkov is more totalitarian than Stalin ever was. Stalin ruled through contradictions; he gave the appearance, at times, of muddling through. He let his deputies quarrel among themselves; he permitted experimental policies, even if they proved futile in the end and had to be contradicted; he was strong enough to permit himself errors.

Stalin, at all times, maintained certain pleasant fictions. There was, for instance, the fiction of legality: the Soviet Constitution, election to the Supreme Soviet, debate in pseudo-parliamentary meetings. Malenkov, within a few days of taking power, began to ignore these legal niceties. At the session of the Supreme Soviet that approved his appointment, Malenkov imposed the reduction of fifty-one ministerial portfolios to twenty-five. This move paralleled reduction of membership in the Presidium of the Communist Party from the twenty-five named at the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress, to a mere ten. Malenkov asserted that these measures had been "maturing for a long time during the life of Comrade Stalin", but he did not say in so many words that Stalin had actually approved them.

Edmund Stevens, who was Moscow correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* from 1943 to 1950, believes that Malenkov has shown "open disregard for the niceties of legalistic procedure, and impatience with constitutional formalities". Malenkov specifically violated the Soviet Constitution and the statutes of the Communist Party on March 6, 1953. On this day, the party's Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet held combined meetings—or, at any rate, major changes were announced over their combined signatures.

Under Stalin there was considerable overlapping in the functions of leading personalities, but the legal framework was never openly violated. These interlocking directorates of party and state were supposed to show that, although the party had supreme importance, the two entities were indeed separate. Malenkov is impatient with these technicalities, which are partly rooted in Bolshevik tradition and partly represent expedient compromises made during some thirty years of Lenin-Stalin rule.

Malenkov as electoral secretary, had in the past hand-picked the very men and women who were later, with all the Soviet paraphernalia of balloting, "elected" by the populace.

Presumably, knowing full well that this election to the Supreme Soviet was a mere façade, Malenkov has come to disdain its fake parliamentarism. But he wandered far afield, and certainly outside Stalin's footsteps, in his appointment of Marshal Klimenti E. Voroshilov as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

This post is in theory the highest in the Soviet Union, yet it is largely an honorary position. Malenkov seems to have railroaded Voroshilov's appointment—which meant kicking the old man upstairs—through the joint meeting of March 6, while simultaneously ousting the previous chairman, Nikolai Shvernik, from his post. At the same time, and in the same openly high-handed manner, Shvernik was put into Vasily V. Kuznetsov's post as chairman of the Soviet Trade Union Council, the all-embracing Soviet labour union which supposedly elects its own officers.

Soviet totalitarianism, under Stalin, gloried in democratic window dressing. Its supporters outside the Soviet state could thus always point to the Soviet Constitution and other statutes and procedures to prove the democratic nature of the Soviet system. At home, too, these rituals had meaning and impact. Even docile members of the Supreme Soviet may be assumed to have a certain amount of pride; they know that they are rubber stamps, but they don't want to be reminded of it.

Malenkov, because of his dictatorial efficiency, lacks Stalin's finesse in dealing with human sensibilities and he also lacks his sense of humour.

A second danger for Malenkov is his patience-turned-impatience. It is related to the disdain with which he has ignored legalities of the Soviet Constitution. Malenkov as Premier is a volcano that has patiently rumbled for years, and is just beginning to crack open.

Since 1946, Malenkov has been pulling his punches. He tried, at that time, to push aside some of the Old Bolsheviks who talked lengthy Marxist dialectics when Malenkov felt

that action was needed. But he was slapped down, hard. He made his comeback in 1948, and afterward managed to restrain impetuous impulses.

As Premier, he is likely to find it more difficult to control his pent-up hostility. He is impatient to get on with things and may be tempted to push his associates too hard. After years lost in painstaking intrigue, Malenkov must be eager to impose his personality and ideas on others. His outward bulk has created the caricaturist's image of "the fat boy", the slow, plodding schemer. This image was outmoded when he became Premier, and it was never wholly correct. His scathing criticisms, his outbursts of violent language are notorious.

But the new Soviet Premier must try, no matter how much it taxes his self-control, to cultivate some of the outward serenity which the pipe-smoking, deliberate Stalin had in full measure. Georgi Malenkov's dealings with Mao Tse-tung of China will require both discretion and continued patience. He cannot push the enormously powerful Chinese leader around, nor can he let impatience get the better of him in his dealings with Marshal Gregori K. Zhukov and the army clique. Mao is unlikely to accept peremptory orders; Malenkov may show the Supreme Soviet that he disdains its impotence, but he must observe to the letter all legal niceties in dealing with the Peiping régime. He cannot dare a conflict with Mao or the army clique while Interior Minister Lavrenti P. Beria stands ready to check Malenkov's ambitions.

Another heresy seems to stalk Malenkov. Knowing Communist casuistry so well from the inside, he may be tempted to push aside another Stalinist nicety—the incense of Marxist-Leninist theory which Stalin always wafted in front of the harsh realities of Soviet life. Malenkov, the power-conscious man of action and technocrat, has previously shown a marked tendency to underestimate the importance of ritual. He may tend to disregard the

religio-idealistic aura which the wordy dialecticians have given even to purges and forced-labour camps.

Frederic C. Barghoorn, professor of political science at Yale University, has noted that the ideological approach gave "dignity and continuity to a régime that otherwise might have seemed one of oriental despotism rendered harsher by a measure of modern efficiency". Malenkov, an addict to efficiency, doubtless would like to eliminate the time-wasting ritual of wordy dialectics. If he does, he will not only be a Marxist revisionist and Leninist heretic, but he will also rob himself of this handy tool of idealism.

There remained a remarkable world-wide reservoir of pro-Soviet idealism at the time of Stalin's death. It was misguided idealism, to be sure, but nonetheless sincere. A great deal of deep-rooted French and Italian radicalism, of traditional Near and Far Eastern anti-colonialism still looked upon the Soviet state as a fortress built of ideals. Malenkov the materialist runs the danger of underestimating the importance of these forces which command no divisions or well-trained cadres, and whose strength cannot be measured in output per man hour.

Malenkov also runs the danger of prejudice. He is a man of hostilities that have remained pent up for many years. One of these is anti-Semitism. Mikhail Soloviev, author of the novel *When the Gods Are Silent*, relates that he once attended a meeting of Soviet industrial leaders as a reporter for *Izvestia*. Soloviev heard Malenkov, in a sudden burst of temper, interrupt an explanation of why nail production had fallen off, to announce that the man in charge of production was a Jew. Malenkov shouted at the man: "If these nails were for Stalin's coffin, you'd have them soon enough!"

The increasing number of Soviet expressions of anti-Semitism can be traced to a *Pravda* editorial on January 28, 1949—some six months after Malenkov's succession to Zhdanov's post in the Communist Party's secretariat. *Pravda* attacked Zionists and "cosmopolites actively

serving the interests of imperialist reaction". From then on, Soviet propaganda organs used such anti-Jewish euphemisms as "passportless wanderers", "people without kith and kin", and "people without tribe".

The next target were Jewish theatre critics, and Jews in other cultural fields. In late February a plenum of Ukrainian writers condemned "serious manifestations of Jewish bourgeois nationalism" in Soviet magazines. On March 14 the paper *Evening Moscow* labelled the targets of an editorial attack by publishing in brackets the Jewish names they had before adopting Russian pseudonyms, in exactly the same way in which the Nazis used to refer to Leon Trotsky as Bronstein.

It should be remembered that the Soviet Union rather unexpectedly endorsed partition of Palestine and establishment of the Republic of Israel in 1947, at a time when Malenkov had been pushed into the background and his antagonist Zhdanov was responsible for a good part of Soviet foreign policy. The anti-Israel and generally anti-Jewish line that emerged since then is apparently an expression of Malenkov's personal prejudices.

The danger of these prejudices seemed clearest during the openly anti-Semitic purge trials in Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1952, which puzzled and angered world opinion. But the climax came in January, 1953, when "Jewish terrorist doctors" were accused of a Moscow murder plot at the instigation of "American imperialism". Beria reversed this move on April 4, when his ministry announced that the doctors had been falsely accused. But much damage had been done.

Remnants of idealistic illusions regarding the Soviet state could, in the past, be maintained by pointing to Moscow's constitutional opposition to racial, or religious discrimination. Malenkov's anti-Semitic prejudices have done much to destroy these remnants of illusion. They have also contributed to a weakening of the ideological mortar that helps maintain the structure of the Soviet state.

Malenkov may have underestimated the repercussions of such events as the Prague purges, which seem to have combined his anti-Semitic hostilities with his desire to eliminate potentially anti-Malenkov or too rigidly pro-Stalin elements in the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Most likely, the two factors were jumbled in Malenkov's mind; his anti-Semitism led him to suspect that Jewish party officials would seek to undermine his own power position.

In misjudging public reaction, Malenkov illustrated another danger he faces: the danger of ignorance. Compared to him, Molotov is a "cosmopolitan"; he at least has seen much of the world. Malenkov has merely attended brief party meetings in Warsaw, Bucharest, and Prague. He knows the world entirely through the eyes of the Soviet espionage and diplomatic machineries.

The Old Bolsheviks who fought their way to power under czarism knew pre-Communist Russia. Many of them, like Lenin, lived in Switzerland, England, or other parts of Europe. Malenkov has no such background. And if he deliberately continues to isolate himself from contact with foreigners, he can gain no true knowledge of the world.

This ignorance is a danger to Malenkov. It is also a danger to the Soviet Union and to the world. We cannot assume that Georgi Malenkov has the insight to sit back and sort out the facts from the loaded verbiage and twisted reports supplied by his own information and propaganda machinery. We cannot assume that Soviet officials and agents have the courage to supply the Kremlin with anything but a caricature of the world outside Soviet boundaries; they must strive to please, to provide what Moscow wants to hear.

Consequently, Malenkov is likely to find himself listening to his own voice. Thus a thorough understanding of his personality is of great importance to Western policy makers; only then will they be able to anticipate the image which is likely to form in the mind of Stalin's successor.

. . . . .

Malenkov has to move with caution. He cannot risk unsettling the delicate balance of power that was achieved after Stalin's death. He cannot afford to defy his opponents too openly, to crush antagonists too ruthlessly. Perhaps that is why he compromised on the fate of two old rivals: Andrei A. Andreyev was given a largely honorary position of membership in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Anastas I. Mikoyan received the title of Deputy Premier.

This raises a question absolutely central to our thinking on Russia today. Is the Soviet Union controlled by a single all-powerful dictator, Malenkov, or by a directorate of top Soviet officials? Very likely Stalin never was quite the supreme dictator he appeared to be. Two important elements tended to create the picture of Stalin as the all-knowing, all-deciding Soviet dictator. First was the effort of the Soviet propaganda machine to have the Stalin image blot out everything else. He was presented as the superfather, actually a continuation of the "little father" symbol that served to popularize the Czars. Secondly, the world prefers to see nations as the lengthened shadow of one man: Gandhi was India to the world; Hitler was Nazi Germany; Peron is Argentina; Churchill, England. Where there is more than one important leader, such as in France, the picture becomes blurred; it doesn't suit the world's imagination. In Stalin, the world had a man who was ready-made, by courtesy of the Moscow propaganda machine, to fit the preferred pattern.

But no one man, obviously, could do all the things Stalin was supposed to have done. He had to delegate authority, to play associates and their projects against each other, to select and decide. He worked hard, but so did the men around him. Their responsibilities were manifold, their fields of operations were immense, the margin for error allowed them was narrow.

The Moscow régime functions in almost every field of human life, in many areas untouched by democratic govern-

ments. It controls all enterprises, from industry and agriculture to the arts and literature. Soviet state bureaucracy is enormous. Undertakings and decisions which, in a nation like the United States, are in the hands of private individuals, are in the Soviet Union the responsibility of hard-pressed officials. If the President of the United States must rely on large staffs of advisers and associates, then the Premier of the Soviet Union cannot do less.

Stripped of the propaganda trimmings that made Stalin appear omniscient and ever-present, the late Soviet Premier might appear as a top executive who knew how to let others do much of his work, while he received all public credit. Thus, when Malenkov became Premier, he moved into a position of similar responsibility with the same need for sharing authority, but without Stalin's prestige and carefully built up public image. Today, Malenkov must step warily and advance his ideas with caution. *His is not a one-man dictatorship; it is a junta, a directorate, in which Malenkov stands out by virtue of drive, toughness, and the sense of inborn personal power which emanates from him.*

If Malenkov were an all-powerful dictator, he might have signed the amnesty decree of March 27, 1953, with his own name; instead, the decree was issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. If Malenkov were an all-powerful dictator, men like Andreyev and Mikoyan would probably no longer be in public life. Stalin at first shared power with Gregori Zinoviev and Leonid Kamenev. He disposed of these potential rivals and replaced them with such men as Molotov and Beria to whom he could more safely delegate authority.

Malenkov shares his power with Beria. Other members of the governing junta may not necessarily be found among the first deputy premiers. More likely Nikita E. Krushchev is one of the central group; others who have achieved quick prominence, such as Culture Minister Ponomarenko also seem to belong to the new inner circle.

Georgi M. Malenkov cannot govern alone. Neither could Stalin. But Malenkov's career shows that he has the perseverance and dynamism to hold authority and impose his will on others.

For Malenkov, the memory of Stalin poses still another danger. It is the memory of Stalin. In one important sense, the Stalinist system made no preparations for a successor. It operated as if Stalin were immortal. The Soviet propaganda machine, unable to prepare the nation for Stalin's death, also could not begin to build up his successor's image in the public mind. The gap between the ever-present Stalin and the relatively obscure Malenkov is therefore enormous.

It took Stalin himself at least four years before he began to overtake the image of Lenin. Stalin's task in 1924 was perhaps easier than Malenkov's is today as there had not been the same tremendously calculated effort in Lenin's lifetime to popularize him as the fount of all wisdom and the "great teacher and father" of the state. Malenkov's task of dulling the memory of his predecessor is compounded because of the length of time, nearly three full decades, that the Communist propaganda organs have been blowing up the Soviet Premier into superhuman proportions. That any man should even pretend to replace Stalin—this proposition may well seem arrogant and near-sacrilege to many Russians. It must certainly seem so to Malenkov's associates, the men who know his beginnings, career, and qualifications. To them, the memory-image of Stalin provides a temporarily safe shield for sly digs at Malenkov's pretension and crudities. Any immediate or ultimate revolt against Malenkov's authority might well come in the name and guise of Stalinism.

One fascinating question which stands unanswered, and will perhaps always remain so, is the part Stalin played in Malenkov's succession to power. No testament signed by Stalin, to decide this vital issue, was published at the time of his death. No indication that Stalin had chosen his own successor could be found in funeral addresses or official

public statements. One can only consider Malenkov's position of power before Stalin's death, his prestige, and the honours heaped upon him; certainly Stalin must have at least approved Malenkov's prominence in the battle for power and he probably had a hand in it himself.

On January 7, 1952, for instance, Malenkov's prominence was dramatized when the Supreme Soviet awarded him the Order of Lenin for his "outstanding services to the Communist Party and the Soviet people". At the same time, the party's Central Committee and the Council of Ministers joined in long and effusive tribute in which Malenkov was called "a loyal disciple of Lenin" and a colleague of Comrade Stalin" and a man whose "entire conscious life had been devoted to the great cause of the Lenin-Stalin Party, to the struggle for the triumph of Communism". In October, 1952, there were further clear signs that Malenkov was first in line as heir to Stalin's power. During the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress, his mammoth report on nearly all phases of the Soviet Union's internal and external policies took five hours to deliver and dwarfed the performances of other officials.

The new Soviet Premier, whether or not he has Stalin's official sanction, will try to turn the memory-image of his erstwhile master into a remote and cloudy Stalin myth. Malenkov must realize the menace which the Stalin image represents to his ambitions. He will undoubtedly be on the look-out for those around him who seem to overpraise Stalin but pay only perfunctory homage to his successor.

When he appeared before the Supreme Soviet, less than ten days after Stalin died, Malenkov mentioned the dead ruler only in passing. This, he was saying in effect, is a new era—"Stalin is dead; long live Malenkov!"

But in trying to obscure the memory of Stalin, Malenkov may once again be tempted to underestimate the religio-ideological elements of Soviet society. To replace Stalin will take many years, and Malenkov is an aggressive and

impatient man. On his power to exercise restraint, now that he has reached the top, may depend Malenkov's success or failure.

Pugachov, Pushkin's bandit from Orenburg, told his followers to "think of me what you like". Yet, although he asked for allegiance and not affection, he forced the people to pretend that he was the Czar and to kiss his hand. In the end, Pugachov the Orenberg rebel impatiently overextended his power. He was beheaded, and his head was held up for all the people to see.

CHAPTER II

Halfway to Power

WHAT is Malenkov? Is he a professional revolutionary, a new type of Communist statesman, an energetic industrial executive, a skilled organizer of men? Is Malenkov the possessor of a card-index mind, is he a meticulous administrator, or just a party official and palace intriguer?

Georgi Malenkov is all these things, in a measure. But mainly, as his career shows, he is a trained terrorist who travelled the road to power as a cunning, ruthless conspirator.

That is not said lightly but on the basis of evidence that illuminates the life of this man who has sought to hide behind a fog of obscurity. It is said because Malenkov chose and followed a career that is itself a character portrait. The past lives of men, at various points in their careers, reflect their personalities as much as do their acquired habits of dress, of speech, of thought and self-expression.

Premier Malenkov learned to use the tool of terror during the early part of his career, and it has served him well as he carved a way to power through the jungle of Soviet Communist society.

Malenkov has hidden his ancestry. No one knows who his parents were. Had his father been a worker or poor peasant, the biographers of the *Soviet Encylopædia* would surely tell us so, and proudly; in Communist society, proletarian origin is thought essential for membership in the exclusive Soviet *élite*. Malenkov is thought to be the son and grandson of a provincial official or a member of the despised "bourgeois" middle class.

When he was younger and more impetuous, Georgi

Malenkov once gave public vent to his feelings about the inverted snobbery of Communist society. In a rambunctious speech on February 15, 1941, he ranted against officials who hire only people who have the proper ancestors, officials "who busy themselves with researches into a man's genealogy, with searches of who was his grandfather and grandmother", not with studying his "qualities and his abilities". Malenkov did not empower Soviet biographers to tell us who his grandfather or grandmother were, much less his father and mother—who may have had the bad judgement to belong to the wrong class for a son engaged in perfecting a classless society.

Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov was born on January 8, 1902, south of the Ural Mountains, in the town of Orenburg; the town was later renamed Chkalov, after the Soviet flyer who crossed the North Pole on a flight to the United States in 1937. What kind of people lived in Orenburg when Malenkov was born? Census figures show that five years before he was born Orenburg had a population of 72,740. According to the *Russian Encyclopædic Dictionary* of 1897, 43 per cent of the population belonged to the lower middle class; 30 per cent to the military—which means that they were mostly Cossacks and subalterns, and only 10,570 were of peasant stock. The number of people who were workers in Orenburg cannot, on the basis of a census taken four years earlier, have been much more than 1,000 when Malenkov was born. According to Laza M. Pistrak, the painstaking research specialist of the Voice of America, "the majority of the Orenburg 'peasants' were actually engaged in trade activities, which were flourishing in this city at the time Malenkov was born; it is very improbable that Malenkov's parents belonged to the working class."

Pistrak also noted that Malenkov's father's name, Maximilian, was rather high-brow for the time and place. The common Russian name is Maxim. Malenkov's own name, Georgi, is also rather literary, its common form being

Yuri. All this evidence suggests that Georgi Malenkov has excellent reasons, in Soviet society, not to want people to dig back and "busy themselves with researches into a man's genealogy."

When the Bolshevik Revolution took place in St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) in October, 1917, Malenkov was not yet sixteen years old. It must be remembered that the Bolshevik Revolution did not immediately set up Soviet rule the length and breadth of the former Czarist Empire. Rather, the Red Army had to subdue the country bit by bit, in a long and bitter civil war that did not end until 1921. Was Georgi Malenkov prevented by youth from being a pre-Revolution Bolshevik, an early fighter in the Red Army? Did he quickly ally himself with the forces which, more than three decades later, were to place him at the head of the nation? The official Soviet biographers say so, but careful analysis of the evidence contradicts this official version. We are told that Georgi Malenkov was a Red Army volunteer at the age of 18, late in 1919 or early in 1920. That would indeed have made him a daring young rebel, choosing sides while the great battle was still undecided, when it wasn't yet a certainty that the Bolsheviks would conquer the country.

Malenkov, living in his parents' home at Orenburg, saw the city change hands three times. His home town was then being defended against the Red Army by troops under the Cossack commander Ataman (Chief) Alexander Dutov. The Cossacks held Orenburg until January 18, 1918, when the Red Army occupied the town. But about six months later, on July 2, Dutov's troops returned and forced the Red Army to quit Orenburg. (The town had been bitterly fought over in earlier wars as well. Cossacks and peasants of the Orenburg area had risen against the Czarina Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century.)

Shortly after Malenkov's seventeenth birthday, the Red Army once again occupied Orenburg, on January 22, 1919.

Even though the town seemed securely in Bolshevik hands for three months, Georgi Malenkov did not join the Red forces. On April 27, the Cossacks made another attack on Orenburg, advancing from the east and south, and then firing on the railroad station and the town itself. One Soviet historian, F. Popov, in his book *The Dutov Movement*, published at Moscow in 1934, wrote that "the Orenburg proletariat, under Bolshevik guidance, grasped arms against and made every effort to repulse the Cossack troops. . . . Workers went to the front; almost the entire [Communist] Party organization took a stand in the trenches; and even the city police was sent to the front line." But young Malenkov does not seem to have felt sufficiently sympathetic with the "Orenburg proletariat", the workers in the trenches, and the Communist Party's defenders, to join the fight. Not in the spring and summer of 1919, at any rate, although Popov reports that "during the entire months of June and July the situation near Orenburg remained tense."

Meanwhile the Red Army was gaining the upper hand in its effort to extend Bolshevik rule throughout the Empire. Anti-Bolshevik resistance forces in Siberia, as well as in the southern region, were in retreat. In mid-1919, the Southern Command of the Red Army was organized separately, as the Turkestan Command, and led by Mikhail V. Frunze. The Turkestan Command, from then on, had to deal only with a native guerrilla movement. Commander Frunze himself admitted that these guerrillas, known as the "Basmach" movement, were a force of "hundreds and thousands of those whom the [Communist] authorities had hurt and offended." Frunze admitted that the Red Army had outraged the local population by lawlessness, looting, and violence. He said that the Reds, instead of acting as "defenders of the working people and the revolution," had acted as "an instrument of violence against them". The Bolshevik commander recognized that the Basmach guerrillas

were "far from being simply brigands," but people who had looked in vain for a defence of their rights and who had decided to take justice and self-protection into their own hands.

These people, acting in self-defence against Red Army excesses, became the first target in Malenkov's revolutionary career—but even then not on the battlefield. According to the *Political Dictionary* published in Moscow in 1940, when Malenkov at last entered the Bolshevik Party in April, 1920, after the Bolshevik victory had become a certainty, and two and a half years after the Bolshevik Revolution, he became "engaged as a political worker" successively in "a squadron, regiment, brigade, and the Political Administration of the Turkestan Front".

Young Malenkov thus was never a front-line fighter in the Red Army, even though he joined the Communists belatedly and might have been supposed to be eager to make up for lost time. Instead, he was engaged in making sure that the local population did not try to take vengeance against the Bolsheviks.

The very month that Malenkov entered the party, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan Front sent a significant message to the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Soviets. The message revealed two facts: first, there was practically no sympathy for the Bolsheviks in Turkestan; second, in order to enforce their rule, the Bolsheviks were ready to undertake mass killings, a "pogrom". The message, dated April 16 and signed by Shalva Eliava, stated: "Here, as far as Soviet power is concerned, there is absolutely a blank space, and as far as communism is concerned, it is a negative quantity. As it seems, it will be necessary to organize a Soviet and Party pogrom." The organization of such a "pogrom" was the task of Red Army "political workers", and it was with such a group that Malenkov received his earliest training.

