# Micropolitics in Contemporary China

## MARC J. BLECHER AND GORDON WHITE

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A TECHNICAL UNIT DURING AND AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

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Published simultaneously as Vol. IX, No. 1, of International Journal of Politics.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 79-67176 International Standard Book Number: 0-87332-136-7

Printed in the United States of America.

For Sharon and Christine

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## Acknowledgments

Evermore thanks, the exchequer of the poor.

—Shakespeare

Our disbursements go first and foremost to "Mr. Ji," our informant turned friend. His willing cooperation in sharing his experiences with us in more than one hundred hours of interviews over seven months vastly enriched our own understanding of revolutionary China. His patience with our seemingly interminable queries, which must have seemed odd at best and picayune at worst, made this book possible. We owe him more than we can express here, though we hope our narrative does him sufficient justice to make some small step in this regard.

The Center for Chinese Studies of the University of California at Berkeley and the Center for Far Eastern Studies of the University of Chicago, through its research project on "Political Leadership and Social Change at the Local Level in China, 1850 to the Present," which was generously funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, provided years of research leave which Marc Blecher devoted in part to data analysis and writing of this book. Gordon White benefited from research time provided by the Australian National University and the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.

Ms. Penny Lockwood of the Australian National University was of invaluable assistance to us in coding our data and preparing it for computer analysis, and we wish to thank her for the systematic care, accuracy, and creativity which she brought to bear on this work. The computation centers of the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Chicago, Oberlin College, and the

Australian National University generously provided us with the large amounts of computer time we required to make some sense of our data.

A very special debt is owed to the Universities Service Centre, Hong Kong, which provided the facilities in which our interviews on this and other projects could take place.

Douglas Merwin, our editor at M. E. Sharpe, gave us his support at stages in the project when we needed it most, for which we have only repaid him with numerous delays which must have taxed his patience, though not, we were astonished to learn, to its rather considerable limits.

Our four anonymous referees read our earlier draft with critical sympathy and care, and we have benefited from their comments. Hong Yung Lee and Jon Unger were good enough to read that draft and made some significant and useful suggestions. John Bryan Starr was of very special help.

Nancy Holodnick provided yeoman service by simultaneously typing the final draft and providing for the myriad and often obscure daytime needs of Ian Samuel Blecher, which enabled his father to have some time to work on this book.

Finally, we are especially grateful to Sharon Blecher and Christine Pelzer White, who supported us throughout in more ways than we can count or comprehend.

M.J.B.
Oberlin
May 1979

D.G.W. Sussex May 1979

#### A Note on Romanization

We have followed the current Chinese practice by using pinyin romanization uniformly throughout. Umlauts have been used only when absolutely necessary, for example, to distinguish between lu and  $l\ddot{u}$ .

#### Introduction

One of the most prevalent and significant issues facing socialist countries is the role of intellectuals. In the poorer countries like China, this has presented itself with particular acuity in the relationship of scientists and technicians to the process of socialist economic modernization. Since the Cultural Revolution has come to a close, its impact on China's intellectual life—especially on scientists, technicians, and the development of scientific and technical work—has been the subject of lively inquiry in China. In turn, this inquiry has provided a major focus for reevaluating the Cultural Revolution as a political movement and as a way of dealing with the inequalities and bureaucratic inefficiencies that have arisen and will continue to arise in the centrally planned Chinese economy during a period when rapid economic growth and modernization have been given the highest priority. In this monograph, we intend to address some of these issues by presenting a detailed case study of a Chinese technical unit over the period from 1966 to 1974.

We have three basic goals in our study. First, in focusing on a technical unit, we hope to fill a gap in the literature on contemporary China and throw light on some of the crucial political, administrative, and developmental problems facing the People's Republic. Western commentators and scholars have written several in-depth accounts of bureaucratic, industrial, public security, rural, and educational units but, as far as we know, there has been no detailed account of the nature and functioning of a relatively advanced technical organization. Since many of the key political problems in contemporary China concern the relationships between politics and revolutionary practice on the one hand and expertise and tech-

nological development on the other, we feel that such a study is much needed.

Second, we hope that this study can add to the steadily accumulating information about and insights into the nature of sociopolitical processes in basic-level institutions in contemporary China. Until recently, most political research on China has tended to focus on the national level. As a result we can only dimly discern how politics is conducted at the grass roots, how political processes at different levels vary and how they interact. In our opinion, the effectiveness and justice of the new institutions introduced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can be judged most tellingly by examining how they are translated into systems of human relationships at the basic level. Similarly, the impact of the Party's new ideological values and beliefs can best be gauged by assessing their influence on people in basic-level organizations.

Third, we intend to provide a detailed account of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in this unit.2 During this movement, mass politics erupted throughout China in complex ways which we are only gradually beginning to understand. In our study, we shall pursue a rigorous analysis of the various dimensions of collective political participation and the nature of personal political motivations during this movement: who became involved, when, how deeply, in what ways, and for what reasons. We will also look into the relationship between the movement in this particular unit and the nationwide ideological content and political dynamics of the Cultural Revolution. Finally, we are interested in discovering just how much change took place as a result of the Cultural Revolution in the unit. We hope that our case study will make some contribution toward answering a basic question: is China a significantly different place because of the Cultural Revolution, or does the situation more closely conform to the adage that "the more things change, the more they stay the same"? If the Cultural Revolution was an unprecedented attempt by a society to change itself without discarding its form of government and its accompanying ideology, then the success or failure of the Cultural Revolution will teach us a great deal about the possibilities for and the constraints on social and political change, both for China and perhaps for other countries as well.

Under these general headings, we shall be asking several sets of

specific questions of our study. We shall explore two sets of structural questions. First, we are interested in the relationship between the unit, on the one hand, and both higher levels of the administrative system and the external society, on the other: how autonomous is the unit, how is it affected by its social and administrative environment, and what forms does the unit's interaction with its environment take? Second, we are curious as to the concrete organizational division of labor established to carry on the unit's technical functions: the nature of occupational differentiation, the structure of administrative authority, and the relationship between administrative, political, and technical functions.

Bendix and Lipset have suggested that political sociology involves the study of the impact of society on politics, while political science concerns itself with the reverse relationship.<sup>3</sup> Using this simple definition of "political sociology," we are interested in estimating the influence of certain key social variables on political behavior at the basic level: occupation, class, sex, education, friendship, and personal relationships based on school ties, previous work experience, or geographic origin. We believe that precise description and analysis of these relationships will not only enhance our understanding of political processes and behavior in basic-level units but also contribute to an understanding of wider political events in China. In addition, such inquiry will open the door to the comparison of political behavior in China with other countries.

Turning to problems of "political science," we shall investigate the impact of the political system on the unit and its members. This involves analysis of patterns of membership in political organizations, participation in institutionalized political activities, the nature and impact of political factions during the Cultural Revolution, and problems of political recruitment, control, leadership, mobilization, and education. Our concerns here are wide-ranging and include: the impact of official propaganda on personal political motivations, the relationship between the unit's political structure before the Cultural Revolution and the formation of factions during the movement, the nature of cadre-mass relations before and after the Cultural Revolution, and the impact of its factional alignments on the operation of the unit after the movement. Furthermore, we are interested in delineating the nature of the substance of political issues and the processes by which they evolved and were debated and dealt with at the basic level. We want to

know the extent to which the political process in this unit involves ideological commitment, attachments to policy, differential interests, or "clientelist" personal ties. We shall identify the salient issues which have concerned members of the unit both before, during, and after the Cultural Revolution and investigate the relationship between those issues and the wider alignments of Chinese politics.

In sum, our major concern throughout is with political behavior and attitudes at the basic level: why do people behave and think politically in certain ways and to what extent have systematic changes taken place in both behavior and attitudes during the tumultuous period of the late 1960s? We can then compare our conclusions with some of the wide-ranging theories and explanations of political behavior in China, whether based on notions of "power struggle," "revolutionary commitment," "interest group politics," or "personalist cliques." We also hope to throw some light on problems of inter-level and leader-mass relationships: are basic-level units mere tools of higher-level organs, and are the "masses" in any organization mere instruments of their unit's leadership? Our hunches, and our data, point away from these interpretations to a picture of Chinese politics involving a great deal of mutual influence and autonomy both between levels and between mass and leadership, a conclusion which throws doubt on both "totalitarian" and "revolutionary mobilization" models of Chinese politics.

Our study is based on qualitative and quantitative data about a technical unit in a remote part of western China. The unit was engaged not in the production of tangible goods but in the collection and analysis of technical information. Its work involved relatively sophisticated technical processes and required a staff which included many people with college-level scientific training.

The data were gathered in over eighty hours of interviews with a former member of the unit, whom we shall call Mr. Ji. He attended a major university in China, where he studied science, majoring in a specific technical subfield. Although he graduated in 1966, because of the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution he did not receive his job assignment until 1968. He was assigned to a technical unit—the subject of this study—which worked in his field of specialization, and he remained there until the mid-1970s, when he successfully applied to emigrate *legally* to Hong Kong.

While in China, he remained a nonparticipant observer of the political events which swirled around him, including the Cultural Revolution. He told us that he has always been a free thinker ("wode sixiang bijiao ziyou") and that consequently he stayed out of politics himself as much as possible. Today, he is neither hostile to nor an ardent supporter of the People's Republic. He feels that China has achieved much since Liberation and is a better society than it was in 1949. But he also feels that in the late 1960s and early 1970s at least, it was a difficult place for intellectuals to live. He left China primarily for personal reasons having to do with his family. Still, on rare occasions he did express to us some traces of the discontent felt by many Chinese intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution, which has been receiving so much attention in China lately. In Mr. Ji's case this took the form of generalized concerns about the status of intellectuals and the stagnation of professional work rather than grievances about personal maltreatment or persecution, which he does not seem to have suffered. In any event, he has no illusions about "freedom" in Hong Kong, and we have a clear sense that he would prefer to live in China today if his familyrelated concerns could be worked out. He returns regularly for visits.

We interviewed Mr. Ji in two different ways. First, we gathered some basic data about each of the 248 people who worked in his unit from 1968 to 1973. With his encyclopedic memory (which was one reason that prompted us to undertake the study in the first place), Mr. Ji was able to supply us with each person's job title, occupational category (technician, administrative cadre, worker, or medical worker), rank on the relevant occupational wage-grade and administrative scale, age, sex, educational level, school or university attended, date of graduation, family class background, Party membership, Youth League membership, whether or not the person was a cadre of the unit's labor union, whether or not the person had any "historical," "family," "style," or "political problems," previous People's Liberation Army (PLA) service, subjective ratings of each person's professional capability, work effort, and "political behavior" (zhengzhi biaoxian) (based on a scale which Mr. Ji himself created and felt was meaningful), specific friendship ties with other members of the unit, job before coming to the unit, location and occupations of spouses and children, native province, factional membership or sympathy during

the Cultural Revolution, whether the person was criticized or struggled during the Cultural Revolution, and the nature of the person's relations with each of several leading cadres in the unit. In addition, anecdotal information raised either in response to our questions or spontaneously by Mr. Ji was recorded on the data sheet of each person.

Second, we interviewed Mr. Ji about the structure of the unit, its origins, its work, the course of the Cultural Revolution in the unit, the facilities of the unit (housing and dining arrangements, health care, etc.), processes of transfer and promotion, political study, the nature and meaning of professional, social, economic and political stratification in the unit, and various other aspects of everyday life and work in the unit.

Needless to say, the methodological problems of basing a study of this detail and depth on the information provided by one person are manifold. If we add to this the usual problems of any interview situation, and the one in Hong Kong in particular, how can we place any confidence in Mr. Ji's voluminous account? There are two reasons. First, when we met Mr. Ji and conducted the first few interviews with him, he impressed us both as a straightforward, honest, and highly intelligent person. Second, we interviewed Mr. Ji for over eighty hours, over a period of six months, during which time we became close friends. This deepening of our relationship bore out our early impressions. Though we are painfully aware from personal experience in interviewing that informants often attempt to cover themselves, consciously and unconsciously, we feel confident in the general reliability and honesty of Mr. Ji's account.

Problems of implicit bias remain. There is every reason to believe that people who leave China probably do not reflect the variety of opinions held by the Chinese people. We tried as far as possible, therefore, to avoid asking Mr. Ji to generalize, express value judgments, or opine in other ways. Instead, we asked in detail about concrete empirical events and objects of his experience and then constructed our analysis of the broader picture and more general phenomena in mosaic-like fashion.

Given the complex nature of this study and our reliance on one respondent, we are also concerned about the problem of accuracy. Could one person manage to recall accurately so much information about each of the 248 people with whom he worked? Again, despite our experience with respondents who have fabricated de-

tails they could not remember, we believe for several reasons that the data which Mr. Ji provided about his colleagues were accurate. First, he is extremely intelligent and is clearly capable of this feat of memory in terms of sheer mental power. Second, the unit in which Mr. Ji worked was quite isolated, and except for annual vacations he spent all of his time for five years in the exclusive company of his workmates. Third, he is very gregarious; we noticed that he makes friends very quickly and is extremely inquisitive. He would often quiz us at length about the United States, Australia, and England, about films, about our families, and about books and objects on our desks. He clearly got to know a large percentage of the unit's work force personally. Mr. Ji explained this as follows: "Another reason I can remember so much is that I lived in many different buildings. So I got to know lots of people. Also, after I came back from visiting home at New Year's, I brought back a lot of foods. So lots of people came around then and I got to know them." A fourth reason relates to the nature of the Cultural Revolution itself, when many hitherto unknown details about the unit and its personnel were publicly exposed and were the subject of intense discussion and argument over a period of several years. When we asked Mr. Ji how he knew so much about the structure of his unit before the Cultural Revolution since he did not arrive there until 1968, he replied: "Everything about the history of the unit was written up in big-character posters (da zi bao) which I read." Fifth, where Mr. Ji was unsure of an important detail, he checked with another former unit member who was living in Hong Kong (but who did not want to be interviewed directly).

Finally, the most compelling reason for accepting his account as reliable is that he "passed" a test of reliability which we included in one of our last interviews. We told him that we had lost our information on factional membership and asked him to review each person's faction for us. To our amazement, he did so on the spot without a single mistake. Throughout the interviews, moreover, he frequently demonstrated an easy command of the data. For example, in referring to a certain colleague, he would say something like: "You remember, he was the level XX technician who graduated from YY school in 19ZZ." When we checked the data sheet, he would nearly always be right.

At the same time, however, Mr. Ji was frank about his own limitations, indicating that he could not be equally precise about all

members of the unit. In his own words, "Every one of the technicians in my unit knew the following information about all the others: their educational level, what speciality they had studied, when they graduated, and how long they had studied. This is a matter of professional concern, after all." He admitted that "we were not as familiar with the workers" of the unit. But where he was uncertain about the data, he told us so quite unabashedly.

# The Unit: Personnel, Structure, and Operations

The unit was engaged in technical survey work over a demarcated area of the country as part of a long-term national scientific program. It was established during 1964 and 1965, not long before the start of the Cultural Revolution. Many of its original personnel were recruited from similar units in the local province and from other provinces, apparently as part of a general move in the mid-1960s to shift the focus of this field of technical survey work from the eastern coastal provinces into the interior. In fact, of the personnel on whom information was available (n = 242), 76% had been reassigned from other units engaged in the same work. The unit was located in the countryside, next to a highway which linked it with the prefectural (zhuanqu) seat in one direction and with the commune town, the county seat, and the provincial capital (the latter journey taking about 4 hours by bus or 2½ to 3 hours by truck) in the other direction. Unit personnel went to the county seat to do their shopping since the market in the commune town, though nearer, did not sell many of the things they needed. They also went to the county seat to handle matters of civil administration, such as the registration of births, marriages, and the like. The province capital was not considered far away, and members traveled there often by public transport or in the unit's trucks.

Although the unit was located within a rural commune, it had no formal relationship with the commune administration. In effect, it was a self-contained technological village. All of its personnel lived in houses built specially for them. Unit cadres and technicians did not have to take part in "downward transfer" (xiafang) or manual labor in local communes since the unit fell into the category of "business enterprise units" (qiyexing danwei) engaged in

practical "production" which seldom required these modes of tempering cadres and intellectuals.<sup>5</sup> Over time, however, the unit did develop some informal ties with the surrounding rural community. Local residents came to the unit's clinic for medical treatment, for which they were not charged a registration fee (unlike commune and county clinics). The cost of their medicine was billed to their production brigades each month, but local peasants made friends with the unit's medical personnel and often succeeded in getting their medicine free of charge. They sometimes sent gifts to the unit's health workers and invited them home for meals. Unit personnel in general found it easy to strike up acquaintances with locals since the latter often passed through the unit on their way to work in the fields, or unit personnel passed through their villages on their way to town. Central directives required, moreover, that if technical units of this type required more workers, skilled or unskilled, they should recruit them in their immediate vicinities, in this case all the communes in the county where the unit was situated. The county government compiled a list of nominees from the communes within its jurisdiction, and the unit sent its chief personnel cadre to the county seat to make the final selection. Over the years, this meant that an increasing number of the unit's staff had local roots and connections. By the early 1970s, in fact, just over 5% of the unit's work force were local people, all of them manual workers of various types. A small number of nonlocal unit personnel also married local women, but this was rather exceptional. The national policy of keeping spouses together, on the other hand, meant that a number of nonlocal technicians in the unit managed to have their wives transferred to jobs in surrounding communes, notably as teachers, health personnel, or skilled industrial workers.

Despite these ties and the cordial relations with surrounding communities, however, in general the unit did not have strong roots in the local countryside. To the extent that it looked to the outside, it was first and foremost toward its superordinate organs at the province level and secondarily to the other relevant administrative units in the county, prefectural, and provincial capitals. In addition, many staff members looked toward a multitude of homeplaces throughout the province and in many other provinces throughout China.

We do not have enough information to support a firm conclu-

sion about the unit's administrative links with higher levels since Mr. Ji had no detailed knowledge of the subject. The evidence suggests, however, that the unit was the lowest level of a branch-type organizational system operating according to vertical rule.<sup>6</sup> This form of administrative coordination was clearly related to the nature of the unit's work. First, this type of technical work was of some strategic importance for national security (though the unit is not a military one and, except for a transitional period at the end of the Cultural Revolution, not subject to PLA direction). Second, the local operation was clearly part of a national plan spanning a large number of provinces. This particular unit, for example, did fieldwork over a large area which cut across provincial boundaries.

More specifically, the unit was one of several based in and operating in the province, all of which were directly responsible to a provincial-level bureau (ju) in the province capital. There is no evidence that the unit was subject to conflicting pressures from different superior bureaus. The provincial bureau was in turn directly responsible to a central ministry (bu) in Beijing. Some of the more complex technical processes necessary to the unit's functions were carried out by the provincial bureau on its own premises, and it was also the locus of decisions about matters such as organizational expansion. In general, however, administrative pressures from the bureau do not seem to have been very intense. The head of the unit's technical section made regular monthly work reports to the bureau, and bureau cadres occasionally came down to the unit, normally one to three times a year, on questions of a technical nature. Although the vice-head of the provincial bureau came once, most visits were by ordinary provincial-level cadres, and the unit never saw anyone from the central ministry. Unit cadres attended periodic "production planning meetings" (shengchan jihua huiyi) convened by the bureau in the provincial capital, and at one such meeting, Mr. Ji recalled, a unit cadre was publicly criticized for complaining that the unit was being given short shrift in distribution of equipment and supplies.

To sum up, this unit had certain specific characteristics. First, it was an "enterprise-type unit" engaged in the production of technical information gathered from systematic surveys. Second, it was at the bottom rung of an administrative ladder reaching to Beijing. Third, it was relatively insulated, though not completely isolated, from the surrounding community. Fourth, its work was organized

on a national basis which meant, for example, that a large section of its staff was drawn from other provinces and its work spanned provincial boundaries. Fifth, its work was strategic in character, a fact which necessitated caution, for example, in handling technical matters classified as secret or top-secret. Sixth, it was a relatively new unit and, given the changing geographical priorities underlying its field of specialization, eventually could be broken up and dispersed to form new units elsewhere (as it itself had been formed), though this would not happen for quite some time. Seventh, the very fact of its location in the western part of China contributes to its distinctiveness since, in the eyes of many of its staff born and educated in the eastern and northern provinces, it was a "far distant unit." Many of them did not want to be there, hankered for a return to their homes and/or the provinces to the east, and consequently did not, according to Mr. Ji, feel fully content in their work (gongzuo bu anxin).7

#### Unit personnel: A profile

By the early 1970s, the unit employed around 240 people at any given time.<sup>8</sup> The staff was predominantly male (91%), and the females were concentrated exclusively in the headquarters technical section and the clinic. Field survey work was strictly a male domain (for health reasons, according to Mr. Ji), as was the leadership of the unit. The average age of unit personnel in 1968 was thirty-two, with a range of twenty-one to over sixty.<sup>9</sup>


Personnel were divided into four broad occupational categories, of which three were predominant. There were 116 technicians (jishuyuan) who made up 47% of the unit and included one engineer (gongchengshi); 39 administrative cadres (xingzheng ganbu) and staff (xingzheng renyuan) constituting 16% of the unit; 90 manual workers (gongren) constituting 36%; and 3 medical staff (yiwu renyuan) constituting 1% of the unit. All members of the unit's staff were employed on a permanent basis—i.e., there were no temporary or contract workers.


Mr. Ji noted that the popular meaning of the term "cadre" (ganbu) was somewhat ambiguous, resting on three different non-exclusive criteria: people who draw state salaries, people who do mental work, or people who have positions of authority. Ordinary workers and peasants tended to regard anyone doing mental work


as a cadre. But Mr. Ji himself made a clear distinction between people on the administrative personnel scale who had positions of authority, whom he classified as "cadres," and those who had routine clerical or nonmanual service jobs, whom he did not. Within the former group, Mr. Ji distinguished between cadres whose work was primarily administrative, political, or a combination of both. In describing technicians, on the other hand, Mr. Ji used the terms "technicians" (jishuyuan) and "technical cadres" (jishu ganbu) interchangeably. All technicians are cadres, he stated, and the major distinction is that they manage professional matters (guanli yewu), while their politico-administrative counterparts manage people (guanli ren). The common characteristic of "cadre," then, is clearly some type of managerial control. 10

Within the worker category, a good proportion were classified as "specialized workers" (*zhuanye gongren*) who had acquired techniques relevant to the work of the unit, as distinct from "ordinary workers" (*putong gongren*) involved in unskilled, routine jobs.

Each of three major occupational categories had its own system of wage grades: 18 for technicians (the highest is 1), 30 for administrative staff (the highest is 1), and 8 for workers (the highest is 8).11 The distribution of staff members along these three scales is presented in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c. Basic pay defined by wage grades was in turn supplemented by flat-rate livelihood supplements (shenghuo buzhu) and a complex system of differential increments for fieldwork. These wage grades were also significant in that they were the basis for quasi-formal status distinctions between different layers of administrators and technicians. 12 According to Mr. Ji, people in administrative grades 1-13 were considered "high-level cadres" (gaoji ganbu), those in grades 14-17 "middlelevel" (zhongdeng) cadres, and 17 and below "ordinary" (putong) or "basic-level" (jiceng) cadres. During the late 1960s, the highestranking cadre in the unit was the unit head at grade 17, which Mr. Ji described as the equivalent of a county head (xianzhang), a PLA regiment commander (tuanzhang), or the head of an urban administrative office (chuzhang). 13 Until a grade 16 cadre arrived to replace the unit's vice-head in 1972, the unit head was the only "middle-level cadre" in the unit, the remainder falling into the "basic level" category, though some of them were counted as "leading cadres" within the unit.







Figures 1a, b, c:

The Distribution of wage-grades in various occupations

Similarly, Mr. Ji said that "higher engineers" from grades 1 to 6 counted as "higher intellectuals," "ordinary engineers" (grades 7-9) and higher technicians (grades 10-13) counted as "middle intellectuals," and technicians from grades 14 to 18 counted as "lower intellectuals." The highest-ranking technical officer was the pre-Cultural Revolution technical section chief, who was an "ordinary engineer" at grade 7.

Members of the unit had diverse levels of education, reflecting the range of skills required for this kind of technical unit: 4% had received no formal education; 24% had primary education only; 18% had reached lower-middle (i.e., junior high) school; 33% had reached upper-middle (i.e., senior high) or vocational middle school (zhongzhuan); 15% had reached vocational college (dazhuan); 5% had reached college or university, and 1% (two people) had been to graduate school. There were marked variations in educational background across occupations, as Table 1 shows. Of particular interest is the contrast between the educational levels of the technicians and the administrators. Two-thirds of the administrators had only attained lower-middle school level or below, and only four had received any formal technical training relevant to the unit's work. Three of these held junior positions while the fourth, the unit's vice-head who was officially in charge of supervising the unit's technical work, had been sent to a vocational middle school for a one-year intensive course in the subject. In general, however, the unit's administrators could not be described as "expert" in the work of their unit.

Among technical staff, in this as well as other units, said Mr. Ji, there was a very close relationship between educational attainment and salary grade. Grades 1-9 were overwhelmingly people with pre-Liberation higher educational training; grades 10-11 tended to be people who had studied abroad after Liberation; grades 12-13 were domestic four-year college graduates; and grades 14-16 were the graduates of specialized vocational two-year colleges or middle schools. The close equivalence between educational attainment and salary grade is one index of the remarkable absence of upward mobility, both for individuals and groups, in the unit in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Until the wage promotion of 1972 (and, probably more significantly, 1977), most technicians stayed at their initial grade set after arrival in the unit (after a probation period); there were few individual promotions and no across-the-board promotions of whole grades.

Table 1 Educational Levels of Various Occupational Groups

Educational	Q Q Q	Primary	Lower-middle school	Upper-middle or vocational middle school	Vocational	College	Graduate	Row
Technicians				63	38	12	2,00,1	116
Administrative	2	12	(1%)	(54%)	(33%)	(10%)	( <del>/</del>	39
Staff	(%9)	(31%)	(31%)	(33%)		•	l	06
Worker	7 (8%)	46 (51%)	32 (36%)	4 (4%)	I	(1%)		) }
Other	I	ļ	1	2 (100%)	ļ	j	1	7
Column totals	9 (4%)	58 (24%)	45 (18%)	82 (33%)	38 (15%)	13 (5%)	2 (1%)	247

Members of the unit also came from diverse class backgrounds (jieji chushen). We ranked these on an ordinary scale from "bad" to "good"; the "bad" category included landlord, rich peasant, and capitalist and constituted 16% of the unit's work force (39 people); a "middling" category, including middle or upper-middle peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and free professionals (ziyou zhiye), constituted 25% of the work force (61 people). The other 60% of the unit's staff (148 people) were of "good" origins, predominantly poor and lower-middle peasant (126 or 51% of the work force). The "bad" classes were more heavily concentrated among the technicians (23% of technicians had "bad" class backgrounds) while workers and administrative cadres were more likely to have "good" origins (only one member of the administrative staff [3%] and six manual workers [7%] had "bad" class backgrounds). The relatively high percentage of people with "bad" and "middling" class origins among the technicians reflects both the continued cultural and intellectual advantages of the prerevolutionary upper and middle classes and the relatively nondiscriminatory educational recruitment policies of the 1950s and early 1960s.15

About 21% of the unit's staff were former PLA officers or soldiers. Just under 60% of the administrative staff and 32% of the manual workers had PLA backgrounds. 16 By contrast, only one technician had been in the PLA, and he was somewhat of a special case.<sup>17</sup> Former PLA service carried with it a certain political cachet, namely the implication that a person, whether old revolutionary or recent draftee, was politically reliable. 18 We can distinguish three types of people within this general category. First, there were the older "revolutionary soldiers" (geming junren) who served in the PLA before Liberation and were given positions of political and administrative authority in the postrevolutionary state institutions. In this unit, all but one of the leading political cadres had such PLA records (see page 30). Second, there were more recent veterans who had acquired some technical skill while serving in the armed forces and were recruited to civilian posts partly on this basis. A good example in this unit was the "repair group" (xiuli zu) established in 1971 to maintain the unit's motor vehicles. This whole group (five workers) was recruited from recently discharged PLA men who had worked as army drivers and mechanics in one PLA unit. Both of these two types of ex-soldier were referred to as "transferred soldiers" (zhuanye junren). Third, there were recent dischargees with no special skills who were recruited because they were considered politically reliable. Thus, for example, PLA experience was an important criterion in selecting local peasants for manual jobs in the unit. These people were usually referred to as "demobilized soldiers" (fuyuan junren).

