can I use for classes?"

asked the conscientious Tutor

And the Education Secretary, from his considerable experience, was able to point to some very valuable material for use at all levels.

" First," he said, " there's one of the year's best-sellers amongst syllabuses—*The Aims of the Communist Party.* You've probably heard of it. It's the first of an introductory series on Marxism. The lessons are headed ' Our Communist Aim '; ' Socialism '; and ' The Communist Party and Labour's Programme '; and there are questions at the end of each to stimulate discussion. It's a threepenny."

" Good," said the Conscientious Tutor. " I'm glad you reminded me. It's just the thing for new members and sympathisers—and some of the older members who need something of a refresher. But I've another problem. I want something simple but good for an elementary political economy class. You know how difficult that subject can be. Any offers? "

" Certainly," flashed back the Education Secretary. " Try the companion syllabus—*Capitalist Society,* No. 2 in the series, also 3d. It gives the elements of political economy under headings ' Capitalist Exploitation '; ' Capitalism, Crisis and Unemployment '; ' Capitalism and War '; and ' The Development of Capitalist Society.' "

" Well, that's really fine," said the Conscientious Tutor, making a note to get in touch with his Literature Secretary that evening. But the Education Secretary had a little more to say.

" I think," he went on, " you should also make use of *Essentials of Communist Theory.* That's R. W. Robson's great little syllabus, which has been widely used. Maybe it's most suitable for comrades who've already had basic education—but a good tutor like you could probably take any kind of class on it. And it's worth noting that it has done a good job with the tricky business of briefly explaining some important political terms."

" But don't put your notebook away yet," he continued. " Just add these four Lawrence and Wishart titles, which no tutor should be without—one, *Britain's Wealth,* 9d.; two, *The Problems of Full Employment,* by Winternitz, 1/-; three, *Britain's Labour Movement,* 6d.; finally, a *Study Guide to Morton's People's History of England."*

" And here's something new, to help you make your classes live by illustrating basic and abstract theory with topical illustrations—the Report of the Party's 19th Congress. There are two volumes at 6d. each time—Part I, Harry Pollitt's speech, *Britain's Problems Can Be Solved,* which is the Marxist way out of Britain's present troubles; Part II, *The Resolutions Passed at Congress."*

All the above may be obtained through Communist Party Branch Literature Secretaries; from progressive bookshops; or direct from Central Books, Ltd., 2-4 Parton Street, London, W.C.1.

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THE THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG

BY ANNA LOUISE STRONG

Editorial Note: The following is an excerpt from a letter written by Anna Louise Strong concerning this article: "This letter concerns a special article that I have just finished, after working at it on and off for two months. It is "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" and is the first time Chinese Marxism has been summarized, in English at least. I had several all-day interviews with Yenan theoreticians on the subject; after the article was written, it was translated back into Chinese and corrected in great detail, with additions made, a lot of important people spending quite a bit of time. . . . "

* * *

MAO Tse-tung is one of Asia's most notable leaders and thinkers. He is Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and for nearly twenty years has lived blockaded, shut off from the world by the battle fronts of foreign and civil wars. From this seeming isolation, the thought of Mao Tse-tung shapes the Chinese Revolution and is expressed in regional governments representing 140 million people in North China and Manchuria.

From his distant Yenan cave Mao Tse-tung even became a world figure. His thesis on "protracted war" predicted the course of the Chinese people's resistance to Japan so accurately that it became an accepted formula in other lands among military experts who never knew whence it came. His theories on "new democracy" have probably affected new government forms in post-war Europe. His analysis of the path to national independence, people's democracy, and people's livelihood charts a way not only for the Chinese people but for the billion folk that live in the colonial countries of southeast Asia.

The thought of Mao Tse-tung, despite its wide influence, has never been clearly and fully summarized abroad. It has reached the outside world spasmodically, with long intermissions, due to the blockade of war. In America, people still raise the childish antithesis: "Are the Chinese Communists followers of Moscow or are they what the West calls 'democrats'?" The answer is that they are neither, though to some extent they are a little of both. They are Chinese trying to solve the bitter problems of China, using their own ideas and also any valid ideas they find in the West. Specifically they use the method of social analysis known as Marxism. Because they are Chinese, applying their thought to Chinese problems, their policies and even their concepts of Marxism have increasingly diverged from the European pattern. Their thought is not dependent, but creative. Its creative quality comes, first of all, from Mao Tse-tung.

"Mao Tse-tung's great accomplishment has been to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form," said Liu Hsiao-chi, whom the Chinese Communists consider their second greatest Marxist thinker, and to whom I went for an estimate of Mao's thought. "Marx and Lenin were Europeans; they wrote in European languages about European histories and problems, seldom discussing Asia or China. The basic principles of Marxism are undoubtedly adaptable to all countries, but to apply their general truth to concrete revolutionary practices in China is a difficult task. Mao Tse-tung is Chinese; he analyzes Chinese problems and guides the Chinese people in their struggle to victory. He uses Marxist-Leninist principles to explain Chinese history and the practical problems of China. He is the first that has succeeded in doing so. Not only has he applied Marxist methods to solve the problems of 450 million people, but he has thus popularized Marxism among the Chinese people as a weapon for them to use. On every kind of problem—the nation, the peasants, strategy, the construction of the party, literature and culture, military affairs, finance and economy, methods of work, philosophy—Mao has not only applied Marxism to new conditions but has given it a new development. He has created a Chinese or Asiatic form of Marxism. China is a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country in which vast numbers of people live at the edge of starvation, tilling small bits of soil. Its economy is agricultural, backward, and dispersed. In attempting the transition to a more industrialized economy, China faces the competition and the pressures—economic, political, and military—of advanced industrial lands. This is the basic situation that affects both the relations of social classes and the methods of struggle towards any such goal as national independence and a better, freer life for the Chinese. There are similar conditions in other lands of southeast Asia. The courses chosen by China will influence them all."