In the atmopshere of violence and chaos prevailing in

Turkestan, Red Army troops, as we have seen from Frunze's admission, were wild and undisciplined bands. It was the task of "political workers" to instil a measure of discipline through terror and purges. A historical account, published in Moscow in 1924, appraised this situation candidly. Writing on *The Fergan Basmach Movement in* 1918–1922, D. D. Zuyev quoted the Turkestan Central Executive Committee of the Soviets as reporting: "The First Cavalry Regiment represents an armed gang, a complete chaos, in which criminal elements and anti-Bolshevik Whiteguardists feel like fish in water, and develop their activity to the utmost. And this is not even the worst regiment." Soviet sources do not state whether Malenkov was a political worker in the First Regiment or not. However, similar conditions seem to have prevailed throughout the Turkestan Red Army. The report observed that the whole army was in chaos, saying that "properly speaking, until now there is no Army in Turkestan, and there will be none as long as the organizational principles of the military units remains unchanged."

A political worker like Georgi Malenkov was therefore kept busy crushing the local resistance movement behind the lines, while liquidating unsuitable elements within Red Army regiments. But he also had an economic-political task, particularly in the Fergana region, rich in grain, whose peasants had proved stubborn in resisting the Bolsheviks and who needed to be taught a lesson in rather primitive politico-economic co-operation. The political worker engaged in seizing the farmers' grain stocks—documentation, in this case, coming from a report submitted to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, as reported in the *Great Soviet Encyclopædia* (Moscow, 1935): "The front in Fergana was of a purely internal nature, its main significance was an economic one, because, in case of liquidation of the front, we would be able to realize the Ferganian grain reserves, which are certainly very large."

Those were the functions of men like Malenkov, "political workers" in the Red Army, as it imposed Bolshevik rule upon the former czarist Empire. These tasks were later amplified, expanded on a national scale: ferreting out any effort toward nonconformity among the civilian population; acting as a "political commissar" within the Bolshevik apparatus; squeezing as much out of the economy as terroristic pressure methods could accomplish. During his Turkestan period, Malenkov went through tough and valuable schooling.

This element of caution showed itself for a second time during Malenkov's student years in Moscow. It was the Communist Party itself, which after the civil war, selected the politically most promising young men for study in the capital's institutes of higher learning. According to the *Political Dictionary* reports, Georgi Malenkov, having made good as a "political worker" in Turkestan, "after the end of the civil war studied at the MVTU"—initials which stand for the Moscow Higher Technical School. Whether he was serious about becoming an engineer or not, student Malenkov certainly remained politically active, because he was "secretary of the Russian Communist Party cell for the entire school".

Malenkov's cautiousness in choosing sides revealed itself during the controversy between Stalin and Leon Trotsky, which eventually led to Trotsky's exile and assassination in Mexico. The Stalin-Trotsky controversy was a fight for the post of successor to Lenin, a power struggle which began considerably before Lenin's death in 1924. Trotsky's brilliance as a writer and orator made him popular among the intellectually-minded Moscow students. About seventy per cent of the students favoured Trotsky, which prompted him to claim that "youth is the most correct barometer of the party" and "especially students react sharply against bureaucracy". Quite a few students who had helped the Bolsheviks take over the country were disillusioned with

the revolution's aftermath. They felt the Communist Party owed them more than the drab life of post-revolutionary Moscow. Where were the fruits of rebellion, where was the Marxist-Leninist utopia?

Like young people elsewhere in the world, particularly in Near and Far Eastern countries today, the Moscow students of the post-civil-war era formed an important part of Communist Party strength. In 1923, one quarter of the Moscow party organization was made up of students. They argued among themselves, they orated, they wrote flaming resolutions. The trend at the universities was clearly pro-Trotsky and anti-Stalin. *Pravda* reported early in 1924 that 6,594 students favoured Trotsky; only 2,790 students were neutral or in favour of Stalin.

What was happening at the Moscow Higher Technical School, where Malenkov was secretary of the party cell "for the entire school"? On January 4, *Pravda* reported that the Workers' Department of the school had come out for Trotsky. But Malenkov, if he was pro-Stalin, soon had a chance to state his allegiance without leaving a shadow of a doubt.

The Stalin partisans drew up an anti-Trotsky letter, a long document signed by students, which appeared in two instalments in *Pravda*, on January 9 and 11. The letter carried 404 signatures, but the name of G. M. Malenkov was not on the list. Lazar Pistrak, in his *Voice of America* research report on Malenkov, notes that "the total number of cell secretaries in the Moscow higher schools was at that time 72", considerably less than the number of signatures. Therefore, Pistrak says, "if Malenkov, one of these secretaries, had been at that time a supporter of Stalin's line, he would have signed the anti-Trotsky letter as one of the 404."

Nevertheless, shortly after Lenin's death on January 21, 1924, Malenkov found himself in the good graces of the Stalin-led party machine. Official Soviet sources are reticent about this period. The *Political Dictionary* restricts itself to

the reference that Malenkov joined the "apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party," where he served as a "responsible worker from 1925 to 1930." There is no word of how he came to be selected, or who did the selecting.

Close students of Kremlin operations agree that the biographical reference to the party's "apparatus" in reality refers to Stalin's personal secretariat. According to Robert Dall, a student in Moscow at the time, Malenkov was recommended for a party position by Besso Lominadze,* at that time leader of the Communist Youth League, the Komsomol. With this recommendation, Malenkov was hired by Ivan Tovstyukha, who was then looking for promising young men to staff the party secretariat. The job paid 250 roubles per month, considerably more than the five roubles students received as an allowance. Tovstyukha, Malenkov's first employer, was a cultivated and idealistic man who died of tuberculosis in 1927. He was succeeded by his deputy, Alexander Proskrebyshev, who remained Stalin's personal secretary for a quarter of a century.

Thus between the ages of twenty-three and twenty-five, Malenkov appears to have made his mark as an up and coming "apparatus" man—and a man capable of serving and utilizing the machinery of the Communist Party. Without ties of sentiment to "Old Bolsheviks", already experienced in the tactics of party terror, Malenkov was learning the practice of conspiracy from the Master himself.

* Lominadze was one of the Comintern agents who, on December 11, 1927, organized the bloody Chinese Communist uprising that became known as the "Canton Commune". During the factional fight within the United States Communist Party in 1928, he threw Comintern support behind William Z. Foster. Lominadze was shot during the purges of 1937.

CHAPTER III

In Stalin's Shadow

CHILDREN in Russian schools used to chant a song with the words, "I want to be like Stalin." Malenkov, working in Stalin's shadow, had ample opportunity to observe his idol at close hand. Above all, he saw the workings of intraparty conspiracy, the operations in which men were manœuvred to the advantage of Lenin's ruthless successor.

The years from 1925 to 1930 were decisive for the U.S.S.R. Trotsky was exiled, and Stalin prepared the downfall of his remaining opponents: Nikolai Bukharin, who had helped him to defeat Trotsky; Gregori Zinoviev, the first chief of the Communist International; Leonid Kamenev, who had a lingering affection for Trotsky. All these men had supporters within the Communist Party. First this support had to be weakened. Then each in his turn had to be isolated, surrounded by antagonists, and finally destroyed.

During these years, Malenkov learned one fundamental technique: how to use a campaign in favour of supposed ideological purity to crush an opponent. During the Stalin-Trotsky controversy and the purges that followed, Stalin created vast smoke screens of theoretical verbiage. In speeches, overloaded with Marx and Lenin quotations, these men hurled charges of obscure ideological sins at each other. Trotsky favoured "permanent revolution" on an international scale; Stalin preferred to consolidate the gains of socialism in one country, the Soviet Union, first of all.

It did not matter that, at heart, Stalin had no quarrel with the idea of a world-wide revolution. In fact, after ridding

himself of Trotsky, he ultimately put Trotsky's theories into practice. But the main thing had been to find a talking point, a propaganda theme, a supposed heresy of which his opponent could be found guilty. No ideological concept seemed too remote and fanciful to serve in ruining an antagonist's standing. Some twenty years later, Malenkov was to use a similar tactic in dealing with supporters of his antagonist, Andrei A. Zhdanov.

When his five years with Stalin's secretariat ended in 1930, Malenkov was made a divisional director within the party's Central Committee. He participated in the party's Sixteenth Congress, representing the central party "apparatus" with a deliberative vote. That same year, Malenkov became chief of the Organizing Department in the Moscow Party Committee. His superior was Lazar M. Kaganovich—who, in 1953, was to become a First Deputy Premier under Malenkov.

Perhaps this early relationship helps to explain why Kaganovich received such a high post following Stalin's death. True, he had long been a Politburo member, and he had never been mentioned as a man harbouring dangerous aspirations. But why so prominent a position—on the same level as Lavrenti Beria, Molotov, and Bulganin? Also, his appointment came at a time when anti-Semitism seemed to have become official policy in the Soviet Union and its satellites; Kaganovich is the only Jew in the top Kremlin hierarchy. Because the answer to these contradictions may be found in the early relationship between Malenkov and Kaganovich, it may be justified to digress briefly in order to examine the career of the man who was Malenkov's superior in the Moscow Party Committee back in the early thirties.

Lazar Kaganovich's, big square-looking head and full Stalin-type moustache have looked, unsmiling and forbidding, at the Western world for years. His life, not unlike that of Molotov, is that of an Old Bolshevik and an early

idealist who long ago made his compromise with tyranny, terror, and deceit. Kaganovich and Malenkov together were at least partially responsible for the ruthless removal of Stalin's potential enemies from the Moscow party. (Premier Stalin was married to one of Kaganovich's sisters.)

Both men, as their careers and utterances show, are shrewd and practical—coldly determined to get results, regardless of price. They are meticulous organizers, capable of cutting through mountains of bureaucratic red tape. Malenkov, in the second World War, was in charge of industrial and transportation problems—in other words, it was his task to speed up war production. Kaganovich had dealt with similar problems in the late 1930s. In particular, he is credited with straightening out the chaotic Soviet railroad system.

Immediately following the second World War, Kaganovich was sent on a trouble-shooting mission to the Ukraine, charged with suppressing anti-Soviet guerrillas and resurgent Ukrainian nationalism. Later he was once more placed in charge of heavy industry and transport, and of war-production centres in Central Asia.

Operating in the same fields, with the same kind of machine-like efficiency (whether it meant party purges or industrial production figures), may have created a measure of mutual respect between Malenkov and Kaganovich. Possibly, too, the relatively unambitious Kaganovich today occupies a position in the Malenkov scheme of things similar to his own trouble-shooter role under Stalin.

At any rate, the two men served Stalin well in the early 1930s. They crushed Moscow party opposition even before the great purges of the mid-thirties. Malenkov's service was rewarded with an appointment to the Moscow Provincial Party Committee on January 30, 1932. At the same time he was made a delegate to the Seventeenth All-Union Party Conference with a deliberative vote. Two years later, in

January, 1934, Malenkov participated in the Seventeenth All-Union Party Congress, this time with a decisive vote.

We now come to a complex set of initials, and to a violent, erratic man. Both are of great importance in the life of the new Soviet Premier. The initials are ORPO and they stand for Otdel Rukovodiashchikh Partiinikh Organov, which means Department of Leading Party Organizations. The man's name was Nikolai Yezhov.

The ORPO was set up in 1934 by the Seventeenth Party Congress, and Malenkov became its operating director. ORPO took the place of the Communist Party's personnel section, the Registration and Distribution Department. The magazine *Party Construction*, in its issue of October 15, 1935, defined the main functions of ORPO, within the party's Central Committee; it had the job of supervising the work of leading party organizations throughout the Soviet Union, that is, in the various Soviet Republics, and on provincial and regional levels. This particular phase of the task was undertaken through special territorial groups of instructors, or inspectors.

Furthermore, ORPO had the job of making and keeping a record of every prominent party member—people in the party itself, as well as in the government administration, industry, transport, agriculture, trade, education, and science. In other words, Malenkov's bureau was the Communist Party's internal secret service, Stalin's own intelligence service within the party.

As for Nikolai Yezhov, he was Malenkov's superior in ORPO and later became the head of the Soviet Secret Police, called NKVD at that time. During the final phase of the great purge he went too far, even by Kremlin standards, and in 1938 was done away with. This man Yezhov for a time was Malenkov's esteemed superior.

Because Yezhov eventually went wild and embarrassed

Stalin, official Soviet biographers now avoid linking Malenkov with Yezhov. In fact, however, Malenkov was Yezhov's pupil. Although he may, in witnessing Yezhov's demise, have learned to avoid obvious excesses, the teacher-student relationship definitely did exist. Nowhere could a man study terror tactics more intimately than under Yezhov. Nowhere could the mechanics of conspiracy be examined more closely.

The infamous Moscow trials of 1936–1937 had to be prepared well in advance, with painstaking attention to detail. Dossiers about the accused men had to be compiled, actual facts had to be cleverly integrated with wild and fantastic accusations. Early in 1935 Yezhov became one of the party secretaries, and replaced Kaganovich as chairman of the party's Control Commission. There is no question that at this time Yezhov became Malenkov's immediate superior. The source for this information is the magazine *Party Construction* (Moscow, February, 1935). As chief of ORPO, Yezhov replaced Kaganovich.

In September of that year Yezhov was the main speaker at an ORPO meeting. Malenkov, too, spoke to the audience, but he was merely identified as an ORPO "representative". It was during this period that Yezhov and Malenkov worked closely with the NKVD, compiling incriminating dossiers on party people who were to be purged. Malenkov's speech at this particular conference was concerned with efforts to safeguard membership-card authenticity, an undertaking, in the words of *Party Construction*, designed to accomplish the "unmasking and banishing from our ranks of swindlers, rogues, Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and other kinds of rascals." Malenkov, in this speech, was most complimentary toward his superior, repeating such phrases as "Comrade Yezhov was absolutely right . . ." and "Comrade Yezhov has fully elucidated all questions. . . ."

In March, 1936, we find Malenkov as editor of *Party Construction*, replacing Yezhov. Two months later the magazine

was editorially extolling Yezhov's teaching abilities, saying: "Comrade Yezhov taught us how to reorganize the party's work, how to raise organizational work to a higher level, and how to make this work more effective. . . . We strive to carry out these instructions." As Lazar Pistrak puts it: "The relations between Yezhov and Malenkov were those of a chief and a subordinate, of a teacher and pupil. They continued to be such even when Yezhov was replaced by Malenkov as chief of ORPO," in mid-1936.

Malenkov, in December, 1937, editorially hailed Yezhov for making the bloody purges possible. *Party Construction* said that "under the leadership of the Stalinist People's Commissar, Comrade Yezhov, the Soviet intelligence service inflicted merciless and striking blows at the fascist bandits." adding in a somewhat inappropriate tone of adulation: "The Soviet people love their intelligence service, because it defends the vital interests of the people and it is their flesh and blood. . . . The faithful guardians of Socialism—the NKVD men—under the leadership of their Stalinist People's Commissar, Comrade Yezhov, will continue in the future to crush and to root out, the enemies of the people—the vile Trotskyite, Bukharinite, bourgeois-nationalist and other agents of fascism. Let the spies and traitors tremble! The punishing hand of the Soviet people—the NKVD—will annihilate them! Our ardent Bolshevik greetings to the Stalinist People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov."

To view this extravagant praise in historical context, we must recall that the conveyer belt of the Moscow purges had then reached full speed. Andrei Vishinsky, later famous for his dramatic appearances at the United Nations, was the prosecutor at the big show trials, goading his victims into confessions of guilt. Yezhov's secret-police machinery after wearing them down with threat and torture, fed victim upon victim into the trials' meat grinder, arranging for quick execution or banishment of hundreds and thousands of the accused. Behind

Yezhov stood Malenkov, compiling and supplying dossiers—and naming the men who would take over positions vacated by the dead and deported.

The trials and purges, in the self-generated hysteria of NKVD persecution, reached their highest pitch in mid-1938. Yezhov's accusations lost all link with reality, became incoherent, knew no bounds.

But, by then, Malenkov was no longer in need of teachers. He had already spent thirteen years at the nerve centres of Soviet power. He had observed Stalin himself, had been instructed by the cold Kaganovich, and the rather hysterical Yezhov. During the purge period, he had begun himself to eliminate men whom, for one reason or another, he personally wanted out of the way. He had also managed to staff the party organization to a large degree with personnel who would, from that time on, be deeply indebted to Georgi M. Malenkov. He had begun to assemble the parts of his own political machine, a party within the party.

During these years, Malenkov had little chance or cause to deal with Marxist-Leninist theory. He knew the uses of ideological arguments in a struggle for power. He knew how ideological failings could be amplified into charges of anti-party activity, of conspiracy against the Kremlin; how they could prompt a party member to fall from grace. But, as he knew the use of theoretical arguments from the inside, Malenkov clearly developed a cynical attitude toward theories and theoreticians—a cynicism which showed itself, in public utterances, during various parts of his career.

Nevertheless, Malenkov had developed a working knowledge of Marxist vernacular, although he preferred to quote Stalin rather than Marx, Engels, or even Lenin. He learned to dress his speeches with the proper veneer of Marxism-Leninism, but he knew that reality lay deeper. Reality meant people in their relation to each other; it meant careers broken or made, in lives fulfilled or crushed; it meant

powerful men sitting in judgment on high rostra, helpless men standing beneath them—looking upward, cringing—and confessing to deeds of which they knew nothing.

Until the end of the purges, Georgi Malenkov had been satisfied to operate in the shadows. Now, slowly, he stepped into the limelight of Soviet affairs. Under the Soviet Constitution of 1937, a document that provided democratic camouflage for Stalinist tyranny, pseudo-elections were instituted in the Soviet Union. Delegates were to be "elected" to the Supreme Soviet—the same hand-picked group which on March 15, 1953, gave a stamp of spurious legality to Malenkov's succession to Stalin.

On October 11, 1937, Malenkov was made secretary of the Central Electoral Commission. All members of the Supreme Soviet had to be, of course, completely reliable in Kremlin terms. Malenkov knew intimate details of the lives of everyone who might be considered as a candidate. As he looked down, sixteen years later, upon the men and women who legalized his power, Malenkov could know the deepest secrets behind the faces that looked up to him. As electoral secretary, he had passed judgement on each one of them before their names were submitted to the powerless voters.

In addition to selecting candidates for the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov was himself elected to this body in 1938, and served as a parliamentary delegate until 1946. Membership in the Supreme Soviet was, however, so much window dressing. Quite another matter was membership in the Presidium of the Eighteenth Party Congress of 1939. That Congress named Malenkov to the party's Central Committee. The Committee, in turn, appointed him a member of its Organization Bureau (Org-bureau). He also became one of the Central Committee's secretaries.

Malenkov was moving up the ladder of command and authority quickly. The year of 1939 was crucial in his life, just as it was in the life of his later antagonist Andrei Zhdanov. Until then, Zhdanov was well ahead in public

prestige, Stalin's esteem, and party power. But Malenkov was gaining rapidly, and eventually the two men were to meet violently in a collision that was to shake all strata of Soviet life.

Zhdanov made the key report to the Eighteenth Party Congress—the last such Congress until the meeting of October, 1952, which gave Malenkov such overwhelming prominence. Zhdanov in 1939 outlined important changes in the Communist Party programme and statutes. Malenkov was a member of the committee actually in charge of proposing the changes, but he was one of twenty-seven committee members, well below Zhdanov in importance.

Above all, however, it should be remembered that Georgi Malenkov remained in charge of the huge dossier files, the streamlined card-index machinery. He was made director of the office that succeeded ORPO, the Administration of Cadres.

What are cadres? The word appears constantly in Communist Party exhortations, in the Soviet Union as well as in parties outside the Soviet orbit. Cadres, like "cells" or "party nuclei", are the tightly knit groups of trained, reliable Communists who operate within a larger organisation, control it, lead it, swing it into line with party aims. Even in the United States, as in other countries outside the Iron Curtain, such cadres have been and can be found in labour unions, at schools, in the arts, sciences, and professions, in industrial plants, in non-party organizations. By parliamentary skill and pressure methods, small cadres can swing large but lethargic groups.

Cadres, in the Soviet Union, are the hard core of Kremlin supporters: men and women who can be relied upon to push execution of policies, and to report back to the Administration of Cadres anyone suspected of insufficient zeal. Upon the performance of cadre members depends their advance or demotion within party ranks, their admit-

tance to or exclusion from the privileged top stratum of Soviet society—these are the "intellectuals," who, together with workers and peasants, now make up the three classes in a nation supposedly on its way to a "classless society".

As we have seen, the ORPO concerned itself with keeping close control only over leading party members. When the Eighteenth Congress established the cadre administration, under Malenkov, it widened his authority by extending it to the cells, or virtually to the entire party membership. When this step was taken, in 1939, the party had 1,588,852 members and 888,814 candidates for party membership. Details on every one of these men and women were on file in Malenkov's office, staffed by hundreds of carefully-selected researchers and statisticians, equipped with up-to-date cataloguing facilities.

By this time the war in Europe had started. Stalin had made the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Finland had resisted Soviet invasion. The Stalin-Hitler deal gave the Kremlin a brief breathing spell in which Stalin decided to expand party control over all fields of Soviet life essential in war production and internal wartime discipline. On February 15, 1941, four months before Hitler's armies invaded the Soviet Union, Malenkov made the key address at the Eighteenth Party Conference. His speech was devoted to organization of industry and transport. His criticism of Soviet administrators in this field was scathing to the point of arrogance and showed no trace of caution. He spoke of "flaws, shortcomings, and errors" in the direction of industry and transport; he castigated Soviet bureaucrats, saying that "some of them like to sit in swivel chairs and run things by correspondence."

The day after this speech, Georgi M. Malenkov was named an alternate member of the all-powerful Politburo. At thirty-seven, he was thus already a power in a circle of Old Bolsheviks. In the wholesale shake-up in the upper

echelons of Soviet industry that followed Malenkov's attack, Vyacheslav Molotov's wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina —who had earlier failed as Cosmetics Trust director—was ousted as People's Commissar of the Fish Industry, and had to withdraw from public life.

Victor Kravchenko, in his book *I Chose Freedom*, reports that Molotov took his wife's failure as a personal disgrace, and said: "The fault, comrades, is one which I must share myself. I have failed to give sufficient attention to the matter." To which Stalin is said to have replied, with characteristic sarcasm: "That's beside the point. The crux of the matter is that too many fish are swimming in the sea when they ought to be on citizen's tables." Whether Molotov related his wife's demotion to the tongue-lashing Malenkov gave the bureaucrats is a moot point. There can be little doubt today there is scant love lost between the two.

During the war years Malenkov's star rose. His result-getting ruthlessness was now directed against Soviet labour engaged in war production. His extraordinary organizational ability was utilized to the hilt. Shortly after the German invasion Malenkov became a member of the State Defence Committee, together with Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Beria. Malenkov, swamped with work, named an energetic young man from Leningrad to join the Committee. The Malenkov protégé was Nikolai A. Voznesensky; it is a name to remember, the name of one who tried to betray the man who today is Soviet Premier.

On the State Defence Committee, Malenkov's job was to break bottlenecks in war production, particularly in the tank and aircraft industries. As the Nazi armies overran the most crucial Soviet industrial areas, this became an extremely difficult task. It called for quick action, the dismantling and eastward transfer of whole plants, and for the enforcement of labour discipline at a time when chaos threatened the enforcement of Kremlin rule.

Malenkov was the enforcer of that rule. He reduced war production to essentials, cutting out civilian items almost entirely, limiting tank and aeroplane models to a few standard items, and enforcing mass production of those standard models. Soviet sources claim that aeroplane production at that time rose to 40,000 per year. Malenkov also had a hand in assuring essential steel and oil output. During the battle of Stalingrad he exhorted the defenders. Later he moved into territories vacated by the retreating Germans and whipped the population into quick rebuilding of devastated industries. He received the Order of Lenin and a Gold Medal with Hammer and Sickle in 1943, and was also made a Hero of Socialist Labour. In 1945 he received a second Order of Lenin.

In March, 1946, Malenkov became a full Politburo member. It seemed as if nothing could stop his rise now. And yet, it appears that, at about this time, he became careless. Perhaps his antipathy against Bolshevik old-timers, men with a past rather than a present, got the better of his usually cautious judgment. In 1946, speaking in favour of new party principles, Malenkov actually called for a revision of Marxist tenets. A worshipper at the altar of his own accomplishments, he spoke out in favour of the doers, and against the theorists and the talkers.

He urged, heretically, that "we who follow the Marxists teachings, must study our contemporary experience". Communists, he said, must "incorporate it into day-by-day practical leadership. . . . The war has forged new people, new personnel capable of pushing the work ahead."

