

Volume VIII
From Rectification to Coalition Government
1942–July 1945

MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Revolutionary Writings
1912–1949



Stuart R. Schram and Timothy Cheek, Editors
Nancy J. Hodes, Associate Editor

ROUTLEDGE


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for Chinese Studies, Harvard University

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The Cover

“Cultivate the Party Spirit”

(For the Records of the Seventh Party Congress, 1945)

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Translations of the materials included in this volume have been drafted by many different hands. First and foremost, we must acknowledge two key and long translations included here that came to us in full, polished form: Bonnie S. McDougall's translation of Mao's May 1942 "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art" and Andrew Watson's translation of Mao's December 1942 "Economic and Financial Problems." These fine translations can hardly be improved on, and we thank our two colleagues as well as their respective publishers—University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies in the case of McDougall's translation and Cambridge University Press in the case of Watson's translation—for permission to reproduce those texts in this volume. We have

modified these translations only to fit the conventions of our other translations. Those who have made a substantial contribution to the drafts of all the other translations in this volume include, in alphabetical order: Anna Belogurova, Timothy Cheek, Hsuan Delorme, Gu Weiqun, Lin Jin, Beth Ruggiero, Tian Dongdong, Wang Xisu, Wang Zhi, Yu Zhansui, and Zhu Hong.

The co-editor of this volume is Professor Timothy Cheek of the University of British Columbia. Professor Cheek has long worked on Mao and the Yan'an period. He joined this project in 2000 and worked on all stages of the current volume, from draft translations to revision and annotation of translations, to writing the introduction for this volume with Stuart Schram. After 2005, Schram's declining health necessitated a team approach to complete this volume and maintain the standards of the series. Yu Zhansui of Nazareth College, New York, joined the project in 2009 in order to check all the translations one more time, and Timothy Cheek once again reviewed and edited them.

It has taken a veritable village to carry on Stuart Schram's meticulous approach. Nancy Hearst deserves special credit for editing above and beyond the call of duty, catching and correcting endless infelicities and inconsistencies that had crept into the manuscript over a decade. We also acknowledge the editorial role and major contribution to the broader project of Nancy Hodes, now a professor at Soka University of America.

This project was launched by Roderick MacFarquhar, director of the Fairbank Center until June 30, 1992. Without his organizing ability, forceful advocacy, and fundraising, it would never have come into being, and his continuing active participation has been vital to its success. Subsequent directors—James L. Watson, Ezra Vogel, Elizabeth Perry, Wilt Idema, William Kirby, and Mark Elliott—have continued to provide moral and, on occasion, material support.

In the two decades and more that have elapsed since this project to collect and translate all of Mao's writings before 1949 got under way, some new texts have come to light. However, we have maintained (except as noted in a few cases) the selection that Schram made for the present volume based on his best knowledge in the late 1990s. Ultimate responsibility for the accuracy and literary quality of the work as a whole rests with Schram and Cheek as senior editors of this volume. The fault for any remaining errors and inadequacies, however, lies with the one who oversaw final production, Timothy Cheek.

General Introduction

Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912–1949

Mao Zedong stands out as one of the dominant figures of the twentieth century. Guerrilla leader, strategist, conqueror, ruler, poet, and philosopher, he placed his imprint on China, and on the world. This edition of Mao's writings provides abundant documentation in his own words regarding both his life and his thought. Because of the central role of Mao's ideas and actions in the turbulent course of the Chinese Revolution, it thus offers a rich body of historical data about China in the first half of the twentieth century.

The process of change and upheaval in China which Mao sought to master had been going on for roughly a century by the time he was born in 1893. Its origins lay in the incapacity of the old order to cope with the population explosion at the end of the eighteenth century, and with other economic and social problems, as well as in the shock administered by the Opium War of 1840 and further European aggression and expansion thereafter.

Mao's native Hunan Province was crucially involved both in the struggles of the Qing dynasty to maintain its authority, and in the radical ferment which led to successive challenges to the imperial system. Thus, on the one hand, the Hunan Army of the great conservative viceroy Zeng Guofan was the main instrument for putting down the Taiping Rebellion and saving the dynasty in the middle of the nineteenth century. But, on the other hand, the most radical of the late nineteenth-century reformers, and the only one to lay down his life in 1898, Tan Sitong, was also a Hunanese, as was Huang Xing, whose contribution to the 1911 Revolution was arguably as great as that of Sun Yatsen.¹ In his youth, Mao profoundly admired all three of these men, though they stood for very different

things: Zeng for the empire and the Confucian values which sustained it, Tan for defying tradition and seeking inspiration in the West, Huang for Western-style constitutional democracy.

Apart from Mao's strong Hunanese patriotism, which inclined him to admire eminent figures from his own province, he undoubtedly saw these three as forceful and effective leaders who, each in his own way, fought to assure the future of China. Any sense that these were contradictory symbols would have been diminished by the fact that from an early age Mao never advocated exclusive reliance on either Chinese or Western values, but repeatedly sought a synthesis of the two. In August 1917, Mao Zedong expressed the view that despite the "antiquated" and otherwise undesirable traits of the Chinese mentality, "Western thought is not necessarily all correct either; very many parts of it should be transformed at the same time as Oriental thought."² In a sense, this sentence sums up the problem he sought to resolve throughout his whole career: How could China develop an advanced civilization, and become rich and powerful, while remaining Chinese?

As shown by the texts contained in Volume I, Mao's early exposure to "Westernizing" influences was not limited to Marxism. Other currents of European thought played a significant role in his development. Whether he was dealing with liberalism or Leninism, however, Mao tenaciously sought to adapt and transform these ideologies, even as he espoused them and learned from them.

Mao Zedong played an active and significant role in the movement for political and intellectual renewal which developed in the aftermath of the patriotic student demonstrations of May 4, 1919, against the transfer of German concessions in China to Japan. This "new thought tide," which had begun to manifest itself at least as early as 1915, dominated the scene from 1919 onward, and prepared the ground for the triumph of radicalism and the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. But though Mao enthusiastically supported the call of Chen Duxiu, who later became the Party's first leader, for the Western values incarnated by "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy," he never wholly endorsed the total negation of Chinese culture advocated by many people during the May Fourth period. His condemnations of the old thought as backward and slavish are nearly always balanced by a call to learn from both Eastern and Western thought and to develop something new out of these twin sources.

In 1919 and 1920, Mao leaned toward anarchism rather than socialism. Only in January 1921 did he at last draw the explicit conclusion that anarchism would not work, and that Russia's proletarian dictatorship represented the model which must be followed.³ Half the remaining fifty-five years of his life were devoted to creating such a dictatorship, and the other half to deciding what to do with it, and how to overcome the defects which he perceived in it. From beginning to end of this process, Mao drew upon Chinese experience and Chinese civilization in revising and reforming this Western import.

To the extent that, from the 1920s onward, Mao was a committed Leninist, his understanding of the doctrine shaped his vision of the world. But to the extent that, although he was a Communist revolutionary, he always "planted his backside on the body of China,"⁴ ideology alone did not exhaustively determine his outlook. One of Mao Zedong's most remarkable attributes was the extent to which he linked theory and practice. He was in some respects not a very good Marxist, but few men have ever applied so well Marx's dictum that the vocation of the philosopher is not merely to understand the world, but to change it.

It is reliably reported that Mao's close collaborators tried in vain, during the Yan'an period, to interest him in writings by Marx such as *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. To such detailed historical analyses based on economic and social facts, he preferred *The Communist Manifesto*, of which he saw the message as "jiejì dòuzhēng, jiejì dòuzhēng, jiejì dòuzhēng!" (Class struggle, class struggle, class struggle!) In other words, for Mao the essence of Marxism resided in the fundamental idea of the struggle between oppressor and oppressed as the motive force of history.

Such a perspective offered many advantages. It opened the door to the immediate pursuit of revolutionary goals, since even though China did not have a very large urban proletariat, there was no lack of oppressed people to be found there. It thus eliminated the need for the Chinese to feel inferior, or to await salvation from without, just because their country was still stuck in some pre-capitalist stage of development (whether "Asiatic" or "feudal"). And, by placing the polarity "oppressor/oppressed" at the heart of the revolutionary ideology itself, this approach pointed toward a conception in which landlord oppression, and the oppression of China by the imperialists, were perceived as the two key targets of the struggle.

Mao displayed, in any case, a remarkably acute perception of the realities of Chinese society, and consistently adapted his ideas to those realities, at least during the struggle for power. In the early years after its foundation in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party sought support primarily from the working class in the cities and adopted a strategy based on a “united front” or alliance with Sun Yatsen’s Guomindang. Mao threw himself into this enterprise with enthusiasm, serving first as a labor union organizer in Hunan in 1922–1923, and then as a high official within the Guomindang organization in 1923–1926. Soon, however, he moved away from this perspective, and even before urban-based revolution was put down in blood by Chiang Kaishek in 1927, he asserted that the real center of gravity of Chinese society was to be found in the countryside. From this fact, he drew the conclusion that the decisive blows against the existing reactionary order must be struck in the countryside by the peasants.

By August 1927, Mao had concluded that mobilizing the peasant masses was not enough. A Red Army was also necessary to serve as the spearhead of revolution, and so he put forward the slogan: “Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun.”⁵ In the mountain fastness of the Jinggangshan base area in Jiangxi Province, to which he retreated at the end of 1927 with the remnants of his forces, he began to elaborate a comprehensive strategy for rural revolution, combining land reform with the tactics of guerrilla warfare. In this he was aided by Zhu De, a professional soldier who had joined the Chinese Communist Party, and soon became known as the “commander-in-chief.” This pattern of revolution rapidly achieved a considerable measure of success. The “Chinese Soviet Republic,” established in 1931 in a larger and more populous area of Jiangxi, survived for several years, though when Chiang Kaishek finally devised the right strategy and mobilized his crack troops against it, the Communists were defeated and forced to embark in 1934 on the Long March.

There were periods during the years 1931–1934 when Mao Zedong was reduced virtually to the position of a figurehead by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, dominated in substantial measure by the Moscow-trained members of the so-called “Internationalist Faction.” At other times, he was able to maintain a substantial measure of control over the military tactics of the Red Army, and to develop his skills both as a theorist and as a practitioner of the art of war. Even when he was effectively barred from that domain, he continued to

pursue the investigations of rural conditions which had long been one of his trademarks.⁶ Such enquiries into the conditions in a particular area served as the foundation for an approach to revolution stressing the need to adapt the Party's tactics to the concrete realities of the society in which it was operating.

The defeat of 1934 weakened the position of Mao's rivals for the leadership. In meetings of the Politburo held in December 1934, in the course of the Long March, Mao was supported for the first time in over two years by a majority of the participants.⁷ At the conference held at Zunyi in January 1935, Mao began his comeback in earnest. Soon he once again played a dominant role in decisions regarding military operations, though his rise to unquestioned dominance in the Party was a long process which reached its culmination only in 1945.

In the course of the northward march from Zunyi to Shaanxi, Mao was driven at times by the continuing threat from Chiang Kaishek's campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression" to advocate that the Red Army should fight its way to the borders of the Soviet Union, in order to obtain Soviet aid and protection.⁸ Once the survivors of the Red Army had established themselves in Shaanxi Province in 1936, Mao's perspective began to change, and a vision of the Chinese people as a whole as the victims of oppression came progressively into play. For a time, Mao's line called for overthrowing the traitorous running dog Chiang Kaishek in order to fight Japan, but soon the growing threat of Japanese aggression and strong Soviet pressure in favor of collaboration with the Guomindang led to a fundamental change in the Party's policy. The Xi'an Incident of December 1936, in which Chiang Kaishek was kidnapped in order to force him to oppose the invader, was the catalyst which finally produced a second "united front." Without it, Mao Zedong and the forces he led might well have remained a side current in the remote and backward region of Northwest China, or even been exterminated altogether. As it was, the collaboration of 1937-1945, however perfunctory and opportunistic on both sides, gave Mao the occasion to establish himself as a patriotic national leader. Above all, the resulting context of guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines allowed the Communists to build a foundation of political and military power throughout wide areas of Northern and Central China.

During the years in Yan'an, from 1937 to 1946, Mao Zedong also finally consolidated his own dominant position in the Chinese Communist Party, and in

particular his role as the ideological mentor of the Party. Beginning in November 1936, he seized the opportunity to read a number of writings by Chinese Marxists, and Soviet works in Chinese translation, which had been published while he was struggling for survival a few years earlier. These provided the stimulus for the elaboration of his own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and in particular for his theory of contradictions. As noted above, another of the main features of his thought, the emphasis on practice as the source of knowledge, had long been in evidence and had found expression in the sociological surveys in the countryside which he himself carried out beginning as early as 1926.

While Mao attained a dominant and unchallengeable position in the Party only in the mid-1940s, the year 1938 was of crucial importance in his rise to power. In May and June, he produced two of his most important and influential military writings, “Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War” and “On Protracted War.” Meanwhile, it had been decided in March 1938 to send an emissary to Moscow to seek instructions from the Comintern in the face of the acute rivalry between Mao and Wang Ming, who had recently returned to China. In September the reply came back that the leading organs of the Chinese Communist Party, “with Mao Zedong as their head,” should strive for close unity.⁹ Having been thus anointed by Georgi Dimitrov, speaking on behalf of Stalin, Mao delivered in October 1938 his report “On the New Stage,” in which he put forward the call for the “Sinification of Marxism,” making it very plain that he was the one who best understood this imperative. By this term he meant the modification not only of the language, but of the substance of Marxism in order to adapt it to Chinese culture and to Chinese realities.

In 1939 and 1940, while paying lip service to the role of the Guomindang in China’s struggle against Japanese imperialism, Mao began increasingly to suggest that a successful Chinese Revolution would only be possible under Communist leadership. By 1941, he made plain that in his view, no one else was capable of carrying out this enterprise, and he attacked those in the Party who, in his view, preferred to translate ready-made formulas from the Soviet Union. The “Rectification Campaign” of 1942–1943 was designed in large measure to change the thinking of such “Internationalists,” or to eliminate them from positions of influence.

When Mao was elected chairman of the Politburo and of the Secretariat in

March 1943, the terms of his appointment to this second post contained a curious provision: Mao alone, as chairman, could out-vote the other two members of the Secretariat in case of disagreement. This was the first step toward setting Mao above and apart from all other Party members and thereby opening the way to the subsequent cult. At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945 came apotheosis: Mao Zedong's thought was written into the Party statutes as the guide to all work, and Mao was hailed as the greatest theoretical genius in China's history for his achievement in creating such a remarkable doctrine.

In 1939–1940, when Mao put forward the slogan of “New Democracy,” he felt it necessary to define it as a regime in which proletariat (read Communist Party) and bourgeoisie (read Guomindang) would jointly exercise dictatorship over reactionary and pro-Japanese elements in Chinese society. Even as late as 1945, when the Communists were still in a weaker position than the Guomindang, Mao indicated that this form of rule would be based on free elections with universal suffrage. Later, when the Communist Party had military victory within its grasp and was in a position to do things entirely in its own way, Mao would state forthrightly, in “On People's Democratic Dictatorship,” that such a dictatorship could in fact just as well be called a “People's Democratic Autocracy.” In other words, it was to be democratic only in the sense that it served the people's interests; in form, it was to exercise its authority through a “powerful state apparatus.”

In 1946, when the failure of General George Marshall's attempts at mediation led to renewed civil war, Mao and his comrades revived the policies of land reform which had been suspended during the alliance with the Guomindang, and thereby recreated a climate of agrarian revolution. Thus national and social revolution were interwoven in the strategy which ultimately brought final victory in 1949.

In March 1949, Mao declared that though the Chinese Revolution had previously taken the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside, henceforth the building of socialism would take place in the orthodox way, with leadership and enlightenment radiating outward from the cities to the countryside. Looking at the twenty-seven years under Mao's leadership after 1949, however, the two most striking developments—the chiliastic hopes of instant plenty which characterized the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s, and

the anxiety about the corrupting effects of material progress, coupled with a nostalgia for “military communism,” which underlay the Cultural Revolution—both bore the mark of rural utopianism. Thus Mao’s road to power, though it led to total victory over the Nationalists, also cultivated in Mao himself, and in the Party, attitudes which would subsequently engender great problems.

Revolution in its Leninist guise loomed large in the world for most of the twentieth century, and the Chinese Revolution was, with the Russian revolution, one of its two most important manifestations. The Bolshevik revolution set a pattern long regarded as the only standard of Communist orthodoxy, but the revolutionary process in China was in some respects even more remarkable. Although communism now appears bankrupt throughout much of the world, the impact of Mao is still a living reality in China almost four decades after his death. Following the Tiananmen events of June 1989, the continuing relevance of Mao’s political and ideological heritage was heavily stressed by the Chinese leadership, and elements of a new Mao cult even emerged. While that tendency has faded in recent years, the symbolic importance of Mao as the creator of the new China has thus far largely ruled out serious criticism of the Chairman.

Though the ultimate outcome of these recent trends remains uncertain, the problem of how to come to terms with the modern world, while retaining China’s own identity, still represents one of the greatest challenges facing the Chinese. Mao did not solve it, but he boldly grappled with the political and intellectual challenge of the West as no Chinese ruler before him had done. If Lenin has suffered the ultimate insult of being replaced by Peter the Great as the symbol of Russian national identity, it could be argued that Mao cannot, like Lenin, be supplanted by a figure analogous to Peter because he himself played the role of China’s first modernizing and Westernizing autocrat. However misguided many of Mao’s ideas, and however flawed his performance, his efforts in this direction will remain a benchmark to a people still struggling to define their place in the community of nations.

Stuart Schram died on July 8, 2012 at the age of 88. This volume and the previous ones in the series *Mao’s Road to Power*, along with his earlier works on Mao, are eloquent testimony to Schram’s widespread reputation as the greatest Western expert on the late Chairman’s life and thought. As a result of Schram’s

failing health, Timothy Cheek took on a far larger role in the editing of Vol. VIII than anticipated, and also wrote most of the Introduction that follows. But the original translations of the texts for this volume and for the projected final Vols., IX and X, were almost entirely prepared earlier under Schram's editorship, with the assistance of Professor Nancy Hodes. A tribute to Professor Schram can be found in *The China Quarterly*, No. 212, December 2012.

Notes

[1.](#) Abundant references to all three of these figures are to be found in Mao's writings, especially those of the early period contained in Vol. I of this series. See, regarding Zeng, pp. 10, 72n, 122, and 131n. On Tan, see "Zhang Kundi's Record of Two Talks with Mao Zedong," September 1917, pp. 138–139. On Huang, see "Letter to Miyazaki Tōten," March 1917, pp. 111–12.

[2.](#) Letter of August 23, 1917 to Li Jinxi, Vol. I p. 132.

[3.](#) See his letter of January 21, 1921, to Cai Hesen, Vol. II, pp. 35–36.

[4.](#) Mao Zedong, "Ruhe yanjiu Zhonggong dangshi" (How to study the history of the Chinese Communist Party), talk of March 30, 1942, to a Central Committee study group, in *Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi*, ed., *Mao Zedong wenji* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), Vol. 2, pp. 399–408.

[5.](#) See the relevant passages of the texts of August 7 and August 18, 1927, in Vol. III, pp. 31 and 36.

[6.](#) See, in particular, in Vol. III, the Xunwu and Xingguo investigations, pp. 296–418 and 594–655, and in Vol. IV, the circular of April 2, 1931, on investigating the situation regarding land and population, pp. 54–55, and the texts of 1933 on the "Land Investigation Movement," pp. 408–526 *passim*.

[7.](#) See Vol. IV, pp. xciii–xciv.

[8.](#) See the Introduction to Vol. V, pp. xliv–xlv, and also, in Vol. V, the "Resolution of the Central Committee on Problems of Military Strategy" of December 23, 1935, pp. 77–83.

[9.](#) See Vol. VI, p. xlix.

Introduction

The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1942–July 1945

The previous three volumes of this series document successive stages in Mao Zedong's rise to a dominant position in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Volume V deals with events from the Zunyi Conference of January 1935, which restored Mao to a major role in the leadership, and the Long March, which laid the foundation for his legend, to the Xi'an Incident and the Japanese attack on Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937, which finally pushed the Communists and Guomindang (GMD, or Nationalist Party) into an agreement in the face of the Japanese threat. Volume VI covers the period from the summer of 1937 to the end of 1938, when Mao began to elaborate on his new ideas regarding both politics and military tactics. Central to them was the concept of the "Sinification of Marxism," which served to reinforce Mao's own claim to leadership while at the same time strengthening the appeal of the Communists to the Chinese people as a whole. During the period from 1939 to 1941, which is the subject of Volume VII, several of Mao's potential rivals in the Party were either eliminated from the leadership or forced into subordinate positions, but others enjoyed substantial prestige. Meanwhile, Mao produced important writings that expanded on his own ideas regarding the role of the CCP in the anti-Japanese war and in China's political future. It was, however, during the period from 1942 to 1945, the subject of this volume, that Mao underwent the most decisive and dramatic change in his status, culminating in an apotheosis which made him no longer simply *primus inter pares* but the incarnation and symbol of the Chinese Revolution—the Chairman.

In a May 1941 address, Mao stressed the importance of linking the "universal truth of Marxism-Leninism" to the "concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution."¹ This speech elaborated in greater detail the concept of the

Sinification of Marxism. At the same time, however, it was marked by sharp criticism of those in the Party who contented themselves with bookish study of Marxism and made no effort to understand the Chinese reality that they were tasked with transforming. For this reason, it was published only in early 1942, in the context of the “Rectification Campaign” which was to play a central role in the affairs of the CCP for the following two years. On February 1, 1942, in the first of his two speeches launching this campaign, Mao once again inveighed against those who saw only the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on the shelf, and failed to study or understand Chinese reality.² In a second speech, delivered on February 8, denouncing Party formalism Mao concluded this discussion with an extended reference to his earlier argument for the Sinification of Marxism, complaining that his call for the adaptation of Marxism to Chinese conditions had not been taken seriously enough.³

In early 1943, the process of setting Mao apart from and above the other leading figures in the Party began in earnest. On March 20, he was elected chairman of the Politburo and chairman of the three-man Secretariat. In the Secretariat, it was explicitly laid down that, should there be disagreement, Mao, as chairman, could outvote the other two members. Shortly thereafter, in April 1943, a Movement to Investigate Cadres, also known as the Rescue Campaign, was launched. This was in fact a harsh purge of “dissident” elements in the Party, under the control of Kang Sheng. Soon thereafter, articles began to appear that exalted Mao and denounced his rivals in the Party. One of the earliest and most striking of these was the work of Liu Shaoqi. In his “Liquidate Menshevik Thought in the Party,” published on July 6, Liu hailed Mao as a true Bolshevik and dismissed the “Internationalist Faction” as Mensheviks in disguise.⁴ Finally, in 1945, at the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao’s Thought was written into the Party constitution as the guide to all the Party’s work, characterized by Liu Shaoqi as “the greatest achievement and glory of our Party and our people,” which would “bring blessings to China for generations and generations.” Mao’s Thought, Liu declared, was “the highest expression of the wisdom of the Chinese nation.” Mao was “not only the greatest revolutionary and statesman in all of Chinese history”; he was “also the greatest theoretician and scientist in all of Chinese history.”⁵

Such, in outline, is the pattern of Mao’s rise to supremacy during the 1942–

1945 period. While this certification of supreme leadership is certainly a key development in Mao's life during these years, the broader context to which his leadership contributed so significantly was, of course, more complex. The Introduction to Vol. VII identifies four settings for an appreciation of Mao's writings translated in this volume: the international setting, domestic relations with the GMD government, military matters in the war with Japan and the renewed military clashes with GMD and other Chinese forces, and, finally, CCP leadership and Party building.

The international setting for these years begins with the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into World War II in the Pacific. This had profound effects for China as it boosted confidence that the Japanese could, in the end, be defeated. It gave both the CCP and the GMD the opportunity to plan for the future and formed the most fundamental backdrop for the Yan'an Rectification movement, offering a window of opportunity for the Party to get its house in order before the inevitable confrontation with Chiang Kaishek and the GMD. Just a month before the United States entered the war came news that the Soviet Union had stopped the Nazi invasion at Stalingrad and by early 1943 had dealt Hitler's troops a resounding defeat. This confirmed hopes of ultimate victory. Mao's writings in 1942 and 1943 clearly credit the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, with stopping the expansion of fascism and turning the tide in the war. The Communist International (Comintern) was disbanded in the spring of 1943, alleviating the pressure on the CCP to conform to Soviet foreign policy. Despite setbacks in the renewed Japanese offensive, Operation Ichigo, in 1944, the worst of the war was over, and the CCP had a new and broader playing field on which to develop and present a vision of a new China. Finally, this period ends with the Allied victory over Japan in August 1945.

Relations with the GMD and its government were bad but stable during these years. The repercussions of the New Fourth Army Incident, which had wiped out Chinese Communist forces in Central China, had dissipated by the end of 1941, and by 1942 the CCP was beginning to mobilize its resources to overcome the end of GMD subsidies and the renewal of the economic blockade of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The United Front with the GMD was effectively over, though Mao advises his colleagues to maintain appearances for purposes of

propaganda. However, the United Front was applied with considerable success in the “Three-Thirds” system of shared government in the CCP base areas in North China, particularly in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, the only other base area officially recognized by the Nationalist government. Not only this form of coalition government at the local level but various production and village campaigns (first tried out in a number of base areas) were synthesized, coordinated, and extended in Yan’an’s famous production and other campaigns of 1942 to 1944. As the war ground on, Chiang Kaishek and Mao squared off in the competition to represent China. The Nationalist campaign to present the Generalissimo as China’s charismatic leader reached a crescendo in 1943 with the publication of Chiang’s *China’s Destiny* and his international recognition as one of the Big Four powers at the Cairo Conference. The drive to present Mao as the CCP’s charismatic leader, as Lyman Van Slyke aptly points out, needs to be seen in this context, as well as in terms of Mao’s own drive for power and the model of Stalin: “if there was a cult of Chiang, there had also to be a cult of Mao; an anonymous ‘Party Central’ would not do.”⁶

Military matters remained crucially important but, like relations with the GMD, did not present new challenges or responses. The terrible “burn all, loot all, kill all” counterinsurgency campaigns of the Japanese military against the CCP’s North China bases continued, but the Eighth Route Army and other units had developed ways to survive and put down roots. Indeed, the biggest military developments of this period have to do with administration and coordination with the local populace—all themes of the next topic, leadership and Party building—as represented in the mass movements and production campaigns.

Leadership and Party building form the heart of the story in this volume of Mao texts. In the detailed review below, we follow the chronology and reflect on representative texts. Here we merely suggest the broader context. While the push to present Mao as the charismatic leader was in part a response to the GMD cult around Chiang Kaishek, far more important was the political culture of the Bolshevik party (which under Stalin had developed the model of an infallible, charismatic leader), the practical need to speak coherently and convincingly to a rural and largely peasant audience, and the personal drive of the key player, Mao himself. These four factors define the parameters of the Mao Cult that was certified at the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945 and help explain why it was,

for a time at least, so successful in bringing the Party together as an effective political and military organization and in extending the Party's mandate to cover all of China by 1949. The main developments in leadership and Party building are: (1) the Rectification Campaign and "Rescue Campaign" of 1942–1944; (2) the six major Yan'an campaigns (*yundong*) of 1942–1944; to mobilize a new administrative style in the spirit of the Rectification movement; and (3) the apotheosis of Mao in the 1944 *Selected Works*, the revisions of Party history, and the new constitution of the Seventh Party Congress in the spring of 1945.

This, then, is the broader context for the myriad essays, talks, letters, and telegrams by Mao translated in this volume. Nonetheless, the main focus for Mao and for the CCP during these years was leadership and Party building. Let us now review these developments in detail, with reference to the broader international, domestic, and military events of the day, to give a sense of the concrete events in which Mao was involved as he wrote these texts.

The Rectification and "Rescue" Campaigns

The Rectification Campaign was a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. On the one hand, it was obviously desirable to strengthen the coherence and discipline of the CCP, which had accepted hundreds of thousands of new members in the chaotic conditions of the anti-Japanese war, many of whom were poorly educated or even illiterate and not well informed on the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, a relative flood of educated youth and left-wing writers from the cities brought problems of an intellectual elite out of touch with rural life and issues. Party membership had risen from 40,000 in 1937 to 800,000 in 1940, so by 1941 some 95 percent of the Party rank and file were newcomers. It is abundantly clear that Mao intended to structure the rectification process in such a way as to reinforce his own prestige and the preeminence of his thought at the expense of his rivals. Although rectification was formally launched in February 1942, the origins of this campaign can be traced at least as far back as 1939.⁷ Mao had, as noted above, evoked many of the principal themes of rectification in a May 1941 speech to high-level cadres. And as underscored in the

Introduction to Volume VII, he delivered an address to the Politburo on September 10, 1941, denouncing the supporters of the “Internationalist Line” as “sham Marxists” and calling for “creative Marxism,” by which he obviously meant his own Sinified Marxism.⁸ These remarks were made at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo, where the Party leadership agreed to what in the spring of 1942 became the Rectification Campaign and to the outlines of a Party history that criticized other leaders, such as Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu), and suited (and soon glorified) Mao.

On January 23, 1942, a week before the beginning of the Rectification Campaign, Mao issued a directive calling for the study of the Gutian Resolution of December 1929 by all mid- and upper-level cadres of the Communist-led armed forces.⁹ As the author of this document, Mao was thus prescribing the study of his own work. Too much importance should not be attached to this point, given his central role in the military struggles of the Jiangxi period (1931–1934). The reprinting and widespread distribution of the Gutian Resolution was, however, clearly intended to underscore the fact that the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies were heirs to the history and traditions of earlier revolutionary struggles, and the Chinese should draw on this background, as well as on modern military doctrines. It is also worth noting that in reissuing this document, which rejected the example of the Taiping army as a model for China’s current revolutionary struggles, Mao may have been aiming criticism at Li Lisan and others of the “Internationalist Faction,” who had in the past urged that the Taiping pattern of military organization, because it was particularly suited to guerrilla warfare, be studied by the Red Army.¹⁰

Three days later, on January 26, Mao issued a sharp criticism of subjectivism, sectarianism, and failure to allow a significant role for non-Communists under the “Three-Thirds” system. Citing his speech of November 21, 1941, at the Assembly of Representatives of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region on the importance of cooperating democratically with non-Party members,¹¹ he stressed the need to maintain a broad coalition at the present stage of the revolution.¹²

Thus, Mao’s two speeches launching the Rectification movement constituted a direct challenge to those who did not share his understanding of the course that should be followed by the Chinese Revolution. That being the case, their importance is obvious. There is no need for a lengthy discussion here, since the

two texts are relatively short and Mao conveys his message very clearly, but a few points are worthy of mention. As indicated in the title of the speech of February 1, Mao's themes are the rectification of study style, Party style, and writing style. The first two of these topics are dealt with in the first speech; the third is reserved for the speech of February 8. The problem of study style, which occupies the lion's share of the first speech, is approached by Mao not in terms of method in the abstract but in the context of the divergent problems in mastering Marxist theory encountered by the intellectuals, on the one hand, and the workers and peasants, on the other. Those brought up in schools cut off from the practical activities of society "don't know how to till the land, ... don't know how to work in factories, and ... don't know how to fight battles"; they have nothing but book learning. Such "half-baked intellectuals" can be transformed into intellectuals worthy of the name only by "turn[ing] to practical tasks" and "practical research." Cadres of working class and peasant origin must, on the contrary, obtain an elementary education, because without this they cannot learn Marxist-Leninist theory or take up any other branch of study. Thus within the Party there are two kinds of subjectivism, of which the dogmatism of the intellectuals is a greater danger than the empiricism of the workers and peasants. Marxism-Leninism is not a ready-made panacea or religious dogma, but a guide to action.

As for Party style, Mao argued, the crucial issue was that of sectarianism, which was to be found both in the Party's internal relations and in its relations with those outside. In discussing internal relations, Mao began by denouncing Li Lisan and Zhang Guotao, who had set themselves against the Central Committee and the Comintern. There was also, he added, the problem of relations among cadres from a given locality and those from the outside. Here he cited his own example, declaring: "No matter how I investigate and study, I still fall somewhat short in comparison with the cadres of northern Shaanxi." Mao stressed the need to improve relations among army cadres and local cadres and among old and new cadres. Finally, he underscored the importance of uniting with non-Party cadres and non-Party people.

The second speech, "Oppose Party Formalism," is somewhat rambling and less sharply focused than the first, but its overall message is clear enough. Mao's discussion of writing style begins with the May Fourth movement, which, apart

from the “great achievement” of its fight against imperialism, exposed “the old formalism and the old dogma” of writings in the classical language. Later, however, “some people” turned this lively and progressive antifeudal movement into its opposite, giving rise to “foreign stereotyped writing” constituting a “new dogma.” Even some CCP members fell into the error of “Party formalism,” which was a reflection of petty-bourgeois thought in the Party. Discussing this phenomenon under eight headings, Mao noted that learning from foreign countries was “not at all the same as foreign formalism,” and “the treasure house of the classical Chinese language” could still be excavated. In conclusion, he advised comrades to read a pamphlet containing four articles that had been distributed at the meeting. The first piece consisted of excerpts from the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* dealing with the way Lenin did propaganda work. The second included passages from Georgi Dimitrov’s statements at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. The third was taken from an essay by the writer Lu Xun about how to write. The fourth consisted of extracts from Mao’s own report at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1938 and included the text:

We must put an end to foreign formalism. There must be less repeating of empty and abstract refrains; we must discard our dogmatism and replace it with a new and vital Chinese style and manner, pleasing to the eye and to the ear of the Chinese common people.

Commenting on this, Mao wrote: “The abolition of foreign formalism was demanded in that report, yet some comrades are, in fact, still promoting it. ... In short, many people have let this decision, which was adopted at the Sixth Plenum, go in one ear and out the other, as if willfully opposed to it.”¹³ In the context of his call for the rectification of the thinking of Party members, Mao stressed the need for cadre education, which he thought could best be carried out on the job. This comprised not only political and cultural education but also mastery by each cadre of the specific tasks entrusted to him. “Senior and middle cadres who have the qualifications” should also study theory, linking it with practice.¹⁴

In Mao’s view, the history of the CCP was also a crucially important subject, which should be studied according to a “comprehensive historical method.” In a speech on this topic at a meeting of the Central Study Group,¹⁵ Mao reviewed

systematically the main points that should be made regarding the three periods of the “Great Revolution” of 1924–1927, the Civil War between the Communists and the GMD, and their renewed cooperation beginning in 1937. He concluded on a less scholarly and more pungent note by arguing that in studying Party history, “we must plant our backsides on the body of China.” To be sure, world capitalism and socialism should also be studied, but a correct understanding of their relation to the history of the CCP could be achieved only by “plant[ing] ourselves on the body of China to study the affairs of the world.” Just as Lenin combined the method and standpoint of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Russian Revolution to develop Bolshevism, “we should apply the methods of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin to China and create some new things in China. General theories, divorced from Chinese realities, cannot defeat the enemy.” In other words, only the Sinified Marxism that he advocated offered China a way out.¹⁶

Meanwhile, at the time, several influential writers residing in Yan’an published essays sharply critical of the privileges enjoyed by Communist leaders and their failure to practice their own theories of equality and democracy and asserting that creative work must enjoy independence if it is to help advance social reform. Among the writers who advanced such ideas were Ding Ling, Wang Shiwei, Xiao Jun, and Ai Qing.¹⁷ It was partly in response to these criticisms that Mao convened the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art in May 1942. His two speeches on this occasion, of which Bonnie S. McDougall’s translation is reproduced below, constituted his second major contribution to the discussions within the Party during the opening stages of the Rectification Campaign. Although this conference should not be seen simply as a response by Mao to his critics among the writers, it assuredly provided him with a platform from which to rebut their views.

In her substantial and wide-ranging introduction to the monograph in which this version originally appeared, McDougall places the emphasis on Mao’s “specifically literary message” and on the “elements of literary theory” contained in the “Talks,” though she also touches on the political overtones of the conference.¹⁸ Here we stress the role of the Yan’an Forum in the overall dynamics of the Rectification Campaign, while noting also some aspects of Mao’s literary views that throw a striking light on his mindset and personality in general. In his contributions to the Yan’an Forum, Mao criticized the views of others in

extremely blunt terms, and the issues that he raised were not easily resolved. It is this, no doubt, that explains the delay in the publication of his talks. Whereas the speeches of February 1 and February 8, 1942, were published respectively on April 27 and June 18 of the same year in *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily), Mao's introductory remarks of May 2 and his conclusion of May 23, 1942, appeared seventeen months later, on October 19, 1943.

The introductory lecture on May 2 was relatively conciliatory. In it, Mao hailed the role of the "cultural army" which had taken shape at the time of the May Fourth movement and had aided the revolution by weakening China's feudal culture. The purpose of the forum, he declared, was to "ensure that literature and art become a component part of the whole revolutionary machinery."¹⁹ Raising the questions of "position, attitude, audience, work, and study," he noted, regarding the first of these points, that CCP members must identify themselves with the proletariat and the broad popular masses. "Some of our workers in literature and art," he noted, "still lack a clear and correct understanding of this question," but he did not suggest that the problem was worrisome or insoluble. Similarly, as regards attitude, he declared that "many members of the proletariat still retain petty-bourgeois ways of thinking, and both peasants and the petty bourgeoisie have backward ways of thinking," but his response to this was simply that "we must educate them patiently over a long period of time."

In dealing with the third and fourth questions, regarding the audience for whom Communists were writing and the work that must be done to reach them, Mao took a somewhat stronger line. The audience for literature and art, he said, "consists of workers, peasants, and soldiers, together with their cadres." Workers in literature and art must, to be sure, carry out their own work, but "the task of understanding people and getting to know them properly" has the highest priority. And in this respect, "our workers in literature and art ... have been ... remote and uncomprehending." Here Mao recalled how, as a student, he had looked down on workers and peasants and felt that "intellectuals were the only clean people in the world." Subsequently, however, he had come to understand that many intellectuals were "spiritually unclean," while workers and peasants were cleaner than the bourgeoisie. "If our workers in literature and art who come from the intelligentsia want their work to be welcomed by the masses," he concluded, "they must see to it that their thoughts and feelings undergo

transformation and reform.” Finally, as for the question of study, anyone who called himself a revolutionary writer must have a general knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, which “some comrades” still lacked. They failed to understand that “the objective reality of class struggle and national struggle determines our thoughts and feelings” and turned the problem upside down, saying that everything should proceed from “love,” a “kind of love which goes beyond class.” This showed how deeply these comrades had been influenced by bourgeois thought and that they must eliminate this influence thoroughly by the study of Marxism-Leninism.

Despite these criticisms and warnings, the tone in the first phase of the Yan’an Forum was not excessively harsh. As emphasized by McDougall, Mao’s views had hardened considerably by the time he gave his concluding speech on May 23; he had become “more certain of the correctness of his own views, and the harmfulness of the opposition.”²⁰ The tone of his opening statement remained moderate. “The new culture of China at its present stage,” he declared, “is an anti-imperialist, antifeudal culture of the popular masses under the leadership of the proletariat,” and he went on to define the popular masses as workers, peasants, soldiers, and petty bourgeoisie. He immediately qualified this formulation, however, by observing that the petty bourgeoisie “are fewer in number, their revolutionary determination is weaker, and they have a higher cultural level than workers, peasants, and soldiers.” Because they had a higher cultural level, they did not need the new literature for the masses which it was essential to create. A more serious problem, however, was that “many comrades” placed more emphasis on studying the “intelligentsia from petty-bourgeois backgrounds” and, instead of doing so from a proletarian position, identified themselves with the petty bourgeoisie and served as their spokespersons. Such writers, Mao declared, liked some things about the workers, peasants, and soldiers, but in the final analysis they had “their backsides planted on the side of the petty bourgeoisie.” Our workers in literature and art, he asserted, must shift their backsides and gradually move over to the side of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. On this fundamental question of principle, Mao declared, all of our writers “to some extent had a tendency to despise workers, peasants, and soldiers, and to isolate themselves from the masses.”²¹

If literature was to be written for the popular masses, should the main effort be

directed toward raising standards or toward reaching a wider audience? Both goals, said Mao, should be pursued, but standards should be raised on the basis of the present cultural level and the budding literature and art of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. As for the source from which such achievements might arise, Mao here introduces, and discusses at some length, a concept which has been truncated in the *Selected Works* version of these talks—that of “popular life,” perceived as “literature and art in their natural forms.” “Revolutionary literature and art,” Mao wrote, “are thus the result ... of the human mind reflecting and processing popular life.” And he continued:

Rich deposits of literature and art actually exist in popular life itself: They are things in their natural forms, crude but also extremely vivid, abundant, and fundamental. They make all processed forms of literature pale in comparison; they are the sole and inexhaustible source of processed forms of literature and art. ...

Although literature and art in their natural form are the sole source of literature and art in conceptualized form, and although the former is incomparably more vivid and abundant in content, nevertheless, people are still not satisfied with the former and demand the latter; why is this? It is because while both are beautiful, literature and art that have been processed are more organized and concentrated than literature and art in their natural form; they are more typical and more idealized and therefore have greater universality.²²

It is clear from this quotation and from the balance of this passage that, by “literature and art in their natural form,” Mao did not mean popular art. Rather, he saw life itself as a kind of living art. This concept, poetic rather than logical and rigorous, is not incompatible with the image of Mao’s personality conveyed by his writings as a whole. As McDougall suggests, it is “reminiscent of early German romanticism and expressionism rather than realism.”²³

Moving toward his conclusion, Mao declared:

What we demand, therefore, is a unity of politics and art, a unity of content and form, a unity of revolutionary political content and the highest artistic form possible. Works of art that lack artistry, however progressive politically, are nevertheless ineffectual. We are therefore equally opposed to works of art with a harmful content and to the tendency toward the “slogan style,” which is only concerned with content and not with form; ... Both of these tendencies exist among many of our comrades. Many comrades have a tendency to ignore art and should pay attention to raising their artistic standards. But what I believe is more of a problem at present is still the political aspect.²⁴

He then proceeded to criticize “all sorts of foolish ideas” that had recently been entertained by comrades “lacking a fundamental knowledge of politics,” beginning with humanism. “In a class society,” he asserted, “... human nature in

the abstract ... does not exist.” In the eyes of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, “proletarian human nature is incompatible with human nature. The so-called ‘humanism’ which some people in Yan’an at the present time uphold as a theoretical basis for literature and art goes along these lines and is completely mistaken.”²⁵

The next “muddled idea” denounced by Mao was the notion that the starting point of literature is “the love of mankind.” Such a unifying love, he declared, had never existed since mankind split into classes and would be possible “only when classes have been eliminated all over the world.” He likewise rejected the view that “the task of literature and art has always been exposure.” The only targets of exposure that revolutionary writers and artists can take, he declared, are “aggressors, exploiters, and oppressors, not the popular masses.” In conclusion, he denounced the idea that studying Marxism-Leninism “hinders creativity.” Marxism-Leninism, he declared, “will definitely destroy feudal, bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, literalistic, individualist, nihilist, art-for-art’s sake, aristocratic, decadent, pessimistic, and other kinds of creativity that are alien to the popular masses and the proletariat.” An ideological struggle, he said, has already begun among writers and artists in Yan’an, and is very necessary.²⁶

On May 27, a series of meetings was launched specifically for the purpose of criticizing Wang Shiwei, and on the next day Mao declared that the case of “our Comrade Wang Shiwei” was “rather serious” because his thinking was relatively systematic, and the bad things “are deeper in him.”²⁷ This literary rectification followed the general model of rectification. Indeed, it became the archetypical example. First, there was *persuasion* in small groups (which had occurred in meetings associated with the Yan’an Forum in May) and then in large public meetings (in the anti-Wang meetings of June). Next, as the deviant behavior persisted, *coercion* ensued in mass struggle meetings (the latter part of the June meetings), resulting in demotions, reform through labor, and public confessions by offenders.²⁸ This public model was paralleled by a secret review and purge of cadres that previous Western studies did not discern. Recent Chinese research has demonstrated the link between the literary rectification with its criticism of Wang Shiwei and the notorious “Rescue Campaign” (*qiangjiu yundong*) purges that in fact began in fall 1942, though the campaign is publicly dated to April 1943.²⁹

The public face of the anti-Wang meetings was the mass meeting held at the Central Research Institute from May 27 to June 11 and a second forum, the “Yan’an Literary Circles Forum” chaired by Ding Ling and Zhou Yang from June 15 to 18. These two meetings modeled correct ideological education—including self- and mutual criticism according to the new Maoist model. The first meeting is recorded in a startling “Diary of Struggle” that was published in Yan’an’s *Liberation Daily*. There was nothing secret about it, even though it makes for chilling reading.³⁰ The second meeting ended with an official resolution expelling Wang Shiwei from the CCP and declaring the loyalty of all others to Mao’s rectification vision and their desire to “go to the villages to learn from the masses.”³¹ After that, the literary rectification subsided as Ding Ling and other left-wing writers went off to the countryside.

The “internal” or secret face of the anti-Wang meetings fed into the notorious purges of the “Rescue Campaign.” The public record indicates that the Northwestern Bureau’s Senior Cadres Conference ran from October 19, 1942 to January 14, 1943. Here, as Mark Selden summarizes so well in his study, *The Yanan Way*, the initial lessons of the 1942 rectification were given to the top Party leadership and the six major production and administrative campaigns (see below) were popularized. Now it is clear, however, that the intense cadre screening and purges that emerged publicly as the Rescue Campaign in April 1943 had begun in fall 1942.³² Yang Shangkun, a leader of the Northwestern Bureau (and soon to be appointed to the new CCP Secretariat leadership in March 1943), spoke in October at a joint forum of the Political Research Office and the Central Research Institute called to carry on the criticism of the Wang Shiwei “Five Member Anti-Party Gang.”³³ Yang made the link between rectification and purges explicit, “we can see that the Rectification movement contains two kinds of struggles. One is the inner-party struggle ... to remold the ideological methods of both cadres and party members. ... The other struggle is the one that exposes and opposes those Trotskyites and dissidents who snuck into our party to destroy and undermine it.” Yang concludes that the current forum is a case of the second kind of struggle and that “[o]ur own participation in this forum proves once more the accuracy of Mao’s instructions.”³⁴

The intimate linkage between rectification and the cadre inquisition is represented by Kang Sheng. The top leader of the Rectification Study Group

(with Mao) in spring 1942, Kang was also in charge of the deceptively named Social Affairs Department and therefore in charge of anti-espionage. Post-Mao writings have laid the blame on Kang for the excesses of the Rescue Campaign, but as the documents in this volume show, Mao was certainly aware of what was going on, enough to pen joint instructions with Kang on the cadre investigation movement on February 26, 1944.³⁵ As we shall see, Mao distanced himself from the extremes of Kang's prosecution of this purge, but clearly Mao believed that the problem facing the Party was too much democracy rather than too little. Nonetheless, Kang's version of rectification is chilling, indeed. In his August 1943 review of the stages of the anti-Wang struggle from June 1942, Kang concludes: "The strategic aspect of this struggle was adopted from the Leninist strategy of winning over the majority and attacking the minority so as to destroy them one by one."³⁶ Nothing of Mao's "cure the illness to save the patient" here. We shall see how the anti-espionage campaign fit in with the emerging policies and campaigns in Yan'an, to which we now turn.

The Yan'an Campaigns

Paralleling the spring 1942 rectification and ongoing anti-espionage Rescue Campaign, Mao oversaw a remarkable set of administrative and production campaigns that applied the ideals of rectification to practical statecraft. As we have noted, these campaigns or movements were developed in various CCP base areas, particularly under Peng Zhen and Nie Rongzhen in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, but they were systematized and applied in Yan'an and Mao put his stamp on them. There are six major movements associated with Yan'an: Crack Troops and Simple Administration, To-the-Village, Reduction of Rent and Interest, the Cooperative movement, the Production movement, and the Popular Education movement.³⁷

Mao attached great importance to the campaign for "Crack Troops and Simple Administration," which, like rectification, had been launched at the end of 1941 and was pursued throughout 1942 and 1943. Its purpose was to reduce the number of cadres at higher levels of government in the areas controlled by the

Communists and to transfer many of them to work at lower levels. The primary, if not the exclusive, goal has sometimes been seen as a struggle against bureaucracy, but Mao saw the matter in a somewhat different perspective. In a telegram sent in August to Chen Yi, Mao asserted that along with the bitter struggle then under way, there would certainly be a contraction of the base areas, probably very soon. Under these circumstances, it would be impossible to maintain “excessively large armies” for long. “We should not forget the lesson of the Central Soviet in the latter half of 1934 [when the Communists had been obliged to embark on the Long March],” he declared. A month later, in an editorial that he wrote for *Liberation Daily*, he noted that the base areas had shrunk and might continue to shrink in the future, so it would no longer be possible to maintain “the same enormous resistance war apparatus” as before. It was indispensable to reduce it. Many comrades, he noted, thought that if this were done, it would be impossible to resist the enemy. For an answer to this dilemma, Mao turned, as he so often did, to Chinese literature of the past. How had the Monkey King dealt with the Ox Devil? He changed himself into a tiny insect and made his way into the devil’s heart. Similarly, in “The Trick of the Guizhou Donkey,” Liu Zongyuan describes how a huge donkey had initially frightened a small tiger, but in the end the tiger bit the donkey to death. “Our Eighth Route and New Fourth armies,” Mao concluded, “are the Monkey King or the small tiger, and they are fully capable of dealing with the Japanese devil or donkey.”³⁸

Between May and December 1942, Mao made no major statements comparable to the rectification speeches and the Talks on Literature and Art. During this period, however, events occurred that had a significant impact on his efforts to establish himself as the unchallenged leader of the CCP and a dominant figure on the Chinese political scene. Foremost among these were the Soviet victories at Stalingrad beginning in September, which marked the turning point in the struggle between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. As Ray Wylie argues cogently, this development, and the growing role of the United States in the war, promised to weaken Japan’s position, and as a result set both Mao and Chiang Kaishek to thinking less about the war against Japan and more about the role one or the other would play in a liberated China.³⁹

Naturally, Mao did not immediately begin to express himself in these terms,

but his contemporary writings underscore the decisive importance of what he called “the great victory of the Red Army” at Stalingrad. This battle, he observed, had been compared in the British and American press to the Battle of Verdun, and the “Red Verdun” was now famous all over the world. It was “not only the turning point of the Soviet-German war, or even of the present anti-Fascist world war,” but “a turning point in the history of all humanity.” Hitler was now “on the threshold of final defeat.” “Napoleon’s political life ended at Waterloo,” Mao noted at the end of an editorial dated October 12, “but the decisive turning point was his defeat in Moscow. Hitler today is treading Napoleon’s road, and the Battle of Stalingrad is his decisive turning point.” These developments, Mao added, would have a direct impact on Asia. The coming year would not be propitious for Japanese fascism either, and its headaches would grow “until it descends into its grave.”⁴⁰

From October 19, 1942, to January 14, 1943, Mao participated in the Senior Cadres Conference of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region held in Yan’an. In December, he presented a report called “Economic and Financial Problems,” which is, with the “Xunwu Investigation” of 1930⁴¹ and “On the New Stage,” his report to the Sixth Plenum in 1938,⁴² one of the longest of his known writings. Of this, only the brief introductory section, devoted to a summary of past work, has been retained in the current edition of the *Selected Works*. The central theme is that “while a good or a bad financial policy affects the economy, it is the economy that determines finances. ... We shall simply be resigning ourselves to extinction unless we develop both the private and public sectors of the economy.” That did not mean, he immediately added, “reckless or ill-founded expansion,” as demanded by some comrades who called for the establishment of heavy industry. The people of the border region, he added, must accept and do accept that they must bear part of the burdens of economic development, but as soon as we can we should lighten these burdens. Following the present conference, Mao added, we shall put into effect the policy of “Crack Troops and Simple Administration,” and the resulting simplification will “lighten the people’s burdens and benefit them economically.”

In the body of his report, Mao took up, in turn, the development of agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, cooperatives, the salt industry, self-supporting industry, the productive undertakings of the troops, the productive undertakings

of official organizations, and grain work. It is impossible to summarize all of these points here. In the introduction to the volume from which we have reproduced his translation, Andrew Watson deals at length with the background to the situation in 1942, the main themes of Mao's report, and the influence of this experience on Mao's economic policies from 1949 to the "Great Leap Forward."⁴³ Here we mention only a few points.

An important slogan was that of "centralized leadership and dispersed management." Mao complained that this concept had been put forward by the Central Committee as early as February 1940, but it did not obtain unanimous acceptance until late 1942 at the Senior Cadres Conference. We have been unable to find any mention of this formula in 1940, but Mao places great emphasis on it in his report of December 1942. Posing the question of why industry should be run in a dispersed way, he said the main reason was that the labor force was divided among the various branches of the Party, government, and army. "If it were centralized, we would destroy their activism." But, he added, "it is very important that dispersed management does not lead to forgetting centralized leadership." This applied, he added, not only to industry, but to agriculture and commerce.⁴⁴ In order to "establish a unified leadership for the whole of self-supporting industry, and overcome the serious anarchy which exists now," he called for the establishment of a "unified plan," drawn up under the "unified leadership" of the Finance and Economy Office, but at the same time he specified that agriculture, industry, and commerce should not be put in the hands of one single organization for the whole border region. Instead, the unified plan should be "handed over to the Party, government, and army systems for separate implementation." His final conclusion was, however, that the problem of unified leadership was "the central problem in advancing self-supporting industry during 1943."⁴⁵

With this economic study, Mao completed his claim to the four areas of expertise required of a Marxist-Leninist theoretician: military, politics, culture, and economics.⁴⁶ The report stands, along with Mao's rural investigations from the 1930s, as an example of his ability to focus on detail with balance and sensitivity to practical economic problems. Nonetheless, recent research by Chen Yung-fa has shown that these policies, including the famous Yan'an production and administration campaigns, alone were insufficient to pull Yan'an out of the

economic crisis of the early 1940s. Secret and substantial opium sales by the CCP balanced the budget, particularly in 1943 and 1944.⁴⁷ Such opium sales had been undertaken by all Chinese governments in the twentieth century, including the one under Chiang Kaishek, but the CCP, unlike other regimes, put an end to opium sales as soon as it could generate sufficient income from more productive industries and trade (in this case, ending opium production in 1945).

With the new year of 1943 came further reports of Soviet victories in the war against “Hitler’s bandits,” about which we have already noted Mao’s enthusiastic reaction in October 1942. His telegram of congratulations to Stalin on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Red Army provides a striking illustration of the wide-ranging conclusions he drew from these developments. “Freedom-loving people of all nationalities on five continents,” he wrote, “unanimously acknowledge that the Red Army and the people of the Soviet Union are the mountain blocking the river of Fascist violence and are the vanguard of the creation of a new world peace.” Because of the Red Army’s victories, he declared, “the face of the future new world is brighter and more definite. ... National freedom and political democracy have become the unswerving principles of the new world.” Modifying his previously critical stance toward the Western democracies, he added that Britain and the United States in North Africa, and the United States in the Pacific, had won important victories and that these two countries were “actively preparing to carry out the promise of opening a second front on the European continent.” China’s task, he said, was to prepare to drive out the Japanese invaders, and he ended not only with “Long live the Red Army and its Supreme Commander Stalin!” but also with “Long live the unity between China, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States!”⁴⁸

As noted above, such German defeats led both Mao and Chiang Kaishek to devote further attention to the future and to their respective roles in it. Two texts from early 1943 translated below illustrate the complexity and ambiguity of Mao’s views. In January, he noted that Chiang had made contributions to the War of Resistance, and the people detested civil war, so the Communists should strive to establish a peaceful situation with the GMD after the war. In September 1942, he added, Chiang had invited Mao to meet with him, and Mao had sent Lin Biao as his representative. He was, he said, prepared to go to see Chiang when the time was right, in order to promote the success of the negotiations.⁴⁹ On

March 16, he observed that, in the face of Japanese attacks and in the absence of foreign aid, the GMD needed internal support. Thus there was the possibility of improvement in relations between the GMD and the CCP. But in the very next paragraph he went on to state baldly:

The situation in the whole world and historical development are unfavorable to the Guomintang and favorable to us. But we need genuine Marxism-Leninism to be able to triumph over the Guomintang.⁵⁰

It seems no accident that this virtual declaration of war was uttered by Mao only six days after the publication of Chiang's book, *China's Destiny*, which asserted his claim to be the sole legitimate father and guide of the Chinese people, as the inheritor of Sun Yatsen's legacy.⁵¹ In any case, as noted at the beginning of this Introduction, Mao Zedong was elected chairman of the Politburo and chairman of the CCP Secretariat on March 20, 1943. Thus each of the two major parties had a single unquestioned leader.

Two months later, on May 15, Stalin decided, as a gesture of goodwill to Western leaders, and President Franklin Roosevelt in particular, to dissolve the Comintern, which had in any case ceased to play a prominent role in Soviet foreign policy. This obviously strengthened Mao's position as a Chinese national leader who was not, formally at least, subject to any outside authority. He therefore embraced the change with enthusiasm. In a report of May 26 to a mass meeting convened by the Secretariat, Mao noted that the Comintern had been created by Lenin himself and had given China great assistance in the three great revolutionary movements of the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution, and the anti-Japanese war. Nonetheless, "revolutionary movements can be neither exported nor imported," and in any case "the form of revolutionary organization known as the Comintern" was no longer suited to the necessities of struggle, because it could not respond rapidly to conditions in each country. Moreover, the CCP had "already acquired its own excellent cadres endowed with rich personal experience." Summing up, Mao declared:

Since the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935, the Comintern has not intervened in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party. And yet, the Chinese Communist Party has done its work very well throughout the whole Anti-Japanese War of National Liberation.

The dissolution of the Comintern, Mao said, was "not for the purpose of weakening the Communist parties of the various countries, but for the purpose of

strengthening them,” and the ongoing Rectification movement was “precisely for the purpose of increasing the national character of our Chinese Communist Party.”⁵²

A few days after forcefully asserting the autonomy of the CCP in dealing with its own affairs, Mao drafted an extremely important resolution regarding the Party’s methods of leadership.⁵³ In particular, this document spelled out the meaning of what came to be called the “mass line.” The relevant section reads as follows:

In all practical work of our Party, all correct leadership must come from the masses and go to the masses. This means to take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas by means of study), then propagandize and explain these ideas to the masses until the masses embrace them as their own ideas, hold fast to them, and translate them into action, testing the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then, once again concentrate ideas from among the masses and persevere in sending them back to the masses. In such an endless cycle, the ideas will become ever more correct, vital, and abundant each time. This is the epistemology *or methodology* of Marxist-Leninist theory.⁵⁴

It is clear from this text, and even clearer from Mao’s practice, that the mass line meant listening to the views of the masses but in no sense being governed by them. It was the leaders who, while taking account of popular sentiments, had the responsibility of elaborating the Party’s policies and then persuading the masses to internalize ideas that they would have been quite incapable of devising for themselves. There is an obvious parallel between this approach and Lenin’s view that class consciousness could only be imported into the proletariat from outside.

As noted above, the cadre investigation Rescue Campaign had evolved out of the Rectification Campaign and expanded in the spring of 1943. On July 15, Kang Sheng called for the “emergency salvation” of those in the Party who had lost their footing, and in less than two weeks more than 1,400 so-called secret agents were arrested, often on false evidence.⁵⁵ Mao did not agree with this action, and on July 30, in a telegram to Peng Dehuai, he laid down nine guiding principles for screening cadres, in the following terms:

- (1) The leading cadre takes responsibility;
- (2) He goes to work himself;
- (3) Leading cadres and backbone cadres unite closely with the broad masses;
- (4) General calls must be combined with specific guidance;
- (5) Investigate and study [the facts];
- (6) Differentiate right from wrong, and trivial from important;
- (7) Win over those who have taken a wrong step;
- (8) Cultivate the cadres;
- (9) Educate the masses.⁵⁶

On August 15, the Central Committee formally adopted a decision concerning the screening of cadres, in which the issues were addressed under the nine headings proposed by Mao. It was also stated in the conclusion: “On the basis of the materials from the various localities, rectification must be prolonged into 1944, and cadre screening may be carried out side by side with rectification.”⁵⁷ Although Mao’s nine guiding principles unquestionably implied criticism of Kang Sheng’s practice of pursuing the investigation of cadres, they did not amount to a call for leniency but, rather, to a recommendation for prudence and caution in imposing harsh punishments. A letter that Mao had sent to Peng two months earlier regarding Peng’s understanding of democracy throws light on his thinking at this time. This document can be seen as part of the background to the clash between Mao and Peng a decade and a half later, but quite apart from the personal dimension, it contains revealing statements of a general character:

Your talk ... starts from the definitions of democracy, freedom, equality, fraternity, and so on, rather than from the political necessities of the current struggle against Japan. ... [Y]ou ... do not say that traitors and elements who destroy our anti-Japanese unity should be deprived of the freedoms of residence, mobility, communication, and any other political freedoms; you just make a sweeping statement that people’s freedoms should not be subjected to any interference. But in reality, the democratic freedoms in the base areas are too numerous, too large, and too unlimited for some people, rather than too small, too few, or too constrained. This is why in November of last year the Central Committee issued a proclamation explaining the policies of tolerance, emphasizing the necessity for suppressing reactionaries. ... Only after the annihilation of class distinctions will it be possible to realize the principle of not doing unto others what you would not have them do unto you and to get rid of war, political oppression, and economic exploitation.⁵⁸

It was in this spirit that the Rectification Campaign, together with the investigation of cadres, was pursued in the second half of 1943. Meanwhile, the external and internal political context continued to evolve. On July 2, on the sixth anniversary of the “holy war against the evil Fascist imperialism of the Japanese,” the Central Committee issued a declaration, drafted by Mao, beginning with the categorical statement that the balance of power between “the worldwide anti-Fascist alliance and the alliance of the Fascist invaders” had undergone a dramatic shift. The Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States had won great victories in their “first united military operation,” and the armies of the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States, as well as the navies of Britain and the United States, had “developed into an invincible force.” The consolidation of the unity between the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States would spell defeat

not only for the German and Italian Fascists but for the Japanese Fascists as well. Although China's people had been "steadfast in the face of struggle," it had not been possible to mobilize them effectively because China did not have democratic politics. Mao therefore expressed the hope that during the seventh year of the War of Resistance, the National Government would carry out the Three People's Principles and make a few necessary political reforms. In conclusion, he called on all members of the CCP to "solidly rally around the Central Committee with Comrade Mao Zedong at its helm" but also to "support the Nationalist government and Chairman Chiang [Kaishek], and vanquish Japanese imperialism."⁵⁹

Despite such polite words, tensions remained high between the CCP and the GMD. On July 11, Mao wrote an article for the Xinhua (New China) News Agency protesting the suppression by GMD censors of a *Xinhua Ribao* (New China Daily) editorial of July 1 commemorating the twenty-second anniversary of the founding of the CCP and of an editorial of July 7 commemorating the seventh anniversary of the Japanese invasion of China.⁶⁰ Ten days later, Mao took the step of publishing Chen Boda's sharply critical review of Chiang's *China's Destiny*. In a telegram announcing this decision, he declared that the immediate cause of the "recent wave of anti-communism" was Chiang's desire to destabilize the CCP through a propaganda offensive, because of the disbanding of the Comintern and the belief that an attack by Japan on the Soviet Union was imminent. Both military preparations against the Communists and "political oppression," such as the suppression of *New China Daily* editorial on July 7, would intensify. As a countermeasure, wrote Mao, Chen's denunciation of *China's Destiny* was being published "in order to expose Chiang's feudal, compradorial, Chinese Fascist system to the Chinese people" and also to influence the United States and Britain.⁶¹ On August 11, in a telegram to Dong Biwu, signed jointly with Zhou Enlai, Mao declared that the GMD propaganda war against the CCP had become even more intense. Telegrams from local parliamentary assemblies and from news, cultural, and women's groups requesting the disbandment of the CCP had arrived from more than ten places, and the GMD Central News Agency was also publishing anti-Communist editorials aimed at mobilizing public opinion. In response, in addition to continuing to criticize *China's Destiny*, the Communists would launch a

movement against Chinese fascism, thus exposing the true character of Chiang and the GMD. Everything possible should be done to win over the middle-of-the-rovers, and criticisms of the GMD should also be translated into English and sent to British and American publications.⁶²

It was in this context that Mao gave instructions, in September 1943, for the publication and widespread distribution of an article by Vladimir Rogov, the head of the Soviet news agency TASS in China, sharply criticizing the behavior of the GMD.⁶³ This piece did not, in fact, contain any direct attacks on Chiang himself. Rogov did, however, denounce in sharp terms the “capitulationists” in Chongqing, adding that the Nationalist government did not display sufficient firmness in dealing with the actions of these elements, which were “aimed at the destruction of national unity and the weakening of China’s resistance to Japanese aggression.”⁶⁴ Thus the article represented a welcome contribution to Mao’s polemics against the GMD leadership, but it must have been equally significant in his eyes in the context of relations between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. Mao had assuredly not forgotten the harsh and patronizing Soviet reaction at the time of the Xi’an Incident in December 1936, which Moscow had denounced as a Japanese plot, and Stalin’s peremptory orders to support all the measures of the GMD aimed at uniting the forces of the Chinese people against the Japanese aggressors.⁶⁵ And though this crisis had been papered over, Moscow had continued to regard Chiang’s role in resisting the Japanese, and thereby lessening the Japanese threat against the Soviet Union, as decisive, and this factor had strengthened the hand of Wang Ming in his struggle with Mao in 1937–1938 for control of the CCP.⁶⁶ Mao’s enthusiastic welcome for Rogov’s article, which marked, he wrote, “truly the first time in the six years of the War of Resistance that a Soviet personage has given a systematic criticism of the Chinese government” and which he saw as “in complete harmony with the opinions of the Chinese Communist Party and with those of true patriots,” therefore reflected deep-seated feelings.

Three weeks later, Mao pursued his criticism of Chiang in a comment on the Eleventh Plenum of the GMD Central Executive Committee. The international situation, he declared, was “on the threshold of a great change.” While Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were “conserving their strength” and “waiting for Hitler to totter” before thrusting into France, the Red Army had already fought its way

to the Dnieper. Thus the problem in Europe was “on the eve of a total solution,” and the Soviet Union was “the main force” in bringing this about. Since Europe was “the pivot of the worldwide problem,” the fate of the “two great world camps,” Fascist and anti-Fascist, would thus be decided, and the Japanese imperialists already felt themselves cornered. Faced with this situation, the GMD was feeling joy, because it imagined that with the war in Europe over, Britain and the United States would fight Japan on its behalf, and feeling fear, because with the downfall of all three Fascist powers, the world would enter an unprecedented age of liberation, and the GMD’s comprador-feudal Fascist dictatorship would become a “small island in a vast ocean of worldwide freedom and democracy.”

The GMD, he continued, had only three possibilities: capitulating to the Japanese, continuing on the old path, or changing its political principles. Many in the GMD, while still desiring to “take Yan’an” and “liquidate the Communist Party,” did not wish to forfeit China’s international standing by abandoning “the pretense of resistance to Japan.” That they had, however, no real desire for a political solution involving an agreement with the Communists was evidenced by the fact that they had kept Mao’s representative, Lin Biao, waiting for ten months in Chongqing without ever engaging him in serious negotiations and by their repeated denunciations of the Communist Party as the “traitor party.” This hostile attitude had recently found expression in *China’s Destiny*. In conclusion, Mao declared that only the third option, “the complete abandonment of the erroneous course of dictatorship and civil war and the pursuit of the correct course of democracy and cooperation,” could put Chiang and the GMD, as well as the people of the entire country, on the road to salvation.⁶⁷

In the weeks and months that followed, Mao’s expectations for the future continued to fluctuate. At a party celebrating the anniversary of the October Revolution, Mao hailed once again the contribution of the victories of the Red Army to “the destiny of all humanity.” In the aftermath of the Moscow Conference with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, and the Four-Nation Declaration in which these three were joined by China, he declared that “the dawn of human emancipation” was already in sight.⁶⁸ In mid-December, however, while asserting that the situation was “extremely advantageous” for resisting Japan and for revolution, he stated that the regions in North China

behind enemy lines should be “fully prepared to hold out for another three or five years” and should guard against taking the enemy lightly, despite the decisions reached at the Tehran Conference, the Cairo Conference, and the “continued victories” of the Soviet Union.⁶⁹

In the early months of 1944, Mao consistently spoke in favor of avoiding conflict with the GMD. In January, in an order he wrote for the Secretariat, he declared: “In order to maintain peace between the Guomintang and the Communist Party and to win the final victory in the War of Resistance, please instruct all relevant units that, in dealing with the Guomintang army, our army should strictly defend our territory and not provoke any kind of incident. Only when the other party attacks us should we implement the principle of self-defense.”⁷⁰ A fortnight later, he declared that “after reviewing this year’s overall situation,” there was “a need for and a possibility of coordination between the Guomintang and the Communist Party.” The Yan’an newspapers should therefore do their utmost to avoid irritating the GMD. Mao had informed a GMD representative that our Party’s two principles of supporting Chiang [Kaishek] to fight the War of Resistance and supporting Chiang [Kaishek] “to build our country will never change.”⁷¹ In March, in a speech to the Politburo, Mao declared: “Our general policy is to make the Guomintang unable either to capitulate or to fight a civil war.” The CCP’s political offensive in the second half of 1943 had forced the Eleventh Plenum of the GMD to declare that they would use political methods to solve the problem of the CCP. Thus it might be possible to avoid a civil war in 1944. Our policy, Mao added, “is to avoid civil war and to concentrate on the War of Resistance. ... We should adopt the policy of establishing a good relationship with the Guomintang.”⁷²

Nevertheless, Mao continued to make it plain that he had no illusions about Chiang’s intentions. In May, in a report to the Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, he complained that the Nationalist army “does not teach patriotism and democracy, but only fascism. Consequently, upon encounter with the enemy its fighting capacity crumbled immediately.” “[I]f democracy is practiced,” he declared, “we will win, and if not, we will lose.” He noted, however, that GMD officials had recently shown themselves more inclined to negotiate seriously and added that if this proved to be the case, the CCP would be willing to maintain a good relationship with them. At the same time, Mao

expressed skepticism regarding the performance of his own comrades. Looking forward to the Seventh Party Congress, to be held in 1945, he declared that it should “select a Central Committee that is more powerful and more capable than the Central Committee of the past twenty-three years”—that is, since the founding of the Party in 1921.⁷³ Here there is a clear hint of Mao’s intention to reshape the CCP in accordance with his own ideas and to reorganize it by making use of people he trusted.⁷⁴

During the ensuing months, Mao’s attitude toward Chiang and the GMD continued to fluctuate in light of what he saw as Chiang’s ambiguous and unreliable behavior. On the one hand, he said that the Communists supported “Chairman Chiang” and believed in cooperation between the two parties. But, on the other hand, he stated repeatedly that Chiang’s China had defects that could be summed up in the statement that it lacked democracy. Despite this, the CCP was trying its best to unite the entire nation, no matter how reactionary the GMD’s policies were. “A basic adjustment to the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists awaits more difficulties for Chiang and further pressure from the United States,” he concluded. On this issue, he declared, “we will continue the general policy of acting with caution.”⁷⁵

At this time, Mao also hailed the opening of the second front in Europe. Hitherto, he had been skeptical about the willingness of the United States and Britain to launch such an offensive until the war had been basically won by the Soviet Union, but now he saluted the “hard struggle” of the British and American people, as well as that of the Soviet people. He was enthusiastic about a visit of British, American, and Soviet journalists to the border region. Chiang Kaishek, he said, had arranged anti-Communist propaganda during their stay, but the journalists had stayed on and shortly would be going to the Northwest to see other areas. Mao was likewise very pleased about the imminent arrival of the U.S. Army Observation Group, which, he said, had been made possible by pressure from Roosevelt and Vice President Henry Wallace.⁷⁶

Although the two problems of relations with the GMD and the prospects for ultimate victory over Japan continued to occupy a great part of Mao’s attention during 1944, other topics were raised from time to time in his writings. One of the most intriguing texts is his letter of August 31, 1944, to Qin Bangxian (Bo Gu). As noted in earlier volumes of this series, Mao and Qin had been bitter rivals in the

1930s and early 1940s, but at this time Qin was head of the Propaganda Department of the CCP, and editor of *Liberation Daily*. Mao had recently written an article for the newspaper on the role of the family in a peasant society in transition but was dissatisfied with it and did not allow its publication. In this letter, he said that he was engaged in revising the earlier article. There is no evidence that he ever actually did this, but his letter to Qin on the subject does contain interesting information about his thinking on the subject.

The most striking point is that while Mao is often regarded as a “peasant revolutionary,” he here declares categorically that since the Chinese Communists are Marxists, not populists, or the Narodniks vigorously denounced by Lenin, “the countryside at present is our temporary base. It is not, and can never be, the principal foundation of China’s democratic society. Moving from an agricultural foundation to an industrial foundation is precisely the task of our revolution.” This statement in itself is not surprising, given the primacy of the urban proletariat in the Marxist conception of socialist revolution, but in developing his argument Mao plays down the role of the countryside and the peasantry to a striking degree. “The peasant family,” he argues, “must necessarily be destroyed,” by the departure of a large number of its members to participate in work or join the army and thus to be liberated from the oppression of landlords and compradors and become part of a “modern industrial society.” And he adds: “The transformation of families in the countryside from feudalism to democracy ... can only be attained through mass movements.” In a postscript to this letter, Mao noted that a discussion of “liberating individuality” should be included in the democratic revolution against feudalism. “Some people,” he declared, “say that we neglect or suppress individuality. This is incorrect. If the fettered individuality is not liberated, there will be no democracy, nor will there be socialism.”⁷⁷ This insight was no doubt sincerely felt by Mao, though in the future it would often be vitiated by his calls for mass upheavals.

Apotheosis

The year 1945 marked the beginning of a decisive new chapter in the history of

the CCP. With the approaching victory over Hitler and the rapid progress of the Allied offensive against Japan, it became evident that China could look forward soon to the restoration of its independence and territorial integrity. In that context, the long-postponed Seventh Party Congress, which took place in the spring and summer of 1945, faced a range of issues which, though long apparent, now confronted Mao and his comrades with a new sense of urgency. In the context of this congress, in the spring and early summer of 1945, Mao delivered four major addresses. These texts, which total more than 150 pages, cannot be discussed here in detail, but some key points should be underscored. In these writings—and the panegyrics of his colleagues and the Party press—we can see the crystallization of Mao’s new role as the supreme, correct, and charismatic leader embraced by his colleagues: the apotheosis of Chairman Mao. *Liberation Daily* had signaled this final rise to charismatic authority in a series of articles in July 1943 that called on the Party to study Mao’s Thought. Key endorsements by senior Party leaders followed and rose to a crescendo at the Seventh Party Congress. It was in this context that Mao held forth in 1945.

Regarding the overall prospects for political change in China, Mao adopted in the written report distributed in advance to the delegates to the congress, under the title “On Coalition Government,” a relatively moderate position. While acknowledging that the maximum program of the Party called for a proletarian socialist revolution in the future, he indicated that the “new-style bourgeois democratic revolution” that was the immediate goal would last “for several decades.” At the same time, his list of “minimum demands” included “the abolition of the one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang and the establishment of a democratic coalition government and a joint supreme command.”⁷⁸ In the oral report delivered on April 24, he noted more bluntly that “the leader, the commander” of the revolution against imperialism and feudalism is the proletariat.⁷⁹

Not surprisingly, Mao devoted considerable attention to the role of the peasantry. In his oral report he discussed once again the limitations of the peasants and the need to transform them, declaring:

We need to distinguish ourselves clearly from the peasants. ... This may not be easy to understand for comrades who have come from peasant origins. ... I say now you are a member of the Communist Party. You are a peasant only by origin, but origin and admission to the Party are two different things. ... What

I mean by saying that we should not get mixed up with the peasants is that we should raise the level of the peasants by one more step, to the level of the proletariat. After several decades, we will have raised the level of all peasants outside the Party to the level of the proletariat. If you do not believe this, you are not a Marxist. In the future, we will mechanize and collectivize and that will raise them up.⁸⁰

The current pattern of the struggle, he said, was from the cities to the countryside, but to stay in the countryside indefinitely would not be Marxist either. “We will definitely hold our Eighth Congress” in the cities, not in Yan’an, he concluded.⁸¹ But at the same time, Mao underscored the importance of the peasants, who were “the source of China’s industrial workers,” “the market for China’s industry,” the only suppliers of foodstuffs and raw materials, “the source of the army, for soldiers are just peasants in military uniform” and “the main political base for democracy in China at the present stage.”⁸² And in the oral report he declared: “The main force of the Chinese democratic revolution is the peasants. If you forget the peasants, there is no Chinese democratic revolution; if there is no Chinese democratic revolution, then there is no Chinese socialist revolution, and then there will be no revolution at all.”⁸³ In his concluding oral report on May 31, Mao declared: “Whether we can be victorious will depend on whether we will be able to unite the 360 million peasants in China.”⁸⁴

Thus, although Mao had titled his report “On Coalition Government,” he made it very clear in all of his speeches to the Seventh Party Congress that the dominant political force in China should henceforth be that of the proletariat and the peasantry, rather than that of the classes that supported the GMD. At the same time, it was impossible to avoid the problem of what role Chiang Kaishek should play. As noted earlier, it was the Seventh Party Congress that marked the final decisive stage in Mao’s elevation to a supreme and unchallenged position in the CCP. Not surprisingly, therefore, Mao’s tone in the discussion of China’s future (like Chiang’s tone) was both political and personal. In his oral report of April 24, he observed: “Asking the Generalissimo to organize a coalition government, have we put such requests to him? Indeed, we have done this on many occasions. ... Every time you ask him, he always shakes his head, he’s not happy. He says that to organize a coalition government is to ‘overthrow the government.’”⁸⁵ In his concluding remarks on May 31, he put it more bluntly. “His fighting against Japan is a good thing, but his oppression of the people is not. We should also tolerate him when he is still fighting against Japan. Do not say

‘Down with Chiang Kaishek!’” Posing the question “Is There Still Any Hope for the Negotiations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party?” Mao replied: “We have always advocated negotiations ..., but there is absolutely no hope of reaching any agreement. At present, however, we will not proclaim this to the people of the whole country, because once we do that, the next step will necessarily be to overthrow Chiang Kaishek. We say that this is still a slight possibility now [of success], and we will not give it up, ... we will continue to negotiate so long as there has not been a breakup.”⁸⁶

At the core of the arguments put forth in the spring of 1945, as well as in the study materials of the Rectification Campaign itself, was history, CCP history. Mao had called for a review of Party experience in 1938. He had reiterated the essential importance of studying Party history to rectification in his speech of March 30, 1942. History, for Mao, was the proof of his correct line and the material that cadres should study in order to understand, embrace, and follow his line. This was legislated in the April 20, 1945, “Resolution of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on Certain Historical Questions.” Here the various claims of “line errors” committed by the internationalists, especially Wang Ming, were codified and the lessons supporting Mao’s policies and the charismatic nature of Mao’s wisdom were set forth. As Tony Saich has noted, the “line” enunciated in the “Historical Resolution” provided purpose and inspiration for true believers and “rules of the game” for the pragmatic who wished to prosper under the CCP.⁸⁷

At the center of this new history was Mao himself, the charismatic leader. This new role for Mao was reflected in the study materials for the ongoing Rectification Campaign in areas outside of Yan’an (and in areas taken over after 1945). Mao’s own writings came to replace the *Zhengfeng wenxian* (Rectification documents) and to serve in the place of the more extensive collection of Party documents that had been collected for senior cadres in December 1941, *Liuda yilai* (Since the Sixth Plenum). According to CCP historian Gong Yuzhi, Mao’s *Selected Works*, first published in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region in 1944, grew out of the *Liuda yilai* collection, which had featured Mao’s writings among those of other Party leaders. Furthermore, wrote Gong, the 1944 *Selected Works* was one of five “systems” (*xitong*) of Mao collections officially published in the various base areas between 1944 and 1947.⁸⁸ Here we see that whereas the

500 texts in *Liuda yilai* were supposed to guide leaders at the Higher Party School in Yan'an, the 29 writings by Mao in his first official *Selected Works*, with later additions, were to suffice for the education of lower-level cadres beginning in 1944. This shift from authoritative institutional documents to the writings of a single genius nicely suited the beginning of a massive effort at popularizing Marxist-Leninist ideology beyond the ranks of Party cadres and leftist intellectuals. To the uninitiated, loyalty to Mao was considerably easier than an emotional attachment to the Politburo.⁸⁹

In the 1940s, the growing audience of Mao's *Selected Works* could read the main public documents that appear in this (and earlier) volumes of our series. The bulk of the selections, however, came from the 1938–1944 period and served to introduce the *system* that Mao had both guided and ridden to such promising results by 1945. In those *Selected Works*, as is reflected in a more complex fashion in his full writings for 1942–1945 presented here, readers can find the model of state-society relations and the vision for new China that clearly appealed to so many in the years following the end of World War II. This vision was built on several pillars: absolute leadership of the Party because it—and its supreme leader—had the right answers for China; rectification study and public self- and mutual criticism to inspire, to inform, and to discipline the Party's and the army's cadres; mass movements or campaigns through which those rectified cadres could implement Party policy and actively involve the public; and a clear “story” of salvation—for China and for the individual—wrapped up in Mao's personal experience and his writings to make all the effort sensible and worthwhile. Further reading reveals something of the psychology in this: the emphasis on physical labor, the assumption that class nature is learned and thus can be relearned through physical experience (particularly by living with working people), the emphasis on expression, and on demonstrating one's understanding (and one's loyalty to Mao and the Party) through concrete action. These were the themes of the Yan'an Way that—along with brilliant soldiering and other factors—brought Mao and the CCP to the brink of national power in 1945, and with them, the Party not only took control of the whole nation but by and large obtained the support of the majority of the Chinese people. Nonetheless, we can also see in these documents the fault lines that would break open in later years—the intolerance, the witch-hunt against Wang Shiwei, and the disinclination to

“air dirty laundry” or to contradict the Chairman. While Mao’s core rectification writings and talks from 1942 show him at his rhetorical best, by the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, his speeches, such as his oral report of April 24, go on and on, taking odd turns, repeating themes and examples in a wandering sort of way, and feature more traditional literary references—all tell-tale signs of a lack of competitors or editors that would become the hallmark of Mao’s Great Leap and Cultural Revolution talks. These all came, in time, to haunt the Party and bring grief to the nation.

Finally, a word is in order regarding Mao’s views of foreign policy at this time. As noted above, in the recent past Mao had been sharply critical of the United States and the United Kingdom, arguing that they were not really committed to the struggle against fascism, but his position shifted significantly following the opening of a second front in France. “On Coalition Government” contained warm praise for the British and American contribution to the war in Europe and also to the struggle against Japan. (All such passages were, of course, deleted in the *Selected Works* of the 1950s.) There are repeated references to the “Three Great Powers”—the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom—and to the “Five Great Powers,” that is, these three plus China and France. As a result of these developments, Mao declared that the international environment was “unprecedentedly favorable” for China.⁹⁰ Toward the end of his report, Mao declared that the CCP welcomed the Dumbarton Oaks agreement to establish a United Nations and looked forward to the forthcoming San Francisco Conference of the new organization, to which they were sending a representative. He also hailed, as might be expected, the Yalta Conference. In the context of his remarks on these developments, he noted that the United States had granted independence to the Philippines and he declared that the United Kingdom should do the same for India.⁹¹

Despite the positive trends in the international situation at this time, Mao plainly did not anticipate that Japan would capitulate a little more than two months after the end of the Seventh Party Congress. As a result, Mao suddenly found himself confronted with many of the problems that at this time he regarded as important, but not extremely urgent. Developments during the postwar period will be dealt with in Volume IX of this series.

Notes

- [1.](#) See “Reform our Studies,” a speech to high-level cadres dated May 19, 1941, in Vol. VII, pp. 747–54.
- [2.](#) See below, “Rectify Our Study Style, Party Style, and Writing Style.”
- [3.](#) See below, “Oppose Party Formalism.”
- [4.](#) For a translation, see Boyd Compton, tr., *Mao’s China: Party Reform Documents, 1942–1944* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952), pp. 258–68.
- [5.](#) For extracts from Liu’s speech on this occasion, including the passages quoted above, see Hélène Carrère d’Encausse and Stuart Schram, tr., *Marxism and Asia: An Introduction with Readings* (London: Allen Lane, 1969), pp. 259–61. For the official full text, see *Liu Shaoqi xuanji* (Selected works of Liu Shaoqi) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, shang, 1981), pp. 314–70, and *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, Vol. 1, 1984), pp. 314–64.
- [6.](#) Quote from Lyman Van Slyke, “The Chinese Communist Movement During the Sino-Japanese War 1937–1945,” in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds., *The Cambridge History of China* (CHOC), Vol. 13, part 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 692; see also Raymond Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung, Ch’en Po-ta, and the Search for Chinese Theory, 1935–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), ch. 8.
- [7.](#) On the roots of rectification during the 1939–1941 period, see the concluding sections of the Introduction to Vol. VII, “Leadership” and “Party Building.”
- [8.](#) See the Introduction to Vol. VII, p. lxix, and for the text of this address of September 10, 1941, Vol. VII, pp. 808–11.
- [9.](#) See below, “Instructions for Troops in All Border Regions to Study the ‘Resolution of the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army,’” January 23, 1942.
- [10.](#) See Vol. III, pp. 100, n134, and p. 206, n50. The Draft Resolution is on pp. 195–230.
- [11.](#) For this speech, see Vol. VII, pp. 839–42.
- [12.](#) See below, the text of January 26, 1942.
- [13.](#) See below, the texts of February 1 and 8, 1942, and for the quotation from Mao’s report at the Sixth Plenum, Vol. VI, p. 539.
- [14.](#) See below, “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Educating Cadres on the Job,” adopted by the Politburo on February 28, 1942.

[15.](#) The Central Study Group, also known as the Central Research Group, was established by the Central Committee of the CCP in August 1941. Composed of Central Committee members, it aimed to raise the theoretical and political levels of high-ranking cadres.

[16.](#) See below, “How to Study the History of the Chinese Communist Party,” March 30, 1942.

[17.](#) See Merle Goldman, *Literary Dissent in Communist China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 22–32; Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism*, pp. 178–80. See also Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and ‘Wild Lilies’: Rectification and Purges in the Chinese Communist Party 1942–1944* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

[18.](#) Bonnie S. McDougall, *Mao Zedong’s “Talks at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art.” A Translation of the 1943 Text with Commentary*, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1992), pp. 6, 10. McDougall’s “Introduction: The Yan’an Talks as Literary Theory,” pp. 3–41, is by far the best available treatment of the subject.

[19.](#) See below, “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art,” May 2 and 23, 1942.

[20.](#) McDougall, “Introduction: The Yan’an Talks as Literary Theory,” p. 14.

[21.](#) Mao, p. 112.

[22.](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 114–15, 116.

[23.](#) McDougall, “Introduction: The Yan’an Talks as Literary Theory,” p. 18.

[24.](#) Mao, pp. 124–25.

[25.](#) *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[26.](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 126, 128, 129.

[27.](#) See below, the extract from Mao’s report of May 28, 1942, at a meeting of the Central Study Group. This text consists of part 3 of the report; the other parts are unavailable.

[28.](#) Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 25–45. This model is tested against the documentary evidence of the Wang Shiwei case in Timothy Cheek, “The Fading of Wild Lilies: Wang Shiwei and Mao Zedong’s *Yan’an Talks* in the First CPC Rectification Movement,” *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 11 (1984), pp. 25–58.

[29.](#) Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and “Wild Lilies.”*

[30.](#) Wen Jize, “Douzheng riji” (Diary of struggle), *Jiefang ribao*, June 28 and 29, 1942, p. 4. This text is translated in Tony Saich, ed., *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 1113–22.

- [31.](#) *Jiefang ribao*, June 19, 1942, p. 2.
- [32.](#) The key study in Western literature is Peter Seybolt, “Terror and Conformity: Counterespionage Campaigns, Rectification and Mass Movements, 1942–43,” *Modern China*, 12, No. 1 (January 1986), pp. 39–73. His research has been confirmed by Teiwes and Sun. See notes 33 and 35, below.
- [33.](#) Yang Shangkun, “Activities of the Trotskyite Wang Shiwei and Liberalism in the Party,” dated October 1, 1942, and published in *Dangde shenghuo* (Party Life) is translated in full in Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and Wild Lilies*,” pp. 135–45.
- [34.](#) Yang Shangkun, “Activities of the Trotskyite Wang Shiwei,” translated in Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and Wild Lilies*,” p. 138.
- [35.](#) See below, the text of February 26, 1944. Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun track Mao’s role in the rescue Campaign in “From a Leninist Party to a Charismatic Party: The CCP’s Changing Leadership, 1937–1945,” in Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven, eds., *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 370–75.
- [36.](#) Kang Sheng, “Abstract of Kang Sheng’s Report to a Training Class, August 1943,” translated in Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and “Wild Lilies*,” p. 150.
- [37.](#) Vividly described in Mark Selden, *The Yanan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), ch. 8.
- [38.](#) See below, Mao’s telegram of August 4, 1942, to Chen Yi, and the editorial of September 7, 1942, “A Most Important Policy.” The Monkey King is the central character in the classic novel *Xiyouji* (known in English as *Journey to the West*, or *Monkey*). Liu Zongyuan (773–819) is one of the most celebrated poets and essayists of the Tang dynasty.
- [39.](#) See Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism*, pp. 197–98.
- [40.](#) See Mao’s editorials published in *Jiefang ribao* on October 12, 14, and 16, 1942. The passages quoted above are from the first of these; see texts below.
- [41.](#) See Vol. III, pp. 296–418.
- [42.](#) See Vol. VI, pp. 458–541.
- [43.](#) See Andrew Watson, “Introduction,” in *Mao Zedong and the Political Economy of the Border Region: A Translation of Mao’s Economic and Financial Problems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 1–6.
- [44.](#) “Economic and Financial Problems” (Dec. 1942), pp. 257, 258.

[45.](#) “Economic and Financial Problems” (Dec. 1942), pp. 258–59, 265, 266. For Andrew Watson’s interpretation of this dichotomy, see Watson, “Introduction,” pp. 35–36.

[46.](#) See Wylie’s summary in *The Emergence of Maoism*, p. 174.

[47.](#) Chen Yung-fa, “The Blooming Poppy Under the Red Sun: The Yan’an Way and the Opium Trade,” in aich and van de Ven, eds., *New Perspectives*, pp. 263–98; even Mark Selden, in his rejoinder to this criticism of his thesis on Yan’an self-reliance, accepts the basic findings of Chen’s research. See Selden, *China in Revolution: The Yanan Way Revisited* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 247–48.

[48.](#) See below, the telegram of February 21, 1943.

[49.](#) See below, the text of January 25, 1943.

[50.](#) See below, the speech delivered at a meeting of the Politburo on March 16, 1943.

[51.](#) For a concise discussion of *China’s Destiny* and the implications of its publication, see Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism*, pp. 198–201, and Van Slyke, “The Chinese Communist Movement During the Sino-Japanese War 1937–1945,” pp. 663–64 and 692.

[52.](#) See below, Mao’s report of May 26, 1943, on the dissolution of the Comintern.

[53.](#) See below, “Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Methods of Leadership,” June 1, 1943.

[54.](#) See below, section 4 of the decision of June 1, 1943.

[55.](#) See Jin Chongji, ed., *Mao Zedong zhuan, 1893–1949* (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), pp. 52–53. Seybolt’s article, “Terror and Conformity,” is the classic study; see also Teiwes and Sun, “From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party,” pp. 339–87.

[56.](#) See below, “On the Nine Guiding Principles for Cadre Screening and the Eight Policies for the Areas Behind Enemy Lines,” July 30, 1943.

[57.](#) This document has been attributed to Mao in a number of collections, both official and unofficial. Although it does not bear his name in the most recent official publications, the fact that it follows the pattern he had laid down is frequently underscored. We therefore feel justified in including it below among the texts translated in this volume.

[58.](#) See below, “Letter to Peng Dehuai,” June 6, 1943.

[59.](#) See below, “Declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Commemorating the Sixth Anniversary of the War of Resistance,” July 2, 1943.

[60.](#) See below, “The Chinese Communist Party’s July 7 Declaration Is Suppressed in Chongqing,” July 11,

943.

[61.](#) See below, “On Publishing the ‘Critique of *China’s Destiny*,” July 21, 1943.

[62.](#) See below, “Regarding Launching the Propaganda Movement to Oppose Chinese Fascism,” August 11, 1943.

[63.](#) See below, “Letter to Qin Bangxian,” September 11, 1943.

[64.](#) For the full text, see Vladimir Rogov, “Polozhenie v Kitae” (The Situation in China), *Voina i rabochii lass* (The war and the working class), No. 5 (August 8, 1943), pp. 17–23.

[65.](#) See the Introduction to Vol. V, pp. lxxxiii–lxxxvii.

[66.](#) See the Introduction to Vol. VI, pp. xxxix–xl.

[67.](#) See below, “Comment on the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee and the Second Session of the Third People’s Political Council,” October 5, 1943.

[68.](#) See below, “Speech at the Yan’an Party for Cadres in Celebration of the October Revolution,” November 6, 1943.

[69.](#) See below, “The Current International Situation and Its Influence in the Current Political Situation in China,” December 16, 1943.

[70.](#) See below, “Implement the Principle of Self-Defense When the Guomindang Army Attacks,” January 8, 1944.

[71.](#) See below, “There Is a Need for and a Possibility of Coordination Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party,” February 4, 1944.

[72.](#) See below, “Problems Concerning the Study Lines, the Style of Work, and the Current Political Situation,” March 5, 1944.

[73.](#) See below, “Work Report to the Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” May 21, 1944.

[74.](#) As indeed he did. For a documentary-based assessment of that new leadership under Mao, see Teiwes and Sun, “From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party,” pp. 339–87.

[75.](#) See below, “Talk While Meeting With the Delegation of Chinese and Foreign Reporters Visiting the Northwest,” June 12, 1944; “Commemorating United Nations Day, Defend Xi’an and the Northwest!” June 14, 1944; and “Notice on the Recent Shape of the Current Political Situation,” July 15, 1944.

[76.](#) See *ibid.* and “Welcome the Comrades-in-Arms of the American Army Observation Group,” August 15,

944.

[77](#). See below, “Letter to Qin Bangxian,” August 31, 1944.

[78](#). See below, “On Coalition Government,” April 24, 1945, p. 789.

[79](#). See below, “Oral Political Report at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,” n April 24, 1945, p. 824.

[80](#). See below, “Oral Political Report,” p. 835.

[81](#). See below, “Oral Political Report,” p. 848.

[82](#). See below, “On Coalition Government,” p. 803.

[83](#). See below, “Oral Political Report,” pp. 824–25.

[84](#). See below, “Conclusion at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,” May 31, 945, p. 913.

[85](#). See below, “Oral Political Report,” p. 850

[86](#). See below, “Conclusion at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,” pp. 898, nd 921–22.

[87](#). Tony Saich, “Writing or Rewriting History? The Construction of the Maoist Resolution on Party listory,” in Saich and van de Ven, eds., *New Perspectives*, p. 300.

[88](#). Gong Yuzhi, “Tong Shi Lamu jiaoshou de tanhua” (A Conversation with Professor Schram), in *Venxian he yanjiu, 1984 huibian ben*, ed. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (Beijing: Renmin hubanshe, 1986), p. 224.

[89](#). This paragraph draws from Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Vu (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989), pp. 83–85.

[90](#). See below, “On Coalition Government,” p. 818.

[91](#). See below, “On Coalition Government,” p. 812.

Note on Sources and Conventions

This edition of Mao Zedong's writings in English translation aims to serve a dual audience, comprising not only China specialists, but also those interested in Mao from other perspectives. In terms of content and presentation, we have done our best to make it useful and accessible to both these groups.

Scope. This is a complete edition, in the sense that it will include a translation of every item of which the Chinese text can be obtained. It cannot be absolutely complete, because some materials are still kept under tight control in the archives of the Chinese Communist Party. The situation has, however, changed dramatically since Mao's death, as a result of the publication in China, either openly or for restricted circulation (*neibu*), of a number of important texts.

Although the *Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* (Department for Research on Party Literature), which is the organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party responsible for the publication of Mao's writings, has always disclaimed any intention of producing his complete pre-1949 works, it appeared at one time that an edition containing a very full selection was in fact on the way, at least for a part of his early career. An advertising leaflet dated December 20, 1988, announced the forthcoming appearance, in the spring of 1989, of two volumes, *Mao Zedong zaoqi zhuzuo ji* (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong from the Early Period), and *Jiandang he da geming shiqi Mao Zedong zhuzuo ji* (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong during the Period of Establishing the Party and of the Great Revolution [of 1924–1927]), and invited advance orders for both volumes. The events of June 4, 1989, led first to the postponement of publication, and then to the decision to issue only the first of these volumes, for internal circulation, under the new title of *Mao Zedong zaoqi wengao, 1912.6–1920.11* (Draft Writings by Mao Zedong for the Early Period, June 1912–November 1920).

Prior to June 1989, further volumes in a similar format were in preparation. These plans have now been set aside, and no complete Chinese edition can be

expected unless there is a radical change in the political situation. But, as forecast in Volume I, the corpus of available materials has now been substantially expanded by the publication in Beijing of two major series to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of Mao's birth. These are the *Mao Zedong wenji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong), of which the first two volumes, for the years 1921–1942, appeared in December 1993; three more, covering the period 1943–September 1949 came out in August 1996; and three volumes, for the years 1949–1975, in 1999. A six-volume edition of Mao's military writings, *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* (Collected Military Writings of Mao Zedong), published in December 1993, also contains an abundance of new materials, many of which are not of purely military interest.

Sources. Despite the appearance of these two important collections, there is still no complete, or nearly complete, Chinese edition of Mao's writings from December 1920 onward. This and all subsequent volumes of our edition must therefore be drawn from a variety of materials.

The twenty volumes of the *Mao Zedong ji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong) and the *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong. Supplement), edited by Professor Takeuchi Minoru and published in Tokyo in the 1970s and 1980s still constitute the most important single collection of Mao's pre-1949 writings available outside of China. (For details on this, and other sources cited below, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.) Apart from the *Selected Works* of the 1950s (discussed below), other official Chinese editions of Mao's works, especially the two centenary series described above, contain a large number of important new items. The various specialized volumes issued in the 1980s to commemorate Mao's ninetieth birthday also provide useful materials from the pre-1949 period. Those drawn on in this volume include *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji* (Selected Correspondence of Mao Zedong), and *Mao Zedong xinwen zhuzuo wenxuan* (Selected Materials Regarding Mao Zedong's Journalistic Work), both of which appeared in 1983.

As already indicated, all of these recent publications of the Party center are selective. Fortunately, we have been able to supplement them with materials drawn from an extremely wide range of sources, including contemporary newspapers and periodicals, individual texts published in China for restricted circulation, and facsimiles of handwritten materials.

Information regarding the source we have followed is given in an unnumbered note at the bottom of the first page of each text. We have also included in these source notes information about the first publication, or the earliest known version, of the writing in question, whenever available. To avoid ambiguity, all works referred to in these notes are designated by their Chinese titles, sometimes in a shortened version. (For indications regarding short titles, and for full bibliographical details regarding all works cited, including those mentioned above, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.)

Other things being equal, we have very often referred the reader who wishes to consult the Chinese text to *Mao Zedong ji* and *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan* whenever the item in question appears there, because this series offers the convenience of a large quantity of materials in compact form. There are, however, many instances in which the version contained in recent official Chinese publications is more accurate or more complete, and we have accordingly taken it as the basis for our translation. In such cases, the nature of the more significant differences is indicated in notes to the text in question, but we have not sought to show the variants systematically. That has been done only in dealing with changes made in the original text of Mao's writings when they were revised for inclusion in the official edition of his *Selected Works*.

Variants. While there are some differences between the various versions of texts by Mao published in the 1930s and 1940s, these are on the whole minor. Systematic revision of his pre-1949 writings was undertaken only from 1950 onward, in preparing the four-volume edition of the *Mao Zedong xuanji*, translated into English as the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. This problem did not arise in our Volume I, because its coverage ended in 1920, and the earliest item in the *Selected Works* is the "Analysis of All the Classes in Chinese Society," written in 1925. Apart from this text, Volume II contained the well-known "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" of February 1927. Volumes III and IV each included four texts of this kind, Volume V included six, Volume VI included a dozen, and in Volume VII there were thirteen. In the present volume there are twenty-two such texts, including major talks from the 1942 Rectification Movement and the 1945 Seventh Party Congress. There are also two additional variant texts that do not follow the same notation because they are compared with informal Red Guard publications rather than with earlier published versions.

These are both from 1945: “The Current Situation and Other Problems” of February 15 and Mao’s “Oral Political Report” to the Seventh Party Congress of April 24.

Much ink has been spilled regarding the question of which version of the texts included in the official canon is more authentic, or more authoritative. Despite the passions formerly aroused by this issue, the answer seems rather obvious. For purposes of the historical record, only the text as originally written (when it is available) can tell us what Mao actually said in the 1920s and thereafter. For the study of Mao Zedong’s thought, both versions have their uses in documenting how his ideas evolved over time. For purposes of defining ideological orthodoxy under the People’s Republic, the *Selected Works* version is, of course, the ultimate standard.

In any case, the purpose of this series is not to lay down which was the “real” Mao, but to enable the reader to distinguish between what Mao wrote at any given moment in his life, and the revised texts which were produced in the 1950s under Mao’s close supervision, and often with his own active participation. As in previous volumes of this series, we have endeavored to do this in the following manner:

1. The translations that appear here correspond to the earliest available version of the text in question.

2. Words and passages from this original version that have been deleted in the *Xuanji* are printed in italics.

3. Substantive and significant changes in the text, including additions made by Mao, or under his authority, in the 1950s, are shown in the footnotes. *Mao Zedong ji* indicates meticulously *all* changes, including those that involve only matters of punctuation or style (such as the frequent replacement of the somewhat more literary conjunction *yu* by the more colloquial *he*, both meaning “and”). We have shown in the English version only those changes that appeared to us to have a significant impact on the meaning of the text. Any such judgment is, of course, in some degree subjective. We have sought to err on the side of showing too many variants, rather than too few, even when there was monotonous repetition in the changes, but we have not hesitated to leave out of the account variants we regarded as trivial.

In footnotes of this kind, the words that appear *before* the arrow reproduce

enough of the original text to identify what has been changed. The words that appear *after* the arrow correspond to what has been added or revised in the *Xuanji*. Because, in the rewriting of the 1950s, sentences and whole passages were often substantially recast, it would take up far too much space, and make our text unreadable, to show every variant in detail. In some instances, it has been possible to show the new version in the form of complete sentences, but frequently we include only enough of the new wording to make plain the main thrust of the changes.

Because the official translation of the *Selected Works* has been available for nearly half a century, and has been widely quoted in the literature, we have taken this version as our starting-point, but have modified or corrected it as we judged appropriate, both to improve the accuracy of the translation and to bring it into conformity with the conventions adopted in this series. Except where noted, when other materials in this book have already been published in English, we have made our own translations, comparing them subsequently with existing versions.

Annotations. So that any attentive reader will be able to follow the details of Mao's argument in each case, we have assumed no knowledge of anything relating to China. Persons, institutions, places, and events are briefly characterized at the point where Mao first refers to them. Some individuals of secondary importance, especially those who appear only as names in a long list, are not included in the notes. We have also kept to a minimum annotations regarding people or events in the West. Despite these limitations, the reader will soon discover that the personages who appear in these pages are as numerous as the characters in a traditional Chinese novel.

To keep the notes within reasonable compass, we have generally restricted those regarding Mao's contemporaries to their lives down to the period covered by each volume. To make it easier to locate information, references have been inserted indicating where the first note about a given individual appears in the volume, or in previous volumes.

In most biographical notes dates of birth and death, separated by a hyphen, are given immediately after the name. A blank following the hyphen should, in principle, signify that the person in question is still living. In the case of individuals born at the beginning of the twentieth century, this is obviously

unlikely, but in some instances even the editors working in Beijing have not been able to ascertain the facts. We have done our best to fill these gaps, but have not always succeeded. It should not be assumed that all those born ninety or more years ago for whom no second date is given are already dead; some of them are in fact very much alive as of today.

As pointed out in Volumes III and IV, Mao's writings regarding military operations for the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi soviet periods contain references to an extremely large number of places, many of them of no particular significance. To annotate all of the place-names mentioned would have imposed an intolerable burden on the printer, and on the reader. We therefore provided notes regarding geography, or the terrain, only in exceptional cases. At that time, however, the action took place primarily in a relatively limited area of Jiangxi, Fujian, and neighboring provinces, so it was possible to include in those volumes maps showing the principal localities mentioned by Mao, in order to facilitate the understanding of the text. Because of the extremely extensive area in which the Red Army operated both during and after the Long March, the succeeding volumes would have required a large number of maps to cover the terrain in sufficient detail, and we must therefore refer the reader to an atlas of China—preferably one showing the place-names in use before 1949.

The introductions to the volumes in this series should be considered in a very real sense as an extension of the notes. These texts will, we hope, help readers unfamiliar with Mao Zedong, or with twentieth-century China, find their *own* way through Mao's writings of the pre-1949 period. Any controversial or provocative statements which they may contain are intended to stimulate reflection, not to impose a particular interpretation on the reader. This is a collection of historical source material, not a volume of interpretation.

Use of Chinese terms. On the whole, we have sought to render all Chinese expressions into accurate and readable English, but in some cases it has seemed simpler and less ambiguous to use the Chinese word. These instances include, to begin with, *zi* (courtesy name) and *hao* (literary name). Because both Mao, and the authors he cited, frequently employ these alternative appellations instead of the *ming* or given name of the individual to whom they are referring, information regarding them is essential to the intelligence of the text. The English word "style" is sometimes used here, but because it may stand either for *zi* or for

hao, it does not offer a satisfactory solution. The Chinese terms have, in any case, long been used in Western-language biographical dictionaries of China, as well as in Chinese works.

Similarly, in the case of second or provincial-level, and third or metropolitan-level graduates of the old examination system, we have chosen to use the Chinese terms, respectively *juren* and *jinshi*. We have also preferred *xian* to “county” for the administrative subdivision which constituted the lowest level of the imperial bureaucracy, and still exists in China today. Apart from the Western connotations of “county,” there is the problem that *xian* is also often translated “district” (as in the expression “district magistrate”), and “district” itself is ambiguous in the Chinese context. We have also preferred to use the Chinese word *li* rather than to translate “Chinese league” (or simply “league”), or to give the equivalent in miles or kilometers.

Presentation. In the first five volumes of this series, Mao’s writings are arranged in a single chronological series, according to the date of composition. The only exception to this pattern occurs in Vol. IV, where the forty laws to which Mao had put his signature as the Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic appear in an appendix, and in a smaller typeface, because it seemed unlikely that he had actually written these documents himself. In Vol. VI, the diverse nature of the materials included made it seem appropriate to arrange the texts by category. This is not the case to the same degree with the present volume, hence all the texts appear in simple chronological order.

As already indicated, we have tried to turn Mao’s Chinese into good English. At the same time, since this is a work of reference, we have sometimes followed Mao in directions which do not accord with English usage. Mao frequently emphasized words or phrases by placing dots or circles next to each of the characters involved. In this edition, the corresponding text has been set in bold. Usually we have also added a note explicitly pointing this out, but it should be clearly stated that all such highlighting is Mao’s, not ours. Also, some of the Chinese texts we have translated contain omissions, because the editors in Tokyo, or even those in Beijing, did not have access to a complete version of the document in question, or could not read a few characters. When the number of missing characters is small, each one is commonly represented in the printed Chinese text by a hollow square occupying the space which would normally be

taken up by a single character. In our English version, each such square has been represented by the symbol [X], so the reader of the translation can see how much is missing. Where the gap is a long one, we have dispensed with this procedure, and conveyed the necessary information in a footnote.

Finally, like many Chinese writers, Mao tended to produce very long paragraphs, sometimes extending to several pages. Although this may seem monotonous to the English reader, we have generally followed his paragraphing exactly, because it must be presumed to reflect Mao's own sense of where the crucial turning points in his argument are to be found. We have not followed this pattern rigidly; on occasion massive blocks of text containing figures and other data have been turned into tables which are easier to follow. For the most part, however, the translations in this volume seek to reproduce Mao's original in form as well as in substance.

Volume VIII
From Rectification to Coalition Government
1942–July 1945

Mao's Road to Power

Revolutionary Writings 1912 · 1949

1942

Preface to Textbook for Literacy

(January 17, 1942)

A revolutionary cadre must be able to read and write and also have rich general knowledge of social life and of nature, as the basis for doing work and as the basis for studying theory. Only thus can he hope to do his work well and to study theory well. Without this basis—that is, someone who does not recognize characters is not able to read and write, and someone whose general knowledge of society and nature is limited to the category of what one directly sees and hears—such people, though able to do some work, will not be able to do it well, even if they wish to. Although they can study some revolutionary principles, they will not be able to study them well. We now have a great number of cadres who are bright and faithful but lack a cultural basis. In the future we will inevitably still have a great number of such cadres. They urgently need to resolve the problems of a cultural basis, but the problem of textbooks has still not been resolved. Now, the publication of the *Textbook for Literacy* is a great victory. It is the contribution of comrades [He] Kaifeng, Xu Teli, and Fan Wenlan.¹ Although the contents of the textbook will necessarily have to have its faults corrected from time to time, weeding through the old to bring forth the new, having this textbook still opens the gates to the study of culture. The publication of the *Textbook for Literacy* is good news for many cadres, and I believe the great mass of our cadres will warmly welcome this textbook.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 387. It is taken from the 1948 edition of *Wenhua*

keben, published by the second branch of Xinhua shudian.

1. He Kaifeng (1906–1955) was at this time the vice director of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party; see Vol. V, p. lviii. Xu Teli (1877–1968) had been Mao's teacher at the First Normal School in Changsha from 1913 to 1918; he joined the Party in 1927 and at the time of this publication was director of Yan'an's Natural Science Academy; see Vol. I, p. 372, and Vol. V, p. 601. Fan Wenlan (1893–1969), the noted Marxian historian was at this time vice director of Yan'an's Central Research Institute and director of the History Research Office.

*Instructions for Troops in All Border
Regions to Study the “Resolution of the
Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Red
Army”*
(January 23, 1942)

Comrades Tan Zheng and Mo Wenhua:¹

Print several thousand more copies of the Resolution of the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Army and distribute them to the troops at headquarters and the troops in northwestern Shanxi. Deliver them down to the level of company commander, one copy to each person. Also, issue a notice telling them to treat it as study material which they must read well. (Cadres of all levels must read it well.)²

Mao Zedong

Notes

This note by Mao was published in *Jiefang ribao* on April 15, 1942, under the title that appears above. Our source is Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 192; the text is also reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 69.

¹. Tan Zheng (1906–1988) was at this time deputy commissar and head of the Political Department of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Shanxi-Suiyuan Coalition Defense Army. Mo Wenhua (1910–2000) was deputy director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army.

[2.](#) It is worth noting that Mao himself was the author of this resolution; he was thus instructing the army to study his own writings.

To Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu

(January 23, 1942)

Zhou, Dong,

1. Temporarily subscribe to two copies of every newspaper in the country. Send one copy to [Hu] Qiaomu¹ and one to Chen Boda, all of which will be transferred through the New China Bookstore in Yan'an.

2. Please buy three copies of various types of books and published materials (regardless of whether they are general or specialized) and send them to the New China Bookstore to be forwarded to Qiaomu or [Li] Fuchun² and to be received by [Wang] Shoudao.³ After they are received [we will] plan distribution.

3. In all cases, any other special books that are required should be reported through the General Office of the Secretariat via telegram.

4. As for expenses, please calculate the costs. Even if they exceed 100 yuan a year, there will be no stinting.

Mao [Zedong], Ren [Bishi],⁴

Li [Fuchen]

Notes

Our copy of this text is from *Dangde wenxian*, No. 2, 2012, p. 6, where it is reproduced from a copy.

¹. Hu Qiaomu (1912–1992) was a sociologist by training and by 1942 was the main secretary to Mao Zedong and secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo. Chen Boda (1904–1989) served as secretary and research assistant to Mao from 1937 and was valued by Mao for his work on ideology.

². At the time Li Fuchun (1900–1975) was deputy secretary of the Central Committee and head of its

General Office.

3. At the time Wang Shoudao (1906–1996) was head of the Chinese Communist Party Secretariat. Wang was Mao's student at the Guangzhou Peasant Training Institute in 1925 and thereafter became Mao's longtime follower, working closely with Mao beginning from 1933, particularly in the security services.

4. Ren Bishi (1904–1950) was a top military and political leader in the Party, serving on the Politburo; in 1942 Ren took charge of Yan'an's schools and training institutes and played a leading role in the Rectification Campaign. In 1943 Ren joined Mao and Liu Shaoqi as part of the top leadership group.

*Inscription for the Third Anniversary of
the Publication of the Military and
Political Journal of the Eighth Route
Army*
(January 25, 1942)

“Be prepared to counterattack.”

Note

Our source for this text is Takeuchi, Minoru, ed., *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan* (Tokyo: Sososha, 1983–1986), Vol. 10, p. 174, citing *Balujun junzheng zazhi*, 4:1 (1942).

The Main Points of Propaganda of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee

(January 26, 1942)

1. The main points of propaganda of this department used to lay primary emphasis on propaganda outside the Party. From this period onward, we have decided to add propaganda within the Party. We hope that comrades from all regions will pay attention.

2. In view of the fact that, before the Zunyi Conference, the losses caused to the Party and to the revolution by errors of subjectivism and sectarianism were enormous; and given that although after the Zunyi Conference the line of the Party has been correct, the remnants of subjectivism and sectarianism have by no means been eliminated and still exist to a very substantial extent within the entire Party, especially in certain special regions and certain special departments. The Politburo of the Central Committee has discussed this problem repeatedly and emphatically during the past year. It has issued a Decision on Enhancing Party Spirit, a Decision on Developing Investigations and Research, a Decision on Cadre Schools, and a Decision on High-Level Study Groups. In addition, Comrade Mao Zedong, in accordance with a decision of the Central Committee, delivered a speech at the Consultative Congress of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region opposing sectarianism. These decisions and this speech have already played a guiding role throughout the Party, have attracted the attention of many comrades, and have been concretely correcting the remnants of subjectivism and sectarianism that still exist to this day. This is a good thing, but it is only one side of the phenomenon. On the one hand, the decisions of the

Central Committee and the speeches by comrades of the Central Committee have not made a deep impression on many comrades. The reasons for this may be that some comrades who committed rather serious errors of subjectivism and sectarianism still refuse for the moment genuinely to recognize their errors, are unwilling to conduct genuine self-criticisms, and refuse to correct their errors quickly. On the other hand, it may be that some comrades think that they have by no means committed any subjectivist and sectarian errors of line, and therefore they consider that this matter does not concern them and they are above it all, failing to recognize the subjectivist and sectarian elements in their own thoughts and actions both in the past and in the present and the fact that they have also been guilty of mistakes. For example, they may be easily aroused, substituting their personal feelings for policy, understanding very little about the circumstances of the three sides—enemy, friends, and ourselves. They may lack the spirit of scientifically and carefully investigating and researching objective things, but have the spirit of always considering themselves in the right. All these are precisely the sources of subjectivist errors. Furthermore, such errors may consist, for example, of asserting one's independence inside the Party and confusing correct things, such as developing the ability to work independently and developing Marxist creativity, with erroneous things, such as disobeying one's superior, disobeying the majority, disobeying the Central Committee, setting oneself against the Party, and putting the individual above the Party (giving prominence to the individual), and individual heroism (as opposed to national heroism and the heroism of the masses). In relations between cadres from outside and cadres from local areas, in relations between military cadres and cadres of the localities, in relations between cadres of the same forces and cadres of friendly forces, and in relations between veteran cadres and new cadres, they do not pay attention to helping one another and uniting with one another, but they look down on one another or even bully one another. Here, we did not increase the responsibilities of cadres from the outside, military cadres, cadres of the same force, and old cadres; neither did we do more to forgive and assist cadres from the local areas, cadres from the localities, cadres of friendly forces, and new cadres in the expectation of uniting them and promoting them so that they will overcome various weaknesses in the course of struggle. Because in many places there still exist various abnormal internal relations, these are but

manifestations of remnants of sectarianism within the Party. As far as relations between Party members and non-Party members and between Party cadres and non-Party cadres are concerned, there further exist enormous estrangement, misunderstanding, lack of concern, and looking down on one another. For this, Party members and Party cadres should be held primarily responsible. That the “Three-Thirds” system¹ has by no means been carried out completely, thoroughly, and earnestly is a manifestation of the existence of this sectarianism. It is a fact that this type of serious sectarian error in relations between those inside and outside the Party has not attracted serious attention of all or of the majority of our comrades. All these subjectivist and sectarian thoughts and actions cannot be overcome if we do not initiate a thorough, earnest, and deep struggle against them, and as a result we cannot win victory for the revolution. Moreover, if we want to carry forward the struggle and overcome these thoughts and actions, it will not have much effect if we do not mobilize the entire Party. For this reason, we hope that all the leading organs and all the leading comrades of the whole Party and the whole army will pay attention to this problem, carry out propaganda, and carry on the work. Regarding this problem, our department will successively provide the materials stated as references for our comrades’ work.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 389–91, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.

¹. The “Three-Thirds” system (*san san zhi*), publicized in a March 6, 1940, Central Committee directive, required all public political offices to be shared equally by three groups: Communists, non-Party Leftists, and middle-of-the-road anti-Japanese patriots. See the account of this development in Vol. VII, pp. 432–34.

*Decision of the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party
Regarding Agrarian Policy in the Anti-
Japanese Base Areas*

(Passed by the Politburo of the Central
Committee, January 28, 1942)

Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, the agrarian policy that has been carried out by our Party in all the anti-Japanese resistance areas is the agrarian policy of the Anti-Japanese United National Front: that is, the agrarian policy of reducing rent and interest, on the one hand, and delivering rent and interest, on the other. This policy, after having been carried out in all the base areas, has gained the support of the broad masses, united people of all strata, and won support for the War of Resistance in the enemy's rear areas. In every base area where the reduction of rent and interest has been carried out fairly universally, fairly earnestly, and fairly thoroughly and where the payment of rent and interest on loans at the same time has been guaranteed, the zeal of the local masses to participate in the resistance struggle and in the establishment of democracy is relatively high. Moreover, they are able to maintain day-to-day work and to stabilize the order of social life, and there the base areas are relatively consolidated. Nevertheless, this policy has not been universally, earnestly, and thoroughly carried out in many base areas. In some base areas, the reduction of rent and interest on loans has been carried out only in a certain area; in another part of the area, the reduction of rent and interest is treated only as a kind of propaganda slogan, and no orders have been issued, let alone put into

practice. Or, even though the government has issued orders and formally reduced rent and interest, in fact it did not truly do it. The result is the phenomenon of reducing rent publicly, but not reducing it behind the scenes. In these places the zeal of the masses cannot be manifested, which means that the masses cannot be truly organized to bring about the basis for resistance against Japan. In these areas, the bases of resistance to Japan cannot be consolidated and cannot resist the mopping-up operations of the enemy, thereby becoming weak and powerless areas. But in many other areas, some leftist errors have been made. Although these kinds of errors occurred only in some areas and have been corrected in large part through the instructions of the Central Committee, it is still necessary to draw them to the attention of comrades from all areas. Now, when resistance is entering a difficult period, we demand that all the base areas mobilize even more the zeal of resistance and production by the broad masses and unite even more all the strata of resistance to sustain the long-term struggle in the enemy's rear areas. After it conducted detailed research on experiences everywhere, the Central Committee made a decision in particular summing up the agrarian policy of our Party. In addition, the concrete methods of executing the agrarian policy will be issued as an appendix, along with this decision for use in all areas. It is certainly hoped that comrades from all localities will study it and carry it out earnestly.

1. It shall be acknowledged that peasants (including farm laborers) are the fundamental force of resistance against Japan and the fundamental force of production. Therefore, the policy of the Party is to help peasants, to reduce feudal exploitation by landlords, to carry out reduction of rent and interest, and to guarantee peasants' human rights, political rights, land rights, and financial rights, in order to improve the peasants' lives and to raise the enthusiasm of the peasants for resistance to Japan and for production.

2. It shall be acknowledged that the majority of landlords demand resistance to Japan and that a group of enlightened gentry also approve of democratic reform. Therefore, the policy of the Party is merely to help peasants reduce feudal exploitation and not to eliminate feudal exploitation, still less to strike at the enlightened gentry who approve of democratic reform. Therefore, after reduction of rent and interest has been carried out, rent and interest must be paid. After peasants' human rights, political rights, land rights, and financial rights have

been guaranteed, the landlords' human rights, political rights, land rights, and financial rights must also be guaranteed in order to form an alliance with the class of landlords to resist Japan together. Only toward the traitor elements who are absolutely and firmly unwilling to repent will a policy of exterminating their feudal exploitation be adopted.

3. It shall be acknowledged that the capitalist mode of production is a relatively progressive mode of production in present-day China and that the bourgeoisie, especially the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, is a relatively progressive social component and political force in present-day China. The mode of production of rich peasants has a capitalist character. Rich peasants are the bourgeoisie in the rural areas and are an indispensable force in the resistance to Japan and for production. The petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and the rich peasants not only demand resistance to Japan, they also demand democracy. Therefore, the policy of the Party is not to weaken capitalism and the bourgeoisie, and not to weaken the class of rich peasants and the production of rich peasants, but, under the condition of improving the life of the workers, at the same time to encourage capitalist production and to ally with the bourgeoisie; to encourage and reward the production of the rich peasants and to ally with the rich peasants. But among the rich peasants there is a group that engages in feudal exploitation, and the middle peasants and poor peasants resent this. Therefore, when carrying out the reduction of rent and interest in the rural areas, the rent for land and interest on loans of rich peasants must also be reduced accordingly. After reducing the rent for land and interest on loans of rich peasants, rent for land and interest on loans must at the same time be paid, and the human rights, political rights, land rights, and financial rights of rich peasants must be assured. For the group of landlords that manage their land according to the capitalist mode of production (the so-called managing landlords), the treatment is the same as that for the rich peasants.

4. The above-stated three basic principles are the starting point for the Anti-Japanese United National Front of our Party and for its agrarian policy. The experience of the last four years proves that only when these principles are upheld can we consolidate the Anti-Japanese United Front, correctly resolve the land problems, and ally with all the people to support national resistance, thus leaving the Japanese aggressors completely isolated. Any ultraleftist or

ultrarightist deviations will hinder reaching this goal.

5. Within the United Front in the rural areas, the contradiction between landlords and peasants—for example, landlords opposing or impeding the demand for democracy and the demand for people’s livelihood by the peasants, and so on—must be properly dealt with according to the above-stated principles. The reasonable demands by both sides must be satisfied, but both sides should obey the interests of the national resistance as a whole. In treating the disputes in the rural areas, the working personnel of the Party and the government shall not side with any specific party of either peasants or landlords, but, according to the above-stated basic principles, adopt the guiding policy of coordinating both sides.

6. The “Three-Thirds” system is a rational political form that coordinates the internal relations of all the anti-Japanese classes. This system must be executed firmly, earnestly, and universally within both the system of the representative bodies and the system of government. The view that this system is nothing but a method to go through the motions for the non-Party personages is not correct.

7. Government laws and decrees should have two-sided stipulations but not attach too much weight to this and too little weight to that. On the one hand, it shall be stipulated that landlords generally reduce rent for the land and reduce interest on loans. They must not resist carrying out the reductions. On the other hand, it shall also be stipulated that peasants have the obligation to deliver rent and interest to their landlords; they must not resist delivering them. On the one hand, it shall be stipulated that landlords’ proprietary rights to their land and property still belong to the landlords. Landlords, by law, shall have the rights to sell, pawn, mortgage, or treat their land in any other way. On the other hand, it shall also be stipulated that landlords consider the peasants’ life when they deal with their property in this way. The conclusions of land deeds and of all debts must, according to the wishes of both sides, include that any party has the freedom to terminate the contract when it has been fulfilled.

8. As to funds for resistance against Japan, people of all classes, except those living in abject poverty, must pay to the government, according to a progressive principle; they must not attach too much weight to this and too little weight to that; and they must not resist paying.

9. After the reduction of rent and interest has been carried out, the prerequisite for raising agricultural production has been provided and agricultural production

will be the main production in the anti-Japanese base areas. The working personnel of the Party and government must promote it with all their force. The government should extend a great deal of agricultural credit to resolve the peasants' difficulties in borrowing money.

10. The task of the Peasant Relief Association before the reduction of rent and interest was mainly to assist the government in carrying out the laws on the reduction of rent for land and interest on loans. After the reduction of rent and interest, its task is mainly to assist the government in mediating disputes in the rural areas and in developing agricultural production, and not to replace the laws and decrees of the government with its own or to replace the government with the Peasant Relief Association. In the task of mediating disputes in the rural areas, it should adopt the mode of arbitration instead of the mode of making arbitrary decisions. In the task of developing agricultural production, it should mobilize all members of the Peasant Relief Association to play the role of establishing leadership models.

11. Now that the reduction of rent and interest and the guarantee of peasants' human rights, political rights, land rights, and financial rights are the number-one aspect of our Party's agrarian policy, there are still many places within the base areas that have not yet carried out the reduction of rent and interest universally, earnestly, and thoroughly. The reason is not that landlords resisted the execution of this policy, but that the working personnel of the Party and government adopted an indifferent and bureaucratic attitude. Consequently, the working personnel of the Party and government in all the base areas must conduct serious investigations of their own work, send their members separately to different places in the countryside to inspect the extent of the execution of the policy, conduct careful investigations and research, sum up comprehensively the experiences of all of the places, carry forward the examples of correct execution, and criticize examples of bureaucracy. They must know that between issuing slogans and orders, and carrying out slogans and orders, there often exists a big gap. If the bureaucracy is not punished severely and if Right deviation is not opposed, there is no way that the slogans and orders can be carried out.

12. Given that delivery of rent for land and interest on loans and the guarantee of the landlords' human rights, political rights, land rights, and financial rights are the second aspect of our Party's agrarian policy and given that leftist errors

used to take place that overlooked this aspect within various base areas, the reason was not that peasants were unaware of the agrarian policy of our Party. It was that the working personnel of the Party and government did not understand, or did not completely understand, the policy of our Party. In order to prevent these kinds of errors from recurring, now or in the future, we must, within the Party and among the peasant masses, clearly explain the policy of the Party, making it understood that the agrarian policy for the United National Front of resistance of our Party at present is fundamentally different from the agrarian policy during the Civil War. We must make sure that they do not limit themselves to their current narrow interests, but connect their current interests with the interests of the future and connect their local interests with the interests of the entire nation. We must advise peasants that, after the reduction of rent and interest, the guarantee of the peasants' human rights, political rights, land rights, and financial rights will be carried out. At the same time, we shall also carry out the delivery of rent for land and interest on loans and the guarantee of landlords' human rights, political rights, and land rights. It is just the same as reducing rent for land and reducing interest on loans, and guaranteeing peasants' human rights, political rights, land rights, and financial rights. We must advise the landlords that they should not limit themselves to their current narrow interests, but should take the future interests of the entire nation into account.

[Mao's concluding remarks:] This decision marks the first time that capitalist production has been openly recognized and encouraged. In resolving the land question, at present we must preserve a certain degree of feudalism so as not to make the landlords run to the side of the enemy. Carrying out such a policy is the best method for breaking up the enemy's united front. We have been studying the land question for many months, and hitherto our Party had not taken a decision. Matters should never be lightly decided; they should be decided only when the circumstances are ripe.

Note

This document does not appear to have been drafted by Mao, but Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi,

ed., *Mao Zedong nianpu, 1893–1949* (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), Vol. 2, pp. 358–59. reproduces a substantial portion of the text, followed by a forceful quotation from Mao’s remarks underlining its importance at the January 28, 1942, Politburo meeting. We are therefore including it here. Our source for the decision is Takeuchi, Minoru, ed., *Mao Zedong ji* (Tokyo: Hokubosha, 1970–1972; second edition, Tokyo: Sososha, 1983). where it is reproduced from *Jiefang ribao*, February 6, 1942; Mao’s concluding comments are taken from *Nianpu*.

To Zhou Wen

(February 1, 1942)

Comrade Zhou Wen,¹

I have received your letter and passed it on to various comrades in the Central Propaganda Department and the *Liberation Daily* to read. Your opinion is quite right;² we are now taking the reform in hand and are preparing a meeting of cadres specifically for this purpose. This is my reply.

Salutations,

Mao Zedong

I hope that you will write articles on this issue for the *Liberation Daily* to combat Party formalism and neoclassical writing.³

Notes

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 193, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Zhou Wen (1907–1952) was a noted left-wing writer who went to Yan’an in 1940 and who later served in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region Government and edited Party periodicals. He would become a vocal supporter of the literary Rectification Campaign in 1942.

². Mao may be referring to Zhou Wen’s support of language reform and language simplification.

³. On the term “Party formalism” [*dang bagu*], see Mao’s famous exposition in the February 1 and February 8 texts, below. See “Rectify Our Study Style, Party Style, and Writing Style,” February 1, 1942, note 10.

*Rectify Our Study Style, Party Style, and Writing Style*¹

(Speech delivered at the Opening Ceremony of the Party School on February 1, 1942)

The Party School opens today, and I congratulate the school on its achievements.

I would like to say something about the problem of our Party's work style.

Why must there be a revolutionary party? There must be a revolutionary party because our enemies still exist in the world.² Moreover, what is required is not just an ordinary revolutionary party but a revolutionary party with the nature of a Communist Party.³ *For* without a revolutionary party *with the nature of a Communist Party*, it is impossible to overthrow the enemy completely.⁴ We want to overthrow the enemy.⁵ So we must keep our ranks in good order, we must march in step, our troops must be picked troops, and our weapons must be good weapons. Without these conditions the enemy cannot be overthrown.

What is the problem now facing our Party? Our Party's general line is correct, there is no doubt about that, and our Party's work has achieved success. We have⁶ several hundred thousand members who are working side by side with the people⁷ in waging extremely hard and bitter struggles against the *national enemy*. *Such a heroic spirit of sacrifice, such achievements in the service of the people*, can be seen by all and are not subject to doubt.

After all, then, does our Party still have problems or not? *Does it still have shortcomings or not?* I say there are still problems, *there are still shortcomings*, and, in a certain sense, these problems are rather serious.

What are these problems? They result from the fact that there are certain things in the brains of some of our comrades that are not quite correct, not quite

proper.

What are these various things? There is the question of thought, the question of the relationship between people within the Party and people outside the Party, and the question of speech and writing. On these three questions, some of our comrades have yet to discard their somewhat improper style. In other words, there is still something wrong with our study style, Party style, and writing style. By something wrong with our study style, we mean subjectivism.⁸ By something wrong with our Party style, we mean sectarianism.⁹ By something wrong with our writing style, we mean Party formalism.¹⁰ These styles are wrong, but they are not like the wintry north winds that sweep across the whole sky. Subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism are no longer the dominant styles, but merely gusts of contrary wind, ill winds from the air-raid tunnels (*laughter*). It is not good, however, that such winds should still be blowing in our Party. We must seal off the passages which produce them. Our whole Party should undertake the job of sealing off these passages and so should the Party School. These three ill winds, subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism, have their historical origins. Although at present they are no longer dominant in the whole Party, they still constantly create trouble and assail us. Consequently, it is necessary to *engage in rectification*, to resist them, and to analyze and elucidate them *and study them*.

Oppose subjectivism in order to rectify our study style, oppose sectarianism in order to rectify our Party style, and oppose Party formalism in order to rectify our writing style—such is the task before us.

If we want to accomplish the task of vanquishing¹¹ the enemy, we must accomplish this task of rectifying these styles within the Party. The study style is also the Party's study style. The writing style is also the Party's writing style. *Therefore*, they are both part and parcel of the Party's work style. Once our Party's work style is put completely right, people throughout the country will learn from our example. Those outside the Party who indulge in the same kind of bad practices will, if they are good and honest people, learn from our example and correct their mistakes, and thus the whole nation will be influenced. So long as our Communist ranks are in good order and march in step, so long as our troops are picked troops and our weapons are good weapons, any enemy, however powerful, *cannot but* be overthrown.

Let me speak now about subjectivism.

Subjectivism is an improper style of study; it is anti-Marxist-Leninist, and it cannot coexist with the Communist Party. What we want is the Marxist-Leninist study style. What we call study style means a study style not just in the schools but in the whole Party. It is a question of the method of thinking by comrades in our leading bodies and by all cadres and Party members. It is a question of our attitude toward Marxism-Leninism, of the attitude of all Party comrades toward their work. Since it is a question of this kind, the question of study style is an extremely important question and indeed a question of primary importance.

At present, certain muddled ideas find currency among many people. This is the case, for example, for ideas about what is a theorist, what is an intellectual, and what is meant by linking theory and practice, and so on.

Let us first of all ask: Is the theoretical level of our Party actually high or low? Recently more Marxist-Leninist works have been translated, and more people have been reading them. That is a very good thing. But can we therefore say that the theoretical level of our Party has been greatly raised? True, the level is now somewhat higher than before. But in comparison with the rich content of the Chinese revolutionary movement, the theoretical front lags behind. A comparison of the two shows that the theoretical side *is at a very low level* and lags far behind. Generally speaking, our theory cannot as yet keep pace with our revolutionary practice, let alone lead the way as it should. We have not yet raised our rich practice to the necessary theoretical level. We have not yet investigated all the problems of revolutionary practice—or even the important ones—and raised them to a theoretical level. Just think, how many of us have created theories worthy of the name regarding China's economy, politics, military affairs, or culture, theories which can be regarded as scientific and comprehensive, and not crude and sketchy? Especially in the field of economic theory, Chinese capitalism has had a century of development since the Opium War, and yet not a single theoretical work has been produced that accords with the realities of China's economic development and is genuinely scientific. Can we say that in the study of China's economic problems, for instance, the theoretical level is already high? Can we say that our Party already has economic theorists worthy of the name? Certainly not. We have read a great many Marxist-Leninist books, but can we claim, then, that we have theorists? In reality, we cannot say this. For

Marxism-Leninism is the theory created by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on the basis of practice; it consists of general conclusions drawn from historical and revolutionary practice. If we merely read this,¹² but do not proceed to study the realities of China's history and revolution in the light of this,¹³ or make any effort to think through China's revolutionary practice carefully in terms of theory, if we have not created a theory in accordance with China's real necessities, a theory that is our own and of a specific nature,¹⁴ we should not be so presumptuous as to call ourselves Marxist theorists. If we who are Communist Party members are so accustomed to looking at Chinese problems that we cannot see them, *if we look every day and see nothing, put on glasses and still see nothing, if we see only the complete works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on the shelf*, then our achievements on the theoretical front will be very poor indeed. If a person can only commit Marxist economics or philosophy to memory, reciting glibly from Chapter I to Chapter X, (*laughter*) but is utterly unable to apply them, can such a person be considered a Marxist theorist? Hardly. *Indeed, the fewer such "theorists" we have the better. If there was someone who had read ten thousand works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, had read every work a thousand times, and could recite every sentence, he still could not be counted as a theorist.* What kind of theorists do we need? We need theorists who, basing themselves on the standpoint, viewpoint, and method of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, are able to explain correctly the actual problems arising in the course of history and revolution and give scientific explanations and theoretical elucidations of China's economic, political, military, cultural, and other problems. This is the type of theorists we need. To be a theorist of this kind, a person must have a true grasp of the essence of Marxism-Leninism, of the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, viewpoint, and method, and of the theories of Lenin and Stalin on the colonial revolution and the Chinese Revolution, and he must be able to apply them in a penetrating and scientific analysis of China's practical problems and discover the laws of development of these problems. Such are the theorists we really need.

The Central Committee¹⁵ has now made a decision calling upon our comrades to learn how to apply the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, viewpoint, and method *of thinking* in the serious study of China's history, and of China's economics, politics, military affairs, and culture and to investigate and study¹⁶ every problem on the basis of detailed material and only then to create theories.¹⁷ This is the

responsibility that we must shoulder.

Our Party School¹⁸ should not read the Marxist-Leninist tenets in a lifeless manner.¹⁹ *Instead*, they must be able *first of all* to master them and *then* to apply them, master them for the sole purpose of applying them. *Now it is fashionable to measure performance in terms of percentages. Then, what grade shall we give to this person who has read 10,000 books, has read each one 1,000 times, and is completely unable to apply them? I say zero (laughter).* But if you can apply the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint to elucidate one or two practical problems, you should be commended and credited with some achievement. The more problems you elucidate and the more comprehensively and profoundly you do so, the greater will be your achievement. At present, our Party School should also lay down the rule to grade students as superior or inferior, good or bad, according to how they look at China's problems after they have studied Marxism-Leninism,²⁰ according to whether they see the problems clearly and whether they see them at all.

What about the problem of the so-called intellectuals? Because this China of ours is a semicolonial, semifeudal country and its culture is underdeveloped, intellectuals are of particular value. The Central Committee has, moreover, made the decision²¹ that we must strive to attract a broad stratum of intellectuals.²² Insofar as they are revolutionary and willing to take part in the War of Resistance,²³ welcome them one and all. *This is very correct, but as a result, intellectuals are glorified and country bumpkins have a difficult time.* It is entirely right for us to esteem intellectuals, for without revolutionary intellectuals the revolution cannot triumph. But we all know that there are many intellectuals who fancy themselves very learned and assume airs of erudition, not realizing that such airs are bad and harmful and hinder their own progress. They ought to be aware of the truth that actually many so-called intellectuals are, relatively speaking, most ignorant, and the workers and peasants sometimes know more than they do. Here some will say, "Ha! You are turning things upside down and talking nonsense." *(laughter)* But, comrades, don't get excited; there is some sense in what I am saying.

What is knowledge? From ancient times to the present,²⁴ there have been only two kinds of knowledge in the world: knowledge of the struggle for production and knowledge of the class struggle. *(Knowledge of the national struggle is also*

included in the latter category.) *What knowledge is there aside from this? There is none.* Natural science and social science are the crystallization of these two kinds of knowledge, and philosophy is the generalization and summation of natural science and social science. Aside from these, there is no other knowledge.²⁵ Now let us take a look at certain students, those brought up in schools that are completely cut off from the practical activities of society. What about them? A person goes from a primary school²⁶ all the way to a university,²⁷ graduates, and is considered learned. *But first of all, such people don't know how to till the land; second, they don't know how to work in factories; third, they don't know how to fight battles; and fourth, they don't know how to handle a job. They have done none of these things. They have absolutely no practical knowledge of this kind.* All they have is book learning.²⁸ Can such persons be regarded as complete intellectuals? Hardly, in my opinion. *At most they can be considered half-intellectuals,* because their knowledge is still incomplete. What, then, is relatively complete knowledge? All relatively complete knowledge is formed in two stages: the first stage is perceptual knowledge, the second is rational knowledge, the latter being the development of the former to a higher stage. What sort of knowledge is the students' book learning? Even supposing all their knowledge is truth, it is still not knowledge acquired through their own personal experience, but consists of theories set down by their predecessors in summarizing the experience of the struggle for production and of the class struggle. It is entirely necessary that students should acquire this kind of knowledge, but it must be understood that, as far as they are concerned, such knowledge is *the wrong way around, reversed, and one-sided* knowledge, something that has been verified by others but not yet by themselves.²⁹ *They should know that it is not at all difficult to learn this kind of knowledge, it may even be said that it is extremely easy. In contrast, the cook's task in preparing a meal is difficult. Combining firewood, rice, oil, salt, sauce, vinegar, and so on to create something edible is no easy matter, and it is even harder to make something tasty. If we compare the tasks of the cooks at the Northwest Restaurant to those of the cooks in our homes, we find a great difference. If the fire is too big, the food will burn; if there is too much salt, it will taste bitter (laughter). Cooking and preparing food is truly an art. What about book knowledge? If you only read lifeless books, then you need only to know 3,000 to 5,000 characters, learn how to thumb through a dictionary, and hold some*

book in your hand, and the government will give you millet to eat. Then you nod your head contentedly and start to read. Books cannot walk, and you can open and close a book at will. This is the easiest thing in the world to do, a great deal easier than for a cook to prepare a meal and far easier than it is for him to slaughter a pig. He has to catch the pig, [but] the pig can run; (laughter) he slaughters it, [so] the pig squeals (laughter). A book placed on a desk cannot run nor can it squeal (laughter). You can dispose of it in any manner you wish. Is there anything easier to do? Therefore, I advise those of you who have only book learning and as yet no contact with reality, and those who have little practical experience, to recognize your own shortcomings and become a bit more humble.

How can those half-baked intellectuals³⁰ be turned into intellectuals worthy of the name? There is only one way: to make all those people who have only book knowledge turn to practical tasks, so that they become real workers and see that those engaged in theoretical work turn to practical research.³¹ In this way we can reach our goal.

What I have said can hardly fail to make some people angry. They will say, “According to your interpretation, even Marx would be regarded as no more than a half-baked intellectual.”³² I say, it is true³³ *that, in the first place, Marx did not know how to slaughter a pig, and, second, he could not till the land. But he took part in the revolutionary movement.*³⁴ He also studied commodities.³⁵ Millions of people see and use commodities every day, but are so used to them that they take no notice. Marx alone studied commodities.³⁶ *He considered commodities, looking at them this way and that way, unlike the casual way in which we read the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.* He carried out analytical work into their actual development and derived a theory³⁷ from what existed universally. He studied nature, history, and proletarian revolution and created dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and the theory of proletarian revolution. Thus Marx should be regarded as a complete intellectual.³⁸ He differed from those half-baked intellectuals³⁹ *in that he participated in the actual revolutionary movement,* he returned to reality and undertook investigations and research.⁴⁰ He formed generalizations regarding various things.⁴¹ Such generalized knowledge is called theory.⁴² Our Party needs a large number of comrades to do⁴³ such work. In our Party at present there are many comrades

who can engage in⁴⁴ this kind of theoretical research. Most of them are intelligent and promising; we should *treasure these comrades*, we should value them. But their orientation must be correct, and they must not repeat the mistakes of the past. They must discard dogmatism and not confine themselves to ready-made books.⁴⁵

There is only one kind of true theory in this world: theory that is drawn from objective reality and then verified by objective reality. Nothing else can measure up to the theory of which we speak. Stalin has said that theory divorced from reality is empty theory. Empty theory is useless, incorrect, and must be rejected. We should point the finger of scorn at those who are fond of such aimless theorizing. Marxism-Leninism is the most correct, scientific, and revolutionary truth, derived from objective reality and verified by objective reality, but many who study Marxism-Leninism regard it as lifeless dogma, thus impeding the development of theory, and harming themselves as well as other comrades.

On the other hand, our comrades who are engaged in practical work will also fall into error if they misuse their experience. True, these people are rich in⁴⁶ experience, which is very valuable, but it is very dangerous if they rest content with their own experience. They must realize that their knowledge is mostly perceptual and partial and that they lack rational and comprehensive knowledge; in other words, they lack theory and their knowledge, too, is relatively incomplete. Yet without comparatively complete knowledge it is impossible to do revolutionary work well.

Thus, there are two kinds of incomplete knowledge. One is ready-made knowledge found in books. *I fear that this can turn even Marxism-Leninism into something hollow.* The other is knowledge that is mostly perceptual and partial *and has not yet evolved into something rational and universal.* Both are one-sided. Only linking the two together can produce something⁴⁷ which is relatively good and complete.

In order to study theory, however, our cadres of working-class and peasant origin must first learn to read and write. Without this, they cannot learn Marxist-Leninist theory. Having learned this, they can study Marxism-Leninism at any time. In my childhood I never attended something called a “Marxist-Leninist school” and was taught only such things as, “The Master said: ‘Is it not pleasant to learn with constant perseverance and application?’”⁴⁸ (*laughter*) From this, I

learned to read.⁴⁹ For example, the word “study” is there. I could use this word to study Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, nowadays we no longer study Confucius; we study such new topics as modern Chinese, history, geography, and elementary natural science. Once these basic subjects are mastered, they are useful everywhere. The Central Committee of our Party now emphasizes⁵⁰ that our cadres of working-class and peasant origin should obtain an elementary education because they can then take up any branch of study—politics, military science, or economics. Otherwise, although these worker and peasant cadres have rich experience, they will never be able to raise themselves to the level of theory.⁵¹

It follows that to combat subjectivism we must succeed in developing people of each of these two types in whichever direction they are deficient and linking the two together. Only when those with book learning develop in the direction of practice can they avoid being stuck in books. Only then can they avoid committing dogmatist errors. Those with work experience must take up the study of theory and must read seriously. Only then will they be able to systematize and synthesize their experience and raise it to the level of theory, and only then will they not mistake their partial experience for universal truth and not commit empiricist errors. Dogmatism and empiricism alike are subjectivism, each originating from an opposite pole.

Hence there are two kinds of subjectivism in our Party: dogmatism and empiricism. Each sees only a part and not the whole. If people are not on guard, do not realize that such one-sidedness is a shortcoming and do not strive to improve,⁵² they are liable to go astray.

Of these two kinds of subjectivism, however, the principal danger to our Party at the present time is dogmatism. For dogmatism can easily assume the guise of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.⁵³ This intimidates cadres of working-class and peasant origin and forces country bumpkins to be its servant, and cadres of working-class and peasant origin cannot easily see through this *disguise*. This can also intimidate naive young people and capture them. If we overcome dogmatism, cadres with book learning will readily join with those who have experience and will take to the study of practical things. Thus we can create many⁵⁴ good workers who combine theory with experience, as well as some real theorists. If we overcome dogmatism, the comrades with practical experience will

have good teachers to help them raise their experience to the level of theory, and so to avoid empiricist errors.

Apart from the confusion prevailing about the concepts of “theorist” and “intellectual,” there is a phrase about “linking theory and practice” which we read every day, about which many of our comrades also have confused ideas. Every day they speak of “linking,” but in reality they are talking about “separating,” because they make no effort at linking. How can Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese Revolution be linked? To use a common expression, it is by “shooting the arrow at the target.” When shooting an arrow, one should aim at the target. The relation between Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese Revolution is the same as that between the arrow and the target. Some comrades, however, “shoot without a target,” shoot at random, and such people are liable to harm the revolution. Others merely stroke the arrow fondly, exclaiming, “What a fine arrow! What a fine arrow!” but are never willing to shoot it. Such people are merely connoisseurs of curios and have virtually nothing to do with the revolution. The arrow of Marxism-Leninism must be used to hit the target of the Chinese Revolution. *Otherwise why would we bother studying Marxism-Leninism? Is it because we are suffering from indigestion eating millet and need to chant the digestion sutra? Why is it absolutely necessary for our Party School to study Marxism-Leninism?* Unless this question is clarified, the theoretical level of our Party can never be raised and the Chinese Revolution can never be victorious.

Our comrades must understand that we do not study Marxism-Leninism because it is pleasing to the eye or because there is anything mysterious about it,⁵⁵ *like the Daoist priests who ascend Maoshan to learn how to subdue demons and evil spirits. Marxism-Leninism has no beauty, nor is there anything mysterious about it. It is only extremely useful.* Even now, *it seems* that there are still a fair number of people who regard Marxism-Leninism⁵⁶ as a ready-made panacea that, once acquired, can easily cure all maladies. This is a type of childish blindness, and we must *still* carry out a movement to enlighten them. It is precisely those who regard Marxism-Leninism as a religious dogma who show this type of blind ignorance. To them we should say frankly, “Your dogma is useless,” *or to put it more impolitely, “In fact, your dogma is even more useless than shit.” We see that dogshit can fertilize the fields, and human shit can feed*

the dog. What about dogmas? They cannot fertilize the fields, nor can they feed the dog. Of what use are they? (laughter) Comrades! You know that my object in putting it this way is deliberately to be sarcastic toward those who treat Marxism-Leninism as dogma, to give them a big shock so as to wake them up and make them take a correct attitude toward Marxism-Leninism. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have repeatedly stated that our doctrine is not a dogma, but a guide to action. Of all things, such people forget this most important sentence. Only if the Chinese Communists take⁵⁷ the standpoint, viewpoint, and methods of Marxism-Leninism, apply them to China,⁵⁸ and⁵⁹ create a theory⁶⁰ from the conscientious study of the realities of Chinese history and of the Chinese Revolution, can it be said that theory and practice have been combined. Merely talking about linking theory and practice without actually doing anything about it is of no use, even if one goes on talking for a hundred years. To oppose the subjectivist, one-sided approach to problems, we must demolish dogmatist subjectivity and one-sidedness.

So much for today about combating subjectivism in order to rectify the style of study throughout the Party.

Let us now talk about the problem of sectarianism.

Because it has been steeled for twenty years, our Party is no longer dominated by sectarianism, but remnants of sectarianism still exist. They are to be found both in the Party's internal relations and in its external relations. Sectarian tendencies in internal relations lead to exclusiveness toward comrades inside the Party and hinder Party⁶¹ unity and solidarity. Sectarian tendencies in external relations lead to exclusionism toward people outside the Party and hinder the Party in its task of uniting the people of the whole country. Only by uprooting this source of misfortune in both its aspects can the Party advance unimpeded in its great task of achieving unity among all Party comrades and among all the people of our country.

What are the remnants of inner-Party sectarianism? They are mainly of the following types:

First, the assertion of "independence." Some comrades see only the interests of the part and not the whole; they always put undue stress on that part of the work for which they themselves are responsible and always wish to subordinate the interests of the whole to the interests of their own part. They do not understand

the Party's system of democratic centralism; they do not know that the Communist Party not only needs democracy but needs centralization even more. They forget the system of democratic centralism, in which the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, and the part to the whole and the entire membership to the Central Committee. Zhang Guotao asserted his independence from the Central Committee and as a result asserted himself into betraying the Party and became a Guomindang agent. *Li Lisan also asserted independence from the Communist International, and as a result committed the mistakes of the Lisan line.* Although the sectarianism we are now discussing is not of the extremely serious kind of *Zhang Guotao and Li Lisan*, it must still be guarded against, and we must do away completely with all manifestations of disunity. We should encourage comrades to take into account the interests of the whole. Every Party member, every branch of work, every statement, and every action must proceed from the interests of the whole Party; it is absolutely impermissible to violate this principle.

Those who assert this kind of independence are usually wedded to the doctrine of "me first" and are generally wrong on the question of the relationship between the individual and the Party. Although in words they profess respect for the Party, in practice they put themselves first and the Party second. *Comrade Liu Shaoqi once said that there was one kind of people who had very long hands and were very good at looking after their own interests, but paid little heed to the interests of others and of the Party as a whole. "What's mine is mine, and what's yours is mine too."* (loud laughter)⁶² What are these people after? They are after fame and position and want to be in the limelight. Whenever they are put in charge of a branch of work, they assert their independence. With this aim, they draw some people in, push others out, and resort to boasting, flattery, and touting among the comrades, thus importing the vulgar style of the bourgeois political parties into the Communist Party. It is their dishonesty that causes them to come to grief. I believe that we should do things honestly, for without an honest attitude it is absolutely impossible to accomplish anything in this world. Which are the honest people? Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are honest, and men of science are honest. Which are the dishonest people? Trotsky, Bukharin, *Chen Duxiu*, and Zhang Guotao are extremely dishonest. *Li Lisan is also dishonest.* And those who assert independence out of personal or sectional interest are

dishonest, too. All sly people, all those who do not have a scientific attitude in their work, fancy themselves resourceful and clever, but in fact they are most stupid and will come to no good end. Students in our Party School must pay attention to this problem. We must definitely build a centralized, unified Party and make a clean sweep of all unprincipled factional struggles. We must combat individualism and sectarianism so as to enable our whole Party to march in step and fight for one common goal.

*The relationship between cadres from the outside and those from the locality must be one of unity, and they must combat sectarian tendencies. Very careful attention must be given to the relations between outside and local cadres because many anti-Japanese base areas were established only after the arrival of the Eighth Route Army or the New Fourth Army, and much of the local work developed only after the arrival of outside cadres. In these conditions, our comrades must understand that it is possible for our base areas to be consolidated and for our Party to take root there only when the two kinds of cadres unite as one and when a large number of local cadres develop and are promoted; otherwise, it is impossible. Both the outside and the local cadres have their strong and weak points, and to make any progress they must overcome their own weak points by learning from each other's strong points. The outside cadres are generally not as familiar as the local cadres with local conditions and in links with the masses. Take me, for instance. Although I have been in northern Shaanxi five or six years, I am far behind Comrade Gao Gang and others⁶³ in understanding local conditions and in links with the people here. *No matter how I investigate and study, I still fall somewhat short in comparison with the cadres of northern Shaanxi.* Our comrades going to the anti-Japanese base areas in Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and other provinces must pay attention to this. Moreover, even within the same base area, owing to the fact that some districts develop earlier and others later, there is a difference between the local cadres of a district and those from outside it. Cadres who come from a more-developed to a less-developed district are also outside cadres in relation to that locality, and they, too, should pay great attention to fostering and helping local cadres. Generally speaking, in places where outside cadres are in charge, it is they who should bear the main responsibility if their relations with the local cadres are not good. And the chief comrades in charge should bear greater responsibility. The attention*

paid to this problem in some places is still very inadequate. Some people look down on the local cadres and ridicule them, saying, “What do these locals know? Clodhoppers!” Such people utterly fail to understand the importance of local cadres; they know neither the latter’s strong points nor their own weaknesses, so they adopt an incorrect, sectarian attitude. All outside cadres must cherish the local cadres and give them constant help and must not be permitted to ridicule or attack them. Of course, the local cadres for their part must learn from the strong points of the outside cadres and rid themselves of inappropriate, narrow views so that they and the outside cadres become as one, with no distinction between “them” and “us,” thus avoiding sectarian tendencies.

The same applies to the relationship between cadres in army service and other cadres working in the locality. They must be completely united and must oppose sectarian tendencies. The army cadres must help the local cadres, and vice versa. If there is friction between them, each should make allowances for the other and carry out proper self-criticism. Generally speaking, in places where army cadres are actually in positions of leadership, it is they who should bear the main responsibility if their relations with the local cadres are not good. *This question is also very important.* Only when the army cadres understand their own responsibility and are modest in their attitude toward the local cadres can the conditions be created for the smooth progress of our war effort and our work of construction in the base areas.

The same applies to the relationship among different army units, different localities, and different departments. We must oppose the tendency toward selfish departmentalism by which the interests of one’s own unit are looked after to the exclusion of those of others. Whoever is indifferent to the difficulties of others, refuses to transfer cadres to other units,⁶⁴ or sends only the inferior ones, using the neighbor’s field as an outlet for his overflow, and does not give the slightest consideration to other departments, localities, or people—such a person is a selfish departmentalist who has entirely lost the spirit of communism. Lack of consideration for the whole and complete indifference to other departments, localities, and people are characteristics of a selfish departmentalist. We must intensify our efforts to educate such persons and to make them understand that selfish departmentalism is a sectarian tendency which will become very dangerous if allowed to develop.

Another problem is that of the relationship between old and new cadres. Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, our Party has grown enormously, and large numbers of new cadres have emerged. That is a very good thing. In his report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Comrade Stalin said, “there are never enough old cadres, there are far less than required, and they are already partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws of nature.”⁶⁵ Here he was discussing the cadre situation as well as the laws of nature. If our Party does not have a great many new cadres working in unity and cooperation with the old cadres, our cause will come to a stop. All old cadres, therefore, should welcome the new ones with the utmost enthusiasm and show them the warmest solicitude. True, new cadres have their shortcomings. They have not *yet* been long in the revolution and lack experience, and unavoidably some have brought with them vestiges of the unwholesome ideology of the old society, remnants of the ideology of petty-bourgeois liberalism.⁶⁶ But such shortcomings can be gradually eliminated through education and tempering in the revolution. The strong point of the new cadres, as Stalin has said, is that they are acutely sensitive to what is new and are therefore enthusiastic and active to a high degree—the very qualities that some of the old cadres lack. Cadres, new and old, should respect one another, learn from one another, and overcome their own shortcomings by learning from one another’s strong points, so as to unite as one in the common cause and guard against sectarian tendencies. Generally speaking, in places where the old cadres are mainly in charge, it is they who should bear the chief responsibility if relations with the new cadres are not good.

All those things discussed above—relations between the part and the whole, relations between the individual and the Party, relations between outside and local cadres, relations between army cadres and other cadres working in the locality, relations between this and that army unit, between this and that locality, between this and that department, and relations between old and new cadres—are relations within the Party. In all these relations, it is necessary to enhance the spirit of communism and guard against sectarian tendencies, so that the ranks of our Party will be in good order, march in step, and therefore fight well. This is a very important problem which we must solve thoroughly in rectifying the Party’s work style. If we want to get rid of subjectivism⁶⁷ and promote the Marxist-

Leninist spirit of seeking truth from facts, we must sweep the remnants of sectarianism out of the Party and proceed from the principle that the Party's interests are above personal or sectional interests, so that the Party can attain complete solidarity and unity.