The Chinese Communist Party, like other Communist parties, regards itself as the advance group of the "proletariat." In China it considers itself the spokesman and leader for other classes as well, notably the peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the middle class of the cities and towns. Even the concept of the "proletariat" as a base for the Communist Party is given a new meaning. Liu Hsiao-chi was quite explicit about it. Accord-

ing to Marx, he said, the industrial workers are the only class that can accept communism and bring it to fruition. This is true for several reasons; 1) they own no means of production; 2) they live by selling their labor-power; 3) they are disciplined by working collectively in a factory with other workers.

"All this applies to the western world" said Liu Hsiao-chi. "But in China we have only a few such people. Of our 450 million people, only two or three million can be called industrial workers, whom the imperialist and capitalists are training to be the reserves of the Communist Party some day. Meanwhile Mao Tse-tung is training another two or three million from another kind of people who are not only no less disciplined and devoted, but in fact perhaps even more disciplined and devoted than the industrial workers.

"Take this 'little devil' who is bringing you tea and melon seeds and peanuts. He has been brought up and trained in this special, highly military Communist organization of ours. It does not occur to him to ask for peanuts for himself. He knows that peanuts are limited, that they are for guests and for parties, and that he will only get them at some birthday party, not before. He knows that he will get food of whatever kind we have enough of, and a summer uniform and a winter uniform. He does not ask any more. He is happy because he is a comrade among comrades, because he is respected as a human being, because he is fighting for a better life for all the people in China, in which he too will share.

"China has only a few industrial workers to be the foundation of communism but people were never known by Marx, but they are brought up in the spirit of communism. Their discipline and devotion to public affairs is no less than that of industrial workers. They give their lives to the fight against foreign imperialism and native oppressors even when very young. They fight now for the 'new democracy' but if in the future it is time to build socialism, they will be ready to build it. If it is time for communism, they will be ready for that also. Only one thing they will not build or accept—the old forms of capitalism. They have never even dreamed of making a profit.

"Today we are building capitalism, but it is a 'new capitalism.' Capitalism is needed to break down the semi-feudal, semi-colonial society in which we live today. We encourage free initiative, we encourage capitalist profit. But we do not permit the formation of monopolistic capital. Meanwhile we have a publicly administered economy and an extensive cooperative economy, both of which are very important. As the core of this 'new democracy' and 'new capitalism' we have three million people—the army, the party, and the government—who have lived for twenty years in what might be called 'military communism.' It is not the 'military communism' they had in Russia, for here it is applied only to this leading group. These are some of the inventions of the Chinese Communist Party; they are created chiefly by the genius of Mao Tse-tung."

Liu listed for me many other "inventions and discoveries:" the role of peasants in the revolution, the "united front" among classes, military strategy and system of supply, etc.

China's revolution is a peasant revolution. Its basic characteristic is that the peasants

(not the workers) form the principal mass that resists the oppression of foreign capital and of the left-over mediaeval elements in the Chinese countryside. In the past, Marxist analysis has not been applied to guide such a revolution. Peasant revolts in past history lacked discipline and cohesion—and failed. Mao Tse-tung develops the theoretical basis of the peasant revolution. As one example, he says that "democracy" must be a "peasants' democracy" with voting forms adapted to the vast numbers of illiterate peasants, who vote by dropping a bean in a candidate's bowl. He overcomes the traditional weakness of peasant revolutions by the cohesion, discipline, and devotion of the highly developed organization described above.

The "united front" between classes is a point over which Communist parties in all lands have struggled. "You must unite with them on certain points and struggle against them on others," explained Liu. "Our mistake in 1927 was that we only united with the bourgeoisie but did not struggle against it; so the bourgeoisie gained its aims and rejected ours. In the years immediately following, we made the opposite mistake; we only struggled against the bourgeoisie but found no way to unite even with the small town merchants. To know when and on what points to unite and when and on what points to struggle needs careful and constant analysis. We unite with Chinese capitalists against the Japanese invasion, against foreign imperialism and Chinese compradors, against feudalism; we struggle against any attempts of capitalists to oppress workers or to compromise with imperialism and feudalism. We have, in other words, a policy of uniting with the capitalists and struggling against them at the same time."

cate cooperation between capitalists and labor, under certain conditions. There is no hint of such cooperation in Marxist works; Lenin spoke of it once, only to oppose it. "Such cooperation really betrays the interests of the workers in the older capitalist lands," said Liu Hsiao-chi. "But in semi-colonial lands like China, the workers have common interests with capitalists against foreign monopolistic capital and native bureaucratic capital. Cooperation can then be in the interests of the workers. In China's national industry, the workers should strive to increase production, while the capitalists should improve the living conditions of the workers; only under such conditions can the national industry avoid being destroyed. This is one of our industrial policies, and is applied in all three kinds of industry, publicly owned, privately owned, and cooperative."