Who were these new people? Why Malenkov, of course, and the men he had appointed to wartime jobs. And who were the old people, those—according to Malenkov—ready for the dustbin of history? The theorizing old-timers! Speaking of them, Malenkov said scathingly: "We have people, rightly called bookworms, who have

quotations from Marx and Engels ready for every occasion and every pretext. Instead of labouring to think up something new or studying experience, they have one answer: 'No, that was not said by Marx,' or 'Engels said something else.' If Marx could rise from the grave and see such a follower—if this term is permissible—he undoubtedly would immediately disown him."

Georgi Malenkov, the post-revolutionary party member, the New Bolshevik, had committed heresy. His inside knowledge of the Marx-Engels camouflage in the Kremlin power struggle, his well-justified cynicism on matters of theoretical argument, had prompted him to excessive candour. Also, his own ambitions were showing a bit too clearly between the lines of this impatient and arrogant statement. There were those who knew that Malenkov himself had made mistakes, some of them causing international repercussions. For instance, one night in September, 1945, the cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa took a number of documents from his files and turned them over to Canadian authorities. The documents testified to the extent and methods of Soviet espionage in Canada. And the name of Malenkov was contained in one of them.

Colonel Nikolai Zabotin, centre of Moscow's espionage network in Ottawa, had been careless enough to submit copies of secret reports to the Soviet ambassador himself. Under Soviet espionage rules, the ambassador was not to know the extent or methods of the spy apparatus. For this Zabotin was reprimanded by the espionage "director" from Moscow. In the spy code, the Embassy itself was called "metro"; the ambassador, "head of metro". In his apology, cabled back to Moscow, Zabotin states that he fully understood instructions about dealing with the "head of metro", as he had discussed them "with the director and Comrade Malenkov".

Thus Comrade Malenkov had been guilty of permitting

leaks about the supersecret espionage system, with his own name undisguised in a radio message. Together with his Marxist-Leninist heresies and indiscreet manifestations of his ambition, this carelessness weighed heavily against him. There were men just waiting for ways and means of stopping the cocky, overly ambitious Georgi Malenkov in his tracks. One of these was Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov.

CHAPTER IV

Death of a Rival

"WHEN the whales fight, the shrimps are killed." This old Korean proverb neatly summarizes the upheavals that disrupted Soviet society from the end of the second World War until Georgi Malenkov's emergence as Soviet Premier. Two whales were fighting. Their battle created waves and ripples throughout the Soviet Union even after it was over; it shook the Communist Party, Soviet economics, art, literature, and science.

One of the giant whales was Malenkov. The other was his rival Andrei A. Zhdanov. The two men struggled for control of the party's apparatus, for Stalin's support, and for the allegiance of people in all strata of Soviet society. Through the war years, and into 1948, Zhdanov's position and prestige was considerably greater than that of Malenkov. He was prominently mentioned as Molotov's and Beria's rival for Stalin's succession. But then, on August 31, 1948, Moscow abruptly announced that Zhdanov had died. His death was sudden; only two months earlier he had attended a Cominform meeting in Roumania. Zhdanov's death cleared the way for Malenkov.

Evidence of the Malenkov-Zhdanov conflict did not, of course, appear openly in the Soviet Press and was not otherwise publicized in the Soviet Union. However, reports from recent Soviet refugees who reached Western Germany, as well as the chronology of the events and changing fortunes of key Soviet personalities, strongly indicate that such a conflict did take place and played an important part in Malenkov's career.

Like Malenkov, Zhdanov came from what Marxists call

"bourgeois" parents. He was born in 1898 in the city of Tver, now called Kalinin, some 100 miles north-west of Moscow. Some biographies say that his father was a school inspector, others maintain his father was a parish priest. Zhdanov attended the gymnasium, where he studied French and German. After his graduation, he seems to have been under pressure from his father to enter the priesthood and attend a theological seminary.

The First World War prevented Zhdanov from attending the seminary or from taking any other step toward a career. He was drafted into the army. He joined the Bolsheviks at the time of the October Revolution in 1917 and participated in the fighting in and around Leningrad. From then on, his future was tied up with that city. The first step from regional prominence as Leningrad Communist Party chairman to the national prominence of the Moscow régime took place in 1934 when Zhdanov was a principal speaker at the All-Russian Congress of Soviet writers.

Zhdanov submitted a report to the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 designed to help in revision of party rules. Coming as an aftermath to the great purges, this report was remarkable for the admission that such purges were "attended by many mistakes, primarily by the infringement of the Leninist principle of an individual approach to people". The report admitted that "there were numerous cases of unwarranted expulsion from the party, and of hostile elements who had wormed their way into the party, taking advantage of the purges to persecute and ruin honest people".

The Zhdanov report marked the end of the period of internal purges. It was made in an apparent effort to patch up wounds created by the purge, and to conciliate resentment against Yezhov's pure excesses, resentment to be found both inside and outside the Communist Party. The very fact that Zhdanov was able to make a speech of such frankness points to his prominence at the time of the Eighteenth

Party Congress. He had become a member of the Communist International's Executive Committee at its Seventh Congress, in 1935, he received the Order of Lenin the same year and became a candidate to the Politburo. In 1939, at forty-one, Zhdanov became a full Politburo member. He was way ahead of Malenkov.

In fact, 1939 was a high point in Zhdanov's career. It was on his advice that Premier Stalin decided upon the Soviet attack on Finland; later, when the Finns put up heroic resistance, Zhdanov's advice was revealed as unsound. His star temporarily faded, just as Malenkov entered the Politburo. However, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, Zhdanov received new prominence as commander of the Leningrad area. Among other accomplishments, he established a supply route across frozen Lake Ladoga, which enabled the hard-pressed citizens of Leningrad to survive the Nazi siege.

Zhdanov reached his zenith of importance in international affairs with a supposedly "personal" article in *Pravda* in mid-1939. His article proved to be a trial balloon heralding the coming Soviet-Nazi Pact. It expressed doubts as to the sincerity of the Western powers, saying: "I will permit myself to voice on this subject my personal opinion, though my friends do not agree. They still believe that when the British and French Governments began to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. a pact of reciprocal help, they had in view the creation of a powerful and strong barrier against aggression in Europe."

The Zhdanov argument became the official Soviet alibi for the Soviet-Nazi Pact which was concluded just about two months after his *Pravda* article. The official Moscow view, from then until 1941, was that the Western powers had not been sincere in their negotiations with the Soviet Union and had instead hoped to set Hitler against the Soviets.

During the war Zhdanov successively received the military ranks of lieutenant-general and colonel-general. He

was placed in charge of the occupied Baltic nations, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. As chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Finland after the war, Zhdanov was in effect master of Finland's post-war fate.

The war had kept Malenkov and Zhdanov apart. Malenkov had risen as production chief on the home front, Zhdanov at the war front and in the field of foreign affairs. Now the two men met, and sparks began to fly. They had one thing in common—ambition. But they differed in their methods, their background, their personalities, their likes and dislikes.

By comparison to the bulky, slow-but-sure Malenkov, Zhdanov was brilliant and erratic. When Malenkov was cautious, Zhdanov was dynamic. Where Malenkov preferred the conservative chess-like manœuvre of pawns against each other, Zhdanov chose open combat. The difference in their outward appearance was striking enough. The non-military Malenkov at all times wore the drab uniform of the Communist Party, unadorned, designed to hide him rather than dress him up. Zhdanov, on the other hand, with his neatly-clipped moustache and carefully tightened tie, seemed almost dapper.

On a speaker's platform, Zhdanov's dynamic qualities stood out. For all his wild notions about the arts and literature, he had emotional roots in Russian culture. Zhdanov was a pseudo-intellectual, who found in his second home, Leningrad, a cultural tradition he admired and envied. Since czarist days, Leningrad (the former Petrograd) has been Russia's window to the West. When the city was the czarist capital, it drew to itself English technicians, French *couturiers*, and German physicians. It was, of course, the centre of Russian literature.

Of these traditions Zhdanov was aware—in his own distorted, Bolshevik fashion. Looking back, there must have been in Andrei Zhdanov a strongly ambivalent, contradictory relation to things Western. He must have felt

attracted to the forbidden ferment of the West, to the free give-and-take in politics and art—where a brilliant man could make his way on his gifts and accomplishments alone, without constantly mouthing Marxist platitudes. Malenkov, on the other hand, shared none of Zhdanov's cultural pretensions. He was faced with the eminently practical problem of keeping his political footing.

Malenkov's slighting remarks about Old Bolsheviks cost him support at the full meeting of the party's Central Committee in February, 1946. The Committee sided with Zhdanov, against Malenkov. The struggle for power continued through the summer. One striking external clue exists of the degree to which Zhdanov was able to beat down his rival. On May Day, 1946, Malenkov stood right next to Stalin on the reviewing stand overlooking the Red Square parade. One year later, he had dropped down to sixth place among the Soviet leaders on the rostrum. During the same period, Zhdanov climbed from fourth place in the line, to the position at Stalin's side on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, November 7, 1946.

Thus, in mid-1946, Malenkov suddenly and definitely fell from favour, while Zhdanov, advanced to the coveted Number Two position on the rostrum. There was a second definite clue: the electoral lists of Politburo members submitted to the public. During the January, 1946, elections, Malenkov's name was third on the list; he dropped to ninth place in November, 1947. From late in 1946 to mid-1948, Malenkov's name never appeared as that of a member of the Communist Party secretariat.

Zhdanov's cultural dilettantism was largely responsible for the wild and harsh things he did from 1946 to 1947. It was a period when he had to assert his Bolshevik will, when he had to crush all that could be suspected of being Western in post-war Soviet society. During the war, a measure of tolerance had been permitted Soviet economists, scientists, writers, and artists in their treatment of Western

subjects and sources. It was Zhdanov who spear-headed the drive against things "alien" in Soviet society. On August 21, 1946, he said in Leningrad that "if feudalism and later on, the bourgeoisie in the period of its flourishing, could create art and literature asserting the new systems," then certainly "our new socialist system, embodying all that is best in the history of human civilization and culture, is capable of creating the most advanced literature, which will leave far behind the best creations of olden times."

The Zhdanov line on Soviet culture, as it developed from late 1946 until early 1948, was threefold: cultural products had to serve politico-economic ends, propagandizing such things as the Five-Year Plan and hydro-electric power; Western "bourgeois tendencies" had to be crushed at all cost; Russian traditions and Russian themes were to be encouraged.

Armed with a resolution from the Central Committee of the party, Zhdanov proceeded to remodel Soviet culture. Literature was first. The arts followed, one by one: painting, the theatre, music, motion pictures. The Leningrad Writers' Union was forced to urge its members to use such themes as "the majesty of our victory, the pathos of rehabilitation and socialist reconstruction, and the heroic deeds of the Soviet people in fulfilling and overfulfilling the new Stalin Five-Year Plan."

The composers, too, fared badly. After all, Zhdanov played the piano. At a meeting on February 10, 1948, Zhdanov said composers should write their music more "like Glinka and Tchaikovsky". One pro-Zhdanov composer said the composers ought to know more folk songs to inspire them—the way Zhdanov himself knew folk songs. "When Comrade Zhdanov was asked whether he really knew six hundred songs by heart, he replied, 'I hesitate to say I know six hundred, but I know about three hundred songs.' And how well he knows them! When he visited our choir, we presented him with an album of songs. On the following day,

he returned the album with variants of texts of several of the compositions written in his own hand. Comrade Zhdanov is not a professional musician, but if our composers followed his example, we would say that they really knew our folk songs."

A day after this meeting, *Pravda* published a Central Committee resolution which criticized the opera *Great Friendship* by Vano Muradeli. The resolution had the Zhdanov touch. It critized Muradeli because the opera had "not one melody or aria that remains in the memory." It noted that the composer "did not utilize the wealth of folk melodies, song tunes, and dance motifs in which the creative art of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is so rich." The party resolution then went from the specific to the general:

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers that the failure of Muradeli's opera is a result of the formalist path taken by Muradeli, false and ruinous to the creative production of the Soviet composer. . . . The failure of Muradeli's opera is not an isolated incident, but is closely tied up with the unfortunate situation in contemporary Soviet music, with the prevalence of the formalist trend among Soviet composers."

Among the composers who suffered from the musical notions of the piano-playing Zhdanov, was one of the great figures in modern music, Dmitri Shostakovitch. The composer was forced to admit that "the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party open a new page in the history of Soviet art; they direct and inspire us".

The Central Committee's resolution announced that it had found the "fullest manifestation" of a "formalist trend in music" in the works of such composers as Comrades Dmitri Shostakovich, Sergei Prokofiev, Aram Khachaturian, Vissarion Y. Shebalin, Gabriel Popov, Nikolai Miaskovsy, and others. The Resolution accused these composers of "formalist distortions, anti-democratic tendencies

in music alien to the Soviet people and its artistic taste". The composers were further accused:

"Characteristics of such music are the negation of the basic principles of classical music; a sermon for atonality, dissonance, and disharmony, as if this were an expression of 'progress' and 'innovation' in the growth of musical form; a rejection of such important fundamentals of musical composition as melody; a passion for confused, neuropathic combinations which transform music into cacophony, into a chaotic piling up of sounds."

It was clear, at least, that Zhdanov didn't like their music. But the final indictment was obviously political: "This music reeks strongly of the spirit of contemporary modernist bourgeois music of Europe and America, which reflects the decadence of bourgeois culture, the full denial of musical art."

Zhdanov and Malenkov briefly joined forces at the meeting that set up the Cominform, which eventually received the full name of Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers Parties. The Comin form, created in Warsaw in September, 1947, was the successor, to a degree, of the old Communist International. Zhdanov had been one of the men who signed the resolution which dissolved the Comintern, back in 1943. Now, at Warsaw, it was his task to guide the organization and lay down the policies of the Cominform.

Andrei Zhdanov appeared in Warsaw as the originator and spokesman of a new Soviet foreign policy. His address on "The International Situation", was more important than that of a Soviet diplomat would have been. In contrast, Malenkov's role was that of a mere technician, delivering an address on "The Activities of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)".

Zhdanov laid down the line of solid Soviet opposition to the Marshall Plan. He asserted that "the new, openly

expansionist orientation of the U.S.A. has as its aim the establishment of the world domination of American imperialism. . . . The new expansionist and reactionary course of the U.S.A. policy is orientated for a struggle against the U.S.S.R., against the new democratic countries, against the working class movement in every country, against the working class movement of the U.S.A. herself, and against the liberating anti-imperialist forces of all countries throughout the world."

This speech was made, it must be remembered, only two years after the end of the war in the Pacific. Zhdanov discarded the wartime alliance with the United States completely. Never before had a Soviet official quite so bluntly described its former ally as a vicious enemy. Zhdanov called the Marshall Plan a tool "in the realization of one of the most important tasks of the general American programme; that of restoring the power of imperialism in the countries of the new democracy [the Soviet satellite nations] and to force them to renounce close economic and political co-operation with the Soviet Union".

Zhdanov also claimed that dissolution of the Comintern had forever put an end to the slanderous accusation that Communist parties "act not in the interests of their own peoples but on orders from abroad". However, Zhdanov observed with pride that in the four years since the dissolution of the Comintern a "considerable strengthening" of Communist parties had taken place in Europe and Asia.

Zhdanov, perhaps Moscow's leading "Europe First" protagonist, never once mentioned China at the Cominform meeting. He concluded with a call for defiance of the United States, saying: "Just as the Munich policy in the past gave a free hand to Hitlerite aggression, so concessions to the new course of policy in the U.S.A. and to the Imperialist camp can make its inspirers only more insolent and aggressive. Therefore, the Communist parties must head the resistance

to the plans of the imperialist expansion and aggression in all fields."

And so the Cominform was born under Zhdanov's aegis—on a solid anti-American platform.

Malenkov, dealing with Soviet party affairs, was even forced to pay lip service to Zhdanov's pet project, the literary purge; he hailed "the measures adopted by the Central Committee which aim at the triumph of a militant Soviet patriotic spirit among scientists and art workers." He said that these measures strengthened "adherence to Party principles in science, literature, and art, and at raising to new and higher levels all vehicles of Socialist culture—the Press, propaganda, science, literature, and art."

Zhdanov's Europe-oriented policy in 1946–1947 favoured establishment of a Balkan Communist federation. Greece, subdued by Communist guerrilla forces with aid from neighbouring Communist countries, was to be included in the federation. Guerrilla war in Greece began in mid-1946. The federation scheme's foremost spokesmen were Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and Georgi Dimitrov, Communist Premier of Bulgaria. With Yugoslavia the strongest member of any such federation, perfection of the plan would have greatly strengthened Tito.

Planning proceeded with Zhdanov's approval through 1947. Dimitrov outlined the scheme even to outsiders, such as Robert Kleinman, correspondent of *World Report*. Quoted in the magazine on June 17, 1947, Dimitrov referred to the federation plan as "music for the future". He envisaged a federation of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, adding that it might later be expanded to include "several other nations—Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, perhaps Hungary and perhaps Greece, after the present régime is changed." Dimitrov outlined the federation in detail in Bucharest on January 16, 1948, and his speech was printed in Moscow's *Pravda*, although without comment.

Meanwhile, the Yugoslav Communists and Moscow split on the delicate issue of Soviet espionage within the Yugoslav Communist hierarchy. Marshal Tito observed that a member of his party's Central Committee, Andreja Hebrang, was turning accounts of committee meetings over to the Soviet ambassador. Tito protested to Moscow, and the situation began to deteriorate rapidly.

Zhdanov, in backing the federation scheme, had thus been guilty of advancing a plan that would have given the rebellious Tito immense power. On January 28, therefore, *Pravda* carried an article heavily critical of the federation proposal. One scholar, Boris I. Nikolaevsky, believes that the *Pravda* statement was "personally prepared by Stalin with the aid of Malenkov." Nikolaevsky, writing in *The New Leader*, on March 30, 1953, describes this episode as "the turning point in the struggle between Malenkov and Zhdanov."

Certainly, Zhdanov's position began to weaken early in 1948. Although he attended the Cominform meeting in Bucharest in June of that year, Malenkov appears to have begun to overshadow him even then. It was Malenkov, for instance, who made the decision of how to deal with General Markos (Markos Vafiades), the Greek Communist guerrilla leader, who had worked closely with Tito. Malenkov suggested that Markos be lured from Greek territory and arrested. The actual arrest was arranged by General Vsevoled N. Merkulov, now Soviet Minister of State Control. Merkulov advised Markos that he was to attend a political-military meeting at Stelnik, Bulgaria. When he arrived on Bulgarian soil, Markos was arrested in August 3, 1948; but his name continued to appear on Greek guerrilla proclamations until February, 1949, when he was officially replaced.

Yugoslav Communist leaders maintain that Dimitrov initially sided with Tito in his conflict with Moscow. The Yugoslav newspaper *Borba* said on September 29, 1949, that while "passing through Belgrade immediately after the first letter

was sent by the Bolshevik party" attacking Tito, "Dimitrov told us, 'stand your ground'." Georgi Dimitrov died in Moscow in July, 1949. A purge of his followers accused of Tito-ism rocked Bulgaria for more than a year afterward.

Tito's break with Moscow contributed directly to Zhdanov's decline and fall. As the chief Soviet spokesman in the Cominform, Zhdanov had the decisive word in advising Stalin on the break between Moscow and Marshal Tito. His theory that the Yugoslav Communist Party would oust Tito and support Moscow, turned out to be a grave error. Tito solidified his position at home and challenged Soviet power. Clearly, for such faulty judgement, for such grave lowering of Moscow's prestige, someone had to pay. Malenkov was doubtless ready to point out that his antagonist Andrei Zhdanov was deeply responsible for the disaster.

Tito's defiance became public knowledge during the early days of July, 1948. On July 20, Malenkov was back at the Communist Party's secretariat; he signed a party message to the Japanese Communist Party, congratulating Kyuichi Tokuda on surviving an assassination attempt. Four days earlier, shortly after the Tito incident, Stalin himself signed a corresponding message to Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti, who had been similarly wounded.

Malenkov replaced Zhdanov almost immediately following Tito's defiance of Moscow's ill-fated provocation of the independent-minded Yugoslavs. Anna Pauker, Rumanian Communist Foreign Minister at the time, advised friends at the Danube Conference in Belgrade in mid-August that Stalin told her of his annoyance with Zhdanov's handling of the Tito affair. She quoted Stalin as saying that the matter would have been handled quite different had he realized the extent of the support that Tito had within the Yugoslav Communist Party.

The chronology seems clear. Malenkov quickly used the Yugoslav leader's defection to replace his rival Zhdanov

from his position of power in the Soviet Communist Party. Little more than a month later, the news came from Moscow: Zhdanov was dead.

At Zhdanov's funeral, Malenkov once again stood next to Stalin.

After Zhdanov's death, the star of Malenkov rose without hindrance. Certainly, the man who became Soviet Premier in 1953, benefited immensely from his rival's death. In the Moscow atmosphere of suspicion and terror, the question was natural: had someone killed Andrei Zhdanov? Had Malenkov been a party to such an act? As if to forestall these questions, late though they might be in rising to the surface, a startling announcement made on January 12, 1953, four years after Zhdanov died, alleged that a group of "terrorist Jewish doctors" had confessed to killing Zhdanov. "The criminals confessed they made an incorrect diagnosis of his disease and, concealing the miocardial infraction from which he suffered, prescribed a régime which was contra-indicated for this serious illness and thereby killed Comrade A. A. Zhdanov."

The accusation named nine doctors, although only four doctors had signed the Zhdanov death certificate in 1948, which had said: "For many years Zhdanov suffered high blood pressure, which was complicated by severe arteriosclerosis, especially in vessels supplying the heart. During the last few years he had frequent attacks of angina pectoris, followed by cardiac asthma. Death followed from paralysis of the heart, accompanied by acute emphysema (swelling)."

The nine accused doctors, only six of whom were actually Jewish, were named as Professors M. S. Vovsi, V. N. Vinogradov, M. B. Kogan, B. B. Kogan, P. I. Yegorov, A. I. Feldman, I. G. Etinger, A. M. Grinstein, and B. I. Mairov. The announcement charged that the death of Zhdanov had been hastened under orders from the United States government, using as its channel to the doctors "the international

Jewish bourgeios nationalist organization 'Joint,' set up by the American Intelligence Service." This reference was to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, a charitable organization, whose spokesmen classed the accusation as "too ridiculous for comment."

The announcement accused the nine doctors of having planned the deaths of several other leading Soviet military figures, and added: "Investigation has established that members of this terrorist group, by taking advantage of their position as doctors and by violating the trust of ill people with premeditation, criminally undermined their health and deliberately made incorrect diagnoses and they, by incorrect healing methods, destroyed them."

This charge, coming more than four years after Zhdanov's death but shortly before Malenkov's ascension to power, seemed oddly timed. It became even more significant when its validity was denied by Beria in April, the accused doctors set free, and their accusers arrested.

These events now tend to sharpen interest in the long and deep feud between Malenkov and Zhdanov, and in the repercussions which the struggle between these two men had in all fields of Soviet society. As late as 1952, a footnote to the history of this conflict was written in Czechoslovakia when a group of high Communist Party officials was found guilty of treason and its members condemned to death or imprisonment. This group was headed by Rudolf Slansky, the Party's secretary-general. It was the Slansky wing of the party which, in March, 1948, followed Zhdanov's instructions in taking power by coup d'etat in Prague. The most plausible interpretation of these purges of 1952 is that they accomplished the elimination of the Zhdanov group within the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

CHAPTER V

Years of Crisis

DURING the years of the Malenkov-Zhdanov feud, some 300,000 members were dropped from the rolls of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The see-saw struggle affected the lives of hundreds of Soviet officials, economists, scientists, writers, and artists. Their names are many, but as an illustration, none is more significant than that of Eugene S. Varga, the Hungarian-born economist and veteran of the abortive Communist régime that ruled Hungary for 133 bloody days in 1919.

Varga is a Malenkov man. He suffered volleys of violent abuse when Zhdanov enjoyed full power. He was denounced as a quack, a traitor to the Bolshevik cause, a fool and a charlatan. His economic research institute was dissolved; his name all but disappeared from the Soviet Press.

Under Malenkov, Varga has made a full come-back. He is the kind of hard-working, skilled technician Malenkov professes to like. During the 1920s and 1930s, Varga was top economist of the Communist International. His Marxist-Leninist analyses of world economic affairs were published by Communist organs throughout the world. At the end of the second World War he laid down the economic party line in a magnum opus entitled *Changes in the Capitalist Economy as a Result of the Second World War*. This book was completed in 1946 and circulated confidentially among Soviet officials. It was published in 1947 by the Institute of World Economics and World Politics in Moscow, of which Varga was director.

