

THE STRUGGLE FOR KOREA'S NATIONAL RIGHTS

Wilfred Burchett

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Publisher's Note

Wilfred Burchett, a writer and journalist of Australia, delivered a speech entitled, "The struggle for Korea's national rights" at a symposium on "Korea for Koreans" held in Stockholm, Sweden, on March 25, 1974, under the auspices of the Swedish Society for Foreign Policy. Here we publish the full text of his speech.



There are some obvious similarities between the fate of the people of Korea and that of the peoples of Indochina. Korea, like Indochina, is a peninsula appendage to the mainland of Asia. Prior to the period of modern colonialism, Korea and Vietnam, had been invaded by various dynasties of outside feudal states but had always waged heroic

wars of resistance against the invaders. In between periods of occupation, they vigorously developed their own distinctive cultures, defending these together with their land in times of invasion and occupation. Despite very long foreign domination, the peoples of Korea and Indochina, have preserved their own language, their distinctive forms of dress and customs and everything else that goes to make up national culture.

In modern times the Koreans were victims of Japanese colonialism; the peoples of Indochina were victims of French and Japanese colonialism. They were all more recently victims of US aggression. The heroic struggle waged against the mightiest of the imperialist powers, the USA, has aroused the admiration of the whole of progressive humanity. Great national leaders were thrown up during these epic struggle for national liberation, President Kim Il Sung in

Korea, President Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, Prince Souphanouvong in Laos and Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia. The fame and influence of each spread far beyond the national boundaries of their respective countries, inspiring national liberation forces whenever people fought for independence.

Finally, if Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel. Because of this degree of similarity between the problems I find it very appropriate that a discussion of the Korean problem should follow on that which took place here on Indochina after the Paris agreements.

For almost 70 years, ever since Japan imposed a "protectorate" over Korea in 1905, the Korean people have been denied their full national rights. In 1910, Japan annexed the "protectorate" introducing one of the most brutal, oppressive colonial regimes, in the history of imperialism. Insurrections were drowned in blood-baths, the country's human and material resources were exploited in an intolerable way, ground into the military machine that Japan was building up to further her plans for the conquest of China, and then the rest of Asia. Use of the Korean language was forbidden, names had to be changed into Japanese, even the wearing of national dress was banned; exploitation descended into even the annual cropping of women's hair. 5,000 patriots arrested in 1937 were executed to the last man and woman in March, 1945, on the eve of the final victory over the Japanese occupiers and the liberation of Korea. Yet, the Korean people did not sit idle. Among other things, young guerilla commander Kim Il Sung (then he was called General Kim Il Sung by the people) organized and led the armed anti-Japanese struggle for 15 years in northern border area of Korea and Manchuria till victory. After 40 years of unimaginable sufferings under the Japanese, the Korean people had every right to hope for the dawning of a new life

with the full exercise of their national rights, after the defeat of the Japanese. They have still been denied this however.

At the Potsdam Conference, it decided that the Soviet and American forces, should enter Korea to round up the Japanese forces and evacuate them back to Japan. The Soviet forces would take care of this north of the 38th parallel up to the frontiers of China and the Soviet Union. American forces would carry out this south of the 38th parallel.

When the Soviet Union launched its attacks against the much-vaunted, elite Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria on August 9, 1945, General Kim Il Sung's forces were well placed to support the Soviet landings at Chongjin in the northeast corner of Korea near the Soviet border, catching the main part of the Japanese occupation forces in a huge encircling manoeuvre. By that time also, General Kim Il Sung had gradually expanded his guerilla bases from the Korea-Manchuria border area pushing them far to the South. With the Japanese surrender the establishments of the guerilla bases, facilitated the setting up of People's Committees over the whole length and breadth of Korea. By the time MacArthur's forces arrived on September 8, 1945, the Japanese had been disarmed and rounded up everywhere in the South, except in Seoul and a few other towns. The leaders of the People's Committees, who had taken over the administration, eagerly awaited the arrival of the US troops to hand over their captives. They expected that the American forces would immediately arrest the hated Japanese Governor-General Abe, as well as the remaining Japanese commanders and the worst of the Korean collaborators. In the North, the Japanese and a few top Korean collaborators were firmly in Soviet hands.

