


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# **THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY**

## **The Process of Conflict & Current Policy**

by Daniel Tretiak

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## **The Chinese Cultural Revolution & Foreign Policy:**

The Cultural Revolution affected Chinese foreign policy in several interrelated ways.\* First, it resulted in the removal of Liu Shao-ch'i, who exercised some influence over broad issues of foreign policy decision making. Second, it reduced considerably the power of Foreign Minister Ch'en I and other personnel in the Foreign Ministry, including ambassadors; as a result, Ch'en and the others were virtually or completely unable to perform their functions for various periods of time. Third, many lower and middle echelon personnel in various Chinese embassies abroad came to play key roles in performing administrative, if not necessarily policy, functions. Fourth, as a consequence of the attacks on senior officials, Chinese foreign policy virtually lost any sense of direction; thus, supported by some, but not all, Cultural Revolution leaders (including Chairman Mao), young, quite xenophobic Chinese exerted an extraordinary amount of influence on foreign policy during most of 1967. A main feature of policy -- if the term may be used -- during this period was the high degree of hostility and violence manifested toward foreign nations' diplomatic missions and personnel in China. Finally, since the end of 1967, the impact of Cultural Revolution diplomacy has declined, but has not completely disappeared.

It is the thesis of this paper that as a result of the process of conflict which took place during the Cultural Revolution in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, that a sufficient number of radicals were elevated to power in the Ministry and that the influence of these individuals will continue to have a limited but at times significant impact on Chinese foreign policy decision making. Nevertheless, because Cultural Revolution radicalism has been eclipsed -- the latest evidence being the results of the Ninth Party Congress -- more moderate foreign policy officials may have some room in which to maneuver and be relatively free at times from verbal attacks from the Cultural Revolution remnants in the Ministry

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itself and their supporters on the new Politburo.

This article examines the crescendoing process of conflict as it affected individuals and organizations involved in foreign policy making during the Cultural Revolution itself; and suggests how the impact of Cultural Revolution still exerts limited influence on Chinese foreign policy.

#### 1. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BEFORE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

During the years before the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the working of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had become increasingly routinized. Its leadership was rather stable and its personnel were somewhat divorced from internal politics. Ch'en I and several vice-ministers had served in the Ministry for some time; and although several new vice-ministers had been appointed during the 1963-1966 period, these were either experienced diplomats or personnel promoted from within the Ministry. Before the Cultural Revolution began, there were few, if any, outward indications that the Foreign Ministry elite was divided on foreign policy issues or that there were rumblings of discontent amongst lower echelon officials toward the Ministry's leaders. Additionally, the expansion of China's foreign relations in the 1960's,<sup>1</sup> particularly but not exclusively in Africa, should have provided increasingly more opportunities for interesting employment for new officials.

In comparison with nearly all the other ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was more insulated from the immediate pressure of domestic events by the mere nature of its work -- foreign affairs. Within China, the Ministry's work was mainly in Peking and involved relations, however cautious, with foreigners and external affairs. The degree of political work in the Ministry undoubtedly declined over time; personnel devoted itself increasingly to obtaining skills necessary for the conduct of China's ideological foreign policy. As Ch'en I noted in one of his self-criticisms:

[In various talks] I did not stress the accentuation of politics in the relationship of being red and expert. I [as Foreign Minister] overly emphasized specialization, thus accelerating the tendency of political apathy among some people. <sup>2</sup>

Many of the Ministry's personnel served abroad where, as Red Guard material<sup>3</sup> suggests, they were exposed to and in some cases even corrupted by foreign influences. By Western standards, Chinese diplomats in foreign lands seemed to live austerely; but by Chinese standards senior-level functionaries were apparently learning (or relearning) how to live the good life by benefitting from perquisites obtainable in their foreign postings.

If Red Guard attacks on the Ministry's high officials within and without the country have any basis in fact, the environment in which high officials functioned may have influenced not only their personal life but also their political viewpoints. Some, if not all, Ministry personnel became less susceptible to Maoist ideological influences at home and abroad, and more willing to reduce the level of hostility extant between China and the rest of the world. Before the Cultural Revolution, foreign observers did not perceive Chinese foreign policy as very accommodative in nature; in retrospect, however, in pre-Cultural Revolution diplomacy there was more willingness to tolerate differences between China and other countries than pertained during the Cultural Revolution.

In sum, within China, Foreign Ministry officials were undoubtedly somewhat removed from certain kinds of internal environmental influences; and outside the country, personnel were consciously or unconsciously influenced by the environments in which they worked, albeit in varying degrees. Nevertheless, as the Cultural Revolution has shown, internal developments could and did intervene into the foreign policy decision-making apparatus.

For even though the Ministry's position vis-a-vis China's domestic and international environments was different from that of other Ministries, it had some

of the same problems that other Chinese organizations had in the pre-Cultural Revolution period. Its elite may have been quite experienced in the conduct of China's foreign policy, but it was an old elite. Although the opening of new embassies undoubtedly provided some opportunities for moderate upward mobility, these opportunities may have been deemed insufficient by the Ministry's new and lower-echelon officials. The latter, like their counterparts in other ministries, were undoubtedly quite unhappy with the increasingly rigid stratification setting into their Ministry, with the economic and political distance separating them from their leaders, with the behavior of the latter, and even with the policies made by them. In the pre-Cultural Revolution environment, it would have been very risky indeed for lower-echelon Foreign Ministry personnel to criticize and attack their leaders. However, as the Cultural Revolution developed, a pattern of conflict emerged which reflected the clashes between senior and junior officials as well as the sanctions which each side could invoke against the other.

The players were different but the pattern of conflict within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quite similar to that which obtained in other "organs of power" during the Cultural Revolution, as the following section shows.

## II. CONFLICT WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Attacks involving foreign policy decision makers inside and outside the Foreign Ministry took place on several levels and had varying goals at different points of time. These relationships are shown in the table on page 5.

As Table 1 indicates, conflict within the Foreign Ministry occurred in several stages. In Stage 1, during May and June 1966, the Foreign Ministry elite succeeded in thwarting younger members of the Ministry from launching criticism against their leaders. The nature of the younger members' attacks is not clear, but presumably they were critical of the Ministry's senior leadership. As Stage 2 suggests, whatever the prestige of the leaders, their detractors were not thoroughly silenced by the work teams sent in Stage 1 by Foreign Ministry personnel to subdue them.