Nothing in Mr. Varga's book seemed to vary greatly

from what might have been expected from a Moscow economist at that time. He forecast a serious crisis in the "capitalist" countries, although he cited factors likely to delay such a crisis for several years after the war. On October 7, 1947, while Zhdanov was at the height of his influence, *Pravda* reported that Varga's Institute of World Economics had been merged with the Institute of Economics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Dr. Konstantin V. Ostrovityanov was named director of the new body; he was a Zhdanov man.

The anti-Varga campaign gathered momentum. It involved scores of Soviet economists; articles and reviews in the Moscow magazine *Planned Economy* echoed the controversy. Varga was denounced from all sides. The debate soon grew abstruse, exceedingly technical, and at times lost all contact with economic reality. Communist theoreticians outside the Soviet Union were hard put to interpret the controversy.

Together with that of Varga, another name should be remembered in connection with the Zhdanov-Malenkov power struggle—Nikolai A. Voznesensky, who was originally an associate of Zhdanov in Leningrad. After his transfer to Moscow he became a protégé of Malenkov, who arranged Voznesensky's appointment to the strategic State Defence Committee in 1942. However, Voznesensky appears to have counted on Zhdanov's ultimate victory over Malenkov. When his former Leningrad boss returned to Moscow from his war jobs, Voznesensky allied himself with Zhdanov against Malenkov. The reward for what must have seemed pure betrayal to Malenkov, was high: Voznesensky, in Zhdanov's 1947 heyday, became a full-fledged Politburo member.

Voznesensky led the pack against Varga, the Malenkov economist. From his exalted position as chairman of the State Planning Commission, and director of the Five-Year Plan, he castigated Varga's ideas. In his book *War Economy*

of the U.S.S.R. during the Patriotic War, published in 1947, Voznesensky attacked Varga, without deigning to mention his name, as a "woebegone economist" and a "theoretician who thinks he is a Marxist" but writes "nonsense not worthy of attention". While his backer Zhdanov was powerful and alive, Voznesensky was safe. His work as Five-Year Plan administrator seemed satisfactory. He was the youngest member of the Politburo, an up-and-coming figure in the top Soviet bureaucracy.

But less than half a year after Zhdanov's death, Voznesensky's career came to a sudden and complete end. On March 14, 1949, he was dropped from the Politburo. He was stripped of his title as Vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and was replaced as chairman of the State Planning Commission.

A number of men who were demoted following Zhdanov's death were able to make amends, and then eventually made come-backs in the Soviet hierarchy. But the double-crossing Voznesensky disappeared completely. Quite obviously, Malenkov was making an example of the Five-Year Plan boss. Voznesensky's fate was a warning to anyone who imagined that Malenkov could be trifled with.

Just as, when Zhdanov failed, Malenkov moved upward, so did Voznesensky's fall from favour bring good fortune to Eugene Varga. The day after Voznesensky was dropped from all his posts, Varga was given the opportunity of publicizing his views in a letter to *Pravda*. In this letter, published March 15, 1949, Varga repudiated charges that he was a man of Western orientation. He said that such a classification was equal to being accused of being a "counter-revolutionary, anti-Soviet traitor to the working class" and he denied these accusations vehemently. With his antagonist Voznesensky removed, Varga was able to call the accusations against him comparable to "the worst examples of Hitler and Goebbels propaganda." He also recalled that, back in 1947, he had attacked the United States foreign-aid

programme, the Marshall Plan, and that this proved his Soviet orthodoxy.

From then on, Varga made a quick come-back and the Zhdanov faction was forced to retreat. The man who had succeeded Varga in 1947, K. V. Ostrovityanov, now came under attack from *Culture and Life*, the organ of the party's agitation and propaganda section. Ostrovityanov was accused, among other things, of using an alleged conversation between Karl Marx and the German Communist leader Karl Liebknecht as a Communist Party document—whereas Marx had died when Liebknecht was only twelve years old. But Ostrovityanov was permitted to recant later and unlike Voznesensky, managed to make a come-back.

Meanwhile, Varga re-emerged as the Soviet Union's leading economist. In early 1950, he was commissioned by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to prepare a major theoretical economic work. On May 10, 1950, *Pravda* published a long article by Varga, entitled "The Economics of the Capitalist Countries under the Blows of the U.S. Monopolies". The ideas expressed in this article anticipated and corresponded to those expressed in Premier Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, published on the eve of the 1952 party congress.

After Zhdanov's death in the autumn of 1948, Malenkov systematically eliminated the "Zhdanovites" from public life. During this campaign, Voznesensky became to Malenkov what Trotsky was to Stalin. To perpetuate Voznesensky's ideas became sheer heresy. To be accused of keeping Voznesenky's theories alive, meant one thing for certain: the accused had incurred Malenkov's displeasure. Voznesensky's name was not mentioned in the Soviet Press from late 1949 until December, 1952.

One man who was caught in the middle of this battle was Georgi D. Alexandrov. From 1940 to 1947 he had been Zhdanov's deputy in the Communist Party's Propaganda

and Agitation Department. Zhdanov dismissed him in 1947, accusing him of being a "prisoner" of "bourgeois philosophy". Just what, in the Zhdanov-Malenkov struggle, Alexandrov's position had been, cannot be clearly determined.

At any rate, under Malenkov, Alexandrov got his old job back. But things did not work out too well. Perhaps his seven years of service under Zhdanov made Alexandrov, in Malenkov's eyes, a doubtful risk. A July, 1949, issue of the magazine *Bolshevik* was postponed suddenly. On July 13, the Communist Party's Central Committee published a secret decree concerning the Party's main theoretical organ and its editorial board. Alexandrov, a fellow board member, and the editor of the magazine, were removed.

The delayed issue of *Bolshevik*, when finally published, revived the attack against Alexandrov in just about the terms the Zhdanov group had used earlier, but this time with Malenkov's obvious approval. The party's decree, not made public until December, 1952, said that "the editors of the journal *Bolshevik* made a serious mistake by offering the pages of the journal for servile glorification of N. Voznesensky's book," and "publicizing it, without any ground for so doing, as a text-book and as a profound scientific investigation." The Malenkov-sponsored decree said that "editorial workers of *Bolshevik* went so far in their servility as to insert, contrary to the desire of writers, quotations from N. Voznesenky's book into articles by these writers."

In such fashion is the memory of Voznesensky invoked whenever Malenkov wants to put an opponent in his place. During the critical period between the October, 1952, party congress and Stalin's death, the Voznesensky controversy was once again revived. Some of the men who had roused Malenkov's ire back in 1949 had meanwhile made their way back to influential positions—among them Varga's old antagonist, Konstantin V. Ostrovityanov. In 1953, Ostrovityanov was chairman of a meeting, held from January 9 to 11, under the auspices of the All-Union Society for the

Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. For the most part, the participants accused themselves of errors in accepting and publicizing the Voznesensky book. A day after the meeting closed, *Pravda* accused three leading economists, associated with the magazine *Economic Problems*, of having failed to "overcome fully and to the end", alien and mistaken "subjectivist distortions of the Voznesenky type".

The Varga-Voznesensky feud had started as a shadow of the fight for power between Malenkov and Zhdanov. Eventually, being accused of favouring Voznesensky became identical with blocking Malenkov's path. The whole economics feud had numerous parallels in other sections of Soviet life. Both Zhdanov and Malenkov utilized controversies in special fields to mask their manœuvring of people, the ousting of opponents, and the placing of favourites in controlling positions.

Zhdanov had used this tactic in 1946 by pouring vitriolic criticism on allegedly nonconformist writers and artists, on "cosmopolites", and so forth. During the two years that followed, scores of Soviet artists and writers saw their careers destroyed, their works violently castigated, their motives impugned. One man, however, survived the cultural holocausts of the post-war era unscathed. He is the novelist Alexander A. Fadeyev, head of the Union of Soviet Writers, and his case is an interesting one.

Fadeyev was prominent in organizing a series of so-called "peace" conferences outside the Soviet Union. In this capacity, he made the keynote speech at the Cultural and Scientific Conference for Peace, which took place in the spring of 1949 at New York's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Fadeyev appears to have been low enough on the administrative ladder to have the purge storms pass over his head. Or, perhaps, he just proved himself extremely adaptable during the transition from the Zhdanov to the Malenkov period.

Fadeyev became a target of Zhdanov's literary wrath in 1947. It was Fadeyev's novel *The Young Guard*, published in 1945, which aroused the wrath of the Zhdanov group. The novel described the guerrilla activities of young Communist students in the Don coal basin during the war against Germany. The critics praised it, the book achieved mass distribution, and stage and film versions were widely shown. For two years it was held up as a model for Soviet writers. Then suddenly the novel was attacked for giving insufficient prominence to Old Bolsheviks, and for being otherwise "incorrect". While the Zhdanov-Malenkov feud raged, Fadeyev revised the book, and a new version, 150 pages longer, was eventually published in 1951. The changes are revealing.

Although the corrected version is still called *The Young Guard*, the young Communists are shunted out of central roles and replaced by Communist veterans. Instead of disorganization and panic, there is now careful planning and cool generalship by the Party command. In the original text of 1945, Fadeyev described the evacuation of the coal city of Krasnodar by saying: "In all the city blocks adjoining the mine, panic swirled like a tornado. . . . The whole crowd shouted, swore, wept, jabbered, clanged."

Six years later, his memory jogged by the party, Fadeyev deletes the reference to panic. His jabbering crowd had vanished and is replaced by "columns of workers, alternating with trucks, carrying the property of the enterprises and establishments of Krasnodon." Instead of shouting, they now move "silently, with sombre faces." "The leaders of the columns," who did not exist in the original version, keep the traffic moving in orderly fashion.

Also, in the original edition, Fadeyev wrote that "the Soviet military people at the front still had not learned to utilize those modern machines and men trained in production that were placed at their disposal". In the revised edition this passage is deleted and instead, we read: "Our

soldier is better than the enemy soldier . . . simply in the material sense. Our commanders are immeasurably more competent, not only because of their political awareness, but also on account of their military education, their ability to grasp new things quickly."

There were other subtantial changes. All of them showed that Fadeyev could adapt his writing to the dictates of whomever happened to be the party's literary oracle.

Certainly, Alexander Fadeyev showed in October, 1952, that he was conscious of Malenkov as the commanding figure at the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress. Malenkov demanded that writers portray Soviet men and women of the "new type" in "all their splendour and human dignity," and to contrast them with "ulcers and vices to which capitalism gives rise." In other words, he called for pamphleteering and caricature rather than literary truth. This was Malenkov's first expression of his theory of the "typical" in art, which is discussed more fully in a later chapter. Fadeyev's speech before the same congress was truly remarkable. Although Fadeyev paid tribute to the Soviet Premier, he quoted Stalin only three times and Malenkov five. To show the thoroughness of his indoctrination he even referred back to the 1946 party resolution on culture but, of course, was careful not to mention Zhdanov's name.

In a reference which, in this context, might well have been directed against lingering opposition to Malenkov, Fadeyev said that Soviet literature has the task of "unmasking the enemies of our cause in our country, the thieves, careerists, bootlickers, bureaucrats, frauds, individualists, and grabbers of all kinds. . . . Comrade Malenkov was completely right when he outlined the new struggle of Soviet literature. . . . In Comrade Malenkov's report the shortcomings of our literature have been thoroughly unmasked." And, he continued, "of paramount importance for Soviet art as a whole is the thesis, developed in Comrade Malenkov's report,

of the typical features and characters of our reality and of the weakness with which these typical characteristics are brought out in our literature. . . . The need for training the cadres to which Comrade Malenkov referred, applies to a large extent also to the cadres in the Writers Union." Finally, "We consider as yet another expression of the assistance the party is rendering in the development of literature, the straightforward, true, and passionate criticism which Comrade Malenkov voiced in his report."

Reading the Fadeyev speech, one might possibly conclude that Malenkov had replaced Stalin, at least as a arbiter of Soviet literary volumes, as long ago as the autumn of 1952. One thing is certain: this obsequious novelist could pay homage and sacrifice his art with equal ease to either of these bureaucratic literati.

From mid-1948 on, a science controversy raged in the Soviet Union. It began in genetics and spread to nearly every other field of the natural sciences, including medicine. The genetics phase of the controversy, the first and most widely publicized, began with a meeting of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Science. At this meeting, on July 31, 1948, the Malenkov favourite, Trofim D. Lysenko, submitted a report that had the backing of the Communist Party. From that moment on, Lysenko was the most influential scientist of the Soviet Union. An American authority and Nobel Prize winner, Dr. H. S. Muller, professor of zoology at Indiana University has described the Lysenko doctrine as "a mystical perfecting-principle" based on "no properly documented, controlled, or repeatable factual evidence."

Here, once again, the chronology is important. The Academy's meeting had been planned while Zhdanov was still a decisive figure in top Soviet leadership. When Malenkov replaced him, following the Tito debacle, Malenkov may have revamped the itinerary and content of the con-

ference on short notice. At any rate, the issues that arose were hardly more than camouflage for a demonstration of Malenkov's power in an important stratum of Soviet society. Relying on Lysenko in a hurry, Malenkov may have been led to make decisions he later regretted; this would account for subsequent cautiously publicized criticisms of Lysenko's theories.

In the autumn of 1948 and through 1949, Lysenko's crudely and exclusively environmental ideas on the propagation of species were supreme. It was Lysenko's claim that he had grafted a yellow-fruited tomato stalk on a red variety, and caused the vine to grow red fruit. He denounced as a "bourgeois fraud" the science of genetics as fathered by the Austrian Gregor Mendel and advanced by Thomas Hunt Morgan, the American Nobel Prize winning biologist who developed the theory that the nature of the genes within the chromosome is a decisive factor in human heredity. According to Lysenko, citing Marxist chapter and verse, dialectical materialism indicates that environment is the prime factor determining the characteristics of an individual.

By the time Malenkov became Premier in 1953, the Lysenko theory had run its course. Perhaps Malenkov regretted that, under pressure of time and circumstance, he had permitted this quack to become the virtual dictator of Soviet science. Such disillusionment would explain the changed status of Zhdanov's son, Yuri Zhdanov. In 1948, young Zhdanov had been ousted from his position as chief of the Communist Party's Science section. Four years later, he was restored to this position.

But the Lysenko case did serve at least one purpose for which it was intended: it gave Malenkov the opportunity to reshuffle Soviet academic society from top to bottom. It is perhaps revealing that Malenkov should have fallen for Lysenko's extreme environmental approach; it is part of his personality pattern always to seek to impose his control,

or the control of the society with which he is identified, even on nature.

Perhaps this is also the reason why the conditioned-reflex findings in humans and animals of the noted Soviet physiologist Ivan P. Pavlov have been extended, in Soviet science, to subjects completely outside Dr. Pavlov's field. The works of Charles Darwin have been revised to fit the Soviet line that man can change nature to serve his needs.

Malenkov's tendency to favour such schools of thought goes hand in hand with his constant, almost compulsive, emphasis on getting results by sheer force. Thus he could easily be attracted to theories that promised results by forced growth, by controlled conditions of environment. On one hand, this tendency would make him favour such relatively harmless experiments as cloud seeding and rain-making. On the other, on a dangerously ambitious level, he, like the Nazis before him, might see merit in breeding a super-race by controlled selection.

CHAPTER VI

Beria and Molotov

GEORGI MALENKOV became Premier of the Soviet Union after Stalin's death, by-passing men who were his elders and who had long histories as professional revolutionaries. Among them were the four men who became deputy premiers: Lavrenti P. Beria, Minister of the Interior; Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Foreign Minister; Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin, War Minister; and Lazar M. Kaganovich, to whom no specific ministry was assigned.

On the day of Stalin's funeral service, these top officials climbed in a single file to the top of the Lenin-Stalin tomb in Moscow's Red Square. First came Malenkov, then Beria. Next, the Chinese Communist representative Chou En-lai mounted the steps. He was followed by Marshal Bulganin, and only then Molotov. Finally came Nikita Khrushchev, a secretary of the Party's Central Committee, followed by Kaganovich.

Over and over again, as announcement followed announcement and ceremony followed ceremony, Malenkov's name was immediately followed by that of Beria. Together, the two men represented the strongest internal forces of the Soviet Union: the Communist Party machinery, and the powerful secret police. Molotov commanded no such forces. His years spent in dealing with world affairs, his extensive trips abroad, had prevented him from winning the allegiance of a supporting apparatus within the Soviet Union. Marshal Bulganin represented the armed forces, and thus in theory potential strength in a possible showdown of power. More accurately, Bulganin represented the party's army within the army: the staff of political commissars.

Behind these five top Soviet officials stood a large array

of newly reshuffled officials. These were men who, in some cases, had been in and out of Kremlin favour, in and out of various tough jobs in the party, the government administration, industry, and the armed forces. These were men who would play important roles in the delicate balance of power and personalities that had helped Malenkov to reach the top. They would demand constant skilful readjustment—in the manner of a tightrope walker who has to shift his weight just slightly to one side and then another, forward and backward, almost imperceptibly but nevertheless sufficiently to assure stability.

The men who walked up to the reviewing stand atop the Lenin-Stalin tomb were representative of large and shifting forces within the Soviet Union. The mass of the Soviet people—of Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Moslems, and many other groups—was, after all, to be considered a potential power. The vast and delicate machinery of the Party, the secret police, the government bureaucracy in Moscow and the various Soviet republics, of the army and navy—all these were channels toward the hopes and fears of millions. Even in a dictatorship, and particularly a dictatorship of delicate balance, the mood of the people—like swift currents beneath the placid surface of the sea—must be constantly gauged and responded to.

Malenkov and Beria had become the most powerful men in the Soviet Union, officially as well as in fact. They had been powerful before, but their new leadership translated this reality into the more formal trappings of power. How had they come to this point in their life histories? How had the relationships between the three men—Malenkov, Beria, Molotov—brought them to a point of power balance? What manner of men were these comrades, antagonists, rulers, and rivals?

First, Beria. The face is familiar: the impassive face with pince-nez, the thin lips, the partly bald head, the precise bearing, the measured voice of the man who is a shrewd ad-

ministrator rather than an orator. Beria may well have gone through a last-minute struggle with members of an army clique that hoped to benefit during intrigues that preceded Stalin's death. But his career had prepared him well to weather such storms.

Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria is the last in a long succession of secret-police administrators. In czarist days, the Okrana (Guard) served to spy upon citizens, to arrest them, hold them incommunicado, spirit them away into oblivion. Under Lenin, Felix Dzerzhinsky headed the Cheka. He was succeeded, in 1926, by Vyacheslav R. Menzhinsky, who was assassinated in 1934. The post was then taken by Genrikh Y. Yagoda whose name to this day conjures up pictures of horror and cruelty. It was he who developed the slave-labour camps that became a central factor in successive Five-Year Plans.

Yagoda was finally crushed by the terror machine he helped to build. During the Moscow purges of the mid-thirties he was accused of trafficking with conspirators. After he was shot, the *Soviet Encyclopædia* belatedly claimed that his predecessor Menzhinsky "was treacherously slain in 1934 on the orders of the provocateur and Fascist, Yagoda, to serve the purposes of the Trotskyite bloc". Then, for two violent years, the Soviet secret police was directed by Malenkov's one-time superior, Nikolai Yezhov. In 1938, Beria was brought by Stalin from his home region, Georgia, and the long Beria régime began.

Lavrenti Beria's predecessors were all, in varying degrees, highly unbalanced characters. They seemed to act out paranoid drives, revenges upon society, sadistic tastes. Not so Beria. Somewhat like Stalin, he has used terror as a matter of course, coldly, thoroughly extensively. He appears to believe that a giant police state needs a great amount of terroristic pressure simply to keep from breaking apart. And so, tortures and imprisonment and death are everyday enforcement tools under the Beria system.

He was born March 29, 1899, in the Georgian village of Merkheuli. He came from peasant stock, attended the Polytechnical Institute at Baku, and graduated as a draughtsman and engineer. He joined the Bolsheviks in 1917. He was successively a Cheka operative in Soviet Azerbaijan and in his native Georgia. He rose, both in the Cheka and in the Communist Party, to become the Georgian party's first secretary in 1931.

At the Seventeenth Soviet Communist Party Congress in 1934, Beria was appointed to the party's Central Committee. Four years later he became a Politburo nominee; the same year he was made secret-police chief. From 1941 to 1946, Beria was officially Commissar General for National Security. He retained control of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) and the Ministry of State Security (MGB) from then on.

Beria, according to the historian Mark Vishniak, is "interested in painting, music, and architecture," is married and has children. It is difficult to associate the cruel secret-police machinery with the outwardly mild-mannered Beria. His pince-nez makes him appear school-teacherish. He seems fussy, meticulous, retiring. Unlike his Nazi counterpart Heinrich Himmler, Beria rarely favoured a uniform. He wears conservative civilian clothes and a felt hat usually pulled way down over his face. He is of medium height, slightly on the stout side. His manner and speech are quiet.

His career and mannerisms suggest that he prefers the reality of power to its outward trappings. He always stood just one step behind Stalin, as he now stands half a step behind Malenkov. Despite his outward demeanour, he has very likely for years been the most hated man in the Soviet Union, a country where there is much reason for hate. Beria personifies the secret police visit at dawn; wild accusations and sadistic interrogations; years of forced labour on the basis of trifling charges; camps that are a living death; and death itself. But in front of this tapestry of horror stands Lavrenti

Beria—quiet, unassuming, holding the fate of millions in his hands.

Beria was personally close to Stalin, his confidant and associate. Even so, the sudden death of Andrei Zhdanov in 1948 must have eased Beria's position in the Soviet hierarchy. The dynamic Zhdanov eclipsed Beria immediately after the war—perhaps more obviously than he overshadowed Malenkov. Evidence of this came whenever huge portraits of Soviet leaders decorated city squares, buildings, or parades. Molotov was consistently shown on Stalin's right; Beria and Zhdanov competed for the left-hand position. As a favourite son, Beria was given the choice spot in such old stamping grounds as the Caucasus; but he had to yield to Zhdanov in the Leningrad area.

This tragicomic dilemma was ingeniously solved during the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, November 7, 1947: early in the day, some of the buildings showed Beria on Stalin's left, others featured Zhdanov. But the solution lasted for only a few hours. Later in the day workmen changed the layout, so that Molotov, Beria, and Zhdanov formed a semi-circle beneath the Premier's picture.

After Zhdanov's death, Beria achieved new prominence. On March 29, 1949, his fiftieth birthday, he was awarded the Order of Lenin. The Press hailed him, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* publishing a two-column portrait on their front pages. The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers sent him a congratulatory message which said: "We warmly congratulate you, a true pupil of Lenin and colleague of Comrade Stalin, on your fiftieth birthday. All your conscious life you have devoted to the revolutionary battle for the cause of the working class and to the victory of Communism."

On November 6, 1951, Beria gave the keynote speech at the Moscow Soviet's celebration of the Revolution. It was the year's most important address by any Soviet leader; it showed that Beria's star was shining brightly. At no time has

there been any sign of conflict between Beria and Malenkov. Such clash of interest might have developed after Zhdanov's death, which cleared the road to power for both of them; but there is no evidence of disagreement. Zhdanov's death, on the contrary, seems to have strengthened their unity of interest.

Whether Malenkov tried to whittle down Beria after the October, 1952, party congress is not clear. It cannot be ruled out that, for a period, army elements allied themselves with Molotov to weaken or neutralize Beria's influence. When, early in 1953, the alleged murder of Zhdanov by a group of doctors was publicized, this news was coupled with attacks on security forces and with the statement that prominent army men had been slated to suffer Zhdanov's fate. At that time, it was felt that these attacks emanated from army circles and were directed against Beria and his secret police. When Beria denounced the accusations against the doctors, he attacked the Malenkov protégé Semyon D. Ignatiev. Ignatiev had succeeded Victor S. Abakumov, a Beria appointee, in 1951 or 1952. Malenkov had, before the 1952 Party Congress, eliminated Abakumov: in April 1953 Beria redressed the power balance by striking at Malenkov through Ignatiev.

There is certainly substantial reason for long-standing antagonism between Soviet army leaders and the security police. Beria's organization represents a powerful mixture of armed strength and commercial resources. It is both an army outside the army and a giant manufacturing and trading enterprise. In manpower, Beria commands an estimated full-time force of about 1,700,000; an increase of nearly half a million over pre-war strength. Some 650,000 Beria men are believed to be employed in border control. Others serve in regional command posts, forced-labour camps, and administrative offices. Some 350,000 are assigned to militia duties and this militia is independent of the Soviet army. It not only has its own uniforms, but also its own staff, officers' training schools, service regulations, and commissaries.