The remnants of sectarianism must be eliminated from the Party's external as well as its internal relations. *This is also something that must be resolved in rectifying the Party's work style.* We cannot defeat the enemy⁶⁸ by merely uniting the comrades throughout the Party. We can defeat the enemy only by uniting the people throughout the country. For twenty years we have⁶⁹ done great and arduous work in the cause of uniting the people of the whole country, and the achievements in this work since the outbreak of the War of Resistance are even greater than in the past. This does not mean, however, that all our comrades already have a correct style⁷⁰ and are free from sectarian tendencies. No. In fact, sectarian tendencies still exist among a number of comrades and, in some cases, to a very serious degree. Many of our comrades tend to be overbearing in their relations with non-Party people, look down upon them, despise or refuse to respect them or appreciate their strong points. This is indeed a sectarian tendency. After learning a few Marxist-Leninist sentences,⁷¹ such comrades become more arrogant instead of more modest and invariably dismiss others as no good without realizing that in fact their own knowledge is only half-baked. Our comrades must realize the truth that Communist Party members are at all times a minority compared with non-Party people. Suppose that one out of every hundred persons was a Communist, then there would be 4,500,000 Communists among China's population of 450,000,000. Yet even if our membership reached this huge figure, Communists would still form only 1 percent of the entire population, while 99 percent would be non-Party people. What reason can we then have for not cooperating with non-Party people? As regards all those who wish to cooperate with us or might cooperate with us, we have only the duty of cooperating and absolutely no right to shut them out. But some Party members do not understand this and *look down upon*, or even reject, those who wish to cooperate with us. There are no grounds whatsoever for doing so. Have Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin given us any grounds for this? No, they have not. On the contrary, they have always earnestly enjoined us to form close ties with the masses and not divorce ourselves from them. Or has the Central Committee of

the Communist Party⁷² given us any grounds? No. Among all its resolutions there is not a single one that says we may divorce ourselves from the masses and so isolate ourselves. On the contrary, the Central Committee has always told us to form close ties with the masses and not to divorce ourselves from them. Thus any action divorcing us from the masses has no justification at all and is simply the mischievous result of the sectarian ideas some of our comrades have themselves concocted. As such sectarianism remains very serious among some of our comrades and still obstructs the application of the Party line, we should carry out extensive education within the Party to meet this problem. Above all, we should *begin* with our cadres and make them really understand how serious the problem is and how utterly impossible it is to overthrow the enemy and attain the goal of the revolution unless Party members unite with non-Party cadres and non-Party people.

All sectarian ideas are subjectivist and are incompatible with the real needs of the revolution; hence, while waging the struggle against sectarianism, we should also wage a struggle against subjectivism.⁷³

Concerning the question of Party formalism, it will be discussed at another meeting.⁷⁴ Party formalism is a vehicle for filth, a form of expression for subjectivism and sectarianism. It does people harm and damages the revolution, and we must get rid of it completely. *I cannot finish talking about these things today all at one sitting. I will do it next time.*

To combat subjectivism, we must propagate materialism and dialectics. There are, however, many comrades in our Party who lay no stress on the propaganda either of materialism or of dialectics. Some tolerate subjectivist propaganda and regard it with equanimity. They think they believe in Marxism, but they make no effort to propagate materialism and do not give it a thought or express any opinion when they hear or read subjectivist stuff. Such an attitude is not the attitude of a Communist. *For this reason*, many of our comrades are poisoned by subjectivist ideas, which numb their sensitivity. We should therefore launch a campaign of enlightenment within the Party to free the minds of our comrades from the fog of subjectivism and dogmatism and we should call upon them to resist subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism. Such things are like Japanese goods, for only our enemy wishes us to preserve such evils and continue to befuddle ourselves with them; so we should advocate a boycott against them,

just as we boycott Japanese goods. We should boycott all the subjectivist, sectarian, and Party formalist stuff,⁷⁵ make their sale difficult, and not allow their purveyors to ply their trade by exploiting the low theoretical level in the Party. *We should make it difficult to sell any subjectivist, sectarian, or Party formalist stuff in the market.* Our comrades must develop a good nose for this purpose; they should take a sniff at everything and distinguish the good from the bad before they decide whether to welcome it or boycott it. Communists must always go into the whys and wherefores of anything, use their own heads, and carefully think over whether it corresponds to reality and is really well founded. On no account should they follow blindly and encourage slavishness.

Finally, in opposing subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism, we must have in mind two purposes: first, “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones” and, second, “cure the sickness to save the patient.” The mistakes of the past must be exposed without sparing anyone’s sensibilities; it is necessary to analyze and criticize what was bad in the past with a scientific attitude so that work in the future will be done more carefully and better. This is what is meant by “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones.” But our aim in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings, like that of a doctor curing a sickness, is solely to save the patient and not to doctor him to death. A person with appendicitis is saved when the surgeon removes his appendix. *No matter how big his mistake is*, so long as the person who has made mistakes does not hide his sickness for fear of treatment or persist in his mistakes until he is beyond cure, so long as he honestly and sincerely wishes to be cured and to mend his ways, we should welcome him and cure his sickness so that he can become a good comrade. We can never succeed if we just let ourselves go and lash out at him. In treating an ideological or political malady, one must never be rough and rash but must adopt the approach of “curing the sickness to save the patient,” which is the only correct and effective method.

I have taken this occasion of the opening of the Party School to speak at length, and I hope comrades will think over what I have said (*enthusiastic applause*).

Notes

This speech was first published in *Jiefang ribao*, April 27, 1942. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 8, pp. 63–85, which reproduces the text as it appeared in Vol. 5 of the 1944 edition of *Mao Zedong xuanji* (Selected Works of Mao Zedong). Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

1. Rectify Our Study Style, Party Style, and Writing Style → Rectify the Party’s Work Style
2. Because our enemies still exist in the world → Because enemies who oppress the people exist, and the people want to throw off the oppression of these enemies
3. Not just an ordinary revolutionary party, but a revolutionary party with the nature of a Communist Party → In the era of capitalism and imperialism, a revolutionary party just such as the Communist Party is needed
4. It is impossible to overthrow the enemy completely → If the people want to overthrow enemy oppression, it will be simply impossible for them to do so
5. We want to overthrow the enemy → We are Communists, we want to lead the people in overthrowing the enemy
6. We have → The Party has
7. Who are working side by side with the people → Who are leading the people
8. We mean subjectivism → We mean the malady of subjectivism
9. We mean sectarianism → We mean the malady of sectarianism
10. We mean Party formalism → We mean the malady of Party formalism

Note: The expression here translated as “Party formalism” is *dang bagu*, literally “Party eight-legged essays.” This was a rigid style that candidates were required to employ in their answers to questions modeled after the imperial examinations used from the fifteenth to the end of the nineteenth century. The examination system was abolished in 1902 as irrelevant to the modern world in which China found itself, and thereafter the term was often used to signify the use of outmoded stereotypes. Compton translates it as “Party formalism”; in the *Selected Works* it is rendered as “stereotyped Party writing.” We prefer “formalism” because, like Mao’s reference to “eight-legged essays,” it evokes adherence to traditional forms rather than simply following current fads.—Eds.]

11. Vanquishing → Overthrowing
12. This → Their works

- [13.](#) This → Their theories
- [14.](#) If we have not created a theory in accordance with China's real necessities, a theory that is our own kind of a specific nature → If we have not tried to reflect theoretically on China's revolutionary experience
- [15.](#) The Central Committee → The Central Committee of our Party
- [16.](#) Investigate and study → Make a concrete analysis of
- [17.](#) Create theories → Draw out conclusions of a theoretical character
- [18.](#) Our Party School → Our comrades in the Party School
- [19.](#) Should not read the Marxist-Leninist tenets in a lifeless manner → Should not regard Marxist theories as lifeless dogma
- [20.](#) After they have studied Marxism-Leninism → When a student has studied Marxism-Leninism
- [21.](#) The Central Committee has, moreover, made the decision → The Central Committee of the Party made the decision over two years ago
- [22.](#) The reference is to the decision on recruiting intellectuals adopted by the Central Committee in December 1939, which appears in Vol. VII, pp. 262–64.
- [23.](#) War of resistance → Resistance to Japan
- [24.](#) From ancient times to the present → Since the emergence of class society
- [25.](#) Aside from these, there is no other knowledge → What other knowledge is there?
- [26.](#) A primary school → A primary school of this kind
- [27.](#) A university → A university of the same kind
- [28.](#) All they have is book learning → All they have is book learning; they have not yet taken part in any practical activities or applied what they have learned to any field of life
- [29.](#) Here the revised text inserts the following sentence: Thus, what is most important is to be good at applying this knowledge in life and in practice.
- [30.](#) How can those half-baked intellectuals → How can those who have only book learning
- [31.](#) Turn to practical research → Study important practical problems
- [32.](#) Even Marx would be regarded as no more than a half-baked intellectual → Even Marx would not be regarded as an intellectual
- [33.](#) I say, it is true → I say this is not the case

[34.](#) He took part in the revolutionary movement → He took part in the practice of the revolutionary movement

[35.](#) He also studied commodities → Moreover, he created revolutionary theory. Beginning with the commodity, the simplest element of capitalism, he made a thorough study of the economic structure of capitalist society

[36.](#) Studied commodities → Studied commodities scientifically

[37.](#) A theory → A thoroughly scientific theory

[38.](#) Thus Marx should be regarded as a complete intellectual → Thus Marx became a most completely developed intellectual, representing the acme of human wisdom

[39.](#) He differed from those half-baked intellectuals → He was fundamentally different from those who have only book learning

[40.](#) Research → Research in the course of practical struggles

[41.](#) Here the revised version adds: “and then verified his conclusions by testing them in practical struggles.”

[42.](#) Such generalized knowledge is called theory → Such work is called theoretical work

[43.](#) Do → Learn how to do

[44.](#) Who can engage in → Who can learn to engage in

[45.](#) Ready-made books → Ready-made phrases in books

[46.](#) Are rich in → Are frequently rich in

[47.](#) Something → Knowledge

[48.](#) This is the opening sentence of the Confucian *Analects*.

[49.](#) From this, I learned to read → Though this teaching material was antiquated, it did me some good because from it I learned to read

[50.](#) Emphasizes → Emphatically requires

[51.](#) To raise themselves to the level of theory → To study theory

[52.](#) Strive to improve → Strive to overcome it

[53.](#) The guise of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin → A Marxist guise

[54.](#) Many → Some

[55.](#) Here the *Selected Works* text adds: “but solely because it is the science that leads the revolutionary

ause of the proletariat to victory.”

[56.](#) Marxism-Leninism → A few odd quotations from Marxist-Leninist works

[57.](#) Take → Are good at using

[58.](#) Apply them to China → Are good at applying the doctrine of Lenin and Stalin regarding the Chinese evolution

[59.](#) And → And, taking a step forward

[60.](#) Create a theory → In every domain, produce theoretical creations adapted to China’s needs

[61.](#) Party → Inner-Party

[62.](#) These two sentences were removed from the *Selected Works* only in 1967 in the context of the Cultural evolution; they were restored in the 1991 second edition.

[63.](#) Comrade Gao Gang and others → Some comrades from North Shaanxi

The reference to Gao Gang appeared only in the first Chinese edition of 1953; it was removed in 1954 and was not restored in the 1991 second edition. Gao Gang (1905–1954) was an established Communist partisan in Shaanxi when Mao and the Long Marchers arrived. Gao helped Mao take control and was rewarded with leadership of the Chinese Communist Party’s Northwestern Bureau.—Eds.]

[64.](#) Whoever is indifferent to the difficulties of others, refuses to transfer cadres to other units → Whoever is indifferent to the difficulties of others, and refuses to transfer cadres when they request them

[65.](#) Here the translators of the *Selected Works* have replaced what Mao actually said, “they are becoming decrepit and dying out,” by the official English translation of Stalin’s words, which accurately renders the original Russian. See Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), p. 92, and for the original, Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, 11th ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1952), p. 636.

[66.](#) Liberalism → Individualism

[67.](#) If we want to get rid of subjectivism → Sectarianism is an expression of subjectivism in organizational relations; if we want to get rid of subjectivism

[68.](#) We cannot defeat the enemy → The reason is this: we cannot defeat the enemy

[69.](#) We have → The Chinese Communist Party has

[70.](#) Have a correct style → Have a correct style in dealing with the masses

[71.](#) After learning a few Marxist-Leninist sentences → After reading a few Marxist books

[72.](#) Communist Party → Chinese Communist Party

[73.](#) Hence, while waging the struggle against sectarianism, we should also wage a struggle against subjectivism → Hence the struggle against sectarianism and the struggle against subjectivism should go on simultaneously

[74.](#) Concerning the question of Party formalism, it will be discussed at another meeting → I cannot talk about the question of stereotyped Party writing today; I shall discuss it at another meeting

[75.](#) Stuff → Wares

Oppose Party Formalism

(Speech delivered on February 8, 1942)

Comrade [He] Kaifeng has just stated the purpose of today's meeting. I now want to discuss the ways subjectivism and sectarianism use Party formalism (or Party "eight-legged essays")¹ as their instrument of propaganda or form of expression. We are fighting against subjectivism and sectarianism, but they will still have a hiding place in which to lurk if at the same time we do not get rid of Party formalism. If we destroy that, too, we shall "checkmate" subjectivism and sectarianism, and *definitely* make these two monsters show themselves in their true colors, and then we shall easily be able to annihilate them, like "rats running across the street with everyone yelling: 'Hit them! Hit them!'"

If a person produces Party formalist writings only to read for himself, it does not matter much. If he passes them on to someone else, that already increases the number of readers and no small harm is done. If he has them posted, mimeographed, printed in newspapers, or published in book form, then the problem may become a big one, for they may influence many people. And those who produce Party formalism always seek large audiences. Thus it has become imperative to expose and destroy it. Party formalism is equivalent to² foreign formalism. Long ago, Lu Xun opposed such foreign formalism. Why, then, do we call it Party formalism? Because, apart from its foreign flavor, it has some smell of the native soil. Perhaps it, too, can be counted as creative work of a sort! Who says our people have not produced any creative works? Here is one! (*loud laughter*) Party formalism already has a long history in our Party. Particularly during the Civil War,³ it stirred up a great deal of trouble at times.

Viewed historically, Party formalism is a reaction to the May Fourth movement.

How can we say this?

At the time of the May Fourth movement, modern-minded people generally opposed writing in the classical style and advocated the use of vernacular Chinese; they opposed the old dogmas and advocated science and democracy. All of this was very correct. At that time, the movement was vigorous and lively, progressive and revolutionary. In those days the ruling classes indoctrinated students with Confucian teachings and compelled the people to venerate all the trappings of Confucianism as religious dogma, and writers all used the classical language. In sum, what was written and taught by the ruling classes and their literary hacks at that time consisted of formalism and dogma, both in content and in form. That was the old formalism and the old dogma. A tremendous achievement of the period of the May Fourth movement was its public exposure of the ugliness of the old formalism and the old dogmas, and its call to the people to rise up against them. The May Fourth movement *did not have just this one achievement*, it also had the great and related achievement of its fight against imperialism, but the struggle against the old formalism and the old dogma remains one of the great achievements of the May Fourth movement. Later on, however, foreign formalism and foreign dogma came into being. Certain *anti-Marxist* people in our Party developed this foreign formalism and dogma into subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism. All these are the new formalism and the new dogma. Such new formalism and new dogmatism have become so deeply ingrained in the minds of many comrades that today we still have a very strenuous job of remolding. Thus we see that the lively, vigorous, progressive, and revolutionary movement of the May Fourth period which fought the old feudal formalism and dogma was later turned by some people into *something extreme*, into its very opposite, giving rise to the new formalism and the new dogma. The latter are not lively and vigorous but dead and stiff, not progressive but retrogressive, not revolutionary but obstacles to revolution. That is, the foreign stereotyped writing, or stereotyped Party writing, *or the new stereotyped writing and the new dogma* are a reaction against the original nature of the May Fourth movement. The May Fourth movement, however, had its own weaknesses. Many of the leaders at that time lacked the critical spirit of Marxism. The method they used generally remained that of the bourgeoisie—that is, the formalist method. They were quite right in opposing the old formalism and the

old dogmas and in advocating science and democracy. But in dealing with current conditions, with history, and with the affairs of foreign countries, they lacked the critical spirit of *dialectic materialism and historical materialism*. They regarded what was bad as absolutely and wholly bad and what was good as absolutely and wholly good. This formalist approach to problems affected the subsequent course of the movement. In *the course of* its development, the May Fourth movement divided into two currents. One section inherited its scientific and democratic spirit and transformed it on the basis of Marxism; this was the work of the Communists and some non-Party Marxists. Another section took the road of the bourgeoisie. *This was the Right wing*, the development of formalism toward the *Right wing*. But within the Communist Party, too, the situation was not uniform; there, too, some members went to extremes⁴ and, lacking a firm grasp of Marxism, committed formalistic errors, namely, errors of subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism. This was the development of formalism toward the “Left” *wing*. So it can be seen that this thing called Party formalism is by no means an accident, but is, on the one hand, a reaction against the positive elements of the May Fourth movement and, on the other, a legacy, a continuation, or a development of its negative elements. It is useful for us to understand this point. Just as it was revolutionary and necessary to fight the old formalism and the old dogmatism during the period of the May Fourth movement, so it is revolutionary and necessary today for us to criticize⁵ the new formalism and the new dogmatism. If there had been no fight against the old formalism and the old dogmatism during the May Fourth period, the thinking of the Chinese people would not have been freed from bondage to them and China would have no hope of freedom and independence. This task was merely begun in the period of the May Fourth movement. If we are to free the people of the whole country completely from the domination of the old formalism and the old dogmatism, it will require a further great effort and a huge project on the road of revolutionary transformation. If today we do not oppose the new formalism and the new dogmatism, the minds of the Chinese people will be fettered by a new kind of extremism.⁶ *Have we not all seen how harmful foreign formalism and foreign dogmatism are?* If we do not get rid of the poison of Party formalism and the error of dogmatism found among some (only some, of course) of our Party comrades, then it will be impossible to arouse a vigorous and lively revolutionary

spirit, to eradicate the bad habit of taking a wrong attitude toward Marxism, or to disseminate widely and develop true Marxism. Furthermore, it will be impossible to conduct an energetic struggle against the influence of the old formalism and dogma among the people of the whole country and against that of foreign stereotyped writing and dogma among many people in the whole country, and it will be impossible to attain the goal of demolishing and sweeping away these influences.

These three things—subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism—all meet the needs not of the proletariat⁷ but of the exploiting classes. They are a reflection of petty-bourgeois thought in our Party. China is a country with a very large petty bourgeoisie, and our Party is surrounded by this enormous stratum;⁸ we also have a great number of Party members who come from this stratum.⁹ When they join the Party, they inevitably drag in with them a petty-bourgeois tail, be it long or short. Unless checked and transformed, the fanaticism and one-sidedness of petty-bourgeois revolutionaries can easily engender subjectivism and sectarianism, of which foreign formalism, or Party formalism, is one manifestation.

It is not easy to clean out these things and sweep them away. It must be done properly—that is, by taking pains to reason with people. If we reason well and appropriately, it will be effective. The first thing to do in this reasoning process is to give the patient a good shakeup by shouting at him, “You are ill!” so as to administer a shock and make him break out in a sweat, and then to give him sincere advice on getting treatment.

Let us now analyze Party formalism and see where its evils lie. Using poison as an antidote to poison, we shall imitate the form of the eight-legged essay and set forth the following “eight legs,” which might be called the eight major indictments.

The first indictment against Party formalism is that it fills endless pages with empty verbiage. Some of our comrades love to write long articles with no substance, very much like the “foot-binding of a slovenly woman, long and foul-smelling.” Why must they write articles that are so long and, at the same time, so empty? There can be only one explanation; they are determined that the masses shall not read them. Because the articles are long and empty, the masses shake their heads when they see them. How could they be willing to read them? Such

writings are good for nothing except to take advantage of the naive, among whom they spread bad influences and create bad habits. On June 22 of last year the Soviet Union began waging a gigantic war,¹⁰ and yet Stalin's speech published on July 3 was only the length of an editorial in our *Liberation Daily*. Had any of our bureaucrats written that speech, just imagine! It would have run to at least 100,000 words.¹¹ We are now in the era of a major global war,¹² and we should learn how to write shorter and pithier articles. Although there is as yet no fighting here in Yan'an, our troops at the front are daily engaged in battle, and the people in the rear are busy at work. If articles are too long, who will read them? Some comrades at the front, too, like to write long reports. They take great pains writing them and send them here for us to read. But who has the courage to read them? If long and empty articles are no good, are short and empty ones any better? They are no good either. We should forbid all empty talk. But the first and foremost objective¹³ is to throw the long, smelly foot-bindings of those slovenly women into the latrine.¹⁴ Some may ask, "Isn't *Capital* very long? What are we to do about that?" The answer is simple—just go on reading it attentively. There is a proverb, "Sing different songs on different mountains"; another runs, "Fit the appetite to the dishes and the dress to the figure." Whatever we do must be done according to actual circumstances, and it is the same when writing articles and making speeches. What we oppose is long-winded and empty formalistic writing, but we do not mean that everything must necessarily be short in order to be good. True, we need short articles in wartime, but, above all, we need articles that have substance. Articles devoid of substance are the least justifiable and the most objectionable. The same applies to speech-making; we must *also* put an end to all empty, long-winded speeches.

The second indictment against Party formalism is that it strikes a pose in order to intimidate people. Some Party formalism not only is long and empty but also puts on an act with the deliberate intention of intimidating people; it carries the worst kind of poison. Writing long-winded and empty articles may be attributed to immaturity, but striking a pose to intimidate people is not merely childish but downright knavish. Lu Xun once said in criticism of such people, "Hurling insults and threats is certainly not fighting." That which is scientific never fears criticism at any time, for science is truth and fears no refutation. But this subjectivist and sectarian stuff, as it appears in articles and speeches marked by Party formalism,

shows a profound fear of refutation and great cowardice. Its authors therefore rely on striking a pose to intimidate others, believing that they can thereby silence people and “return to court, having achieved a victory.” Such a false show of authority to intimidate people cannot reflect truth but is an obstacle to truth. Truth never strikes a pose to overawe people but talks and acts honestly and sincerely. Two terms used to appear often in articles and speeches by many comrades,¹⁵ one being “ruthless struggle” and the other “merciless blows.” Measures of that kind are entirely necessary to be used against the enemy or against enemy ideology, but to use them against our own comrades is wrong. It often happens, as discussed in Item 4 of the conclusion of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, that enemies and enemy ideology infiltrate the Party. Against these enemies, we must undoubtedly resort to ruthless struggle and merciless blows because scoundrels use these very measures against the Party, and if we were tolerant of them, we would fall victim to their schemes. But the same measures should not be used against comrades who occasionally make mistakes; for them, we should apply the method of criticism and self-criticism, the method indicated in Item 5 of the conclusion of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*.¹⁶ But striking a pose to intimidate is not a good method, no matter with whom you are dealing. Against the enemy this tactic of intimidation is utterly useless, and with our own comrades it can only do harm. It is a tactic that the exploiting classes and the lumpen-proletariat habitually practice, but for which the proletariat has no use. For the proletariat, the sharpest and most effective weapon is a serious and militant scientific attitude. The Communist Party lives by the truth,¹⁷ by seeking truth from facts, by science, and not by intimidating people. Needless to say, the idea of attaining fame, position and “vitamins”¹⁸ for oneself by striking a pose is even more contemptible. In short, when organizations make decisions and issue instructions and when comrades write articles and make speeches, they must without exception depend on the truth¹⁹ and seek to serve a useful purpose. This is the only basis on which victory in the revolution can be achieved; all else is of no avail.

The third indictment against Party formalism is that it shoots at random, without considering the objective. A few years ago, a slogan appeared on the Yan’an city wall which read, “Workers and peasants, unite and strive for victory in the War of Resistance!”²⁰ “The idea of the slogan was not at all bad, but the

second stroke of the character *gong* in *gongren* [meaning working people or workers], was written with its perpendicular stroke twisted into a zigzag. How about the character for *ren* [meaning people]? It was written with three slanting strokes added to its right leg.²¹ There is no doubt that the comrade who wrote this was a disciple of the ancient literati, but it is rather baffling that he should have written such characters on the city wall in the place called Yan'an at the time of the War of Resistance.²² Probably he had taken a vow that ordinary people should not be allowed to read them; otherwise, it is very difficult to explain. Communists who really want to do propaganda must consider their audience and bear in mind those who will read their articles and slogans or listen to their speeches and their talks; otherwise they are in effect resolving not to be read or listened to by anyone. Many people often take it for granted that what they write and say can be easily understood by everybody, when it is not at all so. How can people understand them when what they write and speak is Party formalism? The saying "to play a lute to a cow" implies a gibe at the audience. If we substitute the idea of respect for the audience, the gibe is turned against the player. Why should he strum away without considering his audience? Moreover, he is producing Party formalism that sounds like a crow, and yet he insists on cawing at the popular masses. When shooting an arrow, one must aim at the target; when playing the lute, one must consider the listener; how, then, can one write articles or make speeches without taking the reader or the audience into account? Suppose that we want to make friends with a person, whoever he may be, can we become bosom friends if we do not understand each other's hearts, do not know each other's thoughts? It simply will not do for our propaganda workers to rattle on without investigating, studying, and analyzing their audience.

The fourth indictment against Party formalism is its drab language that reminds one of a *biesan*.²³ Like our Party formalism, the creatures known in Shanghai as "little *biesan*" are extremely wizened and very ugly. If an article or a speech merely holds forth with the same old "student jargon" without a shred of vigor or spirit in its language, isn't that just like a *biesan*, drab of speech and repulsive in appearance? If someone enters primary school at age seven, goes to middle school in his teens, graduates from college in his twenties, and never has contact with the popular masses, he is not to blame if his language is poor and

monotonous. But we are a revolutionary party working on behalf of the masses, and if we do not learn the language of the masses, we cannot do our work well. At present, many of our comrades doing propaganda work make no study of language. Their propaganda is very dull, and few people care to read their articles or listen to their speeches. Why do we need to study language and, what is more, spend much effort on it? Because the mastery of language is not easy and requires painstaking effort. First, let us learn the language of the masses.²⁴ The people's language²⁵ is rich, vigorous, vivid, and expressive of real life. It is because many of us have not mastered *this* language that our articles and speeches contain few vigorous, vivid, and effective expressions and resemble not a hale and healthy person, but an emaciated *biesan*, a mere bag of bones. Second, we need to study foreign languages.²⁶ *The languages of the people of foreign countries are not at all the same as foreign formalism. It is only when Chinese copy them and import their expressions indiscriminately that they become lifeless foreign formalism.* We should not import foreign expressions mechanically,²⁷ but we should absorb what is good and suitable *for our work*. Our current language²⁸ has already incorporated many foreign expressions because the Chinese language was inadequate.²⁹ For instance, today we are holding a meeting of *ganbu* [cadres], and the term *ganbu* is derived from a foreign word. We should continue to absorb many fresh things from abroad, not only progressive ideas but new language³⁰ as well. *For example, in his speech on the new Soviet constitution, Stalin referred to "the alliance of Party and non-Party people." We have absorbed this phrase into the administrative platform for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, calling it "the carrying out of democratic cooperation between Communist Party members and non-Party people."* In a word, we cannot but absorb a great many good elements of this kind from foreign countries. Third, we must also study the language of the ancients.³¹ *A large part of present-day popular language has been transmitted to us from the ancients, and the treasure house of classical Chinese language can still be further excavated. Whatever is still alive in it, we should absorb and use to enrich our articles, talks, and speeches.* Of course, we are resolutely opposed to the use of obsolete classical allusions, and that is final; but what is good and rational³² should be absorbed.³³ At present, those in the Party who are badly infected by Party formalism *reject*

wholesale and are unwilling to study what is useful in the language of the people, in foreign languages, or in classical Chinese. *At the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stalin said, "Some comrades have lost their feeling for new things." Some of our comrades are the same. There are numerous new things they simply do not see. This defect must be remedied.* Who are our propagandists? They include not only teachers, journalists, writers, and artists, but all of our working cadres. Take the military commanders, for instance. Though they make no public statements, they have to talk to the soldiers and have dealings with the people. If this is not propaganda, what is it? Whenever a man speaks to others, he is doing propaganda work. Unless he is dumb, he always has a few words to say. It is therefore imperative that our comrades should all study language. *Among the various languages we study, we must pay particular attention to studying the language of the people. Of the language of the people, we must pay particular attention to studying the language of the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers. If we do not learn the language of the masses, we cannot lead them.*

The fifth indictment against Party formalism is that it lists items under a set of headings,³⁴ as if starting a Chinese pharmacy. Go and take a look at any Chinese pharmacy and you will see cabinets with numerous drawers, each bearing the name of a drug—toncal, foxglove, rhubarb, saltpeter ... indeed, everything that should be there. This method has been mastered by our comrades. In their articles and speeches, books, and reports, they use first the big Chinese numerals, second the small Chinese numerals, third the characters for the ten celestial stems, fourth the characters for the twelve earthly branches, and then capital A, B, C, and D, then small a, b, c, and d, followed by the Arabic numerals. How many of these headings there are! How fortunate that the ancients and the foreigners created all these symbols for us so that we can start a Chinese pharmacy without the slightest effort. For all its verbiage, an article that bristles with such symbols, that does not pose, analyze, or solve problems, and that does not take a stand for or against anything is devoid of real content, and is nothing but a Chinese pharmacy. I am not saying that such symbols as the ten celestial stems, and so forth, should not be used, but this kind of approach to problems is wrong. The method borrowed from the Chinese pharmacy, which many of our comrades are very fond of, is really the most crude, infantile, and philistine of all. It is a

formalist method, classifying things according to their external features instead of their internal relations. If one takes a conglomeration of concepts that are not internally related and arranges them into an article, speech, or report simply according to the external features of things, then one is juggling with concepts and that may also lead others to indulge in the same sort of game, with the result that they do not use their brains to think over problems or to reflect on the essence of things, but are satisfied merely to list phenomena in *jia, yi, bing, and ding* order. What is a problem? A problem is the contradiction in a thing. Wherever there is an unresolved contradiction, there is a problem. Since there is a problem, you have to be for one side and against the other, and you have to pose the problem. To pose the problem, you must first make a preliminary investigation and study the two basic aspects of the problem or the contradiction before you can understand the nature of the contradiction. This is the process of discovering the problem. Preliminary investigation and study can discover the problem, can pose the problem, but they cannot yet solve it. In order to solve the problem, it is necessary to make a systematic and thorough investigation and study. This is the process of analysis. In posing the problem, too, analysis is needed; otherwise, faced with a chaotic and bewildering mass of phenomena, you will not be able to discern where the problem or contradiction lies. But here, by a process of analysis we mean a process of systematic and thorough analysis. It often happens that although a problem has been posed it cannot be solved because the internal relations of things have not yet been revealed—that is, because this process of systematic and thorough analysis has not yet been carried out. *Therefore, we are unable to discover those numerous secondary facets of the contradiction that exist and evolve on the basis of the two basic aspects of the contradiction;* consequently, we still cannot see the contours of the problem clearly, cannot make a synthesis, and so cannot solve the problem well. If an article or speech is important and meant to give guidance, it ought to pose a particular problem, then analyze it, and then make a synthesis pointing to the nature of the problem and providing the method for solving it. In all of this, formalist methods are useless. Since infantile, crude, philistine, and lazy-minded formalist methods are prevalent in our Party, we must expose them; only thus can everybody learn to use the Marxist method to observe, pose, analyze, and solve problems; only thus can we do our work well; and only thus can our

revolutionary cause be victorious.

The sixth indictment against Party formalism is that it is irresponsible and harms people wherever it appears. All the offenses mentioned above are due partly to immaturity and partly to an insufficient sense of responsibility. Let us take washing one's face to illustrate this point. We all wash our faces every day, many of us more than once, and inspect ourselves in the mirror afterward by way of "investigation and study" (*loud laughter*), for fear that something may not be quite right. What a great sense of responsibility! If we wrote articles and made speeches with the same sense of responsibility, we would not be doing badly. Do not present what is not presentable. Always bear in mind that it may influence the thoughts and actions of others. If a man happens not to wash his face for a day or two, that, of course, is not good, and if, after washing, he leaves a smudge or two, that, too, is not so pleasing, but there is no serious danger. It is different with writing articles or making speeches. They are intended solely to influence others, and yet our comrades go about this task casually. This amounts to putting the trivial above the important. Many people write articles and make speeches without prior study or preparation, and after writing an article, they do not bother to go over it several times in the same way as they would examine their faces in the mirror after washing. Instead, they offhandedly send it to be published. Often the result is "A thousand words from the pen in a stream, but ten thousand *li* away from the theme." Talented though these writers may appear, they actually harm people. This bad habit, this weak sense of responsibility, must be corrected.

The seventh indictment against Party formalism is that it poisons the whole Party and jeopardizes the revolution. The eighth indictment is that its spread will wreck the country and ruin the people. These two indictments are self-evident and require no elaboration. In other words, if stereotyped Party writing is not transformed but is allowed to develop unchecked, the consequences will be very serious indeed. The poison of subjectivism and sectarianism is hidden in stereotyped Party writing, and if this poison spreads, it will endanger both the Party and the country.

The above eight counts constitute our declaration of war against Party formalism.

As a form, Party formalism not only is unsuitable for expressing the

revolutionary spirit but also is apt to stifle it. To develop a revolutionary spirit, it is necessary to discard Party formalism and instead adopt a vigorous, lively, fresh, and forceful form of language.³⁵ This style of writing has existed for a long time, but it has yet to be enriched and spread widely. When we have destroyed foreign formalism and Party formalism, we can enrich our new style of writing and spread it widely, thereby advancing the Party's revolutionary cause.

Party formalism is not confined to articles and speeches, but it is also found in the conduct of meetings. "(1) Opening announcement; (2) Report; (3) Discussion; (4) Conclusions; and (5) Adjournment." If this rigid procedure is followed at every meeting, large or small, everywhere and every time, is that not also an instance of Party formalism? When "reports" are made at meetings, they often go as follows: "(1) The international situation; (2) The domestic situation; (3) The border region; and (4) Our own department." The meetings often last from morning until night, with even those having nothing to say taking the floor, as though they would let the others down if they did not speak. In short, there is a disregard for actual conditions and obstinate adherence to rigid old forms and habits. Should we not correct all these phenomena as well?

Nowadays, many people are calling for a transformation to a national, scientific, and mass style. That is very good. But "transformation" means thorough change, from top to bottom and inside and out. Yet some people who have not made even a slight change are calling for a "transformation." I would therefore advise these comrades to begin by making just a little change before they go on to "transform," or else they will remain entangled in dogmatism and Party formalism. This can be described as having grandiose aims but puny abilities, great ambition but little talent, and it will accomplish nothing. So, whoever talks glibly about "transformation to a mass style" while in fact remaining stuck fast in his own small circle had better watch out, or some day one of the masses may bump into him along the road and say, "What about all this 'transformation,' sir? Can I see a bit of it, please?" and he will be in a fix. If he is not just prattling but sincerely wants to transform to a mass style, he must really go among the common people and learn from them; otherwise, he will never be "transformed." There are some who keep clamoring for transformation to a mass style but cannot speak three sentences in the language of the common people. It is evident that they are not really determined to learn from the masses.

Their minds are still confined to their own small circles.

At this meeting, copies of *A Guide to Propaganda*, a pamphlet containing four articles, have been distributed, and I advise our comrades to read and reread it.

The first piece, composed of excerpts from the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*,³⁶ deals with the way Lenin did propaganda work. It describes, among other things, how Lenin wrote leaflets:

Under Lenin's guidance, the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class was the first body in Russia that began to unite Socialism with the working-class movement. When a strike broke out in some factory, the League of Struggle, which through the members of its circles was kept well informed on the state of affairs in the factories, immediately responded by issuing leaflets and Socialist proclamations. These leaflets exposed the *exploitation and* maltreatment of the workers by the manufacturers, explained how the workers should fight for their interests, and set forth the workers' demands. The leaflets told the plain truth about the ulcers of capitalism, the poverty of the workers, their intolerably hard working day of twelve to fourteen hours, and their utter lack of rights. They also put forward appropriate political demands.

Take note, “well informed” and “told the plain truth”! Again:

With the collaboration of the worker Babushkin, Lenin at the end of 1894 wrote the first agitational leaflet of this kind and an appeal to the workers of the Semyannikov Works in St. Petersburg who were on strike.

To write a leaflet, you must consult with comrades who are well informed on the state of affairs. *Otherwise, even Lenin would not have been able to do this.* It was on the basis of such investigation and study that Lenin wrote and worked.

Every leaflet greatly helped to stiffen the spirit of the workers. They saw that the Socialists were helping and defending them.³⁷

Do we agree with Lenin? If we do, we must work in the spirit of Lenin. That is, we must not fill endless pages with verbiage, shoot at random without considering the target, or think that we are always right.

The second piece is composed of excerpts from Dimitrov's statements at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International. What did Dimitrov say? He said:

We must learn to talk to the masses, not in the language of book formulas but in the language of fighters for the cause of the masses, whose every word, whose every idea, reflects the innermost thoughts and sentiments of millions.³⁸

The broad masses cannot assimilate our decisions unless we learn to speak the language which the masses understand. We are far from capable, at all times, of speaking simply, concretely, and in analogies

that are understandable to the masses. We are still unable to refrain from those abstract formulas which are clichés and things we have learned by rote.

As a matter of fact, if you look through our leaflets, newspapers, resolutions, and theses, you will find that these periodicals and publications are often written in a language and style so heavy that they are difficult even for our Party functionaries to understand, let alone ordinary workers.³⁹

Well? Does not Dimitrov put his finger on our weak spot? Apparently, Party formalism exists in foreign countries as well as in China, so you can see it is a common disease (*laughter*). In any case, we must hasten to cure our own disease in accordance with Comrade Dimitrov's injunction.

Every one of us must make the following a rough and ready rule, make it a law, a Bolshevik law: When writing or speaking always have in mind the rank-and-file worker who must understand you, must believe in your appeal and be ready to follow you! You must have in mind those for whom you write, to whom you speak.

This is the prescription made for us by the Communist International, a prescription that must be followed. Let it be a law for us!

The third article, selected from the *Complete Works of Lu Xun*, is the author's reply to the magazine *The Dipper*, discussing how to write. What did Lu Xun say? Altogether he set forth eight rules of writing, some of which I shall pick out for comment here.

Rule 1: "Pay close attention to all manner of things; observe more, and if you have observed only a little, then do not write."

What he says is, "pay close attention to all manner of things," not just to one thing or half a thing. He says "observe more," not just take a look or half a look. How about us? Don't we often do exactly the opposite and write after having observed only a little?

Rule 2: "Do not force yourself to write when you have nothing to say."

What about us? Don't we often force ourselves to shit when it is all too clear that there is nothing in our bowels?⁴⁰ To pick up the pen and "force ourselves to write" without investigation or study reflects an irresponsible attitude.

Rule 4: "After writing something, read it over at least twice, and do your utmost to strike out non-essential words, sentences, and paragraphs, without the slightest compunction. Rather, condense the material for a novel into a sketch, never spin out the material for a sketch into a novel."

Confucius advised, "Think twice,"⁴¹ and Han Yu said, "A deed is accomplished

through taking thought.”⁴² That was in a feudal society.⁴³ Today matters have become very complicated, and sometimes it is not even enough to think them over three or four times. Lu Xun said, “Read it over twice at least.” And at most? He did not say, but in my opinion it does no harm to go over an important article more than ten times and to revise it conscientiously before it is published. Articles are a reflection of objective reality, which is intricate and complex and must be studied over and over again before it can be properly reflected; to be slipshod in this respect is to be ignorant of the ABCs of writing.⁴⁴

Rule 6: “Do not coin adjectives or other terms that are intelligible to nobody but yourself.”

We have “coined” too many expressions that are “intelligible to nobody.” Sometimes a single clause runs to forty or fifty words and is packed with “adjectives or other terms that are intelligible to nobody.” Many who never tire of professing to follow Lu Xun are the very ones who turn their backs on him!

The last piece is taken from the discussion at the Sixth Plenum⁴⁵ on how to transform the style of propaganda into a national style. At that session held in 1938, we said, “If there is any talk about Marxism apart from China’s peculiarities, this Marxism is merely an empty abstraction.” That is to say,⁴⁶ if Communists living in China talk about Marxism apart from China’s practical needs, *even though they have read 10,000 works by Marx 1,000 times, they are still fake Marxists. Such Marxist theoreticians are still fake theoreticians who are like mice that have jumped onto the hook of a scale to weigh themselves.*⁴⁷

The report said:

We must put an end to foreign formalism; there must be less repeating of empty and abstract refrains; we must discard our dogmatism and replace it with a new and vital Chinese style and manner, pleasing to the eye and to the ear of the Chinese common people. To separate internationalist content from national form is the way of those who understand nothing of internationalism; we must link the two inseparably. As regards this question, serious shortcomings still persist in our ranks and must be resolutely eliminated.

The abolition of foreign formalism was demanded in that report, yet some comrades are, in fact, still promoting it. Less singing of empty, abstract tunes was demanded, yet some comrades are obstinately singing more. The demand was made that dogmatism be laid to rest, yet some comrades are telling it to get out of bed. In short, many people have let this decision,⁴⁸ which was adopted at the

Sixth Plenum, go in one ear and out the other, as if willfully opposed to it.

The Central Committee has now made the decision that we must discard *foreign* formalism, Party formalism, dogmatism, and the like once and for all, and that is why I have come and talked at some length. I hope that comrades will think over and analyze what I have said and that each comrade will also analyze his own particular case. You should carefully examine yourself, take the points on which you have clarified your thinking and talk them over with *your spouse and with* close friends and comrades around you, and really get rid of your own defects. *This is our hope.*

Notes

This speech was originally published in *Jiefang ribao* on June 18, 1942. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 8, pp. 89–108, where it is reproduced from the version in the 1944 edition of *Xuanji*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

1. On “Party eight-legged essays,” see “Rectify Our Study Style, Party Style, and Writing Style,” February 1, 1942, note 10.

2. Equivalent to → A kind of

3. Civil War → Agrarian Revolution

4. Went to extremes → Developed deviations

5. To criticize → To use Marxism to criticize

6. Extremism → Dogmatism

7. All meet the needs not of the proletariat → Are all anti-Marxist, and meet the needs not of the proletariat

8. Stratum → Class

9. Stratum → Class

10. War → War against aggression

11. 100,000 words → Several tens of thousands of words

- [12.](#) In the era of a major global war → In the midst of a war
- [13.](#) Objective → Task
- [14.](#) Latrine → Garbage can
- [15.](#) Articles and speeches by many comrades → The articles and speeches of many comrades
- [16.](#) Here the *Selected Works* version adds: “The comrades who in the past loudly advocated ‘ruthless struggle’ and ‘merciless blows’ against comrades who occasionally made mistakes did so because, for one thing, they failed to make any analysis of the persons they were dealing with and, for another, they were striking a pose in an effort to intimidate.”
- [17.](#) The truth → The truth of Marxism-Leninism
- [18.](#) Mao apparently used this term, transcribed as *weida min* in the Chinese text, to suggest vitality, power, and authority.
- [19.](#) The truth → Marxist-Leninist truth
- [20.](#) War of Resistance → War of Resistance Against Japan
- [21.](#) The nonstandard characters Mao mentions are reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 8, p. 96.
- [22.](#) War of Resistance → War of Resistance Against Japan
- [23.](#) A note to the Chinese edition of the *Selected Works* reads: “The people of Shanghai call *biesan* those impen-proletarians in the city who have no regular employment and live by begging or thievery. Most of them are extremely scrawny.”
- [24.](#) Let us learn the language of the masses → Let us learn language from the popular masses
- [25.](#) Language → Vocabulary
- [26.](#) We need to study foreign languages → Let us absorb what we need from foreign languages
- [27.](#) We should not import foreign expressions mechanically → We should not import foreign expressions mechanically or use them indiscriminately
- [28.](#) Language → Vocabulary
- [29.](#) The Chinese language was inadequate → The old Chinese vocabulary was inadequate
- [30.](#) Language → Expressions
- [31.](#) The language of the ancients → Whatever is alive in the language of the ancients. Since we have not devoted sufficient effort to the study of language, we have not made full and proper use of much that is still

ital in the language of the ancients

[32](#). Rational → Still useful

[33](#). Absorbed → Taken over

[34](#). What we translate as “a set of headings” is *jia, yi, bing, ding*, the characters for the first four of the “ten celestial stems,” commonly used as headings in Chinese outlines.

[35](#). And instead adopt a vigorous, lively, fresh, and forceful form of language → And instead to adopt the Marxist-Leninist style of writing, which is vigorous, lively, fresh, and forceful

[36](#). *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* → *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*.

[37](#). The text of these extracts is taken from the English version of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, first published in Moscow in 1938; the English edition of the *Selected Works* follows the same source.

[38](#). For the English translation of this and the following three excerpts from Dimitrov’s speech, we have reproduced the version cited in the English edition of the *Selected Works*: Georgi Dimitrov, “Unity of the Working Class Against Fascism,” in *Selected Articles and Speeches* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1951), pp. 16–17, 132–33, and 135.

[39](#). There are some minor variants in the text of this quotation, but since these result simply from the use of a different Chinese translation of Dimitrov’s words, they are not shown here.

[40](#). Don’t we often force ourselves to shit when it is all too clear that there is nothing in our bowels? → Don’t we often force ourselves to write a great deal when it is all too clear that there is nothing in our heads?

[41](#). The reference is to *Analects*, V, XIX. The text reads: “Chi Wan [Ji Wan] thought thrice, and then acted. When the Master was informed of it, he said, “Twice may do.””

[42](#). In his essay, “The Scholar’s Apologia,” Han Yu (768–824) wrote, “A deed is accomplished through thinking thought and fails through lack of thought.”

[43](#). In a feudal society → In ancient times

[44](#). The ABCs of writing → The rudiments of writing

[45](#). The Sixth Plenum → The Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. [The reference is not, as implied by the official English translation, to a separate report on propaganda at the Sixth Plenum, held in October 1938, but to Part VII, section 13, of Mao’s very long general report, “On the New Stage,” titled “Study.” For the full text of this report, see Vol. VI, pp. 537–39.]

[46](#). That is to say → That is to say, we must oppose empty talk about Marxism

[47](#). In Chinese, “to weigh themselves” (*cheng ziji*) also sounds like “to call themselves.”

[48](#). Decision → Report

Celebrate the Twenty-Fourth Anniversary of the Red Army (February 18, 1942)

February 23 of this year is the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Soviet Red Army. As this day is approaching, one is especially reminded of the time when the Red Army was founded. The Red Army was born during the fighting against the German imperialists' attack on Leningrad, and today's Red Army is again waging a decisive battle against the German Fascist aggressors. But precisely this year, not only is the strength of the Red Army many times greater than when it was just founded but it is even greater than before June 22 of last year. Today's Red Army is now the mightiest in its history and has proved, through the toughening of eight months of fighting, to be the most powerful army in the world. At present, when the world is divided into two major camps of Fascists and anti-Fascists, and a final and decisive battle is being waged between them, the Red Army is the main hope of the vast majority of people in the world. The anniversary of the Red Army this year is a day of joint celebration for people all over the world. We Chinese people will celebrate this day with even greater enthusiasm, for the Red Army became a loyal supporter of the cause of liberation of the Chinese people as early as 1925. Over the five years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Red Army has again offered its greatest encouragement and assistance, and the main backer of China in its final victory over Japan is also expected to be the Red Army. Currently, the Red Army is conducting a successful counterattack against Hitler, whose army, though yet to retreat from all Soviet territories, is close to the day of total collapse. There is a danger in the near future that the Japanese Fascists will attack the Soviet Union, and the Red Army must be prepared to fight enemies on two fronts. But we are

absolutely convinced that should the Japanese Fascists dare to undertake such an adventure, they will certainly be defeated. Many factors enable us to predict that Hitler will be vanquished within a year, and the Japanese Fascists will be defeated within two years. These factors consist of all the anti-Fascist people of the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, China, and other countries, and the Soviet Union is the model for all of them. The history of the Red Army demonstrates the indisputable truth that only forces linked to the masses are invincible forces. The task of people of all China and of the whole world in celebrating the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Red Army is to propagate and study this truth and to strengthen the struggle against fascism under its guidance, so as to win an earlier victory over the Fascists.

Note

Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 8, pp. 109–10, which is based on the text published in *Jiefang ribao* on February 23, 1942.

*Internal Rectification and Cadre
Training Should Be Our Core Work at
Present*
(February 20, 1942)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

1. The assessment of the current political situation in your telegram is basically the same as ours. It seems that the Soviet Union is the primary target of the Berlin agreement. Beginning in the spring, Germany and Japan will move the main force of their armies and air force northward and the main force of their navy and a portion of their army and air force units southward with the main force of Italy's navy, army, and air force. Even if this situation comes to pass, it is still beneficial, for Germany and Japan have three fronts each and Italy has two fronts, with their forces very much dispersed. If Japan invades India, then its forces will be all the more dispersed. All the Axis powers will fail as a result of dispersion and attrition. If Japan invades the Soviet Union, then Chiang [Kaishek] will compel us to move northward. We should be prepared to deal with his pressure. However, with the Yunnan-Burma Highway severed and British and American assistance having to go through the Soviet Union, internally he [Chiang] dare not break with us.

2. We have already decided that ideology, politics, policy, military affairs, and Party responsibilities are the five main tasks of the Politburo, with mastering ideology the number-one priority. The way to put this mastery of ideology into effect is through cadre education. The Party School has already been reorganized. Comrades from the Central Committee will teach there. The decision to reform

the cadre school has been publicly announced; I wonder if your office has received notice. The decision on educating cadres on the job will likely be published in a few days.¹ Senior cadre study groups have already been organized in various places; this is of crucial importance. Recently the slogans “Oppose Subjectivism to Rectify Study Style,” “Oppose Factionalism to Rectify Party Style,” and “Oppose Party Formalism [or Party “eight-legged essays”]² to Rectify Writing Style” have already been raised. Yan’an is in the midst of mobilization.

3. This year, we also have a way to handle finances and the economy. The border region has now adopted the system of semi-unified planning and support and semi-self-sufficiency.³ It is on track; we are not afraid of a blockade. None of the other base areas is in such a miserable state, and they have ways to handle the situation. The border region’s “Three-Thirds” system is widely popular, and it has united various classes inside the border region. The Crack Troops and Simple Administration policy is now being carried out in various places.⁴

4. Generally speaking, our basic priorities at present are internal rectification and cadre training, grasping these points to prepare to respond to any changes in the political situation.

5. The figure for Party membership calculated in February of this year is 800,000, and the figure for troops calculated last September is 570,000 (including guerrilla units), which should be kept secret from outsiders.

6. Lin Biao has returned to Yan’an,⁵ and his health has significantly improved, but he still needs rest. While he was in Lanzhou and Xi’an, he did a good job with United Front work, having some in-depth talks with Hu Zongnan⁶ and others. According to Lin, there is great potential for United Front work with the Guomindang. He asked me to tell you to take note.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 392–93, where it is reproduced from a handwritten manuscript.

1. The Central Committee resolution was, indeed, published on February 28, 1942.
2. Regarding “Party eight-legged essays” and these three slogans, see the text “Rectify Our Study Style, Party Style, and Writing Style,” February 1, 1942, note 10.
3. *Tongchou tongzhi* (unified planning and support) and *zigei zizu* (self-sufficiency) were key economic policies that would be implemented in Yan’an in the coming years.
4. On the “Three-Thirds” system (*san san zhi*), see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942; the Central Committee directive to require all public political offices to be shared equally by three groups: Communists, non-Party leftists, and middle-of-the-road anti-Japanese patriots. The Crack Troops and Simple Administration policy formed the core of the administrative reforms of the Yan’an Rectification movement. See Mao’s letter on this topic to Xie Juezai and Cheng Zhengren, August 19, 1942, and his “A Most Important Policy” of September 7, 1942. All these policies are described in Selden, *China in Revolution*.
5. Lin Biao (1907–1971) was at this time the commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. He had returned from medical treatment in the Soviet Union.
6. Hu Zongnan (1896–1962) was at this time the commander of the Nationalist Thirty-fourth Army Group, making him the effective commander of the Guomindang-led armies in northwestern China. See Mao’s references below, in “Calling the Guomindang to Account,” July 12, 1943.

Telegram to Zhou Enlai

(February 21, 1942)

Comrade Enlai,

1. We have taken note of your telegram of the 16th. The documents from the Fifth Plenum and the Zunyi Conference will be wired to you. Last October, the Politburo carefully examined the question of the former line and unanimously held that the line of the Central Committee from the Fourth Plenum to the September 18 Incident¹ was basically correct, though there were several serious errors of principle. The Central Committee's line from September 18 to the Zunyi Conference (a total of three years and four months) was erroneous. The line of the Central Committee since the Zunyi Conference has been correct. The summation has been written. It can be discussed and decided upon only when Zhou, [Liu] Shaoqi, and [Peng] Dehuai have come back before the Seventh Congress. It will be passed to the Seventh Congress for adoption and will be distributed internally (do not distribute it externally). The Senior Study Group may discuss past issues now but should not implicate individuals. The purpose of the study is to learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and to "Cure the Illness to Save the Patient."

2. Please pay attention to this point.

Mao [Zedong], Wang [Jiaxiang]²

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 9, p. 387, where it is reproduced from *Dangshi yanjiu*,

No. 5 (1984).

1. That is, between January 1931 and the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, when Japan began its occupation of Manchuria.

2. Wang Jiaxiang (1906–1974) went to the Jiangxi Base Area as a member of the delegation of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the spring of 1931 and was a member of the Central Bureau of the central soviet region and the head of the General Political Department of the Chinese Red Army of Peasants and Workers. He was elected to the Central Committee as an alternate member of the Politburo in January 1934. He supported Mao Zedong at the famous Zunyi Conference and joined Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and made up of the three-member military leadership group after the conference. In Yan'an he was the vice chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the head of the General Political Department, and the head of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army. He was elected to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as an alternate member at the Seventh Congress in 1945.

Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Educating Cadres on the Job

(Adopted by the Politburo of the Central
Committee on February 28, 1942)

1. Under current conditions, cadre education work should have first priority in all educational work, and the education of cadres on the job should have first priority in all cadre education work. This is because all work, including national education work, must be carried out by cadres. “After political policies are set, cadres are the factor that determines everything.” If cadre education work is not seen as of special importance and not given first priority in all educational work, then this will be putting the cart before the horse. At the same time, running cadre schools with emphasis and care and selecting many cadres to attend various cadre schools for systematic education are certainly significant tasks that cannot be neglected in any way. But the vast majority of cadres, over 90 percent of all cadres, are at their posts, and our human and financial resources and the needs of work make it impossible to run so many cadre schools now. Therefore, offering necessary and possible education to cadres on their jobs is definitely the first priority in all cadre education work, which should draw the full attention of the leading organs of the Party, army, and government and their propaganda departments. The nature of guerrilla warfare not only permits us to work like this but also requires us to do so.

2. Since the Sixth Plenum, the education of cadres on the job has aroused considerable attention inside the Party, and cadres on the job in many

departments and many localities have become enthusiastic about learning. This is an excellent phenomenon. Nevertheless, negligence still exists and some localities and departments have not even started. Professional education has not been emphasized, despite the high enthusiasm of most cadres for learning and mastering professional knowledge. Although political education has been given general attention, it has failed to impart the essence, failed to distinguish between the important and unimportant, or lacked regularity. The leading organs of the Party, army, and government at various levels have also not given sufficient attention to cultural education, which is urgently needed by most cadres of worker and peasant origins in our Party. Until now, the theoretical education of senior cadres either has been neglected or has been divorced from reality and become dogmatic, but the success or failure of theoretical education is the number-one key to the success or failure of the revolution. All this must be reformed or strengthened.

3. The education of cadres on the job should be in four areas: professional education, political education, cultural education, and theoretical education.

- a. All cadres receiving professional education on the job should put into practice the slogan "What you do is what you study." Cadres working in military affairs, politics, Party affairs, culture, education, propaganda, mass movements, weeding out spies, finance, economics, banking, medicine, health, or any other department must learn and master their own professions. This is the first task of education and learning, and the responsible persons in each department must direct their cadres to study in an orderly fashion. The Party committees at each level and the political departments [in the military] at each level, with their propaganda and educational departments, have overall responsibility for guiding this study. Their study should cover the following five items. First, investigate and analyze phenomena closely related to the business of each department. For instance, military departments should carefully investigate, analyze, and study the conditions of the enemy, our allies, and ourselves and compile the essential points into teaching materials to educate military cadres. Other departments should proceed in an analogous fashion. Second,

study the policies, decrees, instructions, and decisions closely related to the business of each department. For instance, finance personnel should be familiar with financial policies and decrees, and personnel in anti-espionage work should be familiar with anti-espionage policies and decrees. Third, study the concrete professional experience of each department. For instance, Party organization departments should research, analyze, and summarize the practice of the Party's organizational and cadre work and write the main points into documents to educate the cadres under their leadership. Fourth, study the historical knowledge of each department's business. For instance, the Party's propaganda departments should describe and sum up the evolution of our Party's propaganda and agitation work and its policies over the past twenty years to make teaching materials for educating propaganda cadres, and other departments should proceed analogously. Fifth, study the scientific knowledge for each department's business. For instance, military cadres should study military science and medical cadres should learn medicine; each department must study its own theories. The leading organ of each department is responsible for providing teaching materials, study guides, and assessment tools in each of these five areas. They must ensure that their cadres gradually reach the goal of learning and mastering their own profession both in theory and practice. It is erroneous to despise learning and mastering professional work.

- b. All cadres must receive political education at their posts. This includes the two topics of current affairs and general policies. Methods for carrying out education in current affairs include encouragement of subordinate cadres to read newspapers, explaining current issues to them and convening talks on current affairs for work units by region and department. The way to carry out general policy education, or that which all cadres should generally study, includes encouraging cadres to read and then providing interpretation and discussion on materials, such as the Central Committee's statements on the current political situation, Party Central decisions on strengthening Party character, and decisions on field research and on carrying out the political program of

the border region. This also means materials which are indirectly, though not directly, related to the business of one's own department but need to be studied by subordinate cadres, for example, interpreting the Central Committee's agrarian policies to military commanders. The purpose of political education is to make cadres thoroughly familiar with the general situation and policies beyond mastering the special business and policies of their departments, thus broadening their vision and avoiding the errors of deviation, narrow-mindedness, and ignorance of the overall situation. It must be pointed out that the tendency to prattle on about general politics while overlooking professional work is wrong, and the tendency to restrict oneself to professional work while neglecting general politics is also wrong. It also must be pointed out that though the general situation and policies must be studied by all cadres, the weight and emphasis put on them may vary in accordance with the nature of the work of each department. For example, they should be lighter for doctors, technical experts, writers, and artists but heavier for Party personnel, propaganda workers, government workers, and political workers in the military. The propaganda and educational departments of the Party, army, and government should have plans to overcome irregularities in political education.

- c. Cultural education, apart from professional and political education, should be stressed for all cadres whose cultural level is too low or not high, and the erroneous viewpoint of slighting cultural education must be rejected. For them, studying culture and raising their cultural level are the central link in their entire education. For the time being, their education and study should include courses such as Chinese, history, geography, arithmetic, nature, society, and politics, and the propaganda and educational departments should take responsibility for providing textbooks. The methods for this education and study can include, where conditions permit, running supplementary cultural classes or remedial schools by individual units independently or jointly with others or, alternatively, adopting a system of rotational study, selecting and sending cadres to study in one central place in turn. Both methods

are good. Both the supplementary classes and remedial schools should have full-time teachers assisted by part-time teachers. Where conditions do not permit this, study groups may be adopted in a unit, employing one of its cadres with a higher education as a part-time teacher while cutting down on his regular work or employing a full-time teacher. Supplementary cultural classes and remedial schools may be divided into two levels: primary and middle. Primary-level classes are for people who are illiterate or who know only a few words and may provide education up to the standards of primary school graduates, whereas the middle-level classes are for people who have reached the standard of primary school graduates and may offer education up to the standards of middle-school graduates. Cultural level rather than position should be the criterion for dividing cadres into classes. In addition, small group study sessions or other supplementary study methods may be used for some propaganda and education cadres who are intellectuals but still need to continue their study of Chinese and Chinese grammar. To raise the cultural level of a great many cadres, Party, army, and government units should elevate the status of cultural educators, and the best cultural educators should receive an enthusiastic welcome and preferential treatment. Persons who have made contributions to cultural education work should be rewarded.

- d. Senior and middle cadres who have the qualifications (the cultural level, comprehension, interest in study, and so forth) should all study theory in addition to their professional and political education. This theoretical study consists of political science, ideological science, economic science, and historical science, and they should be studied in that order. The method for study should be based on the principle of linking theory with practice. For instance, in political science the theoretical materials are Marxist-Leninist discussions on strategy and tactics and the practical materials are the history of our Party's twenty years of struggle. In ideological science, the theoretical materials are the ideological methods of Marxism, and the practical materials are the history of the development of Chinese thought during the past century.

In economic science, the theoretical materials are Marxist political economy and the practical materials are the history of China's economic development over the past century. Historical science studies the revolutionary histories of foreign countries and China. For actual operations, senior- and middle-level study groups can be organized chiefly through self-study assisted by collective discussions and guidance.

4. Allocation of the times and courses for the four types of education, which should be coordinated by the propaganda and educational departments of the Party, army, and government, ought to complement each other rather than to conflict with each other or to be disjointed.

5. The spirit of opposing subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism must permeate all aspects of professional, political, cultural, and theoretical education in all departments. All teaching materials must be reviewed and approved by leading organs, and pernicious elements of subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism must be strictly eliminated and sternly criticized.

6. The education of cadres on the job is a long-term task which, in principle, should promote, not hinder, professional work and not harm cadre health. At the front, it should certainly not hamper the war. In localities and departments where conditions permit, a daily two-hour study system should be maintained. In localities and departments where conditions do not permit this, the study time can be shortened. The study time spent by cadres on the job should be counted as regular work time, treating education and study as part of work. In evaluating the cadres, the results of study should be one of the standards.

7. The Propaganda and Educational Department of the Central Committee will formulate a system of examinations, tests, rewards, and punishments for implementing education of cadres on the job.

8. The leading organs of the Party, army, and government at all levels should give their utmost attention to cadre education (on-the-job education and education at cadre schools). The personnel needed for educating cadres at work (teachers and staff members) should undergo strict screening and have priority in personnel assignments. The leading personnel at all levels have a duty to teach. Funds for educating cadres on the job should, as much as possible, be provided.

9. Personnel engaged in cadre education, especially instructors, should be trained. The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee will determine the methods for this.

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, pp. 71–76, where it is reproduced from *Jiefang ribao*, March 2, 1942.

*Increase Strength, Prepare to Counterattack*¹ (March 4, 1942)

Dear Comrades,

First, we would like to express our warmest appreciation to all of you, soldiers, commanders, and political personnel. Looking back over the four years since the beginning of the War of Resistance and the relocation of the main force of our Eighth Route Army to the North China front, you have been very successful in garrisoning the border region. You have victoriously protected the rear area of our entire army, consolidated the security of the border region, and shielded the entire Northwest. Over the four years, you have made great strides, achieving progress in the study of military techniques and political and cultural matters, as well as in internal work. Furthermore, you have diligently and broadly carried forward the production movement, overcoming numerous difficulties in daily life, and have laid the groundwork for self-reliance. These achievements first and foremost should be attributed to all of your united efforts.

Now the ice is already melting, and the rivers are flowing. Spring is here, and we are starting a new year. This year, the Soviet Red Army of the Workers and Peasants will defeat Hitler's bandit troops, and the people of all the democratic countries in the world are working urgently and arduously to vanquish the German, Italian, and Japanese bandit forces. Consequently, in order to coordinate our actions with the worldwide anti-Fascist war, we, for our part, should prepare a counterattack and defeat Japanese imperialism within the next two to three years.

Today we are still facing all kinds of difficulties, and the weight on all our

shoulders is still very heavy. Even though the enemy has been weakened, he is still quite powerful, and moreover he is extremely cunning and vicious. The pro-Japanese groups within the country that have yet to be eliminated still attempt to destroy the War of Resistance, to destroy our armies, and to destroy the border region. Consequently, empty optimism and negligence can absolutely not be tolerated. To further consolidate and strengthen the border region, we must heighten our vigilance, stick to our posts, strictly guard against sabotage and harassment by enemy aggressors and traitors, enhance our unity with friendly armed forces, and forge a closer relationship with the masses.

Furthermore, we must greatly improve our military technology and cultural level. All soldiers and commanders must exercise and keep fit, intensify training in targeting, hand grenade throwing, knife and bayonet fighting, and the use of other weapons, and study all kinds of acts of combat to improve our fighting skill. Cultural education should be organized energetically to overcome illiteracy and the shortcomings of low educational levels in our army, especially among cadres.

We should also double our efforts in the production movement, which is the most effective method for smashing the enemy's economic boycott, overcoming financial and material difficulties, and improving provisions and supplies to the troops. We should plant more sunflowers, raise more pigs and sheep, develop textiles, and organize transportation. Our slogan is that everyone participates in solving the problems of food and clothing in order to reach the goal of complete self-sufficiency.

Dear comrades, the tasks we shoulder are extremely heavy. To fulfill these tasks, we must rely on the unity of our entire force, increased a hundredfold, and carry on the spirit of bearing hardship and an indomitable fighting will. Between superiors and subordinates, commanders and soldiers, and among all personnel, a relationship of unity, friendship, and mutual assistance should be earnestly strengthened to overcome all occurrences of cruelty, ruthlessness, unfriendliness, detachment, and disunity. With such steel-like unity and hard-working efforts, there is no difficulty that cannot be overcome, no obstacle that cannot be surmounted, and no task that cannot be completed.

Soldiers, commanders, political workers, and all comrades! This is the year for us to increase our strength and prepare to counterattack. We hope that due to all

of our active efforts, we will soon be able to counterattack, and at that time we will wipe out the evil enemies from our nation and raise our flag of national independence, freedom, and liberation all over China. We can already see the light of victory, and that day is not far away. At the start of this great year, we send a comradely salute to you all. We hope that you will unite even more as one and redouble your efforts. We wish you even greater success during this year in combat, study, production, and all of your work, leading to new and greater victories and progress.

Salute!

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang

March 4, the 31st Year of the Republic

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe and Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), Vol. 2, pp. 677–79, where it is reproduced from *Jiefang ribao*, March 19, 1942.

[1.](#) This text is a letter of solicitude to the garrison troops and public security forces of the Yan'an region from Mao, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang.

*Inscription for the Special Issue of
Yan'an's Liberation Daily for March 8
Women's Day
(March 8, 1942)*

“Go deep among the masses, do not value empty talk.”

Note

The source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 10, p. 176, citing *Mao Zedong tici moji xuan* (Beijing: Renmin meishu chubanshe and Dang'an chubanshe, 1984).

Party Newspapers Should Recruit Non-Party People to Express Their Opinions (March 14, 1942)

I

1. Send a telegram about the Korean Interim Government within the next few days. (2) Zhang Shenfu's article commemorating the anniversary of *New China Daily* shows wholehearted enthusiasm for our Party and has been reprinted in *Liberation Daily*.¹ He hopes that Party newspapers will be a place where all anti-Fascist people are allowed to speak. This is an excellent point, and both *New China Daily* and *Liberation Daily* should act on it. There has already been discussion on the reorganization of *Liberation Daily* to increase its Party character and to reflect the opinions of the masses. *New China Daily* also ought to reorganize. The Central Committee has already prepared a draft resolution on the relationship between Communist Party members and non-Party people, which may be adopted next week. It includes the idea that Party newspapers should accommodate talk by non-Party people.

Notes

This is the text of a telegram from Mao to Zhou Enlai, dated March 14, 1942. Our source is Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan* (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1983), p. 93, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript. In that volume, it appears together with two paragraphs from Mao's own draft of the Central Committee resolution "Resolution (Draft) on the Relationship Between Party Members

and Non-Party People.” These other two paragraphs are not translated here because they are incorporated into the complete text of the resolution, dated simply March 1942, which appears below.

1. Zhang Shenfu (1893–1986) was a French-trained academic known for his Marxist views as well as a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party. His article appeared in Chongqing’s *Xinhua ribao* on January 11, 1942, and was reprinted in Yan’an’s *Jiefang ribao* on March 9, 1942.

How to Study the History of the Chinese Communist Party (March 30, 1942)

Now we are all studying Party history. This study is essential. If we do not make Party history clear, if we do not make the road that the Party has followed in history clear, then we will not be able to improve our work. Of course, this does not mean that nothing can be done unless we make every event in history clear. But it does mean that we need to make the historical development of the Party's line and policies clear. This is necessary for studying today's line and policies, for strengthening inner-Party education, and for promoting our work in various areas. We should identify what our past successes and victories have been and what our failures have been, using the overturned cart ahead as a warning to the carts behind. We did not do this work in the past and are just now beginning to do it. Since its publication [in December], senior cadre study groups and the Central Party School have been reading *Since the Sixth Congress*¹ for half a year and other units have now started reading it. This is a good thing which is beginning to show positive results today. Comrades who have read it suddenly see the light, and this has played a role in enlightening their thinking. Now we should consider the road we have taken and our experiences in the past. And we should consider them in a systematic way. A road is followed step by step. Although, as we took that road, we may have thought about how it went yesterday and how we should go tomorrow, no one has yet studied Party history in its entirety. After discussions last August and September, the Central Committee printed the book *Since the Sixth Congress*, which is being studied in the senior study groups of the Central Committee. How do we study it? We regard the course of development of the entire Party as the subject of our study.

We analyze it objectively instead of studying any one step; we study the whole process instead of individual details. We study line and policy. We should conduct this kind of study to improve our understanding of today's line and policies, to make our work better, and to make more progress.

How should we study Party history? The basic method, which Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have already discussed, is the comprehensive historical method. Naturally, when we study the history of the Chinese Communist Party we should also follow this method. Today I am only talking about one aspect of this method, which, to put it plainly, I intend to call the “method of ancient and modern, China and foreign.”² This clarifies the specific time and area of the issues under study and views them as a historical process under specific historical conditions. The terms “ancient and modern” refer to historical development and the terms “China and foreign” mean China and foreign countries, our side and the other side.

In order of historical development, I think the history of our Party can be divided into these three stages: the period of the Great Revolution is the first stage, the period of the Civil War is the second, and the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan is the third. Regardless of whether or not such a division is appropriate, everyone can discuss it. I am only putting forward one suggestion, and it is not a decision of the Central Committee. If there are more suitable divisions of Party history, so much the better.

The task of the revolution in all three stages has been to oppose imperialism and its running dogs. Its direct manifestation in the first stage was opposing the northern warlords; in the second it was resisting the Guomintang; and in the third it has been combating the Japanese invaders and traitors like Wang Jingwei.³

The masses with whom we were allied in the first period were all the democratic classes throughout the country. There was cooperation between the Guomintang and the Communist Party. In the second stage, there was a smaller United Front. The Guomintang and the Communist Party split and the whole country divided into two opposing camps, with one under the leadership of the Guomintang and the other under the leadership of the Communist Party. In the third stage, the whole nation is resisting Japan and formal cooperation between the Guomintang and the Communist Party has been restored.

The target of attack for the revolution in the first stage was mainly the northern warlords and our policy was a broad United Front. In the second stage, our target was the Guomindang and our policy was a smaller United Front, uniting the proletariat, the peasants, and the lower stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. The third stage is characterized by our present policy, and our target of attack is the Japanese invaders and Chinese traitors. The revolutionary front is the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, with all patriotic forces in the country. This is our line.

During the first stage, we were correct in some respects and wrong in others. We were correct in putting into practice the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as in the choice of targets of attack and the organization of the revolutionary troops. Later the Chen Duxiu line emerged. The Party line for the first half of 1927 was wrong. It was Right opportunism to maintain an alliance with the Guomindang as it was preparing to betray the revolution, to discard the proletariat and the peasants, to discard us and the revolutionary masses. When the circumstances changed, our policies and line did not change accordingly. The Right deviation is to unite with all elements while rejecting struggle. This was the basic feature of the Chen Duxiu line, namely, allying with all and opposing struggle and continuing to ally with the big landlords and big bourgeoisie even when they had already betrayed the revolution. The policy of the big landlords and big capitalists had changed, yet our policy did not change. When the big landlords and big capitalists attacked the revolution, still we did not change our policy. This was a Right error. In the process of uniting with them, we should have cooperated with them, on the one hand, and struggled against them on the other. During the second stage, the country was split into two blocs. After the May 21 Incident,⁴ a type of putchism emerged, holding that “All those with land are bullies and all gentry are evil.”⁵ This was accompanied by the Li Lisan line, which advocated national insurrections when the time was not right for them. From the September 18 Incident [1931]⁶ to the Zunyi Conference [1935], as an enemy of the nation invaded and as the national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie had already changed, still our policy did not change with them. It was still the same old stuff, giving rise to “Left” things. The leading line at the time was to struggle against all and to reject alliance. The situation changed after

the September 18 Incident; the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, such as Sun Ke and Huang Yanpei,⁷ openly leaned toward us. But we said that they were reformists. We said they were our main targets of attack. It was wrong to regard these people as our main targets. Furthermore, it was also excessively Left to advocate the elimination of rich peasants at that time. During the third stage, there should be neither alliance with all elements without struggle nor struggle against all without alliance but a combination of alliance and struggle, with alliance as the key and struggle as the supplement. We need independence in unity. Unity is alliance, and independence is struggle. What is independence? There is no question of independence if you stand here and no one asks you to move. But when someone else wants to stand on your spot and drive you away, then you have a question of independence. Struggle and friction are for the sake of unity. They are the means to achieve unity. This is called striking out and drawing in at the same time in a way that is reasonable, beneficial, and restrained. With independence and self-reliance that does not impede unity we hope that a better unity may be achieved.

In terms of the goals of struggle, the targets of attack, and the political line of the Party, to divide the history of the Chinese Communist Party into these three stages both accords with the facts and is reasonable.

Before the Great Revolution of 1925–27, there was a preparatory stage. The direct preparation for the Great Revolution was from 1921 to 1924, and this period can be combined with the Great Revolution beginning in 1925 to form one stage. The period after the Third Congress of the Guomindang⁸ when the overall situation of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party took shape before the July 7 Incident⁹ can be considered part of the third stage and need not be separated out.

As for the preparations for revolution, the first stage, starting in 1921, was in fact prepared by the 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth movement. The May Fourth movement in particular began to prepare the ideas, cadres, masses, and young intellectuals for the Great Revolution. So, strictly speaking, if we study Party history only starting in 1921, we will still not get the whole picture. I fear that we need materials from this earlier part to explain the predecessors to the Communist Party. If this earlier part goes too far, it will be too long. To start from the 1911 Revolution would be all right, but to start from the May Fourth

movement might be better.

The 1911 Revolution took place at a time when the Chinese proletariat was not yet awakened and the Chinese Communist Party was not yet formed, when the proletariat of the whole world, after the failure of the Paris Commune, had no actual revolutionary operations and was only preparing for revolution, and when colonial and semicolonial revolutionary movements still served as reserves for the world bourgeois revolution. However, the May Fourth movement took place after the Great War in Europe [World War I] and after the October Revolution. The colonial and semicolonial revolutionary movements of that time were no longer the reserves for the world bourgeois revolution but those for the world proletarian revolution. The May Fourth movement was a response to the Russian October Revolution and therefore was more profound than the 1911 Revolution. The 1911 Revolution only politically overthrew the emperor of the Qing dynasty but did not follow through. In writing history, we often say that the 1911 Revolution was a failure. In truth, we cannot say it was a complete failure. The 1911 Revolution had its victory. It overthrew the Qing emperor, who depended directly on imperialism. But it failed later on because it did not consolidate its victory, and so feudal forces replaced the revolution, Yuan Shikai replaced Sun Yatsen. The proletariat of that time did not ascend the political stage as an awakened class. The May Fourth movement took place under the influence of the October Revolution. The influence of the October Revolution was very powerful in awakening the world and China. During the May Fourth movement, the Chinese proletariat began to gain awareness. The May Fourth movement took place in 1919 and in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party was born. The May Fourth movement was a broad United Front with a Left wing and a Right wing and middle-of-the-road forces within it. A month after the May Fourth movement came the June 3 movement, with strikes by workers, students, and merchants taking place all over the country. The strikes by workers at the time were initiated by the workers themselves. We should examine the attitude of the workers during the May Fourth movement. Even though the strikes at that time had no leadership from the Communist Party, there were in the end some Communist Party leaders among them. The role of leadership in the May Fourth movement was played by some progressive intellectuals. University professors may not have taken to the streets, but they did many things, charging around and

inspiring others. Chen Duxiu was the general commander of the May Fourth movement. Now is not the time to publicize the history of Chen Duxiu, but when we revise Chinese history in the future, we should talk a bit about his contributions. The Guomindang did not play a leadership role in the May Fourth movement. It stood on the side.

The May Fourth movement prepared the way for the Great Revolution; if there had been no May Fourth movement, there would have been no Great Revolution. The Chinese Communist Party was born after the May Fourth movement which in turn took place after the Russian October Revolution. The Chinese Communist Party was organized at the urging of Lenin and with the assistance of people sent by the Comintern. Comintern representatives attended the Chinese Communist Party's First Congress.

When studying the history of the Chinese Communist Party, we must also study the materials on the 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth movement before the formation of the Party. Otherwise, it is impossible to clearly understand the historical development. Now there are many issues that have direct connections with that period. For instance, the issue of opposing stereotyped Party writing can hardly be understood without referring to the opposition during the May Fourth movement to the old eight-legged essays, old dogma, the doctrines of Confucius, and classical Chinese.

We should reexamine the appraisals of the 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth movement. Was the 1911 Revolution a total failure, or did it win some victories? Was the May Fourth movement a popular movement or not? I believe that the May Fourth movement had a broad mass nature, though naturally less so than the Great Revolution. At that time, the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat formed a United Front without the participation of the peasants but with large numbers of workers. By the time of the Great Revolution, the peasants participated. A lot more peasants were involved in the Agrarian Revolution,¹⁰ but the United Front was not broad enough. By the time of the War of Resistance, the peasants participated even more broadly, more so than during the Great Revolution or the Agrarian Revolution. At the same time, the United Front was broader than before.

The May Fourth movement was a united front of the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat and had a spontaneous character. But its spontaneity was different

from that in the past, as it included some degree of awareness. Many people were in favor of the October Revolution and Lenin's revolution. When Sun Yatsen said, "Lenin is a revolutionary saint and communism is a good friend of the Three People's Principles," he was supporting communism as an ally. Under the influence of the October Revolution, the people of that time had a great awakening. The May Fourth movement led to the founding of the Communist Party and the development of the workers movement, and only after that could you have the cooperation between the Guomintang and the Communist Party. Therefore, the founding and later history of the Communist Party cannot be explained clearly without explaining the preceding 1911 Revolution and the May Fourth movement.

When speaking of the 1911 Revolution, its emergence cannot be interpreted without describing the domestic and international circumstances of that time. Similarly, the emergence of the May Fourth movement and the June Third movement cannot be explained without describing what type of government there was then. Therefore, it is necessary to study all the important political documents of that period, such as the Declaration of Abdication by the Xuantong emperor, some documents of the Yuan Shikai and Duan Qirui governments, and several significant declarations by Sun Yatsen.¹¹

The targets of struggle during the 1921–27 period were imperialism and its northern warlord lackeys. Unless we explain the ways in which the landlords oppressed the peasants, the capitalists oppressed the workers, the imperialists divided China, and the northern warlords opposed the revolution, it will be hard to understand the struggle at that time. Then when studying the cooperation between the Guomintang and the Communist Party, it will not do just to look at the declarations of the Communist Party and not those of the Guomintang. At that time, Communist Party members joined the Guomintang as individuals, and the Guomintang was a big organization. Without a clear picture of this large organization, it is impossible to comprehend the situation at that time and why Chen Duxiu's later mistakes are so intolerable. We should also look at the materials on the April 12 Incident and the May 21 Incident.¹² During the Civil War, we opposed the Guomintang and the lackeys of imperialism. Unless the ways in which the Guomintang capitulated to imperialism and the imperialists oppressed and exploited the Chinese people are discussed, it is difficult to grasp

the necessity of the Civil War. Unless we know who had the main agricultural means of production, such as land and oxen, and are clear about the land relations between landlords and peasants, it is impossible to grasp the necessity of the Agrarian Revolution. If we do not talk about how, after the September 18 Incident, the Guomindang still continued to fight against the Communist Party and refused to fight the Japanese, then our opposition to the Guomindang seems unreasonable, baseless. The War of Resistance is everyone's war against Japan in which the Guomindang and the Communist Party should cooperate. The Guomindang has published many documents. The Communist Party has also published many documents. Some of the anti-Japanese documents of the Guomindang are good, but they are also anti-Communist. We should read our own documents as well as the documents of the Guomindang. If we do not read these materials, we will fail to understand the grounds of our opposition to the anti-communism of the Guomindang. Since they have published things such as "Measures for Restricting Alien Party Activities"¹³ and stirred up friction, it is necessary for us to stress struggle, provided that it will not harm unity and cause a split. If we do not emphasize struggle, we could see the return of more Chen Duxiuism.

As for the anti-imperialist struggle in China, we should talk about the ferocious aggression of foreign capitalism and imperialism against China. As for the Chinese proletariat, it is essential to mention the world proletariat, the struggle of the political party of the Chinese proletariat, the Chinese Communist Party, and the way Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin led the international proletariat's fight against capitalism and imperialism. This is what I call "China and foreign," meaning China and foreign countries. To borrow the meaning of this phrase, we could also say that the 1911 Revolution was "China" and the Qing government was "foreign"; the May Fourth movement was "China" and Duan Qirui and Cao Rulin were "foreign";¹⁴ the Northern Expedition was "China" and the northern warlords were "foreign." During the Civil War period, the Communist Party was "China" and the Guomindang was "foreign." Unless we are clear about who the "foreign" is, we can hardly be clear about who "China" is. In this world, if you do not have one side, then you cannot have the other. So, in addition to "ancient and modern," there is also "China and foreign." Since the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth movement, the Great Revolution, the Civil War,

and the War of Resistance Against Japan are the “ancient and modern.” The Chinese Communist Party, the Guomindang, the peasants, the landlords, the workers, the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie and proletariat of the world, and so forth are “China and foreign.” In my view, for a systematic study of Chinese Communist Party history we need to compile two sets of materials, one set about the Party’s internal affairs, including the international Communist movement, and another set about affairs outside the Party, including those of imperialism, the landlords, the bourgeoisie, and so forth. Both sets should be arranged in chronological order. The two sets can be studied in comparison to each other. This is the “method of ancient and modern and China and the foreign,” and it is the method of historicism. When we study Party history we should do so comprehensively, which is the only scientific way to study it. Our study of Party history must be scientific and not subjectivist. In analyzing the mistakes we see in Party history, we should not merely hate some individuals. If we merely hate some individuals, then we will see history as created by just a few people. The Marxist view of history is not subjectivism, and it seeks to identify the nature and objective causes of historical events. Is it enough to look at the objective causes alone? No. We must also recognize the role of leaders, for they have a big impact. But leaders themselves are an objective reality, and there are objective causes for their Left or Right actions or their mistakes. They can only be explained by finding their objective causes.

Now we are fighting against subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism. When we study history, we should notice whether these things existed in the past. Only by understanding these questions clearly can we learn a scientific method. This scientific method is not subjectivism, not sectarianism, and it has nothing to do with stereotyped Party writing. We should use this method to study the tactics and lines of our Party during various periods as well as to study various other issues, such as military issues, the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, and peasant and land issues.

In studying the history of the Chinese Communist Party, we must regard China as the center, we must plant our backsides on the body of China. We must study world capitalism and socialism, too, but if we want to be clear about their relations to the history of the Chinese Party, it all depends on where you sit with your backside. If you sit entirely on the side of the foreign countries, then you are

not studying Chinese Communist Party history. When we study China, we must view China as the center; we must plant ourselves on the body of China to study the affairs of the world. Some of our comrades have a defect, which consists of looking at everything by regarding foreign countries as the center. They act like phonographs, mechanically swallowing foreign things whole and importing them into China in an uncritical manner, without taking account of China's characteristics. Failing to study China's characteristics and instead importing foreign things cannot resolve China's problems. If we do not study the historical development of the Chinese Communist Party, including its ideological and political struggles, our study will not yield any results. We have read the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*. It tells us that Bolshevism created that socialist nation, the Soviet Union, with Marxist theory and methods. This Bolshevism and this socialist country never existed before. They were created in Russia by the party led by Lenin. Combining the method and standpoint of Marxism with the concrete practices of the Russian Revolution, Lenin developed Bolshevism. With this theory and these tactics, Lenin launched the February Revolution and the October Revolution and Stalin, after him, drew up three five-year plans and created the socialist Soviet Union. We should follow the same spirit. We should apply the methods of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin to China and create some new things in China. General theories, divorced from Chinese realities, cannot defeat the enemy. But if we combine theory with practice, use the standpoint and methods of Marxism to solve Chinese problems, and create a few new things, that will work. For instance, while having no canons and airplanes, our Party has created the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. These are China's own creations.

Notes

This speech was delivered by Mao Zedong at a study group meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was first published in *Dangshi yanjiu*, No. 1 (1980). Our source is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 399–408, which reproduces that version.

[1.](#) *Liuda yilai dangnei mimi wenjian* (Since the Sixth Congress: Inner Party Secret Documents) is a two-

volume compendium of about five hundred Party documents dating from 1928 that was first published in December 1941 in Yan'an by the Higher Party School. A 1981 Beijing reprint, published by Renmin chubanshe, is generally available to scholars. See Tony Saich, "Writing or Rewriting History," in Saich and van de Ven, eds., *New Perspectives*.

[2.](#) Mao coins the four-character phrase *gujin zhongwai* to summarize his approach.

[3.](#) Wang Jingwei (1883–1944) had been a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang and the president of the National Government during the Northern Expedition period in the 1920s. He initially appeared as the leader of the "left" wing of the Guomindang, but his Wuhan National Government openly opposed the Communists after July 15, 1927. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he was the vice chairman of the Guomindang Supreme National Defense Council and vice chairman of the Guomindang. In 1938 he became the president of the puppet Nanjing "National Government" supported by the Japanese from December 1938.

[4.](#) Called the *Mari shibian* (Horse Day Massacre). On May 21, 1927 the Guomindang military commander in Changsha, Xu Kexiang, captured and executed Chinese Communist Party activists in the Hunan labor and peasant unions. See Vol. II, p. 510 n2 and p. 515.

[5.](#) "You tu jie hao, wu shen bu jie" was popularly shortened as *tuhao lieshen* (local bullies and evil gentry).

[6.](#) September 18 Incident, i.e., the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, when the Japanese army staged an attack on itself to create the excuse to take over Manchuria formally.

[7.](#) Sun Ke [also known as Sun Fo] (1895–1973), the only son of Sun Yatsen, was at this time the head of the Legislature of the Guomindang government. Huang Yanpei (1878–1965) was a Chinese educator, industrialist, and politician. He was a founding member of the China Democratic League that was formed in 1941.

[8.](#) Held in Nanjing in 1929.

[9.](#) This refers to the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which began full hostilities in the anti-Japanese war.

[10.](#) Mao is referring to the land reform and peasant mobilization of 1926–27, made famous in his "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (1927); see Vol. II, pp. 429–64.

[11.](#) The abdication of the Xuantong emperor in 1912 marked the end of the Qing dynasty; Yuan Shikai became the leader of the ensuing Republic of China, displacing Sun Yatsen after only a month, and Duan Jirui followed Yuan.

[12.](#) These refer to Chiang Kaishek's massacre of the Shanghai workers on April 12, 1927, and the massacre of peasant militia in Changsha on May 21, 1927; see Mao's comments on these on May 8, 1941 [Vol. VII, p.

31] and the Introduction to Vol. II, pp. li and lv.

[13](#). These measures, adopted by the Nanjing government in March 1939, made the organization of other political parties extremely difficult. Mao rails against these and related “Measures” in an open telegram on February 1, 1940 (see Vol. VII, pp. 401–2), and returns to them in his speech at the Party’s Seventh Congress on April 24, 1945.

[14](#). Cao Rulin (1877–1966) was vice minister for the Beijing governments under Yuan Shikai and Duan Qirui.

Speech at the Forum on the Reform of Liberation Daily (March 31, 1942)

The Communist Party's line is the people's line. Currently, the policy of the anti-Japanese National United Front pursued by the Chinese Communist Party is the policy which is in accordance with the public will of the people. In carrying out this policy, we will often encounter many obstacles, such as subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism.¹ To correct these unhealthy work styles, we have brought up the rectification of the Three Work Styles. However, our objective cannot be achieved without collective action and coordinated steps. At today's meeting, we have all presented many ideas and will be able to advance together with a common goal.

Using *Liberation Daily* should be part of the daily work of all units. After they are spread by the newspapers, the experiences of one department can propel other departments to reform their work. As we rectify the Three Work Styles today, we must make good use of newspapers.

Various departments have already started spirited discussions on the question of rectification of the Three Work Styles. This is a very good thing, but a few people still speak from an erroneous standpoint, namely, the concept of absolute equality and the methods of cold irony and hidden arrows. Recently, a few people have demanded absolute equality, but this is an illusion that cannot become real. Our work system has many defects which should be corrected. But the demand for absolute equality cannot be reached either now or in the future. We should reject the utopian socialism of the petty bourgeoisie.

Criticism should be serious and penetrating, as well as sincere, straightforward, above-board, and well-intentioned. This is the only attitude that is conducive to

unity. Cold irony and clandestine attacks are, in contrast, corrosive and detrimental to unity.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 90–92, which is reproduced from *Jiefang ribao*, April 2, 1942. This text contains only the main points of Mao’s speech to the concluding session of a forum of some seventy leading cadres held in the Central Party offices at Yanjialing village near Yan’an. The title of the original text in *Jiefang ribao* is “Zai benbao zuotanhui shang, Mao Zedong tongzhi haozhao, zhengdun sanfeng yao liyong baozhi, piping juegui pingjun guannian he lengchao anjian banfa” (At This Paper’s Forum, Comrade Mao Zedong Calls for Using Papers in the Rectification of the Three Styles and Criticism of the Concept of Absolute Equality and the Methods of Cold Irony and Clandestine Attacks).

1. On Party formalism, or *dang bagu* (literally “Party eight-legged essays”), as well as subjectivism and sectarianism, see above, Mao’s report of February 1, 1942, “Rectify Our Study Style, Party Style, and Writing Style,” note 10.

*On the Relationship Between
Communist Party Members and Non-
Party Persons*
(March 1942) (Never adopted)

The task of our Party's anti-Japanese National United Front policy is: except for Chinese traitors and those who are determined to sabotage unity in the War of Resistance, Communist Party members must closely cooperate with people of all strata who resist Japan, regardless of whether they have party or factional affiliations or do not have such affiliations, regardless of whether they sympathize with our Party or only wish to cooperate with our Party on certain points of our program, regardless of whether they have already worked with our Party or have not yet worked with our Party, and we must join with them in the struggle to achieve the general goals of the War of Resistance and to establish the nation. Our Party has long resolutely followed this correct policy and has had great achievements. The War of Resistance of the whole nation depends on supporting it; the unification of the whole depends on putting it into practice. All these are very good. However, within the Party in the anti-Japanese base areas, whether in the government, military, Party affairs, popular movements, or cultural and educational departments, or within the underground Party, certain Party organizations and certain Party members remain seriously divorced from non-Party persons and have failed to do away completely with the work styles of sectarianism and closed-doorism. These Party members and Party organizations to this day still do not understand the content and significance of our Party's anti-Japanese National United Front policy. They turn their backs on our Party's principle of maintaining close links with the popular masses. They do not

maintain close links with the popular masses; on the contrary, they isolate themselves from the popular masses. They do not put themselves among the popular masses, modestly learning the innermost thoughts of the popular masses but, instead, put themselves above the popular masses, acting pretentiously and lording over them. They do not want to listen to the opinions of non-Party persons, treating them as unimportant. They do not want to learn from non-Party persons, and, on the contrary, they assume the stance of leaders. Toward non-Party persons who are willing to cooperate with our Party, they are either apathetic and do not trust them or they are extremely demanding and want them to be perfect. They do not want to implement resolutely the “Three-Thirds”¹ political system, and they keep a tight rein on mass organizations. Even today, they do not understand that state affairs are the public affairs of the country and not the private affairs of a single party or a single faction. The sole task of the Communist Party is, while uniting all the people, selflessly forging ahead to overthrow the national enemy for the benefit of the nation and the people, with absolutely no self-interest. Communist Party members all along have constituted but a tiny minority of the people, and without understanding our Party’s position with regard to the overwhelming majority of the people and their true willingness to cooperate with our Party, it will be impossible to realize our Party’s propositions. Hence, Communist Party members are obligated to cooperate democratically with all persons who loyally resist Japan and absolutely have no right to reject them. In order to rectify these various negative phenomena seriously and thoroughly and reform the Party’s work style, it is imperative to launch the struggle against subjectivism and sectarianism (i.e., closed-doorism) within the Party, to engage in self-criticism in all places and departments, and to reveal such self-criticisms to non-Party persons without indulgence or cover-ups so as to achieve the effect of thorough revelation and correction. At the same time, the following concrete rules are set forth, of which all Party members and Party organizations must resolutely put into practice.

1. Caring about and listening to the opinions and needs of non-Party persons and learning from these people must be the serious responsibility of every Communist Party member. All Party members have the responsibility, inside the Party and in the various work departments, to regularly reflect on the opinions and demands (be they correct or incorrect) of the non-Party persons. The leading

members of all Party organizations and work departments have the responsibility to consider such opinions and needs and to put them on the agenda in a timely fashion for deliberation and resolution.

2. The “Three-Thirds” system will be carried out at each level of the leading organs in the government system, the political consultative system, and mass organizations of the various anti-Japanese base areas, with Communist Party members comprising only a third of these bodies and non-Party persons who are willing to cooperate with our Party making up two-thirds of such bodies. If the number of Communist Party members elected to such bodies constitute less than one-third, Party organizations may not designate Party members who are not duly elected to fill up the one-third quota. Even less may they push aside the elected non-Party persons. In these organs, Communist Party members must engage in democratic cooperation with non-Party persons. They must pay attention to the opinions of non-Party persons, consult with them on issues and make joint decisions with them on these issues. Together they must jointly follow the system of democratic centralism characterized by the minority obeying the majority, the part giving way to the whole, and the subordinate obeying the superior. They must let non-Party figures assume posts and power, daring to speak up and daring to take responsibility.

3. Within the government, political consultative congresses, mass organizations, and other organs of the various anti-Japanese base areas, the appointment and removal of all staff subject to the people’s democratic election shall follow the methods of the “Three-Thirds” system set out in the previous item. The appointment and removal of other staff which does not require democratic election should not be based on the criterion of Party membership. Instead it should be based on whether the staff support the unity of the War of Resistance, as well their personal competence, experience, knowledge, work activism, and so forth, thus carrying out the correct policy of recruitment on the basis of merit.

4. Within the government, political consultative congresses, and all other departments that either already have non-Party persons or should have them working there in the various anti-Japanese base areas, the task for Party cells is: to engage in Party education among Party members, to lead Party members to become model workers, to unite with non-Party persons, and to ensure the

completion of work in their department. The Party cell may not directly intervene in the administrative leadership and even less substitute for it. In administrative relations, Party members must obey the administrative leaders. In departments where non-Party persons assume administrative leadership, if the Party organizations and Party members in those places or those departments have a different point of view regarding administrative work, they should adopt appropriate methods to consult with the non-Party persons to seek solutions and should not deal with such matters directly. The phenomenon of the blurring of the lines between the Party and the government which exists in certain places should be corrected. If any Party member violates an administrative rule, he or she shall be penalized in accordance with administrative procedures. If his or her mistake also pertains to Party discipline, then he or she should at the same time be sanctioned in accordance with Party discipline. However, in administrative relations, non-Party persons with administrative responsibilities should also obey the leadership of superior administrative units.

5. Party members as well as Party organizations shall refrain from willful and groundless suspicions of non-Party persons. They must in friendship try carefully to understand the history and character of each and every non-Party person around them, attentively listen to the opinions and needs of the people, our Party, and work. They must respect non-Party persons' religious beliefs, freedom of thought, and lifestyle. They must know that the willingness of non-Party persons to cooperate with our Party and our Party's respect for them are the necessary conditions of our mutual cooperation.

6. All non-Party persons who are willing to cooperate with our Party have the right to criticize our Party and its members and cadres.² Except for the malicious attacks that are designed to sabotage the unity of the War of Resistance, our Party members and organizations should modestly heed all well-intentioned criticism, whether it is expressed in writing, orally, or in any other form. They should accept correct criticism. Even if certain of their criticisms are incorrect, Party members and organizations may only make explanations in a fair and well-intentioned way after they have completed making such criticisms and after giving them careful consideration. It is absolutely impermissible to cover up or gloss over errors and mistakes, to reject criticisms by non-Party persons, or to misinterpret well-intentioned criticisms as attacks which will lead to silencing

non-Party persons in the face of the Party's mistakes. With regard to those Party members and cadres who violate government decrees or Party policies, aside from bringing them to court or to administrative organs in accordance with the law, non-Party persons also have the right to file complaints with the Party committees at each level up to the Party Central Committee.

7. *New China Daily* and *Liberation Daily*, as well as other newspapers and journals in the various anti-Japanese base areas, should recruit vast numbers of non-Party persons to publish their political views, enabling all persons who are anti-Fascist and opposed to Japanese imperialism to have an opportunity to speak up through our Party periodicals, and to the extent possible recruiting non-Party persons to join editorial committees so as to improve the quality of our newspapers and journals. Party newspaper workers must learn to be good at methods for recruiting non-Party persons to write articles and reports for Party newspapers. The subjectivism and sectarianism of certain Party newspaper workers should be criticized.

8. When a non-Party person who is working with our Party makes a mistake in work, the relevant Party organizations and Party members must give careful consideration to the circumstances. Adopting appropriate methods and proceeding from an attitude of true friends, they should advise him in a timely and sincere fashion on the real facts pertaining to his mistake as well as the true reasons for it, consult with him on the methods to correct the mistake and help him to correct it. It is absolutely impermissible to be silent about it, letting his mistakes accumulate, or only to talk about it behind his back but not in his presence. Be aware that such an approach can only hinder cooperation and is harmful to the non-Party person.

9. Within the various anti-Japanese base areas, any non-Party person who works with our Party is completely equal with Communist Party members before the law. At work, necessary and possible working conditions must be provided for them. In study, in all institutions and schools that have non-Party persons, whether on-the-job cadre education or school education, non-Party persons have the same right to study as Communist Party members. As for materials, do not make empty promises of special treatment but, rather, render genuinely necessary assistance depending on the circumstances and needs of work as well as existing material conditions. At the same time, it is imperative that Party

members be made to understand that providing such assistance is necessary.

10. In government institutions, military divisions, and schools of the various anti-Japanese base areas, the ordinary meetings of Party organizations and small groups should be open to non-Party sympathizers who work in the same department to sit in and to express their views.

11. Each Party committee above the county level in the various anti-Japanese base areas should have plans to hold cadre meetings or fora in which both Party members and non-Party persons participate, jointly discussing various anti-Japanese policies and soliciting views on the Party from non-Party persons.

12. In Party organization departments or personnel departments in the various anti-Japanese base areas, create special units to manage non-Party cadres, assuming the responsibility for receiving, registering, understanding, and taking care of them. Within the Party's health-care committees at each level, create non-Party cadre sections to manage their health care.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 394–98, which reproduces a printed copy of the original held in the Central Archives. This was a draft resolution for the Central Committee written by Mao but never formally issued. It is mentioned in Mao's telegram to Zhou Enlai of March 14, 1942, which appears above, in which Mao says this resolution "will be adopted" soon. According to *Nianpu*, Vol. 2, p. 369, "This draft was discussed at an expanded meeting of the Politburo on March 19, 1942," but a footnote to the text as published here states that the document was never formally issued.

[1.](#) The United Front power-sharing system advanced in Communist Party areas. See above, note to the text of January 26, 1942, and Vol. VII.

[2.](#) The paragraphs numbered 6 and 7 were printed together with Mao's telegram of March 14 to Zhou Enlai translated above. Thus, although Mao took responsibility for the whole document, these passages can be regarded as definitely his.

Inscription in Honor of Children's Day (April 4, 1942)

“Children, unite! Learn to become the new masters of the New China.”

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 10, p. 176, citing *Mao Zedong tici moji xuan*, which notes that it was prepared for the April 4, 1942, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

Letter to Ouyang Shan

(April 9, 1942)

Comrade Ouyang Shan:

I have received your letter. I would like to have a talk with you in person. If you agree, please be kind enough to come today for a chat. I hope Comrade Cao Ming will also come with you.¹

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 9, p. 389, where it is taken from Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu, 1982 huibian ben* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983).

¹. Ouyang Shan (pen name of Yang Fengqi, 1908–2000) was a well-known writer. Beginning in September 1941 he was the director of the Literature and Art Research Office at the Central Research Institute in Yan'an. In February 1942 he went to the Central Party School for study. Cao Ming (b. 1913), a writer, served as a special researcher in the Literature and Arts Research Office of the Central Research Institute. For Mao's follow-up letter and information on Ouyang and Cao, see below, the text of April 13, 1942.

Letter to Ouyang Shan and Cao Ming (April 13, 1942)

Comrades Ouyang Shan and Cao Ming:

Please be so good as to collect the negative responses to the guiding principles for literature and art that we discussed the day before yesterday.¹ If you get some, please let me know as soon as possible!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 194, where it is reproduced from a photographic copy of the original letter.

¹. See the April 9, 1942, text above. Mao wrote an additional letter to Ouyang and Cao, the text of April 17, 1942. See below.

*Letter to Ouyang Shan and Cao Ming*¹

April 17, 1942

Comrades Ouyang Shan and Cao Ming:

I have received and carefully read your letter of April 15. I cannot answer your questions yet; I must study it first. It will be very good if you are collecting materials. Collect both positive and negative materials, and it would be best if you could give me a brief introduction. I do not know whether the comrades in the Literature and Arts Research Office will have time to do this.

Best wishes!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 9, where it is taken from Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu, 1982 huibian ben*.

¹. For information on Ouyang and Cao, see Mao's first letter in this series, in text for April 9, 1942, above.

On the Rectification of the Three Styles

(April 20, 1942)¹

Last time, I talked about the question of current affairs. Today, I am going to talk a bit about the question of the educational work currently under way in Yan'an. Our present educational work has great significance. Whether for dealing with today's current affairs or for greeting those of the future, we must strengthen education. The current situation is now one in which the Guomindang anti-Communist high tide could emerge. If the anti-Communist high tide arises, our difficulties will be greater, but even if the anti-Communist high tide does not arise, we will still have a great many difficulties. This year and next are the two most difficult years, so we need to strengthen our internal education. When the anti-Communist high tide comes, the difficulties will be greater. We will need to strengthen internal education even more. The Guomindang says that we are changing our work style and that we are rectifying and consolidating internal affairs. This is completely correct. We must do this for the present, and we must do it for the future. The darkness in current affairs is only a temporary phenomenon; it will change. The whole world and all of China will change in the not-too-distant future, and fascism will collapse. In order to welcome brightness, we need to strengthen our education and prepare our thinking. To report on current affairs, to assess current affairs, is one way to prepare our thinking. To master Marxism-Leninism and to overturn subjectivism are far deeper and more thorough methods for strengthening our education. If, within the next two years, cadres in our entire Party can change their work style, expand the correct work style, and eliminate the improper work style, after such a goal is attained, we will be able to consolidate our internal affairs. The level of our cadres will be raised so that fundamentally we may welcome the bright world of the future and grasp this new bright world. In sum, we need to strengthen education in order to deal with darkness; we need to strengthen education in order to welcome brightness. No matter what, we need to strengthen education.

Looking at the history of our Party, there has been very little internal cadre

education that is comprehensive, all-Party, and led by the Center. Only since July of last year, when the Central Committee circulated its decision on enhancing Party character [*dangxing*], have we paid attention to this question as a whole, from the top to the bottom, and systematically. This is very significant. The education and study that are being carried out in Yan'an right now have national significance. The significance of comrades in the Central Study Group who are present here, and all the working cadres of Yan'an engaging in study, is by no means partial. First, this is because our institutions are directly under the Center. This place, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, has the greatest political significance of all border regions, and many cadres here engage in work of a national character. Second, cadres from many different places around the country have come here. These cadres originally were from various places around the country, and they have come to Yan'an for one reason or another. Either they were no longer able to stay in their previous location, or they have business to do in Yan'an, or they have come here to study. Yan'an has gathered together talent from all over the country, so our educational work has national significance. After the cadres in Yan'an have been taught well and have studied well, they will be able to deal with the darkness in the present, to welcome the brightness in the future, and to create a new world. This is extremely significant and has a nationwide character. Moreover, after Yan'an does this work and does it well, word will spread. It will spread to various other base areas and to the Guomindang-controlled areas. Party organizations in various areas will follow us. Now, we are only doing this here. We want to spread the word through *Liberation Daily* and the New China News Agency. Now, the New China News Agency should mainly broadcast teaching materials, broadcast documents such as "On the Self-cultivation of Communist Party Members" by Comrade Liu Shaoqi, the Twelve Articles by Stalin, Stalin on investigation, Lenin on discipline, and Dimitrov on cadre policy.² Of course, the world is at war now. It is not possible to carry no news about the war, but a little less of it can be broadcast. For example, broadcast a little less news on the fighting in India or on the fighting in the Soviet Union and instead broadcast more educational materials and more news on the rectification of the Three Styles in Yan'an. The report submitted by North China [bureau] on the rectification of the Three Styles may be broadcast from Yan'an. We can struggle a bit more against subjectivism.

Now the Guomindang is taking advantage of our opposition to subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism to curse us, to publish articles in the press cursing us. Yet we will continue to oppose these things. Of course, the kind of subjectivism and other things that we oppose are completely different from the things that they are cursing. First, we must make all comrades present at this meeting understand, and through them make all the cadres in Yan'an understand, that what we are now doing is a matter of great significance and is work of nationwide significance that builds the Party and makes the work of our Party more perfect and more complete. Now the Center has already determined to oppose subjectivism, to oppose sectarianism, and to oppose Party formalism, to transform our study style, Party style, and writing style and to expand the correct styles and restrict and eliminate the erroneous styles. Except for certain necessary routine work, the various ministries and committees under the Center are devoting all their energies to this work. Of course, we cannot yet be sure that we will do this well. Some comrades in various agencies and schools have still not recognized this point clearly, not made this matter an important matter, or not made this a central task. We say that for the next three months we should make this a major task; but does that mean that all other work should come to a halt? Routine, necessary work will not come to a halt. We must take this as our major task under the condition that routine, necessary work does not stop. How about less urgent work? Stop less urgent work temporarily. Many different courses are taught in school; stop the less important courses. For example, the Central Party School is devoting all its energies to this task, to studying the eighteen documents, plus four more, making twenty-two,³ for two and a half months. The Central Research Institute should also suspend other courses to make room for the study of these documents. Other schools, taking into consideration their varying circumstances, may suspend more or fewer courses. Various agencies may also more or less suspend less urgent work according to their circumstances. That is, in addition to doing the routine, necessary work, they should give top priority to discussing and studying the twenty-two documents, as well as to inspecting their work and thought. It is stipulated that schools should devote two months to this and agencies should devote three months. If two months are not enough for the schools, then extend it by a fortnight, and if that is not enough, then extend it by a month. If three months are not enough for the agencies, then

extend it by a fortnight, and if that is not enough, then extend it by a month. In short, we need to oppose subjectivism thoroughly, and to do a good job of it. We must have such determination. If we do not do a good job, then we should do it again. If we still do not do a good job, then do it once more. We must do a thorough job. If anybody opposes this, we must persuade him to come around. If he is not persuaded, then we must keep at it, keep at it until he comes around willingly. In short, we must push this to the end—we must rectify the Three Styles and bring about a thorough transformation of thought. We have long prepared for this transformation and have been preparing since the Zunyi Conference; in particular, since the Center promulgated the decision on enhancing Party character in July of last year, it has been ten months and much preparatory work has been done. Now we will again make a concerted effort for three months, and after that, it will be back to routine work. During the total assault, all work shall stop except for certain necessary work. High-ranking leading cadres must be made to acknowledge this and to have this determination. All comrades must be made to acknowledge this and to have this determination to achieve unity in thought and unity in action.

If we cannot achieve this, there will be great difficulties. Why? Because there were serious shortcomings in cadre education in the past, particularly in schools where policies were completely misapplied, where the study of Marxism-Leninism was taken to an anti-Marxist-Leninist point, and methods, too, were anti-Marxist-Leninist methods. This poison is relatively deep. The present poison of subjectivism is historical as well as recently produced, and both are relatively deep. The historical poison is a legacy. In recent years, many things in education have not been done well. Because thinking is varied and jumbled, there is neither unity of thought nor unity in action. So this person thinks about the issue this way, and that one thinks about it that way; this one looks at Marxism-Leninism this way, and the next one looks at it that way. This person calls a matter black, and that one calls it white; one person says one thing, ten people say ten things, one hundred say one hundred things, each one has his own version. This is how it is in Yan'an, more or less. Liberalist thinking [*ziyouzhuyi de sixiang*] is relatively deep here, and we can say there is pronounced liberalism in certain departments. Liberalism is the thinking of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, and Communist Party members should not have it. However, is there anyone

now who points out that this is petty-bourgeois consciousness, that it is bourgeois consciousness? No one points this out clearly. Under such circumstances, cadres from all fields, new cadres, old cadres, male cadres, female cadres, men of letters, cadres from different places, and people engaging in different kinds of work when together all have defects. These defects will be difficult to overcome without doing a good job of studying the twenty-two designated documents and applying them for several months in concrete actions. Theory must be linked with concrete actions, and the things talked about in the documents must be linked to one's own actions. What is concrete? There is an individual's concrete history, and there is the concrete history of the work of an agency. The ideas various comrades entertain and the actions that they take are all concrete. First, we can study these, and in the process of this study and inspection we can achieve unity in thought and unity in action. If we do not work in this way, we will not be able to achieve the goal of unity in thought and unity in action. That is, many things violate Marxism-Leninism and need to be discarded during this study and inspection. If we want to achieve this goal, then we must use our main energies to do this work. Otherwise, not only will we not be able to achieve this goal but also we will be hard-pressed to deal with the current difficulties, and if fighting starts, then Yan'an will be lost, and everyone will cry, chickens will fly, and dogs will jump. Then, the "hundred schools of thought" will all emerge; it will be a disaster and it will be very difficult for the bright future to arrive. Even if it arrives, we will not be able to grasp it.

Of all the Communist parties in the world, except for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, only the Chinese Communist Party has base areas in which to educate and train its own cadres. Now perhaps we cannot appreciate the advantages of this. But if Yan'an were to be lost, then we would know the advantages of Yan'an, with its many caves, where the twenty-two documents can be read and discussed, and we would realize how wrong it was to be lax and inattentive to our study. Then we would repent. It is no big deal to lose Yan'an. But if the Zhang family wants independence and the Wang family also wants independence, it will be a big problem. Therefore, even if Yan'an is lost, we must still oppose subjectivism and continue fighting. In the end, we must do it, we must do it even if people begin to cry and even if everything is smashed to smithereens. We must do it quickly if we wish to cope with future difficulties.

We must read these documents now. The decision of the Propaganda Department stipulates that one must write a diary [*xie biji*].⁴ Party members have a duty to obey Party decisions, and now that this decision provides that you must keep a diary, and you must write in that diary. You say that you won't. That won't do. Iron discipline has to be observed by Party members. The headband of the Monkey King was made of gold. When Lenin talks about discipline for Communist parties, he says the discipline is iron. It is tougher and harder than the gold headband of the Monkey King. This is written in the book "*Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*."⁵ On our "headband," it is written that you shall "write a diary." All of us need to write diaries, and I also need to write some [entries]. You cannot clearly study Stalin's Twelve Articles without keeping a diary. Regardless of whether you are a man of letters, a warrior, a man, a woman, a new cadre, an old cadre, and regardless of whether it is a school or an agency, you must write a diary. First, leaders need to write a diary, and class leaders and leaders of small groups all need to write diaries. They must write, and they must also examine the diaries. When you read the documents, you must move your hands and write in your diary. Many comrades have already moved their hands and written diaries, and many comrades have made errors in the past and have written diaries. We say that if you have committed errors, do not worry. As long as one recognizes one's error and corrects it, that is very good, that is a very good comrade. Now some comrades who have made errors are writing diaries, that's an excellent phenomenon. It won't do if you make a mistake and pretend that you are still the Honorable Grandfather. Those who made major contributions in the past also need to write diaries. Don't turn your contribution into a millstone around your neck, acting as if nothing matters, for this will only turn your contribution into a very heavy burden. Perhaps someone will say "I have made great contributions, so what diary is there for me to keep?" That won't do. No matter how great your contribution has been, you need to write a diary. Someone else may say "I understand astronomy and geography, and trigonometry and geometry; it doesn't take three months to read these few documents, so I can finish them in three days." Still others may say: "what is this stuff? I can take the exam without reading them." Those who can do this, of course, are very accomplished, but I say no. Why do I say no? What kinds of documents are these twenty-two documents? They are a summary of the more than one hundred

years of experience in the world revolution and a summary of more than twenty years of experience in the Chinese Revolution. Stalin's Twelve Articles were written seventeen years ago. Without the experience of the proletarian revolution of the whole world, would Stalin have been able to write these Twelve Articles? No. How come there were no Twelve Articles written during the times of Marx? Dimitrov's report at the Seventh Congress of the Com-intern is also a summary of nearly one hundred years' experience, and we fully know that to attain the goals of the revolution, we must implement what is contained in his report and adopt the Four Articles on cadre policy.⁶ The world revolution is reckoned from the time Marxism emerged, and the twenty years of the Chinese Revolution begin from the creation of the Communist Party. Not counting the May Fourth movement, that is twenty years. Even this bit of experience of the Chinese Communist Party was earned through much hardship and cannot be taken lightly. Without the twenty years of twists and turns, without the twenty years in the course of struggle, there would not be these decisions by the Center today, no April 3 decision by the Central Propaganda Department. Some comrades say these decisions are excellent, only it would be better if they had been made five years earlier. I say, you're right, it would have been even better if they had been made twenty years earlier. If the Chinese Communist Party were free of subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism from the day it was created, wouldn't that have been great, wouldn't that have been the tops? Is there such excellence in this world? There isn't. Everything requires experience; every good policy is a summary of experience. Youths who have only spent a few years reading books—how arrogant they are! They say that they only need three days to finish it all, that they can take the exam without reading, and that they don't need two or three months. Still others say that they have marched for 25,000 *li* or 35,000 *li*, so why should they study? I say even if you march that many *li* again, that won't do. Sailors are the most experienced travelers in the world, always on the move circling the globe, but if they do not write diaries, then their experience cannot be summed up. Sometimes it takes six to seven months for the Center to draft one document or at least a couple of weeks. It looks as if we are always more stupid, and others are always wiser. When we write resolutions, we can never produce them very quickly. So, don't take things to be so easy. Many comrades look down upon Stalin's Twelve Articles, look down upon the Center's

decisions, and look down upon Marxism-Leninism. We need to be clear on this point. Don't look down on them. Do write diaries. Do discuss. Do make self-examinations [*fanxing*]. At the mobilization meeting held the day before yesterday Comrade Kang Sheng⁷ talked about criticism and self-criticism. Criticism means criticizing others, and self-criticism means criticizing oneself. Criticism and self-criticism are a single whole, and you cannot neglect one. But for leaders, self-criticism is the main thing. Work should have its core, and the core of our educational work today lies in reflecting, studying, and self-examination. The core is oneself. Enlarge the correct things in oneself, and expunge and eliminate the incorrect things in oneself. We need to make all students and cadres understand that in rectifying the Three Styles, the core is oneself. To help others, one first needs to improve oneself; without oneself making progress, it will be hard to help others. We need to make this clear. We, the comrades present here, must make ourselves examples for others. To make progress, we need to study over and over our own thoughts, our own history, and our own present work, and do a good job of self-examination to serve as a model. We must do this. No matter who we are, we must do this; we must all study the twenty-two documents, read them enthusiastically, and master them. We need to express our attitudes about them: Are we for them or against them? If you think that these documents run counter to Marxist principles, well, then you should submit your views. If you think that they do not violate Marxism-Leninism and they take a Marxist-Leninist position, that they have not violated Party policies or principles, and that they are in accordance with them, then you should express your support and approval. We must carry the determination of the Center, of the high-ranking cadres, and of the comrades within the Central Study Group to subordinate levels. We must do this, and we must do it well. In opposing liberalism and subjectivism, do not act as they did when opposing "opportunism" in the Jiangxi soviet, saying eating hot peppers is Right opportunism. Instead, do it correctly and do it thoroughly. We comrades at the Center have determined that all Central agencies shall be mobilized to assist all of Yan'an to rectify the Three Styles by sending many cadres to assist the various agencies and schools. Aside from continuing routine, necessary work, the entire Central apparatus shall be mobilized to rectify the Three Styles. If the Central agencies proceed like this, then various other agencies and schools will do so all the more. Spend three

months studying the documents and one month reviewing the work. Hold a few meetings [on the rectification of the Three Styles], such as organizational meetings, propaganda meetings, and other meetings. Individual comrades from the Center will take the lead in this rectification of the Three Styles. At the level of the border region, Comrade Ren Bishi⁸ shall be entrusted with the responsibility to provide guidance. Comrades Wang Jiaxiang⁹ and Chen Yun¹⁰ will be responsible for the Military Affairs Committee system. Comrades Kang Sheng and Li Fuchun will be responsible for the various agencies directly under the Center. Comrade [He] Kaifeng will be responsible for schools (except the Party School). I will be responsible for the Party School. The goals we want to reach during this period of study and inspection are to transform our work style and to unify internally, that is, as it is written in the decision, to transform our viewpoint, transform our way of thinking, transform our style of work, unify cadres, and unite the whole Party.

During the work of study, discussion, and inspection, many cadres will appear to be very active and enthusiastic. Some will also be interested and participate in the entire thing, but they will treat the entire thing as business as usual. Also, there will be a few who will be even worse; these are the backward ones. In most places, generally there are these three kinds of people, the active and enthusiastic and thus correct, the average, and the backward. We cannot treat these people equally. It is not good to promote egalitarianism among cadres; egalitarianism makes the activist and the average emulate the backward. We should make the backward and the average elements emulate the activist and advanced elements, make the backward, those comrades whose ideological consciousness and actions are rather lacking and incorrect, emulate the correct and active comrades, as well as make the average comrades emulate the active comrades. It is a mistake to lack such guidance, leaving the active to be mixed up with the backward, not giving any encouragement to the active and treating them in the same way as the backward. Who would want to be active then? There would be no more Stakhanovs.¹¹ Why does the Soviet Union advocate learning from Stakhanov? Because he is active, and it wants others to emulate him. We should adopt this attitude, calling on all to emulate the activists. Of course, in doing this we should pay attention to not praising excessively or inappropriately, creating the impression that the leaders particularly like some people and dislike others. That

would be no good. We need to make everyone emulate the future, the activists, with the spirit of uniting cadres and uniting the entire Party.

There is also the issue of gathering questions, studying the twenty-two documents, and checking on our work. The various agencies and schools shall hold meetings to discuss and explain the questions themselves, and at the same time, they shall report these questions to the Center. We hope that there will be two models. One is the best, and the other is the worst. Report these two views and these two circumstances to the Center. Each work-unit can answer the questions that arise during study by themselves; if you cannot explain them, hold a meeting to discuss them. If you still cannot resolve them, submit them to the Center for answers. This is the way to gather and answer questions. You should separate the activists, the normal elements, and the backward elements among the cadres and pay particular attention to those who have problems in their thinking and in their Party character, and use the method of talking with them one on one. The Northwestern Bureau has used this method, as have several other agencies, to good result. Another method is to hold cadre meetings. One-on-one talks and cadre meetings—use these two methods to do the work. How should cadre meetings be held? I talked with Comrade Wang Shoudao¹² yesterday. In the organization where he works, there are more than twenty small group leaders and section chiefs and more than sixty other kinds of cadres; in all, over eighty people. I think there can be a meeting for those twenty or so people each fortnight, and one meeting for the eighty people each month. At the twenty-person meetings, you should inform them of the spirit of the Central Study Group and systematically discuss its content; you can open up discussion, and everyone can express his views. The size of the meeting can be more than ten people or eight or nine people, according to the circumstances of the unit. Hold such meetings at best once a week, or if that's not possible, then once a fortnight, because these people are the direct leaders of the others. For the others, hold one meeting every month. There are too many people at such meetings, and I fear that it will be very difficult to discuss anything, but you can give a report and explain the discussions from the twenty-person meetings. You need to use these methods to hold meetings. To connect with cadres, one way is to talk with them, and the other way is to hold meetings. By using these two methods, we will be able to know what each comrade is thinking, what problems he or she has, with

what things he or she is dissatisfied, and with what things he or she is satisfied. It is not yet time for investigation work now, and certain things may only be brought up then—for example, methods like first criticizing the leader and then criticizing the led. Last time, when Comrade Deng Fa¹³ compiled a report concerning the experience of the labor movement committee, the shortcomings of the leaders were first criticized, so everyone dared to speak up. If the led had been criticized first, then they would have been intimidated and would not have dared to speak up. Investigation work should encourage people to speak up. As the vice director of the Central Research Institute¹⁴ said, speak up bravely and shoot the arrow at the target, and as long it does not violate the law and is within regulations, speech is permitted. Correct or incorrect refers to the content of the speech; some is right, and some is wrong. Saying something wrong, which happens in the process of speaking, should be acknowledged and identified as wrong; it can be corrected later. When problems occur during discussions, you should first criticize the leader and then the led; this is a better way, like the method used by the Labor Movement Committee. General responsibility for whether we do a good job this time falls on the Center. If we do a good job, it is to our credit, and if we do not do a good job, it is to our discredit. The administrative head of each department shall bear the main responsibility for whether his department does a good job. The Party branch should not, as in the past, take responsibility; this time the administrative side shall bear responsibility. Regardless of whether the one-on-one talks resolved problems, regardless of whether cadres have studied the twenty-two documents and written their diaries, regardless of whether investigation work has been carried out, regardless of whether the style of work has changed, regardless of whether the goals of the discussion have been reached, and regardless of whether there is a little success or none—the responsibility for all this redounds upon the administrative head. All comrades present here today shall bear responsibility. I hope that you consider this well, study well, and do a good job consulting and exchanging views with cadres in the departments under your leadership in order to achieve the goals of rectifying the Three Styles. Others rectify their Three Styles, but I am not rectifying even one; if Party members are like this, that is no good. You are a Party member, so you should obey the decisions of the Party. Will it do if you do not rectify even one style? It won't do even if you rectify two

styles. We say that we must rectify the Three Styles. To rectify the Three Styles, we cannot permit even a few deviant styles. After two and a half styles have been rectified, and there is only half left, can it remain? No! We must rectify the Three Styles; this is called going to the end. We must bear this responsibility. Here, method is important, and first we need to disseminate the decision of the Propaganda Department that puts forward the method, that is, studying the twenty-two documents, discussing them, and carrying out investigation work. Only in this way can you do a good job. This is no easy matter.

I hear that some agencies and schools are pushing things. They spend two days studying one document, and then they're done, but this is like viewing flowers while riding on horseback.¹⁵ Many documents need to be studied and analyzed article by article, only getting to the second after finishing the first, so before finishing the first, don't look at the others. Just discuss this one. With some, two or three articles can be studied together, but first study them one by one. It is no easy matter to achieve a thorough understanding of Stalin's Twelve Articles. Many people attempt to grasp them all at once but end up grasping nothing at all. We should go over the document article by article, using an analytical method. Once you have done one article, then do the next; in this way, first there are ten articles left, then there are eight articles left, and finally they are all "eliminated." Analyze the articles one by one and then sum them up; only in this way will you be able to understand the whole thing. We need to achieve something this time, give a new face to the Party, and all comrades present here must take responsibility for doing this. Regardless of whether we do a good job rectifying the Three Styles has an important bearing on the present, on the future, and on the leadership of the whole revolution. We must resolve to do this work well.

Notes

Our source for this text comes from *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 411–23, which draws from a printed record in the Central Archives.

¹. Mao gave this talk to a meeting of the Central Party Study Group, or the Central Research Group, which had been set up according to the August 1941 Central Committee resolution to undertake education of

senior Party cadres; see the text of the resolution in Vol. VII, pp. 783–85. This talk followed the Party directive on rectification of April 3, 1942, and its timetable was extended in June; see Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 1073–95.

2. These are essentially the core rectification study documents, aside from Mao's writings, most of which were collected in the Yan'an *Zhengfeng wenxian*, 5th exp. ed. (Hong Kong: Xin minzhu chubanshe, 1949). Stalin's Twelve Articles consists of his 1925 list of what is required for the Bolshevization of cadres; they are translated in Compton, tr., *Mao's China*, pp. 269–71. Georgi Dimitrov was the head of Comintern in the 1930s; see Vol. V, pp. lxix–lxx. He called for cadre reform in 1935 at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern.

3. All twenty-two documents are listed in the April 3, 1942, Propaganda Bureau decision, translated in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, p. 1076. These are exactly the contents of the famous *Rectification Documents* book that was used at this time for cadre study. See Compton, tr., *Mao's China*.

4. These *biji* of personal reflections and confessions were a core part of the rectification process, as Mao makes clear below; according to David E. Apter and Tony Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), *biji* were broadly accepted by cadres in Yan'an at that time.

5. Written by Lenin in 1920.

6. The Four Articles are the criteria for selecting cadres put forth by Georgi Dimitrov as the general secretary of the Comintern at its August 1935 Seventh Congress. They are: 1. unconditional dedication to the work of the proletariat, as demonstrated in combat, in prison, and in court; 2. enthusiastic connections with the masses; 3. being decisive and unafraid of taking responsibility, and; 4. demonstrating Bolshevik discipline. Dimitrov's essay is in his *The United Front: The Struggle Against Fascism and War* (New York: International, 1938), pp. 116–26.

7. Kang Sheng (1898–1975) was the leader of Yan'an's security and intelligence services and a leading member of Mao's leadership group in 1942. Kang played a central role in the Rectification movement and anti-spy campaign. He had extensive experience in Moscow and made the delicate transition from serving Wang Ming, competitor for top leadership with Mao, to serving Mao in the late 1930s.

8. Ren Bishi (1904–1950) was a leading military figure in the Communist movement in the 1930s. He joined the Long March and rose to top leadership circles with Mao and would serve in the all-powerful Secretariat from 1943. For his biography, see Vol. IV, p. xxxvii, n18.

9. Wang Jiaxiang, see above, note to the text of February 21, 1942.

10. Chen Yun (1905–1995) was at this time a member of the Politburo and of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the deputy head of the Northwestern Financial and

conomic Office, and the head of the Political Department.

[11](#). That is, labor heroes, like Alexei Stakhanov, the coal miner made famous by Stalin for exceeding production targets.

[12](#). Wang Shoudao was at this time the director of the Party Central Secretariat (see above, note to the text of January 23, 1942).

[13](#). Deng Fa (1906–1946) was at this time the secretary of the Labor Movement Committee of the Central Committee.

[14](#). This was Fan Wenlan, a noted historian. See above, note 1 to the text of January 17, 1942.

[15](#). That is, seeing things only superficially.

An Inscription (for Nurses)

(May 12, 1942)

“Respect the nurses, and take good care of the nurses.”

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 10, p. 177, reproduced from *Jiefang ribao*, May 12, 1942.

Literary and Art Workers Should Unite with Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers

(May 28, 1942)

Comrades in literary and art circles have recently held several meetings to discuss the question of how they can unite with our comrades present here and with comrades working in different fields under our leadership.¹ I think that the comrades present here should also understand this question. Of course, the resolution of this question cannot be achieved in one or two days because it is a long-term process, but we need to understand the Party's policy toward this question.

Let us think back. During the ten years of Civil War, that is, the period of the Red Army, we also had some literature and art, such as writing a few novels and organizing some opera troupes. These were relatively widespread, and, in addition, there were also songs, propaganda posters, and cartoons. Compared with what we have now, they were not nearly as good. Now, with the talent our Eighth Route Army has absorbed, they are much more diverse, and literary. Art work is also more widespread. At that time, our bases were cut off from the broad range of intellectuals, cut off from the people of the central cities. In addition, we had made mistakes concerning intellectuals; we looked down on intellectuals, believing that they were not really very useful. If we had not made these mistakes, perhaps the situation would have been better.

At that time, the Guomindang had two kinds of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, that is, the military "encirclement and suppression" and the cultural "encirclement and suppression." The military "encirclement and suppression" opposed the Red Army; the cultural "encirclement and suppression" opposed the new culture, opposed literature and art containing revolutionary

thought, and opposed revolutionary literature and art in the White area as championed by Lu Xun. After the Xi'an Incident, when we established the United Front, this kind of "encirclement and suppression" was broken up, and a host of cultured people [*wenhuaren*] and intellectuals came to the base areas. As a result, there is a great number of literary and art workers in the various base areas in North and Central China, in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and in particular in Yan'an. Some have already become specialists, while others, who are more numerous, have not yet become specialists but are ordinary cultural and art workers. What kind of phenomenon is this for the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and our base areas? It is a very good phenomenon and by no means a bad one. After the decision by the Center on intellectuals is published, this situation will become better still. The decision by the Center on intellectuals states in a formal way that our Party welcomes and admits a great number of intellectuals. No matter what kind of intellectuals they are, as long as they resist Japan, they should be admitted. In fact, those intellectuals who cooperate with us not only resist Japan but also have democratic ideas and are pro-democratic. If they had no democratic ideas they would not have come at all. Moreover, the thinking of most of the people working with us has become Marxist-Leninist thought, become Communist thought. That is, most of them have become Party members, and their thinking not only is anti-Japanese and democratic but has also become proletarian.

There are already decisions by the Party Center on intellectuals, but we still do not have a very good unified decision on literary and art workers. Now we are preparing to make such a decision, and that is why we have held three conferences.² More than one hundred comrades have attended these meetings, some Party members and others not. This meeting has gone pretty well. Its purpose is to resolve the question of uniting as we have just discussed, that is, the question of uniting writers, artists, and literary and art workers with the cadres of our Party, with workers and peasants, and with officers and soldiers in the armed forces.

How to unite? There are two sides to this, and we need to work on people on both sides. Writers, artists, and literary and art workers need to get in touch with comrades engaged in military, Party, political, and economic work. They need to unite with these comrades. For people in other areas, we need to tell them to get

in touch with and unite with writers and artists. All in all, we need to work on both sides, to tell both sides what attitude each should adopt.

We should also understand the questions for literary and art workers. What questions are there for them? They are the questions of whether and how to unite. First, do we want to unite or not? The answer is we do. Then the question that follows is the method of how to unite. In doing this we must resolve ideological questions, of which the most basic question is the need to break the influence of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois thinking. Only then can thinking be transformed into proletarian thinking; only then can it have a Marxist-Leninist Party character. Only when this ideological question is resolved can they unite with the proletariat and the masses of workers and peasants ideologically, and only on this basis will they be able to unite in action with the workers, peasants, soldiers, and our Party. If this question is not resolved, they will always feel like complete outsiders. If a person engages in one sort of work for a very long time, he is bound to acquire many habits and biases. Many literary and art workers grew up in a society dominated by the Guomindang or in feudal society and have been subject to strong influences from the old society—some more, others less. Some are very sophisticated, others less so. There are differences in degree. If we do not clearly point this out, if we do not make them consciously break up these things and gradually turn them into proletarian thought, then these things will constitute an obstacle in their efforts to unite completely in action with the workers, peasants, soldiers, and our Party, hampering the speed of the uniting process and obstructing their own progress. Therefore, in the Rectification Campaign against the Three Styles all comrades must undergo rectification, including those in literary and art circles, and their goal must be to eradicate bourgeois and petty-bourgeois thinking and to turn them into proletarian thinking.

Recently, some articles, and some literary works—of course, only some—have raised some problems. Some comrades are dissatisfied with certain things and have voiced their opinions. It is certainly correct to raise these questions. What does raising these questions prove? It proves that our comrades are not ashamed to be political soldiers. Although our cultural level is low, we have a keen political sense of smell, and we can quickly sniff out any bad air. We say that of all the problems that have been raised now and all the works that have raised

them, none are very big. Why do I say this? It is because these comrades are essentially all revolutionary. They have all come from cities outside of or from within the base areas. In the cities outside the base areas, many of them engaged in revolutionary work, some already for a long time, and now they continue to engage in revolutionary work. As for not doing so well on certain occasions, or in a certain speech or in a certain article, these are of a secondary character. These problems are easy to resolve, and none is very serious. One individual case is rather serious, and that is our Comrade Wang Shiwei.³ His ideas are quite systematic, and, apparently, the bad things are deeper in him. The other works are all different from this one. Their problems are only partial and not something serious. They are one kind.

The other kind is a more serious problem. They are far from thoroughly applying Marxist-Leninist thought to achieve revolutionary character and Party character and to unite these completely with artistic work. That is, they still demonstrate bourgeois and petty-bourgeois thought. If these things are not eliminated, if they are permitted to develop further, that will be quite dangerous. There is a bit of these things, some more or some less, among comrades in literary and art circles, and this includes some among our new Party members as well as some among old Party members. Of course, such shortcomings are serious only among some comrades. Their basic problem, which has yet to be resolved, is whether literature and art should be for the masses of workers and peasants, in the service of the masses of workers and peasants, popularized among the masses of workers and peasants, and thus elevated in the process of popularization. Their problems can be resolved. Beyond this, there is also a similar problem: in evaluating literary works. Some comrades say their artistic character has been obliterated, and others say that their revolutionary character has been obliterated. This so-called obliteration of revolutionary character really means that only as long as something is artistic, as long as it is a piece of literary or art work with a high artistic level, is it deemed good. They put particular emphasis on this aspect while they are not clear about such things as the question of standpoint, viewpoint, the basic Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, gathering subject matter from the workers, peasants, and soldiers, who are the audience, or how to unite closely with or to serve completely the workers, peasants, and soldiers.

Writers and artists should draw their subject matter from the workers,

peasants, and soldiers and become their friends and treat them like their own brothers and sisters. If this aspect is taken lightly and not given enough emphasis, then it is a deviation; it is a relative neglect of revolutionary character (of course, there are various degrees of such neglect). In terms of deviation, this is a rather serious deviation. Of course, I am not saying that everyone has this deviation, but many have the deviation of neglecting revolutionary character. They neglect the study of Marxism-Leninism and neglect using Marxist-Leninist thought to overcome the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois thought in our minds. Their thinking and practice, their thinking and action, are not unified. They think one way and act another. What they do does not conform to what they think. This is the separation of theory from practice. They think of serving the workers and peasants, but their actions do not serve the workers and peasants. They think of doing things for the workers and peasants, but they have few friends among the workers and peasants. They think of serving the workers and peasants, but they do not understand worker or peasant cadres. This kind of “thinking” in fact is not thorough; that is, they have not placed enough emphasis on revolutionary character. This kind of deviation is quite common among comrades in literary and art circles and should be thoroughly examined.

Are there other deviations? There are. Putting too much emphasis on revolutionary character to the neglect of the artistic character, thinking that as long as something is revolutionary, as long as it has the slogans, even if it is not artistic, it is okay. This is lowering the level of literature and art to that of ordinary things without distinguishing the two because other things do not take the artistic form of literature and art. Now that we are emphasizing revolutionary character, to toss the artistic forms required by literature and art down the drain is another kind of deviation. Is it sufficient for us to emphasize only the revolutionary character of literature and art without emphasizing their artistic character? No, this is not sufficient either. Without artistic character, it is not literature or art. This deviation once occurred in Russia, and I have heard that it has occurred in our Party’s history, too. It is as if something is good so long as it quotes a few lines of Marxism-Leninism or says a few words about the proletariat. Not paying attention to artistic form and paying attention only to the political content of a piece of work is to eliminate the difference between art and other things. To say that art need not have any particularity or that it is not a

special sector in revolutionary work is just as much a deviation.

Then, what kind of things do we advocate? We hold that revolutionary character goes from a low level to a high level, and the same is true for artistic character. How does revolutionary character go from a low level to a high level? If you talk about Marxism-Leninism to the big landlords, they will not come. If you talk about democracy to them, they will not come either. Landlords want to collect rent, and they want the feudal system. Now that the Japanese imperialists have fought their way in here, they also want to resist Japan. As long as we do not destroy their feudal system, or even if we destroy it, as long as we do not do so too thoroughly, if you talk about resisting Japan, they will come. So long as they come, that will be good. We can only work on resisting Japan with big landlords and big bourgeoisie, not other things. If they will only resist Japan, that will do. The national bourgeoisie is different. They need democracy, but the kind of democracy that they want is bourgeois democracy. As for the great masses of the people, the most important part, that is, the democracy of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie, theirs is again different from the democracy of the bourgeoisie. Now when the Chinese national bourgeoisie has not fully taken control of the government or in the main has not taken control of the government, they at least have this thought: They want to build democracy. If you talk about Marxism-Leninism to them, they will not come. The petty-bourgeois class as a whole does not practice Marxism-Leninism. It is only the proletariat and the intellectuals from other social strata who have been proletarianized who truly believe in Marxism-Leninism and practice Marxism-Leninism. To talk about revolutionary character is to talk from resisting Japan to practicing Marxism-Leninism, that is, from the low level to the high level. In art, we adopt the same policy as we do with regard to revolutionary character. We also go from the low level to the high level, beginning from the sprouts up to the high level, up to Tolstoy, Gorky, Lu Xun, and so forth, who represent the consummate level. We want both those things with a high artistic character and those things with a low artistic character. We also want things such as wall newspapers, children's paintings of children—these are the sprouts which have the possibility of growth; there are roots in them. There is art in the songs the common folk sing, in folk stories, in wall newspapers of various departments, in the tall tales that soldiers tell. Men who do not know a single character can tell

beautiful stories. A complete illiterate can tell a beautiful story; even spoken language also has an artistic character. I have heard many such stories. It is wrong to ignore these things, and only having one's eyes glued on highly artistic things while disregarding low-level things, saying the common folk have rough hands and feet and count for nothing, taking their works lightly, going so far as to look down upon ordinary artistic workers, wall newspapers, or reports from the countryside and not understanding that the writing of just a few hundred characters on a wall newspaper by soldiers and peasants has great significance. Such views are more common among specialists. We need to read books by Hu Shi, but it is also okay not to read them. We also need to see and hear wall newspapers, folk songs, and folk stories. That those who have just been emancipated after many years of oppression are able to write a few hundred characters on a wall newspaper is an amazing event. Those who do not see things in this light obviously have not taken a firm stand, and because of this they do not like these things from the masses. What constitutes our main base? It is the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Do we want intellectual artists of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois origin? We do, but our main base is the workers, peasants, and soldiers. It is only from this base that their works can bloom. Artists of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois origin can help us. Among them some have determined to become like the workers and peasants and they have been reborn, taking the thinking of workers and peasants as their thought and taking the customs and habits of workers and peasants as their own. Writing about the workers and peasants in this way, they can educate them and elevate their works to the level of art. In a class society, there are the literati, and in the socialist society of the future, there will also be specialists such as writers and artists. In the future, a large number of writers will emerge from the workers and peasants. Now we are in a transitional period. In my view, it will take China fifty years to go through this transitional period, and it will be bothersome. This is the process in which writers and artists of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois background will unite with the workers and peasants. During this period, it is inevitable that some trouble, some chaos, will occur. Our policy is cautiously to provide good guidance to them so that they will self-consciously but not reluctantly become one with the workers and peasants. A few people will be unable to do this, and we need to tolerate them, for this is an ideological problem, and we cannot force things or

adopt a rough attitude. Our general policy is to strive to get the majority of writers and artists to unite with the workers and peasants so that they treasure those low-level things and treasure ordinary literary and art workers. Specialists have the responsibility to provide guidance to ordinary literary and art workers. Do they only have the responsibility to provide guidance? No. They also need to study them, to absorb nourishment from ordinary literary and art workers and from the people themselves. Otherwise, they will be hanging in mid-air, which is very dangerous. The level of Gorky is very high, but he maintained extensive ties with the grassroots. He had correspondence connections with the countryside. He loved reading a letter by a thirteen-year-old child, and after changing a few words he had it published. It is in *Shanghai Reports*.⁴ Only when high-level literary and art workers develop ties to ordinary literary and art workers and to the people will they have an outlet, will they have the masses, will they have milk to drink—since this is given to them by the masses. Otherwise there will be nothing.

Literature and art are an army, and its cadres are the literary and art workers. They need a commander-in-chief. Without a commander-in-chief, they could mistake their direction. Lu Xun and Gorky are the equivalent of the commanders-in-chief, and their works and their statements are their guiding directions. If ordinary literary and art workers do not have high-level guidance, they could mistake their direction, they could remain at a low level for a long time without improving. We need to make literary and art workers understand these questions and grasp the Party's policies. It would be good if we could get them to understand these things in one to two months. If they cannot understand these things in one to two months, then give them half a year. If half a year is still not enough, then a year. We need to pay particular attention to making writers who are famous and who have many achievements understand these things so as to push the tide of literary and art work in this direction, to benefit the nation and to benefit the workers, peasants, and soldiers. This is also beneficial to writers themselves. "Man has one life to live; grass has one spring to grow," for what purpose? A life is just to serve the workers, peasants, and soldiers. It would be good if when you die that others will write your funeral eulogy like this, though, of course, it is not just for the purpose of writing funeral eulogies. When Zhang Hao⁵ died, we wrote a funeral eulogy. In name, it was for

the dead, but in fact, it was for the living. It was to tell people: Don't be so selfish! Was Zhang Hao's whole revolutionary life only lived for the funeral eulogy? I believe not! Therefore, writers and artists need to understand such a policy, and other comrades also need to understand such a policy. This is a problem in the process of uniting.

In addition, another problem is how to unite. We require that our comrades in the various arenas of the armed forces, the government, education, popular movements, and Party affairs welcome literary and art workers, whether they are low level or high level, and adopt an appropriate attitude toward them, an attitude tolerant of their shortcomings. And we require writers and artists for their part to be tolerant of the shortcomings of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. It will not do not to pardon such shortcomings, because in the future there are bound to be more problems. That some intellectuals, writers, and artists do not wish to be our friends is not just a shortcoming among them. Some departments also have shortcomings and problems. Since the decision by the Center on intellectuals was issued, there remain many problems not yet resolved. So, as with the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points of Attention,⁶ we need to talk about them every day, we need to get comrades in the various arenas of the armed forces, the government, Party affairs, and the economy and education all to welcome cultured people and intellectuals and to understand their importance—that without these people we will not succeed. Stalin talked about this as a theoretical problem at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. All classes need such a group of cultured people to do things. The landlord class, the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat are all alike, they all need intellectuals to work for them. Before one particular class becomes fully educated, it must utilize intellectuals of other class origins. Therefore, we need to go slowly. We need to conduct propaganda and explain things. Merely writing a few articles or making a few speeches will not do. We must advance concretely, step by step, for this is no easy task that can be achieved only in one try.

Notes

This is part 3 of a speech Mao delivered to a meeting of the Central Study Group. Our source is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 424–33, which is based on a printed transcript held in the Central Archives.

1. Mao is referring to the series of meetings held in May 1942 that are most famously recorded in his “Talks at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art,” texts of May 2 and May 23, above.

2. The three Yan’an meetings on art and literature were held May 2, 16, and 23.

3. Wang Shiwei (1906–1947) was a researcher in the Center for Literary Research at the Central Research Institute in Yan’an. His essay, “Wild Lilies,” was among the essays by left-wing writers critical of the Chinese Communist Party that were published in the Literature and Arts supplement of *Jiefang ribao*. Wang’s “Wild Lilies” appeared on March 13 and March 23, 1942. He was purged in the summer of 1942 and criticized as a “negative role model” in the Rectification and anti-spy campaigns and later executed. See the Introduction to this volume, pp. xli–xliii and Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and “Wild Lilies.”*

4. *Shanghai shulin*, literally “forest of books from Shanghai.” A literary magazine in Shanghai.

5. Zhang Hao (real name, Lin Zuopei, 1897–1942) joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922 and was active in the Party until his death. In October 1935 he returned from two years in Europe and Moscow to bring Comintern orders on the new United Front to the Party in Shaanxi.

6. These were a code of conduct for the Red Army put forward by Mao in December 1929 in the draft resolution that is widely known as the Gutian Resolution. See Vol. III, p. 216, n64. Both the Rules and Points went through various formulations (and the Rules grew from six in 1929 to eight in later versions), but the substance remained. The Three Rules: prompt obedience to orders; no confiscation of peasant property; and prompt delivery directly to the authorities of all items confiscated from landlords; the Eight Points: Be polite when speaking; be honest when buying and selling; return all borrowed articles; pay compensation for anything damaged; do not hit or swear at others; do not damage crops; do not harass females; and do not mistreat prisoners.

*Elegy for Dai Anlan*¹

(May 1942)²

Foreign invasion requires men to defend,
General, you wrote a heroic page of this.

The enemy boasted of mechanized troops,
Your valor beat down the might of lions and bears.

Bathed in blood, you defended Donggua,
Driving back the Japanese,³ you swept clean Tang and Ji⁴

On the field of battle in the end you perished,
Your lofty ideals have not been lost.

Notes

Our source for this poem is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 10, p. 177, which reproduces the version published in *Xin wanbao* of July 3, 1980.

¹. Dai Anlan (1905–1942) was a Guomindang general active in the Burma (now Myanmar) campaign in the spring of 1942. He held Donggua (also known as Tongji), though it ultimately fell to the Japanese, and he recaptured Tanggan in the spring campaign. Dai was killed in an encounter with Japanese troops along the north Burma border on May 26, 1942. The Guomindang government honored Dai in December 1942. See Liu Shaotang, *Minguo renwu xiaozhuan* (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1981), Vol. 4, pp. 404–6.

². This poem appears to be from May 1942, when Dai died; however, as the Guomindang government honored Dai in December 1942, it is possible that Mao offered his version at that time.

³. Mao uses the old, pejorative term *wo* for Japanese.

⁴. These are classical names: Tang for Tanggan and Ji for Tongji, that is, Donggua.

Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art (May 1942)

October 19 is the seventh anniversary of the death of Lu Xun. We have specially published Comrade Mao Zedong's talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art in May 1942 to commemorate the greatest and most heroic standard-bearer of the Chinese cultural revolution.

Liberation Daily editor, 1943

Introduction (May 2, 1942)

Comrades! I have invited you to this conference today for the purpose of exchanging opinions with you on the correct relationship¹ between work in literature and art and revolutionary work in general, to obtain the correct development of revolutionary literature and art and better assistance from them in our other revolutionary work, so that we may overthrow our national enemy and accomplish our task of national liberation.²

There are a number of different fronts in our struggle for the national liberation of China; among them are the civil and military fronts—that is, a cultural as well as an armed front. Victory over the enemy depends primarily on armies with guns in their hands, but this kind of army alone is not enough. We still need a cultural army, since this kind of army is indispensable in achieving unity among ourselves and winning victory over the enemy. Since May 4, when this cultural army took shape in China, it has aided the Chinese Revolution by gradually limiting the sphere and weakening the strength of China's feudal

culture and the slavish culture³ that serves imperialist aggression, so that now reactionaries are reduced to resisting new culture by “meeting quality with quantity”: Reactionaries are not short of money, and with some effort they can turn out a lot even if they cannot come up with anything worthwhile. Literature and art have formed an important and successful part of the cultural front since May 4. The revolutionary movement in literature and art, which developed considerably during the Civil War period, had the same general direction as the Red Army struggles⁴ of that time, but there was no coordination between them in their actual work, *and each fought as an independent army*. The reason was that the reactionaries at that time kept the two fraternal armies apart. After the War of Resistance Against Japan broke out, the number of workers in the field of revolutionary literature and art who came to Yan’an and other anti-Japanese bases increased, which was very good. However, coming to a base area is by no means the same thing as integrating with the people’s movement⁵ there, and if we want to push ahead with our revolutionary work, we must integrate these two forces completely. Our meeting today is to ensure that literature and art become a component part of the whole revolutionary machinery, so they can act as a powerful weapon in uniting and educating the people while attacking and annihilating the enemy and help the people struggle against the enemy in full solidarity. What problems must be solved in order to achieve this purpose? They are⁶ questions relating to our position, attitude, audience, work, and study.

The question of our position. We identify ourselves with the proletariat and the broad popular masses. Communist Party members must also identify themselves with the Party and with its basic character and policy. Is it true that some of our workers in literature and art still lack a clear and correct understanding of this question? I think so: Many comrades have frequently strayed from their correct position.

The question of attitude. The question of the concrete attitude that we should take with regard to various concrete matters arises out of the question of our position. For example, whether to praise or expose something is a question of attitude. Which, ultimately, attitude should we take? I would say that we need both kinds of attitudes; it all depends on whom we are dealing with. There are three kinds of people: our enemies, our friends,⁷ and ourselves (that is, the proletariat⁸ and its vanguard). A different attitude is required for each of these

three kinds of people. *Should we “praise” the enemy, Japanese Fascists, and all other enemies of the people? Absolutely not, because they are the very worst kind of reactionaries. They may have some superiority on a technical level, so that we can say, for example, that their guns and artillery are good, but good weapons in their hands are reactionary. The task of our armed forces is to capture their weapons and turn them against the enemy to seize victory.* The task of our cultural army⁹ is to expose the enemy’s atrocities, treachery, and inevitable defeat, and to encourage anti-Japanese forces to unite in complete solidarity to win a decisive victory.¹⁰ To *our friends*, our allies of various kinds,¹¹ our attitude should include unity and criticism according to the circumstances. We support their resistance to Japan, and we praise their achievements. But we should criticize resistance which is not positive and criticize and oppose¹² anyone who is anti-Communist and anti-people, who goes on taking the road of reaction day after day. As for the popular masses, we should obviously praise their toil and struggle, their army and their party. Shortcomings exist even among the people: Many members of the proletariat still retain petty-bourgeois ways of thinking, and both peasants and the petty bourgeoisie have backward ways of thinking which hamper them in their struggle. We must educate them patiently over a long period of time, helping them to cast off this burden from their backs¹³ so that they can advance with rapid strides. They have either reformed themselves or are in the process of reforming themselves in the struggle, and¹⁴ our literature and art should describe this process of their reform, instead of being prejudiced and erroneously ridiculing them or even regarding them as some kind of enemy. What we write should help them to unite, to make progress, and to struggle forward in complete solidarity, discarding their backward qualities and developing their revolutionary qualities. It certainly should not have the opposite effect.

The question of audience is the question of for whom we are writing. This problem is not the same in the anti-Japanese bases in the border region,¹⁵ North China, and Central China as in the general rear¹⁶ or¹⁷ in prewar Shanghai. In the Shanghai period, the audience for revolutionary works of literature and art consisted primarily of students, office workers, and shop assistants. In the general rear¹⁸ after the war broke out, this circle expanded a little, but it still consisted primarily of the same people, because the government there has kept workers,

peasants, and soldiers away from revolutionary literature and art. It is a completely different matter in our base areas. The audience for works of literature and art here consists of workers, peasants, and soldiers, together with their cadres in the Party, the government, and the army.¹⁹ There are students in the base areas, too, but they are not the same as the old type of student; they are either cadres already or cadres of the future. Once they are literate, cadres of various kinds, soldiers in the army, workers in factories, and peasants in the countryside want books and newspapers, while people who are not literate want to see plays, look at pictures, sing songs, and listen to music; they are the audience for our works of literature and art. To speak just of cadres, you shouldn't underestimate their numbers. They outnumber by far the readership for any book published in the rear areas,²⁰ where only two thousand copies are usually printed for each edition and only six thousand even for three editions, while there are more than ten thousand cadres in the base areas in Yan'an alone who can read. Moreover, many of these cadres are revolutionaries who have endured many trials; they come from all over China, and they will go and work all over China, so educational work among these people is of immense significance. Our workers in literature and art should work for them very conscientiously.

Because the audience for literature and art consists of workers, peasants, soldiers, and their cadres, the question then arises of how to get to understand and know these people properly. To do this, we must carry out a great deal of work among them, in Party and government organs, in villages and factories, in the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, gaining an understanding of all sorts of situations and all sorts of people and making ourselves thoroughly familiar with them. Our workers in literature and art must carry out their own work in literature and art, but the task of understanding people and getting to know them properly has the highest priority. How have our workers in literature and art performed in this respect until now? I would say that until now they have been heroes without a battlefield, remote and uncomprehending. What do I mean by remote? Remote from the people. Workers in literature and art are unfamiliar with the people whom they write about and who read their work, or are simply very distant from them. Our workers in literature and art are not familiar with workers, peasants, soldiers, or even their cadres. What do I mean by

uncomprehending? Not comprehending their language. Yours is the language of intellectuals, and theirs is the language of the popular masses.²¹ *I have mentioned before that* many comrades like to talk about “popularization,” but what does popularization mean? It means that the thoughts and emotions of our workers in literature and art should become one with the thoughts and emotions of the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers. And to achieve this unity, we should start by studying²² the language of the masses. If we do not even understand the masses’ language,²³ how can we talk about creating literature and art? Being heroes without a battlefield means that all your fine principles are not appreciated by the masses. The more you parade your qualifications before the masses, the more you act like “heroes,” and the harder you try to sell your principles to them, the more the masses will resist buying. If you want the masses to understand you, if you want to become one with the masses, you must make a firm decision to undergo a long and even painful tempering. At this point, let me relate my own experience in how feelings are transformed. I started off as a student at school, and at school I acquired student habits, so I felt ashamed about performing any manual labor, such as carrying my own bags, in front of all those students who were incapable of carrying anything for themselves. I felt that intellectuals were the only clean people in the world and that workers, peasants, and soldiers²⁴ were in general rather dirty. I could wear clothes borrowed from an intellectual, because I considered them clean, but I would not wear workers’, peasants’, or soldiers’ clothes, because I thought they were dirty. When I joined the revolution and lived among workers, peasants, and soldiers,²⁵ I gradually became familiar with them, and they got to know me in return. Then and only then the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois feelings taught to me in bourgeois schools underwent a fundamental change. Comparing intellectuals who have not yet reformed with workers, peasants, and soldiers,²⁶ I came to feel that intellectuals are *not only spiritually unclean in many respects but even physically unclean*, while the cleanest people are workers and peasants; their hands may be black and their feet soiled with cow dung, but they are still cleaner than the big and petty bourgeoisie.²⁷ This is what I call a transformation in feelings, changing over from one class to another. If our workers in literature and art who come from the intelligentsia want their work to be welcomed by the masses, they must see to it that their thoughts and feelings undergo transformation and reform. Otherwise,

nothing they do will turn out well or be effective.

The final question is study, by which I mean the study of Marxism-Leninism and the study of society. Anyone who calls himself a Marxist-Leninist²⁸ revolutionary writer, particularly a Party writer, must have a general knowledge²⁹ of Marxism-Leninism, but at present, some comrades still lack fundamental Marxist-Leninist³⁰ ideas. For example, one fundamental idea in Marxism-Leninism³¹ is that the objective determines the subjective;³² that is, the objective reality of class struggle and national struggle determines our thoughts and feelings. However, some of our comrades turn this problem upside down: They say that everything should proceed from “love.” Now, love, in a class society, only exists as class love, but these comrades want to seek a kind of love which goes beyond class or love in the abstract; also abstract freedom, abstract truth, abstract human nature, and so on. This shows how deeply these comrades have been influenced by the bourgeoisie. They should eliminate this influence thoroughly and study Marxism-Leninism with an open mind. It is right that workers in literature and art should study literary and artistic creation, but Marxism-Leninism is a science that all revolutionaries must study, and workers in literature and art are no exception. In addition, you must study society, that is, you must undertake research on the various social classes, their mutual relations and individual circumstances, their outward features, and their psychology. Only when these things have been clearly perceived can our literature and art become rich in content and take a correct direction.

Today I have only mentioned these things by way of an introduction; I hope that you will offer your opinions on these and other relevant questions.

Conclusion (May 23, 1942)

Comrades! Our forum has met three times this month, and several dozen Party and non-Party comrades have spoken up in our search for the truth. Heated debates have taken place, bringing problems into the open and making them concrete; I believe that this will prove beneficial to the whole movement in literature and art.

When we discuss any problem we should start with facts, rather than definitions. Looking up definitions of what constitutes literature or art in textbooks and using them for setting goals for today's movement in literature and art, or for judging various opinions and controversies arising today, is the wrong approach. We are Marxists, and Marxism tells us that in dealing with problems we should start not from abstract definitions but from objective facts and that we should derive our goals, policy, and methods from an analysis of these facts. The same applies to our present discussion of the movement³³ in literature and art.

What are the facts at present? The facts are: the War of Resistance which China has been waging for five years; the world war against fascism; the indecisiveness³⁴ of the Chinese big landlord class and big bourgeoisie in the War of Resistance and their oppressive policies internally;³⁵ the revolutionary movement in literature and art since May Fourth—its great contribution to the revolution over the past twenty-three years and its many shortcomings; the anti-Japanese democratic base areas of the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies and the integration of large numbers of workers in literature and art³⁶ with these armies;³⁷ the difference in circumstances and responsibilities between workers in literature and art in the base areas and those in the general rear;³⁸ the controversies and problems that have already arisen concerning work in literature and art in Yan'an and other anti-Japanese bases at the present time—these are actual and undeniable facts, and we must consider our problems on the basis of these facts.

Well, then, what is the central issue facing us? In my opinion, our problem is fundamentally one of³⁹ serving the masses and how to do this. If we do not solve this problem,⁴⁰ or if we do not solve it properly, then our workers in literature and art will not be attuned to their circumstances and responsibilities and will come up against a string of problems both internal and external. My conclusion will center on *some further explanations of this problem*⁴¹ and will also touch on a few other related problems.

1.