Table 1

Stage 1		Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5
Time	May-June 1966	July-Aug. 1966	September 1966	January 1967	April-Aug. 1967
Source of Attack(s)	Foreign Ministry leadership, including Ch'en I.	Lower level Foreign Ministry personnel; also: Ch'en Po-ta and K'ang Sheng as well as some Foreign Language Institute Red Guards.	Directive of Chairman Mao to carry on revolutionization in Foreign Ministry	Lower level Foreign Ministry personnel.	1. Students, many of whom were returned overseas Chinese angry at Chinese policy toward overseas Chinese. 2. Some Foreign Ministry officials. 3. Chinese students who studied abroad.
Target(s)	Lower level Foreign Ministry personnel.	Ch'en I and aides.	Directed at Ch'en.	Ch'en I mainly; some aides.	Liu Shao-ch'i, Ch'en I and aides (Chang Yen and Chi P'eng-fei); the ambassadors.
Substance of Attack(s)	Target accused of being too radical.	Criticism of targets' attempted blockage of Cultural Revolution through use of work teams.	Carry on revolutionization by removing individuals opposed to the Cultural Revolution in Foreign Ministry.	Ch'en I criticized for: 1. Defending aides. 2. Blocking Cultural Revolution generally. 3. Defying Mao by blocking CR in Foreign Ministry. 4. Certain political acts not related to foreign policy.	Ch'en criticized for many of same crimes as in January; also for supporting Liu and Teng Hsiao-p'ing in implementing their foreign policy line. Ambassadors' high living attacked as well.
Goal of Attack	Punishment and cessation of radical activities.	Apparently not Ch'en's removal from position; permission to make revolution in Foreign Ministry.	Enactment of Cultural Revolution in Foreign Ministry without work teams.	Removal threatened but self-criticism by Ch'en main goal.	Removal of Ch'en I.
Result	Basically unsuccessful in challenging Ch'en's authority; Cultural Revolution emerged soon thereafter.	Ch'en continued to use work teams. Stand-off.	Ch'en subsequently accused of not carrying out Mao's directive wholeheartedly.	Ch'en made self-criticisms; remained in office.	Ch'en ousted for several days in August, then reinstated, albeit with diminished prestige.



In Stage 2, the Cultural Revolution became full blown throughout China; however, its effect was thwarted in the Foreign Ministry. Ch'en I's detractors within the Ministry were joined by some Red Guards from the Peking Foreign Language Institute #2 and seem to have been tacitly supported by Cultural Revolution Group leaders Ch'en Po-ta and K'ang Sheng.

In this stage, the demands against Ch'en were quite modest, in comparison with those made later on: Ch'en I's ouster was not demanded, but his authorization was requested to carry on the Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry.

In Stage 3, Ch'en I responded to his detractors in a seemingly astute manner: while promising to accede to the demands, he admittedly attempted to use his power to undercut the revolutionaries' efforts. In this maneuver, he must have been supported by Ministry personnel on higher levels who, presumably, were as anxious as Ch'en to preserve their positions from youthful detractors.

Furthermore, in the various embassies, a similar process was apparently underway: the ambassadors were under attack, but succeeded in holding on until year's end.

Stage 3 ended with most senior officials still in their positions; however, those anxious to promote the Cultural Revolution in the Ministry were permitted "to do their thing", albeit with only partial support from above. Under such circumstances, the movement of the radical members of the Ministry was slow to pick up steam. Notwithstanding, in the final months of 1966, Chairman Mao's personal prestige was continuously put on the line in support of young Red Guards throughout the country; while older party officials may have tried to preserve their positions, this became increasingly difficult to do over time. By year's end, Ch'en I, like many other senior elite in various levels of government and party, came in for serious attack.

Stage 4. Here, concurrent with a surging wave of Cultural Revolution radicalism, a new series of attacks was launched against Ch'en I. Yet, as best



as can be determined from available Red Guard materials, neither Ch'en's ouster nor that of his immediate subordinates was demanded. Although attacks against Ch'en later in the year were interspersed with the call "Down with Ch'en I" (ta-tao Ch'en I) those in this stage were more mild and were partially satisfied with the Minister's several self-criticisms.

This is not to minimize the seriousness of the January 1967 attacks on Ch'en I: he was charged with defending some of his aides from critics; with being opposed to the Cultural Revolution generally; and with specifically thwarting it in the Foreign Ministry, thereby defying Chairman Mao. He was also stated to have committed personal acts (not related to the conduct of foreign affairs) considered objectionable by his detractors.

From all indications, the latter were lower-level functionaries in the Ministry and, as in Stage 2, may have been aided by Red Guards from Peking Foreign Language Institute(s) and supported tacitly, if not directly, by some Cultural Revolution leaders.

Despite the seriousness and duration of the attacks against Ch'en I, he remained in office. As in September 1966, he must have preserved some support within the Ministry; and outside, Premier Chou En-lai and other moderates who supported some, if not all Cultural Revolution aims, were able to demand of the radicals and obtain Ch'en I's salvation (and that of other besieged leaders) as the price of their continued support for the Cultural Revolution. However, such a situation would not auger well for Ch'en I in another storm.

Another feature of this period was the recall to China, beginning in late 1966, of nearly all of its ambassadors and other heads-of-mission. These officials, many of whom had served in high-ranking positions for some time, returned to China to face criticism from Red Guards for not being sufficiently zealous in propagandizing Mao's Thoughts and the values of the Cultural Revolution. Their fate remained in doubt during the entire 1967-1968 period.

In Stage 5 -- which may be said to have stretched from April-August 1967 -- a crescendo of attacks against Ch'en I and some of his vice-ministers eventually succeeded in ousting the Foreign Minister for a brief period of time.

This series of attacks succeeded where others failed because: (1) earlier, Ch'en I's supporters (i.e., Chou En-lai), may not have been sufficiently intimidated by his detractors, who in turn may have not really wanted to oust their chief; (2) from April on, Ch'en's opponents, hitherto mainly but not exclusively from within his Ministry, were joined by large numbers of Red Guards from the Peking Foreign Language Institutes. In previous attacks these Red Guards had played a peripheral anti-Ch'en role, but in the April-August period they were the core of the opposition.

These young radicals were supported by leading members of the Cultural Revolution Group: Chiang Ch'ing, Wang Li, Ch'i Pen-yu, and others. Whereas Ch'en Po-ta may have agreed not to attack Ch'en I earlier, Mao's wife and her supporters were less solicitous of Ch'en I's welfare.<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, while in the past Ch'en I had also obtained strong support from non-Cultural Revolution Group leaders, during this period Chou En-lai and other semi-moderates were hard pressed to preserve their own positions and to try to keep China from being rent asunder during the conflict-filled summer of 1967. While Chou and his supporters undoubtedly attempted to help Ch'en I during his time of troubles, the Foreign Minister was increasingly isolated during this period.

Ch'en's position was further undermined as a result of opposition from some high-level members of his own Ministry, led by Yao Teng-shan, formerly chargé d'affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia.

Yao had been expelled by the Indonesian government in April, and was critical of the way Ch'en I had handled Chinese policy toward Indonesia. Joining with Red Guards from the Peking Foreign Language Institute -- many of whom were

returned overseas Chinese students unhappy with overall Chinese policy toward overseas Chinese -- Yao added fuel and legitimacy within the Ministry to the anti-Ch'en movement. In mid-August, Ch'en was ousted as Foreign Minister for about a week; but in the backlash against Cultural Revolution radicalism which began at this time, Yao (who unofficially replaced Ch'en) was himself removed and the Foreign Minister rehabilitated.<sup>5</sup>

The April-August period was one in which wide-ranging charges were levied against high officials concerned with foreign policy decision making. Thus, not only were some of the charges made against Ch'en in January reiterated; additionally, Ch'en, along with the ousted President, Liu Shao-ch'i, was attacked in Red Guard materials and even in the open press for advocating a foreign policy which disagreed with that of Mao Tse-tung.