The secret-police militia is made up of crack troops that are kept ready to meet internal disturbances and are organized into divisions, battalions, and companies. The militia has infantry and light artillery, tanks, and other vehicles that assure mobility. Reliable information on these forces comes from Soviet refugees who have made their way into West Germany; these informants emphasize that border-control troops of the secret police are organized to meet local conditions and do not follow a nation-wide pattern.

Beria's military power is supplemented by secret-police control over a vast segment of Soviet industry. The MVD supervises some 15 million forced labourers. It has built and runs vast enterprises staffed with men and women who have been condemned to forced labour after having been accused of conspiring against the Soviet régime. These helpless, hopeless human beings have been employed in such widely publicized undertakings as the Volga-Don Canal which was completed in 1952.

The Beria system has employed slave labourers in building state housing and defence projects, in highway and railway construction. A large number of forced labourers are employed in Siberian gold mines. Early in the second World War the secret-police enterprises were responsible for building nearly one-quarter of the railway system then constructed. They also mined nearly 3 per cent of the Soviet Union's coal, cut 12.5 per cent of its timber, mined more than 40 per cent of the chromite, and were responsible for three-quarters of the gold output.

In 1940 and 1941, secret-service enterprises used forced labour in finishing 14 per cent of the country's capital construction, amounting to over 2 billion roubles annually—more than any other single ministry. Since then, although he operates supposedly only to safeguard state security. Beria may have expanded his industrial activities. Aside from the obvious advantages he derives from maintaining an espionage apparatus among civilians, inside the Communist Party and

the armed forces, Beria commands perhaps close to one-fifth of the Soviet Union's internal economic power.

As an antagonist, Malenkov would therefore find Lavrenti Beria a most serious obstacle. As an ally, the Soviet Premier must value Beria as the man whose support, more than that of anyone else, assures the relative permanence of his position. Beria, as "kingmaker", in all probability helped Malenkov substantially in attaining the premiership. It was he who "nominated" Malenkov at the Supreme Soviet's session on March 15, 1953. Beria is obviously much more kindly inclined toward Malenkov than is Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

Beria's and Molotov's differing attitudes toward Malenkov were vividly illustrated when the three men made their funeral orations for Stalin atop Lenin's tomb. Mr. Beria spoke of the measures which the régime had taken "toward ensuring uninterrupted and correct leadership of the whole life of the country". He added: "One of the most important decisions is the appointment to the post of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. of the talented pupil of Lenin and the faithful comrade in arms of Stalin, Georgi Mazimilianovich Malenkov." Bolstering Malenkov further, Beria said that these decisions "adopted by the highest party and state organs of our country were a vivid expression of the complete unity and singleness of the leadership of the party and state".

Five days later, at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet that agreed to the changes in government, Molotov did not even speak. It was Beria who urged the deputies to endorse Malenkov, whom he called "a talented disciple of Lenin and loyal comrade-in-arms of Stalin". He expressed his "firm conviction" that the Soviet government, headed by G. M. Malenkov, will direct the entire work of building communism in our country, according to the teachings of Lenin and Stalin.

But while Beria was thus boosting Malenkov, the speaker

who followed him as Stalin's funeral orator did not once mention the name of Malenkov. That speaker was Vyacheslav Molotov, the man who had been long regarded by many as Stalin's most logical successor. How strong this feeling had been was illustrated in an article which the former Soviet official Victor A. Kravchenko published in *The Saturday Evening Post* of March 22, 1947. Speaking of Stalin's most likely successor, Kravchenko said: "I cannot imagine his being anyone but Molotov. . . . I never once met a person of any standing who doubted for a minute that Molotov, if he lived, would succeed Stalin on the latter's death. Certainly I met no one of any importance who seriously believed that Stalin's successor would be either Andrei Zhdanov or Georgi Malenkov. . . ."

Mr. Kravchenko's estimate was representative of widely held opinion—including, no doubt, the opinion of Molotov himself. Surely Molotov must have considered himself Malenkov's senior in every conceivable respect. Malenkov became Premier when he was fifty-one, at which time Molotov was sixty-three years of age. Malenkov was, relatively speaking, an upstart in Soviet society, while at the time of Stalin's death, Molotov had been an active revolutionary for nearly half a century. He was born in 1890, and named Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Scriabin. Later, like many another revolutionary, he adopted a name considered fitting for a tough rebel: Molotov—the Hammer. He became a Bolshevik when only a sixteen-year-old student. He took part in the abortive revolution of 1905, was arrested and temporarily exiled in the spring of 1909. Living in the city of Kazan, he became one of the "Kazan Bolsheviks", a doctrinaire Communist group. Molotov was a humble and earnest boy, overwhelmed by the brilliance and learning around him.

His special friend in Kazan was the well-to-do Victor Tikhomirnov. Molotov fitted himself obediently into the revolutionary machinery which demanded both subservience

and iron discipline. Tikhomirnov visited Lenin in Switzerland in 1911. A year later, the rich young man put up 100,000 roubles to found a small paper, named *Pravda*, in St. Petersburg. Molotov became editor, with Stalin guiding the paper from a hideout.

Molotov was twenty-two years old when he met Stalin for the first time. Their acquaintance was renewed in 1917. After the Bolsheviks took power, Molotov remained attached to Stalin. His first great moment came in 1922, while Lenin was feuding with Leon Trotsky. During a dispute over party leadership, Lenin proposed that Stalin be named General Secretary, with Molotov as his assistant.

From then on, Stalin and Molotov worked as a team, Molotov emerging as Number Two man par excellence. And so it remained, seemingly, until early in 1953. Molotov survived all the purges that came in between, the banishment and death of Trotsky, the elimination from power and the execution of nearly every one of the Old Bolsheviks, those Politburo Comintern members who had originally shared the helm with Stalin.

In 1930 Molotov became, temporarily, titular head of the Soviet government. He was named chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars, the title equivalent to Malenkov's as chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1953. But, back in 1930, Stalin remained unquestionably the source and centre of power, being Secretary-General of the Communist Party.

In May, 1939, when the Kremlin was preparing its government machinery for the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the aggressive Molotov replaced the more conciliatory, idealistic Maxim Litvinov as Foreign Commissar (later, Foreign Minister). In October of that year Molotov delivered perhaps his most startling speech, denouncing the Allied war effort against Nazi Germany. After years of violent anti-Nazi, anti-Fascist oratory, Molotov said:

"The British Government has announced that its aim in the

war against Germany is nothing more or less than the destruction of Hitlerism. This means that the British and French have declared something in the nature of an 'ideological' war against Germany, reminiscent of the religious wars of ancient times. There is absolutely no justification for a war of this kind. One may accept or reject the ideology of Hitlerism, as well as any other ideological system—that is a matter of political views. But everyone should understand that an ideology cannot be destroyed by force, that it cannot be eliminated by war. It is therefore not only senseless, but criminal to wage war for the 'destruction of Hitlerism', camouflaged as a 'fight for democracy'."

One month before Hitler's armies invaded Russia, Stalin took over the premiership himself, with Molotov in charge of foreign affairs. Molotov remained Foreign Minister until the Kremlin crisis of March, 1949. During that shake-up, Molotov had to give up the Foreign Ministry, although he remained Deputy Premier. Half a year had passed since Zhdanov's death, and Malenkov had been able to consolidate his position. Molotov was not the only one who lost his Ministry post, but he was the most prominent. Quite possibly, the across-the-board reduction of power among Politburo members who were also heads of Ministries obscured the specific facts in the case of Molotov. Clearly, as the shake-up also brought Voznesensky's complete downfall, it involved Malenkov's power drive. We might also assume that Molotov sought to block Malenkov, while Bulganin and others were more or less neutral during this period.

Stalin may simply have decided that being both Deputy-Premiers and Politburo members was enough for members of his entourage. If their power was being reduced a little, raising the relative importance of Malenkov, that might have been considered by Stalin as all to the good. He doubtless welcomed scrapes and friction within the Kremlin circle; such jealousy and competition permitted no single individual to consider himself without need of Stalin's

support. As long as members of the circle feuded among themselves, Stalin could exercise the function of paternal arbiter.

The fact that Molotov ignored Malenkov completely in his funeral oration for Stalin, suggests that he had not forgotten the treatment he received in 1949. Even though the Foreign Ministry was given back to him after Stalin's death, it must have been a bitter pill to rank below Malenkov. One reason for Molotov's bitterness must be the great difference in experience and training between the two men. Old Bolshevik Molotov is skilled in the use of Marxist-Leninist vernacular. He is steeped in Bolshevik theory, in dialectical materialism. Newcomer Malenkov has no such qualifications. He can cite no extensive theoretical works to his credit, no volumes of writings and speeches heavy with quotes from Marx, Engels, Lenin, or the more obscure dialecticians that litter the path of Communist history since the Communist Manifesto.

Rather pointedly, Molotov used his funeral oration for Stalin to emphasize the need for Marxist theoretics. He noted that "Stalin always knew how to combine the everyday, difficult activities of a Communist and revolutionary of the working class with a profound study of the theory of Marxism." Recalling the pre-Malenkov revolutionary days, Molotov said: "This is how he was in the early years in Tiflis and Baku. This is how he was in the stormy years of the Russian Revolution and in the difficult years of czarist reaction. . . . Comrade Stalin's exceptional ability as an incomparable organizer of our party and the Soviet state, and as the theoretician and genius of Marxism-Leninism, was fully developed in the years of the Revolution and the building of Socialism."

But Molotov's words received less than half the publicity accorded Malenkov's speech. The Soviet broadcasting network repeated Malenkov's address fifty-four times, Beria's thirty-five times, and Molotov's only twenty-two times.

When Malenkov became Premier, Molotov was sixty-three

years old. To be shunted aside like this, must have been disheartening to the man who served the Kremlin patiently and competently for three decades. Behind his stolid face, his glittering pince-nez, his recurring stammer, there must now lie the disappointment of a faithful servant who tended to his master's every whim in the hope of a large inheritance —and who found himself abandoned to the arrogance of the young lord of the manor.

There are many instances illustrating Stalin's contempt for Molotov, of Stalin's utter disregard for his feelings, even before important foreigners. Eric Johnston, then president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, visited Stalin during the second World War. Stalin agreed that a group of American correspondents might accompany Johnston on a trip to the Urals. Noting that the Foreign Ministry had not given its permission to the correspondents, Johnston said to Stalin: "But I don't know whether Mr. Molotov will approve." Whereupon Molotov quickly interjected: "I always approve of Marshal Stalin's decisions." Stalin then turned to Johnston and said, smiling, "Mr. Johnston, you really didn't expect Mr. Molotov to disagree with me, did you?"

In spite of these slights, Molotov always was Stalin's second in command, a position in the limelight of prestige and power. Now, after Stalin's death, he has been relegated to third place, shunted into the shadow of the prestige and power of a younger man. Beria, moved up to second place, is stronger than Molotov ever was when he stood next to Stalin. With the power of the secret-police machine at his command, with longer experience than Malenkov, Beria seems assured of closer attention, whenever he speaks out, than does Molotov.

Malenkov, it seems clear, cannot maintain himself without Beria's support. Beria alone, however, would be likely to find pressure from Molotov and the army group uncomfortable. Together, Malenkov and Beria are reasonably sure to

maintain their positions; divided, they might stumble. So long as Beria does not aspire to the title of Premier or to become President of the Council of Ministers, his alliance with Malenkov appears strong enough to withstand outside pressures; and Beria, who has tasted to the full the reality of power that comes with total terror, may well have decided to forgo the trappings of the Soviet Union's highest office. Being, like Stalin, of Georgian birth, he may consider his origin a handicap to his succession to the premiership, since the various peoples of the U.S.S.R. might not welcome two consecutive Georgian leaders.

Will the Malenkov-Beria coalition last? Will internal struggles cause Malenkov's early or eventual downfall? These questions were asked, the world over, within days of Stalin's death, but those who questioned, and who then suggested wishful answers, did not consider that the Malenkov régime had been in the making for exactly four years. On March 1, 1946, the emergence of Malenkov as a superior power in the Kremlin was documented when, together with Stalin himself, he signed the important manifesto on price reduction. Only five days later, Molotov was removed from his post as Foreign Minister.

The struggle which Malenkov won in 1949 was consolidated over a period of four years, while not Molotov but the second-stringer Andrei Y. Vishinsky was in charge of the Foreign Ministry. Whoever Malenkov's enemies are, his main challenger can hardly be Molotov. With Malenkov in control of the Communist Party, and Beria firmly entrenched as head of the secret police, Molotov can seek potential support from only one source: the Soviet army.

CHAPTER VII

The Rôle of the Army

MARSHAL NIKOLAI A. BULGANIN, although a First Deputy Premier and Minister of War, did not rate high enough in the Malenkov régime to mourn Stalin from the top of Lenin's tomb. There was little reference to the Soviet army in the speeches of Malenkov and Beria. Malenkov merely said in his funeral oration that, "under the direct leadership of Stalin, the Soviet army was created and strengthened". Beria, in an even more offhand remark, simply called for "further strengthening of the economic and military might of the state".

Thus it was left to Molotov to pay glowing tribute to the army. It was Molotov who showed appreciation of the army's officer corps, men who in any future struggle for Kremlin power would make important allies or antagonists. Molotov not only paid tribute to Stalin as wartime army leader, but added: "To be faithful and worthy continuers of Stalin means always to remember and constantly to care about the strengthening of the Soviet Army and Navy, ensuring the worthy preparedness of the Soviet armed forces in the event of any move of the aggressor against our country."

Molotov, it appeared, was making a discreet appeal to the army's officer corps. If so, he was appealing to the army clique over the head of Marshal Bulganin—a man who is much less an army representative in the Kremlin, as a Kremlin representative within the army. The professional officer is more accurately personified in Gregori K. Zhukov who, together with Marshal N. Vassilievsky, is Deputy War Minister under Bulganin.

No one outside the top Soviet leadership circle can pretend to understand fully the relationship between Marshal Zhukov and Georgi Malenkov. They worked side by side during the second World War as members of the inner cabinet known as the State Defence Committee. Malenkov was at that time largely responsible for assuring the production of armaments. Zhukov acted as Stalin's deputy, at a time when Stalin had assumed the position of Supreme Commander of all Soviet armed forces.

Former Soviet officers, now living as refugees in West Germany, assert that Zhukov was at one time at odds with Malenkov over the quality and design of certain aircraft models. Malenkov, in his effort to maintain maximum production, had frozen aircraft design. Zhukov is represented as charging that these planes were obsolete when they left the plants.

The chronology of Malenkov's and Zhukov's respective periods of disgrace suggests at least one thing: both had antagonized powerful elements and were demoted when Andrei Zhdanov had reached the peak of his influence. The temporary victory of Zhdanov over Malenkov took place in the early spring and was consolidated in the autumn of 1946. Zhukov's demotion from the post of Commander in Chief of all Soviet ground forces took place in April or early May of that year.

Zhukov made a slow come-back after Zhdanov's death. In July, 1951, he was a prominent participant in state ceremonies at Warsaw, Poland. When Malenkov achieved the premiership in March, 1953, Zhukov emerged into the bright Moscow limelight as perhaps the strongest figure in the Soviet War Ministry.

The two Marshals, Zhukov and Bulganin, personify entirely different schools of tradition and purpose within the Soviet Army. Bulganin is not at all a professional soldier. He has had no real military career, despite his heavily bemedalled uniform. Bulganin, rather, represents the corps

of "political commissars" within the armed forces—and resentment of these commissars is probably the greatest unresolved conflict inside the Soviet military machine.

Nothing illustrates the conflict between the soldiery and the Communist Party's secret services more clearly than the institution, abandonment, reinstitution, reabandonment, and eventual re-reinstitution of the system of political commissars inside the army. This see-sawing between the army on the one hand, and the Party and the secret police on the other, began during the Bolshevik Revolution—while Malenkov was serving as political commissar in Turkestan—and extended through the second World War.

The personalities of Marshals Zhukov and Bulganin reflect their differing careers and viewpoints. Zhukov, although a veteran Communist Party man, holds little brief for hair-splitting theorists. He is a high-tempered, dynamic, egocentric man of action with the face of a bulldog. He became fairly well acquainted with American commanders at the close of the last war. General Eisenhower, who praised Zhukov's military qualities during his presidential campaign in 1952, has observed that he had "a longer experience as a responsible leader in great battles than any other man of our time." General Walter Bedell Smith, now Under Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration, has written that he was impressed not only with Zhukov's soldierly ability, but also his "frank and straightforward attitude." He added that, at the end of the war, there was nevertheless "still an arm's length between us in our dealings." Eisenhower never doubted that Zhukov was a "firm believer in the Communist system."

Like Malenkov, Zhukov has a reputation for being exceedingly rough and tough with underlings. He is opinionated and outspoken and, again like Malenkov, quite impatient with bungling and professional ineptitude. Throughout his career he has antagonized a good part of the army's top officers, but the very ebullience of his personality

has made him popular in the ranks and among the civilian population.

By comparison, Marshal Bulganin, though quite personable, is a colourless figure. While Zhukov is an experienced and highly successful field commander, Bulganin is mainly an efficient administrator. These administrative abilities were originally those of a state banker and utilities executive.

It is a justifiable guess that Zhukov must view Bulganin with a double dose of contempt: first, because the man whose deputy Zhukov has become never once commanded troops in a successful battle; and second, because Bulganin represents the deeply disliked army-within-the-army of political commissars—thought by many regular officers to be spying, scheming parasites on the body of the Soviet armed forces.

Zhukov's genealogy, is properly proletarian. His parents were poor peasants and he himself served his apprenticeship as a leather dresser and furrier.

Zhukov entered the czarist army in 1914. Three years later his fellow-soldiers elected him to the regimental Soviet. He joined the Red Army in 1918, the Communist Party in 1919. During the civil war he won the Order of Lenin and became protégé of Mikhail Frunze, the Red Army commander who was at the top of the military ladder when Malenkov was serving as political worker in Turkestan.

At the end of the civil fighting, Zhukov attended the Frunze Military Academy to study armoured warfare. He became, successively, commander of a regiment, a brigade, a division and a corps of cavalry. In 1929, Zhukov studied at a German military institute. While other top officers were, during the Moscow trials of the 1930s, accused of dealing with Nazis and Trotskyists, Zhukov managed to avoid the tangled web of accusations and purges.

During the Spanish Civil War, Zhukov was one of Moscow's military observers in Spain, testing Russian tanks and his own theories of armoured warfare in actual battle.

Zhukov's next military experience was against the Japanese in Outer Mongolia in 1939. Undeclared but serious warfare raged between Japan and the Soviets in this strategic inner-Asian territory. Hanson W. Baldwin, writing in *Collier's* in January, 1952, observed that "the importance of these battles to the traditions and psychology of the Red Army, and to its training and growth, never have been understood in America." Zhukov's forces in Outer Mongolia virtually destroyed the Japanese Sixth Army, and he was named Hero of the Soviet Union. He had handled, Mr. Baldwin writes, "for the first time in actual war, mass Soviet armoured formations, and had proved the practicability of applying the old cavalry tactics to armour."

During the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939 and 1940, Zhukov had to pull Andrei Zhdanov's chestnuts out of the fire. It was Zhdanov who had assumed that the Finns would collapse quickly, but Zhukov's forces managed to pierce the Mannerheim Line only after weeks of bitter winter fighting. After the Soviet-Finnish armistice, Zhukov took command of the Kiev military district and there made a talk pointedly critical of the political-commissar system, shortly before that system was discontinued.

As Stalin's deputy on the State Defence Committee, Zhukov served the Soviet leader from late 1941 to the autumn of 1942. He organized the defence of Stalingrad while Malenkov arrived on the scene to whip up civilian fervour. Zhukov's "Hold or Die!" order carried the day; Stalingrad withstood attack in one of the great battles of history.

At Leningrad, where Zhdanov and Marshal Klimenti I. Voroshilov were at loggerheads, Zhukov sent Voroshilov home and managed to lift the German blockade of the city late in 1941. His other trouble-shooting assignments included the march into Rumania. Eventually—and for this he achieved world-wide fame—Zhukov led the triumphant Red Army advance into Berlin.

Every victory added to the impressive array of medals on

Zhukov's chest. During a parade in Berlin in the summer of 1945, he wore them all atop sky-blue dress uniform. He so outshone General George Patton, himself no introvert, that Patton turned to General Lucius Clay, and exclaimed: "Damn it, Lucius! Why didn't you tell me he was going to wear all his medals? I've got just as many as he has, and I would have worn mine!"

In August, shortly after this incident, General Eisenhower visited Moscow at Stalin's invitation. In turn, Zhukov accepted an invitation to come to the United States, then cancelled his trip abruptly. He had done his job, and now the time had come for Zhukov and other army leaders to step into the background. Andrei Zhdanov had returned to Moscow, and presently the great war hero disappeared into the obscurity of the Odessa regional command. Not until the autumn of 1948, following Zhdanov's death, did Zhukov leave Odessa; on November 7 of that year, another officer reviewed the Odessa troops.

One eminent scholar, Boris I. Nicolaevsky, has noted that Zhukov, in 1946, opposed the appointment of Zhdanov's man Colonel-General I. V. Shikin as chief of the army's Political Department, in charge of the political commissars.* Mr. Nicolaevsky believes that Zhdanov effected Zhukov's banishment, and that Malenkov reappointed him to the very post he held in 1946, hoping that "this former ally against Zhdanov can help him in the future."

It is significant that the Zhukov-Zhdanov break occurred,

* *The New York Times* chief foreign correspondent, C. L. Sulzberger, in a dispatch from Paris published June 19, 1949, wrote that General Shikin was "reported to have disappeared during the last few months." The dispatch stated that "Shikin, although little known abroad, was one of the most important figures in the Soviet army administration," adding: "General Shikin was directly linked with Andrei Zhdanov. He went to Leningrad in 1940 as deputy chief of the Leningrad Military District when General Zhdanov was both civil and military commander of that key region. He remained there under General Zhdanov during the first years of the German siege of the city, which began in the late summer of 1941, and had daily dealings with his chief."

in all probability, over the issue of the political commissars. This issue must be the key, too, in any power struggle between the Malenkov-Beria alliance and the army clique. The Political Administration, the army-within-the-army, is beholden to the Communist Party and the secret police; it reports to Malenkov and Beria—through Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin.

Born in the town of Gorki in 1895, Bulganin was fifty-eight years old when Stalin died. He had fought in the Red Army during the Bolshevik Revolution in Turkestan, and later became a factory director in Moscow. In 1931 he took over the Moscow city administration as chairman of the Moscow Soviet. In 1937 he was appointed administrative head of the Soviet State Bank, became a deputy in the Supreme Soviet, and assistant Communist Party chairman for the Moscow area.

At the outbreak of the second World War, Bulganin was named to co-ordinate the commissariats of ferrous metals, nonferrous metals, cellulose and paper, sulphites, hydraulics, and rubber. When Moscow was under attack by the armies of Nazi Germany, he ran the city's civilian-defence system. In 1941 Bulganin became Stalin's political trouble shooter within the army, at a time when the Kremlin subjected the armed forces to constant indoctrination to make sure that their loyalty to the Communist Party did not lag. Later Bulganin was political commissar of the Second Baltic and First White Russian armies facing Warsaw; he also helped set up the so-called "Polish Committee for National Liberation", which ultimately grew into Poland's Communist government. After the war, Bulganin returned to Moscow and eventually replaced Premier Stalin in the war ministry.

At the beginning of the war, Stalin had made himself head of the Soviet armed forces. He did so on June 30, 1941, four days after Nazi troops crossed the Soviet frontier. On March 3, 1947, Stalin resigned from this post and Bulganin took his place as War Minister; at the same time, he became Deputy Premier.

Bulganin was named to full-fledged membership in the Politburo at a secret meeting of the party's Central Committee. Volume VI of the new *Great Soviet Encyclopædia* stated that he received this distinction at a meeting in February, 1948. He was removed from the War Ministry in March, 1949, shortly after Molotov was removed as head of the Foreign Ministry but both men retained their Politburo positions.