The first question is: who are the people our literature and art are for?⁴²

It may seem to comrades engaged in work in literature and art in our various anti-Japanese base areas that this problem has already been solved and does not require further mention. This is, in fact, not the case, since many comrades have certainly not found a clear and definite resolution to this question. Therefore, in their emotions, works, actions, and views on the question of the goal of literature and art, to some extent a situation inevitably arises that is appropriate neither to the needs of the masses nor to the actual struggle. Of course, although among the large number of educated people, writers, artists, and workers in the field of literature and art in general who are now engaged in the great struggle for liberation along with the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army, there may be in the short term opportunists, *or even spies sent by the enemy or the secret service of the Guomintang masquerading as writers and artists*, nevertheless, apart from such people, the rest⁴³ work energetically for the common cause, and thanks to these comrades, great achievements have been made in all of our work in literature, drama, music, and art. Many of these workers in literature and art began *to be involved in* this work after the War of Resistance broke out, but many others were engaged in revolutionary work for a long time *even before the war*; they have undergone many hardships and have also influenced the broad masses both in their ordinary work and in their creative work. But why do we still say that even among these comrades there are some who have not clearly and definitely solved the question of whom our literature and art are for? Is it possible that they still maintain that revolutionary literature and art are not for the popular masses but for exploiters and oppressors?

There is, in truth, such a thing as literature and art that serve exploiters and oppressors. The literature and art that serve the landlord class are feudal literature and art—that is, the literature and art of the ruling class in China during the feudal era. This kind of literature and art still has considerable influence in China to this day. The literature and art that serve the bourgeoisie are bourgeois literature and art; although people like Liang Shiqiu, who was criticized by Lu Xun, talk about some kind of literature and art that transcends class, in practice they uphold bourgeois literature and art and oppose proletarian literature and art. The literature and art that serve imperialism, represented by Zhou Zuoren and Zhang Ziping, are called slave culture or slave literature and art.⁴⁴ *There is also another kind of literature and art, which serve the secret*

service and may be called “secret service” literature and art: They may be “very revolutionary” on the surface, but in reality they belong with the three categories above. For us, literature and art are not for those groups mentioned above but for the people. As we have said before, the new culture of China at its present stage is an anti-imperialist, antifeudal culture of the popular masses under the leadership of the proletariat. Whatever genuinely belongs to the masses must now be under the leadership of the popular masses, and what is under the leadership of the bourgeoisie cannot belong to the masses. New literature and art, which are part of the new culture, are naturally in the same category.⁴⁵ We do not by any means refuse to use the old forms of the feudal class and the bourgeoisie,⁴⁶ but in our hands these old forms are reconstructed and filled with new content, so they also become revolutionary and serve the people.

Well, then, who are the popular masses? The broadest section of the people, who constitute more than 90 percent of the total population, are workers, peasants, soldiers, and the petty bourgeoisie.⁴⁷ Therefore, our literature and art are, first, for the workers, the class that leads the revolution. Second, they are for the peasants, the broadest and firmest allies in the revolution. Third, they are for the workers and peasants who have taken up arms, namely, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and other popular armed forces; these are the chief strength in war.⁴⁸ Fourth, they are for the petty bourgeoisie,⁴⁹ who are also allies in the revolution and can cooperate with us on a long-term basis. These four kinds of people constitute the largest sector of the Chinese nation and the broadest popular masses. *We should also make alliances with anti-Japanese elements in the landlord class and bourgeoisie, but they do not support democracy among the broad popular masses. They have a literature and art of their own, while our literature and art are not for them, and are in any case rejected by them.*

Our literature and art should be for the four kinds of people mentioned above. Workers, peasants, and soldiers are again the most important element of these four groups; the petty bourgeoisie are fewer in number, their revolutionary determination is weaker, and they have a higher cultural level than workers, peasants, and soldiers. Our literature and art are therefore primarily for workers, peasants, and soldiers, and only secondarily for the petty bourgeoisie. Here, we must not raise the petty bourgeoisie to a primary position and relegate workers,

peasants, and soldiers to a secondary position.⁵⁰ The problem we now have with one group of comrades, or the key to their inability⁵¹ to solve correctly the problem of who are the people that our literature and art are for, is just this. In saying this, I am not talking about theory. On a theoretical level, that is,⁵² in what they say, not a single person in our ranks would regard workers, peasants, and soldiers⁵³ as less important than the petty bourgeoisie.⁵⁴ I am talking about practice, or what they do: In practice, in what they do, do they still regard members of the petty bourgeoisie⁵⁵ as more important than workers, peasants, and soldiers? I think they do. Many comrades place more emphasis on studying the intelligentsia⁵⁶ and analyzing their psychology; their main concern is to represent them, excusing and even defending their shortcomings instead of guiding the intelligentsia from petty-bourgeois backgrounds⁵⁷ and themselves as well toward closer contact with workers, peasants, and soldiers,⁵⁸ to take part in their actual struggles, to represent them, and to educate them. Coming from a petty-bourgeois background and being intellectuals themselves, many comrades only look for friends among the ranks of the intelligentsia and focus their attention on studying and describing them. This would be quite proper if they did so from a proletarian position. But that is not the case at all or only partly so. They identify themselves with the petty bourgeoisie, and their creative work is designed to act as a means of self-expression for the petty bourgeoisie; we have seen this sort of thing in a fairly large number of works of literature and art. Often they express heartfelt sympathy for the intelligentsia from petty-bourgeois backgrounds, and even the shortcomings of the petty bourgeoisie⁵⁹ win their sympathy or actual encouragement. But when it comes to workers, peasants, and soldiers,⁶⁰ these people do not have any contact with them, do not understand them, do not study them, do not have close friends among them, and are no good at describing them. They can dress their characters up as workers, peasants, and soldiers,⁶¹ but these characters still have petty-bourgeois⁶² faces. They like some things about workers, peasants, soldiers, and cadres from worker-peasant-soldier backgrounds, but they do not like them all the time or everything about them: They do not like their emotions, their manner, or their budding literature and art (wall newspapers, murals, folk songs, folk tales, *popular speech*, and so on). Sometimes they even like these things, too, either out of curiosity or because they

want to decorate their own work with them or even to look for backward things about them. At other times, they openly despise these things in their infatuation with the works of the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie,⁶³ or even the bourgeoisie itself. These comrades still have their backsides planted⁶⁴ on the side of the petty bourgeoisie,⁶⁵ or to put it more elegantly, their innermost souls are still in the kingdom of the petty bourgeoisie.⁶⁶ This is why they have not yet solved the problem of what sort of people to serve or have not solved it clearly and definitely. I am not simply talking about people who have not been in Yan'an for long; even people⁶⁷ who have been to the front and who have carried out work in the base areas, the Eighth Route Army or the New Fourth Army, for several years still have not arrived at a thoroughgoing solution. It will take as long as eight to ten years before this problem can be settled once and for all. But no matter how long it takes, it must be settled and settled clearly, definitely, and thoroughly. Our workers in literature and art must fulfill this responsibility; they must shift their backsides;⁶⁸ they must gradually move over to the side of the workers, peasants, and soldiers⁶⁹ by entering deeply into their ranks and the actual struggle, and by studying Marxism-Leninism⁷⁰ and society; this is the only way we can have literature and art that genuinely serve workers, peasants, and soldiers.⁷¹

The question of what sort of people we serve is a fundamental question, a question of principle. The controversies, divisions, opposition, and disunity that existed among comrades in the past were concerned not with this fundamental question of principle but, rather, with secondary questions that may not have involved principles at all. When it came to this question of principle, however, there was no real division, but almost unanimity on all sides, since all to some extent had a tendency to despise workers, peasants, and soldiers, and to isolate themselves from the masses; I say to some extent, because generally speaking, the way in which these comrades despised workers, peasants, and soldiers and isolated themselves from the masses differed in some respects from the behavior of the Guomindang. Nevertheless, this tendency does exist, and unless the fundamental question is settled, it will not be easy to settle many other questions either. Take sectarianism in the literary and art world, for instance, which is also a question of principle; the only way to get rid of sectarianism is by raising the

slogan “Serve the workers and peasants, serve the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies, and go among the masses” and actually carrying it out in practice; otherwise, the problem of sectarianism will never be solved. Lu Xun said that disunity on the front of revolutionary literature and art is caused by lack of a common purpose and that this common purpose is to serve the workers and peasants.⁷² This problem existed then in Shanghai, and now it also exists in Chongqing; it is very difficult to solve it thoroughly in such places because people⁷³ there oppress revolutionary writers and artists and do not allow them freedom to go among the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers. Conditions here with us are completely different: We encourage revolutionary writers and artists to develop positive contacts with workers, peasants, and soldiers, we give them complete freedom to go among the masses, and we give them complete freedom to create genuinely revolutionary literature and art; we have therefore come close to solving the problem here. But coming close to solving a problem is not the same as solving it completely and thoroughly; our insistence on studying Marxism-Leninism⁷⁴ and society is just for this purpose, a complete and thoroughgoing solution. What we mean by Marxism-Leninism is a living Marxism-Leninism, which is fully applicable⁷⁵ in the life and struggles of the masses, and not a Marxism-Leninism that only comes from books.⁷⁶ If we move this Marxism-Leninism out of books and into the masses so that it becomes a living Marxism-Leninism,⁷⁷ sectarianism will be impossible. Not only will the problem of sectarianism be solved, but many other problems will be solved as well.

2.

After the question of what kind of people we serve has been solved, the next problem is how to go about it. In your own words, should we put our efforts into raising standards or into reaching a wider audience?

A few comrades, some more seriously than others, have in the past despised or ignored the work of reaching a wider audience and have exaggerated out of all proportion the work of raising standards. Raising standards should be stressed, but it is wrong to exaggerate it out of all proportion.⁷⁸ The⁷⁹ lack of a clear and

definite solution to the question of what sort of people we serve, of which I spoke above, is also evident in this question. Since⁸⁰ there is no clear understanding of what people to serve, there aren't any correct criteria for what they mean by reaching wider audiences or raising standards, while the correct relationship between the two is, of course, even more difficult to find. Since our literature and art are fundamentally for workers, peasants, and soldiers, reaching a wider audience means reaching a wider audience among them, and raising standards means raising standards among them. What are we trying to reach them with. Feudal things?⁸¹ Bourgeois things?⁸² Petty-bourgeois things?⁸³ None of these will do: We must use what belongs to⁸⁴ workers, peasants, and soldiers themselves, and therefore, the task of learning from workers, peasants, and soldiers comes before the task of educating them. This is even more true of raising standards. There must be a basis from which standards are raised; for example, surely a bucket of water must be raised from the ground before it can be raised from midair. Well, then, when it comes to raising standards in literature and art, what is the basis from which we raise the standards? From a feudal basis? From a bourgeois basis? From a petty-bourgeois⁸⁵ basis? None of these will do: We must raise standards on the basis of workers, peasants, and soldiers,⁸⁶ *on the basis of their present cultural level and their budding literature and art*. Instead of raising workers, peasants, and soldiers to feudal, bourgeois, or petty-bourgeois⁸⁷ heights,⁸⁸ we raise their standards in the direction of their own development.⁸⁹ Here, too, the task of learning from workers, peasants, and soldiers arises. Only by starting from workers, peasants, and soldiers can we gain a correct understanding of what it means to reach a wider audience and to raise standards, and find the correct relationship between these two tasks.

Reaching a wider audience and raising standards are both worthy activities, but from what source do they arise?⁹⁰ Works of literature and art, as conceptualized forms *on whatever level of operation*, are the result⁹¹ of the human mind reflecting *and processing* popular life;⁹² revolutionary literature and art are thus the result⁹³ of revolutionary writers' minds reflecting *and processing* popular life.⁹⁴ Rich deposits of literature and art⁹⁵ actually exist in popular life itself: They are things in their natural forms, crude but also extremely vivid, abundant, and fundamental. They make all⁹⁶ *processed forms* of literature pale in

comparison; they are the sole and inexhaustible source of processed forms of literature and art. They are the sole source, because only this kind of source can exist; no other exists⁹⁷ apart from it. Someone may ask whether works of literature and art in book form, classical or foreign works, are not also a source. *Well, you can say they are a source, but a secondary source and not a primary one; it would be a distorted way of looking at things to regard them as primary.* In fact, books and other works already in existence⁹⁸ are not the source but the flow; they are things that the ancients and foreigners processed and fabricated from the literature and art⁹⁹ they perceived¹⁰⁰ in popular life in their own time and place. We must absorb these things¹⁰¹ in a discriminating way, using them as models *from which we may learn what to accept or what to reject* when we process works of literature and art as conceptualized forms¹⁰² from the literature and art¹⁰³ in popular life in our own time and place. It makes a difference to have this model, the difference between being cultured or vulgar, crude or refined, high or low, fast or slow; therefore, we certainly may not reject the ancients and foreigners as models,¹⁰⁴ which means, I'm afraid, that we must even use feudal and bourgeois things. But they are only models and not substitutes; they cannot be substitutes.¹⁰⁵ Indiscriminate plagiarism, imitation, or substitution¹⁰⁶ of dead people¹⁰⁷ or foreigners in literature and art is an extremely sterile and harmful literary and artistic dogmatism, *of the same basic nature as dogmatism in military, political, philosophical, or economic affairs.* Revolutionary Chinese writers and artists, the kind from whom we expect great things, must go among the masses; they must go among the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers for a long time to come, without reservation, devoting themselves body and soul¹⁰⁸ to the task ahead. They must go to the soul, the broadest, and the richest source, to observe, experience, study, and analyze all the different kinds of people, all the classes and all the masses, all the vivid patterns of life and struggle, and all literature and art in their natural form,¹⁰⁹ *before they are ready for the stage of processing or creating, where you integrate raw materials with production, the stage of study with the stage of creation.* Otherwise, your foil will have no object, *since without raw materials or semiprocessed goods you have nothing to process,* and you will inevitably end up as the kind of useless writer or artist that Lu Xun in his will earnestly instructed his son never to become.

Although literature and art in their natural form are the sole source of literature and art in conceptualized form,¹¹⁰ and although the former is incomparably more vivid and abundant in content, nevertheless, people are still not satisfied with the former and demand the latter; why is this? It is because while both are beautiful, literature and art that have been processed are more organized and concentrated than literature and art in their natural form;¹¹¹ they are more typical and more idealized and therefore have greater universality. *The living Lenin was infinitely more vigorous and interesting than the Lenin of fiction, drama, and film, but the living Lenin did so many things in the course of a single day, and much of what he did was identical with other people's work; besides, very few people ever saw Lenin, and after his death no one could ever see him again. In these respects the Lenin of fiction, drama, and film is superior to the living Lenin.* Revolutionary fiction, drama, film, and so on¹¹² can¹¹³ create all sorts of characters on the basis of real life and help the masses push history forward. For example, some people suffer from hunger¹¹⁴ and oppression, while others exploit and oppress them. This state of affairs exists everywhere, but people are indifferent to it; but literature and art *organize and* concentrate this kind of everyday occurrence, making it typical¹¹⁵ and creating a work of literature and art which can awaken and arouse the popular masses, urging them on to unity and struggle and to take part in transforming their own environment. If there were no processed literature and art,¹¹⁶ *but only literature and art in their natural form*, it would be impossible to accomplish this task or at least to do it as powerfully and speedily.

Literature and art for a wide audience and literature and art to raise standards are both processed forms, so what is the difference between them? There is a difference of degree.¹¹⁷ Literature and art for a wide audience indicates that the processing has been relatively limited and crude,¹¹⁸ and therefore relatively easy for the broad popular masses at the present time to accept readily, while literature and art to raise standards indicates that the processing has been relatively extensive and skillful and, hence, relatively difficult for them.¹¹⁹ The problem which now faces workers, peasants, and soldiers is that they are engaged in a bitter struggle¹²⁰ with the enemy and also they are illiterate, *ignorant*, and uncultured as a result of prolonged feudal and bourgeois rule; their most urgent

demand, therefore, is for a universal educational movement in the form of cultural knowledge and works of literature and art that they urgently need and can readily accept,¹²¹ which will heighten their ardor in the struggle and faith in victory, strengthen their unity, and make them struggle against the enemy in full solidarity. The first step for them is not a question of¹²² “pinning flowers on brocade” but “sending charcoal during snow.”¹²³ The most serious and central task with regard to the people, therefore, is initially the work of reaching a wide audience rather than raising standards.¹²⁴ The attitude of despising or ignoring the work of reaching a wide audience is a mistaken one.

There is, however, no hard and fast line between the work of reaching a wide audience and raising standards. If the people reaching wide audiences are not on a higher level than their audience, then what is the point of trying to reach them at all?¹²⁵ If their material stays constantly at the same level month after month and year after year, *invariably* consisting of the same old stock-in-trade like [the skit] “The Little Cowherd” or “man, hand, mouth, knife, cow, sheep,” then what is there to choose between these people and the audience they are reaching?¹²⁶ Wouldn't it become meaningless to reach¹²⁷ a wide audience in this way? The people demand material that can reach a wide audience, but they also demand higher standards, standards that continue to rise month by month and year by year. Here, raising standards, like reaching a wide audience, is a popular concern; it does not take place in thin air or behind closed doors, but on the basis of reaching a wide audience; it is determined by the needs of a wide audience, and at the same time it acts as a guide to reaching a wide audience. In the case of China, the development of revolution and revolutionary culture has been uneven and their expansion gradual, so that in some places wide audiences have been reached and standards have been raised on that basis, while elsewhere we have not even begun to reach a wide audience; the experience¹²⁸ gained in one area from reaching a wide audience, and raising standards can therefore be applied to other areas, giving guidance to this kind of work to keep it on the right track there. In the international sphere, the experience of foreign countries, especially of the Soviet Union, can also be used to guide our work *of reaching a wide audience and raising standards, provided that their experience is good*. In raising standards, therefore, we proceed on the basis of reaching a wide audience; in reaching a wide audience, we proceed under the guidance of raising standards.

But raising standards for guidance never involves plagiarism, since this would only destroy its usefulness.¹²⁹

In addition to the direct need on the part of the masses for higher standards, they also have an indirect need, that is, the cadres' need for higher standards. Cadres are the advanced element among the masses, who have generally already completed the kind of education currently offered to the masses;¹³⁰ *their ability to absorb things is higher than the masses, so that the material intended for wide audiences among the masses at their present level, such as "The Little Cowherd," cannot satisfy them.* Literature and art on a higher level are absolutely essential for them, and it would be a mistake to ignore this. *But for the time being, this kind of need is confined to cadres and not generally felt among the masses; it should be our goal to meet this need, but it should not become the total or the central goal today. At the same time, we should understand that in serving cadres we are still wholly concerned with serving the masses, since we rely on cadres to educate and guide the masses. If we violate this aim and give cadres material that cannot help them educate and guide the masses, there would be no point in our trying to raise standards, and we would be departing from our fundamental principle of serving the popular masses.*

To sum up, the raw material of literature and art in popular life undergoes processing¹³¹ by revolutionary writers to become literature and art in conceptual form, which serve the popular masses; they include both an advanced *mass* literature and art, developed on the basis of lower-level mass literature and art¹³² and serving the needs of the masses whose standards have been raised, primarily mass cadres, as well as lower-level mass literature and art,¹³³ which in their turn come under the guidance of advanced *mass* literature and art, and serve¹³⁴ the primary needs of the broad masses today (*which is not to say literature and art with low standards of taste*). Whether at a high level or a low one, our literature and art serve the popular masses, primarily workers, peasants, and soldiers; they are created for workers, peasants, and soldiers and are used by them.

Now that we have settled the question of the relationship between raising standards and reaching a wide audience, the question of the relationship between professional experts and comrades¹³⁵ who carry out the work of reaching wide audiences can also be settled. Our professionals should serve not only cadres but, more important, the masses as well. *Gorky was active in editing factory histories,*

guiding village correspondents, and guiding young people in their teens, while Lu Xun also spent a great deal of time on general correspondence with students. Our professional writers should give their attention to the masses' wall newspapers and to reportage literature in the army and villages. Our professional musicians should give their attention to songs sung by the masses. Our professional artists should give their attention to mass art. All these comrades should develop close relationships with comrades who are doing the work of reaching wide audiences *at the lowest level* among the masses, helping and guiding them at the same time as learning from them and drawing sustenance from them, replenishing, enriching, and nourishing¹³⁶ themselves so that their profession does not become an ivory tower isolated from the masses and from reality, devoid of meaning and vitality. We should respect professionals, who are very valuable to us in our cause. But we should tell them that their work as revolutionary writers and artists can only have significance if they ally themselves with the masses, express their point of view, and become their loyal spokesmen. The only way to educate the masses is by representing them, and the only way to become their teacher is by being their student. If professional writers and artists regard themselves as masters of the masses, as aristocrats on a superior level to "the lower classes," then no matter how talented they might be, they are completely useless as far as the masses are concerned, and there is no future for their work.

Is this attitude of ours utilitarian? Materialists do not oppose utilitarianism in general, but they do oppose feudal, bourgeois, or petty-bourgeois utilitarianism, not to mention the kind of hypocrite who opposes utilitarianism in words but practices the most selfish and short-sighted kind of utilitarianism. There is no such thing as transcendent utilitarianism in this world; in a class society, utilitarianism is a property of one class or another. We are proletarian, revolutionary utilitarians who take as our starting point a combination of the present and future interests of the broad masses who constitute over 90 percent of the total population; we are therefore revolutionary utilitarians who adopt an extremely broad and long-range target, rather than guild utilitarians¹³⁷ who are concerned only with the partial and the immediate. For instance, if someone tries to foist on the market and propagate among the masses a work that appeals only to himself and his friends or a small group of people,¹³⁸ but that the majority does not need and that may even be harmful to it, all for the sake of promoting his

own interests or those of a narrow group, and yet still finds fault with utilitarianism among the masses, then he is not only insulting the masses but also showing a total lack of self-knowledge. Nothing can be considered good unless a large number of people benefit greatly from it.¹³⁹ Suppose you have something like “Snow in Spring,” which aristocrats enjoy,¹⁴⁰ while the masses are still singing “The Sichuanese in the Countryside”; if all you can be bothered to do is condemn the masses without trying to raise their standards, then no matter how much you condemn them, it will all be in vain. The problem at present is one of combining “Snow in Spring” with “The Sichuanese in the Countryside,” which is a problem of combining higher standards with wider audiences. If we do not combine them, professional literature and art of even the highest quality will inevitably turn into the narrowest utilitarianism; you may say it is pure and lofty, but that is only your judgment—the masses won’t accept it. After we have settled the problem of serving the masses and how to go about it as our fundamental goal, we have in so doing settled *all* the other questions, such as *position, attitude, audience, material*, the description of dark and bright sides, unity *versus non-unity*, utilitarianism versus transcendent utilitarianism, and narrow utilitarianism versus long-range utilitarianism.¹⁴¹ If we¹⁴² agree on the fundamental goal, then our workers in literature and art, our schools for literature and art, our publications, organizations, and activities of every kind in literature and art should serve this goal.¹⁴³ It would be a mistake to depart from this goal, and anything at variance with it must be corrected accordingly.

3.

Because our literature and art are for the popular masses, we can now discuss two further questions, the first concerning the relationships within the Party—that is, the relation between Party work in literature and art and Party work as a whole—the second concerning relationships that go outside the Party—that is, the relationship between Party and non-Party work in literature and art, the question of the united front in literature and art.

Let us start with the first question. In the world today, all culture or literature and art belongs to a definite class *and party*, and has a definite political line. Art

for art's sake, art that stands above class *and party*, and fellow-traveling or politically independent art do not exist in reality. *In a society composed of classes and parties, art obeys both class and party, and it must, of course, obey the political demands of its class and party, and the revolutionary task of a given revolutionary age: Any deviation is a deviation from the masses' basic needs.* Proletarian literature and art are a part of the whole proletarian revolutionary cause; as Lenin said, they are “a screw in the whole machine,”¹⁴⁴ and therefore, the Party's work in literature and art occupies a definite, assigned position within the Party's revolutionary work as a whole.¹⁴⁵ Opposition to this assignment must lead to dualism or pluralism and in essence resembles Trotsky's “Politics—Marxist; art—bourgeois.” We do not support excessive emphasis¹⁴⁶ on the importance of literature and art nor do we support their underestimation. Literature and art are subordinate to politics, and yet they in turn exert enormous influence on it. Revolutionary literature and art are a part of the whole revolutionary cause; they are a screw,¹⁴⁷ which naturally does not compare with other parts¹⁴⁸ in importance, urgency, or priority but which is nevertheless indispensable in the whole machinery, an indispensable part of the whole revolutionary cause. If literature and art did not exist in even the broadest and most general sense, the revolution¹⁴⁹ could not advance or win victory; it would be wrong not to acknowledge this. Furthermore, when we speak of literature and art obeying politics, politics refers to class and mass politics and not to the small number of people known as politicians. Politics, both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary alike, concerns the struggle between classes and not the behavior of a small number of people. Ideological warfare and artistic warfare, especially if they are revolutionary, are necessarily subservient to political warfare,¹⁵⁰ because class and mass needs can only be expressed in a concentrated form through politics. Revolutionary politicians are professional politicians who understand the science or art of revolutionary politics; they are simply the leaders of millions of mass politicians, and their task is to collect the opinions of mass politicians, distill them, and return them to the masses in an acceptable and practical form; they are not like the kind of aristocratic or armchair “politician” who acts as if he had a monopoly on brilliance—this is the difference in principle between politicians of the proletariat and the propertied¹⁵¹ classes, *a difference that also exists between*

*their respective politics.*¹⁵² It would be wrong not to acknowledge this or to see proletarian politics and politicians in a *narrow or* conventional way.

The second topic is the question of the united front in literature and art. Literature and art are subordinate to politics, and the first and fundamental problem in Chinese politics today is resistance to Japan; therefore, Party workers in literature and art should form an alliance on this issue with writers and artists outside the Party (from Party sympathizers and petty-bourgeois writers and artists to bourgeois and landlord writers and artists).¹⁵³ Next, they should form an alliance around the issue of democracy; some writers and artists¹⁵⁴ do not support this issue, so the extent of the alliance here will inevitably be somewhat smaller. Third, they should form an alliance around specific questions among writers and artists—issues of artistic style.¹⁵⁵ We advocate proletarian realism,¹⁵⁶ which again some people do not support, and the extent of the alliance here will *probably* even be smaller. There may be unity on one question at the same time as there is struggle or criticism on another. Each question is both separate from and connected with the others, so that struggle and criticism continue to exist even on questions where an alliance has been formed, such as resistance to Japan. United front errors, such as alliance without struggle or struggle without alliance, or practicing as some comrades have done in the past either rightist capitulationism and tailism or “leftist” isolationism and sectarianism, all come under the heading of what Lenin called a hamstrung policy.¹⁵⁷ This is just as true in art as it is in politics.

Petty-bourgeois writers and artists are an important force in China among the various forces constituting the united front in literature and art. There are many shortcomings in their thinking and their works, but they show some tendency toward revolution and are fairly close to workers, peasants, and soldiers.¹⁵⁸ It is therefore a particularly important task to help them overcome their shortcomings and win them over to the front that serves the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers.¹⁵⁹

4.

One of the chief methods of struggle among writers and artists is literary or art

criticism. We should develop criticism in literature and art: our past work has been deficient¹⁶⁰ in this regard, as our comrades have rightly pointed out. Literary criticism is a complex problem that requires a great deal of specialized study. Here I shall only discuss¹⁶¹ the fundamental question of the criteria to be used, along with a brief outline of my opinions on a number of miscellaneous¹⁶² questions and incorrect views raised by some comrades.

There are two criteria in literary criticism: the political and the artistic. According to the political criterion, everything that is in the interests of unity in the War of Resistance encourages solidarity among the masses, opposes retreat, and promotes progress is good or fairly good,¹⁶³ while everything that is not in the interests of unity in the War of Resistance encourages a lack of solidarity among the masses, opposes progress, or drags people backward is bad or fairly bad.¹⁶⁴ Do the words “good” and “bad” in this context refer to motive (subjective desires) or to effect (social practice)? Idealists stress motive and deny effect, while mechanical materialists stress effect and deny motive; as dialectical materialists who believe in the unity of motive and effect, we are opposed to both of these approaches. Motives to serve the masses and effects that win the approval of the masses cannot be taken separately; the two must be unified. Motives that serve the interests of narrow groups or individuals are no good, but neither are effects that do not win the approval of the masses or are not in their interests despite a motive to serve them. In examining a writer’s subjective desires, to see whether his motives are correct and proper, we do not go by his declarations but, rather, by the effect that his actions (his works)¹⁶⁵ produce among the masses in society. The criterion for examining subjective desires is social practice; the criterion for examining motives is their effect. We do not want sectarianism in our literary criticism or art criticism; according to the general principle of unity in the War of Resistance, we should tolerate works¹⁶⁶ of literature and art that contain different kinds of political attitudes, but our criticism still takes a firm stand on principle, and we must pass strict judgment on¹⁶⁷ works of literature and art that contain anti-national, anti-scientific, anti-mass, and anti-Party views, because these kinds of so-called literature and art, both in motive and effect, damage unity in the War of Resistance. According to the artistic criterion, all works of higher artistic standards are good or fairly good, while those of lower artistic standards are bad or fairly bad; but even in making this distinction we must, of course, consider

social effect. There is hardly any writer or artist who does not think his own work is excellent, and our criticism should allow free competition between different kinds of work; but it is also absolutely necessary to subject them to correct criticism according to scientific artistic standards, gradually raising relatively low levels of art to higher levels and transforming art that does not meet the demands of the broad mass struggle (*even if it is on a very high level of art*) into art that does.

Given both political and artistic criteria, what is the relationship between them? Politics is certainly not equivalent to art, and a general world outlook is certainly not equivalent to a methodology of artistic creation.¹⁶⁸ In art, just as in politics, we do not acknowledge abstract and absolutely unchanging criteria, since in every class society and in every class in that society¹⁶⁹ there are different political and artistic criteria. But in every class society and in every class within that society,¹⁷⁰ without exception, political criteria are always placed ahead of artistic criteria. The bourgeoisie always rejects a proletarian work of literature or art however high its artistic quality.¹⁷¹ The proletariat must also reject the reactionary political qualities of bourgeois works of literature and art and accept their artistic qualities only with discrimination.¹⁷² There are some things which are fundamentally reactionary in political terms and yet can have a certain artistry, *for example, Fascist literature and art*. Insofar as a work is reactionary, the more artistic it is, the more harm it can do to the people, and the more it should be rejected. The common characteristic of all literature and art of exploiting classes in their period of decline is the contradiction between their reactionary political content and their artistic form. What we demand, therefore, is a unity of politics and art, a unity of content and form, a unity of revolutionary political content and the highest¹⁷³ artistic form possible. Works of art that lack artistry, however progressive politically, are nevertheless ineffectual. We are therefore equally opposed to works of art with a harmful content¹⁷⁴ and to the tendency toward the “slogan style,” which is only concerned with content and not with form;¹⁷⁵ we should carry out a struggle on both fronts in questions of literature and art.

Both of these tendencies exist among many of our comrades.¹⁷⁶ Many comrades have a tendency to ignore art and should pay attention to raising their

artistic standards. But what I believe is more of a problem at present is still the political aspect. Some comrades, lacking a fundamental knowledge of politics, have come up with all sorts of foolish ideas. Let me give you a few examples from Yan'an.

“Humanism.” Is there such a thing as human nature? Of course, there is. But human nature only exists in the concrete;¹⁷⁷ in a class society human nature has¹⁷⁸ a class character, and human nature *in the abstract*, going beyond class, does not exist. We uphold the human nature of the proletariat,¹⁷⁹ while the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie¹⁸⁰ uphold the human nature of their own class, although they do not talk about it as such but make it out to be the only kind there is.¹⁸¹ In their eyes, therefore, proletarian human nature is incompatible with human nature. The *so-called* “humanism” which some people in Yan'an at the present time uphold as a¹⁸² theoretical basis for literature and art goes along these lines and is completely mistaken.

“The fundamental starting point of literature and art is love, the love of mankind.” Love may be a starting point, but there is a more fundamental one. Love exists on a conceptual level, as a product of objective practice, and it is a fundamental principle that we do not start from concepts but from objective practice. The fact that our workers in literature and art who come from the intelligentsia love the proletariat stems from the fact that society has sentenced both to a common fate and integrated our two separate lives into one.¹⁸³ Our hatred of Japanese imperialism stems from the fact that Japanese imperialism oppresses us. Nowhere in the world does there exist love or hatred without cause or reason. As for “love of mankind,” there has never been this kind of unifying love since mankind split¹⁸⁴ into classes. The ruling class, Confucius, and even Tolstoy all upheld it,¹⁸⁵ but no one has genuinely practiced it because it would be impossible in a class society. A genuine love for mankind will be possible only when classes have been eliminated all over the world. Classes cause splits within society,¹⁸⁶ and only when classes have been eliminated *and unity restored* in society will love for the whole of mankind exist; at the present time, however, it does not yet do so. We cannot love *Fascists*, the enemy, or all the ugly and vicious things in society, since our aim is to eliminate them. This is just common sense; it is hard to believe that some workers in literature and art still cannot

understand it!

“Works of literature and art have always given equal weight to descriptions of brightness and darkness, on a fifty-fifty basis.” There are a lot of muddled ideas contained here. It is certainly not the case that works of literature and art always used to be like this. Many petty-bourgeois writers have never found the brightness, and their works only expose darkness, under the name of “exposure literature”; some actually specialize in spreading pessimism and cynicism. Soviet Russian literature, by contrast, in a period of socialist reconstruction, concentrates on descriptions of brightness; it also describes shortcomings in work,¹⁸⁷ but these shortcomings¹⁸⁸ only form a contrast to the overall picture of brightness; there is certainly no question of a “fifty-fifty basis.” Bourgeois writers and artists in their reactionary phase describe the revolutionary masses as hooligans and themselves as saints, which can be called reversing brightness and darkness. Only genuinely revolutionary writers and artists can settle correctly the problem of praise and exposure. They must expose every dark force that endangers the popular masses, and praise every revolutionary struggle of the popular masses: This is their fundamental task.

“The task of literature and art has always been exposure.” Explanations like this one and the one above show a lack of understanding of the science of history and historical materialism.¹⁸⁹ I have already explained above that literature and art have by no means always been confined to exposure. The only targets that revolutionary writers and artists can take for exposure are aggressors, exploiters, and oppressors,¹⁹⁰ not the popular masses. There are shortcomings among the popular masses, too, but these are chiefly a result of the rule exercised over them by aggressors, exploiters, and oppressors, so our revolutionary writers and artists should expose them as evils for which aggressors, exploiters, and oppressors are responsible;¹⁹¹ but there shouldn’t be any kind of “exposing the people” as such. Our attitude toward the people is solely¹⁹² a question of educating them and raising standards among them. No one but counterrevolutionary writers and artists describe the people as “born stupid” and the revolutionary masses as “tyrannical hooligans.”

“It is still the age of essays, and we still need the Lu Xun style.” *If we consider the essay and the Lu Xun style as meaning only satire, then this view is only right when it applies to enemies of the people.* Lu Xun lived under the rule of the forces

of darkness, where there was no freedom of speech, and it was therefore wholly correct of Lu Xun to use the essay form, with its cold ridicule and burning satire, to do battle. We also have a need for sharp ridicule to direct at fascism and Chinese reactionaries,¹⁹³ but in the anti-Japanese bases in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and elsewhere behind the enemy lines, where revolutionary writers and artists are given complete democratic freedom and only counterrevolutionary *and secret service* elements are denied it, the essay should not take¹⁹⁴ the same form as Lu Xun's; it can shout at the top of its voice, but it should not be obscure or devious, something that the popular masses cannot understand.¹⁹⁵ When it came to the people themselves and not their enemies, Lu Xun even in the age of the essay never ridiculed or attacked revolutionary people or parties, and his style in these essays was completely different from the style that he employed against the enemy. I have already said above that the people's shortcomings must be criticized, but we must speak from genuine identification with the people and total devotion to their protection and education. If we treat comrades with the ruthless methods required against the enemy,¹⁹⁶ then we are identifying ourselves with the enemy. Should we get rid of satire?¹⁹⁷ There are¹⁹⁸ several kinds of satire, for use against the enemy, friends,¹⁹⁹ or our own ranks; each of these three attitudes²⁰⁰ is different. We certainly won't get rid of²⁰¹ satire in general, but we must get rid of its indiscriminate use.

"I am not in the habit of celebrating merit or praising virtue; works that praise brightness are not necessarily great nor are works that portray darkness necessarily trivial." If you are bourgeois writers and artists, you praise the bourgeoisie and not the proletariat, and if you are proletarian writers and artists, then you praise the proletariat and the laboring people, but not the bourgeoisie: Each takes its own side. Works that praise the bright side of the bourgeoisie are not necessarily great, and works that portray its dark side are not necessarily trivial, whereas works that praise the bright side of the proletariat are not necessarily less than great, but works that portray its "darkness" are definitely²⁰² trivial: Isn't this a fact of literary and art history? What is wrong with praising the people, the creators of this world and of history?²⁰³ What is wrong with praising the proletariat, the Communist Party, new democracy, and socialism? A

type of person does actually exist who has no enthusiasm at all for the popular cause and maintains a cold, detached attitude toward the struggle and victory of the people²⁰⁴ and their vanguard; the only thing he is interested in and never tires of praising is his own self and perhaps *his sweetheart as well, plus* a few celebrities from his own clique. This kind of petty-bourgeois individualist naturally does not want to praise the achievements of revolutionary people or inspire them to courage in battle and faith in victory. A type like this is only a termite in the revolutionary ranks, and the revolutionary people really don't need his "praise."

"It is not a question of position; my position is right, my intentions are good, and I understand the issues, but because my expression is poor my work ends up having the wrong effect." I have already explained above the dialectical materialist view of the relation between motive and effect; now I want to ask whether the question of effect is a question of position. For someone to perform a task solely on the basis of his motives and not bother about its effect is equivalent to a doctor being concerned only with making out prescriptions and not caring whether²⁰⁵ his patients die as a result or like a political party being concerned only with issuing manifestos and not bothering to see whether they are carried out; is a position like this correct? Are the intentions good? Of course, even when we take into account the possible effect of something beforehand, mistakes can still occur, but are our intentions still good if we persist in doing something that has already been shown to have a bad effect in practice? We judge parties or doctors by looking at their practice or their results, and the same is true of writers. Genuinely good intentions necessarily involve considering the effects of what we do, summarizing our past experience, and studying various methods or what are known as²⁰⁶ techniques of expression. They must involve totally sincere self-criticism of shortcomings and mistakes in our work and a firm resolution to correct them. This is how the method of self-criticism among Communists was adopted. This is the only position that is correct. At the same time, the only way we can come to understand what the correct position is and maintain our grasp on it is through a process of serious and responsible practice along these lines. If we do not advance along these lines in our practice and just say complacently that "we understand," we have not really understood at all.

"Studying Marxism-Leninism²⁰⁷ leads to the mistake of repeating the

dialectical materialist method, which hinders creativity.” Studying Marxism-Leninism²⁰⁸ requires us *only* to observe the world, society, literature, and art from the point of view of dialectical materialism and historical materialism; it certainly does not require us to write lectures on philosophy in works of literature and art. Marxism-Leninism²⁰⁹ can include but not replace realism in literary and artistic creation, just as it can include but not replace theories of the atom or electron in physics. It is true that empty, dry, and dogmatic formulas will destroy creativity, but more than that, they will first destroy Marxism-Leninism.²¹⁰ Dogmatic Marxism-Leninism²¹¹ is not Marxism-Leninism²¹² at all but anti-Marxism-Leninism.²¹³ Then Marxism-Leninism²¹⁴ will not destroy creativity after all? Yes, it will, it will definitely destroy feudal, bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, literalistic, individualist, nihilist, art-for-art’s sake, aristocratic, decadent, pessimistic, and other kinds of creativity that are alien to the popular masses and the proletariat. Should mentalities like these be destroyed among proletarian writers and artists? Yes, I think so, they should be thoroughly destroyed, and as they are being destroyed, something new can be established.

5.

What does the existence of these questions among our writers and artists in Yan’an tell us? It tells us that *three* incorrect working styles still exist to a serious degree among our writers and artists, and that many shortcomings such as idealism, *foreign* dogmatism, idle speculation, contempt for practice, and isolation from the masses still exist among our comrades, a situation that requires a realistic and serious movement to correct our work styles.

Many of our comrades are still not very clear about the difference between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. Many Party members have joined the Party on an organizational level but have not made a full commitment on the ideological level or even any commitment at all; these people still carry around a lot of exploiter’s filth in their heads and are fundamentally ignorant of what proletarian ideology, communism, and the Party are. They think that proletarian ideology is just the same old story. Little do they realize that it is by no means easy to acquire: some people spend a lifetime without ever getting close to being

a true Party member and invariably end up leaving the Party. *Of course, some people are even worse: On the organizational level, they join the Japanese party, Wang Jingwei's party, or the secret service party of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords, but afterward they also bore their way into the Communist Party or Communist-led organizations, advertising themselves as "Party members" and "revolutionaries."* As a result, although the vast majority of people in our Party and in our ranks are true, nevertheless, if we are to lead the revolutionary movement to develop in a better way and be the sooner completed, then we must conscientiously put in order our internal affairs²¹⁵ on both ideological and organizational levels. We have to put things in order ideologically before we can tackle the organizational level and begin an ideological struggle between the proletariat and non-proletarian classes. An ideological struggle has already begun among writers and artists in Yan'an, which is very necessary. People of petty-bourgeois origins always persist in expressing themselves, using a variety of ways and means, including literature and art, to propagate their own proposals and urge people to remake the Party and the rest of the world in the image of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. Under these conditions our job is to raise our voices and say, "Comrades," this game of yours will not work, the proletariat *and the popular masses* cannot accept your terms; following your course would be in fact following the big landlords and big bourgeoisie; that way we would run the risk of losing our Party, our country, and our own heads.²¹⁶ Who are the only people we can rely on? We must rely on the proletariat and its vanguard²¹⁷ to remake the Party and the rest of the world in their image. We hope that the comrades who are writers and artists recognize the seriousness of this great debate and participate actively in the struggle *directed toward the enemy, friends, comrades, and ourselves*, so that every comrade is strengthened and our entire ranks are genuinely united and consolidated on both the ideological and organizational level.

Because of their many ideological problems, many of our comrades are also largely unable to distinguish correctly between base areas and non-base areas,²¹⁸ and in consequence make many mistakes. Many comrades have come from Shanghai garrets, and the passage from garret to base area²¹⁹ involves not just two different localities but two different historical eras. One is a semifeudal, semicolonial society ruled by big landlords and the big bourgeoisie; the other is a

revolutionary new democratic society under the leadership of the proletariat. To arrive in a base area²²⁰ involves not just two different localities but two different historical eras. One is a semifeudal, semicolonial society ruled by big landlords and the big bourgeoisie; the other is a revolutionary new democratic society under the leadership of the proletariat. To arrive in a base area²²¹ is to arrive in a period *of rule* unprecedented in the several thousand years of Chinese history, one in which *workers, peasants, and soldiers, and* the popular masses hold power; the people we encompass, the object of our propaganda, are now completely different. The eras of the past are gone forever and will never return. We must therefore join together with the new masses, without the slightest hesitation. If comrades living among the masses are still like the “heroes without a battlefield, remote and uncomprehending” that I spoke about before, then they will find themselves in difficulties not only when they go down to the villages but even right here in Yan’an. Some comrades think, why don’t I write for readers in the general rear,²²² that is something I know well and it is also a matter of “national significance.” This kind of thinking is completely incorrect. The general rear²²³ is also changing,²²⁴ and readers there do not need to listen to writers from base areas²²⁵ repeating the same boring old tales; they are hoping that writers in base areas²²⁶ will present them with new characters, a new world. The national significance of a piece of work, therefore, is wholly dependent on its serving the masses in the base areas.²²⁷ Fadeyev’s *The Nineteen* only describes a small guerrilla band, with no thought at all of appealing to the taste of old world readers, but its influence has spread throughout the world.²²⁸ China is going forward, not back, and the force that is leading China forward is the revolutionary base areas and not a backward area in retreat; comrades engaged in correcting their work styles must first of all recognize this fundamental question.

Since we must join in the new era of the masses, we must thoroughly resolve the question of the relationship between the individual and the masses. Lu Xun’s couplet,

Stern browed I coolly face the fingers of a thousand men,
Head bowed I’m glad to be an ox for little children

should become our motto. The “thousand men” are the enemy, and we will never submit to any enemy no matter how ferocious. The “children” are the proletariat

and the popular masses. All Communist Party members, all revolutionaries, and all revolutionary workers in literature and art should follow Lu Xun's example and be an ox for the proletariat and the popular masses, wearing themselves out in their service with no release until death. The intelligentsia must join in with the masses and serve them; this process²²⁹ can and definitely will involve a great many trials and hardships, but as long as we are resolute, these demands are within our grasp.

In my talk today, I have covered only a few fundamental questions on the direction to take in our literary and art movement, and there are still many concrete questions that require further study. I believe that our comrades are resolved to take this direction. I believe that in the process of correcting their work styles, in the long period ahead of study and work, our comrades can definitely transform themselves and their work, creating many fine works that will be enthusiastically welcomed by *workers, peasants, and soldiers*, and the popular masses, and pushing forward the literary and art movement in the base areas²³⁰ throughout the whole country toward a glorious new stage.

Notes

The translation that follows is by Bonnie S. McDougall, as it appears in the 1992 reprint of her monograph *Mao Zedong's "Talks at the Yan'an Conference on Literature and Art,"* first published in 1980 as No. 39 of the Michigan Monographs in Chinese Studies, with a small number of changes and corrections that Professor McDougall has made for this publication. We are grateful to her, and to the University of Michigan, for allowing us to make use of this excellent translation. The Chinese text on which this translation relies appeared in *Jiefang ribao* on October 19, 1943, and was reproduced in a monograph published by the newspaper; this text is reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 8, pp. 111–48. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see "Variants" in "Note on Sources and Conventions," above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

1. Correct relationship → Relationship
2. National liberation → Popular liberation
3. Slavish culture → Compradore culture

4. Red Army struggles → Revolutionary struggles
5. Integrating with the people's movement → Completely integrating with the popular masses
6. They are → I believe they are
7. Friends → Allies in the popular front
8. Proletariat → Popular masses
9. Cultural army → Workers in revolutionary literature and art
10. Here the *Selected Works* text adds: over the enemy, Japanese imperialism, and all other enemies of the people
11. Of various kinds → Of various kinds in the United Front
12. Criticize and oppose → Firmly oppose
13. Here the *Selected Works* text adds: and struggle with their own shortcomings and mistakes
14. Here the *Selected Works* text adds: excepting only those who cling to their errors
15. Border Region → Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region
16. General rear → Guomintang-controlled areas
17. Or → And even less so
18. General rear → Guomintang-controlled areas
19. Cadres in the Party, the government, and the army → Revolutionary cadres
20. "Rear areas" (*da houfang*) was the common term for areas under Guomintang rule at the time.
21. Yours is the language of intellectuals, theirs is the language of the popular masses → That is, you lack an adequate knowledge of the rich, lively language of the popular masses. Because many workers in literature and art have cut themselves off from the masses and lead empty lives, they are naturally unfamiliar with popular speech, so that not only does the language they write seem rather dull, but in addition they frequently insert strange and unfamiliar expressions that they have just made up and that are quite out of keeping with popular usage
22. We should start by studying → We should conscientiously study
23. The masses' language → A great deal of the masses' language
24. Workers, peasants, and soldiers → Workers and peasants
25. Workers, peasants, and soldiers → Workers, peasants, and soldiers in the revolutionary army

[26.](#) Workers, peasants, and soldiers → Workers and peasants

[27.](#) The big and petty bourgeoisie → The bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia

[28.](#) A Marxist-Leninist → Marxist

[29.](#) A general knowledge → Knowledge

[30.](#) Marxist-Leninist → Marxist

[31.](#) Marxism-Leninism → Marxism

[32.](#) The objective determines the subjective → Existence determines consciousness

[33.](#) The movement → Work

[34.](#) Indecisiveness → Vacillation

[35.](#) Internally → with regard to the people

[36.](#) In literature and art → In literature and art in the base areas

[37.](#) With these armies → With these armies and workers and peasants

[38.](#) The general rear → The Guomindang-controlled areas

[39.](#) Our problem is fundamentally one of → Our problems are

[40.](#) This problem ... it → These two problems ... them

[41.](#) This problem → These problems

[42.](#) Here the following two sentences are inserted in the *Selected Works* version: This problem was solved long ago by Marxists, especially by Lenin. As far back as 1905 Lenin pointed out emphatically that our literature and art should “serve the millions and tens of millions of working people.”

[43.](#) Apart from such people, the rest → The vast majority

[44.](#) Liang Shiqiu, Zhou Zuoren, and Zhang Ziping were noted writers, essayists, and translators not associated with left-wing politics. Liang Shiqiu (1903–1987) was most famous for his literary translations from English. Zhou Zuoren (1885–1967) was Lu Xun’s brother, a noted essayist, but controversial for staying on in Beijing under Japanese rule after 1937. Zhang Ziping (1893–1959) was a noted romantic novelist.

Slave culture or slave literature and art → Traitorous literature and art.

[45.](#) Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the following passage:

We should take over the rich legacy and excellent traditions in literature and art that have been handed down from past ages in China and foreign countries, but our aim must still be to serve the popular masses.

[46.](#) The old forms of the feudal class and the bourgeoisie → The literary and artistic forms of past ages

[47.](#) The petty bourgeoisie → The urban petty bourgeoisie

[48.](#) War → Revolutionary war

[49.](#) The petty bourgeoisie → The laboring masses and intelligentsia of the urban petty bourgeoisie

[50.](#) Workers, peasants, and soldiers are again the most important element in these four groups; the petty bourgeoisie are fewer in number, their revolutionary determination is weaker, and they have a higher cultural level than workers, peasants, and soldiers. Our literature and art are therefore primarily for workers, peasants, and soldiers, and only secondarily for the petty bourgeoisie. Here, we must not raise the petty bourgeoisie to a primary position and relegate workers, peasants, and soldiers to a secondary position → To serve these four groups of people we must identify ourselves with the proletariat and not the petty bourgeoisie. Today, writers who cling to individualism and identify themselves with the petty bourgeoisie cannot genuinely serve the revolutionary masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers; their interest is mainly in a small number of petty-bourgeois intellectuals

[51.](#) The problem we now have with one group of comrades, or the key to their inability → The key to the present inability of one group of comrades

[52.](#) That is → Or

[53.](#) Workers, peasants, and soldiers → The masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers

[54.](#) The petty bourgeoisie → The petty-bourgeois intelligentsia

[55.](#) Members of the petty bourgeoisie → The petty-bourgeois intelligentsia

[56.](#) The intelligentsia → The petty-bourgeois intelligentsia

[57.](#) The intelligentsia from petty-bourgeois backgrounds → Them

[58.](#) Workers, peasants, and soldiers → The masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers

[59.](#) The shortcomings of the petty bourgeoisie → Their shortcomings

[60.](#) Workers, peasants, and soldiers → The masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers

[61.](#) Workers, peasants, and soldiers → Laboring people

[62.](#) Petty-bourgeois → Petty-bourgeois intelligentsia

[63.](#) The intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie → The petty-bourgeois intelligentsia

[64.](#) Have their backsides planted → Stand

[65.](#) The petty bourgeoisie → The petty-bourgeois intelligentsia

- [66.](#) The petty bourgeoisie → The petty-bourgeois intelligentsia
- [67.](#) People → Many people
- [68.](#) Backsides → Standpoint
- [69.](#) The side of the workers, peasants, and soldiers → The side of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, the side of the proletariat
- [70.](#) Marxism-Leninism → Marxism
- [71.](#) Here the *Selected Works* version adds: that genuinely serve the proletariat.
- [72.](#) That disunity on the front of revolutionary literature and art is caused by lack of a common purpose, and that this common purpose is to serve the workers and peasants → The prerequisite for the United Front is a common purpose. ... Our inability to form a United Front shows our inability to reach agreement on our purpose, and that we are only serving the interests of a small group or indeed one individual. If our purpose were to serve the masses of workers and peasants, then of course our front would also be united
- [73.](#) People → The rulers
- [74.](#) Marxism-Leninism → Marxism (The same variant applies to the three appearances of the term Marxism-Leninism in the next sentence.)
- [75.](#) Is fully applicable → Must actually have some effect
- [76.](#) that only comes from books → In words
- [77.](#) If we move this Marxism-Leninism out of books and into the masses so that it becomes a living Marxism-Leninism → If we change this Marxism in words into a Marxism in real life
- [78.](#) Out of all proportion → Out of all proportion, one-sidedly and exclusively
- [79.](#) The → The fact of the
- [80.](#) Since → Moreover, since
- [81.](#) Feudal things? → Things that are necessary to and readily accepted by the feudal class?
- [82.](#) Bourgeois things? → Things that are necessary to and readily accepted by the bourgeoisie?
- [83.](#) Petty-bourgeois things? → Things that are necessary to and readily accepted by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia?
- [84.](#) What belongs to → Things that are necessary to and readily accepted by
- [85.](#) Petty-bourgeois → Petty-bourgeois intelligentsia

- [86.](#) Workers, peasants, and soldiers → The masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers
- [87.](#) Petty-bourgeois → Petty-bourgeois intelligentsia
- [88.](#) Heights → “Heights”
- [89.](#) Here the *Selected Works* version adds: “in the direction of proletarian development.”
- [90.](#) Reaching a wider audience and raising standards are both worthy activities, but from what source do they arise? → What finally is the source from which all kinds of literature and art arise?
- [91.](#) Result → Product
- [92.](#) Popular life → A certain social life
- [93.](#) Result → Product
- [94.](#) Popular life → A certain social life
- [95.](#) Literature and art → The raw materials of literature and art
- [96.](#) They make all → In this respect, they make all
- [97.](#) Exists → Can exist
- [98.](#) Books and other works already in existence → Works of literature and art from the past
- [99.](#) Processed and fabricated from the literature and art → Created from the raw materials of literature and art
- [100.](#) Perceived → Found
- [101.](#) Absorb these things → Take over all the excellent traditions in literature and art
- [102.](#) Process works of literature and art as conceptualized forms → Create works
- [103.](#) Literature and art → Raw materials of literature and art
- [104.](#) As models → As legacies and models
- [105.](#) They are only models and not substitutes; they cannot be substitutes → They are legacies and models and cannot in any way become substitutes for our own creative work
- [106.](#) imitation, or substitution → or imitation
- [107.](#) Dead people → The ancients
- [108.](#) Devoting themselves body and soul → Devoting themselves wholeheartedly
- [109.](#) All literature and art in their natural form → All the raw material of literature and art

[110](#). Although literature and art in their natural form are the sole source of literature and art in conceptually naturalized form → Although human social life is the sole source of literature and art

[111](#). Literature and art that have been processed are more organized and concentrated than literature and art in their natural form → Life as reflected in works of literature and art, compared with ordinary actual life, should and ought to be on a higher plane, more intense, more concentrated

[112](#). Revolutionary fiction, drama, film, and so on → Literature and art

[113](#). Can → Should

[114](#). Hunger → Hunger, cold,

[115](#). Making it typical → Making its contradiction and struggle typical

[116](#). Processed literature and art → Literature and art of this kind

[117](#). Literature and art for a wide audience and literature and art to raise standards are both processed forms, so what is the difference between them? There is a difference of degree → What do reaching a wider audience and raising standards mean in regard to literature and art? What kind of relationship exists between these two tasks?

[118](#). Literature and art for a wide audience indicates that the processing has been relatively limited and simple → Things for a wide audience are relatively simple and plain

[119](#). Literature and art to raise standards indicates that the processing has been relatively extensive and thorough, and, hence, relatively difficult for them → Advanced works are more polished and hence difficult to produce, and often more difficult to circulate readily among the broad masses at the present time

[120](#). Bitter struggle → Bitter and bloody struggle

[121](#). Their most urgent demand, therefore, is for a universal educational movement in the form of cultural knowledge and works of literature and art that they urgently need and can readily accept → They urgently demand a wide-reaching educational movement together with cultural knowledge and works of literature and art that meet their urgent needs and are easy to absorb

[122](#). The first step for them is not a question of → The first need for them is still not

[123](#). Mao is using set phrases, drawing from literature, to emphasize the priority of practical help over theory.

[124](#). The most serious and central task in regard to the people, therefore, is initially the work of reaching a wide audience rather than raising standards → Under present conditions, therefore, the task of reaching a wide audience is the more pressing

[125](#). If the people reaching wide audiences are not on a higher level than their audience, then what is the point of trying to reach them at all? → Not only is it possible for some excellent works even now to reach a wider audience, but also the cultural level of the broad masses is steadily rising

[126](#). These people and the audience they are reaching → The educators and the educated

[127](#). Wouldn't it become meaningless to reach → What would be the point of reaching

[128](#). The experience → Good experience

[129](#). But raising standards for guidance never involves plagiarism, since this would only destroy its usefulness → Precisely for this reason, the work of reaching wider audiences that we are speaking of not only does not hinder raising standards, but gives a basis for the work of raising standards, which is now limited in scope, and also prepares the necessary conditions for us to raise standards in the future on a much broader scale

[130](#). Who have generally already completed the kind of education currently offered to the masses → Who have generally received more education than the masses

[131](#). Processing → Creative labor

[132](#). Lower-level mass literature and art → Elementary literature and art

[133](#). Lower-level mass literature and art → Elementary literature and art

[134](#). Serve → Mostly serve

[135](#). Comrades → People

[136](#). Replenishing, enriching, and nourishing → Replenishing and enriching

[137](#). Guild utilitarians → Narrow utilitarians

[138](#). Himself and his friends or a small group of people, → A few people

[139](#). A large number of people benefit greatly from it → It is in the real interests of the popular masses

[140](#). Which aristocrats enjoy → Which, for the time being, a minority enjoys

[141](#). Utilitarianism versus transcendent utilitarianism, and narrow utilitarianism versus long-range utilitarianism → And so on

[142](#). We → All of us

[143](#). Serve this goal → Act in accordance with this goal

[144](#). "A screw in the whole machine" → "A cog and a screw" in the whole revolutionary machine

[145](#). Here the *Selected Works* text adds: and is subordinate to the revolutionary task set by the Party in a seven revolutionary period

[146](#). Excessive emphasis → Excessive emphasis to a mistaken degree

[147](#). Screw → Cog or screw

[148](#). With other parts → With other more important parts

[149](#). The revolution → The revolutionary movement

[150](#). Ideological warfare and artistic warfare, especially if they are revolutionary, are necessarily subservient to political warfare → Revolutionary ideological struggles and literary and artistic struggles are necessarily subservient to the political struggle

[151](#). Propertied → Rotten bourgeois

[152](#). Here the *Selected Works* version adds: It is precisely for this reason that there can be complete concordance between the political character of our literature and art and their truthfulness.

[153](#). Bourgeois and landlord writers and artists → All bourgeois and landlord writers who support assistance to Japan

[154](#). Writers and artists → Anti-Japanese writers and artists

[155](#). Artistic style → Artistic methods and style

[156](#). Proletarian realism → Socialist realism

[157](#). What Lenin called a hamstrung policy → Mistaken policy

[158](#). Workers, peasants, and soldiers → Laboring people

[159](#). Masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers → Laboring people

[160](#). Deficient → Quite deficient

[161](#). Discuss → Concentrate on discussing

[162](#). Miscellaneous → Specific

[163](#). Good or fairly good → Good

[164](#). Bad or fairly bad → Bad

[165](#). (his works) → (chiefly his works)

[166](#). Works → The existence of works

[167](#). Here the *Selected Works* text adds: and repudiate

- [168](#). A methodology of artistic creation → Methods of artistic creation and criticism
- [169](#). In every class society and in every class in that society → In every class in every class society
- [170](#). In every class society and in every class within that society → In every class in every class society
- [171](#). Artistic quality → Artistic achievement
- [172](#). The proletariat must also reject the reactionary political qualities of bourgeois works of literature and art and accept their artistic qualities only with discrimination → The proletariat must also distinguish between works of literature and art from past ages by first examining their attitude toward the people and whether they have any progressive significance in history, and determine their own attitude accordingly
- [173](#). Highest → Most perfect
- [174](#). A harmful content → Mistaken political views
- [175](#). Which is only concerned with content and not with form → Which only has correct political views but no artistic power
- [176](#). Among many of our comrades → In the thinking of many of our comrades
- [177](#). Here the *Selected Works* text adds: not in the abstract
- [178](#). Has → Only has
- [179](#). Of the proletariat → Of the proletariat and the popular masses
- [180](#). The bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie → The landlord class and the bourgeoisie
- [181](#). Here the *Selected Works* text adds: The human nature encouraged by a few members of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia is divorced from or opposed to the popular masses, and what they call human nature is in fact nothing but bourgeois individualism.
- [182](#). Here the *Selected Works* text adds: so-called
- [183](#). Society has sentenced both to a common fate and integrated our two separate lives into one → Society has made them feel that they share a common fate with the proletariat
- [184](#). Split → Divided
- [185](#). The ruling class, Confucius, and even Tolstoy all upheld it → All ruling classes in the past and many so-called sages and wise men have been fond of upholding it
- [186](#). Classes cause splits within society → Classes divide society into many opposing groups
- [187](#). Here the *Selected Works* text adds: and describes negative characters

[188](#). Shortcomings → Descriptions

[189](#). The science of history and historical materialism → Scientific knowledge of history

[190](#). Here the *Selected Works* version adds: and the evil influence they have on people

[191](#). But these are chiefly a result of the rule exercised over them by aggressors, exploiters, and oppressors, our revolutionary writers and artists should expose them as evils for which aggressors, exploiters, and oppressors are responsible → And these shortcomings should be overcome by criticism and self-criticism within the people's own ranks, and one of the most important tasks of literature and art is to carry out such criticism and self-criticism

[192](#). Solely → Fundamentally

[193](#). Here the *Selected Works* version adds: and everything that harms the people.

[194](#). Should not take → Should not simply take

[195](#). That the popular masses cannot understand → That is not easy for the popular masses to understand

[196](#). With the ruthless methods required against the enemy → In the same way as we treat the enemy

[197](#). Here the *Selected Works* text adds: No, satire is always needed.

[198](#). There are → There are, however,

[199](#). Friends → Allies

[200](#). Each of these three attitudes → Each attitude

[201](#). Get rid of → Oppose

[202](#). Definitely → Necessarily

[203](#). World and of history → History, mankind, and the world

[204](#). The people → The proletariat

[205](#). Whether → How many of

[206](#). What are known as → What is known in creative work as

[207](#). Studying Marxism-Leninism → To uphold the study of Marxism

[208](#). Marxism-Leninism → Marxism

[209](#). Marxism-Leninism → Marxism

[210](#). Marxism-Leninism → Marxism

- [211](#). Marxism-Leninism → “Marxism”
- [212](#). Marxism-Leninism → Marxism
- [213](#). Anti-Marxism-Leninism → Anti-Marxism
- [214](#). Marxism-Leninism → Marxism
- [215](#). Put in order our internal affairs → Put things in order
- [216](#). Our country, and our own heads → And our country
- [217](#). The proletariat and its vanguard → The vanguard of the proletariat
- [218](#). Base areas and non-base areas → Revolutionary base areas and Guomindang-controlled areas
- [219](#). Base area → Revolutionary base area
- [220](#). Base area → Revolutionary base area
- [221](#). Base area → Revolutionary base area
- [222](#). General rear → “General rear”
- [223](#). General rear → “General rear”
- [224](#). Is also changing → Will also change
- [225](#). Base areas → Revolutionary base areas
- [226](#). Base areas → Revolutionary base areas
- [227](#). Base areas → Revolutionary base areas
- [228](#). Here the *Selected Works* text adds: At least in China, as you know, it had a very great influence.
- [229](#). Must join in with the masses and serve them; this process → Must join in with the masses and serve them, they must go through a process where each side gets to know the other. This process
- [230](#). Base areas → Revolutionary base areas

To Luo Feng

(June 12, 1942)

Comrade Luo Feng:¹

I have read your articles and I am returning them to you now.

I think the one about Gorky is good. I benefited a great deal from reading it. However, the other articles are not really in harmony with this one. Although I only read them once, some of them are not clear, while others seem to have defects in their arguments. I hope that you will use the Marxist viewpoint to assess your writings, for this will help you make progress. I do not know whether it is proper to say so; please think about it!

With best wishes!

Mao Zedong

June 12

Notes

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 195, which is based on a copy of the manuscript.

¹ Luo Feng (1909–1991), a noted left-wing writer and Communist Party member since 1929. He was at this time head of the Secretariat of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Cultural Workers Committee.

Telegram to Nie Rongzhen¹

(July 4, 1942)

Comrade Rongzhen:

I have already received and read your entire article of July 1, and I have sent it to *Liberation Daily* for publication. This article calls on us to engage in rectification and study and to correct erroneous tendencies in rectification. Moreover, it points out the special characteristics of study in the border region. Thus, it is a real help in expanding the Rectification movement. However, there is one point to which I ask you to pay attention. Do not divide the three incorrect work styles between the senior and the junior respectively, claiming that some are more prevalent at the senior levels and others more prevalent at the junior levels. Take Party formalism, for example.² It carries within it both subjectivism and sectarianism. If it did not, it would not be called Party formalism. If remnants of Party formalism remain at the *xian* [county] level and above, this proves that remnants of subjective sectarianism also remain. This is rectification of the whole Party. It includes every department and all cadres at every level. Every department means not only the locals but also the military. Similarly, every level means not only junior cadres but also that the most important and the first are the senior and middle cadres, the seniors in particular. If they can be educated, the juniors will make faster progress. In a base area, first of all, we should mainly concentrate on educating cadres at the Border Region Government and Party district committee levels and next at the county levels. If these cadres have a correct orientation, it will be easy to correct the shortcomings of cadres in the local areas and at the village levels. My purpose in stressing this point is to remind you to exercise leadership over the study of senior cadres in every area of the Party, government, military, mass organizations, and education in order to overcome the remnants of

the three incorrect work styles among them. In Yan'an we are also concentrating on study in the senior cadre group, emphasizing reading and self-reflection. We are discovering the shortcomings of many comrades and we are in the process of correcting them. Your people can use them as a resource.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 9, pp. 393–94.

[1.](#) Nie Rongzhen (1899–1992) was a prominent Chinese Communist Party military leader and at this time the secretary of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Branch Bureau of the Central Committee and the commander and commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei – Military Area Command of the Eighth Route Army.

[2.](#) For a consideration by Mao of Party formalism (*dang bagu*), see above, text of February 8, 1942, and text of February 1, 1942, note 10.

*The Task of the New Fourth Army Is Not
to Develop Toward the South But to
Sustain Its Present Base Area*
(July 6, 1942)

Present Base Areas

Zeng, Lai, Chen, and Liu:¹

Your telegram of the seventeenth has been received.

1. The July 7th Manifesto² has been broadcast, and no doubt you have heard it.
2. Before long the present situation in the Zhejiang theater will pass and the next move of the Japanese aggressors will be difficult to predict, but you should be prepared to deal with the enemy's "mopping up." The task of our army is not to develop toward the south but to sustain its present base area. This was made clear in my last telegram replying to Comrade Chen Yi.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 680, which is based on the original text held in the Central Archives.

¹. Zeng Shan (1899–1972) was serving as the director of the Organization Department of the Party Central China Bureau Committee. Lai Chuanzhu (1910–1965) was chief of staff of the New Fourth Army. Chen Yi

(1901–1972), a leading Chinese Communist Party general and Liu Shaoqi were the senior Party officials with the New Fourth Army.

[2.](#) “Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Occasion of the Fourth Anniversary of the War of Resistance” was published on July 7, 1941; translated in Vol. VII, pp. 770–75.

Shandong May Become the Pivot for Strategic Redeployment (July 9, 1942)

Comrade Hu Fu:¹

1. I received your telegram of June 9 some time ago, and all the comrades in the Secretariat have read it. Because I have been thinking about it, I am rather late in replying.

2. We would like very much for you to come to Yan'an to participate in the Seventh Party Congress, but since the road is not safe, you should not risk it. Better to remain in the enemy's rear and rely on our troops.

3. As for your activities, you should give first priority to your safety and then to your work. These should be the criteria by which you decide whether to stay in Shandong or to return to army headquarters.

4. There is, however, one point on which we need to consult with you. This is the question of the importance of Shandong. The situation both at home and abroad is very advantageous. There is hope that the anti-Hitler struggle will triumph in the winter of this year or the spring of next year. If this should happen, then there is real hope that Japan will be defeated in the fall or the winter of next year. The Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States have united very well, and this cannot hurt the relationship between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, which will not be very bad either. Our policy is to do our utmost to unite with the Guomindang, to find a way to improve relations between the two parties, and to emphasize that after the war is over we will still need to cooperate in national reconstruction. When the war is entirely over, the international situation will still be in the phase of democratic republics, in which

various democratic forces will collaborate in a united front, so China will need all the more to go through the stage of a democratic republic before entering socialism. Under such overall international conditions, it is still possible that after the end of the war the Guomindang will cooperate with our Party. Although there is the other possibility of civil war, we should work to bring about the realization of the first possibility. Therefore, we need to take into consideration the possibility that after the defeat of Japan and the withdrawal of its forces from China, we may only be able to secure the conditions for continued cooperation between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party by concentrating the New Fourth Army and other forces from south of the Yellow River in North China, and even by concentrating the whole of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in the three provinces in the eastern provinces [Manchuria] (no need to tell anyone else this point at present). If this is the case, then Shandong will be the pivot for redeployment. At the same time, we need to take into consideration the possibility that the Guomindang may then take advantage of the situation to eliminate the New Fourth Army. If Chiang [Kaishek] moves heavy troops out of Shandong to sever the route of the New Fourth Army's northward advance, then the New Fourth Army would be in a very dangerous situation. Hence, it is really necessary to plan ahead and to take control over Shandong and all the forces in Shandong (the 115th Division, the Mountain Column, and the Yang-Su Column) so as to create secure conditions for the northward redeployment of the New Fourth Army.

5. We request that you assume responsibility for the task of securing control over Shandong as mentioned above. As for the execution of this task, it would be most convenient for you to operate out of Shandong. However, if north Jiangsu is safer, you may also work from there. Or you may operate in Shandong for a while, then return to north Jiangsu, and finally move back to Shandong. Please make a decision on this after evaluating the situation. After you have finalized your plans, the Central Committee will notify the Central China, Shandong, and Northern bureaus to entrust you with the power to command overall affairs in Shandong and Central China.

6. The Japanese bandits are now actively preparing to launch an offensive against Jiangsu. One report puts the timing for this at the end of this month. You need to prepare to deal with this situation.

7. One of the policies of the Japanese bandits in their offensive against us is to seek out our main commanding organs for attack. The sudden attack on the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the death of Zuo Quan are a serious lesson.² This spring, the division headquarters of the 115th Division also encountered similar dangers. Please give this serious attention. All main leading organs and main leaders should give first priority to safety.

8. The study of the twenty-two documents in Yan'an has been very effective (10,000 cadres in Yan'an have participated in this study). In the process of study, various erroneous ideas have been discovered and corrected. The overwhelming majority of cadres say that these two months of study have been more effective than the three years of study undertaken in the past. Please pay attention to guiding this kind of study in accordance with the characteristics of life behind enemy lines. Grasping ideological leadership is the most important step in grasping leadership over everything.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 434–36, which is based on a handwritten manuscript.

[1.](#) That is, Liu Shaoqi.

[2.](#) Japanese forces destroyed the Eighth Route Army Headquarters and killed Vice Chief of Staff Zuo Quan in an attack on the Taihang base area in May 1942.

To Zhou Enlai

(July 17, 1942)

Comrade Enlai:

Received your telegram of July 17. The members of the Politburo all express their heartfelt condolences to you over your father's passing and hope that you can restrain your grief. Since you have just recovered from a serious illness, I hope you will rest more and take care not to overwork yourself in the future.

Mao Zedong

24:00, July 17

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 198, which is based on a manuscript copy.

An Appraisal of the Guomindang-Communist Relationship (July 31, 1942)

Comrade Hu Fu:¹

I received your June 25 telegram on July 22. Here is my reply:

1. At present, Great Britain and the United States do not want a civil war in China. The United States has made it clear that the aid of arms and ammunition to China cannot be used against the Communists, and the congratulatory telegram that [Winston] Churchill sent to Chiang Kaishek on July 7 mentioned that the five years of the War of Resistance Against Japan was the result of upholding the United Front. This is one of the reasons for the recent improvement in the Guomindang attitude. This improvement is likely to grow, and I am trying hard to achieve it. The Guomindang-Communist relationship, however, is an internal Chinese affair, and Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union cannot openly mediate it. Instead, they can only secretly persuade and openly express through public opinion their hopes for Chinese unity. This will also happen in the future, and I am trying to achieve it now as well.

2. We are now indicating to the Guomindang that after the war or during the counteroffensive stage, when there is a possibility of moving to the north, our troops to the south of the Yellow River may march to the north of the Yellow River. When the Guomindang's change in attitude becomes more certain, I will again request that they order their troops in Shandong and Central China to stop clashing with us. This possibility also exists.

3. As regards the Guomindang-Communist relationship, in the past some people in the Guomindang preferred to resolve things by force, but these things

never came to a resolution. Because the domestic and international situations have now changed and we are upholding a policy of cooperation, they have expressed a willingness to resolve things politically. The recent talks between [Zhou] Enlai and Chiang went fairly well. Chiang has again appointed Zhang Zhizhong and Liu Weizhang to negotiate with us.² In addition, he has appointed Bu Shiqi as the daily liaison, and Chiang's liaison staff officer will continue to come to Yan'an. These are all signs of improvement, but we cannot be too eager.

4. Our Party's July 7 Manifesto³ and the movement for rectification of the Three Work Styles in three fields have made a very good impression in all areas.

5. Have you received my telegram sent on July 6?

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu, 1985 huibian ben* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986), pp. 172–73.

¹. Hu Fu is the *nom de guerre* for Liu Shaoqi. See Mao's telegram to him under this name in Vol. VI, text of September 24, 1937, p. 55.

². These were representatives of the Guomindang during the negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party. Zhang Zhizhong was the head of the Political Department of the Military Commission of the Guomindang government, of which Liu Weizhang was a member. See also the text of May 21, 1944. Bu Shiqi, an early Chinese Communist Party member, studied in Moscow and interpreted for Borodin. He was arrested by the Guomindang in 1933 and thereafter changed his allegiance and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.

³. See above, note 2 to the text of July 6, 1942.

Suggestions for Crack Troops and Simple Administration for Central China

(August 4, 1942)

Comrade Chen Yi:

After reading the telegram on Crack Troops and Simple Administration, we are aware of the entire situation in Central China. This is very good. It has not been long since your enlarged meeting at the end of April, and you do not have to make changes in a hurry. However, there is one point to which I would like to draw your attention. That is, along with the bitter struggle there will certainly come a contraction of the base areas, and it is highly possible that this will occur very soon. If you do not prepare for it, you will be sure to suffer great losses. Under such circumstances, whether in Central China or North China, it is impossible to maintain excessively large armies. If we manage with great effort to do so, it certainly will not last for long. We should not forget the lesson of the Central Soviet in the latter half of 1934. As for Central China, you have decided to expand the current main army of 80,000 and local armies of 40,000 to 100,000 each, or 200,000 in all, and this does not yet include Party and government staff. Since the Jiangnan, East Anhui, North Anhui, and Central Hubei base areas have all contracted, this number is too large. Next year will be very difficult, and the degree of difficulty is beyond the imagination of many people now. Nevertheless, the senior leading organs must estimate and prepare beforehand. In civil war, it is possible to have a Long March, but it is absolutely out of the question now. If we use up the human and financial resources of the base areas very quickly, putting

both the people and the military in a difficult situation, then we will face the danger of sentencing ourselves to death. North China and Shandong must determine now to begin to thoroughly implement Crack Troops and Simple Administration; otherwise, by next year they will not be able to carry on. Although the situation in Central China is slightly different, the general direction is the same. You should think this over beforehand and make a comprehensive plan by the end of this year or by early spring of next year in order to fulfill our hopes for Crack Troops and Simple Administration.

Mao Zedong

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 437–38, which is based on a manuscript held in the Central Archives.

To Xie Juezai

(August 17, 1942)

Old Xie:¹

I have read your letter. I am interested in the “Yi de shu” column² and have benefited from it. Still, I feel that occasionally one or two points are not so appropriately expressed, but there is no cause for anxiety.

It looks as if the Consultative Congress of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region should be postponed to next spring. By then, the situation may be more promising, and it will be easier to express our opinions to the outside. We should not regard this Consultative Congress as for this region only. Instead, it should be regarded as the leader of all the Consultative Congresses in the base areas in North and Central China. Moreover, after the end of this year, it will be easier to summarize our area’s work experience. So this is worth reconsidering.

With best wishes!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 197–98, which is based on a manuscript copy.

¹. Xie Juezai (1884–1971) was at this time the vice chair of the Consultative Congress of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

². The column was published in *Jiefang ribao* by Xie Juezai under the penname Huan Nan between April and November 1942. The title invokes a popular saying, “Even a fool occasionally hits upon a good idea.”

Xie's essays in the column largely commented on problems in work and cadre attitudes in Yan'an.

To Xie Juezai and Chen Zhengren

(August 19, 1942)

Comrades Juezai and Zhengren:¹

Today we discussed how the second session of the Consultative Congress [of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region] should center on the preparation for Crack Troops and Simple Administration. Retrenchment should begin before the meeting. After the meeting we should devote ourselves to investigating (examining item by item) the Crack Troops and Simple Administration effort, seeing that they include the aspects of better and fewer, efficiency, unity, and so forth. I have just read the article titled “Crack Troops and Simple Administration in the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region” in today’s [August 19] newspaper. It contains many more things, such as economizing and anti-bureaucratism. I think this is a very good article. Please also have a look at it to see whether we can imitate them entirely. After rectification study has been completed, there should be another effort as great as rectification itself. Only in this way can we have widespread, penetrating, and real effects. In the past, it was just like a puff of wind passing by the ear.²

Best wishes!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 199–200, which is based on a manuscript copy.

[1.](#) For Xue, see above, note to the text of August 17, 1942. Chen Zhengren (1907–1972) was at this time director of the Organization Department of the Party Central Committee.

[2.](#) That is, unheeded advice.

*Telegram of Congratulations to the
British Worker's Daily on the
Resumption of Publication
(August 31, 1942)*

The British *Worker's Daily*:

We warmly congratulate you on the resumption of publication of the *Worker's Daily*. We firmly believe that after the resumption of its publication, the *Worker's Daily* will continue to be the clarion call to unite and mobilize British forces of all kinds to defeat nazism. The resumption of publication of the *Worker's Daily* is not only an important event in British political life, it is also a powerful element in defeating fascism in the entire world.

We celebrate your success and the forthcoming ultimate victory of the anti-Fascist cause.

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee

Mao Zedong

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 101, which is based on *Jiefang ribao*, August 31, 1942.

*Resolution of the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party on
Unifying Party Leadership in the Anti-
Japanese Base Areas and Rectifying
Relationships Among Various
Organizations*

*Passed by the Politburo of the Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee
(September 1, 1942)*

Since the War of Resistance began, Party leadership in the various anti-Japanese base areas has generally been unified, and relationships among the various Party, government, military, and popular (mass) organizations have been basically united. Because of this, we have stood firm in the face of bitter struggle over several years and have coordinated the national War of Resistance. However, because of the poisonous influence of subjectivism and sectarianism and because certain political views and organizational relationships still have not been clearly understood or properly resolved, in certain districts there still persist some instances of discord in the relationships among the Party, government, military, and mass organizations (actually, they are the relationships among Party members and cadres in these different systems). For example, the spirit of unity is insufficient; there is no marching order; each regards himself as the authority; the

army lacks the spirit of respect for local Party and government authority; the Party and government are not separated; Party members and cadres in the government agitate for the independence of Party leadership; Party members dominate mass organizations; departmentalism and factional prejudices persist, and so on. These instances of discord hinder the maintenance and construction of the anti-Japanese base areas and the further Bolshevization of our Party. The construction of base areas and the implementation of democracy require the centralization [yiyuanhua]¹ of leadership in every base area. With the cruelty of the Japanese “mopping-up” campaign, the strengthening of the blockade and strongholds, the difficulty of communications between higher and lower levels, and the increase in local and guerrilla warfare, there is a need for greater flexibility in the relationship between higher and lower levels and an increase and strengthening of an active spirit of independence in each district (military district, subdistrict), as well as an active and general unification of leadership and closer coordination among all organizations in every district, so that none will provide the enemy with an advantageous loophole. To attain these objectives, the Central Committee especially issues the following resolution:

1. The Party is the vanguard of the proletariat and the highest form of proletarian organization; it should lead all the other organizations, such as the army, government, and mass organizations. The unification and centralization [yiyuanhua] of leadership in the base areas should be expressed in a unified Party committee that leads everything in that base area (Central Committee bureaus, subbureaus, district committees, and local committees). Thus, it has been decided that the representative bodies of the Central Committee (Central Committee bureaus and subbureaus) and Party committees at each level (district and local committees) are to be the highest leading organs in each district, unifying leadership in each district over Party, government, military, and mass work, and that all former local Party political and military committees are to be abolished (their establishment was necessary and correct during the founding period of the base areas). The character and composition of the Party committees at each level must be changed; Party committees at each level should not merely be committees that guide local work but should also be unified organs leading the Party, government, military, and mass organizations in that district (they should not, however, be joint conferences). For that reason, they must include the

principal responsible Party members and cadres in Party affairs, the government, and the army (the standing committee of the Party committee should also include responsible cadres from the three areas of the Party, the government, and the military), and it should not be made up wholly or mostly of Party workers. The job of the Party committee at each level should be to take care of each area, discuss and investigate each aspect of Party, government, military, and mass work in each area and should not be limited only to local work.

2. Decisions, resolutions, and directives of organs representing the Central Committee and district and local Party committees must be unconditionally carried out by lower-level Party committees, as well as by Party groups at the same level in the government, military, and mass organizations. Relationships of subordination between higher and lower levels in the government, military, and mass organizations should remain unchanged. Resolutions, orders, and regulations from higher levels of government, orders and instructions from higher levels of the military leadership, and resolutions of higher-level mass organizations (of the above documents, the more important must pass through the Party member responsible for that organ, to be delivered to the Party committee at the same level for approval, or they can be discussed and confirmed by the responsible members in the Party committee and thereafter be issued as orders, but not all need to be approved) must not only be unconditionally carried out by lower-level government, military, and mass organizations but must also be unconditionally carried out by lower-level Party committees. They must not be opposed or shelved under the pretext of lacking instructions from higher-level Party committees. If lower-level Party committees have views that differ from the resolutions of higher-level government, military, and mass organizations, they may report them to a higher-level Party committee. If disputes arise within a Party committee when deciding concrete problems according to a resolution of the organization's higher level, they must be resolved according to the principle of majority rule. Even if responsible persons in government, military, or mass organizations do not agree with the majority opinion, they must still carry out the decision of the Party committee at the same level, but they may report their opinions to the related higher-level organ.

3. Central Committee bureaus and subbureaus are the representative organs of the Central Committee and are under its direction. Party district committees and

local committees are selected by the representative assemblies of military and local Party organizations, subject to higher-level approval. District and local Party committees should include responsible people from the local Party organization, Party cadres in the army, and Party groups in the government. Whether the main armed forces should participate in county committees is to be decided according to the concrete situation in the locality. County committees (in which the main armed forces do not participate) and district committees should include only responsible Party persons from the local Party and from local troops and government. For secretaries of Party committees at each level, comrades should be selected who can assume responsibility for any aspect of Party, government, military, or mass work. Secretaries of Party committees must thus understand not only Party affairs but also military and government work. Secretaries of district Party committees are to be selected by decision of the Central Committee bureaus and subbureaus and approved by the Central Committee. The secretaries of local Party committees are to be selected by the district Party committees and approved by the subbureaus and bureaus of the Central Committee. In order to unify the leadership of the local Party and the Party in the military, secretaries of subbureaus and district and local committees are to serve concurrently as political commissars in the military districts or subdistricts (divisions or brigades), and assistant secretaries are to be appointed to be in charge of Party work. If the political commissar for a military district or subdistrict is selected as the Party secretary of a subbureau, district Party committee, or local Party committee, an assistant political commissar can then be appointed specifically to handle the military work. The secretaries of subbureaus, district Party committees, and local Party committees should pay attention to each aspect of work and, except for concurrent services as political commissars, should not be concurrently responsible for other concrete work. When, in a few special cases, it is not necessary for the secretary of a Party committee to act concurrently as political commissar or for a political commissar to act concurrently as secretary of a Party committee, the approval of the higher-level Party committee or Central Committee must be obtained. Military administrative committees and political departments in the army are to become departments of Party committees at the same level (Central Committee bureaus, subbureaus, Party districts, or local committees), are to have privileges and duties equal to

those of the other departments (such as organization departments, propaganda departments), and are not to be subordinate to other departments and committees, yet they differ from other committees or departments in that they retain direct relationships of subordination and leadership between higher and lower levels. Military policy (such as the principles on the expansion or the establishment of armies, political work) and broad political aims of military action (such as the strategy and planning and summarizing of military service in the counter-mopping-up campaigns) must be submitted to Party committees for discussion, but military commanders and political commissars (i.e., secretaries of Party committees) are to make decisions on concrete military action (the final power of decision making by military commanders and political commissars on military affairs depends on the work regulations of the political departments). Unlimited democratic discussion can only lead to defeat in military activities. The appointment and dismissal of important military personnel must still pass through the military organs and be handled according to the already existing regulations.

4. The main armed forces are armed units under Party leadership and the powerful mainstay in establishing base areas and carrying on the struggle. The main armed forces should take the consolidation and sustaining of their respective base areas as their primary task. The main armed forces are definitely of a national character, yet at the same time concretely they have a local character. The most important reason that past leadership in certain base areas was not unified is that the comrades leading the main armed forces in those areas did not have a correct and integrated understanding of the establishment and maintenance of their base area. As a consequence, certain policies they carried out (such as arming the local population as part of establishing the military, military expansion, and unified collection and consumption in financial and economic policy) merely concentrated on the main armed forces and ignored integration of the overall tasks of the base area. This led to disputes with the local Party and government. At the same time, the leading organs of the Party and the government in some localities and districts have not had a real understanding of the fact that everything is subordinate to the demands of the war, have not been capable of fulfilling the necessary responsibilities regarding questions of reinforcements for the main armed forces, the guarantee of supplies and

materials, the privileged treatment of the families of resistance fighters, and the counteracting of desertion, and thus have brought about discordant relations between the army and the local Party and government. In the future, to realize the centralization [*yi yuan hua*] of leadership in the base areas, there must be, in addition to the establishment of Party committees as unified organs of Party leadership in the district, a correction of several errors in thought and policy among the main armed forces and among certain leaders of the local Party and government organs. We must carry out the various policies of the Central Committee on the base areas and the various directives of the Military Commission on the military establishment. In the future, the main armed forces must carry out the decisions and resolutions of the Party committees at each level and the laws of each level of government. The main armed forces must also carry out the resolutions of the lower-level Party committees and lower-level government units (i.e., county, district, and locality) of the area where they are stationed. If there are differences of opinion, reports may be made to higher-level Party committees or to higher government levels. In addition, they should regularly communicate with and assist one another. Plans of the main armed forces—such as orders regarding military movements, troop deployment, and martial law—must be respected and carried out by local Party, government, and mass organs. The main armed forces should be responsible for the protection of Party, government, and mass organs. In all instances in which Party, government, and mass organs have been needlessly harmed because of carelessness or lack of attention on the part of the army, the responsible military personnel are to be punished. If disputes arise in the future, there should first be a lower-level compromise solution, and then the dispute and the solution are to be reported to a higher level; the method in which each organization merely makes accusations to a higher level and fails to achieve a negotiated solution to the problem on the spot is to be opposed.

5. The systems of political authority (representative assemblies, government) are the organs of power, and their ordinances are of a compulsory character. The relationship between Party committees and the political system must be clearly defined. A monopoly of the work in the political system by Party committees, a lack of distinction between Party and government, disobedience by Party members and cadres within the political power system to Party committee

resolutions, and actions which are contrary to Party discipline must all be corrected. In order that the “Three-Thirds” system² be carried out, leadership of the Party within the political system should exist in matters of principle, policy, and overall political orientation but should not intervene everywhere or monopolize affairs. Lower-level Party committees do not have the power to change or to refuse to carry out the resolutions and ordinances of higher-level representative assemblies and the government, and Party organs and Party members should become models of adherence to the ordinances of representative assemblies and the government. The Party should advance its political work by promoting the actual authority of the representative assemblies and the government. When Party cadres or members disobey the ordinances of the representative assemblies or the government, they should be severely punished by Party organizations. The leadership of the Party in the representative assemblies and the government can only work through its respective Party members and Party organs, and Party committees and Party organs have no right to give direct orders to the representative assemblies and government organs. Party groups must obey Party committees of equal rank, yet the work style of Party groups must be reformed; they cannot force obedience of people outside the Party, but must operate through personal persuasion and political work. If the Party group fails to persuade a majority in the representative assembly or government and the opinion of the Party group is not adopted by the representative assembly or the government, the minority must submit to the majority, and the principle of democratic centralism must not be opposed. But if comrades in Party groups do not firmly uphold the resolutions of equal-ranking Party committees because their own views differ from those of the Party committees, their action is contrary to Party discipline, and it should be reproved and punished. The Party must delegate competent cadres to work in the representative assemblies and the government; all concentration of cadres in Party organs to the neglect of political work must be corrected. When the “Three-Thirds” system is carried out, the number of Party members in the political system will decrease, but the quality of the Party members in the political system must be greatly improved. Party members and cadres working in the political system must obey the decisions, resolutions, and discipline of Party committees and Party groups and must not take advantage of their own positions for

independent action. In this respect, it should be especially pointed out that for the practical realization of the leadership of the Party in the “Three-Thirds” system, the Party relies on unanimity in speech and action of Party members and Party cadres in the political system and their absolute obedience to Party resolutions. Strict Party discipline among Party members and Party cadres in the political system is of great significance. Party committees must be careful in transferring Party members within the political system; the procedure must involve the Party members’ formal resignation from the political organ. Relations between the government and the army must be improved; in the army, instructions should be given on the protection of the government; the government must guarantee supplies and transportation for the army; military commanders must be elected as government officials [*weiyuan*] and assembly members. The army should be a model of respect for the government and for the execution of ordinances, and illegal acts committed by soldiers must be severely punished by military organs. Except for the expression of opinions to the assemblies or the government by soldiers in their capacity as citizens, government officials, or assembly members, soldiers and military organs do not have the right to intervene in the internal work of the assemblies or the government. However, political organs of the army must give all possible assistance to the work of the government.

6. Mass organizations are bodies organized on the initiative of the masses themselves, and the Party, government, and army should not directly intervene in their internal activities. The Party’s leadership of mass organizations is exercised through its own Party members and groups. However, failure to distinguish between the Party and the people, monopolization, and complete uniformity must all be corrected. To the greatest extent possible, the membership of the committees of the mass organizations at each level should include more than half non-Party people. The issue of Party groups in mass organizations is the same as that of Party groups in the government. The government should respect the independence of the mass organizations and give them whatever assistance is necessary, but it should demand that mass organizations carry out government ordinances. Mass organizations should, in accordance with the law, petition the government for registration and thus attain legal status. When mass organizations break government laws, the government can punish and even dissolve them; aside from this, the government cannot in any case interfere with

the activities and work of the mass organizations. Mass organizations should rally the masses, support the government and army, and assist resistance mobilization. But mass organizations are by no means political organs; they must not take over administrative functions from the government by arrests, examinations, judgments, or by other actions. The army and mass organizations should assist each other but should not intervene in each other's affairs.

7. In guerrilla areas, due to their special nature, the centralization [*yiyuanhua*] of leadership should not merely be limited to mutual relationships; there must also be centralization, when necessary, of Party, government, military, and mass structures. The organs of Party committees, government, and mass organizations can be amalgamated with military and political organs. Party, government, and mass cadres in army or guerrilla units are responsible for specific tasks (such as superior or subordinate military commanders or political commissars or various jobs in the political departments). When there are hostilities, they are to participate in the work of the army and the guerrilla units. When there is a lull, they are to carry out their former tasks in the Party, government, or mass organizations (as secretaries of Party committees, county magistrates, or labor union leaders).

8. On the one hand, the centralization [*yiyuanhua*] of Party leadership is to be expressed in the mutual relations between Party, government, and mass organizations of the same level; on the other hand, it is to be expressed in the relations between upper and lower levels. In this sphere, strict adherence to the principle of obedience of lower levels to higher levels and obedience of the entire Party to the Central Committee are of decisive significance in unifying Party leadership. When carrying out policies and regulations, the leading organs in each base area must follow Central Committee directives. When deciding new questions of a general nature that affect the entire country, Party, or army, they must ask for instructions from the Central Committee and must not endanger the unified leadership of the entire Party by setting up strange new standards and making decisions on their own. (This does not pertain to decisions of a local nature or those that are not contrary to higher-level or Central Committee decisions.) Failure of Party, government, military, or mass organizations at lower levels to execute with determination higher-level or Central Committee decisions, resolutions, orders, or directives, compliance in appearance only, or failure to ask

for instructions from higher levels or the Central Committee for the solution of new questions of principle or questions which should, according to their nature, not be decided independently are all signs of an impure Party spirit and the destruction of unity.

In this respect, the attention of leading comrades of the Party, government, army, and mass organizations in the base areas should again be drawn to the fact that responsible Party members in Party committees, the government, the army, and mass organizations at all levels must not make statements, engage in discussions, or make broadcasts that have national significance without obtaining Central Committee permission. The writings of leading comrades at each level should be examined by the Party committees or appropriate members of the Party branches at the same level. The principal contents of the writings by individuals with rank higher than subbureau committee member or army commander that have national significance or significance for the entire Party should first be submitted to the Central Committee by report or telegram. Localities should no longer make direct broadcasts to the outside world. This should be unified in the New China News Agency in Yan'an. It should be thoroughly understood that the actions of responsible higher-level Party cadres who take it upon themselves to express political views without obtaining the approval of a specific organization at an equal level or higher is a major transgression of Party organizational principles and an evil obstruction to unity!

9. In order to unify leadership in the base areas and in order to improve relations among the Party, the government, the army, and the people [*min*],³ ideological education must be given to Party members and cadres within the system of Party, government, army, or mass organizations. The Three Work Styles must be rectified and the poison of subjectivism and sectarianism must be eliminated. At cadre meetings, on the basis of Central Committee resolutions and Comrade Mao Zedong's report, teach cadres to recognize the larger aspects and to consider situations in their entirety, summon cadres to carry out criticism and self-criticism, make cadres understand situations in their entirety and not succumb to partial or particular biases, and understand the correct relationships between the part and the whole, between higher and lower levels, and between this and that part of a situation. If we are to strengthen educational work in the various Party, government, military, and mass organizations, we must make all

comrades recognize the importance of a centralized [*yiyuanhua*] leadership and the revolutionary order and laws of the base areas. Here we must especially warn military cadres that when discordant relations exist among the Party, the government, the army, and the people [*min*], the greatest responsibility should generally fall on the military cadres. Since the army is in possession of weapons, it is easy for it to act single-handedly, disregard the government and the Party, break discipline, act independently, and harm the interests of the masses. As a consequence, political cadres in the army in particular must restrain their subordinates and hold themselves in check. They must call on the troops under their command to support Party leadership, support the government, and rigidly uphold Party leadership and government laws. At the same time, they should correct those views among some Party members and cadres that are contrary to reality. These people believe that only the work done in Party committees or Party organs can really be called Party work. In fact, for all Party members and cadres military work, mass work, economic work, technical work, or cultural work are all Party work. The work done in Party organs is only a part of the Party's work. (It is Party affairs work.) In following Party leadership, Party members must follow the Party's line, policies, resolutions, decisions, directives, and discipline. Certain Party members only follow Party leadership in their slogans or they distort Party leadership and as a result they do not earnestly study and carry out the Party's line, policies, resolutions, decisions, directives, and discipline. Such attitudes are incorrect.

10. The purpose of strengthening the unity of leadership in each anti-Japanese base area is to facilitate the war against the Japanese bandits. "Everything bows to the demands of war" is the highest principle of unified leadership. The entire Party must understand that if the army is weak and if the war is lost, it will be impossible for the base areas to exist, and the Party, government, army, and masses will collapse. It is thus the duty of the Party committees, the government, the mass organizations, and the entire people to strengthen the army and increase its fighting power. Party committees, government, and mass organizations all have a constant responsibility to solve the problems of army recruitment, provisions, and clothing; to supply and transport ammunition, to provide living quarters, to transport the wounded and disabled, to provide nursing and care for them, to give preferential treatment to families of anti-Japanese soldiers, and so

forth, and any carelessness in these matters is extremely mistaken and harmful. In the army itself, it must be thoroughly understood that without the integration of the Party, government, and mass organizations, the army by itself would not be able to fight on in the War of Resistance for a single day. We must therefore intensify education in the army so that it will cherish the base areas, treasure human and material resources, respect the Party and government, strengthen discipline, and give the Party, government, and masses the necessary assistance. Recruitment and transportation for the army and preferential treatment for the families of resistance fighters must be worked out according to government orders and regulations; irregularities are harmful to the war effort and disadvantageous to the army itself.

11. On the basis of the principles contained in this resolution and the concrete conditions in each locality, leading organs in the base areas are to decide the various relevant detailed provisions and carry them out through government ordinances, army regulations, the bylaws of the mass organizations, or by other means, in order to solve the many concrete problems of unified leadership. After decisions have been reached, they must be reported to the Central Committee.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji* Vol. 8, pp. 155–63, which is based on *Zhengfeng wenxian*.

1. We have used “centralization” for *yiuanhua*, whereas both Compton, tr., *Mao’s China* and Saich, ed., *Rise to Power* have used “unity” or “unification” in their translations. We are concerned about not confounding *yiuanhua*, the total amalgamation of separate functions under direct Party rule, with *tongyi* (unity). However, we realize that “centralization” could suggest *jizhonghua*. We have marked the appearances of *yiuanhua* in our translation.

2. See above, note 1 to the text of January 26, 1942, and note 4 to the text of February 20, 1942.

3. Clearly “people” here for *min* is most elegant; however, the use of *min* in the rest of the document is short-hand for *minzhong tuanti* (mass organizations).

A Most Important Policy (September 7, 1942)

Ever since the Central Committee of the Party put forward the policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration, Party organizations in many anti-Japanese base areas have been applying it, or have been making plans to apply it, in accordance with the directives of the Central Committee. The leading comrades of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region have really taken this work in hand, creating a model for Crack Troops and Simple Administration. Some base areas,¹ however, have not conscientiously carried this out because of an incomplete understanding of the policy. Comrades in these areas still fail to understand how Crack Troops and Simple Administration is related to the current situation and to other Party policies, or they fail to regard it as a most important policy. This matter has been discussed several times before in this paper,² and we now wish to explain it further.

All Party policies aim at the defeat of the Japanese invaders. From the fifth year onward, the War of Resistance has in fact entered the final stage of the struggle for victory, and in this stage the situation is different from that in the first and second years of the war and also from that in the third and fourth. A character³ of the fifth and sixth years of the war is that while victory is drawing near, there are very great difficulties ahead; in other words, we are in the “darkness before the dawn.” This character prevails at the present stage in all the anti-Fascist countries and in all of China as well; it is not confined to the base areas of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, although it is acute⁴ here. We are striving to defeat the Japanese invaders in two years, and *in light of the entire situation this is not a hollow claim, but has a solid basis as pointed out by the Party Central Committee in the July 7 Manifesto.*⁵ But the two years will

be years of extreme difficulty, differing greatly from the first two years and the middle two years of the war. These particular characteristics must be anticipated by the revolutionary Party and revolutionary leaders.⁶ Should they fail to do so, they will simply delay events and will not be able to attain victory⁷ and may even jeopardize the cause of the revolution. Although the *difficult* situation in the anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy rear is already several times as difficult as before, the difficulty is not yet extreme. Extreme difficulty is behind us.⁸ People in general are liable to judge by past and present conditions and to be misled into thinking that the future will be much the same. They are unable to anticipate the locations where the ship may⁹ encounter submerged rocks or how to steer clear of these rocks with a cool head. What are the submerged rocks in the path of the ship of the War of Resistance? They are the extremely grave difficulties¹⁰ of the final stage of the war. Our Central Committee has pointed them out and has called on us to be on the alert and steer clear of them. Many of our comrades already understand the point, but some do not, and that is the first obstacle we must overcome. There are difficulties in the War of Resistance that must be overcome.¹¹ These are political difficulties that have occurred in the past and may occur again in the future. Over the past five years, our Party made great efforts¹² to overcome them gradually. Our slogan is to strengthen unity, and we must continue to emphasize that. But there are difficulties of another kind, material ones. They will grow more and more acute. Today many comrades¹³ are still unperturbed and inattentive, and we must therefore alert these comrades to the need to pay attention. All comrades in each anti-Japanese base area must recognize that from now on, material difficulties are bound to grow ten times graver,¹⁴ that we must overcome them, and that our slogan¹⁵ is Crack Troops and Simple Administration.

Why is Crack Troops and Simple Administration an important policy for overcoming these material difficulties? It is clear that the present, and still more the future, war situation in the base areas will not permit us to cling to our past views. Our enormous resistance war¹⁶ apparatus is suited to past conditions. It was permissible then, even necessary, but things are different now. The base areas have shrunk and may continue to shrink in the future,¹⁷ and undoubtedly we cannot maintain the same enormous resistance war apparatus as before.

There is already a contradiction, which we must resolve, between our war apparatus and the war situation. The enemy's objective is to aggravate this contradiction, and this is its Three-all policy.¹⁸ If we maintain our enormous apparatus, we shall fall right into its trap. If we reduce it with Crack Troops and Simple Administration, our war apparatus, though reduced, will remain strong. By resolving the contradiction of "a big fish in a small pond" and by adapting our apparatus¹⁹ to the war situation, we shall prove even stronger. The enemy will not be able to defeat us, and, in the end, we will defeat our enemy. That is why we say that the policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration put forward by the Central Committee of the Party is a most important policy.

However, people's minds are liable to be fettered by circumstance and habit from which even revolutionaries cannot always escape. We created this enormous apparatus ourselves, little thinking that one day we ourselves would have to reduce it; and now that the time has come to do so, we find it onerous and difficult. As the enemy bears down upon us with its enormous war apparatus, how can we just shrink? If we do, we shall feel that our forces are too few to cope with the enemy. Such misgivings are precisely the result of being fettered by circumstance and habit. When the weather changes, it becomes necessary to change one's clothing. Each year as spring turns to summer, summer to autumn, autumn to winter, and winter to spring, we have to make this change, but if people sometimes fail to make the *appropriate* change at each "turn," they will fall ill. This is the power of habit. Present conditions in the base areas already require us to shed our winter garments and put on summer clothing so that we can move about nimbly to fight the enemy, but we are still heavily padded and weighed down and quite unfit for combat. How do we deal with the enemy's enormous apparatus? We can learn from the example of how the Monkey King dealt with the Ox Devil.²⁰ Wasn't the devil²¹ a formidable demon? So the Monkey King changed himself into a tiny insect and made his way into the devil's heart and overpowered him. Liu Zongyuan wrote the story "The Trick of the Guizhou Donkey."²² A huge donkey was brought to Guizhou, and the sight of him frightened²³ a small tiger, but in the end, this huge donkey was bitten to death²⁴ by that small tiger. Our Eighth Route and New Fourth armies are the Monkey King or the small tiger, and they are fully capable of dealing with the Japanese devil or donkey. Now we must do a bit of changing and make ourselves a bit

smaller but sturdier. Then we shall be invincible.

These are the fundamental reasons why the Central Committee has put forward the policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration and why it is a most important policy at present and must be understood fully and carried out resolutely. ...

The relationship between the policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration and other Party policies and the concrete matters to focus on when implementing this policy will be explained in another document. (Telegram, Yan'an, September 7)

Notes

This is an editorial written by Mao for *Jiefang ribao*, which appeared on September 7, 1942. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 8, pp. 165–68, which reproduces the text as it appeared in the newspaper. Text in *italics* below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi

1. Base areas → base area comrades
2. That is, *Jiefang ribao* [Liberation Daily]
3. Character → Feature
4. Acute → Particularly acute
5. Published on July 7, 1941; see above, note 2 to the text of July 6, 1942.
6. The revolutionary Party and revolutionary leaders → The leading personnel in the revolutionary Party and revolutionary army
7. Will not be able to attain victory → No matter how hard they try, they will not be able to attain victory
8. Extreme difficulty is behind us → If we do not have a correct policy now, then extreme difficulty will overtake us
9. Anticipate the locations where the ship may → Anticipate that the ship may

- [10.](#) The extremely grave difficulties → The extremely grave material difficulties
- [11.](#) There are difficulties in the War of Resistance that must be overcome → There is the need for unity in the War of Resistance and unity involves difficulties
- [12.](#) Great efforts → Utmost efforts
- [13.](#) Many comrades → Some comrades
- [14.](#) Ten times graver → Graver
- [15.](#) Slogan → One important way of doing so
- [16.](#) Resistance war → War
- [17.](#) In the future → For a period
- [18.](#) The Three-all policy of the Japanese army in North China was to “Burn all, kill all, loot all.”
- [19.](#) Apparatus → War apparatus
- [20.](#) The Ox Devil → Prince Iron Fan
- [21.](#) The devil → The Prince
- [22.](#) Liu Zongyuan wrote the story “The Trick of the Guizhou Donkey” → Liu Zongyuan’s description of “The Trick of the Guizhou Donkey” also contains a valuable lesson
- [23.](#) Frightened → Rather frightened
- [24.](#) Bitten to death → Devoured

To Xie Juezai

(September 15, 1942)

Old Xie:

I have read your letter of the 6th. The dead are already dead,¹ but those who are still alive should take care. Now, you and Mr. Lin² need to adjust your lives and work, and arrange them properly. Don't overwork yourselves, and don't write too many articles, either.³ Please think this over!

Best wishes!

Mao Zedong

P.S.: Luo Mai⁴ has been transferred to work in the government, so many things can be left to his care.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 201, which is based on a manuscript copy.

¹. Mao is referring to Wang Lingbo (1882–1942), who was Xie's fellow provincial and good friend. At the time of his death, Wang was vice dean of Yan'an's Administrative College.

². Lin Boqu (1885–1960) was at this time chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government.

³. Xie had been writing a commentary in *Jiefang ribao*. See above, note 2 to the text of August 17, 1942.

⁴. That is, Li Weihai (1896–1984), who had been working as vice director of the Central Committee

Propaganda Department, was transferred in September 1942 to serve as head of the Secretariat of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government.

Letter to He Kaifeng on Press and Translation Questions (September 15, 1942)

Comrade Kaifeng:¹

Today I talked with Bo Gu² for half the day. Work in the newspaper office has made progress, and we hope that it will be transformed from an incomplete Party newspaper to a complete Party newspaper. He gave a report to over 200 people and the response was very good (according to Shu Qun).³ The staff in the newspaper office are now discussing improvements. Speaking of each department using newspapers to help in their work, I think we should have another discussion in order to draw the attention of comrades in every department of the Central Committee. The authorities in each base area still have not begun to appreciate newspapers as the very important weapon they are. I am thinking of sending out a telegram (or using the name of the Secretariat) to point out this mission. After rectification is finished, the Central Committee should set up a big editing and translation department into which the editing and translation bureau of the military committee should be amalgamated, with about twenty or thirty people working there, to translate a large number of works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and other Russian books. If they have more energy, they could translate English, French, and German classics. I think that Liangping⁴ has made great contributions in translation; it would be best if he could lead the editing and translation department. What do you say? I do not know whether he is willing. For the sake of the whole Party, it is better to do translation rather than to do local work. To model on Tang Sanzang⁵ or Lu Xun would be of boundless merit.

After Luo Mai leaves,⁶ you will be in charge of the Central Research Institute.

Page 4 of *Liberation Daily* is short of articles, and it still favors literature and art. I have already contacted about a dozen people, trying to help Shu Qun solicit articles. They include Ai, Fan, Sun Xuewei,⁷ and the labor, women's, and youth committees. I contacted Feng Wenbin⁸ in the Youth Committee to solicit articles of 6,000–10,000 words each month on the Youth movement, but I do not know whether it can be done.

The unhappy things will be over soon.

Best wishes!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 441–42, which is based on a manuscript copy.

¹. He Kaifeng (1906–1955) was at this time vice director of the Central Committee Propaganda Department as well as acting head.

². That is, Qin Bangxian (Bo Gu, 1907–1946), who was a leader of the Russian returned-student faction and was general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party from 1931 to 1935. At this time he was managing director of the *Jiefang ribao*.

³. Shu Qun (1913–1989) was then editor of features (or supplements) in *Jiefang ribao*.

⁴. Wu Liangping (1908–1986), translator of Engels's *Anti-Dürhing*, was then an editor at the Yan'an weekly *Jiefang*.

⁵. That is, the monk Xuanzang, who brought the Indian Buddhist classics back to China and translated them in the AD seventh century.

⁶. Luo Mai (alternate name for Li Weihai) (see note 4 to the previous text, "To Xue Juezai," September 15, 1942).

⁷. Ai Siqu (1910–1966) was a noted Marxist philosopher. Fan Wenlan, a noted historian (see above, note to the text of January 17, 1942). Sun Xuewei (alternate name for Liu Xuewei, 1912–) was a friend of the doomed Wang Shiwei who turned against him during the June 1942 anti-Wang struggle sessions in Yan'an. All were researchers at the Central Research Institute.

8. Feng Wenbin (1911–1997) was in charge of the Yan'an Youth Arts Theater and the Central Committee's Youth Department.

Try the Utmost to Avoid Clashes (September 15, 1942)

Comrade Xiannian:¹

Now is the time to try your utmost to improve [the relationship] between the Guomintang and the Communists and to resume negotiations between the two parties to restore the legal status of the New Fourth Army for the purpose of sustaining the War of Resistance. After this operation,² try your utmost to avoid clashes while seeking compromise with the Guomintang troops in the areas around you.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu, 1985 huibian ben*, pp. 173–74, which is based on the manuscript.

¹. That is, Li Xiannian (1909–1992), a leading Chinese Communist Party military figure who joined the Party in 1927. At this time he was commander and political commissar of the New Fourth Army's Fifth Division.

². Here “operation” (*xingdong*) refers to concrete movements, such as a military operation, rather than to negotiations.

Methods for Soliciting Manuscripts for Page Four of Liberation Daily

September 20, 1942

Page 4 of *Liberation Daily* is short of articles, and because it lays stress on literature and art, in addition to the manuscripts already contracted and those directly solicited by the editorial department, the following comrades are responsible for soliciting articles:

Comrade Huangmei:¹ concentrate on literature, along with others, 12,000 words per month.

Comrade Jiang Feng:² concentrate on the fine arts, along with others, 8,000 words per month; in addition, he can paint and draw.

Comrade Zhang Geng:³ concentrate on opera, along with others, 10,000 words per month.

Comrade Ke Zhongping:⁴ concentrate on mass-ified⁵ literature, art, and culture, along with others, 12,000 words per month.

Comrade Fan Wenlan: concentrate on history, along with others, 12,000 words per month.

Comrade Deng Fa: concentrate on the labor movement, along with others, 8,000 words per month.

Comrade Peng Zhen: concentrate on Party building, along with others, 15,000 words per month.

Comrade Wang Zhenzhi:⁶ concentrate on opera, along with others, 5,000 words per month.

Comrade Feng Wenbin:⁷ concentrate on the youth movement and sports, along with others, 12,000 words per month.

Comrade Ai Siqi: concentrate on culture and philosophy, along with others,

10,000 words per month.

Comrade Chen Boda: concentrate on politics, economics, and international affairs, along with others, 12,000 words per month.

Comrade Zhou Yang: concentrate on literary criticism, along with others, 10,000 words per month.

Comrade Lu Ji:⁸ concentrate on music, along with others, 5,000 words per month.

Comrade Cai Chang:⁹ concentrate on the women's movement, along with others, 5,000 words per month.

Comrade Dong Chuncai:¹⁰ concentrate on education, along with others, 8,000 words per month.

Mr. Wu:¹¹ concentrate on Chinese language, along with others, 5,000 words per month.

This comes to a total of 149,000 words.

2. These responsible comrades should select and correct these articles to eliminate mistakes in thought, to make the language smooth, and to try to make their style more popular [*tongsuhua*].

3. In principle, each piece should not exceed 4,000 words. Those that exceed this limit will be exceptions.

4. If every person solicits articles totaling 12,000 words, they can be published all at one time on page 4. But the editorial department may adjust the articles and publish them over two or three days without using the name of the [page 4 literary] supplement.

5. If an article is not suitable for publication, the editorial department will return it to the responsible person who solicited it to undertake revisions. If the editorial department wants to make important corrections, it should contact and discuss the matter with the solicitor of the article.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 101–3, which is based on a manuscript copy. The editors of the Chinese text note that these instructions were drafted for *Jiefang ribao* by Mao, and

indeed, the opening line repeats Mao's comment to He Kaifeng in his letter of September 15, above. Individuals named are glossed briefly below, except for well-known senior Party officials.

1. Chen Huangmei (1913–1996) worked under Zhou Yang at the Lu Xun Academy.
2. Jiang Feng (1910–1982) was head of fine arts at the Lu Xun Academy. For brief information on him and most of the literary intellectuals below, see David Holm, *Art and Ideology in Revolutionary China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 46–47.
3. Zhang Geng (1911–2003) was a noted drama critic and advocate of folk drama and *yang'ge* under Zhou Yang's group at the Lu Xun Academy.
4. Ke Zhongping (1902–1964) was a poet noted for his “new style poetry” and was chair of the Preparatory Committee for the third meeting of the Border Region Cultural Association.
5. Literally, *dazhonghua*. Can be translated as “popularized,” but this political term has a special meaning for Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, drawing from Qu Qiubai's literary theories in the 1930s; see Holm, *Art and Ideology*, pp. 31–37.
6. Wang Zhenzhi, (b. 1916) was a dramatist at the Lu Xun Academy under Zhou Yang's group.
7. Feng Wenbin, see above, note to “Letter to He Kaifeng on Press and Translation Questions,” text of September 15, 1942.
8. Lu Ji (1909–2002), like Zhang Geng and Chen Huangmei, was part of Zhou Yang's group at the Lu Xun Academy; a music critic.
9. Cai Chang (1900–1990), wife of senior Party official Li Fuchun and in charge of the Central Committee's Women's Department.
10. Dong Chuncai (1905–1990), an educator and prominent writer of a science book, went to Yan'an in 1937 and served in its Education Bureau.
11. That is, Wu Yuzhang (1878–1966), who was already a senior Party official active in leadership since the 1920s, having participated, for example, in the August 1 Nanchang Uprising of 1927 (see Vol. III, p. 26). From 1928 to 1937 he studied in Europe and the Soviet Union. By 1942 he was chair of the Border Region Cultural Association, head of Yan'an University (1940), and head of the Lu Xun Academy. After 1949 he became resident of People's University.

Ensure That Press Propaganda Follows Party Policies (September 1942)¹

Now we have already entered a period of improved relations between the Guomindang and the Communists and have revived negotiations between the two parties, restoring the legal status of the New Fourth Army and keeping up the resistance war. I have telegraphed Li Xiannian to try his best to avoid friction in the future and to find a way to improve relations with Guomindang troops in the surrounding areas. Please pay attention to the other troops. From the standpoint of propaganda, please make clear to propaganda workers that they should not talk about the bad points of the Guomindang or make value comparisons between the Guomindang and the Communists. The first two news dispatches by Fan Changjiang² are very good, and they have been published in *Liberation Daily*, and they were broadcast as well. The third one is not appropriate and has not been published. Please explain to him our present policy and give him my best regards. Please take firm hold of the newspapers and periodicals in northern Jiangsu and ensure that their propaganda follows the current policy of the Party.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 96, which is based on a manuscript copy of a telegram that Mao sent to Chen Yi.

1. This text appears in *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan* with two others (which are translated according to their date, October 28, 1942) under the general heading: “Strengthen the Party Character of Press Propaganda.” This text however, carries the note “September 1942.”

2. Fan Changjiang (1909–1970) was a noted journalist whose writings were widely read in the 1930s. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1939.

A Comment on Liu Shaoqi's "On Inner-Party Struggle"

(October 9, 1942)

Comrade Shaoqi has abundant experience in how to deal with inner-Party contradictions. When his article "On Inner-Party Struggle" was published in the Yan'an *Liberation Daily*, Comrade Mao Zedong added the following comment:

This is Comrade Liu Shaoqi's speech delivered on July 2, 1942 at the Party School of the Central China Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party. It solves the very important problem of inner-Party struggle, both theoretically and practically, and is required reading for every comrade.

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 103, which copies the original from *Jiefang ribao* of October 9, 1942.

*The Great Victory of the Red Army*¹

(October 12, 1942)

The Battle of Stalingrad has been compared by the British and American press to the Battle of Verdun, and the “Red Verdun” is now famous all over the world.² World War I ended in the winter of 1918, and in that year³ German forces launched several attacks on the French fortress of Verdun. The commander-in-chief at Verdun was the German crown prince, and the forces thrown into the battle were the cream of the German army. The battle was of decisive significance. After the ferocious German assaults failed, the entire German-Austrian-Turkish-Bulgarian bloc had no future, and from then on its difficulties mounted. It was deserted by its followers, it disintegrated, and finally it collapsed. But at the time, the Anglo-American-French bloc did not grasp the nature of these events, *still* believing that the German army was still very powerful and *still* unaware that their own victory was before them.⁴ At each stage of human civilization,⁵ all reactionary forces on the verge of extinction invariably conduct a last desperate struggle against the revolutionary forces, and the revolutionaries⁶ are apt to be deluded for a time by this phenomenon of outward strength but inner weakness, failing to grasp the essential fact that the enemy is nearing extinction while they themselves are approaching victory. The rise of the entire force of fascism and the war of aggression they have been conducting for some years is precisely the expression of such a last desperate struggle; and in this present war this attack on the “Red Verdun”⁷ is the expression of the last desperate struggle of fascism itself. At this turning point in history, too, many people in the worldwide anti-Fascist front have been deluded by the ferocious appearance of fascism and have failed to discern its essence. In the forty-eight days during which there raged an unprecedentedly bitter battle, unparalleled in

the history of mankind—from August 23, when the entire German force crossed the bend of the River Don and began the all-out attack on Stalingrad, through September 15, when some German units broke into the industrial district in the northwestern section of the city, and right up to October 9, when the Soviet Information Bureau announced that the Red Army had breached the German line of encirclement in that district—this battle was finally won by the Soviet forces. During those forty-eight days, the news of each setback or triumph from that city gripped the hearts of countless millions of people, now bringing them anxiety, now stirring them to elation. This battle is not only the turning point of the Soviet-German war, or even of the present anti-Fascist world war, it is also a turning point in the history of all humanity. Throughout these forty-eight days, the people of the world watched Stalingrad with even greater concern than they watched Moscow last October.

Until his victory on the western front, Hitler had been cautious.⁸ When he attacked Poland, when he attacked Norway, when he attacked the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, and when he attacked the Balkans, he concentrated all his strength on one objective at a time, not daring to disperse his attention. After his victory on the western front, he became dizzy with success and attempted to defeat the Soviet Union within three months. He launched an offensive against this huge and powerful socialist country along the entire front stretching from Murmansk in the north to the Crimea in the south, and in so doing he dispersed his forces. The failure of his Moscow campaign last October marked the end of the first stage of the Soviet-German war and the failure of Hitler's first strategic plan. *At the time, Hitler had many military advantages and the Red Army had many weaknesses. Inept war tactics were one of the Red Army's weaknesses which cost her large numbers of casualties at that time. However,* the Red Army halted the German offensive last year and launched a counteroffensive on all fronts in the winter, which constituted the second stage of the Soviet-German war, with Hitler turning to retreat and on the defensive. In this period, after dismissing [Walther von] Brauchitsch, his commander-in-chief, and taking over the command himself, Hitler decided to abandon the plan for an all-out offensive, combed Europe for all available forces, and prepared a final offensive, which, though limited to the southern front, would, he imagined, strike a fatal blow to the Soviet Union. Because it was in the nature of a final offensive on which the

fate of fascism hung, Hitler concentrated the greatest possible forces and even moved in part of his aircraft and tanks from the North African battlefield. With the German attack on Kerch and Sevastopol in May of this year, the war entered its third stage. Massing an army of over 1.5 million, which was supported by the bulk of his air and tank forces, he⁹ launched an offensive of unprecedented fury on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. He endeavored to capture these two objectives at great speed for the twofold purpose of cutting the Volga and seizing Baku, intending subsequently to drive against Moscow in the north and break through to the Persian Gulf in the south. At the same time, he directed the Japanese Fascists to mass their troops in “Manchuria” in preparation for an attack on Siberia after the fall of Stalingrad; this¹⁰ would weaken the Soviet Union to such an extent that he would be able to release the main forces of the German army from the Soviet and German war theaters¹¹ to deal with an Anglo-American attack on the western front and to seize the resources of the Near East and to effect a junction with the Japanese. At the same time, this would allow the main forces of the Japanese to be released from the north and, with their rear secure, to move westward against China and southward against Britain and the United States, and this was how the Fascist camp would achieve its victory. But how did things turn out during this stage? Hitler came up against the Soviet tactics which sealed his fate as the Soviet Union adopted the policy of first luring the enemy in deep and then putting up a stubborn resistance. During five months of fighting the German army has failed either to penetrate the Caucasian oilfields or to fight into¹² Stalingrad, so that Hitler has been forced to halt his troops before high mountains and outside an impregnable city, unable to advance or to retreat, suffering immense losses, and stuck at an impasse. October is already here, and winter is approaching; soon the third stage of the war will end, and the fourth stage will begin. Not one of Hitler’s strategic objectives has been achieved.¹³ In this period, bearing in mind his failure in the summer of last year, when his forces were divided, Hitler concentrated his strength on the southern front, but as he still wanted to achieve the twofold purpose of cutting off the Volga in the east and seizing the Caucasus in the south in a single stroke, he again divided his forces. He did not recognize that his strength did not match his ambitions, and he is now doomed—“when the carrying pole is not secured at both ends, the loads slip off.” *Hitler has only this year (the second front has not yet opened) and will*

have no more time later. On the contrary, the Soviet Union,¹⁴ Britain and the United States are approaching their strategic objective. The strategic objective of the Soviet Union and its allies in Europe is to annihilate Hitler by exhausting him and opening up a second front to outflank him from east and west. Meanwhile, the Red Army's fighting has exhausted Hitler as well as gained time for the opening up of the second front. Without first exhausting the German army and gaining time in this way, it would be impossible to defeat fascism. Meanwhile, the Red Army's competence in tactics has cut its losses dramatically. The proof is that for five months now, even such a braggart as [Joseph] Goebbels has not been boasting of any major seizures from the Red Army. This winter begins the fourth stage of the war, which marks the approach of Hitler's demise.

Comparing Hitler's position in the first and third stages of the war, we can see that he is on the threshold of final defeat. *Even though the German army did not achieve its strategic objective from June 22 of last year, when Hitler launched the assault, to November 30 ... the eighth day of ...¹⁵ but it engaged in a very comprehensive offensive and occupied a vast track of territory. In contrast, in the ten months and more from last November to now, the German army only attacked on the southern front, gaining no more than the triangular area between Kharkov, the northern Caucasus, and the suburbs of Stalingrad, while suffering its first winter defeat and losing a track of land on the central front to the Red Army. Both at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, the Red Army has now in fact stopped the German offensive; Hitler is now weakened and demoralized, having failed in his attacks on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The forces which he managed to assemble throughout the winter, from last December to May of this year, have already been used up. In less than a month, winter will set in on the Soviet-German front and Hitler will have to turn hastily to the defensive; as the entire belt west and south of the Don is his most vulnerable area, the Red Army will go over to the counteroffensive there. This winter, goaded on by the fear of his impending doom, Hitler will once again reorganize his forces to meet the dangers on both the eastern and western fronts. He perhaps may be able to scrape together the remnants of his forces, equip them, and form them into a few new divisions, and, in addition, he will turn for help to Italy, Romania, and Hungary¹⁶ and extort some more cannon fodder from them. However, he will have to face the enormous expenditures of a winter campaign in the east and be ready to deal*

with the second front in the west, while Italy, Romania, and Hungary, becoming pessimistic as they see that it is all up with Hitler, will increasingly fall away from him. In short, after October 9 the only road open to Hitler is the road to extinction.

The Red Army's defense of Stalingrad during these forty-eight days has a *certain* similarity to the defense of Moscow last year. That is, Hitler's plan for this year has been foiled just as it was last year. The difference, however, is that although the Soviet people followed up their defense of Moscow with a winter counteroffensive, they *inevitably* had to face the summer offensive of the German army this year, partly because Germany and her European accomplices still had some fight left in them and partly because Britain and the United States delayed the opening of the second front. But now, following the battle for the defense of Stalingrad, the situation will be totally different from that of last year. On the one hand, the Soviet Union will launch a second winter counteroffensive on a vast scale, Britain and the United States will no longer be able to delay the opening of the second front (though the exact date cannot be determined), *and* the people of *Germany* and Europe will be ready to respond with armed insurrection.¹⁷ On the other hand, Germany and its European accomplices no longer have the strength to mount large-scale offensives, and Hitler will have no alternative but to change his entire policy line to *the* strategic defense *track*. Once Hitler is compelled to go over to strategic defense, the fate of fascism is as good as sealed. From its birth, fascism¹⁸ has built its political and military life on taking the offensive, and once its offensive stops its very life will stop as well. *If* the Battle of Stalingrad stops the offensive of fascism, *then* it will be a decisive battle. This sort of decisiveness applies to the entire world war. *From now on*, there are three powerful foes confronting Hitler: the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States, and the people.¹⁹ On the eastern front stands the Red Army, firm as a rock, whose counteroffensives will continue through the whole of the second winter and beyond.²⁰ On the western front, even if Britain and the United States continue their policy of looking on and stalling, even waiting until all there is to do is to belabor the slain tiger, still the second front will eventually be opened. *Britain has an army of 3.5 million men and a strong navy and air force. The United States can equip an army of 4.5 million men this winter, according to Army Secretary [Henry L.] Stimson, and is capable of producing 60,000 warplanes this year and*

120,000 next year, according to Navy Secretary [Frank] Knox. These forces have yet to be used. Hitler faces an internal front as well, the great armed insurrection²¹ of the people which is brewing in Germany, in France, and in other parts of Europe; they will respond with a third front the moment the Soviet Union launches an all-out counteroffensive and the guns roar on the second front. Thus, an attack from three fronts will converge on Hitler—such is the great historical process that will follow the Battle of Stalingrad.

Napoleon's political life ended at Waterloo, but the decisive turning point was his defeat in Moscow. Hitler today is treading Napoleon's road, and the Battle of Stalingrad is his decisive turning point.²²

These developments will have a direct impact on the Far East. The coming year will not be propitious for Japanese fascism either, and as time goes on its headaches will grow until it descends into its grave.

All people who take a pessimistic view of the world situation should change their point of view.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 8, pp. 171–77, which copies the original editorial from *Jiefang ribao* of October 12, 1942. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

1. The Great Victory of the Red Army → The Turning Point in World War II
2. The world → ... The world. This comparison is not altogether appropriate. The Battle of Stalingrad is different in nature from the Battle of Verdun in World War I. But they have this in common—now, as then, many people are misled by the German offensive into thinking that Germany can still win the war
3. That year → 1916
4. Unaware that their own victory was before them → Unaware of their own approaching victory
5. At each stage of human civilization → Historically
6. The revolutionaries → Some revolutionaries

7. The “Red Verdun” → Stalingrad
8. Had been cautious → Seems to have been cautious
9. He → Hitler
10. This → Hitler thought this
11. The Soviet and German war theaters → The Soviet war theater
12. Fight into → Seize
13. Not one of Hitler’s strategic objectives has been achieved → Not one of Hitler’s strategic plans of attack against the Soviet Union has succeeded
14. On the contrary, the Soviet Union, → As for the Soviet Union, the more it fights, the stronger it grows. Stalin’s brilliant strategic direction has completely gained the initiative and is everywhere drawing Hitler toward destruction.
15. *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 8, p. 174, has about a dozen lost words at this point, translated here as “...”
16. Help to Italy, Romania, and Hungary → Help to his three Fascist partners, Italy, Romania, and Hungary
17. Will be ready to respond with armed insurrection → Will be ready to rise up in response
18. Fascism → A Fascist state like Hitler’s
19. The people → The people of the German-occupied areas
20. And beyond → And beyond; it is this force which will decide the outcome of the whole war and the destiny of humanity
21. The great armed insurrection → Uprising
22. Is his decisive turning point → Has sealed his doom

*An Inscription for the Establishment of
the Yan'an Institute for the Study of
Pingju Opera
(October 12, 1942)*

“Weed through the old to bring forth the new.”

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 10, p. 179, citing *Jiefang ribao* of October 12, 1942.

The Lessons of History

(October 14, 1942)

On October 4, when answering an American reporter's question, "What are the remaining resistance forces in the Soviet Union?" Stalin said: "I think the ability of the Soviet Union to resist the German bandits is, if not larger, then no smaller than that of Fascist Germany or of any other aggressive countries that seek world hegemony." The October 5 editorial of *Pravda* in Moscow said: "The resistance fighting at Stalingrad has shattered Hitler's great plan. That plan was to march on to Moscow and Baku as soon as Stalingrad was taken." These words were vindicated on October 8 and 9. On October 8, a German military spokesman announced: "There will be no more assaults on Stalingrad by artillery and engineering forces." One of the reasons is that, as the Soviet Intelligence Bureau declared on October 9, "the Soviet army has already broken through the encirclement of the industrial district in Stalingrad and is holding fast to new positions." The other reason is, as explained by Reuters on October 10: "Yesterday the German army was forced to transfer part of its forces attacking Stalingrad to the northwest district because this district is under constant attack from the Soviet relief army." All this means that the converging attacks from the city proper and from the northern side by the Red Army have forced Hitler to abandon the attack on this city and have in reality made him shift day by day to a defensive position. Only one month ago, some people were busy discussing the situation after the loss of the Caucasus, and they were all wrong in their predictions about the strength of both the Soviet and the German armies. Hitler did have a "great plan," but this plan, exactly as *Pravda* said, was shattered by the resistance fighting at Stalingrad.

The contradiction between Hitler's actual strength and his ambitions is the major cause of his failure. This contradiction is expressed in his policy of

avoiding the enemy's main force and striking at its weak points. Leningrad and Moscow were to be avoided; hence he gathered his strength in the south. In July he fought desperately for Voronezh but failed to take it, and so he avoided it. He fought desperately for Klet'skaia but failed again, and he avoided it, too. Now his attack concentrates on Stalingrad and the northern Caucasus. This time it cannot be avoided, but it cannot be taken, and yet it must be avoided. However, this is the last dodge, which means he has to give up the offensive and turn to the defensive. This is the situation in which Hitler finds himself now. Today he has not released a general declaration to stop the offensive and maybe he wants to give it his last try, but as the game is as good as lost, failure is inevitable. Every place that he avoided has become a starting point for Red Army attacks on him. At present, the Red Army is attacking the German army right along the line from Klet'skaia to the northern corner of Stalingrad. In this way Hitler will be forced in the end to give up all his strategic offensives.

The direct fight to protect Stalingrad began on August 23, when the German army crossed the valley of the Don River, but the battle in the river valley was of the greatest importance in protecting Stalingrad. All of July, the German army fought from Kharkov to the Don. During this period, the Red Army was making a strategic retreat and the Germans gained nothing. On July 30, Berlin announced that the German army had crossed the Don along the 250-kilometer front between Tsimlianskaia and Rostov-on-Don and the lower reaches of the Don. Whether it was in the original plan or because German General Bock¹ became overconfident from his success in crossing the river, he ordered twenty divisions from the entire field army to pursue vigorously the retreating Red Army. They had already reached the basin of the Kuban River by the middle of August, but unexpectedly the Germans met with stiff resistance from the Red Army. Even today (October 14) the Germans only occupy a small oilfield in Maikop. There is another larger oilfield called Groznii in the northern Caucasus. The AP news agency said as early as August 13 that "the road to Groznii is very flat and smooth, and the question of the moment is only if the German attack will leave the Red Army enough time to destroy this oilfield completely." Yet it is fully two months since they said that, and for Hitler this oilfield is still within sight but beyond reach. In terms of their desire to reach the Baku region and taste this most delicious piece of swan meat, the Germans have made unrewarding efforts

to climb the Caucasus mountains. On August 23, the [official Nazi news agency, the] Transocean News Service, claimed, “at about 10 o’clock in the morning on August 21, German mountaineers raised the German battle standard atop the 5,630-meter-high Mount Elbrus,” expressing the ecstasy of the Fascist vampires. However, we do not know whether this battle standard was given to the Red Army or was dragged down the mountain by the Fascists themselves when they fled, but in all it was an empty boast. It is said that Baku has now been cast aside by Hitler (Reuters, October 9), but then, what were his mistakes? Perhaps the first was to divide his forces in his advance on the Caucasus. On the one hand, the Red Army firmly defended the Don River valley; on the other, it seduced Bock into diverting one part of his troops to the Kuban River. In this way, the pressure on Stalingrad was reduced.

The river valley battle began in July and August, with the Red Army fighting extremely bravely and only giving up its position in the Kerch area on the east bank of the Don River on August 23. Without this battle, had the Germans not been stopped and greatly depleted for twenty-three days in the valley, it would have been very difficult to protect Stalingrad directly.

From August 23, when the German army crossed the river, to September 15, when it fought its way into the industrial district of Stalingrad, the Red Army again wore away the Germans for another twenty-three days in a 50- to 60-kilometer belt between the Don River and Stalingrad. Without these second twenty-three days of depletion, it would have been difficult to defend Stalingrad.

From September 15, when the Germans fought into the industrial district, to October 9, when Aleksandr Rodimtsev’s² division of the Red Army broke through the German front in this district, these twenty-four days were a period of fierce street fighting. The Red Army shattered the German attack through street fighting in the city and pressure from the north.

Ever since then, Hitler’s whole position has become passive. The contradiction between his actual strength and his wild ambitions have finally been revealed, and he will be crushed by this contradiction.

Referring to the Red Army in the speech he delivered at the sports palace in Berlin on September 30, Hitler was only able to say, “That is an enemy that does not know what pity is; they are not human beings but wild beasts,” indicating, it seems, that he had once hoped the Red Army would have pity on him. The entire

war between the Soviet Union and Germany has already demonstrated: If only we do not have pity on the Fascists, that is, if we have more courage, then the Fascists are sure to lose. This is the lesson of history.

Seeing Hitler's fiasco, how do the Japanese Fascists feel? Do they still want to try their luck in Vladivostok? There is certainly no pity there. The contradiction between Japan's actual strength and its ambitions will also surely shatter the Japanese Fascists.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 444–47, which is based on the editorial in *Jiefang ribao* of October 14, 1942.

- [1.](#) German Field Marshal Fedor von Bock (1880–1945).
- [2.](#) Major General Aleksandr Rodimtsev (1905–1977) was head of the Eighteenth Division of the Red Army at this time.

A Comment on the Berlin Declaration (October 16, 1942)

The Berlin spokesman already made a formal declaration on October 12. The declaration says: “The armies of Germany have already shifted from offense to defense.” The declaration also says: “This should not be seen as our fighting plan for the future, and it does not mean that any country among the three allies has decided or has been forced to give the initiative to the enemy either. This merely reflects that Germany and its allies have gained a position that is not easily attacked after three years of war and they maintain a calm attitude and the confidence of victory with this change.”

This last passage is a lie. But this lie is extremely necessary for the Fascists in their current position, because the shift Hitler made from offense to defense this year is very different from his shift from offense to defense last year.

Last year, Germany could prepare for another offensive this year because it still had surplus forces and because the Fascists of Japan had agreed with Hitler to break open the Pacific War soon. Thus, the thinking went, this was enough, first, to anesthetize the people and, second, to pin down the United States and weaken England so that there would be no second front. In addition to this it was because the Japanese Fascists had answered Hitler’s call that they would attack Siberia in concert with Germany under certain conditions (e.g., should the second German summer offensive reach its aims). These three items were all present then, or were possible, and so Hitler had no need to spout such a pitiful lie as this after the defeat of the attack on Moscow. He could just hand the head of his commander-in-chief [Walther von] Brauchitsch to the people, blaming the failure of the attack on him and claiming that, naturally, it would not have happened if he, Hitler, had been in charge.

As expected, the Pacific War broke out, with England and the United States

suffering great losses and Japan gaining a great reputation. This event immediately anesthetized the people of Germany and Europe. Hitler's pain caused by the twin wounds of the failure of the summer offensive and the winter counterattack by the Red Army was eased by this anesthetic. And, as expected, there was no second front when Hitler launched his summer offensive this year.

Last year, Hitler dealt with the winter offensive of the Red Army, and he supplemented his old forces, replenishing his military strength and snatching some ten divisions from Italy, Romania, and Hungary at the same time. These were the bases on which Hitler and all his Fascist partners maintained that they still had a future and still possessed real strength. Based on these, Hitler launched this year's offensive as expected. Even though it was not as intense as last year's offensive, still it caused confusion during the three months of July, August, and September, making people feel that Hitler was really very strong.

It is only the third item which down to the present has seen no movement. Even if there were still some possibility of it, well, there seems only one opportunity, when England and the United States launch their attack on Germany, for the Fascists to try to escape with their lives or for the Japanese militarists to give it one more go. But that plan to coordinate an attack with Hitler this year is bankrupt.

In the past year, two of the three items have been fulfilled, and these are something the German Fascists can congratulate themselves on when they settle accounts for the year.

However, there is another side to this, and that is that all three items are now bankrupt. First, this year's offensive has completely fallen through. Last year they still had that magic weapon with which to comfort themselves and the people completely, but this year it is gone. The statement "defense should not be seen as our fighting plan for the future" suggests hope for a third offensive, but it is nothing but a lie. Hitler's older forces are extremely worn, with their best units already consumed. His human resources and military matériel, regardless of his exhortations, cannot organize a similar offensive. The condition that used to hold the people's hearts together and extend the life of the Fascists has been basically destroyed—Germany's offensive strength has now been transformed into its opposite. Precisely at a time like this the Fascists need to use a complete lie like this to hold on to the hearts of their people, but in this world there has never been

one who using lies while not having real strength has managed to hold on to the hearts of the people. Stalin modestly said, “While the strength of the Soviet Union may not be great, it is still greater than that of the Fascists.” After the failure of Hitler’s offensive, the strength of the Red Army has surpassed that of the Fascists. Under these sorts of conditions, the Fascists internally face the danger of splitting, as the former unity is no longer possible. The contradictions between the Fascists and the people will certainly grow, for it is very difficult for the people and the army to hold them together. There will be a tendency for relations between Germany and Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland, and Japan to become strained, and Italy may even change sides. The attitude of several neutral states in Europe will change and some may even join the Allies.

As for the second item, this year is the reverse of last year. Japan’s victory has mobilized the United States to reorganize its military, making up for its losses in Hawaii within a single year and even vigorously preparing for attack. On the same day Berlin declared its defensive position, [Franklin] Roosevelt said: “We have already made several important decisions concerning the opening of a second front. Among them, we all agree on the need to launch a new offensive against Germany and Japan in order to disperse enemy forces from inside the Soviet Union and China to other battlefields.” Japan fears the United States as if it were a tiger. On August 28 the spokesman for the information department of the Japanese navy said: “After the sinking of the British [HMS] *Prince of Wales*, the United States immediately added \$40 million to the air force budget and began the transformation of some fourteen ships into aircraft carriers, while changing some twenty merchant marine ships and some seven others under construction to aircraft carriers. This shows how much weight the United States puts on aircraft carriers. Our nation should not sit by and watch the United States build these ships but should find a way to destroy them before it can build them.” On September 26 [Japanese prime minister Tōjō Hideki] said: “England has gradually reorganized its strategic line, and America’s plan of counter-attack becomes more clear daily. The two countries rely on their ample resources swiftly to strengthen their fighting power, awaiting the time to launch a comprehensive counterattack. The formal development of the Great East Asian War is still in the future.” In all, Japan trembles in the face of the United States. What about Germany? The same. On October 12 the Berlin spokesman said: “The United States has begun its large-

scale armament plans. But no matter how much it is strengthened, if it wants to retake Europe, Africa, and Asia, this will be beyond its capacity.” This last sentence is also a lie. In reality, the Fascists clearly sense the demonic shadow of a second battlefield daily approaching their back door. On August 28, the paper of the Nazi security forces under [Heinrich] Himmler even went so far as to use the power and prestige of the Red Army to threaten England and the United States and to stir the will of his own troops. This paper said: “Those personnel and arms that are now facing unprecedentedly ferocious fighting on the eastern front will in the end exterminate England. We should ask the German military personnel who have been severely tested in fighting on the eastern front and have answered the call for the second front in the west if each man among them eagerly hopes to use the ‘limitless’ strength they developed on the eastern front against the British, or even the American, enemy. When England declared war in 1939 it did not know what war is, but we knew better what war was and now we know fully what war is.” That is to tell Britain and the United States that we are the students of the Red Army, come and get us! It is to tell the German soldiers, we have engaged the Red Army so what do we have to fear with a second front! Do the Fascists know what war is? They know that war is defeat. On October 4, [Herman] Goering threatened the people saying, “If we are defeated in this war, then Germany’s fate will be tragic, and Germans will be torn apart by the poison fangs of international Jewry and will be annihilated. Germany will be erased from the map.” In sum, the Fascists survive now only on lies and threats and have no real strength on which to rely. Their offensive strength is already finished, and their fate is sealed.

The situation for Japan is a bit different. Its strength is sufficient to mount another offensive because the previous fighting did not exhaust its main force. Thus we cannot determine at this time whether Japan will take another big chance toward the north or the south. But one thing is clear: At present, Japan faces the great danger of an American counterattack. Comparing Japan’s current strength with that future danger, well, it just does not bear thinking about. The frightened-to-the-bones reaction of the Japanese military headquarters to the U.S. aircraft and warships comes from just this state of affairs. Japan now stands at this decision point: Should they follow Germany’s risky model this year of an offensive that is certain to bring defeat? Or should they follow Germany now in

preserving their forces on the defensive in hopes of a final victory? If the Japanese Fascists choose the first road, that for Germany would mean using the Japanese attack to preserve Germany, that is, by drawing the U.S. and Soviet offensive from Europe to meet the Japanese attack. This is vastly different from the plan for this year to use the Pacific War and the hope of a Japanese attack on Siberia to support a German offensive. If the Japanese choose the second road, that will naturally be advantageous to the Japanese, but it will be very harmful to the Germans, and we might perhaps expect some strains between the Eastern and Western Fascists on just this question. Before today, Germany had used Japan's attack on Britain and the United States, but was not able to use a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. Today? There has been a great change in the circumstances of both the Germans and the Japanese, and we will have to wait to see clearly what policy Japan chooses in the end.

But no matter what, the world situation has already undergone a basic change, and all the Fascist countries in reality have lost the initiative. Regardless of whether it is Germany or Japan, they are all like this, and no matter which road Japan chooses, they are all like this.

The fate of the Fascists is sealed, and only the most timid of people still fear the Fascists.

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 448–53, which is based on the editorial by Mao in *Jiefang ribao*, October 16, 1942.

Seek Unity Through Struggle with Diehard Troops (October 25, 1942)

Comrade Chen Shaomin:¹

We have received and read your telegram of October 13. Apart from not criticizing the Guomindang Central Committee at present, you should continue to rally the popular masses to resist the attempts to destroy unity and attack the border region with diehard troops. Achieve the goal of unity by means of struggle.

The Secretariat

Notes

Our source for this text is Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu, 1985 huibian ben*, p. 174, which notes that the draft of this telegram carried the signature “Mao’s draft” [*Mao gao*].

¹ Chen Shaomin (1902–1977) worked in the central soviet areas and the New Fourth Army with Guo Hongtao and Tao Zhu in the late 1930s. In Yan’an she was the deputy secretary of the Party Committee of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Border Region.

*The Eighth Route Army Is an Army Led
by the Communist Party and United
with the People*
(October 25, 1942)

I

This is a very good document.¹ It should be printed and distributed to those who attend the meeting before the report is given, and it should also be printed and distributed to all cadres above the rank of battalion commander in the entire army after the report is given to serve as material for cadre education. However, do not publicly distribute it and take care to keep it confidential. While this report is being delivered, consider inviting Li Dingming and others² to listen.

II

As for defects among the government and the people, no matter how serious they are, instead of vicious revenge and attacks, we should always make well-intentioned suggestions, for only this is the correct attitude that a revolutionary soldier should have toward the revolutionary government and the revolutionary people. Any other way would just be the attitude of a warlord.

III

We are sure that all the points discussed in this report³ can be carried out throughout the army. Because our Eighth Route Army is of such excellent quality, we are the best army in the nation, we are the army led by the Communist Party, the army that is united with the people, and the army with a glorious and historic tradition. We believe that we certainly can promote our glorious tradition, overcome our shortcomings, and fulfill the task of rectifying the army.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 686–87, which is based on Mao’s handwritten manuscript in the Central Archives.

¹. These are comments Mao wrote on He Long’s “Outline Report on Rectifying the Army,” presented to the Senior Cadres Conference of the Northeastern Bureau of the Central Committee on November 4, 1942. For details on this important meeting from October 1942 to January 1943, see Selden, *China in Revolution*, pp. 160ff.

². Li Dingming (1881–1947) was a non-Party member and a leading representative of the gentry of the Suide area; at this time he was vice chair of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government under the “Three-Thirds” system.

³. Section 3 of He Long’s report, on which Mao’s comments were written, proposed ten points for rectifying the army.

News Agency and Press Propaganda Must Follow Party Policy (October 28, 1942)

To Various Central Committee Bureaus and Subbureaus:

Recently, propaganda in various localities has produced a series of incidents incompatible with current Party policies. For example, the Taihang branch of the New China News Agency published an open telegram from the Political Consultative Conference urging the convening of a national assembly, the Shandong branch printed an open telegram from the 111th Division of the Northeastern Army opposing Guomindang personnel, the northern Jiangsu branch criticized the Guomindang press, and the northwestern Hebei branch issued a telegram of congratulations to a certain friendly army on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the New Army¹ (which could have affected the position of that friendly army). All these incidents are incompatible with the Party's current policies. Investigation of the central bureaus and subbureaus in various areas reveals that they have paid too little attention to the work of their local news agencies and press and have provided insufficient guidance to their propaganda personnel and propaganda work, still failing to grasp the great task of news agencies and the press to organize propagandists of revolutionary policies and revolutionary work, and still failing to understand that much work of leaders can be done through the press. The Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee has already issued a resolution concerning press work, which all localities should follow in conducting their affairs. They should correct the past practice of not discussing news policies and editorial guidelines and should tighten the leadership of news agencies and the press to make sure that their

propaganda is completely in line with Party policies and to strengthen the Party character of our propaganda. They should use the many documents published by *Liberation Daily* concerning ways to strengthen the Party character of the press to educate our propaganda personnel and to overcome the erroneous tendency of independence among them.

Central Committee Secretariat

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 454–55, which is based on a copy of the telegram written in Mao's own hand.

[1.](#) That is, the Shanxi New Army, an anti-Japanese popular army covertly supported by the Chinese Communist Party.

Northwest Shanxi Must Actively Promote Guerrilla Warfare (October 31, 1942)

Comrade Lin Feng:¹

I have received your telegram of the twenty-fifth. Northwest Shanxi has a population of only about 700,000 to 1 million, and I hope you will investigate the cause of such a precipitous population decline and will discuss with Zhou² and Gan³ concrete plans to promote actively guerrilla warfare and to squeeze the enemy for territory (i.e., a concrete, active, and comprehensive anti-“nibbling” struggle).⁴ We must inspire the army and the people, adopt an active policy against the enemy, or else further contraction of territory will lead to an even worse future.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 688, which is based on a copy of a transcript held in the Central Archives.

¹ Lin Feng (1906–1977) was at this time assistant Party secretary for the Shanxi-Suide Central Committee branch office.

² Zhou Sidi (1900–1979) was at this time chair of the Shanxi-Suide Eighth Route Army’s Consultative Congress.

3. Gan Siqi (1904–1964) was at this time director of the Political Office of the Shanxi-Suide Eighth Route Army.

4. Or “a concrete, active, and comprehensive struggle against their ‘nibbling’ of our territory.”

Celebrating the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the October Revolution (November 6, 1942)

It is with the greatest optimism that I¹ celebrate the anniversary of the October Revolution this year. I firmly believe that this anniversary marks the turning point not only of the Soviet-German war, but also of the victory of the world anti-Fascist front over the Fascist front.

In the past, Hitler was able to keep up the offensive without being defeated because the Red Army was alone in resisting Fascist Germany and its accomplices in Europe *and the second front had not yet been opened*. Now the situation is different,² and Hitler's second summer offensive has failed *as a result of the Red Army's heroic fighting on its own*. Henceforth, the task of the world anti-Fascist front is to take the offensive against the Fascist front and inflict the final defeat on fascism.

The Red Army³ at Stalingrad has performed prodigies of heroism which will affect the destiny of mankind. They are the sons and daughters of the October Revolution. The banner of the October Revolution is invincible, and all *reactionary* Fascists⁴ are doomed to extinction.

In celebrating the victory of the Red Army, we Chinese people are also celebrating our own victory. Our War of Resistance Against Japan has been going on for more than five years, and although there are still difficulties ahead, the dawn of victory is already in sight. *With the smashing of Hitler's offensive plan by the Soviet Union, the daily growth of the fighting capacity of Britain and the United States, and the efforts of 450 million Chinese people*, victory over the Fascists⁵ is not only certain but is not far off. It is the task of the Chinese people to concentrate every effort on striking down the Japanese Fascists.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 8, pp. 179–80, which is taken from the November 7, 1942, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. The text is included in *Xuanji*, Vol. 3, p. 845. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

[1.](#) I → We

[2.](#) Now the situation is different → Now the Soviet Union has grown more powerful in the course of war

[3.](#) The Red Army ... has → The warriors of the Red Army ... have

[4.](#) All reactionary Fascists → All the reactionary forces of fascism

[5.](#) The Fascists → The Japanese Fascists

*Telegram to Peng Dehuai, Secretary of
the Chinese Communist Party Northern
Bureau and Deputy Commander of the
Eighth Route Army
(November 17, 1942)*

Comrade Dehuai,

1. It is imperative to send large numbers of cadres to the rear areas for protection. Despite economic difficulties in the rear areas, cadre regiments can be organized there to implement the policy of cultivating the land themselves¹ and to distribute them among the rear troops as assistants to the leadership, while another portion of them may attend military schools or Party schools.

2. Where is Comrade Hu Fu² now? Please write and tell me whether he is still at headquarters and whether he had any problems passing the enemy's blockade line.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 105, which reprints the text in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu, 1983 huibian ben* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984).

¹. Mao uses the word *tuntian*, an ancient term for military-agricultural colonies. Mao returns to this idea

in his “Economic and Financial Problems.” See below, text of December 1942.

[2.](#) That is, Liu Shaoqi.

To Ouyang Shanzun, Zhu Dan, and Cheng Yin

(November 23, 1942)

Comrades Ouyang Shanzun, Zhu Dan, and Cheng Yin,¹

I have received your letter. Thank you so much! I think that your plays² are good. Plays depicting the life of struggle in the areas behind enemy lines are exactly what need to be seen in Yan'an and the border regions, and I hope that you will produce more such plays.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 205–6, which is a copy of the manuscript.

¹. Ouyang Shanzun (1914–2009) was the director of the Combat Theater of the Eighth Route Army's 120th Division Political Office; between October 1942 and April 1943 he served as the dean of the northwest Shanxi branch of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts and Literature. Zhu Dan (1913–1978) later changed his name to Zhu Danxi. At this time he was serving as vice director of the Eighth Route Army's 120th Division's Combat Theater. Cheng Yin (1917–1984) was serving as the political officer of this Combat Theater.

². Mao is referring to plays by Cheng Yin and others, such as "A Village in Jin-Cha-Ji" and "Night in Famine Village." The Combat Theater performed in Yan'an in the winter of 1942.

To Nan Hanchen

(December 13, 1942)

Comrade Hanchen,¹

I have received the various documents you sent later, thank you very much. I want to ask you again to write me 1,000 to 1,500 words on each of the following topics that **our cadres should pay attention to in their own work** (what ought to be encouraged and what ought to be changed) in the areas of grain, taxation, trade, banking, finance, the supply system, and so forth, so that they can be inserted into the report for cadre education.² These will also be very useful for your work now and in the future. This high-level cadres conference³ mainly needs educational materials. Send me what you can in three to four days.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Night of December 13

It would be even better to write 2,000 to 3,000 words per topic.

How to make them refrain from harassing the people, embezzling, and wasting [resources], while being capable of fulfilling their tasks at the same time—each of these problems should be divided into various points of attention.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 207, which is based on a copy of the manuscript.

[1.](#) Nan Hanchen (1895–1967) was director of the Finance Office of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

[2.](#) That is, Mao’s December 1942 “Economic and Financial Problems.” See the translation, below.

[3.](#) This is the Senior Cadres Conference held from October 19, 1942, to January 14, 1943, by the Northwestern Bureau of the Party Central Committee for senior cadres in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

Letter to Nan Hanchen About Drafting the Report on Economic and Financial Problems

(December 20, 1942)

Comrade Hanchen,¹

I wonder whether you have started writing the materials that I requested.² I asked for materials in the four areas of grain and fodder, taxation, banking, and finance, with each section focusing on government policies and work in each area, **addressed to the masses of cadres so that they can understand the direction of policy and methods of work.**³ In discussing government policy and work, erroneous opinions and shortcomings in work should be criticized to arouse their vigilance. Each section should provide some history and some analysis, as well as ways to proceed in 1943. Please put real effort into this in the four days from today to Thursday and hand them to me on Friday, or you may also first give me the materials on grain and fodder on Tuesday or Wednesday and the rest on Thursday and Friday. Please consult people in the banking and trade bureaus for the two sections on banking and trade, but you are familiar with grain and taxation yourself. Your previous reports were excellent, except that they were addressed to a small number of people instead of speaking to the masses of cadres, and therefore they should be rewritten.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

December 20 at night

I have used the section you wrote on bedding and clothing in the discussion of industrial questions.⁴

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 209–10, which is based on a printed copy of the manuscript.

- [1.](#) For Nan Hanchen, see above, note to the text of December 13, 1942.
- [2.](#) See above, Mao’s letter to Nan, December 13, 1942.
- [3.](#) This phrase is underscored by Mao in the *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 209.
- [4.](#) Mao used materials from Nan’s earlier report on bedding and clothing in section 7, “On the Development of Self-Supporting Industry,” of his “Economic and Financial Problems,” of December 1942. See below, text of December 1942.

Elegy for Dr. Kotni

(December 29, 1942)

Indian friend Dr. Kotni¹ came to China from afar to help resist Japan. After working in Yan'an and North China for over five years and giving medical care to the wounded, he died of illness as result of overwork. The whole army lost an arm, and the whole people lost a friend. We shall never forget Dr. Kotni's international-ist spirit.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 10, p. 180.

¹. Dr. D. S. Kotni (1911–December 9, 1942), known in Chinese as Ke Dihua, was an Indian medical doctor who went to the Chinese Communist Party–controlled areas of China in 1938, working in the hospitals of the Eighth Route Army, especially in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region as director of the Norman Bethune International Peace Hospital.

Economic and Financial Problems

(December 1942)

I. A Basic Summary of Past Work¹

The general policy guiding our economic and financial work is to develop the economy and ensure supplies. But many of our comrades place stress² on public finance and do not understand the importance of the economy; engrossed in matters of revenue and expenditure as such, they cannot find solutions to any problem, hard as they try. The reason is that an outmoded and conservative standpoint is doing mischief in their minds. They do not know that while a good or a bad financial policy affects the economy, it is the economy that determines finances. Without a securely based economy, it is impossible to solve financial difficulties, and without a growing economy, it is impossible to attain financial sufficiency. Our financial problem is that of supplying funds for the living and operating expenses for the tens of thousands of troops and working personnel—in other words, the problem of supplying funds for waging the war. These funds come from taxes paid by the people and from production carried out by the tens of thousands of troops and working personnel themselves. We shall simply be resigning ourselves to extinction unless we develop both the private and public sectors of the economy. Financial difficulties can be overcome only by down-to-earth and effective economic development. Neglecting economic development and the opening up of sources of finance, and instead hoping for the solution of financial difficulties by curtailing indispensable expenditures, is a conservative notion that cannot solve any problems.

In the past five years we have passed through several stages. Our worst difficulties occurred in 1940 and 1941, during the friction of the two anti-

Communist drives.³ For a time, we were almost without clothing, cooking oil, paper and vegetables, footwear for the soldiers, and winter bedding for the working personnel. The Guomindang tried to strangle us by cutting off the funds due to us and imposing an economic blockade; we were indeed in dire straits. But we pulled through. Not only did the people of the border region provide us with grain but, in particular, we resolutely built up the public sector of our economy with our own hands. The government established many self-supporting industries. The troops engaged in an extensive production campaign and expanded agriculture, industry, and commerce to supply their own needs. The tens of thousands of personnel in the various organizations and schools also developed similar economic activities for their own support.⁴ It is by such means that we have been overcoming our difficulties. Do not these indisputable historical facts establish the principle⁵ that supplies can be ensured only through economic development? While we still face many difficulties, the foundation of the public sector of our economy has already been laid. In another year, by the end of 1943, this foundation will be even firmer.