The Communist military strategy, which enabled them to start with an army of 3,000 men, and attain, after twenty years of fighting, an army of 1,500,000 men, all the time drawing military supplies and even man-power from the enemy, is also based on Mao Tse-tung's analysis. It will be partially discussed below, but no complete description can be given. "It is not yet time to furnish a blue-print to the enemy," said Liu. "Let them learn it bit by bit. The Japanese learned it, but it took them eight years and by that time it was no use to them. Chiang now uses Okamura, former commander-in-chief of the Japanese forces in China, as advisor in Nanking. . . . But now we are using new strategy against Chiang."

The "labor exchange brigade," which increased the productivity of farming in the Communist areas during the hardest years

of the anti-Japanese war, was another invention by Mao, based upon a study of the forms of peasant labor—including a type of mutual help that went back more than a thousand years, known as the "squads of the Tang Dynasty Generals." Usually there are two ways to improve the productivity of primitive peasant farming; the capitalist way of Europe and America, or the collective farming of the USSR. The Chinese Communists can not use either now. Their labor-exchange brigade employs cooperative methods of farm production on a foundation of individual ownership.

The supply system that enabled the Yenan Border Region to survive both a Japanese war and a Kuomintang blockade and that made it possible for the many anti-Japanese bases scattered behind the Japanese lines in North China to live and grow into the mighty "Liberated Areas," was worked out through Mao Tse-tung's analysis of conditions in the rural areas. It is a system by which the personnel of army and government is not paid in money but draws part of its food from taxation and part from joint productive work. "By this method," said Liu, "we can support an army and government staff of two or three million without too seriously burdening the people's livelihood. With this system we have been able to carry on war for twenty years and can carry it on till final victory."

I myself saw a convincing example of this in the Four Province Liberated Area in the heart of North China, where General Liu Po-cheng, defending an area of some 30 million people, fought 3923 "minor and major engagements" in 1946, wiping out nearly eighteen of the forty-nine Kuomintang brigades that attacked the area. Chiang's forces, however, succeeded in occupying a score of county towns. The officer in charge of "new mobilization" explained that it would be quite possible to mobilize enough men to take all those towns back, but that an army of such a size would unduly burden the population of the area. Since civil war might last for many years, they were adjusting their army to a size which the area could maintain indefinitely, and which would be strong enough to defend the basic farm life of the area, even if not all the towns. They were, moreover, drawing their new recruits from only a few counties, saving the other counties for possible future needs, so that, even in a long war, they would not have to recruit from the same county twice. This careful budgeting of supply and man-power is almost without precedent in war. The Communists expect Chiang Kai-shek to go bankrupt from war inflation, and to face revolts from his overburdened peasants. They are confident that this will not happen with them.

* * *

"THE Chinese Communist Party was always heroic," said Lu Ting-yi, chief of the Information Department of the Central Committee, "but many mistakes were made in the leadership in getting experience. They were costly mistakes and so they have taught us to avoid such mistakes later. Our membership was 50,000 in the Great Revolution; it sank to 10,000 after the counter-revolution and massacres by Chiang Kai-shek; it rose to 300,000 in the Kiangsi Soviet period, and sank again to 40,000 after the Long March. Our Red Army during the early civil war reached 300,000 and sank to 40,000 after the Long March. These losses were due to mistaken policies of our lead-

ers, before the leadership of Mao Tse-tung developed. Today we have a party membership of 2,200,000; we have a regular army of more than a million and a half, and armed village militia add another four million."

The Chinese Communists distinguish three periods in their history: the Great Revolution, carried forward jointly by Kuomintang and Communists but broken by the split in 1927; the agrarian revolution and civil war, which ended with the "Sian incident" of December 12, 1936; and the period of Anti-Japanese Resistance, which was marred by clashes of civil war from 1939 onward but was not officially terminated until March 1947, by the expulsion of the Communist representatives from Nanking.

The first six years of the Chinese Communist Party were guided by Chen Tu-hsiu, a Peiping professor who was one of the party's founders. When the first congress met in 1921, there were only twelve delegates, and in all China only a few dozen members. In 1923 the Communists, by agreement with Sun Yat-sen, entered the Kuomintang in a body, while retaining their own organization. Their special task was to organize workers and peasants. They had 15,000 members by 1925.

The "mistake of Chen Tu-hsiu," as the Communists now see it, was his "submission to the bourgeoisie," specifically to Chiang Kai-shek. When the Joint Kuomintang-Communist forces were still in Canton, and had not yet driven to power across China, Chiang began his attacks on the Communists. In March, 1926, he arrested the captain of a war vessel for being a Communist and announced that all high officers and political workers in the army who were Communists must be removed. That was the time, the Communists think now, to have made their stand. They had helped organize the Kuomintang armed forces so successfully that three of the four armies in Canton were largely under Communist influence, while there was Communist sympathy even in the fourth. Many Communists wished to oppose Chiang's "purge" but Chen Tu-hsiu submitted. Three months later he submitted again to the Kuomintang's May 5th decision to exclude Communists from all leading positions in the Kuomintang organizations, though many of these had been organized by the Communists.

"This policy left the Communists unprepared to resist Chiang's counter-revolution which began with the massacre of the Shanghai workers on April 12, 1927," said Lu Ting-yi. There was still a chance in Wuhan, where more than half of the Kuomintang Central Committee still cooperated with the Communists in the Wuhan Government through the summer of 1927. Chen Tu-hsiu still retreated. He allowed the workers' pickets to be disarmed in the Wuhan cities. He opposed the agrarian revolution; it took place against his will. When the warlord in Changsha set up a military dictatorship, and 100,000 armed peasants surrounded the city, all set to take it over in the name of Wuhan, the Kuomintang members in the Wuhan government were frightened by this "power of the people," and under their demand, the Central Committee of the Communist Party ordered the peasants to disband. This retreat of the Communists left the workers and peasants leaderless, and made possible the July counter-revolution in Wuhan.