Bulganin's emergence as a "military man" in 1941 coincided with restitution of the system of political commissars which Zhukov and Marshal Semyon Timoshenko had succeeded in ending temporarily. The purges of the late 1930s had been successful in eliminating all possible anti-Stalin opposition from the army, but they had also thoroughly demoralized the army. This demoralization was revealed by the poor performance of Soviet forces in Outer Mongolia and Finland, before Zhukov stepped in. Abolition of the commissar system in 1940 was part of an effort to raise army morale and strengthen a direct line of command.

Yet the Communist Party and the secret police remained distrustful of professional officers. Within a month of the German invasion of Russia, the political commissars made their reappearance through the edict of July 16, 1941. The next two years were extremely critical for the Soviet Union. German advances eroded confidence and discipline even as the political commissars sought to assure the army's loyalty to Stalin. At the same time, behind the regular army stood Beria's own secret-service army, ready to act against mutiny among troops or rebellion among the civilian population.

The Beria army considers itself an *élite* group superior to the regular troops. While the Germans were attacking successfully, the Kremlin sought to heighten the regular army's vigour by reinstituting rank insignia, shoulder straps, and medals as "patriotic reforms". One secret-service militia man, after escaping from the Soviet Union, in 1947 wrote in

the New York Russian-language paper, *Socialist Courier*, that Beria's group in 1942–1943 feared that these "patriotic reforms", which were, in fact, concessions to the regular army troops, would undermine its supremacy and sweep away its privileges.

According to this report, Malenkov, the wartime trouble shooter assured secret-police troops in Stalin's name that "important changes are not contemplated and will not be enacted." He is said to have dwelt on the difficulties of the war situation and stressed that this was no time to bother about trifles. The main objective at that moment was to keep the government's power unchallenged, and this required a good deal of manœuvring. The report added: "Malenkov did not explicitly say so, but the main danger to the party and Stalin was seen as coming from the Red Army, its generals and marshals. This fact was often mentioned in the political instructor's talks with the men, and was the general topic of conversation among us."

The apparent crisis of January, 1953—when deep-running intrigues showed themselves briefly and inconclusively in Moscow announcements—seems to have involved Zhukov. Despite his slow, steady, re-emergence since Zhdanov's death, Zhukov's name did not appear in a detailed listing of army generals who signed an obituary for one of their colleagues in the newspaper *Red Star*. Once again it looked as if Zhukov were involved with a powerful opponent.

Therefore it is very difficult to determine exactly what Zhukov's relationship to the new régime is to be. Allowing the re-emergence of Zhukov may represent a calculated risk on the part of Premier Malenkov, but one he may deem worth while if the support of the army clique can thus be assured.

Also during the first weeks of 1953, the fantastic story of the plot by "terrorist Jewish doctors" was announced in Moscow. The announcement not only asserted that this group had "confessed" to killing Andrei Zhdanov, but had

also been guilty of shortening the life of Alexander S. Shcherbakov, who was Zhdanov's brother-in-law. Before Shcherbakov died in 1945, he had been chief of the army's Political Administration. The truly incredible announcement also alleged that the group of doctors had a number of future victims on their list. All of these supposed targets were army men, namely:

Marshal Alexander M. Vassilevsky, then Soviet War Minister; Marshal Ivan S. Konev, commander of ground forces; Marshal Leonid A. Govorov, commander of the Leningrad Army who led Soviet forces in Leningrad during the second World War; Admiral G. I. Levchenko, Deputy Minister of the Navy, and General S. M. Shtemenko, who was removed as Chief of Staff of Soviet land forces.

No clarification followed this announcement. No text of the supposed confessions was released. In fact, the whole matter dropped from the public eye as suddenly as it had appeared. Meanwhile Stalin was dying, and the struggle for power between the ambitious inheritors of Stalin's mantle must have been at its peak.

In truth, the circumstances of top-level intrigues just before Stalin's death—or while Stalin was already dead and the news withheld by the Kremlin palace guard—may never be fully known. To this day, the facts of Lenin's death are in dispute.

The circumstances of Stalin's death were certainly not without suspicion. The successive communiqués of Stalin's illness were extremely elaborate in their clinical detail; they were signed by eight doctors and went to great lengths in stating the dying man's reported pulse rate, breathing, temperature, and other symptoms. According to Soviet principles of news dissemination, such details were excessive. For years, all news on Stalin's health had been withheld, just as all other information on the personal affairs and habits of Soviet officials are completely hidden behind Moscow censorship. But suddenly, all barriers were down,

the world was invited to what was represented to be Stalin's deathbed.

Just as unusual was the detailed documentation of the causes of Stalin's death. Because the consequences of Stalin's passing overshadowed this announcement at the time, the full text of this autopsy report is presented here, complete with the names of the eight physicians, as it appeared in the Soviet Press:

> The post mortem examination of J. V. Stalin established a large area of haemorrhage in the grey matter of the left hemisphere of the brain. This haemorrhage destroyed vital functions of the brain and resulted in fatal disturbances of respiration and blood circulation. In addition to the cerebal haemorrhage, there were established considerable hypertrophia of the left cardiac ventricle, numerous haemorrhages in the cardiac muscle, and in the mucous membrane of the stomach and intestines, and arteriosclerotic affection of the vessels, particulary pronounced in the brain arteries.
>
> These processes resulted from hypertonicity. Post mortem results fully confirm the diagnosis made by the professors and doctors attending J. V. Stalin. Data of the post mortem examination established the fatal nature of Stalin's illness from the moment the cerebral haemorrhage first occurred. Therefore, the radical measures of treatment could not yield positive results nor avert a fatal outcome.
>
> *Signed*: U.S.S.R. Minister of Health, A. F. Tretyakov; Head of the Health Sanitary Administration of the Kremlin, I. I. Kuperin; President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences, Academician N. N. Qanichkov; Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences, Prof. M. A. Skvortsov; Associate Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences, A. I. Strukov; Associate Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences,

Prof. S. R. Mardashev; Head of the Pathological-Anatomical Section of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health, Prof. B. I. Migunov; Prof. A. V. Rusakov; Docent B. M. Uskov.

This sudden reversal, this excess of detail, where a brief and dignified announcement of the Premier's death would have been completely natural, must raise doubts.

The tentative theory that Malenkov may have taken steps to hasten Stalin's death is given a degree of credence by two authorities: Boris Nicolaevsky and Franz Borkenau.* Nicolaevsky believes that the announcement of the alleged doctors' plot helps to explain Malenkov's possible interest in Stalin's death. Borkenau, in two articles published in the weekly *Rheinischer Merkur*, of Coblenz, Germany, expressed a similar view.

Writing on January 23 and 30, 1953, Borkenau pointed out that only three of the accused doctors had ever been involved in treating top Kremlin leaders; two of these three, including Dr. P. I. Yegorov, were not Jews at all. Yegorov was head of the Kremlin medical administration, and Borkenau regarded the announcement as an attack on the Kremlin medical administration as such. He pictured the Kremlin doctors as loyal to, and trusted by, Stalin. Borkenau therefore saw the attack on these doctors as an effort to dispose of them, and thus gain control of Stalin's fate. He further concluded that it was Malenkov who was most interested in gaining such control at the time.

Borkenau believes that the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress of 1952 had not resulted in a complete Malenkov victory; that, instead, elements of the army leadership and other sections of the Soviet administration had allied themselves against Malenkov; and that, further, Stalin had given these anti-Malenkov forces just enough balance to prevent Malenkov's being proclaimed his heir while Stalin was still alive. But Malenkov, according to Borkenau, had gone too far to retreat without endangering his ultimate chances of success. Therefore, Malenkov may have decided to force the issue by "getting Stalin's person into his grip" by removing Stalin's own physicians from the scene and replacing them with his own men.

* Boris I. Nicolaevsky directed the Historico-Revolutionary Archives in Moscow from 1919 to 1921. Among his works is *Karl Marx: Man and Fighter*; he is the co-author, with David Dallin, of *Forced Labour in Soviet Russia*. Franz Borkenau is an authority on Communist tactics, and author of *World Communism: A History of the Communist International.*

Certainly, the announcement about the alleged doctors' plot was strange enough to encourage such speculation. The relating of the deaths of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov with supposed designs on the lives of high armed-forces officials suggested involvement of the army clique and of the explosive issue of the political commissars.

Whatever the validity of this theory, without doubt wide and bitter struggles for power took place in Moscow between the Nineteenth Party Congress and the announcement of Stalin's death. The month of January, 1953, and the period just before and after, may well have been decisive in Malenkov's succession to Stalin. Zhukov's appointment to an influential position in the War Ministry suggests Malenkov's temporary victory over, or appeasement of, the army clique. Certainly Zhukov's importance overshadows that of First Deputy Premier Bulganin.

Together, Malenkov and Beria can probably keep the army clique in check. They must try to strengthen still further the position of the political commissars under Bulganin. Thus the continued power struggle is likely to be fought within the ranks of the Soviet army itself. The more determined Malenkov is in his effort to wipe out army opposition, the louder will be warnings that the Soviet army must guard itself against spies, saboteurs, and other destructive elements. This theme was used on March 15, 1953, in a broadcast by Radio Volga, the Soviet-controlled transmitter in Berlin. This station, broadcasting in Russian to Soviet

troops, urged that "high political vigilance" should be directed against "all activities of our enemies, their agents, and the imperialistic governments". The broadcast quoted Malenkov as saying: "We have to educate all Communists and workers to high political vigilance and to teach them to fight against all interior and exterior enemies." In the struggle for Kremlin power, the Soviet army is the main battleground.

CHAPTER VIII

Malenkov and Mao

GEORGI MALENKOV and Mao Tse-tung, head of China's Communist régime, met when Mao visited Moscow from December 12, 1949, to February 17, 1950, to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty. It was, as far as is publicly known, Mao's first visit to the Soviet Union. Although there is no official information to suggest that Malenkov has ever visited China, some scholars believe that Malenkov may have gone to Peiping in the autumn of 1950 to prepare the ground for Red China's intervention in the Korean War.

Certainly Malenkov has shown much greater interest in China than did his late antagonist Andrei A. Zhdanov. In his important Cominform address in 1947, Zhdanov restricted his comments entirely to Europe. Two years later, speaking at the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution shortly before Mao's arrival in Moscow, Malenkov dealt with China in detail and with exuberance.

Malenkov said that the Communist victory in China had historic significance. He recalled that Lenin regarded the outcome of the "world struggle between capitalism and communism" as depending on the fact that "Russia, India, and China comprise the overwhelming majority of the population" of the world. As for American aims in China, he said: "American imperialism counted on utilizing China as the chief base for its domination in Asia and the Pacific, as one of the decisive links in the encirclement of the Soviet Union. With this object the imperialists intended to transform China into an enormous colonial appendage to the American world empire."

Malenkov said that the Chinese Communist Party had

arrived at the "height of its historic mission." He referred to the "experienced guidance of its leader, Mao Tse-tung" who had created forces that "smashed the Kuomintang hordes—hordes armed with American equipment and actually directed by American staffs." Malenkov then looked beyond China, toward "all the peoples of Asia". He said that the Chinese Communist victory had moved what he called "the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, of the Pacific, of the entire colonial world", to "a new and considerably higher stage."

Although Malenkov this early expressed his high regard for Mao Tse-tung's success, Mao did not attend Stalin's funeral in Moscow. All other Communist-governed countries were represented by their heads of state. However, in a purely technical sense, Peiping was properly represented. It sent its Premier and Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai. In reality, Chou is second to Mao in internal prestige and international standing. Was Mao's absence a slight? Was it indicative of a possible rift between Mao and Malenkov?

Certainly the Malenkov régime showed itself most cordial toward Peiping. As Malenkov approached the Lenin-Stalin tomb on Moscow's Red Square, he was flanked by Deputy Premier Lavrenti Beria and Chou En-lai. As the group walked to the rostrum, Chou immediately followed Beria, preceding even Foreign Minister Molotov. No other foreign Communist leader was given such prominence.

Premier Malenkov, in his funeral oration for Stalin, went to considerable length to show Soviet appreciation of the successful Chinese Communist régime. He listed it first among the Communist-governed countries, and then said: "We must in every way consolidate the eternal, indestructible, and fraternal friendship of the Soviet Union with the great Chinese people and with the workers in all countries of the people's democracy."

Clearly, in Malenkov's world view of Communist-governed countries, China was priority Number One. All other

satellite nations are secondary in importance, having real weight only when viewed as a group. A curious way of illustrating Malenkov's personal desire to appear closely linked with the cause of Red China was demonstrated in the *Pravda* issue of March 10, 1953, published the day after Stalin's funeral. The Moscow newspaper printed a photograph showing, from left to right, Stalin, Mao, and Malenkov. The caption beneath the picture said that this was a photograph taken February 14, 1950, at the time of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid.

And so it was, but the picture had been radically altered. In the original photograph, Molotov, Stalin, and Mao stood together in one group at the left side of the picture; Malenkov and Beria were on the extreme right. The two groups were separated by four other people, one of them being Vishinsky, who was seated and signing the treaty. But the 1953 *Pravda* version had dropped everyone else out of the picture, including Beria and Molotov, and moved Malenkov directly next to Stalin and Mao.

This was a somewhat crude visual way of saying what Malenkov emphasized throughout his first weeks in power: that he personally regarded Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists highly, and hoped for continued Sino-Soviet unity. In Peiping, meanwhile, the official atmosphere was no less cordial. There were no efforts at pictorial forgery, but official statements emphasized the same theme of continued "indestructible unity".

However, in his Stalin memorial essay, entitled *The Greatest Friendship*, Mao mentioned Stalin's name twenty-nine times—and Malenkov only once, when he said: "We fully believe that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government, headed by Comrade Malenkov, will definitely be able to follow Comrade Stalin's behest to drive forward the great cause of Communism and carry it to further glorious fruition."

An effort to make Malenkov and his ideas familiar to the Chinese took place even before Stalin's death. His address to the Nineteenth Party Congress was translated into Chinese, and given to the 47,150 cadre members who form the core of the Chinese Communist Party.

Malenkov's, Beria's, and Molotov's funeral orations for Stalin were also made obligatory reading for Chinese party members. There were, in other words, conscious efforts on both sides to underline common interests. But long-range relations between Peiping and Moscow must be viewed in terms of two factors: first, the personalities of Mao and Malenkov; second, historical and current Chinese-Soviet interests.

Physically, there is a definite similarity between the two men. Both have full round faces and tend toward double chins. Of the two, Mao is favoured with the more expressive and sensitive features. Both prefer simple and severe uniforms—medals and ribbons and flashing gold stars are clearly not for them. Their uniforms have a sackcloth look of austerity. Both men are grown portly. Mao, however, is hardly the stereotype of the lax, fat man, grown soft with too much civilization. He has been, at various moments of his career, a general in the field, the leader of a long and tortuous forced march, a cave dweller, a prolific writer, an energetic organizer. He has waged a long and apparently successful battle with an ordinarily wasting scourge, tuberculosis.

The year 1920 was important in the lives of both men. In Russia, Malenkov became a member of the party; in China, a group named the Society for the Study of Marxism, which a year later was to become the Chinese Communist Party, was formed in Shanghai and numbered Mao Tse-tung among its active members. Mao is perhaps the principal Marxist theoretician to survive Stalin; he assigned to the peasantry a historical rôle in Communist revolutionary thought. As a

Communist thinker, he would definitely seem to eclipse Malenkov, but in terms of actual party experience, Mao is in no sense the Soviet Premier's senior.

When Malenkov was initiated into the Communist Party, Mao was working as a labour organizer in China. He read avidly and widely, but his feelings about the Bolshevik Revolution were almost entirely emotional. His knowledge of Marxist theory was not first hand. In China, torn by warlordism and strife, the men who wanted to introduce communism waited for an opening under the watchful eyes of Comintern agent Gregori Voitinsky.

China has never had a middle class to speak of, and yet Mao's parents, probably like those of Malenkov, were of better than average economic substance. They owned their house and land, they employed farm labour. Mao was able to attend school and a university. His position as a library assistant at Peiping University put him in touch with people who read books, and over cups of jasmine tea he could listen to fellow intellectuals dissect the West, discuss Marx, and plan for the future.

Lenin, after the turmoil of the October Revolution, saw that China represented a vast Communist potential, although he believed that a land with so wide an agrarian base could not move quickly toward Communism, that a working-class base was needed. Meanwhile he sought to capture Chinese attention by many gestures, such as the decision to renounce Russian extra-territorial claims in China. He also spoke constantly of liberating the oppressed peoples of the East from colonial bondage, and the reiteration of this theme attracted many Chinese who fiercely resented foreign intrusion.

China's revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen welcomed assistance from the Soviet Union, and this paved the way for large-scale Soviet aid to China during the 1920s. For a time, Soviet army officers and advisers were treated as friendly

princes from afar. But the honeymoon ended when the Communists tried to entrench themselves and were expelled from the Kuomintan in 1927.

Thus, at the outset of Sino-Soviet relations, both Soviet material and ideological help was welcomed, particularly aid designed to facilitate organization. The Chinese had for centuries failed in organizational procedures. There was no common feeling for the "state" as such, beyond resentment toward taxation and conscription, and feelings of unity and obligation were concentrated within the kinship system, the family, the village.

The tradition of Soviet aid was revived after the Communists succeeded in conquering the Chinese mainland in 1949. Since then, the Chinese Communist Party has, at every turn, officially welcomed Soviet aid. It professes not to see Soviet aid as a disguise for future exploitation, but rather as fraternal help. The open Soviet looting of Manchuria immediately following V-J Day—a systematic theft estimated to represent some 2 billion dollars—caused severe embarrassment to the Peiping régime. To combat initial Chinese sensitivity to this type of high-handed operation, the Communists brushed it aside by stating that if the Soviets had not removed it, it would have been destroyed by the Kuomintang. Then Peiping propagandists found it more advantageous to go on the offensive, emphasizing Soviet-Chinese solidarity and turning their vitriolic pens against the West and the United States in particular.

A small army of Soviet technical advisers has been in China since early 1950 and they have been in large measure responsible for overseeing construction of new railroad networks, highways, and irrigation projects. Their influence has been felt in related fields, from Stakhanovite coal-mining methods, to oil drilling and airfield development.

Some 20,000 branch offices of an organization known as the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association have sprung up all over China. Some of the branches are in factories and

schools, some in former Western mission homes, some in elaborate buildings of their own. A membership running into millions is claimed. This is quite possible, because by a simple fiat, all Communist soldiers received automatic membership, and many Chinese have found that membership in the association is a reasonably good insurance policy against being branded counter-revolutionary.

Sino-Soviet joint stock companies, born out of the treaty of 1950, have expanded substantially. They are located principally in Sinkiang Province, in China's relatively unexploited but mineral-rich North-west. There is also evidence pointing to the existence of an atomic centre and proving ground in Sinkiang. Manchuria and Sinkiang are regions where the Soviet Union has established a degree of economic hegemony. Together with Outer Mongolia, these are potential danger points in relations between Malenkov and Mao, because Moscow's and Peiping's interest in them must ultimately conflict. The delicate case of Outer Mongolia was probably discussed in Moscow in 1952 when the region's head of state, Prime Minister Yumzhagil Tsedenbal of the Mongolian People's Republic, joined Sino-Soviet talks on August 28.

Outer Mongolia has long been a source of discord between Russia and China. In 1925 the government of Sun Yat-sen signed a pact with the Soviet Union which said: "The Government of the U.S.S.R. recognizes that Outer Mongolia is a part of the Chinese Republic and honours the sovereign rights of China. The U.S.S.R. declares that as soon as withdrawal of Soviet troops is practical, they will be withdrawn from Outer Mongolia." But the Soviet régime never lived up to this agreement. It has kept the Outer Mongolian frontiers closed to China and the rest of the world. Again, in 1945 the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the Chinese government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, promising that a plebiscite would be held on the proposed independence of Outer Mongolia. Then the

Soviets simply announced that such a plebiscite had been held—and that the vote had been unanimously for "independence". Although technically sovereign, the state is actually run as a Soviet province. Prime Minister Tsedenbal is head of the local Communist Party. As such he is subordinate to G. I. Bannikov, who has the title U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the Mongolian People's Republic.

Malenkov's dilemma is underlined by a strongly-worded statement which Mao Tse-tung made in 1936: "The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in the past, has always been based on the principle of complete equality. When the people's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese Federation of its own will." Moscow's and Peiping's maps also differ on the boundary line that divides Moscow-controlled Outer Mongolia from Peiping-controlled Inner Mongolia.

Such historic territorial conflicts are not easily resolved, even though both Malenkov and Mao may consider them secondary matters, greatly overshadowed by factors that emphasize continued Moscow-Peiping co-operation. Certainly Malenkov must step gingerly in all territorial matters affecting China. Soviet high-handedness in regions under Chinese sovereignty may arouse latent chauvinism even among the Peiping Communist leadership.

Some observers divide the Peiping régime into two factions. The so-called "nationalist" faction is presumed to be headed by Mao Tse-tung and General Chu Teh. The party leaders Liu Shao-chi, Li Li-san, Kao Kang, and Po I-po are considered part of the slavishly pro-Moscow "internationalist" bloc. If these groups were ever to split on the issue of support for Malenkov, Communist unity in China would be sorely shaken. Given such an eventuality, we would probably witness a turbulent division of power in China, with the pro-Moscow faction holding sway in the north and north-east, close by the Soviet Union, and the opposing

group camping in the central and southern regions. A new grouping of Chinese "war lords" might thus emerge.

Elements running counter to such a split are, however, very strong. Mao Tse-tung's debt to Moscow is clear and undeniable. Without Moscow's continued ideological guidance and moral support, without the symbol of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, without Moscow's financial assistance and advice on such vital matters as organization and propaganda, Mao Tse-tung, for all his independent accomplishments, might not today be exercising the most complete control of China that has been known in all of its 4,000-year history. Mao himself has asked the question, on July 1, 1949, in his *Essay on Democratic Dictatorship*: "Do you seriously think that it was possible for us to come out victorious without the Soviet Union?" And he himself answered curtly: "Decidedly not!"

From the Soviet viewpoint, Malenkov obviously realizes that China's value to the U.S.S.R. far exceeds the value to Moscow on any other single Communist-governed state. China and the Soviet Union share a long, common border, in about the manner of Canada and the United States. The Soviets have long expressed an almost obsessive need for friendly "buffer regions". A pro-Soviet China is therefore not merely in Moscow's interest; it is a necessity, dictated by real or imagined fears. A Soviet China, together with the Soviet Maritime East (provinces on the Pacific coast), provides Moscow with an ideal protective flank. From the point of view of military strategy, a friendly China is invaluable to Moscow, as the Korean War so well demonstrated. There Communist China is tying down large numbers of American troops, while not one single Soviet soldier's life is endangered.

Beyond military security, China can be a vast supplier of raw materials and natural resources, of light manufactures including consumer goods, and of foodstuffs, particularly grains. By the end of 1952, Communist China's exports to

the Soviet Union totalled 70 per cent of all Chinese exports, and signs that the percentage would increase were obvious. Communist China's trade with the non-Communist world was decreasing rapidly, save for items unobtainable from the Soviet Union, including certain pharmaceuticals and rare drugs, and rubber.

On January 1, 1953, the Peiping régime launched an ambitious Five-Year Plan of industrialization, but shortly afterward it cut the building plans of various ministries by 30 per cent. It seemed that Peiping was hard pressed for capital goods, of which the Soviet Union was its only source. On March 25, Moscow and Peiping signed a trade protocol that pledged Soviet assistance in the construction of power stations and in the metallurgical, mining, machine-construction, and chemical industries, as well as supplying agricultural machinery, pedigree cattle, and seeds. In turn, China was to provide the Soviet Union with light metals, rice, vegetable oil, meat, tobacco, tea, fruits, wool, jute, raw silk, silk textiles, leather goods, and other products. New but unpublished Soviet credits to China were also said to have been granted.

This is not to imply that the Kremlin has made no allowance for any Chinese action it might interpret as unfriendly. From ten to twelve Soviet infantry divisions are stationed above China's northernmost border. They are there, ostensibly, for normal security and garrison reasons, but they could, if need be, flood down into China and be in Peiping within ten hours. The China mainland itself is filled with Soviet personnel, estimated at as many as 40,000. Each Soviet representative in China, quite apart from his openly declared organization, is under Vasily V. Kuznetzov, Soviet Ambassador to China. The slightest indication of an anti-Soviet trend in China would be reported back to Moscow immediately and appropriate countermeasures would be taken.