To the dismay of the Korean patriots in the South, one of the first acts of Hodge who commanded the

US forces was to order Abe and all other Japanese officials to remain at their posts and that they be restored to office if dismissed. Furthermore, a typical MacArthur Proclamation in his name, was posted up all over South Korea stating that: "All powers over the territory of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude, and the people thereof, will be for the present exercised under my authority. Persons will obey my orders and orders issued under my authority. Acts of resistance to the occupying forces or any acts which may disturb public peace and safety will be punished severely. For all purposes during the military control, English will be the official language..." A second Proclamation provided that any person committing acts "calculated to disturb public peace and order, or prevent the administration of justice, or willfully does any act hostile to the Allied Forces, shall, upon conviction by a Military Occupation Court, suffer death or such other punishment as the Court may determine..."

The United States thus proceeded to set up a Military Occupation Regime which was in total violation of the tasks outlined at the Potsdam Agreement. North of the 38th parallel the Soviet Union did the opposite, handing over effective power to the People's Committees. A passage from the Proclamation issued by Colonel-General Chistiakov, who commanded the Soviet Army in Korea, defines the Soviet attitude. After referring to the crushing of the Japanese forces, the Proclamation states: "Korea has become a country of freedom. However, this is only a first step in a new era of Korean history... The happiness of the Korean people will only be achieved by the heroic efforts that you Korean people will exert... You have attained liberty and independence. Now everything is up to you..."

An ordinance of the US Military Government issued in the South stated that "all laws which were in

force, regulations, orders, notices or other documents issued by any former Government of Korea, having the full force of law on August 9th, 1945, will continue in full force and effect until repealed by express orders of the Military Governor of Korea..."

In other words the only difference in the US occupation regime to that of the Japanese, was that English replaced Japanese as the official language.

Under American supervision, the Japanese-trained Korean police set about disbanding the People's Committees—with death the penalty for any who resisted. Koreans in the South were treated as "enemies" subject to a military government infinitely more oppressive than those the US Government set up in Japan, Germany or Italy.

At a meeting of Soviet, US and British foreign ministers in Moscow in December 1945, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov fought hard to have the US-Soviet forces withdraw and let the Koreans settle their own problems. But faced with a two-to-one vote on every question the Soviet Union went along with a proposal to set up a Soviet-American Joint Commission to work out ways and means of "establishing national independence for Korea" during a period of trusteeship for up to 5 years. Although the Japanese in the South were shipped back to Japan by the end of 1945, after tremendous protests from the Korean people, the Japanese police machine was kept intact and handed over to the USA's chosen "Man in South Korea", Syngman Rhee, when the latter was brought back from exile in the United States. The work of the Joint Commission was sabotaged by the United States, which arbitrarily excluded from the South Korean organs to be consulted, all those favouring reunification, including the trade unions, peasants associations and even right-wing political parties, if they were known to favour reunification.

In February 1946, a North Korean Provisional Pro-

ple's Committee, was elected by delegates from the local People's Committees and General Kim Il Sung was elected its chairman. The NKPPC carried out a number of urgent reforms including land reform and the nationalisation of the former Japanese-owned enterprises. At the end of 1946, the US occupation authorities started to organise a hand-picked "interim" government and "interim" Legislative Assembly. The leadership of the "interim" government was handed over to Syngman Rhee on a plate the following year, by which time there had been a wholesale purge of anyone suspected of being a "communist" in South Korea; advocating the unification of the country was considered sufficient "proof", whole families were arrested, tortured and even executed on suspicion of "sympathising" with the North. These facts were testified to by organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (to which both the American CIO and the British Trade Union Congress were affiliated at the time) after on-the-spot investigations. The WFTU delegates protested to the US occupation authorities that: "Organized terror deprives the Korean people of their right to exercise freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of political expression and freedom of organization..."

Having wrecked the work of the Joint Military Commission, the US took the "problem" of Korea to the UN where it was assured of an automatic majority for any policies it wanted to put across. In this case the organization of separate elections in South Korea "under UN supervision" on May 10, 1948, thus making the line along the 38th parallel, intended exclusively as the boundary up to which US and Soviet forces should operate in their task of rounding up the Japanese occupation forces, into a political boundary, entirely over the heads of the Korean people. And against their expressed wishes. That this was so was proven by the fact that delegates from all