Another mistake, as the Communists now see it, took place after the August 1st Nanchang uprising. "We had strong armies there; we should have held Nanchang or at least formed a strong base in the rural districts near it. . . . But we were inexperienced; we did not think we could hold that area. We started south to Canton out of an 'old home' feeling for the birth-place of the Revolution. We were defeated near Swatow in a fierce battle; our army was dispersed and wasted. Only about one thousand men gathered around Chu Teh when he moved into Hunan to join Mao Tse-tung."

Leadership changed in the Chinese Communist Party after the collapse of Wuhan. Chen Tu-hsiu was replaced by a succession of others. "After the mistakes of Chen Tu-hsiu, we swung too far to the left and made a series of mistakes in the other direction," is the way the Communists see it today.

The "mistakes of the left" were not continuous; they occurred three times for shorter or longer periods. The first mistake was the launching of uprisings in isolated cities in the winter of 1927-28. Encouraged by successful revolts in several villages, the "leftist leaders" refused to admit the failure of the Great Revolution, but declared that China's revolution was a "ceaseless revolution." They organized many revolts that had no chance of victory. The Chinese Communists still consider that the great Canton revolt in December 1927 was justified as a "rearguard action to the Great Revolution, which raised the flag of revolt and announced our program to the Chinese people." Later uprisings at this time were just sheer waste, due to mistaken views of "leftist leaders."

A second leftward swing, now considered mistaken, was the "Li Li-san line" in the summer of 1930. At this time the guerrilla warfare in rural areas was developing successfully under Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, while wars had also broken out among reactionary warlords. When the Red Army took Changsha in 1930 a "left" group of party leaders thought that it was time for "a large-scale action throughout the country." They mocked the revolutionary bases in villages as too far away and too unimportant, demanded that the Red Army engage in regular warfare and take the Wuhan cities, and also start uprisings in Shanghai and Nanking. They considered that the transition through the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution would be rapid, and had already begun. Their "socialist policies" in industry alienated the small town merchants.

The Communist Party "corrected" this policy in August 1930, but five months later, in January 1931, a group now known as the "dogmatists" gained control, with a policy still further to the left. Many of these had studied abroad, especially in Moscow, and had the prestige of being able to quote Marx, Lenin, and Stalin in great detail. Their ignorance of the practical problems of China was catastrophic. They maintained the "pure proletarian line," permitting no "united front" with anyone. They confiscated land, not only of landlords, but of rich peasants, were highly suspicious of "intellectuals," opposed guerrilla war, and demanded a "modern army." All these policies had a heavy overcoat of Marxist-Leninist phrases, in which the "dogmatists" were specialists. Their leadership lasted four years, until the now historic Tsen-yi conference, held in January 1935 in Kweichow, in the midst of the famous Long March.

"The leadership of the dogmatists cost us very heavily," said Lu Ting-yi, giving the view of the Chinese Communists today. "When we were in Kiangsi we were offered a united front with the Fukien general, who opposed Chiang's capitulation to the Japanese and offered his alliance to us. Our dogmatists were too orthodox to build up a united front with 'that bourgeois,' and thus we lost the chance of victory. We also indulged in too much positional warfare in Kiangsi, especially against Chiang's Fifth Extermination Campaign. With our present experience, using Mao Tse-tung's technique of 'dispersal,' we could have filtered through the hills past Chiang's blockhouses."

Even the Long March, the Communists now think, "could have been avoided" by correct tactics in Kiangsi. No Communist goes quite so far as to say that the Long March was "the result of a mistake." They feel, however, that it might well have ended in catastrophe had not the Party changed leadership in that January 1935 conference in Kweichow. Mao Tse-tung's leadership made of the Long March a victory, a military miracle, and brought them to Yenan. The Long March—and the mistaken policies in Kiangsi—cost heavy losses. The membership of the Chinese Communist Party, and the size of their Red Army, dropped from 300,000 in Kiangsi to 40,000 when they gathered in Yenan.

Yenan as a base had both advantages and disadvantages. From Yenan the Communists were to spread, as a result of the anti-Japanese war, to a large part of North China and Manchuria. The Yenan Border Region itself, however, is an arid, economically backward region, which handicapped every effort from the start. Could more have been done from a widened base in Kiangsi, with a seaport at Foochow? This is a futile conjecture in which the Communists do not indulge.

* * *

DURING these years and these losses, the "line of Mao Tse-tung" developed —a weapon tempered by fire and sharpened by blows. He was one of the earliest founders of the Communist Party. He was a leader of that peasant revolution in Hunan that was dissolved in 1927 by orders of Chen Tu-hsiu. Later, combining the remnants of his "peasants self-defense corps" with the equally shattered remnants of Chu Teh's army, he became a leader of those slowly growing rural guerrillas who were "too trivial" for Li Li-san. As chairman of the Soviet Government in Kiangsi, his views on practical matters carried weight, but the upper realms of party policy were still reserved for those dogmatists who had the prestige of foreign study. What did Mao know but the Chinese peasantry?

Several practices of today's Communists date from Mao's theories of those early days. People that struggle with the difficult names of the Liberated Areas, which often include syllables from two, three, or four provinces, must have wondered what makes the Communist areas violate so frequently the old provincial boundaries. It was not chance, it was intention. Eighteen years ago, when pessimists thought the Chinese Revolution over, while adventurers yearned to seize great cities, Mao Tse-tung declared that it was possible to create a Soviet district, but that this should be done in the hilly areas where the boundaries of provinces met.