Development⁶ is the correct line, but development does not mean reckless or ill-founded expansion. Some comrades who disregard the specific conditions here and now are raising an empty clamor for development; for example, they are demanding the establishment of heavy industry and putting forward plans for huge salt and armament industries, all of which are unrealistic and unacceptable. The Party's line is the correct line for development; it opposes outmoded and conservative standpoints, on the one hand, and grandiose, empty, and unrealistic plans, on the other. This is the Party's struggle on two fronts in financial and economic work.

While we must develop the public sector of our economy, we should not forget the importance of help from the people. They have given us grain, 90,000 *dan* in 1940, 200,000 *dan* in 1941, and 160,000 *dan* in 1942, thus ensuring food for our troops and working personnel. Until the end of 1941, the grain output of the public sector of our agriculture was meager, and we relied on the people for grain. We must urge the army to produce more grain, but for a time we shall still have to rely mainly on the people. The border region has only 1.4 million inhabitants,⁷ a small population for so large an area, and the provision of such large quantities of grain is not easy. Besides, the people transport salt for us or

pay a substitute salt levy, and in 1941 they purchased government bonds, worth 5 million *yan*, all of which are no small burden. To meet the needs of the War of Resistance and national reconstruction, the people must shoulder such burdens, the necessity of which they very well realize. When the government is in very great difficulties, it is necessary to ask the people to bear a heavier burden, and they understand that, too. But while taking from the people, we must at the same time help them to replenish and expand their economy. That is, appropriate steps and methods must be adopted to help the people develop their agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, salt industry, and commerce, so that they gain at the same time as they lose,⁸ and only thus can we sustain a long war against Japan.

Disregarding the needs of the war, some comrades insist that the government should adopt a policy of “benevolence.” This is a mistake. Unless we win the war against Japan, such “benevolence” will mean nothing to the people and will benefit only the Japanese imperialists. Conversely, although the people have to carry rather heavy burdens for the time being, things will get better for them as the difficulties confronting the government and the troops are overcome, the War of Resistance is sustained, and the enemy is defeated, and this is where the true benevolence of the revolutionary government lies.

Another mistake is “draining the pond to catch the fish,” that is, making endless demands on the people, disregarding their hardships, and considering only the needs of the government and the army. That is a Guomindang mode of thinking which we must never adopt. Although we have temporarily added to the people’s burden, we have immediately set to work building the public sector of our economy. In the years 1941 and 1942, the army, the official organizations, and the schools met most of their needs by their own efforts. This is a wonderful achievement without precedent in Chinese history, and it contributes to the material basis of our invincibility. The greater our self-supporting economic activities, the more we shall be able to lighten the people’s tax burdens. In the first stage, from 1937 to 1939, we took very little from them; during this stage they were able to build up considerable strength. In the second stage, from 1940 to 1942, the burden on the people increased. The third stage will begin in 1943. In the next two years, 1943 and 1944, if the public sector of our economy continues to grow and if all or most of our troops are in a position to engage in farming,⁹ then by the end of 1944 the people’s burden will again be lightened, and they will

again be able to build up strength. This is a possibility which we should prepare to turn into actuality.

We must refute all one-sided views and advance the correct slogan of our Party: “Develop the economy and ensure supplies.” With regard to the relationship between public and private interests, our slogans are: “Give consideration to both public and private interests,” and “Give consideration to both troops and civilians.” We consider only such slogans to be correct. We can guarantee our financial needs only by expanding both the public and private sectors of our economy in a realistic and practical way. Even in difficult times, we must take care to set a limit to taxation so that the burdens, though heavy, will not hurt the people. And as soon as we can, we should lighten the burdens so that the people can build up strength.

The Guomindang diehards regard construction in the border region as a hopeless undertaking and the difficulties here as insurmountable; they are expecting the border region to collapse any day. It is not worth arguing with such people; they will never see the day of our “collapse,” and we shall unquestionably grow more and more prosperous. They do not understand that under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Border Region Government,¹⁰ the masses always give their support to the Party and government. And the Party and the government will always find ways to overcome economic and financial difficulties, however serious. In fact, we have already pulled through some of our recent difficulties and will soon overcome others. We encountered difficulties many times greater in the past and surmounted them all. With intense fighting going on every day, our base areas in North and Central China are now facing much greater difficulties than the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, but we have already held out for five and a half years in these areas and can certainly continue to do so until victory. For us there is no ground for pessimism; we can conquer any difficulty.

After the present conference of senior cadres, we shall put into effect the policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration.¹¹ It must be carried out strictly, thoroughly, and universally, and not perfunctorily, superficially, or partially. In carrying it out, we must attain the five objectives of simplification, unification, efficiency, economy, and opposition to bureaucracy. These five objectives have a very important bearing on our economic and financial work. Simplification will

reduce nonproductive expenditures and increase our income from production; it will not only have a direct and healthy effect on our finances but will lighten the people's burdens and benefit them economically. In our economic and financial set-up, we must overcome such evils as disunity, assertion of independence, and lack of coordination and must establish a working system which is unified and responsive to direction and which permits the full application of our policies and regulations. With the establishment of such a unified system, working efficiency will rise. All our organizations, and particularly those engaged in economic and financial work, must pay attention to thrift. By practicing thrift, we can cut out a great deal of unnecessary and wasteful expenditure, which amounts possibly to tens of millions of *yuan*. Finally, people engaged in economic and financial work must overcome surviving bureaucratic practices, some of which, such as corruption and graft, overly elaborate organization, meaningless "standardization" and red tape, are very serious. If we fully attain these five objectives in the Party, the government, and the army, our policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration will achieve its purpose, our difficulties will surely be overcome, and we shall silence the gibes about our approaching "collapse."

Below, we shall discuss separately various work in finance and the economy, concretely summarize experience in past work, and put forward the general policies for work that should be carried out in 1943.

II. On the Development of Agriculture

The general strategy for economic and financial work in the border region is to develop the economy and ensure supplies. This being the case, the first and most important questions are: How has our economic work been done in the past? What are the successes? What are the shortcomings? and What should be our strategy henceforth?

The economy of the border region is divided into the two large sectors, public and private. The private sector of our economy consists of all agriculture, industry, and commerce undertaken by private individuals. The public sector of

our economy consists of the agriculture, industry, and commerce undertaken by the government, troops, official organizations, and schools. The functions and relationship of these two sectors are such that the private sector provides the livelihood of the 1.4 million people of the border region. At the same time, through taxation, it assists the government and troops, and supports the sacred cause of the War of Resistance and the reconstruction of the country. The public sector provides the bulk of the living and operating expenses of several tens of thousands of Party members, government workers, and soldiers, thus reducing the amount taken from the people and building up their resources so that these can be obtained in future urgent need. The principles used here are “Give consideration to both public and private interests” and “Give consideration to both troops and civilians.”

If our Party and government do not pay attention to mobilizing the people and helping them to develop agriculture, industry, and commerce, their lives cannot be improved and the needs of the War of Resistance cannot be met. As a result, there will be trouble between the troops and the people. And if we cannot settle the minds of the troops and the people, it is pointless to consider anything else. Therefore the most important task is for the Party and the government to concentrate great efforts on building up the people’s economy.

However, relying on the taxes handed over by the people alone cannot meet the needs of the War of Resistance and the reconstruction of the country. This is particularly true of the border region, where the area is large and the population sparse and where there has long been a large contradiction between the taxes paid by the people and the expenditure of the government. Therefore, we must also concentrate great efforts on managing the public sector of the economy. This is an extremely great responsibility borne by our government, troops, official organizations, and schools. In the past few years, we have had great successes in this work. In 1943 we must achieve even greater successes so as directly to meet the needs of the War of Resistance and the reconstruction of the country. The more the public sector of the economy grows, the more the burden carried by the people can be reduced. This is another way of building up the resources of the people. And the instrument which unites and reconciles the private and public sectors is the currency.

The private sector comprises agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts,

cooperative undertakings, the salt industry, and commerce. Here I shall first deal with agriculture. The agriculture of the border region was depressed during the period of the land revolution.¹² At that time, there was much uncultivated land in Yan'an, Ansai, Bao'an,¹³ Ganquan, Huachi, the three eastern *xian*,¹⁴ and so forth. On the border between Huachi and Bao'an, there was an area called Erjiachuan which was more than 200 *li* long, yet only twenty or thirty households lived there. As early as the Tongzhi period [1862–1874], no one lived in Wuyasi and Zhangjiacha in Bao'an *xian*. Fucunchuan in Ganquan *xian* and Jinpenwan and Mashichuan in Yan'an *xian* had for the most part ceased to be cultivated. Cotton planting had ceased throughout the border region. The decline in animal husbandry was very great. Only 400,000–500,000 head of sheep remained and 100,000 oxen and donkeys. Textiles, the transport of salt, and other subsidiary undertakings had all been disrupted in the same way. In particular, the textile industry had almost completely disappeared. By 1938, only 70,000 packs of eating salt were exported.¹⁵ All this shows how depressed the agriculture of the border region was at that time. Agriculture was only speedily restored and developed after the Central Red Army came to the border region and Civil War ceased, after the local bandits were cleaned up and the peasants were given security, after the “left” economic policy was corrected and a mild taxation policy was adopted, and after the Party and government’s call for the development of agriculture had greatly raised the enthusiasm of the peasants for production.

[Table 1.1](#) gives the statistics for livestock, cotton planting, and opening up of uncultivated lands in the past four years.

[Table 1.1](#) Agricultural Activity, 1939–1942

Year	Area of new land opened (<i>mu</i>)	Area of cotton planted (<i>mu</i>)	Livestock		
			Oxen	Donkeys	Sheep
1939	1,002,774	3,767	150,892	124,935	1,171,366
1940	698,989	15,177	193,238	135,054	1,723,037
1941	390,087	39,087	203,915		
1942	281,413	94,405	—	—	—
Total	2,373,263				

Notes:

1. The statistics for the livestock of Jiaxian and Mizhi *xian* have not been included; the 1939 figures for livestock include the 1940 total for seven of the *xian*.

2. The figure for the area of new land cultivated is for the amount of new land opened each year. The figures for cotton planted and for livestock are the annual totals for the whole of the border region.

These statistics show that year by year the cultivated land of the border region has expanded, the acreage of cotton planted has grown, and the amount of livestock has increased. Moreover, the real totals are more than those shown in the table. As a result, much of the formerly uncultivated land has become productive. For example, there are now more than a hundred households in Erjiachuan, and all the land of the area has been cultivated. Wuyasi and Zhangjiacha are now both fully inhabited. In the past, all eleven districts in Yan'an *xian* had unused land. At present, only Jinpen and Liulin districts, half the Central district, and one township in Yaodian district have uncultivated land. In 1939, there were only about 300,000 *mu* of plowed land in Yan'an. In 1942, there were 699,538 *mu*. There used to be a lot of uncultivated land in the *xian* of Ansai, Anding, Yanchuan, and Yanchang. Now there is very little. Before 1940 the border region bought grain from Luochuan *xian* and east of the Yellow River. Now, not only is it unnecessary to buy grain from outside but there is even some surplus grain exported to the region of Yulin. Some people have moved here from other areas and livestock has increased, but we do not feel a shortage of grain. In light of all these facts, there is no longer any doubt that the border region can be self-supporting in grain.

Cotton growing has not only reached its prerevolutionary peak but has also developed. For example, the districts of Yongping, Yongsheng, and Yuju in

Yanchuan *xian* did not previously grow cotton. Now they have all started growing it. The same is true of Yan'an. The profit from cotton is greater than that from grain. The return from 1 *mu* of cotton is on average 700 *yuan* or more, whereas if grain were planted, the return would only be 200 *yuan*. The ratio is thus 3:1. In 1939, the area planted to cotton was only just over 3,700 *mu*. In 1942 it was more than 94,000 *mu*, and the quantity produced reached 1.4 million *jin*. This was a great achievement. However, the amount needed by the border region is 3 million *jin*. This is our future task.

The increase in livestock has also been very rapid. For example, in 1937 there were only about 8,000 sheep in Yan'an. Now there are more than 60,000. In 1937 there were only 70,000 sheep in Huachi; now there are more than 120,000. Before the land revolution, there were only five flocks of sheep in Zhangjiahe of No. 3 township, Dongyang district, Yanchuan *xian*. (There was no grazing land, and there could only be thirty to fifty head in each flock.) Now there are thirteen flocks. Oxen and donkeys have increased by almost two-thirds since the time of the Civil War. As a result, in 1940 and 1941 we were able to export 500,000 packs of salt. If it were not for the increase in oxen and donkeys, this salt would have been very difficult to move out.

However, the development of agriculture has not been even. Those areas with relatively all-around development and rather more successes include the *xian* under direct administration¹⁶ and the Longdong subregion, in particular Yan'an, Ansai, Ganquan, Huachi, Quzi, and the three eastern *xian*. This is because they have a lot of land and few people, and the climate is quite good. These *xian* also have the biggest share in the subsidiary work of salt transport and, at the same time, the largest amount of public expenditure. The area that has not developed is the special military area [*jingbeiqu*],¹⁷ because it has a large population and the land is limited. There is no possibility of enlarging the plowed area. They have had some success there in the gradual restoration of household spinning and weaving work. Moreover, there has been some emigration to the Yan'an area, which has eased the distribution of population and land.

The speed of development has also varied. Development was faster before 1940, particularly in 1939 and 1940. In these two years 1,700,000 *mu* of new land were opened up. In 1940, the number of sheep increased by nearly 600,000 and oxen and donkeys by over 50,000. But in 1941 and 1942 only about 600,000 *mu* of

land were opened up. This is only one-third of the previous two years. There were fewer sheep in 1941 than in 1940, and the number of oxen and donkeys increased by only 10,000 (in reality there was a reduction). However, in these two years cotton growing and textiles both developed.

The above outlines the development of agriculture in the border region. Now I want to say a few words about how this development took place.

Before the Civil War ended, agriculture was in decline. Afterward it developed. How did this development come about? Apart from the arrival of the Central Red Army, the cleaning up of the local bandits, and the realization of peace so that the peasants could live and work securely, there were the following six reasons.

1. The “left” mistakes in economic policy were corrected and the policies to build up the resources of the people were carried out. Although the peasants had obtained a share of land, they were afraid to develop production because of the “left” economic policy. In addition, because agriculture was disrupted both before and after the revolution, the base was very weak and this hindered growth. The Central Committee corrected the “left” policy and thus put an end to the peasants’ tendency to fear developing production. The peasants were then willing to buy more implements, and the rich peasants dared to take on tenants [*an huozi*] and long-term laborers [*gu changgong*]. The milder policies restored confidence and helped the extension of production. At the same time, the high price for grain and the great profit in subsidiary undertakings stimulated the peasants’ zeal to produce and made agriculture develop rapidly. This laid the basis for the levy of 200,000 *dan* of grain tax and 26 million *jin* of hay tax in 1941.

2. Calls were made for the development of production. The Production Mobilization Conference for cadres held by the Central Committee (1939), the Second Party Congress of the border region (1939), the first meeting of the Border Region Council (1941), and the first agricultural exhibition all called for the development of production. These calls played a major role in promoting growth. They first aroused the cadres, and then through them penetrated deeply to the masses, mobilizing men, women, old, young, and even loafers¹⁸ to take part in production. They increased the labor force and finally destroyed the peasants’ fear of developing production. Thus the amount of new land opened up in 1939 was more than 1 million *mu*, and real imports of livestock were also greatest in that year.

3. The immigration policy. A major reason for the enlargement of cultivated land by 2.35 million *mu* in the past four years has been that those regions with large amounts of land have absorbed large numbers of immigrants and have increased their population. For example, in 1937 Yan'an (including Yan'an city) only had a population of 34,000. Now its population is roughly 70,000. Because of this, cultivated land in this *xian* has increased from around 300,000 *mu* to roughly 700,000 *mu*. In 1936 Ansai only had a population of about 20,000. Now it has a population of more than 40,000. Ganquan originally had about 8,000 people. Now it has more than 14,000. In 1939 Yanchang had a population of only 25,000. Now it has more than 32,000. Yanchuan had the least uncultivated land, but between 1938 and the present its population has increased by over 10,000. Huachi had a population of only 35,000 in 1938. Now it has a population of more than 40,000. Other places such as Bao'an, Anding, Jingbian, and the *xian* of the Longdong and Guanzhong subregions have also increased their population. These immigrants came mostly from Hengshan, Yulin, Shenmu, and Fugu,¹⁹ and secondly from the special military area. They all came voluntarily and were not organized by the government. They were willing to come because there was land and they were treated well. The various *xian* organized the existing householders to give help with grain, tools, cave dwellings, and so forth. At the same time, the rich peasants took on tenants, which also helped the immigrants. The increase in immigrants not only enlarged the area cultivated, but also increased livestock and stimulated commerce. Therefore, the immigrants were one of the factors in the development of agriculture.

4. The policy of incentives. Immigrants do not pay grain tax for three years, and their other obligations are reduced. If some of the peasants planting cotton do not make as much profit as those planting grain, the government pays compensation. If livestock is purchased from outside the border region, there is a reduction in the grain tax by a fixed amount in the first year. In addition, there were the rewards to labor heroes given at the two agricultural exhibitions, which also brought about great results. For example, Wu Manyou and Mao Kehu of Yan'an and Du Fafu of Ganquan were rewarded at the first agricultural exhibition. Now they have become very good, rich peasants. They all pay more than 5 *dan* of grain tax (in the border region 1 *dan* is 300 *jin*). Moreover, they have encouraged other peasant householders in the villages to develop

production. All these things have promoted the development of agriculture, in particular of grain and cotton.

5. The reduction in the waste of labor power and the better adjustment in the use of labor power. Because we were busy fighting during the Civil War period, we did not pay attention to production and the land was neglected. After peace was established, there were frequent exercises and guard duties by the self-defense army [*ziweijun*] and many kinds of meetings. Therefore, each month each able-bodied man missed at least three working days. Later this kind of waste was reduced. Furthermore, before 1941 not much grain tax was collected, there was little grain tax transport duty, and the amount of work missed was comparatively limited. In recent years in rural areas, contract-labor teams [*zhagong*] (short-term work for others done collectively under a boss) and exchange-labor teams [*biangong*] (mutual aid among the masses, also done collectively) have developed and made better adjustments in the use of labor power. We have mobilized loafers to take part in production. The number of women joining in production has also increased. All these things have helped the development of border region agriculture.

6. The policy of agricultural credit. Formerly there was no agricultural credit, but this was offset by the mild taxation policy. Now that the grain tax has increased and in particular as 80 percent of peasant households must pay it, households (roughly one-third) that lack oxen, agricultural tools, and food grain must be helped with credit. Moreover, a supply of credit is very necessary for certain kinds of agriculture that must be developed (like cotton planting), for agricultural subsidiaries (like spinning and weaving), and for certain regions which need more development. Although only 4 million *yuan* of credit was given in 1942, of which merely 1.5 million *yuan* was for oxen, more than 2,600 oxen and nearly 5,000 agricultural implements were bought, and cotton planting also expanded. It cannot be denied that this was a great help. But because finances are limited and we can only lend in accordance with the government's financial strength, we still cannot provide enough credit to match the needs of the peasant households. However, a little is always better than nothing, and it does give some help.

The above are several of the major factors in the development of agriculture; below I shall discuss several major lessons to be drawn from our work.

1. Act according to the conditions of the area and the season. Agricultural regions and seasons are different, and methods of development are also different. For example, there is no uncultivated land in the special military area (apart from a small amount in Qingjian). The cultivated land area cannot be enlarged. Sheep herding is limited by the pasture land available. There is also a lack of pack animals for the transport of salt. The policy of rent reduction has not yet been thoroughly implemented. Because of these things, grain production has not increased in those areas, and with the exception of spinning and weaving, subsidiary undertakings have not developed. Although improved techniques—such as more frequent hoeing of weeds, greater use of manure, and more deep plowing—were introduced there long ago, we should still carry out more investigation of the situation and at the right time do our utmost to increase production. However, if we were to employ these improved techniques in areas where land is plentiful, population sparse, and working methods primitive, they would not be very effective because they all require an increase in labor power. From the point of view of the peasants of the latter kind of area, deep plowing is not as good as planting more land. Applying more manure is not as good as opening up more uncultivated land. Planting more land is especially good in areas with low rainfall. Therefore, in these areas the call to improve agricultural methods is in general ineffective at the present time. To really increase production in these regions, the most important thing for the moment is to rely on opening up unused land. If in the six years from 1937 to 1942 the increase in plowed land was roughly 3 million *mu*, then the amount harvested in 1942 was at least 500,000 *dan* more than in 1936, which is equivalent to 250,000 *dan* of hulled grain (each *dan* is 300 *jin*).²⁰ If we estimate the grain production of the border region in 1942 at 1.5 million *dan* of hulled grain, then in over six years the increase in grain production through the increase of plowed land is approximately one-sixth of the total. Some of this increase in cultivated land is new land opened up by immigrants, and some is expansion of land farmed by the original households. All this shows us that in directing agriculture, we must adopt different methods in different regions. In one region we should make deep plowing the key, and in another enlarging the area plowed. We must also make distinctions with respect to timing. At a time when there is unused land that can be cultivated, we should mainly encourage the opening up of new land. When

uncultivated land has been exhausted, then we must turn to encouraging deep plowing. We must not only make these distinctions between large regions, we must also make them within a *xian*, a district, and sometimes even within a township. For example, if certain villages in a township have rather a lot of unused land, we should encourage the opening up of unused land there. If in other villages there is little or no unused land, we should encourage deep plowing. While there is still uncultivated land in a township, we should encourage the opening up of land. When all the lands have been opened up, we should encourage deep plowing. Although we have had some successes in the past few years in our work, much has been too empty and generalized. Many of our comrades still do not know how to investigate objective circumstances minutely, nor do they know how to put forward concrete proposals to provide the conditions for increasing production in different regions and at different times. Slogans put forward in the past for deep plowing, opening new lands, water conservancy, and increasing production by 400,000 *dan* or 200,000 *dan* in reality contained much subjectivism. Many peasants were not interested or influenced by them. From this we may conclude that in the future we must carry out deep investigation by seeking truth from facts [*shishi qiushi*] and solve problems in terms of concrete times, places, and conditions.

2. As yet the peasants in a large number of areas still pay heavy rents and heavy interest rates, and the policy of reducing these has not been thoroughly implemented. On the one hand, peasants must bear the burden of paying rent and interest to the landlords, and, on the other, they must pay grain tax and money tax to the government. They get too little for themselves, which dampens their enthusiasm to produce. Thus there is no possibility of increasing production. From this we may conclude that we must conscientiously carry out the decrees to reduce rent and interest rates.

3. As a result of the increase in grain tax, and the newly levied hay tax, sheep tax, and salt-transport requirement, the peasants' enthusiasm for production has diminished. In the two years of 1941 and 1942, the peasants paid a large amount of grain tax, hay tax, and salt tax, and during these years, they expanded the area of ploughed land by only 600,000 *mu*, merely 60 percent of the increase in 1939. Livestock did not increase in 1941, and the number of sheep even declined (of course, epidemics had some effect). Immigration also dropped. In 1942 only 4,843

households came. Moreover, 3,527 old households moved out, the reason mainly being that they feared further burdens. Another reason was that the amount of grain tax collected increased progressively according to the amount harvested and not according to the area of land worked. This method, although rational in terms of sharing the burden equally, hindered the growth of investment in agriculture. It lowered the peasants' enthusiasm to invest in the land because for the same land a good harvest meant paying out a lot and a poor harvest meant paying out a little or even nothing. If taxation were based on the area of land worked, this point could be corrected. The enthusiasm of the middle and rich peasants could be raised, and there would be no detriment to the poor peasants. From this we may conclude that there must be limits to the grain tax and hay tax, and at the same time we must improve the methods of taxation so as to promote agricultural production.

4. Policies should be thoroughly implemented. For example, we stipulated that for three years we would not take grain tax from new immigrants or from those planting cotton, but in fact we have "welcomed" grain tax from immigrants and we have levied half the grain tax for land planted to cotton. We originally stipulated that when livestock was bought from areas outside the border region we would reduce the grain tax by a definite amount for the first year, but this has also not yet been implemented. In addition, regulations for giving rewards for increased production have not been fully carried out. All these things not only affect the authority of the government but also diminish the enthusiasm of the peasants. From this we may conclude that henceforth everything pertaining to the decrees announced by the government must be resolutely implemented.

5. More equitable adjustment in the use of labor power and other methods helpful to peasants, such as exchange-labor teams and contract-labor teams, have a strong influence on agricultural growth. However, with the exception of some *xian* like Yan'an, we have still not done enough to organize and promote them. There are certainly many comrades among the *xian* cadres who are actively striving to put ideas to the people and who have originated many good methods for mobilizing the masses to develop production. They have created many model examples. However, many other comrades are not like this. They lack the spirit of investigation that seeks truth from facts and enthusiastic effort. They lack creativity. They feel that there is no work that they can do for agriculture, or they

do not know how to begin. Therefore they only raise empty slogans like “spring plowing” or “autumn harvest.” They remain passive and let the peasants do as they like. The government simply keeps a record of what is done. But, in fact, there are many things to be done. Many good methods can be thought up. For example, during spring plowing in 1942 some of the peasants in Yan’an felt very discouraged. Instances of moving out, splitting up the family, and selling livestock in preparation for reducing production occurred. From the point of view of the comrades who lack enthusiasm and creativity, these phenomena would be unchangeable, and it would be best to accept fate and let such bad things happen. But the comrades from Yan’an were not like this. They were neither passive nor bureaucratic. They were able to grasp the key to the problem and adopt active methods. They overcame the difficulties. At that time, the Party and government did much propaganda work and gave help with grain, cave dwellings, and agricultural tools. Afterward not only did production not decline but cultivated land increased by 80,000 *mu*. This example proved that there is much work in agriculture that can and should be done by the local Party committees and the local government. Moreover, so long as they grasp the key points and find a method, then when they act they can be effective. From this we may conclude that cadres must be active to overcome difficulties, and they must unite with the masses and, in accordance with the needs of the masses, create vigorous methods to solve their problems. They definitely cannot be passive and bureaucratic.

In order to give our comrades a clear-cut position on this extremely important question of uniting closely with the masses and conscientiously solving their difficulties, I here specially reproduce for reference the reports of the comrades of Yan’an *xian* on how they handled the problem of opening up unused land, how they handled the problem of refugees, and how they handled the problem of loafers.

What follows is the original report:

How Was Yan’an *Xian*’s Plan to Open Up 80,000 *Mu* of Unused Land in 1942 Completed?

1. We relied on the labor power of immigrant refugees to open up uncultivated land. There were 25,428 refugees in the period from 1940 to 1942. Assuming that five of them equal one labor power, there

were 5,086 labor powers. Each labor power can open up 10 *mu* of new land in one year, yielding a total of 50,860 *mu*. (Ten *mu* is the average figure for the land opened up by refugees in the past three years. In 1942 the land opened up by each labor power was more than this.)

2. We relied on the labor power of the original households and animals to open up unused land, totaling 29,399 *mu*. The original households had 10,616 labor powers. The work could be done with each labor power opening up less than 3 *mu*.

3. However, the organization of labor power is a major task. This year we adopted methods of collective labor, such as contract-labor teams and exchange-labor teams. We also organized women and loafers to take part in production.

Altogether we organized 487 contract-labor teams. We also drew 4,939 good labor powers into collective labor (exchange-labor teams). This was almost one-third of the total number of labor powers (according to statistics for this spring, there were 15,702 labor powers in the entire *xian*), which meant that one out of every three people took part in collective labor. The method of contract labor was to form a group of eight to ten good workers from a village and appoint a foreman [*gongtou*]. Then they opened up new land and hoed weeds either for themselves or for others. Sometimes the foreman took part in physical labor, in which case he received pay valued at two labor days per day worked. If he did not take part, he received pay valued at only one labor day per day. Those who formed contract-labor teams were either entirely from the local village, or came from outside, or were organized with people from outside the village together with peasants from the village. The peasants were very pleased that we organized loafers to take part in production. It increased their enthusiasm for work. More and more women joined in production each year. In particular, refugee women took part in opening up uncultivated land and even more of them in hoeing. There were thirty-nine in Liulin district this year. The refugee women of No. 3 township in Chuankou district did not have any hoes. They went to the mountains and waited until others were tired and resting; then they took up the hoes and began opening up land. When the others had finished their rest, they handed back the hoes and waited again.

4. We relied on production plans for each peasant household. In 1942, this *xian* laid emphasis on determining production plans for each peasant household based on discussions with that household and with its assent. The government printed a standard form to record plans, including opening up new lands, hoeing weeds, and so forth. After a plan was determined, it was posted in the home of each family so that afterward the government could examine the production plan of each household according to the form. When determining peasant household plans, we had to pay attention to the following points:

- i. production circumstances of the previous year
- ii. conditions for the increase of production in the current year
- iii. the amount of labor power (human and animal)
- iv. obtaining the agreement of the people concerned
- v. the need for constant examination and supervision of work

5. The effect of agricultural credit was important, in particular the 100,000 *yuan* credit given to refugees for agricultural tools. When the refugees arrived, they did not have a thing. To open up unused land, first, a mattock was needed to clear away the scrub and then a hoe to break the land. After agricultural credit was issued and the problem of tools was solved, the refugees' desire to open up new land was very strong. In six days they were able to open up 3 *mu*. In 1942 agricultural credit was given rather late. The earlier credit is given, the sooner more land can be opened up. (Note: do not violate the agricultural season.)

6. During spring plowing, mobilization work had to be reduced as much as possible. The peasants were allowed the time to open up new land and to take part in production.

7. The government had a firm grasp on the work of opening up unused land. Only three months were available for this. With a hundred-day plan in which each day opened up 800 *mu*, it was necessary to have a labor force of 1,600. This was one-tenth of the labor force of the entire *xian*. Only three months were available for this, but by April 19 we had only opened up 15,000 *mu*. This was still far short of completing the task, and already two-thirds of the time had gone. Therefore, beginning on April 20 after a rainfall, there was a twenty-day assault, and 46,442 *mu* of land was opened up, which was 58 percent of the work.

In the assault the best districts were the following:

Liulin district: The ratio of new land opened up during the period of assault to that opened up before was 1,294.4:100.

Yaodian district: The ratio was 1,184.4:100.

Chuankou district: The ratio was 432.1:100.

All together, the *xian* government held two meetings of district heads to inspect the work and issued three directives. The cadres of the *xian* government went down to the districts and townships more than three times.

The districts checked up on the work of the townships up to seven or eight times in some cases and three times at the very least. The townships also checked up many times on the work of the villages.

The tight grasp of the leadership and the strict check-ups played a decisive role in the completion of the task.

How to Solve the Problem of Refugees Taking Part in Production

1. [Table 1.2 refers to] statistics on the flow of refugees into Yan'an *xian* in recent years (the figures represent the annual increase; Yan'an city excluded).²¹

Putting it simply, the number of households more than doubled, and the number of people just about doubled. The refugees who came settled mainly in Chuankou, Liulin, Jinpen, and Yaodian districts. In these districts, there was a lot of unused land.

Table 1.2 The Flow of Refugees into Yan'an *Xian* (Yan'an city excluded), 1938–1942

Year	Households	Number of people
1938	249	1,200
1939	533	1,976
1940	1,137	6,090
1941	5,040	14,207
1942	1,050	6,231
Total	8,009	29,704
Comparison with 1937:		
	Households	Number of people
1937	7.703	32.705

Increase during 5 years		8,009	29,704
Percentage increase	103.9%	90.8%	

2. Statistics on how the government helped the refugees solve problems in production after they had come ([Table 1.3](#)).

3. The methods for solving refugees' difficulties in production were:

- i. There was a lot of land. We proposed that the ownership of publicly owned uncultivated land should go to those who opened it up. If the owner of privately owned unused land did not open it up, we let refugees do so. The three-year exemption from tax was an incentive.

Table 1.3 Allocation of State Aid to Refugees, 1940–1942

	1940	1941	1942	Total
Allocation of land (in <i>mu</i>)	10,220	3,451	6,335	20,006
Grain (in <i>dan</i>)	669.9	495	458.48	1,623.38
Seeds (in <i>dan</i>)	40.18	8.2	47.37	95.75
Agricultural tools (items)	424	2,133	427	2,984
Oxen	979	82	212	1,273

Notes:

a. In 1942 in addition 13,555 *jin* of sweet potatoes [*yangyu*] were given to the refugees and on 273 occasions they were helped with oxen.

b. Agricultural tools were plowshares, rakes, and hoes.

- ii. The problem of a place to live. In the beginning, they lived in old cave dwellings or broken-down cave dwellings. Many of the others who came afterward were joining friends, relatives, or people in other social relationships. They lived in the cave dwellings of those friends or relatives. Having settled down, they dug out their own cave dwelling. In other cases, one person came in the first year and dug out the cave dwelling. In the second year, the family came and moved into the dwelling.
- iii. We made arrangements among the peasants for grain to eat. We proposed that if 1 *dou* of grain were borrowed before spring, after autumn 1 *dou* and 3 *sheng* should be repaid. This was a profit of 30 percent. It encouraged the original households to lend grain, and the government guaranteed repayment. Another method was to urge the original households to hire help [*diao fenzi*], to take on share-cropping tenants [*an zhuangjia*], and to contract short-term labor [*lan gong*] from among the refugees. Conditions were decided voluntarily by both sides. Allowing the original households to exploit [that is, to profit] a little was not a problem because when the refugees first came, they did not have a thing. Although they were exploited, we could not let them starve.

Statistics for this year (1942) [are shown in [Table 1.4](#)].

Table 1.4 Households Reliant upon Employees for Food Grain in 1942

Hired help [<i>diao fenzi</i>]	359 households
Share-cropping tenants [<i>an zhuangjia</i>]	466 households
Short-term contract labor [<i>Ian gong</i>]	184 households
Total	1,009 households

These households relied on their employers for food grain. However, the hired helpers [*diao fenzi*] could only get supplies for themselves. Hired farmhands and short-term contract laborers were able to get food grain for their family members as well. There were 650 households of the latter kind. At a rate of three people per household, this was all together 1,950 persons. If we add the 359 hired helpers, the total was 2,309 people relying on their employers for grain. If they had asked for aid from the government, at a rate of 5 *dou* per person per year the amount of grain needed would have been 1,154.5 *dou*. What a large amount this would have been! Therefore, on the basis of mutual agreement between employer and employee, the hiring of farmhands, helpers, and short-term contract laborers solved many great problems. It not only solved the problem of food grains. It also enlarged production and increased the supply of grain. Taking each household as one labor power, there were 1,009 labor powers all together. One labor power could produce 2 *dan* of grain, so in total they could increase grain production by 2,018 *dan*. After consumption, this still left a surplus of 863.5 *dan*. By the following year, these people were in a position to carry out production by themselves.

- iv. The peasants were urged to help the refugees with seed and land to work. Seed was repaid after autumn, and rent was paid for land with the government as guarantor.
- v. The institution of credit for agricultural implements for refugees was very effective in solving the problem of supplying tools to open up new lands. If arrangements for any problem (food grain, supply of agricultural implements, and so forth) were not good, the opening up of unused lands could have been impeded. Therefore, it was necessary to solve each problem rapidly and at the correct time. A delay of even one day reduces the amount of land opened up.
- vi. As for the problem of burdens on the refugees, we resolutely carried out the decisions of the government of the border region on treating them well. For three years, we made no demands on them, and instead the government helped them solve all kinds of difficulties. This year the government cadres of the *xian*, districts, and townships saved 10 *dan* of grain for distribution to the refugees. While solving the problem of grain for refugees to eat, No. 3 township in Central district made great efforts to reduce their burdens.

4. Why did the refugees want to come to Yan'an?

- i. We have really solved the problem of refugees. The solution of the refugee food-grain problem in 1940 had a particularly wide impact. In Chuankou district alone, 300 *dan* of grain was supplied. Therefore, many more refugees came in 1941.
- ii. Although government calls had a great impact, the effect of the refugees themselves telling their own friends, relations, and other social acquaintances of the good treatment they

received was even greater. We found that very few refugees who came to us had refugee certificates issued by Suide subregion. This was because they feared that, after having accepted settlement funds or registration cards from there, they would not be free or they would become public property. They preferred to obtain money through their own personal relationships.

5. Opinions concerning future immigrant refugees.

- i. Persuade more of them to come by encouraging refugees to use their social connections.
- ii. The government at the *xian* and district levels should conscientiously solve problems for them.
- iii. The Border Region Government should issue some grain and funds to help them, with repayment after autumn.
- iv. Persist in carrying out the decisions to treat refugees favorably.

How to Mobilize Loafers to Take Part in Production

Statistical summary [given in [Table 1.5](#)].

Table 1.5 Mobilization of Loafers, 1937–1942

Year	Original number of loafers	Number joining in production	Number not yet taking part in production
1937	1,629	299	1,330
1938	1,246	578	668
1939	543	120	423
1940	359	175	184
1941	184	126	58
1942	145	40	105

Note: The chief reason for the increase in loafers in 1942 was that in 1941 Jin-penwan was taken from Gulin *xian* and placed under the administration of this *xian*. According to statistics, that district had forty-three idlers.

Explanation:

- i. In Panlong district, a certain spirit medium beat his “three mountains knife”²² into a hoe. He told the masses he would not swindle people again and would work hard in the future.
- ii. At Lijiaqu in No. 3 township of Chuankou district, Hui San and Gao Wu were each given the task of opening up 6 *mu* of uncultivated land this spring. They completed this and even exceeded it by 2 *mu*. At Tianjiagelao in No. 4 township, Yang Yingcheng was given the job of opening up 6 *mu*. He opened up 9 *mu*.

- iii. In Liulin district this year, seven men were reformed and joined in production. In Wuyang district twelve men were investigated; after a struggle, nine of them took part in production. In Fengfu district, there were eight men. At Ganguyi in Yaodian district, eight men were organized into two groups to go to Zhangjiakou to open up new land.
- iv. At Nanyigou of No. 3 township in Fengfu district, Bai Fenyu was a shaman before 1936. By 1941 he had an ox and had hired a man. He had 200 sheep and had become the village head. He paid 10.2 *dan* in grain tax, 200 *jin* in salt tax, and 500 *jin* in hay tax. This year he has got another ox and has hired a helper. He has expanded production, and his prospects are very good.
- v. Because the government mobilized them to take part in production, the loafers of Panlong district said: "If things go wrong this year, government men will be even more strict with us." For example, Li Dejin from Lijiabian in No. 4 township used to smoke opium. This year he has opened up 6 *mu* of new land and has stopped smoking. In the entire district, there were twenty-seven loafers. They have written guarantees that they will do well in production, and as a result twenty of them are very good.
- vi. At Liujiaping in Mudan district, there is a man (name unknown) with extremely bright prospects, now that the government has mobilized him to join in production. Later he sought out one of the government personnel and treated him very well, saying: "The government was right to get us to take part in production." Cao Yucheng from the same district used to be a loafer. He did not farm, and he did not cut firewood. Winter and summer, wearing a ragged old cotton-padded jacket he would curl up on the cold *kang*.²³ Every day he would smoke one-fifth of an ounce [*er qian*] of opium. His wife and children cried from cold and hunger. After the revolution and after having been educated by the government, he has become the production director of No. 4 township. Everybody praises his method of work. He is a labor hero. Moreover, he keeps a close watch on loafers. He forces them to make production plans. Every five days, he goes up into the hills to supervise them. Under his direction, Liu Guai and Yan Fenghe have each planted 24 *mu* of land this year.

2. Our methods of mobilization are:

- i. Doing propaganda, educational, and persuasive work to persuade them to take part in production. After receiving some grain, their prospects improve.
- ii. The government gives them definite production tasks, such as opening up uncultivated land (see examples above). They are inspected at regular intervals. Moreover, particular people in the villages are designated to supervise their production.
- iii. Urging the masses to struggle against them and to force them to join production. This year in the two villages, Jinpenhe and Yunshansi in No. 3 township, Panlong district, production competitions were organized. In this situation, Chang Degong, a loafer in Jinpenhe, was forced by the villagers to go up into the hills to open up new land. He has opened up 3 *mu*. At present, he is preparing to plant 15 *mu*.
- iv. Organizing the loafers in collective labor. The loafers are concentrated in the district town and organized into teams to open up new land. After they give up the opium-smoking habit, they can go home. The land opened up and farmed is given to whoever does the work.
- v. The government solved some of the loafers' production difficulties.

3. Results.

The masses were very pleased that the government made the loafers take part in production. The

masses opposed them very much because they did no work at all, paid no grain tax, and caused trouble every time there was mobilization work. As for the loafers themselves, after they obtained some real results from production, they realized that the government was acting for their betterment. The above examples clarify this point. As for those who were extremely stubborn and refused to change, some even running away when the government tried to mobilize them, on their return they joined in a little light productive labor. In this *xian* no loafers have become bandits.

We have not referred to this report of the leading comrades of the Party and government of Yan'an *xian* without purpose. The spirit of the comrades of Yan'an *xian* is entirely the spirit of Bolsheviks. Their attitude is enthusiastic, and there is not the slightest passivity in their thought and action. They are not at all afraid of difficulties and are able vigorously and firmly to overcome them all. Look how responsible they are toward their work: "In 1942 agricultural credit was given rather late. The earlier credit is given, the sooner more land can be opened up!" "It was necessary to solve each problem rapidly and at the correct time. A delay of even one day reduces the amount of land opened up." "Determine the production plans of each peasant household." "The firm grasp of the leadership and the strict check-ups played a decisive role in the completion of the task." How vastly different and how much better is this spirit than that of those timid people who draw back full of sighs when they meet difficulties and of those who are not conscientious in their work and try to get by and neglect things. Imbued with such spirit, there is not one thing that the comrades of Yan'an did not handle realistically and practically [i.e., according to seeking truth from facts]. They have a full understanding of the feelings, needs, and concrete circumstances of all the people of Yan'an *xian*. They have become completely one with the masses. They conduct extremely good investigation and research, and thus they have learned the Marxist art of leading the masses. They are entirely without subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism.²⁴ How does this compare with those subjectivists who do not solve problems according to the demands of the masses but according to their own subjective imagination? And with those bureaucrats who do no investigation and research work at all and, though they work for many years, have no idea of what is going on around them? Is there not a world of difference between them? We hope all the comrades of the border region will have this spirit of the comrades of Yan'an, this attitude toward their work, this oneness with the masses, this willingness to carry out investigation work, and thus also learn the Marxist art of leading the masses to

overcome difficulties so as to make our work successful, no matter what is undertaken. Quite a few of the comrades of the various *xian* of the border region are like, or more or less like, the comrades of Yan'an. We hope that the model experience of these comrades can quickly spread to all *xian*, districts [*qu*], and townships [*xiang*].

The above is a summary of agricultural work in the border region in the past. What follows are the tasks for the year 1943.

The major demand on agriculture is to increase the production of grain and cotton (subsidiary undertakings will be discussed elsewhere). In light of the present need for grain and cotton and also in order to strive for some grain and cotton for export, it is still necessary for us to mobilize the peasant masses to increase the production of hulled grain by 200,000 *dan* and to increase the production of cotton by 1.6 million *jin*. Is there any hope that this can be achieved? It is estimated that in the six years between 1937 and 1942, roughly 3 million *mu* of uncultivated land was opened up and the production of grain increased by 500,000 *dan*. Well, then, is it possible that in the next few years once again on the basis of opening up new land and other methods to increase the production of grain by 400,000 *dan*, equivalent to 200,000 *dan* of hulled grain? In the years between 1939 and 1942 the land planted to cotton exceeded 90,000 *mu* and the raw cotton produced reached 1.1 million *jin*. Well, then, in the next few years is it possible to increase the land planted to cotton by more than 100,000 *mu*, and the cotton produced by more than 1.6 million *jin*?

We consider that all this is entirely possible.

If the peasants are able to increase the production of hulled grain by 200,000 *dan*, then even if they hand over 200,000 *dan* of grain tax as in 1941, they will still only have to give the government the amount of the increase. They themselves will be able to keep an amount equal to the entire previous harvest. As for cotton, even if in the future we levy some tax, the peasants will still be able to keep the majority of the harvest and the problem of cotton cloth supply for the border region can be solved.

What are the policies that will effectively attain the above targets and not remain just empty words? According to our past experience, the following eight policies must be implemented: (1) a reduction of rent and of interest rates; (2) an increase in the opening up of uncultivated land; (3) an increase in the planting of

cotton; (4) not violating the agricultural seasons; (5) more appropriate use of labor power; (6) an increase in agricultural credit; (7) improvement in technical skills; (8) implementing progressive taxation. In what follows, I shall deal with each of these eight points separately.

Our first agricultural policy is reduction of rent and of interest rates. Approximately one-half of the 1.4 million people of the border region have received a share of land. The remainder have not yet done so, such as those in the Suide-Mizhi special military area, Longdong subregion, Fuxian, and many places in Sanbian subregion. In these regions we should carry out the reduction of rent and interest rates in accordance with government decrees. This is an extremely important policy for increasing the peasants' enthusiasm for production. After rent and interest rates have been reduced, the peasants' burdens from the landlords are smaller, and the amount they can keep themselves is increased. Thus their enthusiasm for production is greatly raised, and they can produce more. The Northwestern Bureau [Xibei ju] has already made concrete arrangements with the Border Region Government about this policy, and I will not speak more of it here.²⁵

Our second agricultural policy is to increase the amount of uncultivated land opened up. Peasants in areas where there is a lot of uncultivated land consider that deep plowing is not as good as opening up new land. We should therefore organize the peasants in the *xian*, districts, and townships where such land exists to develop it as a means of increasing the production of grain. In addition to land freshly cultivated by the original households, we must mainly rely on encouraging immigrants to come and develop unused land. At present, the conditions are right for attracting immigrants. The various *xian* should do a large amount of organizational work. According to the circumstances, they should determine specific tasks for the new and old households separately. Like Yan'an *xian*, they should make specific sowing and planting plans for each household. Such plans should include both the opening up of new land and the planting of cultivated land. For 1943 the planned increase in production of grain for the entire border region has been fixed at 80,000 *dan* of hulled grain. This should be achieved by the people and the troops by opening new lands and improving agricultural methods.

Our third agricultural policy is to increase the planting of cotton. The entire

border region needs 3 million *jin* of cotton. If on average each *mu* of land can yield a net total of 20 *jin* of raw cotton, we only need 150,000 *mu* of land for cotton. If each *mu* can only yield a net total of 15 *jin* or even less, we shall need 200,000 *mu*. We should prepare our cotton land according to the latter estimates. But because households planting cotton for the first time lack experience and faith, even if we expand the area planted to cotton, the harvest will not live up to expectations. Therefore, it is not possible to attain the full target for cotton production in a single year, and we should increase cotton land by 56,000 *mu* in 1943. Together with the previous 94,000 *mu*, the total will be 150,000 *mu*, making it possible to increase production to 2.25 million *jin*. There is no problem over land and seed for planting this area of cotton, but there is a great shortage of cotton-gin equipment. If each gin can [process] 60 *jin* of cotton per day on average, we need 300 machines in order to be able to [process] 3 million *jin* of cotton in half a year. In 1943 there will be 2,250,000 *jin* of cotton to be ginned. For this, we will need more than 200 machines. However, at present there are only a hundred or so broken and old machines, of which only fifty can be used every day. If we attempt to gin 2 million *jin* of cotton on fifty machines, we will need two full years. Therefore, solving the problem of ginning the cotton is a vitally necessary part of the policy of expanding the planting of cotton. A further point is that until now the peasants of the border region have still not learned to press cottonseed oil. From 2 million *jin* of cotton we will also obtain 4 million *jin* of cottonseed. Each 100 *jin* can produce 12 *jin* of cottonseed oil. If we can solve the problem of pressing the oil, then the returns to the peasants growing cotton will increase. Their enthusiasm for growing cotton will also rise. In relation to the above needs, in 1943 the government should do the following work to expand the planting of cotton: (1) Allocate the planting of cotton to peasant households with suitable land so as to make a total of 150,000 *mu*. Help the households planting cotton with seed, manure, and techniques. Those who have difficulties with draft animals and implements should be given credits. (2) Construct cotton gins and spare parts and supply them to the peasants planting cotton. Help them to repair old machines. At the same time, organize them to buy cotton gins from outside areas, helping with credits. In these ways, solve the problem of the ginning of the cotton. (3) Do research into methods of pressing cottonseed oil so that the peasants planting cotton will be able to extract 480,000 *jin* of oil from the 4

million *jin* of seed (each *jin* is worth 15 *yuan*, a total value of 7.2 million *yuan*). (4) Organize joint public and private cotton cooperatives to undertake work such as cotton ginning, making it up into bundles, selling, and pressing oil. (5) Give rewards to peasants good at growing cotton and introduce good methods of planting and ginning cotton so as to increase the enthusiasm of the peasants growing cotton and to raise the amount and quality of the cotton.

Our fourth agricultural policy is not to violate the agricultural seasons. That is, in busy agricultural seasons we should allow the peasants to cease all meetings and mobilization work that are not related to agriculture. Under the present circumstances in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, in busy agricultural seasons we should stop all meetings and mobilization of the peasant masses outside their agricultural work, so as to economize on labor and animal power and to let it all be used for agricultural production. Essential meetings and mobilization should be carried out during gaps in the work. The previous mistake of holding too many meetings and too much mobilization must be corrected.

Our fifth agricultural policy is more appropriate use of labor power. To this end, there are the following methods: incentives to immigrants, mutual-aid labor, mobilization of women, mobilization of loafers, emphasizing support for families with kin serving as soldiers in the War of Resistance, granting leaves of absence to take part in production, obtaining help from the troops, and so forth. All of these assist in adjusting the use of labor power.

As regards incentives to immigrants, we must rely on cooperation between the government and the people. The methods to be employed are as follows. (1) The Party and government of the Suide-Mizhi special military area should be responsible for organizing immigrants with a total of 5,000 labor powers to go to the directly administered *xian* to open up unused land. However, the basic principle must be voluntary participation, and all kinds of propaganda and organizational work should be done. (2) The government should set aside some grain for lending to immigrants who need help. It should also provide credit for agricultural implements and fully carry out preferential treatment by waiving the grain tax for three years. (3) The old households should be encouraged to help the new households by lending grain, giving up some cultivated land, lending out cave dwellings, and so forth. In these loans the peasant doing the lending should be permitted to charge some interest, with the rate freely decided by the two

parties. (4) Peasant households on a firm economic footing should be organized to take on the poorest immigrants as tenants [*huozhong*]. The amount of rent should not be excessively low, so that the old households will be happy to take them on. (5) Immigrants from outside should be encouraged to come by old households that have contact with outside areas. Each *xian* in the border regions should have a designated person responsible for their reception. He should tell them about regions where there is land to be opened up so that they can go there and settle. For example, recently 600 refugees from Henan came to Longdong subregion; they should be welcomed in this way.

Mutual-aid labor means that, within one village or among several villages, the peasant households not only plow and plant their land independently but in busy seasons also carry out mutual aid. For example, on a voluntary basis five, six, seven, or eight households can become one group. Those that have labor power can supply labor power. Those that have animal power can supply animal power. Those that have a lot can supply a lot, and those that have a little can supply a little. In rotation and collectively they can plow, hoe, and harvest for each household in the group, and they can settle accounts in the autumn. Work can be repaid by equal amounts of work. Those who supply more can receive supplementary wages from those who supply less according to the wage rate of the village. This method is called mutual-aid labor. The mutual-aid cooperatives and plowing teams previously set up throughout the Jiangxi soviet were all organized according to this method. In villages with a large population, several small teams can join together into a mutual-aid cooperative. The teams have a team head and a deputy head. Cooperatives have a cooperative head and a deputy cooperative head. Adjustment in the use of labor can also take place between cooperatives. These, then, are the labor cooperatives of the peasant masses. They are extremely effective. Not only do they mean that peasant households that lack labor power can plow, hoe, and harvest at the correct time, but also those households that do not lack labor power can, through collective labor, get even more profit from their plowing, hoeing, and harvesting. This method is entirely beneficial and has no drawbacks. We should promote it widely. The system of exchange-labor teams that some areas in the border region have already implemented is the same method. Each *xian* should strive to organize mutual-aid cooperatives and greatly expand collective labor by the

peasants. Apart from this, there are contract-labor teams. These are also welcomed by the peasants of the border region. The method is not one of mutual aid but a kind of hired-labor organization for the busy agricultural seasons. Several people or even more form a group and collectively work for the people who hire them. When they have finished working for one household, they go to another. It is another method of adjusting the use of labor power. All areas should help those who come from outside to do contract labor by helping them to find work to do and so forth.

As for mobilizing women to take part in production, although many of the women of the border region have bound feet, they still comprise a large labor force, second only to the men. They can take part in various kinds of supplementary agricultural work, such as planting vegetables, sowing seeds, hoeing weeds, feeding livestock, taking food to the fields, drawing water, and gathering the harvest. There are also some who can take part in basic labor. They have generally done these things in the past. In the future, we should spread propaganda and encouragement widely, stimulating their enthusiasm for labor so as to raise agricultural production. Comrades in the leading organs of Party and mass organizations for women have as yet not found an orientation for their work. They believe that there is nothing that they can do. In fact, their first task should be that of looking into and helping the women of the border region play a wider role in productive labor, so that all those women who can take part in labor go to the production front and, together with the men, solve the great problem of how to increase production. There are still a large number of women in the border region who have not untied their bound feet. This is a great hindrance to labor and production. We should use the two methods of propaganda and compulsion so that within a few years we can make them untie their bound feet. Henceforth, no one is permitted to bind the feet of young girls, no matter who they are.

As for mobilizing loafers to take part in productive labor, we have already had some remarkable successes over the past few years. After the various counties did this work, the number of loafers greatly decreased. However, in those regions where they still exist we should use both persuasion and compulsion to mobilize all of them to go to the production front during 1943. The experience of Yan'an *xian* in this work is good, Bolshevik experience. Mobilizing loafers to take part in

production not only increases the labor force but also reduces the number of bad people doing bad things. It is supported by the people and strengthens social peace.

When emphasizing support for families with members working in the War of Resistance, we have in the past put support for families with civilian personnel first and support for families with kin serving as soldiers in the War of Resistance second. This is entirely wrong. Now we should reverse this and put support for families with kin serving as soldiers in the War of Resistance first. First, the system of substitute cultivation [*daigengzhi*] should be applied conscientiously for those family dependents of soldiers in the army resisting Japan who lack labor power (making no distinction between our own army and friendly armies). Second, it should be applied to those dependents of workers in the Party and government who truly lack labor power. In those areas where labor cooperatives [exchange-labor teams] have been successfully organized, the solution to this problem can be entrusted to the cooperative.

Granting leaves of absence to take part in production means that, in the busy agricultural seasons, Party and government officials in the border region whose families have difficulties are permitted to return home each year on two occasions, each time for several days, so that they can take part in family-based agricultural production. The primary and secondary schools of the border region should also stop classes during the busy agricultural seasons, letting the students and local teachers return home to assist in production. This is another method of adjusting the use of labor.

The armed forces assisting in production means that each busy agricultural season the troops of the border region spend several days helping the peasants in the areas around where they are stationed with the plowing, hoeing, and harvesting. Moreover, they do not receive any payment (they eat their own food). On the one hand, this can help adjust the use of labor power, and, on the other hand, it can strengthen the relationship between the army and the people. The political work departments of the army should plan this work.

If all the seven above ways [listed above under our fifth agrarian policy] of adjusting the use of labor power are put into practice well, they will be of great help to agricultural production in the border region. Among them the most important is the mutual-aid cooperative, which should be realized generally

throughout the border region.

Our sixth agricultural policy is to increase agricultural credit. In 1942 the government issued credit for draft animals, cotton planting, water-conservancy work, and so forth. This was greatly appreciated by the peasants and helped some of them to overcome their difficulties. One-third of the peasants of the border region lack draft animals and agricultural implements. This is an extremely important problem. If we want agriculture to develop, helping this huge number of peasant masses to solve their problems is a very important policy. One way of doing this is to increase agricultural credit. In 1942, under the sponsorship of the Border Region Bank, 1.58 million *yuan* of credit for draft animals and agricultural implements was issued to 8,025 peasant households in the seven *xian* of Yan'an, Ganquan, Fuxian, Ansai, Zichang,²⁶ Gulin, and Zhidan. Together with capital of more than 1.03 million *yuan* amassed by the peasants themselves, this bought 2,672 draft animals and 4,980 pieces of agricultural equipment. Over 100,000 *mu* of new land was opened up, and grain production increased by an estimated 26,000-odd *dan*. In addition, the three *xian* of Yanchang, Yanchuan, and Gulin issued 1,530 *yuan* of credit for planting cotton and for cotton seedlings. The area planted to cotton grew by over 51,000 *mu* and could produce an estimated increase of 870,000 *jin* of cotton. In view of the achievements due to agricultural credit in 1942, a further 17 million *yuan* should be lent in 1943, in addition to relending the 3.11 million *yuan*. Of this, 14 million *yuan* should be credit for agricultural implements and draft animals, and 3 million *yuan* should be for planting cotton. Based on the experience in issuing credit in 1942, methods for credit in 1943 should pay attention to the following points.

1. Credit should be given in those regions that have a lot of unused land to new and old immigrants and old households of poor peasants who have labor power but lack implements, draft animals, and grain and to peasant households that have planted a lot of land but have no money with which to hire labor for hoeing.

2. After trials by the Commodities Bureau [Wuzi ju], we should introduce loans in kind, buying draft animals and suitable implements from outside or assisting peasant households themselves to purchase them. Only in this way can we truly increase the number of draft animals and agricultural implements in the border region. Otherwise, the peasants can only buy implements and animals

from the rich peasants and landlords of the border region with their border region currency. This merely has the function of adjusting the ownership of animals and tools within the border region and does not increase the total stock of animals and implements.

3. Agricultural credit for next year has already been increased. We should also alter the policy used this year of concentrating the issuance of credit in the *xian* around Yan'an. We should issue a suitable amount to the Sui-Mi, Longdong, Sanbian, and Guanzhong subregions. But this should not be done on an egalitarian basis. Instead it should be issued in a planned way to those counties, districts, and peasant households where there is a lot of unused land, where the need for funds is greatest, and where there can be profitable production.

4. The organization for issuing credit must be improved. That is, credit must be issued through district and township governments and cooperatives that have the trust of the masses. Therefore, the cadres of the districts and townships must be made to recognize the great significance of agricultural credit in the development of agriculture. They must not look upon it as a disaster-relief system. They may not adopt a policy of egalitarian distribution nor an irresponsible attitude.

5. The formalities for issuing credit must be simple. Use the local methods for giving credit with which the peasants are already familiar. There is no need for formalities such as a "letter of request for credit."

6. Of the total agricultural credit of 20.11 million *yuan*, set aside 3 million *yuan* as credit for cotton and wheat seedlings. The households which borrow this can repay it in kind after the cotton and wheat harvest. Although these funds are specified as funds for cotton and wheat seedlings, the peasants should be able to use them freely. Such credit is of mutual benefit to public and private interests. The government receives repayment in kind, and the peasants can reduce exploitation from paying high interest rates on loans.

7. The issuance of credit should not violate the agricultural seasons. The Finance Department [Caiting] and the Border Region Bank should make rapid plans so as to issue half the total credit before the end of this lunar year, that is, about 10 million *yuan*.

Our seventh agricultural policy is to improve agricultural techniques. Improving techniques means carrying out research into things that are feasible, starting from the existing agricultural techniques and the peasants' production

skills in the border region. The aim is to help the peasants improve the major processes in the production of grain and cotton and to increase production. Some improvements are very possible. We have already had quite a lot of experience. It is wrong to lack faith and enthusiasm on this point. However, there is no basis for boasting of the possibility of great improvement or for considering that we can realize modernized, large-scale agricultural techniques in the border region.

How should we carry out this policy? We consider that the following things should be done.

1. We should build effective water-conservancy projects. Jingbian provides an example. In Yangqiaopan, Changcheng district, Jingbian *xian*, 25,000 *mu* of land can be irrigated. Residents have already irrigated 5,000 *mu*. In 1943 they want to carry out further construction. According to Jingbian comrades, 1 *mu* of dry land only yields 1 *dou* of hulled grain. However, 1 *mu* of irrigated land can be planted three times per year. The first planting is spring wheat, yielding 8 *dou*, equal to 4 *dou* of hulled grain. The second planting is black beans, yielding 4 *dou*, equal to 2 *dou* of hulled grain. The final planting is turnips, yielding 2,000 *jin*. Each *jin* is worth 0.3 *yuan*, and the total value is 600 *yuan*. If each *dou* of hulled grain is worth 150 *yuan*, this is the equivalent of 4 *dou* of hulled grain. These three things yield a total equivalent of 1 *dan* of hulled grain. This is ten times the yield of dry land. Therefore, the peasants of Jingbian often proudly say, "Plant wheat first and then black beans. The black bean forest contains turnips, too." The major problems in constructing irrigated land are those of the distribution of land rights, of mobilizing labor [*minli*], of organizational leadership, and of building ditches and dikes. If one of these four is not right, then nothing can be achieved. In 1942 the comrades of Jingbian led the peasants to construct six dikes in Tuwan, Yangqiaopan, and so forth. After the dikes, they built ditches, channeling in the water to irrigate the land. First, they solved the problem of land rights by dividing the new irrigated land between landlords and peasants at ratios of 70 percent to 30 percent, 60 percent to 40 percent, or half and half. This aroused the enthusiasm of the peasant masses. According to the comrades from Jingbian: "So long as the problem of land rights is solved, it is easy to call on the peasants. For example, we constructed ten irrigated areas. More than 100 new households came, in addition to the existing 200 peasant households, and of these more than 30 came from other districts." They also say: "Government funds are very

important in the construction of irrigated land. However, we must mainly rely on the organization of labor [*minli*] and on unutilized capital. In Jingbian we built 5,000 *mu* of irrigated land in 1942. Altogether we used 28,560 labor days, which is an average of 5.7 per *mu*. The total funds were 858,000 *yuan*. Of this, 210,000 *yuan* came from public funds, and 648,000 *yuan* was absorbed from unutilized capital. Of course, a large proportion of these resources was made up for by the ordinary folk giving their labor instead of cash.”

As regards organization and leadership, Jingbian comrades say: “We adopted the following two methods of leadership when building irrigated land. First, we organized water-conservancy committees of three to five men from good peasants in the locality. These were responsible for balancing equitably the use of labor, tools, and so forth. However, it was often difficult for them to solve problems of property rights and water-use rights, hindering the implementation of water-conservation work. Therefore, it was necessary to have a second method in which the government delegated cadres to assist in leadership and to solve difficult disputes among the masses. Cadres from the Water Conservancy Bureau [Shuili ju] and a further three delegated by the *xian* government took partial control of construction at the ten sites.”

The comrades of Jingbian have also decided that in 1943 they will continue by constructing 4,000 *mu* of irrigated land in Yangqiaopan. However, since there were originally only sixty households there, and in 1942 only about forty new households came, the total of a hundred or so households still leaves a problem of labor power. They have therefore decided to appeal for a hundred households to come in 1943. At present, they have already begun to dig out cave dwellings and to prepare them. “Settling a hundred immigrant households is a heavy task. Since most of them come from Hengshan, and many will be refugees, they will need a lot of credit if we are to succeed. If the immigrants arrive, together with the labor power already in the area, there will be no difficulty in constructing 4,000 *mu* in 1943.” In addition to this, the comrades of Jingbian have also built a kind of water-logged land [*shuimandi*]. Water-logged lands are “large pieces of flat land surrounded on three sides by high mountains and on the fourth side by a deep gully [*tian gou*].” Some are 2,000 to 3,000 *mu* and some are 200 to 300 *mu*. The soil of such land is very good but on top of it is piled sand and gravel which obstructs the seedlings and spoils the quality of the soil. The method of

constructing water-logged land is “to build a solid dike along the side of the gully on top of which sand willows [*shaliu*] and pea trees [*ningtiaozi*] (in winter, this supplies food for the sheep) are planted. This dike prevents the water that runs off the mountains during the course of the year from flowing away through the gully. It all lies on the land. The mud is very thick. It is extremely fertile and has a high water content. It is very good for planting crops. Furthermore, each year the area expands and the mountain gullies become flat land. Thus the productive area is increased.” The yield of this water-logged land is more than double that of dry land. “Five *mu*²⁷ of dry land yields 1 *dan* of grain, but 5 *mu* of water-logged land can yield 2 or 3 *dan*.” The comrades of Jingbian only discovered how to build this water-logged land during the mobilization for the spring plowing in 1942. Therefore, it has as yet only been tried out in two places totaling 1,000 *mu*. They are preparing to construct such land in a good many places in 1943, and the total area will be over 13,000 *mu*. They say, “From 50,000 to 60,000 *mu* of water-logged land can be built throughout the *xian*.” I have given the example of Jingbian in detail to prove that the case for building water-conservancy works is far from hopeless. Conditions for doing so exist in several places. In particular, the conscientious and practical spirit of the comrades of Jingbian provides an effective model for the various counties. Although the water-conservancy conditions in other counties cannot be the same as those in Jingbian, by relying on the leadership of the Party and government and the efforts of the people some water conservancy can be started in those places where conditions are really right. In 1943 the government should set aside 2 million *yuan* in funds for carrying out water-conservancy works in the Yangqiaopan area of Jingbian, the Huluhu area of Fuxian, and so forth.

2. We should popularize the use of superior quality seeds. If we have good seeds, we can get a bigger harvest even without increasing labor and manure. For example, the Guanghua agricultural station has already successfully tried out the “wolf’s tail” seed. It has a high yield, is resistant to insects and birds, and can be planted anywhere. Their sweet potato yield is also higher than average. We should encourage the peasants to plant them. First, each *xian* should select one or two districts and order some peasants to carry out tests. If they find the soil and climate suitable, then such seeds can be popularized so as to increase production.

3. We should encourage the opening up of new land and the turning over of

the earth during the autumn, as this can reduce insect pests and promote the aeration of the soil. It can also conserve the water content and increase the harvest of the following year.

4. After popularizing the organization of mutual-aid cooperatives, we should encourage the peasants to increase the number of times they hoe weeds. The purpose of hoeing weeds is not only to get rid of weeds and to help the seedlings but also to conserve water and resist drought. If we increase the number of times we undertake hoeing, we can increase the amount of the harvest even if we do not use much manure.

5. In the summer and winter of 1943, the five subregions should separately hold exhibitions organized by the Reconstruction Department [Jianting] and five special offices [*zhuanshu*]. In light of the experience of the two previous agricultural exhibitions in the border region, we should improve the layout, introduce and promote the achievements of model peasants, and popularize an agricultural production movement in the labor style and skills of Wu Manyou.²⁸ In 1943 the agricultural exhibitions of the subregions should include the achievements of the troops, the official organizations, and the schools in agricultural production. This will encourage their agricultural production and will also promote unity between the troops and the people.

6. In 1943 *Liberation Daily* and *Border Region Masses Daily* should widely promote the Wu Manyou production movement so that many more Wu Manyous will be created within the five subregions.

7. The primary and secondary schools of the border region should run general agricultural knowledge classes and edit textbooks for winter study containing practical information on border region agriculture with the aim of improving agriculture and increasing production.

8. The Reconstruction Department should call a meeting of experts to get down to research on “willow-root” water, which flows from the hilltops, so as to deal with it in a scientific manner and to prevent people from contracting “limping sickness” after drinking it.²⁹ If this problem can be solved, then much fertile land in the neighborhood of the hills can be put under the plow and become good arable land.

Our eighth agricultural policy is to put into practice progressive agricultural taxation. In the past, agricultural taxation was in the form of a national salvation

grain tax. Although it was levied on progressive principles, the amount levied each year was not standardized. The amount levied per family varied from year to year. In 1941 there were cases of taxes being apportioned out [*tanpai*]. Although an assessment method [*pingyizhi*] was instituted in 1942 as more equitable, there were still inequalities. The most important failing was that the amount of tax was not fixed. This dampened the enthusiasm of the peasants for production. We propose that in 1943 the government should examine and register the land held by the people and thereby construct a simple progressive agricultural tax. The amount of tax should be decided according to the amount of land, its quality, and so forth. In this way, the peasants will be able to calculate the amount of tax themselves according to the amount and quality of the land that they farm. Once the peasants can do this, they can work out the ratio between income and expenditure for the family for the entire year. They can then settle down and produce with greater enthusiasm for production. This will guarantee an increase in the production of grain. Moreover, inequalities will not arise when the government levies the tax. After carrying out the preparatory work in 1943, we can implement progressive taxation in 1944. Counties where preparation is completed early can carry it out on a trial basis in 1943.

Reduction of rent and interest rates, an increase in the opening up of new lands, popularizing the planting of cotton, not violating agricultural seasons, better adjustment in the use of labor power, an increase in agricultural credit, improvements of agricultural techniques, and preparation for implementing a progressive tax—these eight items are the effective agricultural policies which we can and must carry out in 1943. With the exception of the progressive tax, for which we can make preparations and which can be tried out in a few counties, the other seven items should be implemented immediately. Many of them should commence during the winter of 1942. Otherwise time will be lost and they will become empty words.

The above is a summary of our work as regards agriculture in the private sector and our strategy for 1943. What follows is a discussion of closely related agricultural subsidiary undertakings, such as animal husbandry and handicrafts.

III. On the Development of Animal Husbandry

The three major subsidiary undertakings of the peasants of the border region are animal husbandry, salt transport, and textiles. It is well known that the breeding of cows and donkeys plays a decisive role in agriculture and salt transport. The breeding of sheep is closely related to the supply of bedding and clothing. Last year the peasants of the border region harvested more than 1 million *jin* of wool. Including sheep exported, the estimated value was more than 20 million *yuan*, which is proof of the importance of sheep. The greatest enemies of livestock are the many diseases and the lack of fodder. If we do not solve these two problems, there can be no development. First, the destructive power of disease is very great. For example, in the spring of 1941, more than 20,000 sheep died in an epidemic in Jingbian. In 1942, more than 16,000 died of the same cause in Dingbian. In the summer of 1941, more than 500 cows died of cattle plague in Yan'an. In the summer and autumn of 1942, 574 cows died in Zhidan. This shows how disease is the great enemy of the livestock of the border region. Second, the lack of fodder also greatly hinders the raising of livestock. In the spring of 1941, when 20,000 sheep died in Jingbian, most of the 30,000 lambs also died. In addition to the epidemic, an important factor was the lack of fodder. At the same time, more than 2,000 cows and horses died of hunger there. Another keenly felt difficulty in recent years is the lack of fodder supplies on salt-transport routes, which greatly hinders the transport of salt.

Our task is to protect livestock and increase breeding. In order to attain these goals we should implement the following policies.

Prevention of disease. The important thing here is for the *xian* and district governments to call meetings of local veterinarians and old experienced peasants to do research into simple methods of preventing and curing animal diseases and to encourage the use of these methods among peasant families with livestock. This is a very simple thing to effect. Second, the Reconstruction Department should order its agricultural station to increase veterinary equipment, to do research into animal diseases in the border region, to produce large amounts of serum and vaccine, and to propagate and carry out effective methods of prevention and cure.

Popularize the planting of grass for animal pasture. Most of the animals of the border region are put out to pasture. Where the pasture is not good, disease easily arises. Therefore, we should widely promote the planting of alfalfa [*musu*],

particularly on and near the salt-transport routes. This will benefit both the transport of salt and the development of animal husbandry. In 1942 the government originally planned to plant 30,000 *mu* of alfalfa, but ultimately only 23,000 *mu* was planted because there were not enough seeds. In 1943 the *xian* governments should transport more seeds from Guanzhong and issue them to the peasants in areas where planting is planned. They should also encourage the peasants to buy some themselves. In addition, they should mobilize the peasants to cut large quantities of grass in the autumn and to store it up for winter use. This will not only avoid illness induced by having animals eat cold grass [*sic*] but also stop the peasants from selling animals because of lack of winter fodder. We should look to the experience of Jingbian in this respect. On their guard because of the great loss of livestock in the spring of 1941, the comrades in Jingbian have done much work in the past two years. They have appealed to the peasants to plant alfalfa, create fields for pasture, cut autumn grass, plant willow trees, and dig up grass roots as means of providing fodder. First, they called upon the peasants to plant over 2,000 *mu* of alfalfa in 1942. Most of the seed was issued by the government, and the peasants were very enthusiastic. They are once again preparing to issue some credit for seeds to the peasants in 1943, and they are especially calling upon the peasants themselves to prepare seeds. As a way of encouraging them to plant large amounts of alfalfa, they are giving rewards to those who do this very well.

Second, they prepared more than 4,000 *mu* of pasture fields in 1942. The grass on this pasture land is mainly reed grass [*luwei*]. This flourishes in the ponds and large marshes in the desert land bordering on Mongolia. Each *mu* yields more than 500 *jin*. The pasture fields that existed before the revolution were later destroyed, and the cows and sheep wandered around at will. Now they are mobilizing the masses to restore them. It does not take a lot of labor, and cutting the grasses after the autumn prepares for winter use. Third, in the mountainous areas of Jingbian there is a lot of reed grass, white grass [*baicao*], bing grass [*bingcao*], desert rushes, and so forth. These are of great help for the livestock, if they are harvested in the autumn. In 1941 the masses were organized to gather 5 million *jin*. In 1942 they again mobilized each man to cut 100 *jin*. As yet, they have not worked out the latter total. Fourth, they encouraged the masses to plant willow trees, sand willows, and pea trees. The leaves and twigs can be fed to

camels and sheep, in another way of providing fodder. At the same time, this supplies fuel, which pleases the masses. The duty of the government is to supply seeds and encourage planting. Fifth, in Jingbian the animals eat both the leaves and the roots of the white grass and bing grass. During spring plowing, the strongest men in Jingbian plow the land in the morning, dig up the roots in the afternoon, and feed the livestock in the evening. The women and children spend the whole day digging up the roots. Each person can dig up more than 100 *jin*, and this plays an important part in the supply of fodder. However, the government must make good arrangements since, as there are many people digging, there are arguments over land rights. The landless refugees make it even more difficult. According to the Jingbian comrades: "With these methods, we solved many problems for the people. Of course, the grass grew well in 1942 because there was good rainfall. However, animal husbandry also developed because of the above five methods for providing fodder. In 1942 more than 60,000 lambs survived throughout the *xian*, and there were very few deaths. With the exception of a few areas, there was a great reduction in the loss through disease of fully grown sheep and cows, donkeys, horses, and so forth. Excluding sheep, the livestock of Jingbian requires 30 million *jin* of fodder per year. We can get at least 10 million *jin* with the above five methods."

Fodder is a life-or-death question for livestock. We hope that the comrades in the various *xian* will make a plan for fodder in 1943.

Ban the slaughter and export of female animals. The slaughter of all cattle is forbidden, and old cattle can be killed only after inspection.

Improve animal breeds. We should investigate experience in cross-breeding, select good breeds of donkeys and sheep, and popularize them among the people. This should be done first in Ganquan and Yan'an and then spread to other *xian*. Moreover, the government should purchase *tanyang* sheep³⁰ from Yanchi. These should be issued for breeding to peasant families with many sheep. Each *tanyang* ram can be mated with twenty ewes. The wool of this sheep is extremely fine and soft, and each sheep yields 2 *jin* per year.

If we can conscientiously put into practice the above methods, there can be even greater expansion of livestock in the border region. I hope the Reconstruction Department and the comrades in the various *xian* will pay attention to this.

IV. On the Development of Handicrafts

Handicrafts in the border region exist in two forms. The majority are subsidiary family undertakings, and a portion are independent handicrafts. The largest is the spinning and weaving undertaken by women. However, for many years a large proportion of local yarn and local cloth has been displaced by foreign yarn and foreign cloth. Only recently, because of our encouragement, has there been some resurgence. Even so, the peasants of the border region still want to take their surplus products, skins, and salt-transport trade to outside regions in exchange for large amounts of foreign yarn and foreign cloth. Their own spinning and weaving industry is still far from sufficient to supply their own needs. I shall therefore take textiles as the key popular handicraft for discussion here. In addition, I shall deal with silk and oil pressing, ignoring the others for the moment.

Spinning and Weaving

The people, the troops, and the official personnel need 250,000 bolts of coarse cloth per year (each bolt is 2 feet, 4 inches, wide and 100 feet long [Chinese measurements]).³¹ Of this, the amount required by the troops and official personnel is roughly 50,000 bolts, and that required by the people is 200,000 bolts. What is the present supply? The seven publicly run textile mills produce approximately 11,000 bolts per year. The seven large and small textile cooperatives run by the people produce roughly 18,000 bolts per year. There are no statistics for the amount of local cloth produced by women at home, but it is estimated to be around 30,000 bolts per year. Public and private annual production totals 100,000 bolts,³² 150,000 bolts less than the amount needed. It is easy to say that we can already supply 40 percent of our needs, which is a great achievement. But we are still 60 percent short, and meeting this is our future task. This task is very great, and we shall need several years to complete it. But it can be done if we rely on, improve, and expand the existing textile enterprises run by the government and by the people. If we have the raw cotton, we can in a planned way encourage the women to spin yarn and to weave cloth made half of

local yarn and half of foreign yarn. Gradually, we can reduce the importation of foreign yarn until eventually we reach the point where we use only our own yarn to weave cloth. In this way, we can solve the problem.

As regards weaving, the responsibility rests first with the publicly run mills. In 1942 publicly run textile mills were capable of producing 11,000 bolts of cloth. This could supply almost half [*sic*] the needs of the troops and official personnel. In a few more years, we can be completely self-sufficient. Second, we must encourage women to weave cloth as a popular industry. In the Suide subregion the women can already produce more than 30,000 bolts per year. However, the widths and lengths are not uniform. The people do not like to buy it. They still prefer imported cloth. If improvements can be made, there are good prospects for increasing the production of cloth. Third, the people's cooperatives can already produce 18,000 bolts per year. This can be further developed. We must rely on the combination of these three forms to provide the cloth required by the border region. However, first, the greatest problem is the supply of yarn. At 12 *jin* of yarn per bolt, we need 3 million *jin* to weave 250,000 bolts of coarse cloth entirely from local yarn. If we use a mixture of half local yarn and half foreign yarn, we will need 1.5 million *jin* of local yarn and 150,000 bundles of foreign yarn. At present, the cloth woven by publicly run mills and the people's cooperatives is made from this mixture of half local and half foreign yarn. However, there is still not enough local yarn. We must greatly expand the amount of spinning done by the people and improve the quality of the yarn. Therefore, it is extremely important for the border region to gradually expand handicraft spinning and weaving among the people, to increase the quantity, and to improve the quality.

How should we gradually solve these problems? In light of past experience, we propose the following methods.

1. First, we should reorganize and expand spinning and weaving among the people in the *xian* of the Suide-Mizhi special military area. The way to do this is, under the direction of the special office of the military area, to unite the efforts of the Commodities Bureau and the Daguang Yarn Factory of the 359th Brigade, issuing raw cotton to women and ordering them to produce more local yarn to supply the yarn needs of the publicly run cloth factories. This method was effectively implemented in 1942. It should be continued and expanded in 1943. Apart from supplying yarn to the publicly run cloth factories, the people of the

special military area may weave cloth themselves. The Commodities Bureau can determine measurements and quality and guarantee a market. That is, the cloth can be purchased by the Commodities Bureau either for its own use or for selling among the people. Next, the government should invest 1 million *yuan* in order to increase the quantity of local yarn. Based on the experience of the Southern District Cooperative of Yan'an *xian*, which organized spinning by women in 800 households, lending funds to 3,000 households in Yan'an and Ansai will increase the number of spinning machines in the two *xian* by 3,000 in 1943. Organizing spinning by women in 1,000 households in Qingyang and Quzi *xian* will increase the number of spinning machines by 1,000. These credit funds can be handled by the Commodities Bureau, which can issue raw cotton and spinning machines. It can purchase the local yarn produced to supply the needs of the publicly run factories. Next, in order to increase cloth production, the government should invest a further 1 million *yuan* either as loans or as share capital in the existing cloth-weaving cooperatives run by the people as a means of expanding their undertakings.

Here we should consider the plan for Yan'an *xian*. In their *Plan for Production and Construction* in 1943, the comrades in Yan'an say:

In 1943 we shall increase the number of women able to spin and weave by 4,000. Estimating that they will be able to spin 18 *jin* of yarn each in a year (1.5 *jin* per month), this yields a total of 72,000 *jin*. In addition, there were already 1,000 women able to spin in 1942. Each year one of these can spin 20 *jin*, for a total of 20,000 *jin*. The two groups can together spin 92,000 *jin*, which can be woven into 8,363.6 bolts of cloth. However, this is still 4,886.4 bolts short of our needs. We plan to solve this problem within two or three years and to achieve complete self-sufficiency. The population of this *xian* is 64,000 (excluding the city of Yan'an). Of these, 42,000 are adults. Each adult needs one-quarter of a bolt of coarse cloth per year (a suit of plain clothes requires 11 feet of cloth and half a suit of padded clothes requires 14 feet of cloth, a total of 25 feet: each bolt of coarse cloth is 100 feet long). Their total requirement is therefore 10,500 bolts. The 22,000 young people each need half the quantity of cloth required by an adult. A bolt of cloth is enough for eight and their total requirement is 2,750 bolts. The annual requirement for the whole *xian* is thus 13,250 bolts.

The 92,000 *jin* of yarn spun in 1943 will be woven into 8,363.6 bolts of coarse cloth. This requires 56 looms (each loom can weave 150 bolts of coarse cloth per year). In 1942 there were twelve looms in the villages and factories of this *xian*. Thus we must expand the number in the village by forty-four during 1943 using the cooperative structure. There are three methods for doing this. The first is investment (i) in incentive awards to encourage women to spin, 50,000 *yuan*; (ii) in producing 5,000 *jin* of raw cotton at 100 *yuan* per *jin*, 500,000 *yuan*; and (iii) in expenses for spinning and weaving equipment, 1,000 spinning wheels at 100 *yuan* each, 100,000 *yuan*, and 44 looms at 1,000 *yuan* each, 44,000 *yuan*. The total required for the above items is 694,000 *yuan*. Second, looms in the villages should be set up by the peasants organizing themselves into partnerships. The government can help them overcome their difficulties by

training skilled workers or by investing capital for looms and so forth. Third, for every 2 *jin* of raw cotton issued, 1 *jin* of yarn should be collected. The cotton cloth woven in the villages may be used by the peasants themselves. The Gaodan Yarn Spinning Factory should play the leading role in encouraging women to spin and in training workers.

This plan by the comrades in Yan'an is really worth looking at. If the people of Yan'an, who lack experience in spinning and weaving, are able, with the encouragement of the Party and the government, to become fully self-sufficient in yarn and cloth within two or three years, other *xian* without experience should also be able to solve the problem within a similar or slightly longer period. We hope that the comrades in the various *xian* will all make such a plan. As for the various *xian* where the peasants have experience, such as the special military area, the problem should be solved even more easily. According to the calculations of the comrades in Yan'an, adults make up two-thirds of the population and children one-third. One bolt of cloth is enough for four adults or eight children. Therefore, the yearly cloth requirement for the 1.4 million population of the border region is not 200,000 bolts but 337,500. According to the opinions of the comrades in Yan'an, a large quantity like this can be provided within two or three years. In sum, by relying on the masses settling in and on the leadership of the Party and the government any difficulty can be overcome.

2. The Reconstruction Department should do research into the people's experiences in spinning in order to improve the quality of local yarn so as to prepare to produce border region cloth entirely from local yarn, gradually reducing and ultimately stopping the importation of foreign yarn. If the quality of yarn cannot be improved, then we cannot suspend dealings in foreign yarn.

3. Improve the woolen goods made by the publicly run factories. Using woolen goods in place of some of the cotton clothing and bedding used by the army is a way of reducing the consumption of cotton cloth.

4. In 1943 official personnel should set a personal example and wear local cloth without exception. At the same time, they should encourage the people to use more local cloth and less foreign cloth. According to the situation in the development of local cloth, the Commodities Bureau can gradually limit the import of foreign cloth.

The above methods will help us gradually to solve the great problem of self-sufficiency in cotton cloth. Although it can only be done gradually, it is

nevertheless entirely possible. We must resolutely implement all methods for doing so.

Cottonseed Oil

In 1942 the peasants of the *xian* planting cotton harvested around 3 million *jin* of cotton seeds capable of giving 360,000 *jin* of oil, and, with the expansion in cotton planting, from the 5 to 6 million *jin* of seed that can be obtained next year we can further increase the quantity of oil. We should prevent all this from being wasted. Cottonseed oil is edible, but the peasants of the border region are still not accustomed to it. If the government does not promote it, they will not extract the oil. Therefore the Border Region Government should invest 300,000 *yuan* and, through the governments of the *xian* where cotton is planted, encourage the peasants to experiment with pressing cottonseed oil. After the experiments succeed, this can be widely promoted. The oil can be bought by the government. This will not only provide edible oil but also at present oil prices of 30 *yuan* per *jin* give the peasants an income of 10.8 million *yuan* from 360,000 *jin* of oil.

Silk

In the *xian* of Suide, Qingjian, Anding, Yanchuan, Gulin, and so forth many peasants raise silkworms. It is a relatively large subsidiary undertaking. For example, in Anding alone there were 3,585 peasant households raising silkworms during 1942. They harvested 23,662 *jin* of silkworm cocoons, at a value of 600,000 *yuan*.

Our sewing and repair industry needs silk thread and our woolen-blanket industry needs silk edging. We can also use silk thread for the woof when weaving cotton cloth as a way to reduce the importation of foreign yarn. Therefore, we should develop the silk production of the border region. The way to do this is for the government to issue 300,000 *yuan* in credit to peasant families to expand the raising of silkworms. Credit should be given especially to those peasant households that have a good record in raising silkworms. Moreover, the Commodities Bureau should buy the peasants' silk through the local cooperatives

and order woven silk articles from the peasants in order to promote the expansion of the silk industry.

The total investment in the above three undertakings, spinning and weaving, oil pressing, and silk, is 2.6 million *yuan* (yarn spinning 1 million, cloth weaving 1 million, oil pressing 300,000, and silk 300,000). Although these funds are not great, they can stimulate the people to progress a little in solving the urgent needs of the moment. In 1943 when we have even more experience, we should consider increasing the amount of capital. Spinning and weaving are particularly important. Unless the people get to work and the public sector helps, the problem as a whole cannot be solved.

Here I have only taken up spinning and weaving, oil pressing, and silk. Other items have not been mentioned. The *xian* can, according to actual circumstances, do research into handicrafts which are related to the people's economy and which need stimulus from the Party and the government, and they can make their own plans.

V. On the Development of Cooperatives

There were already cooperatives in the border region during the Civil War period. Since the War of Resistance began, the Border Region Government has continued to promote them, and after five and a half years of hard effort they have gradually expanded.

In the four years from 1937 to 1941, the number of consumer cooperatives increased from 130 to 155 and the number of cooperative members from 57,847 to 140,218. The share capital grew from 55,525 *yuan* to 693,071 *yuan*. The value of sales increased from 261,189 *yuan* to more than 6.008 million *yuan*. Profits rose from 4,800 *yuan* to over 1.020 million *yuan*, and the public accumulation fund [*gong jijin*] increased from 3,500 *yuan* to over 173,000 *yuan*.

If we compare the October 1942 statistics for the nineteen *xian* capitals with those of 1941, the number of cooperative members has increased from 97,297 to 115,899. The share capital has risen abruptly from over 712,900 *yuan* to more than 6 million *yuan*, and the profit has also grown, from 858,000 *yuan* to more than

3,398,000 *yuan*.

The largest amount of share capital owned by individual members of consumer cooperatives is around 10,000 *yuan*, and the lowest is around 4 or 5 *yuan*.

The distribution of consumer cooperatives at the end of 1941 was as follows: Yan'an, twenty-eight; Ansai, twelve; Yanchang, eight; Gulin, eight; Dingbian, eight; Qingyang, Huachi, Quzi, and Yanchuan, seven each; Anding, Fuxian, and Wuqi, six each; Ganquan, Jingbian, and Heshui, five each; Yan'an city and Mizhi, four each; and Suide, two. There are still no statistics for the other *xian*.

Turning to producer cooperatives, ten were established in 1939 with the support of the government and the assistance of the Northwest Office of the Chinese Industrial Cooperative [Gonghe].³³ Thereafter some consumer cooperatives with large amounts of capital also ran producer cooperatives. By October 1942 the number of producer cooperatives had increased from ten to fifty. The number of employees engaged in production had increased from 199 to 563. Share capital had grown from 11,130 *yuan* to 2.492 million *yuan*, and the total value of monthly production from 60,000 *yuan* to over 2.3 million *yuan*.

According to this year's statistics, the distribution of producer cooperatives is as follows: Suide, sixteen; Yan'an, seven; Gulin, five; Yanchang, five; Yanchuan, five; Ganquan, three; Ansai, three; Jingbian, two; Qingyang, one; Jiaxian, one; Mizhi, one; Anding, one.

Among the fifty producer cooperatives, there are twenty-seven large and small textile cooperatives, thirteen in Suide, four in Yan'an, two in Gulin, and one each in Ganquan, Fuxian, Yanchang, Yanchuan, Ansai, Anding, Jiaxian, and Mizhi. Altogether they employ 497 people, and their share capital is 1.7 million *yuan*. Six have twenty-five or more employees, the rest range from three to over ten. If these twenty-seven cooperatives were working at full capacity, they could produce 30,000 bolts of cloth annually (each bolt 100 feet) [Chinese measurements]. At the moment, they are only producing around 22,000 bolts, 6,000 woven blankets, 4,152 dozen woolen towels, and 8,400 dozen pairs of woven socks.

There are five dyeing cooperatives, two in Yanchuan, two in Suide, and one in Yanchang. They employ a total of thirteen people, their share capital is 128,000 *yuan*, and each year they can dye more than 7,000 bolts of cloth. There are five producer cooperatives pressing cottonseed oil. Of these, two are in Gulin, two in

Jingbian, and one in Yanchang. They employ a total of nineteen people, their share capital is 245,000 *yuan*, and each year they can press 10,000 *jin* of cottonseed oil. There are nine flour mills, two each in Ansai, Ganquan, Yanchang, Yanchuan, and one in Gulin. They employ a total of twenty-four people, and their share capital is 262,000 *yuan*. There are four blanket-making cooperatives, two in Yan'an, one in Qingyang, and one in Suide. They employ a total of forty-two people, and their share capital is 152,000 *yuan*. Each year they can produce 7,600 blankets. There is one pottery cooperative in Yan'an *xian*. It employs seven men, its share capital is 3,000 *yuan*, and each year it produces six kiln-loads of pottery.

The above statistics show us that both consumer and producer cooperatives have expanded greatly in terms of membership, share capital, profit, and undertakings. However, this development has been uneven. In the past five years, it has gone through three stages. Moreover, qualitative development only began to advance rapidly during 1942. Before 1939, cooperatives everywhere were based upon share capital from the government, with the addition of some share capital assessed from the masses. At this time, their nature was basically that of publicly run enterprises, and for the most part they became shops publicly run by the *xian* and district governments. Cooperative enterprise was not facing the masses but chiefly facing the government. It was providing funds for the government and all decisions were taken by the government. This was the first stage. After 1939, the slogan "Popularize the Cooperatives" was advanced. However, most places still used the old method of assessing share capital from the masses to carry out this "popularization" [*qunzhonghua*].³⁴ Thus the masses still regarded the cooperatives as a burden assessed upon them and not as something of their own. Cooperative personnel were still the same official personnel. They ordered the masses to do substitute farm work on their land on their behalf. The masses could not see the great benefits of the cooperatives for themselves and, on the contrary, considered that the cooperatives increased the labor burden they had to bear. After 1940, the duty of all the local governments to achieve self-sufficiency in production was increased. Thereafter, the large shareholders in many cooperatives were not the people but government organs. It was thus even more difficult for the cooperatives to give due consideration to the interests of the masses. This was the second stage. It was only in January 1942 that the

Reconstruction Department advanced the strategy of “overcome the desire to monopolize everything, follow the policy of the people in control and officials as helpers,” based on the experience of the Southern District Cooperative of Yan’an *xian*. It was only by carrying out this strategy that cooperatives everywhere did away with the method of levying shares by assessment and gradually built up close relations with the masses and experience in concerning themselves with the interests of the masses. Thus, in only ten months the share capital has risen sharply by more than 5 million *yuan*, and projects have also expanded. This has played a great role in organizing the economic strength of the people, reducing middleman exploitation, and developing the people’s economy. This is the third stage. It is only in this stage that the cooperatives of the border region have in general begun to follow the right path.

The above outlines the path of development of most cooperatives. However, there have been exceptions. For example, the Southern District Cooperative of Yan’an *xian* got on to the right path somewhat earlier. Through several years of hard experience, this cooperative has become a model cooperative truly supported by the people. During 1942 cooperatives from the *xian* of Suide, Anding, Ansai, Ganquan, Yanchang, Wuqi, and so forth, have advanced by studying this model cooperative.

What, then, are the special features of the Southern District Cooperative? It has the following good points.

1. It has smashed dogmatism and formalism in cooperatives, and it does not cling to old ways and regulations. The Southern District Cooperative began as a consumer cooperative. However, its undertakings have extended into every aspect of the economic life of all the people of the Southern District. It does not just manage consumer activities but handles supply and distribution, transport, production, and credit. It has organized six producer-cooperatives for textiles, oil pressing, blanket manufacture, and so forth, and one transport team with more than a hundred animals. It has become a comprehensive cooperative. It does not concentrate on the percentage of income that should be devoted to the cooperative’s own public accumulation fund and public welfare fund [*gong yijin*], but strives to share out its profits to the members. It does not place a limit on the share dividend, and each member receives a return on his shares regardless of the number held. It does not limit the right of members to dispose of

their shares, and each member has the freedom to withdraw his shareholding at any time. Nor does it limit the nature of the membership. People from all social strata can join. (Since Yan'an is an area that has gone through land revolution, allowing people from all classes to join is no hindrance to the leadership of the cooperative by the Communist Party.) They can also belong to the organs of the cooperative. Moreover, it is not necessary to have ready cash to become a shareholder. Before the cooperative won complete confidence among the masses, it permitted them to become shareholders, using government bonds [*gongzhaiquan*] and savings bonds [*chuxupiao*]. In this way the share capital was increased. When the cooperative came to have the confidence of the masses and the masses wanted to take out shares but had no money, it allowed them to use any articles of value such as grain, livestock, eggs, and firewood to buy shares. Therefore, all the people praise it.

2. It has smashed formalism in cooperatives and conscientiously carried out the policy of facing the masses and working for the benefit of the people. It has therefore gradually come to be loved and respected by the masses. For example, every year during spring plowing, it makes early arrangements to transport shovels from Hancheng and elsewhere, selling them to the peasants for less than the market price. It organizes various productive enterprises, which not only absorb unemployed workers, take on apprentices, and employ the family dependents of working personnel but also expand profits, guarantee the supply of daily necessities to the people of the area, and increase the income of the people. The Southern District Cooperative has organized more than 800 women to spin yarn. Each month they can spin 1,400 *jin*. This has increased the monthly income by 70,000 *yuan*. The managerial policy of the consumer cooperative is to fully ensure the supply of necessary commodities for the people, not only letting them make fewer trips for their purchases but also charging prices cheaper than those found in shops of large towns.

3. It uses the policy of benefiting both the public and the private sectors as the bridge between the economic activity of the government and the economic activity of the people. On the one hand, it carries out the financial and economic policies of the government, and, on the other, it adjusts the burdens of the people so as to make those burdens more acceptable, raises their income, and increases their enthusiasm. For example, in 1941 when the government was mobilizing for

the salt-transport levy, the Southern District Cooperative persuaded the people of the district to hand over a money substitute, and its transport team transported the salt for the government on behalf of the people. Before the government collects the grain tax, the cooperative mobilizes the people to pay it to the cooperative itself in accordance with the amount of tax collected in the previous year. The cooperative guarantees to pay the grain tax for the current year on behalf of the cooperative members and also accepts the tax grain handed over as share capital paid in by people to join the cooperative. Thus, on the one hand, the cooperative acts on behalf of the government, ensuring the payment of grain tax but using it to make a profit before it is finally paid over. On the other hand, the people not only pay their grain tax but also get some share capital. As a result, some households with surplus grain have even wished to pay two years' worth of grain tax to the cooperative. No matter what the increase in grain tax the following year, the cooperative undertakes to pay the difference. More than forty households in the district have done this. In this way, the burdens of the peasants have been removed, their income has increased, and their enthusiasm for production has also been raised. Another example was when the government of the *xian* and the district wanted the people to pay educational expenses and expenses for the guard posts of the self-defense army. The cooperative again paid these for the people from its profits. In this way the government was saved the trouble of collecting the expenses and the people were not burdened with the payment. The government policies of encouraging immigration and assisting refugees can also be carried out by the cooperative (it can give credit to the refugees and immigrants and so forth). In all these ways the interests of the government, the cooperatives, and the people and the interests of the individual and the collective are closely united.

4. It changes the organizational structure of the cooperative according to the wishes of the people. It does not hold congresses of all the cooperative members but allows the members to elect delegates from each village. It does not use the method of assessment for raising share capital but rallies groups of activist cooperative members to encourage the people to take out shares. It does not limit the share capital of the cooperative members, and it divides the profit according to shares held. However, in solving the cooperative's problems it does not consider the number of shares owned. Each shareholder has equal rights.

The above are the features of the Southern District Cooperative. As a consumer cooperative, its characteristics conform to the basic spirit of consumer cooperatives and grow from the life, culture, economy, and politics of the people of the border region. As a producer cooperative, while not a cooperative of the producers themselves but an enterprise in which shareholders hire labor, its present structure is a means of absorbing unused rural capital to develop handicrafts and corresponds to existing conditions in the border region where handicrafts are not developed and handicraft workers are few.

Since 1936 the Southern District Cooperative has gone through six to seven years of trial and hard struggle. Now it has grown from 160 members to include more than 90 percent of the households of the Southern District. The number of voluntary members is 1,112. The amount of share capital has risen from 159 *yuan* to 2 million *yuan*. It has grown from one cooperative to sixteen cooperatives. The net profit has risen from several dozen *yuan* to 1.62 million *yuan* for the first ten months of 1942. It has developed the agricultural, industrial, and commercial enterprises of the people of the district and looked after their economic welfare, becoming the economic heart of the people of Southern District.

In the large but underpopulated border region, where the economy is almost entirely a small-scale peasant economy, it is necessary to rely upon truly popularized cooperatives to play a pivotal role in implementing the economic policies of the government and in organizing and encouraging the people to develop the economy. Thus the road of the Southern District Cooperative is the road for all the cooperatives of the border region. A movement to develop cooperatives in the style of the Southern District Cooperative is a major item of work for expanding the economy of the people of the border region.

For this reason, the Party and government should carry out the following work in cooperatives throughout the border region in 1943.

1. The Reconstruction Department should be responsible for studying the experience of the Southern District Cooperative and for compiling a small handbook as educational material for the fourth section [*ke*] of all *xian* governments and for the personnel of all cooperatives. Furthermore, we should use the opportunity presented by holding meetings in Yan'an to take working cadres from all parts of the border region on a tour of the Southern District Cooperative.

2. All the enterprises run by the Commodities Bureau should help successful consumer and producer cooperatives with supplies and distribution. They should sell commodities to the consumer cooperatives, and supply raw material to, and guarantee the purchase of products from, the producer cooperatives. The government should issue 3 million *yuan* to the Commodities Bureau in 1943 to help in adjusting the cooperatives' supplies and distribution.

3. In order to stimulate cooperatives, the government must clearly stipulate and conscientiously carry out a reduction in the cooperatives' tax burden.

4. The Border Region Government and the governments of all the *xian* should seek out students educated to the upper primary school or higher levels for training as accountants or managers in order to help solve the accounting and management problems of cooperatives in each area.

5. The personnel of the cooperatives must carry out the policy of "popularization" and adopt the wage system, doing away with the system of substitute cultivation for cooperative personnel. They must improve cooperative organization and simplify administration. They must make them into proper enterprises and not official organs. They must reduce the working personnel and reduce expenditures.

In order to ensure that everyone fully understands the history of the development of the Southern District Cooperative, we have specially invited its director, Comrade Liu Jianzhang, to write a report, which now follows.

The History of the Yan'an Southern District Cooperative

First Period

On December 2, 1936, we began to propagandize the people to buy shares. At that time, each share was worth 0.30 *yuan* in soviet currency. After twenty days there were 160 members with 533 shares, for a total value of 159.90 *yuan*.

Wang Tianjin was elected director, Liu Jianzhang accountant, and Li Shengzhang buyer. Dividends were paid quarterly, and the gross profit for the first quarter was 199.44 *yuan*.

Expenditures were made up of payments to the three staff members 9 *yuan*, food 45 *yuan*, stationery 3.50 *yuan*, woolen socks and gloves to support the front 13 *yuan*, help for the dependents of troops in the War of Resistance 15 *yuan*, support for the primary school 8 *yuan*, and the public welfare fund 10 *yuan*. After expenses, the dividend per share was 0.18 *yuan*, and the total dividend 95.94 *yuan*.

On the occasion of this dividend, we held a cooperative members congress attended by all. At this meeting we reported on the work done by the cooperative, shared the dividend, and gave the members dinner. The meeting produced great results. The members themselves proposed that since the cooperative was helping the dependents of soldiers in the War of Resistance, assisting the primary school, supporting the front with woolen socks and gloves, and so forth all on their behalf, everyone should buy more shares. This was the first period.

Second Period

Wang Shengming became treasurer. I planned a large increase in the share capital. Director Wang was not satisfied. He argued that an increase in share capital should be carried out when the situation demanded it. I wanted to take the matter to the *xian* government for discussion, and later we went to see Liu Shichang, head of the National Economy Department [Guomin jingjibu] of the *xian* government. Department head Liu permitted an increase in share capital. Since Wang Tianjin disagreed with everyone, the *xian* government moved him to another post.

In March 1937, Liu Jianzhang was elected director, Wang Shengming accountant, and Li Shengzhang remained as buyer. Once again, there were three people. On the one hand, we managed the business, and, on the other, we increased the share capital. The date for the second payment of dividends was June 2, 1937. The total of new shares issued was 2,697, which, together with the previous issue, made a total of 3,230 with a value of 969 *yuan* at the maintained rate of 0.30 *yuan* per share. The sum of 3,657 *yuan* was turned over [*guoliushui*] during the three months, and the gross profit was 276 *yuan*. Expenditures included support for the primary school 6 *yuan*, support for the dependents of soldiers in the War of Resistance 12 *yuan*, donation to the appeal for support for the front 20 *yuan*, public welfare fund 10 *yuan*, three months' food 53 *yuan*, staff payments 13.50 *yuan*, and office expenses 3.50 *yuan*. After expenses, the dividend per share was 0.05 *yuan*, a combined total of 161.50 *yuan*. As before, a congress of cooperative members was held when the dividend was paid. Two-thirds of the members attended. We reported on the activities of the cooperative. At that time, we had bought 30 *dan* of grain on behalf of the troops and had also acted as an agent for the purchase of all the charcoal and firewood used by the reception center of the Northwest Military Committee [Xibei junwei]. All income from this business was in soviet notes, but the ordinary people did not like this. They wanted the cooperative to require goods as a pledge when acting as a purchasing agent. On the one hand, the purchasers would give some goods, and, on the other, the people would accept some soviet notes. At this time, the cadres of the cooperative worked hard and patiently to bring about agreement between the people and the troops. After this, we built relations between the army and the people. If the soviet notes held by the people could not be used to buy things in other places, the cooperative could buy them. When this was announced, the members gained a greater understanding of the cooperative and stated that "the cooperative was able to act on their behalf."

Third Period

Beginning in June 1937 we again planned to increase the number of cadres. Sun Shenghua was promoted to be buyer. He worked for one month, acting every day as buying agent for the troops, a task he found very troublesome. He said he wanted to stop working. Despite repeated attempts at

persuasion and education, he was determined not to work for the cooperative and so he left. Li Shengcai became buyer. We planned to open a firewood shop at Goumenshang. The cooperative put up 200 *yuan* in capital, and it became an independent unit. Li Shengzhang was director of the shop, with his wife as cook and Li Shengcai as assistant. After three months, the gross profit was 400 *yuan*.

The current account for the running of the cooperative and the shop was 7,175.60 *yuan*, and the gross profit 538.70 *yuan*. Three *yuan* in soviet currency was equivalent to 1 *yuan* in national currency [*baipiao*], giving a converted value of 175 *yuan* [*yang yuan*]. When cooperative members took out shares, 1 *yuan* in soviet currency was considered equivalent to 1 *yuan* in national currency. We donated 25 *yuan* for the front and 10 *yuan* to help the primary school. The director for women's affairs of the district was robbed by local bandits, and new bedding for her cost 4.50 *yuan*. The public welfare fund was 12 *yuan*. Losses on forged notes came to 8.50 *yuan*, payments to staff 45 *yuan*, food 90 *yuan*, and office expenses 7.50 *yuan*. New shares issued numbered 2,130, making a total of 5,360 with a value of 1,596 *yuan*. The dividend per share was 0.02 *yuan*.³⁵

During this period, the porters in Ansai *xian*, Bao'an *xian*, and our own district organized a salt-transport cooperative. They pooled their capital and formed a partnership, setting up a salt-transport team with a total of twelve donkeys, horses, and mules. Together with more than a hundred privately owned animals, they regularly went to Yanchi to transport salt, which was sold through the cooperative. This also encouraged porters from other *xian* to invest 320 *yuan* in the shop. During this period, the soviet currency used to buy shares was converted entirely into national currency.

We reported to the September cooperative members' meeting. Everyone expressed the opinion that making the soviet notes worth 1 *yuan* in national currency instead of 0.30 *yuan* had increased the trust of the members. We proposed an increase in the share capital, made a census of the population and surveyed the conditions of the people's economy. The three townships of the district had 432 households, with a population of 1,733. There were 222 ox-drawn implements and 323 oxen, 125 donkeys, and 270 sheep. The total value of the people's economy for the whole district was 220,000 *yuan*, including livestock, land, houses, and all assets. Excluding grains, the average annual expenditure per head on clothing, agricultural implements, salt, matches, and so on was 40 *yuan*, for a total of 69,320 *yuan*. We proposed to the meeting that each person increase his share capital to 20 *yuan* so that we could provide daily necessities for the people. The members agreed to increase the share capital and to lengthen the accounting periods from quarterly to half-yearly.

Fourth Period

The fourth period ran from September 1937 to February 1938. The original value of 0.30 *yuan* per share was raised to 0.50 *yuan*. The total number of shares was 5,360, valued at 2,680 *yuan*. The current account was 22,875 *yuan*, and the gross profit 1,732.30 *yuan*. Outgoing expenses were for the public accumulation fund 110 *yuan*, the public welfare fund 68 *yuan*, woolen socks and gloves to support the front 245 *yuan*, support for the dependents of troops in the War of Resistance 18 *yuan*, support for the primary school 12 *yuan*, payments to cooperative personnel and hired labor 310.50 *yuan*, food 90 *yuan*, entertainment expenses 38.50 *yuan*, office expenses 61.50 *yuan*, incentives for personnel 60 *yuan*, and repairs 285 *yuan*. After expenses, the dividend per share was 0.08 *yuan* and the total dividend was 428.80 *yuan*. Although the cooperative members' meeting for the previous period had proposed raising the share capital per person to 20 *yuan*, this had only been partly realized because of difficulties in the people's economy. This time the meeting planned to establish a credit cooperative with share capital of 1,000 *yuan*. People could come to this cooperative for short-

term loans for marriages and funerals without paying interest. As soon as this slogan was put forward, the members said they would guarantee the raising of all share capital. The aim was to provide assistance. We also planned to open a restaurant in Liulin.

Fifth Period

This period lasted from March to August 1938. First, we increased the number of cadres, recruiting Wang Yaoming, Mao Keye, Li Shenghai, Huang Baozhong, and so forth. Within three months, we raised 1,060 *yuan* share capital for the credit cooperative and, in addition, increased other share capital by 110 *yuan*. Including previous share capital, the total was 3,890 *yuan*. The current account for the six months was 42,500 *yuan*, and the gross profit was 3,633 *yuan*. Expenses were for woolen socks for troops at the front 185 *yuan*, relief appeal donations 22 *yuan*, incentives 80 *yuan*, repairs 230 *yuan*, meetings and entertainment 85.60 *yuan*, office expenses 189 *yuan*, payments and salaries (twenty-four people) 864 *yuan*, and food 900 *yuan*. After expenses, the dividend per share was 0.10 *yuan* and the total dividend 778 *yuan*. When the dividend was distributed, we held a meeting of the cooperative members' group leaders. We planned to accumulate 500 *yuan* to buy plowshares. Each plowshare cost 0.25 *yuan*, so we could buy 2,000. We also planned to expand with an oil-pressing shop [*youfang*], a flour mill [*fenfang*], and a public welfare center [*gongyixin*] so as to establish commercial relations in Yan'an city. On this occasion, none of the group leaders disagreed.

Sixth Period

This ran from September 1938 to February 1939. We changed the share value from 0.50 *yuan* to 1 *yuan*, and we increased the share capital by 4,510 *yuan*, for a new total of 8,200 *yuan*. The current account for the six months was 49,860 *yuan* and the gross profit 4,118 *yuan*. Expenses included support for dependents of troops in the War of Resistance 34 *yuan*, the public accumulation fund 654 *yuan*, the public welfare fund 100 *yuan*, incentives 131 *yuan*, entertainment 180 *yuan*, miscellaneous expenses 116 *yuan*, salaries and payments to personnel (thirty people) 867 *yuan*, and food 1,116 *yuan*. During this period, all plans were realized. We bought 2,000 shovels in Hancheng. Each shovel was worth 0.50 *yuan*, and the market price was 0.90 *yuan*. We sold them to cooperative members at 0.60 *yuan* each, a savings of 0.30 *yuan* and a total savings of 600 *yuan*. The oil-pressing shop and flour mill were established. In this period, we still paid a dividend on a half-yearly basis. There was a total of 850 cooperative members.

Seventh Period

This period lasted from March to August 1939. We started planning to do business in partnership with private individuals. There were some people in the area who wanted to go into business but feared that the government would increase their taxes. So they invested their money together with the cooperative as individual shareholders in a joint venture. First, we set up a business in partnership with private individuals in Sanshilipu, including a noodle shop and a restaurant. The cooperative put up 200 *yuan* and the individuals 800 *yuan*. Through this partnership business, we

solved many problems for the people. We made a rule allowing the freedom to invest or withdraw share capital from the cooperative. This lasted until the end of the year, when the government, reaffirming the principles of cooperatives, pointed out that the cooperative had developed the private economy, and this was not allowed. So this business was broken off.

In the same year, we expanded the share capital by 860 *yuan*, for a new total of 9,016 *yuan*. Cooperative members numbered 960.

The current account was 57,600 *yuan*, and the gross profit was 4,778.60 *yuan*.

After deducting the public accumulation fund, public welfare fund, and other expenses, the net dividend was 0.10 *yuan* per share and the total dividend 901.60 *yuan*.

In the course of paying out this dividend, many difficulties arose. On the one hand, the expansion of the share capital was slow and the rise in commodity prices high, making it difficult for the cooperative to operate. On the other hand, the people figured that there was no increased profit for the individual, and they were unwilling to invest in more shares. We tried again and again to propagandize and persuade them, but they remained unwilling to invest more. I myself reckoned that unless we formed partnerships with private individuals, the cooperative could not develop and that we should do business in such partnerships without government approval. I raised this for discussion at a management meeting, and it was agreed that it should be done.

Eighth Period

In September 1939 we again went into partnership with individuals to set up the Xinghua Branch Cooperative at Sanshilipu, the Limin Cooperative at Goumenshang, the Minsheng Herbalist at Liulin, and the Lihe Cooperative at Nanzhuanghe. Using the cover of being joint public and private ventures, they attracted more than 100,000 *yuan* in capital from private investors. The people working in the branches got personal shares. We drew up contracts. There was still complete freedom in making investments and withdrawals, and the cooperative did not impose any restrictions. Subsequently, when the *xian* government learned about this, it wanted to see the contracts. After seeing them, it approved the formation of partnerships. The original cooperative was transformed into the head cooperative of the district, and the various townships set up branch cooperatives. Excluding the branch cooperatives, the head cooperative again increased the share capital by 2,629 *yuan*, for a new total of 11,645 *yuan*. The current account for the head and branch cooperatives together was 158,350 *yuan*, and the gross profit was 18,250 *yuan*. Expenses were 8,895.13 *yuan*, and the net profit was 9,354.07 *yuan*. The dividend per share was 0.10 *yuan*, including the branch cooperatives. Having set up branch cooperatives, the head cooperative was strong enough to establish productive undertakings. In 1940, in partnership with Guanghua Store, we bought mules and set up a transport team, benefiting from cooperation with private individuals. The original capital of the transport team was 5,000 *yuan*. By the end of the year, it had expanded to have 160 mules, and it was regularly transporting salt goods. We also set up a textile mill and a leather workshop. The West District Cooperative and the Xinmin Cooperative at Dufuchuan collectively set up a transshipment warehouse and two felt workshops at Qilipu. At first, shares were taken out on an individual basis so that there could be several cooperative members within one family. Later this became troublesome, so they were combined, based on the household as the unit. Each family became one cooperative member, and there was a total of 853 members.

After the membership had been combined in this way, households had 300–500 *yuan* to 1,000 *yuan* invested. At the same time, small merchants and porters from other *xian* had also joined the branch

cooperatives, with share capital of 10,000 *yuan*. In particular, the porters who came frequently from the *xian* of Luochuan, Fuxian, Ansai, Bao'an, and Sanbian invested in the cooperative. When the dividend was paid in the ninth month [*sic*], we held a meeting of members' representatives and reported on the reasons for the expansion of the cooperative. After examination, we put forward the general aims for future work. First, we wanted to increase shares by 30,000 *yuan*, and we asked the representatives to guarantee that this would be done. Second, we planned to accept local products and to sell them on behalf of the people, to supply the people with all daily necessities, and to take responsibility for buying goods from other areas. Third, the salt, matches, and plowshares needed by the people of the district would not be bought from outside but would be supplied by the cooperative. We figured that the 7,135 people of the district consumed 2 *qian*³⁶ of salt per head per day and 4.5 *jin* per head per year, for an annual total of 32,107.5 *jin*. At a price per *jin* 1 *yuan* below the market price, we could save more than 32,100 *yuan*. Each family used five packs of matches per year, a total of 8,675 packs for the whole district. At a price per pack 5 *yuan* below the market price, we could save 43,375 *yuan*. The district used 1,500 plowshares per year. At 15 *yuan* below the market price, we could save 22,500 *yuan*. The total savings for these three items could be 98,050 *yuan*. The district's annual consumption of cotton cloth for making clothes was 7,000 bolts. Each bolt required 2.5 *jin* of raw cotton, a total requirement of 17,515 *jin*. The total value was 3.5 million *yuan*. If the yarn was spun by the people, they could earn half of it, that is, 1.75 million *yuan*. We reported on our plans to the members at this meeting. After approval by the members, we increased the number of machines for spinning and weaving by peasant women.

Ninth Period

In August 1941 we increased the share capital in the form of shares taken out as government bonds for national salvation [*jiuguo gongzhai*]. The government mobilized the people to buy government bonds for national salvation. The amount of bonds to be taken out by the people was added to their share capital. The dividend on this share capital was paid toward the government bonds of 33,000 *yuan*. In this difficult situation for the people, we helped ease their burdens and raised their faith in our ability to do so.

The new share capital was 33,070 *yuan*. When this was combined with the old share capital, it totaled 44,715 *yuan* for the head cooperative. The share capital for the various branch cooperatives was 120,000 *yuan*, and for the transport team it was 80,000 *yuan*. The combined total was thus 244,715 *yuan*, and the membership was 1,018. The current account for the head and branch cooperatives together was 1,161,840.70 *yuan*, and the gross profit was 284,317.40 *yuan*. Expenses were 138,849.30 *yuan*, and the net profit was 145,469 *yuan*. The dividend per share of 1 *yuan* was 0.70 *yuan*. When issuing the dividend, we proposed that each dividend of 0.70 *yuan* could be valued at 1 *yuan* if invested as share capital. This increased the members' trust, and a lot of the dividend was added on to the share capital. People taking out additional shares could use local products, firewood, and grain as money, calculating the value higher than the market price. For example, each *jin* of grass was valued 0.20 *yuan* higher than the market price. This was true of all investment in-kind, and it also increased the people's trust.

Tenth Period

In 1942 we set up a sock-weaving factory. When we began propagandizing for share capital, we made each share worth 20 *yuan* and presented the members with a pair of socks. Afterward, with the increase in the cost of raw cotton, we raised the value of each share to 40 *yuan*. The total share capital was 30,000 *yuan*. We set up the sock-weaving factory, and it now has six machines. In Yan'an city, we set up the Yunhe transshipment warehouse with 420,000 *yuan* in share capital. At Songshulin we set up a branch cooperative with share capital of 340,000 *yuan*. The surplus accumulated by the transport team increased its capital to 750,000 *yuan*. The head and branch cooperatives expanded their share capital by 1,232,000 *yuan*, for a new total of 2.52 million *yuan*. The membership was 1,112 (each member represented one household). The largest investor had shares in the value of 5,000 *yuan*. There were nineteen units of the cooperative within the boundaries of the district (including production, transport, and consumption). Apart from the cooperatives, there was no other private commerce. Southern District is 60 *li* long and 40 *li* wide. It has 1,544 households with 7,128 people. Altogether there are 1,469 oxen, 635 donkeys, 60 horses, 22 mules, and 4,445 sheep. Arable land covers 54,408 *mu*. The wheat harvest was 872.5 *dan*. The harvest of coarse grains was 9,084.16 *dan*, equivalent to 5,662.43 *dan* of hulled grain. The output from subsidiary undertakings was equivalent to 334.25 *dan* of hulled grain. The total was 6,869.18 *dan*. In 1942 we paid 2,480 *dan* in grain tax, leaving 4,389.18 *dan*. The average amount of grain per head was 0.6 *dan*. Animal fodder totaled 1,500 *dan*.

This spring the government mobilized to obtain 34,000 *yuan* for education expenses and for sentry fees for the self-defense army, 8,000 *yuan* for share capital for production at Gaomaowan, and 20,000 *yuan* for bank savings bonds. The total was 62,000 *yuan* to be raised in three parts. Each time, each household would have to attend a meeting for collection and lose the work of one of its members. This would happen three times, and each time the work of 1,500 would be lost. The work of each person was valued at 30 *yuan*, so the total loss of earnings would be 135,000 *yuan*. Added to the 62,000 *yuan*, the full burden on the people would have been 197,000 *yuan*. Therefore, the cooperative paid the 62,000 *yuan* on behalf of the people, saving the 135,000 *yuan* which would have been lost. We helped the people's production at a particularly busy agricultural time. We also handed over 1,050 packs of salt, each worth 240 *yuan*, as salt tax on behalf of the people. The total value of this was 252,000 *yuan*. Reducing the amount of work time lost by the people influenced their attitudes toward the cooperative, and we increased the share capital by 420,000 *yuan*. We plan to pay next year's salt tax on their behalf.

We organized 600 peasant women to do spinning. Each day, each woman spun 2 *liang* of yarn. The total of raw cotton spun each day was 75 *jin*, and the people should receive half of it. Each *jin* of yarn was calculated to be worth 150 *yuan*. The profit per day was 5,250 *yuan*, and the profit for the year was 1.89 million *yuan*. This year they spun 5,000 *jin* of raw cotton. In the first half of the year, cotton was low-priced. Combining both halves of the year, each *jin* cost 70 *yuan*. The people earned 2,500 *jin* of raw cotton, equal to 175,000 *yuan*. The cooperative arranged advances of 20,000 *yuan* for spinning wheels. After deducting this 20,000 *yuan*, the people earned 155,000 *yuan*. Now we are expanding the amount of spinning done by women. In the past, there was no spinning done in Southern District. Now large numbers of women are taking part, but there are problems with the quality of the raw materials. Finally, this year we sold 200,000 *jin* of charcoal for the people, at 2 *yuan* per *jin*. The people received 400,000 *yuan*.

The above facts relate what the cooperative has done. We have not doled out the dividend so far this year on account of the floods. The cooperative has lost 58 buildings,³⁷ with a value of 400,000 *yuan*, equipment worth 300,000 *yuan*, goods worth 400,000 *yuan*, and the Fuchang storehouse at a value of 200,000 *yuan*. Total losses were 1.3 million *yuan*. The government later helped us borrow 500,000 *yuan*, and we went to Dingbian *xian* three times to sell goods, making a gross profit of

300,000 *yuan*. At present, we again have repair expenses of 240,000 *yuan*, and we are expanding the share capital.

As regards the organization of the cooperative, each village elects one or two representatives. Cooperative affairs are handled by the twelve-person management committee, meeting on the sixth day of each month. All questions concerning management and cadres are determined at the management committee meetings.

Supplementary notes:

1. At present, the cooperative has 135 buildings [*jian*] and fifty-five stone-built cave dwellings³⁸ worth 2.89 million *yuan* at current values, liquid capital of 1.5 million *yuan*, and equipment and livestock worth 1.02 million *yuan*.
2. The experience and lessons of the cooperatives are explained on the page on the Southern District Cooperative in the volume *Materials on Yan'an's Economic Construction*.

December 13, 1942

The above document leaves a gap of two years between the eighth and ninth periods, and there seem to be some omissions. Inquiries were made, and the following report came back.

Concerning the Problem of Periodization of the Southern District Cooperative Operations began in December 1936, and the first meeting of all cooperative members was held after three months. All together three such meetings were held at three-month intervals. Then they were changed to once every six months, and a further three meetings were held. After the sixth meeting, there was a gap of eight months, and then the first meeting of representatives was held (at the end of 1939). Afterward, the second meeting of representatives was held in July 1940 and the third in August 1941. We planned to hold the fourth meeting in July of this year, but because of the floods it was difficult to draw up the accounts so we extended the period. Before 1939 the period between meetings was short, and all the members attended. This was because our scope and membership were both small. Later, meetings of representatives were held once a year because our membership was too large, our undertakings had expanded, and drawing up accounts was not easy.

In our previous report we omitted referring to the second representative meeting of July 1940, and so the eighth period was lengthened to two years.

The previous report was made without proper drafting. If there are still questions on this material, please ask for further reports.

Wang Pi'nian,³⁹ Liu Jianzhang
December 15

Below is the report of the comrades of the Yan'an *xian* Party Committee on the Southern District Cooperative. It is reproduced here for study.

The Experience of the Liulin District (i.e., Yan'an Southern District) Cooperative

Looking at the process of development of the Liulin District Cooperative, we can see:

1. Cooperative operations are not limited to consumption but are also related to production, credit, and transport, making them a coherent whole. The head cooperative and its branches make a total of sixteen.

On the production side, there is the textile mill, the leather workshop, the felt workshop, the oil-pressing shop, and the flour mill.

On the transport side, there is the transport team with over a hundred animals. The cooperative's capital investment is 500,000 *yuan*.

Because the Liulin District Cooperative operates by uniting several economic functions, its scope is wide, its capital is large, its activities are big, its development is fast, and it has solved many problems in the supply of daily commodities for the people. Other cooperatives in this *xian* are limited to consumption. Compared to a cooperative that also produces and provides transport, their capital and scope are small and their development is delayed.

2. The policy for the management of the cooperatives by the people was put forward by adopting the experience of Liulin. This cooperative's share capital was expanded, absorbing the capital of small merchants and drawing them in to take part in the work. All the work of the cooperative was discussed and decided by the cooperative members. The people were deeply involved with the cooperative. They did not consider it run by officials but by themselves.

3. The cooperative solves problems in the supply of daily necessities for the masses, such as bolts of cloth, salt, matches, and plowshares at less than market price. Taking matches and salt alone, the annual savings for the people is more than 80,000 *yuan*. Naturally the people wish to buy things at the cooperative. The cooperative can supply the entire needs of the people of Liulin district for these four daily necessities.

4. The cooperative helps the masses out of urgent difficulties, such as those created by marriages or funerals by allowing them to borrow funds temporarily, either giving credit against bolts of cloth or taking something as a pledge. It sets a time limit for repayment. This fills the role of a credit cooperative, solving major difficulties for the people. Because the cooperative does this at a time of urgent need when no help can be found elsewhere, it creates trust among the people, who feel that the cooperative really helps them.

5. The cooperative has a variety of ways of expanding share capital:

- i. Buying shares with ready cash.
- ii. Taking out shares in return for goods: a chicken, a pair of shoes, some sheepskin, and some hemp ropes can all be exchanged for shares at equivalent value.
- iii. Absorbing the capital of small merchants.
- iv. Helping the masses pay the burdens from the government and making this a way of taking out shares. After the government issues its demands, the cooperative turns the demands into a call to buy shares (of the same amount) and pays the taxes itself. For example, in 1942 the people of the district had to pay 250,000 *yuan* to the government as a cash substitute for the salt tax.

This was treated as share capital and paid to the cooperative. The cooperative paid the salt tax to the government, making a profit from the handling of the cash. The people also earned a dividend. Government bonds, education costs, sentry costs, and so forth were collected in this way and paid by the cooperative. The government was paid, and the cooperative's share capital increased and its operations expanded. The people profited, and they had fewer troubles. They also received dividends as shareholders.

- v. Increasing share capital by making timely responses to the needs of the moment of the people. For example, when they wanted to expand spinning and weaving, they put forward the slogan of raising share capital to do so. In 1941 the cooperative experimented with paying the grain tax for the people. For each *dan* of the previous year's grain tax, the people bought shares for cash. The cooperative used the cash to expand its operations. In the following year, when the grain tax was allocated among the people, it was paid by the cooperative from the profits that it had obtained. This was done for forty or so households, for whom paying the grain tax was almost like not paying. They became shareholders in the cooperative and were able to receive a dividend every year. They were very happy, their enthusiasm for production increased, and they received even more grain.
- vi. Paying a dividend on taking out shares. People taking out shares for 40 *yuan* were issued a pair of socks valued at 20 *yuan*. In this way, the people were encouraged to buy shares.

6. The cooperative is in a very good geographic location since it is in Liulin district, which is close to the large commercial market in Yan'an. Liulin has much forest land. Many people sell timber and charcoal, which raises their income, and thus there is a lot of liquid capital in the villages which can be absorbed in the purchase of shares. At the same time, being near a market, the turnover of capital is very rapid. These are the objective factors.

7. The scope of the cooperative's activities is very wide. It has established relations with the Border Region Bank, Guanghai Store, and the various official organizations in Yan'an. Sometimes it can borrow capital or do a lot of work for the official organizations, and the cooperative has been able to develop through this mutual help.

8. The cadres have not been transferred much, and they pay attention to investigation and research. Director Liu has not been transferred to other work since he was appointed. He has been able to concentrate exclusively on his work, on research, and on thinking of ways of doing things. At the same time, he also pays great attention to investigating objective conditions. For example, he often investigated such things as individual annual consumption of bolts of cotton, salt, and matches so as to solve the people's problems.

Here is an example to demonstrate the relationship between the cooperative and the people. In 1941 the peasant Bai Da of Lufengpo in Liulin district had to hand over 60 *yuan* for the national salvation grain tax. Beforehand he paid it to the cooperative as share capital. At the appointed time, the cooperative paid the government on his behalf. Later the dividend was added to the original capital of 60 *yuan*, bringing it up to 200 *yuan*. He bought four plowshares from the cooperative and saved 15 *yuan* on each (i.e., they were sold at 15 *yuan* less than the market price), making a total savings of 60 *yuan*. He bought five packs of matches, saving 5 *yuan* on each, for a total of 25 *yuan*. At the end of the twelfth lunar month in 1941, he bought goods worth 1,000 *yuan* at the cooperative but only paid 500 *yuan*, saving 500 *yuan*. Subsequently, the market prices of these goods rose by 550 *yuan*. Including the previous purchases of plowshares and matches, he saved a total of 635 *yuan*. Originally he had to pay 60 *yuan* in grain tax, which now has become share capital of 200 *yuan*, and he has saved 635 *yuan* on the purchase of goods. This has really made the cooperative belong to the people, facilitating their dealings and looking after their interests. There are many examples like this.

The Cooperative Situation Throughout the Xian

Table 5.1 Number of Cooperatives in Yan'an Xian, 1941 and July 1942

	1941	1942
Branch cooperatives	18	30
District cooperatives	8	8
Total	26	38

Table 5.2 Capital (in *yuan*) Invested in Cooperatives in Yan'an Xian, 1941 and 1942 (half-year)

	1941	1942 (for the half-year)
District cooperatives	264,207.56	312,207.56
Branch cooperatives	193,340.00	978,507.14
Total	457,547.56	1,290,714.70

Within six months, capital increased by 833,167.14 *yuan*. The fastest increase in capital was in the branch cooperatives, which are directly organized by the people with the support of the district cooperatives. Therefore the people are very enthusiastic about taking shares.

The average taken from 1.29 million *yuan* works out to 20 *yuan* per head of the population of the *xian*. This is not much so the role of the cooperatives in the entire *xian* is still minor.

Important Experience

1. Persist in the policy of management by the people and non-interference by the government. We inspected the cooperatives in July of this year and called for an increase in share capital. Substantial capital should be held by the cooperatives.

2. Cadres in the cooperatives should not be lightly transferred to other posts. Let them be settled in their posts, concentrating on their work. Guarantee their livelihood. Cooperatives should adopt the method of assigning personal shares [*da shenfen*]. That is, each member of the cooperative's personnel should receive a number of shares in relation to his ability and work. For example, if someone is deemed equivalent to shares of 5,000 *yuan*, he is paid the interest due on shares of 5,000 *yuan* at the time the accounts are settled. This becomes his salary, and he does not receive any other income.

3. Enlarging the scope of cooperative undertakings should not be limited to consumption alone but should include production, transport, credit, and so forth. This is an inevitable trend in cooperative development henceforth. That is, we must run comprehensive cooperatives.

4. Concentrate on doing a good job in one or two cooperatives and gaining experience. Gradually expand to other areas. For example, we are preparing to turn the Songshulin Cooperative of Jinpen district into a second Liulin Cooperative.

These are opinions on our future work.

VI. On the Development of the Salt Industry

Salt is the great resource of the border region. It is the mainstay which balances imports and exports, stabilizes the currency, and regulates commodity prices. A large proportion of the people rely on salt [as a form of] exchange for goods from outside. A relatively large proportion of the troops and working personnel rely on salt for their livelihood or to supplement their livelihood. Salt is also a major source of government financial revenue. Therefore, salt plays an extremely important role in the border region. Since the War of Resistance began, the supply of salt from the sea has been cut off and the supply from the Huai area and from Shanxi has been reduced. The Southwest relies on salt from Sichuan and the Northwest and the Eastern areas⁴⁰ on salt from Ningxia and Qinghai. Salt from our border region has thus come to occupy an important position, and the transport and sale of salt increases annually. In 1938 our salt exports were only 70,000 packs (each pack is 150 *jin*, and each *jin* is 24 *liang*). In 1939 there was a sudden increase to 190,000 packs. In 1940 the figure was 230,000 packs, and in 1941 there was another sudden increase to 299,068 packs. By September 1942 the total was 155,790 packs, and it is estimated that another 70,000–80,000 packs can be sold in the last three months, making a total of 230,000–240,000 packs. These statistics reflect two important facts: first, external demand, and second, our hard work. Some comrades cannot see that external demand is determined by the War of Resistance and that within certain limits salt can be sold. Therefore, they propose that things should follow their own course and that there is no need for the Party and government to interfere. Other comrades merely ascribe the yearly increase in the sale of salt to external demand and do not recognize that the leadership of the Party and government is a great factor in that increase. We began to pay attention to the salt industry in autumn 1940. As well as the objective factor of the external salt famine and the depletion of salt stocks which made 1941 salt sales particularly good, the sudden increase from 230,000 packs in 1940 to 299,000 packs in 1941 was also due to the subjective factor that we implemented the policy of supervising transport in that year. Apart from the fact that external demand was not as urgent as in 1941, the sudden drop to 230,000–240,000 packs in 1942 from the previous year's 299,000 packs was due to our abandonment of the policy of supervising transport (putting an end to the many

plans made by the people for transporting salt). If we do not learn a lesson from this, we shall repeat past mistakes in future work. Certainly there were defects in the salt industry work for 1941. The original plan to transport 600,000 packs was too big. The border region still does not have such a great transport capacity. The achievement in producing 700,000 packs of salt was good, but the quality [of the salt] was too poor. Supervision of transport was correct, but it was unnecessary to mobilize everyone everywhere. There were also many abuses in the organization and method of mobilization which did not accord with the actual situation. All these things were shortcomings and mistakes in our work in 1941. Nevertheless, adopting a policy of active development of the salt industry was entirely correct. Belittling, misunderstanding, and even opposing this policy is entirely wrong.

What should be done in 1943? First, we must determine a policy for active development. In the current situation in the border region, we certainly cannot adopt a negative approach toward salt, which is a major factor in solving financial problems (the publicly run salt industry and the salt tax), in balancing imports and exports, and in stabilizing the currency and commodity prices. Therefore, we must enlarge the already established Salt Company into the main force for uniting the public and private salt industry and for expanding public and private production, transport, and sales. And we must improve the quality of salt produced so as to promote sales. We must restore transport supervision and organize all possible transport capacity among the people to expand salt transport. We must draw in porters from outside areas to transport and sell more. We must build roads and arrange for inns, warehouses, and fodder to help transport. The Salt Company should gradually gain control of outside sales in order to avoid the anarchic situation produced by the lack of public and private coordination. These are our general policies for the active development of the salt industry in 1943.

Concrete arrangements should be as follows:

1. Expand the Salt Company and increase its capital. Under the direction of the Commodities Bureau, raise share capital from the various official organizations, the troops, and private individuals. Develop salt transport, expand salt sales. Regulate salt prices. Guarantee that the company transports 40,000 packs in 1943, and based on this salt buy as much salt from the people as possible to carry out

partial unification of salt sales to outside areas. Afterward, depending on the situation, gradually achieve complete unification so as to prevent outside manipulation and to guarantee the interests of the government and the people.

2. In 1943 plan to produce 400,000 packs of salt and to transport 300,000–360,000 packs. Moreover, strive to exceed this. With regard to production, continue the policy of supervision by officials and production by the people. Ensure that the salt is mostly or entirely top quality and do not allow inferior quality to be produced again. With regard to transport, plan for the Salt Company system to transport 40,000 packs, draw in porters from outside to move 50,000 packs, and organize the manpower and animal power of the border region to move 210,000–260,000 packs, making a total of 300,000–360,000 packs.

3. The organization of the manpower and animal power of the border region to transport 210,000–260,000 packs is an immense, arduous, and meticulous piece of organizational and mass work. It should be directed by the Reconstruction Department and supervised by the government at various levels, with the Party committees at each level having the responsibility for checking up and helping. Mobilization to transport salt must have a degree of coercion, but it certainly must avoid commandism, which causes damage. We must chiefly adopt the policy of using propaganda and persuasion. The organization to transport salt must take the forms of transport cooperatives and transport teams. Propagandize the masses to buy shares voluntarily. Some can provide manpower, and some can provide draft animals. Some can provide both. Some can provide running costs, and some, in special circumstances, can be exempted from providing anything. We can organize transport teams among people who have rich experience in portering, together with the necessary animals. The Party and government at the *xian*, district, and township levels should actively direct the rational, fair, and healthy organization of these transport teams. They should set off smoothly, do the necessary work along the way, and ensure the safety of the personnel and animals. On return, pay attention to the distribution of the cooperative's profits and guarantee the interests of the people involved and of all the cooperative members. Salt transport must not violate the agricultural seasons. We must strengthen the organization of labor mutual-aid cooperatives (exchange labor) so that, after the transport team has departed, the cooperative members do not lose agricultural production through lack of manpower and animal power. With

regard to the salt-transport organizations (cooperatives and teams) of the Suide-Mizhi special military area and the three eastern *xian*, we should allow the masses greater freedom and reduce coercion. The transport cooperatives and teams in all places must be built up on the basis of benefiting the cooperative members. The duties of the Party and government lie in making these benefits increase daily, otherwise we will certainly be defeated. The Reconstruction Department, the subregions, and the *xian* should teach the people through the most successful examples of salt transport by the masses. They should propagandize them widely for imitation so as to be certain that the plan for salt transport in 1943 will be completed and will also bring large direct benefits for the people.

4. The enterprises of the Commodities Bureau and the people's cooperatives in all places must closely coordinate with the people's transport cooperatives and teams and strive to ensure that the animals used by the people to transport salt are able to transport other goods on their return journey. Only then can the people's salt-transport undertaking expand and the entirety of salt transport develop, and only then will the entire salt-transport plan be completed.

5. The key sector in developing the salt industry is transport, and the major [necessary] condition for transport is communications. In 1943 the government should allocate 2 million *yuan* under the direction of the Reconstruction Department for the building of two cart roads between Yan'an and Dingbian, and Dingbian and Qingyang, and for repairing the road from Yan'an to Fuxian. Furthermore, the Commodities Bureau should set up inns with stables and transshipment warehouses along the main salt-transport routes, and dig water storage holes in places lacking water. The Reconstruction Department and Commodities Bureau together should plant alfalfa widely along the routes and also provide fodder in other ways. So long as there are roads, inns, grass, and water, transport costs can be greatly cut, the volume of transport can be greatly increased, and the three forms of transport—porters from the outside, people from the area, and the Salt Company—can all develop. Plans to improve the means of transport should also be directed by the Reconstruction Department. Carts and handcarts should be built according to road conditions in order to increase salt transport. Provided the roads are well built, it is much better for the government to use more carts and for the people to use more handcarts than to use pack

animals.

6. In 1943 the salt tax is fixed as 100,000 packs. Those who live close by will provide transport, those who live far away will provide a substitute, and some will provide a mixture of both. However, the salt tax and the development of the salt industry are two different matters. So long as we can definitely export 300,000–360,000 packs, it does not matter whether we accept actual salt or substitute payments for the salt tax.

If we can complete our plans for planting cotton and spinning and weaving in 1943, we can reduce our imports of raw cotton, cotton yarn, and cotton cloth. If we can export 300,000–360,000 packs of salt in 1943 at an average value of 10 *yuan* in border region currency per *jin* (each donkey pack is 150 *jin*), our income will be between 450 million *yuan* and 540 million *yuan*. Thus by reducing one and increasing the other, the border region's problem of balancing imports and exports will be entirely solved. The following material reflects the people's experience in the transport of salt during 1941.

A Record of Lu Zhongcai's Long March

Report on the first experiences in salt transport of Chengguan district, Fu-xian *xian*, as told by the deputy leader of Chengguan district, Lu Zhongcai. Supplemented by Wang Yuxian and Kong Zhaoqing. Recorded by Gao Kelin, August 13, 1941.

1. For the first salt transport, Chengguan district should have provided fifty pack animals. In fact, it provided twenty-eight. The reason the plan was not fulfilled was the lack of animals (at most we could mobilize forty). Some animals were hidden away and not kept at home. The district government did not handle things firmly as it was busy with grain loans and government bonds.

2. We set off on July 18 and returned home on August 11, a total of twenty-five days. It took twelve days to get from Fuxian to Dingbian, one day to get to Yanchi and load up, and twelve days to return. The longest stage was 90 *li*. The route, stage names, and conditions during each stage were as follows:

- i. From Fuxian to Zhangcunyi, 50 *li*. Five gullies,⁴¹ and the road was difficult. Good water and grass.
- ii. Zhangcunyi to Lannipo, altogether five stages, each 70 *li*. Road good. Cut grass to feed the animals.
- iii. Lannipo to Lijiabian. 20 *li* of mountains and 40 *li* of gullies. Road difficult. Fodder no good.
- iv. Lijiabian to Lujiajiao. 30 *li* of gullies and 5 *li* of mountains. Most difficult to travel. Fodder no good.
- v. Lujiajiao to Luanshitouchuan. Traveling in gullies. There were military stations. Fodder was sold (each 100 *jin* of mountain grass 30 *yuan*, of valley grass 50 *yuan*, and wheat hay 40 *yuan*).
- vi. Luanshitouchuan to Sanlimiao, 80 *li*. There were military stations. Dry grass cost 50 *yuan* for

- 100 *jin*. Forty *li* of mountains, very precipitous. Difficult to travel. Water difficult (salt water not drinkable). Saw a salt porter whose donkey had fallen to its death.
- vii. Sanlimiao to Liangzhuang, 80 *li*.
 - viii. Liangzhuang to Dingbian, 90 *li*. There were military stations. Fodder 50 to 100 *yuan* per 100 *jin*. No water.
 - ix. Dingbian to Yanchi, 40 *li*. One day there and back. Sandy road difficult to travel.

3. Difficulties along the route were:

- i. During three of the five stages from Zhangcunyi to Lannipo, locusts [*zhameng*] were biting. It was best for men and animals to travel in the evening.
- ii. During the two stages from Sanlimiao to Liangzhuang and thence to Dingbian, there was no water. Men and animals were thirsty.
- iii. There were a lot of robbers at Dingbian. Animals, money, clothing, and tools often taken.
- iv. Beyond Luanshitouchuan, since salt-transport animals from various *xian* converge, there are often several thousands or hundreds of animals traveling together. Thus there are problems of inn space, fodder, water, and especially of room to rest the animals. Things can easily go wrong and cause trouble.

4. Life on the road: Chengguan district sent twenty-eight animals and fourteen men. Along the way we cooked for ourselves. Each meal required 7 *sheng* of millet, roughly 25 *jin*. Everyone felt that “We eat more after we have set out.” Inn charges ranged from 3 *yuan* at the lowest to 8 *yuan* at most. It depended entirely on whether you had a good or bad relationship with the manager of the inn. When traveling we sang and told stories, many of them about Duke Xiang seeking a wife. Everyone was very happy, and no one felt burdened. Animal fodder was cut in rotation. It was plentiful and could not all be eaten. The masses along the route were very good, and there was no problem in getting grain and fodder, though we relied chiefly on ourselves. Sometimes there were quarrels, mainly because the animals had eaten someone’s crops. Only in one place did the manager of an inn give us bad grain.

5. Points that arose during the journey:

Good:

- i. None of the animals had any illness. Those from No. 1 and No. 3 townships were thin when we set off but returned fat. This was because of the care of the porters and careful feeding.
- ii. None of the porters had any illness. Everyone was very fit and in good spirits. No one grew thinner. They just got a little sunburned.
- iii. Nothing was left behind along the way, and the animals did not eat people’s crops [*sic*]. This was mainly because deputy district head Lu Zhongcai was an old porter. He was experienced, responsible, and meticulous. Everyone else was very active, and thus we were successful.

Bad:

- i. Du Hai, head of the village council of the first administrative village of No. 3 township, sold a

good donkey and bought a bad one to go. As a result, the donkey was exhausted and did not carry packs, and we wasted 165 *yuan* in travel expenses. No. 3 township also sent another bad animal (it had bad loins), and Jianjuntaicun in No. 4 township sent a donkey with a bad leg. Neither carried salt, and each wasted 165 *yuan* in travel expenses. Furthermore, the same village sent a donkey with a rotten saddle, with the result that its back was hurt due to the pressure of its load. The head of No. 2 township had two donkeys. He sent a bad one with a poor saddle and frame. This caused a lot of bother along the way. The district-level government did not conduct a careful inspection of these matters before we set out. Some were known but not corrected. As a result, only twenty-five of the twenty-eight donkeys carried salt. The other three traveled without loads, not contributing one bit to the value of the salt carried and wasting from 500 to 600 *yuan* in travel costs. All in all, the total loss was more than 1,500 *yuan*. This is a valuable warning for district and township cadres.

- ii. The head of the village council of Jianjuntaicun in No. 4 township did not obey deputy district head Lu Zhongcai's instructions. He did not bring good fodder for the animals (oats [*yumai*] and broad beans [*candou*]) and instead used *gaoliang* [sorghum] and other poor substitutes. As a result, the animals from that township sometimes lay down when traveling because of their poor fodder. We are preparing to struggle against that village head and punish him.
- iii. The porter Yang Wanbao from No. 4 township was a real troublemaker along the way. He pretended to be ill and skulked off home. He created wild rumors—"two people had died, deputy district head Lu and a man called Wang ... There was nothing to eat along the way ... The donkeys' backs had all been ruined under their loads. The inns could not sell grain"—so many people back in the town felt unhappy. The district head did not pay sufficient attention to this. In the future, he should be alert.
- iv. Some families sent bad donkeys, which carried less, only about 110 *jin*. One family from Jianjuntaicun in No. 4 township changed their donkey's halter for a bad one when they sent it off. They anticipated that the donkey would die, and they had made up their minds to write everything off. The donkey from the head of No. 2 township was only 10 *li* from home on the way back when it laid down. The head was unwilling to send a good donkey to take over. He defaulted on his responsibility as he thought the donkey would surely die and could not return. So he did not come and take over.
- v. Twelve donkeys carried too much, and 40 to 50 *jin* were given to a donkey without a load. When we got to the tax inspection office at Sunkeyao *xian*, they confiscated 50 *jin* of salt and one sack (valued at 20 *yuan*) because we had no certificate.

6. Costs, losses, and gains:

- i. Average expenses per donkey were: 2 *dou* of beans valued at 60 *yuan*; each man had 1.5 *dou* of grain, and as each man looked after two donkeys, this equaled 0.75 *dou* per donkey, with a value of 35 *yuan*; traveling costs were 70 *yuan*. The total was 165 *yuan*. In addition, there was salt capital [*yanben*] of 20 *yuan*. The average cost per donkey was thus 185 *yuan*.
- ii. On average each donkey from No. 1 township carried 130 *jin*, and from No. 2, No. 3, and No. 4 townships 110 *jin*. At present market prices of 200 *yuan* per 100 *jin* of salt, each load was worth from 220 to 260 *yuan*.
- iii. At current prices, after expenses were deducted, earnings per donkey load ranged from 35 to 75 *yuan*. Note: (a) If each donkey were able to carry 150 *jin*, the guaranteed income per donkey at current prices be above 100 *yuan*. (b) Reports on amounts carried were given by the porters, who were certainly holding something in reserve—most donkeys here can carry 150 *jin*. (c) At

the same time, the principle is clear that so long as you have good donkeys, you can earn more. The worse the donkeys the less you earn, and you can even incur a loss.

7. Experience and lessons:

Experience:

- i. The victorious return of this salt-transport team from Chengguan district, Fuxian, proves that the Party and government's plans, estimates, and methods for salt transport are entirely correct. The doubts, lack of trust, and considerations by various comrades that it would be a burden are all erroneous and shallow outlooks.
- ii. We smashed the fears of some cadres and masses about going to Sanbian for salt ("men and animals will die ... they will go and not return"). On the contrary, the animals carrying salt returned fatter, and the men were healthier and merely a little sunburned.
- iii. We proved that salt transport can earn money, and we smashed the inaccurate reckless talk that we certainly would lose capital, "each donkey would lose 100 *yuan*," and "it is the greatest burden ever imposed in the border region."
- iv. We showed that certain cadres at the district and township levels, particularly at the township level, did not do their work responsibly (they did not inspect carefully), were prepared to cover up things that were wrong (village and township heads could send poor animals and were not investigated), were corrupt (used poor sorghum instead of beans), and had become tails following behind the masses.
- v. The cadres played a decisive role. Deputy district head Lu Zhongcai was experienced, lively, and responsible. Each time we reached a place or something happened, he held a discussion meeting of the porters—he even discussed how much salt each donkey should carry. As a result, neither men nor animals came to any harm and, on the contrary, ended up stronger and in better spirits than when they set out.

Lessons:

- i. The district and township cadres did not pay attention to and investigate at the right time the troublemaker from No. 4 township, Yang Wanbao, who skulked off home and created rumors. They did not talk to him and did not report him to higher levels. As a result, a rumor spread among the people of the district that two people had died—deputy district head Lu and Wang so-and-so—and that three donkeys had died. This made people very uneasy.
- ii. There were problems along the way (some stages were hard going, one or two had many locusts, and two had little water), but they could be overcome. On bad roads we had to be more careful. Where there were locusts, we traveled in the evening. Where there was little water, we drank more on getting up in the morning and carried water with us. With patience all difficulties could be overcome.
- iii. The better the donkeys, the more we can earn. If we could earn 75 *yuan* for each donkey that carried 130 *jin* this time, we can earn 115 *yuan* for donkeys carrying 150 *jin*. The worse the donkeys, the less we can earn, and we can even incur a loss. For example, Chengguan district

sent three poor donkeys (one with bad loins, one with bad legs, and one that was exhausted). As a result, they did not carry salt. Each donkey wasted 165 *yuan* in traveling expenses, and the total loss including porters was more than 1,000 *yuan*. At the same time, this showed that work must be done carefully and you cannot muddle through. If the district and township had carefully inspected the donkeys sent this time, worked conscientiously, and not given any favors, we would not have incurred these losses since everyone would have known about the poor donkeys.

- iv. If we had not stayed at inns along the way and had let the animals out to pasture not buying hay, we could have saved over 50 *yuan* per donkey. What we save becomes earnings.
- v. We must pay more attention to national laws. Because we were not careful, we had 50 *jin* of salt and one sack confiscated. This was an unnecessary loss. (This report was published in *Liberation Daily*, September 14, 15, 1941.)

VII. On the Development of Self-Supporting Industry

The agriculture, animal husbandry, handicraft industry, cooperatives, and salt industry discussed above are all economic undertakings by the people. The Party and government only give guidance and help within the bounds of ability and need, so that these things can develop and the requirements of the people can be met. At the same time, the portion handed over to the government by the people in the form of taxes ensures a part of the government's needs (e.g., the grain tax, salt tax, and other taxes), and the portion handed over in the form of trade ensures another part of the government's needs (e.g., raw cotton, cotton yarn, cotton cloth, and wool). Their basic nature is that of undertakings run by the people. Only in the case of the salt industry, in which 40,000 packs of salt are transported and sold under the control of the government's Salt Company and 5,000 or so packs are consumed directly by government personnel, does a part (about one-seventh of the whole) belong to the public sector of the economy.

As a whole, the public sector of the economy consists of the following three undertakings: (1) the salt industry, industry, and commerce run by the government; (2) the agriculture, industry, and commerce run by the army; and (3) the agriculture, industry, and commerce of the official organizations of the Party and government. These all directly ensure the supply of living and other expenses of the Party, government, and army personnel. According to accounts for 1942 and the budget for 1943, the amount supplied in this way exceeds the amount handed over by the people in the form of taxes (including the grain tax).

Therefore, publicly run economic undertakings have become the greater of the two large sources ensuring financial supplies. Their importance cannot be overstated.

The reasons we pay attention to publicly run economic construction are both historical and contemporary. During the Civil War, the Party Center established some publicly run industry and commerce in the Jiangxi soviet in order to meet the needs of the war. At that time, we initiated the growing of vegetables and the raising of pigs by the various official organizations and schools so as to make up for the lack of provisions. However, the army did not have experience in production. Also, since the peasants of Jiangxi were comparatively rich and numerous, it was not yet necessary for we ourselves to set out to provide grain. These are the historical reasons. Since the War of Resistance began, we have found ourselves in a very special situation. At first, the Guomindang provided a very small amount of rations for our army. Subsequently, it cut them off entirely. The border region was blockaded, leaving us no alternative but to become self-supporting in supplying the needs of the War of Resistance. These are the contemporary reasons.

After the War of Resistance began, attention turned to publicly run economic construction in 1938. Since we could not cover the costs of our army, we began a production movement. However, at that time we only ordered some of the troops to take part in production, growing vegetables, raising pigs, cutting wood, making shoes, and so forth, on a trial basis. The aim was simply to rely on this as a way of improving the livelihood of the soldiers. We still did not plan to rely on it as a way of providing general finance and supplies. Later we saw how successful the soldiers were in this experiment. They could do a lot of productive work during their rests from training, and their living standards really improved. After this happened there was a reduction in the instances of desertion. On seeing this success, we applied the experience widely among the troops garrisoned in the border region. An order was issued from the Garrison Office [Jiushouchu] calling on the troops to learn from this example. But we still aimed at improving the livelihood and not at meeting general needs. At that time, the government started to pay attention to setting up several small factories, but the official organizations and schools were not even called on to grow vegetables and raise pigs. In 1939, the Guomindang issued the “Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien

Parties,” and relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party worsened. The number of official organizations and schools in the border region also increased. Although there was a small amount of subsidies for expenses from outside, it was already far from sufficient. We were facing a serious situation in finance and supplies. For these reasons, we were forced to devise a movement for all-around mobilization to become economically self-supporting. We then raised the following questions at the congress for cadre mobilization. Do you want to starve to death? Shall we disband? Or shall we set-to ourselves? No one approved of starving to death, and no one approved of disbanding. Let us set-to ourselves—this was our answer. We pointed out this simple principle: In the final analysis, how did the ancients survive, if not by getting down to it themselves? Why is it that we, the sons and grandsons of these ancients, do not even have this spark of intelligence? We also pointed out: It is very common for an exploited peasant household in a feudal society with three or four or even seven or eight mouths to feed to rely on the production of only one labor power. Such a family must not only support itself but must also pay 50 to 80 percent of its income in rent and taxes to others. Why are we not as good as such a family? Our army is made up entirely of labor power; there are no women, no old or young. Nor is there the burden of rent and taxes. How could hunger arise? We have these powerful organs of government. Why can't they provide their own clothing, food, housing, and equipment? We reflected for a while on the reasons that the ancients and today's poor peasants were able to survive and, moreover, to live better than wild animals. Without a doubt it was because each had a pair of hands and extended their hands using tools. We again considered ourselves. In fact, each of us has a pair of hands and we can extend them with tools. This period of reflection was very important. Thereafter, our problems were immediately solved. In sum, we affirmed that we were able to overcome economic difficulties. Our response to all problems in this respect were the three words “set-to ourselves.” This time the tasks we set were no longer the same as those in 1938. We no longer wanted merely to improve our livelihood, but we also wanted to meet some of our general needs. The scope of mobilization was not limited to the army and we called on all forces, official organizations, and schools to carry out production. We implemented a call for a large-scale production movement. “The Song of Opening up New Land” [Kai huang ge] was a new song from that period, and so

was “The Production Chorus” [Shengchan dahechang]. This call not only mobilized the several tens of thousands of staff in the Party, government, army, and schools, but also mobilized the common folk of the border region. In that year the common folk opened up over 1 million *mu* of new land. This call also reached all over North China. Many units of the Eighth Route Army at the battlefield also carried out production during breaks in the fighting. This was the first stage of our movement for production self-sufficiency. This stage included the three entire years of 1938, 1939, and 1940. During this stage, the government’s industrial construction advanced and the army, official organizations, and schools developed agricultural production.

From 1941 until this Senior Cadres Conference (December 1942) has been the second stage. The foundation for self-supporting production had already been firmly laid. During these two years, personnel increased, and many people unable to find enough to eat outside came to the border region seeking food. The 359th Brigade also came to strengthen defenses along the Yellow River. The troops have grown in number, and support from outside has completely ceased. There are only two sources for the government’s living and operating expenses, the people and the government itself. As a result of two years of hard work, the proportion of the total amount coming from the government itself is greater than that coming from the people. Experience during this stage makes us feel grateful to those people who blockaded us, for the blockade as well as its negative drawbacks also brought about a positive side, which was to encourage us to be determined to set-to ourselves. As a result, we achieved our goal of overcoming difficulties and gained experience in running economic enterprises. The old saying “Hardship and distress help you to succeed” is something we have come to understand entirely and consciously.

During the first of the two stages we have gone through, the troops, official organizations, and schools placed emphasis on agriculture, and the government developed industry. During the second stage, we stressed commerce in order to provide for the critical needs of the moment. With the exception of those troops, official organizations, and schools which persisted in the policy of putting agriculture in a prime position, the rest developed business skills and did not place such heavy emphasis on agriculture as in the first stage. However, the government, troops, official organizations, and schools all developed industry and

handicrafts. After this Senior Cadres Conference, we will enter a new stage of development. In the new stage our economic base will already be rather firm and our experience fairly wide. We should put agriculture in first place, industry, handicrafts, transport, and animal husbandry in second place, and commerce in third place. Since commerce can only help in an emergency, we cannot and should not attempt to lay a long-lasting foundation upon it.

Distinctions between the government, the army, and the official organizations and schools in the public sector of the economy can only be made in terms of management and not in terms of an economic nature. Therefore, in the following discussion on self-supporting industry we shall treat the industry run by all three as a whole, and when discussing the self-supporting economy of the army and the official organizations and the schools, we shall again look at their industrial production separately. However, since industry run by the government is the largest part of all publicly run industry (government textile mills produce 56 percent of the 22,000 bolts of cloth produced annually by all publicly run textile mills; the output of government paper factories is 70 percent of all publicly run paper production; the output of government soap factories is 70 percent of all border region soap production), it is rational to deal with all self-supporting industry alongside that run by the government.

Why should unified, self-supporting industry be run in such a dispersed way? The main reason is that the labor force is divided among the various branches of the Party, government, and army. If it were centralized, we would destroy their activism. For example, we encouraged the 359th Brigade to set up the Daguang Textile Mill and did not order it to combine with a government mill because most of the several hundred employees at the mill were selected from the officers and men of the 359th Brigade. They work to produce the bedding and clothing requirements of the brigade, and their enthusiasm is high. If we centralized, we would destroy this enthusiasm. Another important reason for dispersed operations is that raw materials are in many different locations, and this causes transport problems. For example, in order to meet the needs of the Party, government, and army personnel of Guanzhong, Longdong, Sanbian, and Suide, the bedding and clothing industry finds it best to produce cloth (or buy it) on the spot and to make it up on the spot. It certainly should not concentrate its production in Yan'an alone. Thus we use the activism of the various branches to

undertake production to meet their own needs. Adopting the policy of “dispersed operations” is correct, and ideas aimed at centralizing everything are wrong. However, enterprises of the same kind carried out within the same area should be centralized as much as possible. Unlimited dispersal is not profitable. At present, we are already carrying out or about to carry out centralization of this kind. One example is the handing over to government control of the Tuanjie Textile Mill of the Central Committee’s Central Administration Bureau [Zhongyang guanju] and the Jiaotong Textile Mill of the Rear Services Department [Houqin bu]. Perhaps this process of dispersal at first and centralization later cannot be avoided. Dispersal makes it possible to use the activism of various branches when setting something up, and centralization enables the various branches to get better supplies. But it is very important that dispersed management does not lead to forgetting centralized leadership. This facilitates unified planning, balanced supplies, and essential arrangements in rational management and distribution. Until now we have had great shortcomings in this respect, and they must be corrected in the future. To sum up, our policy is “centralized leadership and dispersed operation.” Not only is industry like this, but agriculture and commerce are too.