However, in the immediate future, grounds do not exist

for a Sino-Soviet rupture. As a friendly associate of the Soviet Union—not a satellite—China stands to profit greatly. The gains made thus far in Chinese production, in economic stability, in military strength, in laying the groundwork for industrialization—all these are clearly apparent and in part can be traced to Soviet assistance. Save for the possibility of Kremlin recklessness, there is nothing on the horizon to give substance to a Sino-Soviet split in the next few years. Soviet experience with Yugoslavia was bitter; Malenkov is not likely to repeat Zhdanov's Yugoslav mistake in Asia.

What, then, are the chances of a break between Mao and Malenkov, viewed in long-range terms? The intensive Marxist remoulding of Chinese people goes beyond the control of the pro-Moscow Communist Party element. The present resurgence of Chinese strength may eventually channel into a stream of anti-foreignism that will permit the dominance of no alien power in China, including the Soviet Union. Although Communist cultural genocide has destroyed a number of traditional Chinese concepts, intense Chinese nationalism and sensitivity to every kind of foreign imperialism has not been entirely purged. Thus far, anti-foreign sentiment has in fact served the Communists in encouraging Chinese wrath against the Western powers.

Yet another consideration is the fact that the Chinese are an immensely practical and realistic people. Even as it is classic Chinese strategy to make strategic withdrawals, so may it also be strategy to accept gifts from questionable friends. If the gifts be industrialization, organization, material assistance, well and good—the Chinese can use such gifts. None can doubt that a strong China is a Chinese Communist aim. And independence can be asserted only when there is strength to maintain it.

The Malenkov-Mao relationship lacks the Stalin-Mao teacher-student relationship. But Malenkov, like Mao, is a high priest at the shrine of the Stalin myth. As long as this "co-existence", this seeming equality is maintained, there

will be no radical change in Sino-Soviet relations. Communist China, in its relationship to Moscow, sees itself as a younger brother who is rapidly growing up.

As a disciple of Stalin, Malenkov must understand China's immense strategic and economic importance to the Soviet Union. Perhaps he will have to make concessions to China's role in Asia. Even while Stalin was alive, such Communist parties as those of Japan and India were looking to Peiping as well as to Moscow for guidance. Chinese in other lands, especially throughout southern Asia, play an important rôle in Communist agitation. In a manner of speaking, Peiping has, since 1950, developed into a revolutionary centre that, in some ways, rivals Moscow.

This condition has not, in the past, led to open friction. If Malenkov curbs his characteristic brusqueness and impatience in dealing with Mao, the adjustment in Peiping-Moscow relations can take place without noticeable friction. Mao has declared himself unswervingly faithful to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, headed by Malenkov. The two men are bound together by the realization that they need each other.

CHAPTER IX

What Does He Believe?

WHAT does Georgi M. Malenkov believe? These, as far as one can tell, are his professed articles of faith:

1. Peaceful "co-existence", on Soviet terms, with the West. But this is predicated on the supposition that American "billionaires" will drop their "terrorist" policy which he believes, or says he believes, is designed for American world conquest.

2. Atomic weapons should be outlawed. He believes in the use of atomic energy only for productive purposes, but he would not hesitate to use any weapon against "aggression".

3. The "imperialist camp"—meaning the West—cannot exist on a peace-time economy, and economic crises will produce further warfare. Such warfare will "dig the grave of world capitalism".

4. Peace for the Soviet Union, but not a pacifist, inactive peace. His idea of peace is "to struggle actively against warmongers".

5. The United States and other Western Powers are using spies and saboteurs to infiltrate the satellites and Russia, to poison Communist doctrine, to interrupt Communist production.

6. For Russia and the Communist world: equality between the Soviet Union and the satellites.

7. Tighter organization and purer doctrine in the Communist Party.

8. More industrial and agricultural production through greater efficiency, greater labour "enthusiasm", and modern techniques.

9. Transition from socialism to pure communism in the Soviet Union.

10. The growth of communism throughout the world.

This interpretation of Malenkov's credo is based mostly on analyses of his six major speeches between 1941 and 1953.* But one must be careful in examining these papers to translate not only from Russian into English, but also from the ingrown, private Communist vernacular into terms understood by the rest of the world. In 1947, for example, Malenkov spoke of "morality", but this had nothing to do with ethics, philosophy, or religion. He was talking about Communist Party morality, political purity acceptable to the party. In 1941 and after, he spoke of "labour enthusiasm" which might better be interpreted as "demonstrations of labour obedience to the Party". By the word "democracy", Malenkov means "people's democracy" or socialism in the Soviet sense, which has nothing to do with democracy as we know it. When he says "co-operation", or "co-existence", the non-Communist reader should immediately add, "on Soviet Communist terms". When the new Premier mentions "peace", he usually means peace for Russian Communists and on their own terms. Any act to stem the expansion of Russian communism, is, to Malenkov, "aggression", while it might merely be interpreted by a non-Communist as defence.

Atomic energy, Malenkov said in his 1949 speech to the Moscow Soviet "must be a mighty instrument of technical progress . . . and an instrument for the further rapid development of the productive forces of our country". Although

* The Speeches were "Tasks of the Party Organization in Industry and Transport," delivered to the Eighteenth All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 15, 1941; "The Activities of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)", delivered to the secret meeting of the parties of nine nations which formed the Information Bureau (Cominform) in Poland, September, 1947; the speech before the Moscow Soviet delivered in November, 1949; Report to the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivered in Moscow, October 5, 1952; Stalin Funeral Oration in Moscow, March 9, 1953; speech to the Supreme Soviet, March 15, 1953.

later in the 1949 oration he said flatly that the Soviet government "possesses the atomic weapon", by 1952 he was more evasive, begging the question with talk of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. "While possessing real possibilities for producing atomic energy, the Soviet state is deeply interested in seeing this new type of energy used for peaceful purposes, for the good of the people, since such a use of atomic energy vastly extends man's dominion over the elements and opens up before humanity colossal opportunities for increasing the productive forces, for technical and cultural progress, and for multiplying the social wealth."

He did not say in 1952, as he did in 1949, that the U.S.S.R. had atomic weapons, much less give any indication of what kind of atomic tools the Soviet might have.

Malenkov has consistently expressed Moscow's official "peace" policy. In 1949 he said that the main element of foreign policy was that the U.S.S.R. "stands for peace and defends the cause of peace. . . . We do not want war and will do everything possible to prevent it". He added that, "the socialist state has no need for foreign expansion." Stalin had also said something similar shortly before subduing what are now the satellites.

The official peace policy which Malenkov supports is an exercise in semantics. He demonstrated what he meant by peace when he said, in 1949, that the Soviet people were discharging their responsibility to history by their actions toward "certain successors of the fascist barbarians" who "are extending the bloody hand of a new war over the world." Presumably, "fascist barbarians" was Malenkov's description of Americans who were then supporting the legal government of China against Communist insurrection.

If there was any doubt about what Malenkov meant by peace, he eliminated it in the same speech as follows: "The world movement of the supporters of peace is based not upon pacifist ideology . . . but upon a firm determination to

struggle actively against warmongers and to block their insidious plans and schemes. . . . The people have ceased to be passive and are prepared to defend actively the cause of peace. . . ."

On March 9, 1953, in his funeral oration for Stalin, Malenkov again mentions peace, but the subject is far down the list of topics covered. On that occasion he gave far more attention to "unity" of party and state, undoubtedly because here lay a potential threat to his own position. He gave almost as much emphasis to plans for strengthening the Soviet armed forces as he did to peace. But peace he did mention:

"The foreign policy of the Soviet state, a policy of peace and friendship between peoples, forms a shattering barrier to the unleashing of a new war. . . ." The Soviet policy, he said, was "based on the Lenin-Stalin premise of the possibility of the prolonged co-existence and peaceful competition of two different systems, capitalist and socialist." And later in the oration, "the Government must serve their people faithfully, and the peoples thirst for peace and curse war."

Malenkov carried the peace theme still further in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on March 15, 1953. Malenkov in early 1953 may have been sparring for time. He had stated before, in 1949, that Communist foreign policy favoured five-power conferences and the reduction of armaments. But Malenkov has a Communist vocabulary. Even if new international conferences materialize, if heads of state meet to discuss the removal of tensions, Malenkov's attitudes will very probably show that co-existence and peace have a meaning for Communists entirely different from what they do for the West.

Malenkov's attitude towards the United States and its policies was expressed in 1947, at a time when he denounced Soviet citizens "infected with the disease of servility to everything foreign". He seemed convinced, at that time,

that the world was split in two. He claimed that the United States had adopted a "new openly expansionist policy aimed at establishing American world supremacy". Two opposite trends had begun to take shape, he said. The first trend was the foreign policy of the Soviet Union "designed to undermine imperialism," while the opposite trend in world politics was headed by "American imperialists" who had taken the path of outright expansion, of "enthralling the weakened capitalist states of Europe and the colonial dependent countries. It has chosen the path of hatching new war plans against the U.S.S.R."

It was at this point that Malenkov declared his belief in the co-existence of capitalism and socialism—on a "democratic" basis—but he was not very hopeful that the West would be satisfied with the co-existence on his terms. He charged the United States and Great Britain with pursuing a "terrorist policy", of bullying, of interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet satellites, and of conducting propaganda for a third world war. And finally, in preparing the minds of his Party for any eventuality, he called the Western powers "would-be aggressors" and repeated the charge that the West wants war. Malenkov gave this interpretation of affairs the stamp of Party approval saying: "Such are the foundations of the foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union".

Two years later, in 1949, his ideas had not changed. To Malenkov, the North Atlantic Pact signified the preparation of a new imperialist war. The Marshall Plan spurred on a "debauch" of militarism. But history he believed, was on Moscow's side: the "first imperialist war" (the first World War) led to the Russian revolution and the creation of a "socialist state"; the second World War, also unleashed by "imperialists", led to the creation of "democratic" régimes in Central and South-eastern Europe and to the "victory of the Chinese people". Finally he asked: "Can there be any doubt whatever that, if the imperialists unleash a third

world war, this will be the grave . . . for the whole world of capitalism?"

Malenkov's foreign policy objectives in 1949 called for a five-power conference to condemn war, the outlawing of the atom bomb, and the establishment of "suitable" antimilitarism controls. He would have had the five powers conclude a pact to strengthen the peace—(a peace, of course, based on tolerance for Communist expansion).

Twice in the 1949 talk, Malenkov charged American exploitation of Western Europeans. The Marshall Plan, he said, was a bribe to force Europeans to enter the armaments race: despite artificially-stimulated industry, capitalist Europe was in a decline; industrial production had remained the same in non-Communist Europe for twenty years, while Soviet production increased ninefold. World trade had dropped, Europe's currency was inflated, living conditions had fallen, and there were 40 million unemployed and partially unemployed in the world's capitalist countries. Western European nations were losing their colonies while Americans were moving in to replace them.

Malenkov asserted that Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia had been turned into American colonies. The ruling circles of France, Italy, Britain, Western Germany and Japan had "harnessed themselves to the chariot of U.S. imperialism". In contrast to his virulence toward America, the language used toward Europeans is, for Malenkov, mild. His remarks were part of an effort to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States.

For it is basic Communist strategy to sow distrust between the capitalist nations, to create a split, to isolate the United States. Along this line, Malenkov said in 1952: "One can suppose that in the countries doomed to play the role of obedient pawns of the American dictators, there will be found truly peace-loving, democratic forces which will implement their own independent, peace-loving policy and which will find a way out of the dead end into which they have been

chased by their American dictators. Having entered into this new path, the European and other countries will meet with complete understanding from all peace-loving countries".

Translated from party jargon, this means that Malenkov would have the Communist front organizations—the people who circulate party-line petitions and run so-called "peace and cultural conferences"—create as much friction as possible within the non-Communist world. Normal frictions, exacerbated by the Communists, might flare into war between non-Communists; at least, according to Malenkov's strategy, this should lead to the fall of old governments, and the creation of "Popular Front" governments which would break with the United States. The Communist Party could then develop the Popular Fronts into outright communist governments and the United States would then be isolated. While Malenkov's strategy goes no further, it seems plausible that he believes that an isolated United States could not survive.

Although Premier Malenkov's beliefs about, and strategy toward, the United States and the West are of great interest to Western students, Malenkov's chief interest for many years lay in:

1. Soviet industrial production, and
2. Communist Party organization.

In these fields, Malenkov appears as a bureaucrat who despised bureaucracy, a Party disciplinarian who seldom discussed ideology, and an efficiency expert who was almost a faddist about the subject of modern techniques.

Malenkov's major tasks, during and after the last war, were to produce more goods, build more war planes, expand the railways, and build bigger factories. To these tasks he brought great faith in the direct approach, an attitude he called "Bolshevik directness". It was blunt, harsh and demanding. But it would take all those qualities and more to obtain his objective—economic independence for the Soviet Union. In 1941 Malenkov reported to a party conference:

"Stalin said that to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically, above all requires a great and indomitable desire to forge ahead . . . In order not to become an appendage of a capitalist economy, we must have everything at our disposal. Guided by this instruction, our Party has ensured the independence of the national economy of the U.S.S.R."

In "forging ahead", Malenkov excoriated inefficient workers, shocking Old Bolsheviks by demanding that non-party workers should be promoted on the basis of merit. He attacked bureaucrats who hired and promoted on the basis of questionnaires and family connections. Being himself probably of a bourgeois origin, he attacked the "biological approach in selecting cadres". Some non-party workers and executives, he said, were doing better jobs than Communists with long tenure.

"Weak-willed and unfit workers . . . must be relieved of their jobs whether they are Party or non-Party people." Thus Malenkov came perilously close to heresy in 1941. "Some of them are ignoramuses who . . . pay no attention whatsoever to advice and instructions. It is necessary to unmask ignoramuses . . . and kick them out. It is inadmissable to tolerate ignoramuses at the top of enterprises. . . ."

In 1947, after supervising the restoration of war-damaged Soviet areas, Malenkov told the Cominform proudly that, contrary to the decline prevalent in capitalist countries, "the Soviet Union, thanks to its socialist system of national economy, has been spared such post-war upheavals. In the Soviet Union there are neither crises nor unemployment, but a steady development of production and improvement in the welfare of the people." (Unemployment was then being eliminated by the slave labour system.)

Here, briefly, he discussed raising the living standard of the people. But first priority went to heavy industrial output which, Malenkov said, must be raised to the pre-war level by 1948. After that date, priority would go to rehabilitation of

heavy industries and railways, without which further expansion would be impossible.

In contrast to specific target dates and target objectives for heavy industry, Malenkov's interest in consumer goods was vague. He said: "We have to surpass the pre-war level of national income and national consumption, eliminate in the near future the rationing system; we have to devote special attention to raising the standard of living."

He did not say when these objectives could be accomplished, or how much specifically could be done for the consumer. This slighting of the consumer has been a continuing fixture in Malenkov's speeches. In 1952, he pointed out that industrial output had increased 240 per cent over pre-war figures; consumer production, however, was up only 43 per cent.

Malenkov believes in the future. He predicts, just around the corner of the next Five-Year Plan, millions of new hectares of wheat, millions of new "enthusiastic" workers, new factories crammed with the latest devices. In 1952 he said that new power stations would make possible the "introduction of electric ploughing".

Although the Soviet Premier has visions, he does not dream. He is, above all, a man of action, one who insists on efficiency. The most recent and dramatic example of his faith in efficiency was the reorganization of the Soviet Government. His first act as Premier was to streamline the sprawling Soviet bureaucracy. He annihilated whole ministries and within two weeks of Stalin's death, he had cut the bureaux almost in half. He reduced the number of ministries and special committees attached to the Council of Ministers from a total of fifty to only twenty-seven.

He has a respect for efficiency which, after all, is usually associated in capitalist countries with "big business". In his 1952 speech to the party congress, for example, he attacked viciously all inefficient workers and

executives, concluding, "It is the problem of profitability that gives us pain."

Another extreme example of his preoccupation with production. In 1947 Malenkov gave over a considerable part of his Cominform speech to "problems of building the Party". In his long discussion he mentioned Stalin four times, on three of which occasions Stalin's name was in the title of books being published by the party. It was significant—almost typical—that Malenkov told the audience how many copies of the book were printed, but not what was in them.

Malenkov believes it is his mission not to theorize, but to produce, to direct, to discipline.

On the subject of agriculture, Malenkov stated in 1941 that "the grain problem and the task of securing an annual harvest" have "mostly been solved". In 1952 he eliminated the world "mostly", saying that "the grain problem has been successfully solved." He skirted the delicate question of the collective farms, suggesting that "the collective-farm system had been firmly established in 1939." In reality, peasant resistance to complete collectivization has slowed up the schedule of Kremlin planning considerably, in spite of the state-induced famines of the early 1930s.

Malenkov said in his 1952 speech that "amalgamation of the small collective farms" into big collectives was making progress. He then referred to the abortive effort of "hasty, mass resettlement of villages to form big collective-farm towns", known as collective-farm cities or "agro-cities". This scheme had envisaged a rural proletariat, living in apartment houses, that would work on super-collectives in the manner of factory workers.

Malenkov accused the backers of these schemes of forgetting the principal production needs, and of advancing "amenities in the collective farms." He accused party workers of "pilfering farm property," of taking advantage of their official positions "to occupy collective land, make collective-

farm chairmen provide them with grain, meat, milk, and other commodities free of charge at or a low price". He also accused the farms of being slow in adopting new production methods, although he admitted that "agricultural science still lags behind the needs of collective-farm and state-farm production."

Malenkov's ideas on Soviet culture reflect his impatience with intellectual processes. As in the field of agriculture and industry, he wants to see results that reflect instructions from above. In 1952 he said that the ideological and artistic level of many works was not high enough. He explained that some works "distort Soviet reality", are boring and without spirit, are mediocre and dull. To improve their work, writers and motion-picture makers should "pillory the faults, shortcomings, and unhealthy phenomena to be met with in society; they must create positive artistic images of the men and women of the new type in all their splendour and human dignity." This he said, would show readers traits, habits, and customs "free from the ulcers and vices to which capitalism gives rise."

In other words, Malenkov sees literature as a tool to reshape the reading public in the image of a "new Soviet man". He also asked for scorching satire which would "burn out all that is negative, decaying, and moribund, everything that acts as a brake on our march onward". Malenkov warned writers not to think of the Soviet man as "sort of statistical average". He explained that "the typical" was not "that which is most frequently encountered", but that which "most fully and pointedly expresses the essence of the given social force". (Thus, in the new Soviet dictionary, the word "typical" has come to mean "ideal".) He went further: "Conscious hyperbole and accentuation of an image does not exclude typicalness but discloses it more fully and emphasizes it." Malenkov, in other words, wants writers to contrast the new Soviet "type" imagined by the Kremlin, with the

"negative, decaying" elements that may still fail to live up to the Communist Party's expectations. He wants literature to create an image after which the average Soviet man and woman can model themselves.

Malenkov's views as expressed in his public addresses do not differ greatly from the basic ideas expressed by Joseph Stalin during the last years of his life. From 1948 through 1952, the impact of Malenkov's personality and beliefs could be increasingly felt in the internal and external affairs of the Soviet Union. There is, therefore, a natural identity between the views expressed by Stalin, Malenkov, and other Soviet leaders in recent years. Malenkov's speeches do, however, reflect a shift in emphasis and approach as the younger man replaces the old—a new note of concrete challenge, an aggressive and plain-spoken tone that seems to echo the new Soviet leader's impatient nature and "practical" approach.

CHAPTER X

Malenkov and the World

GEORGI M. MALENKOV, viewing the world from his desk in the Kremlin, must see it in a series of circles. First there is the narrow inner circle of the Kremlin itself, of the men who are his close associates, his friends, his enemies. Then there is the wider circle of top men in Soviet society—in the Communist Party, the army, the secret police. The next circle encompasses the vast majority of the more than 200 million people within the borders of the Soviet Union: Great Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Balts, Moslems, Armenians, Mongols—diverse groups, brought together by czarist imperialism, now held together by Communist force.

There are other, and still wider circles. Within them can be found the Eastern European nations under Communist control: Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and dangerously isolated Albania. Eastern Austria and Soviet-controlled Eastern Germany are important parts of this satellite circle.

As he ponders over the still wider circles outside the Soviet Empire, Malenkov may want to go downstairs into Stalin's old map-room to take a closer look at countries and capitals he has never seen—and which, beyond the reports he has read, must be enigmas to him. There is Peiping, capital of a Communist-governed nation twice as populous as the Soviet Union; Peiping, seat of the régime of Mao Tse-tung, whose power rivals that of Georgi Malenkov himself.

The nations of Western Europe—Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria, the Low Countries and Scandinavia, Switzerland and the Iberian countries—all these are parts of a still wider circle. So, also, are the Near East and southern

Asia, the far Pacific, and Latin America. And, separated by two oceans from the Eurasian mainland over which the Soviet Union stretches, there is another powerful nation, a challenger to Kremlin expansionism: the United States of America.

Joseph Stalin, in all his seventy-three years, never ventured further away from Soviet borders than Teheran, just to the south. And yet, Stalin's name was known everywhere; Stalin's power was felt and feared everywhere; Stalin's followers fought his battles from Indo-China to Guatemala, from Korea to Iran.

Georgi Malenkov, returning from the map-room to his own office, has much to weigh, to hope, to fear. He is no novice in world affairs, although much of his work has been on internal Soviet matters. He knows the world through reports of the Soviet intelligence services, whose work he supervised; he knows it through the machinery of the Cominform, which he helped to create in 1947. He knows it from reports submitted by Soviet diplomatic missions abroad. He knows it from card-indexed dossiers at the Foreign Ministry and at the Communist Party's Central Committee. Although subject to distortions inherent in the Soviet system, these reports are detailed and extensive.

In the nearly three decades of his Moscow career, Georgi Malenkov has succeeded by thinking mainly in terms of one factor: people. He has learned much about the ambitions, the strengths, and the failings of people, of men who are potentially both loyal and disloyal, heroic or cowardly, narrow-minded or far-sighted, wise or foolish, dynamic or careful. Malenkov knows that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy; he has also learned that a crushed enemy can be made into a frightened and therefore particularly eager supporter.

Malenkov has learned to manœuvre people, to move them about like pawns on a chess-board. These living figures, on

the giant chess-board that is the world, are what must count to Georgi Malenkov. They are what he knows most about.

Many of the figures on the world chess-board are new men in history. Malenkov believes firmly, and said so in 1946, that new and vigorous leaders must take the place of men by-passed by history.

With Stalin, symbol of the past, lying dead in the tomb on Red Square, others are dead—dead in actual fact, or dead in the chess game of power. Outside the circle formed by the frontiers of the Soviet Union, one man died just a day before the Supreme Soviet affirmed Malenkov's appointment as Stalin's successor. That man was Klement Gottwald, who had run the Czechoslovak Communist Party for more than a quarter-century. With Gottwald, as with Stalin, an era had died.

Others, too, had died. In September, 1947, when the Cominform was founded in Poland, fourteen men signed the declaration in the name of nine Communist parties. Where were they now? Zhdanov, Malenkov's enemy—dead. The Bulgar Vladimir Poptomov—dead. The Czech Rudolf Slansky—executed as a traitor to communism. Edvard Kardelj and Milovan Djilas of Yugoslavia—read out of the Communist community, together with their leader Marshal Tito. Wladyslaw Gomolka of Poland—charged with treachery, behind bars, accused of "activities hostile to the Polish state". Another Czech, Stefan Bastovansky—purged from office as one of Slansky's men. Anna Pauker of Rumania—awaiting trial as a traitor.

The Communist parties in all satellite states are in a ferment. The men on whom Malenkov has to rely are trying to penetrate the thoughts of the men in Moscow, trying to read the signs. They ask, will Malenkov remain top man? Will we be safe siding with him? Who are his enemies? May they not win out in the end, and will we not then be purged ourselves?

Malenkov knows that these questions are being asked. He has read the declarations of allegiance, but he cannot be sure. His tasks are enormous. Not only must he consolidate his power within the Soviet hierarchy, he must also impress his strength upon the satellite leaders. And while he is showing his strength, he must also be careful.

Once before he was not careful. Once before he cast away the caution which had served him so well throughout his successful career. In 1946 he had thought himself strong enough to defy Zhdanov and the Old Bolsheviks. He failed. It is a lesson he has remembered.

Strength, cautiously applied, might be the proper tactic—strength applied where there would be little resistance. The shooting down of the American and British fliers showed strength, but the risks were small—just "strongly worded" notes from Washington and London. Other actions must be taken that carry a similar aura of strength, but little or no risk.