In terms of regional origins, 55% of the staff hailed from the province in which the unit was situated, most of them being workers or lower-level technicians. There were several groups of about 5% each from four other provinces and, in toto, there were people representing twenty provinces in the unit. The high percentage of outsiders reflects the system of nationwide "unified allocation" (tongyi fenpei) for technicians and cadres for branch units of this kind and, according to Mr. Ji, a conscious attempt by higher authorities to achieve regional diversity:

It would have had a bad effect on our work if people spoke local dialects on the job. Moreover, if people were with lots of other people from the same province, they might pine for home all the time and morale would suffer.

The system of nationwide allocation is also reflected in the statistics on marriage. Of the 90% of staff members who were married, 21% had spouses living in other provinces, 41% had spouses in the local province but living away from the unit, 12% had spouses living in the vicinity of the unit (i.e., in the same county), but only 21% had spouses living in the unit, either as staff members or housewives.

From this brief overview of the unit, one can discern its major socio-economic dimensions: three major occupational groups and corresponding systems of economic, social, and work-type differentiation; overwhelmingly male; a wide variety of educational, regional and class backgrounds; many people geographically separated from spouses; economic differentiation plus differentials according to type of work. These dimensions of differentiation among unit personnel—notably the marked differences in educational levels and class backgrounds among the three main occupational groups—should be borne in mind during our later discussions of the nature of political issues in the unit and the dynamics of the political process before and after the Cultural Revolution.


### Structure of technical and administrative organizations

Turning to the organizational structure of the unit, we shall concentrate on the pre-Cultural Revolution structure as a basis for later analysis of structural changes resulting from the movement. (Those organizational features discussed here which do not appear in our later discussion of post-Cultural Revolution changes remained constant into the 1970s.) In terms of organization of the unit's work, Mr. Ji made a basic distinction between professional (yewu) and administrative (xingzheng) processes. He included subunits with both administrative and political functions within the latter category. Overall leadership was provided by a duumvirate of unit head and vice-head, the relationship between whom was to become one of the crucial factors in factional politics in the unit during the Cultural Revolution. The pre-Cultural Revolution structure of the unit is depicted in Figure 2. This organizational scheme can be divided into four categories:

#### The technical section (jishu ke)

This complex subunit was under the direction of an engineer and his assistant (zhushou), a technician. They shared the services of a technical clerk (jishu shoufa). The engineer (grade 7 on the salary scale) was a man in his late forties who had been educated before Liberation. He was in charge of all professional work in the unit before the Cultural Revolution. He either wrote or approved the unit's technical reports, which were sent to the provincial bureau every month, and operated free from direct supervision by the unit leadership. The engineer and his assistant, together with the unit head and vice-head, were known collectively as the "high unit cadres" (da dui ganbu).

The technical section had two basic components. First were eight technical groups situated within the unit, seven of which (called zu) dealt with different subspecialities while one, a "materials room" (ziliao shi), operated a small reference library and handled supplies of technical materials for the entire technical section. Since many of the documents kept in the materials room were classified as secret, both of its personnel, a technician and an administrator, were considered politically reliable (kekao). The former was a Party member and the latter a "transferred sol-



evolution Unit before

dier," while both had "good" class backgrounds. Each of the groups had a head (zuzhang), a technician in each case, who supervised the activities of the other technicians and workers in the group. One of the seven subspeciality groups called the "special problem group" (zhuanti zu) was responsible for holding consultations with other technical groups in the unit which encountered problems they could not solve themselves. It met this responsibility by forming special "combined groups" (zonghe zu) made up of personnel from relevant technical groups. When the problem at hand had been solved, the "combined group" was disbanded.

Second were three technical fieldwork teams (yewai fendui) who worked outside the unit from spring to fall, each responsible for surveying in a specific geographic area. Each team had a central unit composed of cadres and work personnel. The fieldwork team cadres (fendui ganbu) were five: a head and vice-head (both administrative cadres), a political counselor (literally, zhidao yuan, or "guidance person"), and a technical responsible person (jishu fuze) and his assistant. There were several minor functionaries, known as "work personnel" (gongzuo renyuan), a term denoting lower positions on the administrative scale and more routine duties. These included a person in charge of supplies, a warehouse custodian, and an accountant. Under each team were nine or ten mobile small-groups (xiaozu), usually with four people in each (two technicians and two workers) with one of the technicians serving as group head. The fieldwork team cadres and personnel staffed a fixed field station, which served as a base for the smallgroups as they fanned out to survey their prescribed areas.

In each case, the fieldwork team head combined the tasks of providing general supervision over the team's technical plans and work schedule, on the one hand, and solving concrete "livelihood problems" (shenghuo wenti), on the other. Specifically, this involved such things as the approval of the team's monthly work plan; distributing ration coupons for grain, cotton, meat and edible oil; coordinating the distribution of technical equipment to the mobile small-groups; and handling liaison with the home unit and the authorities in those counties where the fieldwork team was working. The vice-head assisted the team head and the political counselor; one team did not have a vice-head, which suggests that the position was dispensable. The political counselor was in charge of political study, mediation of disputes, and monitoring the "ideo-

ogy" (sixiang) of each person in the team. This last responsibility was discharged by reading monthly political reports sent by the small-groups and through his own investigations of small-groups. In the latter case, he would go down to a particular small-group to live and work for periods ranging from one week to a month. He sorted out arguments among small-group members<sup>20</sup> and, in the case of groups without Party members, would lead group study of important political documents.

Day-to-day technical management in the team rested in the hands of the technical responsible person and his assistants. They were a key transmission point in the upward flow of technical information within the unit. They received monthly reports from the team's mobile small-groups and, on the basis of these, wrote a monthly report to the engineer in the technical section office. The latter in turn synthesized reports from both the mobile teams and the eight technical groups in preparing his reports for the provincial bureau. The remaining positions require no elaboration. Each team needed two persons in charge of ordering and storing materials and equipment because the various technical small-groups worked in areas with widely different conditions and technical requirements, which demanded elaborate procurement, storage, repair, and distribution facilities.

#### Administrative subunits

There were three subunits with primary administrative functions, viz. the office of the unit head, the finance group, and the supply section. The unit head's office handled a variety of matters relating to maintenance of the unit's physical plant, communications, and services for its members. Under the supervision of a director (zhuren) and a vice-director (fu zhuren), the office contained the following personnel: an administrative warehouse custodian (xingzheng baoguanyuan) who was in charge of office supplies, furniture, and building maintenance for the entire unit; a communications person (tongxunyuan) who wrote letters, sorted mail, and so forth; a carpenter (mugong); an electrician (diangong); a handyman (zagong); and a typist. A five-person refectory group (yinshi zu), also under the office's authority, comprised a head and four cooks.

The finance group (caiwu zu) was the central accounting office which managed financial transactions within the unit and between

the unit and outside agencies. It consisted of a group head and three accountants and was supervised by an administrative cadre whose job included monitoring the group's work for signs of corruption.

The supply section (gongying ke) was responsible for the procurement and maintenance of the technical materials and equipment needed by the unit and for transportation and vehicle repair services. Under a section chief worked two buyers (caigouyuan), two warehouse managers (guanliyuan), and a truck drivers' group which had formerly been responsible for both operation and repair until supplemented by a repair group after the Cultural Revolution.

#### Political subunits

The unit had a political office (zhengzhi chu) headed by a single director (zhuren) and composed of three subsections. The most powerful of these was the personnel group (renshi zu) composed of a head and one staff member. This group handled the administrative and informational work involved in transfers to and from the unit, promotions, horizontal transfers within the unit, salary arrangements for cadres and technicians, and the recruitment of children of the unit's staff members to jobs in this or other similar units. The group's function in these matters was far more than clerical. The group head, an administrative cadre with a relatively modest wage-grade, exercised considerable discretion and influence in these matters, even though the formal authority lay with his superiors. In fact, they delegated to him a great deal of power to make decisions about transfers, promotions and recruitment, normally just accepting his recommendations or rubber-stamping his decisions. Another source of his power lay in his exclusive control over the dossiers (dangan) of staff members. These files contained the information on the basis of which personnel decisions were made. These factors gave the personnel group head power far exceeding his level of formal authority or others of his salary grade. Given the importance of questions such as promotions and transfer to members of the unit, notably to cadres and technicians, many of whom longed to return to their home areas, he loomed large in their eyes as a man of influence. He literally held the key to their future.

The second component of the political office was a propaganda group (xuanquan zu), composed of a group head, a vice-head, and

a staff member. Its major responsibility was ideological and political education. The group received political documents from higher levels and arranged for them to be printed and distributed; it organized showings of political films; if there were an exhibition in the province capital, it would arrange for people to go see it; when the unit's Party committee made a decision or had an announcement, the group organized discussion meetings, printed up the relevant documents, and so on. The vice-head had the special task of mobilizing people to speak at meetings. He concentrated on staff members who he knew were interested in politics, and he paid personal visits to their homes to convince them to speak on specific occasions. He was also in charge of the unit's wall newspapers (qiang bao).<sup>21</sup> In contrast with the personnel group, the work of the propaganda group exerted little real political or administrative power over the lives of the unit's staff.

The third component of this subunit was the political section (zhengzhi ke), comprised of a section head and a staff member, which functioned as a political watchdog. The section head did "ideological work" (sixiang gongzuo) with staff members who had "ideological problems" (for example, clarified Mr. Ji, not wanting to accept a job assignment, complaining a lot, or "saying bad things" [shuo huaihua]). This involved investigations through interviews with the head of the person's subunit and also with members of the Party branch committee who worked with the person. Of course, it also involved chats with the person in question. If this did not clear the matter up, the political section head then brought the matter up with the heads of the personnel group (to check the person's file) and of the political office. Problems came to the attention of the political section by referral from subunit heads or from the head of the propaganda group (for example, if the latter noticed that someone was not participating in discussion groups). The section's staff member mainly handled administrative and clerical matters connected with the work of the section. He also handled the more minor problems which were referred to the section and sometimes did some of the investigative work on individual cases.

Various special-purpose ancillary units

Here we include the security section, the farm and the clinic. The security section (baowei ke) was staffed by only two people, a sec-

tion head, and a clerk (banshi renyuan), both of whom were Party members and former soldiers with "good" class backgrounds. They were responsible for the security of the unit's plant and equipment, for the secret and top-secret documents kept in the materials room, and for general problems of theft and the like. If anything in the unit were stolen, a report was submitted to the head of this section. The section's personnel patrolled the grounds at night and organized people to sleep in the offices during the annual holidays to prevent theft or vandalism.

The unit operated a farm before the Cultural Revolution. Strictly speaking, it was unnecessary to the unit's food supply, but Mr. Ji explained that it was set up to create jobs for two relatively senior administrative cadres (grades 19 and 20) who had been assigned to the unit. They had no technical skills, and all the administrative positions had already been filled. It may also have been a response to the pressures for "self-sufficiency" which became widespread in China in the early and mid-1960s. The farm raised pigs and grew grain and vegetables, some of which was used to make pig fodder. Workers assigned to the fieldwork teams worked on the farm when they were not out of the unit, but their technician counterparts did not because they had plenty of professional responsibilities while back in the unit. After the Cultural Revolution, administrative jobs were found for the two cadres in charge of the farm and it was abolished.

The unit had its own clinic, staffed by a doctor and one nurse until 1971, when a second nurse's position was added. Unit staff received all their treatment and medication free of charge; their immediate families, including parents who might be living with them, received treatment at half the normal cost. The clinic could perform no procedures more sophisticated than stitching up wounds or delivering babies; surgery, dentistry, and specialties such as ophthalmology were unavailable at the unit clinic. Unit staff who were referred for treatment to the hospitals in the county, prefectural, or provincial seats had to pay nominal registration fees, but the unit reimbursed them for all the medical expenses as well as the cost of bus transport and hotel accommodations (if the journey required more than one day). Families of unit staff were reimbursed by the unit for half of these expenses. As we have seen, the unit clinic also serviced local peasants when the doctor and nurses Were not busy treating unit staff and their families, who had priority.

#### Structure of political and mass organization

Existing side by side with this functional division of labor was a system of political and mass organizations. This system was to change somewhat under the impact of the Cultural Revolution, and these changes will be discussed later. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the unit had two political organizations, the Communist Party and the Young Communist League, and two mass organizations, the militia and the trade union. Let us first deal briefly with the latter since they were relatively unimportant. The unit had a militia company (lian) which had apparently never amounted to much (bu wanshan), meeting or practicing relatively infrequently. During the Cultural Revolution, it lapsed and had still not been rebuilt when Mr. Ji left the unit. It had been under the command of two administrative cadres—the head of the defense section served as commander, and one of the farm cadres as vice-commander. Both were PLA veterans; the latter had reached the rank of company vice-commander (fu lianzhang) in the PLA before he was demobilized in the mid-1950s; the former was apparently an ordinary soldier who was demobilized in the early 1960s).

The unit's trade union (gonghui) was organized on the normal industrial pattern with all members of the unit's staff, irrespective of occupation, eligible for membership. Apparently all were actual members without exception. The union had a full-time chairperson, a vice-chairperson, three functionaries (ganshi), and five smallgroup heads. Members of the union were divided into five smallgroups with 30-40 people in each. The union clearly had little political influence. Its political activities were confined to holding annual meetings on May Day, when there were speeches, songs, reading of May Day editorials and other documents, and films. In contrast, it did have two significant economic functions, both involving the allocation of union welfare funds amassed through a 5% levy on the staff's wages and through grants "from higher levels." First, the union (specifically the union chairperson) was responsible for distributing an annual supplement (buzhu) each year shortly before the Spring Festival (or lunar New Year). The supplement was intended to aid staff members in economic difficulties, and only people who felt they qualified for assistance could apply. The union chairperson evaluated the applications and made the decisions in consultation with and with the final approval of the unit head. The union's second economic function was to provide emergency welfare relief to needy cases as they presented themselves. These areas of decision and activity aside, however, the union was clearly a lightweight organization politically: the small-groups never held meetings but rather functioned as mere categories of the work force to rationalize the processes of investigation, decision, and administration involved in welfare supplements. Similarly, the duties of the union functionaries and small-group heads were mainly concerned with monitoring and evaluating claims for union welfare funds. The organization lapsed during the Cultural Revolution, and its chairperson was detailed to other work. It was not to be revived until 1974.

Turning now to more specifically political organizations, it seems that the unit's Young Communist League was also a somewhat bantamweight organization. According to Mr. Ji, joining the League was fairly easy before the Cultural Revolution, and its activities were rather circumscribed. Looking at the period 1966 to 1972 as a whole, of those staff members eligible for League membership on whom information is available, 45% (72 of 160) were in fact League members. Of these, an overwhelming proportion (94% or 68 out of 72) were over twenty-five years old as of 1972 and therefore technically ineligible for Youth League membership. Nonetheless, overage members could attend weekly League political meetings (held on Saturday afternoons), just about the sole activity of the unit's League organization. Membership in the League did not count for much politically, said Mr. Ji, because it was too common (tai pupian). Nor was there anything exceptional about League activities—the substance of League meetings was not secret, and those who attended them were free to discuss what had happened with non-League members. Still, the League was important as a prerequisite to joining the Party for those with the necessary qualifications and qualities. For many others, however, it presented a relatively easily obtained but terminal political status, either because they were loath to make the political commitments required of Party members or because they were ineligible for Party membership for some reason (for example, a "bad" class background or political history).

Like the union and the militia, the League organization fell into disuse during the Cultural Revolution, and its for ner secretary

(tuanwei shuji) was allocated to other work. Meetings still continued, but only once a month or once every several months instead of weekly. In 1974, however, the former secretary was reappointed to his previous post and began to resuscitate the unit's League organization.

The key political organization in the unit was unquestionably the Communist Party. Before the Cultural Revolution, the unit had a Party general branch committee (zongzhi weiyuanhui) with five members: the secretary was the unit head, the vice-secretary was the unit vice-head, and the other three were the chairperson of the union, the political counselor in the second technical fieldwork team, and the personnel group head. They were all administrative cadres and Party members of long standing, and all had been the founding organizers of the unit in 1964-65. Under the general branch committee there was an organization branch committee (jiguan zhibu weiyuanhui) for the personnel who worked at unit headquarters and fieldwork branch committees (yewai zhibu weiyuanhui) for the staff of the fieldwork teams. Each of these in turn was divided into Party small-groups (dang xiaozu). This Party organization lapsed during the Cultural Revolution and the process of reconstitution began from the bottom up in the early 1970s with the eventual establishment of a Party committee in 1974. We shall examine this process in detail later.

Table 2 shows that in the late 1960s there were considerable differences among the three major occupational groups in terms of their "representation" in the Party. Administrative cadres were heavily *over*-represented in the Party, workers were slightly over-

Occupational Distribution of Party Members Compared with Total Unit Staff, Late 1960s

Occupational category	Percentage of Party members	Percentage of unit staff
Administrators	48%	17%
Workers	37%	29%
Technicians	<b>1</b> 5%	53%
	(n = 46)	(n = 211)

represented, and technicians were greatly *under*-represented. On the one hand, this situation was clearly connected with the fact that many Party members distrusted technicians as "intellectuals" and the fact that a large percentage of the older technicians came from "bad" class backgrounds (thus being ineligible for Party membership except in extraordinary circumstances). On the other hand, there were other explanatory factors which laid the onus for low Party participation on the technicians themselves and on the relatively relaxed political atmosphere before the Cultural Revolution. The relevant factors were the career motivations of technicians, the clear separation between technical and administrative tasks and career patterns, the high status accruing to technical work *per se*, and the low incentive for political commitment. Mr. Ji summarized the reasons as follows:

Most technicians did not want to join the Party before the Cultural Revolution for three reasons: (i) they wanted more time for [professional] studies; (ii) they didn't want to get involved in politics; (iii) it was not important to get involved in politics then. Before the Cultural Revolution, Party membership helped your career, but not that much. A technician who wanted to advance was better off using his spare time to study or to rest. Getting involved in politics took a lot of time and energy which could be spent on professional matters.

On the professional side of the team, professional skills were more important than political skills. On the administrative side, the opposite was the case. If a technician got involved in politics, he or she would not have the leisure time necessary for resting in order to keep up professional work at high standards.

Moreover, technicians could not qualify for Party membership merely by slacking off at their professional work and compensating through more political activities. In its limited recruitment among technicians, the Party leadership seems to have enforced both standards of "redness" and "expertise" as criteria for Party recruitment. To be a good Party member, it was felt, a person had to have credibility among his or her peer group. If a technician was poor at professional work, he or she would lose the respect of fellow technicians and thus be politically ineffective as well. The Cultural Revolution brought changes both in the political position of technicians and in the processes of political recruitment, which we shall discuss in Chapter 6.

It is important to conclude this section by identifying the key

leadership group in the unit before the Cultural Revolution. The unit's leading cadres were six in number: two technical experts (the engineer and his assistant) and four cadres, each of whom had both administrative and political responsibilities. The unit head, a grade 17 cadre in his late forties, was a "revolutionary cadre" (geming ganbu; i.e., a cadre in pre-Liberation days) who had served in the PLA before 1949. He was from a poor-peasant class background, had only attained a primary education, and knew little about the unit's technical work. He was the unit's Party branch secretary, and his primary responsibilities in the unit were political, rather than administrative. The unit vice-head, a grade 18 cadre about forty years of age who had also served in the PLA before Liberation, came from an upper-middle peasant family and had some limited technical expertise about the unit's work. Though he served concurrently as the Party branch vice-secretary, his major function was supervising the unit's professional work. The director of the political office was a grade 19 cadre in his mid-forties who had also served in the PLA before Liberation. He came from a "poor and lower-middle peasant" background, had lower-middle school education and no specialized technical knowledge. His primary responsibility lay in the political work of the unit. The head of the personnel group, a grade 23 cadre in his late thirties from a "poor or lower-middle peasant" family, had graduated lower-middle school, and had no specialized technical knowledge. His power in the unit came less from his formal grade or position than from the specific nature of his job and his ability to expand his area of influence through careful maneuver and pressure. These latter four cadres constituted the unit's core politico-administrative leadership.

Below them was a less important echelon, including the head of the propaganda group, the head of the political section, the director of the unit head's office, the secretary of the Youth League, and the union chairperson. This structure of cadre power should be borne in mind during later chapters since these "leading cadres" were to become the major targets of the Cultural Revolution in the unit.

#### Conclusion

If we sum up this information on the unit's personnel and structure on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, three major points of political significance stand out. First, there was a relatively clear distinction between technical activities on the one hand and politico-administrative activities on the other. People specialized on both sides, and there were few "red experts" or "expert reds." Technical work seems to have been carried on with a minimum of direction or interference from the administrative side. General political pressures on technical staff seem to have been restrained.

Second, one is struck by the great differences between the technical staff and the administrative staff. One can discern "types" on either side; administrative and political cadres tended to be older (59% were over forty) and had good class backgrounds (74%), little formal education and almost no specialized technical knowledge, were likely to be Party members, and often had PLA backgrounds. Technicians, on the other hand, tended to be younger (80% were under forty), often had "bad" or "mediocre" class backgrounds (71%), had all undergone specialized education, and were unlikely to be Party members or former soldiers. The sociological and political differences between these "types" were to find expression in the factional politics of the Cultural Revolution.

A third set of judgments concerns the relationship between politics and administration in the unit. On the one hand, political functions were carried out by two different tracks: through political organizations (such as the Party and the League) existing separately from the unit's administrative system, and through specialized political units within that administrative system. On the other hand, leaving out the lower levels of administrative staff engaged in routine clerical work, at more senior levels cadres tended to "wear two hats," either as administrators in specifically political subunits or as administrators with important roles in the Party organization. At these higher levels of the cadre structure, therefore, politics and administration were inseparable.

# The Nature of General Issues in the Unit

We shall move now from questions of organizational and human context to those of political process. In this chapter we shall inquire into the nature of "issues" within the unit, i.e., the relatively stable and recurring events and problems which have caused concern among members of the unit, and tension or conflict between them and the unit leadership. How did these issues relate to the unit's structure and how did the political and administrative leadership deal with them? What forms of political interaction took place around these issues between personnel and leadership? What was the structure of political relationships which developed between personnel and cadres? We begin by focusing on those basic issues which seem to have remained constant in the unit from its inception until the mid-1970s. This chapter should thus provide some insight into basic-level politics in the unit in "normal" times, acting as a backdrop for our later discussion of the specific issues which arose in the unit during the Cultural Revolution between 1967 and 1970.

We have categorized these basic issues into five groups: issues of job allocation, involving questions of recruitment into the unit, and transfers and job allocation within the unit; issues of upward mobility, both in job level and salary grade; issues arising from the use of class origin categories and political labels; everyday material and welfare issues concerning wages, housing, vacations and the like; and finally personal issues of various kinds. After discussing each category, we shall then suggest how these issues structured the nature of relationships between the political leadership and the mass of the unit's personnel.

#### Types of issues in the unit

Issues of job allocation

There were three sets of issues here. The first involves the problem of misallocation by outside agencies, whereby a person was assigned to a position in the unit for which he or she was clearly unsuited. There were two clear cases of misallocation in the unit. In the first, a graduate of a normal (i.e. teacher training) school (shifan xuexiao), who had specialized in political education, was assigned to the unit as a manual worker. He was eventually able to secure a transfer to his home village in central China. A more blatant case was that of a graduate of the history department of the main university in the unit's home province who was working, rather incompetently, as a manual worker in one of the mobile teams. Apparently, neither of these two particular cases was punitive; they were simply examples of inefficient allocation. Mr. Ji attributed this to wrinkles in the planning process in general and, in particular, to the disruptions to the "unified allocation" of school and college graduates caused by the Cultural Revolution. In general, he maintained, students in the social sciences and humanities fared worse than their counterparts in the natural sciences. For example, when foreign language students began studying Russian, the plan might have called for X Russian language specialists by 19XX; but come 19XX, it might be found that only 1/2 X were needed, so half of the Russian language graduates ended up in jobs unrelated to their training.

During the Cultural Revolution, misallocations not only resulted from snafus in planning but in some cases were an expression of the desire of cadres in charge of job allocation to further the principle of intellectuals "uniting with workers, peasants, and soldiers over the long term" (changqi he gong nong bing jiehe). Mr. Ji knew of no clear cases in his own unit but cited another case in which a graduate of an engineering program in Shanghai was permanently assigned to sort mail in a commune post office. He also scratched his head over "an even stranger case": a person who graduated as a legal expert from the prestigious Beijing University after six years of study was assigned to another technical team in the same province as an ordinary worker. On this fragmentary evidence, cases of genuine inefficiency and confusion are hard to separate from those which reflect a commitment to Maoist egalitarian motives. But it is

important to note that there was only one clear continuing case of misallocation in this unit, suggesting that, even with the temporary confusions brought by the Cultural Revolution, the allocation process seems to have operated reasonably well.

Clear cases of gross misallocation apart, however, a significant portion of the unit's specialized personnel, particularly recent graduates from colleges in the big eastern cities, wanted transfers out of the unit. They felt that even though their skills might be relevant to their present jobs, they could be more fruitfully employed at more elevated intellectual levels in more salubrious surroundings. Mr. Ji for example, dearly wanted to work in a big-city research institute and spent five years in a series of fruitless applications for a suitable transfer. Other technicians of his acquaintance applied for transfers because they wanted jobs in or near their home areas. Successful applications were rare—Mr. Ji could only recall two or three such cases, one of which involved a person whose work capacity had been seriously impaired by an accident. The resulting tensions and complaints were focused on the head of the personnel group, who had the power to block or facilitate applications for transfer.

This type of discontent was apparently most common among the technical staff, particularly those with some form of higher education. Mr. Ji was unable to provide information on similar feelings among the administrative staff. Manual workers were unlikely to complain since they (particularly those from peasant backgrounds) considered their assignments to be relatively good.

The second problem of allocation was the contentious one of separated families. According to Mr. Ji, there was a national policy of arranging for husbands and wives to live together, for both humanitarian and efficiency considerations. As we have seen, however, 62% of the 221 married people in the unit did not live with or near their spouses, and 21% did not even live in the same province as their spouses. The relatively high proportion of separated spouses reflects both the relative remoteness of the unit and its high degree of specialization, both of which factors made suitable transfers difficult. On the other hand, not all separations were involuntary—Mr. Ji noted that wives living in the countryside were willing to come and live in or near the unit but those living in cities were less so. Involuntary separations, as we shall see later, did create pressures for suitable transfers (either in or out). This, in turn

led to tension and discontent which were intensified by the disruption of normal processes of recruitment and transfer during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution.

A third problem was that of *job allocation* within the unit. To a large extent, the nature of the job allocated to any one staff member was already predetermined by the nature of the individual's educational background and technical qualifications. There was some scope for cadre discretion, however, and as a result some jockeying for relatively more or less desirable jobs. Certain types of technical work enabled a technician to shine and more easily gain recognition, and so were much more sought after than the more humdrum jobs.