At this point, we must distinguish between two forms of publicly run agriculture, industry, and commerce, large and small. The large should be centralized, and the small should be dispersed. Examples of things for which we should encourage dispersed operations include agricultural work such as growing vegetables, raising pigs, cutting wood, making charcoal, and handicrafts such as shoemaking, knitting, or small mills when both are run by one or more provision unit [*huoshi danwei*] to provide for their own daily food, bedding, and clothing needs and to make up for deficiencies in operating expenses, or cooperatives and small-scale commerce operated to provide for consumption costs or to earn a small profit to cover office expenses. These things must be dispersed—carried out and developed everywhere. They cannot be centralized and should not be. This is one kind. However, there is another kind. Examples of this are such things as large agricultural plans to provide a definite amount of grain for a whole brigade or regiment of troops—that is, the military farming [*tuntian*] plan; large agricultural stations run to meet the grain and vegetable requirements of many official organizations; large workshops and factories run to provide for the

bedding, clothing, and daily requirements of a whole brigade, a regiment, or a large number of official organizations; and large-scale commerce run to meet the operating costs of such large units. All these things must have a unified plan, centralized control, and strict regulation of expenditures. We cannot allow them to lack coordination and to operate without restraint. However, agriculture, industry, and commerce, which should be under centralized leadership, must not be put entirely in the hands of one single official organization for the entire border region. Instead, the unified plan drawn up by such an official organization (at present the Border Region Finance and Economy Committee and its office), according to the needs of the whole and the parts and the possibilities for operations, is handed over to the Party, government, and army systems for separate implementation. Within the Party, government, and army systems, there is also a unified plan with division in operations. These are the features of the policy of “centralized leadership and dispersed operations” in the publicly run sector of the economy of the border region.

In the five years since 1938, the public sector of the economy has made some very great achievements. These achievements are worth treasuring for ourselves and for our nation. That is, we have established a new model for the national economy. The reason that this is a new model is that it is neither the old Bismarckian model of the national economy nor the new soviet model of the national economy, but it is the national economy of the New Democracy or the Three People’s Principles.

Our publicly run, self-supporting industry has not yet reached the stage of supplying fully all our needs. We still cannot talk of using surplus capacity to meet the needs of the people. As yet, those needs can only be met by the Party and government providing organizational stimulus and the people setting-to themselves. At present, all our efforts are aimed at meeting the needs of self-sufficiency within two or three years, particularly the need for cotton cloth. We must not indulge in the fantasy that in present circumstances we can have tremendous development. That will only do harm.

Below I shall discuss our publicly run economic undertakings over the past five years item by item, beginning with self-supporting industry.

We first began to pay attention to the construction of publicly run industry in 1938. In that year the border region successively established the Refugee Textile

Mill, the paper factory, the bedding and clothing factory, the agricultural implements factory, and the Eighth Route Army medicine factory. Later on, most of these factories each provided an important stimulus. At the time, the industrialist Shen Hong voluntarily moved his ten privately owned machines to the border region to serve the Eighth Route Army, and Mr. Shen himself came to the border region to work. Thereafter, many scientific and technical personnel also came to the border region to work, enabling the border region to gather a pool of scientific and technical talent as the guiding force in the establishment of industry.

In 1939 the blockade of the border region economy began. Imports of industrial products were limited. The Party Center issued calls to “set-to ourselves” and to be “self-reliant.” After the Border Region Government held the agricultural exhibition in January, it held an industrial exhibition on Labor Day, which stimulated enthusiasm to develop industry. The government and the Rear Services Department sent people to Xi’an to select and buy machines and materials. They also organized spinning and weaving cooperatives and oil-pressing and tile-making producer cooperatives in Yan’an and Ansai. Although the machines and materials bought from Xi’an were insufficient, they became one of the major material strengths in the development of border region industry over the past few years. In that year we also set up the Xinhua Chemical Factory and the Guanghua Medicine Factory, and began to explore the thick coal seams at Shilipu in Yan’an *xian*.

The development of industry in 1940 was carried out under the policy of becoming “semi-self-sufficient” in production. It was decided to make the development of light industry the key feature. In January we held the second industrial exhibition and reviewed the strength of our factories. The Border Region Bank lent 1 million *yuan* to expand factory capital, to set up proper factory sites, and to continue buying materials. In February the Central Committee put forward the policy of “centralized leadership and dispersed operations.” In September Commander Zhu promoted the wool spinning movement and developed some wool spinning and weaving undertakings. Very many large official organizations and schools and troop units planned actively to set up factories. They sent people to existing factories to study techniques. They studied methods of control and fixed plans for the rapid development of industry

in 1941.

In 1941 the Central Committee put forward the policy of “moving from semi-self-sufficiency to complete self-sufficiency.” Under this policy the bank increased its loan by 3 million *yuan*, and the government also invested 500,000 *yuan* in the publicly run factories. Many official organizations and troop units also set aside funds to establish factories. On the Eighth of March Festival⁴² we held a production exhibition. In December the large bank building was completed and we held another industrial exhibition presided over by the bank. The following list gives the factories set up by the official organizations and schools directly under the Central Committee in 1942 to show the efforts made by the various units to develop industry at this time. These industries are all handicraft factories, none large and some very small.

1. The New China Textile Mill, the Experimental Factory,⁴³ the wooden implements factory, the carpentry factory, the first and second charcoal factories, the tile factory, and the bedding and clothing factory run by the Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee. Total capital over 200,000 *yuan*. More than 220 employees.

2. The Victory Wool Factory and Victory Carpentry Factory set up by the Central Organization Department [Zhongyang zuzhibu].

3. The July 1st Mill set up by the Central Propaganda Department [Zhongyang xuanchuanbu].

4. The United Textile Mill set up by the Marxism-Leninism Institute.

5. The Sun Yatsen Textile Mill set up by the Central Party School.

6. The blanket factory, mill, alcohol factory, glass factory, and machine factory set up by the National Sciences Institute.

7. The factories run by the Lu Xun Academy, the North Shaanxi Public School [Shaangong], the Youth League cadres, and the Women’s University.

8. The New China Carpentry Factory and the bedding and clothing factory run by the Central Printing and Publishing Department.

9. The Yan’an Gardens Paper Factory run by the instruction brigade [*jiaodao dadui*].

The above lists twenty-seven factories run by the systems directly controlled by the Central Committee, with a total of 447 employees and more than 400,000 *yuan* in capital. Most were set up with the aim of achieving economic self-

sufficiency.

Apart from these, there are several small factories run by the Economic Construction Department [Jingjianbu], the Garrison Office, the Public Security headquarters, the Border Region Finance and Economy Office, the 359th Brigade, and various special offices. The Daguang Textile Mill of the 359th Brigade has a fairly large output. The various regiments of the 359th Brigade also have their own small-scale cotton or wool-spinning and weaving workshops.

The industry constructed from 1938 to 1941 is now expanding. Development during 1941 was particularly vigorous and provided a foundation for the work of 1942. However, throughout the period, construction was carried out rather blindly. Many of the staff lacked conscious awareness. They only thought of the present and not of the future. They only thought of dispersed operations and not of unified leadership. They had an entirely anarchic outlook. As a result, some factories closed down as soon as they were built, some announced that they were closing down after a short period of operations, and some merged with other factories. Only a portion of them have continued to exist. To take textile enterprises near Yan'an, by 1942 only three large factories, the Refugee, the Communications, and the Unity, and two small factories, the China Revival and the Public Goods, remained. This winding path could not be avoided at the time, since one can only gain experience from paths that one has already traveled. But having gained experience from this stage, it would be better to avoid following a similar winding path in new industrial construction.

In 1942 the Reconstruction Department laid down the policy of “consolidating existing publicly run factories and developing rural handicrafts.” Government investment in industry was 1.7 million *yuan*. Rural handicrafts run by the people had already greatly expanded before this year. In Suide, for example, there were 600–700 cotton cloth hand looms. Blanket making, leather tanning, and ironwork had also developed in other places. The public and private textile industry has developed particularly quickly, and it has a lot of problems. In order to ensure the development of the textile industry, we have reduced the import tax on raw cotton and foreign yarn to 1 percent and have increased the import tax on bolts of cloth to 15 percent. In Suide the bank organized the “the Eversong [Yongchang] Native Cloth Producing and Selling Company” with capital of 2 million *yuan*. It issues raw cotton and collects yarn and cloth, encouraging

peasant women to spin yarn and weave cloth. Since cloth weaving by peasant households has expanded, much of the cloth produced by privately run, small-scale, capitalist textile production cooperatives can no longer be sold. They also have difficulties with the supply of native yarn. They have no choice but to reduce their scope of operations or to become fragmented, distributing their equipment among the people and transforming themselves into family subsidiaries. Since publicly run textile mills chiefly supply for public use, they can maintain themselves. But they also have problems with the supply of raw cotton and yarn. This year the Rising China [Zhenhua] main factory and branch factory of the publicly run paper industry completed the task of supplying the Publications Office with 3,000 rolls of paper made from malan grass. The Prospering China [Lihua] first and second factories originally planned to produce 2,500 rolls but did not succeed. This year's output will not exceed 500 rolls. Other publicly run paper factories experience great difficulty since there is no market for their paper. The products of the publicly run woolen industry such as blankets are aimed at solving problems of finance. The government does not use them itself. Some are exported, and others are sold to the troops. The fine-spun woolen thread produced is particularly well received and brings a good profit. Beginning in September, the Communications, Rising China, and Unity Textile Mills and the first and second Prospering China paper factories were all handed over to the control of the Border Region Government from the Central Committee and the Rear Services Department systems. In order to ensure raw materials for spinning and weaving in 1943, we have begun to buy cotton from the three eastern *xian* this year. We plan to buy 750,000 *jin*. To ensure the supply of raw materials for paper manufacture, we have raised a levy of 730,000 *jin* of malan grass from the *xian* of Ganquan, Yan'an, Ansai, Anding, and so forth. The factories should wait until they have carried out the policy of better workers and simpler administration before dealing with the recruitment of staff.

The year 1942, and particularly this Senior Cadres Conference, is an important landmark in beginning to get rid of blindness and anarchy and for introducing consciousness and unified and planned operations into the whole of the public sector of the border region economy, and especially into publicly run industry. Although the Central Committee put forward the principle of "centralized leadership and dispersed operations" long ago in February 1940, only in 1942 has

it attracted comrades' attention. It has only obtained unanimous acceptance at this Senior Cadres Conference. Five years of practical experience have made us progress considerably. After this conference, the whole public sector, industry included, must be reorganized so that it develops in a healthy manner.

Above I have given a simple outline of the history of industry in the border region over the past five years. By December 1942 we have seven kinds of industry—textiles, bedding and clothing, paper, printing, chemical, tools, and coal and charcoal.⁴⁴ There are seven textile mills,⁴⁵ with 26.9 million *yuan* in capital and 1,427 employees; eight bedding, clothing, and shoe factories with 1,001,100 *yuan* in capital and 405 employees; twelve paper factories with 4.1 million *yuan* in capital and 437 employees; three printing factories with 5.2 million *yuan* in capital and 379 employees; twelve chemical factories (medicine, soap, leather, pottery, petrol, and so forth) with 17.03 million *yuan* in capital and 674 employees; nine tool factories with 3,662,792 *yuan* in capital and 237 employees; and twelve coal and charcoal factories with 1,777,070 *yuan* in capital and 432 employees. The total figures are sixty-two factories with 59,670,962 *yuan* in capital and 3,991 employees.⁴⁶ Although our industry is still very small and mainly takes the form of handicrafts with not much machine industry, nevertheless during five years of effort, we have laid down an initial foundation and played a part in ensuring supplies and regulating commodity prices. Developing from this foundation, our industry can certainly plan an even greater role.

Our most important self-supporting industries are the textile industry and the bedding and clothing industry. These are what the several tens of thousands of troops and personnel in the official organizations and schools rely upon each year for their cloth, bedding, and clothing. Without them we would freeze. In 1942 our textile industry was already capable of producing over 22,000 bolts of cloth. However, we needed 40,000–50,000 bolts, and we could only reach our goal of self-sufficiency through great efforts. If we want to develop textiles, we must carry out the following policies.

1. We must raise the cotton-cloth import duty and protect native cloth. At the same time, the troops and official organizations and schools must use only native cloth produced in the border region.
2. We must generally encourage peasant women to spin cotton yarn and wool

thread to guarantee supplies of yarn and thread to the factories. At the same time, we can raise the income of the masses.

3. We must solve problems of supply and distribution. Regardless of whether it is through a publicly run, privately run, or family subsidiary, the ability to develop is chiefly related to whether problems of supply and distribution can be solved. With regard to raw materials, we are still not self-sufficient in raw cotton and cotton yarn, and the sources are not dependable. Since communications are not very good either, there are problems in distribution. We must arrange things so that yarn spinners can buy raw cotton whenever they want it, and cloth weavers can buy yarn whenever they want it. With regard to finished products, the markets for cotton cloth and woolen products are not stable. We must arrange things so that producers can sell their products at any time at suitable market prices. These problems must be solved by the combined strength of the financial organs, commercial organs, and the people's cooperatives.

4. As for problems in the supply of clothing and bedding, we must act according to the methods implemented by the Finance Department in 1942 so as to economize on costs and get clothing at the right time.

Our paper-making industry can already produce over 5,000 rolls of malan paper per year. In 1943 we can increase this to 7,000 rolls, which is entirely sufficient for our printing needs. However, we must: (1) unify the production and supply of paper. Malan paper is not suitable for general use apart from printing. It cannot be sold if the printing departments do not want it. At present, we have the following situation: If the printing factories do not use enough, the paper factories cannot sell and have to stockpile, capital turnover is sluggish, and this influences production. In order to solve this contradiction between supply and demand in 1943, we should unify purchase and supply and make precise economic relationships between particular official organizations and paper factories. (2) We must improve the quality of the paper. With existing equipment and technical conditions, the quality of the paper can be improved at a greater cost in work and raw materials. From the point of view of function and significance, a slightly greater cost is worthwhile. At the same time, we must study improvements in paper-making implements so as to raise production efficiency.

Our printing industry is a modernized cultural tool, and a large quantity of

books and papers depend on it. In 1942 printing shops of the Central Committee, Eighth Route Army, and Northwestern Bureau printed 51.6 million characters. In 1943 this can be increased to 53.6 million. However, we must increase equipment and ensure the supply of paper.

Our chemical industry includes medicine, soap, leather, pottery, glass, alcohol, matches, and petrol. The Eighth Route Army and Glorious China [Guanghua] medicine factories can produce some of the Western and Chinese medicines needed for military and public use, but we are still not entirely self-sufficient. In 1943 we should study the medicinal materials produced in the border region and set up the means for buying raw materials so as to increase the production of necessary medicines. The New China and Daguang factories make soap. Their production increases daily, and their quality is good. In addition to meeting our own needs, they can sell outside. In 1943 the New China Factory can produce 420,000 pieces of soap, valued at 7 million *yuan*. And it has prospects for development. The scale of leather tanning is small and the cost of materials high. It cannot develop much. If we could use plant materials produced in the border region to manufacture leather for military use, then there would be some prospect of development. There are three small pottery kilns making pottery for daily and industrial uses. Glass has already been successfully trial-produced, and we have decided to set up a factory. We can also make our own alcohol for industrial and medical use. We have still not been able to solve the problem of supply of phosphorous for making matches. We are now investigating the possibility of getting it from animal bones. Apart from these, there is petrol from Eversong which supplies a little each year for military use. The white wax it contains can be supplied for daily use. In sum, the chemical industry must choose to expand and introduce the supply of things that are urgently needed or are profitable and possible. It should not bother with the rest.

Our tool manufacturing industry supplies spinning machinery, weaving machinery, cotton bowing and crushing machinery, paper-making equipment, horse-drawn carts, carpenters' tools, agricultural implements, and so forth. They are mainly handicraft tools, but they are extremely important. We must do research into improvements and provide for expansion.

Our coal industry⁴⁷ is concentrated in Yan'an and Guanzhong. Its output is chiefly for daily use. Although it is small scale, it is very important.

The border region lacks iron, which impedes the manufacture and improvement of industrial and agricultural tools. At present, we are holding trials in Guanzhong, and there are hopes of success. If we can make iron, we can solve a major problem of the border region.

The above discussion has roughly covered the whole of publicly run, self-sufficient industry. Textiles, papermaking, bedding and clothing, printing, chemical, tool making, and coal all have reasonable prospects for development. Their first target is to meet the needs of the army and government, and their second is to supply some of the people's needs. We should make the following improvements in 1943 in order to meet these targets.

1. Increase capital (the amount to be decided). Each official organization concerned should draw up concrete plans for consideration by the Finance and Economy Office [of the Border Region Government—Caijing banshichu] with the aim of investing in each of the various industries and in certain investigation and research undertakings, in order to promote the development of self-sufficient industry in a planned way.

2. Establish a unified leadership for the whole of self-supporting industry, and overcome the serious anarchy which exists now. The principle of "centralized leadership and dispersed operation" put forward earlier is correct, but it has not been thoroughly implemented. As a result, there is a lack of planning, excessive dispersal in production, a lack of work inspection and waste of manpower and materials among the industries run by the Reconstruction Department, the Finance Department, the troops, and the official organizations. In 1943 we should set up unified leadership under the Finance and Economy Office and first make all self-supporting industry have a unified plan, no matter which branch it controls. In the unified plan we should calculate as a whole the supplies of raw materials, grain, and straw, the totals for production and the coordination of sales. In supplying raw materials we must deal with the problem of many factories facing regular raw-material crises because the region is spread out, and these materials are not concentrated, or because supply comes from outside. In supplying grain and hay, we should provide the factories with the grain and hay they need as calculated by the Finance Department so as to save distracting the responsible people at each factory from their concentration on looking after production. With respect to the problems of production and sales, the Finance

Department and the official organization concerned should, under the unified plan of the Finance and Economy Office, give each factory responsibility to produce a definite amount so that whatever is needed is produced in the quantity required and the finished products are accepted by a definite organ at the right time, solving the contradiction between production and supply. In the unified plan, we must realize mutual aid between enterprises and get rid of departmentalism, which gives rise to independence from each other or even hindrance of each other. We must also realize unified inspection, giving encouragement and criticism so that the poor catch up with the good. In sum, the problem of unified leadership is the central problem in advancing self-supporting industry during 1943. We must make thorough efforts to solve it.

3. Establish the system of economic accounting [*jingji hesuanzhi*], overcome the muddled situation within the enterprises. To achieve this we must do the following. First, each factory unit should have independent capital (liquid and fixed) so that it can handle the capital itself and its production is not frequently hindered by capital problems. Second, income and expenditure in each factory unit should be handled according to fixed regulations and procedures, putting an end to the confused situation in which income and expenditure are not clear and procedures are not settled. Third, according to the actual situation in the factories, some should adopt the cost-accounting system [*chengben kuaijizhi*] and some need not for the time being. However, all factories must calculate costs. Fourth, each factory should have regulations for inspecting the rate of progress in completing the annual and monthly plans. They should not let things slide by doing without inspections for long periods. Fifth, each factory should have regulations for economizing on raw materials and looking after tools and for fostering the practice of doing these things. All these points are the chief elements of the system of economic accounting. Once we have a strict accounting system, we can examine fully whether an enterprise operates profitably.

4. Improve factory organization and administration, overcome the tendency to build organizations like those of government organs [*jiguanhua*] and relaxation of discipline. The first thing we must reform is the irrational phenomenon of excessive staffing in factories. At present, many of our factories are extremely irrationally organized. There are too many staff, the organization is too large, the ratio between administrative staff and those directly involved in production is

not right, and systems for administering large factories are being used in our small factories. These phenomena must be quickly corrected so that all factories carry out “enterprization” [*qiyehua*].⁴⁸ All factories should shrink or grow according to their economic prosperity. All salaries should be paid from the factories’ own profit and not from the grain tax, government clothing, and government grants. Second, we should implement the ten-hour work system and the progressive piecework wage system [*jijian leijin gongzizhi*] so as to raise work enthusiasm and increase production. The eight-hour system is something to be implemented in the future with the development of large-scale industry. At present, we should universally implement the ten-hour system and make employees understand that this is a requirement of the War of Resistance. An egalitarian system of wages destroys the distinction between skilled labor and unskilled labor and the distinction between industriousness and laziness, thus lowering work enthusiasm. We can stimulate labor enthusiasm and increase the quantity and quality of production only by replacing it with a progressive piecework wage system. For the moment, industrial production in the army cannot adopt the piecework wage system and should have the piecework incentive system [*jijian jiangli zhidu*]. Next, we should improve the work of the workers’ congress [*zhigonghui*] and launch a Zhao Zhankui⁴⁹ movement in every factory. Work done by the workers’ congresses which is not suitable for raising labor discipline and activism must be changed. Within a factory, the work of the administration, Party branch, and workers’ congress must be united toward common ends. These common ends are to save as much as possible on costs (raw materials, tools, and other expenses), to make as many and as good products as possible, and to sell them as quickly and as profitably as possible. These tasks of lower costs, better products, and faster sales are the tasks shared by the administration, Party branch, and workers’ congress, all three of which should unite as one. Working methods which divide their work into three separate areas are entirely wrong. The three sides must organize a unified committee, in the first place, to put administrative personnel, administrative work, and production plans on the right track. The task of the Party and the workers’ congress is to ensure completion of the production plans. Finally, the factory should reward the workers and employees with the greatest achievements, and criticize or punish workers and employees who commit errors. Without a suitable system of rewards

and punishments, we cannot ensure the improvement of labor discipline and labor enthusiasm.

5. Strengthen and enlarge textile mills, increase output of bolts of cotton cloth, and struggle to achieve complete self-sufficiency in cotton cloth used by the government in 1944. Improve woolen goods and, after supplying the army's needs, increase the amount exported. In the bedding and clothing industry fix standards for the cotton cloth used and the methods for making it. Ensure that cotton garments and bedding can be used for two years.

6. Put paper-making factories in order, improve the quality of paper. Ensure it is fully satisfactory for printing and office use. Make us entirely self-sufficient in paper for printing and office use in 1944.

7. Increase production of coal and oil, and ensure self-sufficiency and also some exports. Set up ways of making or buying phosphorous so that match factories can be established. As for other industries, continue with or enlarge those that are urgently needed or profitable. All those that do not match the principle of ensuring supplies or are unprofitable should be merged or closed down.

VIII. On the Development of the Productive Undertakings of the Troops

Which of the three branches of the public sector of our economy—the government, the army, or the official organizations—is ultimately the most important in terms of directly meeting requirements most quickly and in greatest quantity? Our experience of the past few years shows that it is the army. The army's productive undertakings have become the most important part of the public sector of our economy because the army is the body which is relatively most organized and has the most labor power. So long as it has no direct fighting duties, it can use all its time outside training doing work. And under our present backward technical conditions, labor is the decisive factor in economic undertakings.

The production movement in the garrison forces of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region began in 1938 and a year before that in the official organizations and schools. A joint production movement of the army and the official organizations and schools together began in 1939. In 1940, the 359th Brigade took on the duty of defense on the Yellow River and joined in the production movement. In 1941 and 1942, the army increased its responsibility for self-supporting production, just like the official organizations and schools. However, the tasks taken on by the army were greater and occupied the most important position in the total volume of self-supporting production. It would have been impossible if, during these years, the army had not for the most part provided its own means of livelihood and running costs and instead had relied on the government. Responding to the Party Center and the Northwestern Bureau's call for "production self-sufficiency," the army has fulfilled its production tasks in the midst of the urgent work of fighting, guarding, and training. The objective circumstances of some troop units are better than those of others; some have more duties than others, some have worked harder than others, and some have employed better methods of production than others. As a result, their respective levels of achievement have varied. Nevertheless, in general they have all fulfilled

their tasks. With very little capital and backward techniques, they have all developed agriculture, handicrafts, transport, and commerce. Some have even set up relatively large-scale textile and paper-making factories. During these two years, the capital invested by the government in the army's productive undertakings has not exceeded 6–7 million *yuan* in total. However, during that time they have both ensured supplies worth over 300 million *yuan* and they have accumulated roughly 80 million *yuan* in capital from their agriculture, industry, and commerce. They have opened up several tens of thousands of *mu* of land and have supplied rich experience for the whole of production construction. They have not only played a political and military role in the protection of the border region but have also played a role in directly providing a large amount of financial supplies and in helping to develop the border region economy.

Let us take a look at the self-supporting production of a certain company in a certain regiment. The income and expenditure of this company during 1941 are shown in [Table 8.1](#).

With the exception of 750 *yuan* in production capital from upper levels, miscellaneous payments of 360 *yuan* from the office, supplementary production payments of 2,855 *yuan*, and supplementary provisions payments of 3,771 *yuan* given by the regimental supplies office, a total of 7,736 *yuan*, the expenditure of 52,530 *yuan* [*sic*] shown [in [Table 8.1](#)] was met by the company's own production of 44,794 *yuan*. This excludes the capital accumulated for use in production for the following year.

According to these figures, each regiment of ten companies can be self-supporting up to 440,440 *yuan* [*sic*].

Furthermore, there is still the self-supporting production run by the regimental headquarters [shown in [Table 8.2](#)]. The total value of production of the companies, battalions, and regiments is 703,828 *yuan*. The regiment's total annual expenditure (including grain and a proportion of clothing and bedding) is 896,838 *yuan*, which leaves a shortfall of 185,510 *yuan* [*sic*] to be supplemented from upper levels. As a result, the regiment's own self-supporting production accounts for 79 percent of consumption and supplements from above account for 21 percent. If we add the large amount of self-supporting production carried out by the brigade headquarters, the proportion for the whole brigade far exceeds 80 percent.

Table 8.1 Income and Expenditure of a Regimental Company in 1941

1941 Income (<i>yuan</i>)	1941 Expenditure (<i>yuan</i>)	
Transport of coal and charcoal (<i>shitan</i>)	698.20	Miscellaneous expenses 1,312.00
Transport of salt	772.45	2 mules 2,850.00
Saw planks	3,256.40	1 donkey 574.00
Wooden beams	630.00	600 sweatshirts 600.00
Pig sales	738.02	Shoes (2 pairs per man) 405.50
Stables	2,256.00	87 towels 128.00
Corn sales	998.20	Tobacco 179.00
Export business	935.60	Basins 90.00
Miscellaneous business	481.25	Production tools 181.00
Oil (840 <i>jin</i>)	16,800.00	Oil 16,880.00
Meat (1,610 <i>jot</i>)	16,100.00	Meat 16,100.00
Vegetables (4,690 <i>jin</i>)	4,690.00	Vegetables 4,690.00
Charcoal (5,000 <i>jin</i>)	500.00	Charcoal 500.00
Firewood (2,555 <i>jin</i>)	2,555.00	Firewood 2,555.00
Received production capital	750.00	Supplementary provisions 3,771.00
Miscellaneous office payments	360.00	5 months' pay 567.50
Supplementary production		
Rifle-cleaning	22.00	payments 3,885.00
Summer clothing	100.00	
Supplementary provisions		
New Year costs	146.00	payments 3,771.00
Office	339.00	
Horse feed	620.00	
Total	59,147.12	Total 52,530.00
Net income 6,537.12 <i>yuan</i> [*]		

* The sum of the income column is in fact 601,77.12 and the expenditure column 52,610, giving a net income of 7,567.12 *yuan*. The tables probably contain a number of typographical errors which are carried over in the discussion. There are discrepancies between the 1947 and 1949 editions.

Table 8.2 The Values (in *yuan*) of Self-Supporting Production by Regimental Headquarters

Regimental headquarters	197,426
Directly controlled forces	27,149
First Battalion headquarters	18,628
Second Battalion	12,777
Third Battalion headquarters	7,408
Total	263,389

The following material is a summary by the Garrison Office of five years' production by the garrison army. We can see the general situation in self-supporting production by the army.

A Summary of Five Years' Production by the Garrison Army

a. Outline

In the new and difficult environment since the War of Resistance and following Chairman Mao's call for production, the garrison army began the production movement in the autumn of 1938. At the time, production did not yet aim at self-sufficiency and was merely making up for deficiencies in the necessities of life. We could only give each member of the forces 0.05 *yuan* for vegetables and 1.5 *jin* of grain per day. At the market prices of the time, each *yuan* could buy 30–40 *jin* of vegetables, 2 *jin* of edible oil, or 100 *jin* of firewood. With a hundred men in a company, each day they had 5 *yuan* for vegetables. If they bought vegetables, they could not buy oil, salt, and firewood. If they bought oil, salt, and firewood, they could not buy vegetables. Pork was even further beyond their reach. As for their clothing and bedding, you could rarely see a soldier whose clothing was not darned and patched. Bullet bags were so tattered that they could no longer carry bullets, which had to be put in pouches. Some wore padded clothes in summer, and some wore shorts in winter. Some went on parade barefoot in the snow, and some could not even find a broken old leather bag for leg wrappings. These were the material conditions of the troops then.

The methods used in the production movement at that time were: (i) to set up cooperatives; (ii) to plant a lot of vegetables; (iii) to set up grinding mills, to raise pigs and sheep, to make bean curd, and to grow bean sprouts; (iv) to mobilize every soldier to learn to make shoes; (v) to knit woolen clothes, socks, shoes, and gloves; and (vi) to promote economy and prevent waste. The result of half a year's production in 1938 exceeded the plan, and the soldiers' lives were greatly improved. For example, they ensured self-sufficiency in vegetables, each week they had two pork meals, they partly met requirements for woolen clothes, socks, gloves, and shoes, and they supplemented the supply of bullet bags, pouches, leather bags, and leggings.

The significant achievements in production in the latter half of 1938 raised the troops' enthusiasm

for, and trust in, production. So in 1939 even greater tasks for self-supporting production could be put forward, reducing the burden on the people of the border region. In 1939 it was stipulated that in their agricultural work, the troops should plant grain as well as vegetables so as to fulfill the task of producing 4,700 *dan* of grain. Most production in 1939 was agricultural, and 25,136 *mu* of new land was opened up over the whole year. At first, it was estimated that 2 *dou* of hulled grain could be harvested per *mu*, giving a total of 4,986 *dan*. But because the new land was just being broken in, there were not enough agricultural tools, leadership experience was uneven, and some of the land suffered natural disasters, so only 2,590 *dan* of hulled grain was harvested. At this time, the troops still had little capital and commerce had not yet developed.

In 1940 the production tasks for the troops stipulated that each section should provide grain for a month and a half, a total of 3,400 *dan*. In that year the troops opened up 20,679.7 *mu* of land, which should have yielded 4,136 *dan* of hulled grain. Because the harvest was poor, they only obtained 2,400 *dan*. In order to fulfill its duties, each section also took on salt transport, digging licorice root and felling trees (in Guanzhong they also did some commercial work). The garrison army earned a total profit of 2,236,516.16 *yuan* from this supplementary production. This, together with the agricultural harvest, provided grain for a month and a half and also met part of the supplements for equipment.

In 1941 the operating budget for all troops was 4,479,536.40 *yuan*, and the task for production was to provide 400,000 *yuan*. However, the result was entirely different. The requirement for operating expenses and the task for self-supporting production were much greater than originally estimated. Chiefly as a result of the call by Commander Zhu to select six battalions to obtain salt, we received a total of 56,966 packs of salt, valued at 236,408.90 *yuan*. In agriculture 14,794.6 *mu* were opened up and 1,170 *dan* of miscellaneous grains harvested. In commerce the total profit was 12,019,592.72 *yuan*. Because of price inflation, the value of paper money fell. Regular expenses and clothing and bedding expenses for the whole year were 7,881,757.17 *yuan*. (All this excludes the income and expenditure of one regiment and the forces in Guanzhong.) The average daily expenses for provisions per man over the whole year was 0.50 *yuan*. Apart from the 0.10 *yuan* issued by the state, we provided 0.40 *yuan* ourselves, a total of 2,592,000 *yuan*. The total for the above regular expenses, bedding and clothing expenses, and provisions expenses was 10,473,757.17 *yuan*, 5,673,804.35 *yuan* above the original budget. There was still a surplus after payments were made from production income.

In 1942 the budget for expenses (excluding grain, clothing, and bedding) was 5,833,636 *yuan*, and we took on the task of helping central expenses with 2.5 million *yuan*. The year's production plan was for 12.4 million *yuan*. By August (statistics for the later period not yet available), commerce had earned a profit of 38,969,230.20 *yuan*, and industry had a profit of 431,773.40 *yuan*, for a total of 39,401,004.60 *yuan*.

By June we had received 1,440,058.60 *yuan* for running expenses, and supplementary expenses of 206,825 *yuan* for the first issue of summer clothing. Actual expenditures comprised running expenses, 7,750,598.85 *yuan*; supplements for bedding and clothing, 3,067,730.60 *yuan*; and supplements for provisions (the state issued 0.70 *yuan* per man per day, and the actual cost was 3.00 *yuan*) over the half-year, 9,180,000 *yuan*. Most of the winter clothing and bedding for the latter half of the year was provided by the brigades and regiments themselves. The second issue of summer clothing, half the padded clothing, 40 percent of the bedding, and bindings, bullet bags, grenade pouches, padded cotton shoes, and light shoes—these eight items had a total value of 12,641,200 *yuan*. Other things, such as charcoal for heating in winter, were provided by each unit itself. As for animal fodder, in 1941 we provided two months' horse feed ourselves. In 1942 the Finance Department issued eight months' hay for horses, leaving two months' unaccounted for. In general, we cut two months' supply of grass ourselves, saving roughly 1.2 million *yuan*. Furthermore, in 1942 the budget for horse fodder was 11,000 *dan*. According to the regulations of the Finance Department, 1 *dou* of hulled grain is

equivalent to 2 *dou* of horse fodder. But this is insufficient, and it is necessary to increase the annual amount by 2,750 *dan*, which comes to 1,375,000 *yuan* at 500 *yuan* per *dan*.

The outcome of five years' production has been that, besides meeting annual running expenses, clothing and bedding expenses, and provisions expenses, current financial assets include 24 million *yuan* in commercial capital, 556 transport animals (excluding plow oxen, and excluding the First and Fifth regiments) with a value of 11,232,000 *yuan*, and factory capital of 712,000 *yuan*. The combined total is 35,944,000 *yuan*.

(Note: The above summary does not include the 359th Brigade and the Peace Preservation Corps [*bao'an budui*].)

b. Lessons

1. The reason the forces of the border region have been able to carry out self-supporting production and solve great problems over the past few years is their immense labor power and better organizational strength and the fact that the border region also has rich resources to develop. This experience proves that the troops can be entirely self-sufficient. Because the troops have solved the problem of self-sufficiency over the past few years and have increased their faith in production, they have realized that self-sufficiency is one of the major tasks in building up the army and is one of the best methods of overcoming hardships and coming through a difficult period.

2. The production construction of the troops is part of the economic construction of the entire border region. Although in the past the troops did well in working hard to fulfill production tasks, ideologically they did not emphasize the relationship with the construction of the border region. Therefore they still had a shallow understanding of the development of the agricultural and industrial base. They were not good enough at working hard to establish a secure foundation. Their thinking on unified construction was also muddled. There was even a lack of coordination between units and incidents of serious breaches of command discipline. These shortcomings must be resolutely and ruthlessly corrected.

3. Under conditions of backward production methods, the production base must chiefly be built up depending on the labor power and economic base of each unit. Therefore, the government's financial and economic policy should look after the productive undertakings of these units. Within the confines of the government's unified policy, they should be allowed full development and profitability. Only in this way can the development of productive undertakings have greater organization, greater strength, greater unity, greater rationality, and greater ability to fight the blockade in a unified way. The greatest shortcoming of the troops in production is to pay most attention to commerce and to neglect agriculture. In the future they must improve and encourage agricultural production.

4. In their productive work, the troops should grasp ideological leadership tightly and set up and strengthen the regulations and leadership organs in production. They should correct and guard against cadres doing things without coordination, becoming decadent, eating and living well, spending recklessly, not economizing, not stressing effective results, and adopting other corrupt practices.

The above sums up our opinions.

The self-supporting production of the 359th Brigade is the best among the various units in the garrison forces. In the first place, the leading comrades of the

359th Brigade have grasped the strategy of agriculture first, industry and transport second, and commerce third. They have taken advantage of their lack of active duties, the suitable environment of Nanniwan for agriculture and of the Suide-Mizhi special military area for light industry. They have mobilized a large amount of labor power and within three years have completed large assignments for economic self-sufficiency. In particular, they have grasped the policy of taking agriculture as the core so that the economic base rests on a secure foundation. Second, the troops of the 359th Brigade have carried out the following concrete economic construction: (i) Their grain production in 1940 was a failure, but they were not disheartened. They persevered in 1941 and had tremendous results. In 1942 they strengthened this foundation. They opened up 25,000 *mu* of land and planted grain, vegetables, hemp, and tobacco, meeting the troops' requirements for vegetables, lamp oil, hemp for shoes, and tobacco, and supplementing supplies of grain, vegetable oil, horse beans, and fodder. Thus after only two years' work, they laid the foundation for the agricultural economy of all the companies in the brigade. Furthermore, the period of labor for all the officers and men was no more than two months per year. Ten months were left for troop exercises, and training was not impeded. According to the new method thought out by the brigade, each company sets up a specialist agricultural labor group of six or seven men and the masses of soldiers only provide extensive assistance during the busy agricultural seasons. In this way, training time is even greater. (ii) They have used the farms to develop animal husbandry. In 1942 the whole brigade maintained 2,000 pigs which met the troops' requirements for meat and oil. Since the troops ate more meat, they saved grain. In addition, they organized groups of men to gather firewood, make charcoal and saw planks, which not only provided for their own fuel and building needs but also provided a surplus for sale. (iii) They also built up industry and handicrafts. In 1941 they assigned some soldiers and rear service personnel to establish the Daguang Textile Mill and Daguang Soap Factory. Now there are Daguang products on the market in addition to those they consume themselves. They set up ten salt wells in Suide and Nanniwan, one charcoal pit, two carpentry factories, three iron factories, six mills, eight flour mills, and one oil press. They also mobilized the soldiers during their spare time after training to spin woolen thread, to make various kinds of utensils from willow and elm wands, to make writing boards from birch bark, to

make vegetable boxes, and to make lamp lighters. This work done by the soldiers not only benefited the whole but also profited the individuals. The brigade stipulated that four-fifths of all the products of handicraft labor done using publicly owned tools should come under public ownership and one-fifth should belong to the private individual, and that two-thirds of that produced not using publicly owned tools should come under public ownership and one-third should belong to the private individual. This method provided commodities for public use and was also equivalent to raising the soldiers' pay. (iv) They established a strong transport undertaking. Now they have a transport team which owns 600 pack-mules and is fully engaged in the transport of salt and goods. Along the road between Suide, Sanbian, and Yan'an, they have set up ten stables and settled a group of older and weaker personnel. (v) Their commercial organ is the Daguang Store, which has ten branches besides the main shop. The profit in the first nine months of 1942 was over 6 million *yuan*. However, this commerce only makes up 10 percent of the brigade's total production of 60 million *yuan* (at Yan'an market prices). (vi) The brigade has implemented a unified production plan and regulations for production and supply. The production plan for the whole brigade is fixed by the brigade headquarters. Some undertakings are directly run by the brigade headquarters, such as large-scale industry, transport, and commerce. Others are run by the regiments and companies, such as agriculture, animal husbandry, small industry, and commerce. Inspections are carried out at each level from brigade down to individual companies. The regulations for production are also fixed by the brigade headquarters. The arrangements for soldiers spinning woolen thread described above is an example of this. The regulations for supply also preserve unity. Although the agricultural, industrial, transport, and commercial undertakings are each run separately, all expenditures above a certain level must be approved from above. Lower levels cannot spend freely. This prevents instances where free spending of the fruits of production bring unequal blessings or waste. It ensures the unity of the whole brigade. (vii) They not only have developed large amounts of production but also have rigorously carried out the policy of strict economy. For example, they decreed that they would issue three suits of summer clothing every two years and two suits of padded clothing every three years and that new bedding and clothing would only be issued in exchange for old. They also issued needles and thread to

the soldiers so that they could repair clothes themselves. Thereafter, bedding and clothing lasted longer, and the soldiers took greater care of them, greatly reducing these expenses. As mentioned above, they ordered the soldiers to make writing boards from birch bark, vegetable boxes, and lamp lighters and issued wool to the soldiers to knit socks, gloves, and so forth. This not only increased the supply of daily necessities but also economized on purchases of these things. All building construction and tool repairs for the whole brigade are done by the troops, and none are contracted out. All these things have not only economized on expenditures but have also developed care for public property among the officers and men, attention to results, opposition to waste, and a simple style of work that rejects ostentation.

The following material is a summary of the three years' production by the 359th Brigade drawn up by its leading comrades. It shows us the actual situation in the brigade's agriculture, industry, and commerce.

A Summary of Production and Construction in the 359th Brigade over the Past Three Years

In the three years since this brigade has returned to take up the defense of the border region, implementation of the economic policy of self-reliance and self-sufficiency has been a new creation in building up the army. With the exception of grain received from the government, we have achieved 82 percent self-sufficiency in all other expenses through carrying out this policy. In this way, we overcame difficulties with material resources, improved our troops' provisions, consolidated our forces, promoted the physical strength of the soldiers, consolidated army discipline, and strengthened the ties between the army and the people. The following outlines our experience over the past three years in agricultural, industrial, and commercial operations.

a. Agriculture

In response to the call for a production movement, we began agricultural production in 1940. We planned to plow and plant enough land to be self-sufficient for two months' grain, to be entirely self-sufficient in vegetables beginning in the summer, and to raise enough pigs to cover our meat requirement for the New Year festivities. However, since the areas where we were stationed in Suide, Mizhi, and Wuqi *xian* were heavily populated with little spare land, we had to travel to places more than 100 *li* away (Jiulishan and Qingjian) to open up new land, and we wasted a lot of time in travel. Although enthusiastic and taking pains, we did not investigate carefully or plan suitably. As a result, the harvest did not match the capital spent on tools and seeds. However, the vegetables planted near where we were stationed enabled us to be self-sufficient in these after the summer. Each provisions

unit was issued 0.10 *yuan* provisions expenses per man per day, barely enough to buy oil and salt. The troops had to go up to 100 *li* away carrying charcoal for sale. They earned enough to make more charcoal and a surplus to buy pigs to raise. These productive activities laid the foundation for the companies to improve provisions. Apart from opening up all the public unused land (public cemeteries, the neighborhood of temples, odd pieces of land near cities, stretches of old unused road, old military defense works, and so forth) around the towns of Suide, Mizhi, Jiaxian, Wuqi, and Qingjian, where we were stationed, and along the river defenses, we also rented land from the local inhabitants to plant vegetables. The spirit of bitter struggle and hard work of the commanders and troops gained great sympathy and understanding from people of all walks of life. Some of the landlords from whom we rented land (like the landlords and rich peasants of Yihezhen) would not accept our rent payments. Other poor peasants voluntarily granted temporary tenant rights. This came from the deep sympathy and concern of the people for the army. For those stationed in poor agricultural regions, particularly those where the climate only suited summer and autumn crops, agricultural production was not only necessary to solve difficulties in running expenses but was also essential to maintain the correct relationship with the people. From the end of 1939 to the spring of 1940, the troops did not have enough expenses for provisions and were short of vegetables. Personnel sent out to buy sometimes resorted to the serious actions of forced purchases or purchases at unfair prices. In carrying out agricultural production, we ensured a good political influence among the people, with the exception of the small number of people in the *xian* towns who relied on market gardening for their livelihood and spoke angrily of the poor defense forces who offered no profit.

We solved the following problems with our production in 1940. (i) We became self-sufficient in vegetables after May. (ii) We added pig-raising to self-sufficiency in vegetables and improved provisions in the latter half of the year so that each man could eat 1 *jin* of meat per month. (iii) Each provisions unit made its own agricultural implements and raised more than ten pigs. (iv) We proved the old saying: "If you have vegetables you have half a year's grain; if you have no vegetables you have half a year's famine." The troops' grain was sufficient. (v) Planting grain meant opening up new land. In the first year we obtained no profit from grain since it was too far from where we were stationed. We could not weed at the right time, and we wasted too much effort in travel. For these reasons, the planned grain harvest was not realized.

In 1941 the troops found land that they could farm and implemented the farming policy that the commander-in-chief himself ordered. Each man on average farmed 6 *mu* of land. Each *mu* needed seven days' work, including opening up, planting seed, weeding, and harvesting. Six *mu* required forty-two days' work, from which was obtained roughly 3 *dou* (a low to medium harvest) of hulled millet and hay, also worth 3 *dou* of hulled grain. The grain and hay together could be exchanged for one suit of padded clothing. If a medium to high harvest could be obtained, the return would increase by one-quarter. Various secondary crops such as corn, hemp, and sesame also gave a harvest the same as that of millet. Around the edges of the 6 *mu* we could plant many subsidiary crops, such as castor, pumpkins, and beans, producing good harvests. In addition, each man planted half a *mu* to provide vegetables for a whole year. Also, among the products were hot peppers, garlic, onions, lamp oil, tobacco, and grass rope for sandals. Since we had field crops, it was easy to raise domestic animals, such as pigs, cows, sheep, chickens, ducks, and rabbits. As raising pigs was most profitable, it was the major subsidiary. Figuring one pig for every five men, a hundred men could raise twenty pigs. In addition to this, they could raise three sows. Every year each sow can have two litters of at the very least four piglets. With no swine fever and no untoward events, they could produce twenty-four pigs per year. Killing pigs at a rate of two per month, we would have to kill twenty-four per year. The pig-breeding rate would counterbalance the slaughter rate, and there would still be surplus piglets. From birth to slaughter, piglets can grow 5 *liang* per day on average. In actual practice, the

annual average was indeed one pig per five men.

As a result of agricultural production, there was a lot of vegetable refuse. Since we were grinding flour, we got the chaff remains from the husking, and since we were making bean curd, we got the bean residue, and so forth. We could raise the pigs using waste and gain great benefits. Now the entire brigade has achieved all the above. The wealth obtained from agriculture and animal husbandry by each provisions unit is increasing. All this wealth is controlled by the Party branch, supervised by all the soldiers, and used rationally according to the regulations laid down at high levels. As yet, there is no summary for 1942, but harvests will definitely be no less than those of last year.

Reviewing the agricultural production movement, we can make the following summary of its merits and shortcomings.

Merits

1. The troops carried out political mobilization concerning performance of the tasks so that all personnel realized that the slogan of self-sufficiency in production put forward by Chairman Mao was of great significance in maintaining unity in the War of Resistance and in passing through an economic crisis. The commander-in-chief himself led the way after his return to the border region and strengthened the soldiers' enthusiasm and endurance.

2. Improvements in real livelihood made us feel the advantages of the production movement.

3. The brigade and regiments fixed the entire annual production plan, stipulated the production tasks for the companies, and conscientiously supervised the regiments' guidance and supervision of the companies' production.

4. The companies organized production committees to discuss and arrange the implementation of production tasks, to inspect and examine the economy (the companies' economies are entirely public), and to ensure implementation of the supply regulations.

5. Now every company is enjoying a self-sufficient, rich peasant family standard of living because of its agricultural production.

Shortcomings

1. We have not paid full attention to production tools, we have not organized and employed plow oxen, and we have not selected some soldiers (from among the cooks) to specialize in farming throughout the year. We have generally adopted the method of all-around mobilization, wasting time and impeding troop training.

2. Some cadres have taken a negative attitude toward farming and do not strive to reap a larger harvest by extending the land farmed.

3. We have not been conscientious in gathering manure.

4. We have no cadres specially directing production.

According to experience, we must use oxen for plowing, carting manure and harvesting (using oxcarts), prepare sufficient tools, assign cadres with special responsibility for directing production (a deputy battalion leader for production and company leaders with special duties), assign soldiers (from among the cooks) to carry out agricultural production throughout the year, mobilize all the officers and men to take part at planting, weeding, and harvesting times, and stipulate the number of workdays so as to use a fixed amount of time. In this way, the total work per man to farm 6 *mu* and cut a year's firewood will not exceed two months, and we shall not

only get grain but will also become entirely self-sufficient for all daily vegetables, meat, straw, shoes, firewood, shoes, and socks. The last few items alone make up one-third of all running expenses, so they cannot be considered a small problem. The grain harvest can sustain 2,000 men.

The above is a brief summary of the brigade's agricultural production.

The following list shows how much work and time it would cost a provisions unit for a hundred men to travel over 60 *li* to make its purchases if it did not plant vegetables itself.

Monthly vegetable consumption (1 <i>jin</i> per man per day)	3,000 <i>jin</i>
Number of purchases (each time buying 100 <i>jin</i>)	30 times
Labor days per purchase (each time using 2 men)	4 days
Actual days per purchase (there and back 2 days)	2 days
Labor days per month	120 days
Actual days per month	60 days
Labor days per year	1,440 days
Actual days per year	720 days

Using this table alone we can expose the lie that "agricultural production is profitless and hinders training."

b. Industry

There follows a summary of our experience in establishing and developing the Glory Textile Mill and other handicrafts.

1. Motivation and intention

The troops need clothing and bedding every year. The raw materials for bedding and clothing are the chief problems in supply work. In the winter of 1939 after the troops returned to the defense of the border region, we had difficulties in buying these raw materials and also had no money. In response to the call by Chairman Mao for self-reliance, self-sufficiency, and overcoming difficulties to build up the border region, we made a long-term plan to run a textile mill.

2. Trial beginnings

We began to think about running a textile mill in September 1940. At the time there was a man from Hebei in the short-term training class set up by the supply department who could weave cloth. We set up a small wooden loom, bought some foreign yarn, and tried it out. Within ten days, all the yarn was woven, and the cloth was quite good. We could weave 100 feet per day [Chinese measurements], and costs worked out to be one-third cheaper than buying cloth.

Since there were weavers among the troops we decided to set up a factory and undertook the following: (i) we bought wood and built nineteen small looms in our own machine repair shop, and we bought four metal looms from Shanxi; (ii) we bought yarn from local merchants on credit; (iii) we selected twenty skilled men from places like Gaoyang in Hebei who were among the troops.

In this way the factory got going. It was not only profitable and convenient, but also solved problems in buying cloth.

In December 1940 we decided to enlarge the factory in order to achieve self-sufficiency in cloth for

the whole brigade.

Early in 1941 we abolished service personnel at all levels throughout the brigade and gathered together more than a hundred youths as apprentices to study weaving.

We again bought two iron looms from northwestern Shanxi and made a further eleven large wooden ones ourselves. In February and March we made another sixteen large wooden looms and fourteen more toward the end of March. We thus had sixty-six looms of all kinds. At the same time, we made spinning wheels and other essential small implements.

With regard to raw materials, in 1941 the government issued the brigade with 400,000 *yuan* in capital for production. Of this, 250,000 *yuan* was divided among the regiments. Of the remaining 150,000 *yuan*, 100,000 was spent buying 300 bales of yarn (each bale was 7 *jin*, 14 *liang*, and cost 280–290 *yuan*) and some things that had to be bought (such as the wire for the looms which we could not make ourselves and had to purchase).

Administered by the supply department accountants, the workers divided into yarn starchers, weavers, thread joiners [*luoxian*], and threaders [*daxian*]. Each group had twenty to thirty men. About ten skilled men became master workmen and took charge of the technical work in starching and reeling the yarn. Intelligent youths studied weaving, and the less bright and the younger did threading and thread joining.

As soon as the looms started working, we became aware of a need for more labor power. So under the name of Daguang Textile Mill, we employed fifty young boys and girls from the Suide area as apprentices. We also took captured bandits and people who had committed mistakes from the military courts. In this way we assembled our labor force. There were then more than 200 workers administered by the military training unit and the supply department. They were divided into four platoons and twelve squads (including one women's platoon; each platoon had three squads of ten or more people).

The factory was roughly taking shape. But there were still two difficult problems to be solved, first the supply of capital and raw materials, and second the control, education, and training of the workers.

a. The problem of the supply of capital and raw materials

In May 1941 we borrowed 200,000 *yuan* from the Border Region Bank, but it did not provide support for long. After that we had to make friends, build up relationships, liaise with rich merchants, and buy raw materials on credit, making repayments at fixed periods.

Before May 1941, most foreign yarn was bought from Shanxi. Afterward, because supplies were cut off, we could only buy from Xi'an and Yan'an (Shenxin and Guanghe brands). We also bought raw cotton from Xi'an and Yan'an.

The supply of local yarn came as a result of the government's encouragement of local women to spin. At first, the wage for spinning 1 *jin* of yarn was from 3 to 7 *yuan* (raw cotton cost 4 *yuan* per *jin*), and it was divided into three grades. In July and August this was changed to issuing 1 *jin* of prepared cotton in return for 1 *jin* of yarn. In February and March of 1942 this was again changed into 2 *jin* or 2 *jin*, 2 *liang*, for 1 *jin* of yarn.

Because the supply of yarn from the people was insufficient and of poor quality, we set up our own yarn-spinning factory with four cotton-bowing machines and forty spinning machines in October 1941. By July 1942 we still lacked skilled workers and the cotton bowed by the machines could not all be used on the machines (the raw cotton was poor). Now only the four bowing machines are still going, and the spinning has stopped.

b. The problem of controlling, educating, and training the workers.

The number of workers has increased, but there are many different elements, and they are not easy to control. The young service personnel in particular were used to a free life and had not taken part in labor before they left home. At first they would fight, curse, and carry on every day. They would say "We've seen all the officers, big and small" and would not accept any controls.

Most of the women from the villages had come because of marriage problems. They had been sent to the factory by the women's aid committee or the government. Whenever they talked of marriage, some cried and others laughed. They often asked for help in solving their marriage problems.

Persuading captured bandits to work was difficult.

Many of the people being punished for mistakes were company and platoon cadres who maintained their old character, were unwilling to work, and were troublemakers.

From January to March 1941, the head of the supply department tried hard to correct them and achieved some success.

During this time, approximately twenty skilled workers acted as master workers and taught the youths in the weaving group. First they used the small looms (needing little strength and easy to manage). The master worker did all the preliminaries and told them how to start the loom, how to connect broken threads, how to handle the shuttle, and how to coordinate hand and foot. At the beginning they wove for only two or three hours a day. After one or two months, this group had mastered these looms and moved on to the large wooden ones, and another group came to learn. Thus group-by-group teaching went on until March 1941.

The work of joining the threads and threading was easy to learn and only required patience. Once you had learned to join the threads properly you were all right. But it required practice. When unpracticed, the results were not good enough for weaving.

When the work began and the young apprentices sat at the looms or did their joining and threading, their backsides ached after a short time, yarn easily broke, tempers rose, there was little patience, and they wasted a lot of thread and broke some looms. So before March 1941 products were no good.

Apart from strengthening technical training and raising technical stalls, the chief way of dealing with this was political encouragement and education in revolutionary labor discipline. This made the workers consciously realize the important significance of production, made them patient in their work, and improved their enthusiasm for production and their labor discipline.

Various methods of education were used to implement military discipline. The head of the supply department, He Weizhong, the head of the military training unit, and the branch Party secretary personally came to give guidance every day, explaining that production at the rear was equal to fighting at the front, that they should accept organization, that work was glorious, and that they were the working class. We proposed a competition, with emulation between apprentices and emulation between male and female workers. We implemented a system of rewards and punishments and a system for getting time off. At the same time, each person was given some writing materials every month, and we bought some entertainment equipment.

Thereafter, the workers felt that to work was glorious. After work, they wanted to study culture and politics and to live a military life. As a result, life became organized on military lines. In this way, we gradually set up the soldier-worker system, and the factory got going in the right way. Before breakfast, there were early morning exercises and

running. After breakfast, they went to work. In winter and spring there was a ten-hour day.

We then encountered new difficulties.

The factory site was a rented house. As it was not convenient for work, we built ten or so cave dwellings ourselves for the workers to live in. Unexpectedly, the cave dwellings were moist and damp, the workers developed sores, and many of them could not work. So we changed the new caves into storerooms, and the workers moved into the rented house. In June we began to build five stone cave dwellings for the looms, and they were not completed until October. During this period there was nowhere to put the looms. The only thing we could do was put them in the courtyards and work under tents. In May and June, there was early morning dew, and it often rained. Wet thread is no good for weaving. In July, the weather was hot, and the sun strong. The threads became very dry, which was also no good for weaving. The only thing we could do then was cover the looms in wet army blankets and pour water on the ground. But this worked for only two or three hours and, as can be imagined, created a lot of problems.

The months from June to September passed in this way. The new caves were completed in October, and we also built one-story houses with a total of twenty-seven rooms for the workers to live in. Only then were all these problems overcome.

As for raising the workers' technical level, after June the youths gradually became skilled and some even exceeded the master workers.

The first week that they were apprentices, they generally worked for only two or three hours a day and made four or five feet of cloth. After two or three weeks, they worked for seven or eight hours a day and could weave 10 to 40 feet. After April, they could do 40 to 50 feet, and by May, 60 to 70. After June, they had all become skilled workers, and the best could weave 120 to 130 feet a day. During this time the quality of cloth continuously improved.

We can say that after June 1941 the factory was consolidated and began to develop, having overcome all kinds of difficulties.

3. Establishing the soldier-worker system

The factory expanded and needed to be regularized. It was very inconvenient for the administrators from the military training unit. And so under the supply department, we set up a factory head and a commissar to provide leadership and drew up a draft outline for the administration of the factory.

Under the leadership of the head and commissar, administration was divided into four sections, labor, operations, accounts, and general work. These sections divided the tasks and worked together, each with its own responsibility. We stipulated a variety of regulations for meetings, minutes, reports, inspections, livelihood, pay (according to technical skill with the top rate of 10 *yuan*), and rewards and punishment. We settled the times for work, study, rest, and relaxation. We fixed the scope for democratic life and all kinds of principles—for the workshops, dormitories, canteen, days off, leaving the premises, and so forth.

By October 1941, everything was properly set up.

After October we found that the wooden looms were not as good as the iron ones. The cloth that the latter produced was of good quality and required less work. We planned gradually to replace the wooden looms with iron ones. Between January and October 1942, we built iron looms ourselves. However, as one had to be strong and skillful to weave with these looms and there were not enough of this kind of workers, we could not convert entirely to iron looms, and we did not build any more.

The total was forty-five iron looms and sixty-two wooden looms. Apart from this, we bought thirteen wooden looms for weaving woolen blankets and woolen goods from the Longwan Factory (in spring 1942) and built thirteen wooden looms ourselves. This was a total of 133 looms. On average, we produced about 1,000 bolts of wide cloth, 500 woolen towels, and 100 blankets per month.

After May 1942, the pay system was changed into a piecework system, yielding at most 70–80 *yuan* per month (roughly one-tenth of the wages in a privately run factory) and at least 20–30 *yuan*. This increased the workers' enthusiasm for production. Some workers did not take their noon break and did not stop at the end of the workday but kept on working. After some persuasion and education, we overcame this excessive enthusiasm.

We persisted in the soldier-worker system. The factory workers also grew vegetables and raised pigs for their food.

In the winter of 1942 we stopped work for one month to make padded clothing.

In 1941 after all expenses, the factory made a profit of 3.9 million *yuan*. In the first ten months of 1942, the profit was 8 million *yuan*. The value of the factory site, looms, yarn, and raw cotton is 5 million *yuan* (yarn and cotton 1 million *yuan*). We intend to invest several million *yuan* more to maintain production.

In sum, the lessons of experience in running industry are as follows:

- i. The profit earned by the soldier-workers working in textiles, that is, the Daguang Mill led by the brigade supply department, is the largest among that earned by the various industrial enterprises. In 1941 the total number of employees was 250, and in 1942 it was 225. After deducting all expenses, its profit in 1941 was 3.9 million *yuan*, equivalent to the price of 4,000 *dan* of millet at year-end prices (300 *jin* per *dan*). Profits by October 1942 were 8 million *yuan*, again equivalent to 4,000 *dan* of millet at current prices in Suide. The average net profit per worker was roughly 18 *dan*.

In light of two years' experience and the present circumstances, we shall invest 25,000 *yuan* per head for the 225 employees of the factory during 1943, not counting buildings and tools, making a total of 5,625,000 *yuan*. The cloth required for uniforms will be bought from the factory. In this way production for 1943 will earn a net profit per man of 20 *dan* of millet (because of inflation, it is best to take millet as the standard).

Each regiment has a cloth-weaving factory which can produce enough cloth for one hundred men.

In addition, apart from undertakings purely for producing equipment and clothing for the troops, such as making shoes, making clothing, and tanning leather, the brigade also has roughly 200 blacksmiths and carpenters. In light of the past two to three years' experience and the prospects for the continued development of the border region economy, these craftsmen could make an annual profit roughly equivalent to 6 *dan* of millet in return for an investment of 1,000 *yuan* per man.

There is also a paper-making factory and an oil-pressing shop which use as raw materials the sesame seeds and straw coming from the troops' agriculture and malan grass cut by the soldier-workers, for which the factories pay a cheap price. These enterprises employ sixty people, with an average net profit per head of 6 *dan* of millet.

- ii. In addition to agriculture, effective operation of the system of soldier-workers is a way of realizing self-sufficiency and solves both commodity and financial problems. Commerce is definitely not as reliable as agriculture and industry. Commerce relies on others, not on oneself, so it is not suitable to do too much of it.

- iii. Shortcomings are: in running a large factory there is a lot of expense and waste, and there is no fixed amount of capital. This influences production. Therefore, in the future we must strive to set up a fixed amount of capital.
- iv. In the past we did not take the entire border region economy into consideration. Nor did we make a unified plan for the troops' agricultural and industrial production. We could not interlock agriculture, industry, transport, and commerce. This was a great failing. Henceforth, we should have unified plans and interrelated management.
The above is a summary of our opinions.

c. Commerce

Our commerce began with a cooperative, and it took six years to develop large-scale commerce.

In 1937, the brigade was sent across the Yellow River to the area around Guoxian to fight the enemy. After the loss of Taiyuan, commerce was disrupted and goods from the city could not be moved to the countryside. The common folk did not dare to travel to buy goods. As a result, there were great shortages in daily necessities. Oil and salt were out of supply for a while. Both the army and the people had to eat plain food. Under these circumstances, we set up a cooperative at the request of the people. We allocated [pack] animals to go to Ningwu and elsewhere for [transporting] salt. The supply department put up 300 *yuan* to buy goods belonging to merchants which were stored in the countryside. We contracted the merchant, Li Maolin, from Yangwu as manager and set up business at Yangwu. It was called the "359th Brigade Army-People Cooperative." The aim was simply to solve difficulties in the supply of salt, oil, and so forth and to deal with other necessary goods. At the time, the currency had not yet lost value, so although there was not much capital, business was successful. In the short period of six months from October 1937 to April 1938, when the troops moved east, we gained great sympathy among the people in the *xian*. Thousands of people praised us, saying that if it were not for the cooperative, they would have died even though they were not killed by the enemy. Making a profit was not the aim at the time, so although business was good we did not earn any money. At the end of April, the capital and profit of 490 *yuan* was handed over to the troops and used.

In May 1938, the cooperative personnel went to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region with the troops. When they got to Lingqiu, there was another shortage of daily necessities. Both the people and the army suffered. They wanted to continue with the cooperative but had no capital and could think of no solution. In August, the cooperative personnel went to the *xian* town of Laiyuxian to build up relations with merchants. Due to their friendly connections, they bought goods worth 3,042 *yuan* on credit. Most of it consisted of bolts of cloth, writing materials, paper, soap, and so forth, totaling eleven packs. They returned to Donghenanzhen east of Lingqiu and set up a shop. The suppliers of the goods also came along. Within five days the goods were entirely sold, and they made a net profit of 800 *yuan*. They paid the suppliers 2,042 *yuan* and presented 1,000 *yuan* to the front-line troops for buying provisions. With the 800 *yuan* left over, they returned with the suppliers to Laiyuan to get more goods. This process was repeated several times up until December when the bill for goods was fully repaid. From August to December the operations of the cooperative provided supplies of oil, salt, and cloth needed by the people of the Lingqiu region and earned 2,800 *yuan* to supplement the troops' expenses. In addition, goods worth 1,500 *yuan* remained.

In January 1939, we moved the 1,500 *yuan* worth of goods to Xiaguanzhen. We mainly dealt in oil and salt, on the one hand, supplying the troops and, on the other, helping the ordinary folk. Since the

troops were continuously engaging the enemy at this time, we had more than 1,000 wounded. It was not easy to get Western medicine and nutritious foods, so the cooperative developed good relations with various merchants and through them obtained Western medicine, milk, arrowroot, and so forth from Tianjin, Beijing, Baoding, and elsewhere. This ensured the supply of necessities for the wounded. In September 1939 the brigade received the order to take on the defense of the Yellow River between Shanxi and Shaanxi. The cooperative was closed down. The nine months' business had brought in 9,400 *yuan*. When the troops set off, they had no money, so 5,400 *yuan* was paid out in expenses. The remaining goods worth 4,000 *yuan* were brought west with the troops in five donkey packs. In October, when we got to Wuliwan in Suide in the border region, we sold them for 20,000 *yuan*, and we sent people to Loufan, Wenshui, and Jiaocheng to buy writing materials and cloth. By the end of the year we had 31,000 *yuan* in goods and cash.

In January 1940 the cooperative moved to Nanguan in Suide. At that time the troops' economy was in great difficulty. We could rely only on the earnings of the cooperative to help pay expenses, so we found the name "Army-People Cooperative" unsuitable, and we changed it to the Daguang Store, to indicate that its goal had changed into making a profit. During that year we built up friendships with some merchants and bought goods either for cash or on credit. We bought writing materials, cloth, paper, shoes, socks, towels, and so forth, and made a profit in the market. We worked hard and by year's end, we had earned 191,700 *yuan*. We apportioned 101,700 *yuan* to the troops to help with expenses and kept 90,000 *yuan* as capital for 1941.

In 1941 the brigade decided to expand its commercial activities as a supplement to the major undertakings in agriculture, industry, and transport in order to meet the urgent requirements of the troops. In addition to the existing 90,000 *yuan* in capital, a further 250,000 *yuan* was given from the 400,000 *yuan* issued to the brigade by the Finance Department for production capital. In addition, all the small shops run by the regiments were closed, and their capital of 60,000 *yuan* was collected. The total capital was 400,000 *yuan*. Beginning in January 1941 we set up ten branch shops. After a year's operations, we made a profit of 2,982,377 *yuan*, of which 982,377 *yuan* was used to supplement the troops' expenses and 2 million *yuan* was kept as the store's capital.

In 1942, the store and ten branch shops earned a profit of 6,720,080 *yuan* from operations during the spring, summer, and autumn. Two million *yuan* were used to supplement expenditures for the troops, and the remaining sum of 4,720,080 *yuan* continues in use.

The lessons of the experience are:

- i. We helped the ordinary folk to buy cloth, paper, oil, salt, and other necessities, and we strengthened relations between the army and the people.
- ii. We helped the troops to buy daily necessities by making it possible for the soldiers' income of 1 *yuan* to purchase soap, towels, toothbrushes, toothpaste, and so forth at a time when the Eighth Route Army was in difficult economic circumstances. At the same time, the troops rightfully bought daily necessities with their money, which reduced improper and wasteful behavior among the troops.
- iii. Building friendships is very important. If we had not had good relations with the merchants of Laiyuan, we could not have bought goods.
- iv. Surplus income supplemented the expenditures for our forces.
- v. We sold local products and put limits on goods from outside. However, since we did not inspect strictly and provide firm leadership, some shops could not carry out this work in a planned and integrated manner. They only looked after narrow departmental interests and neglected all-around economic construction.
- vi. Before 1940 we did not know much about setting up a commercial information network

and knew only how to work hard. As a result, we suffered quite a few losses from rises and falls in prices. In 1941 we set up such a network to report on the situation in various places and we built liaisons with some big merchants. We learned of rises and falls in prices at the right time. Therefore, we did not incur this kind of losses in 1941 and 1942.

- vii. We liaised and worked together with local experienced merchants able to operate outside the border region. When we encountered difficulties in the supply of raw materials for spinning and weaving, we obtained great help. However, we also encountered some rogue merchants who used us to carry out their own businesses, damaging our operations.
- viii. There were too many people working in the store who did not earn their keep and thus added to expenses.
- ix. Frequent contact with merchants from outside enabled us to understand each other's policies and attitudes, reducing misunderstandings and building friendships.
- x. We tested the cadres' Party spirit, thought, and ability.
- xi. Only with strict administration and a complete system of regulations could the store reduce waste.
- xii. To help stabilize the currency, in 1940 the store changed Guanghua banknotes.⁵⁰
- xiii. Comprehensive preparations, correct and lively application of trading policies, staying within the scope of nonprohibited goods, selling local products, and selling necessities solved difficulties in the supply of goods for the army and provided a profit.
- xiv. With the aim of earning money, after January 1941 all the brigade and regimental cooperatives became part of the Daguang Store. The organization was centered in Suide and set up branches in Suide, Mizhi, Jiaxian, Wuqi, Anding, Yanchuan, and Yanchang. The brigade had the Daguang Store, and the regiments had the branches.
- xv. Most personnel in the shops were soldiers who were paid according to their jobs. Employees were paid a wage according to their abilities, strengths, and weaknesses.
- xvi. During 1941, most of the goods were bought from northwestern Shanxi. Afterward, because of the enemy's mopping-up campaigns and the economic blockade (the decline of the Nationalist currency and the use of the puppet currency),⁵¹ commodity prices rose. In addition, because of our problems with capital, we could not obtain much money to buy goods. Therefore, using the slogan "resist the enemy's goods and sell local products," we sold the cloth that we wove ourselves, and the leather shoes, woolen towels, and cloth shoes that we produced ourselves. We also sold Daguang soap in even greater quantities. To prevent unprincipled merchants from raising market prices and to promote the border region currency, we changed Guanghua banknotes and lowered the rising market prices. For example, the salt we extracted ourselves we sold at 2 *jin*, 4 *liang*, per *yuan*, compared to the market price of 1 *jin*, 4 *liang*, per *yuan*. Thus we enabled the ordinary folk to buy at cheaper prices. So we can say that during a certain period our aim was not to earn money but to stabilize prices and secure the people's livelihood.
- xvii. "If you knew what would happen in three days' time, you would be rich for thousands of years." It seems as if trading is a question of finding the right way by accident. If you find a good opportunity, then you can earn money. In fact, it is not so. Trading relies entirely on a correct estimation, understanding of the situation locally and elsewhere, and understanding the difference between imports and exports. Then can forecast the rises and falls in commodity prices, and fix the policies for attention in a certain period.
- xviii. A stable currency and secure finances are the primary conditions for developing business. During the past three years, the sudden rises and falls in the value of the border region currency and the disruption of finances have influenced trading in commodities and made

everything difficult. Another aspect is that this situation has enabled speculative merchants to deal in currency notes. They have earned a lot of money and influenced the economy of the border region.

- xix. The various regimental shops have in practice not thoroughly implemented centralized leadership and have competed with one another. They have lacked coordination, which is an unhealthy tendency.
- xx. The various regiments have set up an accounting system run by specialists who keep the accounts. However, since too many of them were merchants in the past, they did not use new methods of recording and still used the old. (The summary ends here.)

A concrete plan for agricultural production in 1943 has been prepared by the 359th Brigade. It is really clear and definite and may be supplied to all units for consideration. The text follows.

The 359th Brigade's 1943 Agricultural Production Plan

The military farming system of the troops stationed in the border region is one of the basic duties of our army in carrying out the policy of the anti-Japanese National United Front and in establishing new democratic politics. Persisting in carrying out this duty enables us to lighten the people's burdens, improve the quality of the army, and achieve close unity with the people from a position of self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Therefore, in light of the experience and achievements in carrying out the call from upper levels for production during the past three years, the brigade has drawn up the following plan to strengthen implementation of this call and to increase the quantity of production in 1943.

A. How should we organize the troops' agricultural production?

1. All the defense areas where the regiments and troops are stationed have arable land, so we stipulate that each provisions unit should carry out agricultural production according to its manpower and the land situation.
2. In circumstances in which the army is stationed in one place, each provisions unit only needs three cooks for every hundred men. Therefore, each provisions unit can select six or seven strong comrades with agricultural experience from among the cooks to specialize in farming.
3. The deputy battalion head with responsibility for production in each battalion, the head of the special duties in each company, and the deputy officers with responsibility for production in the brigade and regiments have the task of planning and inspection. During spring plowing, summer weeding, and autumn harvesting, they should organize and lead all personnel to take part.
4. We stipulate that the provisions unit of each combat company, apart from supplying all their own vegetables, should plant 600 *mu* of grain. [\[Table 8.3\]](#) lays down the tasks each unit can shoulder.

B. The year's plan relies on the spring. This winter we must prepare for the work of the coming spring

1. Each provisions unit must make a clear register of the land to be planted, how much mountain land, how much river land, how much land that has been farmed, and how much uncultivated land. It must also work out what is going to be planted and how much work, seed, and so forth will be required for planting, hoeing, and harvesting.

2. Farming requires oxen, plows, and other agricultural tools such as hoes, rakes, baskets, and sickles. These should be fully prepared in winter. Actual requirements per provisions unit are three plow oxen, three plows, and sixty other implements.

Table 8.3 Agricultural Tasks Assigned to Units

Troop units	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Number of production units	5	2	1	17	16	13	6	5	65
Area to be planted (<i>mu</i>)	3,000	1,200	600	10,200	9,600	7,800	3,600	3,000	39,000
Number of men to be selected from among the cooks	30	12	6	102	96	78	36	30	390

Table 8.4 Preparatory Work Necessary by Spring 1944

Unit	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Number of production units	5	2	1	17	16	13	6	5	65
Number of plow oxen	15	6	3	51	48	39	18	15	195
Number of plows	15	6	3	51	48	39	18	15	195
Number of other implements	300	120	60	1,020	960	780	360	300	3,900
Amount of manure in <i>dan</i>	12,000	4,800	2,400	40,800	38,400	31,200	14,400	12,000	156,000

3. If you do not use manure, the crops do not grow well. Every unit must collect manure. All nightsoil, animal manure, and wood and straw ashes must be gathered. Pay attention to control of lavatories, pig sties, sheep pens, and stables for oxen and horses. We must put at least 4 *dan* of

manure on each *mu* of land. In many places there are grass roots from flooded land and tree leaves. These can be moved to the farmed land for burning.

[Table 8.4] lists the amount of preparatory work to be undertaken by all units and by the brigade as a whole.

C. How much money is needed and how many workdays?

1. Oxen, plows, and other implements all cost money to buy or make. This is capital. In addition, there is manure and seeds, which total at least 800 *yuan* for 600 *mu*. Total capital for 600 *mu* and for the land formed by the units and for the brigade as a whole are shown [in Tables 8.5 and 8.6].

Table 8.5 Capital Needed to Farm 600 *Mu*

Item	Cost (<i>yuan</i>)
Oxen	12,000
Plows	600
Other implements	6,000
Manure and seed	800
Ox fodder	2,700
Total	22,100

Notes: Each ox is reckoned at 4,000 *yuan*, each plow at 200 *yuan*, each implement at 100 *yuan*, and ox fodder at 900 *yuan* per animal.

2. How many workdays are required for 600 *mu* from opening up the land and sowing seed to harvesting? It is estimated that opening land and sowing seed requires 500 days; preparation and spreading of manure, 800 days; three weedings, 1,800 days; and harvesting, 450 days. This makes 3,550 days in all. Note: Six cooks farming 600 *mu* throughout the year can do at least 1,000 workdays; 3,550 workdays minus 1,000 leaves 2,550. Each provisions unit has a hundred men, so each man has to do twenty-five days of agricultural labor during the year.

D. The type of crops and the harvest

1. Find out what the most suitable grain to be planted is according to the land. In general, plant spiked millet [*gu*], millet [*su*], sorghum, corn [*baogu*], beans, rice, and so forth. In addition, also consider the needs of the troops and plant hemp for sandals, lamp oil, and cooking oil. Some units can plant cotton.

The seventh regiment can plant 200 *mu* of cotton. Estimating a harvest of 30 *jin* of cotton per *mu*, the total will be 6,000 *jin*. At a value of 50 *yuan* per *jin*, this will be equal to 300,000 *yuan*.

Each company in the special duties battalion [*tewuying*] should plant 80 *mu* of cotton in addition to its 600 *mu* of grain. This can yield an estimated harvest of 2,400 *jin*, worth 120,000 *yuan*. The battalion headquarters can plant 20 *mu*, yielding 600 *jin* worth 30,000 *yuan*.

2. Figuring 4 *dou* of hulled grain for every 3 *mu*, 600 *mu* can produce 80 *dan* of hulled grain, and the 39,000 *mu* of the whole brigade can produce 5,200 *dan*. At a value of 1,250 *yuan* per *dan*, the crop from 600 *mu* will be worth 100,000 *yuan* and that of the brigade's 39,000 *mu*, 6.5 million *yuan*.

Table 8.6 Capital Needed for the Land Farmed by the Units and by the Brigade as a Whole (*yuan*)

	Unit				
	Oxen	Plows	Other implements	Seed and manure	Ox fodder
A	60,000	3,000	30,000	4,000	13,500
B	24,000	1,200	1,000	1,600	5,400
C	12,000	600	6,000	800	2,700
D	204,000	10,200	102,000	13,600	45,900
E	192,000	9,600	96,000	12,800	43,200
F	156,000	7,800	78,000	10,400	35,100
G	72,000	3,600	36,000	4,800	16,200
H	60,000	3,000	30,000	4,000	13,500
Total	780,000	39,000	379,000	52,000	175,500

3. In each 600 *mu*, it is estimated that 300 will be planted with spiked millet. Each *mu* will produce 300 *jin* of hay, yielding a total of 90,000 *jin*. At a value of 1 *yuan* per *jin*, 600 *mu* will produce hay worth 90,000 *yuan*, and the whole brigade will produce hay worth 5.85 million *yuan*.

The harvest totals are given [in [Tables 8.7](#) and [8.8](#)].

Table 8.7 Harvest Total on 600 *Mu*

Hulled grain	80 <i>dan</i>
Value of grain per <i>dan</i>	1,250 <i>yuan</i>
Total grain value	100,000 <i>yuan</i>
Hay	90,000 <i>jin</i>
Value of hay per 100 <i>jin</i>	100 <i>yuan</i>
Total value of hay	90,000 <i>yuan</i>
Total value of grain & hay	190,000 <i>yuan</i>

Table 8.8 Harvest for the 359th Brigade

Unit	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	Total
Area planted in <i>mu</i>	3,000	1,200	600	10,200	9,600	7,800	3,600	3,000	39,000
Grain which can be harvested in <i>dan</i>	400	160	80	1,360	1,280	1,040	480	400	5,200
Hay (10,000 <i>jin</i>)	45	18	9	153	144	117	54	45	585
Value of grain crops (10,000 <i>yuan</i>)	50	20	10	170	160	130	60	50	650
Value of hay crops (10,000 <i>yuan</i>)	45	18	9	153	144	117	54	45	585
Total value of crops (10,000 <i>yuan</i>)	95	38	19	323	304	247	114	95	1,235

After each regiment and unit has received this plan, it should at once call a meeting of production cadres to discuss implementation. The general plan for the regiment or unit and the plan for each provisions unit (including their own plans for vegetables, edible oil, lamp oil, hemp for making sandals, and so forth, for which they have been self-sufficient for three years) should be reported upward by the end of November. It is important that this should be obeyed.

(End of plan.)

The above materials show us that the army's self-supporting production has undoubtedly achieved a great deal. What have these achievements depended on? They have depended on the active leadership of the cadres and the labor enthusiasm of the troops. The cadres have given active leadership to the production movement consciously in order to overcome difficulties in the course of the revolution. The troops have taken part in productive labor consciously in order to overcome difficulties in the course of the revolution. If these two groups had not had this conscious awareness, if they had not felt that their work was not for others but for themselves, not for some worthless cause but for the sacred

cause of the revolution, there would have been no way for them to fulfill these difficult production tasks. If they had felt that they were hired laborers, if they had felt that the production they carried out had no relationship to their own interests and no relationship to the common revolutionary cause, there would have been no way to fulfill these production tasks.

Above, we have discussed the fine experience and great achievements of our army in self-supporting production. Below we shall again discuss the shortcomings in our work.

Our work has shortcomings, and these shortcomings are found not only in the army but also in the official organizations and schools. Some of these shortcomings were unavoidable in the past. However, after five years' experience we should be able to correct them. Some have already become serious abuses. If we do not correct them, they will hinder the interests of the Party and the revolution.

What are these shortcomings?

First, in order to solve urgent problems of self-sufficiency quickly some army units and some official organizations and schools have relatively or especially stressed commerce and have neglected agriculture and industry. They do not realize that only agriculture and industry produce value. Commerce is merely a medium for circulation. It cannot produce any value itself. Informed by experience, the production task for all forces and official organizations and schools in 1943 is gradually to transfer the main emphasis to agriculture, industry, and transport. In our present circumstances, agriculture is particularly important since the majority of the things that we need are agricultural products (staple grain, miscellaneous grain, vegetables, hemp, meat, vegetable oil, animal oil, cotton, horse fodder, timber, firewood, and so forth). Agricultural products can also be exported in exchange for industrial products. If we also undertake some possible and necessary handicrafts (spinning yarn, spinning wool, making shoes, weaving woolen thread and garments, digging coal, sawing wood, pressing oil, and so forth) and large light industry (textiles, papermaking), we can meet the majority of our daily requirements and produce enough for trading.

The second shortcoming is that we lack unified planning and unified inspection. Lower levels act without coordination, and upper levels either do not have or lack sufficient unified direction, planning, and inspection of policy

principles and work content. As a result, the various branches do not know what they should not do or do know but still do it. Thus instances of lack of coordination or struggling for independence often occur. Incidents have arisen in which policy principles and government orders have been broken, in which the people's interests have been damaged, in which various economic units have not only not cooperated but have competed and hindered one another, in which the upper levels have been deceived and not the lower levels, or in which both have been deceived, in which things have been held back or in which lies have been told. There has been great waste, reckless spending, and concentration on show and not on results. Particularly serious are cases of the evils of bribery and corruption among cadres. Some cadres have been enticed by material things and are not loyal to the sacred cause of communism, having become completely corrupt. Other cadres have been poisoned and can regain their health only by laying in the sun. All these bad things and all this corruption have occurred to a greater or lesser extent among some parts of the army and in some official organizations and schools. Henceforth, all upper-level leadership organs in the army and the official organizations and schools must place emphasis on looking after the whole situation and on grasping policy. They must provide unified planning and inspection for the productive activities of all subordinate units. They certainly must not permit the abuses described above to occur again. If they do occur again, they must be strictly disciplined. Less important cases should be criticized and serious ones punished. We certainly cannot condone them or, to use a flattering term, "have a liberal policy." These are the Three Work Styles⁵² for rectification in economic work. We must carry them out without the slightest delay.

The third shortcoming is that in the production activities of many army units, official organizations, and schools, the cadres responsible for administration and control do not make much effort, and a minority even pay no attention at all and merely entrust everything to the supply organ or to the general office. This is because they still do not understand the importance of economic work. And the reason that they still do not understand it is that they have been poisoned by the deceitful corrupting words of metaphysicists like Dong Zhongshu,⁵³ "Conform to the requirements and do not seek gain, be concerned with the way and do not plan for merit," and have not yet cast them fully aside. It is also because they

consider politics and Party and army affairs come first and are most important, while economic work, although also important, is not important to the same degree. They feel that they themselves do not have to divide their attention or to give much attention by being concerned. However, these attitudes are entirely wrong. In the present situation in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, the great majority of people have work to do. If you talk of revolution, then in the final analysis, apart from economic work and educational work (including theoretical education, political education, military education, cultural education, technical education, professional education, and national education), what other work is worthy of the names central or primary work? Is there any other work that is more revolutionary? True, there is other work and a lot of it, but the central or primary work for the majority of comrades in the present situation in the border region is certainly economic work and educational work. All other work is only significant in the context of these two. If we conscientiously carry out these two items of work, we can consider that we have done well in supporting the war at the front and in helping the people of the great rear areas. Of the two, education (or study) cannot be carried out alone. We are not at a time when “official rank lies in study.” We cannot go and “conform to the requirements and illuminate the way” with hungry stomachs. We must get food to eat. We must pay attention to economic work. Talking of education or study separately from economic work is merely using superfluous and empty words. Talking of “revolution” separately from economic work is like making revolution against the Finance Department and against yourselves. The enemy will not in the least be hurt by you. Because we have many comrades with leadership responsibilities who still take the attitude of neglecting or not paying much attention to economic work, many other comrades copy them, being willing to do Party, government, army, and educational work, or to work in literature and art but unwilling to do economic work. Some female comrades are unwilling to marry economic workers, implying that they consider them dishonorable. They consider that marrying the head of a mule and horse team would be an insult, and they would rather marry a political worker. In fact, all these viewpoints are very wrong and do not match the situation at this time and place. We must make a new division of labor. We need some revolutionary specialists who are separate from production affairs. We also require some doctors, literature and art workers, and so forth. But we do not

want many people like this. If there are too many, then danger arises. If those who eat are many and those who produce are few, if those who are employed suffer and those who benefit are comfortable, we shall collapse. Therefore, many cadres must be transferred from their present work or study to economic posts. Chief responsible cadres at all levels in the Party, government, and army must at the same time pay full attention to leading economic work. They must investigate and study the content of economic work, be responsible for making plans for economic work, allocate cadres for economic work, inspect the results of economic work, and never again entrust this extremely important work to the supply departments or general offices alone and wash their hands of it.

The fourth shortcoming is that in the past some army units and official organizations have not had a division of labor between levels when allocating production tasks. All levels from brigade to company and from upper level to lower level have been permitted to run commerce without any limits. Thus many defects have arisen. Henceforth, most commerce, industry, and transport should be concentrated in brigades, in regiments working in independent areas, and in upper-level organs. Furthermore, these must work according to correct principles. Trade with the outside must be united under the direction of the Commodities Bureau. Units under regiments working in an independent area, units at the battalion level or below, and most lower-level organs should be instructed to carry out agriculture, handicrafts that can be done by the troops, or miscellaneous personnel, and business or trading of the consumer cooperative type. They are not allowed to do other work.

In light of the achievements and shortcomings over the past five years, the concrete tasks for the various units of the army in 1943 are as follows.

1. With the exception of most of the grain and some of the bedding and clothing which are supplied by the government, the great majority of army units should provide 80 percent of their own supplies. Some units (such as the 359th Brigade) should provide 100 percent. Only those in special circumstances (such as the cavalry) can be allowed to bear a lighter production burden, and they, too, should think of ways to provide more in 1944. All forces should prepare to increase self-sufficiency in grain and clothing and bedding in 1944 so as to reduce the burden on the people and to let them build up their strength.

2. With the exception of the 359th Brigade, which is already fully carrying out

the military farming system, the cavalry, which would find it difficult because of special circumstances to implement that system at once, and of those with garrison duties, all other forces should carry out the policy of military farming in individual units or several units together so as to increase agricultural production.

3. All units from top to bottom should carry out production in an organized, led, and planned way. Set up production committees at all levels from brigade to company, and carry out collective planning and inspections at each level. Study improvements in production techniques so as to increase production and improve supplies. Correct all irregular phenomena.

4. Select cadres who are strong in politics and who can administer production and supply work in each department. Existing economic cadres should be examined. Incompetents and those who have committed corrupt and decadent errors must be transferred. Particularly serious cases must be punished. Every unit must set up a deputy battalion head with responsibility for production and personnel to administer production in companies. These people should especially control production and the distribution of tasks for whole battalions and whole companies. Brigade units and regimental units should establish deputy officers with responsibility for production to administer the production work of the units themselves. The commanding officer of each level must personally plan and inspect the economic work.

5. All economic and financial work of the Party, government, and army in each subregion should carry out coordinated cost accounting under the leadership of the finance subcommittee of the subregion. In order to stimulate the activism of the production and working personnel of all units, it should permit them to spend a suitable amount of the results of their production on improving their livelihood. Everything apart from this should be distributed in a coordinated way so as to avoid the problem of unequal benefits. Some coordinated distribution should be applied throughout the border region as a whole, some within the subregions, some within the various systems, and some within units. It can be decided according to the nature of production and the economic situation.

6. Implement the policy of “giving consideration to both the army and the people.” The economic activities of the army, Party, and government should harmonize with the economic activities of the people. Anything which damages the people’s interests or causes them dissatisfaction is not allowed.

7. Production and education cannot be out of balance. All units must carefully plan both kinds of work and their mutual relationships. Correctly share the time for each so that production and education in 1943 can be greater and better than that in 1942. We have had five years' experience, and it is entirely possible to achieve this aim.

8. The core of the army's political work is to ensure the fulfillment of its production and education plans, to ensure that while it is carrying out these plans there are correct relationships with the Party, government, and people, to ensure the correct relationship between upper and lower levels within the army itself, and to ensure the purity of economic cadres. If political work does not fulfill its own task in these areas, then it will be defeated.

IX. On the Development of the Productive Undertakings of Official Organizations and Schools

Within the three branches of the public sector of the economy, production by the troops and by the official organizations and schools is directly intended to meet their own living and operating costs. Production by government organs is also included in this. For example, the staff working in the various departments and offices of the Border Region Government run agricultural, handicraft, and commercial enterprises. These directly supplement deficiencies in the operating expenses of the organs and in clothing, bedding, and food for the personnel. By contrast, the salt industry and industry and agriculture established as government enterprises are not intended to provide operating expenses but to meet the needs of the whole Party, government, and army.

In Yan'an and the border region, the official organizations of the Party and government, the leading organs of the mass organizations, and many schools have pursued agriculture, industry, and commerce under the slogans "set-to ourselves" and "self-reliance." This is a broad mass movement, and it has solved many big problems of finance and supply. It is only just second to the army's production, and it is worth our while to sum up its experience carefully, to point out its achievements and shortcomings, and to determine the work plan for 1943.

The army's production movement began in 1938 and gained some experience. In 1939 we spread this experience into all official organizations and schools. In February 1939 we held a Production Mobilization Conference. We organized production committees to be leading organs for the production movement, and we stipulated different production tasks according to the different circumstances of the work and study of each official organization and school and the strength of their labor force. For example, we laid down that working personnel in districts and townships should be fully self-sufficient in grain and other organizations, from the center down to the *xian*, should be either half or one-third self-sufficient according to the strength and size of their labor force. In total, we asked them to open up 100,200 *mu* of land and to harvest 13,000 *dan* of hulled grain. In addition to this, we decided that all official organizations and schools should be entirely self-sufficient in vegetables, should raise pigs for meat, and should use the straw from their grain crops to provide part of the fodder for horses. At the time, there were roughly 20,000 people in the official organizations and schools of the entire border region. We issued average production expenses of 2.60 *yuan* per head, a total of more than 49,000 *yuan*. This provided capital to buy plow oxen and agricultural tools. After they had found land and bought oxen and tools, everyone was mobilized for the spring plowing. Most of these people were intellectuals and youths who had never previously taken part in production. Together with cadres from worker and peasant backgrounds and service personnel, cooks, and grooms, they were organized into production groups to open up the land. All hilltops near Yan'an with unused land became covered with men and women opening them up. They automatically showed labor discipline and declared competitions in clearing the land. The strong took up hoes and the weak grew vegetables and raised pigs, or took food and water to the workers.

The gains from this production movement were: (i) The official organizations and schools of the entire border region opened up 113,414 *mu* of land, harvested 11,325.63 *dan* of grain (equivalent to 5,830.17 *dan* of hulled grain), and harvested roughly 1.2 million *jin* of vegetables. At prevailing market prices, the two harvests were worth over 368,000 *yuan* (over 10,179,000 *yuan* at 1942 prices). This provided one-quarter of the grain requirements of 20,000 people, half the horse fodder, and some of the vegetables and meat. (ii) It enabled more than 10,000 intellectuals and young people to understand from their own experience what

physical labor is. This tempered them. (iii) When the common people of the border region saw or heard that all working personnel and young students in all the Party and government official organizations—from the Party Central Committee members to young service personnel—were all going up into the mountains to farm, they were moved. Everyone was keen to open up land, and it became an exceptional year for doing so.

However, the stipulated task for grain production was not fulfilled this year because of lack of labor experience and because the application of manure, seed planting, and weeding were not done at the right time. Also, in some areas there was drought and so forth. As a result, although a lot of land was opened up, the harvest was not large and only 45 percent of the original grain target of 13,000 *dan* of hulled grain was achieved. Second, the error of egalitarianism was committed in leadership and organization. The different nature of each organization and school was not considered. Some were given tasks that were too great, such as the call for district and township cadres to be self-sufficient in grain. In fact, they only achieved one-quarter [of the goal]. Some put off and spoiled their work or study in order to carry out production, with the result that it was uneconomic. In some cases, male and female comrades too physically weak to do hard work were forced to labor, and their health suffered. Some units could in fact have engaged in industry and commerce, but this was not pointed out at the time, and they purely and simply concentrated on agriculture.

In 1940 we corrected these shortcomings. First, we reduced the agricultural production tasks. Apart from self-sufficiency in vegetables and meat, we stipulated that the official organizations and schools should be only from one-seventh to one-sixth or one-quarter self-sufficient in grain according to their differing circumstances. We did not ask weak males or any females to do physical labor. No person over fifty or under fifteen took part in production. We permitted the hiring of experienced peasants to join in or to direct production. In addition, the Finance Department issued 50,000 *yuan* to the official organizations and schools as capital to allow them to engage in industry and commerce and to develop animal husbandry, raising pigs and sheep. Therefore, in agricultural production during 1940 we did not increase cultivated land beyond the existing amount. Some units lacked labor power and adopted the method of making ordinary people tenants. Some gave part of their grain-producing land to others

and concentrated on planting vegetables and raising pigs. In addition, some schools moved elsewhere in North China. Therefore, the 1940 harvest only totaled 3,000 *dan* of hulled grain and 900,000 *jin* of vegetables, worth 3 million *yuan* at the market prices of the time.

The commerce we engaged in began with cooperatives. In 1939 each official organization and school had a consumers' cooperative and some had opened restaurants. By the first half of 1940, there were thirty cooperatives and restaurants with more than 60,000 *yuan* in capital. The largest had 10,000 *yuan* and the smallest not more than a few hundred *yuan*. Their aim was to supply daily necessities for the organization or school itself. At the same time, they sold to outsiders at a slight profit as a means of improving their livelihood. They had still not become commercial undertakings to meet general needs. However, they gave initial tempering to cadres running commerce and accumulated some commercial experience and a small amount of capital.

In the two years of 1939 and 1940, the organizations and schools generally did not engage in industry. They only set up some flour mills for their own needs, and the Rear Services' Communications Store set up a smithy for horseshoes. These can be considered the beginnings of their handicraft production.

The above was the first period in self-sufficient production for organizations and schools. Below we turn to the second period.

In the winter of 1940, the production tasks of the organizations and schools rapidly changed as a result of the economic blockade of the border region, the cutting off of outside aid, the extreme financial difficulties, and the unavoidable need to move quickly from semi-self-sufficiency to full self-sufficiency in finance and supplies.

At the time (with the exception of the troops) the various organs of the Party, government, army, and mass organizations and the personnel of the schools could not all take up agriculture and the task of achieving self-sufficiency was extremely difficult. On the one hand, we wanted to rely on developing production to ensure daily and monthly supplies. On the other hand, we wanted to accumulate capital to establish a foundation for future self-sufficiency.

In order to get through this difficult situation, the Party and government adopted the necessary steps. First, we improved the organizations for leading production. In succession we established the Finance and Economy Office

directly under the Central Committee, the Rear Services Economic Construction Office, the Finance and Economy Office at the top level in the Border Region Government, and ordered each subregion and *xian* to set up production committees. Second, between the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 the government paid out 700,000 *yuan* and the Border Region Bank lent 3 million *yuan* to increase the production capital of the various branches. This was handed to the various bodies leading self-sufficient production for issuing downward, to be added to the capital accumulated by the organizations themselves during the first period. Thereupon everyone made new arrangements, selected personnel, chose undertakings, and put industry and commerce at the fore. Agriculture was then placed in a subordinate position.

Below we shall discuss the experience of the various organizations and schools in industry, commerce, and agriculture during this period.

The starting point for the industry of the organizations and schools was textiles. Since the border region had wool, the personnel of the organizations and schools spun wool by hand after work and study during the winter of 1940. For a while it became a movement, and everybody began to spin. But since there was not enough raw material and spinning skills were poor, the woolen thread was uneven and too much labor was wasted. After March 1941 this was gradually stopped and we applied ourselves to setting up handicraft textile mills. In the first half of 1941, each large organization and school selected service personnel and messengers to go to the Refugee Textile Mill run by the government to study spinning and weaving. More than ten textile mills grew up within a short time, like bamboo shoots after a spring rain. The shortcoming was that there was no planning. By the latter half of the year, because they had no ensured supply of raw materials or market for yarn, or because they lacked sufficient liquid capital or were poorly administered, some had closed, some had merged, and some had temporarily closed. For example, the New China Textile Mill of the Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee first merged with the Victory Mill of the Central Organization Department and then merged with the Unity Mill run by the Marxism-Leninism Institute. Then under the name of the Unity Textile Mill, it was run in a centralized way and earned more profits. The wool spinning factory run by the Lu Xun Academy and the Women's University was closed down, and its capital was used elsewhere. The Unity Textile Mill of

the Finance and Economy Office under the Central Committee and the Communications Mill run by the Rear Services could not fully employ their production capacity because of all kinds of difficulties. They alternately worked and closed down for a while until they eventually got on the right track. Thus the process of moving from a hand-spinning movement of several thousand people to the setting up of handicraft factories, from the setting up of more than ten small textile mills and wool-spinning factories to the final merger into two factories, the Communications and the Unity, was a process of moving from blindness to consciousness in which there was continuous groping forward through research, improvement in techniques, and improvement in administration. This process, on the one hand, illustrated the hard-working spirit of the various organizations and schools and, on the other, illustrated our complete lack of experience in running industry at that time. By 1942 the Communications factory produced 3,336 bolts of cloth and the Unity Factory produced 2,736, becoming major factories in the border region. They are the valuable creation of the process of hard work and groping the way forward.

Besides textile mills, the organizations and schools directly under the Central Committee have successively set up many handicraft factories for such things as bedding and clothing, shoes, coal and charcoal, carpentry, papermaking, pottery, flour milling and oil pressing, silk weaving, and making iron implements. Their aim has been self-sufficiency. The capital for these factories came from commercial capital, from bank loans, or from the closure of the wool-spinning factories. Warned by the experience with textiles, these factories were not run in such an entirely disorganized way. They were rather more orderly with several organizations and schools cooperating or with cooperation with the common people or with the bank. But it was not all plain sailing. Most only laid a firm foundation after following a winding path from an initial loss of capital through continued support to final profit.

In the years 1941 and 1942, the system under the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office [Zhong-Cai xitong] set up a total of twenty-seven large and small handicraft factories, with total capital of more than 400,000 *yuan* and 477 employees. Among them, there were eight textile mills with 217,000 *yuan* in capital and 161 employees, three coal and charcoal factories with 70,000 *yuan* in capital and sixty-eight employees, three mills with 15,000 *yuan* in capital and

twenty-one employees, two bedding and clothing factories with forty-eight employees (capital details not available), three carpentry factories with 35,000 *yuan* in capital and seven employees, one shoe factory with 10,000 *yuan* in capital and thirty-eight employees, and one paper-making workshop with 20,000 *yuan* in capital and twenty-nine employees. In addition, there were six small factories individually producing machinery, glass, alcohol, pottery, oil lamps, and blankets. (There are no statistics on capital and employees for these factories. The first three were experimental undertakings by the Natural Sciences Institute.) All the above factories were reorganized in September 1941 when the official organizations and schools directly under the Central Committee carried out their first drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration. They were transferred to the direct control of the Central Administration Bureau (the Finance and Economy Office directly under the Central Committee was dissolved and we set up the Central Administration Bureau attached to the Central Work Department [Zhongyang bangongting]). Their number was reduced from twenty-seven to nineteen due to closure or merger. In particular, the merging of the eight textile mills into two, the Tuanjie and the Shiyan, enabled concentration of management and improvement in operations. Thus we were able to move from a situation in which eight mills either lost capital or just maintained themselves to one of a profit of 1.6 million *yuan* in October 1942.

Self-sufficient industry run by the rear services system was started in the winter of 1940, just like that run by the central financial system. After two years' operation, in 1941 and 1942, there was one textile mill, two paper-making factories, three charcoal factories, two carpentry factories, two silk-weaving factories, and one factory each for coal [*shitan*], refined salt, pottery, bedding and clothing, writing brushes, ironwork, flour milling, shoes, and hemp weaving, for a total of nineteen. There are no statistics yet for the amount of capital, number of employees, and amount of production of these factories. Although the profit earned by these undertakings is not great (in the first ten months of 1942 it was 200,000 *yuan*), their great merits are: (i) they are run in a centralized way by the Rear Services and are not run freely in a dispersed way by the various official organizations and schools. Thus leadership and inspection are thorough, and mistakes are quickly corrected. (ii) They constitute a wide range of operations. Unlike the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office system's initial

concentration on textiles through the establishment of eight factories, the Rear Services has at all times only run one factory, the Communications Textile Mill, and thus has had spare capacity to do other things. (iii) They are entirely aimed at ensuring supplies. Although they do not earn money, they have provided a supply of many necessary goods.

In October 1942 we carried out a thorough drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration. The Central Administration Bureau and the rear services systems were combined and their industries administered in a unified way. We also carried out further reorganization. The Unity and Communications textile mills and the bedding and clothing factories were transferred to the Finance Department. The medicine, alcohol, iron, and glass-making factories were transferred to the Garrison Office. The Natural Sciences Institute and all the things that went with it were handed over to the government. All remaining factories were closed or merged and handed over to the control of the Central Administration Bureau. By December 1942 there were three carpentry factories, two paper-making factories, five charcoal factories, one shoe factory, one oil-pressing factory, one flour mill, three grinding mills, one cart factory, one wine factory, and three blanket workshops, a total of twenty-one large and small handicraft factories and workshops. These can ensure all supplies of coal, shoes, and flour, the manufacture and repair of all wooden and galvanized iron implements, and some of the paper and edible oil requirements for the entire Central Administration Bureau system. Bedding and clothing are supplied by the government. This is the outcome of the activism in industrial production over the past two years of the Central Administration Bureau (prior to September 1941 the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office) and the Rear Services.

The above experience shows that under present circumstances it is essential for the official organizations and schools to run handicrafts. The aim is not to earn money but to ensure supplies of necessities. However, organizations and schools cannot set up any kind of factory they want to. They should choose in a planned way which ones to run, according to the nature of the industry and the situation in the official organization or school. They should reduce the number of errors created by blindly groping around. Existing factories should be organized into systems according to area and official organization. Cutbacks, mergers, and transfers can reduce waste and enable them to play an even greater role in

providing supplies.

As mentioned above, our comrades lacked experience in running commerce in the same way as they did in running industry. They had previously managed only a few cooperatives. We wished to turn to relying on a profit from commerce in order to provide a large proportion of supplies. What had to be done? Once again, it was a process of moving from blindness to consciousness in order to find an answer to this question.

During 1941 and 1942, commerce started off with the aim of rapidly overcoming difficulties. Therefore we had no choice but to use the bulk of the capital of each official organization and school to trade for a quick profit.

In the year from autumn 1940 to autumn 1941 we operated mainly large stores. Some official organizations and schools enlarged their existing low capital, small profit cooperatives, small shops and stalls, increasing capital and staff, joining chambers of commerce, and running proper commercial undertakings. For example, the Communications Store of the military base was at first a small cigarette shop set up at the entrance to the base at Qilipu in Yan'an. In August 1939 it moved to the new market in Yan'an, and in addition to selling general goods, it set up a Chinese medicine shop and a horseshoe shop. Its capital increased from a few hundred *yuan* to 20,000 *yuan*. Another example is the Cooperative Store, which grew from the cooperative of the Anti-Japanese University. In June 1940 it moved to the new market and set up branch stores at the three branch schools of the Anti-Japanese University. Its capital increased from 80 *yuan* to 19,000 *yuan*. The Rear Services Store was at first a small stall with 30 *yuan* in capital. By September 1940 it had expanded, and its capital had grown to 20,000 *yuan*. In addition to selling goods, it also set up a dyeing shop. Originally many official organizations and schools did not have shops. Around this time they too collected capital and people and set up businesses either independently or in partnerships. At the time, the business done by all the publicly run stores depended on trading goods mainly from Suide, Dingbian, and Fuxian *xian*, in particular the cloth, paper, and writing materials required by the official organizations, schools, and troops themselves, and the matches, raw cotton, and so forth required by the common people. During this period, the official organizations and schools set up over sixty large and small stores in Yan'an, Suide, and Dingbian, not including those run by the army. In addition,

there were many that did not set up premises but depended on one or two people and a few animals to trade goods along the roads, calling it “floating trade” [*zoushui shengyi*]. According to statistics for October 1941 the stores under the control of the Rear Services Committee for store administration were the Northwest Store, the Xibei Vegetable Cooperative, and fourteen large and small stores, including the China Rising, the Cooperative, the Communications, the New-New, the People Rising, the Rising People, the Hundred Goods, and the Soldiers. The Central Administration Bureau had twenty stores.

We really relied on commerce to pass through a serious crisis during that year. It solved great problems of supply. For example, during the first half of 1941 the Central Committee’s Finance and Economy Office and the official organizations and schools relied on the twenty large and small stores run by 113 staff with 296,800 *yuan* in capital to earn profits of 256,000 *yuan*, which supplied 48 percent of their daily running expenses. The rear services system, with capital of 706,000 *yuan*, made 810,000 *yuan* in profit during the same period, which supplied 45 percent of their daily running costs.

However, commerce during this period had one great fault, which was excessive dispersal and no centralized leadership. Furthermore, almost all of it was trade in general goods. These faults came from the urgent need to solve difficulties in operating costs for each official organization and school. Each acted without coordination, competed with others, and even disobeyed Party policy, influencing prices and currency. Simultaneously, there was price inflation, the Border Region banknotes lost value, and the external blockade intensified. Suddenly, dealing in the export and import of general goods had a gloomy future and the various official organizations and schools which relied on this for their operating expenses also found themselves with problems. In this situation, it was urgently necessary to transform the commerce run by the official organizations and schools and by the army. This transformation began in the latter half of 1941. In the spring of 1942 the border region carried out an initial drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration. It was then decided to organize all commerce into proper enterprises [*qiyehua*]. On the one hand, each system put its existing stores in order, organized a joint committee for publicly run commerce, unified the leadership of publicly run stores, and strictly carried out laws, commands, and policies. On the other hand, they expanded the scope of commercial activity,

carrying out many kinds of business, such as salt shops, mule and horse supplies, transshipment agencies, merchant warehousing, and slaughtering. The operational method also changed. In some cases, stores were merged, in others capital was invested in private stores or in cooperatives and the official organization or school did not run its own trade. In other cases capital was invested in the government's Salt Company or in the Glorious China Store. Thereafter, the fault of having too many shops competing with one another was avoided, and the function of providing the operating costs of the official organizations and schools could be restored. For example, as a result of reorganization according to this policy the Central Administration Bureau and rear services systems reduced the number of their shops from thirty-eight with 196 staff to twenty-five with 105 staff by October 1942. In the first ten months of 1942 the two systems earned a profit of 16.44 million *yuan*, with capital of 8 million *yuan*. This accounted for 68 percent of all production income. Also during 1942 the production committees of the various departments and offices of the Border Region Government earned 600,000 *yuan* from agriculture and commerce; of this commerce accounted for 350,000 *yuan* or 58 percent. Official organizations at the subregion and *xian* levels originally put agriculture first, but by 1942 commerce was the most important.

In 1943 financial and economic leadership will be unified [*yi yuan hua*]. External trade will be unified under the Commodities Bureau. Every official organization and school must carry out a thorough drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration. As a result, the commerce run by the official organizations and schools must be regulated by the Commodities Bureau, must share in running transport for local products and salt, and must allocate some capital for cooperation with the Commodities Bureau. In this way, publicly run commerce will be more rational.

The agricultural production of the official organizations and schools also made progress in 1941 and 1942. In these two years there were great achievements in the areas of grain, vegetables, charcoal, and labor after work.

Some official organizations and schools were still growing grain entirely independently in 1941, some had already changed to forming partnerships with the common people, and some ran agricultural stations (including both independent operations and partnerships). Independent operations had changed

somewhat. The entire personnel no longer went up to the mountains to farm. Instead, those who went were chiefly those doing miscellaneous duties organized into production teams accompanied by some of the physically stronger personnel. For example, the production teams of the various official organizations in the rear services system planted 5,200 *mu* of grain in 1941, and the Central Party School planted 800 *mu*. Those in partnership with the common people included the Central Organization Department, which planted 840 *mu* and divided the grain at a ratio of 2:8, 2 to the government and 8 to private individuals, and the hay at a ratio of 7:3, 7 to the government and 3 to individuals. The agricultural stations included the two stations run by the Secretariat of the Border Region Government on a partnership basis. There were also the independent stations run at Nanniwan by teams selected from the miscellaneous duties personnel of the official organizations and schools equipped with oxen and tools. These included two from the Rear Services and one each from the Central Committee's Finance and Economy Office, the Central Organization Department, and the Youth League cadres. Official organizations of the subregions and *xian* also adopted both independent operations and partnerships.

In 1942 the drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration was carried out. Many official organizations and schools in Yan'an were merged. As a result, self-supporting vegetable production continued, but all grain production was only carried out either at agricultural stations or in partnerships.

Although partnerships have some of the character of exploitation, the common people, in particular the immigrants and refugees, appreciate it very much since the government supplies seed, plow oxen, and agricultural implements, and the taxes are not high. This method has a role to play in encouraging immigration and in adjusting the use of labor power. The Party School provides an example:

The General Office of the Party School planted 300 *mu* in partnership with four immigrants. These four were all very strong. The Party School sent one man responsible for leadership and inspection. The arrangements were for the Party School to supply the agricultural tools, a hoe, a pick, and a sickle per man, to lend two oxen, and to give the seed. It also lent grain at a rate of 4 *sheng* of hulled grain per 3 *mu*, making 4 *dan* for 300 *mu*. It was agreed to repay in the autumn of the following year. The division of the grain and hay harvest was laid down as 20 percent of spiked millet [*gu*] for the government and 80 percent for private individuals, 30 percent of coarse millet [*meizi*] for the government and 70 percent for private individuals, and 40 percent of the miscellaneous grains for the government and 60 percent for private individuals. All the hay went to the Party School. This year the Party School received 10,500 *jin* of hay, 8.37 *dan* of spiked millet, 10.17 *dan* of coarse millet, 6.9 *dou* of black beans [*heidou*], 4.2 *dou* of hemp seed [*xiao mazi*], 1 *dou* of sesame [*lao mazi*], and 2 *dou* of adzuki beans [*xiaodou*], valued at a

total of 31,925 *yuan* in border region money. The four partners received 33.48 *dan* of spiked millet, 22.4 *dan* of coarse millet, 7.5 *dou* of black beans, 6.3 *dou* of hemp seed, 1.5 *dou* of sesame, and 3 *dou* of adzuki beans, valued at a total of 46,805 *yuan*. This is a good example of giving consideration to both public and private interests.

There is also new experience in building up agricultural stations. Since the personnel selected from the official organizations and schools do not have strong labor power, have limits on their working time, and are not skilled in agricultural techniques, they will waste their capital if they concentrate only on farming. In 1942 we adopted the following two methods. One was independent operations, which included subsidiary undertakings such as animal husbandry and wood plank sawing as well as planting grain. This was like the method adopted by the 359th Brigade. The other was to form partnerships and becoming involved going into partnership with the common people on stations that already had some foundation and setting up another new station oneself. In the first year the new station brings no profit, but in the second year it has some foundation and can also be changed into a partnership. The Secretariat of the Border Region Government provides an example. According to the comrades there:

We have two stations, one to the east, the other to the south. Their size, method of operation, and harvest are much the same. In 1942 the southern station planted 288 *mu* of river land, 324 *mu* of previously farmed hill land, and 408 *mu* of newly opened land. Altogether the harvest was 244 *dan* of grain. Since beans and corn formed the bulk, this was equivalent to 146.6 *dan* of hulled grain. Taking each *dan* at 1,300 *yuan*, this was worth 190,230 *yuan* [*sic*]. We also harvested 14,000 *jin* of hay worth 14,000 *yuan* and 20,000 *jin* of vegetables worth 20,000 *yuan*. The total value for these three items was 224,320 *yuan*. Originally we had 128 sheep. In 1942, eighty-one lambs were raised, worth 10,000 *yuan*. We bought pigs for 3,482 *yuan*, and we also had thirteen worth 400 *yuan* each. The total of all the above items is 243,002 *yuan*. As we have adopted the method of partnership operations, all our expenditures were taken from the amount harvested, including all expenses for the five men we assigned. We went into partnership with twelve households, totaling forty-five people. They had nineteen with full labor power, thirteen with half labor power, and thirteen children not able to work. Altogether their share was 68 *dan* of grain equivalent to 40.8 *dan* of hulled grain, with a total value of 53,040 *yuan* at 1,300 *yuan* per *dan*. They also received 7,000 *jin* of hay worth 7,000 *yuan*. The two items came to 60,040 *yuan*. Our own five men (one was crippled and looked after general operations, two cooked, planted vegetables and crops, and two looked after sheep and did general work), four oxen, one mule, and five dogs received 30 *dan* of grain for eating, equivalent to 18 *dan* of hulled grain worth 23,400 *yuan* and 50 *jin* of edible oil worth 1,300 *yuan* at 26 *yuan* per *jin*. In addition, repairs to implements, plows, clothing, and supplementary payments came to 20,000 *yuan*. The total of all the above expenditures was 104,740 *yuan*, yielding a surplus of 138,262 *yuan*. Adding the roughly 110,000 *yuan* from the eastern station, the return on the two stations was roughly 250,000 *yuan*.

The two stations are nominally run by the Secretariat and the Civil Affairs, Finance, Education, and Reconstruction Departments. In practice, they send out only ten people, of whom two are hired laborers,

one is a cripple, and seven are surplus personnel. The government has a production committee to control the two stations. In practice, usually only one person runs things. This year due to floods and strong winds we were 150 *dan* short on our harvest, worth 117,000 *yuan*. We were also swindled on the seeds that we bought for turnips and cabbage, which were the wrong kind. This lost us 30,000 *yuan*. These two items came to 147,000 *yuan*, and total losses for the two stations were roughly 200,000 *yuan*. This means that without natural disasters and the wrong seeds we could have earned 200,000 *yuan* more. The working personnel in the Civil Affairs, Finance, Education, and Reconstruction Departments and the Secretariat number around 400. The income of 250,000 *yuan* is thus an average of 625 *yuan* per head. Although the harvest this year is below the norm, they have laid the foundation for next year and provided a livelihood for twelve immigrant households. Furthermore, relying on this foundation, next year we are preparing to expand the plowed land at the southern station by 900 *mu* so as to soak up the surplus personnel. The two original stations will still be run as partnerships.

The methods adopted by the *xian*-level official organizations also include both individual operations and partnerships. For example, the top-rank official organizations in Yan'an *xian* have planted a total of 630 *mu*. Of these, over 270 *mu* are farmed in partnership with two households. These have five labor powers, and the *xian* committee has only assigned two people to work on the station. The remaining 360 *mu* are farmed by convicts. In 1942, excluding the amount distributed to the partners, they received a total of 75 *dan* of grain, equivalent to 45 *dan* of hulled grain with a value of 58,500 *yuan*. With the addition of hay worth 3,000 *yuan*, the total was 61,500 *yuan*.

As the above examples show, independent operations, partnerships, and a combination of them are correct. We should refer to this experience when determining the grain production tasks for 1943.

A very great task in agricultural work is the growing of vegetables, since grain is also provided by the grain tax. If vegetables are not grown, then over 20,000 people will be semistarved. The saying "having no vegetables is like half a year's famine" is completely true.

The method for producing vegetables in the past two years has been to assign personnel especially for growing them and to assign some supplementary labor from official organizations and schools. Each year we have on average been self-sufficient for three to six months. According to the Rear Services statistics, in 1941 their various official organizations and schools planted 1,801 *mu* of vegetables, consisting of 1,030 *mu* of potatoes and 771 *mu* of cabbage, beans, turnips, and miscellaneous vegetables. In autumn, autumn cabbage and autumn turnips were planted on the 771 *mu*. Over the course of the year 879,000 *jin* of vegetables were harvested, equal to one-third of annual consumption on average.

According to the Central Administration Bureau statistics, in 1942 the various official organizations and schools directly under central control assigned forty personnel for growing vegetables and planted 388 *mu* of river land and 1,941 *mu* of hill land. They harvested 745,000 *jin* of vegetables, being self-sufficient for five months on average. The Central Administration Bureau itself supplied nine months of its needs. Yan'an University and the Natural Sciences Institute both supplied eight months of their needs, and the Central Research Institute and the Chinese Writers Anti-Aggression Association [Wen-kang] both supplied seven months of their needs. The circumstances for vegetable production by the personnel in the various official organizations are very varied. For example, in the Guanzhong subregion they can plant only a little on account of the climate and can achieve only three months' self-sufficiency on average. In the special military area, they can reach only two or three months' self-sufficiency because of the scarcity of land. In some areas, such as Huachi, Mudan, and other *xian*, they can achieve six months' [self-sufficiency] or more because they have land and can farm in partnerships. Production of vegetables for their own use by official organizations and schools throughout the border region is estimated to be worth around 6 million *yuan*.

The problem here is that of discerning whether the method in which official organizations and schools assign production personnel to grow vegetables outside their permanent organizational structure is ultimately worthwhile. The experience of the various offices under central control shows that it is. The best land for growing vegetables is river land, where all kinds of green vegetables can be grown. On hilly land only potatoes and beans can be grown. One *mu* of river land growing vegetables can supply five people for a whole year, that is, 0.2 *mu* per person. However, 1.5 *mu* of hill land is required to supply one person for one year. Furthermore, if a man specializing in growing vegetables has additional help when spreading manure, he can farm 6 *mu* of river land. This means that one man specializing in growing vegetables together with some supplementary labor can supply a year's vegetables for thirty people. The daily vegetable requirement per head is 12 *liang*, and the annual requirement is 300 *jin*. For thirty people the annual requirement is 9,000 *jin*. At December 1942 Yan'an market prices of 3 *yuan* per *jin*, the total value of this is 27,000 *yuan*. If we allow 6,000 *yuan* for the man specializing in growing vegetables, there is a surplus of 21,000

yuan. Taking into account the necessary incentive payments, the smallest return is 20,000 *yuan*. Therefore, in the future after each official organization and school has carried out a thorough drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration, it should pay attention to arranging river land for growing vegetables, to assigning personnel for the work, to providing supplementary labor, and to ensuring self-sufficiency in vegetables for more than half a year and even for a whole year.

Apart from grain and vegetables, raising pigs and sheep for meat is also an important part of agriculture.

Some people believe that raising pigs wastes grain. However, our experience proves that raising pigs does not waste grain; rather, not raising them does. First, if there are no pigs, leftovers have to be thrown away, and there are quite a lot of leftovers in large official organizations and companies. Second, if little meat is eaten, then greater quantities of other food are consumed, and if a lot of meat is eaten, then less other food is consumed. Thus, raising pigs to increase meat supplies is not only necessary to maintain health but also economically rational. The various official organizations and schools have developed many ways of raising pigs. For example, the Central Party School directed the pig slaughterhouse to send someone to the kitchen daily to collect the water in which the grain was washed and the vegetable waste to feed the pigs. The Central General Affairs Section directed someone to collect as pig food the waste left after husking the grain and also the leaves and roots left over in the vegetable plots when the vegetables were harvested. According to Rear Services Department statistics, in the first half of 1941 its various official organizations got 56,814 *jin* of pork worth 170,440 *yuan* at the market prices of that time. This was enough for each person to have 1 *jin* of pork per month. If we add the following six months, the value for the whole year was roughly 350,000 *yuan*. According to the statistics of the Central Administration Bureau, the various official organizations and schools directly under central control raised an average of 265 pigs a month until October 1942. Over the ten months, this totaled an estimated 23,330 *jin* of pork worth 700,000 *yuan* in border region currency. Another example is the top-level official organizations in Yan'an *xian*, which in the first ten months of 1942 earned 10,000 *yuan* from pig raising. According to these figures, the total value of animal husbandry by the official organizations and schools of the entire border region is more than 4 million *yuan*.

In addition to raising pigs, raising sheep is also profitable where there is pasture.

After a thorough drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration in 1943, we can adopt the method used by the 359th Brigade in which they assign one cook for every forty people and reduce the number of service personnel. The remaining cooks and service personnel are sent to work on the production front, where they can do many things, such as growing grain and vegetables and raising pigs and sheep. Running large-scale animal husbandry on large livestock farms should be given greater prominence in 1943.

Apart from the grain, vegetables, and animals, there is also charcoal burning and labor done outside working hours, both of which have provided examples worth looking at. All the charcoal used in the winter of 1942 by the various official organizations and schools in Yan'an was provided by teams of people from those institutions sent up into the hills. Buying it would have involved a substantial sum of money. In September the Central General Affairs Section organized a charcoal-burning team of forty-two people made up of service personnel, cooks, and grooms to spend three months up in the hills making charcoal. Altogether they prepared 145 pits of charcoal, completing their task of making 140,000 *jin*. At 1.20 *yuan* a *jin*, this was worth 168,000 *yuan*. If during the four winter months the 30,000 people in the official organizations and schools of the border region made on average 1 *jin* of charcoal per head per day, this would provide 3.6 million *jin* of charcoal worth 3.6 million *yuan*. If we do not make the charcoal ourselves, where shall we find such a large amount of money?

There is also the labor done outside working hours by the miscellaneous duties personnel of the official organizations and offices of the border region. For example, the Central General Affairs Section this year mobilized them to repair buildings, to build surrounding walls, to make bridges, to build roads, and to cut horse fodder. This saved the government more than 110,000 *yuan*. Similar labor done by miscellaneous personnel of the Central Party School saved the government more than 139,000 *yuan*; and the 359th Brigade did not employ outside workers for any of its repairs or new construction. All official organizations and schools should strive to do the same. Mobilize all the people in an official organization or school to do all the work they can do. If we only consider the labor done after working hours by miscellaneous duties personnel,

the amount from all the official organizations and schools of the border region could be surprising. We should give rewards to all people who make achievements in production, and this should also apply to labor outside working hours.

The above is a summary of the experience of the various official organizations and schools of the border region in self-sufficient production during the 1939–42 period.

According to the comrades doing economic work, in the two years of 1941 and 1942 the agricultural, industrial, and commercial capital of the Central Administration Bureau and the Rear Services Department rose from 1,281,917 *yuan* to 11.69 million *yuan* (much of this increase was due to the fall in the value of the currency, and it was not all due to increased production). The production surplus for the year 1942 was 23.81 million *yuan*. Except for the 2.33 million *yuan* retained to increase production capital in 1943, the remaining 21.48 million *yuan* was all used to supplement food, clothing, bedding, and office expenses for the various official organizations and schools. In terms of the type of enterprise, agriculture accounted for 17 percent, industry 8 percent, salt 7 percent, and commerce 69 percent [*sic*]. In terms of the official organizations, the enterprises directly under the control of the Rear Services Department got 8.4 million *yuan*, those directly under the Central Administration Bureau 3.5 million *yuan*, those jointly run by the above two 800,000 *yuan*, and those run by the various official organizations and schools individually 11.1 million *yuan*. If we compare the amount of self-supporting production and the amount supplied by the people, the former is 57.5 percent and the latter 42.5 percent. The comrades at the *xian* level estimate that the monthly running expenses for the Party and government at the *xian* level are roughly 10,000 *yuan*. Their own production is around 9,000 *yuan*, and the upper levels only issue around 1,000 *yuan*. The proportion is thus 90 percent to 10 percent and is an even greater achievement.

In sum, the self-supporting production work of the official organizations and schools of Yan'an and of the entire border region has had some success. It has not only supplied the greater part of daily operating expenses and solved urgent financial problems but has also laid a secure foundation for the public sector of the economy. Relying on this base, we can continue to develop production and solve future problems.

What is particularly important and worth raising is that we have gained experience in running economic enterprises. This is a priceless treasure that cannot be reckoned in figures. We should not only be able to manage political, military, Party, and cultural affairs but should also be able to manage economic affairs. If we could do all the others but not economic work, we would be a useless bunch of people. We would be overthrown by our enemies and decline until we collapsed.

In light of our experience of the past five years and particularly the past two, production by official organizations and schools must henceforth improve, expanding its achievements, overcoming its weak points, developing toward greater consolidation, and completing even greater production tasks. In 1943 we should adopt the following policies.

1. Implement the policy of taking agriculture as the chief sector.

- (a) According to the actual circumstances in the official organizations and schools, in each system adopt the following methods of running agriculture: (i) Those with no foundations in agricultural stations should at once prepare plows and tools and separately or in partnership with the people grow grain and vegetables. (ii) Those with agricultural stations, as well as those continuing production, should expand the scope of operations and arrange for surplus personnel to do more subsidiary work, such as raising pigs, sheep, chickens and ducks, and sawing planks. They should also form partnerships with the ordinary people and open new farms. With these methods, grain production in 1943 will be greater and better than that in 1942. Agriculture must not be considered backward and must not be neglected.

- (b) All official organizations and schools, large and small, must allocate the necessary personnel to specialize in growing vegetables, supplemented by light work done by working personnel and students. According to the area and climate, become self-sufficient in vegetables for six or more months of the year and strive to become entirely self-sufficient. This is one of the most important steps in improving livelihood.

2. Coordinate and develop the various kinds of handicrafts. According to the area, system, and the principle of Crack Troops and Simple Administration, join

the existing handicrafts of a similar nature run by each section into partnerships. At the same time, according to the needs of each area and each system, set up new handicraft workshops, such as oil-pressing workshops, places to make soy sauce and condiments, and charcoal pits. The principles for running these handicrafts should be, first, that the workshop itself must be self-supporting and, second, that it can make a profit.

3. Develop animal husbandry. All official organizations and schools both large and small should raise pigs and strive to equal the 359th Brigade's rate of one pig for every five people, so as to increase the supply of meat. Treat increasing the supply of meat, improving living standards, and raising health standards as extremely important matters. In addition, each large official organization and school, particularly the army, should set aside capital and without harming the interests of the people select areas in Sanbian, Longdong, Jinpenwan, and so forth to run livestock farms. They should raise large numbers of cows, sheep, donkeys, and horses, preparing for the time after victory in the War of Resistance when the border region's salt trade declines and it has to be replaced by animal exports.

4. Develop transport undertakings. After a thorough drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration, keep only a small number of animals to ensure the transport of grain and straw needed by each official organization and school itself. All surplus animals together with animals specially purchased should be organized into transport teams to transport salt or goods. These transport undertakings can be run by the area and system as the best way of reducing costs.

5. Regulate commerce. Following the policy of commerce playing a supplementary role and the principles of not going against trading policies or engaging in speculative business, run shops in partnerships or individually according to the circumstances in the various systems and units after the drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration. Eradicate commerce which goes against policy, and close unprofitable shops. The various systems should transfer the proportion needed from commercial capital to agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, and transport. Do not hesitate to lay secure foundations in the work of becoming self-supporting through agriculture, industry, animal husbandry, and transport.

6. Treat improving the livelihood of the working personnel, miscellaneous

duties personnel, and students in official organizations and schools as an important matter. Responsible people in these institutions should think of all kinds of ways of doing so. Under the principle of voluntary participation, they should encourage and direct miscellaneous duties personnel, working personnel, and mothers with children to carry out some handicraft or agricultural production in ways which do not hinder their work, study, or health. However, they should not run commerce. This work can be carried out in large production cooperatives, in small production groups, or individually as the people involved wish. The government should provide loans for capital, and the earnings should belong to the people who take part in the labor. All responsible people who run this very well and have the best success should get rewards. All those who are not good at running their official organizations and schools and hence make the life of the working personnel, miscellaneous duties personnel, students, mothers, children, the sick, and the convalescent too harsh, or those who improve livelihood through ways which are wrong, hinder work and study, or sabotage policies and orders should be criticized and taken to task.

7. Implement unified leadership. Firmly carry out the principle of unified leadership and dispersed operations. The top levels of the Central Committee, the border region, the special regions [*zhuanqu*], and the *xian* should all set up strong leadership organizations concerned with unifying all production undertakings. According to the system and level, unify the policies for running enterprises, unify the coordination between enterprises, and unify the ways of inspecting the running of each enterprise. Furthermore, under the condition of permitting each production unit to retain a suitable profit for itself, within a suitable area and according to the nature of production and operations, unify the distribution of the profits from production. This is necessary to avoid the great evils of lack of coordination, inequalities in profits and losses, and disparities in hardships and comforts.

8. All agriculture, industry, animal husbandry, transport, and commerce must be run as proper enterprises [*qiyehua*], using the system of economic accounting. The food, bedding, clothing, and payments for the working personnel and employees in each enterprise should be supplied by the enterprise itself. They must not be provided at public expense.

9. All production organs (factories, shops, and so forth) should be “massified”

[*qunzhonghua*] regardless of whether they belong to the government, the troops, or the official organizations and schools. With the exception of the allocation of production tasks, the administration and supervision of production, and the disposal of the results of production, everything else is under the leadership of the local Party and government, even including branch life. All personnel in production organizations must carry out policies, be law-abiding and pay taxes, take off their uniforms and put on ordinary clothing, join in the activities of the local masses, and be model citizens of the border region.

10. In accordance with the concrete circumstances, the Finance and Economy Office and the financial and economic committees of the subregions should issue specific production tasks for 1943 to the official organizations and schools in each county system. They should investigate and examine the production plans and enter all the results of production completed within the plan by these production units into the financial accounts. Surplus production beyond the plan should be retained by the production unit for itself as a means of improving livelihood. Upper levels should issue supplements to units whose production is not enough. Those that incur a loss in 1942 should be quickly examined to find ways of making up the deficiency.

11. The four shortcomings pointed out in Chapter VIII, “On the Development of the Productive Undertakings of the Troops,”⁵⁴ also apply to the official organizations and schools. All official organizations and schools committing similar abuses should pay attention to correcting them.

12. It must be clearly explained to all personnel engaged in agriculture, industry, animal husbandry, transport, commerce, and labor outside of working hours (including the ordinary people working as hired labor or in partnerships) that their work is for the revolution, and they are part of a very glorious cause. Setting aside a portion of the income from their labor to hand over to the government helps our own glorious and sacred revolutionary cause. It does not increase the assets of any individual. If publicly employed personnel working in the public sector of the economy plot to make special profits for themselves, they are guilty of immoral conduct within our ranks and crimes of corruption before the law. Those who are entirely free of corruption and waste and work loyally for the Party and the country are considered noble and moral and should receive praise and rewards from the Party and the government. This point should be

explained to the troops.

13 All people doing economic, financial, supply, and general service work, so long as they are not corrupt, do not waste, are loyal, and work for the Party and the country, should be honored. All people who treat their work lightly or with disdain should be criticized and rebuked.

X. On Grain Work

We have now completed our discussion of economic work. Our economy is divided into the two large private [*minyng*] and public sectors. The private sector of the economy includes agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts, cooperatives, and salt undertakings. The public sector consists of the undertakings run by the government, the army, and official organizations and schools. We have looked at all these things. We have not discussed commerce in the private sector since we still lack the necessary information. For the moment we have to ignore it. Now we must discuss the problems of finance. However, we shall not look at all of its aspects but just look at three questions: (i) the question of grain, (ii) the question of taxation, and (iii) the question of economizing.

Our finances depend on two sources, the people and ourselves. Financial work for the portion supplied by ourselves is basically distribution and supply work when the process of production by the three elements of the public sector of the economy is completed and becomes a process of distribution. The public sector of the economy is the primary foundation for our finances and supplies. It provided three-fifths of all finances and supplies during 1942. Thus our primary financial work consists of properly carrying out the distribution of the fruits of production in the public sector. We have already discussed this question at length as a supplementary factor when dealing with the public sector of the economy, and there is no space to say more about the details here. It can wait for further studies later. Now we must discuss the second foundation for our finances and supplies—the portion obtained from the people, namely, grain and tax. There is also the question of economizing. This is related to what we get from the people and what we supply ourselves. It is a question related to the amount of resources we

already possess and to the correct distribution and use of the funds for running our undertakings. Therefore, it is an important financial problem. The grain question referred to here is the grain tax alone and not all grain problems. This is part of the tax system. However, since it is related to all the needs of the army and government and to the relationship of 80 to 90 percent of the people of the border region with the Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the government, it is worth separating it from the general question of taxation and dealing with it first.

More than 90 percent of the 1.4 million people in the border region are peasants. Landlords and merchants make up less than 10 percent. More than half these peasants have obtained a share of land, and the other half have not yet done so. Why are we striving to the utmost to enable the peasants to develop agriculture? First, our aim is to enable the peasants to grow richer and improve their life. Second, we want the peasants to be capable of paying grain tax to help meet the needs of the War of Resistance. There is also a third reason, which is that we want the peasants, after obtaining a reduction in rent and interest rates, to develop agricultural production in order to be able to pay part as land rent to the landlords and thus to unite the landlords with us in the War of Resistance. We must only do one thing to achieve these three aims and that is to strive to the utmost to enable the peasants to develop agriculture. The more agricultural production develops and the greater the amount of agricultural and subsidiary products the peasants harvest each year, the lower the grain tax paid to the government becomes as a proportion of their total harvest. We propose to levy an annual grain tax of 180,000 *dan* beginning in 1943. We intend to keep this amount fixed in the following few years, even if as a result of agricultural development the total amount of grain produced in the border region increases from its present level of around 1.5 million *dan*. (Many comrades estimate that with better use of existing labor power, we can raise the total production of the border region to 2 million *dan*.) All increases will thus accrue to the peasants, making them keen to work hard to develop their own production and enabling them to improve their own livelihood and to dress and eat well.

All comrades throughout the border region must learn from the way the comrades of Yan'an *xian* strive to work in the interests of the peasants so that the peasants rapidly get richer. The richer the peasants become, the less they take exception to handing over a fixed amount of grain tax and the more they feel

close to and inseparable from the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the Border Region Government. The peasant Wu Manyou of Yan'an *xian* is clear proof of this. On April 30, 1942, *Liberation Daily* carried the following report on him.

The Model Rural Labor Hero, Wu Manyou, Excels in Opening New Land and Harvesting Grain for Several Years Running and Influences the Masses to Take Part Actively in Spring Plowing.

(Our special report) Rural labor heroes appear one after another in the spring plowing movement. In order to express their deep devotion to the border region, to consolidate the region, and to improve their own life, they display the spirit of labor to a high degree. Among them, Wu Manyou from Liulin district in Yan'an *xian* is especially respected by most peasants. Every year his harvest of grain exceeds that of others by one-sixth. The two labor powers in his family farm over 120 *mu* of land. This year they opened up 35 *mu* of uncultivated land. He is already publicly recognized as a model labor hero by the peasants of the township. According to late news last night, the Reconstruction Department of the Border Region Government has decided to give him a special award.

(Our report from Yan'an) For several years in a row, the peasant Wu Manyou of Wujiacaoyuan in No. 2 township, Liulin district, Yan'an *xian*, has been active in spring plowing and has grown good crops. Usually people get an average of 5 *dou* from every 3 *mu*; he gets 6 *dou*. Thus when the government issued the call for great efforts in spring plowing, he said: "I have benefited from the revolution, and I can never forget it. I truly love the border region, and at the same time I work to improve my own life." He redoubled his efforts at opening up new land and influencing the masses. He created an enthusiastic spring-plowing movement in his own village. All the peasants in Yan'an *xian* know that Wu Manyou's township did the best farming this year. Wu Manyou originally planned to open up 35 *mu*. He had already opened up 15 *mu* before it rained, and he was even more active afterward. He said: "I can finish clearing the new land in ten days, and if there is time I'll exceed the plan." As for his other 100-odd *mu* of cultivated land, some parts have already been seeded and in some parts the earth has already been turned over. All the inhabitants of Wujiacaoyuan, the village head, the head of the township, and the head of the district, unanimously praise him as "a model hero in spring plowing." Now the district government has applied to higher levels to reward him. On hearing this, the Border Region Government also decided after practical investigation to give him a suitable reward as an incentive.

(Our report from Yan'an *xian*) During the spring plowing movement, many labor heroes have appeared, but in the final analysis who is best at growing crops? To clear up this question, our reporters spent a month visiting various villages. Now they have found the model labor hero generally recognized by the masses. This model hero's name is Wu Manyou. This year he is forty-nine. He is well built and strong. Before the land revolution, he was a tenant farmer. At that time, he had to eat leaves and husks. He "suffered hardship" [worked for others] by cutting firewood. With the money he earned, he had to pay taxes to the local bad officials and rich gentry, and he himself usually went hungry. After the land revolution, he joined the revolution. He was given a share of land on the hills, roughly 40 *shang* equal to 120-odd *mu*. Apart from this private land, he has actively opened up and sown uncultivated land in

successive years, and he raises cows and sheep. Now all the hill land is cultivated, and he has two bulls, three cows, and more than a hundred sheep. His prospects grow brighter and brighter. He has married and eats and dresses well. Last year, after government examination, his family status was raised from poor peasant to middle peasant. He often says: "When I think of the past and then of the present, how can I forget the benefits of the revolution and of the border region?"

(Our report from Yan'an *xian*) Model labor hero Wu Manyou plants crops like any other peasant. Why does he reap more grain than others? According to the peasants in his village, there are several reasons. First, he gets up earlier than anyone else and goes to bed later. Before the sky has grown light, he has already fed his cows and gone up the hill. He only comes back from his land when the sky is dark. He can really endure hard work. Second, in winter when there is no work to do, he diligently collects manure. As he also can raise sheep and cows, he has more manure than others. On average, he applies seven pack loads of manure to every 3 *mu*. Third, when the crops begin to have shoots, some peasants are afraid to go up into the hills. They do not hoe the weeds or at most hoe only once. He hoes at least twice, so his millet naturally grows well. Fourth, he plows deeply. Other households plow down 5 inches, but he plows down at least 7 inches. Fifth, when breaking up the earth, he breaks it finely and is not careless. Sixth, he always plows and sows at the correct time, neither early nor late. Because of these fine qualities, he harvests a top yield per 3 *mu* of 12 *dou* on the old scale (18 *dou* on the market scale) and the lowest of 4 *dou* (6 market *dou*). The average is 6 *dou* (9 market *dou*). The average for other peasants is 5 *dou* (7 market *dou*). In terms of averages, he is one-sixth better than others.

(Our report from Yan'an *xian*) Model labor hero Wu Manyou is not only a model at growing crops but also a model citizen. Last year, he harvested 18 market *dan* of wheat [*xiaomai*] and 27 market *dan* of grain (equivalent to 16 *dan*, 2 *dou*, of hulled grains). He paid 14 *dan*, 3 *dou*, in grain tax, 1,000 *jin* of hay tax, contributed two lots of 150 *yuan* to government bonds, and paid 665 *yuan* cash substitute for the salt tax. The villagers said to him: "Old Wu, you pay out too much, cut down a bit!" He said, "During the revolution, the Eighth Route Army protects our border region. People at the front lose blood. All we have to do is sweat a little more. How can you say 'Too much'?" Afterward everyone respected his opinion and enthusiastically gave grain to the state. This year the upper levels moved some refugees to live in the village. He lent them grain and hoes and helped them find uncultivated land. He also often encouraged them materially and spiritually to open up and plant land. Usually he is also the fairest person in the village. His prestige among the ordinary people is very high, and everyone trusts him. In May of last year he was elected a member of the township council and director of the township's work in supporting families with dependents fighting in the War of Resistance. He has a younger brother who is a soldier with the Eighth Route Army, so he himself belongs to such a family, but he declined public support. He said: "Fighting is the duty of the Chinese people, there is nothing strange about it. I've enough to eat—what other support do I need?" However, he is extremely correct toward other families in the township with dependents at the front. At the same time, he is very fair in his distribution of labor duties. There are twelve families in the township with dependents fighting in the war. This year he arranged substitute farming for 220 *mu*, and all the families were grateful to him. There is no one in the township who does not say he is good.

(Our report from Yan'an *xian*) There are fourteen peasant households in Wujiacaoyuan with fourteen heads of family. When you raise the question of whether Wu Manyou is worthy of being called a model labor hero, everyone puts his thumb up and says, "What else can be said about old Wu. He is the best at enduring hardship. If he isn't a hero who is fit to be?"

On June 2, there was another report in *Liberation Daily*.

Because of the influence of the labor hero Wu Manyou, Wujiacaoyuan, which originally planned to open up 147 *mu* of uncultivated land, had already opened up 225 *mu*. Wu Manyou himself opened up 15 *mu*. After Wu Manyou was rewarded, the whole township (No. 2 township, Liulin district) opened up 540 *mu*.

On October 29, *Liberation Daily* carried a further report.

This year the harvest of coarse millet is very good. In Wu Manyou's village the yield per 3 *mu* is in general 5 to 6 *dou* but he has got 8 *dou* (each *dou* is the large kind equivalent to 45 *jin*). Most peasants get 3 or 4 *dou* of hulled grain from husking 1 *dan* of coarse grain. He always maintains the official standard for the equivalent amount of hulled grain. Wu Manyou often puts on a propagandistic air and says to others: "If you want to get your crops as good as mine, learn from me! I have no secret, I am simply willing to labor."

Wu Manyou is already a prosperous [*fuyu*] peasant. Because he received benefits from the soviet government in the past and the Border Region Government now, he has united his destiny with that of the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the Border Region Government. All empty words are useless, we must give the people visible material wealth. The minds of many of our comrades have still not fully turned into minds of Communists. They only know how to do one kind of work: asking the people for this and that, for grain, for hay, for taxes, and for mobilization for various kinds of work. They do not know how to do the other kind of work, striving to the utmost to help the people develop production and to improve their cultural level. It is entirely rational for us to ask things of the people for the sake of the revolution and the War of Resistance. It is good that our comrades consider that in doing this work they are doing the work they should do for the revolution. But it is only doing one aspect of the work, and it is not the primary aspect. The primary aspect of our work is not to ask things of the people but to give things to the people. What can we give the people? Under present conditions in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, we can organize, lead, and help the people to develop production and increase their material wealth. And on this basis we can step by step raise their political awareness and cultural level. To these ends, we must endure all discomforts night and day, and diligently and thoroughly look into the people's problems in their livelihood and production, including such important matters as plow oxen, agricultural implements, seeds, manure, water conservancy, animal fodder,

agricultural credit, immigration, opening up new land, improving agricultural methods, female labor, labor by loafers, plans for setting up households, cooperatives, exchange-labor teams, transport teams, textiles, animal husbandry, and salt industry. Moreover, we must concretely help the people to solve these problems and not use empty words. This work is the primary work for all Communist Party members working in the countryside. Only after we have done this aspect of work and achieved real results can we get the people's support when we do the second aspect of our work, which is to ask them for things. Only then will they say that our requests are necessary and correct. Only then will they understand that if they do not give grain, hay, and other things to the government, their life cannot be good and cannot get better. Only in this way will our work not be done through coercion. Only in this way will things run smoothly, and only in this way will we be truly united with the people. This is the basic line and policy of our Party. Every comrade (including those in the army) should study this thoroughly. Only when our comrades understand and carry out the complementary nature of these two aspects of work can we call ourselves all-around Communist revolutionaries. Otherwise, although we do revolutionary work and although we are revolutionaries, we shall still not be all-around revolutionaries. Furthermore, some comrades are still bureaucrats remote from the masses. Because they only know how to ask the masses for things and do not know how to or are unwilling to give things to the masses, the masses detest them. This question is extremely important. I hope everyone will pay great attention to it and propagandize the principle throughout the whole Party.

In what follows we shall sum up our past experience in grain work and point out the policy for 1943.

From 1937 to 1939, the grain tax levied in the border region covered only a part of supplies. The deficiency each year was made up for by purchases using funds issued by the government. With the exception of particular areas and periods, when there were grain difficulties, there were no insurmountable problems in the whole of grain supply for the four years. During that time, we actually enabled the people to build up their resources. The burdens of the grain tax were heavy on the rich peasants and landlords, very light on the middle peasants, and most poor peasants had none at all. In 1940 outside aid was cut off, and the government had no resources to buy grain. We had to turn to raising all of it in

tax. However, the principle of “calculating tax on the basis of income” had not yet changed. Also, the grain tax for 1940 was raised to only 90,000 *dan*, and the policies for collection were not altered. For supplies in the following year (1941), we put forward the policy of “strengthening grain administration and ensuring grain sufficiency.” However, we could not provide all supplies since we had not levied much grain in 1940. There was also the related matter of achieving self-sufficiency in running costs in 1941, in connection with which the various army units and official organizations paid careful attention to grain in order to solve problems of livelihood. Another factor was that since the organizational structure of the departments doing grain work was not yet strong and the quality of the cadres was not good enough, the various regulations were not well established and we could not fully control grain income and expenditure in all places. At the time, the problems of making excessive returns and rash leadership were very serious, personnel was constantly changing, increasing and decreasing, and there was too much occasional expenditure outside the set amount. The grain tax levied in 1940 provided supplies until March 1941, when some places already had nothing to eat. Before long, there was panic over grain everywhere. It was only by successively buying grain once and borrowing twice that we lasted until November. In order to guarantee supplies for 1942 and to repay loans taken out in 1941, it was estimated that a levy of 200,000 *dan* was essential. At this time the problem of grain had already become the most serious financial problem. After repeated study by the Party and government and under the new principle for collection of “calculating tax first on the basis of our expenditure and second on the basis of income,” it was decided to levy 200,000 *dan* of grain and 26 million *jin* of hay. To ensure collection of this amount of grain and taking into account the interests of all social strata, the base for collection was expanded. The burden on the middle peasants was increased, and the poor peasants began to bear some of it. We corrected the earlier phenomenon of bias toward the minority of wealthy.

The grain accounts at the various *xian* granaries clearly were not kept in the past, and the great muddle in the formalities for buying and borrowing grain during 1941 had increased the difficulty in sorting them out. The Grain Office was deeply afraid that the lack of clarity over the old grain would influence the new. Therefore, “grasp the new grain, ensure supplies” was declared the strategy

for work in 1942. Events during the year showed that although there were deficiencies in implementation, the policy itself was entirely correct. The grain tax for 1942 was reduced to 160,000 *dan* and the hay tax to 16 million *jin*. The policy for collection also reduced the burden on the poor peasants slightly. Furthermore, we are preparing to implement a unified progressive agricultural tax in 1943 in place of the grain tax method. In order to raise the peasants' enthusiasm for production, we lent them some grain and hay during 1942 to help them solve problems during spring plowing. In supply work, the main thing is to concentrate on grain and hay.

With regard to the work of collection, we levied taxes of only 10,000 *dan* in 1937 and 1938. The burden on the masses was very light, and everyone was willing to pay. In 1939 the amount was raised to 50,000 *dan*. The government proclaimed new regulations for collecting the grain. Work groups were sent down to the countryside to make surveys and to collect tax according to the regulations. However, in reality, 50,000 *dan* was still a very small amount of grain tax for the masses to bear. The cadres were used to the method of democratic apportionment of taxes, and the survey work was very perfunctory. The so-called collection according to regulations remained a theory. In 1940 it was just the same. Only in 1941, when the grain tax burden suddenly increased to 200,000 *dan*, did the government again seriously revise the regulations. The Finance Department sent large numbers of work groups to the *xian* to work with the *xian* and district governments in carrying out fairly thorough-going surveys so that the masses' burdens were made rational. This grain collection emphasized "thorough-going surveys" and "carrying out the regulations." Summing up collection in 1941, there is clear proof that if good survey work is done, it is easy to carry out the regulations. For example, Ganquan *xian* was very conscientious in conducting surveys and then implementing the regulations and the rates for collection. Quzi *xian* carried out three surveys and was able to ensure a fair and rational distribution of the burden. In Baima district of Huachi *xian* the requirement was not fulfilled after two allocations. Eventually the head of the grain collection work group, Comrade Wang, surveyed one township to get experience. As a result, the whole district overfulfilled its quota by several dozen *dan*. In places where survey work was poorly done, such as in the special military area, the regulations could not be carried out. In general, *xian* cadres still treated

survey work too lightly. Only a minority of them carried out thorough-going surveys for grain collection in 1941. The majority still used the old method of democratic apportionment of taxes. In 1942 the grain collection increased due to the experience of the previous year. The regulations were revised again to bring them more in line with reality. More thorough surveys were undertaken on the basis of the surveys carried out in 1941. The Finance Department issued instructions that the cadres collecting the grain had to follow the regulations. In cases where carrying out the regulations meant that the task could not be completed, they could also use the method of democratic apportionment of taxes. At the same time, during this collection the cadres were given ideological education, which overcame their previously crude work style and backward conduct, such as following personal preferences and holding things back. According to recent reports from Longdong, there is once again proof of the importance of thorough-going surveys for the implementation of regulations. One district in Qingyang *xian* carried out a thorough survey, and because much new land was cultivated during the year and production increased, it was able to exceed the original collection target by several hundred *dan* in line with the regulations.

A further point to consider is that for several years the figures set for the grain collection have been achieved and exceeded, but the work of putting the grain into the granaries has been too muddled. Many cadres involved in grain collection think that they only have to meet the target. They do not consider quality or investigate delayed payments. As a result, on the one hand, the quality is not good enough, with 15 to 20 percent consisting of husks in some cases, and, on the other, there are instances in which the masses delay in paying their grain. There is a difference between the amount collected and the amount put into the granaries. In the 1941 collection, although the quality was a bit better, there were still a lot of husks mixed with the grain. The slogan "Grain to the Granary and Hay to the Cellar" was put forward to overcome the problem of late payment, but there was still too much of it. In addition, because the 1941 collection was much bigger than that in any previous year, the difficulties of getting it into the granaries were much greater. As a result, more than 3,900 *dan* of the grain collected did not go into the granaries. This was nearly 2 percent of the total. During the 1942 collection the problem of getting the grain into the granaries was

especially emphasized. According to the latest examination, this work has been done a little better this year. However, the question of whether the full total was put in the granaries awaits a final summary before it can be answered.

Another point is that for several years the Finance Department has assigned work groups to help the *xian* and district governments in the grain levy work. Where *xian* and district cadres are too weak, this method is of great help. Its shortcoming is that it easily creates dependency in the lower levels of government, and every time there is a mobilization, the upper levels have to send people. The cadres have to go back and forth, spending much time on the road, which leads to a waste of manpower and time. Since collection in 1942 had the good foundation of the work done in 1941, the Finance Department adopted the principle of “fewer and better” in its assignment of work teams. It sent fewer cadres to each *xian* and increased the responsibility of the *xian* and district governments. In 1941, 150 people were sent down. On this basis, they are preparing to move toward not sending down anyone at all, handing all the grain collection work over to the *xian* and district governments.

With regard to supply work, because general income and expenditures were not firmly controlled in 1941 so that grain had to be bought once and borrowed twice, and because mobilization was hurried and almost cruel, the masses were not satisfied. This was a great shortcoming. In 1942 we were able to control income and expenditures. We also had the 200,000 *dan* of grain levied in 1941 as a guarantee to ensure supplies until December. However, since the drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration was not thorough, the budget could not be strictly implemented. Occasional expenditures combined with unpaid grain tax came to over 18,000 *dan*. In addition, troop movements influenced the relationship between supply and demand in various places, and grain balances in the first half of 1942 could not be maintained as allocated. Therefore, after July places like Yan’an, Nanniwan, and Linzhen one after another became short of grain. Afterward, the Finance Department issued supplementary funds of 2 million *yuan* to buy grain, and a summer collection was made. Only in this way was a grain panic avoided during 1942, and there was no bad effect on the masses. Next, for the grain in 1941 we adopted the method of “allocation as a whole and divided administration.” Although this saved the bother and waste of transport to and fro, it brought about cases of uncontrolled selling of grain, which

also entailed a lot of waste. There was still a gap between the amount collected and the amount needed for supplies, which also led to many shortcomings. For example, the grain and hay allocated to the various *xian* in 1941 were biased toward the harvest situation and neglected the supply and demand situation. The grain requirement in Sanbian for the year was more than 10,000 *dan* but only 1,600 *dan* was collected. A supplement of 9,000 *dan* had to be transported from Longdong, Ansai, Zichang, Zhidan, and so forth. Not only was the year's grain transport work excessive for the masses of these *xian*, but the masses in Sanbian were also very busy handling transshipment. They declared that "this way is not as good as collecting more from us." It is now estimated that only the 4,000 *dan* of grain moved to Sanbian from Longdong cost 7 million *yuan* to transport, which is more than the cost of buying grain in Sanbian. Another example is the grain collected in Yanchuan. Originally it should have supplied Yan'an. However in 1941 grain from Dongyang district was collected at the Majiapan granary, which is on the opposite side of the *xian* near the Yellow River. As a result, it took an extra three days to transport the grain to Yan'an. Quite a few similar situations arose in other *xian*. Again, the plan for the 1941 hay collection was not thoroughly researched. It was decided everywhere to collect the hay after the grain, and no attention was paid to supply and demand. As a result, some places kept hay for which there was no use and it was allowed to rot, which dissatisfied the masses. In other places which needed a lot of hay, there was an exceptional shortage and supplies were only enough for eight months. Another example was the 1941 grain collection in Guanzhong. Millet was made the unit instead of wheat. The peasants had to go out of the border region to sell wheat and buy millet in order to pay the tax. As a result, too much millet was collected, the troops were not used to eating it, and there were many disputes. After summer begins, millet rots easily, which added to the troubles. Again in 1941 the relative proportion between regular and miscellaneous grains was generalized and not reckoned according to the grain production circumstances or the relationship between supply and demand in each place. As a result, some places (such as the special military area) collected a lot of miscellaneous grains which could not be issued. Some places (such as Yan'an) needed horse fodder but could not get miscellaneous grains. The official organizations had to lower the relative proportions and exchange hulled grain for miscellaneous grains, which in turn

led to a waste of grain. The above shortcomings illustrate that grain work is very concrete and meticulous, practical work. If it is done crudely and in a way divorced from reality, then the results will disturb the people and disrupt the government. In 1942 after the grain collection work was handed over to the Grain Office, the management of grain collection and supplying was united. At the same time, as a means of balancing resources, it was decided to accept a money substitute for the hay tax according to the different supply-and-demand situations in each place. As for the relative proportions of grains, the earlier way of generalized application was changed into a system of deciding according to the concrete situation in each place, thus overcoming the previous shortcoming.

Next, from the winter of 1941 to the present, rather large successes have been achieved in setting up and consolidating systems for grain supply. With regard to the budget system, for example, in 1942 most official organizations were able to draw up their budgets at the correct time. They have eliminated the bad practices of claiming excess grain and eating double rations and have corrected the situation in which *xian* approved budgets haphazardly and spent grain without control. In particular, they have grasped the policy of “the final account must not exceed the budget.” During 1942 they have conscientiously cut down on all irrational expenditure, economizing on more than 19,000 *dan* of grain. With regard to the system for paying out grain, most army units and official organizations have honored the regulations that grain cannot be paid out without a grain payment document. The responsible comrades in the *xian* have also paid attention to this regulation. They have not indiscriminately permitted loans from the grain tax. At the same time, during 1942 all the *xian* have used the official *dou* measure, which considerably reduces the number of disputes. As for the granary regulations, because of the cadres’ limitations, these could only be strengthened first in the central granaries and then gradually generalized to all granaries. For keeping accounts, the Finance Department drew up two standard account books (one new style and detailed, and the other very simple), which were adopted by the cadres according to their ability. In 1942 most granaries, good and bad, had account books. Gradually we can reach the goal of being able to obtain at any time statistics for grain income, expenditure, and the amounts and kinds of grain in store. As for the grain coupon regulations, there was much corruption in 1941 because we issued large numbers of coupons. In 1942 we

abandoned the old grain coupons and issued three kinds of meal tickets, which were only supplied for circulation among personnel in the official organizations to cover meals. This was a step forward.

However, there were still many defects in the grain supply work. For example, a minority of large units still could not draw up their budgets at the stipulated time. A comparison of the actual personnel totals and the budgets of various large units showed that there was still a sizable proportion of figures without foundation. Some instances of taking double rations still occurred. The ratio of livestock was not clearly laid down, which in some cases led to quite a lot of waste. Instances of individual troop units insisting on grain loans from granaries because they had wasted grain and overspending could still not be completely avoided. As for the storage system, most granaries still only managed to do the work of receiving and paying out grain and of administration. They were not good enough at supervising collection, safe keeping, submitting accounts, and other duties. The meal tickets could not be circulated among the people, which caused problems for personnel sent to do outside tasks. This, too, was a shortcoming. Finally, there was a great defect in building up and consolidating all regulations, which was that the Grain Office emphasized only its own regulations and difficulties. It could not comprehensively and concretely concern itself with solutions to the problems and difficulties facing each official organization.