major political parties in the South—except the weak landlord-capitalist Democratic Party and Rhee's party which was based exclusively on the Japanese collaborators—and every social organisation of any importance, took part in a conference held in Pyongyang in April 1948 to discuss the question of unification. The political parties from the South were right-wing and centrist, but together with the social organisations, they represented 90 per cent of all organized South Koreans. The unanimous decision as announced in a communique on April 23, 1948 was to reject the elections and to denounce Syngman Rhee and Kim Sung Su, leader of the Democratic Party: "We brand them as traitors and we will brand as traitors all those who collaborate with them," the decision stated and continued: "Because of these reactionaries, the South Korean people have been unable to obtain the precious privileges of democracy. On the other hand, in the North, which was liberated by the Soviet Army, the people are able to create what they desire and, through their People's Committees they established, they were able to realize democratic reforms and lay down a firm foundation for a sound national economy and revive our national culture..." The conference decided to "oppose separate elections and to support the Soviet proposals to establish a unified, independent country by having foreign troops withdrawn from Korea. To this end we will exert all our efforts."

However the elections were held, on May 10. American correspondents who reported on the polling estimated that at least 500 people were killed, some for refusing to go to the polls, others in riots at the polling booths. The main political parties boycotted the elections, including the American choice for president at that time, Kim Kyu Sik and Kim Ku of the right-wing Korean Independence Party. Syngman Rhee was declared the elected president.

A second meeting of the organisations that had

taken part in the Pyongyang unification conference was held at Haeju, just north of the 38th parallel in June, 1948, at which it was decided to carry out nation-wide elections on August 25. Despite the efforts of the Rhee police and US occupation authorities, 77.52% of eligible voters voted in the South to elect 360 deputies; 99.97% voted in the North to elect 212 deputies (this was in proportion to the respective population south and north of the 38th parallel). 572 deputies were thus elected, in the only nation-wide elections ever held in Korea. On September 8, the 360 deputies from the South went to Pyongyang and together with the deputies from the North, meeting in the Supreme People's Assembly, they unanimously elected General Kim Il Sung as prime minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Thus, when General Kim Il Sung is referred to as the leader of the 40 million Korean people, this is juridically and historically correct. One of the first acts of the new Assembly was to draft a request to both occupying powers announcing that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been founded and requesting them to withdraw their occupation forces. The Soviet reply was prompt. The founding of the Republic was welcomed; Soviet troops would be withdrawn. A similar request to the US Commander was rejected. After several vain requests to the USA by the Soviet Union for simultaneous withdrawal of US-Soviet armed forces, Soviet forces were withdrawn from North Korea in December 1948, less than 3 months after the setting up of the DPRK.

Rhee was not slow in introducing a reign of terror. Even the UN Commission reported in August 1949 that under Rhee's "National Peace Protection" Act, 89,710 persons had been arrested in the South in the 8 months prior to April 30, 1949. Kim Hyo Sok, Rhee's Minister of the Interior who went to the North at the outbreak of war in June, 1950, estimated that between

August 1945 and the start of the war on June 25, 1950, a quarter of a million people had been massacred and 600,000 imprisoned in the South during "Liberation—American-style."

According to my own, still incomplete investigations, the war started in fact in August-September, 1949 and not in June, 1950. Repeated attacks were made along key sections of the 38th parallel throughout the summer of 1949, by Rhee's forces, aiming at securing jump-off positions for a full-scale invasion of the North. Important heights were seized in the western and central sectors during that period and deep penetrations into North Korean territory were made in the eastern sector. Some key positions in the Haeju area in the west were held for several months. Although US troops had been forced to follow the Soviet example and withdraw back to Japan, US military "advisers" were in charge of Rhee's military operations. On June 5, three weeks before the official start of the war, the head of the US military mission Brigadier-General W.L. Roberts, gave an interview to Marguerite Higgins of the New York "Herald Tribune", in which he revealed, among other things, that "I've got at least 13 to 14 Americans with every division. They work with the Korean officers... they live right with them there in the field and at the front and stay with them in battle and rest periods..." This was the first admission that there was a "front" and battles in which US officers had taken part. What happened later was simply that the North Korean forces decided that things had gone far enough and that the next assault by Rhee forces would be repulsed; that—having exhausted all possibilities of a peaceful solution,—those forces would be chased back and the South liberated. June 25th, 1950 was the day, on which that next major assault took place. North Korean militia forces along the frontier having repulsed the attack in most places—except in the Haeju sector

in the west, the regular army of the DPRK, rapidly built up since the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic, then went into action with the results that are now part of history.