Here Mao Tse-tung diverged from the European pattern to follow his own knowl-

edge of the Chinese countryside. Borders between countries in Europe are fortified, they are no place for new regimes to start. In China, the strength of a warlord decreases as you gain distance from his capital. In the border lands between warlords of different provinces, the Chinese Communists organized peasants for self-defense. Some areas thus founded have held for eighteen years.

Mao Tse-tung's military strategy also dates from this period. In the Chu-Mao combination, from which grew the Communist armies, Chu Teh was the experienced military man. But it was Mao, the Hunan schoolteacher, whose keen analysis supplemented Chu Teh's military knowledge and developed the theory of their joint strategy. It is the theory by which the Communists survived through eighteen years of warfare against Japanese invaders and Chiang Kai-shek.

It may be condensed as follows: "When the enemy comes, he is stronger than we. He has good arms, arsenals, foreign support. If we thus fight and are beaten, we are lost. If we fight and repel the enemy this is also not victory, for we have used up ammunition while the enemy can return with more ammunition. We can only count it victory if we surround the enemy, crush him, and capture rifles, bullets, and men.

"So when the enemy comes, let him come. If he wants this or that city, let him have it. Our army should retire and disperse where the enemy cannot find us. We get news everywhere from the peasants. We shall fight only when conditions are favorable to us. Every such battle must be short and decisive, we must win every battle. The war itself is protracted, it is won by securing and organizing the long-enduring support of the peasants. When the living force of the enemy is worn down, then we go into counter-attack—but still very carefully—to take back cities and territory."

This strategy is so different from traditional warfare that many foreign military experts dismiss it as "guerrilla war." One can hardly apply that term, however, to the encirclement in January 1947 of three and a half brigades of Chiang's best men in Shantung, an engagement in which seven thousand of Chiang's men were reported killed and wounded and twenty thousand captured with their weapons. The Communists distinguish sharply between their smaller local guerrilla units, and their regular armies, which can however, at need dissolve into smaller groups. These groups are flexible yet disciplined and can quickly reassemble. This strategy is tailored to fit a war of defense in a territory where the people whole-heartedly support the army. It could not be made to fit an aggressive war. It may yet give points to other colonial peoples fighting against a superior foreign foe.

The bitter test of the Long March raised Mao Tse-tung to leadership. "Without his leadership, the completion of the Long March would have been impossible," say the Communists today. But it was only ten years later, in April, 1945 at the Seventh Party Congress, after eight years of anti-Japanese war, that Mao Tse-tung was formally elected chairman. The Chinese Communist Party, which by that time had grown to 1,200,000 members under his leadership, discussed for two years their party history, in all their far-flung organizations across the battle-lines.

The results were crystallized in the Seventh Congress, which they called "The Congress of Unity and Victory." "There was a great sense of achievement," says Lu Ting-yi. "that 1,200,000 comrades, separated by many lines of battle, could think their way through to a joint estimate of their past experiences and their future path."

It was at that congress, after that two years' discussion, that Mao Tse-tung was at last elected chairman, though he had been recognized leader for ten years. It was at that congress that many past leaders' policies were so thoroughly discredited by the long discussion of what they had cost the Communists, that they would have gone down in disgrace, dropped from the Central Committee and perhaps from the party, had not Mao intervened to save them. "Those comrades who have made mistakes," he said, "no matter how costly and grievous, if they admit their mistakes honestly, and if they have analyzed their mistakes and learned from them, are better leaders than men who are untried."

* * *

SINCE the leadership of Mao Tse-tung developed, the Chinese Communists do not consider that they have made any profound mistakes. "We have had good leadership and good policies," said Lu Ting-yi, speaking of the period from the Sian incident through the Japanese war.

"Don't you regret setting Chiang Kai-shek free at Sian?" is a question often asked of the Communists, since Chiang is attacking them now. In the Sian incident of December 12, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek and his staff were forcibly detained by the officers of two of his armies, and were only set free after considerable negotiation in which En-lai, representing the Communists, urged that Chiang be released. Some Communists at the time opposed this policy, notably Chang Kuo-tao, who afterwards became a member of Chiang's secret police. All the present leaders of the Communist Party, led by Mao Tse-tung, urged the release of Chiang and still think that they were right. "It was the only way to unite China against the Japanese," explains Lu Ting-yi.

The Communists out-guessed Chiang in the agreement they made to fight in the Japanese rear, organizing peasant resistance into partisan bands. Chiang assigned them this task, expecting them to be annihilated; it was a job in any event that his Kuomintang armies could not do. As the Japanese penetrated further into the interior, the Communists got more and more territory in which to organize the Chinese people's resistance to the invader. This is the foundation of their widespread territory today.

Mao Tse-tung's book on "Protracted War" (July 1938) was his first work that influenced thinking outside the Communist ranks. It was military and political analysis of high quality, the most important book of its kind to appear in China during the war. The ideas later became current among Chinese and American military experts. The book was studied by the Japanese high command in China. "We know from captured documents," Liu Hsiao-chi told me, "that the Japanese, after reading it, considered Mao Tse-tung the greatest Far Eastern strategist."