#### Issues of upward mobility

Two types of promotion can be distinguished: those involving a rise in salary level (dengji) and a rise in job position (zhiwei). The latter might or might not accompany the former. "(Salary) grade level," remarked Mr. Ji, "only related to your pay. It did not confer greater authority. Your authority came from your job, not your level." To support this assertion, he pointed to the case of one mobile technical small-group where the assistant technician had a higher wage-grade level (14) than his superior, the group head (16). According to Mr. Ji, the difference reflected the latter's superior technical proficiency and work performance. This case was not the norm, however. If we look at the salary grades of the heads and assistants of the twenty-one mobile small-groups on which we have adequate information, there is only this one case (5%) where the salary grade of the assistant exceeded that of the group head; in five cases (24%), their grades were equal, and in fifteen cases (71%) the group head was one or more grades higher than his assistant. Grade level and job position were thus closely linked in the case of technicians. Though Mr. Ji admitted this link, he maintained that the relationship was much closer for administrative than for technical staff. In any event, the crucial leaps in the administrative (from 14 to 13 and 18 to 17) and the technician Wage-grade scales (from 10 to 9 and 7 to 6) were leaps of authority as well as pay.

These two patterns of promotion differed in that wage-grade promotions were made in the context of across-the-board shifts prescribed by higher authorities as part of generalized wage re-

adjustments. Mr. Ji could only remember two such adjustments in a decade—in 1963 and in 1972. Job promotions, on the other hand, were made on a case-by-case basis within the unit by the unit leadership. As a result, wage promotions were a negligible issue within the unit, whereas job promotions were a very live issue indeed.

Given the low salience of wage promotion as an intra-unit issue, we shall only deal briefly with it. Clearly the complex system of basic wages, supplements, and increments in the unit sufficed to compensate for certain inequalities and hardships (for example, the differential between work at headquarters and fieldwork), thus removing some potential sources of contention from the system of economic remuneration. In general, however, wage promotion was slow over the period covered in this study. The only revision (in 1972) affected only a section of the work force.<sup>22</sup> Mr. Ji noted that the desire for wage-grade promotion was universal, both as a source of greater income and as an expression of occupational status. At the same time, however, such adjustments were not within the power of the unit's leadership, the unit's wage levels were already relatively high (particularly compared with the surrounding community), while expenses in this isolated area were low. As a result, wage promotions were not a pressing issue within the unit.

In the case of job promotions, the desire for upward mobility was widespread among both technicians and administrators. For technicians, said Mr. Ji, promotion meant higher status (diwei), more freedom to do one's own work, more opportunity to do more significant and challenging work, and more authority (most commonly in the form of authority over a technical assistant). Criteria for promotion were not fixed, and a considerable amount of discretion was reserved for the cadres who made the decisions. Criteria were both explicit and implicit and included experience, work commitment, technical or administrative competence, class origin, political behavior, and personal relations with leadership cadres. Promotions, particularly for higher-level appointments, depended a great deal on (political) "trust" (xinren): "If the top cadres trusted you, they would give you a political job or more important professional work."

In the eyes of Mr. Ji (and, he said, many other technicians in the unit), there were legitimate and illegitimate criteria for technical promotions. The legitimate criteria were deemed to be experi-

ence, work performance, and technical competence; class origin and cadre "favoritism" were illegitimate. It is clear from Mr. Ji's comments on individual technicians that technical competence was an important criterion for job promotion. It was certainly the dominant criterion for professional promotions before the Cultural Revolution. This meant, for example, that there was considerable incentive for the technical staff to spend part of their free time in the materials room reading the latest materials relevant to their work. But there were other factors which determined the rate of promotion: good "political expression" (zhengzhi biaoxian) could help somewhat, particularly in the more politicized atmosphere of the early 1970s. Previous work experience was also important: those technicians who had worked during the 1950s and 1960s in comparable units in the eastern provinces had found it easy to gain promotions during this early period of rapid expansion. When they were assigned to this unit in the interior, therefore, they tended to retain their high position of authority at the expense of later arrivals, notably those from the unit's home province. This led to friction between the local provincials and outsiders. Though the unit's own expansion opened up new opportunities of promotion for the younger, local technicians (there were fifteen cases of upward professional mobility between 1965 and 1973), the general picture is one of relatively slow rates of mobility. To cite one example, Mr. Ji estimated that it had taken the engineer's assistant about fifteen years to move up from grade 13 to grade 11. "In general," said Mr. Ji, "the older people had the higher ranks because it took so long to move up." He also lamented the fact that promotion criteria were not sufficiently institutionalized—too much was left to the discretion of individual cadres. In a research institute, he argued, such criteria were fixed (exams, dissertations, publications, and the like), and a person knew where he or she stood.

#### Issues of class origin and political labeling

The key issue here was that of a person's officially assigned class origin (jieji chushen)<sup>23</sup>. The political authorities considered class origin to be an important aspect of a person's "political nature" (zhengzhixing) and an index of his or her "reliability" (kekaoxing). Class origin had considerable influence on many aspects of life. Certain doors were shut to people of "bad" class origins, most importantly access to Party membership. "Middling" origin, such as

urban petty bourgeois or middle peasant, did not bar one from the Party, while "good" origin, such as industrial worker or poor peasant, was a positive advantage for those aspiring to Party membership. Among fifty-eight Party members in the unit as of 1973, not one had a "bad" class background and only four (7%) had "middling" origins.

"Bad" class origins could also adversely affect various other opportunities such as job allocation and promotions (particularly to administrative positions), the provision of jobs for one's children in the unit (which we shall discuss further), the ability to make friends, and marriage (i.e., with people in "sensitive" positions such as PLA border guard). We can cite examples of the impact of this discrimination. All four people who received administrative promotions in the unit during the period under study were from "good" class backgrounds. Of the fifteen people who received professional promotions, eleven (73%) had "good" backgrounds (while only 60% of total unit members had "good" backgrounds). Looking at all those people in the unit with administrative authority (n = 18), sixteen (89%) had "good" class backgrounds, two (11%) had "middling" backgrounds, and none had "bad" backgrounds. The stigma led some people to withdraw into passivity or timidity (pashi) or to be content with indifferent work performance since extra effort and involvement would, they felt, be fruitless. Several members of the unit did take effective steps to compensate for the ill-effects of their "bad" origins through good political expression and the cultivation of good personal relations with the important cadres. Still, in general, people from "bad" class origins resented the stigma implied.

The impact of class origin on professional appointments seems to have been less significant before the Cultural Revolution. Looking at those who held positions of professional authority above the small-group level (n = 16), for example, only six had "good" backgrounds (38%), five "middling" (31%), and five "bad" (31%). These statistics, unlike the above figures on promotions which date from the early 1970s, mainly reflected the structure of authority established *before* the Cultural Revolution, and they point to a relatively low salience of the class criterion at that time.

There were a number of other labels, called "hats" (maozi), which were assigned to individuals for political or criminal misdeeds in their past (for example, "counterrevolutionary," "bad element," or "rightist").<sup>24</sup> In addition, people whose personal

dossiers contained evidence of politically embarrassing activities or affiliations before Liberation were said to have "historical problems" (lishi wenti) or problems in their "historical background" (lishi beijing). The most common examples were former membership in the Guomindang, its satellite mass organizations (such as the Three People's Principles Youth Corps), and coercive organs in the Nationalist state structure, notably the security police (xian bing). As in the case of class origin, the authorities held that invidious labels or dubious histories affected an individual's "reliability" and his or her fitness for access to social, economic, and political benefits.

#### Material and welfare issues

There were a number of issues which can be grouped under the loose heading of "material treatment" (wuzhi daiyu). There was some concern and tension over the allocation of annual and emergency economic supplements, the allocation of housing, and the arrangements for annual vacations. Complaints were also raised, formally and informally, about special material privileges accruing to the unit's ranking cadres, particularly their use of the unit's transportation facilities for private purposes.

The burning issue, however, was the recruitment of staff members' children to jobs in the unit when they reached the age of sixteen. According to Mr. Ji, this was a regularized method of giving special consideration to staff members, particularly technicians. The provincial bureau periodically sent down a list of job vacancies, and staff members made formal applications to the unit leadership, mostly for sons rather than daughters. Before the Cultural Revolution the choice was made by the personnel group, and after by that group and the political section. The major criteria, according to Mr. Ji, were the class status of the family and the political expression of both the youth and his parents. Since this privilege was important for many parents, and the number of applicants usually heavily exceeded the number of slots available (there were only five children of staff members working in the unit by 1973), intense concern was generated, and the cadres' handling of this issue was scrutinized closely during the Cultural Revolution for evidence of favoritism.

Individual peccadilloes, both political and nonpolitical

Certain personal problems of individuals or couples were of suffi-

cient significance to become issues of concern to the unit as a whole: one case each of wife-beating, drunkenness, an excessively large family, licentiousness, petty theft, and minor embezzlement. The most common explicitly political sin was listening to foreign radio broadcasts from Hong Kong or Taiwan, or to the Chinese-language services of Voice of America and the BBC.

The usual sanction applied in these cases was "criticism" (piping). There were two basic types of criticism: "ordinary" (putong) and "serious" (yanzhong). The former involved a private talk between the individual and one of the unit's leading cadres, usually in the latter's office. Assuming that the cadre regarded the result of the meeting as satisfactory, the incident was usually not recorded in the person's dossier. The latter form of criticism, usually applying to more serious "errors" or to cases in which individuals refused to correct less serious errors previously criticized, was conducted before a public meeting and was recorded in the person's dossier.<sup>25</sup> Thus, for example, wife-beating initially merited an ordinary criticism, but repeated wife-beating led to a serious criticism; the same applied to listening to foreign radio broadcasts or petty theft. Adultery, on the other hand, led to a serious criticism. Such sanctions in many cases left legacies of bitterness and hostility both among staff members and between them and the unit leadership.

#### The political significance of unit issues

Moving now to the political significance of these five types of issues, each of them involved decisions by the unit's leadership cadres. In most cases, the decisions regulated the distribution of scarce goods and opportunities among competing claimants, rewarded "correct" or otherwise laudable behavior, or imposed sanctions on deviant behavior. Their decisions were guided and circumscribed by general ideological norms and specific policies and regulations. To the extent that cadre decisions about rewards or penalties were based on institutionalized criteria, notably professional performance or "political expression" (*zhengzhi biaoxian*), staff members could expect to improve their lot through effort and initiative. Though professional performance was relatively easily measurable, "political expression," or what we could call political action in its broadest sense, was a somewhat diffuse concept. Mr. Ji noted two major problems here. First, though the "good" political

action of many staff members did in fact reflect "red" beliefs and a sincere desire to "demand progress" (yaochiu jinbu), others faked good politics for ulterior reasons. In Mr. Ji's terms, some people's motives were "pure" (danchun) while others were utilitarian (shiveen "good" political expression and buttering up cadres was expression" tended to manifest itself or be associated with good relations with cadres.

As we discussed each member of the unit's staff, we asked Mr. Ji to rate each person's political expression. He used two basic criteria: activism and knowledge. "Activism" had several dimensions: for example, a person's willingness to implement political tasks assigned by the national leadership (such as the campaign beginning in 1969 to dig air-raid shelters), or the extent of a person's participation in political meetings (whether he or she spoke, what they said, etc.). Political knowledge, on the other hand, implied a "good grasp of politics" (zhengzhi jianjie), e.g., the ability to understand the real significance of newspaper articles, the ability to use special political terminology. These two basic dimensions did not necessarily go together; the politically ignorant activist and the passive or detached but knowledgeable person were recognizable types.

Mr. Ji ranked people into three categories: bad, "average" (yi-ban), and good or "active." On this impressionistic basis, it seems that most of the unit's staff were "average" (179 or 72%), a term which tended to mean that they were not generally interested in politics but would go through the basic motions when appropriate. Sixty-seven (27%) were rated as having "good" or "active" politing motives which underlay similar bahavior. Only two people were described as having chronically "bad" expression.

Cadres in the unit clearly had considerable discretionary power, which created opportunities for favoritism and discrimination. Since the potential benefits of good personal relations with cadres were substantial, Mr. Ji cited several examples of insincerity or "pragmatism" on the part of certain members of the unit. One worker of rich peasant origin, for example, attempted to compensate for his bad class background by "flattering the cadres" (taohao ganbu) through insincere political activism and attempts to establish friendly relations with them. "I knew that his activism was in-

sincere," said Mr. Ji, "because he only tried to get close to the cadres but not the masses." As a result, the worker found it easier to have his vacations scheduled more conveniently, to exceed the prescribed limit for annual leave, to get marginally better work assignments, and to receive less criticism in political campaigns than others from rich peasant family backgrounds. This is an interesting case in which the benefits deriving from good personal relations with cadres outweighed the liabilities deriving from bad class origin.

Mr. Ji gave another example of the importance of personal relations in the relative fortunes of two of the unit's accountants:

[Mr. A] had a relative minor historical problem, having been a former member of the [Guomindang's] Three People's Principles Youth Corps. He was thus unable to bring his children into the unit to work. But [Mr. B] had a serious historical problem, having been in the Guomindang security police. But because he and his wife were on very good terms with the personnel group head and on good terms with the head of the political office, they were able to arrange to get work for two of their children, one in another unit in the province and one in our unit. This shows how important personal ties are, often more important than political issues.

Another staff member, a political counselor (zhidaoyuan) in one of the mobile teams, epitomized the liabilities of not cultivating special relations with cadres. Although he was a Party member and on good terms with everyone (Mr. Ji described him as a "good old chap") (laohaoren), he had no special ties to the relevant cadres and was thus unable to arrange employment for his son.

Personal relations with cadres also influenced the allocation of annual supplements. Mr. Ji described this as follows:

The criteria used to decide who would be awarded supplements were, in order of importance, (i) class, (ii) the nature of your economic problem, and (iii) your political expression. But the leading cadres made a favorable evaluation of the political behavior of people with whom they were on good terms. Some people who were on bad terms with them did not even apply, because they felt there was no chance of getting a supplement. On the other hand, these cadres asked their friends to apply.

One point of particular importance is the extraordinarily wide range of power held by the head of the personnel group, stemming from his control of staff members' dossiers and his role in investigating and approving transfers, arranging employment of staff

members' children, promotions, and so on. Formally, his decisions were subject to approval by the unit's two top cadres and to appeal by the person concerned. Such was the nature of the personnel group head's influence, however, that approval tended to be automatic and appeal dangerous. This high degree of concentration of administrative power is clearly dangerous if the power is not exercised fairly and responsibly. According to Mr. Ji, the personnel group head played favorites and was very vengeful toward people he disliked.<sup>26</sup> For this reason, he was the most unpopular person in the unit.

People reacted to the fact of cadres' discretionary powers in different ways. There was much complaining and grumbling in conversations among friends. Sometimes a person would deliberately state his grievance to an acquaintance whom he knew to be a friend of a particular leading cadre in the hope that the latter would hear about the problem and respond sympathetically. Others pressed their complaints through more formal means: for example, by approaching one of the unit's political "activists" (jijifenzi), who had a special relationship with the leading cadres, and asking him or her to intercede on their behalf. A person could also complain to a cadre directly or raise the matter in organized small-group discussions. The more direct and the more formal the method, however, the more reluctant people were to use it—it needed "guts" (danzi).27 Thus certain formal channels available in theory for the expression of grievances against unit cadres, such as the institution of "people's letters" to newspapers or superior bureaucratic organs, were never used.

Others went out of their way to cultivate good personal relationships (renshi guanxi) with the relevant cadres in order to influence them, implicitly or explicitly, in their favor. People did this in various ways: praising a cadre behind his back, in the hope it will get back to him; when in the cadre's presence, agreeing with him; when traveling outside the province, bringing the cadre things not available in the province; inviting the cadre for a meal now and again; addressing the cadre with his office title (e.g. Section Chief Gao). Mr. Ji himself was ambivalent toward these practices. On the one hand, he admitted the importance of establishing good personal relations as a sensible way to safeguard or even advance one's interests. On the other hand, we was quick to characterize many examples of this behavior as "flattering cadres" (taohao ganbu). For those whose relations with the cadres were not on any special

footing (including Mr. Ji), it was important that cadre decisions should be made according to reasonably explicit criteria (such as professional capability or objectively assessed "political expression") without hint of personal favoritism or political bias. Such people were particularly sensitive to decisions influenced by personal ties or by what were deemed illegitimate criteria such as class origins. These concerns would become manifest in the Cultural Revolution.

To conclude this section, although there were some basic general issues (such as class or "politics versus expertise") which underlay more specific ones, issue concerns tended to be particularized, focusing on specific sets of decisions, mainly distributive in nature, by specific cadres. Before the Cultural Revolution, this led to the formation of informal groupings based on the opinions of individual staff members about individual cadres. Each cadre had a group of supporters and a group of opponents, or what we could call a clientele and a "counter-clientele." The former spoke well of the cadre, defended his decisions and, at least in the eyes of their opponents, were usually seen to have benefited from those decisions. Members of the counter-clientele, on the other hand, perceived themselves (and others) as having been unfairly treated, and informally criticized the cadre on the grounds of favoritism or prejudice. During the Cultural Revolution these hostilities and alliances were to flare up into open conflict and play a large role in defining the contours of the political process during that movement, to which we turn next.

# The Cultural Revolution: A Narrative Account

We shall divide our study of the Cultural Revolution in the unit into two parts. In this chapter we present a chronological narrative account of the major stages of the movement and details on the political process from late 1966 to the end of 1970. With this historical information as background, we adopt a more analytical perspective in Chapters 4 and 5, inquiring systematically into the nature of political issues and, with the help of quantitative analysis, into the determinants of political behavior during the movement.

#### A false start: autumn 1966 to autumn 1967

The Cultural Revolution in the unit began slowly for two reasons: first, because the unit was far away from the eastern provinces where the political pace was being set and, second, because over half of the unit's staff was out on fieldwork assignments as the movement got under way elsewhere. At this early stage in the national movement, moreover, unit staff members felt that the Cultural Revolution was being conducted by and for college and middle school students and thus was largely irrelevant to a unit of this nature. No student Red Guards came to the unit during this period, and contact with the progress of the movement came mainly from newspapers and radio reports.

Even when the fieldwork teams returned in late October and early November 1966, there was considerable confusion about what, if anything, should be done, particularly since the Cultural Revolution was still considered to be basically a student affair. Staff members discussed the movement but normal routine was not interrupted. At the end of the year and the beginning of 1967,

however, a large number of staff members went on their annual home leaves to visit relatives (tan qin), and some of the younger members of the unit from the local province went on "link-up" (chuanlian) trips to the provincial capital, other provincial capitals, and even Beijing (Peking) to find out what was going on. By the early spring of 1967, everyone was back in the unit with news of their experiences and information on the movement. People began to organize small "combat groups" (zhandou xiaozu) within the framework of their work groups, but at this stage their activities were confined to putting up big-character posters (da zi bao), discussion, reading newspapers and magazines, and studying Mao's thought.

In April 1967, the usual time to leave for fieldwork, a big debate broke out about whether to go out or not. The leading cadres, eager to contain the movement and keep the unit functioning normally, argued that people should go out as usual and could participate in the movement while out in the field. They were opposed by a number of young workers and technicians, notably those who had engaged in "link-ups." They argued that all personnel should remain at the unit's headquarters so they could carry on the Cultural Revolution in earnest. Going out for fieldwork, they argued, would weaken the movement and would thus be contrary to the wishes of Mao himself. The majority of the work force tended to support the cadres and favored going out to the field. These issues were argued out in both large-scale meetings and small-group discussions. Eventually, the debate came to the attention of the county authorities, who sent a vice-secretary to the unit. It is quite likely that the unit's leading cadres called him in to bolster their position. He spoke at a mass meeting and urged staff members to go out to the field, where they could keep in touch with events through newspapers and could participate in the movement by mailing in their big-character posters to unit headquarters and by meeting at the field stations for periodic discussions. Meanwhile, staff members remaining at headquarters could put up their own big-character posters. This intervention tipped the scales, overt opposition evaporated, and the three teams went out to the field. Considerable time had been spent on the debate, however, and they left over a month late.

Members of the fieldwork teams were in fact able to participate in the movement while in the field. Politics now took up more of

their time, they paid less attention to keeping up with their technical reading, and their productivity declined somewhat. They discussed the movement in their small-groups, listened to the radio, and kept up with the newspapers through frequent trips back to the field stations. People wrote letters, individually or jointly, back to the unit headquarters or the field stations criticizing specific cadres, and they exchanged ideas about the movement at field stations and by mail with other field workers and people at headquarters. This continued until autumn, when the impact of the movement brought the fieldwork teams back to home base earlier than usual with part of their work plan uncompleted.

### Fractions form and the conservatives decamp

After the fieldwork staff members returned, a number of politically active people argued that the Cultural Revolution was calling for criticism of the unit's leadership. The organization of small combat teams within work groups, they maintained, was not conducive to this goal since there was no guarantee that people in the same work group felt the same way about the leaders. As a result of their initiative, the groups were enlarged spontaneously and the targets of criticism expanded to include both all people with any authority (not merely the leading cadres) as well as those staff members with "bad" class backgrounds or political histories. In every case, subordinates criticized superiors, never vice versa. The movement was still disorganized and substantively diverse, however, and many of the criticisms tended to be rather picayune.

The situation changed, however, when a document came from the "Center" (probably the Cultural Revolution Small-Group in Beijing) calling on people to concentrate their criticism on the more important leaders of their units. Criticism gradually narrowed onto a handful of individuals, notably the unit head, the unit vice-head, the heads of the political office and the personnel group and, to a lesser extent, the head of the technical section (who had a "bad" class origin), the head of the propaganda group, the former chairperson of the union, the two administrative cadres in charge of the farm, and the director of the unit head's office. At the same time, the enlarged but still fragmented "combat groups" began to coalesce into even larger groups either through amalgamation or through dissolution of previous groups in favor

of larger ones. The initiative for these reorganizations apparently came from below. The unit's leadership, undermined from both below and above, had now lost control of the movement.

By early 1968, there were five "factions" (pai) in the unit, their names deriving variously from heroic revolutionary images, a significant date, and from lines from the works of Mao Tse-tung. All the names apparently originated within the unit. What we will call group 1 was to become the "conservative" faction 28 which in general supported and defended most of the unit's former leaders. Groups 2, 3, 4, and 5 merged early in 1968 to form one temporarily unified "rebel" faction critical of the unit's leadership. As the factions polarized, the atmosphere grew more and more tense. Greater tension in turn fostered greater polarization as people sought safety in numbers. There was a proliferation of big-character posters, and pushing and shoving incidents broke out over their contents. Members of the two factions moved to different sections of the unit to live and both sent out calls to the PLA for weapons. Each faction started a stockpile of arms and kept people on patrol at night to protect their area of the unit.

The factions became more organized, complete with an office and a secretary who kept two kinds of records: first, a compilation of "Excerpts from Big-Character Posters" (da zi bao zhailu) which recorded the date, author and substance of every big-character poster put up by either major faction; second, a diary of major events (dashi ji) which recorded the following: (i) events which took place outside the unit which were important to the faction, such as news from other units; (ii) day-by-day events in the unit, such as who was struggled, who spoke out at struggle meetings, what they said, etc.; (iii) notes of meetings of the faction's leaders; and (iv) notes of meetings with the leaders of opposing factions. But despite these movements in the direction of formal organization, joining a faction involved merely putting up a big-character poster stating one's views and then beginning to attend faction meetings. There were no official membership rosters, formal membership criteria, or processes of application.

Even after its amalgamation, the rebel faction was in the minority and attempted to offset this by making alliances with rebel factions in other units, notably some factories in the county seat and a nearby technical unit engaged in the same kind of work. Contacts tended to be made informally, through friends or former

schoolmates. These factions sent big-character posters to the unit denouncing the former unit head and the head of the political office, and they sometimes sent representatives to meetings when the unit head was "struggled." Similarly, the unit's rebel faction sent posters and representatives to the other units. The majority conservative faction did not make such alliances in this early period.

The issues seem to have been defined primarily by the rebels at this stage. The major one was alleged cadre discrimination on the basis of class origin, for which the rebels singled out the unit head and leading cadres in the political office as the guilty parties. Rebels also accused all the leading cadres (except the unit vice-head) of being "bureaucratic" and of forming a self-interested cabal. They approved of the unit vice-head, however, and defended him from conservative attacks. The conservatives, for their part, defended the leaders of the unit as "good cadres" (hao ganbu) and poured their vitriol on the vice-head. The rebels also went after two accountants who had historical problems, one a former member of the Guomindang's Three People's Principles Youth League and one a former member of the Guomindang military police (xianbing). This appears to have been less a matter of conviction and more an attempt to protect themselves from the charge of protecting or ignoring "bad elements" and to improve their general political image.

The proposed rebel attack on these accountants in the spring of 1968 caused an incident which blew the Cultural Revolution wide open. The accountants caught wind of what the rebels were planning and left the unit. The rebels accused the conservative faction of hiding them and demanded permission to search every room in the conservatives' area of the unit, with the ulterior motive of uncovering arms. They found some arms and confiscated them. A fracas broke out in the process but no one was shot. This frightened the conservatives, who left the unit en masse for the prefectural seat, where the factions in control were more friendly than those in the nearby county town, where factions allied with the rebels held sway. They left hastily with only the clothes on their backs and the money in their pockets, and were forced to live on credit from their factional allies in the prefectural seat. In the melee before their departure, moreover, the rebels managed to capture and detain the unit head, the head of the political office and the

former union chairperson, all of whom had been under conservative protection.

The departure of the conservatives left the way open for the rebels to execute a "power seizure" in April 1968. Though this was the normal time to depart for fieldwork, no one advocated this. The only people left in the unit at this time were the rebels and thirty-odd people who were not members of either faction at the time.

# Rebel predominance and the rocky road to rapprochement

After the conservatives fled, the rebels executed a *de jure* "power seizure" by occupying the unit's offices and forcing open the personal files (*dangan*) in the personnel office. There they found documentary proof to substantiate their charges that the unit head and the heads of the political office and the personnel group had been discriminating against people from "bad" class backgrounds, specifically with respect to job assignments, political evaluations, transfers, and requests for employment of their children in the unit.

A week or two after they left, the conservatives sent four representatives to the unit to arrange for their return. They were anxious to come back since they were going into debt for food, were unable to draw their salaries, and were getting increasingly uncomfortable in their thick winter clothing as summer approached. When the representatives reached the unit, they were seized, blindfolded, deprived of food and sleep, interrogated, and beaten "just like war [prisoners]." The following day they were untied and the guard was relaxed, which made possible their escape. When they reported their reception to the conservatives, antirebel sentiment ran high and antagonisms hardened. An opportunity for conciliation was thus lost.

Back in the unit, this was a period of struggles directed against the unit head and the head of the political office. They were both "struggled" frequently, in part because the other key rebel targets among the unit leadership (notably the head of the personnel group) had already escaped from the unit. When not being struggled, they were put to work in the kitchen. The unit head had a very easygoing personality (which was related to one of the charges against him, viz. that he provided weak leadership and simply approved

whatever technicians put in front of him). As a result, he fared well in struggle sessions because he was willing to admit to any charges the rebels made. The head of the political office, however, was made of sterner stuff and maintained that all this struggling was not right. He said that according to central documents on the movement cadres should not be subjected to physical abuse, but rather should be made to study and labor to reeducate themselves. The more he protested in this way, the more pressure, both physical and psychological, was brought to bear on him. By the late summer, he could stand it no longer and hanged himself.