What is not as well known, are the last minute efforts by Premier Kim Il Sung to avoid such an armed conflict. As the storm clouds gathered and Syngman Rhee openly boasted that he would "occupy Pyongyang within 3 days" and quickly unify the country up to the borders of Manchuria (in an interview with the vice-president of United Press), renewed efforts were made to avoid a fratricidal war. In early June, Pyongyang offered cooperation with all politicians in the South, except Syngman Rhee and 7 other notorious collaborators with the Japanese. A personal invitation was issued to 300 members of the South Korean parliament and other prominent leaders to take part in another unification conference. By then the frontier along the 38th parallel had been closed. Pyongyang radio announced the invitations would be delivered by two delegates and a journalist at a point on the 38th parallel at a specified date and hour. They were met by a hail of machine-gun fire, one of the delegates being wounded. They were instructed however to press on and deliver the invitations in Seoul. Nothing is known of their final fate, except that they were arrested and tortured.

On June 19, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly in Pyongyang proposed to the National Assembly in Seoul that the two bodies join together and achieve peaceful reunification of the country. The reply was the assault from the South at dawn on June 25, 1950 and the powerful counter-offensive launched by the North a few hours later. Just about a year later, I was based for 2 1/2 years in Kaesong, a few kilometres south of the 38th parallel, where some of the heaviest fighting on a vital sector of the front started. I had ample time to question local residents as to who fired

the first shots. They had no doubts. South Korean troops, in large numbers had moved into Kaesong during the first half of June, and to positions immediately north of the city on the evening of June 24. Early risers saw them moving up the mountain behind the city just before dawn, accompanied by artillery barrages. Two or three hours later they were running back, throwing away arms and tearing off uniforms. Seoul papers announced on the evening of June 25 and morning of June 26 capture of Pine Tree Peak, just behind Kaesong in a "heroic counter-attack," after the Korean People's Army had "attacked" south of the parallel. While the Seoul press and radio was announcing a glorious advance on Pyongyang, Syngman Rhee and his American wife, taking with them most of the country's gold reserves, fled by plane to Tokyo, on the afternoon of June 26. Rhee had boasted that he would occupy Pyongyang within 3 days. In fact it was Seoul which was liberated in 3 days. Within 6 weeks, the Korean People's Army had liberated over 90 per cent of the territory and over 92 per cent of the population of South Korea. This could only have been possible because of the massive support they received from the local population. Over 400,000 young people joined the KPA as it swept south. Hundreds of thousands more formed guerilla units to harass the enemy rear. The US 24th division rushed across from Japan to stem the advance was cut to pieces, its commander, Dean, among the captured.

The rest is history. US massive intervention under the "UN" flag. MacArthur's ill-fated attempt to carry the war to China and achieve his ambition of restoring Chiang Kai-shek to power. His sacking by Truman, not for having attempted it but for having lamentably failed. Despite the most merciless use of air power that the world had seen until that time, the United States failed in its aim of bringing the Korean people to their knees. They bombed Korea north of the

38th parallel until virtually not a single building was left standing. In the capital, Pyongyang, then a city of 400,000 people, only two small buildings were left intact. When buildings were destroyed, the US Air Force operating in the name of the "UN" turned its attention to dams and irrigation projects. These attacks, without precedent in warfare, were aimed at the direct death by drowning of thousands of Korean civilians and indirectly at the death of millions by mass starvation and famine. They were aimed at destroying the whole irrigation system on which depended north Korean rice crops—the staple food of Koreans. It was the first time these dams had been attacked since the war started. The excuse given by the Air Force was that they were intended to start floods to wash away any bridges and roads they had been unable to put off action by normal bombing methods. In one raid alone, in which a total of 36 B-26 bombers were used in four waves against the Sunan dam, more than 450 peasants were drowned, 70 villages were flooded and 5,000 people made homeless. The planes returned day after day to bomb and strafe the peasants and workers up to their waists in mud and water desperately trying to block the breaches. Later, the raids were extended to include bombing and strafing attacks on refuge camps and against any villages in well-known rice-growing centres, no matter how far removed from industrial or transportation facilities. The raids started on May 14, 1953, and continued until the end of the month at a time when the dams and reservoirs were at their maximum capacity after the spring thaws.