Several broad conclusions should be made about these various stages. First, beginning with Stage 2 (July-August 1966), the earlier the attacks made against senior officials the less demanded of a given target; conversely, the later in time (through Stage 5) an attack was launched, the greater the demands against the attacked. As the discussion of the nature of attacks particularly against Ch'en I will show, there developed in the process of conflict a crescendo of criticism which:

1. caused foreign policy decision making first to slow down, later almost to grind to a halt;
2. concurrently, nearly resulted in the removal of Ch'en I from the post of Foreign Minister.

Thus, attacks made in January 1967 against Ch'en only sporadically threatened him with removal from his post; it was not until April 1967 that Red Guard publications continuously called for Ch'en I's removal.

Second, the attacks of groups who had even lower echelon administrative roles within the foreign policy machinery, tended to be less extreme than those of students outside the administration who may have aspired to enter that machinery. Third, the earlier the critiques made of foreign policy leaders, the less they dealt

with foreign policy questions and the more they criticized general behavior of the individual under attack. Indeed, it is one of the hallmarks of the Cultural Revolution that, despite all the articles published in official and unofficial sources which revealed policy disagreements between given officials, only a very few dealt with foreign policy questions. Yet, quantity need not be equated with intensity; though references to foreign policy disputes in Chinese sources -- particularly Red Guard ones -- have been few, they suggest that the range of disagreement amongst high officials may have grown increasingly wide over time.

### III. ATTACKS AGAINST SENIOR ELITE

We turn first to an assessment of charges levied against Liu Shao-ch'i and then to an examination of those made against Ch'en I and the ambassadors. Although Liu, strictly speaking, was not a Foreign Ministry official, he bore some responsibility for policy and participated in a variety of foreign policy activities (trips abroad, meeting foreigners in China, and sharing in policy making).

#### A. Attacks on Liu Shao-ch'i

The charges levied against President Liu Shao-ch'i, Mao's apparent arch-rival, in May and June 1967, suggest the range of general foreign policy criticism levied by the Red Guards, and provide an indication of the varying influences of Mao and Liu on foreign policy making in the years immediately preceding the Cultural Revolution.<sup>6</sup> In the months prior to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (summer 1966), several analysts of contemporary China have concluded that many of Mao Tse-tung's colleagues were trying to ease him out of power, even as he was launching schemes against them to restore his position. Concurrent with this effort to trim Mao's sails, his opponents also advocated internal and external policies antithetical to those of the Chairman.

While this line of analysis emerged primarily as a result of analyzing data with regard to internal politics and policies, it is at least partially confirmed by Red Guard articles dealing with Liu Shao-ch'i's role in foreign policy decision making as well.

Liu was charged with advocating the "Three Capitulations and One Extermination" (San-hsiang i-mieh) line in foreign policy. The "Capitulations" included "capitulation to Imperialism headed by the US, to modern revisionism headed by the Soviet Union, and to the reactionaries of all countries"; by one extermination, the Red Guards meant Liu supported "exterminating the fire of the revolutionary struggle of the world's people."<sup>7</sup>

By tabulating the occurrence of alleged statements on foreign policy matters made by Liu over time, we find (Table 2) that the majority were made in an 18-month period, November 1963-May 1965, before the Cultural Revolution began. Fifty-seven percent (eight) of the statements were made in the 1963-1965 period, while the remaining 43 percent occurred in four different years. The inference is clear: especially in 1964-65 Liu spoke out increasingly on foreign policy matters because he was increasing his power relative to that of Mao Tse-tung.

Under the San-hsiang i-mieh rubric, Liu allegedly advocated a Chinese foreign policy line which would have had the effect of decreasing hostility toward and normalizing relations with major international actors. Thus, with regard to the US, Liu's statements revealed:

1. respect for US power in general;
2. the feeling that neither China nor the US wanted a conflict in Vietnam;
3. a view that China could not attack Taiwan without drawing an American response; and
4. that Liu was even thinking of "cooperating" with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government on Taiwan.

As for Sino-Soviet relations, Liu

1. suggested in October 1964 that the new leadership was an improvement over Khrushchev;
2. admitted that Soviet embassy personnel had been badly treated in China;

Table 2  
Occurrence of Liu Shao-ch'i Foreign Policy Statements\*

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Alleged Statements</u>
1949	1
1956	3**
1959	1
1960	1
1963	1
1964	3
1965	4

- \*Derived from statements attributed to Liu in "The Iron Proof of the San-hsiang i-mieh foreign relations line pushed by Liu Shao-ch'i", WSHC, No. 6 (14 June 1967), p. 2. For a full translation of these statements, please see Appendix A.
- \*\*These three statements are the only ones definitely verifiable: they were made during the course of Liu's speech at the 8th Congress of the CCP. Compare this WSHC article with Jen-min Shou-ts'e (People's Handbook) 1957, pp. 22-23. As far as can be determined, the other statements attributed to Liu were not published by official Chinese sources.

3. argued that the Soviet Union and not China was the main enemy of the US; and
4. added that "in the struggle with imperialism, we [China] would be united with you [Russia], we wouldn't do anything that would benefit imperialism."

The charges against Liu with regard to "capitulationism...to the reactionaries of all countries" are basically not specified, but rather subsumed in the "one extermination of the fire of the revolutionary struggle of the world's people." The thrust of these charges was that Liu questioned the efficacy of embarking on guerrilla warfare in such diverse areas as Latin America and India: he doubted whether Latin Americans would make the sacrifices necessary for launching successful struggles, and whether Indian Communists had sufficient hostility toward the authorities to want genuinely to make revolution. Furthermore, instead of urging foreign guests to make preparations to launch guerrilla warfare regardless of a given country's political climate, Liu urged that armed struggle be carried on mainly in reaction to authorities' suppression. Finally, as for revolutionaries who launched struggles which seemed to be winning, Liu poured cold water on their efforts by allegedly warning: "If armed struggle is winning, US imperialism will intervene."<sup>8</sup>

If these charges are valid, the cleavage between Mao and Liu deepened over time on matters of foreign policy (as well as, of course, domestic policy). But, unfortunately, until more information becomes available, it is not possible to be certain whether or not the Red Guard charges against Liu were valid. One exception to this reservation exists, however: in 1963, Liu visited Indonesia and made speeches which did appear in Jen-min Jih-pao. During and after the Cultural Revolution, this trip, more than any single Liu foray into the field of foreign policy, has been the subject of official and unofficial criticism. Thus, it is possible to compare the post facto charges against Liu with the 1963 public record. Following is:



1. a listing of the main charges against Liu for his behavior and the political attitudes he expressed (or failed to express, as the case may be) while in Indonesia;
2. the writer's evaluation, based on an examination of 1963 reportage in Jen-min Jih-pao, of the validity of the charges.

The table on pages 15 and 16 shows that the charges against Liu may be an amalgam of the true and the false: in some cases, as far as can be determined, Liu said exactly what his detractors claimed he did not say (see charges 2, 5b); in other cases, there is evidence in the public record that Liu did make omissions, as his post facto detractors claim (see charges 3 and 4).

This mixed evaluation suggests that if Liu was advocating a foreign policy different from that of Mao (or the Chairman's followers), Liu's trip to Indonesia may have been the starting point for a divergence which over time became more pronounced. This view would certainly correspond with the evaluation of the data in Table 2: that in the 1963-1965 period, Liu Shao-ch'i's foreign policy views were becoming increasingly different from Chairman Mao's. We can only speculate that Liu's trip to Indonesia -- his first visit to a non-Communist country as China's chief-of-state -- required him to become more subtle and compromising in dealing with the non-Communist leaders of a friendly nation.