His suicide was a cardinal event in the Cultural Revolution in the unit. It precipitated the breakdown of rebel unity: one of the original four groups which had amalgamated to form the rebel faction split off, moved to a separate part of the unit, and became an independent "third faction" ( di san pai), as Mr. Ji and other staff referred to them, with about thirteen members. The reasons for the split were several. Members of the new "third faction" opposed the use of force to achieve or retain power in the unit. They also believed that permission should have been obtained before the files were opened. Unlike the rest of the rebels, moreover, they opposed both the head and the vice-head of the unit, assuming a general "antileadership" stance. On the other hand, they preferred verbal to physical methods of struggle. This earned them the scorn of the rebels who called them "intellectuals" for believing that power could be seized peacefully, or "petty bourgeoisie" who wanted revolution but not complete revolution and were "soft" (ruan) in their categorical opposition to violence. Even when this group had been part of the rebel faction, the rest of the rebels had looked down (kanbuqi) at them as "intellectuals," which was a contributing factor in the split. There was also a more political reason for the split. After this group joined the rebel faction in the first place, only one of their leaders represented them in the rebel leadership. As a result, they felt that they did not really have a voice in the decisions of the rebel faction. If they split, it was felt, they would have a better chance of getting their views across and, when a revolutionary committee was eventually set up, they could claim direct representation in their own right rather than being Submerged within the rebel faction.

The split was damaging to the rebel faction which had already been numerically inferior to the conservatives. Now they had only members to the conservatives' 120. Though they resented the

third faction for their betrayal, no fighting broke out between them.

By late summer 1968 the conservatives were more anxious than ever to return to the unit. They tried to enlist military aid by contacting a PLA base in the prefectural seat and some members of the county's armed department who were sympathetic to their faction. The armed department, an organ of the PLA, was in charge of the county administration during this period. For the purposes of the Cultural Revolution, the county superseded the provincial bureau as the unit's higher authority. Although the county armed department was generally more sympathetic to the rebels, central documents had come down to the effect that factions should strive for a "great alliance" (da lianhe) and form a revolutionary committee in their units. As a result, the county armed department began to send representatives to the unit to mediate the dispute and arrange for the conservatives' return. The rebels accused some of the representatives of being partial to the conservatives but did not dare to start a fight against military men. They were aware, moreover, of the documents calling for "great alliance," and this exerted a restraining influence.

The county armed department invited both factions to send representatives to secret negotiations in the county seat (secret because the armed department wanted to avoid interference by local factions in the county seat). The rebels resisted at first, but after repeated appeals by the armed department which continually drew their attention to the documents calling for unity, and as these became more frequent and insistent, both factions gradually came to realize that further conflict was wrong. Finally the rebels agreed to let the conservatives back into the unit. Soldiers from the armed department escorted them back to the unit to guard against any recurrence of physical conflict. The conservatives were given back their old rooms, and the three factions continued to live in separate sections of the unit. Under explicit instructions from Beijing all arms were removed from the unit.

# The establishment of the revolutionary committee and efforts to clear up problems raised in the movement

Late 1968 and early 1969 saw continued factional activity and attempts by external political actors and groups to bring the factions

together to form a revolutionary committee. After the conservatives returned, all three factions continued to hold struggle meetings and put up big-character posters. Attacks were highly concentrated since central documents clearly instructed people to struggle only against the top cadres in their units, not middle- or low-level cadres. The rebels' attacks centered mainly on the unit head, the conservatives' on the unit vice-head, and the third faction's on both. These cadres had to make themselves available for struggle whenever any of the factions wanted them. Refusal or avoidance would have made matters worse for them. The rebels would have liked to struggle against the heads of the personnel and propaganda groups, but they were both still staying at their homes in other provinces. Rebel attempts to struggle the head of the unit head's office and one of the farm cadres were foiled by conservatives' claims that political documents on the movement specifically prohibited attacks on such middle- or lower-level cadres.

At struggle meetings held by any faction, representatives of the other factions attended. If a struggle threatened to get out of hand and it looked as if the unit head or the vice-head were going to be beaten, the observers from the other faction stepped in and tried to prevent it. Though this sometimes resulted in some pushing and shoving, no fighting ever broke out. On one or two occasions, the conservatives sneaked into the rebel area at night and abducted the vice-head for secret struggles at which he was beaten. This was their way of getting revenge for the beatings which the rebels had doled out to their representatives earlier in the year. The rebels did not retaliate in kind.

Although relations between the factions had improved after the conservatives returned, they were still far from a "great alliance." Throughout the latter part of 1968, the county armed department continued to send representatives once or twice a week in an attempt to bring the two major factions together. They used three techniques of mediation: separate meetings with leaders of each of the factions, mass meetings at which central documents were read and discussed, and joint meetings of leaders from all three factions, at which lots of arguments took place. In addition, the factions sometimes sent representatives to the county town to negotiate with each other in the presence of the officials from the armed department.

The main subject of negotiations and the object of mediation

during this period was the composition of the new organ of power, the revolutionary committee. Since the committee director was to be a PLA representative appointed by the county military administration, contention mainly centered on who would be vice-director and who would be the ten projected mass and cadre representatives. Citing their numerical superiority, the conservatives argued that they were entitled to a larger quota of seats than their rivals. The third faction began to maneuver for position, fearing that their small size and the enmity of the two major factions would lead to their total exclusion from the revolutionary committee and even their suppression. After much reflection (and political arithmetic, no doubt), they decided they preferred the unit head to the vice-head and offered to make a deal with the conservatives. Though the conservatives resented the third faction for its previous alliance with the rebels and its treatment of conservative targets during that period, and distrusted them as unreliable and opportunistic, they decided to go along with the deal while insisting that it remain informal. Mr. Ji termed it an "accommodation" (kaolong) rather than an alliance. The third faction agreed to stop struggling the unit head and to write fewer big-character posters about him, while the conservatives in turn agreed to reduce their poster attacks on the third faction.

Despite this factional realignment and external attempts at mediation, little headway was being made in bringing the factions together. Early in 1969, just before the lunar New Year festival, the county armed department decided to speed the process by sending a workers' propaganda team (gongren xuanquan dui or gongxuandui for short) to the unit. It consisted of ten or so people from the county town, who stayed in the unit for nearly a year. During this time, they took over leadership of the unit. At the time, there was no technical work going on. After the team's arrival, military representatives from the county came far less frequently, only once every few months.

The propaganda team was a sociologically heterogeneous group which favored the rebel cause. It included factory workers, soldiers from the county armed department, poor and lower-middle peasants, and a primary school teacher. The team head was a minor cadre (xiao ganbu) in a county factory. He was not a Party member but had been a leader of the rebel faction in his factory. The team vice-head was a primary school teacher. All the members of the team were members of rebel factions, reflecting the rebel sym-

pathies of the county armed department which arranged for the team in the first place. It seems that the head of the armed department had formed the team by asking the leaders of the county town's rebel factions to nominate suitable personnel. Needless to say, the team's political bias did not facilitate the task of conciliating and uniting the unit's factions.

The team's first act was to call a mass meeting at which they announced that they were assuming leadership of the unit. They made it clear that they supported the rebels and that their job was to get the conservatives to recognize their mistakes before making up with the rebels. To this end, the team used four political techniques: daily mass meetings lasting anything from half an hour to half a day, daily small-group discussion sessions, daily "individual chats" between team members and members or leaders of the conservative faction (different people each day), and study classes for faction leaders. The purpose of the individual chats was to make the conservatives see the error of their ways, but they often backfired because the leaders and active members of the conservative faction were generally better educated and more skilled in political argument than the members of the propaganda team. In fact, the conservatives were so persuasive that they began to win over some of the propaganda team members! As a result, the team changed its tactics by sending groups of people to speak with individual conservative leaders and activists and by emphasizing study classes (xuexi ban). Members of all three factions were invited to these classes and encouraged to help the conservatives change their viewpoint. Needless to say, each faction sent its most committed core members.

These activities continued on a daily basis through the middle of 1969. The propaganda team kept the pressure on the conservatives, calling them to task for their criticism of the unit vice-head, the unit's rebel faction, and the county armed department. They also criticized the conservatives for advocating a discriminatory class line, for taking the capitalist road and following Liu Shaoqi, for "deserting" the unit the preceding spring, and for bearing grudges against the rebels for the latter's treatment of their representatives. Although these issues tended to be expressed in relatively abstract ideological terms, Mr. Ji felt that the central concrete issues were the role of the unit vice-head and specific cases of class discrimination.

The pro-rebel stance of the propaganda team was also reflected

in their proposals for the composition of the new revolutionary committee. They argued that the rebels should have five representatives, the conservatives three, and the third faction one and that the unit vice-head (who had never been a member of the rebel faction because cadres were not supposed to join factions) should also be a member. The conservatives, on the other hand, proposed that the rebels and conservatives should have four representatives each and the vice-head should be excluded.

In the summer of 1969, however, an external event caused a shift in the balance of political forces in the unit. The head of the county armed department changed his political stance and began to favor the conservative factions in the county. Mr. Ji was not sure why this change came about, but suggested that it was a response both to central documents and the arrival of the movement to "clean class ranks," which we will discuss shortly. After the shift, the propaganda team head and vice-head and most of the team members left the unit, leaving behind only the peasant members. Shortly after, the team was replenished by a number of members of conservative factions from the county town who were dispatched by the armed department.

Soon after the propaganda team was reconstituted, the revolutionary committee was finally set up in the unit. It was larger than originally planned, having sixteen rather than twelve members, an expansion which favored the conservative position. It was headed by a PLA representative from the county armed department and had ten mass representatives: three rebel, two third faction, and five conservative. There were five cadre representatives, three favored by the conservatives (including the former union chairperson), and two by the rebels. The conservatives clearly dominated the committee (even without the support of third faction representatives), but in terms of representation proportional to size of faction membership the conservatives actually were underrepresented, the third faction was overrepresented, and the rebels came out even.<sup>29</sup> The rebels were dissatisfied at not commanding a majority but had to go along with the new committee. They would have borne the blame for any further delay in establishing a revolutionary committee, which was long overdue already, and they were aware that the general political tide outside the unit had turned in favor of the conservatives. Within the unit, moreover, they had been weakened by the accommodation between the third faction and the conservatives.

After the revolutionary committee was set up, there was a period of "unifying factions" partly overlapping with a campaign to "clean class ranks" and a program of investigating cadres. The leaders of each faction were supposed to pay personal calls on the leaders of the other factions whom they had beaten, struggled, or criticized in order to apologize and say that their actions had been directed at the person's views and were not ad hominem attacks. The revolutionary committee attempted to establish an atmosphere conducive to this mutual reconciliation by calling a mass meeting at which the PLA representative-cum-committee director called on people to be apologetic and conciliatory. The conservatives in fact did a lot of this since they now commanded a superior political position. The rebels, on the other hand, found this unpleasant and tried to get away with the perfunctory minimum. Both sides were insincere, and bad feeling remained strong behind the rituals of reconciliation.

In the latter part of 1969, the revolutionary committee undertook an investigation of the unit cadres (shencha ganbu). Cadres were obliged to admit their mistakes and do self-criticisms before mass meetings and small-group sessions. The small-groups then discussed each cadre's case and wrote comments about their self-criticisms. These comments were examined by the director and other members of the revolutionary committee, who made a decision about whether a cadre should be "liberated" (jiefang) based on the written comments and their own assessments of the case. By the end of 1969, all the unit's top cadres were "liberated" and placed on the revolutionary committee. According to Mr. Ji, the committee gained prestige and authority as a result.

Interestingly enough, the problem of "liberating" the unit's two central figures, the head and the vice-head, who had been at the heart of factional conflict during the movement, was handled quite smoothly. According to Mr. Ji, their two factional protectors made an implicit deal (jiaohuan), and they were both liberated without further ado. This process was also facilitated by the feeling on both sides that although they had committed errors these were not so serious as to prevent their "liberation."

The investigation of cadres was accompanied by an investigation of ordinary staff members in the campaign to "clean class ranks" (qingli jieji duiwu). This campaign further weakened the rebel group for two basic reasons. First, the political context of the campaign favored the conservatives, who could thus use it as a

weapon against the rebels. Second, the basic substantive goals of the campaign, with its stress on punishing people who had gone to extremes during the Cultural Revolution and people with bad class origins or dubious political histories, were more of a threat to rebels than conservatives. In terms of behavior during the Cultural Revolution, the rebels, who were on the offensive during most of the movement, had in fact engaged in more extreme activities than the conservatives. (For example, they had driven the conservatives from the unit and had seized and beaten the emissaries of peace sent by the conservatives shortly thereafter.) Sixty-three percent of the members of the conservative faction had "good" class origins, compared with only 38% in the rebel faction. The conservatives only had one person with a minor or ordinary historical problem (less than 1% of their membership), while the rebels had two members with minor or ordinary historical problems and one member with a serious historical problem (5% of their membership).

The new movement involved daily mass meetings to study the documents relevant to "cleaning class ranks," usually with a speech by the PLA representative followed by discussion in small groups. The targets of the movement—i.e., people who were to be investigated—were chosen by the PLA representative and the important members of the revolutionary committee after a preliminary checking of their files. Mr. Ji could remember eleven people who were investigated: of these all but three cases were dismissed because of insufficient evidence. Of these 11 people, five had "bad" class backgrounds (45%), far higher than the percentage of people with "bad" class origins in the unit as a whole (16%).

In factional terms, the rebels and the third faction were hit hardest by these investigations: out of the eleven cases, five were rebel faction members, one was a conservative, and one was the top leader of the third faction. Of the four people who were not members of factions, one was married to one of the rebels under investigation. The cases seem to have been chosen on the basis of four types of political problems: (i) In the case of three older people, their activities before Liberation were deemed to be murky and in need of clarification for the record. All of these cases were cleared up satisfactorily. (ii) Four people had certain reactionary political affiliations in their past: two were former members of the Guomindang youth league, one was a former Guomindang military policeman, and one had been a member of the Communist New

Fourth Army who had been taken prisoner by the Guomindang army. All four cases were eventually dismissed. Guomindang youth league membership per se was viewed as relatively unimportant. In the other two cases, representatives were sent outside the unit to collect more information on their activities before 1949. Nothing incriminating was found on either. (iii) One person came under suspicion because some of his former friends had escaped to Hong Kong before the Cultural Revolution and because he had contacts with overseas Chinese outside China. Since there was no hard evidence to validate these suspicions, his case was dismissed. (iv) Several people were criticized for "errors" during the Cultural Revolution. A married couple in the unit who had attempted in 1967 to "reverse the verdict" on a parent labeled as a "bad element" were criticized severely during the "clean class ranks" movement for denying the political significance of class and class origin. More importantly, the top leader of the third faction was attacked for "ultra-leftism," in particular for arguing during the Cultural Revolution that all cadres were no good and for contributing to an atmosphere which caused the suicide of the head of the political office. He was singled out as a target of the movement and subjected to struggle.

These more serious cases aside, other staff members were given lighter criticisms for slighter peccadilloes: for example, one case of petty corruption and another of listening to a Western radio station. The "clean class ranks" movement lasted through the first half of 1970, taking over six months to deal thoroughly with the most serious cases and finally accept self-criticisms from the offenders. In the latter half of 1970, the process of reconciliation continued through study sessions, "unification work" (tuanjie gongzuo) by the revolutionary committee, and a reintegration of residences so that the factions no longer lived in different places. By mid-1970, the number of big-character posters in the unit had declined substantially compared with the preceding two years. Finally, in late 1970, everyone in the unit was granted an extended vacation to make up for the lack of annual vacations during 1968, 1969, and 1970. In April 1971, soon after the staff arrived back from vacation, normal work resumed and the mobile teams went out on fieldwork for the first time in four years.

According to Mr. Ji, the Cultural Revolution in the unit effectively ended when the staff left for their extended vacations in

late 1970. Subsequent national movements, such as the "strike one and oppose three" (yi da san fan) campaign and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius (pi Lin pi Kong), had little impact on the unit. The "strike one and oppose three" movement came along while people were on vacation in late 1970 and early 1971, and it was not followed up after their return because people were anxious to get back to work and, according to Mr. Ji, were tired of political movements. The campaign against Lin Piao and Confucius came in late 1973. It was carefully planned and organized with no struggles, just mass meetings for the reading of documents and carefully supervised small-group discussion. In short, the period of 1971 to 1974 was a period of depoliticization and return to technical work. This aftermath period will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

# The Political Process During the Cultural Revolution I: Context and Issues

With the preceding chapter as context, we now intend to analyze those characteristics of the unit's political experience during the Cultural Revolution which we consider significant in terms of the light they throw on more general patterns of political behavior in China.

# The relationship between politics inside and outside the unit.

First, we are interested in the relationship between issues within the unit and the wider issues of Chinese national politics. As we argued in the Introduction, it cannot be assumed that the nature of political issues is uniform throughout the political system. Politburo and production brigade politics may be different insofar as people may perceive politics and form political relationships in different ways. They certainly differ in their respective agendas of relevant political problems and issues. Here we shall pay attention to the degree of congruence between the issues raised in the unit during the Cultural Revolution and the wider issues of the Cultural Revolution as a national movement.

The unit became involved in the Cultural Revolution comparatively late. It also seems to have lagged consistently behind the broader trends of the movement, particularly during the prolonged period of factional reconciliation and the establishment of the revolutionary committee. This lateness can be traced partly to the initial uncertainty which members of the unit felt about the significance of the movement and their role in it. Three characteristics of the unit augmented this uncertainty. First, the unit was far

responded relatively rapidly to events in the east. Thus their only contact with the Cultural Revolution through the crucial early months was indirect, through newspapers, magazines, and the radio. No Red Guards came to the unit to spread the word and stir things up. Staff members did not have direct experience with the movement until they went on leave in February 1967, by which time the Cultural Revolution had been raging for months and the radical "power seizures" of the January Revolution had already taken place in Shanghai and elsewhere.

A second cause of delay and uncertainty was the nature of the unit and the way its work was organized. Since it was a professional and technical rather than a cultural or educational unit, staff members at first felt that the Cultural Revolution did not directly involve them but was mainly confined to educational institutions. The Cultural Revolution at the national level did not extend officially to this type of professional unit until the end of 1966, though by that time in the big urban centers the movement had in fact already expanded into a wide range of noneducational institutions. But the unit was insulated by its remote location from these successive stages of expansion.

A third cause of delay was the fact that when the Cultural Revolution was gathering steam elsewhere in mid- to late 1966, about half of the unit's staff were out on fieldwork and thus were even more removed from the early alignments and issues of the movement. During the height of the first major period of radical victories in early 1967, moreover, the staff were on their annual home leaves and thus unable to emulate external events in their own unit. When they finally returned from leave, the unit and county leadership prevailed upon them to accept a watered-down version of the movement in their unit and to go back to normal work again in the spring. If the unit had been situated in or near one of the major eastern urban centers, or in or near the province capital, this type of decision and acquiescence by the unit's staff would have been extremely difficult to enforce. It is possible, however (and Mr. Ji did not mention this), that the sluggishness of the unit's response to the movement and the decision to put professional work before politics in the spring of 1967 partly reflected the fact that the unit's work was technologically sophisticated and

related, albeit indirectly, to national defense. It is well known that attempts were made, in both the initial conception and the conduct of the Cultural Revolution, to insulate advanced scientific-technological units and those connected closely with national security.

If these factors inhibited the unit's initial response to the Cultural Revolution, the relative isolation of the unit also contributed to delays in the process of the movement once it had started. The physical separation of the factions (after the conservatives left for the prefectural seat) during the height of the movement in the unit clearly delayed the process of reconciliation and institutional reconstruction. Physical separation not only impeded negotiations but also exacerbated tensions and animosities. The rebel faction was left in sole charge of the unit after the conservatives' departure. This gave them few incentives for adopting a conciliatory attitude toward their opponents, and it conditioned their violent response to the early conservative peace overtures. The incident in which the conservatives' envoys were tied and beaten not only cost the unit one chance for early reconciliation but also diminished hopes for future agreement by sending the conservatives into a rage which they still felt strongly enough six months later to vent by kidnapping the unit vice-head at night and secretely beating him.

Given the relative remoteness of the unit and the geographical origins of its personnel, moreover, key cadres under fire, notably the heads of the personnel and propaganda sections, were able to return to their homes in eastern China to escape attack. The effect was to concentrate the full wrath of the rebel faction on the unit head and the political office head, both of whom were physically detained within the unit. The absence of the unit's other leading cadres also delayed the process of criticizing and "liberating" cadres in the latter stages of the movement.<sup>30</sup>

The relative lateness of the Cultural Revolution in the unit affected the nature of the issues which arose during the movement. Basing our judgment on accounts of the Cultural Revolution in other units and risking a broad generalization, we can say that one "typical" political process during the movement seems to have proceeded from an initial stage of policy-oriented and/or ideologically motivated politics (from mid-1966 to February 1967) to a prolonged period when policy issues and ideological values became

less salient as rival factions struggled for power, legitimacy, and position in the new structures of authority which emerged during 1967 to 1969. Using Christian Bay's terms, "politics" degenerated into "pseudo-politics." Since the movement in the unit did not really get started until late 1967, it bypassed the initial stage experienced elsewhere of political mobilization around burning policy and ideological controversies. This slow start, said Mr. Ji, meant that the national issues which dominated the early phases of the Cultural Revolution elsewhere were poorly understood by members of the unit. By the time the movement really got going, the national campaign was well into the stage of maneuvering for factional advantage in the formation of the new revolutionary committees. The process of the Cultural Revolution in the unit seems to have been defined primarily not by national policy issues or ideological conflict. We wish to note, however, that this impression may in part be conditioned by Mr. Ji's own subjective position, i.e., his relatively late arrival in the unit at a time when any major ideological issues that were current in the early stages of the movement had already receded in significance.

The lateness of the Cultural Revolution in the unit also affected the patterns of political alignment and the major targets of the campaign. For example, the unit "missed" the early stage of political organization in which threatened unit cadres in other parts of China organized their own "conservative" mass organizations to protect themselves.<sup>32</sup> The Central Cultural Revolution Small-Group had already declared this to be illegitimate before the movement had gotten under way in the unit.

The initial delay also meant that the process of the movement in the unit was out of phase with that at the national and provincial levels. For example, the top "capitalist-roader" in the province was a major focus of factional conflict in the province capital in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution but had already been removed from power by the time factional struggle emerged in the unit, effectively removing him as an important issue within the unit. Later delays deriving from the physical separation of the factions and the flight of several top cadres also contributed to the asynchronous nature of the campaign. The provincial revolutionary committee was set up while the conservatives were out of the unit, so this too was not a major focus of factional debate. By the time the conservatives returned, the scope of cadre targets for struggle

and criticism had already been narrowed by central directives, and some of the major issues of the national campaign had either been closed for debate or partially resolved by documents from the Center. The relative lateness also accounts for the considerable external pressure brought to bear in late 1968 and 1969 to speed up the process of bringing the factions together and forming a revolutionary committee. To the extent that this process of reconciliation was hurried along, it was insufficiently thoroughgoing and thus contributed to continued factionally based tensions after the Cultural Revolution (which we shall discuss in Chapter 6).

In short, the late development of the Cultural Revolution in the unit and the fact that the two major factions were physically separated for a crucial period combined to deflect the attention of the factions away from national issues and away from criticism of both national and provincial cadres on the one hand and lowerlevel unit cadres on the other. The brunt of the conflict was borne by a few of the unit's top cadres.

The technical nature of the unit also helped to limit the scope of issues raised during the Cultural Revolution. Forty-seven percent of the unit's staff were technicians, and they made up a plurality of the conservative faction and a majority of the rebel and third factions. Since issues such as pay differentials and the problem of "red versus expert" fundamentally challenge the roles and functions of technicians in society, it is not surprising that none of the factions raised them as important issues.

# The nature of the political process in the unit

Second, we want to clarify the key dimensions of the political process within the unit during the Cultural Revolution. Our basic question is simple indeed: what kind of politics took place in the unit during the Cultural Revolution? But as the account in the previous chapter suggests, politics during the movement was exceedingly complex and multifaceted. To help unravel this process into its various strands, we are using a simple analytical framework. We begin by specifying four commonly recognized "ideal types" of political process, and after a wide-ranging discussion of the unit's concrete issues and alignments, we shall use these categories in organizing our conclusions about the nature of the political process during the Cultural Revolution.

Our four basic categories are as follows:

- (i) *Ideological Politics*. In this form of political process, political action is assumed to be motivated by general ideological commitments. Issues are relatively abstract or generalized, lines of conflict are starkly drawn, and participants are caught up in a strong feeling of moral fervor and personal involvement. This model is familiar to students of China from those accounts of political conflict and behavior which stress the "struggle between the two lines" or the clash between "revolutionary" and "revisionist" leaders and policies.<sup>33</sup>
- (ii) *Policy Politics*. In this form of political process, lines of conflict and cooperation are structured by perceptions of and attachments to more or less concrete sets of policies. Policy support or rejection transcends individual or group interest to include the notion of *public interest*. This is a rationalistic approach to political choice and implies that a person's policy position may vary across issue areas. The relevant field of analysis is thus the policy area and not, as in the case of ideological politics, the area of general principles which both transcend and penetrate different areas of policy.<sup>34</sup>
- (iii) Interest Politics. Familiar to students of "interest group politics" in Western societies, this model rests on utilitarian assumptions about the use of political action to further individual and/or group interests. Utilities include personal satisfactions arising from a wide variety of social goods, notably power, prestige and wealth. Whereas ideological politics implies a firm moral and emotional commitment and policy politics implies the idea of policy evaluation in the public rather than the private interest, interest politics implies a process of rational calculation for sectional or individual interests.<sup>35</sup>
- (iv) Particularistic Politics. Commonly linked with theories of "traditional" political processes, this model implies that political behavior is motivated by personal loyalties organized in networks or dyads. Politics is thus structured according to patron-client ties, political machines, cliques, factions, or informal groups.<sup>36</sup>

All of these models of political behavior, in more or less "pure" or mixed form, have been used to analyze Chinese politics. They have, for example, allowed different analysts to see Mao Zedong as a heroic revolutionary figure, a person committed to certain sets of concrete policies in particular contexts, a waning power-broker

seeking to recoup his losses, or an aging emperor surrounded by hand-picked cohorts. More germane to this study, these models have engendered interpretations of the Cultural Revolution as an epic tussle between contending philosophies, a clash over a set of concrete and innovative policy issues, a mixture of power struggle at the top and the struggle for social, political and economic benefits at the bottom, or a clash of personalities and cliques. Our own assumption is that Chinese politics is a complex mixture of these different types of political process. The difficulty, of course, is to decide which of the models elucidates the more important facets of political action or behavior in any specific context and to discover how ideological, policy, interest, and particularistic factors may be related in a specific political process. It is these tasks we shall tackle in our discussion of the issues and political alignments in the unit during the Cultural Revolution.

# The key issues in the unit

Let us now turn to a discussion of the major issues which emerged as foci of political debate and factional conflict during the Cultural Revolution.

# Class origin (jieji chushen)

Clearly the most important substantive issue in the unit during the Cultural Revolution was class. The differential impact of official class policies on members of the unit was an important factor in structuring factional alignments. Many of the charges made against leading cadres during the movement concerned cases of alleged class discrimination, and to the extent that the movement gave rise to theoretical innovation or ideological heterodoxy, it involved primarily an attempt to redefine the theory and practice of the CCP's class line. Mr. Ji described the importance of class issues as follows:

The reason the rebels opposed [certain leading cadres] and the conservatives supported them was definitely not a question of line, policy, leadership methods, or cadre style. The main question was discrimination on the basis of class, i.e., the question of who should be trusted.