In 1942 the official organizations in charge of grain were very successful in the work of clearing up the granaries' old grain accounts. For several years, the *xian* grain accounts had not been examined and reckoned, so the Grain Office's accounts were no longer of any use. For example, according to the office's accounts, in the winter of 1941 Ansai should have had more than 2,900 *dan* in storage. In fact, it had less than 100 *dan*. Again, the account for the grain taken from the granary by the sanitarium had not been worked on for five years. It was discovered in 1942 that it had collected more than 100 *dan* too much. There were many cases like these. Compounded by the muddle over purchases and loans in 1941, many *xian* had no accounts to be examined. As a result, the Grain Office sent cadres down to each place to work out the accounts and adopted all kinds of accounting methods. The old granary accounts were only cleared up after six months of hard work. Now the Grain Office is able to work out how much grain is actually held by the granaries and can keep a grasp of grain income and

expenditure. The *xian*'s administration of grain was also previously very poor, with losses due to a combination of rats, insects, rot, and so forth. In addition, there was serious corruption among the cadres. During grain collection in 1941, there were more than ten cases. It had even gone so far that individual special agents had infiltrated granary work. For example, Zhang Bingquan, the director of the granary of Taile district in Fu *xian*, was a special agent. In February 1942 he embezzled over 10 *dan* of public grain and fled the border region. This shows that previously the Grain Office's supervision of granary cadres was too lax and its inspection work too infrequent. Since the granary accounts were cleared up in 1942 and the leadership of the granaries by the five sections of government at the *xian* level was strengthened, corruption and waste have been reduced and many active and hardworking cadres have been discovered.

In carrying out the collection policy in 1939 and 1940, the regulations were fixed so that the tax threshold began at 1.2 *dan* (that is, peasant families whose harvest per person was less than 1.2 *dan* were not taxed). The tax was progressively applied to a top level of 36 percent (that is, the tax rate increased until it levied 36 percent of the harvest, and thereafter the percentage did not increase). The failing here was that the tax burden was biased toward the minority of the well-off. At the same time, the method of collection was that of democratic apportionment of taxes and not that laid down by the regulations. As a result, there were cases of "going for big households" and "ignoring everything but the target." Also the collection policy was influenced by excessive "leftism." In 1941 the regulations were revised. The tax threshold was fixed at 0.5 *dan* (e.g., a family of five whose annual harvest of regular grain was less than 2.5 *dan* was not taxed). Taxation was progressively applied up to 30 percent. The implementation of these regulations resulted in a broadening of the base for collection. Apart from Huan *xian*, which suffered natural disasters, the tax burden in all other *xian* was carried by more than 80 percent of the people, and in Yan'an *xian* it reached 95 percent. In terms of caring for the interests of all classes and strata, with the exception of Yan'an, Yanchang, and Ansai, the burden in other *xian* did not exceed 30 percent of the harvest. However, there were still shortcomings. For example, the *xian* were not entirely rational in their allocations to meet the total collection. The special military area lowered the tax threshold to 0.3 *dan* and reduced the number of steps in the tax progression. As a result, the

poor and middle peasants suffered, and the richer middle peasants and above were let off too lightly. Also, during grain collection in 1941 we paid attention to only collecting grain and not to reducing rents and interest rates at the same time. Some new immigrants who should not have paid tax had to do so. Dependent family of troops in the War of Resistance should have received special assistance, but this was stopped in some cases. Some cotton growers should not have been taxed for grain but were. All these things contravened the government's policies. Other policies, such as caring for the interests of all strata and raising the peasants' enthusiasm for production, merely remained general slogans. Actual implementation was very deficient. Compared with the experience of 1941, grain collection in 1942 made some advances. However, we still did not pay enough attention to the cotton-growing policy. For example, the allocation of a quota for the grain tax to the cotton-growing areas in the three eastern *xian* was the same as that allocated to other *xian*. When it came to collection, problems arose. If the grain tax was not collected on the cotton fields, the requirement could not be fulfilled. Yet if it was collected, it would conflict with government orders. Ultimately they had to make accommodations and reduce the collection by half. This still damaged the authority of the government.

In any work, going beyond the policies depends on whether the cadres are good or bad. Grain work is no exception. The most hardworking people doing grain work are the granary cadres. The most easily corrupted are also the granary cadres. Therefore, we shall here especially quote examples of typically good and typically bad granary cadres, so that everyone can learn from the good and be warned by the bad.

Good Examples

A. Comrade He Chungao, director of Panlong granary, is an old fellow of fifty-two. He does not say much, but he is very careful and thoughtful, enthusiastic and hardworking. In 1939 he was assigned to work in the Zhenwudong granary of the Grain Office. In 1940 he was transferred to be director of the Panlong granary, concurrently responsible for the grain market balancing station [*diaojizhan*] and the transport station. He is responsible for the work of three

men. In the past he had been secretary of a district Party committee and had been trained at the Border Region Party School. Initially he was one of seven people, including Jia Zhicai and Ren Shengbiao, who were assigned from the Border Region Party School to do grain work, but of all of them he alone remains at his post today. His cultural level is not among the lowest of the granary directors. He can write simple letters and keep clear accounts. He is very conscientious in studying the newly adopted account books and learns quickly. In 1941 when the “monthly report tables” were issued to the granaries, some directors could not understand them after three days of explanation. After hearing about them once, he was able to raise questions and opinions. After a few questions like “What should be filled in this section?” “Would it be all right to fill in that section like this?” he could complete and send in his “monthly report tables” on time. Many fine qualities are expressed in his work. The first is meticulous attention to detail. When receiving grain, he writes a receipt for the amount and makes up his accounts every evening. When making a payment, he double-checks on the abacus. The second is a deep sense of responsibility. He takes great care of the granary. One storage bin was a little damp, and he gave it special attention. He often had the grain spread out to dry in the sun, and when distributing grain he always drew from this bin first. Eventually he dug a ditch behind the bin and dug the surface of the earth around the bin lower than the bin, making it a little drier. When the granary needs minor repairs, he does not hire workers but carries bricks and plaster himself (under his influence, the personnel in charge of moving the grain also work hard and help). As administrator of the transport depot, he helps to cut grass, draw water, and prepare food every time a transport team arrives. His third quality is his friendly attitude toward others. Some of the personnel in leading official organizations are in a bad mood when the grain is doled out, but he patiently finishes the job and does not get into arguments. Occasionally some of the masses contribute bad grain. He just encourages them to take it back. When buying grain to balance the market, he can discuss things and get close to the masses. But he also has his own opinions. Once when it was raining and the grain in the market could not be sold, he took the opportunity to purchase it. The price was fairly low, and the masses were still pleased. For these reasons, he enjoys some prestige among the masses of Panlong. When he was collecting grain tax in 1941, a peasant from Yongping district in Yanchuan *xian*

offered him a bribe. He got angry and sent the man and the bribe to the district government. His fourth quality is a plain and simple way of life. He raises very few questions about his own life and he expresses concern about receiving welfare expenses. In 1942 he was responsible for collecting 4,000 *dan* of grain tax, and everyone was concerned that he might not manage since he is old and has few helpers. But every time he wrote a letter to the Grain Office, he said that he could manage.

B. Comrade Bai Heming is director of the Tianzhuang granary in Suide. He graduated upper primary school. He had worked in the old *baojia* office.⁵⁵ His qualities include, first, a deep sense of responsibility. When receiving grain, he compares receipts and invoices every evening to make sure that there has been no mistake. He also makes out clear accounts for households that owe grain and supervises the districts and townships, encouraging them to send in their grain. Before receiving grain, he himself lays stones and boards in the storage bins, spreads dry straw, and puts straw mats over the straw so as to guard against dampness. After the grain is received, he seals up the bins which will not be opened soon, using bricks and plaster and covering up holes, which let in the wind, with broken mats. Second, he is friendly toward others. When receiving grain, he inspects it conscientiously. However, to those who send in bad grain, he simply says: "Look, everybody, can you feel easy about sending grain like this for the troops?" He has never raised his voice in abuse. If someone from the army came to collect grain in a manner not in accordance with official procedures, he always courteously and patiently explained things. On the one hand, he would lend some grain to prevent shortages, and, on the other, he would ask them to follow the procedures. Before long if anyone from the troops stationed in Suide went to collect grain from old Bai's granary, they always went through the procedures to avoid difficulties for old Bai and embarrassment for themselves. Third, he is very hardworking. He gathers firewood and draws water himself. He is careful about operating and food costs. He reports excess expenditures to the fifth government section at the *xian* level. He does not indiscriminately take grain and sell it for the cash to make up for deficiencies. Now Comrade Bai Heming has been promoted to be head of the fifth section of the Suide *xian* government.

Bad Examples

A. Hu Dianchang was director of the granary of No. 4 district of Xinning. When receiving grain in the winter of 1941, he sold 3 *dan* privately, took 1.3 *dan* home, and lent 3.92 *dan* to his relatives and friends. He and his relatives and friends, Hu Diangong, Hu Qingrong, and Liu Zixiao, should have paid 7 *dan* of grain tax. They did not hand over a single grain, but he still issued grain tax receipts. When receiving grain, he did not allow the masses to sweep up the grain on the floor but swept it up himself and shared it with the personnel helping him to receive the grain. After he had finished issuing grain tax for deposit in citizens' homes, he was 0.2 *dan* short, but he falsely reported 1 *dan* to the fifth section of the *xian* government. After the fifth section exposed him, he was sent to court, sentenced to prison, and ordered to return the embezzled grain.

B. In September 1939 after grain was sold from the Shuifan district granary in Huachi *xian*, 14.7 *dan* of grain tax was found to be missing. The granary director, Wang Wenbin, reported to the upper levels that rats had eaten 12.7 *dan* and another 2 *dan* had been contaminated. In 1941 when the grain collection work group went to investigate, they discovered that Wang Wenbin had gone to the *xian* town for a meeting during the time when the grain was sold. His place had been taken by the district secretary, Mao Yupeng. During the grain sales, Mao Yupeng had lived exceptionally well. He had bought a flock of sheep and two skin coats. He had also bought cloth. There was suspicion of embezzlement. However, at the time the *xian* government did not investigate. Afterward Mao Yupeng was transferred to work elsewhere. This affair is still going on.

Above, we have summed up our experience in grain work during the past five years. Below are the policies for work in 1943.

1. Implement the unified progressive agricultural tax. In the past, we have used the method of levying the national salvation grain tax. It is not an entirely satisfactory method of taxation. If it is well done, it can only achieve the aim of being fair and rational in its burden on the people. It cannot effectively encourage the peasants' enthusiasm for production. Therefore, we must actively prepare to implement the unified progressive agricultural tax. How should our preparatory work be done?

- (i) Under the leadership of the Finance Department, set up a specialist research team consisting of five to seven cadres selected for their experience in political work and their good understanding of land and financial problems. This team should gather, study, and arrange materials concerning progressive taxation, and plan the work for introducing it. In addition, directed by the Border Region Government, responsible comrades from the relevant official organizations led by the head of the Finance Department should organize a planning committee to take charge of policy, to solve major problems, and to regularly lead the work of the research team.
- (ii) Carry out survey work. A detailed summary of grain collection work in 1942 should be supplied to the progressive taxation research team as concrete source materials. The research team should first study some *xian* with different situations, whose collection in 1941 and 1942 was comparatively good. It should draw up an initial survey plan, and first carry out trial surveys. Afterward, it should revise the plan, draw up a format, and carry out a general survey. In light of the materials from the survey, it should determine the regulations and methods. *Xian* with good successes that complete the work early can carry out a trial run during 1943.
- (iii) Carry out land registration at the same time as the surveys.
- (iv) Strengthen government organization at the township level, build up sound clerical records, and survey thoroughly.

2. Grasp grain and hay, and ensure supplies. Supplying grain and hay is complex and detailed work. Grain and hay resources are widespread and not easily grasped. If we are unable to pay full attention at all times and cannot suitably adjust the relationship between supply and demand, it will be hard to do a good job with it. If we want to be able to grasp grain and hay and ensure supplies, we must do the following:

- (i) We must first ensure that all 160,000 *dan* enters the granaries, and we must improve the quality so that 100 percent is grain. Do not allow adulteration with husks. At the same time, call on all *xian* to eliminate evasion of payments. We must build up thorough regulations for the

administration of grain and hay. Pay attention to the running and inspection of granaries. Set up central granaries. Gradually improve equipment. Prevent damage through contamination and rot, and corruption and theft. Strictly carry out the budget system. Completely eradicate excessive claims and taking double rations. Set up grain accounts in accordance with the cultural level of the cadres in each locality. Do not be too elaborate but require that receipts, issues, and stocks of grain are clearly recorded. Next, the regulations for paying out grain are even more important and must be carried out. The reason for building up regulations soundly is to ensure supplies and to prevent corruption and waste. All instances of not adhering to discipline must be strictly corrected. However, a mechanical viewpoint which one-sidedly emphasizes regulations without concern for the concrete facts must also be guarded against.

- (ii) To ensure supplies, we must first handle the relationship between supply and demand of grain and hay. Prepare supplements for areas deficient in grain through transport, adjustment of distribution, and so forth. In 1943 we should organize any unused animals owned by the official organizations to transport grain and hay, improve the work efficiency of every transport team (on average, our animals each carry 1 *dou* less than those of the common people, and we need three days to go as far as they do in two), and lay down precise transport tasks so as to economize on manpower and animal power, which can then be used for production. We must depend on the grain transported by the people, making plans early and using the slack agricultural periods and unused porters and animals. Except in special circumstances, mobilizing transport in the busy agricultural seasons is not allowed. Long-distance transport must also be avoided as much as possible. In areas where the distribution of grain can be adjusted, coordinated plans should be made by the Grain Office. Grain should be sold or bought at the right times so as to supplement supplies, save on transport, and avoid waste. In areas where official organizations and schools are excessively concentrated, such as Yan'an, we should consider the situation and disperse men and horses to ease the distribution of grain and straw.

3. Carry out the drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration, and store grain to prepare for famine. For several years in a row, the border region has over-drawn its grain tax and does not have the slightest reserves. If a natural disaster were to occur, grain supplies for the army and people would become an extremely serious problem. Everyone should be warned about this and take the following steps:

- (i) Resolutely carry out the new reorganization plan of the Party and government and the drive for Crack Troops and Simple Administration. Through simplification and strict economy, ensure a balance between grain income and expenditure in 1943.
- (ii) Collect 180,000 *dan* of grain tax in 1943 so that we have a chance to retain some as reserves against need.
- (iii) During 1943 the troops, official organizations, and schools should prioritize developing agriculture. Growing grain should form a considerable proportion of farming work so that there will be an even greater surplus in 1944 and we will be prepared against disaster. The troops, official organizations, and schools certainly may not relax their own grain production because we are preparing to levy 180,000 *dan* in taxes during 1943.

4. Strive to economize, and strictly prevent waste of grain. There is a serious waste of grain among official organizations and troops. Thus, mounting a campaign to economize should be one of our central tasks for 1943. Recently in Yan'an some official organizations and schools inspected the amount of waste and carried out economy campaigns with great success. For example, the administrators of a training squad in the supply department of the garrison forces were diligent and responsible. When issuing grain and flour, they did the weighing themselves. Thus their food supply was just right, and they were often able to eat buns and noodles. The Central Party School has large kitchens. Recently, administration of food has been strict. Grain cooking has been supervised. Leftover grain has been kept and eaten at the following meal. After this was done, only 1 *jin* of millet was consumed per head per day. Before a month was up, more than 5 *dan* of millet was saved. Another example is the collective meals at the nursery. In the past, when the people there took meals in

separate groups, the nursery consumed 150 *jin* of flour per meal. After collective meals were introduced, they only consumed 100 *jin*, saving one-third. You see, comrades, what a surprising amount this is. Similarly, the central departments and committees have implemented collective mess halls and have also gotten good results. The Central Party School planned in the first half of the year to raise 2,000 chickens, requiring 300 bowls of millet a day. The waste was quite large. Afterward, they killed most of the chickens, and only sixty were left. This saved quite a lot of grain. In addition, it is necessary to foster the habit of using meal tickets. It can reduce the issue of large amounts of grain. In sum, in order to ensure that there are absolutely no shortages of grain, on the one hand, we must levy and produce it, and, on the other, we must seek to economize. This is the work for leading comrades and it is a mass movement. Everyone must pay attention and complete the task given by the Party.

Two chapters on taxation and economizing originally planned for this book could not be written in time because the Senior Cadres Conference ended. They had to be left out.

The Author

Notes

This text is a report submitted by Mao to the Senior Cadres Conference of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region held in Yan'an. The translation of Mao's *Economic and Financial Problems* by Andrew Watson, which is reproduced here, is based primarily on the edition of the Chinese text published in 1949 by Xin minzhu chubanshe in Hong Kong, after comparison with the version published in 1947 by the Communist Party Central Bureau of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region. With the agreement of Professor Watson, we have made a small number of changes. Apart from replacing British spelling with American spelling, we have applied other conventions followed in this series, such as the use of the Chinese word *xian* rather than the English "county" for the administrative unit, which is mentioned repeatedly in the text. Finally, in dealing with the introductory summary, which is the only portion of this long text included in the current edition of *Xuanji*, we have followed the version in *Mao Zedong ji*, which shows all the variants between the official version and what Mao wrote in 1942 (as published in the 1944 edition of *Xuanji*). For that section, text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised

version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi. We are grateful to Andrew Watson and to the publisher of his monograph, Cambridge University Press, for kindly allowing us to make use of this excellent translation.

A Note on Measurements

(Taken from Watson, *Mao Zedong and the Political Economy of the Border Region* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980], p. xi. The names Buck, Jingbian, and Dingbian refer to previous studies of the Chinese rural economy; details are given in Watson, pp. 261 ff.)

Weights

1 *dan* = 300 *jin* = 150 kg

1 *dou* = 30 *jin* [standard] or 45 *jin* [old standard] = 15 kg

1 *sheng* = 3 *jin* = 1.5 kg

1 pack of salt = 150 large *jin* (24 ounces) = 225 *jin* (16 ounces) = 112.4 kg

Area:

1 *shang* = 3 *mu* (Yan’an) = 5 *mu* (Jingbian)

1 *mu* = 0.0614 ha (Buck) = 0.06067 ha (Dingbian 1930) = 0.0667 ha (Current Standard)

1. A Basic Summary of Past Work → Economic and Financial Problems at the Time of the Anti-Japanese War

2. Stress → One-sided stress

3. The friction of the two anti-Communist drives → The friction of the Guomindang’s two anti-Communist drives

4. Here the *Selected Works* version inserts the following two sentences: “This self-supporting economy, which has been developed by the troops and the various organizations and schools, is a special product of the special conditions of today. It would be unreasonable and incomprehensible in other historical conditions, but it is perfectly reasonable and necessary at present.”

5. The principle → The truth

6. Development → Developing the economy
7. The border region has only 1.4 million inhabitants → Although the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has not suffered directly from the impact of the War of Resistance on conditions in the rear, it has only 1.5 million inhabitants
8. Here the *Selected Works* version adds: “and, moreover, gain more than they give.”
9. Mao here used the term *tuntian* (camp-field system), which historically was used in China to describe troops farming land to provide for their own needs as military colonists.
10. Border Region Government → Border region revolutionary government
11. Watson translates *jingbing jianzheng* as “better troops and simpler administration”; we prefer “crack troops and simple administration.” See *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 8, p. 187. This policy is raised in “A Most Important Policy,” September 7, 1942; it is extensively discussed in Selden, *The Yanan Way*.
12. Mao is here referring to the land redistribution of 1934–37, which by 1942 was considered to have entailed left-wing excesses under the influence of the Wang Ming line. See the Introduction to Vol. IV, pp. cv–lxx, and the Directive on Land Policies (Vol. V, pp. 281–82).
13. Renamed Zhidan *xian* in 1937 in memory of Liu Zhidan.
14. Meaning Yanchuan, Yanchang, and Gulin.
15. That is, exported from the border region.
16. That is, the eleven *xian* administered directly from Yan’an.
17. That is, the Sui-Mi subregion. This area only came under the full control of the Border Region government during 1940.
18. Mao uses a colloquialism, *erliuzi*, which means “loafers.”
19. These are all *xian* in northern Shaanxi Province, near the Great Wall.
20. Usage throughout the text indicates that Mao is employing the terms *culiang* (coarse grain) and *xiliang* (fine grain) to mean “grain” and “hulled grain” respectively, rather than to distinguish between different types of grain as might have been the case. *Xiliang* is often used as an official equivalent.
21. The 1947 edition of the *Selected Works* has a number of mistakes in its figures, so we have followed the 1949 Hong Kong edition for this table, with reference to the 1944 edition as reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 8, p. 201.
22. The “three mountains” refer to three mythical islands where magic spirits are presumed to live.

- [23.](#) A *kang* is a raised platform warmed by the flue for the kitchen stove in North China village homes.
- [24.](#) *Dang bagu*, literally “Party eight-legged essay.” We use “formalism” because it evokes adherence to traditional forms rather than simply following current clichés. See above, Mao’s seminal essay on this issue in the text of February 8, 1942.
- [25.](#) The Northwestern Bureau was a leading Party organ in the border region. It was headed by Gao Gang, one of the original leaders in the area before the Long March. Selden argues that it was one of the bodies used by the Party to curb growing government bureaucracy (*The Yen-an Way*, p. 205).
- [26.](#) Anding *xian* was renamed Zichang in 1942 in honor of a fallen hero.
- [27.](#) The term *shang* is used, but Mao supplies the following definition: “In the Yan’an area of the border region, each *shang* is equal to 3 *mu*, but in the Jingbian area, each *shang* is equal to 5 *mu*.”
- [28.](#) Wu Manyou was a peasant labor hero in Shaanxi. Mao quotes a glowing report on Wu in section 10, “On Grain Work,” below, and praises Wu’s virtues in “Get Organized,” below, in the text of November 29, 1943.
- [29.](#) We are indebted to Professor David Holm of the University of Melbourne for bringing the existence of this disease to our attention. See Harrison Forman, *Report from Red China* (New York: Book Find Club, 1945), p. 48–49.
- [30.](#) A description of the qualities of this fat-tailed sheep can be found in H. Epstein, *Domestic Animals of China* (Farnham Royal: Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux, 1969), p. 40.
- [31.](#) According to Selden, this is equivalent to 120 by 3 English feet (*The Yen-an Way*, p. 256).
- [32.](#) The figures quoted by Mao here are very different from those compiled by Selden from other sources (ibid.). For 1942 Selden gives 16 public mills, producing 14,565 bolts, 27 cooperatives producing 4,500 bolts, 50 private mills producing 12,000 bolts, and home production at 14,158 bolts, a total of 45,223 bolts. Mao’s figures in the following discussion often appear contradictory. This may be due to printing errors or to changes in definitions. In Section V, below, Mao refers to twenty-seven textile cooperatives and, in Section VII, below, to twenty-seven mills run by systems directly controlled by the Central Committee.
- [33.](#) A description of Gonghe is in Edgar Snow, *Scorched Earth* (London: V. Gollancz, 1941), Vol. 2, pp. 213–217 and 309–16. Impressions of the work done by the Northwest Office during this period are in Rewi Alley, *Revolution: The Story of George Alwin Hogg* (Christchurch: Caxton Press, 1967).
- [34.](#) *Qunzhonghua* is more properly translated by the inelegant “massification” (Holm, *Art and Ideology*). We prefer “popularization” for *qunzhonghua* and use “masses” for *qunzhong*; however, our translation

obscures the pointed irony of Mao's discussion here: the *qunzhonghua* of the cooperatives did not, until 1942, do any good for the *qunzhong!* (See *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 8, p. 230.)

[35.](#) Mao's accounting here is not entirely clear. On the basis of the number of shares and the total dividends, the dividend per share should have been 0.03 *yuan*. The discussion is not clear, due to the mixed use of the terms *yuan* and *yang yuan*. The distinction made early in the paragraph is not adhered to in the subsequent discussion. Snow states that in mid-1936 the exchange rate was 1.21 *yuan* in soviet currency for 1 *yuan* in national currency (*Red Star Over China* [London: V. Gollancz, 1937], p. 234).

[36.](#) 10 *qian* per *liang* [ounce] and 16 *liang* per *jin*.

[37.](#) The report uses the term *jian*, meaning a division of a building, usually taken as a room.

[38.](#) Typical buildings in the loess region of North China.

[39.](#) The 1949 version gives the name Wang Pizhang.

[40.](#) Mao here uses the phrase *zhongyuan*, which was used historically to indicate the eastern areas of Shaanxi Province.

[41.](#) Gullies in loess country are like cracks in the earth's surface, with precipitous earth cliffs on either side.

[42.](#) That is, International Women's Day.

[43.](#) We have translated Xin Zhongguo and Shiyan here, since the rest of the factories on this list are similarly translated; Watson (*Mao Zedong and the Political Economy*, p. 153) retains only the pinyin for these two.

[44.](#) Both the 1947 and 1949 editions use the term *shitan*, which may be a misprint for *shihui* (lime). However, in the following discussion the term used is *meitan*, which probably refers to coal and charcoal. We have translated *shitan* as "coal and charcoal" in what follows, noting its occurrence in case lime was intended.

[45.](#) The 1949 edition gives the number as eighteen.

[46.](#) Totaling up the figures quoted gives sixty-three factories.

[47.](#) The term *shitan* is used again.

[48.](#) "Enterprization" is contrasted with factory organization along the lines of a government organization (*giguanhua*). It implies, for example, the use of the economic accounting system rather than the budgetary system used in the latter.

[49.](#) A model worker.

[50.](#) These notes were issued by the semi-official Guanghai Trading Company from 1938 to 1941. During

at period the Guomintang currency was the official currency of the border region, but the Communists could not get any small denomination notes, which were very necessary for the poor area in which they were operating. The Guanghai issue, totaling around 300,000 *yuan* (Guomintang currency) over the four years, was intended to cover this deficiency. See Forman, *Report from Red China*, p. 81, and Günther Stein, *The Challenge of Red China* (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1945), pp. 156–57.

[51](#). This refers to the paper currency printed by the Chinese administrations in areas controlled by the Japanese army.

[52](#). That is, unified direction, planning, and inspection.

[53](#). A philosopher during the Han dynasty responsible for restoring the old learning after the burning of the books during the Qin dynasty.

[54](#). See above, Section VIII, “On the Development of the Productive Undertakings of the Troops.”

[55](#). The local security office used in traditional times and by the Guomintang.

1943

General Orientation for the Work of the New Fourth Army (January 5, 1943)

Chen [Yi] and Rao [Shushi]:¹

I have received your telegram² and agree with your plan to disperse. The only problem is that you should not send anyone to eastern Zhejiang because I fear that when we win the War of Resistance, they will be wiped out by the Guomindang and we will not be able to recover any of them. We need to be prepared for at least two more years of the War of Resistance. You should try every possible means to survive two years and to preserve the backbone of our army. Do not be afraid of decreasing numbers. As long as the backbone exists, that is a victory. We are negotiating with the Guomindang to reorganize the New Fourth Army into one army and to incorporate it into the Eighth Route Army in order for it to obtain legal status. We also promise the Guomindang that we will move to the north of the Yellow River after victory has been achieved so that the two parties can continue their cooperation and rebuild the country together. Currently, the Guomindang and the Communist Party have moved a step closer, but a concrete resolution of this pending case may drag on for some time. During the period when the danger of a Far Eastern Munich Treaty,³ that is, the danger of Guomindang capitulation, still exists, it is necessary for us to develop to the south of the Yangzi River and to eastern Zhejiang. When such a danger disappears and when we need to plan to continue our cooperation with the Guomindang, we should be prepared to move to the north of the Yellow River after the war. This is the general orientation. The winter counteroffensive by the Soviet Union is a great success. In the Stalingrad war zone alone, the Soviet army

defeated and shattered more than forty divisions of the German, Italian, and Romanian armies. Twenty-two divisions of the German army were surrounded and could not escape. The enemy troops suffered 310,000 casualties. The day of Hitler's complete collapse is not far away. After Hitler's defeat, the situation in China will improve, the morale of the Japanese aggressors will be deflated, and these will both benefit our War of Resistance. We should take advantage of this situation to boost the morale of the army and the people and to achieve the goal of perseverance. Also, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi has arrived safely in Yan'an.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 696–97, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Chen Yi was the acting commander of the New Fourth Army; Rao Shushi (1903–1975) was at this time acting secretary of the Central China Bureau of the Central Committee and acting commissar of the New Fourth Army.

[2.](#) Referring to the telegram sent to Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee by Chen Yi, Rao Shushi, Lai Chuanzhu, and Zeng Shan on December 23, 1942, regarding the orientation and military deployment in dealing with the enemy's "mopping up" in Central China. Regarding Lai and Zeng, see above, note to the text of July 6, 1942.

[3.](#) A Far Eastern Munich Treaty refers to the allegation that, in the several years before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the United States and Britain plotted to sacrifice China for a compromise with the Japanese imperialists. This plot was likened to the "Munich Treaty," signed between Britain and France and the German and Italian Fascists, which allowed Germany to take over Czechoslovakia.

Letter to Wang Zhong

(January 10, 1943)

Comrade Wang Zhong,¹

The materials you sent to me are very useful. They are about production by small collectives and production by individuals. I still need “the production summary for 1942 and the production plan for 1943” of the Work Committee of the Central Committee for the Enemy-Occupied Areas in order to survey the entire situation. Please notify the comrades concerned to prepare them and hand them to me in about ten days. In writing this summary and plan, you should include (1) production by all organizations, (2) production by small collectives, and (3) production by individuals, with a focus, of course, on the production by all organizations. Both achievements and shortcomings should be pointed out and self-criticisms should be made.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

I hope that from now on you will discuss your opinions with me.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 211, where it is reproduced from a manuscript copy.

¹. Wang Zhong (1906–1981) at this time was responsible for administrative management on the Central Committee for Enemy-Occupied Areas.

*Inscriptions*¹

(January 14, 1943)

Inscription for Yan Fusheng

Firmly carry out the policy of cultivating land in one's garrison [*tuntian*].

Inscription for Production Hero Luo Chengde

Fear no difficulties.

Inscription for Production Hero Hui Zhongque

Seek truth from facts and reject empty talk.

Inscription for Production Hero Li Pifu

Face the masses.

Inscription for Production Hero Luo Zhang

He set an example with his own actions.

Inscription for Wang Zheng

Have the spirit of creativity.

Inscription for Wen Niansheng

Attend to both production and education.

Inscription for Xi Zhongxun

Put Party interests first.

Inscription for Production Hero Yang Lin

Implement Party policies resolutely.

Inscription for Production Hero He Weizhong

Be conscientious, simple, and selfless.

Notes

Our source for these inscriptions is the index volume to *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, p. 182. They also can be found in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu*, No. 5 (1985).

[1.](#) For brief references such as these inscriptions, biographies are not warranted; however, it should be noted that Communist military and Party leader Xi Zhongxun (1913–2002) was the father of Xi Jinping, the current Party general secretary and president of China.

Strive to Establish Peace with the Guomindang After Victory in the War of Resistance

(January 25, 1943)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:¹

I have read your telegram of December 18 only recently. My response is as follows:

1. After Germany, Italy, and Japan are defeated, both the domestic and the international situations will undergo fundamental changes. The situation will benefit the people, not the dictators. But Chiang [Kaishek] has made a contribution to the War of Resistance, and at the same time the people detest civil war. Therefore we should strive to establish peace with the Guomindang after the War of Resistance and focus our efforts on democracy and the people's livelihood. The July 7 Declaration of last year² was based on this point. We are striving to obtain the legalization of the border region and the New Fourth Army, and we have promised the Guomindang that after the end of the War of Resistance we will concentrate our troops that are now south of the Yellow River by moving them to the north. For the past two years, *Liberation Daily* and the New China News Agency have followed the orientation of national peace, doing everything possible to avoid provoking the Guomindang. Last September, Chiang invited me to meet with him; I sent Lin Biao,³ who has not yet returned. I am prepared to go and see Chiang when the time is right in the hope that the negotiations will succeed. All of this is the point of departure. In addition to its current function, even the policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration

serves this purpose. Since we are not preparing to fight a civil war, we don't need so many troops. Fewer troops may also serve to reduce the Guomindang's psychology of fear and to help achieve peace, while awaiting the enlightenment of the people of the entire nation. If others want to fight, we are prepared and unafraid.

2. The essence of democratic power is to improve the economic life of the people and to raise their political consciousness, both of which will contribute to the War of Resistance. The conditions for improving the standards of living are: first, to reduce the burden on the peasants imposed by the landlords, that is, to carry out rent and interest reductions; second, to reduce the burden on the peasants by the government, that is, to carry out the policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration, and to develop a state-owned economic sector; third, conscientiously to help the peasants develop agricultural and sideline production and increase their grain and sideline income. Every base area can do much work on these issues. The core work for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is the two issues of the economy and education; the core work of each base area behind enemy lines is the three issues of war, the economy, and education.

3. In terms of the object of education, there is cadre education and citizen education, and so on. The present emphasis should be placed on cadre education instead of citizen education (this is not to say that we do not want citizen education). In terms of its content, there is ideological education, political education, military education, cultural education, and so on. For cadres, especially at the present time, we should emphasize ideological education. The means of doing this is rectification study and cadre investigation. These are the basic policies for Party building. In Yan'an, the study began in April of last year; it has lasted for eight months and will be completed by the end of March of this year. The results will be tremendous. Cadre investigation has already begun (with some achievements); it will take this entire year to complete. Party, political, military, and civil cadres in areas other than Yan'an in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region are still in the midst of rectification study and cadre investigation. I hope that you will take note that various base areas behind enemy lines have yet to become deeply engaged in rectification study and have not yet conscientiously undertaken cadre investigation. The most important task of rectification is to rectify high-level cadres (those who are most stubborn in

ideological defects are among these cadres) and to clarify their thought. Each base area has 100 to 200 such people (including all central bureau and branch bureau committee members). Next in importance are the middle-level cadres, of which each base area has from several hundred to several thousand. Only then is it the turn for the low-level cadres. Some base areas have reversed this order. Only in the upsurge of serious and deep rectification study and the exercise of self-criticism will cadre investigation be thorough. In the past, both in Yan'an and in other places, cadre investigation was mostly a formality. If we can, within the next two years (before our victory in the War of Resistance), clarify the thought of the high- and middle-level cadres through rectification and cadre investigation, and preserve the backbone of the Party and the military, then we may consider ourselves victorious. Preserving and educating the backbone are the two important tasks for this year and the next; high-level responsible persons must grasp this guiding principle. For these two tasks, we must carry out these critical struggles, both internally and externally.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 1–3, where it is reproduced from a manuscript copy.

[1.](#) Peng Dehuai (1898–1974) was at this time the acting secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee and the vice commander of the Eighth Route Army.

[2.](#) Referring to the “Declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the War of Resistance,” published July 7, 1942.

[3.](#) Lin Biao (1907–1971) was at this time the commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. He left for Chongqing as the representative of the Chinese Communist Party in the negotiations in September 1942 and returned to Yan'an in July 1943.

Request to Each Area to Summarize the Rectification Study Experience (February 10, 1943)

Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, [Peng] Dehuai, [Deng] Xiaoping, [Nie] Rongzhen, Lin Feng, Zhu Rui, [Luo] Ronghuan, and [Rao] Shushi:¹

In order to summarize last year's rectification study and to decide on this year's study plan, we request that you report to us via telegram your region's study experience over the past year, especially concerning the following items:

1. Did most comrades have a correct understanding of rectification study? Were there any prejudices or misconceptions?
2. Among the cadres, for whom did the rectification have the greatest effect? In terms of the object of rectification, was there any [evidence of] putting the trivial above the important by rectifying only junior cadres and not senior cadres?
3. Was the study plan based on concrete circumstances and on the variety of cadres? Were there any defects in terms of disregarding the war environment or of not taking into consideration the levels of the cadres?
4. Did the study methods make it possible to link rectification study closely with practical work? Were the study and its application consistent with each other? Was there an attitude of dogmatism in any study?
5. Did responsible comrades at every level set good examples? Did they personally take charge of the study? Did they give up their duties and delegate leadership over the study to their secretaries or to the care of other people?

I look forward to a speedy reply to the above questions.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 4–5, where it is reproduced from a copy of the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. For Peng Dehuai, see above, note to the text of January 25, 1943. Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) was at this time secretary of the Taihang Branch Bureau of the Central Committee and the commissar of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. For Nie Rongzhen, see above, note to the text of July 4, 1942. For Lin Feng, see above, note to the text of October 31, 1942. Zhu Rui (1905–1948) was at this time secretary of the Shandong Branch Bureau of the Central Committee. Luo Ronghuan (1902–1963) was at this time commissar of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. For Rao Shushi, see above, note to the text of January 5, 1943.

*Telegram of Congratulations from the
Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party to the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and the
Officers and Soldiers of the Soviet Red
Army*

*In Celebration of the Twenty-fifth
Anniversary of the Founding of the Red
Army and of the Great Victory of the Red
Army*

(February 21, 1943)

Special report: Tomorrow is the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Red Army, whose counteroffensive is advancing irresistibly and scoring unprecedented victories. Anti-Fascist people all over the world unanimously express their congratulations, and the Chinese people are especially overjoyed on this occasion. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a congratulatory telegram yesterday, of which the text is as follows.

Comrade Stalin, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Officers and Soldiers of the Red Army:

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party represents all Party comrades and Chinese people in its warm celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Red Army and of the great victories of the Red Army's counteroffensive.

The Red Army's twenty-five years of struggle and, in particular, its twenty months of fighting against Fascist invasion have turned the anniversary of its founding from a festival for the international working masses into a festival for all of humanity. Because of their own experiences, freedom-loving people of all nationalities on five continents unanimously acknowledge that the Red Army and the people of the Soviet Union are the mountain blocking the river of Fascist violence and are the vanguard of the creation of a new world peace. The Red Army's offensive over the past three months has inspired cheers and praise everywhere in the world. And the entire world is studying the Red Army's victorious military and political lessons. Certainly unprecedented in history, the offensive of the Red Army is constantly developing in scale and speed. After launching the counteroffensive at Stalingrad¹—then a city in danger—on the Volga River on November 19, the Red Army leaped to the vicinity of the Desna River, more than six hundred kilometers to the west. It is only a matter of time before the Red Army completely drives Hitler's bandits out of the Soviet Union. Since the Red Army began its war with Germany, conditions in the world have changed markedly. Now, because of the Red Army's victories, the face of the future new world is brighter and more definite. Throughout the world, all forms of Fascist systems and ideology have forever lost space in which to exist. National freedom and political democracy have become the unswerving principles of the new world. We, the Chinese people, welcome the arrival of this new epoch; we welcome the solidarity and hard work of all anti-Fascist forces in the world that strive for this new epoch. Even while the Red Army is victorious, Britain and the United States in North Africa, and the United States in the Pacific, have won important victories. Britain and the United States are in the process of actively preparing to carry out the promise of opening a second front on the European continent. They have abrogated their unequal treaties with China. The primary task of the Chinese people in facing this new epoch is to further strengthen our own unity, so as to prepare to drive out the Japanese invaders just as the Red Army is expelling the German invaders. We believe that, because of the united struggle of the Chinese people and because of the victories and aid to the Chinese on the part of the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States, we will also be able to enter into a counteroffensive and win the final victory.

Long live the Red Army and its Supreme Commander Stalin!
Long live the victories of the war against Fascist aggression!
Long live the unity between China, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States!

Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 9, pp. 11–12, where it is reproduced from *Jiefang ribao* of February 22, 1943. An identical text, minus the introductory note, can be found in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 6–7.

- [1.](#) Stalingrad is now called Volgograd.

Women Workers Must Participate in Economic Work(February 24, 1943)¹

Female workers must themselves acquire knowledge of the rural economy and understand the substance of women's production. Only thus can they truly become the organizers and leaders of production by the rural masses. Many capable female comrades must go and work in the cooperatives. Moreover, many female Party members and female cadres must go and work in the economic organs of the publicly owned sector and promote the development of the public sector of the economy. It is entirely wrong to feel honored rather than ashamed of floating idly at the top levels without work to do.

Notes

This is a paragraph that Mao added to the draft of the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Guiding Principles on the Present Work of Women in All Anti-Japanese Base Areas,” dated February 26, 1943, and reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, pp. 113–15. Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, p. 8, where it is indicated that Mao wrote this passage while revising the abovementioned decision. It also appears at the end of the decision, as published in Zhongyang dang'an guan, ed., *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1982), Vol. 14, pp. 24–27. Since Mao was not the author of the decision itself, it is not included here.

¹. This is the date that Mao wrote the paragraph, according to *Nianpu*, Vol. 2, p. 427. In *Mao Zedong wenji*, it is dated simply February 1943.

Key Points of a Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee

(March 16, 1943)

I. The Current Situation

Japan recently moved troops from Manchuria into Shanhaiguan, taking the offensive against China. Recently a Guomintang radio station made contact with Yan'an, and this is an indication that the relationship between the Guomintang and the Communists has taken a turn for the better. Last winter, the Guomintang estimated that Japan definitely would attack the Soviet Union, but after this past February the Guomintang concluded that it might not attack. Because of Japan's new offensive, the Guomintang is thinking of internal aid, since foreign aid has not arrived. Negotiations are still in progress. They said the negotiations should be based on the October 19 telegram of He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi].¹ If Japan continues its offensive, the Guomintang government might move its capital to Chengdu, but still will not surrender. Amid Japan's new offensive, the number of people who have defected to Wang [Jingwei] has increased. Japan has already decided on the policy: Support Wang, Strike Chiang [Kaishek], and it is now unifying the puppet regimes of Northern and Central China.

Will Germany be defeated this year or next year? The first possibility is more likely. We should also take into consideration the second possibility (that Germany will not be defeated this year, that the second front² will not be opened, and so forth). For now it is impossible to know with absolute certainty which

possibility is more likely.

Our overall assessment: Japan follows the Support Wang, Strike Chiang policy. Under attack by Japan, the Guomintang needs internal aid since foreign aid is not available. There is a possibility that the relationship between the Guomintang and the Communist Party will take a turn for the better. There is a possibility that the Chinese War of Resistance will last for seven or eight years. We must continue to persevere for two or two and a half more years.

The situation in the whole world and historical development are unfavorable to the Guomintang and favorable to us. But we need genuine Marxism-Leninism to be able to triumph over the Guomintang.

II. Orientation for Work

The Central Committee's orientation for work is research and guidance and to achieve the goals of preserving the backbone and preparing for the future.

The issue of research:

1. International

For the six major countries of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and Japan, we should mainly research the three major issues of their politics, military affairs, and economy.

Last year our research on Japan was the best; research on the other countries was not so good. This year we are doing better.

2. Domestic

As for the Guomintang-controlled areas, we should mainly do research on their politics, military affairs, economy, and culture.

For the base areas, we should do research on their politics, military affairs, economy, culture, and education. The most important aspect of politics is political power. In military affairs, the most important aspect is the building of the military and the militia. In the economy, the most important aspects are the public sector and the private sector.

Last year the best research was done at the Central Research Institute and the Office of Political Research.

3. History

Research on modern Chinese history: politics (Fan Wenlan);³ military affairs (the Headquarters of the General Staff and the General Political Department); the economy (Chen Boda);⁴ culture (Ai Siqu⁵ on the history of philosophy and Zhou Yang⁶ on the history of literature).

Begin to do research on the history of the Chinese Communist Party: the line problem during the past twenty-two years; discussion meetings of the members of the Politburo. There should be definitive results within one year.

4. We should preserve and educate the cadres. Education includes professional education and theoretical and ideological education. This year we should continue our efforts with respect to the latter.

Cadres in departments directly under the Central Committee should undergo theoretical and ideological education, reading forty books by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Of the various kinds of cadre education, the most important are rectification education and ideological education. Among the various cadres, the most important is the education of the senior cadres.

The issue of guidance:

Means—newspapers, telegrams, broadcasts on Party affairs, and oral reports.

Newspapers are a very important method. Comrades of the Central Committee should be adept at using newspapers. They should spend half their time with newspapers. *Liberation Daily* has made progress since changing its format last April. Since the work method of starting from the masses and returning to the masses was established, sources of materials for the newspaper have become inexhaustible. The soul (or essence) of Marxism is to concretely analyze concrete problems.

Broadcasts on Party affairs are a way of educating cadres within the Party.

Last year we made some achievements in our work. This year we must make more. We should spread the achievements throughout the entire country through newspapers and broadcasts on Party affairs.

This year we should prepare to hold the Seventh Party Congress.⁷

We should add one more item to our list: Our leadership should connect with the masses. Now the orientation for the finance and economic work of the Women's Committee, of the Professionals' Committee, and of the Cultural Committee are undergoing transformation. Investigation of cadres also requires the connection of the leadership with the masses. This is done by summarizing experience from the grassroots level and then providing guidance, that is, starting with the masses and returning to the masses, or, in other words, gathering together and persevering. The sole resource and the only way forward for us rests with the masses.

Last year I did not have much contact with comrades working in many departments; this year I will have more contact with them. Only with much contact does one acquire knowledge.

III. Work Tasks

The tasks of the departments directly under the Central Committee are work, production, and education. At the front line, the tasks are war, production, and education. In the rear echelon, they are production and education. This orientation should be explained to all comrades. In public we will say that we will overcome difficulties and welcome the light, but among senior Party cadres we will explain that we will preserve the backbone and conserve our strength. Northern China is now sending large numbers of cadres to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region to study. Preserving the backbone means preserving not only local cadres but also the backbone of the army. Now we should slim down, that is, [the policy of] Crack Troops and Simple Administration. In order to preserve the backbone, we must resolutely adopt this policy and fight against the enemy's "nibbling" policy. This is the task of war; this is our primary task.

The second task is cadre education and citizen education. Cadre education is primary. In the past, cadre progress was very slow while progress by soldiers was much better. A groom in eastern Gansu even became a wood carver.⁸ In the past, cadres didn't have the time or the funds and textbooks for study. We must

conscientiously carry out the Central Committee's decision on cadre education.⁹

Third is the task of production.

Making use of these methods, we will reach the goals of preserving the backbone and preparing for the future.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 9–13, where it is reproduced from a transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) The *hao* telegram (*hao* being the telegraphic code designation for that date) refers to the telegram that Chiang Kaishek sent to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Ye Ting, the commander-in-chief, vice commander-in-chief of the Eighteenth Group Army (Eighth Route Army), and the commander of the New Fourth Army, respectively, in the name of He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, the chief of the General Staff and vice chief of the General Staff of the Military Commission of the Guomindang government, on October 19, 1940. In this telegram, the Guomindang disparaged the work of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and ordered that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army move from south of the Yellow River to the north, according to the “Admonitions of the Central Government” on July 16, 1940.

[2.](#) Regarding the second front, see above, the text of February 21, 1943.

[3.](#) Regarding Fan Wenlan, see above, note to the text of January 17, 1942.

[4.](#) Chen Boda (1904–1989) was at this time vice director of the Central Political Research Office and the study secretary for Mao Zedong. For further information on Chen, see above, note to the text of January 23, 1942.

[5.](#) Ai Siqi was at this time director of the Supplement Department of *Jiefang ribao*. See above, note to the text of September 15, 1942.

[6.](#) Zhou Yang (1908–1989) was at this time director of the Cultural Work Committee of the Central Committee and the president of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts and Literature.

[7.](#) The Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was postponed and not held until April 23 to June 11, 1945 in Yan'an.

[8.](#) Meaning a woodblock print artist.

[9.](#) Regarding this decision, see above, the text of February 28, 1942.

*An Elegy for General Dai Anlan*¹

(March 1943)²

One must resist the foreign insults,

The General composes an ode of war.³
The commander says “Mechanize!”
And brave men wrest away the might of the beasts.
Soaked in blood, protecting Toungoo
Driving the [Japanese] dwarves back to Taunggyi.⁴
On the battleground then, you sacrificed your life
Yet our noble purpose was accomplished.

Notes

Our copy of this source is from *Mao Zedong shici ji* (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 1996), pp. 177–79.

- ¹. For Dai Anlan (1904–1942), see above, note to the text “Elegy for Dai Anlan” (May 1942).
- ². This poem is the 1943 version published in the registry book *Elegiac Poems and Couplets from the Memorial Service for General Dai Anlan*. The first unofficial version appeared on December 28, 1983, in *Renmin zhengxie bao* in an essay interpreting the classical allusions in the poem.
- ³. That is, “Cai zheng,” a poem on the suffering of war from the *Shijing* (Book of Odes).
- ⁴. Toungoo and Taunggyi are towns in southern Burma [Myanmar].

Letter to the Indian National Congress (April 5, 1943)

Gentlemen of the Indian National Congress:

After the beginning of China's War of Resistance Against Japan, your honorable Congress dispatched a medical team to China to participate in our War of Resistance, thereby showing very great friendship for China. All five members of this medical team worked in the Eighth Route Army. For four years, the comrades of the medical team trekked through the battlefields in North China, shunning neither hardship nor danger. Their arduous efforts and extremely valuable work allowed countless Chinese soldiers and civilians to see with their own eyes the Indian people's enthusiasm for helping China. While three of the five members of the medical team returned to India at various times, Dr. Kotnis died of illness in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region.¹ Our army and our people have lost a good friend, and the Indian people have lost an outstanding fighter. It is a loss that we deeply mourn. Dr. [B.K.] Basu is now returning to India, and we would like to take this opportunity to express our respectful thanks to your honorable Congress and to the Indian people. At this time, when we are striving for final victory in the worldwide anti-Fascist war, we hope that the two great nations of India and China will unite even more firmly so as to cooperate with all the other anti-Fascist countries in waging war, thereby to achieve the destruction of fascism, the liberation of all the peoples oppressed by fascism, and, simultaneously, the liberation of the Indian and Chinese nations, thus winning independence for these two great nations.

With respectful salutations,

Mao Zedong

Zhu De

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, p. 14, where it is reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) For a detailed account of Dr. Kotnis's four years in China, see *An Indian Freedom Fighter in China: A Tribute to Dr. D.S. Kotnis* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1983). Dr. Kotnis succeeded Norman Bethune as director of the International Peace Hospital after Bethune's death in 1939. Kotnis died in December 1942 of epilepsy aggravated by overwork. See also above, note to the text of December 29, 1942.

Letter to He Kaifeng¹

(April 22, 1943)

Comrade Kaifeng:

You have written several letters to me that I have not yet returned. My response is as follows:

1. It is not yet suitable to raise the question of petty-bourgeois liberalism on May 5 of this year. As far as the whole Party is concerned, the present is still the time to allow liberalism to expose itself; it is not yet suitable to come to a general conclusion. On May 5, perhaps the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee might issue something summarizing rectification study in general, thereby propelling forward the rectification of the entire Party: Please think about this suggestion.

2. I have decided not to celebrate birthdays. Too many birthday celebrations will have an unhealthy influence. The present is a difficult time both domestically and abroad; it is also not an opportune moment. I personally feel that my (Marxist-Leninist) ideology is not mature; it is still the time for learning, not trumpeting or promulgating. If there must be such trumpeting, the only appropriate objects would be a few fragments (such as a few essays from the rectification documents). It is inappropriate to trumpet it as a system, because my system is not yet mature.

3. It is best temporarily to stop the educational plan for senior and middle-level cadres as you suggested yesterday and first to engage in education for the elimination of traitors so as to coordinate with the current work of eliminating traitors. I have already replied to your letter from yesterday.

4. I agree with the idea that this year the Propaganda Department's work will concentrate on three items: educating cadres, educating citizens, and the literary

and artistic movement. However, a few people must be gathered to translate and write (translate the works of Marx and Lenin and write history); hopefully they will achieve something. Please consider the above. There will be a Propaganda Committee meeting tomorrow as planned.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 212–13, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

- [1.](#) He Kaifeng, see above, note to the text of January 17, 1942.

*Instructions of the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party
Regarding Propaganda Work on the
Problem of When Japan Will Be
Defeated¹
(May 1, 1943)*

All Central Bureaus and Central Subbureaus:

Regarding the question of when Japan will be defeated:

1. When the Soviet Union put forward the proposal to defeat Germany in 1942, it was based on the agreement by Britain and the United States to establish a second front in 1942.² At that time, we not only could have but should have put forward such a slogan to mobilize every effort. But when Britain and the United States did not open a second front and did not make a new agreement, we stopped propagandizing such slogans. This is an example of how propaganda must vary as the situation varies.

2. When the Soviet Union put forward the above-mentioned slogan on the basis of the agreement with Britain and the United States, our Party accordingly put forward the slogan of defeating Japan in 1943, as we not only could have but should have done. But when Britain and the United States did not live up to their promise, and as a result Germany was not defeated last year, our Party should not have continued to propagandize this slogan. Instead, the Party should have explained to the masses the reason we could not defeat Japan this year and should have encouraged the masses to maintain their efforts to achieve victory.

In this regard, the Central Propaganda Department once offered an explanation in its major points of propaganda, and *Liberation Daily* has also changed its tone since last autumn.

3. There are, however, a few leading comrades in various base areas who even today have not understood the significance of this. Not only did they fail to provide correct explanations; on the contrary, they continued to propagandize mechanically the slogan of defeating Japan this year, thus giving rise to doubts and questions among the people. Because these comrades still did not know how to explain these matters, they repeatedly made inquiries to the Central Committee by telegram. This is to fail to understand that propaganda should vary according to changes in the situation.

4. It is not clear now whether Britain and the United States will open a second front or whether the Soviet Union can independently defeat Hitler this year. The Soviet Union has already put forth the slogan of preparing for the decisive battle, and the strength of the Red Army has increased tremendously. But although there is a great possibility that Hitler will be defeated this year, there is also a possibility that he will not be defeated until next year. If Germany can be defeated this year, then it is naturally possible that Japan can be defeated next year; otherwise, the defeat of Japan will be further delayed. Over the next few months, the propaganda departments of various regions should not emphasize the time of Japan's defeat. They should wait until the situation in Europe becomes sufficiently clear, and then the Central Committee and *Liberation Daily* will provide instructions.

5. As for the slogans used in the past, public explanations should be given in localities where many have raised questions and public explanations are required. If there are only a few individual comrades raising questions, their concerns should be answered individually; in localities where no questions are asked, do not give any explanations.

6. All central bureaus and their subbureaus ought to plan on persevering for a long period and prepare for another two or three years of extremely hard struggle. They should also prepare for any possible unexpected change. If victory arrives early, it will do us no harm; if victory is delayed, we will have been prepared in good time, both mentally and in terms of our work.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 17–18, where it is reproduced from a transcript preserved in the Central Archives.

- [1.](#) This is an intraparty directive drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Secretariat.
- [2.](#) Regarding the second front, see above, the text of February 21, 1943.

Inscription in Memory of Zhidan

(May 2, 1943)¹

In 1943, on the seventh anniversary of Comrade Liu Zhidan's² heroic death, the Party and the people moved his remains back to Zhidan *xian* (originally Bao'an *xian*) and built a tomb there. Comrade Mao Zedong himself wrote the words "General Liu Zhidan's Tomb" for the tombstone and "Leader of the Masses and Hero of the Nation" for the tablet. He also wrote the following inscription: "From the one face-to-face meeting with Liu Zhidan after I came to northern Shaanxi, I knew that he was an excellent member of the Communist Party. His heroic death was unexpected, but his complete devotion and spirit of serving the Party and the people will forever remain with the Party and the people and will not disappear with the passage of time."

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 117, where it is reproduced from a memorial volume for Mao published in 1980.

¹. May 6 is the date given for this text in the source cited in *Bujuan*. However, both *Nianpu* and Wang Zuoxin, ed., *Mao Zedong zhushu biannian suoyin* (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2001), confirm that it was written on May 2.

². Liu Zhidan (1902–1936) joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and was a member of the fifth class at Huangpu Military Academy in 1925–26. From 1929 to 1933, he organized guerrilla operations in Shaanxi, finally succeeding in 1934 in establishing the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Region Revolutionary Committee, which subsequently gave birth to the Shaanxi-Gansu Provisional Soviet Government. In 1935,

Liu was the commander of the Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh Red Armies, which welcomed Mao and his comrades on their arrival in the Northwest at the end of that year. In early 1936, Liu played a leading role in the "Eastern Expedition" to Shanxi Province, where he was killed in action.

Report on the Question of the Dissolution of the Communist International (May 26, 1943)

On the evening of May 26, when Comrade Mao Zedong appeared on the speaker's platform of the mass meeting of cadres in Yan'an, he was greeted with thunderous applause. This meeting had been called by the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party to transmit the two historic documents from the Presidium of the Communist International and from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.¹ After Comrade Ren Bishi² explained the reason for calling the meeting, and Comrade Li Fuchun³ read out the two documents, Comrade Mao Zedong, in his capacity as chairman of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, made a report to the meeting.

Comrade Mao Zedong first pointed out:

The dissolution of the Communist International [Comintern] is, precisely as the American press agencies have reported, "an epoch-making great event." This judgment has been confirmed by the fact that during the past four days, the greatest attention has been paid to this event by everyone, regardless of whether they belong to the anti-Fascist or the Fascist camp, regardless of party or faction.

Comrade Mao Zedong asked:

Why should the Comintern be disbanded? Did it not devote all its efforts to the emancipation of the working class of the whole world and to the war against fascism?

Comrade Mao Zedong said:

It is true that the Comintern was created by Lenin himself. Throughout its entire existence it has rendered the greatest services in helping each country to

organize a truly revolutionary workers' party, and it has also contributed enormously to the great cause of organizing the anti-Fascist war.

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed particularly to the great services of the Comintern in aiding the cause of the Chinese Revolution. He said:

The influence of the Comintern on the Chinese people is very great. The reason for this is that although China is an economically backward country, during the past twenty-two years it has gone through three great revolutionary movements in succession, and the Comintern gave great assistance in all three of these movements, the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution, and the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance.

Comrade Mao Zedong spoke of how, on the eve of the Northern Expedition, the Comintern aided Sun Yatsen, and the Guomindang under his leadership; how, in 1924, a reorganization was carried out, and cooperation was established between the two parties, the Communists and the Guomindang. He mentioned historical facts, such as how, at that time, Chiang Kaishek, on instructions from Sun Yatsen, visited Moscow, and how a representative of the Guomindang participated in meetings of the Comintern, and he went on to say:

This suffices to demonstrate that the support of the Comintern for the Chinese Revolution and its influence among the Chinese people has always been very great, even without mentioning the subsequent Agrarian Revolution and the present Anti-Japanese War of Resistance.

Comrade Mao Zedong further pointed out:

Revolutionary movements can be neither exported nor imported. Even with help from the Comintern, the birth and development of the Chinese Communist Party resulted from the fact that China herself had a conscious working class, and the Chinese working class created its own party—the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party, although it has a history of only twenty-two years, has already undertaken three great revolutionary movements.

Since the Comintern has rendered such great services to China and to various other countries, why should it be necessary to proclaim its dissolution?

To this question Comrade Mao Zedong replied:

It is a principle of Marxism-Leninism that the forms of revolutionary organizations must conform to the necessities of the revolutionary struggle. If a

form of organization no longer suits the necessities of the struggle, then this form of organization must be abolished.

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out:

At present, the form of revolutionary organization known as the Comintern is no longer suited to the necessities of the struggle. To continue this organizational form would, on the contrary, hinder the development of the revolutionary struggle in each country. What is needed now is the strengthening of the national Communist Party in each country, and we no longer need this international leading center. There are three main reasons for this:

1. The internal situation in each country and the relations between the different countries are more complicated than they were in the past, and they are changing more rapidly. It is no longer possible for a unified international organization to adapt itself to these extremely complicated and rapidly changing circumstances. Correct leadership must grow out of a detailed analysis of these conditions, and this makes it even more necessary for the Communist Party of each country to undertake this itself. The Comintern, which is far removed from the concrete struggle in each country, was adapted to the relatively simple conditions of the past when changes took place rather slowly, but now it is no longer a suitable instrument.

2. There is a wide gulf between the Fascist bandits in their Fascist cliques and the anti-Fascist organizations in the various countries. The anti-Fascist states are of all kinds: socialist, capitalist, colonial, and semicolonial. Among the Fascist states and their vassals there are also great differences; in addition, there are also the neutral countries that find themselves in varying circumstances. For some time, it has been felt that a centralized organization of an international character is not very appropriate for organizing the anti-Fascists of these states rapidly and efficiently, and this has become particularly obvious recently.

3. The leading cadres of the Communist parties of the various countries have already grown up and attained political maturity.

Comrade Mao Zedong explained this point by using the example of the Chinese Communist Party:

The Chinese Communist Party has been through three revolutionary movements. These revolutionary movements have been continuous and

uninterrupted and extraordinarily complex, even more complex than the Russian Revolution. In the course of these revolutionary movements, the Chinese Communist Party has already acquired its own excellent cadres endowed with rich personal experience. Since the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935, the Comintern has not intervened in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party. And yet the Chinese Communist Party has done its work very well throughout the whole Anti-Japanese War of National Liberation.

Comrade Mao Zedong summed up public opinion in various countries regarding the dissolution of the Comintern during the past four days as follows:

All upright persons in the various countries belonging to the anti-Fascist alliance unanimously acclaim this action. But the case is not at all the same in the Fascist countries. All the bloodstained aggressors, who in the past established the Anti-Comintern Pact, now apparently do not want the Comintern to be dissolved. Isn't this strange! They are all in an awkward position, desperately denouncing the dissolution of the Comintern. For example, the diehards among the Social Democrats of Stockholm and London in the past forbade Communists to join their parties on the grounds that they "received orders from the Comintern," and now they are also displeased by the dissolution of the Comintern. This is a rather odd thing.

At present, the mission of all those throughout the world who oppose the Fascist countries is to bring about the union of the working class so that we can more easily and more quickly defeat fascism. Diehards of this type within the workers movement are very much displeased because the dissolution of the Comintern has deprived them of their pretexts, to the point where they even say that the Communist parties in the various countries should be abolished.

Summing up, Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out:

This strange opinion may turn up in China, too. Let us see. But I am convinced that the great majority of upright people throughout China will not echo these views, because such arguments are entirely lacking in common sense.

Comrade Mao Zedong said:

The dissolution of the Comintern is not for the purpose of weakening the

Communist parties of the various countries, but for the purpose of strengthening them, increasing still further the national character of the Communist parties in every country, and rendering them even more capable of responding to the needs of the anti-Fascist war. The Rectification Campaign which our Party is carrying out this year, and our fight against unhealthy tendencies such as subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism, are precisely for the purpose of increasing the national character of our Chinese Communist Party, adapting it to the needs of the War of Resistance, and building the country.

At this point, Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out in the most solemn tone:

Now the Comintern is no more, and this increases our own responsibilities. Every comrade must understand that he bears great responsibility. Starting from this sense of responsibility, we must display the creative force of Communists. We find ourselves in the midst of an arduous war of national liberation. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are fighting behind Japanese lines against an extremely powerful enemy, our circumstances are very difficult, and the duration of the war remains very long. But such a long and difficult struggle is precisely what we need to discipline ourselves, to make us think carefully, and absolutely to avoid being crude and careless or imagining that we are always right. It will make us earnestly rid ourselves of subjectivism, sectarianism, and that old Party formalist style and achieve a fully responsible attitude and a high level of creative force.

Comrade Mao Zedong put forward the absolute necessity of the following two types of unity:

One of these is unity within the Party, and the other is unity between the Party and the people. These are priceless weapons for overcoming difficult circumstances, and comrades of the whole Party must value these two priceless weapons. First, comrades of the whole Party must unite around the Central Committee. Any action which disrupts unity is a crime. Provided only that Communists unite closely and are of one heart and one mind, any powerful enemy and any difficult situation must yield to us. Second, all Party comrades must be good at uniting with the popular masses. In this respect, I think we should ask comrades to study the example of Comrades Chen Zongyao and Zuo Qi, as reported recently in *Liberation Daily*. Comrade Chen Zongyao is a

regimental commander in the Eighth Route Army. He led his whole regiment on foot for several hundred *li* to carry rice. He did not ride on horseback, and he carried rice himself and the horse carried rice. All the officers and soldiers of the regiment were moved by his example, morale was excellent, and not a single person deserted. Comrade Zuo Qi was the political commissar of this regiment. He lost a hand in combat, and when clearing wasteland he could not hold the hoe, but he prepared food for the fighters in camp and carried it up the mountains to give it to them to eat. The fighters were inexpressibly moved.

Comrade Mao Zedong called out:

Let cadres throughout the Party imitate the spirit of these two comrades, become one with the broad masses, and overcome any bureaucratism that divorces us from the masses.

Comrade Mao Zedong said:

Our Communist Party members must not act like officials, they must make revolution. All of us must have a thoroughly revolutionary spirit and we must never for a moment divorce ourselves from the masses. Provided only that we do not divorce ourselves from the masses, we will surely be victorious.

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 15–20, which reproduces the version that appeared in *Jiefang ribao* on May 28, 1943. The report can also be found in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 19–23, with a few minor changes and corrections and without the brief sentences introducing each paragraph that appeared in the newspaper.

Notes

- [1.](#) The Central Committee's decision of May 26, 1943, is translated in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 1143–45.
- [2.](#) Ren Bishi, see above, note to the text of April 20, 1942.
- [3.](#) Li Fuchun, see above, note to the text of January 23, 1942.

To Zhou Xiaozhou¹

(June 1, 1943)

Comrade Xiaozhou:

I have received your letter of January 29, and your ideas are correct. If you conscientiously work according to them, you are sure to make progress. I also received your letter of last year and wrote a letter in response. I am afraid that it has been lost. A person needs only limitless loyalty to be able to correct any shortcoming; your views on yourself are correct.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 214, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Zhou Xiaozhou (1912–1966) was at this time head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Hebei District Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Before this, he had been Mao's secretary.

Strenuous Efforts Should Be Made to Consolidate and Stand Undefeated in the Next Three Years
(June 1, 1943)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. I have received your telegram of May 25 and agree with your method of handling Tainan.¹

2. The Guomindang lacks any appropriate policies to deal with the enemy, the foreigners (Britain and the United States), the Communist Party, the people, and its own party (their Central Committee and localities, the CC Clique,² and the Renaissance Society³), and crises are increasing every day. Nor does it have any countermeasure at all with which to react to Tōjō [Hideki]'s⁴ new policy of supporting Wang [Jingwei]⁵ while toppling Chiang [Kaishek], the number of people who have surrendered is increasing, and their fighting capacity is greatly reduced. Britain and the United States continue to concentrate their strength on Germany, and there is very little aid to China. They make empty promises. The Guomindang has no solutions. It is very suspicious of us, and it is unwilling to deal with the issues. Every day it publicizes the “crimes” of our Party, attacks our Party’s prestige, and makes strong efforts to spy on us in attempts to destroy our Party from within. These are its only methods. Mass uprisings broke out on a large scale in Gansu, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Shaanxi, and the Guomindang has no solution except to suppress them. The disputes within their party are endless and growing. All of this puts the situation of the War of Resistance in an increasingly difficult position. We need to be prepared for the War of Resistance to last for three more years, and we should pay close attention to China’s

situation.

3. Our Party should make strong efforts in the next three years to consolidate and stand undefeated. To deal with the enemy, we must use every possible means to sustain our indispensable base areas, and we must figure out the best policies to resist the military fight of [Japanese] “mopping up” and “nibbling” campaigns and to counteract the political fight with the enemy and the puppet regime that aim to disintegrate us. We must do our utmost to avoid any major military confrontation with the Guomindang so that it will concentrate all its strength on the enemy. In dealing with the people, in addition to adhering to the “Three-Thirds” system,⁶ we should make strong efforts to develop agriculture and handicrafts. If the economy of the people (mainly the peasants) is exhausted, it will be impossible for our Party to survive. To this end, production by the Party, the government, and the military itself is extremely important, in addition to organizing the people for production. With regard to policies within the Party, first is the rectification of the Three Styles (this should be upheld as a one-year plan); second is the investigation of cadres (including ferreting out hidden traitors); third is the preservation of cadres (large numbers of cadres should be sent to the rear echelon to study). If each of the aforementioned items can be carried out without making major mistakes, our Party can be invincible.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 24–25, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Regarding the methods of dealing with Guomindang troops stationed in the area south of the Taihang mountains, or Tainan.

2. The Zhongyang julebu (Central Committee Clique or CC Clique) was a right-wing political faction within the Guomindang led by the brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, friends of Chiang Kaishek.

3. The Fuxing she (Renaissance Society), a political faction in the Guomindang with primary loyalty to the person of Chiang Kaishek, was founded in the spring of 1932 and dissolved in April 1938. Among its most prominent members were He Zhonghan and Dai Li.

4. Tōjō Hideki (1884–1948) was at this time the prime minister of Japan, in charge of Japan’s war effort.

5. Wang Jingwei (1883–1944) was at this time the president of the Nanjing puppet “National Government” supported by Japan.

[6.](#) Regarding the “Three-Thirds” system of local administration, see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942.

*Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Methods of Leadership*¹

(Passed by the Politburo of the Central
Committee, June 1, 1943)

1. There are two methods which must be employed² in whatever work we carry out. One is to integrate the general with the particular; the other is to integrate the leadership with the masses.

2. In any task, if no general and widespread call is issued, the broad masses cannot be mobilized for action. But if only a general call is issued, and leaders do not, in a few units,³ concretely and personally delve into carrying out the work that is called for, make a breakthrough, gain experience, and then use this experience to lead other units, there will be no way to test the correctness of or to enrich the content of one's general call, and then there is the danger that it will come to nothing. In the Rectification Campaign of 1942, for example, wherever something was achieved, the method of integrating the general call with particular and specific guidance was used; where nothing was achieved, this method was not used. In the Rectification Campaign of 1943, each bureau and subbureau of the Central Committee and each district and prefectural Party committee, in addition to making a general call (a rectification plan for the whole year), must select two or three units (not too many) from among its own organizations or from nearby organizations, schools, and troops for thorough investigation. Acquire detailed knowledge of the development of the Rectification Campaign in them and detailed knowledge of the historical experience,⁴

ideological characteristics, enthusiasm or laziness in study, and the strengths and weaknesses in the work of some (again, not too many) typical, actual cadres.⁵ Furthermore, personally lead those in charge to find concrete solutions for the practical problems facing these units. Do all of this in order to gain experience. The leaders in every organization, school, or army unit must do likewise, as each of these has a number of subordinate units. This is also a method by which leaders integrate leading and learning. No one in a leading position is competent to give general guidance to all units unless he learns from⁶ actual⁷ individuals and events in actual⁸ subordinate units. This method must be promoted everywhere so that leading cadres at all levels can master it.

3. Experience during the 1942 Rectification Campaign also proves that each *concrete* unit must, during its rectification process, create a backbone group of leaders that comprises a small number of activists with a nucleus of the administrative heads⁹ of this unit. This backbone group should closely link itself to the broad masses who are participating in and learning from the movement. Only if this is done will the rectification complete its task. Unless combined with the activism of the broad masses, the activism of the backbone group alone will be merely a fruitless endeavor by a minority. Unless a strong backbone group appropriately organizes the activism of the broad masses, such activism will not be sustained for long nor will it move in the correct direction or reach a high level. The masses in any given place generally consist of three groups of people: the relatively active, the intermediate, and the relatively backward. *Generally, the number of people in the three groups is few at the extremes and many in the middle.* The leaders must therefore be skilled in uniting the small number of active elements to be the backbone group and must rely on this group to raise the level of the intermediate elements and to win over the backward elements. A backbone group that is genuinely unified as well as linked with the masses must be formed gradually from mass struggle (*e.g., from Rectification Campaigns*); it cannot be formed in a way that is divorced from mass struggle. During the course of any¹⁰ glorious struggle, the composition of the backbone group should not and cannot remain entirely unchanged throughout the initial, middle, and final stages. It is necessary constantly to promote the activists (*heroes*) produced during the process of struggle to replace those members of the original backbone group who are comparatively inferior or who have degenerated. One

fundamental reason we have not been able to push forward this work in many places and organizations is the lack of backbone groups that are unified, integrated with the masses, and constantly perfected. A school of a hundred people cannot be run well if it does not have a backbone group of a few to a few dozen people, which is formed naturally¹¹ (not thrown together artificially) and is composed of the *comparatively* most active, upright, and alert of the teachers, other staff, and students. In every organization, school, and army unit, whether large or small, we should apply the ninth of Stalin's Criteria¹² on the Bolshevization of the Party, which discusses the problem of establishing a leadership nucleus.¹³ The standards for such a leading backbone group should be the four which Dimitrov brings up in his discussion of cadre policy (limitless loyalty, connection with the masses, ability to work independently, and observance of discipline).¹⁴ Whether carrying out the central tasks of war, production, and education (including rectification), or carrying out *rectification and study*, reviews of work, investigation of cadres, or other activities, it is always necessary to adopt the method of integrating the leading backbone group with the masses in addition to adopting the method of integrating the general call with particular guidance.

4. In all practical work of our Party, all correct leadership must come from the masses and go to the masses. This means to take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas by means of study), then propagandize and explain these ideas to the masses until the masses embrace them as their own ideas, hold fast to them, and translate them into action, testing the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then, once again concentrate ideas from among the masses and persevere in sending them back to the masses. In such an endless cycle, the ideas will become ever more correct, vital, and abundant each time. This is the epistemology *or methodology* of Marxist-Leninist theory.¹⁵

5. The idea that the correct relationship between the leading group and the masses in an organization or in a struggle and the idea that correct ideas on the part of the leadership can only be "from the masses, to the masses," and the idea that the general call must be integrated with particular guidance when the leadership's views are being put into practice—these ideas must be propagandized everywhere during the present Rectification Campaign in order to correct

mistaken viewpoints among our cadres on these questions. Many comrades do not see the importance of, or are not good at, drawing together activists to form a nucleus of leadership, and they do not see the importance of, or are not good at, integrating this nucleus of leadership closely with the masses, and so their leadership becomes bureaucratic and divorced from the masses. Many comrades do not see the importance of, or are not good at, summing up the experience of mass struggles, but fancying themselves clever, they are fond of voicing their subjectivist ideas, and so their ideas become empty and impractical. Many comrades rest content with making a general call with regard to a task and do not see the importance of, or are not good at, following it up immediately with particular and concrete guidance, and so their call remains on their lips, or on paper or in the conference room, and their leadership becomes bureaucratic. In the present Rectification Campaign, we must correct these defects and learn to use the methods of integrating the leadership with the masses and the general with the particular in our rectification study, in inspection of work, and in investigation of cadres; and we must also apply these methods in all our future work.

6. *Correct guiding views are those that are concentrated* from the masses and then maintained among the masses—such is the basic method. In the process of concentrating ideas and maintaining them, it is necessary to use the method of integrating the general call with particular guidance, and this is a component part of the basic method. Formulate a general view (a general call) out of the particular guidance given in a number of cases, and put them to the test in many different units (not only doing so yourself, but by telling others to do the same); then concentrate the new experience (sum up the experience) and draw up new directives for general guidance of the masses. Comrades should do this in the present Rectification Campaign and also in every other kind of work. Better leadership comes with greater skill in doing this.

7. In relaying to subordinate units any task (whether concerning war,¹⁶ production, or education; rectification study, inspection of work, or investigation of cadres; propaganda work, organizational work, or anti-espionage work, and so forth), an upper-level organization¹⁷ should in all cases go through the leaders of the lower organization concerned, causing these leaders to assume responsibility and in this way achieving the goals both of division of labor and of unification

(centralization). An upper-level department should not merely call on its lower-level counterpart (for instance, an upper-level organizational department going only to a lower-level organizational department, an upper-level propaganda department going only to a lower-level propaganda department, or an upper-level anti-espionage department going only to a lower-level anti-espionage department), so that the primary person in charge of the lower-level organization (such as the secretary, chairman, director, or school principal) neither understands nor takes responsibility. Both the primary person in charge and the persons with specific responsibility should be informed and given responsibility. This centralized method, which combines division of labor with unification, makes it possible, via the primary responsible person, to mobilize a large number of cadres—on occasion even the entire staff of an organization—to carry out a particular task, and thus to overcome shortages of cadres in individual departments and to turn a good number of people into cadres in their own area of work.¹⁸ This, too, is one form of integrating the leadership with the masses. Take, for instance, the investigation of cadres. If only the few people in the leading apparatus, the Organization Department, carry out this work in isolation, they cannot possibly do it well. But if it is done through the administrative head¹⁹ of a particular organization or school, who mobilizes many or even all of his staff or students to take part in the investigation of cadres, while at the same time the leaders of the upper-level Organization Department give correct guidance and apply the principle of integrating the leadership with the masses, then the goals of cadre investigation can be fully attained.

8. In any given area, *organization, school, or army unit*, there cannot simultaneously be a number of central tasks. At any one time there can be only one central task, supplemented by other tasks of a secondary or tertiary importance. The person with overall responsibility in this area, organization, school, or army unit must take into account the history and circumstances of the struggle there and assign the different tasks their proper level of importance; he should not act upon each instruction as it comes from a higher-level organization without any plans of his own, thereby creating a multitude of “central tasks” and a state of confusion and disorder. Nor should a higher-level organization simultaneously assign many decentralized tasks to a lower-level organization without indicating their relative importance and urgency, for that will lead to

confusion in the work of the lower-level organizations, and thus to an inability to achieve definite results. It is part of the art of leadership to take the whole situation into account and to plan according to the particular historical conditions and circumstances of an area, to decide correctly on the central tasks and the sequence of the work for each time period, to firmly carry out the work sequence,²⁰ and to make sure that definite results are achieved. This is also a problem of leadership methods that we must attend to when applying the principles of integrating the leadership with the masses and the general with the particular.

9. We will not here detail the particulars of the individual problems involved with leadership methods. Comrades in all localities²¹ will think carefully according to the principles and policies discussed in this resolution,²² and in doing so make the most of their own creativity. The more bitter the struggle, the greater is the need for Communists intimately to integrate their leadership with the demands of the broad masses and intimately to integrate general calls with particular guidance, so as to thoroughly shatter the subjectivist and bureaucratic methods of leadership. All the leading comrades of our Party must at all times set scientific methods²³ of leadership against subjectivist and bureaucratic methods of leadership, and use the former to overcome the latter. Subjectivists and bureaucrats do not understand the principles of integrating the leadership with the masses and the general with the particular; they greatly impede the development of the Party's work. To oppose subjectivist and bureaucratic methods of leadership, we must widely and profoundly promote scientific methods²⁴ of leadership.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 25–31, where it is taken from the June 4, 1943, issue of *Jiefang ribao* and from the fifth expanded edition of *Zhengfeng wenxian*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

¹. Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Methods of

Leadership → Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership

- [2.](#) Methods which must be employed → Methods which we Communists must employ
- [3.](#) Units → Organizations
- [4.](#) Historical experience → Political experience
- [5.](#) Typical, actual cadres → Representative workers
- [6.](#) Learns from → Derives concrete experience from
- [7.](#) Actual → Specific
- [8.](#) Actual → Specific
- [9.](#) Administrative heads → Important leaders
- [10.](#) During the course of any → Under most circumstances, during the course of a
- [11.](#) Naturally → In accordance with reality
- [12.](#) Ninth of Stalin's Criteria → Ninth of Stalin's Twelve Criteria
- [13.](#) A Chinese translation of Stalin's "The Bolshevization of the Party" is in *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 247–9; an English translation of Stalin's Ninth Criterion is in Compton, tr., *Mao's China*, p. 271.
- [14.](#) Dimitrov's "Cadre Policy and Cadre Education Policy" is in the Yan'an *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 153–61; an English translation is in Dimitrov, *The United Front*, pp. 116–21, 123–26.
- [15.](#) Marxist-Leninist theory → Marxist theory
- [16.](#) War → The revolutionary war
- [17.](#) An upper-level organization → An upper-level organization and its separate departments
- [18.](#) Cadres in their own area of work → Cadres who actively participate in the work at hand
- [19.](#) Head → Responsible person
- [20.](#) The work sequence → The resolution
- [21.](#) Comrades in all localities → It is hoped that comrades in all localities
- [22.](#) Discussed in this resolution → Discussed here
- [23.](#) Scientific methods → Scientific Marxist methods
- [24.](#) Scientific methods → Scientific Marxist methods

Letter to Peng Dehuai

(June 6, 1943)

Comrade Dehuai:

We feel that your “Talk Regarding Democratic Education” published two months ago was inappropriate. My opinion is as follows:

Your talk, for example, starts from the definitions of democracy, freedom, equality, fraternity, and so on, rather than from the political necessities of the current struggle against Japan. You also do not emphasize that democracy is for resisting Japan; instead, you stress that it is for opposing feudalism. Furthermore, you do not say that freedoms of speech and the press are for mobilizing the initiative of the people to resist Japan and for winning and protecting the political and economic rights of the people; instead, you start from the principle of freedom of thought. In addition, you do not say that freedom of assembly is for obtaining victory over Japan and for the people’s political and economic rights; instead, you say it is for furthering the unity of humanity and for benefiting cultural and scientific development. You also do not say that traitors and elements who destroy our anti-Japanese unity should be deprived of the freedoms of residence, mobility, communication, and any other political freedoms; you just make a sweeping statement that people’s freedoms should not be subjected to any interference. But in reality, the democratic freedoms in the base areas are too numerous, too large, and too unlimited for some people, rather than too small, too few, or too constrained. This is why in November of last year the Central Committee issued a proclamation explaining the policies of tolerance, emphasizing the necessity for suppressing reactionaries. You do not adopt this principle in your talk. Another example is that you advocate implementing the right to veto in the base areas. Not only would this not be beneficial, but it would

also be impractical. You also say that there should not be any sort of unequal legal regulations, and you fail to distinguish between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries. The slogan “Don’t do unto others what you would not have them do unto you” is not appropriate politically. Our present task is to use war and other political means to defeat the enemy, and the basis of our society right now is a commodity economy. Both these things are examples of what is called “doing unto others what you would not have them do unto you.” Only after the annihilation of class distinctions will it be possible to realize the principle of not doing unto others what you would not have them do unto you and to get rid of war, political oppression, and economic exploitation. At present in China, there is a sort of mutual assistance between different classes for the purpose of defeating the common enemy. But there still exists not only economic exploitation but also political oppression (e.g., opposition to the Communist Party). We should raise the demands of limiting exploitation and limiting oppression and also stress uniting to resist the Japanese. But we should not put forth the slogan of universal and absolute mutual assistance between classes (i.e., “Do not do unto others as you would not have them do unto you”).¹ Another example is that you say that the democratic movements in Western Europe began with workers demanding to reduce their work time, and this does not accord with reality, and so on.

I have received *Inner Party Life*,² which you mentioned earlier. If I have any opinions after studying it, I will let you know.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 26–27, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Mao here is quoting from Confucius, *Analects*, 15:23.

². *Dangnei shenghuo* (Inner Party Life) was an restricted-circulation Party publication put out by the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party beginning on November 15,

1939.

Comrade Mao Zedong Summarizes Twenty-Two Years of Heroic Struggle at the July 1 Evening Party for Cadres (July 1, 1943)

(Special report by our newspaper) At the grand evening party on July 1, Comrade Mao Zedong summarized the six years of War of Resistance and the twenty-two years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. His report was full of confidence in the victory of the War of Resistance and in a bright new China and a new world. That evening, all the seats in the Central Auditorium were taken. Those present included all the comrades of the Party Central Committee, Party comrades, and nonpartisan cadres at every level. The leader of the Japanese Communist Party, Comrade Okano Susumu,¹ who recently arrived in Yan'an, and Soviet and American guests in Yan'an were also present. After Comrade Li Fuchun announced the opening of the meeting, Comrade Mao Zedong stepped onto the platform amid enthusiastic applause from the entire audience. He began his report with the following words:

Today we are commemorating the twenty-second anniversary of the Party and the sixth anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Now, all the anti-Fascist forces in the world and in China, the Communist parties in every country all around the world, and our own Chinese Communist Party have only one task, that is, to defeat the common enemy of mankind—the German, Italian, and Japanese Fascist invaders.

In summarizing the six years of the War of Resistance, Comrade Mao Zedong said:

It has been six years since China began the War of Resistance. In terms of time, this has been longer than for any other country.

He pointed out:

In the past year, fundamental changes have taken place in the features of the

world war. In the past, all the countries in the world were attacked by the Fascists, and the Fascists were actively assaulting every country. Moreover, they won the offensives and oppressed the anti-Fascist countries. This was the situation in the past, an unfavorable and difficult situation. Now the situation is totally different, and fundamental changes have taken place. These changes have occurred during the past year. The victory of the Soviet winter offensive, the American and British victories in North Africa and the Pacific Ocean, and the six years of perseverance in the War of Resistance Against Japan by the Chinese are the factors that led to these fundamental changes. Among them, the major victory in Stalingrad in particular played a decisive role in these changes. In the past, the Fascist invaders were rampant, and they held the initiative. Now they have lost the initiative, and it is in the hands of the Allied countries.

Comrade Mao Zedong spoke in an affirmative tone:

The problem for the future is to finish off the Fascists. This should be divided into two steps: first, dispose of the Germans, then eliminate the Japanese. The coming year will probably be a year of decisive battle in Europe.

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out:

Last year we said that a decisive battle in Europe could begin in 1942. But due to the failure to open up the second front in Europe,² our prediction did not come true. The key issue this year is still the second front in Europe. The earlier it is set up, the earlier victory will come.

Comrade Mao Zedong further explained:

In the past, we pointed out tendencies and possibilities. We Communists often did so in order to make everyone see the bright future in the midst of difficulties. Now that the passive situation of the Allied countries is over and it has turned active, things that were only possibilities in the past will soon become realities today. There is still no second front in Europe, but certainly that day will not be far away. It is the goal toward which all human beings in this world are striving.

With regard to the battlefield in China, Comrade Mao Zedong said:

When the big boss Hitler has been toppled, there is no doubt that the second boss, the Japanese Fascists, will also be overthrown. Some people in the rear

echelon are confused and are not in favor of defeating Hitler first. This is wrong. The entire world has now formed an anti-Fascist front, and no state is fighting independently. Therefore, strategy should not be decided from the point of view of the immediate interest of one country. Instead, it should be based upon who should first be defeated for the greatest benefit of the entire anti-Fascist front. Looking at things in this way, we can see that, after defeating Hitler, it will be quite easy to defeat the Japanese.

After comparing the past six years of the War of Resistance and the present situation, Comrade Mao Zedong made the following conclusion:

It is certain that the bright future we pointed out in the past is already within reach.

Comrade Mao Zedong continued by summarizing the twenty-two years of the Chinese Communist Party. He compared the world during World War I and the world during World War II. He also compared the China of twenty-two years ago and the China of today. Then he pointed out:

The conclusion we draw from these comparisons will increase our confidence in a bright new world and a bright new China. We know in which direction the world is headed and in which direction China is headed, whether the world will become a bright world soon and whether China will become a bright China soon.

Comrade Mao Zedong first compared the two world wars.

In the past thirty years, the world has experienced two wars of unprecedented scale. They were the inevitable result of the development of the world economy. World War I was correctly predicted by Lenin, and it was Stalin who predicted World War II. Their correct predictions proved that Marxism-Leninism is the real scientific truth.

World War I was an unjust war, an imperialist war. At that time, there was only one Russian Bolshevik party, and very few people in the other countries were true Communists. However, among the social democratic parties in every country, their leaders all supported imperialist wars, and most of their members were still not enlightened. This was the situation thirty years ago.

During World War II, the look of the world has completely changed. Among the Allied countries, there are socialist countries, capitalist countries, colonies, and semicolonies. All the Communist parties in the Allied countries have taken

part in the war. This is a just war.

It was only in the third year of World War I that a socialist country—the Soviet Union—was established by the Russian Bolsheviks. It is no more than twenty years since then, and the Soviet Union has become the hero in the anti-Fascist war of mankind all over the world. Without the Soviet Red Army, the Soviet people, and the Soviet leader Stalin, and without the battle for Stalingrad, the fate of mankind still would be unknown. With a Bolshevik party led by Lenin and Stalin, the old Russia became a socialist Soviet Union. The world now has this territory with a socialist state, and it is influencing the entire world; it has now become the hero in the anti-Fascist movement in the world.

With regard to the Communist movement in the whole world, after the victory of the October Revolution in 1917, the Communist International was set up in 1919. As a result, in the East the Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921, the Japanese Communist Party was founded in 1922, and the Communist Party of India in 1933. Our Chinese Communist Party held its First Party Congress twenty-two years ago. Only twelve representatives were present at the meeting. Today it has become such a large political party.

Comrade Mao Zedong said:

In its twenty-two-year history, the Chinese Communist Party has already carried out three big revolutionary movements. Now it is working in coordination with the people of the entire country to organize a united front and to gather our strength to deal with the Japanese invaders. It is absolutely certain that now we are not merely an isolated party. Rather, we have people throughout the country and the world fighting with us against the Fascists, and we have the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of India fighting together with us against Japanese imperialism.

Comrade Mao Zedong ridiculed the Japanese bandit chief Tōjō [Hideki] who is fond of saying “one billion people.”

But all of these one billion people oppose the Japanese Fascists. The 450 million Chinese, 400 million Indians, 100 million people in Southeast Asia, and 100 million people in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are, as a matter of fact, all opposed to the Japanese Fascists.

Comrade Mao Zedong expressed his warm welcome to the leader of the Japanese Communist Party and the representative of the Japanese people, Comrade Okano Susumu. He said:

We have long been living in the mountains, so we hope that Comrade Okano Susumu, who is now in Yan'an, will give us as much advice as possible, now in service for unifying to defeat the Japanese Fascists and in the future for building a new China and a new Japan.

Comrade Mao Zedong turned to a comparison of present-day China with China of World War I. He said:

At that time, China had no Communist Party, and the people were so unenlightened that they did not even know that there is a distinction between good foreigners and bad foreigners. They still did not know how to distinguish between imperialists and good and honest workers and farmers. By then Marxism had existed for seventy years, but we were not aware of it. When teaching philosophy, economics, and sociology at school, the teachers did not even know Marx's name. The old democratic culture already existed at that time in China, but there was still no new democratic culture, literature, and arts. Writing in the vernacular was not even recognized. China was also a participant in World War I, but it only helped the imperialists. Its semicolonial status not only did not change; instead, it became worse.

China now is a China that is fighting the War of Resistance. The people's consciousness has reached such a degree that they have joined the international front to fight against the Fascists. Culture has progressed with the founding of the Communist Party. We often take many of the progressive things before us for granted. As a matter of fact, compared with the past, they are like a change of dynasties.

Comrade Mao Zedong said:

From this, it can be seen not only that fundamental changes have taken place in the past six years in the War of Resistance but also that the circumstances of the world and China are essentially different from thirty years ago. This is earth-shaking progress, and it is made by humanity with its own hands. This anti-Fascist war will inevitably create a more progressive world and a more progressive China. The Fascists want to drag the world backward. That won't do. Our direction is to march forward.

“Direction must be accompanied by policy,” Comrade Mao Zedong said. Thus he turned to the issue of policy. He said:

Policy can be divided into two parts: national policy and policy for the border regions and the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines.

He said:

With regard to national policy, the declaration commemorating the sixth anniversary of the War of Resistance by the Party Central Committee³ put forward four suggestions for the government. They were to “strengthen military capacity,” “enhance unity,” “reform politics,” and “develop production.” With regard to how to handle things after the victory of the War of Resistance, the Party has already made it very clear in the July 7 Declaration of last year⁴—we hope to continue our cooperation with every party and group to build the nation together.

Then Comrade Mao Zedong began to talk about the Party’s policies in the border region and in the areas behind enemy lines. He said:

At present, our War of Resistance has two battlefields: the front[line] battlefield and the battlefield behind enemy lines. The struggle in the battlefield behind enemy lines is extremely ruthless. We Communists have done our work in those areas. In the past few years, we have come up with many new things, such as anti-“mopping-up,” anti-“nibbling,” Crack Troops and Simple Administration, supporting the government and cherishing the people, supporting the army, production movements, and rectifying the Three Work Styles, and so forth.

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out:

When we see shortcomings in other areas, the only thing we can do is to give our suggestions, but this is not the case in the border region and in the areas behind enemy lines, where we can take our own actions, and, therefore, we should do a much better job.

Comrade Mao Zedong summarized Party policy in the border region and the areas behind enemy lines during the past six years by dividing the time into two periods.

The first period covers the first four and a half years after the beginning of the

War of Resistance (until the end of 1941), the second period covers the past year and a half.

During the first period, the Party's attention was focused on the following issues: how to form an anti-Japanese National United Front, how to mobilize the masses, how to resist the enemy's attack in cooperation with friendly armies, how to create anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines, and how to make all kinds of policies, such as land policy, labor policy, and the "Three-Thirds" system.⁵ These are all issues that required urgent solutions at that time. During the past year and a half of the past four and a half years, we were also forced to deal with the two major conflicts launched by anti-Communist elements.

In the second period, that is, in the past year and a half, apart from carrying on the work mentioned above, we also carried out the rectification of the Three Work Styles, Crack Troops and Simple Administration, supporting the government and cherishing the people, and the movement to support the army.

Comrade Mao Zedong explained in particular detail the rectification of the Three Work Styles. He said:

This event has ensured that the Party is unified ideologically and politically, as well as ensuring the purity of its organizational composition.

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out:

We must tirelessly carry on these tasks through to the end to guarantee victory in the War of Resistance. Everything should aim to defeat the enemy, to overcome present difficulties, and to embrace the oncoming light.

The report ended amid thunderous applause.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 33–40, where it is reproduced from the July 3, 1943, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. A shortened version of the document, excluding the reporter's descriptions and with a few minor revisions, can be found in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 28–34.

[1.](#) Okano Susumu would spend the remainder of the war years with the Communists in Yan'an.

[2.](#) On the second front on the European continent, see above, text of February 21, 1943.

3. “Declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Commemorating the Sixth Anniversary of the War of Resistance” was published in *Jiefang ribao* on July 2, 1943; see below, text of July 2, 1943.

4. Referring to the July 7, 1942, “Declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Commemoration of the Fifth Anniversary of the War of Resistance.”

5. Regarding the “Three-Thirds” system, see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942.

Two Lines in Anti-Traitor Work

(July 1, 1943)

Two lines in anti-traitor work.

The proper line is: “Senior officers take responsibility, and they themselves do the work. Leaders and the broad masses unite; the general call and individual guidance unite. Investigate and study. Clearly distinguish between the true and the false, and between the trivial and the important. Win over those who have slipped up. Train cadres and educate the masses.”

The incorrect line is: “Force, extorting confessions, credulity.”

We should carry out the proper line and oppose the incorrect line.

Note

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, p. 35, where it is reproduced from Mao’s manuscript. According to *Nianpu*, Vol. 2, p. 448, July 1 is the date on which Mao sent this brief text to Kang Sheng with instructions to have it published.

*Declaration of the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party
Commemorating the Sixth Anniversary
of the War of Resistance
(July 2, 1943)*

Six whole years have passed since the Chinese people united to wage a holy war against the evil Fascist imperialism of the Japanese. On this grand occasion of the sixth anniversary of the War of Resistance, at a time when the power balance between the worldwide anti-Fascist alliance and the alliance of Fascist invaders has undergone a dramatic shift, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party would like to express its views to its compatriot brothers and sisters throughout the country and to all our officers and soldiers.

Ever since the evil Fascist countries launched their war of aggression, China and all other countries in the world opposed to Fascist aggression have fought a long and bitter struggle. However, all along we were in an inferior position. Now this unfortunate circumstance has fundamentally changed, and it has changed decisively throughout the entire world. This change was brought about by the triumph of the Soviet Union's second winter offensive, Britain's and America's victories in North Africa, China's six years of fighting the War of Resistance, and Britain and America's strike against the Japanese bandits in the Pacific this past year. In particular, the Red Army's victory in Stalingrad played a major and decisive role in turning around the entire war. Over the past year, these great victories have created a global situation that is highly favorable to the anti-Fascist allies and extremely unfavorable to the Fascist aggressor countries.

The anti-Fascist allies are now in an unprecedentedly advantageous situation, which is:

First, as a result of the first planned united military operation between the Soviet Union in Stalingrad and Britain and the United States in North Africa, the solidarity between these three countries has become even firmer. The Fascist aggressor countries have completely failed in their attempt to drive a wedge between them through their trick of calling for peace. Such a situation is what is most historically meaningful and worthy of celebration in the entire war against the Fascists.

Second, the Soviet Union's, Britain's, and America's decisive battle to vanquish the German and Italian Fascists will begin this year. This decisive battle could have taken place this past year; however, Britain and the United States were unable to carry out the resolution to open a second front in Europe,¹ so it was postponed for a year. Now, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States have won great victories in their first united military operation, and the armies and air forces of the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States, and the navies of Britain and the United States, have developed into an invincible force. Now is the moment for the Soviet Union from the eastern front and Britain and the United States from the western front to stage their second and third even greater united battles and to deal the German and Italian fascists a final decisive blow. The time is ripe. So long as it is possible to open a second front in continental Europe, there can be no doubt that the German and Italian fascists will be defeated during the next year. This past year saw the establishment of the necessary preconditions for defeating German and Italian fascism. The coming year will be the year of the decisive battle.

Third, the consolidation of the unity between the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States, and the implementation of the decisive battle against the German and Italian Fascists, will spell defeat not only for the German and Italian Fascists but for the Japanese Fascists as well. Because Hitler is the chieftain of the aggressor countries, his defeat will be the defeat of all Fascists. Some Chinese hope that the Allies will not first defeat Hitler, either because they are not thinking clearly or because they do not want to see Hitler's Fascist system end in defeat, which would mean that they do not want to see the Japanese Fascists defeated. There can be no other explanation.

Fourth, with the strengthening of American power, the victories of the joint British and American forces and China's persistent war efforts, the situation in the Pacific has become favorable for the Allies and unfavorable for the Japanese Fascists. American power continues to increase fiercely. Although the Japanese Fascists try, on their short legs, to run a race with the United States, they will inevitably be defeated. The Japanese Fascists' extreme fear of the American plan to build 125,000 planes, 120,000 tanks, 2,000 warships of all sizes, and 20 million tons of boats and ships within one year is very natural and logical.

As far as the Fascist aggressor countries are concerned, there have been the following obvious changes:

First, the Fascist aggressor countries are completely isolated in the international arena. Over the past year, the first successful united military assault between the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States against the brigand troops of Germany and Italy; the threat posed to the Japanese bandits by the increase in U.S. military power; and China's, Britain's, and America's attacks on and encirclement of the Japanese brigands in the Pacific and on Chinese battlefields have caused all these Fascist nations to feel the threat of doom. Therefore, they resort to playing their trick of calling for peace, trying to divide the sacred alliance between Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. They hope that one party will sign a stop-gap peace treaty so that they can first defeat the others, thus saving themselves, and then attain their goal of annihilating the entire world. However, this scheme has met with a unanimous, resolute blow from Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Therefore, all Fascists have only one dismal option left, which is that of unconditional surrender. The Fascist countries have also attempted to rope in the neutral countries that have not yet entered the war. But those neutral countries that the Hitlers of this world wish to draw into the aggressor bloc see that the situation is beyond hope for the aggressors, and they are not willing to join them. Some neutral countries that were sympathetic to the Allies from the first but feared an offensive from the aggressor countries therefore hesitated and wavered. These countries have now stopped, or are about to stop, hesitating. Now that the Fascist aggressor countries' peace scheme is bankrupt, and their plot to draw in the neutral countries is a failure, they are completely isolated.

Second, the alliance among the Fascist aggressor countries themselves is also in

crisis. In the wake of the Allies' military and diplomatic triumphs, there is now discord among the aggressor countries. This has caused a crisis, which has sprung up not only between Germany and Italy but also between Germany and its vassal states as well as between Germany and Japan. Because of his military defeats and diplomatic failures, the prestige with which Hitler had been holding together Italy, Japan, and the vassal states has suddenly plummeted. There is now within Italy a force demanding withdrawal from the war. In Japan the extreme pro-German faction is being elbowed aside by other factions. Once Hitler suffers one or two more attacks like those he suffered in Stalingrad and North Africa, no faction within the Japanese ruling camp will dare to depend on Hitler or the Fascist alliance. At this junction, not only is the Fascist alliance completely isolated externally, but each party is also isolated from every other one internally. Because of the threat to the Japanese Fascists of becoming completely isolated internationally, in the past year the Japanese bandit leader Tōjō [Hideki] had to use the shameless trick of proposing a "new policy" to the collaborators in the Japanese-occupied territories in China and Southeast Asia, thus hanging the false mask of "independence" on them.² He did this in order to increase his own prestige and also in the hope of deceiving the Chinese and Indian people who resolutely resist Japan. The "new policy" of the bandit chieftain Tōjō is not a reflection of circumstances favorable to Japanese fascism but, rather, a reflection of the complete isolation of Japanese fascism in the international arena.

Third, the great triumphs of the anti-Fascist alliance during the past year have caused a military crisis among the Fascist aggressor countries. Despite the fact that some people on Hitler's general staff are unwilling to give up their risky plan to attack the Soviet Union again, and also despite the fact that some on the Japanese general staff are unwilling to give up their own risky plan of attacking the Soviet Union or another area, the feeling that "the situation is beyond hope" hangs over the armies and people of all Fascist countries. That the aggressor countries have lost the initiative to the Allies is beyond question. This past year, the Allies have mobilized on a grand scale the material forces, such as human, military, and subsistence resources, which form the foundation of war. They are now in a superior position vis-à-vis the aggressor countries. With the mobilization of this upcoming year, without a doubt the Allies will have an advantage great enough to overcome the enemy. On the side of the aggressors,

however, Germany's and Italy's resources are all but exhausted, and Japan's production will soon reach its upper limit. This situation will exacerbate yet further the already severe military crisis of all the aggressor countries.

Fourth, because of their international isolation, internal discord, and military crisis, as well as their cruel and inhumane rule, all Fascist countries are in a political crisis both internally and within the territories that they occupy. The breaches between the controllers and the people, and between the officers and the soldiers, in all the aggressor countries are like a crack in a volcano: They widen every day, brewing an immense eruption. This is a great army that will blast away fascism from under its own feet. When fascism's internal and external crises reach their apexes, it will suddenly burst forth. We have only to look back at imperial Germany's and Austria's situations in 1918 to be convinced of this point. Likewise, we have only to look at the hearts of the Chinese people in the occupied territories as well as at what kinds of changes have occurred in the feelings of the Japanese bandit soldiers over the past year in order to deduce that if things continue in this way, the maturity of the Japanese bandits' political crisis will be inevitable. The people of the home country of the Japanese bandits themselves are a volcano. All the people under the control of the Japanese—the Chinese, Southeast Asians, Koreans, and Taiwanese—are so many volcanoes. Once the anti-Fascist allies (including China) deal Japan several severe military blows, these volcanoes will erupt.

Compatriots! Officers and soldiers! China has been fighting for six years. Our War of Resistance has been carried on under extremely harsh conditions. We are different from the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, and the other Allied countries. They are advanced industrialized countries; we are a backward agricultural country. But we have still managed to wage a bitter War of Resistance for six years, surpassing the length of time of any other country's resistance. This is the result of the efforts of all our people and all our officers and soldiers. In the sixth year of resistance, we saw a decisive shift in the power balance between the Allies and the aggressor countries. Now we and the Allies are extremely advantaged, and the aggressor countries are extremely disadvantaged. In the seventh year, we will encounter new favorable changes. The realization of the Allies' final decisive strike against fascism in the West will be the time for the realization of the defeat of all Fascists and for the liberation of

all people all over the world. At that time, the realization of the defeat of fascism and the liberation of all people in the East will follow suit.

It is beyond doubt that, whether in the West or in the East, enormous efforts must be made in order to defeat the enemy and realize liberation. Without such efforts, victory and liberation are impossible. Our China is a member of the anti-Fascist alliance and so is placed in a highly favorable international position. What efforts should we make? We are an agricultural country, and we cannot compete with the advanced industrialized countries. But our six years of fighting the War of Resistance are clear proof of our country's merits in being a vast country with a large population and having a people steadfast in the face of struggle. Under these circumstances, what should we do in order to support the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, and the other Allied countries and to fulfill our responsibilities? During the six years of the War of Resistance, we have accumulated much experience. What is that experience? Entering the seventh year of this war, how should we utilize that experience to achieve more results, overcome the many existing difficulties, and prepare our strength for the future counterattack on the enemy?

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party believes:

We should reinforce our fighting. The entire Chinese war theater over the past six years is actually divided into two parts: the front and the area behind enemy lines. The roles of these two battlefields are complementary; if we lose one, at present we would not be able to prevent the Fascist beasts from scurrying around, and in the future we would not be able to drive them out of China. Therefore, we must reinforce the mutually beneficial utility of these two battlefields. This is especially the case because the soldiers and civilians on the battlefield to the rear of the enemy have defeated more than half the Japanese army, but their situation is a hundred times more difficult than that of those on the front. Therefore, we are duty-bound to strengthen our support for them. We believe that only if we reinforce the mutually beneficial nature of these two battlefields, especially by strengthening our support for the soldiers and civilians behind the enemy lines, will we be reinforcing in a concrete manner the war efforts of the entire Chinese war theater. However, during the past several years, most soldiers and civilians in the rear have not received much aid. Our initiative in the front has also been inadequate. We hope that the government can improve this situation. Under the

scheming inducement of the Japanese and their puppet Wang Jingwei regime, as many as thirty-three senior officers have defected to the enemy with their troops, thus selling out their motherland. We have not heard that the government has issued a general order denouncing them, and as a result the puppet army has drastically expanded. The hoax of the Japanese and Wang Jingwei's "new policy" has been proclaimed everywhere, unscrupulously. We hope that the government will act on the situation so as to boost the morale of the military and facilitate the war effort. To reinforce our fighting, reform of the system of military service is urgently needed. There are many serious flaws in the current system of military service: for instance, compulsion, kidnapping, suborning, the total lack of political mobilization, and so on, which greatly obstruct the demand for the mobilization of large numbers of people to go to the front. We hope that the government can promptly reform this situation.

We should strengthen our solidarity. We will not dwell on the frictions, conflicts, obstructions, limitations, and other negative tendencies of the past few years. We only hope that the government can remedy such phenomena in the future. The Communist Party has always upheld the Anti-Japanese National United Front and supported the government's resistance against Japan. In order to overcome greater difficulties during future resistance and to prepare to coordinate the counteroffensive with the Allies, we are prepared to continue negotiations with the Guomindang and other parties to solve existing problems and to improve relations among the various parties. The War of Resistance Against Japan should begin and end with unity. Unity is the foundation upon which the people of the entire country resist Japan, and it also the base upon which the people of the whole world fight fascism. How to strengthen and reinforce that foundation in order to facilitate cooperation with the Allies to overthrow fascism is indeed the most important of all tasks.

We must reform politics. The Communist Party has repeatedly stated its opinion on how to reform Chinese politics in order to meet the need to fight Japan. Our position remains the same now. We believe that the only policy is truly to implement Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles. The invading Japanese army comprises no more than thirty-odd divisions. Why is it that 450 million of us cannot defeat them or achieve still greater victories? Could it be that the only reason is the backwardness of our industries? No, that is not the only reason, nor

is it the main reason. Rather, it is because China does not have democratic politics, and therefore we do not have the initiative to mobilize the people of the entire country. China is different from the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States. The longer the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States fight, the greater grows the initiative of their people. China is just the opposite. The fighting initiative of most local people met with attack and restrictions that it absolutely should not have had, and so their initiative greatly abated. The vigorous new atmosphere of the first two years of the War of Resistance gradually vanished over the next four years. If we do not carry out the necessary reforms, this sort of phenomenon will inflict an incalculable amount of obstruction on the War of Resistance. It has already given rise to disharmony among different classes, parties, and nationalities, and harmony is indispensable to the War of Resistance. We hope that during the seventh year of the War of Resistance, the government can implement the Three People's Principles and carry out a few necessary political reforms in order to build a more harmonious relationship among the different classes, parties, and nationalities, and also that it can mobilize the people's initiative in order to prepare a counteroffensive.

We must develop production. We have also discussed this problem many times. Severe economic difficulties have now arisen. If there are no reforms appropriate to the times, it will be impossible to handle the increasingly difficult War of Resistance as well as to prepare a powerful counteroffensive. The basic principle of economic reform, we believe, should be to develop production through implementing a concentrated, democratic economic policy which regulates the economic advantages of the different classes. We must mobilize the army to engage in production as well as war, mobilize schools and organs across the country to produce as well as to work and learn, and mobilize all peasants to increase production, even while firmly implementing a policy of reducing both rents and interest rates. We must mobilize the workers of the whole country to increase production, and simultaneously we must raise their wages. We must protect the production of small and medium-size industries from the attacks of bureaucratic capital and speculative commerce. When implementing these new economic policies, we must abolish all current fiscal and economic policies that hamper the initiative of public and private production. These are our views on how to overcome the economic crisis through developing production.

Many things need to be reformed in order to win the war. For now we will confine ourselves to pointing out only the above four for the government's reference. As far as postwar cooperation on nation building is concerned, our Party clearly stated our position last year in our declaration on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the War of Resistance, and this position has won the approval of our compatriots from all walks of life. We will say no more here.

As the victorious conclusion of the War of Resistance approaches, the difficulties involved in fighting will become more and more formidable. This will increase the responsibilities of the government, the people, and the Communist Party members, especially those Communists who fight on the battlefield to the rear of the enemy. Their duties will now be more onerous than ever.

Their six years of fighting the War of Resistance have proved the limitless loyalty of the Chinese Communist Party to the holy war of defending our motherland. The bitter struggles of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the people behind enemy lines are unprecedented in history. Half the enemy's forces that have invaded China have faced resistance for the past six years, and the people behind enemy lines will continue to resist violently until the enemy forces are driven out of China. They have had no support in terms of ammunition or provisions, but they have achieved a miracle with only their loyalty and creativity. They have taken back vast tracts of land from the hands of the enemy, established democratic resistance bases, resolutely implemented the Three People's Principles, carried out the "Three-Thirds" system³ uniting resistance groups from all social strata, carried out the land policy of reducing rent and interest while continuing to pay rent and interest, carried out the labor policy of rewarding production while protecting workers, and carried out the cultural policy of encouraging the patriotism and the initiative for resistance among the people. All of this has provoked the profound hatred of the Japanese bandits and their collaborators, such as Wang Jingwei, who are hell-bent on destroying them. Cruel "mopping-up" operations, insidious "nibbling," forests of fortresses, trenches and walls everywhere you turn, the relentless implementation of the "burn all, kill all, loot all" policy and the "reinforcement of peace" campaign, and the widespread establishment of "Committees for the Suppression of Communists" were all designed to wipe out these people. The struggle in the battlefields behind the enemy lines is as cruel as this, yet there are still people

among our compatriots in the rear echelon who are ill-informed about the situation.

Members of the Communist Party! Officers and soldiers of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army! Male and female compatriots in the area behind enemy lines! Strengthen your solidarity until you are united as one person! This cruel war will only temper you into exceptionally brave, strong people. It will be impossible for the enemy to subjugate you.

Communists should be close to the people. Defend the people the way you defend your own eyes; depend on the people the way you depend on your parents and siblings. Conscientiously implement the policies of Crack Troops and Simple Administration, supporting the government and loving the people, and supporting the troops. Thoroughly achieve the goals of unity between officers and men, between the army and the people, and between the army and the government.

Better organize the coordination of military operations behind enemy lines between the main force of the army, the guerrilla forces, and the militias. Strengthen the technical, tactical, and political training of the main force of the army, the guerrilla forces, and the militias. Intensify attacks on the enemy. Grind into dust the enemy's "mopping-up" operations. Develop armed work teams. Intensify the struggle against "nibbling." Have all military cadres and political work cadres master the summing up of war experience. Elevate the arts of opposing "mopping up" and "nibbling" to a higher level. You are experts in guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare. You have achieved admirable results in the six years of this patriotic war. The whole country cares for you and has invested great hopes in you. Therefore, you must try even harder to elevate your military and political arts in order to coordinate with the military operations on the front and to drive the enemy out of China.

Pay extreme attention to winning over Japanese soldiers and the army of the puppet government. Assist the Japanese Communist Party to carry out sabotage of the enemy and of the puppet government's army. Greatly step up this work. Organize Japanese workers' and peasants' schools. Develop the Japanese anti-war alliance and the Japanese Communist alliance. Develop the Korean people's armed troops and resistance groups. Turn all these groups into powerful forces friendly to the Chinese people's resistance to Japanese fascism.

Develop publicly operated production. All of the army, all administrative organs, and all schools must be engaged in production for themselves, under the condition that such activity does not interfere with military operations. Improve your lives and lessen the burden on the people by using your own hands. Develop privately run production. Communists, go deep into the countryside to master helping the peasants with their settlement plans and to organize mutual-aid societies and cooperatives so as to improve the lives of the masses. The highly effective public and private production activities in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and in many bases behind the enemy lines must continue without abatement. Reward labor heroes and develop production competitions. Oppose corruption and waste. Punish the lazy. Overcome the bureaucratism of being divorced from the masses. In everything, strive for victory over the enemy.

Communists must study culture, vocational work, politics, and theory with open minds. Continue the Rectification study movement. Develop self-criticism; firmly, thoroughly, unceremoniously, and mercilessly overcome subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism among our own ranks. No matter how cruel the war, no matter how arduous your work, never slacken your studies. You ought to acquire superhuman abilities during this harsh, long war.

At every moment and by every possible means, the enemy is trying to destroy you, to wipe you out, from both without and within. You must raise your vigilance tenfold, a hundredfold, a thousandfold. You must master all the new ways to struggle against enemy secret agents.

The sixth anniversary of the War of Resistance is also the twenty-second anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. At its inception, the Chinese Communist Party declared to the Chinese people its guiding program of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, a program unprecedented in Chinese history. During the periods that followed, the Communist Party established different sorts of concrete policies for carrying out such principles. Over the past twenty-two years, the members of the entire Communist Party and the broad masses of the people have acted as one. For the sake of actualizing these principles and policies, for the sake of opposing imperialism and its running dogs within China's borders, and for the sake of national and social liberation, they have sacrificed their blood and their lives. With those behind marching forward as those in front fell, they have tenaciously, bravely, and heroically struggled on.

No matter how strong the enemy or how difficult the journey, they have always insistently forged ahead. They have never wavered, never flinched. They have caused the people of this nation to find light where there was only darkness, to find a way out of a dead end. Twenty-two years of historical practice have proven that the direction in which our Party has been moving is entirely correct and has allowed the Chinese people to rise as if from the dead. Our Party will persist in this direction during our future historical practice, never ceasing until we achieve a complete victory. Communists are a special breed of people. They do not scheme for private gain but, rather, seek material benefits only for the people and the nation. They are rooted among the people. They are the people's sons as well as teachers. At every moment they guard against being isolated from the people. Regardless of what sort of situation they encounter, they always begin their analysis from the point of view of the interests of the masses. Therefore, they have won the heartfelt support of the vast masses. This is the foundation for the inevitable victory of their cause. Now, when the Chinese War of Resistance Against Japan and the world war against the Fascists have entered the decisive stage, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party believes that all members of the Communist Party must solidly rally around the Central Committee with Comrade Mao Zedong at its helm, firmly and conscientiously execute the policies of the Central Committee, enhance their own sense of responsibility, make full use of their creativity, uphold the Anti-Japanese National United Front, exhaust all possibilities and spare no efforts to unite with all anti-Japanese parties, all anti-Japanese people, support the Nationalist government and Chairman Chiang [Kaishek], and vanquish Japanese imperialism.

Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

Notes

This declaration was drafted by Mao Zedong. Our source for the text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 36–48, where it is reproduced from *Jiefang ribao*, July 2, 1943.

1. On the second front in Europe, see above, text of February 21, 1943.

[2.](#) On Tōjō Hideki, see above, note to the text of June 1, 1943. The “new policy” refers to the revival of the Japanese “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere” in overtures to the Wang Jingwei puppet government in Nanjing, offering peace, economic cooperation, and joint Japanese-Chinese efforts “to eradicate Bolshevism in Asia.”

[3.](#) Regarding the “Three-Thirds” system, see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942.

Central Committee Decision to Launch a Propaganda Counteroffensive¹ (July 8, 1943)

1. Taking advantage of the dissolution of the Communist International, the Guomindang is preparing a military offensive against the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region to force us to yield. Meanwhile, they want to create anti-Communist public opinion by starting a propaganda attack.

2. The Central Committee has decided to launch a propaganda counteroffensive and, at the same time, prepare militarily in order to defeat any possible attacks.

3. Every region should respond to the propaganda from Yan'an, mobilize local opinion in July, and organize public meetings. Create a high tide that overpowers the reactionary bluster and assists in the self-defense struggle in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region by sending telegrams to the headquarters of the New China News Agency to broadcast the demands that the National Government stop the Civil War and punish elements that provoke the Civil War. The orientation of your propaganda should be based on the content and slogans of the open telegram sent from the Yan'an mass meetings.

4. In order to use this opportunity to enforce education within the Party and among the people, documents published in Yan'an and in the localities should be published in booklet form for cadres to read and discuss.

5. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is mobilizing the Party, government, military, and civilians in every subregion and county.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp.104–5.

[1.](#) This telegram, drafted by Mao, was sent to the bureaus and subbureaus of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

*Prepare to Counter Chiang Kaishek's
Military Deployments to Attack the
Border Region*
(July 9, 1943)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

Chiang [Kaishek] and Hu [Zongnan]¹ have withdrawn all the troops guarding the river, moving them to the Luochuan-Zhongbu-Binzhou line and secretly ordering them to prepare actively and to await orders to attack. I have ordered the four regiments in northwestern Shanxi to cross the river and march south and prepare to fight. There are now only six small regiments remaining in northwestern Shanxi, which is left nearly empty. At the same time, there is a possibility that the incident will progress to the point of splitting the two parties; our Party must be prepared in advance. If things get to that point, we plan to carry out the plan decided on in the spring two years ago: we will transfer ten large regiments (about twenty thousand people) from Wutai and Taihang to the west to deal with the incident. Please think this over today and cable your opinion. At present, in addition to making military preparations, we should also do our utmost to carry out political mobilization, to launch a propaganda battle, and also to spread such propaganda to Xi'an, Chongqing, and to Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, in order to mobilize public opinion both domestically and abroad to attack Chiang's counterrevolutionary scheme.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 701–2, where it is reproduced from Mao's manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Hu Zongnan was at this time the effective commander of the Guomindang-led armies in northwestern China. For more information, see above, note to the text of February 20, 1942.

*Quickly Send Out the “July 7”
Declaration Materials to Every
Newspaper Office and to Personalities
in Various Circles¹*
(July 9, 1943)

All your telegrams have been received. Please secretly print and distribute the “July 7” Declaration, the telegram to Chiang [Kaishek] and Hu [Zongnan] from Commander-in-chief Zhu [De], news from the Yan’an New China News Agency exposing secret agents who have fabricated public opinion in Xi’an, and the open telegram sent from the Yan’an mass meeting (it was issued today) to every newspaper office, every foreign embassy, every neutral party, and personalities in cultural circles. Also please try by every means to mail them to various social circles and to de facto powers in Chengdu, Guilin, and Kunming. This is of utmost importance. The wider the range to which this kind of propaganda is distributed, the better for us. Please make every effort to organize this and to carry it out with great secrecy.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 105.

¹. This is a telegram sent to Dong Biwu of the Chongqing Office of the Eighth Route Army.

Secretly Distribute the Open Telegram and Materials from the Yan'an Mass Meeting to Various Social Circles¹ (July 9, 1943)

Try every means to quickly print several dozen to several hundred copies of the telegram from Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] and Director Xiao [Jingguang]² to Chiang [Kaishek], Hu [Zongnan], and others, the news from the New China News Agency exposing secret agents fabricating public opinion in Xi'an, and the open telegram from today's Yan'an mass meeting, and secretly distribute them to various circles. This kind of work is very important.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 106.

- ¹. This is a telegram sent to Zhou Zijian of the Xi'an Office of the Eighth Route Army.
- ². Xiao Jingguang (1903–1989) was at this time the director of the Rear Office of the Eighteenth Army Group (the Eighth Route Army).

The Chinese Communist Party's July 7 Declaration Is Suppressed in Chongqing (July 11, 1943)

[New China News Agency, Yan'an, July 11] According to sources in Chongqing, the *New China Daily* editorial of July 1, which commemorates the twenty-second anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and strongly supports a unified War of Resistance, has been suppressed by the Guomindang's news censorship agency, which will not permit it to be published. The Chinese Communist Party sent its July 7 Declaration to the censorship agency on July 4, and when [the Party] went to retrieve it on July 5, it too was suppressed. On July 6 the newspaper office sent someone to negotiate with responsible persons at the censorship agency. The result was that it was to be allowed to be published, after more than three thousand words were deleted. But that evening the news censorship agency suddenly informed them that once more it would not permit publication. Further efforts to negotiate by the newspaper office ended without result. And that is not all: The authorities also mobilized all their secret agents, military police, and regular police in Hualongqiao as if they were facing a formidable enemy. They set up three inspection stations between the *New China Daily* office doors and Hualongqiao, with other ones at each of the two entrances. They said their task was to inspect whether or not the newspaper still contained the July 7 Declaration. But even though they did not find the declaration, they still did not permit the newspaper to be circulated. *New China Daily* had been completely printed by 6:00 on July 7. The newspaper office attempted several times to negotiate with the censorship agency, but it was not until 8:30 that the secret agents, military police, and regular police were withdrawn.

On the same day, at the news conference for foreign reporters hosted by the

Guomindang Central Propaganda Ministry, a *New York Times* reporter asked about the purpose of Mr. Zhou Enlai's return to Yan'an. Zhang Daofan, the Guomindang minister of propaganda, answered provocatively: "The Communists are divided into two factions. One of them upholds cooperation with the government, and the other opposes it." The Japanese Fascist information organization, the Tōmei News Agency, immediately promulgated the words of Zhang Daofan's slander on July 8, helping Zhang to trumpet his statements. At the news conference on July 7, a reporter from United Press International asked: "I have heard that the situation in northern Shaanxi is very tense. Is it true that the Central Government sent a large number of troops to encircle the Eighth Route Army?" Zhang Daofan was very embarrassed; he could only mutter in Chinese: "Nothing of the kind." Another American reporter asked: "Every year the Communist Party publishes a declaration on July 7. Why did we not see any such declaration in *New China Daily* on July 7 of this year?" Zhang answered: "That is the affair of the censorship agency. I will look into it." It turns out that the withdrawal from the line of defense along the river, the encircling of the border region, and preparations to attack have indeed been going on secretly. However, due to the tense situation, as before a thunderstorm, which was created by active troop movements and an endless stream of transportation, their scheme is already known both at home and abroad. Even though the propaganda apparatuses of the Guomindang still closely guard this secret, they can no longer keep it under wraps.

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 230–31, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

Chinese Politics Is Dark, Its Resistance Is Weak, the British and American Allies Are Highly Dissatisfied (July 12, 1943)

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, July 12) People in the British and American alliance are highly dissatisfied with China's Fascist politics. At press conferences in New York, Washington, and London, Xiong Shihui¹ was invariably asked the following questions and pressed for answers:

1. China is a country calling itself democratic, so what are its measures for creating, guaranteeing, and strengthening democratic government?

2. What is the purpose of establishing labor camps?

The people at these conferences repeatedly asked these two questions, but Xiong Shihui was silent and had nothing to say in response. In the United States, Song Meiling² has given deceptive explanations in response to questions about the state of China's internal unity, and she has been criticized on the spot by Americans. Those Americans have said, "The situation described by Ms. Song Meiling does not fit with what we Americans know about the internal situation in China." The weapons that the United States has given to aid China have not been used on the front line to fight Japan and, instead, have mainly been used to equip troops in the rear areas. For example, Hu Zongnan's more than 300,000 soldiers are being used specifically to deal with the Communists, and the Americans are very dissatisfied about this as well. We have heard that the British and Americans have publicly stated to Xiong Shihui, "If the aid previously given to China had all been used on the front lines, it would have been enough to fight

several battles, but China has used all of it to supplement the rear echelons. Certainly Britain and America cannot continue to give large amounts of weapons to a country that does not use them to fight the Axis countries.” After Xiong Shihui returned to China, he was therefore extremely disappointed with Britain and the United States.

Many people in the Guomindang are still unwilling to spend energy on reforming politics, strengthening internal unity, and reinforcing the fight against the enemy. Instead, they only complain that Britain and the United States do not give more help. Recently, the Guomindang initiated a traitorous campaign to “dissolve the Communist Party and eliminate the border regions.” At the same time, they withdrew the troops defending the river in preparation to attack the border region. What will the British and Americans think when this news reaches them?

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 232–33, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

- [1.](#) Xiong Shihui (1893–1974) was at this time head of the Design Bureau of the Nationalist government.
- [2.](#) Song Meiling (1897–2003; also Soong May-ling) was the wife of Chiang Kaishek.

Calling the Guomindang to Account

(July 12, 1943)

The past few months have witnessed a most unusual and shocking event inside China's anti-Japanese camp: namely, the campaign launched by many Party, government, and army organizations led by the Guomindang to shatter unity and sabotage the War of Resistance. It assumes the posture of attack on the Communist Party, but in fact it opposes the whole Chinese nation and people.

First, there is the army.¹ Of the Guomindang-led army throughout the country, the main force stationed in the Northwest has three army groups: the Thirty-fourth, the Thirty-seventh, and the Thirty-eighth—all of which are under the command of Hu Zongnan, deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth War Zone. Two of them are used to encircle the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and only one is used to defend the Yichuan-Tongguan section of the Yellow River against the Japanese bandits. This has been the situation for more than four years, and people became accustomed to it so long as there was no military conflict. But during the past few days, an unexpected change has taken place. Of the three armies on defense duty along the river—the First, the Sixteenth, and the Ninetieth—two have been moved, the First Army to the area of Binzhou and Chunhua, and the Ninetieth to the area of Luochuan. Both are actively preparing to attack the border region, leaving empty the greater part of the river defenses against the Japanese bandits.

This cannot but make people ask questions such as: What exactly are the relations between these Guomindang members and the Japanese?

Many Guomindang members day in and day out have been brazenly spreading propaganda that the Communist Party is “sabotaging the War of Resistance” and “shattering unity.” Can the complete removal of the main force defending the river be called strengthening the War of Resistance? Can the attacks on the

border region be called strengthening unity?

We should like to ask the Guomintang members who are doing all of this: You are turning your backs on the Japanese while they are still facing you; and so if [they]² advance toward your backs. What will you do then?

If, when you abandon large sections of the river defenses, the Japanese still just silently sit and watch on the opposite bank without making a move other than to watch with glee through their field glasses the gradually receding view of your backs, then what is the reason behind it? Why do the Japanese so greatly enjoy seeing your backs? And how can you be so relaxed after abandoning the river defense and leaving a large tract of land empty?

In a society based on private property, everyone shuts their doors at night before going to sleep. Everybody knows that this is not fussiness but a precaution against thieves. Now, having left the front door wide open, are you not afraid that thieves will come? And if you leave the door wide open and thieves do not come, what can be the reason?

According to you, in China it is only the Communists who are “sabotaging the War of Resistance,” while you yourselves are oh-so-devoted to “the nation above all.” Well now, with your backs turned to the enemy, what are you placing “above all”?

According to you, it is also the Communists who are “shattering unity,” while you so ardently adhere to “sincere unity.” Well, you have sent a huge force of three army groups (minus one army), with fixed bayonets and heavy artillery, to march against the people of the border region. Is this also considered to be “sincere unity”?

Or take another of your statements: You are not very keen on “unity” but, rather, on “unification.” You therefore want to wipe out the border region, annihilate “feudal separatism,”³ and kill off every Communist. Very well! How is it then that you are not afraid that the Japanese will “unify” the Chinese nation, including you, out of existence?

Suppose that you can triumphantly “unify” the border region at one stroke and wipe out the Communists, and that you are able to keep the Japanese frozen by some “sleeping pill” or “spell” of yours, so that the nation and you yourselves both escape “unification” by them. Well, dear gentlemen of the Guomintang, won’t you give us some inkling of the secret of your “sleeping pill” or “spell”?

But if you have no “sleeping pill” or “spell” with which to deal with the Japanese, and if you have not reached a secret understanding with them, then let us tell you formally: You should not and cannot attack the border region. “When the snipe and the clam grapple, it is the fisherman who profits.” “The mantis stalks the cicada, but behind it lurks the oriole.” There is truth in these two parables. You should join forces with us to unify the land occupied by the Japanese and to drive the devils out. Why are you in such a hurry to “unify” the palm-sized border region? Though vast stretches of our beautiful country have fallen into the hands of the enemy, you are not anxious or in a hurry about this, but instead you are anxious to attack the border region and in a hurry to crush the Communist Party. How painful! How shameful!

Next is Party affairs.⁴ To oppose the Communist Party, the Guomindang has organized several hundred teams of secret agents and has drawn all kinds of scum into them. For example, on July 6, 1943, in the thirty-second year of the Chinese Republic, on the eve of the sixth anniversary of the War of Resistance, the Guomindang Central News Agency released a news item stating that certain “cultural associations” in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, had held a meeting and resolved to cable Mao Zedong, calling on him to seize the opportunity of the dissolution of the Communist International⁵ to “dissolve” the Chinese Communist Party. There was also a section calling on him to “abolish the separatist border region.” The reader may well take this to be “news,” but actually it is an old story.

It turns out that the whole thing was the handiwork of one large team among the several hundred large teams of secret agents. Acting on orders from headquarters (namely, the “Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military Committee of the Guomindang Government” and the “Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Guomindang”), this team gave instructions to the Trotskyite traitor Zhang Difei, now director of discipline in the Xi’an labor camp, who is notorious for his anti-Communist writings in that traitorous periodical financed by the Guomindang, *Resistance and Culture*. On June 12, twenty-five days before the Central News Agency released this news item, he called nine people together for a ten-minute meeting which “passed” the text of the so-called telegram.

To this day, Yan’an has not yet received this telegram, but its contents are

clear. We are told that it says that since the Third International has been dissolved, the Chinese Communist Party likewise should be “dissolved.” It also says that “Marxist-Leninist thought is bankrupt” and other such things.

This is the sort of thing the Guomindang is saying! We have often felt that anything at all may come out of the mouths of the likes of these Guomindang people (and things attracting their like). And now, just as one would expect, they have again let out this gust of foul air!

China now has many political parties and factions; there are even two Guomindangs. One of them is called the Wang Jingwei brand of the Guomindang, set up in Nanjing and other places. It also flies a flag with a white sun against a blue sky and has something called a Central Executive Committee. It also has teams of secret agents. In addition, there are Japanese Fascist parties all over the areas occupied by the enemy.

Our dear gentlemen of the Guomindang! Since the dissolution of the Third International, you have been so busy with your plots to “dissolve” the Communist Party that you can’t do anything else. But you will not even lift a finger to dissolve a few of the parties of Chinese traitors and enemy parties.⁶ Why is this? When you had Zhang Difei write that telegram, why did you not, in addition to demanding the dissolution of the Communist Party, add a sentence (*which we would not dare to hope you would put in the main body of the text*) saying that the parties of Chinese traitors and enemy parties⁷ are also worth dissolving?

Could it be that you think there are too many Communist parties? Within the whole territory of China there is only one Communist Party, but there are two Guomindangs. In the end, which is more numerous?

Gentlemen of the Guomindang! Why is it that, in addition to yourselves, the Japanese and Wang Jingwei are together making frantic efforts to overthrow the Communist Party and asserting that only the Communist Party is too numerous and must therefore be crushed? Have you ever given this a thought? But what do they feel about the Guomindang? They never feel that there are too many Guomindangs; they just feel that there are too few, and they support and nourish the Wang Jingwei brand of the Guomindang everywhere. *The history of the War of Resistance is full of records of two Guomindangs and two types of the Three People’s Principles. But the Japanese and Wang Jingwei are so stingy that they*

refuse to support even one puppet Communist Party and won't advocate one false communism. Think a little. What can be the reason for this?

Gentlemen of the Guomintang! We don't mind taking the trouble to tell you that the reason the Japanese and Wang Jingwei have a special love for the Guomintang and for the Three People's Principles is that they find something in both that they can take advantage of. The only time since World War I that imperialists and Chinese traitors had no love for the Guomintang but bitterly hated it and tried their utmost to plot to destroy it was during the period of 1924–27, when it was reorganized by Dr. Sun Yatsen and admitted Communists into its ranks and became a national alliance in which the Guomintang and the Communist Party cooperated. As for this ideology, it was only during the same time period, and after Dr. Sun Yatsen transformed it into the Three People's Principles,⁸ as recorded in the Declaration of the First National Congress of the Guomintang, that it became the object of the bitter hatred of the imperialists and Chinese traitors, who did not dare love it but did everything in their power to plot to overthrow it. Except for this period, and under the condition that this party and ideology extirpate the spirit⁹ of Dr. Sun Yatsen and the Communist Party, the Japanese Fascists and the traitor to the Chinese Wang Jingwei have therefore begun to love them and to nourish and support them as if they were treasured possessions. There used to be a yellow patch in the left-hand corner of the flag of the Wang brand¹⁰ to distinguish it from that of the other Guomintang, but now they simply do not want that distinction; everything is made to look the same so as not to offend the eye. What a level of love!

The Guomintang people of the Wang Jingwei brand are numerous not only in the enemy-occupied areas but also in the great rear echelon. Some are undercover, forming the enemy's Fifth Column. Some are in the open, working in the Guomintang or as secret agents, but they do nothing at all to fight Japan; they specialize in anti-communism. These people may not have the logo of the Wang brand on their skin, but in reality they are part of his group. They, too, are the enemy's Fifth Column, but they use a somewhat different guise in order to disguise themselves and confuse the people.

Now the whole thing is completely clear. When you instructed Zhang Difei to draft the telegram demanding the "dissolution" of the Communist Party, the reason you would never add a sentence saying that enemy¹¹ parties and parties of

traitorous Chinese should also be dissolved is that you have much in common with them in terms of ideology, policy, and organization. The most fundamental common ideology is anti-Communist and anti-people.

There is something else we want to ask you Guomintang people: Is it true that the only “bankrupt-”ism in the world and in China is Marxism-Leninism, while everything else is great stuff? We’ve already talked about the Wang Jingwei brand of the Three People’s Principles. But what about the fascism of Hitler, Mussolini, and Tōjō Hideki? What about the Trotskyism of Zhang Difei? And what about the counterrevolutionary-ism, be it the Zhang brand or the Li brand, of counterrevolutionary secret agencies within China?

Our dear gentlemen of the Guomintang! Why is it that when you instructed Zhang Difei to write that telegram, you did not add even one proviso or postscript about these “-isms” that are like pestilence, like bedbugs, like dog shit? Could it be that in your eyes all these counterrevolutionary things are perfect, flawless, beautiful, and that only Marxism-Leninism is completely “bankrupt”?

Let’s be frank. We strongly suspect that you are working in collusion with enemy¹² parties and parties of traitorous Chinese and that therefore you and they breathe through the same set of nostrils. This is why in word and deed you are exactly like the enemy and the Chinese traitors, with no dissent or difference. The enemy and the Chinese traitors wanted the New Fourth Army disbanded; you ordered it to be disbanded. The enemy and the Chinese traitors want to dissolve the Communist Party; so do you. The enemy and the Chinese traitors want to abolish the border region; so do you. The enemy and the Chinese traitors do not want you to defend the Yellow River; you abandon its defense. The enemy and the Chinese traitors attack the border region (for the past six years, the enemy forces along the river bank opposite Suide, Mizhi, Jiaxian, Wubao, and Qingjian have never ceased bombing the Eighth Route Army’s river defenses); you, too, want to attack the border region. The enemy and the Chinese traitors are anti-Communist; so are you. The enemy and the Chinese traitors bitterly revile liberalism and communism;¹³ so do you. When the enemy and the Chinese traitors capture a Communist, they force him to make a public recantation in the papers; so do you. The enemy and the Chinese traitors send counterrevolutionary agents to worm their way into the Communist Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies to carry out work of destruction; so do you. How is it that

you and they are so alike, identical, and indistinguishable to such a degree? Since so many words and actions of yours, like these, are exactly the same as those of the enemy and the Chinese traitors, how can people not suspect that you and they are working in collusion, or that you have some secret pact with them?

We hereby make the following formal protest to the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang: Withdrawing the main forces for the defense of the river, preparing to attack the border region, and starting civil war are the most mistaken of actions and cannot be permitted. Your Central News Agency's publication of the news item on July 6 that destroyed unity and insulted the Communist Party is the most mistaken form of speech and also cannot be permitted. Both these errors are monstrous crimes, indistinguishable from those of the enemy and the Chinese traitors. You must correct them.

We hereby make these formal demands to Mr. Chiang Kaishek, chair of the Guomindang: Please order Hu Zongnan's troops to return to the river defenses. Please disband the Central News Agency and punish the traitor Zhang Difei.

We hereby *raise an* appeal to all true patriots in the Guomindang who are not willing to withdraw the river defense forces to attack the border region and who are not willing to demand the dissolution of the Communist Party: please act to stop this civil war crisis. We are willing to cooperate with you to the very end, together to rescue the nation from its peril.

We believe that these demands are entirely justified.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 41–49, where it is reproduced from an editorial in the July 12, 1943, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

- [1.](#) There is the army → Consider the Guomindang armies
- [2.](#) So if [they] → If the Japanese
- [3.](#) Annihilate “feudal separatism” → Annihilate what you term “feudal separatism”

- [4.](#) Party affairs → The affairs of the Guomintang
- [5.](#) Communist International → Third International
- [6.](#) Enemy parties → Japanese parties
- [7.](#) Enemy parties → Japanese parties
- [8.](#) The Three People's Principles → The revolutionary Three People's Principles
- [9.](#) Spirit → Revolutionary spirit
- [10.](#) The Wang brand → The flag of Wang Jingwei's brand of the Guomintang
- [11.](#) Enemy → Japanese
- [12.](#) Enemy → Japanese
- [13.](#) Liberalism and communism → Communism and liberalism

Our Propaganda Blitzkrieg Has Already Yielded Results

(July 13, 1943)

Our propaganda blitzkrieg has yielded results. Not only did foreign reporters question Zhang Daofan¹ one after another on the seventh. It also caused the ambassadors from Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union to hold meetings. In accordance with Zhu [De]'s telegram to Chiang [Kaishek] and Hu [Zongnan], they warned Chiang not to start a civil war, otherwise, they would stop assistance. Moreover, Chiang was frightened by the urgent mobilization in Yan'an and had to change his plan. On the tenth, he ordered Hu to stop his action. On the eleventh, Chiang and Hu both sent telegrams to Zhu stating that they had no intention of attacking. On the twelfth, Hu ordered the withdrawal of one division and two army headquarters (the First and Ninetieth armies). It seems that the crisis of a civil war can be overcome. The rapid failure of Chiang's conspiracy this time should be credited to our taking the opportunity and seizing the two important points of opposing civil war and opposing insults to the Communist Party. We struck a surprise blow at them when they were not expecting it. The foreigners in Chongqing received the telegram from Commander-in-chief Zhu at the same time (on the fifth) that Chiang and Hu received it. As a result, it led to questioning on the July 7 memorial day and interference by the various ambassadors. This is not the right time to strike at Liu Jin² in the south of the Taihang mountains. Please try by every possible means to overcome difficulties and preserve peace between the Guomindang and the Communists for a year. Then our Party will be able to achieve an extremely favorable position.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 106–7.

[1.](#) Zhang Daofan (1897–1968) was at this time head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Guomindang.

[2.](#) Liu Jin was at this time the commander of the Guomindang's Twentieth Army, stationed in the area south of the Taihang mountains.

Principles for Dealing with Various Factions of the Guomindang Army (July 15, 1943)

To the Shandong Branch Bureau and also for the information of the Northern Bureau:

We received your telegram of July 4.

1. We agree with your approach in dealing with Yu Xuezhong¹ and Li Xianzhou.²

2. We must resolutely unite with those who are friendly to us. Toward those who are diehards but have not yet attacked us, we should try to make them maintain neutrality. Toward those who have attacked us, we must resolutely fight back. These are the principles you should apply in dealing with the various factions of the Guomindang army. But you should inform the Central Committee by telegraph about all the details of how the diehard elements attack and oppress us in engagements and battles so that we can inform the Guomindang Central Committee and prevent their excuses and false accusations.

Central Committee Secretariat

Notes

Our source for this text is Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu, 1985 huibian ben*, pp. 174–75.

¹. Yu Xuezhong (1890–1964) was at this time governor of Shandong Province and commander-in-chief of

the Southern Shandong Guerrilla War Zone.

[2.](#) Li Xianzhou (1894–1988) was at this time commander-in-chief of the Guomindang's Twenty-eighth Army Group.

On Publishing the “Critique of China’s Destiny” (July 21, 1943)

[Dong] Biwu:¹

The immediate cause of the present wave of anti-communism is, first, the dissolution of the Communist International and, second, because Chiang [Kaishek] believes that the Japanese are going to attack the Soviet Union, he seeks to shake our Party through a propaganda offensive and to force us to submit by using military pressure. But because he did not plan this secretly enough, the scheme has been exposed by our Party and is known to the whole country by telegram. We launched a frontal attack on them, whereupon they have had no choice but to deny our charges with all their might (e.g., Hu [Zongnan]’s and Xu [Yongchang]’s² telegrams), strive to go through the motions (as in their dealings with Zhou [Enlai] and Lin [Biao]),³ and to ease up a little (two divisions have been withdrawn from the border region). But, in reality, they can definitely not ease up on their military preparations at present. Political oppression will likewise intensify (as in the suppression of *New China Daily* on July 7 and the search of our Chongqing Office a few days ago). In order to expose their scheme completely, and to respond to their propaganda offensive since the Southern Anhui Incident,⁴ in addition to sending the aforementioned telegram and publishing the *Liberation Daily* editorial,⁵ we have today published Chen Boda’s denunciation of Chiang’s book *China’s Destiny*.⁶ We did this in order to expose Chiang’s feudal, compradorial, Chinese Fascist system to the Chinese people on an ideological and theoretical level and also to consolidate our Party and influence in the United States, Britain, and other countries, as well as in various small parties, various localities, and all the various cultural circles. With

this goal in mind, we expect you to pay attention to carrying out the following matters:

1. Upon receiving the broadcast of the review, try to find a way to print it secretly in Chinese booklets and to translate it into English booklets and distribute them among Chinese and foreign personages.
2. In the Chongqing office and *New China Daily*, adopt this article as a textbook and offer explanations and carry out discussions.
3. Gather every published reaction to this article, as well as the Guomindang's important rebuttals, send me the main points by telegram, and send them all to me.
4. *New China Daily* and *The Masses* magazine in particular can use other roundabout ways to expose the evils (ideological, systemic, characteristic, and behavioral) of Chinese fascism.
5. [Zhou] Enlai will brief you on technical questions via telegram.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 49–51, where it is reproduced from a copy preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Dong Biwu (1886–1975) was at this time vice secretary of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the head of both the Propaganda Department and the United Front Department.

[2.](#) Xu Yongchang (1887–1959) was at this time head of the Department of Military Orders of the Military Commission of the Guomindang government.

[3.](#) Lin Biao, the commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route, had left for Chongqing as a representative of the Communist Party in the negotiations in September 1942 and returned to Yan'an in July 1943.

[4.](#) The Southern Anhui Incident took place in January 1941, when 9,000 troops of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui were encircled and attacked by 80,000 Guomindang troops as they were moving north. While 2,000 New Fourth Army troops broke through the encirclement and survived, the rest were all killed.

The commander of the New Fourth Army, Ye Ting, was captured and detained by the Guomindang.

5. The telegram, entitled “Calling for Unity and Opposing Civil War,” was issued on July 9, 1943, by the Yan’an mass meeting in commemoration of the sixth anniversary of the War of Resistance. It refers to the editorial drafted by Mao Zedong for the July 12, 1943, issue of *Jiefang ribao*, entitled “Calling the Guomindang to Account.” See above, the text of July 12, 1943.

6. Chen Boda was at this time vice director of the Political Research Center of the Central Committee.

*Letter to Lin Boqu*¹

(July 24, 1943)

Chairman Lin:

Here are the labor hero Yang Buhao and his relative Li Zhiming from Shijiapan, Sixth Township, Chuankou District, Yan'an county. They were introduced to me for a chat by Cao Yu, the head of Yan'an county. I am very interested in learning about the situation in the countryside. Now I would like to introduce them to you. If you have time, please receive them for a chat. They are very keen to have the chance to meet and learn from you. I hope you will put them up for one night and send them home the next day because they live about 70 *li* from here.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

P.S.: The same for Comrade Luo Mai.²

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 215, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Regarding Lin Boqu, see above, note to the text of September 15, 1942.

². Luo Mai, a pseudonym for Li Weihang; see above, note to the text of September 15, 1942.

On the Nine Guiding Principles for Cadre Screening and the Eight Policies for the Areas Behind Enemy Lines (July 30, 1943)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:¹

1. Zhou [Enlai] and Lin [Biao]² have returned to Yan'an in preparation for the Seventh Party Congress. Please come to Yan'an to participate in the congress together with Luo [Ronghuan], Bo [Yibo], Nie [Rongzhen], and Lü [Zhengcao].³ I hope you will make arrangements in advance. Some representatives must be reelected in the districts of Taihang, Taiyue, and Beiyue. The Central Committee will send a separate notice.

2. There is progress in rectification in the areas behind enemy lines, as is evident from the two articles on the experience of rectification and on ideology written on July 9 by the Northern Bureau⁴ (which have been passed along to be broadcast). Please supervise and encourage the rectification behind the enemy lines, so that it will be substantially completed this year, thus allowing cadre screening to be launched on a full-scale basis next spring and to be finished within the year.

3. The guiding principles for cadre screening are as follows: (1) The leading cadre takes responsibility; (2) He does the work himself; (3) Leading cadres and backbone cadres unite closely with the broad masses; (4) General calls must be combined with specific guidance; (5) Investigate and study [the facts]; (6) Differentiate right from wrong, and trivial from important; (7) Win over those who have taken a wrong step; (8) Cultivate the cadres; (9) Educate the masses.

You must clearly distinguish these guiding principles of seeking truth from facts from the subjectivist principles which once damaged the Party during the Civil War. This subjectivist approach can be summarized as “obtaining confessions by compulsion and giving them credence.” I will give a detailed explanation on another occasion.

4. The plan of Chiang [Kaishek] and Hu [Zongnan] to attack our border region was exposed by us in time. Seeing that we are prepared, they had to stop temporarily. Thus, we can hope for one year of peace. Our preparations for military defense, however, absolutely must not be relaxed.

5. Please make multiple copies and widely distribute the telegram sent by the Yan'an mass meeting, the editorial of *Liberation Daily*,⁵ and the critiques by Chen Boda and Fan Wenlan⁶ on *China's Destiny*. Take this opportunity to give extensive, in-depth, and planned education on class [struggle] and to expose thoroughly the Guomindang's deceitful influence. Do not underestimate the importance of this matter. The Guomindang's ideas exist in our Party to a serious degree.

6. In the areas behind enemy lines, we should add “fighting the enemy” (anti-“mopping-up” and anti-“nibbling”) and class education to the six policies as stated in the previous telegram. This will make eight policies, the sequence of which should be: (1) Struggle against the enemy; (2) Rectification of the Three Styles; (3) Crack Troops and Simple Administration; (4) Unified leadership; (5) Support the government and cherish the people; (6) Develop production; (7) Investigate cadres; and (8) Carry out class education. (In the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, “Fight the enemy” should be changed to “Military education” and ranked as the eighth policy.)

7. Among the masses, the daily and common tasks are these three items: fighting, production, and education.

8. Class education, that is, education combining unity and struggle within the United Front, is not class education standing in isolation and divorced from the United Front. The term “class education” should not be used outside our Party.

This telegram will also be sent to all responsible comrades of the Central Bureau and Central Subbureaus, and the Party committees of several districts.

Mao Zedong

noon, July 30

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 52–54, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

- [1.](#) Regarding Peng Dehuai see above, note to the text of January 25, 1943.
- [2.](#) Regarding Lin Biao, see above, note to the text of January 25, 1943.
- [3.](#) Bo Yibo (1908–2007) was at this time deputy secretary of the Taihang Subbureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lü Zhengcao (1904–2009) was at this time commander-in-chief of the Third Column of the Eighth Route Army and commander-in-chief of the Central Hebei Military Area Command.
- [4.](#) Referring to the two articles “Introduction to the Experience of Rectification,” by the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee, and “Problems Regarding Ideology,” by the Study Committee of the Departments under the Headquarters of the Eighteenth Army Group, published on August 2 and August 4, 1943, respectively.
- [5.](#) The telegram entitled “Calling for Unity and Opposing Civil War” was issued by the Yan’an mass meeting in commemoration of the sixth anniversary of the War of Resistance on July 9, 1943. The editorial refers to the editorial drafted by Mao Zedong for the July 12, 1943, issue of *Jiefang ribao* titled “Calling the Guomindang to Account.” See above, note to the text of July 12, 1943 and note to the text of July 21, 1943.
- [6.](#) Regarding Chen Boda, see above, note to the text of March 16, 1943. Fan Wenlan at this time worked for the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. See above, note to the text of January 17, 1942.

*Talk During the Inspection at
Nanniwan
(July 1943)*

Hardship is not a monster that cannot be conquered. If everyone takes action to conquer it, it will yield. If everyone makes an effort to be self-reliant, there will be food, clothing, and daily necessities. We currently do not have foreign aid. But even if we have foreign aid in the future, we must still continue to be self-reliant. We cannot be like the Guomindang, relying on foreigners even for cotton cloth.

Note

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 119, where it is reproduced from the 1967 Red Guard source, *Ziliao xuanbian*, and the February 1967 Red Guard source *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui*.

*Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Should Be
Determined in Carrying Out Crack
Troops and Simple Administration*¹
(August 5, 1943)

Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Subbureau:

We have received your telegram on Crack Troops and Simple Administration. There is no doubt that you should carry this out. If you hesitate on this policy, you will meet with unconquerable difficulties. At present, you only have a relatively stable base area with a population of about 900,000; the other 900,000 people from whom you can collect the grain tax are in the guerrilla areas. But you have over 80,000 people, calculated by converting horses into manpower [sic], who are divorced from the production. This situation cannot continue for long. You must now resolve to cut 30,000 people and retain only 50,000. The ratio between civilian and military personnel should be 1:4. Of the 30,000 people to be cut, in addition to the 6,000 under Lü [Zhengcao]² who will move westward, 4,000 under Nie [Rongzhen]³ should also move westward. In all, 10,000 people will move westward. The remaining 20,000 should be peacefully integrated locally. If next year is more difficult, you should prepare to cut another 10,000 from the remaining 50,000.

Secretariat of the Central Committee

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 703–4, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s manuscript in the Central Archives. The same text can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 121.

[1.](#) This is a telegram to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) Subbureau of the Central Committee drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

[2.](#) On Lü Zhengcao, see above, note to the text of July 30, 1943.

[3.](#) Regarding Nie Rongzhen, see above, note to the text of July 4, 1942.

Talk at the Opening Ceremony for the Second Class of the Central Party School (August 8, 1943)

The second class of the Central Party School begins today. Most of the comrades come here from the front, directly from the battlefield; some come here from various places in the border region, in the midst of their work there; and some were in Yan'an and have left work in order to study. Now that you are all attending the same school, you must reach a consensus and unified thinking in order to reach a unified goal. Otherwise, if some want to study economics, some philosophy, others fiction, and still others foreign languages, it will be difficult to run this school, and we will not run it well. Our whole Party should be unified, as should the study and all the activities in the school. We need a consensus. My major purpose in attending today's opening ceremony is to do this propaganda work.

What kind of consensus and unified goal should we reach? As Comrade Peng Zhen¹ said just now, it is the four criteria for cadres that Dimitrov talked about at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International [Comintern]: boundless loyalty, close links to the masses, ability to work independently, and observance of discipline.² Our study should follow these four criteria; all the students, faculty, and staff of the school should strive to achieve such a goal.

All of you have been working for a long time without opportunities for study and research, and some of you are still not in very good health. This visit to the Party School not only provides an opportunity for study and research, but will also allow time for convalescence for those comrades who are exhausted from overwork. Good rest and good study will enable you to achieve something in the future.

You are studying at a time when the world is undergoing a tremendous change. Every age witnesses changes in the world. Chinese society has already experienced several great transformations, from primitive society to slave society, from slave society to feudal society, and from feudal society to semicolonial and semifeudal society. The nature of our society has already undergone three rearrangements, and now the fourth one is about to take place.

What tasks should the Chinese Revolution complete? In the final analysis, what is the Chinese Communist Party going to accomplish? We aim at two accomplishments, to change dynasties twice.

First, we want to turn the semicolonial and semifeudal society into a democratic society, namely, the new democratic society. This is different from the transformation of feudal society into democratic society that took place in France, England, or any other countries (with the exception of the February Revolution in the Soviet Union). The old democratic revolutions occurring in those countries were under the leadership of the bourgeoisie. They did not mobilize the masses completely because they were afraid that once the consciousness of the masses was aroused, the revolution would be beyond the control of the bourgeoisie. The basic nature of the new democratic society that we are going to establish is still capitalist; it breaks up the feudal order and overthrows the oppressive feudal system and imperialism. The Chinese Revolution, however, is under the leadership of the proletariat, and the popular masses have been fully mobilized.

China already entered the phase of a feudal society over three thousand years ago. Until the present, our country has been a semifeudal society in which feudal relationships dominate. Now we want to transform this society into a democratic society. During the democratic revolution to accomplish this transformation, no matter what the proletariat should not give up the leadership.

In our Party School, there also exists a kind of struggle for the leadership, namely, using proletarian thought to overcome petty-bourgeois thought and any other nonproletarian thought. Among the various kinds of nonproletarian thought, the most important is petty-bourgeois thought, such as individualism, liberalism, aversion to discipline, and spontaneity. Since last year, the comrades participating in the first class of the Party School have spent a year and a half rectifying the Three Styles and receiving education on the Party line and

Marxism-Leninism. This is part of the struggle of the proletariat for ideological leadership with the petty bourgeoisie and other classes.

The Guomindang recently published a book written by Chiang Kaishek titled *China's Destiny*, in which he claimed that there would be no China without the Guomindang. It is not clear where he got his evidence. Any of you who have read books on history and fiction will recall that there is no Guomindang in *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, *Water Margin*, *Investiture of the Gods*, or *Dream of the Red Chamber*, and yet China has always existed. The Guomindang has a history of fifty years and has done some good things in China's old democratic revolution. It has, however, definitely not accomplished the first step in China's revolution, which is to transform China from a semicolonial and semifeudal society into a democratic society. Under the leadership of Sun Yatsen, the Guomindang held its first congress in Guangzhou in 1924, following the suggestion of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. At that time, some people in the Guomindang approved of its cooperation with the Communist Party for its own purposes. But when the time came, they wanted to attack the Communist Party and the masses. Naturally, upon the death of Sun Yatsen, Chiang Kaishek gradually seized power. In 1927, as soon as he reached Nanjing, he issued an unambiguous order to "purify the party," suppress the Communist Party, and crack down on the masses of workers and peasants. The War of Resistance Against Japan came ten years after the Guomindang became reactionary and began to engage in civil war. Is the War of Resistance a revolution? It is. But while it fights against Japan, the Guomindang is also dabbling in fascism. The Chinese Fascists are, however, different from the Fascists in foreign countries. The foreign Fascists are expansionist and imperialist; the Chinese Fascists are comprador and feudalistic; they are not expansionist because they have no power to invade other countries. The Chinese Fascists are, however, against the people. From the beginning of the War of Resistance, the Guomindang adopted an orientation of partial resistance because it was not willing to see the people participate in the war. It holds that the War of Resistance is the responsibility of the government. So as long as the ordinary people are willing to be enlisted and to provide money, that will do. The Chinese Communist Party adopts the orientation of a comprehensive war of resistance, maintaining that China cannot win the War of Resistance unless we mobilize and

rely upon all our popular masses. On this issue we contradict the Guomintang's stance and we struggle against it. You do not want the ordinary people to rise up, but we do. One wants it, but the other does not. So, there is conflict.

The Guomintang also needs the ordinary people and pays lip service to "cherishing the people." Whether in China or in foreign countries, in ancient times or in the present, the exploiting classes cannot live without the ordinary people. The Guomintang pays lip service to "cherishing the people" merely out of its intention to exploit and squeeze the ordinary people. This is similar to feeding oxen. Why do they feed oxen? They do so because they can milk them and make them plow the fields. The exploiting classes "cherish the people" in the same way as they cherish oxen. We are different from the exploiting classes because we ourselves are part of the people. Our Party is the people's representative. We want to raise the people's consciousness and unify them. It is on this issue that we oppose the Guomintang—we want to join the people, whereas they want to detach themselves from the people.

Eighty percent of China's population are peasants. When we say the people, we refer mainly to the peasants. Do we want the peasants or not? If we were to align ourselves with the political orientation of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and fall captive to them, that is, if we were to become the prisoners of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and milk the ordinary people like oxen, would there ever be such a Communist Party? There may be, but there should not be. Does this exist in reality? The answer is positive. In our Party, there used to be some members who deserted the peasants and sacrificed the interests of the peasants in order to accommodate the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. These Party members abandoned not only the peasants but also the middle bourgeoisie. We must struggle against such a phenomenon. Our major enemy at present is Japanese imperialism, which prevents China's transformation from a semicolonial and semifeudal society to a democratic society. Our chief slogan is "down with Japanese imperialism." At the same time, the Guomintang daily opposes our mobilization of the people and tries by every means to sabotage our efforts. We must fight against it and compete with it for leadership. Who should the millions of Chinese peasants follow? If they follow the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, China will still remain a semicolonial and semifeudal society; if they follow the proletariat and the Communist Party, China will

change from a semifeudal society to a democratic society and from a semicolon to an independent state. One of our reasons for setting up this Party School is to effect this change of dynasty.