At the time the book was written, most people in China despaired of final victory. A few people talked of swift victory, to be won

by a desperate gamble, a tremendous counter-offensive, which if it failed, would mean complete defeat for China. Chiang's view was obscure. At times he talked of a quick counter-offensive, at other times he clearly awaited the entrance of America, Britain, and USSR into the war. Mao Tse-tung proclaimed that the Chinese people, if sufficiently united, could drive out the invader. The war, he said, would be in three stages: (1) Japanese penetration, during which the regular Chinese armies would retreat, but guerrilla warfare would be carried on in the Japanese rear; (2) a long stage of "stalemate," whose length and severity would depend on the extent of unity among the Chinese forces, but in which Chinese resistance would eventually wear down the Japanese; (3) a victorious counter-offensive. The book charted so accurately the path that the war actually followed that today it reads less like prediction than history.

"The New Stage," published in October 1938, continued the analysis of the "Protracted War" with special reference to the beginning of the "stalemate stage." Its primary purpose was to make detailed proposals to the Kuomintang for cooperation against the Japanese. Three forms of cooperation were suggested: that the Communists might join the Kuomintang; that, if this was not allowed, there might be joint committees; failing this, there might be frequent conferences on emergencies. The proposals came to nothing, for the Kuomintang was growing increasingly reactionary, passing regulations against all non-Kuomintang parties and people's organizations.

Pessimism grew in China in 1939. Since the Kuomintang, now centered in Chungking, did almost nothing against the Japanese, the Japanese left Chiang alone in the interior, and concentrated on mopping up North China and the coastal areas. The Kuomintang grew more oppressive; elements in the Kuomintang collaborated with the enemy. Was China then a lost nation?

In such a situation Mao Tse-tung wrote his "New Democracy" in 1940. It was a clarion call. China, he said, was not lost. There were great reserves of strength in the Chinese people. Even if the Kuomintang turned reactionary, even if it turned traitor, the Chinese people would win victory, both in their war of resistance and in their revolution. The book then analyzed the road to victory, the methods by which victory might be hastened; it set forth the form of government that could best lead the people to victory and to prosperity after the war. Not the Kuomintang dictatorship, not a socialist government by the Communists, not the old forms of democracy from the developed capitalist lands, but a "New Democracy," a coalition government of all revolutionary classes.

The "New Democracy" bases itself on an analysis of the character of the Chinese Revolution, and its place in the present stage of the "world revolution," which has, in the USSR, reached the socialist stage. China has not the conditions for socialism; its revolution is the democratic revolution, which in European countries in the past was led by the bourgeoisie in their struggle to establish capitalism. The democratic revolution must also establish capitalism in China, but, because the world is in a new stage, and because China is a semi-colonial country and because of the existence of an energetic Communist Party, this capitalism will not be the old form of capitalism, under the rule

of the bourgeoisie, but a "new capitalism" controlled in the interests of the vast majority of the people. The democracy also will not be of the old type, in which the capitalists are in control—nor will it be a workers' dictatorship establishing socialism, as in the USSR. It will be a "New Democracy" jointly administered by "all revolutionary classes"—workers, peasants, petty-bourgeois, and even such capitalists as oppose feudalism and foreign imperialism.

"New Democracy" marked a turning-point in China's revolutionary thinking and influenced the revolutionary thought of the world. For the Chinese Communists, it became the basis for all future policies, from 1940 till now. On it was based the form of government in the Liberated Areas, including the famous "three-three" system by which the Communists, even in areas that they might easily dominate, confine themselves to one third of the government positions. After five years of testing, the thesis of "New Democracy" was expanded in Mao's report to the Seventh Party Congress, in April 1945, in the work "On Coalition Government," which may be regarded as a sequel to "New Democracy" applied to a later period.

By this time Mao Tse-tung felt able to state with confidence: "In the entire period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, in a period of several dozens of years, our general program of new democracy will remain unchanged." The Chinese form of Marxism was established; it had its theoretical base, its practical experience, its program for the years to come.

"New Democracy" was also published in Moscow both in Russian and in English. The Soviet reviewers recognized it as a new "Marxist classic," applicable not only to China, but to similar semi-feudal, semi-colonial lands. It seems highly likely that the theories of Mao Tse-tung's "New Democracy" influenced the forms of government that have arisen in parts of post-war Europe.

* * *

IN the five years that followed the writing of "New Democracy," great changes took place in the world. The war widened to involve the Soviet Union and then the United States. The entrance of America into the war with Japan did not lighten the difficulties of the Chinese Communists. It did not compel Japan to move any troops out of North China. Chiang Kai-shek meanwhile got American weapons, and became more aggressive toward the Chinese Communists. The years 1941-42, after America entered the war, were for the Communists their most difficult period, in which the Yenan Border Region itself was attacked from the north by the Japanese and from the south by Chiang Kai-shek.

The thought of Mao Tse-tung, during this period, turned towards many inventions. Under his leadership the Chinese Communists learned to "disperse even more completely" and so to penetrate into the enemy's securest regions. They devised a very wide organization of the peasant militia, unpaid, fighting with very primitive weapons, but cooperating with the regular armies of the Communists towards effective victory. The "production movement" arose, to make the army and government as self-sustaining as possible. "Labor exchange brigades" were promoted to increase the output of the farms.

Two books by Mao Tse-tung appeared during this period: "Problems of Economy and Finance," which outlined the policies

that enabled the Yenan Border Region to survive both the blockade and the war; and a book usually called "Remaking of Ideology" but which might better be called: "Rectification of the Three Styles," which deals with methods of study, methods of party work, and methods of literature. This was part of a campaign within the party to get away from the dogmatic, pedantic, narrow approach, and to base policies and methods on concrete knowledge.