In this area of debate, the political process in the unit resonated to some extent with the issues of the wider campaign. Class was a

focal point of Red Guard debates in Beijing and the provinces in mid- to late 1966 and continued as a hotly disputed issue until late 1967. The central point of disagreement was this: should a person's class status or class origin, deriving from definitions laid down in the early 1950s, be regarded as an important criterion of that person's social and political worth? In concrete terms, should class identities be allowed to influence access to political, educational, occupational, or economic opportunity? Put more abstractly, should there, in socialist society, continue to be discrimination, both positive and negative, based on sociological categories which derived from the structure of prerevolutionary society?<sup>37</sup>

Discussion of these issues in the unit was apparently not greatly influenced or informed by the debates on class current in the early stages of the national movement. The concept of "blood theory" (xuetong lun), implying excessive or exclusive reliance on class status or class origin in evaluating and advancing people, was debated across the nation in mid-1966 and was officially branded as "incorrect" by the Central Cultural Revolution Small-Group in Beijing in the fall of that year. Rebels in the unit apparently did not use the labels and concepts generated by these earlier debates in their attacks on cadres whom they regarded as guilty of class discrimination. This partly reflects the fact that the movement started late in the unit when the issue of discrimination against nonproletarian classes<sup>38</sup> had already receded in significance at the national level.

More importantly, however, the significance of class themes in the unit reflects not so much the direct impact of outside events as the presence within the unit of ambiguities and antagonisms involving the question of class. These problems were widespread throughout China's urban institutions; in fact, Mr. Ji described a similar set of issues in his university in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Red Guard and revolutionary rebel documents from a variety of cities, moreover, testify to the importance of class issues in a variety of basic-level institutions during the Cultural Revolution. They found intense expression in the unit's politics when the movement offered a chance to criticize previous policies and cadre practices.

Mr. Ji claimed that since factional alignments in the unit depended heavily on attitudes toward senior unit cadres and since many staff members from nonproletarian class origins regarded most of these cadres as favoring the "good" classes over others, a higher proportion of people from the nonproletarian classes joined the rebel faction. We will test this assertion statistically in Chapter 5, though for now we can say that the data do accord with it.<sup>39</sup> Here we shall examine the specific charges leveled against cadres and the nature of the disagreement and antagonism which emerged during the Cultural Revolution on issues of class.

As the rebel factions rose to political prominence in the unit in late 1967 and 1968, they leveled charges of class discrimination against six of the unit's leading cadres, most notably against the unit head, the heads of the personnel and propaganda groups, and the director of the political office. The essential problem, claimed the rebels, was one of "political trust" (zhengzhishang de xinren), particularly in the way cadres evaluated the "political performance" of staff members:

For example, when the people from good classes said something at a meeting, the leaders thought it was okay, whatever they said. But if the people from bad classes said something, the leaders always had doubts about their sincerity or looked for some other meaning in what they said. This doesn't mean that the cadres jumped right on the bad classes when they said things at meetings. They showed their doubts in their choice of activists and small-group leaders, and in their speeches summing up small-group discussions. They would say: "Some people think this, but this is wrong because. . . ." It was clear from the context that they were talking about the people from bad classes.

These leading cadres, argued the rebels, believed in the need for class discrimination, though they did not dare to express such views openly. The director of the political office was a particular target of such criticisms, a fact which partly explains the vehemence of the attacks against him during the movement:

[The director of the political office] treated people with good class origin and good political expression well and treated people with badd class origin and bad political expression badly. If someone had bad class origin but good political expression, he treated him or her okay. But there weren't many of those. As a result, people of bad class origin or political expression didn't like him.

As this statement indicates, the director was not a pure "blood theorist" since he allowed for cases where good political behavior could cancel out bad class origin. On the other hand, he does seem to have favored people from "good" class backgrounds.

Rebels from nonproletarian class origins tended to like the unit vice-head because of his upper-middle peasant class origin. Possibly for this reason, they felt he was more sympathetic to the interests and concerns of the nonproletarian classes. Some members of the conservative faction, on the other hand, were critical of him on these very same grounds. Significantly enough, moreover, all of the cadres accused of discrimination against the nonproletarian classes had excellent class backgrounds (poor or lower-middle peasant). To summarize this aspect of the issue, therefore, it seems that the Cultural Revolution in the unit partly involved a form of "class struggle" between people from former "middling" or "bad" (i.e. "exploiting") class families without political authority (most of them technicians) and people now in authority from previously lower class backgrounds.

The class issue dominated the early stages of the movement in the unit. People from "bad" class backgrounds were early targets of criticism. One Party member who joined the conservative faction early on, for example, took a position on class which was close to "blood theory." As a result, she came under intense criticism from the rebel side and withdrew from factional politics.

Although the rebels were organizationally divided in the early stages, they apparently all agreed on the issue of class discrimination. They were unable to substantiate many of their specific allegations, however, until they gained access to the classified personnel files when they "seized power." In the files, they found more than enough information to confirm and strengthen their allegations, which covered a wide area of alleged discrimination, from invidious political evaluation to economic discrimination to blocked upward mobility. For example, the rebels alleged that cadres had used class as a criterion in allocating annual economic supplements to needy staff members, in choosing which staff members' children would receive employment in the unit, and in promoting people from unskilled to skilled work and from lower to higher professional jobs.

Class-based hostilities also exacerbated personal relations among unit personnel as the issue gained prominence. One incident in particular illustrates this process. A woman from a "bad" class origin, while on leave in another province in 1967, tried to persuade the local rural cadres to remove a "hat" (or negative political label) from a relative whom she and her husband (also in the unit) re-

garded as having been unjustly classified a "bad element." The local commune cadres refused and reported the matter to the unit, where the unit head, the director of the political office, and the head of the personnel group took it up against her. As a result, the woman was furious with them and became an active member of the rebel group.

Although rebel critiques mostly dealt with such specific instances of discrimination and were directed at the specific cadres deemed responsible (or, actually, irresponsible), several individual rebels evidently took the question further to argue the general position that class was no longer important—that "all the masses were good people." At the end of the movement, this type of thinking was condemned as "ultra-leftist" by the revolutionary committee. This kind of argument was current in Beijing and other cities in late 1966 and 1967 in the form of a sophisticated and comprehensive position known as "origin theory" (chushen lun), which was officially condemned as "incorrect" during 1967. There is no evidence, however, that "origin theory" ever reached the unit. Rebel arguments to this general effect seem to have reflected personal frustrations rather than the impact of heterodox theories generated outside the unit.

Like many other units during the Cultural Revolution, the relative prominence of different positions on class issues fluctuated along with the fortunes of the factions. While the rebels held political predominance in the unit, class discrimination was the key issue. With the rise in the conservatives' political fortunes and the "clean class ranks" movement, which focused on those with "impure" backgrounds and histories, the main emphasis was placed on the political virtues of the good classes and the dubious nature of people from other class backgrounds. As we shall see later, most members of the revolutionary committee established after the Cultural Revolution had good class backgrounds. Thus the new system of authority in the early 1970s carried an implicit political bias comparable to the pre-Cultural Revolution period. In fact, class bias against the nonproletarian classes was strengthened by the factional heritage of the Cultural Revolution.

The exercise of cadre authority

Criticism of and support for cadres tended to focus on individuals, not on cadres as such. The major divide between rebels and conser-

vatives stemmed from their respective attitudes toward the unit head, the unit vice-head, and the director of the political office. The rebels themselves were divided on the general issue of cadres, but they agreed that the unit head, the heads of the personnel and propaganda groups, and the director of the political office constituted an "ancestral clique" (zongpai). The group that broke away to form the third faction, however, opposed all the unit's leading cadres, including the vice-head. As we have seen, moreover, after the Cultural Revolution the third faction's leader was criticized for taking an "ultra-leftist" stand to the effect that "all the cadres are no good."

The rebel attack on individual cadres varied in intensity. The prime targets were the unit head, the personnel group head, and the director of the political office, while criticism of the former union chairperson was much more restrained. This partly reflects disparities in power, but it also seems that the latter was more popular among staff members because he was able to "get on well with the masses" and "reflect the masses' opinions."

Cadres were attacked for a variety of sins, the most prominent being "bureaucratism" (guanliaozhuyi) and personal favoritism. "Bureaucratism" seems to have had several specific meanings, the most important of which were the nature of a cadre's relations with the masses and the extent to which an administrative cadre in a position requiring technical responsibilities was in fact competent at his job. On the latter point, the rebels criticized the former unit head for "failing to lead [professional work] in a sufficiently concrete manner" (lingdao bu gou juti), not trying to understand technical questions, and merely approving whatever his technical advisors put in front of him. On the former point, the unit head, the political office director, and the head of the personnel group were accused of being "bureaucratist" in their failure to contact the masses on a day-to-day basis and their penchant for deciding things among themselves. Other cadres were accused of having "official airs" (guan qi) both in attitude and behavior. These "airs" found a variety of concrete expressions: a tendency for cadres to eat with other cadres rather than with workers or technicians; lack of contact with technicians or workers outside their jobs; or the tone used when speaking to subordinates and other staff members (for example, politely or impolitely asking for a job to be done, saying please and thank you, etc. . .).

Cadres were also criticized for allowing personal favoritism or vindictiveness to influence their decisions. These charges, said Mr. Ji, reflected the importance of "personal relations" (renshi guanxi) in the unit. Both factions accused leading cadres of cultivating personal cliques, rewarding friends and penalizing foes, and being susceptible to false flattery. Rebel attacks focused on the head of the personnel group, whose alleged fondness for good food and female company led him to cultivate relations with two female members of the unit who often invited him to eat at their homes. As a result, argued the rebels, he had arranged for two children of one of these friends to be given employment in the unit while many other staff members could not even get one of their children accepted.

The conservatives, on the other hand, focused their attacks on the unit vice-head, whom they accused of forming a clique before the Cultural Revolution which provided the backbone of the rebel faction and personal support for him during the movement. The clique derived from the vice-head's visit to the unit as vice-head of a "Four Cleans" work team in 1965. After the work team left, he stayed on as unit vice-head and formed close ties with those members of the staff who had been most active in criticizing the unit's cadres during the Four Cleans movement. In Mr. Ji's opinion, their links were so close that they constituted a unified group (jituan). He compared them to the gangs (sidang) of Hong Kong who, as the Chinese term (lit., "confederates sworn to death") implies, vowed to defend each other to the death. Cadres were attacked for allowing such personal ties to influence their decisions, diverting resources and opportunities toward favorites and denying them to enemies. The unit vice-head was criticized, for example, for discriminating on the basis of personal hostility against a unit technician who had criticized him openly before the Cultural Revolution and refused to obey his orders. Specifically, the vice-head refused to approve a supplement for him when he fell sick and he was forced to borrow money from fellow technicians. He also applied to return home for convalescence, since he had no one in the unit to look after him, but the vice-head allegedly blocked this request.

The presence of these patterns of personal relationship in the unit are not surprising given the well-known tendency for informal patterns of allegiance and alliance to develop within the framework of formal organizations and, in the Chinese case, a long stand-

ing bureaucratic tradition before 1949 permeated by semiformal and informal groups and patron-client relations. Of course, some of the charges leveled by the factions during the Cultural Revolution were exaggerated and contained more than an iota of hypocritical cant; still, one can discern two forms of informal interpersonal solidarity in the unit: first, a pattern of bilateral ties between a leading cadre and several subordinate staff members, like the spokes of a wheel emanating from the hub; and second, a more internally co-equal group referred to as a "clique" (pai) or an "ancestral clique" (zongpai). The tightly knit clique composed of the unit vice-head and his friends resembled the hub-spoke type, while the informal alliance of the four leading cadres (the unit head, the heads of the personnel and propaganda groups, and the director of the political office) resembled the "ancestral clique" model. The vice-head's group formed out of the political events of the Four Cleans movement, though Mr. Ji did not know the precise details. By contrast, the affiliative ties in the "ancestral clique" of cadres seem to have derived less from a shared experience than from a common position in the unit's structure—specifically, comparably high rank and frequent need for consultation in making decisions. Both types of clique patterns created tensions and antagonisms within the unit which found expression in the charges and countercharges of the Cultural Revolution.

Mr. Ji's own attitudes toward unit cadres and his descriptions of the attitudes of other unit members seemed to contain an implicit model of what constituted a "good" cadre: a person who consulted regularly with his subordinates and was sensitive to their opinions and interests, who neither played favorites nor used his or her position against enemies, who could recognize insincerity, and who had a frank, open, and friendly disposition. The "bad" cadre, on the other hand, was aloof, secretive, influenced by personal considerations, and somewhat authoritarian. If we focus on the relationship between cadre behavior and the class issue, however, standards for evaluating a "good" cadre clearly diverged. For some members of the unit, a "good" cadre was one who recognized the distinctions between the "good" and "bad" classes and took this into consideration in making decisions in certain areas, notably in political recruitment. According to others, particularly those who became active members of the rebel faction during the Cultural Revolution, such attitudes led to unjust discrimination against people from nonproletarian class backgrounds. Thus ambiguity of criteria for judging cadres—by class attitude and by personal leadership style—reflected the wider ambiguities of China's political process on the significance of class and cadre behavior in socialist society.

#### Conclusion

If we summarize this section on issues, several conclusions emerge. First, the substance of political contention was based on *intra-unit* issues rather than those stemming from the provincial or national levels of the movement. Although they had conceptual and linguistic links with the wider issues of the national movement, they were more fundamentally a response to stresses or contradictions inherent in the socio-political structure of the unit before the Cultural Revolution. They were neither imported nor imposed, though some of them did resonate with the wider issues. At the same time, several important issues debated elsewhere during the nationwide movement, such as wage policies or the red-expert relationship, seem to have made little impression on the unit.

Second, insofar as ideological or policy issues were foci of contention, they were inextricably linked to the concrete exercise of authority by the unit's leading cadres in a variety of areas, the pattern of interests and attitudes which emerged from this, and the networks of affiliation that formed in the unit. Mr. Ji stated that "the main activity of the Cultural Revolution in our unit was to get the unit cadres, not to debate and settle big political issues." Though it is clear that this dimension of conflict has a Dahrendorfian aspect of "class struggle" between those with and those without authority, to it is equally clear from Mr. Ji's account that the antagonisms vented against the unit's top cadres were largely a response to specific actions on the part of individual cadres.

Given these two characteristics of issues in the unit, we must add two initial qualifications, each of which will be discussed in more detail at the end of the next chapter. First, though issues were primarily internal and specific, they were described and discussed in the language of the national campaign. The epithets of "bureaucratism," "conservatism," "capitalist road," and "rightism" were used, but these labels usually referred to specific political or professional misdemeanors rather than general tendencies.

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Second, different types of people in the unit perceived the significance of the Cultural Revolution in different ways. Such phenomenological differences meant that the "same" political events were experienced in different ways and had different impacts on people's attitudes.

# The Political Process During the Cultural Revolution II: Political Behavior

# The bases of factional affiliation

We have already discussed how factions formed and what issues emerged during the Cultural Revolution. But in order to understand why certain issues emerged and others did not, and why factions took the positions that they did, it may help to examine precisely who joined the various factions and why. To what extent, for example, was class the basic issue of concern to unit members or just a surrogate for other latent issues involving the interests of isolated individuals, friendship cliques, or occupational or other kinds of social and political groups and groupings? Answers to these kinds of questions can be approached by analyzing and comparing the correspondence of factional alignments with the various class cleavages, friendship groups, and social, political, and technical occupational cleavages that cut through the unit. In this section, then, we turn to some quantitative analyses of the social and political correlates of factional affiliation.

# Class background

The fact that class and its relationship to cadre authority was the main issue in the Cultural Revolution in Mr. Ji's unit does not necessarily mean that class background was the most important factor motivating people's factional choices. Our data allow us to test, at least partially, the hypothesis suggested by Mr. Ji's account that class background was the main determinant of factional alignment. If the members of the unit really chose their faction because of their views of and personal interest in the class issue, then class background should correlate with factional alignment more closely

than any other independent variable (such as age, sex, friendship ties, occupation, and so forth). Moreover, the relationship between class background and factional alignment should hold up even when controlling for other potential predictive variables.

The first column in Table 3 presents the gamma correlation coefficients for the bivariate relationships between affiliation with the rebel or conservative faction, on the one hand, and class background, age, sex, educational level, four dimensions of political status, and personal problem (existence of any sort of "historical," "political," "style," or "family problem," the four kinds of problems identified by Mr. Ji), on the other hand.<sup>41</sup> Factional alignment correlates most closely with Party membership.42 This high correlation reflects the fact that 84% of the unit's Party members joined or sympathized with the conservatives. But, the strength of the relationship between Party membership and faction affiliation is reduced considerably to -.37) by controlling for class background, since all but one of the Party members had good class backgrounds. The strength of the relationship between Party membership and factional affiliation may thus be due in large part to the effects of class.

Leaving Party membership aside for the moment, factional alignment correlates most closely with class background, sex, PLA back-

Table 3
The Social Bases of Factional Affiliation

Variable	Variable by faction (zero-order gamma)	Class by faction controlling for variable (first order gamma)	Variable by faction controlling for class (first order gamma)
Class background	.41	-	
Age	.25	.36	.07
Sex	.41	.36	.13
Educational level	.25	.39	.14
PLA service	.37	.33	25
Union functionary	.24	.40	01
Party membership	.56	.34	<i></i> 37
"Problem"	.36	.34	.10

ground and existence of an individual political "problem." But inasmuch as the combined rebel and conservative memberships contained only 19 women, 30 PLA veterans, and 16 people with problems (out of a combined membership of 181), these three variables clearly cannot provide a general explanation of factional alignment. (We shall return to each of these groups in detail in later sections.) The data suggest, then, that for the unit staff as a whole, factional alignment is most closely associated with class background.

But is this relationship purely epiphenomenal? That is, does "class background" operate independently on factional alignment, or is the apparent effect of class itself a reflection of the hidden effect of other variables? Using partial gamma, which is a measure of association in multivariate cross-tabulations, we can test the impact of class background in two ways. First we can examine the relationship between class background and factional alignment controlling for other variables. The second column of Table 3 summarizes these partial gammas. The relationship between factional alignment and class background holds up quite well even when controlling for the effects of age, sex, educational level, several components of political status, and "problem."

Second, we can test the relationship between factional alignment and other variables controlling for class background. The results, presented in the third column of Table 3, show that most of the relationships between these variables and factional alignment are weakened (compared with the bivariate [zero-order] gammas) by controlling for class background.<sup>43</sup>

In conclusion, then, class origin seems to have had the greatest independent effect on factional affiliation of all the variables tested. Specifically, people of middling and bad class backgrounds were more likely to join the rebel faction, which expressed their class interests; and people of good class background were more likely to join the conservative faction, whose views on the class issue were consonant with their interests as a class. These effects of class held up even when controlling for other socio-economic variables. To answer the question posed at the beginning of this section, its importance seems actual, not epiphenomenal.

We will, however, attach a number of important qualifications to this conclusion, for the pattern of factional choice in this unit was hardly a simple one. One qualification relates to the effect of occupation. The strength of the relationship between class back-

ground and factional affiliation varied considerably among different occupational groups.<sup>44</sup> The gammas for this relationship within each major occupational group are as follows: technicians .29, administrators .77, and workers -.02. We have presented these relationships in cross-tabular form in Tables 4, 5, and 6. The high

Tables 4, 5 and 6

Class Background by Faction for Various Occupational Groups (row percentages)

Table 4: Technicians

	Conservatives	Rebels
Good class background	24 (69%)	11 (31%)
Middling class background	18 (51%)	17 (49%)
Bad class background	11 (48%)	12 (52%)
Total	53 (57%)	40 (43%) Gamma = .29

#### **Table 5: Administrators**

	Conservatives	Rebels
Good class background	18 (86%)	3 (14%)
Middling class background	4 (50%)	4 (50%)
Bad class background	0	1 (100%)
Total	22 (73%)	8 (27%) Gamma = .77

#### **Table 6: Manual Workers**

	Conservatives	Rebels	
Good class background	33 (79%)	9 (21%)	
Middling class background	6 (75%)	2 (25%)	
Bad class background	5 (83%)	1 (17%)	
Total	44 (79%)	12 (21%) Gamma = .	02

correlation between class background and factional affiliation among administrators may suggest that administrators had internalized the importance of formal class background more than workers and technicians had. In the case of workers, class background appears to have little relationship with factional affiliation. We suggest here that manual workers as an occupational group, regardless of their class backgrounds, were more likely to support the conservative cause than their class backgrounds would predict; i.e., they seem to have acted more in terms of their present class status (chengfen) of worker rather than their class origin or background (chushen).45 As workers, they were susceptible to appeals from conservative spokesmen and threatened cadres to "defend the working class" from the attacks of rebels who were more likely to be intellectuals and have "impure" backgrounds. The data may also reflect the fact that the friendship ties of certain workers counteracted the influence of class in their decision to join a faction. We shall discuss the impact of friendship and occupation separately in later sections.

The distribution of class backgrounds in the third faction (which has been excluded from our analysis thus far—see note 41) resembles that of the conservatives more closely than that of the rebels (Table 7). This may be surprising at first blush, since the third faction was originally part of the rebel faction. But therein may also lie one factor contributing to split. The third faction was mainly concerned with the issue of violence and forced power seizure, and much less with class discrimination, which was the rebels' main concern.

Table 7

Class Background by Faction (column percentages)

	Conservatives	Rebels	Third faction	Totals
Good class background Middling class background Bad class background	76 (63%)	23 (38%)	7 (54%)	106 (55%)
	28 (23%)	23 (38%)	5 (38%)	56 (29%)
	16 (13%)	15 (25%)	1 ( 8%)	32 (16%)

Note:  $X^2 = 11.96$ , significant at .018 level.

#### Friendship Ties

From Mr. Ji's account, it appears that friendship ties were important in the process of faction formation. Before exploring this relationship systematically, it is important to clarify the meaning of the word "friendship." Mr. Ji identified as friends those people who had frequent contact with each other (jingchang laiwang), inviting each other over to dinner and the like. Relations of relative intimacy or distance found expression in different terms of address. A person would use the full name (e.g., Bai Shengji) to address people with whom he or she was not particularly friendly or someone with whom he or she had bad relations. The full name could be used in addressing friends, but it was more common to use the given name (Shengji). If people were good friends, they would often use nicknames (e.g., Hey, long-beard!). Friends also used the term lao ("old") before the family name (e.g., Old Bai!). Mr. Ji maintained that the prefix "old" was also used to address elders and organizational superiors unless mutual relations were bad, in which case the full name was used.

In Mr. Ji's eyes, there were three types of friendship with differing degrees of intimacy. "Know the heart friends" (zhixin pengyou) have a very close relationship, in which people could communicate more intimate sentiments; for example, one could say, "Long Live Chiang Kai-shek." Mr. Ji did not know of any "know the heart friends" in the unit, partly, he suggested, because such friendship was rare in any case, and partly because the unit had not been in existence long enough for such ties to develop. "Talk heart friends" (tanxin pengyou) have a relatively close relationship characterized by informality and frankness. With such a friend, said Mr. Ji, one could praise Wu Han's articles or complain about the unit cadres or about leaders at the level of Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao or Wang Hongwen; for example, one could say "How come Wang Hongwen got ahead so fast?"<sup>47</sup> One could also say that the Soviet Union or the United States were not all that bad. One would not, on the other hand, criticize Mao Zedong, Jiang Qing, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao (before September 1971), or Liu Shaoqi (before the Cultural Revolution). "Ordinary friends" (putong pengyou), maintain cordial and polite relations based on fairly precise reciprocity. For example, if a person invites you out three times, then you are obliged to invite him or her out three times. "Talk heart friends"

need not bother about such strict reciprocity. Ordinary friends could not talk about intimate personal or sensitive political matters with each other.<sup>48</sup>

Mr. Ji referred to a group of "talk heart friends" as a jituan, which carries the meaning of a semiorganized coterie. He identified several of these groups, more or less solidary, in the unit. Some had informal "leaders" (toutou). Mr. Ji identified five friendship groups in the unit before the Cultural Revolution which, he argued, had an impact on factional affiliation. Let us take them in order of political importance.

# "The Rebel Group of Friends"

This group had formed around the unit vice-head and had originated during the Four Cleans movement in 1965. Leaving the vice-head aside, the original group of friends was composed of ten people. They would form the nucleus of the rebel faction and were to expand their numbers during the movement. This group provided one of the rebel faction's two major leaders and two of its most influential members, one of whom wrote a lot of the rebel propaganda.

Members of this group had certain characteristics in common. Nine out of ten were technicians, and nearly all had "bad" or "middling" class backgrounds (two from middle peasant origins, four upper-middle peasant, two landlord, one petty capitalist, and one poor and lower-middle peasant). With one partial exception (a candidate Party member), none of them were in the Party. They were all relatively young, in their early or mid-thirties. On the other hand, their provincial origins (spanning five provinces) and educational origins (spanning at least seven schools or colleges) were diverse. Six members of the group were married couples, while a seventh was the wife of the unit vice-head. It seems that although several members of the group already knew each other before coming to the unit, mainly as a result of shared work experience in other technical units, the group did not form until the events of the Four Cleans movement after they arrived in this unit.

During the Cultural Revolution, the group provided the political nucleus of the rebel faction. They held common views on the cadres and the class issue; their feelings on the latter were strengthened by what they perceived as the victimization of two of their

number by the unit's leading cadres for class-related "mistakes." Only two members were not among the more active (as opposed) to ordinary) members of the rebel faction: the wife of the unit vice-head who supported the rebels but did not formally join for fear of compromising her husband's position, and one female member of the group who, according to Mr. Ji, was only interested in household affairs and simply followed along behind her husband and other more active members of the group.

It is significant for the nature of factional politics that the only member of the group who became a major leader of the rebel faction was himself a worker by occupation and from a "good" class background. This would support a more general hypothesis to the effect that though people from nonproletarian class backgrounds tended to join or support rebel groups during the Cultural Revolution, their political vulnerability made them unwilling to assume leadership positions.<sup>49</sup> Mr. Ji alluded to this problem when he described the political behavior of one of this group, a person from landlord family background and a member of the Guomindang's Three People's Principles Youth League before 1949:

He didn't dare to speak out, owing to his [political] history and his class origin. But people listened to him in both professional matters and in matters relating to the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, he spoke only privately to friends in the rebel faction because he was afraid of speaking publicly.

According to Mr. Ji, moreover, the person who became a rebel leader had not been politically active before the Cultural Revolution, but became involved in factional activities partly as a result of his friendship with other members of the rebel group.

The rebel friendship group expanded during the movement to include four more people who shared several characteristics in common with the original group: they were relatively young (between twenty-five and thirty-five), all were technicians, none were members of the Party, most came from "middling" or "bad" class backgrounds (one rich peasant, one urban "middling" origin [Mr. Ji could not recall his specific category], one upper-middle peasant, and one lower-middle peasant), and all were on good terms with the unit vice-head. One of these, a female, had already been on good terms with one of the original female members of the rebel friendship group before the movement and had graduated

from the same engineering college as another member of the original group. It is again significant for factional structure that the one person with a "good" class origin in this additional group (the lower-middle peasant) also became a leader of the rebel faction.

# The Three "Conservative" Groups of Friends

According to Mr. Ji, there were two groups of people who had been friends before the Cultural Revolution, joined the conservative faction, and merged into one friendship group during the movement. In one of these, nine of ten people (including three married couples) came from the province where the unit was situated, were graduates of two technical schools there, and had worked in similar technical units in the province. Nine of the ten members of the group were technicians in their late twenties and early-tomid-thirties, and compared with the rebel friendship group, had a higher percentage of Party membership (three out of ten) and authoritative positions before the Cultural Revolution (four out of ten with an additional person who had been a pre-Cultural Revolution political activist). One of these people was a leader of the conservative faction.