#### B. Attacks Against Ch'en I

Ch'en I's foreign policy position was often linked to Liu's by Foreign Language Institute (FLI) Red Guards in the summer of 1967. Ch'en was accused of sharing Liu's views on American intentions in Vietnam:

[US President Kennedy] said on [July] 4th [1963] that he was prepared to withdraw American forces from South Vietnam. One cannot say that this is insincere. He has no alternative but to withdraw. It is just that he has not done so up till now. [In 1964, Ch'en I allegedly said,] I do not believe that America will expand the war. 9

Table 3

Liu Shao-ch'i in Indonesia April 1963

Charges	Validity
1. While in Indonesia, Liu "didn't say a word about the fact that US imperialism was the most evil enemy of the world's people." <sup>a</sup>	1. Although he did not use that precise formulation, he attacked "imperialism" in general and "US Imperialism" for its Taiwan policy.
2. "Even with regard to American imperialism occupying our territory of Taiwan, he didn't say a word..." <sup>b</sup>	2. Absolutely untrue. In Liu's speech in Bali, for example, Liu noted that "US Imperialism is still occupying our territory, Taiwan, and is continuously violating our sea and air space." <sup>c</sup>
3. Liu did not say anything about the current (1963) good shape of the Chinese economy nor about China's economic recovery after the Soviets left. Liu didn't talk about the three red flags and instead expressed some misgivings about the current shape of the Chinese economy. <sup>d</sup>	3. The April 1963 published speeches of Liu -- and Sukarno, for that matter -- have no references to the Chinese economy.
4. Liu "basically did not bring up the brilliant leadership of Chairman Mao..." <sup>e</sup>	4. Correct. Liu made no, even perfunctory, statements in praise of Mao, nor did Sukarno, as best as can be determined.
5. With regard to the Maphilindo Plan (for loose political cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines), Liu told the Indonesian bourgeoisie: "You belong to the same race; you ought to unite." <sup>f</sup>	5. a. Liu's public speeches did not refer to Maphilindo. b. The charge may also infer he was uncritical of Malaysia. In fact, however, Liu expressly criticized Malaysia, for which Sukarno thanked him. <sup>g</sup>

Charges	Validity
<p>6. a. Encouraged the Indonesian CP (PKI) to travel the revisionist road, eschewing armed struggle.  b. Liu also ignored the Indonesian communists.</p> <p>7. Praised Sukarno highly, and was cordial to military leader Nasution and the Indonesian Police-Inspector-general.<sup>h</sup></p> <p>8. Liu down played the necessity of communists to gain political power by means of armed struggle, emphasizing instead the feasibility of parliamentary means.<sup>i</sup></p>	<p>6. a. No evidence one way or another.  b. While Liu met Aidit in Indonesia, 1963 Chinese reportage suggests that Liu did not go out of his way to deal with the PKI on the trip.</p> <p>7. Liu's visit, at the time and in retrospect, was noteworthy for the high degree of public cordiality between Liu and Sukarno. There is no reason to suspect that Liu was other than polite to the three Indonesians referred to in the anti-Liu articles.</p> <p>8. Liu seems to have avoided advocating either pole: instead, he hailed the "national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America..." But Liu did not explicitly endorse the use of armed struggle by communists (or others) seeking independence.</p>

<sup>a</sup>Ch'en Mou, "The Running Dog of Imperialism, Revisionism and Reactionaries, the Traitor to Socialism," Jen-min Jih-pao, 27 November 1968, p. 6.

<sup>b</sup>Ibid.

<sup>c</sup>Liu's speech at Bali appears in Jen-min Jih-pao, 20 April 1963, p. 3; translation is in SCMP 2965 (24 April 1963), pp. 30-33.

<sup>d</sup>Ch'un Hsiang-tung, "Shameless Renegade, Scum of the Nation", Jen-min Jih-pao, 12 December 1968, p. 6.

<sup>e</sup>Chou Sung-nai, "Even if the Crows' Wings are Black, They Cannot Hide the Brilliance of the Red Sun", Jen-min Jih-pao, 27 November 1968.

<sup>f</sup>Ch'un Hsiang-tung, op. cit.

<sup>g</sup>Liu's Bali speech and Sukarno's Bali speech; see citations, footnote c above.

<sup>h</sup>Liu Ch'ing-hua, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the 'Police Inspector-General'", Jen-min Jih-pao, 12 December 1968, p. 6.

<sup>i</sup>Ch'un Hsiang-tung, op. cit.

On the general policy of maintaining good relations with other countries, Ch'en I was also said to have sided with Liu Shao-ch'i. On July 31, 1966, Ch'en was accused of "babbling:"

We want peaceful coexistence, we must have peaceful coexistence. Imperialism wants to use peaceful coexistence to wipe out socialism. We must use it to wipe out imperialism.<sup>10</sup>

The denunciation linking Ch'en with Liu on foreign policy issues called for the

thorough smashing of the counterrevolutionary revisionists' foreign policy line of the three capitulations and one extinction. Ch'en I must bow his head and confess his fault to Chairman Mao. If Ch'en I does not capitulate we will resolutely overthrow him.<sup>11</sup>

Ch'en I was also berated by FLI Red Guards for following policies which were detrimental to overseas Chinese in Burma and Indonesia. Ch'en was accused of being particularly praiseworthy of Indonesian former President Sukarno, even though Indonesian authorities "slaughtered overseas Chinese and set fire to their shops. [Notwithstanding,] Ch'en I was afraid of offending Sukarno and the Indonesian reactionaries..." Similarly, in Burma, despite alleged hostile acts by the Burmese government against overseas Chinese, Ch'en "always thought in terms of making concessions in order to bring about a 'normalization' of relations between the two countries [China and Burma.]"

While attacks by FLI Red Guards against Ch'en I dealt with major policy issues, attacks from Red Guards within the Foreign Ministry dealt more with the manner in which Ch'en organized his Ministry, rather than with policy matters. Ch'en was accused of establishing work conditions which established a higher pay scale for members of diplomatic missions abroad than for Chinese diplomats who worked in the Ministry in Peking. Nevertheless, they avoided discussion of policy differences amongst the Chinese elite. Nor did Ch'en I, in his defense before Red Guards, discuss major differences between himself and other leaders on such matters.

C. Attacks on Ambassadors and Other Lower Echelon Personnel

One of the earliest public signs that the entire foreign affairs apparatus was undergoing internal struggle was the gradual return to Peking of nearly all ambassadors from their overseas posts in January and February 1967, with others straggling home somewhat later. (Other members of embassy staffs were also withdrawn.) From early 1967 to May 1969, only one ambassador (Huang Hua in the United Arab Republic) remained in the field; in all other missions, lower echelon personnel became de facto chiefs-of-mission.