One or two quotations from the latter book indicate what Mao was driving at and give a flavor of his style:

"Marxism-Leninism has neither good looks nor magic; it is only very useful. There seem to be a lot of people that think it is a sort of charmed medicine with which one can easily cure any disease. Those that take it as dogma are that kind of people. We ought to tell them that their dogmas are more useless than cow-dung. For dung can be used as fertilizer, while dogmas cannot. Comrades, you will know that my purpose in talking like this is to give the dogmatists a great shock and awaken them. . . ."

"What then is the condition of those students that graduate from schools that are completely severed from practical activities in society? Such a one is considered a man of knowledge. But first of all, he does not know how to till the soil, secondly, he does not know how to work in a factory, thirdly, he does not know how to fight in battle, fourthly, he has no knowledge of office work. . . . All he has is knowledge from books. Can such a person be considered an all-round intellectual? I think not. He can at most be considered a semi-intellectual . . . .

"Books have no legs; they can be opened and shut at will. To read books is the easiest job in the world. It is much easier than cooking a meal or slaughtering a pig, for when you want to catch hold of the pig, he will run, when you slaughter him, he will squeal, while the book on the table can neither run nor squeal but lets you handle it as you like. . . . What an easy job! So I wish those that have only book knowledge and no practical experience would understand their own shortcomings and be more humble. . . .

"On the other hand, if comrades who have done practical work misuse their experience, this is also harmful. Their rich experience is very valuable but should they rest content with it, it is quite dangerous. They should understand that their knowledge belongs to the perceptive sphere, and that they lack rational or generalized knowledge. . . . Their knowledge has no theoretical foundation and is therefore incomplete. . . .

"Thus we see that there are two kinds of incomplete knowledge. It is only by the blending of the two that comparatively complete knowledge can be created."

In the same essay, Mao Tse-tung has this to say on criticism:

"We must bear in mind two principles: 'to make an example of the past so that we shall be more careful in the future'; and 'to cure the disease and save the patient.' We must expose all errors committed in the past, analyzing and criticizing scientifically and showing no favors to friends, so that each one will be more careful in the future and so do his work better. . . . But the exposal and criticism is done as a doctor treats his patients, with the purpose of curing the disease and not of killing the patient. . . . To attempt to cure him at one stroke or by beating him all over is no way to solve the problem."

This bit from "On Coalition Government," is recommended to all organizations:

"A room should be constantly dusted or it will be covered with dust. Our face should be regularly washed or it will be dirty. This is also true of the ideology of our comrades and the work of the party, which should also be constantly cleaned. 'A running stream does not smell and a door-hinge will not be moth-eaten' means that germs and worms are dispersed by continuous movement."

These examples show the clear, pungent style, close to the Chinese peasant, in which the thought of Mao Tse-tung finds expression.

* * *

AFTER reading what I have so far written, Lu Ting-yi summed up for me Mao Tse-tung's thought on the Chinese Revolution under four heads.

I. China is at present a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. Her bourgeois-democratic revolution began after the first World War when the Socialist Soviet Union already existed and the Chinese proletariat was already politically awake. This conditions the present stage of the Chinese Revolution as an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, led by the proletariat, with the peasantry as the main force and with participation of other broad social strata.

The revolution establishes a "new democracy," and not the old forms of democracy nor yet socialism. Therefore one should have no illusions about quick transition to socialism, but should whole-heartedly promote the democratic revolution. Without the leadership of the working-class, the peasants' struggles must fail, but there is no fear of such a struggle developing beyond the power of the workers. While the peasants form the "main revolutionary masses" there are also the liberal bourgeoisie, forward-looking landlords and other patriotic people—who demand democracy and who are especially willing to struggle against imperialism. There must be a correct approach to all of these.

Since China is a vast country, semi-colonial, semi-feudal, under domination by several powerful, rival imperialist countries and by native feudal forces as well, it follows that her economic and political development is marked by disunity and unevenness. This makes the development of China's democratic revolution very uneven, and its nation-wide victory requires a protracted and tortuous struggle. However, bases of armed revolution may first be established and maintained in vast regions where the enemy's rule is comparatively weak. Such a base can be established in a secluded section even during periods of revolutionary ebb. With this as a starting-point, the nation-wide triumph of the democratic revolution can come about through a tortuous process of struggle.

II. Military struggle constitutes the main form of the political struggle. Its two basic problems are: army-building and strategy and tactics.

The army must be a people's army of a new type, fundamentally different from armies of warlords, fighting for the people's interests in all its aspects. It never fights for the personal interest of a warlord or a petty clique. It has the triple task of combat, mass work, and production. Its relation to the people is expressed by the phrase "support the government and love the people." Within the army there must be a democratic life, good relations between officers and men, and a voluntary yet authoritative discipline. It

must have a correct policy to disintegrate enemy forces and win over war prisoners.

Strategy and tactics must admit the enemy's superiority in strength, the enemy being large and we being small. It is under such conditions that ways to defeat the enemy must be sought. Hence the enemy's defects and our own strong points must be thoroughly exploited, and there must be full reliance on the power of the masses of the people for our success, survival, and growth. When our armed forces are small, and the enemy's superiority is unequivocal, we must use guerrilla warfare. When regular forces have been established there must be simultaneously the organization of regional armies and local militia so that the mobile warfare of the regulars will be coordinated with widespread guerrilla fighting of regional and local forces. Armed struggles should go hand in hand with non-military struggles. In military operations we are for quick, decisive battles and against protracted battles, but the war as a whole is a protracted one. In battles we oppose "beating the many with the few"; we are for "beating the few with the many."