Eventually the USA delegates were forced to conclude the Panmunjom truce negotiations, and a ceasefire was signed on July 27, 1953. A demarcation line was fixed roughly along the 38th parallel where the war started, with the DPRK holding territory south of the parallel in the western sector, the "UN" Com-

mand holding approximately the same amount north of the parallel in the eastern sector.

Article 4 of the Ceasefire Agreement, provided for discussions on the withdrawal of foreign troops and steps towards the reunification of the country, within 3 months of the ceasefire. But within 12 days the USA and Rhee regime had violated this article by signing a bilateral agreement providing for the indefinite stationing of US troops in South Korea and the provision of US military bases there for an indefinite period. Twenty-one years later the US still has bases and troops in South Korea.

Ever since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement in July 1953, there have been innumerable attempts by the DPRK to transform that Agreement into a peace treaty and to bring about a step-by-step reunification of the country. But at the political talks at Panmunjom which followed the Ceasefire Agreement and at the International Conference at Geneva in April 1954, the United States and the Seoul regime, adamantly refused to consider any proposals aimed at self-determination for the Korean people. At the Geneva Conference, the United States again tried to shelter behind the flag of the United Nations, by demanding elections to be held in the North under "UN" auspices. This sounded fine for public consumption, but as the "UN" was a belligerent in the Korean War, spreading its authority over the DPRK north of the battleline would have accorded it a victory which it was unable to obtain on the battlefield.

Many proposals have been made from Pyongyang aimed at settling the question of reunification in the most democratic and reasonable way. Premier (now President) Kim Il Sung proposed that nation-wide elections should be held, with all political parties free to campaign in both parts of the country, to elect a unified democratic government. As the population of the South remains about 10 million more than in the

North, the Seoul regime should have had no fears on the score of numbers. The fear, of course, was how those numbers would cast their votes! As this fairest of all solutions was rejected, the North proposed transitional measures. It was proposed that a Confederation of North and South Korea could be set up by establishing first a Supreme National Committee, comprised of an equal number of representatives appointed by both sides, leaving intact for the time being the existing social and political systems of the DPRK and the ROK (Republic of Korea) in the South. The Supreme National Committee however could coordinate in a unified way economic and cultural developments and could represent Korea as a whole in external affairs. This was also rejected. The DPRK then suggested setting up an Economic Committee, independent of political affairs, to handle trade and economic affairs between North and South. When this was also rejected, as far back as 1964, the DPRK offered to share with South Korea some of the gains of the astounding economic progress in the North. Pyongyang offered to supply the South every year with 100,000 tons of rolled steel products; 1 billion kwatt hours of electricity; 10,000 tons of chemical fibres; 300,000 tons of rice as well as large quantities of cement, timber, machinery and other goods. This was refused. Politicians and journalists in the South advocating acceptance were arrested by the Park Chung Hi dictatorship (which succeeded that of Syngman Rhee after the latter was thrown out of the country by a people's uprising in April 1960) and some of them were executed. (It is worth noting that ever since the DPRK was founded as the result of the all-Korean elections in August 1948, economic planning in the North has always been based, until this day, on all-Korean requirements.)

Proposals similar to those outlined above were repeated when delegations of North and South met, in

accordance with the communique of July 4, 1972 which initiated negotiations towards normalising North-South relations. But all such proposals have fallen on deaf-ears. It soon became clear that Park Chung Hi had accepted negotiations only to deceive public opinion in the South and behind the facade of the talks, he strengthened his dictatorship by suspending the constitution in October 1972, declaring martial law and intensifying political repression.

The fact that Park Chung Hi named the head of the South Korean CIA to head his delegation was a pointer to the real aim of Seoul in agreeing to the talks.

The complete lack of sincerity of the Seoul regime was exposed however, when Park Chung Hi proposed on June 23, 1973 that both Koreas should be admitted to the United Nations, thus perpetuating the division of the country in the most definitive way. On the eve of that same day, President Kim Il Sung countered with a five-point proposal on reunification providing for a single representation for the Confederal Republic of Koryo (the ancient name of the country) pending the completion of reunification.