Malenkov, looking out into the world, must feel that he needs time, but that he cannot afford to lose a minute. The loyalty of the Communist satellites, that would come first. But then also the loyalty of the Communist parties abroad. The old leaders are ill: Maurice Thorez of the French Communist Party, who has been in Moscow for years; Wilhelm Pieck of East Germany, overshadowed by younger men. Palmiro Togliatti's Italian party is losing support. The Communist Party of Greece trying to build an illegal underground machinery, is forced to operate from Bulgaria. Harry Pollitt and the British Communists are in retreat, particularly since the Prague purge trial of 1952. In the United States, William Z. Foster is old and ailing; most of the other top Communists are in jail.

In Latin America, the Communist Party of Argentina allied itself with the anti-United States policies of Premier Juan Perón; but their alliance has become too close. In Guatemala, a bright spot on the world Communist land-

scape, the party is expanding its influence; it is also gaining new strength in Cuba. In Brazil it is organizing in pseudo-secrecy, causing food riots and unrest in the starving northern regions.

In Asia, of course, there is China and Mao Tse-tung. The stalemate in the Korean War has enabled the Chinese to strengthen their army. They are an important factor in a successful peace offensive that can split the Western allies and their friends in Asia.

Japan? There is a definite chance for increased Communist strength in Japan. American economic aid cannot support that overpopulated island nation indefinitely. The southern Asian nations of India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia have learned that Communist parties consider their independent governments mere "bourgeois nationalists"; no different, really, from Chiang Kai-shek.

In the Near East, Iran promises a fruitful field for Communist activity. The Communist Tudeh (Masses) party forms a solid bloc within an unstable nation. The Arabs, generally, might be expected to endorse Moscow's revived anti-Zionism; Israel, seen from Malenkov's desk, has become an "outpost of American imperialism". In North Africa, Communist parties are allied with nationalist groups; their future potential is great. Africa is becoming an important target for Communist agitation.

The picture Malenkov sees from the Kremlin is contradictory. There is reason both for pessimism and optimism. As seen from Moscow, the splitting tactic is eminently sound, the tactic which Malenkov, backed by Stalin, advocated at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952. It was not a new tactic, but worth reviving. It meant, this time, splitting the United States from its friends in Europe and Asia.

There are sufficient real disagreements between the United States and her allies, enough potential conflict to exploit. All that is needed, from Moscow's point of view, is the sharpening of what Stalin in his *Economic Problems of Socialism*

in the U.S.S.R. called "the contradictions between capitalist countries". To contribute to this sharpening, *Red Star*, the Soviet army newspaper, has carried articles claiming that "a wave of hatred and resistance is rising among the millions of peoples against the American troops as world policemen." Radio Moscow has been saying that Canada is being absorbed into the United States, that "no foe has ever dealt Britain such heavy blows or has appropriated so much of her Empire as her United States 'friends' are doing today." Tass has carried a feature article, entitled "U.S. Monopolies are Lording It over the Netherlands West Indies." In these and many other ways, Soviet propaganda services, and Communist parties throughout the world, represent the United States as the hypocritical exploiter, a tyrant disguised as friend.

Malenkov can profit from the experience of the past. He knows that French-German antagonism is likely to delay perfection of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. He knows that Italian-Yugoslav conflict over Trieste can endanger extension of the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish military agreement. He knows that the Arab states, split among themselves, are united in resentment of United States support of Israel. He knows that French control in Indo-China is still resented among former colonial nations of southern Asia, although without French armies Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would be overrun by communism.

He knows that France in Morocco, Britain at the Suez Canal, American troops on Japanese soil, are causes for resentment and friction. He knows that the bulk of the American people dislike supporting the armies of other nations—and that these nations resent American prodding and American "charity". He can see the weak spots, one by one, the spots where cleavages between America and Europe, between Europe and the Near East, between America and Asia, between Europe and Asia, cleavages within Europe, within the Near East, within Asia, and even

cleavages within each nation, may be widened by skilful agitation.

A peace offensive can cause the same confusion which the policy of a "united front", of an "outstreched hand" created in the 1930s. It may bring about the American depression—already anticipated as a "Malenkov depression" by some United States writers—which Malenkov's protégé Eugene Varga had forecast, but which war production caused by Soviet aggression may have postponed.

The job of world-wide agitation, from Malenkov's point of view, must continue unabated. In fact, so as not to suggest that any weakening might come with the transfer of power, agitation and propaganda must be stepped up. While occasionally speaking softly of "peaceful" negotiations, of "coexistence" between the Communist states and the West, Malenkov can hardly afford to relax the Soviet propaganda drive. There is, then, ground for optimism from Malenkov's point of view, as he looks about the world. There are trouble spots in the West to make more troublesome, conflicts to sharpen, differences of opinion to capitalize.

But there is also ground for pessimism. Since the heyday of world communism, immediately after the second World War, membership in Communist parties has gone down everywhere. Party newspapers, such as *Ce Soir* in Paris, have fallen by the wayside. Aggressive Kremlin policies have served to expose Communists operating in the free nations, have reduced their usefulness as channels for Kremlin propaganda. The deluded friends of Moscow, the fellow travellers or crypto-Communists, have dropped out one by one. When the impetuous Zhdanov forced the break with Tito, he helped destroy pro-Soviet affections as far away as Burma.

Ever since the Zhdanov policy of bold antagonism toward the United States emerged in 1947, the fortunes of world communism have gone down. This downward trend began, in fact, even earlier and can perhaps be traced to the summer

of 1945, when the Communist Party of the United States ousted Earl Browder. It had been Browder's policy to take the pledges of co-operation, voiced by Stalin at Teheran, quite seriously. Browder was found guilty, in the words of the Communist Party of the United States, of "deserting to the side of the class enemy—American monopoly capital".

The "Teheran policy", the tactic of speaking and acting softly toward the temporary wartime allies, had paid off handsomely in such indispensable items as Lend-Lease shipments. It had contributed to the increase in membership and funds available to the Communist parties. It had strengthened the Communists of Western Europe—to the point where their leaders received cabinet posts. But the swift change to a policy of all-out antagonism toward the West had weakened the Communist parties abroad and strengthened Western unity against Soviet aggression.

Malenkov, viewing the world from the Kremlin, must weigh all this. More than anything else he needs time—time to consolidate his own position at home, time to knit together the frayed world Communist movement and to staff its key positions with reliable "Malenkovites". In turn, these new Malenkov men need time to purge their parties' leadership and membership of men who fail to adjust themselves to the new régime in the Kremlin, men who make a habit of nostalgia—who remember too often, and too keenly, the good old days when Stalin was alive.

Malenkov may well consider a return to the Teheran policy, or something very much like it. After all, even during its most pronounced application, that policy had simply been organized hypocrisy; and it had worked. The capitalist countries had sent obliging ambassadors to Moscow. Writers who ignored the seamy side of Soviet society found a wide public. Soviet friendship societies blossomed. Communists, in those bygone days, had been respected nonconformists, dissenters who carried the aura of heroic rebels fighting for social reform.

If Malenkov, even temporarily, decides on a policy of hypocrisy—of speaking softly in the Teheran policy manner—such a policy would constitute a grave danger to the West. If a "Malenkovism" develops that turns a hypocritic smile westward, the foundation of Western strength may well be weakened.

This is true because the West has not really learned much since 1945. In much of Europe and Asia, the neutralist notion that the United States and the Soviet Union are twin dangers is far from dead. The idea that there exists "two power blocs"—one led by the United States and the other by Moscow, and that there is little to choose between the two—is a prevalent form of naïve sophistication. A knowing air of cynicism still meets reports of forced labour and secret-police terror in the Soviet Union, the same cynicism that sometimes greets American aid abroad, the cynicism that says, "surely there must be some catch to it".

In the United States itself, anti-communism became fashionable after such Soviet crudities as the *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia. Preferable though it is to the naïveté during the Teheran period, this anti-communism is only skin-deep with some. One kind word from the man in the Kremlin, and wishful thinking will sweep some opinion makers in the United States off their feet. When Malenkov addressed the Supreme Soviet, shortly after he succeeded Stalin, he spoke three slightly conciliatory sentences which might have signalled the beginning of "Malenkovism", of a temporary effort to lull the West into relaxing its vigilance, of slowing down its rate of armament.

Quite possibly, Georgi Malenkov played a part in planning the invasion of the Korean Republic by Communist forces in 1950. In fact, some scholars speculate that Malenkov went to Peiping in the autumn of that year to persuade the Chinese Communists to throw their full weight against the United Nations counter-attack that was driving north toward the Yalu River. At any rate, Malenkov must know

the mixed lesson of Korea: that while it is advantageous to the U.S.S.R. to have the Chinese and North Korean Communists fight the battle for her, the southward plunge of Red troops on June 25, 1950, did much to unite anti-Communists the world over.

If he translates this lesson into active tactics, Malenkov will realize that high-handed actions of the Korean type have consistently strengthened the free world's will to resist. The Czechoslovak *coup d'état* prompted the Marshall Plan. Korea brought about NATO, the American armament programme, the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav alliance, the plans for a European Defence Community, and the blue-print of a Middle East defence command. Here, quite clearly, are cause and effect. But the Prague coup was not necessary to dramatize Kremlin methods to those fully aware; no Korean invasion was needed to illustrate the agressive tactics of the Soviet Union. Less dramatic actions have been equally outrageous.

Before the Czechoslovak *coup d'état*, many saw in Prague a successful "bridge between the West and the East". They were annoyed and disillusioned by the coup. Similarly, Premier Syngman Ree of the Republic of Korea was imagined by some as the main cause for guerrilla unrest against his government, whereas, in reality, these guerrilla activities were the probing manœuvres of the invaders.

However, without Prague and Korea, without these crude and perhaps ill-considered Kremlin actions, the Soviet régime might still be able to masquerade as merely a force for social progress. Few steps would be necessary for Malenkov to turn back the clock of world opinion drastically. One action would be an offer of conciliation to Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.

As Malenkov took power, Tito was making an unprecedented visit to Great Britain to settle political and military questions and strengthen Yugoslavia's ties with the West. But it should be remembered that it was the impetuous

Zhdanov, Malenkov's adversary, who had pushed Tito too hard. Malenkov might derive tremendous satisfaction from repairing what his one-time rival had destroyed. Moreover, the evolving Malenkov-Mao relationship might well form a pattern for a possible Malenkov-Tito reunion.

After Stalin's death, Mao Tse-tung of China rose in importance. A Moscow-Peiping split is not indicated—if only because it would be disadvantageous to both régimes. But greater *de facto* equality between the two governments seems quite certain. As high priests at Stalin's shrine, Malenkov and Mao stand on equal footing; as heads of two populous nations, they can also benefit in terms of internal and external propaganda from such an adjustment in relationship. Emphasis on equality would strengthen Mao inside China, for it would rob anti-Communist and anti-Soviet forces in China of an important talking point: Mao's subservience to Moscow.

A Malenkov-Tito deal might follow a similar pattern. Again, equality would be the key concept. Internal opposition to such a development would give Malenkov the opportunity of purging a "Zhdanovite" opposition, of eliminating Party officials with too marked a tendency toward nostalgia for the Stalin era. Externally, Malenkov would be able to represent himself as reasonable and willing to develop new relationships. Even if Tito did not accept such an offer—it would certainly be extremely difficult for him to do so—the new man in the Kremlin would have definitely affected world opinion by a gesture toward reconciliation with the Yugoslavs.

The possibility of a Malenkov offer to Tito is cited here, not because it is very likely, but as an illustration of the type of gesture that might cause the pendulum of world opinion to swing toward Malenkov, although nothing of substance would have changed. Malenkov can benefit most from a policy of keeping the West off balance; of blowing hot one day and cold the next; of, simultaneously, talking peace and

stirring up guerrilla war, as in northern Iran; of answering the questions of a foreign journalist with great cordiality, while provoking riots in Japan. It is the technique of a magician, who distracts the attention of his audience with the clever gestures of one hand while he is slipping the ace of spades from his sleeve with the other.

The situations in Iran and Japan have just been mentioned. Both nations are obvious targets of Moscow-inspired agitation. That is well realized in the case of Iran, because of the long controversy over the nationalized oil properties. But the potentially dangerous position of Japan is less well known, and it should therefore be emphasized.

However Malenkov may revise, speed up, or delay the time-table of Communist aggression, Japan is likely to be printed on it in large letters. This over-populated island nation is heavily dependent on American aid; its economy would best be helped by trade with China, and the Peiping régime has made much of this. Also, in early 1953, seven and a half years after the war's end, 30,000 Japanese war prisoners were returned to Japan from China—many of them, no doubt, thoroughly indoctrinated Communists. The political-economic condition of Japan is potentially most explosive. Its Communist Party, after years of internal conflict, has been moulded into a manœuvrable and hard nucleus of revolution.

The Japanese Communist Party, like the Communist Party of India, looks simultaneously to Moscow and Peiping for support and guidance. Greater equality between the Soviet and Chinese Communists would, in these areas, merely confirm an already existing attitude. In addition to the repatriated war prisoners, Japan has the internal problem of a large Korean minority heavily infiltrated with agents from North Korea.

Targets like Japan and Iran are inviting because they give the Kremlin an opportunity to show its satellites that revo-

lutionary action is far from dead. Internal unrest in Near Eastern and Asian nations is one of the safest ways in which Malenkov can demonstrate his strength, while keeping risks at a minimum. *The Korean onslaught, an overt act of war which united the enemies of communism, must be a warning to Malenkov that underground and guerrilla operations are preferable to open acts of aggression.* Also, guerrillas create a dilemma for the United States. If guerrillas form among Iran's Kurds, a minority that is under constant propaganda attack from Moscow, there is no way in which the United States could intervene; the Iranian government is not likely to ask for outside help. Similarly, if trouble starts inside Japan, which regained her independence on April 28, 1952, she will doubtless try hard to put her own house in order.

The case of Indo-China illustrates the advantage which Malenkov can derive from using guerilla warfare rather than armed invasion. In Korea, the Communists actually crossed a border in open violation of United Nations rulings. The issue was clear. But United Nations intervention against the Communists in Indo-China would encounter insuperable legal hurdles because Peiping intervention has been unobtrusive.

The Indo-Chinese Communists inside Vietnam are supported by Red China, but technically they represent an internal revolutionary force. Similar guerilla movements might be fostered inside Japan, Iran, India, North Africa, or inside Latin American nations. In every case, Malenkov could disavow Soviet involvement and repeat the time-honoured clichés of co-existence and peace.

We cannot be certain, of course, whether Malenkov will choose any of these tactical roads. But we must recognize the dilemma of the West, and above all of the United States, that may arise with a change of emphasis in Kremlin policy. A Teheran-type policy would play down conflicts, just as

Malenkov did when he said "there is not one dispute or undecided question that cannot be decided by peaceful means" and through "mutual understanding". Such a policy would seek to be disarming, both in the literal and the metaphoric sense of the word. In the United States latent pressures to reduce the expensive armament programme would probably spring to the surface after a series of conciliatory gestures on Malenkov's part.

Indications of a Malenkov "peace offensive" quickly followed the session of the Supreme Soviet. The Soviet government apologized for the shooting down of a British bomber over Germany. It also offered to obtain the release of British and French diplomats and civilians seized by Communist forces in Korea at the beginning of hostilities. Then, on March 28, the Korean Communists responded to a request made by UN Commander Gen. Mark Clark on February 22, and offered to exchange sick and wounded prisoners. Two days later, following his return from Moscow, Chinese Communist Premier Chow En-lai proposed that the future status of all prisoners might be settled and a Korean truce negotiated.

By anticipating such changes in Communist tactics, we may be able to immunize ourselves against their potential effect. The hard-pressed Malenkov must desire a period of grace for himself—to complete reorganization of the top layers of Soviet society, to win over men who might be dangerous antagonists. He must enforce allegiance among wavering and confused leaders in the Eastern European satellite nations. He needs to strengthen the Communist network throughout the world, while working out a new relationship with the powerful Mao Tse-tung.

The Malenkov peace offensive exposed disastrous immaturities of political understanding in the United States, but even more so in nations such as France and India. It seems as if the free world has learned nothing in the seven years of Soviet aggression; seven years that showed the results of grave miscalculations during the second World War. Wishful thinking, hopeful sentimentality, or the immature desire for immediate gains at the price of long-range world security—those were the world's reaction to Malenkov's tactical moves designed to lull the world into reducing its vigilance.

When Beria praised Malenkov before the Supreme Soviet, he described him as a "talented disciple of Lenin." It was Lenin who taught his revolutionary disciples to "retreat in good order when the forces of the enemy are obviously superior to our own, in order to prepare with the utmost energy for a new offensive."

We must recognize that a policy of Soviet hypocrisy is far more dangerous to the free world than is a policy of frank antagonism.

No peace offensive can change the Soviet régime's intent to achieve world-wide supremacy. Short-range tactics may change, but the long-range strategy does not. Malenkov's tactical moves put the free world's political maturity to a crucial test.

At such a moment in history the free world may well ponder about the meaning of the outstretched hand of the new man in the Kremlin. Is it to look with hope, however restrained, to a genuinely new policy, or must it, in the light of very persuasive evidence, realize that this may well be the magician's clever gesture to detract attention from the danger of a poised bayonet?

Appendix

THE NEW SOVIET HIERARCHY: A TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
(As of March 20, 1953)

First Secretary of the Presidium of the Central Committee
Georgi M. Malenkov

Presidium of the Central Committee
Georgi M. Malenkov, Lavrenti P. Beria, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Klementi I. Voroshilov, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Nikolai A. Bulganin, Lazar M. Kaganovich, Anastas I. Mikoyan, Maxim Z. Saburov, Mikhail G. Pervukhin.

Secretariat of the Central Committee
Nikita S. Khrushchev, Mikhail A. Suslov, Peter N. Pospelov, Nikolai N. Shatalin, Semyon D. Ignatiev.*

Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

Congress of the C.P.S.U.

ADDITIONAL APPOINTMENTS
(As of March 15, 1953)

Klimenti E. Voroshilov
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Nikolai M. Pegov
Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Nikolai M. Shvernik
Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

* Ignatiev was dismissed on April 7th, 1953.

STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION
(As of March 15, 1953)

Premier; *Chairman of the Council of Ministers*
Georgi M. Malenkov.

Deputy Premiers; *First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers*
Lavrenti P. Beria, Minister of Internal Affairs; Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Nikolai A. Bulganin, Minister of Defence and Marshal of the Soviet Union; Lazar M. Kaganovich (no portfolio specified).

Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
Anastas I. Mikoyan, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Domestic and Foreign Trade; Alexei I. Kozlov, Minister of Agriculture and Procurement; Panteleimon K. Ponomarenko, Minister of Culture; Alexei N. Kosygin, Minister of Light and Food Industries; Alexander F. Zasyadko, Minister of Coal Industry; Nikolai K. Baibakov, Minister of Oil Industry; Ivan S. Tevosyan, Minister of Metallurgical Industry; Sergei M. Tikhomirov, Minister of Chemical Industry; Maxim Z. Saburov, Minister of Machine Construction; Vyacheslav A. Malyshev, Minister of Transport and Heavy-machine Building; Mikhail G. Pervukhin, Minister of Electric Power Stations and Electrical Industry; Colonel-General Dmitri F. Ustinov, Minister of Defence Industry; Pavel A. Yudin, Minister of Building Materials Industry; Georgi M. Orlov, Minister of Timber and Paper Industry; Nikolai A. Dysgai, Minister of Construction of Machine Building Enterprises; Boris P. Beshchev, Minister of Railway Transport; Nikolai D. Psurtsev, Minister of Communications; Zosim A. Shashkov, Minister of Sea and River Fleet; Areseni G. Zverev, Minister of Finance; Andrei F. Tretyakov, Minister of Health; Konstantin P. Gorshenin, Minister of Justice; General Vsevoled N. Merkulov, Minister of State Control. Gregori P. Kosyachenko, Chairman of the State Planning

Committee (Administration of the Five-Year Plan); Konstantin M. Sokolov, Chairman of the State Committee on Construction.

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT AND PARTY

THE NINETEENTH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS which took place in October, 1952, was the first such Congress since 1939. It greatly altered the structure of the party, replacing the 12-man Politburo with a 36-man Presidium and widening the 71-man Central Committee to include 125 full members and 110 non-voting alternate members.

Announcements made on March 6, 1953, one day after Stalin's death, largely nullified the decisions of the Congress. These decisions affected both the government and the party; in every case, a marked tendency toward consolidation was evident. The Presidium's membership was reduced to ten, with four alternates. The number of ministries was reduced drastically by a series of mergers.

The fourth session of the Supreme Soviet, which approved the government changes, had originally been scheduled for Saturday, March 14, 1953. At the last moment, it was postponed by one day. Instead, the Saturday was devoted to a special high-level meeting that resulted in last-minute revisions, both in the government and in party structure.

Among the total results, the following may be considered as particularly notable.:

Anastras I. Mikoyan, on March 6, had been named trade minister. On March 15 he was also named Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Deputy Premier)—but not *First* Deputy Premier, which would have placed him in the same category as Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Bulganin. Mikoyan, in 1949, had shared the fate of Molotov when he was divested of his ministerial post, although retaining Politburo status. Zhdanov, Molotov, and Mikoyan had at one time formed an inner Politburo circle concerned with formulating foreign policy.

Andrei A. Andreyev, who in 1948 was considered Malenkov's closest rival in succeeding to Zhdanov's position, was not listed as a minister on March 6. Although divested of all his government and party posts, Andreyev was on March 15 named to

membership in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Malenkov's attitude toward Andreyev was illustrated at the Nineteenth Party Congress, when he took occasion to criticize Andreyev for collective farm policies which Andreyev had publicly described as a mistake as long ago as January, 1950.

The following appointments may be regarded as strengthening Malenkov, as they affect men who are considered to be his close associates: the appointment on March 6 of Maxim Z. Saburof to head the Ministry of Machine Building; the appointment, at the same time, of Mikhail G. Pervukhin to head the Ministry of Electric Power Stations and Power Industry; the last-minute appointment, announced on March 15, of Alexei I. Kozlov to be Minister of Agriculture and Agricultural Procurement; the naming, at the same time, of Panteleimon K. Ponomarenko to head the new Ministry of Culture, a merger of the ministries of Higher Education, Cinematography, the Arts Committee, the Broadcasting Committee, the State Publishing House, and the Ministry of Labour Reserves. Ponomarenko, definitely a Malenkov protégé, had no previous experience in this field, as his career was largely devoted to industrial and agricultural affairs.

Changes in the Communist Party's secretariat, decided on Saturday, March 14, were announced six days later. Malenkov resigned as a member of the secretariat but retained his post as first secretary of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the party's highest policy-making body. The five men named to form the new secretariat, the central administrative body of the party, were: Nikita S. Khrushchev—possibly a brother of Malenkov's wife, Elena Khrushchev—Miyhail A. Suslov, Peter N. Pospelov, Nikolai N. Shatalin, and Semyon D. Ignatiev.

Khrushchev replaced Malenkov's antagonist Andreyev on the Council of Collective Farm Affairs and has served from 1938 to 1949 as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party and was Premier of the Ukraine from 1944 to 1947. A strong figure in his own right, he must nevertheless be considered a close associate of Malenkov.

Suslov's association with Malenkov was dramatized on December 24, 1952, when he criticized a Soviet economist for hiding his earlier endorsement of economic ideas expressed by Nikolai A. Voznesensky, one of Malenkov's antagonists.

APPENDIX

Pospelov served as *Pravda* editor in the 1940s, and as director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute from 1949 on. He was associated with Malenkov in revising the Communist Party's programme in 1952, and is regarded by some as the new Premier's adviser in ideological matters.

Shatalin is a very close collaborator of Malenkov. He served in the Administration of Cadres as deputy director in 1946, and since then in the party's Organizational Bureau and as a party inspector.

Ignatiev, although appointed on March 7 to the Secretariat as a Malenkov man, was dismissed on April 7. He had been Minister of State Security in January, 1953, when his ministry charged nine doctors with plotting the death of high Soviet personalities. When Beria took control of the Security Ministry, he charged Ignatiev with "political blindness and gullibility" for permitting the false indictment of the doctors.

The re-emergence of Mikoyan and Andreyev, together with Malenkov's exit from the Secretariat and Ignatiev's removal, appeared as tactical moves designed to check Malenkov's power.

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