Individual diplomats who served abroad were accused of committing acts of personal misbehavior; there were also implications that they were in sympathy with some of the political views attributed to Liu Shao-ch'i and Ch'en I. Officials were accused of being seduced by Western amenities:

Ambassadors, counselors and their wives wear nothing but stuff made in the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Japan...<sup>12</sup>

Furthermore, unspecified diplomats serving abroad were said to be

1. "afraid of waging struggle and making revolution. ...These bureaucrats were so scared that they dared not spread the thought of Mao...";
2. "connections with the ruling groups of the countries in which they are stationed, flattering and applauding them as much as they can. For instance, when the foreign minister of a certain country [Kenya?] accused us of being the 'yellow peril'... our diplomat remained indifferent and did not even refute the accuser..."<sup>13</sup>

On the basis of such accusations, the Red Guards pledged to "redouble our efforts, pursue and hit hard at the privileged stratum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until these people are overthrown."<sup>14</sup>

The only issue-oriented charges levied publicly against a specific ambassador or former ambassador were those levied against Wu Hsiu-ch'üan

(Chinese Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1955-1958 and long involved in international communist liaison work for the Chinese Communist Party). Policy errors attributed to Wu included:

1. Evaluating the Yugoslav regime as "socialist" and supporting Tito's handling of his dispute with Stalin in the early 1950's;
2. Viewing at least partially favorably the draft program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, by stating: "There is Marxist-Leninist as well as revisionist stuff in the program. Let's discuss whether the ratio is 30-70 or 40-60";
3. Advocating that the Chinese have at minimum an open mind about how to deal with the post-Khrushchev regime in the Soviet Union when he stated: "the emergence of the new leadership...marks the beginning of fundamental reforms..." Moreover, Wu reportedly also praised Soviet party theoretician Mikhail Suslov, stating: "Suslov played an important role in the struggle against Khrushchev... Judging from my personal contacts with him, I have the impression that he has lost none of the character of a Communist Party member"; and
4. Finally, Wu was accused of attempting to preserve his position by attacking "revolutionary cadres" and "revolutionary rebels" who were critical of his views.<sup>15</sup>

Hence, even in Wu's case, preservation of his political position was at least partially an issue between the old communist and his Red Guard detractors; moreover, as in allegations against other old-time communists, Wu was charged with being associated with higher echelon anti-Maoists (in Wu's case, P'eng Chen).

In sum, the attacks against Liu, Ch'en and Foreign Ministry officials alleged that these individuals were prepared to reduce the emphasis in Chinese foreign policy on promoting revolution abroad and maintaining high

hostility toward both the US and USSR or either of the two. While undoubtedly these charges were somewhat exaggerated, it is quite possible that, following various Chinese foreign policy setbacks of 1965, at least some, if not all, Chinese foreign policy makers called for an "agonizing reappraisal" of major aspects of policy. However, any dramatic shift was halted by the commencement of the Cultural Revolution.

#### IV. THE EFFECT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON FOREIGN MINISTRY PERSONNEL

##### A. The Early 1968 Unsuccessful Effort at Restoration

As 1967 drew to a close and 1968 began, the fire of the Cultural Revolution began to cool. Within the Foreign Ministry efforts by senior officials who had been under attack during the Cultural Revolution were afoot to attempt their restoration. For example, the recalled ambassadors were in a state of limbo: they had not been formally stripped of their posts, they may have been undergoing "Mao-study" in Peking (since at least two of their number had surfaced briefly in China in late 1967), but they had not been rehabilitated.

The efforts at the Party Center to reimpose a degree of order throughout the country apparently gave hope to 91 ambassadors and directors of various departments within the Foreign Ministry that they might be returned to their pre-Cultural Revolution posts. They formalized this desire in the form of a big character poster issued on February 13, 1968, in praise of Ch'en I. Moreover, they attacked the deposed radicals: Wang Li (formerly a power in the Cultural Revolution Group) and Yao Teng-shan.

Their big character poster was basically a self-defense mechanism: by defending the Foreign Minister, they were defending themselves, as the following lines made clear:

The present central task is to drag out bad men, criticize the "ultra-left" trend of thought, and firmly grasp policy and discipline...  
Correct treatment of cadres [i.e., Ambassadors]



is the main mark of loyalty to Chairman Mao and his revolutionary line. Leading cadres must correctly treat the masses and themselves...The preceding stage of dragging out bad men and struggling to criticize and repudiate the "ultra-left" trend of thought has proved that the overwhelming majority of the personnel of our Ministry [i.e., us!] are good or comparatively good comrades. Essentially they want to make revolution and ardently love Chairman Mao. Most of those comrades who have made this or that kind of mistake have realized that they were deceived by the class enemy.<sup>16</sup>

Had conditions at the Party Center stabilized sufficiently, it is possible that the explicit defense of Ch'en I and the implicit plea by "the 91" for their own reinstatement might have been successful. But the 91 underestimated the influence of Cultural Revolution radicals within the Foreign Ministry as well as in the upper strata of the government.

Thus, in March 1968 Chou En-lai and Ch'en I, who may have preferred that the big character poster's basic principles be implemented, found it necessary to denounce "the 91". On February 28 and March 6, Ch'en I attacked his defenders, stating that the "91-man big character poster is rightist and conservative in its spirit and stand". Ch'en condemned "the 91" stating that they had joined the Cultural Revolution "for more than a year and yet they have produced such a big character poster! This shows that they have not really been educated in the Great Cultural Revolution."<sup>17</sup> Ch'en excoriated "the 91":

You people should mend your ways in a thoroughgoing manner...The big character poster signed by the 91 people has posed... a danger: once the situation has improved and conditions are more favorable, people may become their old selves again. Then you people will once again become ambassadors, counselors or attaches.

Ch'en also revealed the source of pressure against the senior diplomats' big character poster: "The matter was discovered by Premier Chou and uncovered by the 45 combat groups of embassies and consulates -- revolutionary cadres of organs under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." He paid tribute to these critics of "the 91":

...In the course of the Great Cultural Revolution, many young cadres, those at the intermediate level, and many young revolutionary fighters know more than we do; they have more courage and a heightened sense of vigilance.<sup>18</sup>

Quite clearly, if some Foreign Ministry radicals were purged in the moves against the "ultra-leftists" which characterized Chinese politics from September to March, enough not only still remained to prevent a rightist "reversal of the verdicts" in February, but were able to do so in the name of Premier Chou and of Ch'en I.

As a result of the efforts of "45 combat groups" in early 1968, all the ambassadors but one remained in Peking until May 1969, when Keng Piao, formerly ambassador to Burma, was dispatched to be ambassador in Albania and Huang Chen returned to Paris.<sup>19</sup> Otherwise, all embassies were manned by chargés d'affaires.

B. The Effect of the Cultural Revolution on Ch'en I and the Vice-Ministers

Although Ch'en I bore the brunt of the Red Guard attacks during the Cultural Revolution, some of his vice-ministers were not criticized (as far as is known); others disappeared as a result of criticism, while still others simply disappeared, probably as a result of criticisms which are not available to the outsider. Thus, the writer has not seen critiques of Chang Han-fu, Liu Hsin-ch'uan, and Hsu I-hsin; but Liu Hsiao, Wang Ping-nan, and Ch'en Chia-k'ang were criticized at one time or another for their policies and behavior as ambassadors. Chi P'eng-fei, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Han Nien-lung, and Lo Kuei-po

remain as the only active Vice Foreign Ministers.