III. "From the people and to the people" is the all-inclusive political directive. To guarantee this there must be close organizational ties between the Party and the non-party people, and intimate connections within the Party between leadership and rank and file.

The Party must carry on an ideological struggle against erroneous tendencies. Meanwhile a system of strict democratic centralism must be maintained. Special attention must be given with due regard to the vast extent of the Chinese Revolution in space, in time, and in variety of social strata—to defining and securing correct relations between old and [illegible] and outsiders, military and civilians, one area and another, one department and another. By such principles the Chinese Communist Party of two million members, isolated from each other by long periods of war, has been able to achieve unprecedented solidarity, both within the Party and between the Party and the broad masses of the people.

IV. Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism is the method of thinking used. None of Mao Tse-tung's policies are either copied from a book or based on piece-meal experience. Mao's method of thinking opposes both dogmatism and empiricism. He emphatically advocates the study of theory but also holds "there is no right to speak without fact-finding." His policies are based on analysis of both the domestic and the international situation, and of the experiences of the Chinese Revolution, especially those of the Great Revolution of 1925-27, as interpreted by dialectical materialism.

* * *

SINCE World War Two ended, Mao Tse-tung has been developing his thesis on the post-war relations in the world. These views have not yet appeared in book form but have been expressed in several interviews—two were given to me last August[1]—and in an official statement on the "Post War International Situation,"[2] put out by the Communist Party's chief of information, Lu Ting-yi, on New Year's day 1947.

Mao Tse-tung takes issue with the widely current idea that antagonism between the Soviet Union and an Anglo-American bloc is leading to war. "This idea is only a smoke-screen which American reactionaries blow up to hide the more immediate antagonisms," he said to me last summer. "These are be-

1. See AMERASIA, April 1947, pp. 122-126.
2. Published in *Political Affairs*, March 1947.

tween the American imperialists and the rest of the capitalist world." He analyzed these conflicts in some detail and said: "Very soon the British people will begin to ask themselves: 'Who is it that oppresses us? Is it the USSR or is it the United States?' " In the months since then, the thought of important groups in Britain has moved steadily in the direction Mao foresaw.

The official analysis of the international situation, issued by the Chinese Communist Party on New Year's day 1947, sees a world-wide struggle developing between the forces of "anti-democracy," and the growing "world democratic might." The victory in the anti-fascist war has stimulated the growth of the people's democratic forces everywhere, but they are now being attacked on a world scale by the anti-democratic forces, whose "central fortress" is the imperialism of the United States. In the other capitalist and colonial countries, the reactionaries "turn traitor," and sell out the interests of their respective peoples to American imperialism, becoming "running-dogs of American imperialism." Chiang Kai-shek is given as an example.

"The American reactionaries have a heavy burden," said Mao to me with a smile last autumn. "They must sustain the reactionaries of the whole world. And if they cannot sustain them, the house will fall down. It is a house with one pillar. There are many patients with one doctor. And the disease of these patients is incurable. Even penicillin will do nothing for them."

All over the world, therefore, the democratic forces, in resisting the reactionaries of their respective nations, find themselves also in conflict with American imperialism. A united front against American imperialists begins to form on a world scale. It consists of the democratic people of America, the people of other capitalist countries, and the people of colonial lands. It includes all social classes, "workers, farmers and patriotic elements, and advocates of peace among the bourgeoisie." (One need not note how far this departs from traditional Marxism.) Its growth is seen in the new democratic regimes in Eastern Europe; in the leftward advance of Great Britain and France; in the leftward trends among peoples in Germany, Italy, Japan; in the growth of wide people's struggles in colonial and semi-colonial countries with China at the head; in the development of democratic forces in Latin America; in American strike movements and the "Wallace incident." These are the world's immediate struggles, rather than any conflict between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union. The USSR is a "main pillar" of the "world democratic might," but is not a direct participant in these immediate struggles.

This new line-up is seen as a "new page in world history," which will last from the end of World War Two "down to the day when stable and lasting peace of the world is ensured." For the reactionary forces are "outwardly strong but hollow inside"—"paper tigers," as Mao said to me last summer. The struggle will be long and tortuous but the victory of the world democratic might is sure.

With such a world view in mind one should read Mao Tse-tung's New Year's greeting, issued over the Yenan radio on January 1, 1947, at a time when the Yenan

Border Region was invaded, when Chiang Kai-shek occupied more than 100 Communist cities and 179,000 square miles of their territory, when the world outside China worried over a possible Third World War.

"In 1946 throughout the postwar world, the side of light waged victorious struggle against the side of darkness. And in postwar China also the side of light waged victorious struggle. . . . In the postwar world and in China, a very great people's movement developed for peace and democratic liberties. . . . These movements must of necessity move towards victory; there is no power that can bring them to a halt.

"In the year 1947 the worldwide front of the people of all countries, including China—the front against the aggressor policy of America—will develop rapidly. The movement of the Chinese people for democratic liberties will obtain even more important victories than those of 1946. This will cause conditions in China to undergo a change beneficial to the restoration of peace and the independence of the nation. . . .

"At present the Kuomintang authorities have not shown any slightest intention towards peace. . . . But in the not distant future the light of liberty will surely illumine the vast reaches of our ancestral homeland. . . . Within the next few years an independent, peaceful, democratic new China will surely establish a firm foundation."

To many people these words will sound incredibly optimistic. But file them away. Mao Tse-tung's predictions have been right so far.