Second, the Communist Party wants to do another thing, to change this dynasty yet again, namely, to change a bourgeois democratic society into a proletarian socialist society. Some comrades, including some senior cadres, are only aware of the first change but not the second. They have experience in facilitating the first change, which they identify as attacking local tyrants and redistributing land. They support these activities, as well as the present war against Japanese imperialism, the anti-spy campaign, and stopping Hu Zongnan³ from invading the border region. All of these, however, fall under the scope of the first change I have just talked about. The Chinese Revolution has gone through three periods, namely, the Northern Expedition, the ten-year Civil War, and the War of Resistance Against Japan. The revolution during these three periods constitutes part of the first change. Is it right to say that the first change will be completed right after we win the War of Resistance? It will not be completed at that point. By then, Japanese imperialism will be driven out, but the establishment of the new democratic society in China will not be completed. The implementation of new democracy is incomplete even in our anti-Japanese base areas.

The Chinese democratic revolution is very difficult. Sun Yatsen devoted forty years to the old democratic revolution without achieving success. Later we began to engage in the new democratic revolution, the course of which is also arduous and torturous. The cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party for more than three years, from 1924 to 1927, was followed by the Guomindang's counterrevolution for ten years. Currently, in the War of Resistance, the Guomindang adopts a two-pronged policy—fighting against Japan, on the one hand, and against the Communist Party, on the other. Therefore, the Communist Party must be in charge so that victory can be achieved in the Chinese democratic revolution. What is meant by the victory of the Chinese democratic revolution? It is the establishment of a new democratic China. We are now taking the first step in the revolution, which is in essence a bourgeois democratic revolution, a revolution in which the whole people participate and which is under the leadership of the proletariat, but essentially

does not destroy the system of private property.

This first step, however, is not enough. Our cadres must understand that the system of private property will be abolished in the future. Of course, that will take place under certain economic and political conditions, including the condition that the majority of people in the whole country trust the leadership of the Communist Party. Leadership power cannot be demanded of the people, still less can it be forced upon them. It is acquired by making the masses realize which party is good and promising for them to follow on the basis of their own practical interests and political experience. Of course, our Communist Party should make propaganda, too. To achieve good results, our propaganda should proceed from the actual situation of the masses rather than from dogmatism.

Thus, the two revolutions we are talking about refer to the new democratic revolution taking place at present and the socialist revolution to be launched in the future.

To carry out these two revolutions, we need to study the four criteria that Dimitrov talked about. Boundless loyalty should be measured by objective standards. Dimitrov is perfectly right in saying that one's boundless loyalty is tested in battle, during imprisonment, and in the court. Your boundless loyalty should be tested in struggles such as these. Rectification of the Three Styles, cadre screening, fighting against Hu Zongnan's attacks, the six years of the War of Resistance so far, and the ten-year Civil War are all struggles. Opposing opportunism and petty-bourgeois ideology are also struggles. The criterion of maintaining close links with the masses should also be measured against objective standards, an example of which is how the masses react at a memorial service for a cadre who has died. Some cadres have very high positions and are addressed as the leading cadres as if all the ordinary people support them. Actually this doesn't mean a thing. We can pass the final judgment on a person only when the lid is placed on his coffin, which means that we need to wait and see whether the ordinary people shed tears at his memorial service. I do not think that ordinary people will shed tears for the deaths of certain cadres who regard themselves as the leaders of the masses. It is merely because they are government officials that ordinary people have to show courtesy to these officials. In fact, after their business is done, people will turn their backs on these officials and ignore them. At a memorial service for a real leader of the masses, people will

feel sad about his death rather than feeling relieved that he no longer needs to be fed and thus millet can be saved. People in northern Shaanxi went into deep mourning over the death of Comrade Liu Zhidan.⁴ This proves that he was a real leader of the masses. Is a leader of the masses named by the masses or by us? According to Dimitrov, he needs to be named by the masses and confirmed by the masses on the basis of their own experience.

To carry out the two revolutions just discussed we must create a revolutionary party which truly corresponds to these four criteria. Our Party has been in existence for twenty-two years and has gone through three revolutionary periods, but it has not yet matured. Our Party is not unified, and its standards are still low. I am sure that the Chinese Revolution would not be what it is today if our Party were more unified and had reached a higher level. The twenty-two years of history are already behind us, so we must start taking action beginning today. We set up this Party School in order to raise our comrades' political and theoretical levels and to make our Party more unified. There are many "theatrical troupes"—or "drama groups," to use a slightly more vulgar term—in our Party because of the social and economic situation in China. Within a troupe, they are all very friendly with one another, regardless of whether a person is playing a major role, a minor role, or a bit part. But they share one principle, namely, that "my troupe may criticize your troupe, but not vice versa." This is called sectarianism. There are two kinds of sectarianism in our Party. One is dogmatic sectarianism, which borrows dogmas from abroad and shows them off. The other kind is empiricist sectarianism. We have been fighting in the mountains for a long time. From the ten-year Civil War to the present War of Resistance, which has lasted for six years, friendship in adversity has brought factions into existence. The activities of different factions are not unified, and their levels are rather low. Our task of making and finishing the two revolutions by ourselves is a heavy burden. We must raise our political and theoretical levels so that our Party will become more unified and form a big party without any factions. Each one of us should be able to sacrifice himself, to show infinite loyalty, to maintain close links with the masses, to work independently, to observe discipline, and to fight the enemy in a resolute and unified way. We shall devote our lives to these two revolutions.

Comrades! The accomplishment of these two revolutions is not as easy as

making a meal or building a house. It is meant to overthrow our class enemies. We must overthrow foreign imperialism and big Chinese landlords and big bourgeoisie because they intend to oppress us. Today, however, we mainly want to wipe out Japanese imperialism, not to overthrow big landlords and big bourgeoisie of any kind, because they are still fighting in the War of Resistance. We are unwilling to fight against them even after the collapse of Japanese imperialism. But it seems as if the Guomindang is resolved to fight against us. They spend every single minute thinking about how to wipe us out. Consequently, we should take precautions not to be fooled by them as we were fooled during the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Many of you present experienced that occasion, including Comrade Zhou Enlai, some other comrades, and me. We held meetings in Guangzhou with the Guomindang. At that time, they did not understand the principles of revolution and had no power at all. It was the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party that helped them build their party. But, after it started, they kicked us out. In his book published in March 1943, Chiang Kaishek was still cursing the Communist Party. In the current cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party we should not be taken in again like that.

In your two years at the Party School, you are going to take part in the rectification of the Three Styles, in cadre screening, and in the study of our Party's history and the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Furthermore, students in the military class will have military lessons, and those in the cultural class will take classes in culture. In all, there are six courses. After the school opens today, you will begin the rectification of the Three Styles and cadre screening. Some of you have already gone through rectification at the front, but not in Yan'an. Once you have gone through rectification, one of your eyes will be opened; once you have gone through cadre screening, the other eye will be opened. How can you fail in any revolution once both eyes are opened? Moreover, we need to study our Party's history, analyzing and doing research on every year of the Party's twenty-two-year history. As for the methodology of study, as Dimitrov said, there are two ways of training cadres at Party schools. One is the dogmatic way of studying theories in the abstract. The other way is to combine the study of theories with concrete examples of struggle. The methodology used in the past belongs to the first way, which made students all

the more stupid. Now we are adopting the second way, which will enable you to acquire a full comprehension of the issues and will guarantee that you will make progress within two years.

I give this talk today at the beginning of your course in order to make this direction clear, so that you can be assured that studying in this way will benefit you and the whole Party. We must wage the two revolutions and achieve victory in these two revolutions by our own hand. We must have this confidence as Communists and as cadres of the Communist Party, and, moreover, we must master the skills so that we can achieve these two tasks for the toiling masses.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 55–63, where it is reproduced from a transcript of the talk preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Peng Zhen (1902–1997) was at this time vice president of the Party School of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

[2.](#) On Dimitrov’s essay, included in the Yan’an *Zhengfeng wenxian*, see above, note to the text “Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Methods of Leadership,” June 1, 1943.

[3.](#) Regarding Hu Zongnan, see above, note to the text of February 20, 1942.

[4.](#) Regarding Liu Zhidan, see above, note to the text of May 2, 1943.

Telegram to Peng Dehuai

(August 11, 1943)

Comrade Dehuai:

Except for yours, most opinions about maintaining the struggle, on the one hand, and preserving large numbers of cadres, on the other, are incorrect. There are very few good, important cadres sent from the district under Nie [Rongzhen]'s command. The Central Committee has telegraphed them to select four to five hundred good, upper-level cadres from directly affiliated organs, schools (Party schools and the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University), and the Beiyue, central Hebei, and Pingbei areas and to send them to study in Yan'an (these may include some of the best midlevel cadres). Please tell Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], Yang [Shangkun], Huang [Kecheng]¹, and so forth to choose about five hundred good, trainable upper-level cadres from directly affiliated organizations, schools, and from Taihang, Taiyue, southern Hebei, and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan region to send to Yan'an to study. Another large number of midlevel cadres and those who have made mistakes or are dubious and whom the front has difficulties taking care of, may also be sent to Yan'an, but do not include them in the above number. It is not a problem in terms of the material capacity of the border region to accommodate 20,000 to 30,000 more soldiers and 10,000 to 20,000 more cadres. This year rainfall in the border region has been sufficient, and we expect a good harvest.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 123, where it is reproduced from Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu, 1983 huibian ben*.

1. Liu Bocheng (1892–1986) was at this time the commander-in-chief and commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Shandong-Henan Military Area Command and the commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army; Yang Shangkun (1907–1998) was a longstanding military commissar and Chinese Communist Party leader—heading the Northwestern Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and from March 1943 serving on the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party; Huang Kecheng (1902–1986) was a leading Communist general serving at this time as the political commissar of the Eighth Route Army.

*Telegram to Dong Biwu Regarding
Launching the Propaganda Movement
to Oppose Chinese Fascism
(August 11, 1943)*

Dong [Biwu]:¹

A. Although the military situation in the border region has eased slightly, Guomindang arms preparations have not relaxed and its propaganda war is even more intense. Telegrams from local parliamentary assemblies and from news, cultural, and women's groups requesting the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party have arrived from more than ten places. The Central News Agency has also published anti-Communist editorials and telegrams specifically aimed at mobilizing public opinion. We do not know what public opinion in Chongqing has been for the past month. We expect a report by telegram.

B. During this period, in addition to continuing to broadcast critiques of *China's Destiny*, during the two months of August and September we will launch a movement against Chinese fascism, sending open telegrams to the entire country advocating the eradication of every type of spy organization and strictly prohibiting the promulgation of Fascist ideology. By this means we will expose the true character of the Chiang [Kaishek] brand of the Guomindang, and we will also educate ourselves. There will soon be broadcasts of open telegrams and essays; please be prepared in advance.

C. Anti-oppression protests in cultural circles in Chongqing and Guilin are practical; we only hope that you will pay attention to the following points: first, apart from a few well-known personages, do not expose hidden cultural workers;

second, protests may be issued in many forms; third, do everything possible to win over the middle-of-the-roaders, and issue protests in middle-of-the-road publications; fourth, translate the protests into English and send them to be exposed in British and American publications; and fifth, *New China Daily* and the *Masses* magazine should print more anti-Fascist articles in order to begin an ideological struggle.

Mao Zedong

Zhou Enlai

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 64–65, where it is reproduced from a transcript of the document preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Dong Biwu was at this time working in the Liaison Office of the Eighth Route Army in Chongqing and was a member of the People’s Political Council. For his biography, see above, note to the text of July 21, 1943, and note to the text “Congratulatory Speech at the Mass Meeting,” January 15, 1940, in Vol. VII, pp. 370–71.

Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Cadre Screening (August 15, 1943)

It is no surprise that secret agents are numerous. Fascist countries like Germany, Japan, and Italy and their subordinate countries and occupied territories deceive and force tens of millions of young people to join and serve Fascist organizations. Although the compradorial, feudal, and Fascist Guomindang has been useful in resisting foreign Fascist invasions, ever since 1927 it has been anti-Communist and opposed to the people and has established an enormous system of secret agents. During the War of Resistance, although, on the one hand, it has used the Communist Party to resist the Japanese, on the other, it has spared no effort to oppose the Communists. It deceives and forces vast numbers of young people to join its organizations and, moreover, to turn some of them into professional secret agents who specialize in activities aimed at destroying the Communist Party. Japanese Fascists use Chinese as their secret agents, and these spies are numerous. Secret agents are therefore a worldwide problem and a problem involving the masses. If we do not understand this point, we will not be able to choose the correct strategy.

This time, our Party is screening cadres as part of the rectification, and it is planning to further screen all personnel. We do not call this the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, and we will not adopt the policy of turning over every secret agent and suspicious element to public security organs to be dealt with. Instead, we will adopt the policy of leading cadres taking responsibility and getting to work personally, of leaders and backbone elements uniting with the

broad masses, of linking general calls with specific guidance, of investigating and researching, of distinguishing between truth and falsehood and between the minor and the serious, of winning over those who have slipped, of cultivating cadres, and of educating the masses. We do this because it is a problem involving the masses. If we are alienated from the broad masses of the organizations, schools, troops, factories, and the countryside and from those strong and capable cadres who are connected with the masses at every level, we will not be able to solve this important issue thoroughly and in the best, most suitable way.

The strategy of placing responsibility in the hands of the leadership outlined above is fundamentally opposed to the erroneous policy of eliminating counterrevolutionaries used in many localities during the Civil War period. That incorrect policy can be summed up quite simply in three words: force, confession, and credence. The interrogators used physical punishment, mental torture, and other coercive methods on secret agents and suspicious elements; then the accused would arbitrarily confess, slandering the innocent; and then the interrogators and the responsible persons would unthinkingly believe these entirely unreliable confessions and go about arresting, beating, and killing. This was an entirely subjectivist policy and method. During the War of Resistance, the incidents of the incorrect elimination of counterrevolutionaries in the Huxi area of Shandong were the result of repetition of this sort of policy and method. The residual poison of this incorrect ideology still exists today among many cadres, especially among those working in public security. Only with the adoption of the strategy of placing responsibility in the hands of the leadership outlined above will we have a real possibility of eradicating this sort of incorrect, subjectivist ideology and of reaching our goal of screening cadres, and even all personnel, in the best and most suitable and thorough way.

Leading cadres taking responsibility means retaining the majority of those who have problems within their own organizations, schools, and troops and trusting the local leading administrative cadres at every level responsible for screening (but this does not include those few departments under the control of bad people; in such departments we must first remold the leaders). In Yan'an, there are three kinds of departments carrying out this sort of work: ordinary, self-examining, and public security departments. Of those people who have problems, about 80 percent are left to the care of ordinary departments, that is, to the Party,

government, military, and civilian bodies of which they are members; about 10 percent are sent to reformatory units, such as the Northwest Public School and the School of Administration; and about 10 percent are sent to public security organs, such as the Social Affairs Department, the Security Office, and military tribunals (to be arrested and interrogated). During the entire process of investigation, these three organizations communicate and cooperate with one another. Some people are sent from ordinary departments to reformatory and public security departments; some are sent from reformatory and public security departments back to ordinary departments after they have engaged in a self-examination, have been investigated and cleared, and have expressed repentance. Of the secret agents and suspicious elements in ordinary and reformatory units, most are still in the same work and study positions as before. They have only been moved to new positions or have been watched in order to keep secrets or to prevent destruction or suicide. Every department and school strictly and secretly organizes its army for self-defense and implements martial law during a specified period. Reliable people with passes are allowed to come and go, but all people with problems are temporarily stripped of their freedom to go out alone; they are only allowed to join in the collective movements of the masses.

“Leading cadres getting to work personally” means that, within a given location, leaders, from the highest responsible comrade to the officer in charge of the mess, must personally participate in the large and small meetings, persuasion and interrogation sessions, and study associated with cadre screening in order to gain experience and to guide the movement. The bureaucratic attitude of guiding through empty talk and of sitting there motionless is wrong.

Unity between the leadership and the backbone elements and the broad masses means that from among all the personnel in a mess unit, the most reliable administrative leading cadre should be established as the center; then organize a small core consisting of a few people around him. Surrounding this small core, organize medium-size and large cores consisting of a dozen to several dozen people. Revolving around these cores are the broad masses. Most of the people who have problems should talk with the cores and face questioning, persuasion, and struggle with the masses; a fervent movement to obtain confessions should be carried out. At the core of every level are the respective study committees, branch committees, and small group leaders. These people must be completely

dependable, and they will be gradually generated during the process of rectification and cadre screening.

Linking general calls with specific guidance means that, in addition to proposing generally the task of screening and pushing the public to do it within their own localities during the time of cadre screening, leaders at every level must select specific units, concentrate all forces, and make a breakthrough; only in this way can they gain experience, create models, and push everything forward. Afterward, they will give concrete summaries and instructions to each and every unit, one by one. They should be consistent and constant, patient, and able to withstand hard work: only then can the work of cadre screening get thorough results without making mistakes, or with making fewer mistakes.

Investigation and research mean investigating and researching the history of every person, finding out everyone's contradictions, and discovering their problems. In every unit, the leading core must, after careful consideration, prepare two different lists of names according to the daily speech and behavior of everyone: one list of names is of those who are assessed as having no problems; the other is of those who are assessed as having problems. Upon the approval of the upper levels, after careful consideration they can begin investigating and researching those with problems one by one, following the principle of seeking truth from facts. The subjectivist method of "force, confession, and credence" is strictly forbidden.

Distinguishing between right and wrong and between the minor and the serious means adopting the method of investigation and research. First, determine whether they are two-faced, such as secret agents, traitors, or people who have hidden their history of joining other parties; never mistake the half-hearted (Communist Party members with nonproletarian thoughts who once made mistakes) for those who are two-faced. Second, distinguish how serious their crimes were: They may be ordinary elements who only committed light offenses (the majority), middle elements who committed heavier offenses, or leading elements who committed very serious offenses (the latter two are in the minority). Never think that everyone whose name has been raised must be a secret agent or an important spy. For every person on the list, although each was named or arrested, nevertheless in order to make clear whether he is a secret agent and how serious his crime is, we must employ the methods of

investigation, research, and gathering and analyzing materials. This is the task of distinguishing right from wrong and the minor from the serious. If people are wronged or mistreated, we must rehabilitate them; those wrongly imprisoned must be publicly declared innocent and released; for those not yet imprisoned, we must proclaim the final verdict and restore their reputations. During the screening movement, there will definitely occur incidents of excessively Leftist behavior, the error of “force, confession, and credence” (both on an individual and a mass level), the wrong being taken as right, and the minor being taken as serious: leaders must pay careful attention to this and must make corrections when the timing is appropriate. It is bad to correct excessive Leftism both too early and too late. Correcting it too early would be to shoot without a target and would hinder the launching of the movement. Doing so too late would create errors and harm our vigor. Therefore, the guiding principle should be careful attention and correction at the right time.

Winning over those who have slipped into error means generally adopting the policy of winning over all those big and small spies, traitors, and ordinary elements who were temporarily used by the Guomindang or the Japanese (the majority), that is, the policy of leniency. In Yan’an we screened more than two thousand people (some of whom were mistreated or wronged, and they will be rehabilitated during the final investigation), and to this day not a single person has been executed. Those who commit the most heinous crimes, who are unsteady, and who firmly refuse to repent, should be sentenced to death. But this kind of person is extremely rare. The environment on the front and in the border region is special, and the necessity of suppressing a very few individual elements exists. But the general policy is unwaveringly, patiently, and warmly to try every possible means to win them over. At big and small meetings and individual talks, make it clear to them that the end is near for the Fascists of the world; that the Guomindang is rotten, corrupt, and unenlightened and has absolutely no future; and that the Communist Party is open and aboveboard and has a limitless future. Pull their ideology apart to make them collapse. Yan’an’s experience proves that we can win over the overwhelming majority of this sort of elements and cause them to be of one mind with us; many of them have turned out quite well. The work of rectification is to change people who are half-hearted into people of one mind with the Party, and the work of cadre screening is to make two-faced

people become of one mind with the Party. Japan and the Guomindang have long used a counterrevolutionary policy of trying to win over or soften Communist Party members to serve them; they have seldom killed [them]. Our Party must adopt the policy of winning over most or even all secret agents and having them serve us. Otherwise we will be the losers. Do not be afraid that spies will escape. Of course, we will not intentionally release them and let them run away, but we should not advocate more executions out of fear that they will otherwise escape. Under certain circumstances, it is better to let people escape than to execute more people. It is more beneficial to let them flee than it is to execute them: in the end, we will only be able to guarantee that we haven't made mistakes if we either arrest a few and execute none or arrest a few and execute a few. If people are still alive, they may have been falsely accused but they may be rehabilitated (those really falsely accused must be rehabilitated so that there is no room whatsoever left for any doubt). Arresting and executing many people will lead to irreparable mistakes.

Cultivating cadres means that we should train from 10 to 20 percent of the people who are either participating in cadre screening or are being screened and teach them to master the complete theories and techniques of investigation, research, intelligence gathering, interrogation, and screening. For example, of Yan'an's 30,000 Party, government, and military personnel and 10,000 common people, 4,000 to 8,000 people should be trained to master these theories and techniques. Between April and August 1943, of the 10,000 cadres and several thousand personnel of various kinds who took part in Yan'an's first period of cadre screening, we trained more than 2,000. Only in this way can we shatter the view that public security work is mysterious; make it difficult for spies to infiltrate; and eliminate, win over, and transform many secret agents and destructive elements in order to prepare large numbers of cadres for future anti-espionage work. During the task of cadre cultivation, we should include both Party members and secret agents. This is to say that we should not only pay attention to cultivating Party members (though this, of course, is most important), but we should also emphasize changing counterrevolutionary secret agents into revolutionary anti-espionage cadres. The more important the secret agent is, the more use he can be after he changes. Japan and the Guomindang adopted this policy long ago in order to oppose the Communist Party, and it has

been effective. Over the past few months, Yan'an has won over a large group of secret agents who have changed and come over to us and are now serving us, which is a great help to our investigation work.

Educating the masses means that we must mobilize the broad masses and the core backbone elements together to carry out this cadre screening and the further screening of all personnel. In so doing, we will not only cultivate cadres but also give the masses ample experience, develop their initiative, open their eyes, and awaken their consciousness; only then will the Party really be solidified. Without the mobilization and participation of the masses, and unless they undergo training and their consciousness is awakened, it will be impossible for the Party to be truly solidified. If we are divorced from the masses, if cadre screening is carried out coldly and clearly by a small minority, we will surely be unable to attain our goals. The vicious mistake of formalism which our Party made in past cadre screening was fundamentally due to a rightist view on organizational issues and to our being divorced from the masses during the period of cadre screening. In order to cultivate cadres and to educate the masses, generally speaking, higher ranks cannot take the place of lower ranks and one location cannot take the place of another. For example, if a central bureau or a regional Party committee were allowed to take the places of the lower levels in screening all those who have problems, first, it would be impossible to replace them all, and, second, even if it were possible to do so (e.g., for the higher levels to screen most of the cadres instead of the lower levels), it would leave the regional committee, *xian* committee, district committee, and district township and village Party branches looking on with folded arms. They would be left with absolutely no experience in screening cadres, Party members, or other bad elements; nor would they have experience in eliminating reactionaries. Furthermore, such a process would have the result of divorcing those with problems from the local masses and their work posts, and it will make screening clearly more difficult. It is necessary to move people from enemy-occupied areas to base areas for screening, and it is also necessary to select some people from the base areas for collective screening (e.g., they could enter a Party School or the Anti-Japanese University, or they could begin a rectification class). But, in general, it is incorrect to allow higher levels to take the place of lower levels and of other places. In order to prevent erroneous tendencies on the part of lower levels, higher levels

should carry out ample thought and organizational preparation in advance, send higher-level people to help among the lower levels, select lower-level people to come up to the higher levels to study, be highly attentive, and never loosen control. In this way, the problem of erroneous tendencies can be solved.

We have pointed out the major strategies and experiences above, and we hope that comrades in every area will study and adopt them, as well as creating your own experience from your concrete environment.

On the basis of the materials from the various localities, rectification must be prolonged into 1944, and cadre screening may be carried out side by side with rectification. Every place in which espionage activity has been discovered, and which is prepared ideologically and organizationally, can begin to screen for secret agents. Begin first with a few important institutions to gain experience and solidify those institutions. Then gradually extend to include other departments and places. Absolutely do not begin on a large scale or in many places simultaneously. In those areas still without ideological and organizational preparation, in departments and places in which the leadership is in the hands of bad elements, do not launch cadre investigations lightly. In such places, the emphasis should still be on rectification and reforming the leadership in order to establish the necessary conditions for cadre screening.

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, pp. 125–31, where it is reproduced from *Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao* (Beijing), No. 5 (1979). A translation of an alternate version of this text appears in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 1152–57.

*Telegram to Deng Xiaoping, Secretary
of the Taihang Subbureau of the
Chinese Communist Party, to Pass on to
Each Comrade of the Subbureau
(August 16, 1943)*

Comrade Xiaoping to pass on to each comrade of the Taihang Subbureau:

We passed on to you the telegram that the Central Committee sent to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Subbureau regarding preserving cadres, and we assume that you have received it and read it. We hope that your area will properly deal with this problem in accordance with the intent of this telegram in the same way. That is, all the cadres should be divided into two groups, one composed of those who will support the struggle, and the other of those to be kept for study. Select about 400 to 500 good senior and upper-level cadres who have a potential for achievements in the future from directly affiliated departments, schools (Anti-Japanese University, Party schools, and so forth), and the Taihang, Taiyue, southern Hebei, and Hebei-Shandong-Henan regions, and send them to Yan'an to study. Promote middle- and lower-level cadres to take their positions. Midlevel cadres as well as those who have made mistakes and are difficult to manage in your area can also be sent here, but they should not be counted as components of the aforementioned group.

Secretariat of the Central Committee

Note

NOTE

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 133, where it is reproduced from Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu, 1983 huibian ben*.

*Telegram of Encouragement from
Comrade Mao Zedong in Reply to the
Shandong Provisional Representative
Assembly
(September 1, 1943)*

(New China News Agency, Special Report from central Shandong) The Shandong Provisional Representative Assembly sent a message of greetings a few days ago to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong, and in September Comrade Mao Zedong specially sent back a telegram to extend his congratulations. The following is the original telegram:

Gentlemen of the Shandong Province Provisional Representative Assembly:

I received your telegram with great respect. Your honorable assembly persists behind enemy lines and struggles arduously without yielding. You represent the sublime character of our people and set a good example for the entire nation. All people of the nation hold you in high regard. At the moment when some “pacifists,” defeatists, and capitulationists within the Chinese resistance camp attempt to reach a compromise with the enemy and create civil war, and when the nation is faced with a serious crisis, we continue to hope that your honorable assembly and all the patriotic military forces and people behind enemy lines will unite together, work ceaselessly, and struggle to persist in unity and progress in the War of Resistance as well as to oppose capitulation, division, and retrogression. All patriotic compatriots are willing to assist you. The world situation at present is extremely unfavorable for the German, Italian, and Japanese Fascist bandits and those shameless, reactionary Chinese capitulationists who have sold out and are preparing to sell out our people. The iron fist of the

Soviet Red Army will soon break the backbone of Hitler, the beast. The patriotic soldiers and civilians of the British and American allies are also working arduously for the final defeat of the Fascists. The great goal of the Chinese people to defeat Japanese imperialism and to win freedom and liberation is coming closer each day.

Mao Zedong

Note

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, p. 51, where it is reproduced from the September 15, 1943, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

*Letter to Qin Bangxian*¹

(September 11, 1943)

Comrade Bo Gu:

The second part of [V. N.] Rogov's article is extremely important; please run it in tomorrow's newspaper and also broadcast it. The day after tomorrow, please publish Rogov's entire article (both the first and second parts) again in the editorial section under the title "Criticism of the Chinese Government" and put Rogov's name at the bottom, with a short note next to it saying: "Rogov is the head of the Chinese branch of TASS, the Soviet news agency. His essay seriously criticizing the Chinese government appeared in the August 8 issue of the magazine *War and the Working Classes*, published in Moscow. Our newspaper has previously published it in two separate parts. We are printing it here again so that our readers can read it through in its entirety. This essay by Rogov has been widely printed in American and British newspapers and has attracted attention from people all over the world. It has also been warmly received by truly patriotic Chinese in Chongqing. This truly is the first time in the six years of the War of Resistance that a Soviet personage has given a systematic critique of the Chinese government, and this criticism is in complete harmony with the opinions of the Chinese Communist Party and with those of true patriots. We hope that the Guomindang authorities will not ignore impartial international and domestic public opinion and will diligently correct its mistakes. Doing so will greatly benefit the future of the War of Resistance. Rogov's complete essay follows."² The title should be in especially large type. The note and the text should be in no. 4 size font. The essay should also be broadcast once or twice. Especially attend to ensuring that [Dong] Biwu³ receives it, and ask him to print and distribute as many copies as possible in Chongqing (I will send him a telegram).

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 110–11, where it is taken from the manuscript.

- [1.](#) Regarding Qin Bangxian, see above, note to Mao’s letter to He Kaifeng, September 15, 1942.
- [2.](#) Rogov’s article was published in full in the September 14, 1943, issue of *Jiefang ribao*, p. 1.
- [3.](#) Regarding Dong Biwu, see above, note to the text of July 21, 1943. He was at this time working in the Liaison Office of the Eighth Route Army in Chongqing; for details on Dong, see also the note to the text “Congratulatory Speech at the Mass Meeting,” January 15, 1940, in Vol. VII, pp. 370–71.

Directive of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Reducing Rent, Production, Supporting the Government and Cherishing the People, and Propagandizing the Ten Major Policies¹
(October 1, 1943)

1. Autumn harvest has arrived. The base areas² must ask Party and government organizations at all levels to check on the application of our policy of rent reduction. Wherever rent reduction has not truly been carried out, rents must be reduced this year without exception. Wherever this work has not been thorough, it must be done thoroughly this year. Party committees should immediately issue directives based on the agrarian policy of the Central Committee and in conformity with local conditions, and they should inspect a few villages first hand, select³ good examples, and thereby expedite the work in other places. At the same time, the press should carry editorials on rent reduction and reports of good examples. Rent reduction is a mass struggle by the peasants, and party directives and government decrees should guide and help the mass struggle instead of trying to bestow favors on the masses. It is wrong to bestow rent reduction as a favor instead of arousing the spontaneous enthusiasm of the masses to achieve it by their own action, and the results will not be solid. Peasant organizations should be formed or reconstituted in the struggle for rent reduction. The government's position should be one of enforcing the decree on

rent reduction and adjusting the relative interests of the landlords and the tenants. Now that the base areas have shrunk in size, it is of more immediate importance than at any time in the past six years for the Party to win the masses there by patient, conscientious, and thorough work, and to share weal and woe with them. If during this autumn we check on how far the policy has been carried out and perform the task of rent reduction thoroughly, we will be able to arouse the initiative of the peasant masses and, in the coming year, intensify our struggle against the enemy and give impetus to next year's production campaign.

2. In the base areas behind enemy lines, the majority of cadres have not yet learned how to mobilize the masses in the Party, government, and military, and the popular masses (including everyone—men and women, old and young, soldiers and civilians, and people in public and private employment) to carry out wide-scale production *campaigns*. This autumn and winter, Party committees, the government, and military troops in each base area must prepare to launch wide-scale production campaigns next year, each covering an entire base area, in which everyone works to overcome difficulties (except in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, the slogan “ample food and clothing” should not be used for the time being). These campaigns will encompass both private- and public-sector farming, industry, handi-crafts, transportation, animal husbandry, and commerce, with the main emphasis on farming. Carry out planning household by household and mutual aid in labor (known as labor-exchange teams in northern Shaanxi and once known as plowing teams or mutual-aid groups⁴ in the former soviet areas⁵ in Jiangxi). *Carry out Wu Manyou (a farming labor hero), Zhao Zhankui (an industrial labor hero), and Huang Lide (a vegetable-growing hero of organizations and schools) movements*. Reward labor heroes, hold production competitions, and promote cooperatives to serve the masses. In the financial and economic fields, Party and government personnel at the *xian* and regional levels should devote nine-tenths of their energy to helping the peasants increase production, and only one-tenth to collecting taxes from them. If pains are taken with the first task, the second will be easy. Under the present conditions of war, all organizations, schools, and troops must make great efforts to grow vegetables, raise pigs, collect firewood, make charcoal, expand handicrafts, and grow part of their own grain supply. In addition to developing collective production, every unit, large or small, must also reward all individuals (except troops) who engage

in small-scale agricultural or handicraft production in their spare time (*but it is forbidden to engage in business*). Each person may keep the proceeds of such activities. Each base area should hold seven- to ten-day-long training courses on growing vegetables and raising pigs and also for preparing better food. In all Party, government, and army organizations and schools, thrift should be stressed, waste opposed, and corruption forbidden. Leadership personnel at all levels of Party, government, and military organizations and schools should master all the skills involved in leading the masses to produce. Anyone who does not attach importance to the study of production cannot be considered a good leader; any soldier or civilian who does not attend to production and who likes to eat but does not like to work cannot be considered a good soldier or a good citizen. All Party members in rural areas who are not divorced from production should use the development of *household* production as one criterion for being a model for the masses. During the production campaign, it is wrong to neglect economic development and instead to have merely a conservative and purely financial point of view which emphasizes the reduction of expenses.⁶ It is wrong just to attend to the activities of a handful of government functionaries who busy themselves with collecting grain and taxes, funds and food, instead of organizing the vast labor power of the Party, government, military, and civilian masses to begin a mass production campaign. It is wrong not to use all your strength to help the masses develop production and instead just to demand grain and money from them (as the Guomindang does). It is wrong to neglect the launching of extensive mass campaigns for production and instead to have a few economic organs organize a small number of people to engage in production. It is wrong to consider it dishonorable and immoral for Party members in rural areas to engage in household production in order to support their families or for Party members in organizations and schools to engage in private production during their spare time in order to improve their own living conditions; all such activity benefits the revolutionary cause. In the base areas, it is wrong not to promote the development of production in order to struggle to improve the material conditions of life and instead unilaterally exhort people to struggle on in the face of hardship. It is wrong to regard cooperatives as money-making concerns run for the benefit of a minority of functionaries or as stores run by the government and not as economic organizations whose purpose is to serve the masses. It is wrong

not to introduce the Wu Manyou production method⁷ (mutual aid in labor, more plowing, frequent hoeing, and ample fertilizing) everywhere, claiming that these methods are not applicable *in some base areas*. It is wrong, in production campaigns, to shift the task of production to the heads of the construction departments, the army supply chiefs, or the administrative leaders in government or other bodies, instead of carrying out the general policies of: the leading cadres assuming responsibility and participating personally; the leading backbone being closely linked to the masses; combining the general call with particular and specific guidance; investigating and researching; giving priority to what is urgent and important; winning over men and women, young and old, and even loafers to participate in production; and training cadres and educating the masses. *Under the present conditions*, the key to developing production lies in the organization of labor power. In each base area, even under present war conditions, it is possible and entirely necessary to organize the labor power of the tens of thousands of people in the Party, the government, and the army, as well as that of hundreds of thousands of people (organize, on a voluntary basis,⁸ all people who are capable of performing part-time or full-time labor, using the established forms of household-by-household planning, labor-exchange teams, transport teams, mutual-aid working groups, and cooperatives) to engage in production. Communist Party members must master all the principles and methods for organizing labor power. Rent reduction carried out universally and thoroughly *in all the base areas* this year will be an enormous stimulus to the wide-scale development of production next year. And the great production campaign that will be carried out next year by everyone, *the publicly and the privately employed*, Party and government, soldiers and civilians, men and women, young and old, to increase the supply of grain and other necessities and to prepare for natural disasters will lay the material foundation for continuing to maintain the anti-Japanese base areas. Otherwise, we will encounter insurmountable difficulties.⁹

3. In order for the Party, the government, the army, and the people to become one [*dacheng yipian*], which will facilitate the launching of next year's anti-Japanese struggle and production campaign, Party committees and the leading army and government bodies in every single base area should prepare to launch a broad, mass campaign in the first month of the coming lunar year to support the

government and cherish the people and to support the army.¹⁰ The troops should publicly renew their pact to support the government and cherish the people, hold meetings for self-criticism, arrange get-togethers with the local people (with the participation of local Party and government representatives), and apologize and give compensation for any past infringements of the interests of the masses. For their part, the masses should, under the leadership of local Party, government, and mass organizations, publicly renew their pact to support the army,¹¹ as well as carry out an ardent campaign of bringing greetings and gifts to the army. Over the course of these campaigns, the army and the Party, government, and people should each thoroughly examine its own weaknesses and errors during 1943, and firmly correct them in 1944. From now on, such campaigns should be launched everywhere in the first month of every lunar year. During these campaigns, the pacts to support the government and cherish the people and to support the army¹² should be publicly read out time and again. There also should be repeated public self-criticisms (in which each side criticizes itself, not the other party) before the masses by those troops who have bullied and oppressed the Party, the government, or the people, and by those members of the Party and government and civilians who have committed the error of insufficiently caring for the troops. Such mistakes should be thoroughly corrected.

4. *The objective of this directive is to explain the importance of the campaigns to reduce rent this year, to develop production next year, and to support the government and cherish the people next spring. All the other policies have been explained in other directives already and thus will not be repeated here. But it should be kept in mind that there are ten policies that are currently the most important among the policies that our Party is following in the base areas. These ten policies are: first, struggle against the enemy!; second, Crack Troops and Simple Administration; third, unified leadership; fourth, support the government and cherish the people; fifth, develop production; sixth, rectify the "Three Styles"; seventh, cadre screening; eighth, education on the current situation; ninth, the "Three-Thirds" system; and tenth, reduce rent and interest rates. These ten great policies are interrelated and cannot be divided. This autumn and winter, all central bureaus, central sub-bureaus, and regional and district-level Party committees should summarize their work during this year regarding the ten great policies. (No large and long conferences are necessary; simply check and discuss*

the ten policies individually.) In the meantime, the idea of the interrelatedness and unity among the ten great policies must be widely disseminated within the Party, allowing the entire Party, above all the cadres, to realize that we cannot meet our goal of overcoming difficulties and winning glory unless these ten interrelated, unified policies are carried out completely rather than incompletely (e.g., saying that it is not necessary to support the government and to cherish the people, or to learn from Wu Manyou's method of production only in certain places), and carefully rather than haphazardly. But if all the comrades in the Party diligently carry out the ten great policies, we will definitely create many favorable conditions and will attain our goals of overcoming difficulties and winning glory. We have full certainty that we will overcome our difficulties, and our future is infinitely brilliant. We will assuredly defeat Japanese imperialism and build a free and equal new China!

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 53–58, where it is reproduced from the text published in *Jiefang ribao* on October 1, 1943. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

[1.](#) Directive of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Reducing Rent, Production, Supporting the Government and Cherishing the People, and Propagandizing the Ten Major Policies → Spread the Campaigns to Reduce Rent, Production, and Support the Government and Cherish the People in the Base Areas

[2.](#) The base areas → The leading bodies in the base areas

[3.](#) Select → Discover

[4.](#) Mutual-aid groups → Labor mutual-aid groups

[5.](#) Soviet areas → Red areas

[6.](#) Emphasizes the reduction of expenses → Calculates expenditure

[7.](#) The Wu Manyou production method → The model labor methods used by some of the agricultural

labor heroes in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region

[8.](#) On a voluntary basis → On a voluntary basis and in accordance with the principle of the exchange of equal value

[9.](#) Insurmountable difficulties → Tremendous difficulties

[10.](#) Support the army → Support the army, especially those soldiers who are fighting the Japanese

[11.](#) Support the army → Support the army, especially those soldiers who are fighting the Japanese

[12.](#) Support the army → Support the army, especially those soldiers who are fighting the Japanese

*Every Locality Should Widely Distribute
the Comments in Liberation Daily on
October 5
(October 5, 1943)*

1. On October 5 *Liberation Daily* published comments on the Eleventh Congress of the Guomindang and the second session of the Third People's Political Council. When you have received them, in addition to running them in the newspapers, you should print them in large quantities as booklets and distribute them widely. In addition to educating cadres, these should be distributed among the people in the big cities in Guomindang-controlled areas and enemy-occupied areas. This document is also the Party's general policy and a summary of the current political situation.

2. Beginning October 6, *Liberation Daily* will temporarily stop publishing articles aimed at exposing the Guomindang in order to demonstrate some relaxation of tension. We will see whether the Guomindang has an inclination toward a political resolution and toward alleviating the current political situation. Correspondingly, beginning October 6 the New China News Agency and its local branches will stop broadcasting all articles aimed at exposing the Guomindang. But the local newspapers should continue to expose the Guomindang, and especially news of the anti-espionage struggle should constantly appear in the papers. In the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, news of this kind should be carried in the small local newspapers. Class education within the Party should be carried out and should never stop.

NOTE

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 108–9, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

*Comment on the Eleventh Plenary
Session of the Guomindang Central
Executive Committee and the Second
Session of the Third People's Political
Council*
(October 5, 1943)

The Guomindang held the Eleventh Plenary Session of its Central Executive Committee from September 6 to 13, and the Guomindang government held the Second Session of the Third People's Political Council from September 18 to 27. Now that all the documents from both these meetings are at hand, we can make a general comment.

The international situation is on the threshold of a great change, whose imminence is sensed on all sides. The European Axis powers have sensed it, and Hitler is adopting a desperate last-ditch policy. It is mainly the Soviet Union that is bringing about this change. The Soviet Union is now taking advantage of it—the Red Army has already fought its way to the Dnieper, *the German Fascist war machine will soon collapse*, and another winter offensive will bring it to the old, if not to the new, Soviet boundaries. Britain and the United States, too, are taking advantage of the change; Roosevelt and Churchill are *conserving their strength and storing up their energy*, waiting for the first sign of Hitler's downfall to thrust into France. *Churchill regards Italy, which now has no more than a dozen combat divisions in the field, as a third front in the war.* In short, the problem in Europe¹ is on the eve of a total solution, and the Soviet Union is the main force.²

As the key to the world problem³ is in Europe, once the problem there is solved, the fates of the two great world camps, the Fascist and the anti-Fascist camps, will be decided. The Japanese imperialists feel themselves cornered, and their policy, too, can only be to muster all possible strength for a desperate last-ditch struggle. In China they will try to “mop up” the Communists and entice the Guomintang to capitulate.

The Guomintang has also sensed the change. Faced with the situation, it feels both joy and fear. Joy because it imagines that with the war in Europe over, Britain and the United States will be left free to fight Japan on its behalf, and it will be able to return to Nanjing without any effort. Fear, because with the downfall of all three Fascist powers the world will enter a great and unprecedented age of liberation, and the Guomintang’s comprador-feudal Fascist dictatorship will become a small island in a vast ocean of freedom and democracy; it fears that its own brand of fascism with its “one party, one doctrine, one leader” will be buried beneath the waves.

Originally, the Guomintang hoped to have the Soviet Union fighting it out with Hitler single-handedly and to instigate the Japanese to attack the Soviet Union, so that the land of socialism would be destroyed or at least badly mauled; it also hoped that Britain and the United States would shift all their forces to the East and first smash Japan and then wipe out the Chinese Communist Party, before bothering about any second or third front in Europe. It was for this ulterior purpose that the Guomintang first clamored for a strategy of “Asia before Europe” and then for “equal attention to Europe and Asia.” In August of this year, toward the end of⁴ the Quebec Conference, when Roosevelt and Churchill summoned T.V. Soong, the Chinese foreign minister,⁵ to Quebec and spoke a few words with him, the Guomintang started shouting “Roosevelt and Churchill are turning to the East,” “the ‘Europe before Asia’ plan is changed,” “Quebec is a conference of the Three Great Powers, Britain, the United States and China,” and so forth, and joyfully indulged in self-glorification. But this was the Guomintang’s last occasion to rejoice. Since then its mood has changed somewhat; “Asia before Europe” and “equal attention to Europe and Asia” have been consigned to the museum of history, and now the Guomintang is probably cooking up new schemes. Perhaps the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Guomintang Central Executive Committee (CEC) and the Second Session of the

Guomintang-controlled People's Political Council (PPC) mark the beginning of these new schemes.

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Guomintang CEC slanderously accused the Communist Party of "sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state," and at the same time declared itself to be in favor of a "political solution" and of "preparations for a constitutional government." Controlled and manipulated by its Guomintang majority, the Second Session of the Third PPC passed resolutions against the Communist Party to roughly the same effect. In addition, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Guomintang CEC "elected" *Mr. Chiang Kaishek* president of the Guomintang government in order to strengthen its dictatorial machines.

What can the Guomintang be planning to do now, following the Eleventh Plenary Session? There are only three possibilities:

1. capitulation to the Japanese;⁶
2. dragging along on the old road; and
3. a change in its political line

Serving the Japanese⁷ purpose of "hitting the Communists and courting the Guomintang," the defeatists and capitulationists within the Guomintang have all along advocated surrender. They have *encircled Mr. Chiang Kaishek* and constantly endeavored to unleash an anti-Communist civil war which, once started, would naturally make resistance to Japan impossible, leaving capitulation as the only alternative. The Guomintang has concentrated 400,000 to 500,000 troops in northwestern China and is stealthily diverting there still more forces from other fronts. It is said that the generals are in fine fettle and are proclaiming, "Taking Yan'an is no problem." This is how they have been talking since *Mr. Chiang Kaishek's* speech at the Eleventh Plenary Session, when he described the Communist problem as "a political one that should be solved politically" and the session's resolutions since are roughly to the same effect. Similar resolutions were adopted last year at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Guomintang CEC, and the ink was hardly dry before the generals were ordered to draw up military plans for liquidating the border region; in June and July of this year, forces were deployed in preparation for a blitz against the border

region, and the scheme was temporarily shelved only because public opinion at home and abroad was against it. Now, once again, no sooner have the resolutions of the Eleventh Plenary Session been put down in black and white than there are reports of the generals' braggadocio and of troop movements. "Taking Yan'an is no problem"—what does this signify? It signifies a decision to capitulate to the Japanese.⁸ Not all Guomindang members who favor "taking Yan'an" are necessarily conscious and determined capitulationists. Some of them may think, "We will still resist the Japanese while fighting the Communists." This is probably what many officers in the Huangpu [Whampoa] clique are thinking. To these gentlemen, we Communists would like to put the following questions. Have you forgotten the lessons of the ten years of Civil War? Once another civil war starts, will the determined capitulationists allow you to continue the war against Japan? Will the Japanese and Wang Jingwei allow you to continue the war against Japan? Are you really so strong that you can fight a civil war and a war against a foreign foe at the same time? You claim to have 3 million men, but our armies are so demoralized that people have compared them to two baskets of eggs at the ends of a carrying pole—one bump, and they will be finished. This is what has happened in all the campaigns in the Zhongtiao mountains, the Taihang mountains, Zhejiang and Jiangxi, western Hubei, and the Taibie mountains. The simple reason is that you have followed the fatal policy of being "active against the Communists" and "passive against the Japanese." A national enemy has penetrated deep into our country, and the more actively you fight the Communists and the more passively you resist the Japanese, the lower will be the morale of your troops. If you make such a poor showing in fighting against the foreign aggressor, can you expect your troops suddenly to become tough in fighting the Communists and the people? It is out of the question. Once you start a civil war, you will have to give it your undivided attention and inevitably abandon all thought of "simultaneous resistance"; in the end, you will inevitably find yourselves signing a treaty of unconditional surrender to the Japanese, with capitulation the only policy left for you. Those of you in the Guomindang who do not really wish to capitulate will inevitably end up as capitulationists if you take an active part in instigating or prosecuting a civil war. This will surely happen if you lend yourselves to the maneuver of the capitulationist clique and use the resolutions of the Eleventh Plenary Session and the PPC as an instrument for

mobilizing public opinion and preparing for an anti-Communist civil war. Even if initially you do not want to capitulate, you will end up surrendering in the wake of the capitulationist clique if you lend yourselves to their maneuvering and take a wrong step. That is the first possibility concerning the direction the Guomintang may take after the Eleventh Plenary Session, and there is an extremely serious danger that it will materialize. From the standpoint of the capitulationist clique, talk about a “political solution” and “preparations for a constitutional government” are the best means of camouflaging preparations for a civil war, that is, for surrender; all Communists, all patriotic members of the Guomintang, all anti-Japanese parties, and all our fellow countrymen who are opposed to Japan should be sharply on the alert against this extremely grave danger and should not be fooled by the camouflage. It must be recognized that the danger of civil war has never been as great as it is now after the Guomintang’s Eleventh Plenary Session.

There is another direction in which these resolutions may lead, that of “stalling for a while and starting a civil war later.” This course, which differs somewhat from that of the capitulationist clique, may be taken by those people who still want to keep up the resistance⁹ against Japan while absolutely refusing to abandon anti-communism and dictatorial rule. They may move in this direction since they see that the great changes in the international situation are inevitable, and Japanese imperialism is doomed; that civil war would mean capitulation and the people throughout the country are for resistance and against civil war; that the Guomintang is in a state of serious crisis, having alienated itself from the masses, lost popular support, and become more isolated than ever; and that the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union are all opposed to the launching of civil war by the Chinese government. All these may force them to postpone their civil war schemes, using talk about a “political solution” and “preparations for a constitutional government” as *an excuse and* a ploy. These people are past masters in the tactics of “deception” and “stalling.” Even in their dreams, they do not forget their desire to “take Yan’an” and “liquidate the Communist Party.” On this point, they are entirely at one with the capitulationist clique. Nevertheless, they do wish to keep up the pretense of resistance to Japan, they do not wish that the Guomintang forfeit its international standing, and they sometimes fear the censure of domestic and foreign public opinion; therefore, they may stall behind

the smokescreen of a “political solution” and “preparations for a constitutional government” while waiting for more favorable conditions. They have no sincere desire for a “political solution” or a “constitutional government,” at least certainly not at the moment. Last year, about the time of the Tenth Plenary Session of the Guomindang CEC, Comrade Lin Biao¹⁰ was sent to Chongqing by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to confer with Mr. Chiang Kaishek. He waited in Chongqing for ten long months, but Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the CEC of the Guomindang had no desire to discuss a single concrete problem with him. In March of this year, Mr. Chiang Kaishek published his book, *China's Destiny*, in which he emphasizes his opposition to liberal ideas and communism,¹¹ shifts the blame for the ten years of Civil War to the Communist Party, slanders the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army as “warlords of a new type” and “separatists of a new type,” and implies that he will finish off the Communists within two years. On June 28 of this year, Mr. Chiang Kaishek permitted Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and other comrades to return to Yan’an, but at that very moment he ordered his defense forces on the Yellow River to march on the border region, and he also ordered that the local authorities throughout the country seize the opportunity of the dissolution of the Third International [the Comintern] to demand, in the name of the so-called people’s organizations, that the Chinese Communist Party be dissolved. In these circumstances, we Communists were obliged to call on the Guomindang and the whole nation to avert civil war, and we were obliged to expose all the Guomindang’s sinister schemes and conspiracies which were sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state. Our patience has been taxed to the limit, as the historical facts show. Ever since the fall of Wuhan, there has been no end to the anti-Communist battles, large or small, in northern and central China. It is now two years since the Pacific War broke out, and throughout this time the Guomindang has been attacking the Communists in central and northern China; apart from the troops originally stationed there, it has dispatched the group armies under Wang Zhonglian¹² and Li Xianzhou¹³ to attack the Communists in Jiangsu and Shandong. Pang Bingxun’s¹⁴ army group in the area of the Taihang mountains is under orders to concentrate exclusively on the Communists; so are the Guomindang troops in Anhui and Hubei. For a long time, we did not even make these facts public. The Guomindang newspapers and periodicals have never

for a moment stopped vilifying the Communist Party, but for a long time we did not say a word in reply. *We also put up with the fact that the intelligence organs arrested, tortured, and murdered tens of thousands of Communists and innocent young people.* Without any justification, the Guomindang disbanded the New Fourth Army, which was heroically fighting Japan, wiped out over nine thousand men in its contingents in southern Anhui, arrested Ye Ting,¹⁵ killed Xiang Ying,¹⁶ and imprisoned hundreds of its cadres; although this was a monstrous betrayal of the people, the nation, *and its allies*, we maintained our forbearance for the country's sake, simply lodging a protest and demanding redress. When Mr. Chiang Kaishek met Comrade Zhou Enlai, the representative of the Communist Party, at Lushan in June and July 1937, he promised that the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region would be designated by decree as an administrative division under the direct jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan of the National Government and that its officials would receive formal appointments. Now Mr. Chiang Kaishek has not only eaten his own words, he has gone so far as to encircle the border region with 400,000 to 500,000 men to enforce a military and economic blockade; he will not be happy with anything less than the destruction of the people of the border region as well as the rear headquarters of the Eighth Route Army. It is particularly heinous that promised supplies have been cut off from the Eighth Route Army and that the Communist Party is abused as the "traitor party," the New Fourth Army as the "rebel army," the Eighth Route Army as the "traitor army," and so forth. In short, all the Guomindang people who are behaving in this way see the Communist Party as the enemy. To the Guomindang, the Communist Party is ten times, nay, a hundred times, more hateful than the Japanese. The Guomindang concentrates its hatred on the Communist Party and has little, if any, to spare for the Japanese. This resembles the behavior of the Japanese,¹⁷ who treat the Guomindang and the Communist Party differently. Concentrating their hatred on the Chinese Communist Party, the Japanese Fascists have become more and more gentle with the Guomindang; of their two slogans, "Oppose the Communists" and "Annihilate the Guomindang," only the first now remains. The newspapers and periodicals controlled by the Japanese and Wang Jingwei no longer print such slogans as "Down with the Guomindang" and "Overthrow Chiang Kaishek." Japan is bearing down on the Communist Party with 58 percent of its forces in China and

is only using 42 percent of its forces to keep watch over the Guomintang. It has recently relaxed this watch and withdrawn many of its troops from Zhejiang and Hubei in order to make it easier to inveigle the Guomintang into capitulation. The Japanese¹⁸ have never dared utter a single word to persuade the Communist Party to capitulate, but they have no hesitation in directing an endless stream of words to persuade the Guomintang to do so. The Guomintang is fierce only toward the Communist Party and the people, but it drops all its ferocity in the face of the Japanese.¹⁹ Not only has it changed from being a participant to being a mere spectator in the war as far as fighting is concerned, but even in words it dares not offer so much as a single sharp rebuff to the insults and blandishments of the Japanese.²⁰ The Japanese say, “There is nothing wrong with the line of argument in Chiang Kaishek’s *China’s Destiny*.” Has Mr. Chiang or any member of his party ever rebutted this *extremely humiliating but sincere statement*? No, they have not and dare not. How can the Japanese²¹ not help but despise the Guomintang when they see that Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the Guomintang use “military and government orders” and “discipline” only against the Communists and neither desire nor dare to use them against the twenty members of the Guomintang CEC and the fifty-eight Guomintang generals who have gone over to the enemy? The people throughout the country and the friendly countries throughout the world have seen Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the Guomintang disbanding the New Fourth Army and attacking the Eighth Route Army, encircling the border region, maligning them with such labels as “traitor party,” “traitor army,” “warlords of a new type,” “a new type of separatist regime,” “sabotaging the War of Resistance,” and “endangering the state,” and constantly invoking “military and government orders” and “discipline”; they have never seen Mr. Chiang and the Guomintang enforcing any military orders, government decrees, or disciplinary measures against the twenty members of the Guomintang CEC and the fifty-eight Guomintang generals who went over to the enemy. Similarly, the resolutions recently passed at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Guomintang CEC and at the meeting of the PPC are all directed against the Communist Party, while not a single one is directed against the many members of the Guomintang CEC itself and the many army generals who have turned traitor and defected. What are the people throughout the country and the friendly countries throughout the world to think of the Guomintang? As was to

be expected, there was once again talk about a “political solution” and “preparations for a constitutional government” at the Eleventh Plenary Session; well and good, we welcome such talk. But judging by the political line the Guomindang has consistently followed for several years,²² we consider this talk just so many empty words designed to dupe the people, the real purpose being to gain time to prepare for civil war so as to perpetuate its dictatorial rule.²³

Is there a third direction in which the current situation may develop? Yes, there is. It is what a number of Guomindang members, all the people, and we Communists are hoping for. What is this third course? A just and reasonable political settlement of relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, a genuinely democratic and free constitutional government, the abolition of the Fascist dictatorship with its “one party, one doctrine, one leader,” and the convening of a national assembly genuinely elected by the people during the War of Resistance. We Communists have advocated this course from the very beginning. A number of Guomindang members will also agree to it. For a long time we hoped that even Mr. Chiang Kaishek and his own faction in the Guomindang might pursue this course. But judging from what has happened in the last few years and what is happening now, there is nothing to show that Mr. Chiang and the majority of the Guomindang personages in power are willing to do so.

A number of conditions, international and domestic, are needed before this course can be realized. At the present time (with fascism in Europe on the eve of a complete collapse), the international conditions are favorable for China’s War of Resistance, but it is at this very moment that the capitulators are especially eager to instigate civil war so that they can capitulate; the Japanese and Wang Jingwei, too, are particularly keen on civil war, so as to inveigle them into capitulation. Wang Jingwei said (according to the Tōmei News Agency, October 1): “Devoted brothers always remain brothers, and Chongqing will certainly follow our road, the sooner the better, we hope.” What affection, confidence, and eagerness! Thus in the present situation the best that can be expected from the Guomindang is stalling, while the adverse current of a sudden onslaught is very strong indeed.²⁴ The conditions necessary for the third course are not all present yet, and patriots of all parties and people throughout China must make multifaceted efforts to bring them into being.

Mr. Chiang Kaishek announced at the Eleventh Plenary Session: “It should be stated clearly that the central authorities make no demands upon the Communist Party other than that it should give up its armed separatist regime and cease its surprise attacks on the Nationalist army that sabotage the War of Resistance; it is to be hoped that the Communist Party will carry out its declaration made in the 26th year of the Republic [1937] calling for united efforts to save the nation, and will put into effect the four pledges given in that declaration.”

Mr. Chiang’s talk of “surprise attacks on the Nationalist army that sabotage the War of Resistance” ought to be applied to the Guomindang itself, and it is a pity that he is so prejudiced and malicious as to slander the Communist Party in this way. Since the fall of Wuhan, the Guomindang has launched three anti-Communist onslaughts, in each of which, as the facts show, the Guomindang troops sprang surprise attacks on the Communist forces. In the first campaign, from the winter of 1939 to the spring of 1940, the Guomindang troops in their surprise attacks captured five county towns garrisoned by the Eighth Route Army in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region—Chunhua, Xunyi, Zhengning, Ningxian, and Zhenyuan—even employing aircraft in these operations. In northern China, Zhu Huaibing’s²⁵ troops were dispatched to the Taihang mountains region for a surprise attack on the Eighth Route Army forces, which only fought back in self-defense. The second campaign was launched in January 1941. Earlier, on October 19, 1940, He Yingqin²⁶ and Bai Chongxi²⁷ telegraphed a categorical order to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ye Ting, and Xiang Ying, commanding that all units of the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies south of the Yellow River move north of the river within a month. We promised that our troops in southern Anhui would move north; as for the others, while it was impossible for them to be shifted under the circumstances, we promised that they would move to the assigned positions after victory in the anti-Japanese war. Yet before our 9,000 men in southern Anhui began moving north on January 5 in compliance with the order, Mr. Chiang Kaishek had already issued another order to “catch them all in a dragnet.” Between January 6 and 14, the Guomindang troops in southern Anhui actually did catch these New Fourth Army units in a dragnet. Moreover, on January 17, Mr. Chiang Kaishek ordered the whole New Fourth Army to be disbanded and Ye Ting to be court martialed. The Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army have since been attacked wherever there are Guomindang

troops in the anti-Japanese base areas in central and northern China, and they have only fought back in self-defense. The third campaign began in March of this year and is still going on. The Guomintang forces have continued their assaults on the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in central and northern China. In addition, Mr. Chiang Kaishek has published his *China's Destiny*, which is a diatribe against communism and against the people. He has diverted many of his Yellow River defense forces for a lightning attack on the border region. He has instigated the so-called people's organizations all over the country to demand the dissolution of the Communist Party. He has mobilized the Guomintang majority in the PPC to endorse He Yingqin's military report vilifying the Eighth Route Army and to adopt anti-Communist resolutions. He has thus turned the council, which should be a symbol of anti-Japanese unity, into a private agency of the Guomintang for manufacturing anti-Communist public opinion in preparation for civil war, with the result that Comrade Dong Biwu,²⁸ the Communist member of the PPC, had to walk out in protest. These three anti-Communist onslaughts were deliberately planned and launched by the Guomintang. We may well ask, what are they if not actions which "sabotage the War of Resistance"?

On September 22 of the 26th year of the Republic (1937), the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a declaration calling for united efforts to save the nation. In it we said: "To strip the enemy of any pretext for its intrigues and to remove any misunderstanding among all well-intentioned doubters, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party finds it necessary to proclaim its heartfelt devotion to the cause of national liberation. Therefore, it once again solemnly declares to the whole nation: (1) that Dr. Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization; (2) that we shall rescind²⁹ the policies of insurrection to overthrow the Guomintang regime, of the "make it Red" movement, and stop forcible confiscation of the land of the landlords; (3) that we shall abolish the present soviet government and practice democratic politics³⁰ in the hope that state power will be unified throughout the country; and (4) that the Red Army will cancel³¹ its name and designation, will be reorganized as part of the National Revolutionary Army and placed under the Military Council of the National Government, and will be ready for orders to march to the

anti-Japanese front and to do its duty.”

We have completely fulfilled these four pledges; neither Mr. Chiang Kaishek nor anyone else in the Guomintang can charge us with having defaulted on a single one of them. In the first place, the policies practiced by the Communist Party in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and in the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines are designed to realize³² Dr. Sun Yatsen’s Three People’s Principles, and not a single one runs counter to them. In the second place, as long as the Guomintang does not capitulate to the national enemy, disrupt Guomintang-Communist cooperation, or launch civil war against the Communists, we will always keep our promise not to overthrow the Guomintang regime or to confiscate the land of the landlords by force. We have kept this pledge in the past, are doing so now, and will continue to do so in the future. That means that only when the Guomintang capitulates to the enemy, disrupts cooperation, and launches civil war will we be forced to cancel our pledge, for these are the only circumstances which will make it impossible for us to keep it. In the third place, the soviet government was abolished³³ in the very first year of the War of Resistance, and the “Three-Thirds” system of democratic government has long been in operation, but to this day the Guomintang has not fulfilled its promise to recognize the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and, what is more, it accuses us of “feudal separatism.” Mr. Chiang Kaishek and other members of the Guomintang! You should know that what you call “separatism”—the state of affairs in which the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and other anti-Japanese base areas are not recognized by the Guomintang government—is not of our seeking but has been entirely forced upon us by you. What reason do you have for accusing us of “separatism” while you go back on your own words, refuse the recognition you pledged to the border region, and refuse to acknowledge its democratic government? Day in and day out we ask you to acknowledge that *you want to abandon “separatism” “in the hope that the state power of the whole country can be united”*; yet you continue to refuse *and always blame us for continuing the “separatism”*—who then is responsible? What reason does Mr. Chiang have for railing against “separatism” in his *China’s Destiny*, without showing the slightest sense of his own responsibility in the matter, though he himself is director-general of the Guomintang and head of its government? Availing ourselves of the occasion of the Eleventh Plenary Session

at which Mr. Chiang Kaishek has again demanded that we fulfill our promise, we demand that he fulfill his promise to give legal recognition to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, where *the soviet regime has long been abolished and democratic politics*³⁴ has long been in practice, as well as to the anti-Japanese democratic base areas behind enemy's lines, *so that the state power of the whole country can be united*. If you persist in your policy of nonrecognition, it will mean that you want us to continue with "separatism," and, as in the past, the blame will fall entirely on you and not on us. In the fourth place, it is a long time since the Red Army "abolished"³⁵ its "name and designation," became "reorganized as part of the National Revolutionary Army," and was placed under the Military Council of the National Government"; this pledge was fulfilled long ago. The only force directly under the Central Committee of the Communist Party and not under the Military Council of the National Government is the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army; the reason is that it was proscribed as a "rebel army" and "disbanded" on January 17, 1941, by the Military Council in a counterrevolutionary order sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state, *the army of a hundred thousand men could no longer be under the unified leadership of the government and was, moreover, subjected to daily attacks by the government.*³⁶ Yet this army has consistently fought the Japanese in central China and fulfilled the first three of the four pledges; furthermore, it is willing to come "under the Military Council of the National Government" once again, and asks Mr. Chiang Kaishek to repeal the order for its disbandment and restore its designation so as to enable it to fulfill the fourth pledge.

The document concerning the Communist Party adopted at the Eleventh Plenary Session also states: "As for the other problems, they can all be raised at the National Assembly for discussion and solution, since the present session has resolved that a National Assembly should be convened and a constitution promulgated³⁷ within one year after the conclusion of the war." The "other problems" referred to here are the abolition of the Guomindang dictatorship, the abolition of the Fascist secret service, the establishment of democratic rule throughout the country, the abolition of the economic system³⁸ and exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies harmful to the people, the application on a nationwide scale the agrarian policy of reducing rent and interest and the

economic policy of helping small- and medium-scale industries and improving the workers' livelihood. In its declaration of September 22, 1937, calling for united efforts to save the nation, our Party stated: "Democracy should be put into effect and a National Assembly convened to frame and adopt a constitution and draw up a policy of national salvation. To enable the Chinese people to lead happy and prosperous lives, effective measures must first be taken to provide famine relief, ensure a stable livelihood, develop defense industries, deliver the people from suffering, and improve living conditions." Since this declaration was accepted in its entirety by Mr. Chiang Kaishek in a statement on the very next day (September 23), he should not merely ask the Communist Party to keep the four pledges that it set forth, he should also ask himself, the Guomindang, and the Guomindang government, to carry out the provisions we have quoted. Mr. Chiang Kaishek is not only the director-general of the Guomindang, he has also become president of the Guomindang government (nominally the National Government); he should therefore conscientiously carry out these provisions about democracy and the people's livelihood, honor the innumerable promises he himself has made to us Communists and to the people throughout the country, and stop repudiating his promises and acting high-handedly, saying one thing and doing another. Together with the whole people, we Communists want deeds and not more empty deceitful words. If deeds are forthcoming, we shall rejoice; empty words without deeds will not deceive the people for long. What we ask of Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang is the following: Carry the War of Resistance through to the end, avert the danger of capitulation; continue cooperation, avert the crisis of civil war; recognize the democratic government in the border region and in the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines, reinstate the New Fourth Army, stop the anti-Communist campaign, withdraw the 400,000 to 500,000 troops now encircling the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region; stop using the PPC as a private agency of the Guomindang for stirring up anti-Communist opinion, have the National Assembly lift the ban on freedom of speech, assembly, and association, abolish one-party dictatorship,³⁹ reduce rent and interest, improve the living and working conditions of the workers, help the small- and medium-scale industries, abolish the secret service, put an end to secret agent education and introduce democratic education. You yourselves have promised to do most of these things. If you fulfill these demands and promises,

we assure you that we shall continue to fulfill our promises. We are ready to resume talks between the two parties at any time, if Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang are ready.

The first,⁴⁰ capitulation and civil war, is the road of destruction for Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang. The second, demagogic deception for the purpose of gaining time while clinging to dictatorship⁴¹ and actively conducting secret preparations for civil war, likewise offers no salvation for Mr. Chiang and the Guomindang. Only the third direction, the complete abandonment of the erroneous course of dictatorship⁴² and civil war and the pursuit of the correct course of democracy and cooperation, can put Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang *and the Chinese nation and the people of the entire country* on the road to salvation. However, Mr. Chiang and the Guomindang have so far done nothing to convince the people that they intend to move in the third direction; hence people throughout the country must remain on guard against the extremely grave danger of capitulation and civil war.

Let all patriotic members of the Guomindang unite and forbid the first direction, stop the second, and realize the third!

Let all patriotic anti-Japanese parties and people unite and forbid the first direction, stop the second, and realize the third!

An unparalleled change is imminent in the world. We hope that Mr. Chiang Kaishek and the members of the Guomindang will conduct themselves well at this great turning point of our era. We hope that all patriotic parties and patriotic people will conduct themselves well at this great turning point of our era.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 59–74, where it is reprinted from the October 5, 1943, editorial in *Jiefang ribao*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

¹. The problem in Europe → The German Fascist war machine will soon collapse, the problem of the anti-Fascist war in Europe

- [2.](#) The main force → The main force in annihilating fascism
- [3.](#) The world problem → The world anti-Fascist war
- [4.](#) The end of → The last day of
- [5.](#) The Chinese foreign minister → The foreign minister of the Guomintang government
- [6.](#) The Japanese → Japanese imperialism
- [7.](#) The Japanese → the Japanese imperialists'
- [8.](#) The Japanese → Japanese imperialism
- [9.](#) Keep up the resistance → Keep up the appearance of resistance
- [10.](#) Regarding Lin Biao, see above, note to the text of January 25, 1943.
- [11.](#) Liberal ideas and communism → Communism and liberal ideas
- [12.](#) Wang Zhonglian (1903–1991), commander of the Eighty-fifth Army, was involved in the suppression of Communist Party forces during the 1941 Southern Anhui Incident; see Mao's comments on January 18, 1941, in Vol. VII, p. 642.
- [13.](#) Regarding Li Xianzhou, see above, note to the text of July 15, 1943.
- [14.](#) Pang Bingxun (1879–1963) was a noted Guomintang general who had considerable success against the Japanese forces in North China after 1937. In 1943 he remained governor of Hebei Province. As commander of the Guomintang's Twenty-fourth Army, it was his job to face the Eighth Route Army. Despite Mao's complaints, in fact, Pang quickly established a non-aggression policy with Communist forces.
- [15.](#) Ye Ting (1896–1946) had been commander of the New Fourth Army since 1937. He was captured and imprisoned during the Southern Anhui Incident.
- [16.](#) Xiang Ying (1898–1941) was secretary of the Southeastern Bureau, secretary of the New Fourth Army Branch Committee of the Military Commission of the Central Committee, and vice commander of the New Fourth Army after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. He was killed during the Southern Anhui Incident.
- [17.](#) The Japanese → The Japanese Fascists
- [18.](#) The Japanese → The Japanese imperialists
- [19.](#) The Japanese → The Japanese imperialists
- [20.](#) The Japanese → The Japanese imperialists
- [21.](#) The Japanese → The Japanese imperialists

[22.](#) Several years → Many years

[23.](#) Dictatorial rule → Anti-people dictatorial rule

[24.](#) The adverse current of a sudden onslaught is very strong indeed → The danger of a sudden deterioration is very grave indeed

[25.](#) Zhu Huaibing (1892–1968) had participated in the 1911 Revolution and held a number of military and political posts during the 1920s and 1930s. From 1938, he was commander of the Guomintang's Ninety-seventh Army and was involved in the noted Guomintang attack on Communist positions in North China in March 1940; see Mao's comments in the text of March 5, 1940, Vol. VII, pp. 429–31.

[26.](#) He Yingqin (1890–1997) was at this time chief of staff and head of the Military Political Department of the Military Commission of the Guomintang government. Mao makes frequent references to him in Vol. VII, p. 533 ff.

[27.](#) Bai Chongxi (1893–1966) was at this time vice chief of general staff of the Military Commission of the Guomintang government. He had been involved in the exchange of telegrams in October and November 1940 that led to the Southern Anhui Incident in early 1941; see Mao's response on November 1, 1940, Vol. VII, p. 33.

[28.](#) Regarding Dong Biwu, see above, note to the text of July 21, 1943. At this time he was working in the Liaison Office of the Eighth Route Army in Chongqing and was a member of the PPC. See the note to Mao's speech of January 15, 1940, in Vol. VII, p. 370.

[29.](#) Rescind → Discontinue

[30.](#) Abolish the present soviet government and practice democratic politics → Reorganize the present Red government as the democratic government of a special region

[31.](#) Cancel → Change

[32.](#) Designed to realize → Are in keeping with

[33.](#) Abolished → Reorganized

[34.](#) Democratic politics → The principle of democracy

[35.](#) "Abolished" → Changed

[36.](#) The government → The Guomintang troops

[37.](#) Promulgated → Drawn up and promulgated

[38.](#) The economic system → Economic controls

[39.](#) One-party dictatorship → One-party Guomindang dictatorship

[40.](#) The first → In short, of the three possible directions that the Guomindang may take, the first

[41.](#) Dictatorship → Fascist dictatorship

[42.](#) Dictatorship → Fascist dictatorship

*Instructions for Materials on the Anti-
Espionage Assembly in Suide*
(October 9, 1943)

Do not kill a single person, do not arrest the majority. This is the policy we must stick to in this anti-espionage campaign.

Note

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 10, p. 186.

*Conscientiously Carry Out the Ten Great Policies*¹

(October 14, 1943)

All the policies that our Party has put forward during the War of Resistance are effective and have been proven to be correct. At present, there are ten crucial policies, which should be carried out in coordination with one another.

1. Struggle against the enemy. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region must be prepared to fight with Hu Zongnan, the diehard faction in the Guomindang, and Chiang Kaishek; we must make military preparations, making the troops firmer politically and better militarily. This winter troop training will start on a large scale. All officers and soldiers must devote themselves intensely to this training campaign, so that one person will be able to fight two of the enemy. There are now 50,000 troops in the border region; if all of them are well-trained, is there a war that we will be unable to wage? You should be aware that there were only 25,000 troops when the three group armies of the Red Army joined together, and only 45,000 when the Red Army was reorganized. Now that there are 50,000 troops in the border region who will be well-trained, won't it be easy for us to accomplish things? In large-scale troop training, we must earnestly adopt the methods of the leading cadres assuming responsibility and personally participating, the backbone groups linking themselves closely with the broad masses of the rank-and-file soldiers, and general calls combining particular and specific guidance. After the meeting of senior cadres, the regimental commanders and the commissars of each brigade will assume responsibility. We must learn from the company commander of the Sixth Brigade, who showed concern for his soldiers by making the rounds of guard posts and by visiting dormitories in the middle of the night, and from the spirit of Brigade Commander Chen Zongyao,²

who carried rice on his back and reclaimed wasteland together with his soldiers. No matter what shortcomings our comrades have, they will do a good job as long as they are willing to change and to follow the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. All who are able to become one with the masses are Marxists and can become leaders of the masses. We must strive to advocate this way of doing things among the troops. The feudalistic and violent Tyrannical Way, the harsh and unreasonable attitude toward the Party, the government, and the people adopted by some comrades among the troops in the past was not good. It is correct to treat the enemy in this way—you must be ruthless with the enemy—but it is wrong to treat the people, the Party, and the government like this. The Kingly Way of benevolence should be adopted in the treatment of the people and the masses. We must have two different attitudes: the Tyrannical Way with the enemy, and the Kingly Way with the people. This should never be forgotten. During the New Year's festival on the lunar calendar, we will launch another campaign to support the government and cherish the people, and we will make another public pledge: self-criticisms should be made by both sides, beginning with the troops, and then by the Party and the government. We should propagate the way of doing things in which the troops become one with the people, and this method is the fundamental difference between proletarian and capitalist troops. We embrace the people, fight the enemy for the people, practice the Kingly Way with the people, and adopt a self-critical attitude and oppose the tendency of warlordism. Our weapons are criticism and self-criticism. Problems are laid on the table, and criticism and self-criticism are practiced among the cadres, among officers and soldiers, and among the military and the people. In this way we are able to eradicate mistakes and truly unite.

2. Crack Troops and Simple Administration. This is an important policy which we are continuing.

3. Unified leadership. It is very important to practice centralized (*yi yuan huade*) leadership, to set up a core of leadership, and to oppose the practice of “having three kings in one kingdom.”³ If any leading comrade harbors a complaint, he should talk about it and analyze it with others, practicing criticism and self-criticism so that unity and solidarity can be achieved. When someone fails to carry out this policy sufficiently, it should be corrected immediately.

4. Support the government and cherish the people. This campaign should be

held once a year, during which time we should investigate our shortcomings and mistakes over the year and perform self-criticisms in front of the people. We must make a public pledge every year. The Central Committee is preparing to issue a standard public pledge which every locality will make, laying out in ten articles the policies of supporting the government and cherishing the people and of supporting the military. The core of all problems is the problem of the common people. The armed people (troops) must become one with those who are not armed, and there must be policies in order for this goal to be achieved. So long as the army can support the government and cherish the people, the government and the people will cherish and protect the army. Our army and the cadres within it have “braved a journey through the provinces”; they have been through a Long March of 25,000 *li*; they have vast first-hand knowledge and experience. Our army is the organizer and propagandist for the Chinese people; it is the most enlightened. The Party within the army is its most advanced part. It should set up, cherish, and take care of local Party branches and governments, and it should cherish and take care of the people. So long as the army’s attitude toward the people is good, there will be nothing wrong with the people’s attitude. In the past, those responsible for the rear guard troops were always saying that the people in the border region were no good, that they did not cherish and care for the troops. But we must ask, what was the attitude of the army toward the people? What things did they do for the people? We must first investigate ourselves and blame ourselves. “Heed only one side and you will be in the dark; listen to both sides and you will be enlightened.” This is precisely the method that we must adopt.

5. Develop production. In agricultural production, we must work until we have one year’s worth of grain stored after every three years of cultivation in order to prepare against war and famine.⁴ I would especially like to talk about the organization of labor. The border region has had a revolution this year. Of the 350,000 able-bodied laborers in the entire region, more than 30,000 people, or one-tenth of all the able-bodied laborers, have been organized into the regular collective work force by means of labor-exchange teams and teams for the hire of labor. In Yan’an *xian*, laborers who are temporarily organized into the collective work force constitute 70 percent of the labor force, and this situation will develop and improve to a certain extent next year. Most *xian* in the border region should emulate Yan’an *xian* and organize the labor force in the forms of collective labor,

the majority of which should be temporary organizations. The number of regular organized laborers should depend on the particular situation in each *xian* and should be increased from 10 percent of the entire labor force to 20 or 30 percent, and thus total about a hundred thousand people. Furthermore, the partially able-bodied also constitute a large army of laborers.

What kept the productive forces from further development in the border region were the past feudal exploitative relationships. The Agrarian Revolution has completely destroyed such relationships in half the border region. In the other half, the rent and interest reduction campaigns have attacked such relationships. This is the Agrarian Revolution; it is the first revolution. But if we do not promote the second transformation of productive relations, that is, that of the mode of production, by changing individual labor into collective labor, then the productive forces cannot further develop. Production can be greatly increased, by 100 percent or more, if we further develop the organizations for labor exchange—the peasant agrarian production cooperatives—based on the individual economy. If the entire labor force of the border region is organized into collective mutual-aid organizations, then the output of the 14 million *mu* which constitute the cultivated land in the border region will increase by 100 percent or more. In the future, this method can be applied to the entire country, and volumes will be written about it in the annals of Chinese economic history. In this sort of transformation, the tools of production do not change at all, but the productive relations among the people do change. These two changes, land reform and the development of organizations for labor exchange, constitute a revolution in the system of production.

The troops, offices, and schools must vigorously promote cooperatives and the cooperative mode of production. For example, a company in the armed forces can take the form of a cooperative. At Yangjialing, when they changed the transport team into a cooperative, they divided the shares and bonuses by a ratio of 2:8. That is, the state bought eighty shares with eight carts, twenty-two pack mules, and all the tools, while the twenty-two transportation team members themselves had twenty shares. The state paid their transportation fees according to *jin* [weight]. The result was that transport capacity increased by 100 percent, from only 190,000 *jin* per month to 389,000 *jin* or so per month. Moreover, tools were used sparingly and draft animals were taken better care of, thus cutting down on

state expenses. This method was widely applied in various offices and schools directly under the control of the Central Committee and the army with great results. The transport battalion of the Management Bureau of the Central Committee has 100 draft animals and 20 carts. Before it became a cooperative, it transported 1.2 million *jin* every month. Since becoming a cooperative, its transportation capacity has increased 50 percent to 1.85 million *jin* per month. Therefore, everyone will please consider whether it is feasible to apply this cooperative method widely to factories and farms. The method of cultivation partnerships practiced by our farms is actually cooperative in nature. Of course, it is also fine to adopt the method of individual instead of partnership cultivation.

The issue of cooperatives is essentially one that involves the point of view of the masses that we must consider. Having or lacking the point of view of the masses is the fundamental difference between us and the Guomindang. The point of view of the masses is both the starting point and the destination of the Communist Party members' revolution. From the masses and to the masses: Everything will work out well if we begin with the masses when we consider our problems. Responsible comrades in the armed forces must consider the interests of the soldiers; responsible comrades in offices and schools must consider the interests of those working in the kitchens and doing other odd jobs; all Communist Party members must consider the interests of the people.

6. Rectify the Three Work Styles. The border region has had achievements here, and we must continue to work.

7. Investigate cadres. We must go on with the struggle against spies.

8. Class education. Class education is education on current affairs. It has been conducted on a large scale for three months and it must continue. We must puncture the arrogance of others and strengthen our own morale.

9. Reduce rent and interest. This has not been carried out thoroughly in many base areas, and it also has not been done well in some parts of the border region; it must be continued. If relations break off between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, we will continue to carry out the campaign to reduce rent and interest, but not an Agrarian Revolution.

10. The "Three-Thirds" system.⁵ Diligently carry out this campaign. If relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party break off, the ten great policies, including the "Three-Thirds" system, will not change.

As long as we insist on carrying out the above ten great policies, we will be able to handle the Japanese imperialists' invasion and a possible break between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. At present, the four most important tasks for the base areas are: first, to struggle against the enemy, which means attacking the enemy and gaining territory; second, to develop production, which means getting food to eat; third, to rectify the Three Work Styles, which means rectifying unhealthy styles; and fourth, to investigate cadres, which means struggling against spies. Completing these four tasks will consolidate the Party, which is now somewhat but not entirely consolidated.

It is very important to fight the enemy and to gain territory. If we do not gain territory, we will have nowhere to put our feet and to stand. According to Comrade Nie Rongzhen's⁶ report upon his return, we have regained some places in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Region, as well as an area with a population of 1.4 million in southeastern Shanxi. During the six years of the War of Resistance, we were pushed back by the enemy behind enemy lines as if from the bottom of a teapot to the middle of it and then to the top. Now we must push downward from the top of the teapot. And if Chiang Kaishek now wants to push us and try to take the border region, we will have to be prepared to push him back.

All cadres in the Party must master production and get food to eat, and they can master it in just half a year. This used to be the responsibility of the heads of the General Affairs Department, the Finance Department, and the Construction Department. Now everyone must master it: the heads of various armies, the responsible comrades of all offices, and the principals of all schools. Even literati and scholars such as Zhou Yang, Chen Boda, and Fan Wenlan⁷ have already acquired this ability.

Regarding production by the troops: in February of this year Comrade Wang Zhen⁸ proposed a plan, which many people opposed, that everyone should reclaim 6 *mu* of land. It turns out, however, that each person has reclaimed an average of 18 *mu*. This kind of creativity by the masses solves the great problems of the revolution. When the army itself can pay its troops, we have a way to create 10 million troops.

Every brigade should set up a rear echelon. Didn't the Guomindang always mock us before by saying that we "scurried off to our nests"? In the past we did not have nests. The area by the Qiao mountain range in northern Shaanxi is

indeed an ideal place to build a deep and secure “nest.” The enemy cannot get in, but inside we have industry, agriculture, and commerce, cows, sheep, chickens, and dogs, families of women, children, and babies, as well as production teams. This should be planned well; we should create a good revolutionary household, as Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] said.

Since the start of the War of Resistance, the Guomindang has used a policy of spies plotting to sabotage us from within. Our anti-spy campaign has sabotaged this plan of theirs.

In order to carry out the three tasks of fighting the enemy, developing production, and investigating cadres, we must practice criticism and self-criticism, which means rectifying the Three Work Styles. The Senior Cadres Conference held last year⁹ overcame the ideological mistakes prevalent among the cadres by making a distinction between the two lines. But in our work there are also two different kinds of attitudes between which we must distinguish. We must study Marxist-Leninist methodology. Some comrades take it for granted that they have learned a lot of Marxism-Leninism. But as soon as they touch a real job, you can say that not even the smell of Marxism-Leninism remains. The Marxist-Leninist method is, basically, that of analysis. Only by telling the truth can we correct our mistakes and make progress. If we are self-righteous, glad to dwell upon our achievements but reluctant to mention our shortcomings and mistakes, if we make no comprehensive analyses of our work, then our work will not progress. Work should be taken as a whole. Analyzing it, pointing out our achievements and shortcomings, and practicing criticism and self-criticism constitute the methodology of analysis. We also need to summarize our work and draw conclusions from it, or synthesize it. No synthesis is possible without analysis. Synthesis is the result of analysis; analysis is the method of synthesis. We can draw conclusions only after we dissect things. Some comrades afflicted with subjectivism do not understand the methodology of analysis. Last year, at the Senior Cadres Conference, the conference for cadres in the army and the government, as well as the mini-conference for cadres in the 120th Division, correct conclusions were arrived at only after practicing criticism and self-criticism, making a correct analysis, dissecting an originally unified thing, and studying its different aspects. A further example concerns the problem of finance, which could not have been solved if we had not performed an analysis. Even

Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin took pains to collect the facts and to make detailed analyses. If they did so, how much more so must we?

We need to be modest about our work and acknowledge our deficiencies. We should be careful not to catch the disease of arrogance, assuming that we are perfect and superior since we are the leaders. We must be conscious of our inadequacies. We must exchange opinions with others and sincerely listen to what they say. We must constantly remind ourselves that we have shortcomings, mistakes, and deficiencies. Only in this way can we make progress.

Speech, writing, and thought are reflections of objective reality. It takes hundreds or thousands of trials, however, before the laws of objective reality are reflected with relative accuracy in the laws that have taken form as our conceptions. We must combat subjectivism and having too high of an opinion of ourselves. We have one standard with which to evaluate a comrade: namely, whether he has a modest attitude.

Criticism and self-criticism is one aspect of Marxist-Leninist methodology; opposing the theory of spontaneity is another. This theory was very popular before the Senior Cadres Conference last year. For example, when we had tremendous difficulties in finance and economics, some comrades did not try to solve them. Instead, they let all kinds of opinions develop and let the work look after itself. In politics and organizations, liberalism, not engaging in criticism, not struggling, and failing strictly to supervise work, were all prevalent. We Communist Party members must not harbor liberalism. We must strive for the best and combat passive tendencies. We must criticize mistakes and achieve unity through struggle. We must become one with the people, overcome difficulties, and transform the world. This and only this constitutes Marxism-Leninism.

The principle of seeking unity through struggle should be applied in four areas. The first is the relationship between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. We must raise the bourgeoisie, through struggle, to the level of approving of anti-Japanese principles. The proletariat is capable of leading the bourgeoisie. We should follow reality rather than dogma. But Wang Ming¹⁰ opposed the proletariat leading the bourgeoisie, arguing that Lenin did not say anything about that. The second is the relationship between the proletariat and the peasants. This category is entirely different from the first one. Peasants are small-scale producers and belong to the petty bourgeoisie; they are our most reliable Allied army. We

should treat peasants as we treat our comrades, seeking unity through struggle and raising them to the level of accepting the principles of the Communist Party. The third area is the rank-and-file of the proletariat. We must seek unity through struggle, combat backward ideas that divide the proletariat, and oppose Menshevik thought among the rank-and-file of the proletariat. The fourth area is within the Communist Party, which is the vanguard of the proletariat. We must develop criticism and self-criticism and combat all opportunism so as to seek unity through struggle.

The Marxist-Leninist method has three parts. One is to integrate theory with practice; the second is to oppose the theory of spontaneity; the third is to engage in criticism and self-criticism. There are two kinds of criticism: correct criticism, the result of which is to unify the Party, and incorrect criticism, for example, the type made at the Fourth and Fifth Plenums of the Sixth Central Committee,¹¹ the result of which is to divide the Party. We must uphold correct criticism and oppose incorrect criticism; this is what rectification means. We must continue to eradicate unhealthy trends. I believe that all of us will unite and work together, and that we will do a good job.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 68–77, where it is reproduced from the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

¹. This is part of the speech delivered by Mao Zedong at the Senior Cadres Conference of the Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

². Mao introduces this exemplary regimental commander in a speech on May 26, 1943, above.

³. Here and in item 5 Mao is quoting from Chinese classics, first the *Zouzhuan* and then *Li Ji*.

⁴. Points in this section are reiterated in greater detail in “On Cooperatives,” October 1943, below.

⁵. Regarding the “Three-Thirds” system, see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942.

⁶. Regarding Nie Rongzhen, see above, note to the text of July 4, 1942.

⁷. Regarding Zhou Yang, see above, note to the text of March 16, 1943. Regarding Chen Boda, see above,

note to the text of January 23, 1942. Fan Wenlan at this time worked for the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee; see also above, note to the text of January 17, 1942.

[8.](#) Wang Zhen (1908–1992) was at this time the commander and commissar of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

[9.](#) Referring to the Senior Cadres Conference held by the Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party from October 19, 1942, to January 14, 1943, in Yan'an.

[10.](#) Wang Ming, pseudonym of Chen Shaoyu (1904–1974), had been a member of the Central Committee and the Politburo since 1931. He was a major representative of what was called the “Leftist” line. Beginning in November 1931, he was in Moscow as the Chinese Communist Party delegate to the Comintern. After he returned to China in November 1937, he was the secretary of the Changjiang Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Wang Ming was Mao’s major competitor.

[11.](#) In Mao’s view, the Fourth Plenum (Shanghai, 1931) and the Fifth Plenum (Ruijin, 1934) represented the summit of the “Leftist” line.

*Letter to Hou Jiancun*¹

(October 21, 1943)

Doctor Hou:

Comrade Wu Jiqing (who used to be my bodyguard) works in the government of the border region. His child is seriously ill, and the other doctors do not know what to do. I wonder if I could trouble you to check and see whether there is still hope? Is this possible?

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 216, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Hou Jiancun was at this time the director of the Pediatrics Department of the Yan'an Central Hospital.

On Cooperatives

Speech at the Conference of Senior Cadres in the Border Region (October 1943)

This year there has been another revolution in the development of production in the border region: We have organized public and private labor power into the form of cooperatives. In doing so, we have mobilized the energy of the masses for production, increased labor efficiency, and greatly developed our productivity.

In the past, feudal exploitative relationships in the border region prevented productivity from developing. Half the region broke this feudal fetter after the land revolution. In the other half, the feudal bonds were weakened after the campaign of reducing rent and interest rates. With the combination of these two efforts, most of the feudal exploitative relationships throughout the border region have been destroyed. This is the first revolution.

But if we do not transform the form of labor from the individual to the collective, then our productive forces will be unable to take a step forward in their development. Therefore, the establishment of mutual-aid organizations, like peasant agricultural production cooperatives, which are founded upon the individual economy (and do not destroy the base of individual private property), is extremely necessary. Only in this manner can productivity be greatly increased. The present lessons from the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region are that: in ordinary labor exchanges, two can do the work of three, and in a model labor exchange, one can do the work of two, or even more than two. If the entire labor force of the peasantry were organized into collective mutual-aid teams, then the productive force of the entire border region would be increased

by 50 or even 100 percent. This method can be carried out in all anti-Japanese base areas, and in the future it can be carried out throughout the entire country. Special attention will be paid to this in the annals of Chinese economic history. In a reform like this, the tools of production will not change, and the fruits of production will not belong to the collective but, rather, to the private person. But the productive relationship among the people will be changed. This is a revolution in the system of production. It is the second revolution.

There are altogether 350,000 able-bodied laborers in the entire border region.¹ This year more than 30,000 of them have been organized into collective labor-exchange teams on a regular basis; they constitute about one-tenth of the able-bodied laborers. However, temporary mutual-aid teams make up 70 percent of the able-bodied in Yan'an *xian*, and next year this number could be further increased. If the regular collective labor organizations in every *xian* can increase from 10 percent to 20 or 30 percent of the able-bodied labor force, then they will total about 100,000 people. And if the temporary mutual-aid organizations could follow the example of Yan'an, and if the partially able-bodied laborers also join the organizations, they will constitute an enormous labor army.

The production of our military, offices, and schools also has the character of a cooperative. For example, a company is a small cooperative, and a brigade is a large one. Among the various kinds of cooperative production in our military, offices, and schools, the experience of the Yangjialing transport team is worth noting. Before its reorganization, the Yangjialing transport team had eight carts and sixteen mules. Under normal circumstances, they should have been able to transport at least 270,000 *jin* of goods each day. But in fact they transported only 190,000 *jin*. With regard to expenditures, they received an extra 60,000 *yuan* a month in addition to the standard supply. This year, under the principle of benefiting both the collective and the private individual, the transport team was changed into a transport cooperative. The collective invested 80 shares in the form of the 8 carts, 16 mules (later increased to 20), and all the tools; the 20 members on the transportation team invested 20 shares in the form of themselves, for a total of 100 shares. They divide up the dividends monthly according to a ratio of 2:8. All personnel, livestock, and additional equipment expenses are the responsibility of the cooperative. If they are going to transport goods for the collective, they are still paid according to the distance and *jin*. The standard of

living of the members of the cooperative improves according to how the cooperative fares. After this method was explained, all the members of the transport team unanimously agreed to it. The result of implementation of this method has been that the weight of goods transported every month has increased from 190,000 *jin* to 389,000 *jin*, an increase of 100 percent. It exceeds the usual transport capacity by 30 percent. At the same time, it has enormously increased the transport workers' sense of responsibility and enthusiasm about their work, and has resulted in a reduction in expenditures and the use of tools and in greater care of the livestock. For example, no one used to care whether a flour bag had a hole as big as a bowl in it, but now every transport worker carries a needle and thread with him to sew up such holes. Formerly, it was an open secret that people embezzled livestock grain, but now this kind of embezzlement is no more. In the past, if a cart or a tool was slightly damaged, workers would ask the collective to replace it; but now so long as something is usable, the workers make do. In the past, workers were careless with livestock, but now they are gradually coming to nurture the livestock well. Since reorganization, there has been a one-third reduction in transportation expenditures. It used to be that they needed an extra 60,000 *yuan* a month above and beyond the standard supply; now they don't need a single extra penny—indeed they have a profit of tens of thousands of *yuan* each month.

Every administrative organ has had good results from adopting this method. The transport battalion of the Management Bureau has 100 head of livestock and 20 carts. Before its reorganization into a cooperative, the transport battalion's monthly transport capacity was only 1.2 million *jin*. After it became a cooperative, its monthly capacity increased to 1.85 million *jin*, a 50 percent increase. We therefore ask you to consider whether the cooperative method can be widely adopted in our publicly operated factories and farms.

Capitalist countries and the Guomindang are not able to use this method. We are the only ones who can use it because our purpose is not to exploit the people. We carry out the policy of looking after both the collective and the private.

In the military, for example, people in the 359th Brigade weave and make varied kinds of tools with willow and elm branches. They have a rule that when handicraft laborers use equipment belonging to the collective, four-fifths of their output belongs to the collective and one-fifth belongs to themselves; when they

do not use equipment belonging to the collective, two-thirds of their output belongs to the collective and one-third to themselves. On the one hand, this method resolves the necessity for communal goods, and, on the other, it is no different from increasing the soldiers' pay. It has some of the characteristics of a cooperative.

The nature of a cooperative is to serve the masses. This is to say that we must think of the masses constantly, we must plan for the masses, and we must make the benefit of the masses our top priority. This is the fundamental difference between us and the Guomindang. It is also both the starting point and the destination of the Communist Party members' revolution. From the masses and to the masses: Everything will work out well if we begin and end with the masses when we consider our problems. Therefore, every Communist Party member should consider the interests of the people; responsible comrades in the military must consider the interests of the soldiers; responsible comrades in the administrative organs and schools must consider the interests of those working in the kitchens and at other odd jobs. This doctrine of production from the point of view of the masses has shattered the various incorrect "doctrines" of the past. Only this doctrine, which is for the masses, will allow us to improve production.

I hope that comrades from all localities will pay attention to promoting cooperative production. Production in the military, offices, and schools is a kind of cooperative, as is collective mutual-aid labor in farming villages. In addition to these, there are also comprehensive cooperatives, which include every kind of industry from transport cooperatives (called salt transport teams) to handicraft industry's workers' collectives and mutual-aid cooperatives. If this great variety of cooperatives develops more fully, then the masses, both public and private, will become well-off. We will also be able to overcome the difficulties that we currently face in the base areas behind enemy lines.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 75–78, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of *Xuanji*, Vol. 4, and the 1947 edition of *Xuanji*, Vol. 5.

1. This and the following two paragraphs repeat, in slightly different phrasing and a few more details, see above, the key points of section 5 of Mao's October 14, 1943, speech.

Telegram to Stalin in Celebration of the October Revolution (November 5, 1943)

Comrade Stalin, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and all the soldiers and people of the Soviet Union: On behalf of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, I warmly congratulate you on the twenty-sixth anniversary of the October Revolution, congratulate you on the great victories of the Red Army in the war against fascism, congratulate you on the great successes of the Three-Nations Conference in Moscow and the Four-Nation Declaration in which China participated. The Chinese people, who have been cheered by your victories during the past twenty-six years, will march on with you hand in hand and will unite with you as one forever, and we will win the final victory in the anti-Japanese war of national liberation.

Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party

Mao Zedong

Note

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, p. 79, where it is reproduced from the November 8, 1943, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

*Speech at the Yan'an Party for Cadres
in Celebration of the October
Revolution*
(November 6, 1943)

Today we are holding a party in Yan'an to celebrate the twenty-sixth anniversary of the October Revolution of the Soviet Union. When we had the celebration last year, the Red Army was still struggling to defend Stalingrad. Within only one year, however, the victory of the Red Army has already changed the overall picture of the war. With the battlefront moving forward from the Volga to the Dnieper, the Red Army will score an even greater victory in the forthcoming winter offensive. Without the Red Army, the situation in the war today would be inconceivable. The truth has long been self-evident that the victory of the Red Army has a bearing on the destiny of all humanity. During the past year, meanwhile, the Anglo-American-French allies have mopped up the enemy in North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy, and their air forces have undertaken offensive operations. These actions have complemented the fighting of the Red Army. In the East, the Chinese armies and the Anglo-American forces have also struck heavy blows against the Japanese Fascists.

One week ago, the conference among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union in Moscow achieved its goals successfully; this is worthy of great celebration. Having solved many military and political questions, the conference on November 1 issued a tripartite communiqué and issued several historically important declarations. Among the issues discussed and settled at the conference, according to the joint communiqué, the most important one was the decision on definite plans for military operations to shorten the war. There have already been

preparations for these operations. Thus, we can imagine that, in the near future, we will witness the opening of a second front, which will create an East-West pincer attack on Hitler and ultimately defeat him. This will decisively solve Europe's problem. The solution of Europe's problem, in turn, will mean breaking the backbone and right hand of the entire Fascist movement. It will not be difficult to break the remaining left hand of Japanese imperialism.

Among the resolutions of the Moscow Conference was a declaration of the four countries with the participation of China. In this document, the four countries, united in their determination to resist the enemy to the end, established a comprehensive set of essential guiding principles to ensure postwar peace and security. Among these principles, the most important one stipulates that the four nations continue their wartime cooperation with one another after the war. In this way, the plot to drive a wedge between Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China by Fascist Germany and Japan and by internal capitulationists has been thwarted. The four countries have united even more closely, and postwar peace and security have been ensured. To guarantee peace and security, the declaration also stipulates the creation of a new League of Nations which includes all states, large and small, and is based on the principle of sovereign equality. We can imagine that the new League of Nations will be significantly different from the old prewar League of Nations (although the Soviet Union took part in it during the latter period, it was never allowed to play a significant role). It will be a united organization genuinely capable of ensuring peace and security.

The Moscow Conference decided on the fundamental principle and specific policies concerning Italy. The fundamental principle states that "fascism and all its evil influence and emanations will be utterly destroyed, and the Italian people will be given every opportunity to establish government and other institutions based upon democratic principles." The first clause of the specific policies states that "the Italian government should comprise representatives of associations of the Italian people who have always opposed fascism in order to make the government more democratic." Second, "the people of Italy should completely restore freedom of speech, religious worship, political beliefs, the press, and public gatherings and must form anti-Fascist political groups." In addition to these are a number of measures concerning the complete destruction of Fascist

remnants. One of them concerns the creation of democratic local government. According to these articles, the principles of eliminating all Fascist remnants and creating a broadly inclusive new democratic Italy with the participation of the Communist Party have been determined. The declaration regarding Italy concludes with a statement proclaiming that “nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.” This is a principled statement. It means that in the future the people of Italy have the right to choose democracy or other more progressive systems. The Moscow Conference’s declaration on Italy thus sets an example for the treatment of all Fascist countries in the future. This constitutes a clear distinction from things during World War I. The spirit of imperialism in the history of Versailles has been swept clean, and this opens up the bright road of emancipation through freedom to the people of the defeated countries. This is the collective expression of the great internationalism on the part of the people of the Soviet Union, Britain, America, and other countries of the world.

The Moscow Conference declared that Austria will be separated from Germany. At the same time, the conference also directed the Austrian people to contribute to the prosecution of the war against Hitler. This is also a model. All countries and regions annexed by the Fascists will be emancipated.

The Tripartite Conference issued a declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Chairman Stalin, which provides the principle of thoroughly and severely punishing the Fascist murderers. None of the Fascist murderers will be spared. At the same time, for the purpose of destroying the Fascist camp, the declaration warns: “Those who have hitherto not sullied their hands with innocent blood should beware not to join the ranks of the murderers, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will bring them to justice according to the law.” A declaration of such profoundly revolutionary significance was also inconceivable at the time of World War I.

In short, the success of the Tripartite Conference is indeed epoch making. It will profoundly affect both the present war and the postwar life of humanity. The dawn of human emancipation is already in sight. Those who have a pessimistic view of the future of the Chinese people and the people of the world and those who yield to capitulation and unprincipled compromises have already been

proven totally wrong.

We celebrate the twenty-sixth anniversary of the birth of the Soviet Union; we hail the great victory of the Soviet Red Army; we salute the wise leadership of Marshal Stalin; we acclaim the epoch-making accomplishments of the tripartite Moscow Conference; we celebrate China's participation in the great Four Nation Declaration! We, the Communists, our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, and our patriotic compatriots throughout the country, both military and civilian, should work hard together, stand firmly by the Four-Nation Declaration, and stem the still-existing dangers of capitulation and civil war. We will unite all the patriotic forces of China, defeat Japanese imperialism, create a new country of freedom and equality, and, in the capacity of such a new country, take part in the new international cooperation and international reconstruction. These are our expectations.

Note

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 81–84, where it is reproduced from the November 7, 1943, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. The entire text can also be found in the 1944 edition of *Xuanji*, Vol. 2, and in the 1947 edition of *Xuanji*, Vol. 3.

Get Organized

Speech at the Reception for the Labor Heroes of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region

(November 29, 1943)

Today, the Central Committee of the Communist Party is holding a reception for the *labor heroes* of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. I will say a few words on behalf of the Central Committee to the labor heroes and heroines and model workers in production who were elected from the peasant masses, factories, armed forces, government organs, and schools. What I want to say can be summed up by the words “get organized!” The peasant masses and the masses in the army, government organs, schools, and factories of the border region have carried out a year-long production campaign in accordance with the resolutions of the Senior Cadres Conference convened last winter by the Northwestern Bureau.¹ Great achievements and advances have been made in every field of production this year, and the border region has taken on a new look. This fully proves the correctness of the principle adopted by the Senior Cadres Conference. The main point of the principle of the Senior Cadres Conference is to organize the masses and to mobilize and organize into a great labor army all possible forces without exception—all the forces of the ordinary people, all the forces of the army, government organs, and schools, and the able-bodied and partially able-bodied labor power of all men and women, and the young and the old. We have an army for fighting as well as an army for labor. For fighting, we have the Eighth Route and the New Fourth armies. But even this army must be treated as two armies: one for fighting and one for production. With these two kinds of armies and with a fighting army skilled in these two tasks and in mass work, we

can overcome difficulties and defeat the Japanese.² If the achievements³ in the border region before last year were not great or remarkable enough to prove this conclusively, our achievements this year have completely proven this point, as we have all seen with our own eyes.

In all the armed units of the border region that have land this year, each soldier has on the average cultivated 18 *mu*. They can produce or make practically all the vegetables, meat, and oil that they consume, all the cotton-padded clothes, woolen knitwear, shoes, and socks that they wear, all the cave dwellings, houses, and large and small meeting halls in which they shelter, all the tables, chairs, benches, paper, pens, ink, firewood, charcoal, and coal that they use. By using our own hands, we have attained the goal of having ample food and clothing. Every soldier needs to spend only three months of the year on production and can devote the remaining nine months to training and fighting. Our troops do not need the National Government, the Border Region Government, or the people to issue them pay. They can fully provide for themselves. This innovation has such a great significance for our task of national liberation! During the past six and a half years of the War of Resistance, the enemy has carried out a policy of “burn all, kill all, and loot all” in the various anti-Japanese base areas. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has been tightly blockaded by the Guomindang, reducing us to the direst straits, both financially and economically. If our troops could only fight, we would never have solved our problems. Now our troops in the border region have learned to produce, while some of the troops at the front have done so as well. Others are learning. If every person in our heroic and combat-worthy Eighth Route and New Fourth armies is able not only to fight and to do mass work but also to produce, we would not fear any difficulty and would become “invincible under heaven,” to use the words of Mencius. Our government organs and schools have also taken a big step forward this year. Only a small part of their expenditures came from the government, while most came from their own production. They grew 100 percent of the vegetables this year, compared with only 50 percent last year. They increased their consumption of meat considerably by raising pigs and sheep, and they established many workshops for making daily necessities. If the army, government organs, and schools now meet their own material needs fully or for the most part, less is taken in taxation from the people, who can therefore enjoy

more of the fruits of their labor. As both soldiers and civilians are increasing production, all have ample food and clothing and are happy. In our factories, too, productivity has greatly improved after developing production and ferreting out secret agents. Throughout the border region, labor heroes⁴ of the *Wu Manyou type* in agriculture, the *Zhao Zhankui type* in industry, the *Huang Lide type* in government organs and schools, *as well as* many labor heroes in the army, have come forward. We can say that production in the border region has been set on the right path. All of this is the result of organizing the strength of the masses.

To organize the strength of the masses is a general principle. Is there a contrary principle? Yes, there is. It is one that *lacks the mass viewpoint*, fails to rely on the masses or to organize them, and gives exclusive attention to organizing the small number of people working in the finance, supply, and trade offices, while ignoring the need to organize the broad masses in the villages, the army, government organs, schools, and factories. It does not treat economic work as a broad movement or as a broad front but only as a temporary measure to remedy budget shortfalls. That is the other principle and it is the wrong principle. Such a principle once existed in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, but after correct guidance given over these years, especially after the Senior Cadres Conference last year and the mass movement this year, the number of people who still make this incorrect assessment has probably decreased. In the various base areas in northern and central China, because fighting is intense and the leading organs have not paid enough attention, the production campaign of the masses has not yet widely developed. Nonetheless, since the Central Committee's directive of October 1 of this year, preparations are being made everywhere to launch a production campaign next year. Conditions at the front are more difficult than in the border region. Not only is there heavy fighting, but some places also face a serious famine. But to support the war, counter the enemy's "Three-all" policy, and provide disaster relief, we must mobilize the entire Party, the government, the army, and the people to carry out production while attacking the enemy. With the experience in production at the front already gained in the past few years and with the ideological, organizational, and material preparations this winter, a broad movement can be and must be launched next year. Because the front-line areas are in a war environment, it is not yet possible to have "ample food and clothing," but it is completely possible and, indeed, imperative to "use

our own hands to overcome difficulties.”

The cooperative is now the most important form of mass organization in the economy. Although it is unnecessary to insist on attaching the label of cooperative to the production of the masses in our army, government organs, and schools, these activities, being carried out *by the masses* under centralized leadership and using collective labor of mutual aid to meet the material needs of various departments, units, and individuals, have the characteristics of cooperatives. They are cooperatives of a sort.

Among the peasant masses, the individual economy has prevailed for several thousand years, with each family or household forming a production unit. This scattered individual production is the economic foundation of feudal rule and traps peasants in perpetual poverty. The only way to overcome it is gradual collectivization, and the only way to bring about collectivization, according to Lenin, is through cooperatives. We have already organized many peasant cooperatives in the border region, but at present they are not yet Soviet-style cooperatives,⁵ known as collective farms. Ours is a new democratic economy, and our cooperatives are built on the foundation of the individual economy (on private property). Furthermore, they are of several types. One type is mutual-aid organizations of agricultural labor, including “labor-exchange teams,” “bundling work teams,” and “*General Tang teams*.” This sort of agricultural labor mutual-aid organization was known as the mutual-aid labor society or the plowing team in the Jiangxi soviet base areas⁶ and is now also called a mutual-aid society in some places at the front. So long as they are collective mutual-aid organizations that the masses join voluntarily (compulsion must never be used), all of them are good, regardless of what they are called, whether they have a few, a few dozen, or a few hundred people, whether they are composed of able-bodied laborers or partially able-bodied laborers, whether members use labor, farm animals, or tools to help one another, whether they live and eat together during the busy farming season, and whether the organizations are temporary or permanent. These methods of collective mutual aid are the inventions of the masses themselves. In the past, we summed up such experience among the masses in Jiangxi, and now we are summing it up in northern Shaanxi. After being encouraged by the Senior Cadres Conference last year and being implemented all through the current year, they have become much more systematic and widespread.⁷ This year, many labor

exchange teams in the border region have done their plowing, planting, weeding, and reaping collectively, and the harvest this year has doubled or is *simply 200 percent*. Now that the masses have witnessed these substantial results, undoubtedly more people will adopt this method next year. We now do not wish to organize all the several hundred thousand able-bodied and partially able-bodied laborers in the border region into cooperatives within one year, but this objective can be realized within a few years. Women among the masses should all be mobilized to undertake a certain amount of production. All loafers must be reformed into good people through participation in production. Such collective mutual-aid production cooperatives should be widely organized⁸ in all the anti-Japanese base areas in northern and central China.

In addition to the collective mutual-aid cooperatives for agricultural production, there are three other types of cooperatives. They are the comprehensive cooperatives like the Southern District Cooperative of Yan'an, which combines cooperation in production, consumption, transport (salt transport), and credit, transport cooperatives (salt transport teams), and handicraft cooperatives.

With these four kinds of cooperatives among the popular masses and the collective labor cooperatives in the army, schools, and government organs, we can organize *all* the forces of the masses into a great army of labor. This is the only road to liberation for the popular masses, the only road from poverty to prosperity, and the only road to victory in the War of Resistance. Every Communist must learn to organize the labor of the masses. Communists with an intellectual background must also learn to do this. Once they have set their minds on it, they can learn it in six months or in a year. They can help the masses organize production and sum up their experience. *In the past, many of our comrades had Confucius's shortcoming. Like Confucius, who could not answer his students when they asked him how to grow crops and vegetables, our comrades also did not know the answers. But now they have learned and can answer these questions. They are wiser than Confucius.* When our comrades have learned, in addition to other talents, to organize the labor of the masses, to help peasants draw up their household production plans, to organize labor-exchange teams, salt transport teams, and comprehensive cooperatives, to organize production in the army, schools, government organs, and factories, and to set up production

competitions, to reward labor heroes, and to arrange production exhibitions—when they have learned to bring the innovation and initiative of the masses into play—we will certainly be able to drive out the Japanese⁹ and build a new country together with the people of the entire country.

We Communists must be able to integrate ourselves with the masses in all issues. If our Party members spend their whole lives sitting indoors and never go out to see the world and brave the storm, what good will they be to the Chinese people? They will not bring any benefit, and we do not need such people as Party members. We Communists ought to see the world and brave the storm. This storm is the great storm of mass struggle, and this world is the great world of mass struggle. “Three lowly cobblers together equal one Zhuge Liang.” In other words, the masses have great creative power. In fact, there are thousands upon thousands of Zhuge Liangs among the Chinese people. Every village and every town has its own. We should go to the masses, learn from them, and synthesize their experience into better, systematic principles and methods. We then retell these to the masses (propaganda), call upon them to implement them, and thus solve their problems and help them achieve liberation and happiness. If our comrades doing local work divorce themselves from the masses, fail to understand their feelings, and cannot help them organize their production and improve their livelihood, and if they confine themselves to collecting “public grain for national salvation” without realizing that only 10 percent of their energy is quite enough for this purpose, provided that they first of all devote 90 percent of their energy to help the masses solve the problem of “private grain for the people’s own salvation,” then these comrades are contaminated with the Guomintang style of work and the dust of bureaucratism. The Guomintang only demands things from the people but gives them nothing in return. If a member of our Party acts in this way, his style of work is that of the Guomintang, and his face, caked with the dust of bureaucratism, needs a good wash in a basin of hot water. In my opinion, this style of bureaucratism is found in local work in all our anti-Japanese base areas, and there are comrades who are divorced from the masses because they lack a mass viewpoint. Thus we must firmly do away with this work style before we can have close ties with the masses. In addition, a kind of warlordist work style exists in our army work, a style also characteristic of the Guomintang, whose army is divorced from the masses. Our troops must observe

the correct principles and resolutely avoid the problems of warlordism in managing relations between the army and the people, between the army and the government, between the army and the Party, between officers and men, between military work and political work, and among cadres. Officers must cherish their men and must not be indifferent to their well-being or resort to corporal punishment. The army must cherish the people and cannot harm the interests of the people. The army must respect the government and the Party and must never assert independence. Our Eighth Route and New Fourth armies are the armed forces of the people. They have been good historically, and they are still the best in the country. But it is true that in recent years problems of warlordism have cropped up. Some comrades in army work have cultivated an air of arrogance and have acted in a flagrant and unreasonable manner toward the soldiers, the people, the government, and the Party. They only blame the localities¹⁰ but never themselves, see only their own achievements but never their shortcomings, and only welcome flattery but never criticism. Such phenomena exist, for example, in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The tendency was overcome¹¹ after the Senior Cadres Conference and the meeting of military and political cadres last year and after the campaigns to support the government and cherish the people and support the army launched on the New Year¹² of this year. But there is still a residue, which we can¹³ continue to overcome. These faults are found in the various base areas in northern and central China, so the Party and the army there must pay attention to overcoming this problem.

Whether it is in local work or in army work and whether it is the tendency toward bureaucratism or warlordism, the nature of the problem is the same, namely, isolation from the masses. The overwhelming majority of our comrades are good comrades. Those who have committed errors can correct them once they have been criticized and their mistakes have been discovered. Nonetheless, they must carry out self-criticism, face up to their erroneous tendencies, and conscientiously correct them. If we fail to criticize the tendency toward bureaucratism in local work and the tendency toward warlordism in army work, it means we are willing to preserve the Guomindang work style. Willingness to keep the dust of bureaucratism and warlordism on one's otherwise clean face does not make a good Party member. If we get rid of the bureaucratic tendency in local work and the warlordist tendency in army work, all our work, including the

development of production campaigns,¹⁴ will proceed smoothly.

Production in the border region, whether among the peasant masses, in government organs and schools, in the army, or in factories, has achieved great results. There have been great improvements in the relationship between the army and the people. The look of the border region is very different from what it was previously. All this indicates that our comrades have deepened their mass viewpoint and have made great strides in uniting with the masses. Nevertheless, we must not be self-satisfied but must continue our self-criticism and strive for further progress. We must also continue to strive for progress in production. If our faces are dusty, we must wash them every day. If the floor gets dusty, we must sweep it every day. Even though the tendencies toward bureaucratism in local work and warlordism in army work have been basically overcome, these bad tendencies can grow again. Layers of Japanese imperialism and Chinese reactionaries surround us, and we live in the midst of the undisciplined petty bourgeoisie. Great gusts of extremely foul bureaucratism and warlordism blow on our faces daily. Therefore, we must not become complacent as soon as we see results. We should check our complacency and constantly criticize our shortcomings, just as we should wash our faces or sweep the floor every day to remove the dirt and keep them clean.

You labor heroes and model workers in production are the leaders of the people, and you have achieved much. I hope you, too, will not become self-satisfied. I hope that when you return to Guanzhong, Longdong, Sanbian, Suide, and various *xian* affiliated with Yan'an, and when you return to your offices, schools, army units, or factories, you will lead the people, lead the masses, and do better work. The first task is to organize all the masses into cooperatives.¹⁵ The more you organize, the better it is. *Lenin said that our proletariat has no other power than organization. There was a song in the past, which goes "firmly, firmly, firmly, the collective is united."* This is completely correct. So long as we are good at organizing and unite closely, we are afraid of nothing, and no one can do anything to us or dare to abuse us. I hope that when you go back, you will implement this work and propagandize it, so that by next year's labor hero conference, we will have achieved still greater results.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 85–94, where it is reproduced from the December 2, 1943, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. The entire text is also in the 1944 edition of *Xuanji*, Vol. 4, and in the 1947 edition of *Xuanji*, Vol. 5. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

1. The Northwestern Bureau → The Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
2. The Japanese → Japanese imperialism
3. The achievements → The achievements of the production campaigns
4. Labor heroes → Many labor heroes
5. They are not yet Soviet-style cooperatives → They are only of a rudimentary type and must go through several stages of development before they can become cooperatives of the Soviet type
6. Soviet base areas → The Red base areas
7. Widespread → Better developed
8. Widely organized → Widely and voluntarily organized
9. The Japanese → Japanese imperialism
10. Localities → The comrades doing local work
11. Overcome → Basically overcome
12. The New Year → The Spring Festival
13. We can → We must
14. Including the development of production campaigns → Including, of course, the production campaigns
15. Organize all the masses into cooperatives → Organize the masses on a voluntary basis into cooperatives

The Current International Situation and Its Influence on the Current Political Situation in China (December 16, 1943)

Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping:¹

A. We received your telegram of December 3.² It is completely right to work hard on production, pay attention to saving, and prepare for more difficult situations to come. Please stick to this general policy. As for what to do in Shandong and Central China, we will inform you after Zhu Rui and Chen Yi³ arrive in Yan'an and acquaint us with the situation there.

B. Despite two years of the Pacific War and over six years of the Sino-Japanese War, the strength of Japan is still considerable. Moreover, due to the dangers in the Pacific Ocean, it will be no mean feat for Great Britain and the United States to counterattack. However, as the institutions of the Guomindang are corrupt and its secret agents rampant, its power is decreasing rather than increasing during the long period of strategic stalemate. The Cairo Conference⁴ dealt a blow to the Japanese attempt to induce capitulation (but it has not yet been abandoned), blocking the way for Chiang Kaishek to seek a compromise. The promise made to return Penghu, Taiwan, and Manchuria to China might result in the disaster of a frontal attack by the Japanese bandits. The Tehran Conference⁵ ensures the opening of a second front on the European continent, which contradicts Chiang's hope of an impending counteroffensive in the Pacific Ocean. Thus, Chiang did not make a great fanfare with jubilation after he flew back to Chongqing from Cairo, as he did last time after the abolition of the treaties.⁶ The current political

situation is extremely advantageous for resistance against Japan and the revolution. Nonetheless, difficulties are still on the increase (e.g., the results of the Cairo Conference may decrease the contradictions and increase the coordination and unity of the different factions of Japanese financial lords and warlords, thus increasing their resolve to persist in a protracted war). The regions in North China behind enemy lines in particular should be fully prepared to hold out for another three or five years and should guard against the tendency to take the enemy lightly and to slacken on long-term preparations after the Tehran Conference, the Cairo Conference, and the continued victories of the Soviet Union. Please pay attention to the real situations in all the regions and make corrections accordingly at all times.

C. There has been no report reflecting rectification and production in Taiyue and Zhongtiao. Take care to investigate, supervise and promote them.

Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai⁷

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 78–80, where it is reproduced from the transcript preserved in the Central Archives.

- [1.](#) Regarding Deng Xiaoping, see above, note to the text of February 10, 1943.
- [2.](#) The telegram explains the reasons for the current economic difficulties in the regions of northern China and suggests that the Central Committee issue a directive to the Central China Bureau and the Shandong Subbureau, asking them to pay attention to saving and to preparing for unexpected difficulties.
- [3.](#) Regarding Zhu Rui see above, note to the text of February 10, 1943.
- [4.](#) The Cairo Conference, held from November 22 to November 26, 1943, was attended by the leaders of China, the United States, and Britain. The conference negotiated a further alliance in fighting against Japan and jointly issued the Cairo Declaration, which stipulated that Japan had to surrender unconditionally and return to China all occupied territories.
- [5.](#) The Tehran Conference, held from November 28 to December 1, 1943, was attended by the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain. The conference mainly addressed the alliance in fighting Nazi Germany and signed the Tehran General Agreement and the Tehran Declaration. The General

Agreement stipulated that the United States, Britain, and other allies should open a second front on the European continent by invading France.

[6.](#) Referring to the two treaties between China and Britain and the treaty between China and the United States, signed on January 11, 1943, relinquishing all extraterritorial rights in China.

[7.](#) Regarding Peng Dehuai, see above, note to the text of January 25, 1943.

*Regarding Basic Human Characteristics and Other Things*¹ (December 17, 1943)

I

The history of things is infinite, and the relationship between things is infinite. Their attributes, therefore, are infinite. The usual “complete exposition” of a thing is, in fact, merely a limited exposition of certain parts and certain fragments.

II

People are basically distinguished by their social nature. People are animals that make tools, people are animals engaged in social production, and people are animals engaged in class struggle (during certain historical periods). Briefly, people are social animals and are not characterized by the presence or absence of thinking. All animals are characterized by consciousness, and higher animals have feelings, memory, and even the ability to reason. Although people have a high level of consciousness, it is not their most basic characteristic.

III

The difference between primitive human beings and monkeys rests solely on the

ability to make tools. Only when humans acquired the ability to make stone weapons and wooden sticks to use for production did they distinguish themselves from monkeys and all other animals. It was not because humans had superior thinking that distinguished them from monkeys. This is the watershed dividing the materialistic view of history and the idealistic view of history.

IV

Human thinking originated and is developing historically. It was not perfect at the outset, and it can never be perfect.

V

Humans are a high-level form of material development, but not the ultimate form. They will continue to develop in the future, and they are not the spirit of all things. Humans are primarily social animals. The bourgeoisie invariably stresses human rationality (consciousness); we should not do so.

VI

At the very beginning, humans could not differentiate themselves from the external world. It was a unified view of the universe. Only as humans became capable of making more advanced tools and, therefore, had more advanced production could they gradually distinguish themselves from the natural world and establish a view of the universe in which they were both opposed to and united with the natural world. This view of the universe is a historical one, and the substance of future views of the unity of opposites will also be different from now.

VII

The special characteristic, feature, or trait of humanity is its social nature—humans are social animals. Natural traits, animal traits, and other features are not humanity's distinguishing characteristics. There is no doubt or question that humans are animals and not plants or minerals. The question has become one of what kind of animals humans are, and this is a question that, until Marx, nobody could correctly answer for tens of thousands of years, not even Ludwig Feuerbach of the capitalist class. That is, humans have only one basic characteristic—their social nature. We should not say that they have two basic characteristics, one being their animal nature and the other being their social nature. Such a statement is not good because it constitutes dualism, which actually is idealism.

VIII

Ever since the day when humans separated themselves from monkeys, everything, including their physique, their intelligence, and their instinct, has been social. It is not right to consider everything before birth as innate and everything after birth as acquired. If there is anything innate, then monkeys are innate and the entire history of humans has been acquired.

Take physique as an example. The contemporary human brain, hands, and facial features have been transformed over hundreds of thousands of years of labor, and they have acquired social traits. Human intelligence and instinct are also completely different from those of animals.

Human facial features, the entire body, intelligence, and capabilities are all inherited. People often call these things innate so to differentiate them from social influences after birth, but everything that a person has inherited is social and is the result of hundreds of thousands of years of social production. We will lapse into idealism if we are not clear about this point.

IX

Our view of right and wrong holds that the concepts of right, wrong, good, and evil originated and are developed historically, that historically developed relative truths and absolute truths are united, and that the different truths of the different classes vary. Our view of good and evil holds that morality is a reflection of what people require in their economic and other social lives and that different classes have different views of morality. To divide human nature into two aspects, natural and social, and to hold that natural characteristics are without good or evil is to open a back door to idealism.

X

When exploitative classes still represent the masses, they can express certain truths, such as Confucius, Socrates, and the capitalist class. Such a view is only a historical view.

Wang Yangming² has some truth.

Confucius and Mencius have a portion of truth. To negate all of them is an ahistorical view.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 81–85, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong's handwritten manuscript.

¹. This is the main part of Mao Zedong's comments on a letter written by Liu Shaoqi on June 28, 1943, in reply to Xu Fanting's letter regarding issues of human nature, right and wrong, good and bad, and so forth. Xu Fanting (1893–1947) was a senior general in the Eighth Route Army serving in the Shanxi-Suiyuan military area. He was also a noted and published poet.

². Wang Yangming (1472–1529), noted for his philosophical idealism, was a famous Neo-Confucian philosopher of the Ming dynasty.

*Letter to Hu Qiaomu*¹

(December 20, 1943)

Qiaomu:

Please collect for me the histories of social development from the historical materialist point of view that you can find in Yan'an, whether translated or original. I heard that a certain Soviet author wrote a novel about how monkeys changed into human beings.² I once read a book on sociology by Raevsky;³ Zhang Bojian⁴ also translated a book titled *A Brief History of Social Evolution* (or he could have written it). Books like these—please collect them all for me.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 217–18, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Hu Qiaomu was Mao Zedong's main secretary at this time; for details, see above, note to the text of January 23, 1942.

². Referring to *How Man Became a Giant*, by Soviet science fiction writer Mikhail Ilyin and his wife, Elena Segal.

³. Referring to *Weiwu de shehuixue* (Materialistic Sociology), by Raevsky and translated into Chinese by Lu Yiyuan. It was published by Xin Yuzhou Bookstore in Shanghai in August 1929.

⁴. Zhang Bojian (1898–1926) was an early member of the Chinese Communist Party. He compiled *Shehui*

jinhua jianshi (A Brief History of Social Evolution), published by Guoguang Bookstore in November 1925.

Letter to Liu Shaoqi

(December 24, 1943)

Comrade Shaoqi:

There are two short essays by Engels in this book,¹ and they are wonderful and worth reading. The one by Gorev² is also worth reading. *Materialism* by Gorev was once translated by Qu Qiubai³ and I read it. It was not bad. Later I learned that he made some mistakes. I still do not know what his mistakes were. I am looking for other books to read on the materialist view of history. When I finish them, I will send them to you.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 219–20, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Referring to the book *Cong yuan dao ren* (From Ape to Human), translated by Cheng Song and published in Shanghai in September 1930. It is a collection of essays by Engels and other Marxist thinkers on historical materialism.

². Boris Isakovich Gorev (Goldman) (1874–1937) was a Soviet philosopher and historian. His major works include *Outline of Historical Materialism* and *Materialism: Philosophy of the Proletariat*.

³. Qu Qiubai (1899–1935) joined the Communist Party in 1922 while studying in the Soviet Union. After

returning to China, he rose to become Party leader in August 1927, but he was stripped of his position as secretary at the Sixth Congress in June 1928. He went back to the Soviet Union until 1930; after he returned to China he was soon demoted, and was later captured and executed by government forces.

*The Anti-Spy Struggle Must Uphold the Policy of Not Killing One Person and Not Arresting the Majority*¹
(December 27, 1943)

To the Central China Bureau, for transmittal to the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions, Shandong Subbureau, and the Fifth Division:

We must uphold the policy of arresting only a few and killing only a few or even no one in the anti-spy struggle. Only in so doing can we guarantee the thorough eradication of spies and still leave ourselves some leeway for redress if there are people who are wronged and framed (there is a possibility that most people are wronged and that some are framed). “Arresting only a few” means that, except for those military spies and currently active traitors who do direct harm to the anti-Japanese cause, the spy suspects arrested in order to track down clues should not exceed 5 percent of all suspects. You should notify the lower levels to pay attention to this so as to avoid the potential problem of arresting too many to handle. “Killing only a few or even killing no one” means that, except for those military spies who do direct harm to the anti-Japanese cause and who can be executed upon the approval of the *xian* or higher-level organs, and those currently active traitors who resist arrest with arms and who can be killed on the spot, no spy, even if convicted by solid evidence, should be killed. Instead, we should strive to win them over for our own use. This is the policy of not killing one person and not arresting the majority. You should notify the lower levels that no spy convicted with solid evidence should be killed during 1944. In Yan’an, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and northwestern Shanxi, large numbers

of spies were ferreted out during this year's anti-spy campaign, but no one was killed. Therefore, though there were many who were wronged or framed—for instance, some who only made mistakes within the Party and were mistaken for spies and some others who only had problems with factions but never did anything wrong and were taken as spies—they all have been rehabilitated during the process of reexamination. This sort of experience deserves attention. Regarding the treatment of military spies who do direct harm to the anti-Japanese cause and currently existing traitors, there is an order from the Taihang Military Area Command to send to you for reference.

Mao Zedong Kang Sheng

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 86–87, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1.](#) See also the related August 15, 1943 Central Committee decision on the investigation of cadres, in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 1152–57.

1944

Letter to Yang Shaoxuan and Qi Yanming¹

(January 9, 1944)

Comrades Shaoxuan and Yanming:

I have seen your opera.² You have done excellent work. I thank you and please extend my thanks to the performers as well. History is created by the people, but on the stage of old opera (and all the old literature and arts that were divorced from the people), the people were but the dregs of society, and the stage was dominated by nabobs, rich wives, and young masters and misses. You now have reversed this inversion of history and have restored history's true face. From now on, the old opera will turn over a new leaf, and this is worth celebrating. In the area of historical drama, Guo Moruo³ has done excellent work. You have done the same in the realm of the old opera. This beginning that you have made will be the start of a revolutionary epoch for old opera. I am greatly pleased to think about this. I hope you will compose and perform much that will become common practice throughout the entire country!

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

night of January 9

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 222–23, where it is reproduced from Mao's

handwritten manuscript.

1. Yang Shaoxuan (1893–1971) was a researcher at the Central Party School. Qi Yanming (1907–1978) was director of the Cultural Education Section of the Dean’s Office of the Central Party School.

2. The opera by Yang and Qi was titled “Bishang Liangshan” (Driven to Liangshan), meaning “driven to rebellion”—the rebels of Liangshan in the Song dynasty are well known in Chinese literature.

3. Guo Moruo (1892–1978) was a noted historian, writer, and revolutionary activist. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he was the head of the Third Section of the Political Department of the Military Commission of the National Government and the director of the Cultural Work Committee. He organized progressive cultural figures to engage in anti-Japanese propaganda work in the Guomintang-controlled areas.

Letter to Guo Moruo¹

(January 9, 1944)

Brother Guo Moruo:

I have received “Hufu”² and read the entire play, which deeply moved me. You have done a lot of extremely beneficial revolutionary cultural work. I commend you.

Mao Zedong
January 9, Yan’an

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 221, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.

- ¹. On Guo Moruo, see note to the previous text, “Letter to Yang Shaoxuan and Qi Yanming.”
- ². “Hufu” (The Tiger Tally), a modern spoken drama written by Guo Moruo in February 1942, is set during the period of the ancient Warring States.

*Letter to Peng Dehuai*¹

(January 10, 1944)

Comrade Dehuai:

After reading your analysis on the twelve points,² I know that you must have put a lot of effort into it. This is a very good attitude toward research. In general, the content is correct, except for a few shortcomings in some places.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 224–25, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

- ¹. On Peng Dehuai, see above, note to the text of January 25, 1943.
- ². Referring to Peng Dehuai's speech at the regional cadres rectification and study conference held at the Northern Bureau Party School in June 1943. The title of his speech is "Regarding Stalin's Twelve Points on the Bolshevization of the Party." Three of Mao's marginal comments on the draft notes of Peng's speech are quoted in *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 224–25.

*Implement the Principle of Self-Defense When the Guomindang Army Attacks*¹ (January 18, 1944)

Each Central Bureau and Central Subbureau, for transmission to each regional Party Committee:

In order to maintain peace between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and to win the final victory in the War of Resistance, please instruct all relevant units that, in dealing with the Guomindang army, our army should strictly defend our territory and not provoke any kind of incident. Only when the other party attacks us should we implement the principle of self-defense. If any major incident occurs, you should first report it and wait for orders on how to deal with it.

Secretariat of the Central Committee

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 707, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

¹. Drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Secretariat.

*Letter to Lin Boqu*¹

(January 19, 1944)

Venerable Lin:

I have read your instructions. I am sure that production and frugality will produce better results this year than last year. If your personal plan can be carried out, it is sure to have a good effect. I have also made a plan and am preparing to implement it.

Wishing you good health.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 226, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. On Lin Boqu, see above, note to the text of September 15, 1942.

There Is a Need for and a Possibility of Coordination Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (February 4, 1944)

Comrade [Dong] Biwu:¹

We have taken note of your telegram of the 31st. After reviewing this year's overall situation, there is a need for and a possibility of coordination between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. The opportune moment for such coordination will be the second half of this year or the first half of next year. But we should do some preparatory work during the first half of this year. In addition to having the Yan'an newspapers do their utmost to avoid irritating the Guomindang and our ordering all base areas to act with caution and to try their best to avoid starting disputes, we also plan first to send [Lin] Boqu to Chongqing in late spring or early summer. [Zhou] Enlai is preparing to go to Chongqing in the second half of this year. Last month during his meeting with me, Staff Officer Guo requested that Lin [Boqu],² Zhu [De],³ and Zhou [Enlai] go to Chongqing. I answered that Lin and Zhou could go to Chongqing at different times. Guo then raised two issues: first, He [Yingqin]'s⁴ and Bai [Chongxi]'s⁵ telegram of the 19th; second, military affairs in the Northwest. I replied that negotiations would be based on He and Bai's telegram, and that when the time comes for the counteroffensive, we will send a proportionate number of soldiers from Hu Zongnan's⁶ troops and from our border region troops to march to the front. I also told Guo that our Party's two principles of supporting Chiang [Kaishek] to fight the War of Resistance and supporting Chiang [Kaishek] to

build our country will never change. According to other sources, there is a rumor saying that the Investigation and Statistics Bureau said that it had permission from Yan'an to send a branch of the Central News Agency to Yan'an and that it would arrive in Yan'an in a few days. This is entirely their own idea. If you are asked about this, you can deny it. Today there will be another telegram replying to you regarding [Lin] Boqu's going to Chongqing.

Mao Zedong

noon on February 4

Notes

Our source for this document is Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Wenxian he yanjiu, 1985 huibian ben*, p. 175.

[1.](#) Dong Biwu was at this time working in the Liaison Office of the Eighth Route Army in Chongqing. He was also a member of the People's Political Council. See above, note to the text of July 21, 1943, and note to the text of January 15, 1940, in Vol. VII, p. 370.

[2.](#) On Lin Boqu, see above, note to the text of September 15, 1942.

[3.](#) Zhu De was at this time the commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army.

[4.](#) For He Yingqin, see above, note to the text of October 5, 1943, "Comment on the Eleventh Plenary Session"; he was at this time the chief of the General Staff of the Military Commission of the Guomindang government.

[5.](#) For Bai Chongxi, see above, note to the text of October 5, 1943, "Comment on the Eleventh Plenary Session"; he was at this time the vice chief of the General Staff of the Military Commission of the Guomindang government.

[6.](#) For Hu Zongnan, see above, note to the text of February 20, 1942; he was at this time the commander-in-chief of the Thirty-fourth Group Army of the First War Zone of the Guomindang army.

Speech to the Representatives of the Yan'an Masses (February 7, 1944)

(*Liberation Daily*) On the afternoon of the seventh, the People's *Yangge* Dance Troupe¹ and mass organizations of the city of Yan'an, in incomparable happiness, presented Chairman Mao with a flag. As the *Yangge* Dance Troupe advanced toward Yangjialing, all people living nearby rushed over to join in, expressing the people's utmost support for Chairman Mao. [Passage omitted.] Chairman Mao made a speech to the audience amid thunderous applause. He said:

Today the People's *Yangge* Dance Troupe, the municipal government, business associations, and mass organizations in this city have come to Yangjialing, where the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee is located, to present a flag. Your intentions are very good. I speak for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in welcoming you. Just now, you presented a flag and spoke many good words. Your intentions are very good. We Communists will work even harder, and we will do our work even better than in the past in order to respond to you.

Chairman Mao said:

Right now, the whole world and all of China are coming together to fight the Fascists. The Party, the government, the military, and the people in our border regions are already united as one. This year we should be even more united and we must work to increase production, consolidate the rear echelon, and defeat the Japanese imperialists. The border regions have already made progress, and we must make even more progress this year. Communists want to become one with the people of the border regions and to listen to the opinions of the people, which will allow us to work even better.

After Chairman Mao's speech, the *Yangge* Dance Troupe performed more than ten kinds of *yangge* stories, and their performance was brilliant. The General Office of the Central Committee served dinner, and it was dark before they dispersed.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 137, where it is reproduced from the February 12, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

[1.](#) The *yangge* is a form of traditional folk dance and stilt-walking in northern Shaanxi that was adapted by the Chinese Communist Party and quickly developed into a form of drama, incorporating both traditional dance and aspects of modern spoken drama.

*The General Policy for Dealing with the
Eastward Advance of Yan Xishan's
Sixty-First Army¹*
(February 8, 1944)

Teng [Daiyuan] and Deng [Xiaoping]:

We have received your telegram of the sixth. (1) At present, we should strive to obtain a peaceful political situation and not to create any disturbance. The eastward march of the Sixty-first Army might be a provocative plan devised by Chiang [Kaishek] and Yan [Xishan]² to create an excuse to force us into a conflict. (2) As for our general policy on dealing with this, apart from sending a telegram to Yan requesting him to stop, you should order our forces in the Taiyue area to tolerate them and not confront them. Send a letter to the Sixty-first Army and ask them to take the entire situation into consideration and to withdraw. At the same time, you should concentrate our forces at appropriate places to build defensive fortifications. If they are determined to attack us, we will strike back in the form of a counteroffensive, but try to avoid any conflict unless you have no other choice. (3) All negotiations and military operations should be in the name of the Dare-to-Die Corps rather than in the name of the Eighth Route Army. (4) Please keep us continually informed of the situation there.

Mao, Zhu [De], and Peng [Dehuai]

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 708–9, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) This is a telegram sent by Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Peng Dehuai to Teng Daiyuan (1904–1974), chief of staff of the Front Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, and Deng Xiaoping, political commissar of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Teng had been a Party member since 1927, a Long March veteran, and a military leader in the base areas.

[2.](#) Yan Xishan (1883–1960) was at this time the commander-in-chief of the Second War Zone of the Guomintang army.

*Letter to Luo Ronghuan*¹

(February 8, 1944)

Comrade Ronghuan:

The comrades on the Central Committee are all concerned about your illness. Because the illness as described in the telegram is very serious, we replied in our telegram that you should receive medical treatment in Shandong. If that is impossible, you may go to Shanghai, but there are certain risks. What exactly is your current situation? Is it completely impossible to treat your illness in Shandong? And is it completely impossible to come to Yan'an? Do you absolutely need to go to Shanghai? If you are going to Shanghai, how are you going? We await detailed answers to these questions.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 227, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. On Luo Ronghuan, see above, note to the text of February 10, 1943; he was at this time secretary of the Shandong Subbureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the commander-in-chief and commissar of the Shandong Military Area Command, and political commissar and acting commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

*Directive to Various Areas Concerning
Opposing the Erroneous Idea of Too
Many Spies¹*
(February 26, 1944)

Deng [Xiaoping] and Teng [Daiyuan]² to transmit to Central China, Shandong, and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei:

Your telegrams of February 16 and February 19, as well as Li Da's and Xuefeng's of February 15, have all been received. Your cadre investigation work has already entered into the Confession movement [*tanbai yundong*] and has made some accomplishments. This is very good. In order to make present and future work progress more smoothly and correctly, we must understand that the anti-spy struggle is a covert and pointed struggle. Because the enemy is hidden, before spies are discovered the general tendency in the Party is apathy and inattention to what seems familiar. And because the struggle is pointed, after spies are discovered, especially during the Confession movement, the tendency in the Party can easily shift to "too many spies" and "mistaking grasses and trees for soldiers." This sort of first Right and then Left is the general rule for anti-traitor deviations. Moreover, the move from Right to Left can be extremely quick. Because of this, when undertaking the anti-traitor struggle leading organs must correct Rightist deviations in areas where the anti-traitor struggle has not yet begun and protect against Leftist deviations in areas where the anti-traitor struggle has already begun, especially in areas where the Confession movement is under way—and this must be done on the basis of the Center's directive on the nine guiding principles for cadre investigations,³ as well as careful study of the

January 24 telegram⁴ on analysis of the six elements of confession—while paying attention to the following issues:

1. Use the Confession movement in a flexible manner. Don't mechanically apply the experience of Yan'an's various organs. Since the rectification and cadre screening began, the Confession movement has already adopted two forms. In areas in which rectification and cadre screening have been pursued in separate stages, the confession of errors inside the Party and the confession of espionage activities have been carried out separately. However, when the Confession movement is carried out during rectification, then the confession of ideological problems principally follows the model of inner-Party struggle and when the Confession movement is carried out during cadre screening, then confession of espionage problems principally follows the model of anti-traitor struggle; various units in Yan'an for the most part adopted this distinction. In addition, in areas where rectification and cadre screening are carried out together, the confession of inner-Party errors and the confession of espionage issues are likewise interconnected. A few military units in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and most of the Central China Bureau adopted this composite model. This model is for the most part inner-Party rectification. Its content is not limited to confession of espionage issues; it permits and welcomes confessions of inner-Party errors. Even if a spy has been discovered, if there are no reliable materials, then for the time being do not pursue the matter further. This will help us to investigate and collect material evidence, to interpret leniency policies, to enlighten the self-awareness of those who confess, not just to create an atmosphere of antagonism but to make it easier for those with problems to draw close to the Party. For departments in the Northern Bureau that frequently endure the battle conditions of the mopping-up campaign behind enemy lines, it will serve no good purpose to turn so many people into our enemies. Therefore, we ask you to consider carefully whether this form of the Confession movement is more suitable to your circumstances.

2. Correctly assess the strength of the enemy. Those of you in battle conditions behind enemy lines should not underestimate the importance of enemy scouts and Nationalist spies in wrecking us. Therefore, you must resolutely and correctly carry out the anti-traitor struggle, while at the same time you absolutely must not exaggerate the strength of the enemy. And you absolutely

must not regard every student, intellectual, soldier, man of culture, technician, and so forth, who have come from enemy or Guomindang areas, nor all half-hearted people who have committed errors nor even those who have confessed and criminals as spies to be taken into custody. It is not permissible to view all Leftist revolutionary groups organized by the Party in enemy or Nationalist areas as Red Flag policy spy organizations. The experience in Yan'an has already demonstrated that spies amount to only about 10 percent of those who have confessed and new intellectuals are for the most part all good. You must pay attention to these experiences. Thus, of eight hundred rectification cadres, some 30 percent had problems, and it was necessary to investigate them carefully but not to view them all as spies. According to our general judgment, there are certainly spies among them, but they will not exceed 10 percent of those who have already confessed.

3. During the Confession movement continually educate cadres on how to carry out investigations, hunt out genuine evidence, and avoid easily believing statements made under interrogation. Make sure cadres understand that without proper investigation and lacking genuine evidence, it is extremely difficult to determine whether a person is right or wrong, or how serious the matter is. Thus, on the matter before us concerning XX, XX, XX, and others,⁵ do not rely solely on oral testimony to confirm the problem. You must collect reliable evidence from various sides (including oral testimonies) and on the basis of concrete evidence determine whether or not they are spies.

4. Uphold the principle of "not one killed and only a few apprehended" (not to exceed 5 percent of the suspects). Do not simply arrest those who have not confessed at confession rallies. In places where the Confession movement has already been mobilized, you must deeply and widely teach the cadres and the masses of the dangers of giving credence to forced confessions, discuss in detail the directives of the Central Committee, make them understand the great danger and the immense harm of giving credence to forced confessions. Not only can these comrades be wrong, but they necessarily serve the secret plots of the spies to malign us. When interviewing those who have confessed, do not subjectively track people suspected of having connections with them or arbitrarily associate them with any organizations. This way inevitably leads to the realm of forced confessions. There were a few units and schools in Yan'an and Suide that sought

out numerous organized systems, from such groups as the Fuxing [Renaissance] Society, the Three People's Principles Youth Corps, and the Guomindang local Party committees. But in fact, they were all false. Physical torture and disguised physical torture are strictly prohibited in interrogations. Experience has shown that wherever there is anti-traitor struggle these phenomena are inevitable. There is a county in Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia] that has twenty-four types of physical torture, and even in Yan'an there are a few units and schools where phenomena such as binding, beating, dragging, and hanging have occurred. Thus, you must tirelessly promote education on this, establish firm regulations and propagandize firm discipline, and moreover from time to time carry out inspections, constantly opposing the error of giving credence to forced confessions. You must personally grasp this tightly and call upon various important cadres also to grasp this tightly, thereby implementing a system in which leaders take responsibility because a little carelessness can produce disorder.

5. By raising these points, we do not mean to say that you have already exhibited these erroneous tendencies but, rather, on the basis of the experience of various areas, to inform you and to draw your attention to them. As for the problem of XX, now it is most important to collect reliable evidence. If we just arrest those people for whom we lack evidence, it will be very difficult to get them to clarify the issues. Thus, at present, when it is possible to keep a strict watch over them and there is no chance that they can escape, postpone taking them into custody.

Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng

Notes

The text of this telegram comes from the limited circulation collection, Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu bangongting, ed., *Zuzhibu gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, 1935–1945*. (Beijing, 1980), pp. 458–61. Our thanks to Dr. Michael Schoenhals for bringing this document to our attention.

¹. This telegram, co-authored by Mao and Kang Sheng and sent to Deng Xiaoping and Teng Daiyuan on questions dealing with the cadre screening and Confession movement, is listed in *Nianpu*, February 26, 1944,

Vol. 2, pp. 496–97. This title, “Guanyu fandui tewu ruma de cuowu renshi gei gedi zhishi,” is the one to the text in the earliest edition known to us, the 1949 *Kangzhan shiqi chubao wenxian* (Documentary Collection on Rooting Out and Defense During the Anti-Japanese Period), p. 55, as cited in our source, *Zuzhi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, 1935–1945.8*, p. 461. On Teng Daiyuan, see above, note to the text of February 8, 1944, and Vol. VII, p. 43, n4.

[2.](#) The full names of the recipients are given in *Nianpu* and in Wang Zuoxin’s *Mao Zedong zhushu biannian suoyin*, p. 211.

[3.](#) A related Central Committee decision on cadre screening dated August 15, 1943, is translated in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 1152–57.

[4.](#) This telegram, addressed to Deng Xiaoping and Rao Shushi, on the topic of screening “confession elements” (*tanbai fenzi*) is noted in *Nianpu*, January 24, 1944, but we have not located the text.

[5.](#) XX is given for the names in this version of the text.

On the Question of Constitutional Government (March 1, 1944)

Each Central Bureau, Central Subbureau, and for transmittal to each regional Party committee:

On the question of constitutional government:

1. Compelled by domestic and international conditions and the demand of public opinion, during the Eleventh Plenum¹ the Guomindang could not but permit implementation of a constitutional government within a year after the end of the war. It also permitted, with various limitations, discussion of the question of constitutional government in all places. Although its goal is to deceive the people in order to gain more time to stabilize Guomindang rule, still, as long as the people are permitted to discuss this, there is a possibility of gradually breaking through the restrictions imposed by the Guomindang and advancing the democratic movement a step forward.

2. The Central Committee has decided that our Party will participate in this kind of constitutional movement in the hopes of attracting all possible democratic elements to us and of achieving our goals of defeating the Japanese bandits and building a democratic country.

3. In addition to our Party representatives attending the sessions of the Constitutional Government Advancement Conference convened by the Guomindang in Chongqing, Yan'an has also convened a forum on constitutional government. Every base area may, at a suitable time, also convene forums composed mainly of people outside the Party in order to unite these people under the goal of genuine democracy. We should also explain our Party's policies

regarding the constitutional movement to cadres within our Party in order to prevent excessively leftist or rightist tendencies, and we should check on implementation of the “Three-Thirds” system.² We should do our best to consolidate democratic cooperation with people outside the Party.

Politburo of the Central Committee

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 90–91, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript.

¹. Referring to the Eleventh Plenum of the Fifth Congress of the Guomindang, held from September 6 to 13, 1943.

². Regarding the “Three-Thirds” system, see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942.

*Problems Concerning the Study of Lines, the Style of Work, and the Current Political Situation*¹

(March 5, 1944)

I. About the Study of Lines

1. Inner-Party problems and problems external to our Party.

Last year, during the Party's study of lines, several comrades suspected that the mistakes of Comrade Wang Ming and Comrade Bo Gu² were external to our Party. We have now determined that they are inner-Party problems.

2. The problem of legitimate or illegitimate.

In the past, some comrades considered the Provisional Central Committee³ and the Fifth Plenum⁴ illegitimate. Now we have seen Luo Fu⁵ saying in his self-examination notes that the Communist International [Comintern] sent telegrams approving both the Provisional Central Committee and the Fifth Plenum. On this basis, we should say that they were legitimate, although the election formalities were imperfect. The Provisional Central Committee should have reported the relevant circumstances after moving to the central soviet region, and it is not good that they did not do so. Once we have resolved the problems mentioned above, it will be easy for us to examine whether the Fourth Plenum⁶ was or was not marked by a mistake in the political line. The Fourth Plenum was recognized by the Comintern and the Central Committee. Thus its form was legitimate, but its political content was not good.

Dealing with these issues will help us to distinguish right from wrong in

politics and to achieve unity within the Party.

3. Problems of clarifying thought and magnanimity in judgment.

Our aim since the rectification has consistently been to cure the illness and save the patient. When we were ferreting out historical problems inside our Party, some suspected that we were not really following this orientation. Our current policy still is to clarify our thinking thoroughly, but to draw organizational conclusions carefully and appropriately.

In the course of our Party's past history, in addition to the struggle against the erroneous line of Zhang Guotao,⁷ two great struggles took place: that against Chen Duxiu's⁸ erroneous line, and that against Li Lisan's⁹ erroneous line. At that time, we did not thoroughly discuss the ideas involved, and yet we drew very serious conclusions. Therefore, we did not achieve the aim of curing the illness to save the patient. The overturned cart ahead did not warn the carts behind. This time, we must clarify our thinking. Currently, the Central Committee requires that we read five theoretical books¹⁰ dealing with the experience of world revolution. In the past, we did not seriously carry out the work of studying theory and history, and we only punished those who made mistakes. We did not clearly realize that the mistake of the [Li] Lisan line was not a problem of an individual but, rather, represented petty-bourgeois thought. Revolutionary impetuosity is an inherent characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie in a society where the petty bourgeoisie constitutes the majority. It is not an individual and arbitrary phenomenon but a social phenomenon. The social existence of the proletariat is also a necessity, and proletarian thought is the union of a revolutionary passion and a realistic spirit. The proletariat should use the methods of remolding and redeeming by persuasion to lead the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie to socialism. We should not adopt an impetuous policy of annihilation toward the petty bourgeoisie.

The most basic character of Chinese society is that the petty bourgeoisie constitutes the majority of the population. Our Party should deal with this problem carefully. The petty-bourgeois thought reflected within our Party, and the mistakes from this kind of thought, are social phenomena, not individual problems. This is a necessary phenomenon under certain historical circumstances. The Chinese Communist Party made the mistake of Right opportunism during the period of the Great Revolution, and the mistake of "Left" opportunism during

the Civil War. Similar circumstances have occurred in other parts of the world in the past. For example, the mistake of “Leftist” Blanquism was made during the period of the Paris Commune, and the mistake of Right opportunism was made during the period of the Second International. This pattern is caused by the fact that the policy of the bourgeoisie toward the proletariat may be reflected in the Party of the proletariat. For example, when the Chinese bourgeois Chiang Kaishek adopted the policy of allying with the Chinese Communist Party during the period of the War of Resistance, our Party easily made Rightist errors. During the Southern Anhui Incident,¹¹ we tended to make “Leftist” errors. Some people thought that it was another “Horse Day Incident”¹² and advocated that we carry out a country-wide insurrection, and so on. As soon as the bourgeoisie touches us, we jump.

Some of the comrades who took part in the work of the Central Committee after the Fourth Plenum did not take part in the Great Revolution, but they think themselves very clever. That is also one of the reasons that they made mistakes.

We should emphasize the social causes of such mistakes, rather than the problems of individuals, so that our organizational conclusions may be a bit more magnanimous. This policy should be immediately propagandized and explained in order to make comrades understand the necessity of carrying it out. Our Party will benefit only if thought is clear and conclusions are magnanimous. We will carry out this lenient policy because we are opposed to the erroneous orientation adopted during the inner-Party struggle after the Fourth Plenum. Otherwise, we will become students of the Fourth Plenum, and, in that case, we will be unable to clarify our thinking or learn from experience.

We are not permitted to draw conclusions at the Seventh Congress about problems during the War of Resistance. The Seventh Congress will only draw conclusions on the historical segment from the Fourth Plenum to the Zunyi Conference.¹³ This conclusion should focus on learning from experience, and should look toward the future. Rather than focusing on punishment, we should only give a political verdict so as to reach the goal of curing the illness to save the patient.

4. Do not negate everything.

Do not negate everything in the historical period from the Fourth Plenum to the Zunyi Conference. At that time, I worked together with Comrade Bo Gu and

Comrade Luo Fu. We had a common goal, which was to defeat Chiang Kaishek. We disagreed on how to defeat Chiang Kaishek; this was a disagreement about strategy. On the problem of land reform, we did not disagree on the decision of the Sixth Congress to confiscate the land belonging to the landlord class and to distribute it to peasants who had no land or who were short of land. The controversy centered on what to do after the confiscation. Bo [Gu], Luo [Fu], and others advocated that we should give bad land to the rich peasants, and none at all to the landlords, but I did not agree. It would be a deviation to negate everything in the past. We should analyze the problems and not just negate everything. When I wrote “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,”¹⁴ I also said that we should preserve the good things. Only this is simply seeking truth from facts.

5. The appraisal of the Sixth Congress.¹⁵

In this discussion, a few comrades try to negate the Sixth Congress. Some people say that the line of the Sixth Congress was basically wrong.

I consider that the line of the Sixth Congress was basically correct.¹⁶ The Sixth Congress pointed out the nature of the revolution, put forward ten political principles, pointed out that the situation at that time was between two high tides, opposed the theory of a quick victory, and pointed out that we should strive to win over the masses. The basic spirit of the Sixth Congress included the mass viewpoint. It is Li Lisan who did not want the masses. After war broke out among Chiang [Kaishek], Feng [Yuxiang], and Yan [Xishan],¹⁷ Li Lisan then came to believe that the revolutionary situation had reached a high tide and that an insurrection should be carried out, even under conditions in which the masses were not well prepared.

6. Are there or are there not still factions in our Party?

I believe that after going through several splits, there are none. After the split at the Zunyi Conference, the split in the early days of the War of Resistance, and the recent split, these factions no longer exist. Only such an estimate is in accordance with the facts and is beneficial to the unification of the whole Party.

At present, the more serious problem is the mountain-stronghold mentality. The main reasons for its existence are: (1) the vast numbers of the petty bourgeoisie; (2) revolutionary base areas in the countryside that have been cut off from one another for a long time; and (3) the lack of ideological education. Such

things seriously hinder our internal cooperation, especially in the relationships among Party, government, army, and the people. Those old cadres who took part in the Long March tend to emphasize the power that comes from the army, and this is reasonable. If the Red Army had not advanced northward at that time, we would not have such power as we have today and would only be able to carry out guerrilla war. Responsible local comrades should explain this point to local cadres. Responsible comrades from the south should also explain clearly to those cadres who came from outside that without a foundation consisting of local cadres, Party organs, and the masses in their locality, work cannot be done well. The whole of the Red Army on its northward advance consisted of only 25,000 people when it arrived in northern Shaanxi. Now, we have almost one million Party members, of whom only a minority are old members. Except for Comrade Wang Zhen,¹⁸ the regional Party committee under Yan'an consists mainly of local cadres. There are more northern cadres in the Northwestern Bureau and other regions, such as North China and Central China. Therefore, those cadres coming from outside should understand this point and pay attention to this problem. First, we should acknowledge the achievements of the cadres of the Red Army. In the beginning, local cadres treated the Eighth Route Army as though it consisted of "gods." After that, they thought that it was not worth a penny. Now we should have a negation of the negation. That is, they are not "gods," or we can say that they are "gods" who have some defects. Second, cadres from outside should talk more with local cadres, they should understand local history, and they should cooperate with local cadres. They should be conscious of this aspect. Now, the foundation consists of local cadres, and veteran cadres should consciously understand this point. Currently, the mountain-stronghold mentality is the most important and concrete problem within our Party. Historical problems have already ceased to be important.

II. The Problem of Work Style

Recently, some leaders have made progress in their work style. Such progress is gained by rectifying the Three Styles, investigating cadres, and studying lines.

For example, not only is the work of our unit done within the unit but also much of it extends outside it. In the past, many units of our Central Committee had no relationship with the local people. They had no “citizenship.” Some cadres also believed that they were fine timber put to petty use, and consequently they did not concentrate on their present work. Now the situation has changed somewhat. For example, the Women’s Committee has expressed a desire to interact more with the local masses. Those people who used to believe that they were fine timber put to petty use have also changed their thinking somewhat. Previously, there were some cadres who did not use their minds and were unable to analyze concrete problems. Instead, they only knew how to shout at the top of their voices and write big articles. The brain’s sole function is to think. It is a big drawback not to use the brain. Recently, the situation has changed somewhat. There has been some progress, especially in recent days. But the problems of work style are still severe as far as the whole Party is concerned. There are still quite a few people who separate themselves from the masses and do not think through problems in certain sectors.