The origins of this group seem to have lain in their regional ties, their shared educational and work experience and, as in the case of the rebel group, their role in the Four Cleans movement in the unit. Members of their group had come under attack during that movement from the unit vice-head when he was vice-head of the Four Cleans work team, and the group had solidified as a result.

The other conservative friendship group was different in that its six members were all workers and none had been in the Party or in a position of authority before the Cultural Revolution. In other respects, it was similar to the previous group: all six hailed from the local province, all but one had previously worked in a similar technical unit in the province, and all were in their mid-to-late twenties. All but one came from rural backgrounds, and four came from the same county, a factor which Mr. Ji identified as the original basis of their friendship. It is again significant that while this group provided two leaders of the conservative faction, neither of these had "bad" class origins (one had a "middling" urban class status [chengfen] which Mr. Ji could not specify, and one was a poor or lower-middle peasant).

These two groups were to merge into one large, but relatively loose (compared with the rebel group), group of friends during the Cultural Revolution and were augmented by two new members during the movement. This merger within the framework of the conservative faction suggests that, at its core, the conservative faction embodied an alliance of technicians and workers, was linked to local provincial origins, involved relatively young people, and reflected the importance of friendship based on previous educational and occupational experience.

Before leaving the conservative faction, it is important to add one more pre-Cultural Revolution friendship group which overwhelmingly supported the conservative faction. It was composed of eleven people from one of China's southeastern provinces. It seems to have derived initially from common provincial origin, reinforced by common educational experience (of the nine whose colleges Mr. Ji knew, eight had graduated from the same school, some in the same years). All of them, moreover, had worked previously in their home province in similar technical units. Seven (64%) had good class backgrounds, one (9%) middling, and three (27%) bad. Of the nine who supported or joined factions during the Cultural Revolution, seven were on the conservatives' side and only one on the rebels'. The latter was a lukewarm rebel supporter, however, and incidentally the only person in the friendship group from a bad class background who joined a faction at all. Moreover, he retained his friendship with the people in the conservative faction throughout. Mr. Ji was unclear just how and why members of this friendship group aligned themselves with the conservative faction, but the evidence suggests that they did so as a group, and that class may have had something to do with it.

# The Third Faction Friendship Group

This group consisted of eight people (out of a total of thirteen people in the entire third faction), all of them technicians. Six came from one province in north China, and they plus one other graduated in the early-to-mid-1960s from the same technical school in the province capital. All were relatively young, ranging between twenty-seven and thirty-three years of age. Four of them worked in one of the special technical research groups at the unit head-quarters. Their link with the third faction was through the "head"

(toutou) of their friendship group, a technician in one of the mobile small-groups, whose native place was a large city in eastern China and who was the top leader of the third faction during the Cultural Revolution. The group had apparently met as trainees in another similar technical unit and had been transferred together to this unit. The group "head" was from a capitalist class background, while the other members were from poor or lower-middle peasant (five), revolutionary cadre (one), or middle peasant (one) families. Their heterogeneity in terms of class may help explain why the third faction downplayed the class issue. According to Mr. Ji, the group "head" rose to leadership because he had a university education, had attended one of the most prestigious universities in the country, hailed from one of China's most sophisticated cities, had traveled around the country, and was very articulate and knowledgeable about people:

He was very clever. Just from speaking to you a little, he could tell a lot about you and about your relations with other people... When they formed a [friendship] group, it was natural for him to head it.

It was this person who was the driving force behind the formation of the third faction, and his friendship group provided most of its core membership.

The social bases of their friendship seem to reside in age, occupation, school and provincial ties, and perhaps, negatively, lack of positive (Party, PLA) or negative (problem) involvement in politics before the Cultural Revolution. Mr. Ji told us that these people were friends before they joined the third faction. So while their friendship was no doubt a factor in their factional choice, it is also likely that they could find consensus on the basic positions of the faction, since in other cases in the unit friendships broke up over ideological or political disagreements.

Conclusion: Friendship and Factional Choice

To sum up, the evidence on these five friendship groups suggests a clear pattern: members of friendship groups formed before the Cultural Revolution tended to join the same faction, the groups solidified and/or enlarged during the movement, and they continued in both politicized and personal form after the Cultural Revolution. In several cases, friendship groups provided a dispropor-

tionately large number of faction leaders. The political implications of friendship ties in the unit, however, were a good deal more complex than this aggregate pattern suggests. Some members of the unit who had been friends before the Cultural Revolution joined different factions and thus became estranged to a greater or lesser extent. One illustrative case is that of three friends in their mid-thirties, all technicians from the local province and classmates from a technical college in one of its big cities. Two of them had many other friends who joined the conservatives and they followed suit, but the third, a technical assistant in one of the mobile small groups, joined the rebels along with the head of his small group, whom he respected. The split was exacerbated by the fact that one of the two who joined the conservatives came to detest the rebel faction with particular animosity because they abused his motherin-law, who was of "bad" class status, when she visited the unit in 1968. As a result, the original friendship among the three technicians was dissipated during the movement and, according to Mr. Ji, "now they are neither friends nor enemies." Mr. Ji cited several other cases of similar estrangement as a result of the movement.

In Mr. Ji's opinion, cases of bitter estrangement between former friends were relatively rare. In terms of general friendship patterns, however, the data on individuals provided by Mr. Ji, when aggregated, suggest that friendship and factional alignments were clearly related. Of the fifty-eight members of the conservative faction on whom friendship data were available and applicable, thirty-seven (64%) either had bad personal relations with members of the rebel faction or were friendly *only* with members of the conservative faction. As for the rebel faction, of the thirty-four people on whom friendship data are available, twenty-two (65%) had friends *only* in their own faction or harbored hostility toward members of the rebel faction. It is interesting to note the relatively high correspondence (covering about two-thirds of the members in each case) between friendship and factional affiliation in *both* major factions.

Thus the relationship between friendships and the factional politics of the Cultural Revolution is multifaceted. In a significant number of cases, friendship ties led to shared factional affiliation which in turn magnified their internal solidarity and their hostility toward others. In a few cases, the movement broke up friendship

ties, while in others it had little impact on patterns of friendship or hostility. An analysis of friendship patterns does throw some light on the causes of factional affiliation, although friendship ties themselves, as we have seen, rested on other ties, such as regional origin, age, sex, occupation, schooling, and previous work and political experience.

#### Political status

The Cultural Revolution has been widely interpreted as a revolt against the previous structure of political power.<sup>50</sup> If this theory is correct, there should be a detectable relationship between factional alignment and the pre-Cultural Revolution distribution of political status in the unit. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed the relationship between factional affiliation on the one hand and Party and PLA affiliation on the other. (We had considered also using Youth League membership and union leadership as indicators of political status, but Mr. Ji felt that these were not politically important or socially prestigious positions. Our failure to find a statistical relationship between them and factional affiliation bears out Mr. Ji's feeling.<sup>51</sup>)

Looking first at the relationship between Party membership and factional alignment, a clear relationship emerges. Party members were far more likely to join the conservative than the rebel faction. Of the thirty-three ordinary Party members on whom data is available, twenty-nine (88%) were either members (twenty-five) or sympathizers (four) of the conservative faction. Five of the conservative faction's ten leaders were Party members. On the other hand, only four ordinary Party members joined the rebel faction (12%), and none joined the third faction. Turning to Party cadres (n = 10), seven were linked to the conservatives (four sympathizers and three members) and only three to the rebels. In addition, there was one candidate Party member who joined the conservatives. To sum up the three categories of Party membership (Table 8), 84% of the Party members either sympathized with or joined the conservatives, 16% the rebels, and none the third faction. Among non-Party members who joined or supported factions, on the other hand, only 55% were affiliated with the conservatives, 36% with the rebels, and 9% with the third faction. A comparison of these figures suggests that Party members were far more likely than

their non-Party counterparts to affiliate with the conservatives and were considerably less likely to join the rebels and the third faction.

Table 8

Party Membership by Faction (row percentages)

	Conservatives	Rebels	Third faction
Non-Party member	83 (55%)	54 (36%)	13 (9%)
Party member	37 (84%)	7 (16%)	0
Totals	120 (62%)	61 (31%)	13 (7%)

Note:  $X^2 = 12.73$ , significant at .01 level.

Turning to the data on military service (Table 9), 77% of the PLA veterans were affiliated with the conservatives, 20% with the rebels, and only 3% with the third faction. This distribution is significantly different from that among nonveterans.

Table 9

PLA Service by Faction (row percentages)

	Conservatives	Rebels	Third faction
No PLA service	96 (59%)	55 (34%)	12 (7%)
PLA service	23 (77%)	6 (20%)	1 (3%)
Totals	119 (62%)	61 (32%)	13 (7%)

Note:  $X^2 = 3.42$ , significant at .2 level.

To summarize, Party and PLA affiliation were significantly related to factional affiliation. Specifically, Party members and PLA veterans were more likely to join or support the conservatives. This accords with Mr. Ji's impression of the Cultural Revolution in the unit as being in part a revolt against people in positions of authority or power, and also with more general explanations of the Cultural Revolution as a whole as being a revolt against the preexisting system of political stratification.

# The possession of authority

Given the common argument that the Cultural Revolution was an attack against previous patterns of bureaucratic hierarchy and Mr. Ji's claims that the Cultural Revolution in his unit was directed toward "getting the cadres," it is important to test for a statistical relationship between factional alignment and the distribution of positions of authority before the movement. First we must make a distinction between administrative and technical authority.

Altogether, there were nineteen people in the unit who possessed some level of administrative authority in the unit before the Cultural Revolution (ten at the unit level and nine at the subunit level). Of the seventeen of this number who joined factions, three (18%) joined or sympathized with the rebels, and fourteen (82%) joined or sympathized with the conservatives. It is clear from these figures that pre-Cultural Revolution administrators were overwhelmingly either members or supporters of the conservative faction, suggesting that the faction's name was not inappropriate in terms of its relationship with the "people in authority" before the Cultural Revolution.

But what of technical authorities? While Table 10 shows that technicians as a group were more prone than other occupational groups to join the rebel faction, we found that the pattern of factional affiliation among technical authorities diverged only slightly from that for all technicians (see first two rows, Table 11). How-

Table 10

Factional Affiliations of Technicians and Nontechnicians (row percentages)

	Conservatives	Rebels	Third faction
Technicians	53 (50%)	40 (38%)	12 (11%)
Vontechnicians	67 (74%)	21 (23%)	3 ( 3%)
Totals	120 (61%)	61 (31%)	15 ( 8%)

Note:  $\overline{X}^2 = 12.01$ , significant at .01 level.

Table 11
Factional Affiliations of Technicians and Technical Authorities (row percentages)

	Conservatives	Rebels	Third faction	
All technicians All technical authorities	53 (50%) 20 (45%)	40 (38%) 21 (48%)	12 (11%) 3 ( 7%)	
Technical authorities above the small-group	20 (40%)	2: (40/0)	3 ( 7/0)	
level	4 (31%)	8 (61%)	1 ( 8%)	

ever, when we divided the technical authorities into those who had authority at the small-group level and those who had higher levels of technical authority (last row, Table 11), we found an even stronger tendency to join the rebel faction among the higher authorities. This apparent rebel bent among higher levels of technical authority, particularly when compared with the conservative orientations of their administrative counterparts, suggests the existence of a political cleavage between these two groups which found expression in the factional politics of the Cultural Revolution. It provides some limited statistical support for the "red-expert" overtones of the charges of "bureaucratism" against administrative cadres for interfering in technical matters and making decisions on the basis of inadequate evidence.

# Occupation and educational level

The preceding discussion leads naturally into an examination of the relationships between occupation and factional alignment. The figures here, presented in Table 12, suggest that, in general terms, administrative personnel and workers tended more toward the conservatives, and technicians more toward the rebels. This relationship is no doubt intercorrelated with that between education and faction, since administrators and workers had lower levels of education than their technician staff mates. As the figures in Table 13 suggest, the higher the level of education, the more likely people were to join the rebel or third factions.

These statistics on education and occupation do point to a certain cleavage between the better educated "specialist" technicians

Table 12
Occupation by Faction (row percentages)

	Conservatives	Rebels	Third faction
Technicians	53 (51%)	40 (38%)	12 (11%)
Administrators	22 (73%)	8 (27%)	0 ( 0%)
Workers	44 (77%)	12 (21%)	1 (2%)
Totals	119 (62%)	60 (31%)	13 ( 7%)

Note:  $X^2 = 16.18$ , significant at .02 level.

Table 13

Education by Faction (row percentages)

	Cons	ervatives	F	Rebels Third faction	
No education	6	(86%)	1	(14%)	0
Primary school	33	(79%)	9	(21%)	0
Lower-middle school	17	(65%)	8	(31%)	1 ( 4%)
Upper-middle or vocational middle school	40	(54%)	26	(35%)	8 ( 11%)
Vocational college	18	(56%)	13	(41%)	1 ( 3%)
College	6	(60%)	3	(30%)	1 ( 10%)
Graduate school	0		0		2 (100%)
Totals	120	(62%)	60	(31%)	13 ( 7%)

Note:  $X^2 = 40.60$ , significant at .001 level.

on the one hand and the less educated administrators and workers on the other. They also point to the presence of an implicit alliance between administrators and workers within the conservative faction against two opposing factions, both spearheaded by technicians. Though this standoff is not sharp and clear, there are several reasons to suggest that these statistical relationships have some basis in reality: the ability of administrative cadres to appeal to workers for support against rebel technicians by branding the latter as

"bourgeois intellectuals"; the tensions not merely between administrators and technicians on both technical and political matters but also in the relation of authority between technicians and the workers who served under them; and the sociological similarities between workers and administrative cadres, notably their similar educational and class backgrounds.

#### Sex

The impact of sex on factional affiliation is hard to assess since there were only nineteen cases of women in the unit involved in the Cultural Revolution.<sup>52</sup> Out of these nineteen, nine (47%) sympathized with or joined the conservatives, and ten (53%) joined the rebels, implying that there were relatively fewer women than men in the conservative and third factions and relatively more in the rebel faction (of the males, 63% joined the conservative faction, 29% joined the rebels, and 7% joined the third faction).

Does this mean that women were more "radical" during the Cultural Revolution? Part of this statistical relationship can be explained in terms of other factors. Eight out of ten of the females in the rebel faction were technicians, and none had good class backgrounds (six had "bad" backgrounds, four "middling"). Looking at female faction supporters as a whole, moreover, there is no case of a married woman joining a faction opposed to her husband's faction. Of eight married women in or supporting the conservative faction, six had husbands in the conservatives, and the husbands of two did not join any faction; of eight married rebel women, seven had husbands in the same faction, and one husband was a non-joiner. Mr. Ji may have been showing his own prejudice against women when he tried to argue that women tended to join the same faction as their husbands as dependent and dutiful wives. In several cases this may well have been true, but if we focus on those eight women who joined the rebel faction, four were active members, suggesting that their role was more prominent than the dependence hypothesis would allow. Two women (one affiliated with the conservatives and one with the rebels) took an active role in defending their husbands against charges of bad class origin during the Cultural Revolution. In another case, a woman in the rebel faction took a prominent part in struggling one of the unit cadres who had spread rumors about her alleged sexual misconduct before the Cultural Revolution. Several women, moreover, were active in the first conservative friendship group and the core rebel friendship group and thus were part of more general patterns of friendship and hostility toward other staff members and unit cadres which were important in structuring factional affiliation among unit members at large.

The impact of sex on factional affiliation is thus somewhat difficult to determing, given the multiplicity of factors and the small number of women in the unit. Any simple hypothesis to the effect that women were "more radical" or "politically dependent" is inadequate at best, and misleading at worst. It is significant, however, that nothing in the way of specific women's issues seems to have surfaced during the political struggles in the unit during the Cultural Revolution.

#### "Problem"

A number of the unit's personnel had certain "problems" (wenti) which distinguished them from their colleagues. As we discussed in Chapter Two, these were marks of personal error or misdeed and placed individuals under an aura of suspicion or deviance. Mr. Ji distinguished four types of problems: "historical problems" (lishi wenti), stemming from political behavior and/or organizational affiliations before 1949; "political problems" (zhengzhi wenti), referring specifically to political misdeeds committed since 1949; "problems of style," (zuofeng wenti), involving personal sins such as drunkenness, promiscuity, or wife abuse; and "family problems" (jiating wenti), which denoted people whose close family members had some serious historical or political problem or belonged to a proscribed category such as "counterrevolutionary" or "rightist."

Of these four categories, the first two were the most serious in political terms. (They were also the most common in the unit, comprising fourteen of the sixteen cases of "problems.") Each category in turn contained degrees of seriousness. For example, Mr. Ji referred to "minor" (xiao), "average" (yibande), and "serious" (da, lit., "large") historical and political problems. In many cases, information on problems was not in the public domain. They were recorded in a person's dossier and only those unit administrative cadres with access to the dossiers were aware of them. During the Cultural Revolution, however, much of this confidential information was made public and used as ammunition in factional mudslinging. People with serious problems in their past made

In analyzing the relationships between "problem" and factional alignment, the number of people in the unit with problems is too small to make any firm judgment. Eliminating one person who switched factions during the movement, five joined or supported the rebels, two the third faction, four the conservatives, and four did not affiliate with any faction. While the nonaffiliation of these four suggests a pattern of political vulnerability which made political participation difficult for such people, the data on the others indicate that to the extent that they did participate, they took sides against the conservatives in disproportionate numbers.<sup>53</sup> On the basis of this data we can suggest that people with "problems," who were particularly prone to becoming victims of the movement, responded to their vulnerability either by opting out of factional activities or by joining the nonconservative side, perhaps motivated by a desire for a "reversal of verdicts" or for vengeance against unit cadres who themselves generally had good histories and class backgrounds and who actively participated in or passively symbolized the use of political power against the people with "problems."

### The bases of factional activism and leadership

In tracing the relationships discussed above, we were solely concerned with factional "affiliation" or "alignment." This concept contains within it, however, several degrees of political activism—some levels of commitment to and involvement in the activities of the factions. Mr. Ji felt that he could best rate the activism of the unit's members along a five-category scale: neutral nonmember, faction sympathizer, faction member, active faction member, and faction leader. Our concept of factional "affiliation" used in the preceding analysis included persons in the latter four categories. We feel it is important to focus in more detail on those who were active in factional activities (n = 38 or 20%) and those who were leaders (n = 16 or 8%) in all three factions.

Focusing first on the active members of factions, they exhibit certain characteristics which distinguish them from faction members as a whole. Regardless of the faction to which they belonged, they were overwhelmingly and disproportionately technicians (thirty-one out of thirty-eight, or 82%, while technicians only

comprised 54% of total factional membership). Seventy-two percent were in their thirties. In terms of class background, moreover, they were very diverse—34% "good," 37% "middling," and 29% "bad"—suggesting that, since those from "middling" or "bad" class origins were about as likely as those from "good" origins to be politically active in factional activities, class background was not an important determinant of differential levels of activism during the movement. This finding is significant given the rather limited political role of bad classes in the years leading up to the Cultural Revolution. It amounts to a considerable expansion of their political activity. As we might expect, however, the ranks of the conservative faction's activists were somewhat "purer" than their rebel counterparts (50% of the conservative activists hailed from "good" origins, as opposed to 22% of the rebel activists).

Perhaps the most striking aspect of factional activism, however, was its link with the friendship groups we described earlier. Forty-four percent of the conservative and rebel activists were part of the main friendship group in their respective factions. If we add people who were on the fringes of the rebel friendship group, the proportion rises to 61%.

Looking further at the nature of activists in the two main factions, it is possible to trace the influence of previous political status and level of authority. While only one rebel activist was a full Party member and one a candidate member, among conservative activists there were five Party members. Turning to levels of authority, the gamma correlation between it and faction activism was .20 for the conservative faction and -.26 for the rebel faction. The difference in sign (denoting a difference in the *directions* of the relationships in the two factions) suggests that those with higher levels of authority and political status in the unit were more likely to be active in the conservative faction, and those with less authority and political status were more likely to be active in the rebel faction. The difference is consistent with the fact that the thrust of the rebels' attack on the conservatives was related to a general attack on the previous structure of power in the unit.

In conclusion, therefore, factional activism was most widespread among technicians, reflecting the unwillingness or inability of administrators to become overtly involved in the movement, the centrality of many of the movement's issues for technicians as an occupational group, and their superior educational and political skills compared with the manual workers in the unit. Among these activist technicians, friendship ties were an important source of political strength and solidarity within their respective factions. As we have seen earlier, these ties were linked to feelings about and relations with the unit's former two leaders and to questions of class and the exercise of cadre authority. The finding on the differential political and administrative status of activists also points to the dimension of differential authority as an important issue. Thus the determinants of factional activism appear multifaceted. Patterns of political activism seem to have expressed a complex mix of ideological, interest-related, and personal or particularistic concerns.

Looking finally at the sixteen people whom Mr. Ji identified as faction *leaders*, they differed from their activist counterparts in two respects. First, 44% were manual workers by occupation (though only 8% of the faction activists were workers). Second, leaders mostly came from "good" class backgrounds (75%), only one having a "bad" class origin, and even that was capitalist, the "best" of the "bad" class categories. These two factors, occupation and class background, were intercorrelated (eight of the nine workers and administrators had "good" class backgrounds). The data are skewed, moreover, by the fact that most of the leaders identified by Mr. Ji were conservatives (eleven out of sixteen, or 69%). At the same time, however, four out of five nonconservative leaders were from "good" class backgrounds, and the same proportion were technicians. In view of this skew, therefore, we can only suggest tentatively that there may have been a tendency for certain occupations, notably manual workers, to be chosen for leadership positions at least within the conservative faction, and a more general tendency, common to all factions, for leaders to be chosen from among those with "good" class origins. These tendencies are understandable given the higher political standing or reliability and consequent invulnerability of the "nonintellectual" occupations and the "good" class backgrounds, which would of course increase the political effectiveness of an individual leader and reduce the risks of assuming leadership positions. Our data also suggest that as a variable affecting political behavior, class background operated differently among faction members on the one hand and leaders on the other, a point we have made before with respect to faction activists.

Though these several factors distinguish faction leaders from faction activists, there is one dimension common to the two groups: their involvement in the major friendship group of their faction. Eight (50%) of the leaders were members of the major friendship group in their respective factions, a finding which further extends the political significance of friendship ties in the unit's factional politics.

# Conclusions: The nature of the political process during the cultural revolution.

Let us now summarize our findings concerning the general nature of the political process in the unit and the determinants of the complex patterns of political behavior and participation during the Cultural Revolution. We shall organize our conclusions on the basis of the four "ideal type" categories introduced in Chapter 4 (pp. 66-67).

#### Ideology and politics

First of all, to what extent did politics reflect a clash between opposing general *ideological* positions? Can we distinguish the existence of systematically different and theoretically articulated world-views held by different members of the unit which motivated personal behavior and structured patterns of political participation and alignment? Our conclusions here are threefold: first, certain systematic ideological variations can be discerned in the unit; second, these ideological variants can only offer a partial explanation of the substance and process of politics in the unit during the Cultural Revolution; third, the impact of ideological categories and issues on intra-unit politics was multifaceted, and the above question and conclusions, which assume a direct linkage between generalized ideological beliefs and political action, only reflect one among many dimensions of the process of "ideological" politics.

It is apparent that certain members of the unit staff active on both sides of the original factional divide (conservative—rebel/third) were motivated by the various public ideological convictions and positions then current in China.<sup>54</sup> Other staff members who participated in factional politics were only partially so motivated, or not at all. We can make an initial distinction here between

"believers" of various kinds for whom ideological values are subjectively important and behaviorally influential, "nonbelievers" who find public ideologies more or less irrelevant to their lives; and "cynics" whose world-outlook comprehends the domain of public ideology but only to ridicule, reject, or manipulate it. Our immediate concern here is with the people who can be described to greater or lesser degrees as "believers," and with the origin and content of their beliefs. 55

Two forms of ideological commitment emerge, albeit hazily, from our study: a form of "conservative" attitudinal "redness" wedded to the values and structure of the pre-Cultural Revolution polity, and a diffuse brand of ideological "radicalism" which arose during the movement to challenge the political status quo. The former group identified strongly with the central values and institutions of pre-Cultural Revolution society and politics, while the latter developed an immanent critique of these values and institutions based on a common stock of concepts and symbols. During the Cultural Revolution, people of the former type were linked with the conservative faction, while the latter found a political home in the rebel and third factions. In general, the political impact of "conservative" ideological beliefs in the unit was far greater than its "radical" counterpart, judging from the relative number of "believers" we have been able to identify in the unit and the degree of their attachment. It also appears that "conservative" beliefs had more internal coherence and depth, whereas the "radical" alternative was more unsystematic and individualized.

The conservative "reds," of whom we can identify thirteen, tended to conform to a distinct political and sociological type: they all had "good" class backgrounds (twelve poor or lower-middle peasant and one worker); seven were Party members before the Cultural Revolution, and another joined after the movement; five had been in the PLA; and none had higher than vocational middle school education (in fact, five had only reached primary level). In occupational terms, on the other hand, they were a mixture of young, lower-echelon technicians and middle-aged administrators. Turning to the "radical" alternative and focusing on those five people who appear to have spearheaded ideological criticism during the movement, we find a different sociological and political picture. They were all relatively young technicians; they came from varied class backgrounds, only one of them "good" (one rich

peasant, one capitalist, one small capitalist, one middle peasant, and one lower-middle peasant); had no Party affiliation or PLA experience; and had vocational high school or college educations. It is difficult to generalize from such a small number of cases, but it seems clear that the socio-political profile of these five "radical" ideologues differs significantly from the "conservative" believers. Aided perhaps by a greater grasp of ideological theory and political literacy deriving partly from relatively high levels of education, they functioned as a kind of ideological bridge, linking the specific criticism and concerns of rebel faction members with a more coherent, ideologically satisfying critique which claimed identity with the wider themes of the movement at the national level.

We can hypothesize from this data that "conservative" redness, a belief in and commitment to the basic values of the pre-Cultural Revolution political system, is related to a "package" of sociological (i.e. "good" class background, relatively low levels of formal education), historical (former service in the PLA), and structural (Party membership and administrative authority) factors which spanned the occupational divide between administrators and technicians. On the "radical" side, we have no clear hypothesis to offer, except the hints that ideological radicalism may be linked to non-proletarian class background, "intellectual" occupation, and higher levels of education.

The above remarks have been based on the simple assumption that political behavior was a direct product of internalized ideological beliefs of various kinds. We would argue, however, that the relationship between ideology and political behavior is far more complex than this simple equation allows. In addition to the relationship discussed above, to which we can refer for convenience as a "belief-based" or "expressive" relationship, we can specify four other models of the relationship between the formal public ideology and political behavior.

(i) Ideology as abstract political dialogue. This relationship between ideology and behavior, which was prevalent to some degree in the early stages of the movement in the unit, implies that political dialogue is conducted in abstract terminology and concepts external to the detailed everyday life of the participants. It implies the acting out, passively or actively, of general terms of argument deemed relevant either to the national political stage or to the level of the central political leadership, with only marginal relevance to

or impact on the attitudes and everyday behavior of people at the basic level. Thus ideology is a dramaturgical phenomenon, segregated from ordinary life experience and cloistered within the confines of small group sessions and "political" meetings.