During the period November 1967-August 1968, Ch'en I appeared to be returning to his pre-Cultural Revolution prominence. He appeared at numerous diplomatic gatherings and periodically gave speeches on foreign policy questions. Then, in August 1968, Ch'en virtually ceased to perform his public functions; it was not until the 9th Party Congress (April-May 1969) that he returned briefly to public view, albeit not for diplomatic affairs. In his absence, one of three Vice Foreign Ministers usually represented the Chinese Foreign Ministry: Chi P'eng-fei, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, and Han Nien-lung. Lo Kuei-po, who appeared frequently during the Cultural Revolution, was present at few, and then only on unimportant occasions.

Ironically, Ch'en's virtual disappearance may have been as much a result of his behavior after the Cultural Revolution as either before or during it. Ch'en seemed to be recovering his power in the late 1967-early 1968 period; however, radical elements both in the Foreign Ministry, the Party Center, and the embassies may have felt that the February 1968 demands of "the 91" were tacitly encouraged, if not actually instigated, by a Ch'en I who incorrectly perceived that a "rightist reversal of verdicts" was possible in Spring 1968. From mid-1968 on, the Vice Foreign Ministers increasingly replaced their chief at diplomatic functions.

But as evidence of the still unsettled position of Foreign Ministry high officials, it should be noted that none of the Vice Foreign Ministers were named even an alternate member of the 9th Central Committee; and that Ch'en I was only named a member of the Central Committee, not being returned to the Politburo.

C. The Effect of the Cultural Revolution on the Ambassadorial Corps

As a result of the return to Peking of nearly all of China's senior diplomats, a de facto purge of the ambassadorial corps occurred in early 1967.

The replacements of the ambassadors remained at their posts until mid-1969, when several ambassadors who had earlier been recalled were either returned to their posts or sent to new ones.

Despite the extensiveness of the 1967 purge, the changes in retrospect may have been less shattering than was originally expected. Data in Table 4, based on prior posts of the 1968 chargés d'affaires, shows that of 41 posts having chargés, 16 (about 40 percent) were manned by individuals who were either counselors or first secretaries. However, that 11 chargés (or about 30 percent) seem to have held no prior overseas posts shows that the changes in some posts were substantial.

Table 4  
Previous Positions of Chargé, (October 1, 1968)

Counselor	12
First Secretary	4
Second Secretary	3
Third Secretary	3
Commercial Counselor	2
Commercial Attaché	3
No previous position in embassy where currently <u>chargé</u>	11
Previous position in other embassy	1
No name given by NCNA	2
Either ambassador (UAR) or <u>chargé</u> (India) since before <u>Cultural Revolution</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	43

Of the 1968 chargés (see Table 5), the most experienced personnel remained in Asia (non-communist), with Eastern Europe and, surprisingly, Africa getting the bulk of those having no previously known post in a given embassy. The East European pattern is explicable: in pre-Cultural Revolution days, inexperienced ambassadors went to other Socialist countries, experienced ones to non-communist ones; the same result obtains for the ambassadors' replacements. However, in light of the attention given to Africa in Chinese foreign policy, the

Latin America	Africa	Middle East	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Asia (Communist)	Asia (Non-Communist)	Area/Previous Post
	Guinea Congo (B)		UK	USSR DDR	North Korea North Vietnam	Laos, Pakistan Ceylon, Burma Cambodia	Counselor (12)
	Zambia Mauritania		France	Poland			First Secretary (4)
	Kenya	Iraq Yemen					Second Secretary (3)
			Denmark			Nepal Afghanistan	Third Secretary (3)
	Mali		Sweden				Commercial Counselor (2)
			Switzerland	Hungary Czechoslovakia			Commercial Attaché (3)
Cuba	Tanzania Algeria Uganda		Finland Norway	Albania Rumania Bulgaria Yugoslavia			No Previous Known Post in Embassy (11)
		Syria					Previous Post in Other Embassy (1)
	Sudan		Netherlands				No Name in NCNA (2)

results of Table 5 need further explanation. Of the African countries with which China maintained good relations even during the Cultural Revolution, only the chargé in Tanzania held no previous post; the chargés in Guinea, Congo (B), and Zambia all held high rank before the Cultural Revolution. (And, according to one observer, even the Chinese chargé in Tanzania, Chou Po-p'ing, was very competent at administering the Chinese aid program in the East African nation.) The presence of the chargés who held high posts, while originally revealing turmoil in the diplomatic corps, suggested that some degree of order would return to Chinese foreign policy implementation, even in late 1967-early 1968.

Beginning in mid-May 1969, ambassadors were dispatched anew or returned to 17 embassies. All of the individuals were either experienced Foreign Ministry personnel or had held ambassadorships to other countries before their recall to China during the Cultural Revolution.

The pattern of returnees was indicative of trends in Chinese foreign policy during 1969: China was consolidating good relations with nations which preserved good relations with China during the Cultural Revolution, as well as attempting to patch up relations with countries whose relations with China did not deteriorate excessively during the Cultural Revolution. But, at least in 1969, China made few overt moves to improve relations with countries whose relations with China had suffered considerably during the Cultural Revolution. Thus, ambassadors were sent to Albania, Pakistan, Tanzania, Guinea, Zambia, and Congo as well as to Cambodia, Nepal, and North Vietnam -- but not to Burma, Indonesia, India, or North Korea.

A likely reason why not more ambassadors have been sent abroad relates to the continued influence on foreign policy making of Cultural Revolution remnants: the moderates exert sufficient influence on foreign policy to have ambassadors sent to countries having reasonable relations with China. However, Cultural Revolution remnants within the Foreign Ministry as well as in the upper echelons of the Chinese political system continue to have enough influence on

foreign policy to prevent an across-the-board improvement in China's relations with other countries.

#### V. THE LINGERING INFLUENCE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION DIPLOMACY

As 1970 begins, the Foreign Ministry, like other organs of power in China, continues to be affected by the shifting currents of post-Cultural Revolution politics: the radicals are down but by no means out (Chairman Mao protects and partially legitimizes them), the old Party and State bureaucrats have not yet fully recovered their previous positions and prestige, and the Army's roles are still ambiguous. The interplay of interests can be seen by listing those individuals who appear publicly and/or speak on Chinese foreign policy questions, their Cultural Revolution period affiliations, and present main areas of responsibility.