The reunification talks have produced nothing except to reveal to the Korean people who champions the cause of reunification and who is responsible for blocking the slightest progress in this respect. The demagogic position of the Seoul regime was shown again recently by their proposal to sign a "non-aggression pact" with the DPRK. In a speech welcoming the visit of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne to Pyongyang, President Kim Il Sung exposed the absurdity of such a proposal:

"As is well known," he said, "those who really command the South Korean forces are not the South Korean authorities, but the Commander of US troops, still bearing the 'UN' insignia. It is also the US imperialists who control all the means of war from

rifles to artillery. If despite its empty hands, the South Korean government envisage concluding a 'pact of non-aggression' with us, while leaving the aggressive troops of US imperialism in South Korea, then this is a matter of such stupidity that it is not worth discussing.

"Because of such manoeuvres at dividing the country, we cannot believe that the South Korean government are sincerely engaged in a dialogue for reunification." President Kim Il Sung then made another new proposal, to take the question of reunification straight to the people of North and South.

"We think that for a peaceful solution to the problem of reunification, the problem should be made a subject of discussion by the whole nation, instead of leaving it only within the framework of talks between the authorities of North and South.

"We therefore propose that independently of the existing Coordinating Committee on North-South relations, a Great National Assembly should be convoked, or a conference for political discussions between North and South, in which would take part the representatives of different political parties and social organizations and personages from various sections of the population in the North and South. This is the only way which will lead to reunification...."

In a long discussion with President Kim Il Sung in August of last year, after detailing many of the political proposals made during the sessions of the coordination commission, the President also spoke of very concrete offers for economic cooperation made by the DPRK. "We said:—'Why send your workers abroad to places like West Germany and Brazil, when we could give them work? Why import iron ore at high costs from abroad when there is plenty for all Korea in the North? Send your workers to us, we will give them equipment and they can mine the iron ore and send it South—as much as you want, without cost.'

They refused. On another occasion after heavy human and material losses from floods in the South, we said: 'We now have much experience in irrigation and flood-prevention works. We will send you engineers and equipment. They can work under your orders wherever you need them.' 'No' was the reply. 'Communism would flow with the irrigation waters.' We also suggested that the South Korean fishermen come and fish in our waters. They are having a bad time in the South because Japan has exported many of its pollution-making industries to South Korea. The waters are polluted and this has had a disastrous effect on fishing. 'We are one nation. There is plenty of fish for all in the northern waters,' we said. But they refused, as they have refused every concrete proposal towards normalising relations."

The fact that the Seoul regime prefers to turn to the United States and Japan for its economic development instead of sharing the benefits of the extraordinary economic development in the North is also typical. As is the fact of allowing Japanese industry to exploit cheap South Korean manpower—a South Korean industrial worker is paid about one third the wage of his Japanese counterpart—in Japanese factories in South Korea, the output of most of which is exported.

The DPRK is completing ahead of schedule a 6-year economic plan. Due for completion by the end of 1976, most of it will be completed this year and all quotas for all branches of industry will be fulfilled by the end of 1975. Meanwhile new targets were announced in Pyongyang on February 14th, following a two-day session of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party. For the next planning period, steel output is fixed at 12 million tons; coal at 100 million tons; 50 billion kwatt hours of electricity; 20 million tons of cement; 1 million tons of non-ferrous metals; 5 million tons of chemical fertilizers; 10

million tons of grain; 5 million tons of fish. Such figures are further evidence that economic planning in the North is based on meeting the requirements of the whole country—when normalisation of North-South relations makes this possible.

That such aims are feasible is a triumph for President Kim Il Sung's policy of "juche"—or self-reliance in all fields of economic, political and other activities. To give one example. In pre-war days, it was the South that was the country's rice granary. The North depended on grain from the South. In 1956 grain production in the North reached a record 2.8 million tons, easily surpassing the best pre-war year. By 1965, it had reached 5 million tons. This year, the yield is expected to reach between 6.5 and 7 million tons, the target set for 1976. The previous economic plan which ended in 1970 had set targets at 2.5 million tons of steel; 23 to 25 million tons of coal; cement production 4 to 4.5 million tons, electric power at 33 to 35 billion kwatt hours. Even these figures were sneered at by many western "experts". A glance at the new target figures shows a planned rate of industrial growth which no western state can match. The fulfilling of these targets will, at some point or another, provide an irresistible magnet for reunification.

The only factor which can prevent them being realised is if there are renewed hostilities. The government of the DPRK maintains the highest state of vigilance in this respect. Continued espionage activities by American and South Korean intelligence services, as well as the history of the past almost 30 years, justifies this vigilance.

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