- (ii) As the Cultural Revolution gathered pace in the unit, however, ideology was important as an agent of specification. We can distinguish two senses of this term. First, ideology specified the types and range of issues which were pertinent to the campaign and the relative legitimacy of different types of issues and patterns of political action. Thus, for example, the subject of class was germane to the ideological themes of the movement, as was the question of cadre behavior. Second, this link between ideology and specific issues led to the phenomenon of people addressing themselves to relatively narrow ranges of ideological concern without generalizing this to wider patterns of ideological discourse and commitment. Thus, for example, a person might become involved in the ideological implications of class discrimination or the question of cadre privilege without generalizing his or her concern to the broader ideological issues of the movement. To the extent, therefore, that the debate over specific issues was ideologically charged in this sense, the roles of concrete political debates and ideological values are empirically, if not analytically, inseparable.
- (iii) The role of ideology in this policy-specific sense is comparable with the more general *linguistic* function of ideology whereby ideological terminology provides a language through which nonideological concerns can be expressed. Thus, a specific instance of personal slight by a cadre might be expressed by the victim as a case of "bureaucratism"; a specific refusal by a cadre to grant an economic supplement might be described as an example of the "capitalist road." Here an issue which was highly personalized or basically irrelevant to the central thrust of the national movement could be expressed in terms of broader ideological categories either as the unconscious result of socialization or as a more conscious response to the terminological requirements of the political process.
- (iv) Finally, there is the *manipulative* use of ideology, more Machiavellian than the above, whereby political actors manipulate verbal or behavioral symbols for personal or group advantage. This clear disjunction between motives and behavior is a phenomenon well recognized in contemporary China, and various political lead-

ers have devoted considerable attention to the detection and rectification of such "bourgeois" conduct. As we have already seen, this form of political behavior was quite common in the unit before, during, and after the Cultural Revolution. Thus, for example, "good" political behavior could come from the heart in a "sincere" (laoshi) fashion, or could be merely a means of amassing "political capital" (zhengzhi ziben), "climbing up" (wang shang pa), or "flattering the cadres" (taohao ganbu).

We believe all these linkages between ideology and political behavior were operative in the unit during the Cultural Revolution and, more generally, have been an important dimension of political behavior and attitudes in the unit in more settled periods between political movements. They should be borne in mind when we proceed to discuss "nonideological" aspects of political behavior in the next sections.

#### Policy and politics

Second, to what extent was politics in the unit an expression of conflict and debate over general policy issues of the Cultural Revolution as a whole? If we examine the specific political issues and alignments which emerged during the movement, several general conclusions emerge. First of all, issues and political alignments did not directly reflect the general policy alternatives which formed much of the substance of political debate in the national movement. Overwhelmingly, the major issues which arose during the Cultural Revolution, though given impetus and legitimacy by changes in the wider political arena, stemmed from and related specifically to the unit itself, i.e., they were questions of intra-unit policy, the most important of which concerned issues of class. Furthermore, to the extent that wider policies entered the debate, they were approached not as substantive issues (i.e., Is a given policy "good" or "bad," "effective," or "ineffective"?) but more a question of how policies were implemented in the unit by individual leading cadres. One set of issues revolved around questions of cadre "work style," while another revolved around the question of bases for cadre decision-making (e.g., discrimination on the basis of class origin or personal ties). The link with the wider arenas of policy outside the unit tended to take the form of implicit or explicit comparison: for example, a comparison of the work style of particular cadres with that of a hypothetical "ideal" cadre derived

from general political discourse; the complaint that class-based discrimination by cadres was not in fact an expression of the "correct" class line, or the argument that decision-making on the basis of personalistic ties was illegitimate in the light of certain universalistic canons of cadre behavior derived from the Maoist theory of leadership. In its various forms, the concentration on cadres and cadre behavior suggests an anti-authority dimension to the movement, a model of conflict between the leaders and the led.

#### Group interest and politics

The specific issues and alignments of the Cultural Revolution were clearly related to constellations of concrete interests among unit members. The range of issues which divided people during the movement had important distributive implications, stemming from both structural differences among unit personnel before the movement and the perceived unequal and/or "unfair" results of cadre decisions which had differential impact on the concrete interests of different classes, groups, and individuals. This suggests a general hypothesis to the effect that the issues which fueled factional struggle and the motives which led people to engage in that struggle were related systematically to certain structural dimensions of the unit before the Cultural Revolution. The most important dimensions were differences in class origin, occupation and education, political status, and possession of administrative authority. The implicit causal chain in this hypothesis runs from structural position to perceived interest, to perceived political or material treatment by the unit leadership, to issue position, to factional alignment. Thus, our findings on the importance of class as a substantive issue during the movement and its relatively high statistical significance in explaining factional alignment show a clear correlation between one important dimension of socio-political structure and Cultural Revolution politics. Likewise, the emphasis on "getting the cadres" during the movement and the clear division between the rebel and conservative factions in terms of their attitudes toward and support for the units' leading cadres suggest that structural differentiation based on administrative authority is an important factor in explaining political divisions during the movement.

Although such structurally determined interests thus have considerable explanatory power, this is limited by several factors. First,

the structural position of a particular person need not coincide with his or her perceived interest and issue position. Thus, for example, although people of "bad" class background tended to perceive and oppose discriminatory behavior by unit cadres, others saw this as a parameter to which they could adjust successfully and therefore did not oppose it. There were a number of possible positions on class issues, and these were related only in a probabilistic way to patterns of actual class origin.

Second, to posit a more or less simple version of the "haves versus have-nots" model would ignore the fact that political cleavages in the unit were partly structured along vertical lines. The conflict between the unit head and the unit vice-head and its factional imprint on the political affiliation of ordinary members of the unit was a very important structural determinant of the political process. Thus, while the unit's leading cadres were mainly passive participants, if not victims, of the movement, factional struggle among the unit staff was in part an acting out of tension between the leading cadres.

Third and perhaps most interesting is the dynamic aspect of unit politics during the Cultural Revolution. As the movement progressed, the nature of "issues" tended to shift from the substantive to the procedural, the latter generated by the conflicts and hostilities emerging from the process of factional politics. To this extent, alignments and commitments increasingly flowed from people's actual participation in the historical movement, not just from their structural positions in the unit or their perceived distributive interests at the movement's outset.

# Particularism and politics

A fourth limitation to the structuralist explanation of the Cultural Revolution in the unit brings us to our final "ideal type" of political process, namely, the *particularistic*. Structural differentiation based on political or socio-economic variables did not necessarily coincide with the network of particularistic relationships which had formed in the unit before the Cultural Revolution. As we have argued above, such networks, whether based on friendship or mutual backscratching, whether horizontal between equals or vertical between patrons and clients (i.e. cadres and their "favorites"), had an important effect in determining the factional alignments and issue positions of many individuals, some of whom were quite important in the movement and the unit. Several key friendship groups played an important role in the formation of factions and provided a disproportionate number of factional activists. To be sure, we have seen that these patterns of friendship had social correlates, but they were far from socially determined. (Exclusive or excessive reliance on a sociological explanation of friendship networks would skirt the question of why some people of particular social backgrounds were part of such networks while others were not.) We have seen how friendship networks could coalesce around personal loyalties and hostilities rooted in the historical experiences of a relatively small number of people who worked in close, continuous contact with each other and relative isolation from others. For example, the major friendship groups in both the rebel and conservative factions formed around experiences on either side of the Four Cleans movement in the unit. And even beyond the structured semiparticularism of friendship networks, there were many other cases in which particularistic factors intensified by the unit's size, internal intimacy, and external isolation played an important part in determining people's attitudes to different cadres during the movement and determining the intensity of their political involvement.

#### Conclusion

The Cultural Revolution in this unit was a complex affair in which the multifaceted pattern of political participation reflected the richness of the human and historical settings in which it took place. While our statistical analysis has pointed up which of the potential independent variables are most and least useful in understanding the factional choices and levels of activism of the unit staff, we have been unable to find one or two to which all the others can be reduced or by which the pattern of political action can be satisfactorily explained. Our finding that class background was the most important single variable affecting factional choice, even when controlling for other social and political factors, does little more than establish and alert us to the fact that the class issue was a real one to the people in this unit, not an epiphenomenon, a surrogate for other concerns, or a ritualistic theme imported from the national movement. But the class question did not stand in isolation. In this unit (and no doubt in many others throughout China) it was mediated through several other factors which overlapped and intercorrelated with class, such as occupational and authority cleavages and the structure of political stratification. The class question often found expression in the actual political movement through issues of occupational and authority relations and political stratification, while at the same time conditioning those relations and the issues raised about them in the movement.

The importance of the linked issues of class, occupational relations, authority, and political status at the level of political behavior suggests that their expression at the ideological level rested on a real rather than ritualistic base. Still, the very complexity of the structural and historical bases on which the ideological formations in the unit rested and out of which they formed contributed to their diffuseness, particularly on the rebel side, where more ideological innovation was required. Coming full circle, because of this diffuseness, each ideological formation (and, therefore, corresponding faction) could attract different people for different reasons. As we have seen, these reasons ran the gamut from generalized ideological commitment to identification with a social class or group, to affiliation with a network of friends, to highly particularistic concerns and experiences.

We wish, therefore, to close this discussion on a phenomenological note. The Cultural Revolution provided different people in the unit with an historical opportunity to express and act upon some very different political and personal concerns. The pattern of political alignment, participation, and expression we have analyzed is actually a complex composite of a number of subpatterns which emerged in a small, isolated, self-contained, and totalistic human community that linked them together. The complexity of these connected patterns is reflected both in the results of our statistical analysis and in the tortuous historical course which the movement took in this unit.

The phenomenological complexity of Cultural Revolution politics in this unit suggests to us that the movement was a relatively genuine (as opposed to ritualistic) form of human political expression. After all, human communities such as this unit are extremely complicated entities, in which the same structures, symbols, norms, and historical experiences have different meanings and significance to the various people that constitute them. If the politics of the Cultural Revolution had revolved around a simple set of issues or

pattern of cleavage, we would be justified in suspecting a strong element of ritualism. Our analysis of this unit, however, points in quite the opposite direction.

To the extent that this was the case throughout China, any evaluation of the implications and significance of the Cultural Revolution as a whole must remain as complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous as the movement itself. This is particularly important to note in the context of the recent polemical debates both within and, in a somewhat more subtle though no less clear form, outside China<sup>56</sup> in which the Cultural Revolution has been reduced to a relatively simple set of policies or historical events which can be characterized as good or bad. Keeping this in mind, we turn in the next and last chapter to the impact of the Cultural Revolution on this unit.

# The Impact of the Cultural Revolution

# The revolutionary committee and the balance of political forces

In organizational terms, the new organ of authority—the revolutionary committee—which emerged during the final stage of the movement in late 1969 and 1970 represented a clear departure from the unit's organizational setup before the movement. The former positions of unit head and vice-head and the specialized committees under them were combined into one conciliar unit, linking subunits horizontally and linking cadres and masses vertically. It is important to note, however, that the former diarchy of unit head and vice-head remained embedded in the new institution —they were both vice-directors of the revolutionary committee under the PLA representative. In the early stages, in late 1969 and early 1970, however, there appears to have been little functional specialization within this multifunctional body, and lines of authority were diffuse and unclear. As the situation stabilized, however, and the organizational structure of the unit was reconstituted, three "groups" (zu) were established under the authority of the revolutionary committee. The "production group" (shengchan zu) incorporated the former technical section and the subunits, whose composition was changed in two ways. First, for apparent reasons of administrative convenience, the supply section, formerly under the unit head and vice-head, was brought under the authority of the new production group. Second, more importantly, the former staff of the technical section were no longer guaranteed the same freedom of action on technical matters that they enjoyed before the Cultural Revolution. They were now directly subordinate to

the head and vice-head of the production group, who were both technicians and Party members, two of the few unit staff members who were formally both "red" and "expert." Whereas the engineer and his assistant had formerly exercised supreme technical authority, said Mr. Ji, they now became technical consultants, whose role was only significant in the case of technical problems which their newly appointed superiors could not solve. This change is obviously important in that, on the one hand, it embodies the subordination of expertise (the engineer) to "redness" (the two new Party-member appointees), and on the other hand, it represents the fusion of technical and political-administrative authority, since the new appointees were technically qualified.

The other two groups, the "political work group" (zhenggong zu) and the "management group" (banshi zu), did not represent any major change. The former was coterminous with the former political office, and the latter amalgamated the various administrative subunits formerly under the unit head and vice-head.

As we described earlier, in political terms the revolutionary committee initially reflected the balance of political forces in the unit in the period 1969-1970, both between the different factions and between cadres and masses. Though the conservatives had a clear plurality with eight seats and could probably count on support from the PLA director (who, according to Mr. Ji, "leaned to the conservatives") and, initially at least, from representatives of the third faction, the other two factions did have significant representation in the new organ of power. In the initial stage, for example, membership on its executive standing committee was shared equally between the conservatives and the other two factions. This reflects the efforts of the PLA representative and the workers' propaganda team to forge the committee out of a genuine "great alliance" of the different factions. The composition of the new committee also reflected the principle of mass representation, for in the early stages two thirds of its members were mass representatives. In the early stages, moreover, there was a roughly similar ratio of mass to cadre representatives on the executive standing committee (the PLA director, two cadre representatives, and four mass representatives).

We can trace two fairly distinct stages in the history of the revolutionary committee during the three years after the height of the movement. In the first stage, from late 1969 to 1972, certain

trends were in evidence which gradually eroded much of the impact of the Cultural Revolution. As a result of the "clean class ranks" movement and the "liberation" of former cadres in late 1969 and early 1970, the influence of the conservative faction increased and that of the rebel and third factions declined. The top leader of the third faction, for example, a mass representative on the committee, fell victim to this movement. Factional tensions also tended to decline as a new system of specialized authority was established. On the one hand, responsible appointments were made to people who, though on different sides of the factional fences, were distinguished by their general political inoffensiveness, i.e., they did not irritate factional sensibilities. The new head of the "production group" (see p. 112) was just such a former rebel faction member, as was his deputy, a former conservative. On the other hand, there was an apparent attempt to co-opt a more "radical" former rebel mass representative (a technician) by appointing him to a responsible position as head of one of the specialized groups working at the unit headquarters.

As the factional balance shifted, so did the balance between cadre and mass influence in the revolutionary committee. As former cadres were "liberated," they were placed on the revolutionary committee where their numbers, skill, and experience came to outweigh the mass representatives. As the unit resumed its normal activities and political matters increasingly gave way to administrative and professional tasks, moreover, the revolutionary committee as a whole lost power to its standing committee, and the mass representatives on the standing committee became less influential. Their opinions were increasingly ignored, and they spoke less and less.

These trends were dramatized and intensified by two crucial events in 1972. The director of the revolutionary committee, the PLA representative, left the unit and the unit's former vice-head was transferred out to another unit. The provincial bureau to which the unit was subordinate felt that the frequent arguments between the former unit head and vice-head were hampering the unit's work. It is significant, however, that it was the *vice-head*, the focal point of rebel organizing and support during the Cultural Revolution, who was transferred and not the former unit head, who had been a rallying point for the conservatives. The transfer was clearly a shattering blow to rebel influence in the revolutionary committee.

This did not mean, however, that the former unit head automatically became director of the revolutionary committee. The former unit vice-head was replaced by an outsider, and both the outsider and the unit head continued as vice-directors, the post of director lying vacant until 1974.

The second major event was that most of the unit's former ranking cadres were placed on the revolutionary committee's standing committee in 1972. Five in all, they included the former union chairperson, the personnel group head, the propaganda group head (who now became head of political work), the Young Communist League secretary, and the cadre formerly in charge of the unit's farm. All of them had either sympathized with or been members of the conservative faction, and all had been criticized by the rebel and third factions during the movement. The implications for the balance of political forces in the revolutionary committee are obvious. Cadres, mostly the unit's own former leading cadres, now dominated the standing committee. The victory of the conservatives was made crushingly obvious. There remained only one cadre representative on the standing committee who had supported the rebel faction, and even he had not been deeply involved in factional activities. In addition, the rebel and third factions together had two mass representatives on the standing committee (out of four), but these were now clearly outnumbered and were not influential in unit decision-making. Focusing on the standing committee's cadre members, there were only two "new faces" (omitting the outside replacement for the former vice-head). One was the former member of the rebel faction mentioned above, a politically innocuous technician who became head of the new production group in charge of professional work. The other was a former member of the conservative faction, also politically uncontroversial, who became vice-head of the production group. All the other cadre members of the standing committee (again omitting the vice-head's replacement) were pre-Cultural Revolution cadres who either continued in their previous areas of experience or expertise or were given jobs with commensurate authority. Thus, to summarize our findings, although by 1973 the new organ of power retained residual expressions of Cultural Revolution innovations, notably factional alliance, collective leadership and mass representation, in terms of personnel and political complexion not a great deal had changed as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

It is interesting to note that the major changes of 1972 did not bring administrative stability to the unit. The continuation of a duumvirate at the head of the revolutionary committee led to predictable clashes between the former head and his outsider associate (who outranked him in terms of occupational salary-grade). The remnants of mass initiative and factional affiliation stemming from the Cultural Revolution, moreover, created fissures which led to further personnel changes at the top. The newly arrived vicedirector found himself outvoted in standing committee meetings by former ranking cadres who thought he did not know how things in the unit worked. When certain issues were raised by the leadership at meetings of the whole unit, the former cadres were able to enlist the support of former members of the conservative faction. The new vice-director made an abortive attempt to gain the support of former rebels—after that failed, he was transferred out of the unit. The former unit head himself fell sick (officially at least), and both he and his outsider rival were replaced by two new outside appointments in 1974. This time, a clear distinction was made between the roles of unit head and unit vice-head, replicating in structure the unequal duumvirate in operation before the Cultural Revolution.

# Party reorganization and recruitment

Reconstitution of the unit's Party organization after the Cultural Revolution was also a prolonged process. A Party committee was not formally reestablished until 1974, owing to uncertainties about the nature of the new power structure, to problems in reestablishing administrative order, to the expansion of Party membership stemming from a general growth in the unit's staff and a recruitment drive in 1973, and to factional disagreement over the qualifications of old and new Party members. The recruitment drive of 1973 increased Party membership by 23% to fifty-eight (24% of eligible staff). According to Mr. Ji, this drive expanded membership to the point that the Party leadership was able to convert the previous general branch committee (zong zhi wei) into a full-fledged Party committee (dang wei).

The process of Party reconstitution went through two stages. The first was "rectification" (zheng dang), in which former Party members and cadres were examined for political faults and their membership confirmed. As far as Mr. Ji was aware, nobody was expelled from the Party after the Cultural Revolution. Second, the process of "reestablishing the Party" (jian dang) was started by a preparatory committee established in 1972 under the leadership of the PLA representative (who left soon afterward).

This preparatory committee was dominated by members of the pre-Cultural Revolution general branch committee. It supervised the recruitment drive for new members which, in accordance with directives from above, was aimed at several specific categories of people, viz. young people, technicians, and workers. Formal political criteria were apparently relaxed to meet these objectives. Looking at the total Party membership of fifty-eight after the drive, twenty-three were administrative personnel which, though a relative decline (40% compared with 48% previously), still amounted to a significant overrepresentation of administrative staff (who constituted only 16% of the total staff of the unit). Twenty-two members were manual workers (38% of total Party membership compared with 37% previously), a ratio about proportional to the percentage of workers in the unit (36%). There were thirteen technicians in the Party (22% of total membership compared with 15% previously), which amounted to continued underrepresentation of technicians, who constituted 47% of the unit's staff. In relative terms, however, it is clear that the recruitment drive did advance somewhat the relative position of technicians in the Party at the expense of administrative personnel.

This attempt to redress the balance of occupational representation is more obvious if we focus on the eleven new Party members recruited in 1973 (one of whom was already a candidate member before the Cultural Revolution). Six were technicians, four workers, and only one an administrator. Nearly all were relatively young (ten out of eleven were between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five). The major criteria for recruitment were good political behavior and professional work with an implicit criterion of good relations with the unit's cadres. Prospective Party members were also supposed to have made no "big mistakes" in the Cultural Revolution and to have "good" class backgrounds (nine of the new members were from poor or lower-middle peasant backgrounds, one was a "petty trader" or "hawker" (xiaofan), and one an upper-middle peasant).

Not surprisingly, the procedure and criteria of selection were a

bone of contention among members of the various factions. The reconstitution of the Party apparatus and expansion of Party membership, however, were both a reflection and a reinforcement of the reemergent dominance of former cadres and conservative forces generally. Nine out of the eleven new Party members were former conservatives. And of the two recruits who had been rebels, one had already been a candidate member of the Party before the Cultural Revolution. The conservatives at first refused to admit him to full membership because of his behavior on the rebel side during the Cultural Revolution and his class background (which was "middling"). He was finally admitted during the 1973 recruitment drive, but apparently somewhat grudgingly.

The reemergence of pre-Cultural Revolution cadres and the predominance of the conservatives are also clear if we look at the reconstituted Party cadre apparatus. The former unit head and Party secretary became vice-secretary of the Party preparatory committee and continued as de facto secretary after the PLA representative left the unit. If we look at those people given responsible positions in the new Party apparatus, either as members of the Party committee or as cadres in subordinate Party units, eight out of a total of thirteen had been Party cadres before the Cultural Revolution. Leaving aside two new faces who arrived in the unit during or after the movement (both of whom had joined the Party while in the PLA), nine out of the remaining eleven had joined or sympathized with the conservatives during the Cultural Revolution, one had vacillated between two factions, and one had been a lukewarm member of the rebel faction. The general picture, therefore, is of continued domination of the Party at all levels by those forces branded as "conservatives" during the movement.

If we look at the newly constituted Party committee from another angle, however—that of the relationship between political and professional expertise—it appears that a serious attempt was made to include people who were both "red" and "expert." Three out of the nine members of the new Party committee identified by Mr. Ji were fairly young technicians who were now either specializing in political-administrative work or "wearing two caps" with both professional and political authority. This phenomenon, combined with the recruitment of more technicians into the Party in 1973, provides additional evidence of an attempt to close the structural gap between the professional and the political-adminis-

trative sides of the unit which had found partial expression in the political cleavages of the Cultural Revolution.

#### The status of occupational groups

In general, the Cultural Revolution caused a decline in the social position of intellectuals. "Ordinary people changed their views of intellectual occupations," said Mr. Ji, "and came to regard intellectuals with hostility." At the same time, however, the position of technicians was less affected than that of their intellectual counterparts in cultural spheres, owing to their possession of crucial skills and their importance for the economy. As Mr. Ji put it, "my skills were still respected, if not me." The decline in the position of intellectuals was reflected to some extent in the choice of marriage partners and the more skeptical attitudes of young people toward the prospect of higher education.<sup>57</sup>

In the unit, more specifically, the most significant expression of the decline in the position of technical staff was the establishment of a new supervision system whereby workers were organized to manage (guanli) and lead (lingdao) technicians in their professional work, to act as watchdogs on their political reliability, and to supervise their political education. This system was designed as a concrete realization of the principle of "working class leadership over everything" (gongren jieji lingdao yichie), which was theoretically counterposed to the principle of "skill in command" (jishu guashuai) which Maoists claimed to have been dominant before the movement. It was relatively ineffective at the unit headquarters, where the work carried on by the specialized technical subunits was too sophisticated for ordinary workers to understand (and only two of these subunits had workers on their staffs in any case). The supervision system had more impact on the fieldwork teams and small-groups. In the latter, the group head (a technician) was required to submit weekly, biweekly, and monthly work plans to one of the group's workers (known as a "political and propaganda personnel" [zhengzhi xuanquan yuan]) who was to check them over and approve them. In practice, this process depended on the nature of the personal relationship between the particular worker and technician concerned. Mr. Ji estimated that in twothirds of the fieldwork small-groups relations were good, and the plans were either not submitted to the workers concerned or their approval was merely formal. In the other third, workers could cause trouble for small-group heads by raising objections to the plan or by communicating problems to higher levels through a regular system of monthly reports (huibao). Even when the supervisory system worked without friction, however, technicians generally resented it as a sign of lack of confidence in and respect for their work. Mr. Ji expressed his bitterness in no uncertain terms:

[The worker-supervisor] acted very pompously (for example, telling us to hurry up). But he really had no idea what we were doing; we had to show him our work, but he couldn't understand it. On the surface, relations were all right, but deep down there was a lot of hostility on both sides. We had to respect him, while he was trying to get revenge [baofu] on us. This was not necessarily personal revenge—he could feel it even if he did not know us personally before the Cultural Revolution. This revenge is more a structural [zhengti] thing.

Turning to economic matters, however, no attempt was made to reduce economic differentials between occupational groups after the movement. A wage revision was introduced in 1972, the impact of which was primarily to reduce differentials within occupational wage-grade systems by promoting people at the lowest levels on each scale by one or two grades. Specifically, manual workers previously at levels 1 through 3, technicians level 15 and below, and administrative staff level 24 and below were all promoted by one grade. Manual workers who had begun work before 1960 and were still at grade 1 were promoted two grades.

In general, the role of technicians after the Cultural Revolution was more ambiguous and circumscribed than before. They were hemmed in by tighter constraints from both cadres (through a tighter system of political surveillance to be discussed below) and masses (i.e. workers). Political virtue was emphasized vis-à-vis professional skill, and many questions of promotion, particularly along the wage-grade scale and especially for more senior technicians, remained unresolved.

# Political atmosphere and interpersonal relations

The Cultural Revolution influenced the general political atmosphere in the unit in several ways. The system of political control and education was strengthened, partly through the new system of worker supervision, partly by a general tightening of the political

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reporting network. Apart from the activities of the new worker "political and propaganda personnel," fieldwork small-group heads (technicians) were also expected to provide more substantial political information in the technical work reports they submitted monthly to their supervisors at the fieldwork team level. The frequency and intensity of study sessions also increased. Before the Cultural Revolution, they averaged once a week or once every two weeks, but in the period immediately after the movement they were held twice or three times a week.

Turning to the question of political attitudes, unit staff members, particularly those who had participated actively in factional politics, emerged from the turmoil of the late 1960s with widely varying appraisals of their experience. Mr. Ji distinguished four types of attitude held by different groups of people. First, Mr. Ji described certain people as "comparatively red" (bijiao hongde), mainly former members of the conservative faction but also including some members of the third faction, who tended to have relatively low levels of education, a high rate of Party membership or PLA experience, good class backgrounds, and a high level of political commitment to the general values of the Chinese polity. In Mr. Ji's opinion, this type of person believed that the Cultural Revolution had in fact been a struggle between opposing ideological lines and accepted at face value the contents of official documents and media.

A second group included most former rebels, who did not share this point of view and held a more "complex" assessment of the situation, which resulted from their defeat in the Cultural Revolution. Their failure led them to lose confidence in the central government and to feel that the Cultural Revolution had really been about questions of power (quanli wenti) at the central level which were merely replicated at lower levels in the political system, including their unit.

As a third type, Mr. Ji identified a small number of technicians who felt that the movement had been an odd (qiguai) affair, a testimonial to the inexplicability (moming qimiao) of politics, a process which could not be subjected to scientific analysis. Because of the opacity and unpredictability of politics, they felt that scientists and technicians who got involved would only be used by other people for their own political interests. The best path was to avoid politics and concentrate their efforts on professional work.

Fourth, Mr. Ji identified a number of the former ranking cadres who, while taking the first ("comparatively red") view on the surface, in reality felt that the Cultural Revolution was merely the latest manifestation of certain perennial patterns of Chinese politics. According to this view, Chinese political history was a series of power struggles at the top in which questions of morality, the rights and wrongs of the conflict, were always defined by the winner. Thus, according to this view, just because Liu Shaoqi lost his position during the Cultural Revolution did not necessarily mean he was wrong.

Viewed phenomenologically, these four sets of perceptions represent different patterns of experience during the movement and different sets of conclusions drawn from it. Former conservative believers could see their own beliefs in the system vindicated by their victory over the rebels. The political cynicism of former rebels, on the other hand, reflected the bitterness of political defeat. The "politics is unpredictable" tendency among technicians reflected the experience of people who were caught up in the early wave of political activity in the unit but who had their fingers burned or developed a distaste for the excesses and irrationalities of the factional struggle in its latter stages. The fourth view represented a certain nostalgia among senior cadres for the previous system personified by Liu Shaoqi.