<u>Name(s)</u>	<u>Cultural Revolution Period Affiliation</u>	<u>Current Foreign Relations Areas of Responsibility</u>
Ch'en Po-ta K'ang Sheng and Yao Wen-yuan (backed by Mao and Lin)	Cultural Revolution Group; leading radicals	Liaison with pro-Chinese Communist parties
Li Hsien-nien and Ch'en I (backed by Chou En-lai)	Ministers of the State Council and Vice-Premiers; under attack by Red Guards etc.	Some speech making but limited authority in managing foreign affairs
Chi P'eng-fei, Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Han Nien-lung	Vice Foreign Ministers; not major targets of attack	High involvement in public functions; speech making. Some influence probably on decision making
Huang Yung-sheng and other high-ranking military figures	The Army; charged with restoring law and order	Undoubtedly much influence in decision making



Undoubtedly, within the Foreign Ministry there are individuals or groups who are sympathetic and responsive to a corresponding upper-echelon group. Thus, although ultra-radical Foreign Ministry Red Guards no longer run rampant in the Ministry, their still-quite-radical colleagues continue to support and be supported by members of the former Cultural Revolution Group at the Center. Under such circumstances more veteran officials -- supported by moderates like Chou En-lai -- cannot easily override their younger opponents and may be inhibited somewhat by them from launching new policies. Hence, Chinese foreign policy in the post-Cultural Revolution period is the outcome of constant jockeying back and forth between opposing factions, both within the Foreign Ministry and at the Center. Major external events may strengthen the hand of one faction or another, but "losing" factions within the Foreign Ministry have enough outside backing to return to the fray. In late 1968, more moderate members undoubtedly urged China to participate once again in the Warsaw Talks with the US; in early 1969, concurrent with Chairman Mao's return to Peking after a three months' absence, the Chinese postponed the talks, citing the defection of a Chinese diplomat, Liao Ho-shu, as the reason. More radical Foreign Ministry personnel probably supported superiors who were willing to make political capital out of the March 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes; more moderate ones -- in concert with moderate civilian and military senior elite -- prevailed over time, however, and the Chinese sought to reduce the risks of expanding conflict with the Russians.

Thus, as a consequence of these shifting pressures, older foreign policy elites, even should they have desired to do so, were subjected to criticism if they were considering making efforts to reduce tensions between China and the rest of the world. More radical individuals within various organs involved in one way or another with either making or implementing foreign policy showed in speeches during and shortly after the Cultural Revolution that they had little interest in reducing tensions between China and other countries.

One statement can be attributed to Feng Piao (reportedly associated with People's Daily) and the other almost certainly was made by Yao Wen-yuan (a leading radical during the Cultural Revolution, and now a member of the new Chinese Communist Party Politburo). For example, while some Chinese leaders (e.g., Chou En-lai, Ch'en I, and Li Hsien-nien) expressed hostility toward both the Soviet Union and the United States, at the same time they indicated a willingness to maintain "peaceful coexistence" with various Asian and African states; Feng Piao and Yao Wen-yuan did not express even such a limited degree of amity toward Afro-Asian nations.

Feng, in a speech delivered toward the end of 1967, presented the apocalyptic view of the world often characteristic of Chinese official propaganda: he criticized former policies carried out in Indonesia by Sukarno; claimed that "the Japanese Communist Party has gone revisionist"; and denied that because China "is opposed everywhere and setbacks are encountered everywhere", the international climate is anything but favorable for China. "What is most important is the existence of China, the existence of socialist China that clings to Mao Tse-tung's thought." Mao's thought was said to be influential in Burma, with which China once maintained friendly relations, as well as in Thailand and Cambodia. In the latter country there was "armed struggle...because the people there want to rise in insurrection and make revolution, the ruling class there wants to oppose China! These countries [presumably Burma, India, Indonesia, and Cambodia] want to sever relations with us but they also want to pass the responsibility on to us." Feng Piao revealed how he would perceive such an eventuality: "Severance of relations can do us no harm... Severance of relations will only make a mess of things politically and economically for a given country, since we can then support the people of that country to make revolution!"<sup>20</sup> Throughout his speech, there was no evidence that Feng espoused a view of compromise or understanding of neutral Asian and African nations, no reference to the "five principles of peaceful coexistence".

Neutral communist countries came off no better. North Korea was accused of being "opposed to Mao Tse-tung's thought and to China day-by-day. It advocates the road of neutrality, opposition to imperialism but not to revisionism and sits all the time on its bench."<sup>21</sup>

Even toward distant Cuba, Feng Piao showed no interest in improving relations. He termed Cuba a "revisionist country" even though the Cubans had "driven out the imperialist agents". Cuban Prime Minister Castro was said to have "boasted that he had set an example in successfully taking big cities with small armed forces, but this also reflected to some extent the feebleness of imperialism". Feng claimed that Cuba "has never been a Marxist-Leninist country", and ended his address with the only direct reference ever by a Chinese official to the death in Bolivia of the former Cuban leader, Ernesto ("Che") Guevara: "Guevara's line is an adventurist line, but there is a contradiction between him and Castro. In any case, this man cannot be called a Marxist-Leninist."<sup>22</sup>

A speech attributed to Yao Wen-yuan given in October 1967 revealed a similar high degree of hostility toward all nations. In criticizing the Soviet Union and the United States, Yao felt that "the total collapse of imperialism [was] inevitable" and that "in opposing imperialism one must also oppose revisionism." He lent support to armed struggles in Thailand, Burma, India, and the Philippines, as well as implicitly urged communists in Indonesia and Malaya to improve their guerrilla warfare activities. Like Feng Piao, Yao was also critical of both Cuba and North Korea.

As in Feng Piao's address, Yao Wen-yuan made no positive remarks about China "peacefully coexisting" with Afro-Asian nations. The emphasis was on Mao's thought, its applicability to armed struggle mainly in Asian areas and no apologia was made for the serious deterioration in China's relations with neighboring Asian and some distant African nations; no praise was included for those countries which, despite the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, had managed to preserve a modicum of favorable relations with China.<sup>23</sup>

The results of the 9th Chinese Communist Party Congress (concluded in April 1969) suggest that the moderates' position within Chinese politics has grown increasingly strong during the past year, although the influence of Cultural Revolution radicalism continues to persist at various levels of government in China. Under such circumstances, foreign policy emanating from China has been and may remain somewhat contradictory: a policy of moderation has been and may continue to prevail, but from time to time the remaining Cultural Revolution radicals' influence is still felt on China's foreign policy.<sup>24</sup>

## APPENDIX A

### A Translation\* of "The Iron Proof of the Three Capitulations and One Extermination Foreign Relations Line Pushed by Liu Shao-ch'i"

(Wai-shih Hung-ch'i 14 June 1967, p. 2.)

[The introduction is hard to read, but it seems to suggest that Liu publicly opposed Mao's foreign policy line, as the following examples suggest. Tr.]

The US is great and powerful, it is the greatest country in the world.

(20 April 1965, in a talk with a friendship delegation from a certain country.)

I have heard said that in US factories it is very difficult to tell the difference between the factory manager, engineers, and workers, this is the democratic spirit of the bourgeoisie. When I was in the Soviet Union, it was even harder to tell the difference. Therefore, it ought to be like this in our factories.

(25 April 1949; in a talk to the Staff of Tientsin national enterprises.)

Among the US ruling clique, there are some rather enlightened people who are gradually recognizing that a war policy is not necessarily in the US interest.

(8th Congress of CCP -- Political Report [1956])

The policy of peaceful coexistence does not exclude any country. By the same token, we have expectations of peacefully coexisting with the US.

(Ibid.)

The US already tested us in Korea; is it now thinking of coming up against us again in Southeast Asia? It is not.

(17 May 1964, when talking with the ambassador of a certain country.)

As I look at the US [in Vietnam]: China is unwilling to come [in], North Vietnam is also unwilling to do so; and in South Vietnam, it [the US] is even thinking of going. Its problem now is to leave and obtain some face, but it can't think of a way...

(Ibid.)

\*Translated by the author.

The main enemy now of the US, the main opponent is still the Soviet Union, the number one fear is the Soviet Union, it is not China.

(19 November 1963; a talk at the 4th enlarged congress of the members of the Philosophy and Social Science Department of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.)

The new Soviet leadership is 30° [better?] than the previous one.

(October 1964; in a talk at meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee.)

Many people have gone to the Soviet Union and have written essays saying that the Soviet Union is now liberalized, that they appreciate the Soviet Union's material surplus saying that China now is Marxist-Leninist, saying that we are revolutionary Marxism-Leninism, that the Soviet Union is conservative Marxism-Leninism. We must pay attention to this, for they [the writers who make this contrast] are sowing discord in the unity between us and the Soviet Union.

(31 January 1960; talk at home with Wang Kuang-mei.)

We can only have good relations with the Soviet comrades; we cannot have bad ones. If relations sour, [it will be because] instead of correctly sharing the load, the load was incorrectly placed [on the Soviet Union].

(Spoken at a meeting.)

I've heard it said Indian jails are very comfortable, and people are not killed [there]; therefore, the people of that country do not think of revolution. When Nehru was in jail, his standard of living was very high. Now, the life of jailed Indian Communist Party people is very good. If jail is so comfortable, there can't be a revolution.

(22 April 1965; in a talk with nine comrades who victoriously returned from Brazil.)

It is not very easy for journalists who live abroad to foster good relations. For example, a journalist who lives in India wants to report news which is in India's interest, and he also wants to report some news, which from the point of view of the Indian government, is not definitely in its interest; it is necessary to exchange friendships. In order to get news -- sources... [ellipses in original] if a journalist living abroad gets into fights, he will step on his own feet; don't do a bad job by getting into a fight and then be expelled by the host-government.

(28 May 1965; No. 1 directive on the work of Hsinhua News Agency.)

Here is one of the problems which we reckon exists in the international situation. Imperialism is not preparing for war against the socialist countries; their objective is to struggle for the middle zones, that is: Asia, Latin America, the Middle and Near East, Western Europe, England, and France.

(7 April 1959; a talk given on meeting with delegates from several countries.)

In foreign relations, we always carry out a firm peace policy, proposing the peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation of all nations. We believe in the superiority of the socialist system, and we do not fear carrying on peaceful competition with capitalist countries.

(8th Party Congress, Political Report)

Now, the workers and peasants in Western Europe and North America are rising in revolution; if they don't revolt, what are they going to do? Furthermore, they are supporting imperialism, they praise colonies [colonialism?]; if they get rid of [unclear] the ghost of colonialism, the workers could get a few advantages...

(Spoken on several occasions to foreign guests.)

After I returned home, I didn't want to spread propaganda about China, I didn't spread propaganda about the friendship between the two countries so as to avoid attacks from the reactionaries.

(1965; at the time of a talk in the Shanghai Building at a banquet for President XXX.)



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The CPR had embassies, or the equivalent, in 32 countries in 1960; by 1966, the figure had risen to 48.

<sup>2</sup> "My Self-Examination", Hung-wei Pao (Red Guard), 8 February 1967; in IASP translations, vol. 1:1, p. 5f.

<sup>3</sup> During the Cultural Revolution, many unofficial or semiofficial newspapers and pamphlets were published by Red Guards. In contrast, before the Cultural Revolution, only officially-authorized national, provincial, and local papers were published.

<sup>4</sup> Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's wife; Wang Li, relatively unknown before the Cultural Revolution; Ch'i Pen-yü, a Shanghai party intellectual; Ch'en Po-ta, a long-time party theoretician and close aide to Mao.

<sup>5</sup> Correspondent, "Short, Not Sweet", Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), October 5, 1967, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> It may never be possible to ascertain with complete satisfaction the accuracy of charges made in Red Guard newspapers. Yet, they may be used, for what they tell or neglect to tell. The charges against Liu Shao-ch'i's foreign policy line are contained in one issue (14 June 1967) Wai-shih Hung-ch'i (Foreign Affairs Red Guard; WSHC), published by the "Proletarian Revolutionary Liaison Committee of the Foreign Affairs System", apparently Red Guards within the Foreign Ministry.

It should be noted here that, whatever the importance of foreign policy in the start of the Cultural Revolution, foreign policy questions were very limitedly discussed even in Red Guard materials during the entire Cultural Revolution. Some observers have suggested that foreign policy, regardless of differences among elite, was not a subject for even unofficial, let alone official discussion. Basically, only Red Guard papers published in foreign affairs circles discussed foreign policy questions, and even these avoided providing full details about differences between Mao and his opponents on foreign policy. Despite the official criticism of Liu Shao-ch'i beginning in April 1967, articles dealing with his foreign policy views were sparse. While doubts may exist about the veracity of the charges against Liu, we must attempt to utilize the material.

<sup>7</sup> "Thoroughly Smash the San-hsiang i-mieh Revisionist Foreign Policy Line", WSHC, No. 6 (14 June 1967), p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> "Let's Settle the Score with Liu Shao-ch'i...", WSHC, 14 June 1967, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> "Ch'en I -- Another Victory Song for Mao's Thought", Pei-wai Hung-ch'i (Peking Foreign Languages Institute Red Flag), undated.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> "Thoroughly Smash the Foreign Affairs Ministry's Privileged Stratum", WSHC, 14 June 1967; in Survey of Chinese Mainland Press (SCMP) Hong Kong, No. 4004, 18 August 1967, pp. 10-14.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> "Irrefutable Evidence of Wu Hsiu-ch'uan's Betrayal of the Party and the Country", Hung-wei Chan-pao (Red Guard Combat Bulletin, Peking), 13 April 1967; in SCMP No. 4007, 23 August 1967, pp. 6-7.

<sup>16</sup> "A Specimen of Rightist Reversal of Verdict...", I-yueh Feng-pao (January Storm; Canton), No. 26, May 1968; in SCMP No. 4191, June 5, 1968, pp. 8-13.

<sup>17</sup> "Letter from Comrade Ch'en I to Premier Chou", Kuangchou Hung-tai-hui (Canton Red Guard Congress), April 3, 1968; in SCMP No. 4164, April 25, 1968, pp. 1-13.

<sup>18</sup> "Comrade Ch'en I's Speech at Ta-Lien-Ch'ou Examination Rally of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 6", I-yueh Feng-pao (January Storm, Canton), No. 26, May 1968; in SCMP No. 4191, 5 June 1968, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup> Both Huang and Keng were named full members of the 9th Central Committee.

<sup>20</sup> "The International Situation is Excellent", Hung-se Hai-yuan (Red Seaman; Canton), January 24, 1968; as translated in Current Background No. 850, April 3, 1968, pp. 1-9.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Summary by the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, "Report on the International Situation", Kung-chiao Hung-ch'i (Industry and Communications Red Flag), October 12, 1967; translated in SCMP No. 4131, March 5, 1968, pp. 23-25. Reliable observers in Peking and Hong Kong attributed this speech to Yao Wen-yuan.

<sup>24</sup> For a discussion of recent trends in Chinese foreign policy as well as a statement that Chinese policy is starting to return to a more moderate posture, see my paper, "Is China Preparing to 'Turn Out'? Changes in Chinese Levels of Attention to the International Environment, 1966-1969", prepared for the Conference on the Foreign Policy of Communist China, January 1970.