Looking at the unit as a whole, however, Mr. Ji detected a more generalized political weariness: "People were just tired of politics after the Cultural Revolution." As a result, the response to new political movements, notably the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, was flaccid. Mr. Ji suggested two sets of motivations which, we might add, appear to be those of winners and losers: some people felt that the unit's problems had basically been solved during the Cultural Revolution, so further movements were otiose; others felt that since the Cultural Revolution had not been successful, further movements could not achieve much either.

Although the general level of political interest and activism declined, the political antagonism between rebels and conservatives continued into the 1970s in a more attenuated form. Although the conservatives gradually reestablished political dominance, rebel leaders and activists tried to make use of documents or media messages, particularly calls for a new campaign for the study of Mao, or for criticism and self-criticism, in order to attack pre-Cultural

Revolution cadres who had regained their positions. Since the ranking cadres controlled political communications in the unit, however, the rebels were unsuccessful in their attempts to convert these political messages into calls for action against the cadres. But they were able to press criticisms against cadres in small-group, subunit, or unit meetings and had indirect effect through informal criticisms discussed among themselves, notably among members of the rebel friendship group. Even operating at this reduced level, however, it appears that they were a thorn in the side of the cadres, particularly the former unit head. In fact, this may well have contributed to his early retirement from the unit.

Factionalism also influenced other areas of life in the unit after the Cultural Revolution. As we saw earlier, there were several cases in which people who had been friends before the Cultural Revolution were estranged during the movement. At the same time, many pre-Cultural Revolution patterns of friendship and hostility were strengthened by factional alignments during the Cultural Revolution.

Former factional ties also affected relationships among people at work. For example, during the years 1971 and 1972, factional loyalties influenced the relationships between workers and technicians as well as between people of the same occupation in the mobile small-groups. In a minority of cases, if a small-group head had been an active participant in a particular faction, the revolutionary committee made a special effort to give him an assistant from the same faction. In general, though, even immediately after the end of the movement, the major criterion for the allocation of work and work posts was technical—factional questions were a secondary aspect of this process, and their importance tended to dwindle over time.

The Cultural Revolution also left its mark in the form of the various "verdicts" passed on people for their "mistakes" during the Cultural Revolution or their "problems" which came to light during the movement. As we have seen, this process of investigation and labeling was mainly carried out during the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution (the "clean class ranks" campaign). Though most people were cleared, several people were punished through entries in their dossiers which would have a negative impact on their future professional careers.

Summarizing these conclusions, it appears that staff members

emerged from the movement with different evaluations of its significance and its degree of success. Although the political system tightened in the immediate period after the movement and there were two fresh campaigns between 1971 and 1974, the general level of political interest among staff members dropped off considerably. A small number of people carried marks of their "mistakes" written into their personnel dossiers on into the 1970s. Factional antagonisms continued to create some divisiveness in both political and professional arenas. It appears, however, that over the period from 1972 to 1974, factional divisions grew less important, and the strictness of the political atmosphere yielded to a great concentration on stable administration and technical coordination.

#### The behavior of cadres

What impact did the Cultural Revolution have on the general exercise of authority in the unit and the nature of concrete decision-making by unit cadres, which were, after all, its central political issues? We can discuss this question under two headings. First, what impact did cadres' experience of the movement have on their behavior? Second, did the Cultural Revolution bring about any lasting changes in the status of cadres in comparison with the situation in the mid-1960s?

Most of the unit's former leading cadres were criticized during the movement, some of them quite savagely. Some were able to avoid the brunt of the attack by slipping away and returning when things were beginning to return to normal. In theory, their return to power in 1972 gave them a golden opportunity to wreak revenge on their former tormentors. Mr. Ji was only able to locate two clear cases of personal revenge by a cadre on his former assailants, both perpetrated by the former personnel group head, who used his control over confidential files to even old scores. In one case, he allegedly attempted (unsuccessfully) to block a staff member's transfer by filing a secret report criticizing his behavior in the Cultural Revolution. In another case, as mentioned earlier, he tried to prevent a marriage by failing to forward a staff member's file to the prospective spouse's unit. It is significant that he failed to prevent the outcome in both cases, though he did succeed in delaying each process for an exasperatingly long period.

In general, after the Cultural Revolution cadres were influenced to some extent by their experiences during it as well as by their factional proclivities, mainly conservative. Their biases found expression, as we have seen, in the patterns of recruitment to the Party and the revolutionary committee. They were also reflected in decisions on job assignments, job (as opposed to wage) promotions, and transfers. We can check some of these biases by looking at the statistics for various forms of political and professional movement in the unit after the Cultural Revolution. To give statistical support for our earlier assertions about political mobility in the unit after the movement, out of a total of twenty people who moved upward to a position of political or administrative authority, fifteen (75%) were former conservative supporters, three (15%) rebels, and two (10%) third faction members. Looking at professional mobility in the early 1970s, out of a total of thirteen upward movements, nine (69%) were former conservatives and four (31%) former rebels. Looking at transfers out of the unit after the Cultural Revolution, it is interesting that out of a total of eight transfers out of the unit, six (75%) were former rebel supporters, one (13%) third faction, and only one (13%) conservative.

Though these figures and our earlier analysis clearly support a picture of dominance by conservative elements which produced decisional biases of various kinds, neither these data nor Mr. Ji's personal evaluation suggest that the conservatives were able to ride completely roughshod over their former opponents. They were not able to deny totally access to professional, political, distributive, and administrative opportunities to former rebels. We can cite several factors to account for this. First, much of the restabilization process was conducted under the supervision of various outsiders who had no direct stake in the unit's political configuration (notably, the PLA representative, the vice-head's replacement, and the eventual replacements for both unit head and vice-head in 1974). Second, the wider political process after the Cultural Revolution, insofar as it continued many of the themes of the Cultural Revolution, provided implicit legitimation for the criticisms leveled by former rebels at the new leadership. Third, the rebels themselves, notably the core group of friends, constituted a not insignificant political "bloc" after the Cultural Revolution which was capable of embarrassing the cadres, exposing any "deviations," and generally applying pressure to keep them on their toes. Last,

the unit's priorities of the early 1970s were heavily focused on restoring productivity and technical coordination and making up for the several years of work lost during the movement. A tough crackdown or vengeful backlash by former cadres and their conservative supporters would have created tension and hostility which would have affected the technical efficiency of the unit, since many former members of the rebel faction were skilled and hard-working technicians.

Whatever the relative influence of each of these factors, attempts were clearly made by the new leadership to compromise among factional claims, to admit some members of the rebel faction to positions of administrative and professional authority, and to conciliate and muffle factional disagreements in the unit as a whole. We have already mentioned compromises over certain professional appointments, notably the appointment of a former rebel supporter to the important position of production group head. We have also discussed attempts by the leadership to remove the potential for factional dissension on the job by rearranging work assignments. To the extent that these and other efforts at conciliation were successful, they muted the antagonisms generated during the Cultural Revolution and kept the reassertion of conservative dominance within limits.

It is also important to ask whether cadres behaved in any way differently than they did before the Cultural Revolution. Clearly some aspects of cadre behavior which were criticized during the Cultural Revolution continued into the 1970s, notably favoritism in distributing certain benefits and positions—especially economic supplements and allocation of employment to children of staff members—and discrimination on the basis of class. Moreover, cadres still retained certain privileges, for example, access to services such as transport, telephones, and better housing. It is impossible for us to estimate the degree of change from pre-Cultural Revolution practices, since Mr. Ji was not able to provide a detailed description of the situation before the movement. We would hypothesize, however, that such cadre "deviations" became more constrained after the Cultural Revolution for several reasons: cadres' own painful experiences during the Cultural Revolution and the fear of repetition in the future; the presence of former rebel critics who were still watching their behavior; the fact that the Cultural Revolution opened up a wide area of cadre decision-

making to mass scrutiny and criticism, and many of these issues remained on the agenda for both public and private discussion in the unit after the movement; and, finally, the continuation of Cultural Revolution themes in the political messages emanating from the Center in Beijing. All these factors, we would argue, contributed to the imposition of constraints or checks on cadre behavior which were not present or, if present, not as influential before the Cultural Revolution.

## General conclusions on the impact of the movement

Looking at the general political impact of the Cultural Revolution on the unit, it is important to emphasize two key dimensions of the question. First, the impact was uneven in its effects on different sections of the unit's staff. For certain groups, notably factional leaders and active faction members, the experience was a relatively profound one and continued to shape their attitudes and behavior well into the 1970s. For others, notably certain key cadres and those who were attacked for their "bad" class backgrounds or "historical problems," the Cultural Revolution was often traumatic. We must not forget that one senior cadre took his life in the movement. For many others, the Cultural Revolution had relatively superficial significance—they either stayed out of the factional strife or merely went along or were swept along for the ride.

Second, if we focus on the aftermath of the movement, although the impact was fresh in people's minds and the innovations of the movement quite significant in the period from 1970 to 1972, it appears that these changes gradually eroded or "wore off" as the unit resumed its normal technological tasks in 1973 and 1974.

Bearing these two qualifications in mind, let us now summarize the specific dimensions of the Cultural Revolution's impact. The movement had significant influence on the alignment of political forces in the unit, whether in the form of "horizontal" factional affiliations or hostilities, or "vertical" antipathies or alliances between specific groups of leaders and led. In many cases, these alignments or antagonisms were reinforced by friendship or patronclient relationships.

To a limited degree, this new political constellation implied a limited redistribution of power within the unit, achieved through

the presence of mass representatives on the revolutionary committee and the existence of a critical segment among the staff who exerted implicit or explicit pressure on the cadres. This should not obscure the fact, however, that with the exception of former cadres who left the unit, all the pre-Cultural Revolution cadres were in fact restored to positions of preeminence comparable with those they enjoyed before the Cultural Revolution. In the early 1970s, although these cadres did not "decide everything," they had reassumed dominant control over the affairs of the unit.

The Cultural Revolution also brought certain organizational changes in its train, notably the collegial principle of the revolutionary committee which, initially at least, substituted for the diarchic system in operation up to 1967. Although it can be argued that the revolutionary committee brought certain organizational benefits of greater coordination and responsiveness to the unit's decision-making apparatus, it is also important to point out two things: first, by 1974 the unit's Party committee apparatus had been reestablished and proceeded to exert comprehensive control over the activities of the revolutionary committee; and, second, the diarchic institution of the unit head and vice-head reemerged within the collective matrix of the committee.

Changes in attitudes are particularly hard to assess, particularly given our methodological monism and detachment. Our conclusions here must therefore be most tentative. Staff members appear to have emerged from the movement with widely different perceptions of its significance and achievements. The movement left a legacy of solidarities and hostilities in various forms, which shaped the nature of interpersonal relations into the 1970s. At the same time, the Cultural Revolution seems to have led to a greater awareness of both a number of issues and a new range of information, which generated concerns and knowledge that were to change the content of public and private discourse for some time to come. The Cultural Revolution highlighted the unit's problems and gave unit staff far more information about their leaders and each other than they had had before. The political themes of the Cultural Revolution also seem to have changed and expanded the agenda of legitimate political issues which, though contracting to some extent after the movement, was still quite a bit broader than before. At the same time, many of these issues and problems remained unresolved, and not a few more were created. Among the unresolved issues were those of class, of cadre privilege, of distributive decision-making, and of political-professional relations; the creation of new issues arose from the temporary suspension of the unit's organization and its technical work as well as the lingering effects of the political strife experienced by the unit.

In short, though there were changes in the unit which coincided to some extent with the wider goals of the Cultural Revolution, the movement created as well as solved problems, left many previous problems unsolved, and failed to institute the sweeping degree of transformation which the ideology of the movement had demanded. The resulting ambiguities both reflected and were compounded by the larger ambiguities of ideology and policy emanating from the Party Center in the early and mid-1970s. That the Cultural Revolution in this unit did resonate to genuine and deeply felt human concerns suggests that despite the attempts of the post-Mao leadership to lay them to rest, these concerns—only partially revolved and continually recurring in new and old forms—may yet find expression anew in old or new ways in Chinese politics.

# **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> For case studies of central and county-level bureaucratic units, see A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). For a county public security bureau, see Victor H. Li, "The Public Security Bureau and Political-Legal Work in Hui-yang, 1952-64," in John W. Lewis, ed., The City in Communist China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 51-74. For rural units, see, among others, A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China; Gordon Bennett, Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People's Commune (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); Elizabeth and Graham Johnson, Walking on Two Legs: Rural Development in South China (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1976); Jan Myrdal, Report From a Chinese Village (New York: Signet Books, 1965); John Pelzel, "Economic Management of a Production Brigade in Post-Leap China," in W. E. Willmott, ed., Economic Organization in Chinese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 387-414; and Tang Tsou, Marc Blecher, and Mitch Meisner, "Organization, Growth and Equality in Xiyang County," Modern China V, 1 and 2 (January and April 1979), 3-39 and 139-185. For a case study of a factory, see Mitch Meisner, "The Shenyang Transformer Factory—A Profile," The China Quarterly, No. 52 (October-December 1972), 717-737. For a study of an educational institution, see Sidney L. Greenblatt, "Organizational Elites and Social Change at Peking University," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 451-497.

As such, the results of this study can be compared with other studies on the impact of the Cultural Revolution on basic-level institutions, such as Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Jan Myrdal and Gun Kessle, China: The Revolution Continued (New York: Vintage Books, 1972); Victor Nee, "The Cultural Revolution at Peking University," Monthly Review, 21:3 (July-August 1969); William Hinton, Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University, Ibid., 24:3 (July-August 1972); Gordon Bennett and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (New York: Anchor Books, 1972).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, "The Field of Political Sociology," in L. A. Coser, ed., *Political Sociology* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 26.

- <sup>4</sup> Mr. Ji suggested these four types of "problems" to us. We discuss them in later chapters.
- <sup>5</sup> According to Mr. Ji, this was not the case for "professional units" (shiyexing danwei) such as schools, scientific research institutions, and banks. Nor did this exception apply to "administrative organs" (guanli jigou) or government departments at the county level and above.
- <sup>6</sup> For this form of organizational system before the Cultural Revolution, see Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 188-194; for the situation after the Cultural Revolution, see Marianne Bastid, "Levels of Economic Decision-Making," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), esp. pp. 187-188.
- <sup>7</sup> For example, in Mr. Ji's graduating class from a distinguished university in the east, the most preferred job allocations were to research institutes in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Nonresearch positions, such as data collection and analysis (which were the primary functions of this unit), particularly in more economically backward and inland parts of the country, were considered to be decidedly second-rate allocations.
- $^{8}$  Our survey (N = 248) includes every person who was employed by the unit between 1968 and 1974. But because of a rather small number of transfers of personnel in and out of the unit during this period, at any particular time there were slightly fewer people working there.
- <sup>9</sup> The standard deviation was 7.
- <sup>10</sup> For comprehensive discussions of the notion of "cadre," see A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China; John W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963); and Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China.
- <sup>11</sup> For background information on the wage system in the state sector, see Christopher Howe, "Labor Organization and Incentives, Before and After the Cultural Revolution," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China, pp. 233-256; Peter Schran, "Institutional Continuity and Motivational Change: the Chinese Industrial Wage System, 1950-1973," Asian Survey, XIV:II (November 1974), 1014-1032.
- 12 It is interesting here to compare one of the findings of Shi Guoheng's [Shih Kuo-heng's] classic study of a state-run factory during the late Republican period: "Wage means much more to the earners than simple economic gain. It is a token of social prestige." Shi Guoheng [Shih Kuo-heng], China Enters the Machine Age: A Study of Labor in China War Industry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1944), p. 68.
- <sup>13</sup> To be more precise, administrative cadres of levels 15, 16, and 17 were commonly referred to as "county or regiment level cadres" (xiantuanji ganbu) or, in the city, "office-head level cadres" (chuzhangji ganbu). Moving higher up the cadre scale, a grade 13 is equivalent to an army general, 11-13 to a province vice-head, and 8-10 to a province head (shengzhang). Levels 8-13 are generally referred to as "province level cadres."
- <sup>14</sup> New appointees with equivalent levels of education had apparently done

- better in the 1950s than in the 1960s. Before about 1956-57, said Mr. Ji, vocational middle-school graduates were initially appointed at grade 14, after then at grade 16. Likewise, college graduates had declined from grade 12 to grade 13.
- 15 For a general discussion of the relationship between class and education up to the late 1960s, see R. F. Price, Education in Communist China (New York: Praeger, 1970), esp. pp. 168-169. For a study on the specific question of college recruitment, see Robert Taylor, Education and University Enrollment Policies in China, 1949-1971 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973).
- <sup>16</sup> In comparative terms, it is hard to judge whether these ratios are high or not. One could hypothesize, however, that the relatively sensitive nature of the unit's technical work would lead to a recruitment policy or pattern favoring the more politically and security conscious ex-soldiers.
- <sup>17</sup> He had received training in communications technology in the Guomindang navy and had been transferred to similar work in the PLA after 1949.
- <sup>18</sup> For a general discussion of the political role of ex-soldiers in contemporary China, see Gordon White, "Social Inequality and Distributive Politics in China, 1949-1969" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1977), Chapter 7.
- <sup>19</sup> Mr. Ji distinguished between "secret" (baomi) and "top-secret" (juemi) materials. Technicians in the unit had access to both types of material connected with their work. People from outside the unit needed the permission of the unit leadership to gain access to "secret" materials and a letter of introduction (jieshao xin) from the provincial bureau to see "top-secret" materials.
- <sup>20</sup> Since a small group was often out in the field for extended periods (the total duration of fieldwork being six to seven months relieved by periodic visits to the team headquarters), friction between group members was a frequent phenomenon. In particular, arguments between technicians and workers were common and, as a result, workers were frequently transferred between small-groups within the same team.
- <sup>21</sup> The wall newspapers should be distinguished from "big-character posters" (da zi bao) which are current during political movements. The former are a regular feature of unit life, being used to make announcements, publish current propaganda themes, commemorate events or achievements, praise unit personnel, and so on.
- <sup>22</sup> In this wage revision, as Mr. Ji remembered it, all the unit's (manual) workers were promoted by one grade, as were lower-level technicians (grades 15 to 17) and administrative personnel (24 to 27). People who began work before 1960 were raised by two grades.
- <sup>23</sup> For general discussions of class vocabulary and the impact of class categories on people's lives, see Richard Kraus, "The Evolving Concept of Class in Post-Liberation China" (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 1974), and "Class Conflict and the Vocabulary of Social Analysis in China," The China Quarterly, No. 69 (March 1977), 54-74; Gordon White, The Politics of Class and Class Origin: The Case of the Cultural Revolution (Canberra: Australian National University Contemporary China Center, 1976), pp. 1-18. As Kraus and White have shown, the terminology of class analysis in China is

complex and confusing. Throughout this study, we shall be focusing on the political significance of class origin or background, defined on the basis of parents' "class status" (jieji chengfen), which was officially assigned in the early 1950s.

<sup>24</sup> Gordon Bennett discusses the nature and impact of political labels in his "Political Labels and Popular Tension," Current Scene, VII:4 (February 26, 1969).

<sup>25</sup> Entries in the dossier varied according to the seriousness of the case: from a small "demerit," to a large "demerit," to the more serious "warning" (jinggao).

<sup>26</sup> Mr. Ji cited several alleged examples of the personnel group head's ability to damage the prospects of people he disliked. In one case, a young technician applied for a teaching job in another province in a school which was willing to employ him. Given the latter's consent, the transfer should have gone through without much difficulty. Instead of sending the relevant documents to the school, however, the personnel group head sent a letter complaining about the technician's political expression, and the transfer fell through. In another case, a woman worker, who intended to marry an army man in a "sensitive" post, was required to send her dossier to her fiance's unit leadership for scrutiny before the marriage could be approved. The personnel group head sat on the file for several months, thus delaying, though not finally preventing, the marriage.

<sup>27</sup>This pattern finds confirmation in two earlier studies of political participation in rather different institutional settings. First, Blecher found that more formal and direct modes of participation (such as speaking at meetings or contacting cadres) tended to be used more by people with greater political resources, because these modes involved greater risks of various kinds. See Marc Blecher, "Leader-Mass Relations in Rural Chinese Communities: Local Politics in a Revolutionary Society" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978), Chapter 4. This finding also accords with one of Victor Falkenheim's conclusions on the general nature of political participation in China, in his "Political Participation in China," Problems of Communism, XXVII:3 (May-June 1978), 18-32.

<sup>28</sup> This term was used by Mr. Ji and other unit staff, but was not the faction's own self-appellation. In fact, members of each faction accused their rivals of being "conservative," though there was no doubt in their minds about the "real" conservative faction.

<sup>29</sup> Sixty-two percent of the unit members who joined factions (N = 194) were conservatives, but only 50% of the revolutionary committee people were. Seven percent of the faction members were in the third faction, but they comprised 13% of the revolutionary committee.

<sup>30</sup> In particular, the heads of the political office and personnel group did not return to the unit until about the time of the arrival of the workers' propaganda team in early 1969.

<sup>31</sup> Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudo-politics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," American Political Science Review, Vol. 59 (March 1965), 39-51.

- <sup>32</sup> For a discussion of this and other cadre tactics in the Cultural Revolution, see Richard Baum, "Elite Behavior under Conditions of Stress: the Lesson of the 'Tang-ch'uan P'ai' in the Cultural Revolution," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China, pp. 540-574.
- 33 For an analysis of the Cultural Revolution which stresses ideological conflict, see Richard M. Pfeffer, "Serving the People and Continuing the Revolution," The China Quarterly, No. 52 (October-December 1972), 620-653. For contrasting views of the notion of "two-line struggle," see Frederick C. Teiwes, "Chinese Politics 1949-1965: A Changing Mao," Parts I and II, Current Scene, XXII:1 and XII:2 (January 1974 and February 1974); Andrew J. Nathan, "Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A Critique," The China Quarterly, No. 68 (December 1976), 720-733.
- <sup>34</sup> For an analysis of Chinese politics in terms of "policy arenas," see Michel Oksenberg, "The Chinese Policy Process and the Public Health Issue: An Arena Approach," Studies in Comparative Communism, VII:4 (Winter 1974), 375-408, and David M. Lampton, "Policy Arenas and the Study of Chinese Politics," Ibid., 409 et seq.
- 35 The closest thing to an interest-group analysis of Chinese society and politics is Michel Oksenberg, "Occupational Groups in Chinese Society and the Cultural Revolution," in Oksenberg et al., The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1968). For interest-group analysis of Soviet politics, see H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), esp. the articles by Skilling and Griffiths.
- <sup>36</sup> Andrew J. Nathan stresses the role of cliques and factions in "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 55 (January-March 1973), 34-66. For a penetrating critique and refinement of Nathan's model, see Tang Tsou, "Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 65 (January 1976), 98-114.
- <sup>37</sup> For a detailed discussion of these debates, see Gordon White, The Politics of Class and Class Origin, passim.
- <sup>38</sup> By "nonproletarian classes" we mean all those whose class backgrounds were not worker, hired hand, or poor or lower-middle peasant.
- <sup>39</sup> Hong Yung Lee also explores this relationship in "The Radical Students in Kwangtung during the Cultural Revolution," The China Quarterly, No. 64 (December 1975), 645-683.
- <sup>40</sup> For Ralf Dahrendorf's redefinition of "class," see his Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).
- <sup>41</sup> Use of gamma requires at least ordinal level measurement on all variables. Factional alignment therefore had to be dichotomized for this analysis. The third faction, which contained only thirteen members, was excluded from this quantitative analysis and will be handled separately. We have included twenty-eight people (14% of the sample) who Mr. Ji described as faction "sympathizers" (whom he distinguished clearly from "nonmembers") in the analysis of factional affiliation.
- 42 Gamma can vary in magnitude between 0 and 1, and it can have a negative

or positive sign depending on the direction of the relationship.

- <sup>43</sup> The exception is Young Communist League membership, whose bivariate gamma of .09 rose to .26 when controlling for class background. We are at a loss to explain this, though we do note Mr. Ji's low estimation of the significance of Youth League activities and membership in this unit.
- 44 We were unable to run a gamma for the relationship between factional affiliation and occupation, since the latter is a nominal variable.
- 45 This judgment on the "conservatism" of full-time workers during the Cultural Revolution finds corroboration in Oksenberg's conclusion in his "Occupational Groups in Chinese Society and the Cultural Revolution," in Oksenberg et al., The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review, pp. 1-44.
- <sup>46</sup> For the classic discussion of friendship in contemporary China, see Ezra Vogel, "From Friendship to Comradeship: the Change in Personal Relations in Communist China," The China Quarterly, No. 21 (January-March 1965), 46-60.
- <sup>47</sup>We note with considerable interest that Mr. Ji spontaneously suggested these examples in an interview conducted more than a year before the arrest of the "gang of four." This is one more piece of evidence to suggest that their arrest and the subsequent criticism campaign built upon some strongly felt sentiments among some segments of the Chinese people.
- <sup>48</sup> To be sure, one must view the examples of political intimacy raised by Mr. Ji in the historical contexts of when he conveyed them to us (early 1975) and the period to which they referred (1968-1973). One can only wonder whether the levels of political intimacy which the various categories of friends are willing to share has increased since that time, particularly since 1978.
- <sup>49</sup> We were alerted to this hypothesis by Professor Hong Yung Lee.
- <sup>50</sup> For example, see Franz Schurmann, "The Attack of the Cultural Revolution on Ideology and Organization," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., China in Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), Vol. I: Book 2, pp. 525-564, and "On Revolutionary Conflict," Journal of International Affairs, XXIII:1 (1969), 36-53.
- <sup>51</sup> Though one could risk a more general hypothesis that the Youth League membership and union leadership were not significant determinants of political behavior during the Cultural Revolution in this type of unit, where both organizations were weak, this could not on the basis of our data be generalized to include other types of units, such as schools or factories, where the league or the union may have been more important.
- <sup>52</sup> These were all members of the unit's staff. At no time did Mr. Ji provide evidence of participation in the movement by wives of male staff members who were living in the unit as housewives.
- <sup>53</sup> Among people with "problems" who joined factions, 64% affiliated with the rebels or the third faction, while in the unit as a whole only 38% did.
- <sup>54</sup> We are using the word "ideology" here to denote the various versions of Marxist-Leninist or "Maoist" ideology current in China during the Cultural Revolution. We do not wish to preclude, however, that members of the unit little affected by these theoretical currents may have had their own personal "ideologies" which did not coincide with the major themes of public ideological debate.

- <sup>55</sup> These descriptions are ideal types used for analytical convenience. Any particular person may be a more or less complex mix of these three dimensions, or a more or less "pure" representative of each.
- <sup>56</sup> Setting the polemics of sectarian left groups and parties in the U.S. (and elsewhere) aside, a significant number of journalists and scholars have been quite outspoken in expressing strong views—mostly negative—or presenting rather clear-cut analyses of the effects of the Cultural Revolution. Nick Eberstadt's acceptance of the "lost decade" characterization, first enunciated by Deng Xiaoping, is but one example of the former. See Nick Eberstadt, "Has China Failed?" The New York Review of Books, XXVI, 5 (April 5, 1979), especially page 39. For good examples of the view that the Cultural Revolution was basically a clear-cut episode which produced equally clear sets of policies and corresponding groups of winners and losers, see the reporting of Fox Butterfield in The New York Times throughout late 1976, 1977, and 1978.
- <sup>57</sup>Mr. Ji noted with some poignance that a close relation faced in the early 1970s with opportunities to attend college or become a factory worker chose the latter, because being an intellectual was "too much trouble" (tai mafan).

# About the Authors

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