Recently, we have been close to the masses in aspects of literature and art work and propaganda work. There have been some analytical articles in the newspapers. And newspapers have had some relationship with the masses. The work of the Party School and certain units has made some progress. Citizenship education is also being reformed.

The work of organizational departments had some formalism in the past. But there has been much progress after carrying out the mass line. The work of eliminating traitors has been changed. Its former method was for it to be done only by a few workers having specific duties. Now we have aroused the broad masses to take part in it and we have achieved new successes.

As for the workers movement, in the past we generally merely published some documents on the commemoration to mark the day. Now committees of workers have gone deep into the factories to conduct some surveys and research. They will achieve some success because they have really taken part in the workers movement in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

In the army, in the past the relationship between the troops and the people was very bad. This attitude changed after the Senior Cadres Conference.¹⁹ It has made great progress.

Now we pay attention to calculating the numbers, seeking truth from facts, and linking with the masses in all aspects of work. We have achieved greater successes, especially in aspects such as rectification, cadre investigation, and production. That is mainly because we carried out methods such as leading cadres being responsible and doing the work by themselves, leaders cooperating with the masses, and general calls being integrated with specific guidance. We should make every comrade understand that if the work style is not changed, not only will each individual not achieve success but also, from a broader perspective, our revolution will lose its future. All of us should have confidence that those comrades who used to have a bad work style and who made mistakes in the past can change. All of them have a bright future.

What good work methods are there? I think they are the kind of good work methods that we have recently seen in the labor heroes' rallies, labor heroes' and model workers' rallies, and labor heroes and combat heroes' rallies. During the period of the Civil War, some methods separated us from the masses and were coercive; they were not good. Some new content in recent heroes' and models' rallies really belongs to the masses and is compatible with specific situations. Labor heroes and model workers are models from the masses. We can make leading cadres, labor heroes, and model workers link together by holding these kinds of meetings. In the past, leading cadres separated themselves from the masses. They did not integrate activists in order to unify leading cadres and the masses. The standard of the model workers should be discussed among the masses. Now we should first carry out selection in several units. By doing this, we can make the leaders link with the masses. Some leading cadres in our units are not as good as the masses. Of course, there are also some good leading cadres. For example, common people called Assistant Director Ma "Clear Sky" when he carried out a joint case investigation.²⁰ We will hold labor hero rallies again in the border region this year. The labor heroes from all regions, combat heroes, and model workers in all aspects will attend. This is a good method created by the masses. It is a good kind of competitive method. It can improve the cadres, link them with the masses, and move our work forward. We should nurture and educate model workers. We should not make them arrogant or cause them to fall behind. We should select labor heroes or model workers in military companies and in all big or small units. This kind of method is a "challenge" to the leading

cadres at all levels. It gives the cadres the chance to learn something. For example, in military education we will select people who can throw hand grenades or can charge bayonets to teach others. This will force our cadres to go beyond their units. Those cadres should first abandon their haughty manner and break their individualistic heroism. They should forget that they are “leaders,” forget that they are members of the Central Committee, and go among the masses to learn. There was a person in our army who farmed 30 or 40 *mu* of land this year (he farmed only 18 *mu* last year). He could produce 6 *dan* of grain: 4 *dan* of it belonged to the public, 2 *dan* belonged to him. Every person in Yangjialing on average could produce 1 *dan* and 5 *dou*. We now carry out the Red institution of sharing bonuses both with the public and with the private. This is a new principle, created by the masses themselves.

In a word, we should put aside our haughty manners and open our minds to think through more problems in order to construct a good work style.

III. The Recent Political Situation and Our General Policy

Our general policy is to make the Guomindang unable either to capitulate or to fight a civil war. We are not willing to fight a civil war. We carried out a political offensive in the second half of last year. As a result, we forced the Eleventh Plenum of the Guomindang to issue a declaration that it will use political methods to solve the problem of the Chinese Communist Party. It is possible that there will be no civil war this year. This year is very important. We will hold the Seventh Congress. We will be engaged in production. We will continue our rectification and anti-spy campaigns. All these things should be finished this year. Now we are still in a difficult position. We still have a lot of difficulties, for example, economic difficulties, the work of rectification within the Party, and the anti-spy struggle that has still not been completed. We need a year of peaceful circumstances to finish this work. If we compare this year with last year, the situation is rather different: (1) There are the successes of the Moscow Conference and the Tehran Conference²¹ this year. The Soviet Union and the

United States are cooperating very well and are very enthusiastic now. It seems that there are some contradictions between the Soviet Union and England. One faction thinks England has no independent diplomacy, for example, as regards the problem of Poland and the problem of Yugoslavia. But both England and the United States declared that this will not affect the opening of the second front. Although there are some disagreements in international relationships, they will not affect the basis of the Tehran Conference. (2) Japan has decided that it will not attack the Soviet Union. This kind of international situation affects China. It reduces the possibilities of a civil war. Our policy is to follow the defensive and to “gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck.” (3) Recently, the Guomintang changed its plan for attacking the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Four main divisions have left the area around the border region. (4) Our situation has also changed. Our troops carried out winter training. Our production has achieved some success. The relationship between the troops and the people has improved. Last year, we carried out current affairs education (i.e., class education) and unified our Party. Our ordnance production has developed. We are now able to make steel. We have trained our troops in self-defense. Our forces have increased by two brigades. Under the four international or national conditions mentioned above, the possibility of avoiding a civil war has increased. Recently, the Guomintang asked Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade Lin Boqu²² to go to Chongqing to negotiate. We answered that Venerable Lin could go first. They said “Welcome.” Our policy is to avoid civil war and to concentrate on the War of Resistance. We should pay more attention to associating with Gao Shuangcheng²³ in the north and to improving the relationship with the associated staff officers. Foreign reporters will soon come to Yan’an. We should be prepared to show them around. We should adopt the policy of establishing a good relationship with the Guomintang, that is, to carrying out “Confucius plays mahjong—peace is precious.”²⁴

Dialectics has been the rule in this process. When we carried out the political offensive toward the Guomintang last year, we primarily emphasized the aspect of criticizing the Guomintang. Now we should mainly relax our relationship with the Guomintang. The two aspects should not be emphasized and formulated at the same time. Otherwise, it will be merely formal logic.

The Guomintang’s prerequisite for negotiation with us is based on the *hao*

telegram²⁵ that we should reduce our armies proportionally. We proposed that our army could be reorganized into four armies, twelve divisions. Our principles are the Three People's Principles and the Four Promises.²⁶ Our Seventh Congress should also grasp the Three People's Principles and the Four Promises and emphasize avoiding civil war, concentrating forces in the anti-Japanese war and emphasizing peace after the war. We can only reopen the door to negotiation if we now base it on the *hao* telegram (though not completely). Our first step will be first to dispatch Venerable Lin to open the door to negotiations. But concrete negotiations will be held in the second half of this year.

On the question of constitutional government, our policy is to take part in the constitutional movement. On the "March 12" commemoration of Sun Yatsen's death, both Enlai and Venerable Lin will give speeches. They will emphasize local self-government, civil rights, and the lifting of the ban on other parties.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 92–103, where it is reproduced from the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

1. This is a speech delivered by Mao Zedong at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee. The public version of these points was delivered by Mao in Yan'an on April 12, 1944 (see text below) and is included in his *Selected Works*.

2. On Wang Ming, see above, note to the text of October 14, 1943. On Bo Gu, pseudonym of Qin Bangxian, see above, note to the first text of September 15, 1942; he was at this time editor-in-chief of *Jiefang ribao* and the New China News Agency.

3. Referring to the Provisional Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, established in September 1931.

4. Referring to the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in mid-January 1934 in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province. This plenum came to be seen as the summit of the "leftist" line.

5. Luo Fu, pseudonym of Zhang Wentian (1900–1976), was at this time a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee.

[6.](#) Referring to the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held on January 7, 1931 in Shanghai, at which Wang Ming, with the support of the Comintern, assumed leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

[7.](#) Zhang Guotao (1897–1979) participated in the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 and was one of the major leaders of the Party in its early history. During the Long March, he came into sharp conflict with Mao Zedong and took a different path (see Vol. V, *passim*). When he and the remnants of his army finally sought refuge in Yan’an in 1936, he was appointed to major offices in the Party and in the Border Region Government, but he enjoyed no real power. In April 1938, when he was sent to participate in a ceremony in Xi’an honoring the Yellow Emperor, he took advantage of the occasion to travel directly to Hankou to place himself under the protection of the Guomindang.

[8.](#) For that earlier discussion on Party history and on Chen Duxiu, see above, the text of March 30, 1942.

[9.](#) On Li Lisan, see above, the text of March 30, 1942.

[10.](#) The five books include *Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Marx and Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and scientific* by Engels, *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* and *Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder* by Lenin, and *Short Course on the History of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks)* by Stalin.

[11.](#) On the Southern Anhui Incident, see above, note to the text of July 21, 1943.

[12.](#) The reference is to the massacre of large numbers of peasants in Hunan by forces under the command of the Guomindang general Xu Kexiang on May 21, 1927 (a “day of the horse” according to the traditional Chinese calendar). For Mao’s own contemporary account, see the document dated June 13, 1927, in Vol. II, pp. 14–17.

[13.](#) The Zunyi Conference was held from January 15 to 17, 1935, in Zunyi, Guizhou Province, during the Long March. This conference marked the return of Mao to a central leadership position. The historical resolution mentioned here was passed at the time of the Seventh Congress; see below, the text of April 20, 1945.

[14.](#) A textbook originally for internal use by the Eighth Route Army but openly published in Yan’an in 1941. It is dated December 1936 and is translated in Vol. V, pp. 465–538.

[15.](#) The Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Moscow in June and July 1928 because it was too dangerous to meet in China after Chiang Kaishek’s crackdown on the Communists beginning in April 1927.

[16.](#) The “Political Resolution of the Sixth National Congress [of the Chinese Communist Party] (July 9,

928)” is translated in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 341–58.

[17.](#) Referring to the large-scale war between Chiang Kaishek, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Xishan from May to October 1930.

[18.](#) On Wang Zhen, see above, note to the text of October 14, 1943; at this time in addition to being the commander and commissar of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, he was secretary of the Yan’an Regional Party Committee.

[19.](#) Referring to the Senior Cadres Conference held in Yan’an by the Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee from October 19, 1942, to January 14, 1943.

[20.](#) Referring to Ma Xiwu (1889–1962), a Shaanxi local serving at that time in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region Government. “Clear Sky” (*qing tian*) is a popular phrase referring to an upright official.

[21.](#) The Moscow Conference was held in Moscow from October 19 to October 30, 1943, and attended by the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain. The conference mainly addressed issues of shortening the war and peace after the war. Regarding the Tehran Conference (held at the end of November 1943), see above, note to the text of December 16, 1943.

[22.](#) On Lin Boqu, see above, note to the text of September 15, 1942; at this time he was a member of the Central Committee in addition to being chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government.

[23.](#) Gao Shuangcheng (1882–1945) was at this time commander of the Guomindang Twenty-second Army.

[24.](#) Mao is making a pun; the character in this sentence can be read *hu* and is called out when one wins at mahjong. However, the same character is most often read *he*, which means “peace.” Thus, in one character Mao is suggesting a sort of victorious peace, as the same phrase can be read as both “peace is precious” and “victory is precious.”

[25.](#) The *hao* telegram refers to a telegram sent by Chiang Kaishek to the leaders of the Eighth Route Army on October 19, 1940; see above, note to the text of March 16, 1943.

[26.](#) The Four Promises are the four items proposed by the Chinese Communist Party in “Announcement of Guomindang-Communist Cooperation by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” dated July 15, 1937 (in the name of Zhou Enlai), but not publicly released until September 22, 1937, by the Guomindang’s Central News Agency. The text is available in the English version of the *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, Vol.1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981), pp. 93–95, and in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 771–773, with the Four Promises on pp. 772–773, in short: upholding the Three People’s Principles, ceasing anti-Guomindang agitation, halting land reform, and changing the Red Army into a branch of the Guomindang military structure.

Chen Yi Made Contributions During the Civil War and the War of Resistance (March 15, 1944)

Comrade [Rao] Shushi¹ and for transmittal to all comrades in the Central China Bureau and the Branch Military Committee:

Comrade Chen Yi² has arrived at Yan'an, and we now know about the development of work in Central China. We are much comforted. The dispute between Comrades Chen and Rao is only part of their work relationship; they talked things through face to face before Chen left, and things now are fine. The Central Committee entirely believes that, under the leadership of Comrades Chen and Rao and all the comrades in the Central China Bureau and the Branch Military Committee, you can unite as one to carry out the line of the Central Committee and strive for victory in the war. With regard to the dispute in western Fujian during the Civil War, this debate was in the realm of a few individual problems; it was not about the general line. It also has already been resolved correctly. As for the work in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu during the War of Resistance: Comrade Chen carried out the line of the Central Committee. He cannot be lumped together with Comrade Xiang Ying.³ During both the Civil War and the War of Resistance, Comrade Chen made contributions, and he did not make mistakes of line. If some comrades are not clear about the two points mentioned above, we request that Comrade [Rao] Shushi explain things to them.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 104–5, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1.](#) Rao Shushi was at this time acting secretary of the Central China Bureau and the acting commissar of the New Fourth Army. See above, note to the text of January 5, 1943.

[2.](#) Chen Yi was at this time acting commander of the New Fourth Army. See above, note to the text of January 5, 1943.

[3.](#) On Xiang Ying, see above, note to the text of October 5, 1943.

Cultural Education Problems in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region¹ (March 22, 1944)

Today I want to discuss with you comrades the question of culture and education. I have not thoroughly studied this issue; I've just heard some things here and there that I want to bring up in order to give us a place to start. We will be discussing many issues at the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Senior Cadres Conference. Although cultural education problems are not scheduled for discussion, I think that we should put them on our agenda for our Senior Cadres Conference this winter and that they should be an important part of our agenda.

In recent years, the border region has achieved much. This is especially true with regard to last year's production. This year, if the rainfall is sufficient, we will possess the requisite natural conditions, and the Senior Cadres Conference has made ideological preparations for it, so our work will go even better. In terms of the environment, we are better off this year than we were last year; we will probably not have the clashes that we had then. [U.S. president Franklin] Roosevelt does not approve of us Chinese clashing like that. Chairman Chiang [Kaishek] does not want to fight, and we want to even less. No one wants to fight, so naturally no fighting will be launched. This is what is called "peace is precious." The environment of the border region is like this. We raised our slogan long ago: it is "War, Production, Education." Even as we fight the Japanese imperialists behind enemy lines, we can simultaneously make advances in construction, production, and education. The border region is not enduring the conditions of war and so we can directly work on the two tasks of production and education. There is also the task of education in the armed forces: political, military, and cultural education. This winter there will be a large training session.

A few years ago, when Comrade Chen Xuezhao² first arrived in the border region, she said that many things here were constructed poorly. She said that the Communists knew how to take care of military matters but were less able to construct the country. She said this three years ago. Was she right? I think she was. We are not bad when it comes to politics and military matters, but at that time we indeed did not really know what to do when it came to production and construction. Everyone should think about what our achievements in the realm of production were three years ago. If we had managed our production well, then maybe “Wild Lilies”³ would not have been written. Three years ago, everyone’s food was bad, many people were ill, and it was said that half the students at the Lu Xun Academy of Arts and Literature would fall asleep during class, probably because the vitamin content of millet was inadequate.

During the Civil War and the early days of the War of Resistance, our Party learned how to fight and how to wage war. We are relatively good at politics and military matters; of course, we still have a few problems, but we are more familiar with these two courses of study than we are with economics and culture. We have done a little economics already because if we had not we would not have been able to fight. If you want to be able to fight, you must first have rice to eat. So, the fact that we have been able to fight in the past is because we have done a little economics. In the past, the central Chinese soviet areas also did a little in the way of culture. For example, they had navy dances, which some of the comrades here have seen. They also set up reading groups, newspapers, and schools. But we cannot say that the entire Party has mastered cultural activities, so these activities have not really achieved a whole lot. When we speak of ordinary people, there are some right now in northern Shaanxi whose food is bad, and there are still many who do not have enough to eat. In the border region, having sufficient food and clothing is still a goal that only some people have achieved. But during the past year, production and economics have gotten on track. This is a major prerequisite, and it is a new thing. The agenda of this year’s Senior Cadres Conference includes financial and economic issues because although economics has gotten on track, we still have not yet mastered the subject. We must continue to learn.

Cultural issues have not yet been included on the agenda for this conference. In the border region’s Party committees and government, and even a few of its

management units, such as those for propaganda—none of these have included cultural education issues on their agenda—there are still some comrades who do not know what to do in these areas. For example, I have heard that some of the propaganda departments at the *xian* and the regional levels do know what to do and in fact do things well enough, but some do not know what to do. Right now the situation is like this: We know what to do when it comes to military and political affairs, but not when it comes to economics and culture. What will happen if we do not know how to perform in culture and economics? If we do not understand this, then the Communist Party will be essentially useless. It will still be slightly useful: It is good at smashing old things, at attacking the enemy, and at defeating the enemy, but it will not be greatly useful. This is because if you do not master economics and culture, then not everyone will be able to eat their fill of grain, and ordinary people will not have pork to eat, will be illiterate, and won't be able to perform the *yangge* dances. The *yangge* still exists to an extent, but how to disseminate it is a problem. There is still much to do in terms of culture; we must set up reading groups, we must sing and write Spring Festival couplets, and so on. Therefore, things will be bad if we do not master economics and culture.

During the Civil War and the early days of the War of Resistance, and even right now, a way of thinking still exists among some comrades, which is that political and military affairs are the most important thing, and culture and economics are only of secondary importance. Are there grounds for thinking like this? Indeed, political and military affairs are the most important; if you do not defeat the enemy, then you will not be able to concern yourself with millet or rice or *yangge* because the enemy will still be oppressing you. Can you still run schools and produce under the oppression of the enemy? So, of course, defeating the enemy comes first. Since this is the case, those whose job it is to fight the enemy are held in high esteem and are popular, whereas those who produce millet and work on the *yangge* are not much sought after; during meetings they never sit at the head of the table, and the election presidium has no seats for them. If we do not defeat the enemy, we will not be able to produce millet or other things, and so the job of fighting the enemy should come first. But we should know that politics is the superstructure and economics the base. Politics is like a house, and economics is the foundation. Why do we meddle with politics,

government, and the military? In order to smash the old politics, government, and military that block the development of the productive forces. Japanese imperialists occupy our land. What productive forces do we have that we can develop? This is what blocking the development of the productive forces is. If we do not eradicate the old politics and military affairs that block the development of productive forces, then we will not be able to liberate the productive forces and the economy will not be able to develop. Therefore, the first task is to defeat the old politics and military affairs that obstruct the development of the productive forces. And the sole reason that we engage in political and military affairs is to liberate the forces of production. All comrades who have studied the social sciences understand that the most basic issue is the upward development of the forces of production. It is because of this that we have for many years engaged in political and military matters. Marxist social science also is primarily occupied with discussing this issue: that is, how the forces of production have developed over the course of history. Culture is the manifestation of politics and economics, and it also leads politics and economics; it reflects military matters and also guides them. Today in the border region we have two kinds of *yangge* dances. One is old and reflects old politics and economics; one is new and reflects new politics and economics. There is a *yangge* called “Zhao Fugui,” and there is another one called “Zhang Zhiguo.”⁴ I have heard that after the performance in Wuqi, a soldier from the Third Guard Brigade bound his hands together and ran to his commander and requested to be punished. Why did he ask to be punished? He said, “I wanted to desert. Not only did I want to desert, but I wanted to organize others to desert as well.” Then he said that he had sewn a lot of money into his clothes. He demanded to be punished. But since he had confessed everything on his own, of course he was not punished. This is an example of the strength of our culture. Why couldn’t those grand operas and novels of a few years ago give rise to this kind of strength? Because they did not reflect the politics and economics of the border region. In the past, hundreds and thousands of authors, artists, and people of culture were alienated from the masses. But after the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art, they worked all last year on these ideas, and they gradually mastered them. As soon as they did so, the broad masses welcomed them. What I mean by “mastered” is that they know how to reflect the lives of the masses and how to genuinely to reflect the politics and economics of

the border region. This enables them to fulfill the function of leading. The relationships among politics, military affairs, economics, and culture are as follows: the strength of politics and military affairs is a strength with which to overthrow the obstacles to the development of the productive forces. The goal of overthrowing these obstacles is to liberate the forces of production and to develop the economy. Economics is the foundation of politics and military affairs; politics and military affairs are the superstructure. The foundation is economics, and the essential goal is to develop the economy. The reason politics and military affairs come first is that without them, the forces of production will not be able to achieve liberation, and there will be no possibility of talking about other issues. Culture is the reflection of political and economic struggle, but at the same time it is able to guide political and economic struggle. We must not have too little culture. Any society that lacks culture cannot be established. Feudal society had feudal culture; feudal culture propagated the principles of feudalism. Capitalist societies have capitalist culture; if they did not, they, too, would not be able to become established. Right now, China is not yet a capitalist country; capitalism is not dominant. Therefore, Chinese culture is very weak. In true capitalist countries, capitalist culture raises the level of productive technology. Right now we are establishing a new democratic society whose character is capitalist but also is of the popular masses; it is not socialist, nor is it the old kind of capitalism. It is new capitalism or, in other words, new democracy. Such a society also needs culture. For example, if you set up work-exchange teams and cooperatives, you must keep accounts, and to do so you need culture. For a village to set up a work-exchange team, at least one person who can write the names of everyone in the village is necessary. In a word, culture is necessary. During the time of the Northern Expedition, the new troops were better than the old. This is related to the establishment of the Huangpu [Whampoa] Military Academy. At that time, most of the students at the Huangpu Academy were young, and these youths had both knowledge and revolutionary fervor. They had culture, and the other troops could not compare to them. In addition to possessing a revolutionary spirit, revolutionary troops must also have knowledge. If they do not, and their cultural and political levels are not raised, then it will also be impossible to raise the quality of the troops.

To what level has the border region developed now? I think that if we do not

develop culture, then our economy, politics, and military affairs will all be hindered. Now we've been dragged to a standstill; backward things are dragging down good things. For example, illiteracy and the inability to keep accounts are obstructing the development of our economy, politics, and military matters. If we all knew how to read and our culture was higher, then we would progress even faster. Therefore, I propose that from now on we must bring up the question of cultural development, and I ask everyone to think it over and look into it. When winter comes around this year, we should have a meeting for eight or ten days to open up a discussion. Next year, we will do things a bit better. We should have a five-year plan; last year will count as the first year, and this year as the second. During these five years, we will entirely eradicate illiteracy among the 1.4 million ordinary people of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the 100,000 members of the Party, government, and military: a total of 1.5 million people. This will raise the cultural level of the people of the border region to the necessary level. What must we do to achieve this goal? I think that in general there are four issues here: newspapers, schools, art, and hygiene. I will now discuss each of these separately.

First: newspapers.

At present, senior comrades, and even some middle-level comrades, all have a similar feeling about newspapers, which is that if they do not have newspapers, they cannot do their jobs well. When their meals arrive, so do their newspapers. Some read the paper before they eat. One comrade, who was born into a local family of workers and farmers, told me that he always reads his paper before eating. If in every *xian* the number of comrades like this could be increased to fifteen or twenty, then we would do our work better. *Liberation Daily* [*Jiefang ribao*] has become an organizer in the border region. Without this newspaper, it would be very difficult to work in this sparsely populated, vast area, which is one of the most backward places in the country. With *Liberation Daily*, it is possible to organize the political and cultural life of the entire border region. There is also *Border Region Masses Daily* [*Bianqu qunzhong bao*], whose distribution is even greater, and which even more people read. There are also many local newspapers in the border region that are run by the prefectural Party committees. I have seen central Shaanxi's and Suide's newspapers, and I have heard that eastern Gansu and Sanbian also have their own newspapers. The newspapers of central Shaanxi

and Suide seem to be pretty good; the news is written and edited well. I have not seen the newspapers of eastern Gansu and Sanbian yet. The reason local papers are necessary is that if we only have a *Liberation Daily*, then a *Border Region Masses Daily* is still not enough. Wherever a newspaper is established, things can be made known even more directly and quickly. I think that this is good. Our comrades in the prefectural Party committees should take newspapers into their own hands and use them as a weapon with which to organize all their work and to make known politics, military matters, and economics; they should make newspapers into a weapon with which to guide politics, military matters, and economics and to organize and educate the masses. We must focus our energy on this task and advance it with each passing year. Does every brigade of ours have its own newspaper? I know that the central Shaanxi brigade has one, and the 359th Brigade also has one. I have heard that some regiments also have newspapers, but the *xian* still do not. Can't we publish newspapers in every *xian*? We still have absolutely no experience with this. And, after all, is it really necessary? I think it is unnecessary in some places, like Yan'an for example, because *Liberation Daily* and *Border Region Masses Daily* are published there. Is it necessary in some of the *xian* that are far from Yan'an? For example, some prefectural Party committees could publish mimeographed newspapers and each ask an intellectual to assume the responsibilities involved. Such papers could come out periodically or at irregular intervals. One person would probably be enough for everything from editing to distribution, including making the original steel plate. What should we print in these papers? For example, we have here a man named Shen Changlin,⁵ and the things he has done could be published. There's also a man named Chen Defa⁶ who could be written about without waiting for *Liberation Daily*. Comrades should consider this idea. You, of course, should not think that Yangjialing has had a meeting about this and that therefore an order has been issued for everyone to set up a newspaper; if it is not necessary, then do not do it. We could also first set up papers in a few *xian* to try things out.

In the past we mastered one way of working: that is, holding meetings. This way of doing work is practiced everywhere, and for many years now we have not cast it aside. If you now begin to use the method of newspapers, then it will be possible to disseminate much wisdom and many role models via the newspapers. We must now learn how to use this work method. In the border

region right now, holding meetings is the most important work method. If we publish newspapers, we will be able to save ourselves from having to hold so many meetings. We can discuss so many issues in a newspaper that it will serve as a meeting or a training group, and all sorts of directives can be sent via the newspapers rather than by letter. So newspapers can also be an important method of work and education. Wall newspapers are also a kind of newspaper, and publishing wall newspapers can also serve as an important work method. But we still do not know how to use this type of newspaper; we still have not come out with a sensational revolutionary wall newspaper that will attract everyone in Yan'an to come look at it. I think that a canteen unit of, say, one hundred people, could come up with a wall newspaper. There will always be a leader of the unit who can use the wall newspaper as his own weapon for organizing work, educating the masses, inspiring the initiative of the masses, and writing his own editorials. At present, some wall newspapers are not done well and are read only by the people who know how to write articles. Could we hold a meeting on wall newspapers? For example, right now there are two hundred organizations that are making wall newspapers. An editor and a leader should come from every one of them, so we will have a meeting of more than four hundred people. The leaders must attend this meeting. Only if the leaders take responsibility and do things themselves will the wall newspapers be done well. We must make wall newspapers that have both a revolutionary content and also a vivid and lively style so that they become a way of working that will organize the work of every organization.

If we run newspapers in this way, then there will be about a thousand newspapers of one sort or another throughout the border region. This could be called "the entire Party running newspapers." Organizations can run papers, too, and both Party members and non-Party members may participate in them. This could be called "an alliance between Party members and non-Party members." If this happens, then our newspapers would be extremely useful. In the past, we have not paid enough attention to this idea, but now the leaders of every organization should take charge and use the newspapers as their own excellent way of working. There is a lot of political and economic work that we could do much better if we set up good newspapers.

Second: schools.

Yesterday, news about Yan'an Elementary School appeared in the paper. It was very good news. This sort of good news is much more useful than our talking a lot because this elementary school has already produced practical achievements which we should broadcast to the entire country. This elementary school is run very well. In the past, many elementary schools were not run well and were not popular with the masses, but we still insisted on keeping them. That was commandism. There was a teacher in Yangjialing whom I asked, after he had been teaching for about a year, whether people understood the classes that he taught. He said that people did not really understand, but he still insisted on teaching. I say that we Communists must learn something, which is that we will not teach what people will not listen to. The Education Department had a meeting at which they declared that schools should be run by the people themselves. I think that this is very good. Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu⁷ told me that schools should only be run by villages. I have heard that in Chen Defa's township there are twenty-five natural villages but only one elementary school. Students must walk several dozen *li* in order to study, which is very inconvenient. There was another piece of news in the paper yesterday, saying that Suojiaya village will establish an elementary school that will adopt the system of three terms in one year. During the busy farming season, the school will be closed so that students can help their families with the farming. In this way, they both study and help their families. And at the same time, there is no danger of their becoming government employees [*gongjiaren*]. In the countryside, it is more convenient if each village sets up an elementary school. If every township sets up an elementary school, then children must board at school, which will require that they bring grain. If they eat at home, 6 or 7 *dou* of grain are enough; if they have to bring grain to school they will need 1 *dan* and 3 *dou*. And all they will learn is something about "ten thousand nations in the world and the nine divisions of ancient China," none of which comes from the peasants' real needs. Moreover, they also will run the risk of becoming government employees, which would be inappropriate. To become an employee of the revolution is a natural process—just as when the militia become guerrilla troops, and when the guerrilla troops became regular troops; it is a natural process. Now, it is a little unnatural. For someone to join our work and to become alienated from production is as if a piece of flesh has been cut off from the body; it is very abrupt. It is possible for us

to think of a way to resolve the question of teachers. We can organize reading groups. The border region previously organized reading groups, but they failed. I think that they did not actually do it properly. This is like the situation when the idea of increasing the grain tax revenue on flour and rice by 400,000 *dan* was raised; the idea was raised, but no one took charge of how to increase the amount of grain. But the year before last, the Senior Cadres Conference⁸ raised the idea of increasing tax revenue on flour and rice by 80,000 *dan*, and in the end it increased it by 160,000 *dan*. This occurred because in January of last year, Wu Manyou's⁹ plan to tax according to the different household circumstances appeared in the newspaper. The Construction Department found him and held a three-day meeting. Only after understanding Wu Manyou did we see how many more *dan* we should ask of the border region, and how we should go about increasing the amount collected. I think that the so-called failure of the reading groups was because there was no specific direction and the production movement among the masses had not yet developed. Things are different now; there is a demand for them among the people. If we issue an appeal for support, we will be able gradually to expand [the reading groups]. We have the following overarching plan: In northern Shaanxi there are 350,000 households and 1.4 million people. Within ten years, we will eradicate all illiteracy there. People will learn one character a day. There are 365 days in a year, so they will learn 365 characters. After ten years, they will know 3,650 characters. A period of ten years can be divided into two five-year plans. During each five-year plan, every person should learn 2,000 characters. Everyone knowing 2,000 characters is close to having eliminated illiteracy. On this foundation, within five years a population of 1.4 million will be able to read *Border Region Masses Daily*. Since we will extend things for another five years, within ten years it will be possible for everyone to be able to read *Border Region Masses Daily*. We Communists are famous for our lofty ambitions. In ten years, we want every one of the people to be able to read *Border Region Masses Daily* and one-third of them to be able to read *Liberation Daily*. If one-third of a population of 1.4 million can read *Liberation Daily*, it will have to be printed in large numbers. I am afraid that when this happens, we will have to build many paper mills. In the past, we ate steamed cornbread, wore rags, and were freezing to death; how could we think about learning to read? Things are different now. We have made great progress in production. If we do this for

another year, we should start thinking about cultural work. I think we should do some [cultural work] this winter because the people demand it. We could, for example, have winter school for three or four months. It is not easy to do this in the spring or summer, since people are terribly busy going to the hills to till the land. Let us mobilize this winter and lay a foundation, and next year there will be even more progress. To raise the cultural level and to eliminate illiteracy we must rely on reading groups. Of course, willingness is also our principle. At the beginning, we might as well organize one or two groups, invite a few people to learn to read. Of course, knowing how to read is better than not knowing, so those who learn will feel more confident. We then should choose some model students and reward them with some towels. They will know how to read and also will have some towels. If we do this for two years, it will become an established practice.

Which people will teach? Common people will teach common people. Right now among our troops, officers teach soldiers, soldiers teach soldiers, and soldiers teach officers. Last year, after training in Yan'an for five days, some cadres went back to train soldiers. One company has one hundred people, and there is always a good soldier among them. A cadre could compete with him, and as he would not necessarily win, he could have the soldier teach. In the reading groups, the people can teach the people. Someone who knows ten characters can be the group leader; someone who knows one hundred characters can be the committee chair.

We should also edit some books; we should put together some books regarding knowledge of production and such to serve as teaching materials. Students should master how to use an abacus, how to write a letter, how to keep accounts, and how to write travel permits. In this way, the families of the students will see that the students can do everything after only a few days of study at elementary school. This will be better than the situation of students in the past. Back then, as soon as we emerged from school, we thought we were so great; we pushed ourselves forward and felt self-satisfied.

We should also advocate paternal kindness and filial piety. I used to argue about this with my father. He said I was not filial, and I said he was not kind. I said that the first thing is for fathers to be kind, and filial piety comes second; these are two sides of the same coin. If a father beats his son until he cannot see straight, how can the son practice filial piety? This is the dialectics of Confucius.

This year when we celebrated [International] Women's Day on March 8, we brought up the idea of constructing model households. This is one great measure of the progress of the Communist Party. We advocate household harmony in which fathers are kind and children are filial, and older brothers are loving and younger brothers are respectful. Each side helps the other and everyone lives harmoniously.

Elementary schools have now decided on the policy of being run by the people. This is very good. In addition to this, there are also those run by the government. There are six higher-level middle schools and normal schools run by the government. It is unprecedented in history that the border region, with its population of 1.4 million, should have six normal schools and middle schools; this only came about during the era of the Communist Party. Along the line from Suide to Mizhi, education historically has been rather developed, and it may be that right now the situation is not quite as good as it was in the past. As for Sanbian and Longdong, the situation is now completely different: Sanbian now has normal schools and this is a great step forward. We now hand over the power to the prefectural commissioner's offices and the prefectural Party committees. You must look after things now, and you must do it well.

In terms of which teaching methods to use, teachers must teach their classes according to the circumstances of their students. For teachers not to follow the demands of their students, but instead to teach entirely according to what they themselves want, is not acceptable. Teachers must also learn from their students; they cannot merely teach their students. I think that we now are in need of a system, called the Thirty-Seveny System. In this system, teachers will first learn 70 percent from the students, understand their histories, personalities, and needs and afterward teach 30 percent to the students. This system may sound very new, but actually it has been around for a long time. Confucius used it to teach. He answered the same question differently to Zilu and Ranyou.¹⁰ Zilu had an impatient personality, and Confucius's answer was meant to slow him down. Ranyou had a slow personality, and Confucius tried to speed him up with his answer. I have heard that last year Yan'an held a training session that lasted about a month, in which township heads and branch secretaries were all gathered together for training. What were they taught? They were taught some of the materials that appeared in *Liberation Daily* during the months of July, August,

and September of last year, and “A Comparison Between the Achievements of the Communists and the Guomindang During the War of Resistance.”¹¹ Should we teach these things? Yes. “A Comparison Between the Achievements of the Communists and the Guomindang During the War of Resistance” has special educational significance. But merely teaching these few things is not enough; to go to the rural villages and only to be able to talk about a comparison of the achievements in the War of Resistance is not sufficient to accomplish anything. We should teach them how to work, so that they will understand how a branch secretary and a township head should work, and so they will know that their work methods and ways cannot always be the old ones but, rather, should accord with the situations in front of them. As for the schools in Yan’an, for example, the Central Party School, Yan’an University, and the School of Administration, they must also emphasize integrating with reality. Every school, from the Central Party School, Yan’an University, and the Administration Institute, to the elementary schools in every village, must do this. I’ve heard that the two Departments of Propaganda¹² are paying attention to this issue; that is very good. Education right now includes, on the one hand, popular education, including social and literary education, and, on the other hand, cadre education. With these two types of education, we can turn the whole border region into a large school; every township will be a school. All the common people and cadres will study production and culture in this large school. Within a few years, the culture of the masses in the border region will be higher than that in other places; it will be higher than that in large cities such as Wuhan and Chongqing. We just need to do this well, and we can do it well within five or ten years. We will have made great progress and will have developed greatly.

This is no idle talk.

Third: art.

The *yangge* is one item. There are also Spring Festival couplets, songs, and New Year’s pictures.

When the Yangjialing *Yangge* Troupe went to Ansai for a few days to perform, a fundamental problem was solved. In the past, intellectuals from other places were estranged from the local common people. But when the Yangjialing *Yangge* Troupe performed in Ansai, several of the labor heroes also participated and jumped in with the troupe. I think this is very good. The labor heroes felt that

your *Yangge* Troupe was singing their praises, and this eradicated their previous estrangement. Yesterday, *Liberation Daily* printed Zhou Yang's article, which discusses *yangge*. It is worth reading. At present, *yangge* has not been popularized. This year, people in Yan'an watched *yangge* until they were sick of it, but common people all over the border region have not seen enough of it yet. They demand to see *yangge* plays performed three times. I therefore think that we can organize a few more *yangge* troupes. We can set up one per township, and with new content. One region can have one, two, three, or four—there is no limit. We should do it this winter. This is just what I think; it is not a regulation. Comrades can think it over. I think that during the tenth lunar month Yan'an's intellectuals should hold numerous meetings to study how to continue investigation and work. The comrades of the Women's Committee of Yangjialing studied spinning for only two weeks, and when they got to the villages they were greatly welcomed by the women there. If you do not study this basic ability, how can you organize women? You say you are revolutionary, so you need to study the basic skills. This winter, intellectuals from schools in Yan'an will all go to the countryside to do the work of the masses, to help the masses perform *yangge*, to set up winter schools, to set up training classes, to draw up individual household plans, and so on. They will work there for three months and will truly learn some basic skills. I think that these people should be liberated for a little while; every year we can follow this system. It can be both vacation travel and attending the "classroom," which is the border region. There is one condition, which is that if you go, you must help the masses; you cannot hinder them. We did a lot of stupid things in the past, things that got in the way of people doing their spinning, looking after their babies. When you go to the countryside this time, you must "eat the food that is there and cut the clothes according to the figure."

There are 350,000 families in the border region. If every house were to hang a Spring Festival couplet with new content, then the face of the border region would take on a new appearance. Comrades in the two Propaganda Departments should study this issue. We should compile books for writing Spring Festival couplets and come up with some new couplets. New Spring Festival couplets are literacy and political textbooks for the masses; 350,000 couplets with similar content but perhaps different words are an important aspect of the masses' cultural activities. Should we also make up a few songs to sing? We could, for

example, write three or five songs that the 1.4 million people here could all sing and whose meaning they could understand. I think this is also a kind of learning and a way to eradicate illiteracy, similar to the writing of Spring Festival couplets. We could also come up with some New Year's pictures.

In a word, our art should do things that are really welcome by the common people. Right now, they do not even have Spring Festival couplets, and we still are just talking about raising their level. This can only be empty talk. The major problem in the border region is still the problem of how to popularize learning. The artistic lives of the masses are impoverished, and we comrades who are engaged in cultural work must make efforts on many fronts.

Fourth: hygiene.

The problem of hygiene is a very serious one in the lives of the masses in the border region. I will now discuss it as a cultural problem. The Spring Festival propaganda this year, including the *yangge* performed by the General Sanitation Office at Ansai, demonstrated that common people welcome the new culture. In the border region, incidents of superstitious phenomena are much fewer now than they were before, but they cannot yet be entirely eliminated. One important reason for this is that medical and hygiene work has not yet been popularized. The masses have no other means by which to overcome the threats of disease and death, so they can only turn to supernatural beings. At present, Yan'an only has three hospitals. But how many people does it have? There are 30,000 people in the Party, the government, and the army, and 14,000 common people. Those fortunate enough to enjoy hygiene and medical treatment are few. As for the remaining 1.3 million common people in the border region, there is absolutely no one looking after them. We should now promote our medical and hygiene knowledge and work and find a way for every district to train people in medicine. Every district could send people to study in Yan'an, or Yan'an could send people to every district to train people. I think either way would be fine. Every prefectural Party committee, every prefectural commissioner's office, and every district should make a plan so that, within five to ten years, they will each have a clinic that can deal with common illnesses. The border region should develop industry to deal with the problem of medicine. We should make common medicines by ourselves as much as possible. Some necessary medicines can be bought outside of the border region; when the benefit of the people is at stake, of

course we can go to outside areas to buy things. When our economy has developed and we have obtained a favorable trade balance, we will be able to go to outside areas to buy things. To propagandize hygiene, we should cure the illnesses of the masses. Within five to ten years, we demand progress in the popularization of scientific knowledge. Medicine and hygiene should be included in our plans and should be improved along with our production plans.

We hope that the population will develop and that science will progress. If we had discussed this problem two years ago, it would not have been possible for anything to be done, but now there is such a possibility. The Party should, of course, pay attention to the possibility of solving these problems. If we do, we could eradicate superstition, and the common people would not worship Buddha. When I used to travel from Changsha to Shanghai, there were two kinds of boats. One was the foreign boat, and the other was the wooden boat. The people who ran the foreign boats did not believe in the Dragon King, and their customers did not worry about paying respects to the Dragon King. But those on the wooden boats paid their respects to the Dragon King; he was their “insurance company.” Wooden boats flip over easily, and to avoid this they had to throw some money into the “insurance company” of the Dragon King. So, if you do not want the common people to worship gods, you need to develop and popularize science. If science does not develop and is not widespread, then spirit worship will be completely necessary for them. If we had more people like Alexander Alov,¹³ then, of course, no one would worship Guanyin. With scientific knowledge, superstition can be smashed. Without it, the common people will continue to be superstitious.

Today, I will only discuss these few things. If the Communist Party accomplishes these things in the border region; if every system improves its work methods; if we make progress every day and every year; if within five to ten years we establish many kinds of newspapers, organize many reading groups, eradicate illiteracy, popularize the arts to another level, also pay attention to medicine and hygiene, and improve the conditions for medical treatment, then we will have done almost everything. The question of whether or not the Communist Party is useful, that is, the question of whether or not the existence of the Communist Party is necessary will also be resolved. Ye Qing¹⁴ wrote an article stating that the Communist Party is not necessary. We say it is, and we

will use reality to prove it.

Over the past twenty years, our Party first mastered politics and then mastered military affairs. Last year, we mastered economic construction, and this year we will master cultural construction. If our cultural construction achieves glorious results, then we once again will have mastered a great skill, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region will be an even better model for the whole country!

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 106–22, where it is reproduced from the transcript of Mao’s speech preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Speech by Mao Zedong at a conference on propaganda work held by the Propaganda Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

[2.](#) Chen Xuezhao (1906–1991) became an editor at *Jiefang ribao* and a faculty member in the Fourth Department of the Central Party School after she arrived in Yan’an in November 1940.

[3.](#) “Wild Lilies” was a series of critical essays written by Wang Shiwei who was then a researcher in the Center for Literary Research at the Central Research Institute in Yan’an. For details, see the Introduction to this volume, pp. xli–xliii and above, note 3 to the text of May 28, 1942.

[4.](#) The *yangge* “Zhao Fugui Redeems Himself” was performed by the Lu Xun Academy from 1943; this and related *yangge* dramas are discussed in some detail in Holm, *Art and Ideology*, ch. 7.

[5.](#) Shen Changlin was a labor hero in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

[6.](#) Chen Defa was a labor hero in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

[7.](#) On Hu Qiaomu, see above, note to the text of January 23, 1942.

[8.](#) Referring to the Senior Cadres Conference held by the Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee from October 19, 1942, to January 14, 1943, in Yan’an.

[9.](#) Wu Manyou was a famous labor hero in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Mao mentions Wu from time to time, particularly in his long report on “Economic and Financial Problems” of December 1942; see above, in particular, note 28 to the text.

[10.](#) The two senior disciples of Confucius, Zilu (formal name, Zhong You) of military temperament and Ran Qiu (also called Ran Qiu) of artistic sensibilities; a representative passage contrasting the two is in *Analects*, 5.7.

[11.](#) This official Chinese Communist Party document was reported on and quoted in *Jiefang ribao*, August 4, 1943.

[12.](#) Referring to the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee and the Propaganda Department of the Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee.

[13.](#) Alexander Alov was a surgeon from the Soviet Union. At this time, he was working in Yan'an Central Hospital.

[14.](#) Ye Qing, also known as Ren Zhuoxuan (1896–1990), became a member of the Youth League in Europe in 1923 and joined the Chinese Communist Party. But after his arrest in 1928 he joined the Guomindang and became anti-Communist. By the 1940s he was the deputy head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Guomindang.

*Letter to Zhou Yang*¹

(April 2, 1944)

Comrade Zhou Yang:

I have read this article.² It is very well written. You have given a simple historical description of the major issues in literary theory to prove that our general policies are correct. This is very helpful, and it has been a lesson for me, as well. I do feel, however, that it is inappropriate to put that talk of mine³ among the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. My words do not deserve being treated in this way. In addition, on page 10, where it is says that “art should combine the feelings, thought, and will of the masses,”⁴ it seems to me that this refers not only to “concentration” in the course of literary and artistic creation but also to taking these literary and artistic creations to the masses in order to “unite” the “feelings, thought, and will of the masses,” which are dispersed for economic, political, regional, and national reasons (in socialist countries there are no longer political reasons, but other reasons still exist), through the process of disseminating art. Or perhaps the main theme of these words by Lenin lies in the latter point, that is, the work of popularization, and then on this basis “to elevate them.” Please think it over to see if it can be explained this way, or talk it over with those comrades who know Russian and then decide. I have no objection to the rest.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 228–29, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Zhou Yang was at this time president of Yan'an University and president of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts and Literature.

2. Referring to Zhou Yang's "Editor's Preface" to the book *Marxism and Literature*. It was later published in Yan'an's *Jiefang ribao* on April 8, 1944.

3. Referring to Mao's "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art." See above, the text of May 2, 1942.

4. This is a segment of Lenin's talk to the German Marxist Clara Zetkin, quoted by Zhou Yang in his "Editor's Preface" to the book *Marxism and Literature*.

We Must Do Economic Construction

*Work Well*¹

(April 3, 1944)

I

Because of the long-term nature of the Chinese Revolution, we must be engaged in the work of economic construction to meet the material provision requirements for the revolution and the war, on the one hand, and the needs of the people, on the other hand. We should not and cannot wait until the enemy has been entirely defeated before carrying out construction work. Moreover, China's vast area requires that we use construction as an example to the people throughout the entire country so as to convince them of the correctness of our path and therefore to lead them to support us and to take part in the revolutionary struggle.

II

We must understand that trade, banking, and finance are important sectors for organizing all economic life. Without them, or if we adopt erroneous policies toward them, all economic life will stagnate or be obstructed.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 125–26, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript.

[1](#). These are two paragraphs that Mao Zedong added to Ren Bishi’s speech “Estimation of Last Year’s Financial Work in the Border Region and the Basic Policies for This Year’s Banking, Trade, and Finance in the Border Region,” written in 1944.

Letter to Chen Yi¹

(April 9, 1944)

Comrade Chen Yi:

I have received your letter, and I also sent it on to Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi to read. In all things, exercise restraint, think more about your own shortcomings, and correct your deficiencies. Keep in mind the overall situation. So long as it doesn't obstruct major principles, you should excuse others more. Patience is the most difficult thing. But as a statesman you must practice restraint. Please consider these suggestions. When you have a cold, it is appropriate to get more sleep, do less, and eat more. We should talk about other matters face to face.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, p. 127, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹ Chen Yi was acting commander of the New Fourth Army at this time.

*Elegiac Couplet Mourning the Death of
Zhu De's Mother*¹
(April 10, 1944)

Virtuous mother of a national hero for all mothers;
she is a paragon of virtue of the working class.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Nianpu*, Vol. 2, p. 506.

¹. Presented by Mao, as chair of the memorial meeting for Zhu De's mother, in the Yangjialing auditorium, Yan'an.

Our Study and the Current Situation

(April 12, 1944)¹

I

Since last winter, the senior cadres of our Party have been studying the question of the two lines that existed in the history of the Party. This has very greatly raised the political level of numerous senior cadres. In the course of the study, comrades have brought up many questions, and the Politburo of the Central Committee has reached conclusions on some of the important ones. They are as follows:

1. On the question of what attitude to adopt in studying our historical experience. The Central Committee holds that we should enable cadres to become perfectly clear ideologically on the questions that arose in the history of the Party, and, at the same time, we should adopt a lenient policy in arriving at decisions about comrades who have committed errors, so that, on the one hand, cadres should thoroughly understand the historical experience of our Party and avoid repeating past errors, and, on the other hand, all comrades can be united for our common endeavor. In the history of our Party there were great struggles against the erroneous lines of Chen Duxiu and Li Lisan, and they were absolutely necessary. But there were defects in the methods employed. For one thing, cadres did not have a full ideological understanding of the causes of these errors, the circumstances in which they were committed, and the detailed ways and means for correcting them, so that errors of a similar nature came to be repeated; and, for another, too much stress was placed on the responsibility of individuals, so we failed to unite as many people as we could have done in our common endeavor. We should be alerted by these two defects. This time, in dealing with questions of

Party history we should stress not the responsibility of certain individual comrades but the analysis of the circumstances in which the errors were committed, the content of the errors, and their social, historical, and ideological roots, and this should be done in the spirit of “learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones” and “curing the illness to save the patient,” in order to achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology and unity among comrades. The adoption of a careful attitude in handling cases of individual comrades, neither glossing over things nor doing harm to comrades, is a sign that our Party is vigorous and flourishing.

2. Treat all questions analytically; do not negate everything. The question concerning the line of the central leadership during the period from the Fourth Plenary Session to the Zunyi Conference,² for example, should be analyzed from two perspectives. It should be pointed out, on the one hand, that the political tactics, the military tactics, and the cadre policy, which the central leading body adopted during that period, were wrong in their main aspects, but, on the other hand, on such fundamental issues as opposing Chiang Kaishek and carrying on the Agrarian Revolution and the struggle of the Red Army, there was no dispute between ourselves and the comrades who committed errors. And even the tactical side needs to be analyzed. On the land question, for instance, their error consisted of the ultra-Left policy of allotting no land to the landlords and poor land to the rich peasants, but these comrades were at one with us on confiscating the land of the landlords for distribution among peasants who had little or no land. Concrete analysis of concrete conditions, Lenin said, is “the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism.”³ Lacking an analytical approach, many of our comrades do not want to go deeply into complex matters and to analyze and study them over and over again, but like to draw simple conclusions which are either absolutely affirmative or absolutely negative. The fact that our newspapers are lacking in analytical articles and that the habit of analysis is not yet fully cultivated in the Party shows that there are such shortcomings. From now on, we should remedy this state of affairs.

3. On the discussion of the documents of the Sixth National Party Congress, it should be stated that the line of the Sixth National Congress was basically correct, because that congress defined the character of the present revolution as bourgeois-democratic, defined the situation at that time as an interval between

two revolutionary high tides, repudiated opportunism and putschism, and promulgated the Ten-Point Program.⁴ All this was correct. The congress also had its defects. For instance, among its other shortcomings or mistakes, it failed to point out the very protracted nature of the Chinese Revolution and the very great importance of the rural base areas in the revolution. Nonetheless, the Sixth National Congress played a progressive role in the history of our Party.

4. On the question of whether the provisional central leadership that was formed in Shanghai in 1931 and the Fifth Plenary Session that it subsequently convened were legal. The Central Committee holds that both were legal, but it should be stated that the procedures for the election were inadequate, and this case should be regarded as a historical lesson.

5. On the question of factions in the history of the Party. It should be stated that as a result of the series of changes since the Zunyi Conference, the factions which formerly existed and played an unwholesome role in the history of our Party no longer exist. In our present study of the two lines within the Party, it is absolutely necessary to point out that those factions did exist and did play an unwholesome role. But it would be wrong to think that factions with the same erroneous political programs and organizational forms still exist in the Party after all the changes brought about by so many inner-Party struggles—the Zunyi Conference of January 1935, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in October 1938, the enlarged session of the Politburo in September 1941, the Party-wide Rectification movement in 1942, and the campaign beginning in the winter of 1943 for the study of the past struggles between the two lines within the Party. The old factions are gone. What is left is only the remnant of dogmatist and empiricist ideology, which can be overcome by continuing and intensifying our Rectification movement. But what still exists in our Party to a serious extent, and almost everywhere, is a more or less blind “mountain-stronghold” mentality. For instance, there is a lack of mutual understanding, mutual respect, and unity among comrades of different units, which arises from differences in their background of struggle, differences in the areas in which they work (as between one base area and another and as between the Japanese-occupied areas, the Guomindang areas, and the revolutionary base areas), and differences in their work departments (as between one army unit and another and as between one kind of work and another); this phenomenon seems

quite commonplace, but in fact it seriously obstructs the unity of the Party and the growth of its fighting capacity. The social and historical roots of the mountain-stronghold mentality lie in the fact that the Chinese petty bourgeoisie is particularly large, and for a long period our rural base areas were cut off from one another by the enemy, while the subjective cause is the insufficient inner-Party education. The important task now confronting us is to point out these causes, to persuade our comrades to eliminate their blindness and raise the level of their political awareness, to break down the ideological barriers that separate comrades, and to promote mutual understanding and respect, so as to bring about unity throughout the Party. A clear understanding of these questions by the whole Party will ensure not only the success of our present course of study within the Party but also the victory of the Chinese Revolution.

II

The present situation has two characteristics: the first is that the anti-Fascist front is growing stronger and the Fascist front is declining, and the second is that within the anti-Fascist front the people's forces are growing stronger and the anti-popular forces are declining. The first characteristic is quite obvious and can readily be seen. Hitler will be defeated before long, and the Japanese aggressors, too, are heading for defeat. The second characteristic is not so obvious and cannot be readily seen, but it is daily becoming more manifest in Europe, in Britain and the United States, and in China.

The growth of the people's forces in China has to be explained with our Party as the center of the picture.

The growth of our Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan can be divided into three stages. The first stage was from 1937 to 1940. In 1937 and 1938, the first two years of this stage, the Japanese militarists took the Guomindang seriously and the Communist Party lightly; therefore, they threw their main forces against the Guomindang front, and in their policy toward the Guomindang, military attack was primary and political blandishments to bring about capitulation were supplementary; they did not take the Communist-led

anti-Japanese base areas seriously, believing that these amounted to only a handful of Communists engaged in guerrilla actions. But after occupying Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese imperialists began to change their policy and to take the Communist Party seriously and the Guomindang lightly. In their policy toward the Guomindang, political blandishments to bring about capitulation became primary and military attack supplementary, while at the same time they gradually shifted their main forces to deal with the Communists. The Japanese imperialists now felt it was no longer the Guomindang, but the Communist Party, that was to be feared. In 1937 and 1938, the Guomindang put rather more effort into the War of Resistance, its relations with our Party were comparatively good, and it permitted rather more freedom, although imposing many restrictions on the people's anti-Japanese movement. After the fall of Wuhan, however, because of its defeats in the war and its increasing hostility toward the Communist Party, the Guomindang gradually became more reactionary, more active against the Communists, and more passive in the war against Japan. In 1937, as a result of the setbacks in the Civil War period, the Communist Party had only about 40,000 organized members and an army of 30,000 men; hence, it was taken lightly by the Japanese militarists. But by 1940 the Party's membership had risen to 800,000, our army had grown to nearly 500,000, and the population of the base areas, including those paying grain tax only to us and those paying grain tax both to us and to the Japanese and puppets, totaled about 100 million. In the course of several years, our Party had opened up such an extensive war theater, namely, the liberated areas, that for no less than five and a half years we were able to prevent any strategic offensive by the main forces of the Japanese invaders against the Guomindang front, to draw these forces around ourselves, to extricate the Guomindang from the crisis in its theater of war, and to maintain the protracted War of Resistance. But during that stage some comrades in our Party committed an error: They underestimated Japanese imperialism (and so they did not see the protracted and ruthless nature of the war, maintained that mobile warfare with large formations should be primary, and belittled guerrilla warfare), placed reliance on the Guomindang, and failed to pursue an independent policy soberly (hence, their capitulationism toward the Guomindang and their vacillation in applying the policy of boldly and freely arousing the masses to establish anti-Japanese democratic base areas behind enemy lines and

greatly expanding the armed forces led by our Party). Meanwhile, our Party had recruited large numbers of new members who were still inexperienced, and all the base areas in the enemy's rear were newly established and had not yet been consolidated. During this stage, a kind of conceit appeared within the Party because of the favorable development of the general situation and the growth of our Party and armed forces, and many members' heads swelled. During this stage, however, we overcame the right deviation in the Party and carried out an independent policy; we not only hit Japanese imperialism hard, created base areas, and expanded the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies, but also repulsed the first large-scale anti-Communist onslaught by the Guomindang.

The years 1941 and 1942 formed the second stage. In order to prepare and prosecute the war against Britain and the United States, the Japanese imperialists more actively pursued the policy to which they had switched after the fall of Wuhan, the policy of concentrating on the Communist Party and not on the Guomindang. They massed a still larger part of their main forces around all the Communist-led base areas, conducted one "mopping-up" operation after another, and executed the ruthless policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all," concentrating their attacks on our Party. As a result, in the two years of 1941 and 1942, our Party was placed in an extremely difficult position. During this stage, its base areas shrank in size, the population fell to under 50 million, the Eighth Route Army was reduced to 300,000, the loss of cadres was very great, and our finances and economy were very heavily strained. Meanwhile, the Guomindang, finding its hands free, moved against our Party in a thousand and one ways, and unleashed its second large-scale anti-Communist onslaught and attacked us in coordination with the Japanese imperialists. But this difficult position served to educate us Communists, and we learned many things. We learned how to combat the enemy's "mopping-up" operations, its policy of "nibbling" our territory, its "tighten public security" campaign, its policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all," and its policy of extorting political recantations. We learned, or began to learn, how to carry out the "Three-Thirds" system in the state organs of the United Front,⁵ how to carry out the land policy, the Rectification movement, the policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration, the policy of unified leadership, the movement for supporting the government and cherishing the people, and the development of production. And we overcame many shortcomings, including the

conceit of many people that had arisen during the first stage. Although our losses in the second stage were very heavy, we held our ground; we repulsed, on the one hand, the offensives of the Japanese invaders and, on the other, the second large-scale anti-Communist onslaught of the Guomindang. The Guomindang's attacks on the Communist Party and the struggles we had to wage in self-defense gave rise to a kind of ultraleft deviation in the Party, one example being the belief that Guomindang-Communist cooperation would soon break down, with the result that excessive attacks were made on the landlords and unity with public figures outside the Party was neglected. But we overcame this deviation as well. In the struggle to counter the friction created by the Guomindang, we affirmed the principle of waging struggles "on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint," and in United Front work we pointed out the necessity of "unity, struggle, unity through struggle." Thus we maintained the Anti-Japanese National United Front throughout the country as well as in the base areas.

The third stage extends from 1943 to the present. Our various policies have become more effective and, in particular, our work in the Rectification movement and the development of production has yielded results of a fundamental nature, thereby making our Party invincible both ideologically and materially. Moreover, last year we learned, or began to learn, how to carry out our policy of examining the histories of cadres and our policy of combating spies. It is under such circumstances that our base areas have again expanded, the population has risen to over 80 million, including those paying the grain tax only to us and those paying the grain tax both to us and to the Japanese and puppets, our army has grown to 470,000 and our people's militia to 2.27 million, and our Party membership has reached 900,000 and more.

In 1943 the Japanese militarists made no appreciable change in their policy toward China and continued to direct their main attacks at the Communist Party. For more than three years, from 1941 to the present, over 60 percent of the Japanese troops in China have been pressing hard on the anti-Japanese base areas led by our Party. During these years, the several hundred thousand Guomindang troops who were left behind enemy lines have been unable to withstand the blows of Japanese imperialism; about half surrendered, about half were wiped out, and only a small number survived and withdrew. Those Guomindang troops who surrendered have turned and attacked our Party, which has consequently

had to resist over 90 percent of the puppet troops. The Guomintang has only had to resist less than 40 percent of the Japanese forces and less than 10 percent of the puppet troops. For fully five and a half years since the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese militarists have not launched a single strategic offensive on the Guomintang front; there have been only a few relatively big operations (in Zhejiang–Jiangxi, Changsha, western Hubei, southern Henan, and Changde), and even these were mere raids, while they concentrated their main attention on the anti-Japanese base areas led by our Party. In this situation, the Guomintang has pursued the policy of “retreating into the mountains” and “watching others fight,” simply staving off blows when the enemy advanced and looking on with folded arms when it withdrew. In 1943 the Guomintang became even more reactionary in its domestic policy and made its third large-scale anti-Communist onslaught, which we again repulsed.

From 1943 to the spring of this year, the Japanese aggressors have been steadily losing ground in the Pacific theater, the United States has been intensifying its counteroffensive, and now, in the West, Hitler is tottering under the heavy blows of the Soviet Red Army. In an effort to avert their doom, the Japanese imperialists have conceived the idea of forcing the Beiping-Hankou and Guangzhou-Hankou railway open for through traffic and, since they have not yet succeeded in their policy of inducing the Guomintang in Chongqing to capitulate, they have found it necessary to deal it another blow; hence their plan for a large-scale offensive on the Guomintang front this year. The Henan campaign has been going on for over a month. The enemy forces there amount to only a few divisions, yet several hundred thousand Guomintang troops have collapsed without a battle, and only troops of miscellaneous brands have been able to put up some sort of fight. Under Tang Enbo's⁶ command, utter disorder prevails, with the officers estranged from their men and the troops from the people, and more than two-thirds of his total forces have been lost. Likewise, the divisions that Hu Zongnan dispatched to Henan collapsed at their first encounter with the enemy.⁷ This is wholly the result of the reactionary policies that the Guomintang has rigorously enforced for the past few years. During the five and a half years since the fall of Wuhan, the war theater in the liberated areas led by the Communist Party has borne the brunt of resisting the main forces of the Japanese and the puppets; and although there may be some change in the future, it can only be temporary because the

Guomindang, rendered utterly degenerate by its reactionary policy of passive resistance to Japan and its active opposition to the Communists, is bound to suffer serious reverses. When that happens, our Party's task in fighting the enemy and the puppet will become heavier still. What the Guomindang has gained from looking on with folded arms for five and a half years is the loss of its fighting capacity. What the Communist Party has gained from fighting and struggling hard for five and a half years is the strengthening of its fighting capacity. This is what will decide China's destiny.

Comrades can see for themselves that in the seven years since July 1937 the people's democratic forces under the leadership of our Party have gone through three phases—a rise, a decline, and a new rise. We have beaten back the ferocious attacks of the Japanese invaders, established extensive revolutionary base areas, greatly expanded the Party and the army, repelled three large-scale anti-Communist onslaughts by the Guomindang, and overcome the erroneous Right and “Left” thought in the Party; and the whole Party has gained much valuable experience. This sums up our work over the past seven years.

Our present task is to prepare ourselves for a still greater responsibility. We must prepare to drive the Japanese invaders out of China, whatever the circumstances. To enable our Party to shoulder this responsibility, we must further expand and consolidate our Party, our army, and the base areas, pay attention to work in the big cities and along the main lines of communications, and raise work in the cities to a position of equal importance with that in the base areas.

As for our work in the base areas, during the first stage these areas were greatly expanded but not consolidated, and so in the second stage they contracted as soon as they came under the heavy blows of the enemy. In the second stage all the anti-Japanese base areas led by our Party went through a hard tempering process and improved greatly compared with during the first stage; the cadres and Party members considerably advanced the level of their thought and politics and learned many things they did not know before. But it takes time to clarify thinking and to study policy, and we still have much to learn. Our Party is not yet sufficiently strong, not yet sufficiently united or consolidated, and so cannot yet take on greater responsibility than we now carry. From now on, the problem is to further expand and consolidate our Party, our army, and the base areas in

the continued prosecution of the War of Resistance; this is the first indispensable item in our ideological and material preparation for the gigantic work of the future. Without this preparation, we will not be able to drive out the Japanese invaders and liberate the whole of China.

Our work in the big cities and along the main lines of communications has always been very much lacking. If now we do not strive to rally around our Party, the tens of millions of toiling masses and other people oppressed by the Japanese imperialists in the big cities and along the main lines of communications and if we fail to prepare them for armed mass insurrections, then our army and rural base areas will face all sorts of difficulties due to lack of coordination with the cities. For more than ten years, we have been in the countryside and have had to encourage people to know the countryside well and to build the rural base areas. During these ten years and more, the task of preparing insurrections in the cities, as decided by the Sixth National Party Congress, was not and could not be carried out. But now it is different, and the resolution of the Sixth National Congress will be carried out after the Seventh National Congress. This congress will probably be held soon and will discuss the problems of strengthening our work in the cities and winning a nationwide victory.

The industrial conference of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, now in session, is of great significance. In 1937 the number of factory workers in the border region was only 700; it increased to 7,000 by 1942 and it is now 12,000. Those figures are not to be treated lightly. While we are in the base areas, we must learn how to administer the industry, commerce, and communications of the big cities; otherwise, we will not know what to do when the time comes. Thus the second indispensable item in our ideological and material preparation for the future is to organize for armed insurrections in the big cities and along the main lines of communications, and to learn how to manage industry and commerce. Without this preparation, we will not be able to drive out the Japanese invaders and liberate the whole of China.

III

In order to gain new victories, we must call on our Party cadres to get rid of the baggage and start up the machinery. "To get rid of the baggage" means to free our minds of many encumbrances. Many things may become baggage, may become encumbrances, if we cling to them blindly and uncritically. Let us give some illustrations. Having made mistakes, you may feel that, come what may, you are saddled with them, and so you become dispirited; if you have not made mistakes, you may feel that you are free from error, and so you become conceited. Lack of achievement in work may breed pessimism and depression, while achievement may breed pride and arrogance. A comrade with a short record of struggle may shirk responsibility on this account, while a veteran may become opinionated because of his long record of struggle. Worker and peasant elements, because of pride in their class origins, may look down upon intellectuals, while intellectuals, because they have a certain amount of knowledge, may look down upon workers and peasants. Any specialized skill may be capitalized on and so may lead to arrogance and contempt of others. Even one's age may become ground for conceit. The young, because they are bright and capable, may look down upon the old; and the old, because they are rich in experience, may look down upon the young. All such things become encumbrances or baggage if there is no critical awareness. An important reason some comrades are very lofty, isolating themselves from the masses and making repeated mistakes, is that they carry such baggage. Thus, a prerequisite for maintaining close links with the masses and making fewer mistakes is to examine one's baggage, to get rid of it, and to emancipate the mind. There have been several occasions in the history of our Party when great conceit manifested itself, and we suffered as a consequence. The first was in the early half of 1927. The Northern Expeditionary Army had reached Wuhan, and some comrades became so proud and overweening as to forget that the Guomindang was about to assault us. The result was the error of the Chen Duxiu line, which brought defeat to the revolution. The second occasion was in 1930. Taking advantage of Chiang Kaishek's large-scale war against Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan, the Red Army won a number of battles, and again some comrades became proud and overweening. The result was the error of the Li Lisan line, again causing some losses to the revolutionary forces. The third occasion was in 1931. The Red Army had smashed the Guomindang's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign

and, immediately afterward, faced with the Japanese invasion, the people throughout the country started the stormy and heroic anti-Japanese movement; and again some comrades became proud and overweening. The result was an even more serious error in the political line, which cost us about 90 percent of the revolutionary forces that we had built up with so much toil. The fourth occasion was in 1938. The War of Resistance had begun, and the United Front had been established; and once again some comrades became proud and overweening. As a result, they committed an error somewhat similar to the Chen Duxiu line. This time the revolutionary work suffered serious damage in those places where the effects of those comrades' erroneous ideas were more pronounced. Comrades throughout the Party should take warning from these instances of pride and error. Recently we reprinted Guo Moruo's essay on Li Zicheng,⁸ so comrades may also take warning from this story and not repeat the error of becoming conceited at the moment of success.

“To start up the machinery” means to make good use of the organ of thought. Although some people carry no baggage and have the virtue of close contact with the masses, they fail to accomplish anything because they do not know how to think searchingly or are unwilling to use their brains to think much and to think hard. Others refuse to use their brains because they are carrying baggage that cramps their intellect. Lenin and Stalin often advised people to use their brains, and we should give the same advice. This mechanism, the brain, has the special function of thinking. Mencius said, “The office of the mind is to think.”⁹ He defined the function of the brain correctly. We should always use our brains and think everything over carefully. A common saying goes, “Knit the brows and you will hit upon a stratagem.” In other words, much thinking yields wisdom. In order to get rid of the practice of acting blindly that is so common in our Party, we must encourage our comrades to think, to learn the method of analysis, and to cultivate the habit of analysis. There is all too little of this habit in our Party. If we get rid of our baggage and start up the machinery, if we march with light packs and know how to think hard, then we are sure to triumph.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xuanji* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), Vol. 3, pp. 937–51; it is also available in the English edition of the *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 163–76.

1. Text based on the speeches delivered by Mao to the Senior Cadres Conference, Yan'an, on April 12 and to the First Division of the Central Party School, Yan'an, on May 20. These public speeches draw from Mao's Politburo speech the previous month; see above, the text of March 5, 1944.

2. The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in January 1934. The Zunyi Conference was the enlarged meeting of the Politburo called by the Central Committee at Zunyi, Guizhou Province, in January 1935.

3. See V.I. Lenin, "Communism," in which Lenin, criticizing the Hungarian Communist Béla Kun, said that he "gives up the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, the concrete analysis of concrete conditions" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 31 [Moscow, 1950], p. 143).

4. The Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in July 1928 in Moscow, adopted a Ten-Point Program detailing the revolutionary goals of overthrowing imperialism, the Guomindang government and the warlords, establishing soviets, land reform, and uniting with the world proletariat and the Soviet Union. For the text, see Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 341–58.

5. Regarding the "Three-Thirds" system, see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942.

6. Tang Enbo (1898–1954), a major Guomindang general during the anti-Japanese war, was at this time deputy commander-in-chief of the First War Zone of the National army and commander-in-chief of the Jiangsu-Shandong-Henan-Anhui Border Region.

7. For Hu Zongnan, a top Guomindang general, see above, note to the text of February 20, 1942.

8. Guo Moruo's essay, "The Tercentenary of the 1644 Uprising," first appeared in 1944 in *New China Daily* in Chongqing and was later published as a pamphlet in Yan'an.

9. *Mencius*, Book VI, "Gaozi," part I, ch. 15.

*Letter to Li Dingming*¹

(April 29, 1944)

Venerable Mr. Dingming,

In the past several years, many people have borrowed the *Historical Romance of Yongchang* [*Yongchang yanyi*] to read. I read it recently and benefited a great deal from it. I have also made a copy of it for future use. The author, Mr. Li Jianhou,² expended great effort in writing this book. Please extend my heartfelt respect to him. This book praises Li Zicheng's personal moral character but belittles the entire movement. As a matter of fact, peasant wars have been the main force in pushing our society forward in the past more than two thousand years since the Qin dynasty. The great peasant war led by General Li Zicheng, the Dashun emperor, is one very well-known example among the scores of wars of this kind in the past two thousand years. This movement started in northern Shaanxi and indeed it is to the glory of the people of Shaanxi. It is particularly to the glory of you and the author, Mr. Jianhou. If the book can be revised according to the above-mentioned new conception of history, it would be very useful in educating the people, but I do not know whether the author would agree to this. Also, how has Mr. Jianhou's health been recently? Would he be able to visit Yan'an? Please remember me to Mr. Jianhou.

Best wishes!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 230–31, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1.](#) Li Dingming, a member of the “enlightened gentry,” was at this time vice chair of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government. See above, note to the text of October 25, 1942.

[2.](#) Li Jianhou (1894–1952) was a member of the Border Region Political Council. His book was finally published in Chongqing by Xinhua Publishing House in 1984 under the pen-name Li Baozhong.

Twenty Ideas to Be Raised with the Guomindang Regarding Negotiations (May 15, 1944)

I

Comrade [Dong] Biwu¹ and for transmittal to Comrade [Lin] Boqu:²

We have received your telegrams of the fourth, tenth, and twelfth, and reply as follows:

1. Wang [Shijie] and Zhang [Zhizhong]³ have repeatedly requested that we put forth concrete ideas, so we have decided to raise three national issues and seventeen issues between the two parties. They will be sent to you tomorrow via the radio of the Political Department of the military. Please prepare an official letter for Wang and Zhang.

2. In order to save face for the other party, for the time being do not announce the contents of the negotiations to the outside. When it becomes clear, however, that the other party is entirely insincere, prepare to announce the contents to the outside.

3. In order to avoid provocation, we decided not to raise the issues pointed out by Zhang and Wang regarding restoring the name of the New Fourth Army and resisting 58 percent of the enemy.

4. Lin [Biao]'s proposal has already been rejected by He Yingqin.⁴ There have been great changes in the situation during the past year, so it is necessary to put forward a new plan.

5. The armed forces absolutely cannot have less than five armies and sixteen

divisions. Comrade Xu Xiangqian⁵ should organize one army, and the border region one division. Lin [Biao]'s proposal for four armies and twelve divisions is no longer applicable. The 470,000 soldiers of the entire force are willing to accept the leadership of the government, and they should be organized into sixteen armies and forty-seven divisions. This point should also be raised.

6. The border region's official name should be the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia [Shaan-Gan-Ning] Border Region, consistent with what it actually is. We can establish an administrative office and elect our own personnel. Our administrative office should be granted a certificate of appointment by the government and it should be directly under the Administrative Council. Other areas will follow this pattern.

7. The border region and all base areas behind enemy lines should request permission from the government to distribute regional paper currency. Insist upon this point (or else do not raise it).

8. The democratic arrangements in the border region and the base areas behind enemy lines should not be changed.

9. If the other party acknowledges that the Chinese Communist Party may establish Party offices and newspapers throughout the country, then, in return, our side can also acknowledge that the other side may do the same in areas under our Party's control.

10. Please follow the spirit of the twenty ideas during any other negotiations.

11. Request the other party to turn over the draft "brief"⁶ to us for examination. After the two parties reach an agreement through negotiation, they should submit a formal version of it to us. If there is no negotiation and the two parties do not reach an agreement (both in content and wording), then it is only a unilateral opinion of the other side and we will not bear responsibility for its implementation.

Mao Zedong

the fifteenth, 9:00–11:00 p.m.

Comrade Chairman Lin Boqu:

We have received your telegrams of the tenth and twelfth. Please submit the following document to Wang Shijie and Zhang Zhizhong and negotiate with them. The text in its entirety is as follows:

“In order to overcome the present difficulties, repel the attack of the Japanese bandits, and earnestly prepare for a counteroffensive, the Chinese Communist Party believes that there is only one way out, that is, to implement democracy and strengthen unity. To attain this goal, the Chinese Communist Party hopes that the government will solve certain pressing problems. Among these problems are those related to national politics and those related to unsettled issues between the two parties. We frankly state these problems in detail below.

A. Issues regarding national politics:

1. We request that the government implement democratic politics and freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association, as well as personal freedoms.

2. We request that the government lift the restrictions on political parties, acknowledge the legal status of the Chinese Communist Party and every patriotic political party, and release patriotic political prisoners.

3. We request that the government allow the implementation of popular local self-government worthy of the name.

B. Unsettled issues between the two parties:

1. In accordance with the needs of the War of Resistance, the achievements in the War of Resistance, and the actual number of troops we currently have, we must request that the government organize the Chinese Communist Party's armed forces into sixteen armies and forty-seven divisions, with 10,000 people in each division. For the sake of compromise, we will currently accept designations for at least five armies and sixteen divisions.

2. We request that the government recognize the anti-Japanese governments selected by the people in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and in the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines in North China, Central China, and South China as legal local governments, and also recognize that they all are needed institutions to fight the Japanese.

3. In areas presently defended by Chinese Communist forces, the current

situation should be maintained during the War of Resistance. After the war ends, we will discuss this matter further.

4. We request that the government provide sufficient material assistance to the Eighteenth Army Group and the New Fourth Army. Since 1940, the government has not given us even one single bullet, one single tablet, one single penny, or one single grain of rice in assistance. We request that this situation be changed.

5. We must request that the government fairly distribute to each Chinese army the weapons, ammunition, medicine, and monetary assistance that the Allied countries have provided to China. The Eighteenth Army Group and the New Fourth Army should get their share.

6. We request that the government order military and government organizations to withdraw the military and economic blockade of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas.

7. We request that the government order military organizations to stop their attacks on the New Fourth Army in Central China and the guerrilla forces in Guangdong.

8. We request that the government order the elimination of such terms as “traitorous party,” “traitorous army,” and “traitorous region,” which revile and insult the name of the Communist Party, the Eighteenth Army Group, the New Fourth Army, and the anti-Japanese democratic regions. Formerly such slanderous and degrading names were only used secretly, but recently they have appeared publicly in newspapers.

9. We request that the government halt the destructive activities of those spying on the Chinese Communist Party, the Eighteenth Army Group, the New Fourth Army, and the democratic regions of the Japanese resistance. The Chinese Communist Party has obtained full proof that this type of activity has intensified. If it does not stop, it will greatly impede the cause of unity.

10. We request that the government order its party and government organizations to release imprisoned personnel in all areas, for example, the New Fourth Army officers and soldiers taken prisoner during the Southern Anhui Incident such Ye Ting and others, Biao Chengzhi, Zhang Wenbin, and others in Guangdong, Xu Jie,⁷ Xu Mengqiu, Mao Zemin, Yang Zhihua, Pan Tong, and others in Xinjiang, Luo Shiwen, Che Yaoxian, Li Chun, Zhang Shaomin, and others in Sichuan, He Bin and others in Hubei, Liu Ying and others in Zhejiang,

and Xuan Xiafu, Shi Zuoxiang, Li Yuhai, Chen Yuanying, Zhao Xiang, and others in Xi'an. These people all belong to the ranks of noble-minded patriots. Please restore their freedom for the benefit of the anti-Japanese cause.

11. We request that the government prohibit publishing in newspapers and other publications speeches that fabricate rumors against and slander the Chinese Communist Party. For example, the secret agents in Xi'an said that Yan'an executed Wang Shiwei and several dozen others. They even disguised themselves as friends and relatives of Wang Shiwei and some ten others, holding a memorial ceremony for them in Xi'an on March 29 and publishing death announcements and news in the newspapers. As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as the alleged execution of Wang Shiwei and others. Allegations like this are totally fabricated rumors and deliberate slanders. We request that they be corrected and that similar events be prohibited in the future.

12. According to reliable sources, when the foreign reporters arrive in the Northwest, secret agencies around the Xi'an area are preparing to disguise themselves as various kinds of people, to forge all types of credentials along the way to appeal to the foreigners, and to use this method to undermine the Chinese Communist Party's reputation. We have heard that a gang fabricated rumors that the Chinese Communist Party has committed more than ten types of crimes. Events like this not only obstruct unity, but also degrade the prestige of the nation. We request that the government prohibit them. The Chinese Communist Party has obtained convincing evidence of that gang's disguises and forgeries, fabrications and instigations, and plots and schemes. If they are not forbidden, they will inevitably lead to unhappy results.

13. We request that the government allow the Chinese Communist Party to establish Party offices and newspapers throughout the country. The Chinese Communist Party will also allow the Guomindang to do the same in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and in the democratic anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines.

14. We request that the government stop unwarranted censorship of the Chinese Communist Party's *New China Daily* in Chongqing (such as forbidding publication of news of battles involving the Eighteenth Army Group and the New Fourth Army, forbidding the publication of Chinese Communist Party documents, and so forth), sabotaging its distribution, threatening its subscribers,

and delaying mailing.

15. We request that the government return the 101 boxes of medicine provided in assistance by Britain and the United States to the Eighteenth Army Group that was taken by the government's army in Sanyuan.

16. We request that the government permit the restoration of the two radio stations in Chongqing and Xi'an to facilitate communications.

17. We request that the government grant freedom to Chinese Communist Party representatives and personnel of the Eighteenth Army Group Office to travel between Chongqing and Yan'an, and between Xi'an and Yan'an, and freedom to personnel of the two offices in Xi'an and Chongqing to reside in the two places and to purchase daily necessities.”

Regarding the above terms, please put your signature on the document in the name of the representative of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, record the year, month, and day, and formally present it in writing to Wang and Zhang.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 130–35. Part I is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript; Part II is taken from a copy of the telegram preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Dong Biwu, see above, note to the text of July 21, 1943. He was at this time vice secretary of the Southern Bureau and head of both the Propaganda Department and United Front Department of the Central Committee.

[2.](#) Lin Boqu, see above, note to the text of September 15, 1942. At this time he was a representative of the Communist Party in its negotiations with the Guomindang during the War of Resistance.

[3.](#) Wang Shijie (1891–1981) was at this time head of the Propaganda Department of the Guomindang. Zhang Zhizhong (1890–1969) was the head of the Political Department of the Military Commission of the Guomindang government.

[4.](#) He Yingqin, see above, note to the text of October 5, 1943.

[5.](#) Xu Xiangqian (1901–1990) was at this time deputy commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route

Army and the president of the Anti-Japanese Military Political University.

6. Referring to the “brief” of the Guomindang government with regard to solving the problem of the Communist Party by political means.

7. Xu Jie is the pseudonym for Chen Tanqiu.

*Work Report to the Seventh Plenum of
the Sixth Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party*
(May 21, 1944)

Because time is limited today, I can only present a simple work report to the plenum. I ask everyone to consider whether a detailed Central Committee work report will be needed. I do not think it is necessary to prepare a detailed report because all the Central Committee comrades are familiar with the recent work of the Central Committee and the comrades participating in this plenary session are more or less familiar with it. Do we need to give a detailed work report to the Seventh Congress on the Central Committee's work from the Sixth Party Congress until now? Because it has been sixteen years since the Sixth Congress, and the principal responsible persons of the Central Committee have changed several times, I think it would be difficult to give such a detailed report, and we are prepared to put inspection of past work into the historical summary. In the past, the work reports by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Party congresses were in reality also political reports. We are only prepared to give a political report to the Seventh Party Congress, and we will not present an additional work report. The work summary can also be mentioned in this report. Only central problems that have already matured will be addressed.

Today I will only talk about the main problems during the period of preparation for resistance to Japan and the War of Resistance Against Japan. During these two periods, our only objective has been to strive to expel the Japanese imperialists from China. In order to achieve this objective, our general

policy has been to develop ourselves and unite with friendly troops. This policy was first adopted at the Wayaobao Conference (December 1935),¹ and since then to the present day the Democratic Republic Resolution (September 1936), the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (May 1937),² the Luochuan Conference (August 1937),³ and the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee (September to November 1938)⁴ all strove to carry out this general policy. While carrying out this policy, there have been some debates over how to develop ourselves and unite with friendly troops, over views regarding Japan, the Guomintang, and our Party, and over appraisal of the current situation and specific policies for carrying this out. Today, the objective of my talk is to defend the policies of the Central Committee.

There is a report here on the battle of Henan handed in by the Henan Branch Office of the Guomintang's Investigation and Statistics Bureau to its Central Bureau. It is a representative example of recent conditions in the War of Resistance. I would like to ask Comrade Wang Shoudao⁵ to read it aloud. This material indicates how utterly incompetent were the troops of Tang Enbo, one of Chiang Kaishek's three main forces, running about aimlessly from the advances of the Japanese invaders. There is also only one regiment left of the two divisions led by Hu Zongnan. This demonstrates the contrasting results of the two different policies adopted in the War of Resistance. The undemocratic policy can only lead to the failure of the War of Resistance; only the democratic policy can lead to the defeat of the enemy. The Central Army under Chiang Kaishek does not teach patriotism and democracy, but only fascism. Consequently, upon encounter with the enemy, its fighting capacity crumbled immediately. Our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army carry out education in nationalism and democracy and thus fully mobilized the people's forces and set up more than a dozen base areas behind enemy lines. As a result, we were able to stop the enemy's strategic attack on the battlefield for five and a half years. The Japanese are now attacking Henan because they have become desperate and the Guomintang is too weak, and the forces under the Communist Party are not strong enough to protect Tang Enbo's army. Now some of Hu Zongnan's forces have also been transferred to Henan. If Hu Zongnan suffers the same fate as Tang Enbo, two out of the three major forces under Chiang Kaishek will have collapsed. That can cause a tremendous change in the political situation in China, and in the proportion of forces under

the Guomindang and the Communist Party. In the future, when Great Britain and the United States are ready for counterattack, which will shake the confidence of the Japanese army and the Japanese people as well as boost the confidence of the Chinese people in the areas occupied by the Japanese, the contrast between the Japanese forces and the forces of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army will also undergo a change. The idea that if democracy is practiced, we will win, and if not, we will lose, which used to be merely our ideal, is now being translated into reality. Last year, we published an article titled “A Comparison of the Achievements of the Guomindang and of the Communist Party During the War of Resistance” in order to draw foreigners’ attention to the forces of resistance of the Communist Party. Never before have Great Britain and the United States been so explicitly critical of the Guomindang and Chiang Kaishek as they are now. Hu Zhengzhi,⁶ when he invited Comrades Dong Biwu and Pan Zinian⁷ to dinner after he returned from a visit to England and the United States, said that he had talked about the promise of the Chinese Communist Party when he was abroad. He also said that the Twelfth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Guomindang was utterly hopeless. Sun Ke⁸ recently said that he is going to resign; Yu Youren⁹ shows no interest in attending the Twelfth Plenum. These people’s actions are signals indicating that the situation will change.

Concerning the principle of developing ourselves and developing the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the anti-Japanese democratic base areas, which constitute the major forces that represent the Chinese people in combating the Japanese bandits, the Central Committee has done a lot of work trying to persuade those comrades who were against this principle or who did not carry it out actively. In this respect, the mistakes made in Central China and Shandong were most serious, and it took almost all of 1939 to correct them. Afterward, however, the Southern Anhui Incident¹⁰ took place all the same, and only after that were these problems put right. When the Japanese occupied Jiangsu and Zhejiang, although the members of the Guomindang all fled, our comrades did not have enough courage to take over the positions of county head, saying that nobody had appointed them to those positions. During the confrontation between the Old Army and the New Army in Shanxi,¹¹ there was even a debate within the New Army about whether they should fire back when the Old Army opened fire

on them. These stories demonstrate how some of our comrades did not dare to adopt the policy of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands in this national war. The question is whether the policy of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands should be adopted. In today's world, the policy of the Soviet Union is most oriented toward maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in their own hands. The United States is second to the Soviet Union. England is hesitant, its attitude ambivalent on such issues as those about France, Italy, and Poland. And so is Chiang Kaishek, whose policies toward the Communist Party and others indicate his hesitancy, thinking in one way but behaving in another. Both Tang and Hu use the anti-Communist *Handbook on Suppressing Bandits* as the textbook for teaching their troops. Such troops are surely powerless when fighting the Japanese. We are different from them in that from the very beginning we have adopted the policy of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands. From beginning to end, we take the position of uniting with the Guomindang for resistance against the Japanese, while confronting the Guomindang when it creates friction with the Communist Party. In this way, the Guomindang can neither surrender to the Japanese nor attack the Communist Party on a large scale and will gradually be led to take part in the resistance against the Japanese. In our efforts against their friction, we adopt a policy of reason, advantage, and moderation, so as to reduce the friction. We used the same strategy during all three high tides of anti-communism. Our Party was a very small party (with no more than 40,000 Party members), and our army was a very small army (with only 45,000 soldiers) at the beginning of the War of Resistance. Now our Party has almost 1 million members, and our army almost 500,000 soldiers. In the winter of 1935, when the Red Army of the central soviet region made the Long March to northern Shaanxi, we had only 7,000 men left, and each person was just "skin and bones." At that time, we declared that the Long March was victorious, since it served as a force to plant and propagandize; we did not take lightly this small leftover force because it had a great future. The pessimistic feelings that certain comrades developed during that period actually were by no means grounded in reality. From 1936 to 1939, we harbored the hope of reforming the Guomindang on account of the progressive example of Zhang Xueliang¹² and the fact that the Guomindang had lost its territory in Jiangxi and

Zhejiang. This hope of ours, however, did not materialize, although we did not lose anything. In the final analysis, it is mainly the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army that have saved the nation during its crisis by engaging 58 percent of the Japanese army and 90 percent of the Japanese puppet forces. China's War of Resistance could not be what it is today without the participation of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Our policy of developing the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the anti-Japanese base areas is absolutely correct, and so is our policy of uniting with friendly forces.

The growth of our Party during the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan has undergone three stages. The first stage was from 1937 to 1940. During the first two years of this stage, the Japanese used their main force to deal with the Guomintang, which was relatively courageous and had a relatively good relationship with the Communist Party. We adopted the general policy of guerrilla warfare, developed our army, set up base areas, and established cadre schools. There had been a debate among ourselves as to which was more appropriate: mobile warfare or guerrilla warfare. Eventually, however, the correct strategy of using primarily guerrilla warfare was adopted. The policy of forming a United Front suffered a setback first in 1938; later this was corrected at the Sixth Plenum. During this first stage, arrogance appeared among our troops. Some of our comrades were so arrogant that they underestimated the Japanese forces and relied excessively upon the Guomintang, thinking that everything would turn out all right. On this point, we suffered a loss.

The second phase covers the years from 1941 to 1942. During this period, the Japanese used their major forces to attack the Communist Party. They launched innumerable ruthless "mopping-up" operations, applying the policy of "nibbling" and of "burn all, kill all, and loot all." Our base areas, our population, and our army all shrank. This hardship nevertheless taught our comrades a lesson. And we adopted appropriate policies, such as fighting the enemy, rectification of the "Three Styles," Crack Troops and Simple Administration, supporting the government and cherishing the people, developing production, unification of leadership, the "Three-Thirds" system,¹³ and reducing rent and reducing interest. There have been achievements in all these areas. Thus we secured a firm foothold behind enemy lines. Although we suffered losses, we acquired experience as well in overcoming difficulties. During this stage, the Japanese applied the policy of

mainly luring the Guomindang into capitulation through politics, while using military attacks as a subsidiary means. This policy began in 1939 and became most explicit in 1941, when Wang Jingwei set up the puppet government. Consequently, the Japanese launched no big military operations against the Guomindang, which became increasingly counterrevolution-ary by being passive toward the Japanese invaders, but very active in attacking the Communist Party and the broad masses of the Chinese people.

The third stage began last year. Our base areas, population, and armed forces started to grow once again. There are 470,000 soldiers in our armed forces, and its fighting capacity has become very great. Our Party has recruited more than 900,000 members. The population of the base areas in the first stage was nearly 100 million in terms of those who paid grain taxes directly and indirectly. In the second stage the population decreased to less than 50 million; in 1943 it has grown again to over 80 million. More progress has been made in carrying out various policies, especially in the rectification of the "Three Styles" and in the development of the economy. The aim of the rectification of work styles is to make our thinking clear and to unite the whole Party. Our Party is basically united, but this unity was only achieved after we persuaded some of our members to give up their different opinions on policy and after we corrected all kinds of petty-bourgeois thinking and work styles. Unity is one side of our Party, and disunity is the other. We should be able to see and acknowledge the existence of both sides. The factions that previously had a bad influence no longer exist politically or organizationally. There are, however, still residues of dogmatism and empiricism. There is still a strong and blind tendency toward a mountain-stronghold mentality, owing to the fact that the Chinese petty-bourgeois class is so large that the base areas in the countryside have been isolated from one another for a long time and our Party's education work has been insufficient. We must overcome it. We had no experience in economic work for a long period of time in the past; now we must pay much attention to this.

The line of the Sixth National Congress was basically correct, but it did not resolve the problem of the base areas and, instead, proposed insurrection and attacking and occupying the big cities. We have been unable to carry out these things from the Sixth Congress to the present, but we will do so after the Seventh Congress; we must definitely carry out this general policy after the Seventh

Congress. We cooperated with Xue Yue¹⁴ in 1927 to occupy Shanghai, but the Guomindang attacked us immediately thereafter. Now we want to change the method of entering Shanghai from that of Xue Yue to that of Chen Yi. In addition, we already have many “Xue Yues.” Between the Sixth and Seventh Congresses we have actually followed the line of the base areas. We must abide by this line now. We must develop the economy in the base areas. In 1939 there were merely 700 factory workers in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region; in 1942 there were 4,000; this year there are 12,000. If there are 30,000 factory workers in the border region, the proportion of workers in the whole population of the border region will be greater than the proportion of workers in the population of the country as a whole. There was much controversy when the Party shifted the focus of its work from the urban areas to the countryside. There will be many questions when the Party shifts the focus of its work from the countryside back to the urban areas. This will require that we be prepared to resolve these questions and learn to do economic work and work in the urban areas. In the future, the countryside will serve as the base to provide us with food for the army and with personnel for cadres. It will be impossible to drive the Japanese invaders out of the big cities without us, without the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.

Our Party must be prepared to deal with unexpected big events which will take place in the future. The Seventh Congress must select a Central Committee that is more powerful and more capable than the Central Committee of the past twenty-three years.

As regards the negotiations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, the Guomindang sent two high-ranking officials, one civil and the other military, to meet Comrade Lin Boqu, who visited their area on this occasion, spent four hours every day negotiating with them, and was well treated wherever he went. Nothing like this had ever happened before. Originally we did not expect much of this trip, assuming that it could not solve the big issues and thus we asked Comrade Lin Boqu to raise only small issues. The other side offered to negotiate on the basis of the four points raised by Lin Biao last year; Venerable Lin made a counteroffer to negotiate on the basis of the five points raised by [Zhou] Enlai this year, which they turned down. Thus the Central Committee put forward twenty items.¹⁵ The future holds only one of two results: procrastinating

or solving some of the problems, such as the problem of the armed forces, the problem of the border region, the problem of protected areas, and the problem of developing Party offices and of publishing newspapers in specific places. If they are prepared to solve these four problems, we should be ready to accept them and indicate to the whole country our willingness to maintain a good relationship with the Guomindang.

Concerning military affairs, this year we will concentrate on intensifying training. Next year we shall be ready to develop our forces, occupy some small cities, and prepare to drive the Japanese bandits out of China.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 136–45, where it is reproduced from the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

1. The Wayaobao Conference refers to the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in Anding (now Zichang) county of Shaanxi Province, held December 17–25, 1935. This conference adopted the policy of establishing a national united front against the Japanese. This text, the text of the September 1936 Democratic Republic Resolution, and the reports noted below all appear in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, beginning on p. 709, according to date.

2. Referring to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in Yan'an May 2–14, 1937.

3. The Luochuan Conference refers to the expanded meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in Luochuan, Shaanxi Province, August 22–25, 1937.

4. The Sixth Plenum refers to the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held September 29–November 6, 1938. Mao Zedong presented the political report “On the New Stage”; see Vol. VI, pp. 458–541.

5. On Wang Shoudao, see above, note to the text of January 23, 1942.

6. Hu Zhengzhi (1889–1949) was at this time general manager of the newspaper *Dagong bao*.

7. Pan Zinian (1893–1972) was at this time editor of *New China Daily*.

8. Sun Ke (1891–1973) was at this time head of the legislature of the National Government.

9. Yu Youren (1879–1964) was at this time head of the Procuratorate of the National Government.

- [10.](#) Regarding the Southern Anhui Incident, see above, note to the text of July 21, 1943.
- [11.](#) The Shanxi New Army refers to the Shanxi Youth Anti-Enemy Dare-to-Die Corps, an anti-Japanese military force that worked with the Chinese Communist Party. The Shanxi Old Army refers to Yan Xishan's troops.
- [12.](#) Zhang Xueliang was already under house arrest as instigator of the famous Xi'an Incident. See Vol. V, p. lx and *passim*.
- [13.](#) On the "Three-Thirds" system, see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942.
- [14.](#) Xue Yue (1896–1998) was commander of the First Division of the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army in 1927.
- [15.](#) See above, the text of May 15, 1944.

Comrade Mao Zedong Calls for Developing Industry and Overthrowing the Japanese Bandits

(May 22, 1944)

(Dispatch to our newspaper.) The General Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee held a banquet at Yangjialing on the afternoon of May 22 to entertain staff and worker representatives. After the banquet, there was a reception for the representatives in the auditorium of the Central Party School, as well as to welcome the British couple Mr. Michael Lindsay and his wife,¹ and Mr. Hu Renkui, deputy director of the Administrative Committee of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, and the Northwest Battlefield Service Troupe, which had just returned from behind enemy lines. At the reception, all the staff and worker representatives presented banners and scrolls containing congratulatory messages to Chairman Mao and Commander-in-chief Zhu [De]. Amid thunderous applause, Chairman Mao appeared at the front of the stage and spoke to the representatives.

After talking briefly about the significance of the reception, Chairman Mao said:

At present, foreign countries and China are all fighting for a common objective, namely, the overthrow of fascism. Like all our other work, industrial construction in our border region has as its goal the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and no other goal. It was only five years ago that a bit of industry really began to appear in the border region. There were only 700 industrial workers then. By 1942, there were 4,000, and this year we have 120,000. So industrial development in the border region has been rapid. Though the numbers are still small, the significance is extremely far-reaching. All those who are unwilling to recognize this highly developed force, which has the greatest vitality and is capable of bringing about all sorts of changes, are muddleheaded and ignorant. Our aim in calling this meeting is to strive for self-sufficiency in industrial production within two years, first of all in cloth and iron. If we want to be self-sufficient in everything, there must be a big increase in the number of

workers. All the engineers, factory directors, and workers are making efforts in this direction, as are all Communist Party members and nonmembers. Take Comrade Shen Hong and Comrade Chen Zhenxia, for example. Though they are not Communist Party members, their hearts are one with those of Party members, and they are all fighting arduously to overthrow Japanese imperialism. If we want to overthrow Japanese imperialism, we must have industry. If we want to strengthen and guarantee China's national independence, we must industrialize. We Communists must strive for the industrialization of China.

Chairman Mao then pointed out once again that the main cause of China's backwardness is the lack of new-style industry. Chairman Mao went on to say:

The reason the Japanese imperialists dare to bully China in this way is that China does not have a powerful industry, and they take advantage of our backwardness. Consequently, the elimination of this backwardness is the task of our entire nation. The common people support the Communist Party because we represent the demands of the nation and of the people. But if we cannot solve economic problems, if we cannot build a new-style industry and if we cannot develop productive forces, the common people may well not support us. In the anti-Japanese war, the Communists are resisting and fighting against 58 percent of the enemy forces and 90 percent of the puppet troops. In this field we have experience and success. Yet, when it comes to economic work, particularly in industry, we still do not know much. And yet this is the thing that determines all other things; it decides military, political, cultural, intellectual, moral, and religious matters, and it determines changes in society. Consequently, all Communist Party members should study economic work, and many of them should also study industrial technology. Our border region is a big school, and one of its courses is called industry. This representative assembly of staff and workers is a short-term industrial training class. If we Communists do not pay attention to industry, do not pay attention to the economy, and do not understand other highly beneficial work, and if we are ignorant and incompetent in dealing with these things, if we are capable only of doing a kind of abstract "revolutionary work," then such revolutionaries will be completely worthless. We should oppose such empty-headed revolutionaries, and learn the various kinds of technical knowledge that will enable China to industrialize.

After Chairman Mao had finished his speech, the Northwest Battlefield Service Troupe performed a drama called “Taking the Long View” and other excellent plays showing the arduous struggle behind enemy lines. The reception did not break up until late at night.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 97–98, where it is reproduced from the May 26, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. The same text, minus the introductory paragraphs setting the scene, can be found in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 146–48.

1. Michael Lindsay (1909–1994), a British academic who taught in Beiping until 1942, and his wife, Li Xiao, provided radio equipment and training to Chinese Communist Party forces in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region.

Talk at the Opening Ceremony of Yan'an University (May 24, 1944)

Comrades! Today is the first day of Yan'an University. This school of ours offers courses in politics, economics, and culture, which you have to study in preparation for working in these fields in the future. Some parts of this school were administrated separately in the past; now they are all together. As Comrade Zhou Yang¹ said, there are shortcomings and mistakes in our work, but they are temporary. Communists correct mistakes and shortcomings in their work as soon as they discover them. Communists should not be afraid of self-criticism. When there is a shortcoming, say it openly; when there is a mistake, say it openly. Once they are corrected, shortcomings will no longer be shortcomings and wrongs will become right. We used to run schools for many years without much success. Now we have made progress, and our policies and methods are on the right track. This is related to the overall progress in the work of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and of the various base areas in North China, Central China, and the northwestern parts of Shanxi.

All our work has only one goal—to defeat the Japanese imperialists and to drive them out of China. The Japanese imperialists have invaded deep into China's territory. It is the mission of every single Chinese to fight against Japan. But some people oppose the Communist Party and are at odds with us. They have violated this principle. On this issue, they are not of one mind. But we are of one heart and one mind. We share one mind at big meetings. We also share one mind at small meetings. We are, both publicly and secretly, of one mind to fight off the Japanese. To fight off the Japanese, base areas must be built. Anywhere in China that has not fallen under Japanese control is an anti-Japanese base area: The great

rear area is a base area; North and Central China are base areas; Guangdong and Hainan Island are base areas; and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is a base area. Our Communist Party has set up base areas in many places. Some people say that this is not good and that these areas should not have been established. This is not appropriate. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army would have no food to eat and no place from which to set out to fight the enemy if there were no base areas. Who hates our base areas the most? They, the Japanese imperialists. They do not like our base areas because these base areas are located in their rear areas and threaten to shove them out. Once we have base areas, we must work on military affairs, politics, economics, culture, Party affairs, and so on. The Party School is for students to study Party affairs. The school pays more attention to the study of the theory, history, and the work style of the Party, but it also offers courses in politics, economics, culture, and some in military science. Students at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University also study politics, engage in production, and attend to the economy. Now all of our troops attend to economics. The 359th Brigade, for instance, has engaged in production and requires each and every soldier and cadre to produce fine grains of 6 *dan* and 1 *dou*. Is this not economics? All our troops produce food, make clothes, fix houses, build large and small auditoriums, and make desks, chairs, and benches on their own. These are all economics. The curriculum of Yan'an University emphasizes three fields—politics, economics, and culture. People in every base area all work in these fields. Our only goal is to defeat the Japanese imperialists and to transform China into an independent and free new China. Comrade Zhou Yang earlier said that we ought to serve the border region, and we ought to serve the base areas. Can we have one, two, two hundred, two thousand people to offer services in the base areas of the northwestern parts of Shanxi and in the base areas of the Taihang mountains, Mount Tai, and the Wutai mountain? Those are also called border regions. Basically, all our base areas are called border regions. If we are to serve the base areas, why don't we say we will serve the whole country? After all, you have to choose to land some place, just like a plane that flies in the sky has to land some place; it cannot fly around in the air without descending to the ground. Dogmatism does not land; it hangs on in the air. We must keep away from dogmatism and stand on solid ground serving the people realistically.

Japan is a solid entity; in China it stations hundreds of thousands of troops to fight us. At present, our various base areas are confronting many enemies, fighting 58 percent of the Japanese army and 90 percent of the puppet army. Some people do not see this fact and slander us for not at all engaging the Japanese army and its puppet forces. Last year, *Liberation Daily* published our article, which was titled “A Comparison of the Achievements of the Guomindang and of the Communist Party in the War of Resistance.”² This article provides figures, such as 58 percent and 90 percent. Right now, we have 470,000 troops of the Eighth Route Army and of the New Fourth Army, and about 250,000 personnel working for the Party, government offices, and civilian organizations; 470,000 plus 250,000 totals more than 700,000. Currently, in all the anti-Japanese base areas there is a population of more than 80 million people who directly or indirectly pay the agricultural tax in grain. But there used to be a population of 100 million before the Japanese army’s mopping-up operations. Because the Japanese adopted the main policy of luring the Chinese into capitulation through political action and making military attacks subsidiary in the front-line battlefields, in those mopping-up operations they transferred a large number of troops from their front line to gather their forces to destroy us through their “mopping-up,” “nibbling,” and “reinforcing security” operations and their campaign to “burn all, loot all, and kill all.” To deal with the Japanese, we must have our own tactics, that is, a set of military, political, economic, cultural, and Party-related strategies. In 1941 and 1942, when the most brutal war occurred, every anti-Japanese base area faced tremendous hardships. *Liberation Daily* carried an editorial, titled “The Darkness Before Dawn,” calling upon all our efforts to overcome this difficulty. The Party, the government, the army, and the people of every base area survived through our collective efforts and execution of the ten major policies.³ There are many difficulties in our bases behind enemy lines as well as in Yan’an, such as the problem of “Wild Lilies”⁴ and the problem of having only millet but no pork. It is good that production is developing at Yan’an University; such a development should be continued so that people can have more pork to eat. The other day I talked with Comrade Zhou Yang about all of you spinning and weaving and working on various sorts of special production. These activities are all very good. But I think that they are insufficient, and we should put more effort into our production. The situation behind enemy lines is

worse. Generally, every base area is facing tremendous difficulties because the enemy is enforcing its policy of “burn all, loot all, and kill all.” Life is extremely hard behind enemy lines, and the struggle is fierce as well; however, we have survived the seven-year War of Resistance. This brutal war passed its most difficult years in 1941 and 1942, and we are advancing again this year. It is precisely because we have our anti-Japanese base areas that China exists as it is today. Of course, it is not appropriate to say that the big base area in the great rear echelon has contributed nothing to saving China. It is totally senseless, however, when somebody says that only his base area in the great rear echelon saves China while the border regions and the base areas behind enemy lines do not. In what ways do you save China? Your 3 million troops are fighting with only 42 percent of the Japanese army and 10 percent of its puppet forces, whereas our 470,000 troops are battling a far greater proportion of the enemy. Our base areas are smaller, but our burdens are heavier because we have no assistance and we only rely upon the joint efforts of the union of the Party, the government, the army, and the common people. Take this battle for Henan, for instance: In facing over 100,000 Japanese soldiers, the Guomindang’s force of about 400,000 soldiers was not up to the task. They “turned around and marched off” when they heard the first gunshot. Nowadays many things are difficult to do, so we need to find a way out. Democracy is the answer, although there are people who disagree. Another solution is unity, and there are people who ignore this idea as well. They distribute pamphlets, hold big and small meetings, and curse the Communist Party “as the treacherous party,” the Eighth Route Army as “the treacherous army,” and the border region as “the treacherous region.” They are not at all interested in unity.

In short, Yan’an University should serve the needs of each anti-Japanese base area. Once the work of the base areas and the various kinds of work in politics, economy, culture, and party affairs are on the right track, our schools will also be on the right track. We must, however, overcome the shortcomings of the past and eliminate dogmatism.

Politically, you need to learn the Party’s principles and policies, such as the United Front, the “Three-Thirds” system,⁵ and the policy of Crack Troops and Simple Administration. You need to study subjects such as industry, agriculture, commerce, transportation, and finance because our present policy is to maintain

complete self-sufficiency. Regarding the practice of the “Three-Thirds” system, it was a little bit too rightist prior to the Senior Cadres Conference⁶ two years ago and a little bit too leftist last year. Our general policy is very clear and definite—to defeat the Japanese. Thus, we would like to unite with all parties, classes, and political and nonpolitical organizations, as long as they agree to fight against Japan and they are willing to collaborate with the Communist Party instead of sabotaging our Party. This policy will remain unchanged forever. When you comrades study politics, you must uphold such a policy and unite all the people in China in order to achieve the goal of defeating the Japanese.

Economically, we must attain complete self-sufficiency. We have made tremendous progress in economic development during the past few years, especially since last year. To attain complete self-sufficiency, in addition to food production we must produce all necessities. Now the government of the border region has given orders requesting that all families in every household in the region, a total population of 1.4 million, or 350,000 households, secure surplus food for one year. We are not only preventing droughts but also preparing for counteroffensives. This goal was not achieved last year, but it must be accomplished in the next two or three years. We are in Yan’an and we work in the border region, and we run Yan’an University. If all of these lead to having surplus food for one year for all of the 350,000 peasant households, our Communist Party will be remarkable. Moreover, the mountains in northern Shaanxi are all bald like monks’ heads. We are to plant trees so that hairs will grow on these heads. There should be a plan for forestation. Suppose one household plants 100 trees, 350,000 households will plant 35 million trees. We shall carry on the plan for eight or ten years to see the results; as the saying goes: “It takes ten years to grow trees, but a hundred years to rear people.” Also, regarding industrial development, at the Factory Representatives Conference,⁷ we proposed complete self-sufficiency in the industrial production of daily necessities. There are 1.5 million people, consisting of workers, peasants, businessmen, students, and soldiers, in the border region, and they need 310,000 bolts of cloth a year. But now our yearly production, which reaches only 100,000 bolts, is 210,000 bolts short. Relying upon our past experience, we are confident that we will achieve complete self-sufficiency in cloth within the next two to three years. In the past, cotton, cotton yarn, and cloth in the border region were

bought from outside, spending several billion of the border region's currency; this is like losing blood. If we grow cotton, spin yarn, and weave cloth on our own, with the help of 1.5 million people, we shall stop the bleeding and will make our economy stronger. Every year we need 4.7 million *jin* of iron for public and private use. Except for a small proportion, most of it has to be purchased from outside using billions of the border region's currency—we are bleeding again. Now we ask ourselves to achieve complete self-sufficiency for the 4.7 million *jin* of iron within the next two to three years by mining, smelting, and creating the necessary machinery and farming tools on our own. We have various types of industrial production, the major two being spinning and weaving, and iron making. We must accomplish self-sufficiency in these two areas, as well as in all other types of production. This is what we call complete self-sufficiency.

There is much work to be done on cultural and educational problems. We must achieve this goal: Every one of the 1.5 million people—consisting of 1.4 million common people and 100,000 personnel of the Party, government, and army—must be able to read. We have to be literate in order to study politics. In the future, administrative heads of towns, districts, or *xian* must all be literate. Even peasants will be required to be able to read once the economy of the border region is developed. We are to teach all the people of the border region 1,000 words a year and continue for eight to ten years. It will be even better if we can make each of them read 1,500, 2,000, or 3,000 words a year. At least we must beat the goal of 1,000 words and have a winter school in every village. Learning to read should become a mass literacy movement. It is not effective to rely only on our teaching “one, two, three, four” or such simple characters as “man, hand, knife, cow, and lamb.” Anyone among the common people who is able to read a hundred words is capable of teaching others.

And there is health work. As Comrade Zhou Yang has said, we need to start a health training class to help people learn some things. There should be a small clinic in every town. All together there are 1,000 towns in the border region. Let us select 1,000 people from the population of 1.5 million to study medicine for four months or for one year. Then send these people to be doctors in the clinics. Epidemic diseases have been rampant in Yan'an recently. Since we, the Communist Party, are governing this place, we should treat this seriously and we ought to think about how to stop it. Comrade Li Dingming, the vice chair of our

Border Region Government, is a doctor of Chinese medicine. And there are some others who have studied Western medicine. These two kinds of doctors have never worked together. Let us think whether there should be a united front in this field. I know neither Chinese medicine nor Western medicine. It does not matter which kind it is; the function of medicine is to cure illness. There is also a possibility that an illness is not cured due to the skills of the doctor. We should not despise Chinese medicine or Western medicine simply because a patient is not cured. If they can help infants survive to adulthood, if they can cure the sick, we should encourage and reward doctors of both Chinese and Western medicine. We suggest this slogan: The two kinds of doctors should collaborate.

Culturally, you need to study drama, practice *yangge* dance, and master singing, such as singing “The Yellow River” or chorus singing. Politics, economics, and culture are subjects of study at our Yan’an University; you must master them and be able to do work in these fields. We must serve realistically. Do not practice dogmatism. Do not detach yourselves from the real world.

Comrade Zhou Yang just now mentioned rectification and cadre investigation. These two tasks are very meaningful. They have reformed our cadres and their thinking. At the same time, however, there have also been mistakes, which are undergoing correction. In addition to what Comrade Zhou has said, I would like to add a few more things. We have a policy called “kill no one.” Some people still do not believe it, saying who knows whether the government will kill some day. Even if someone is indeed a secret agent who used to sabotage the border region, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army and to collect our secret information, as long as one makes it clear what one has done, we will kill no one. No one has been killed from April of last year until now. Is this harmful? No. To those real secret agents, the real bad guys in the past, our aim is to transform them. Our policy is to educate people. This policy has been determined, and I am proclaiming it to you once again. Some people believe it; others do not. It is up to you to believe it. In the *Analects* it says, “What is spoken can be made good,” meaning that what has been said should be carried out. Now that the policy decision of the Central Committee has been declared, it will be carried out. Everybody can wait and see. It is of great significance that we kill no one. No matter how serious the crime, we can educate the person because we do not kill. After the person has been educated, he is still useful. We hope those real secret

agents who did bad things in the past can repent and follow us to defeat the Japanese imperialists. If among a hundred such people, there are one or two who simply do not repent or cooperate, what should we do? What we should do is to let him get millet on his own. What is bad about his using his own hands to develop production and to make himself amply clothed and sufficiently fed? If he, stubbornly, does not repent or cooperate with us, will we spare him? We will still spare him. Why? To placate the majority of the people. Because executing him will make other people with similar problems panic. Should he remain stubborn for ten years, we will work on him for ten years; should he remain stubborn for twenty years, we will work on him for twenty years. We will be as stubborn as he is. This is what is called “right is right and wrong is wrong.” If he was a secret agent, he was a secret agent. It has to be clear. We must prevent them from doing the job of a secret agent again and make them cooperate with the Communist Party to fight Japan. Wrong is wrong. If he was not a secret agent but had been wrongly accused of being one, we shall withdraw the accusation to clearly distinguish right and wrong and shall weigh the degree of seriousness. During the time of the “Rescue Campaign,”⁸ the atmosphere was very tense. A lot of people were “rescued,” but for many this was in error. Wrong is wrong. So today we need to take these hats off officially—taking off the wrong “hat” that we put on them. The Communist Party may make mistakes when things are not clear, but once they become clear, the mistakes must be rectified. This is how things should be done. Making a mistake is bad, but it can be changed into a good thing. For example, if I wronged you and now using my own hands I remove the “hat” that I put on you by mistake, I will gain experience so that in the future I will not carelessly put hats on others. As for those who are wronged, they feel uncomfortable and in much pain, but they have also gone through hardship and gained experience so that they will be more careful when they investigate others in the future. Regarding the cadre investigation, we apply nine policies: leading cadres taking the responsibility, attending to work with their own hands, leading the main cadres to join with the masses, combining general calls with concrete guidance, investigating and researching, distinguishing right and wrong, training cadres, and educating the masses. Now cadre investigation in Yan’an must apply these policies. Right is right; wrong is wrong. We are to carry out the policy of leniency.

Today the term begins. There is one more thing to say. Some of your classes are taught by the responsible comrades of various departments of the Border Region Government. They have real work experience. You are here to learn. It is very good that the leaders who engage in practical work can come to teach. Meanwhile, you should often consult them by visiting or telephoning them. If some day they do not show up in class, you must urge them, insisting that they come to class.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 149–57, where it is reproduced from the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) On Zhou Yang, see above, note to the text of March 16, 1943. By 1944 he was director of the Cultural Work Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and president of Yan'an University.

[2.](#) Published in *Jiefang ribao*, August 24, 1943.

[3.](#) On the “ten major policies,” see above, the text of October 1, 1943.

[4.](#) On “Wild Lilies” and its author, Wang Shiwei, see above, note to the text of March 22, 1944.

[5.](#) On the “Three-Thirds” system, see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942.

[6.](#) The Senior Cadres Conference was held in Yan'an by the Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party from October 19, 1942, to January 14, 1943.

[7.](#) Referring to the conference held in Yan'an May 1–25, 1944, for factory managers and representatives of workers in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

[8.](#) The “Rescue Campaign,” also called the “Campaign for Rescuing the Unintentional Wrongdoers,” refers to the period from roughly the end of 1942 to August 1943 during which the Rectification Campaign went to an extreme on the issue of investigating cadres. See the Introduction to this volume, pp. xxxii, xxxiv–xlix.

Educational Principles of Yan'an University

(May 24, 1944)

1. The purpose of our university is to meet the demands of the War of Resistance and of construction in the border region and to train cadres engaged in practical work in new democratic political, economic, and cultural construction.

2. To increase the students' knowledge of revolutionary theory and the ideology of new democratic construction, our university will teach them the history of the Chinese Revolution and its present situation; to foster the students' revolutionary standpoint and their work style of seeking truth from facts, we also will teach them an outlook on life and ideological methods.

3. In order to raise practical experience to the level of theory and to unify theory and practice, learning and application, our university will carry out education in the following various ways in combination with the actual working experience of various departments in the border region:

- a. Establishing links with various relevant practical work units in the border region through specific organizations or work, and engaging the leaders of the relevant practical work departments to participate directly in the leadership of educational work of relevant schools and departments at our university.
- b. The various policies, principles, and summaries of experience from construction of the border region are the principal contents of the teaching and learning in our university. Technical classes are to be determined by the present demands of construction in the border region.

- c. In a planned and systematic manner, researchers in our university will undertake research on the practical problems of border region construction, and for specific periods and on concrete problems they should also participate in the work of related departments on a regular basis.
- d. During their study at our university, students are to be assigned for specific periods to various work departments for practical training on a regular basis.

4. Our university combines education with production and through organized labor we foster a spirit of construction and the habit and worldview of labor.

5. Education in our school adopts the work style of collective mutual assistance based on teaching oneself, teachers and students learning from each other, and mutually engaging the book learning and practical experience of the teachers and students, while at the same time developing democracy in teaching and learning, raising doubts and difficulties for discussion, and warmly welcoming vigorous debate in order to cultivate independent thought and the ability to criticize.

Note

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, pp. 183–84, reprinted from *Jiefang ribao*, May 31, 1944.

Letter to Hu Qiaomu

(May 27, 1944)

Qiaomu:

This article¹ is very realistic and lively, and it reflects and concretely resolves the circumstances and problems concerning *yangge* drama in recent years. Apart from publishing it in the newspaper, it can be printed in the form of a small booklet to serve as a textbook. It would be best to move the endnotes to the beginning and to expand them by a few more sentences. Please discuss this with the author.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 232, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Referring to: Ai Qing, “On the Forms of *Yangge* Drama,” *Jiefang ribao*, June 28, 1944.

*Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Directive on Work in the
Cities¹*
(June 5, 1944)

1. If we do not occupy major cities and vital transportation routes, the Japanese bandits will not be driven out of China. If we do not win over the millions of the toiling masses and urban masses under the oppression of the Japanese invaders, dissolve the puppet troops and organizations, and prepare for an armed uprising, we cannot coordinate the army and the countryside to occupy major cities and vital transportation routes. In the past, people thought that only the Guomintang was capable of driving out the Japanese bandits from the major cities and vital transportation routes; now this view must be changed so people come to recognize that some tasks can be achieved only by relying on our Party, whereas other tasks can be achieved mainly by relying on our Party, and that it is hopeless to rely on the Guomintang. The Guomintang has become extremely corrupt. The several hundred thousand Guomintang troops in Henan that collapsed without a fight or right after the first contact prove this. Only in those places where we have no strong army and no strong base areas do we not shoulder this responsibility.

2. Therefore, every bureau and Party committee must regard both the work in the cities and the work in the base areas as two major tasks of equal importance and must bear responsibility to prepare for taking over all large, medium-size, and small cities and vital transportation routes under its jurisdiction. To save themselves from death, the Japanese bandits are currently waging a major attack on the front line in China. They are in the process of decline. It will not be long

before the anti-Hitler struggle in the West wins its victory. The counteroffensive against the Japanese bandits in the Pacific will be more developed in the future. All these provide our Party with superior conditions. On the one hand, we can develop and strengthen our base areas. On the existing foundation, we can build a much stronger army and do much more local work. On the other hand, we can win over the tens of millions of masses in the cities and along vital transportation routes, dissolve and win over the puppet troops and police, and prepare for armed uprisings. Once conditions are ripe, we can combine these two, attack the Japanese bandits from both within and from outside and occupy the major cities and vital transportation routes. The idea of coordinated attacks from within and from without is the primary idea of our Party for driving out the enemy from the major cities.

3. Every bureau and committee must put in the most important position the work of taking all large, medium-size, and small cities and vital transportation routes occupied by the enemy and preparing for mass armed uprisings. You should change your past view of not paying any attention or paying little attention to work in the cities and along vital transportation routes. You should mobilize the entire Party to pay attention to this work, summarize experience conscientiously and carefully, study methods, organize offices, prepare cadres, and carry on our work. We hope that in the second half of this year or the first half of next year our work will achieve remarkable success. We must be prepared to coordinate with major events in the world when conditions are ripe to take over all enemy-occupied cities and vital transportation routes near our strong military and base areas.

4. In order to realize this great task, the specific problems below must be resolved: First, ideology. In general, we must educate cadres to understand completely the possibility, necessity, and importance of coordinating attacks from both within and without in order to occupy the major cities and vital transportation routes under the leadership of our Party and so ultimately to drive out the Japanese bandits. Without such ideological education, it is impossible to mobilize the whole Party to act. We must also make cadres understand that there is a completely new goal in doing work in the cities and along vital transportation routes. In the past, the purpose of this kind of work was to preserve the organization and survive the darkness or to collect intelligence and

buy supplies. Now, it is for the purpose of winning over the tens of millions of the masses, winning over puppet troops and police, preparing for armed uprisings, and taking over the cities and vital transportation routes. Every effort and all work are for this goal and are also subordinate to this goal. We should also make cadres understand that now is the right time to conduct work in the cities and along vital transportation routes to achieve this goal. Because the anti-Fascist war in the world and the War of Resistance in China are indeed quite near complete victory, because of the extreme corruption of the Guomindang and because of the victorious persistence of our Party and our army in the battlefields behind the enemy lines, the people of all China are even more disappointed with the Guomindang and are placing endless hope in our Party and our army. The revolutionary enthusiasm among the broad masses in the enemy-occupied areas is sure to increase rapidly in the future. There are broader social and mass conditions now than in the past to conduct this work. Thus, whereas in the past we correctly did not propose preparation for armed uprisings and the task of taking over the major cities, we must now propose this. If we do not propose it now, we will be making a grave mistake, or, in the future when the counteroffensive begins, we will be forced to carry out the struggle to take over the major cities and vital transportation routes without preparation or with insufficient preparation. This means that when our army attacks the major cities in the future, we will not be able to have sufficient and necessary coordination from within. Moreover, after taking over the cities, we will not be able to mobilize the masses quickly and establish and control their revolutionary order. We should also make cadres understand that the preparatory work for armed uprisings in order to take over the cities and vital transportation routes is a long-term, arduous, but grand form of preparatory work. Due to the special conditions in China, armed uprisings in the cities often can only succeed under the condition of responding to troops attacking from the outside, or under the condition of a coordinated attack from within and from without (e.g., the Shanghai uprising in 1927). It is very difficult for isolated uprisings in the cities to succeed without coordination of military action from outside. Therefore, in the preparatory work for armed uprisings in the cities, we must be on guard against impatience, against starting an armed uprising rashly, and against launching an uprising independently or too early without the coordination of our army from the

outside. We must have prolonged and extremely complicated and patient work. Careless and impatient work will never do. We also have to make cadres understand that it is impossible to keep the general policies and general strategies of our work in the cities a secret and that the strategies should be passed on to the entire Party. Yet the specific work plan and organizational work in the cities and in all enemy-occupied areas should be kept a complete secret and we should carry out education on clandestine work within the Party. Every Party member and cadre should only know what they need to know. They should not know everything that they could know.

Second, planning and organization. Every bureau and committee should make a general plan based on the specific conditions in all the large, medium-size, and small cities, as well as of the railroads and highways and the puppet troops and police in their area. Draw up a general plan to include, for example, how to divide responsibilities, how to organize offices, and how to equip and train cadres. A capable work committee should be organized to conduct work in every individual city (large, medium-size, and small), every section of railroad and highway, every puppet army unit, and every puppet police organization. For large cities and armies, you can organize several committees and divide the work among them. This type of committee does not perform base area work but, instead, takes special responsibility to organize and supervise work in the cities, along vital transportation routes, and among the puppet troops in that jurisdiction. This type of committee can be set up in base areas or guerrilla areas. If security conditions permit, they should be set up in the cities. Every bureau and regional Party committee should delegate to the work committees under their direct supervision the work of large and medium-size cities and important railroads. As for county seats and small cities occupied by the enemy, the work should be done by organizing committees under the supervision of the district or county Party committee. In terms of every army or division of the puppet troops that is in constant movement, a committee under the supervision of a proper Party committee should be set up to perform the work. Nevertheless, we should at the same time mobilize all organizations in the entire Party and army to do this work in many ways and along different lines. The various levels of organization, from the branches to the bureaus of the Central Committee, as long as they have a way to conduct work in the cities, along vital transportation

routes, and among the puppet troops and police, should directly send some people to do it. For now, the work does not need to be unified, and they do not have to explain their connections. If the various connections meet with one another in work or among the masses, they should take care of and help one another instead of fighting and complaining about one another. This kind of work should be under the leadership of the Party committee at every level. But for the sake of convenient management, a department of city work can be set up under every bureau and regional Party committee. Apart from supervising and organizing clandestine work in the cities and vital transportation routes, this kind of department should also supervise the small-scale plainclothes guerrilla troops near the cities and vital transportation routes in enemy-occupied territory to facilitate the work in the cities. This type of committee should be stationed in relatively hidden places in the base areas and should not be mixed up with the Party, administration, and military in the base areas.

Third, work orientation. Because the objective of our work is to oppose the national enemy, the general situation is to our advantage. Moreover, our powerful army and base areas are surrounding, or are not far from, the cities and vital transportation routes. This kind of work will provide the objective conditions for the greatest development. Among the people in the cities and along vital transportation routes in enemy-occupied territory, except for a few recalcitrant traitors and diehard anti-Communist elements, the majority will participate in, or are sympathetic to, various kinds of anti-Japanese work. Therefore, we should conduct extensive and proper work among all the masses and people from all walks of life in the cities and along vital transportation routes. We should carry out our work among the puppet troops and police, among the workers and laborers, among puppet political, economic, and cultural circles, and among young students, children, women, and even secret societies and gangster organizations. Nonetheless, our major attention should be focused on the work of winning over the several hundred thousand puppet troops and police and of winning over the several million workers and laborers because they are the decisive force in the armed uprising. This is precisely the point that many have neglected in the past. Our activities and organizing among workers and laborers should be conducted separately from our United Front work among higher social levels. In contrast, the activities among higher social levels are

usually aimed at camouflaging and assisting the activities of the masses at the bottom. Our activities should not have any connections with Guomindang organizations. We should lay bare to the masses the Guomindang's reactionary side, corruption, incompetence, and concern only for the interest of the few instead of the interests of the whole nation. We should eliminate any illusions about the Guomindang among the masses in the major cities. The organizations and connections we set up in the past for the purpose of intelligence and economic work should continue collecting intelligence and performing economic work. Only when conditions permit will they work both among higher social levels and the masses. In order to set up extensive transportation connections between the base areas and the cities (especially the major cities) and the vital transportation routes, and also to prepare military launch points for taking over the cities and vital routes, we should undertake ample work among the people around the cities and along the vital routes. Our guerrilla warfare in the base areas should try various appropriate methods to gradually approach the cities and the vital routes and to establish hidden guerrilla areas in these places in order to facilitate this work. Meanwhile, we should mobilize large numbers of workers and revolutionary intellectuals in the cities and along the vital routes to leave the cities and the vital routes to join the guerrilla war, some of whom should be prepared to return to supervise the armed struggle during the uprising. This will facilitate the coordination between the attacks from within and from without and occupation of the cities and vital routes. Once again, I repeat: The ideology of coordinating attacks from both within and without is the basic ideology of our Party in taking over the cities and vital routes. We should deploy all our forces and arrange all our work on the basis of this.

Fourth, work methods. Work methods in the cities and along vital transportation routes should emerge based on a summary of past experience. In our future work, we should continue to summarize experience and popularize various good methods created among the masses. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that Party work methods in the cities and along vital transportation routes during the Civil War period were generally wrong and should no longer be used. We should criticize these types of mistakes to avoid repeating them. But since the War of Resistance, various base areas have conducted extremely effective work in coordinating the legal struggle with the illegal struggle in

enemy-occupied areas and in some small adjacent cities. In some major cities, there has also been a lot of good work. The methods in this work have generally been correct. If we make some appropriate modifications to our work experience in enemy-occupied areas and small cities, it can be used in large and medium-size cities and along vital transportation routes. Every place should carefully study the form of struggle that fits every area and the various types of masses, as well as coordination of the legal and illegal struggles in that environment. In enemy-occupied areas, the Party and anti-Japanese organizations can only carry on secretly. Thus, they should pay attention to being small but highly trained and hidden. They should also be on high alert against the infiltration of spies. Nonetheless, various kinds of ordinary mass organizations and mass activities should be carried out openly, for example, by taking advantage of the various kinds of puppet organizations (the New People's Society and the Self-Defense Corps), by setting up various kinds of gray associations, or by building purely social and professional organizations and activities with close ties with the masses (teahouses, restaurants, boarding houses, and so on). We can even use factories, workplaces, schools, and shops to create unspoken alliances between all their workers on the basis of the slogan of cheating and dealing with the enemy and puppets and protecting the Chinese. This is also a very good form of mass organization. We often see an alliance of all the people in villages near the base areas to secretly organize and divide labor to cheat and deal with the enemy and the traitors. This method should be used in certain factories, workplaces, schools, and shops in the cities. We should unify the masses on the basis of protecting the immediate interests of the masses by, for example, reducing their burden, helping them avoid harassment, hiding their products, raising their salaries, and improving their welfare. All these can be the starting points for unifying the activities of the masses. Moreover, with the masses we can take great advantage of the fraudulent purposes of the enemy's "New Policy" to become a legal slogan for our masses. Furthermore, the high prestige of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army among people of various social levels in the enemy-occupied areas can also be an asset in our work in the cities. Many people take great honor and pride in hearing news about our army, establishing some connections with our army, and obtaining certain kinds of official documentation from our army. We should take advantage of this situation to promote the unity of the people,

but because it is illegal to do so in enemy-occupied areas, we should take advantage of it in an extremely covert and limited way. At present, illegal activity and struggle in the cities and along vital transportation routes should be carried out on the premise that it will not obstruct and harm our legal organizations and struggles. This differs somewhat from the association between all legal and illegal struggles in the guerrilla zones near the base areas. In the guerrilla zones, the legal struggle is often aimed at covering the activities and the existence of the illegal guerrillas. It is the opposite in the cities and along the vital transportation routes. The illegal struggles often must be subordinate to the legal struggles. In terms of propaganda work in enemy-occupied areas, it should also be conducted in many legal ways, which include using various legal newspapers, magazines, and books, and various legal slogans. We should also undertake various forms of illegal propaganda, but we have to be very careful about our methods. At present, oral propaganda is the major form, and we may even use the method of spreading rumors. In terms of issuing illegal leaflets, books, and newspapers, we should have a well-conceived and cautious organization. In short, we should guard against two erroneous tendencies in urban work. The first is the careless, irresponsible, loud, crude, and impetuous method of adventurism. The other is the motionless and purely covert method of "tailism," which does not associate with the masses and does not do mass work. The correct method is to contact and unite with the broadest possible segment of the masses and to raise the masses' consciousness and organization within the legal limits in order to hide the small and highly trained secret organizations and secret activities among the masses and among the legal activities of the masses. Moreover, before the uprising, all forms of organization and struggle should avoid taking firm shape and forming into a system, and should use various kinds of methods to scatter and remain formless. This is done to maximize victories while reducing losses.

Fifth, cadres. There must be a large group of cadres to perform work in the cities and along vital transportation routes. We should try to keep the cadres who are working in the cities now and those veteran cadres who used to work in the cities in these positions, but they should absorb new lessons and perform their duties with new methods under the guidance of the new principles. Furthermore, the double-sided struggle in the enemy-occupied territory near the base areas in the past few years has trained a large number of Party and non-Party cadres who

are expert at conducting legal struggle. Many of them have abundant knowledge in handling and misleading the enemy in legal struggle. Some of them have even surpassed the veteran cadres who worked in the cities during the Civil War period. Many of them can set themselves up among the workers, laborers, and other professions in the cities, and they should be well trained, nurtured, and used. If these people can be set up and can undertake work in large and medium-size cities and along vital transportation routes, we should set some of them aside for short-term training before sending them back to work. Whether they are intellectuals, workers, peasants, or other professionals, and whether they are Party or non-Party members, we can use them. Every base area now has many cadres of this kind. In addition, every base area has some people who often go to the enemy-occupied cities to do business, work, or look for a job, especially in northern Jiangsu and eastern Shandong. Every year, several hundred thousand people go to Shanghai, Hangzhou, and various cities in Manchuria to make a living. Therefore, we should look for and train various kinds of cadres from among these people to do work in the cities. Apart from this, we can also train some cadres from among the captured puppet troops and then send them back. When the gentry in the base areas move and settle down in the cities, they may also be given a certain task or may be disguised so that they can operate in the cities. Even people who are politically suspect and who have yet to be cleared in the base areas can be sent to the enemy-occupied cities to conduct some independent activities in order to test them. Among the various cadres, we should pay special attention to training native cadres in every city and every transportation route. Cadres from outside should regard themselves as the guides and protectors of the local cadres. In the base areas, we can also find cadres who grew up and once lived in the cities and along vital transportation routes, train them, and then send them back. In sum, we should go all out to use all kinds of cadres to conduct work of all varieties, and we should let people of every kind do their various tasks independently, instead of mixing them together. Let them do their work in many different ways and along different paths. Meanwhile, we must also maintain the small size, elite training, purity, and dependability of the secret organizations in the Party and build up many dependable Party strongholds in every big, medium-size, and small city and along every railroad and highway in order to use them as the leading backbone for the great work in

the cities. All of this establishes a situation of uniting the leading backbone of the Party and broad segments of the people and masses. Moreover, in the base areas leaders at various levels of the Party, administration, military, and civilian apparatus should all study and learn urban work realistically, study the armed uprisings in the cities and the art of coordinating attacks from within and from without, study the establishment of revolutionary order in the cities and the control and management of the cities, large industries, and commerce. All of this can be used as preparation for taking over and managing the major cities and vital transportation routes in the future.

Sixth, funds. We need a great deal of funds to carry out work in the cities and along vital transportation routes. If it does not lead to waste by cadres and a mercenary attitude among those working in the cities, all the necessary funds should be fully granted. In terms of the necessary expenditures in conducting the work in the cities and along vital transportation routes, every organization in every base area should be reimbursed. The budget in every base area should include sufficient funds for work in the cities. We may also adopt the method of giving some people capital and letting them undertake business in the cities and along vital transportation routes in order to use their profits to supplement the expenses for urban work.

5. On the basis of local conditions, every bureau and committee should realistically study and specifically implement these suggestions concerning concrete problems in their actual work, and further develop them in their future work. Only when these concrete problems are completely resolved can we make outstanding achievements in urban work and along vital transportation routes and march on toward the destination of armed uprisings.

Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 159–66, where it is reproduced from the mimeographed copy of the document preserved in the Central Archives.

1. This is an inner-Party directive drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Party Central Committee.

*Talk While Meeting with the Delegation
of Chinese and Foreign Reporters
Visiting the Northwest
(June 12, 1944)*

I. Introductory remarks

I wholeheartedly welcome you to Yan'an. We have a common goal, which is to overthrow the Japanese warlords and to defeat all Fascists. China and the entire world are united on this common basis.

Your arrival in Yan'an coincides with the opening of the second front in Europe.¹ We greatly celebrate this fact. The impact of the second front is not restricted to Europe; it will extend to the Pacific and China as well. China will move forward, and the world will move forward. We must achieve the ultimate victory.

The opening of the second front is the result of developments long in the making and is the consequence of progress made during the Moscow Conference and the Tehran Conference.² It was at these conferences that the decision was made to attack the enemy from the east, west, and south. The second battlefield has been realized; the plan to attack the enemy from three directions has been actualized. We sincerely wish President [Franklin] Roosevelt, Prime Minister [Winston] Churchill, and Marshal [Joseph] Stalin good health!

All the participants in the War of Resistance throughout China should focus on the objective, work hard, coordinate with the decisive battle in Europe, and overthrow the Japanese warlords. Opportunities abound for us now.

As for the domestic situation in China, you are very concerned about it, so I

must elaborate here. With regard to the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists, the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party is evident in the proclamations and newspapers of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. Today, I will take the opportunity of your visit again to make the following explanation: we support Chairman Chiang [Kaishek], adhere to the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists and the cooperation of the people of the entire nation, and we struggle to overthrow Japanese imperialism and to build an independent and democratic China. All along, these policies of the Chinese Communist Party have not changed. It was the case in the early period of the War of Resistance and in the middle of the War of Resistance, and it remains true today because this is what all Chinese people expect.

China, however, has defects, and they are major defects. These sorts of defects can be revealed in one sentence—it lacks democracy. The Chinese people need democracy very much because only democracy can give the War of Resistance its strength and put domestic relations and international relations on the right track. Only democracy can achieve victory in the War of Resistance, enable us to build a good country, and guarantee continued unity in China after the war. All of us know that China lacks democracy. Only with the addition of democracy can China move forward.

II. Questions and Answers

Questions

Mr. [Günther] Stein:³ Chairman Mao, will you please tell us something about Mr. Lin Boqu's negotiations in Chongqing?

Father Xia Nanhan: We are all concerned about this question. Could you please answer it first?

Mr. Stein: In order to clarify the issue, I would like Chairman Mao to make a comparison between the negotiations between the Guomindang and the Communists in 1936 and the situation in today's negotiations.

Mr. [Israel] Epstein: Has the opening of the second front marked the beginning of a new period? Is the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee preparing

to issue a declaration in this regard to clarify its policy?

Mr. Xie Shuangqiu: In order to strengthen unity, what does the Chinese Communist Party expect from the various sides?

Mr. Zhao Binghen: In order to clarify the issue, I add another question. What does the Chinese Communist Party expect the Guomindang government, the Guomindang itself, and the other parties to do? What is the Chinese Communist Party itself prepared to do?

Chairman Mao's response:

Your questions can be summed up in three points.

On the first question about the negotiations between the Guomindang and the Communists, the negotiations have continued for a long time and continue even today. We hope that the negotiations will make progress and also produce results. As to the rest, I cannot tell you anything more.

The second question is about the second front. A few days ago, an editorial in *Liberation Daily* made it clear that it is a new period, but we are not prepared to issue another declaration. The opening of the second front develops from the cooperation between the Allied countries during the war. Its general character, when comparing the present with the past, has not changed. Nevertheless, the opening of the second front shares a meaning similar to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. Before November 1942, there was a period of extreme Fascist ferocity and a period when anti-Fascist forces were attacked and were in retreat. Owing to the offensive of the Soviet Union, the previous period has ended and a new period has begun. Immediately thereafter, there were offensives in North Africa and the Pacific. This was a major change in which the Allied countries changed from defense to offense. The opening of the second front is another big step forward in the offensive. Without it, it is impossible to overthrow Hitler. Now Europe has entered the stage of decisive battle. In this sense, this is a new stage, especially in terms of military affairs. I have said that the impact of opening the second front will be far and wide. It will directly affect Europe and in the future will have an impact on the Pacific and China. But at present, its impact on China will probably be small. As you can see, although the situation for the rest of the world seems promising, problems in China will continue to depend on the efforts of the Chinese people. Improvements abroad alone will not solve our problems.

The third question is about the expectation of the Chinese Communist Party

and its own work. In order to overthrow the common enemy and to build very good and peaceful domestic relations, as well as very good and peaceful international relations, what we expect from the Guomindang government, the Guomindang itself, and all other parties is implementation of democracy in every field. The entire world is in the midst of the War of Resistance. Europe has entered a period of decisive battle; the decisive battle in Asia is coming soon, but China lacks the democratic system that is needed for the promotion of the war. Only democracy can give the War of Resistance its strength. This has been proven by the experience of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. The experience in China in the past few decades and in the past seven years of the War of Resistance also proves this point. There must be democracy in every respect: in politics, military affairs, the economy, culture, Party affairs, and international relations. All of these require democracy. Without question, everything needs unification, and everything must be unified. Unification, however, should be built on a foundation of democracy. Politics needs unification, but only politics which is built on the basis of freedom of speech, freedom of publication, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and free and democratic election of the government can have strength. Unification is especially important in the military, but unification of the military should also be built on the basis of democracy: between officers and soldiers, between the army and the people, and between different parts of the army. Without a democratic life and democratic relations, the army will not be able to fight as one. Economic democracy means that the economic system should not prevent the general masses from production, exchange, and consumption, but should promote the development of these activities. Cultural democracy, such as in education, academic thinking, newspapers, and art, can only be promoted by democracy. Democracy as part of Party affairs means that the internal relations within the Party and the relations between different parties should all be democratic relations. In terms of international relations, every country should be a democratic state and develop democratic relationships. We expect foreign countries and foreign friends to treat us with a democratic attitude, and we should also treat foreign countries and foreign friends with a democratic attitude. I will repeat one sentence: We need unification very much, but only unification that is built on the basis of democracy is true unification. It is true within the

country, and it will also be true in the new League of Nations. Only democratic unification can overthrow fascism and can build a new China and a new world. Our support for the Atlantic Charter⁴ and the resolutions made at the Moscow, Cairo, and Tehran conferences⁵ are based on this view. This is mainly what we expect from the Guomindang government, the Guomindang itself, all other parties, and all civil associations. This is also what the Chinese Communist Party has done and will continue to do. You gentlemen have been in the border region for more than ten days, and you are still going to stay for a few more days. You will see that all the work we Communists have done to overthrow the Japanese imperialists is carried out in a spirit of democratic unification or democratic centralism. If we are insufficient in one field, we must continue to make an effort. If we have defects, we must overcome these defects. We believe that in the entire Chinese nation only a democratic system and a democratic style can defeat the enemy at present and can build very good and peaceful domestic and international relations in the future. In terms of the Fascist countries like Germany, Italy, Japan, and others, we expect the same from them after their defeat. By holding this attitude when examining many problems, one can explain and accomplish anything. It is already late today. We can still exchange ideas in the future. This is all I want to say.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 167–71, where it is reproduced from *Jiefang ribao*, June 13, 1944, supplemented by the version in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 99–103.

¹. Referring to the Allied invasion on the western front at Normandy on June 6, 1944. Mao's views on the second front are given above, in the text of February 21, 1943.

². Regarding the Moscow Conference, see above, note to the text of March 5, 1944. Regarding the Tehran Conference, see above, note to the text of December 16, 1943.

³. Günther Stein (1900–1960) was at this time a correspondent for the Associated Press, the *Manchester Guardian*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*, stationed in Chongqing.

⁴. The Atlantic Charter, also called the “Joint Statement by Roosevelt and Churchill,” was published on

August 14, 1941, after the two leaders had a met on the Atlantic and promised cooperation in the fight against the Nazis, mutual nonaggression, and postwar disarmament.

[5](#). Regarding the Cairo Conference, see above, note to the text of December 16, 1943.

Commemorating United Nations Day, Defend Xi'an and the Northwest!¹ (June 14, 1944)

Today is the third United Nations Day. In Yan'an there is an enthusiastic mass meeting. This is a meeting not only for celebration but also to mobilize the people to defend Xi'an, Shaanxi, and the Northwest.

In 1942 President [Franklin] Roosevelt suggested that this day be commemorated every year as United Nations Day by all the anti-Fascist countries in the world. This year is the third time. The past two years were years when great changes took place, including two great incidents. The first one was the start of the offensive in November 1942 by the Soviet Red Army in Stalingrad, which changed the course of world history. Subsequently, Britain and the United States started their own offensives in North Africa and the Pacific, turning defense and retreat among the Allied countries into offense. The great achievement of the Soviet Red Army was its decisive role in this change. The second incident was the opening up of the second front² by Britain and the United States jointly on the sixth of this month, which moved the offensive into its decisive phase. The impact of the hard and yet victorious fighting by the brave Allied forces inside France will be felt all over the world. As we celebrate United Nations Day in China, we should not forget the bitter struggles of the Soviet, British, and American people, should not forget the wise leadership of Marshal [Joseph] Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister [Winston] Churchill, and the correctness of the road they have pointed out.

The war in Europe and the Pacific has turned into an offensive for some time now, and in Europe it has entered the decisive phase. But the Japanese bandits are still attacking China. The war in China not only has no sign of being turned

into an offensive, but even the retreat cannot be stopped. Such is the new situation in China today. Beginning April 17, the Japanese bandits launched consecutive offensives in Henan, Hunan, and Guangdong. Luoyang has fallen; Changsha is in great danger; and the most serious is the campaign in Henan. On that front, before the fall of Luoyang, the enemy's major goal was to attack the more than 300,000 troops commanded by General Jiang Dingwen³ and General Tang Enbo of the First War Zone. This campaign ended with the fall of Luoyang. At the beginning of this month, a second campaign began with the enemy's main goal being to attack the troops deployed along the line of Lingbao, Guolue, and Guandaokou, commanded by General Hu Zongnan of the Eighth War Zone. According to information we have received as of today, this line has also been broken, and the enemy is marching toward Tongguan, apparently aiming to invade Shaanxi. It is reported that in Xi'an people have been ordered to disperse; the Northwest is under great threat. Thus, while China is celebrating United Nations Day, the situation here is just the opposite of that in Europe and the Pacific: offensive over there; retreat right here.

There are also two different situations within China itself. On the battlefields behind enemy lines, an offensive is on; on the front-line battlefields, a retreat is on. Two different battlefields were created at the beginning of the War of Resistance, the battlefield behind enemy lines and the battlefield at the front. From July 1937 to October 1938 when Wuhan fell, the enemy's main forces went on the offensive in the front-line battlefield, while the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army marched to behind enemy lines and opened up several large battlefields there. After the fall of Wuhan, the enemy began to change its war policy, making its main approach to politically entice capitulation from the Guomindang in the front-line battlefields, with military attacks as supplemental to this, while transferring its main force to its rear to deal with the Communist Party. Until March of this year, for a total of five and a half years, the enemy's main striking force fell on the Communist Party and the people behind enemy lines. At its peak, of a total of 600,000 Japanese troops and 900,000 puppet troops, three-fourths were borne by the Communist Party. In spite of that, we did not have any outside assistance, and all the anti-Japanese base areas were cut up by the enemy. In the past five and a half years, in the front-line battlefields there were only a few full-scale battles characterized by "leaving home in the morning

and coming back at dusk,” and there were no strategic or occupation offensives. During this period, the policy of the Guomindang rulers was to “ward off” and watch, namely, to ward off the enemy when they came and to sit on their hands when the enemy went away. At the same time, they concentrated all their power on guarding against the people, on suppressing democracy, and opposing the Communist Party. This policy has been carried out by all of its party, administration, and military agencies. To this day, they are stubborn, unwilling to make any change.

However, the situation on the enemy’s side has changed. Since April 18, the enemy’s policy of achieving politically enticed capitulation as the main approach has been changed to a policy of using military attack as its main approach. The only reason that the enemy made such a change is to avoid its own death. But the enemy has not yet lost its fighting capacity. However, due to improper policy that has been carried out for a long time, our government and the Guomindang rulers have sunk into such a condition that they have lost almost all their fighting capacity and the ability to deal with the situation. Their troops have scattered without being attacked or as soon as they were attacked; in the military, the officers and the soldiers are alienated; so are the army and the people. After fighting for more than fifty days they retreated to Tongguan. Xi’an is shaken, and they are preparing for further retreat.

The years 1941 and 1942 were the two most difficult on the battlefield behind enemy lines. Under heavy attacks from the enemy’s main forces, the population in the base areas decreased from 100 million to 50 million. The army became smaller, as did its territory. Nevertheless, we carried on the struggle, carried out all the appropriate policies of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, defeated all the enemy offensives, and finally established a firm foothold. In 1943 and this year we launched extensive offensives, recovering large tracts of land from the evil hand of the enemy, liberating large numbers of people. The population in the base areas has increased to 80 million. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army have regained their strength and have even seen some growth. The total number of regular troops and guerrillas on the three big battlefields behind enemy lines in northern, central, and southern China has reached 470,000, and the number of militia has reached 2 million. More important, they have gained plenty of experience, and their quality has improved.

The enemy originally had planned first to destroy the battlefields in its rear and then to attack the front. This is no longer possible. Thus, to save itself from death, it was forced to simultaneously shoulder both battlefields.

This is truly an excellent situation. As long as our government and the Guomintang rulers are willing to revise its policies, the morale of the soldiers will rise and the enemy's offensive will be shattered. With such strength and such immense battlefields behind enemy lines, we could have defeated the enemy with ease if the front had counterattacked with some force. The enemy is few in number. So far the total number of enemy troops in the offense in Henan, Hunan, and Guangdong is around a dozen divisions. Is it not possible for us to drive them back with all our nation's strength? Yet today we see only our own retreat.

This is totally groundless. Why is it that the Communist Party is able to hold on and able to attack (though it is not yet able to launch strategic attacks or to take over the big cities), whereas the Guomintang is unable to hold on or to attack?

The reason is simple; the Communist Party persists in unity and democracy. It has united people from all walks of life on every battlefield behind enemy lines in northern China, central China, and southern China; it practices democracy and relies on the people; those places are filled with persistent vigor and a patriotic spirit to resist the enemy and defend the country. The Communist Party also tries its best to unite the entire nation. No matter how reactionary the Guomintang's policies are, [the Party] is willing to improve relations with it. The Guomintang is quite different. Even today, its rulers, for example, do not show any sign of remorse or any desire to adopt a correct policy. They do not have unity or the principle of democracy, but instead every day they defame the Communist Party as the "traitorous party," the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army as "traitorous armies," and the anti-Japanese democratic base areas as the "traitorous areas." They are arrogant and conceited and consider themselves matchless in the world. This is already known all over the world. They only remember to ask the Allied countries for assistance, relying wholeheartedly on the Allied countries to defeat Japan, and they seldom have the intention or plan to be self-reliant. Expecting to defeat the enemy this way—isn't it the same as going into the trees to catch fish?

The current situation in the front-line battlefield in China is already critical.

We hope that our government and the Guomintang rulers will immediately make a serious self-criticism and revise their policies. As of today they should start a new beginning with the people, and things can still be done. The most serious task at the moment is to defend Xi'an and defend Shaanxi and the Northwest. This is the only international communication line today. If this falls, Sichuan will be in danger. We Communists have always hoped that the Guomintang will do well. We and the people of the entire nation all hope that the two parties will improve their relations, take care of their unsettled cases, and again move into a new era. We hope that our government and the Guomintang rulers will no longer dishearten the people. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union wish for this just as eagerly. The gentlemen in the press corps⁴ are already in Yan'an, and [U.S.] Vice President [Henry] Wallace will soon visit China. We hope that they will promote progress and help the Chinese people solve the problem of unity and democracy so as to overcome the crisis on the front-line battlefields of China. No medicine other than unity and democracy will cure China's current malady; without this, the military crisis cannot be overcome. We would like to take this United Nations Day to express the sincere hopes of we Communists.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 172–76, where it is reproduced from the June 14, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

- ¹. This is an editorial written by Mao Zedong for *Jiefang ribao*.
- ². On the second front, see above, the texts of February 21, 1943, and June 12, 1944.
- ³. Jiang Dingwen (1895–1974) was at this time commander-in-chief of the First War Zone of the Guomintang Army.
- ⁴. Referring to the delegation of Chinese and foreign reporters visiting the Northwest; see above, the text of June 12, 1944.

*Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Directive on the Reform and
Training of Troops
(June 1944)*

1. At present, our troops number 470,000 in all. We expect this to be sufficient to maintain and develop the base areas during the period before the counteroffensive begins, but not sufficient during the counteroffensive period to seize the large cities and important transportation routes, finally expelling the Japanese bandits from China, or to deal with sudden domestic incidents that will possibly arise from the Guomindang side. In order to finally drive the Japanese bandits out of the large cities and from the major transportation routes and to deal with such incidents, we must not fail to have a military force that is two or more times as strong as our present force. The enemy is currently launching a major offensive on the front, and conditions in a few of the base areas with regard to the enemy have temporarily changed. The good news of the opening of the second front in Europe can boost our morale during the War of Resistance and destroy the arrogance of the enemy and the puppet government. These conditions mean that we can and should expand our base areas and enlarge our military strength behind enemy lines. However, first, our present human, material, and financial resources severely restrict us; second, it is possible that the enemy will withdraw from the front line and will wage a “moppingup” campaign and that it will move troops from Manchuria through the pass; and, third, our troops have been scattered and fighting in guerrilla style for many years, have very little training, and are not yet consolidated. Therefore, it is not possible or suitable at present for there to be any great development. We should take the

present opportunity to deal with the enemy's and the puppet troops' "mopping up" and "nibbling," to go deeply behind enemy lines to develop guerrilla warfare and do everything possible to develop our troops there, to expand and consolidate our base areas, and to endeavor to win over the puppet army and the police as well as the broad masses living in the large cities and on important transportation routes. In addition, within a year we should intensify the reform and training of our current troops. During the intervals between fighting and producing, on our current material basis we will raise our military training and political work to a much higher level, preparing conditions for great future development. Generally, the core work at present is to improve, consolidate, and prepare conditions for great future development. If we cannot complete this sort of task, then our future development and the expulsion of the enemy from the large cities will be hindered.

2. We therefore make the following proposal to you. Under the condition of not obstructing fighting and production, within a year every bureau and committee will make an overall plan, which the military area commands and branch military area commands will be responsible for implementing, to use every possible break between war and production to consolidate and train troops in turn. Those under especially favorable conditions can concentrate and train troops in turn with one or several regiments as a unit. Those not under such conditions can do the same using a battalion or company as a unit. All of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army will have undergone effective, large-scale reform and training within a year.

3. The content of the reform and training is divided into two sections: military and political. Military reform and training means troop training and summarizing the experience of commanding, directing military operations, and maintaining the army (commanding means managing, directing military operations means commanding in battles, and maintaining the army means producing provisions). The focus of the content of troop training will be on skills supplemented by tactics. The method of troop training will be to carry out mass movements; everyone, from officers to soldiers to conscripts as well as anyone who is not military personnel and who can participate, should join. Find experts from among the soldiers (troop-training heroes) to teach the soldiers and the masses. The officers who are not as good as the soldiers should first learn from the troop-

training heroes, and then teach the soldiers. Frequently summarize experience, elect model learners, and use branch military area commands and regiments as the unit for holding large rallies for troop-training heroes and model learners. Smash the old way of training troops. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region's great troop training last winter used this sort of method and achieved great results. The Military Committee has other directives about such experiences.

4. During the one-year period of consolidation and training, political work must undergo a planned, comprehensive, and thorough reform. According to the resolution of the Gutian Conference¹ and Tan Zheng's report,² we should use the methods of examining defects and mistakes, developing fine achievements, promoting the good experience of model companies, and rewarding battle heroes, labor heroes, model workers, and model learners, in order to reach our goal of reforming political work. Our political work must guarantee the accomplishment of the entire task of consolidation and training.

5. Please pass on the task of the year-long consolidation and training to the appropriate military organs and political work organs for study, and make suggestions to the Central Military Committee. July of this year will be the preparatory period, and work will begin in August. Carry out the consolidation and training in stages, and complete the task within a year. But the main forces should seize the winter months for their consolidation and training (November of this year to February of next year, a total of four months). In August, September, and October we must consolidate and train the armed work teams, guerrilla units, and a small portion of the main forces in preparation for their taking over the training of the main forces. In addition to this, under the principle of alleviating the burden on the people by 10 to 20 percent, it is still necessary to recruit a few new soldiers to replenish the companies and to prepare to deal with the new changes next year.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (Neibu ben)*, pp. 251–53. A translation of an

alternate and longer version of the same directive, dated July 1, from *Zhonggong zhongyang wenxuan xuanji*, Vol. 12 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1982), is translated in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 1207–11.

[1.](#) Drafted in 1929 by Mao; see Vol. III, pp. 195–230.

[2.](#) Referring to “On the Issue of Political Work in the Army—Political Work Report at the Senior Cadres Conference of the Northwestern Bureau by the Political Department of the Rear Corps in April 1944.”

Letter to Ding Ling¹ and Ouyang Shan

(July 1, 1944)

Comrades Ding Ling and Ouyang Shan:

It is nearly dawn. Your essays² drew me in so much that, after my bath and before going to sleep, I read them in one sitting. I celebrate for the Chinese people; I celebrate your new style of writing! I was asked to deliver a speech at the Conference on Cooperatives, but I have no materials and I don't know where to begin. In addition to thanking you for your essays, I would like to know if I could possibly invite you to come to my place this afternoon or evening. Is it possible for you to come?

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

July 1, morning

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 233, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Ding Ling (1904–1986) was a writer. During the War of Resistance, she was associate director of the Cultural Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and editor for the “literature and arts” section of the Yan’an *Jiefang ribao*. See above, Mao’s letters to Ouyang Shan, April 9, 13, and 17, 1942.

². Referring to the essay “Tian Baolin” by Ding Ling and the essay “Living in the New Society” by Ouyang Shan. Both essays introduce model figures in the new agricultural cooperatives around Yan’an and were

published in *Jiefang ribao* on June 30, 1944.

*Decision to Convene the Second Session
of the Second Provincial Assembly in
the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border
Region¹
(July 5, 1944)*

The Japanese bandits in their death throes have invaded Henan and Hunan. Chinese troops on the front lines have fallen back, and the country is in extreme peril; the Northwest is in extreme peril. But reports of victory keep flowing in from the battlefields behind enemy lines where the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are fighting, and every democratic base area behind enemy lines gets stronger by the day, so these places have become the focus for the hopes of the people of the whole country. In order to unite all our strength to fight the War of Resistance and to prepare the counteroffensive against the enemy, we have decided to convene the Second Session of the Second Provincial Assembly of the Border Region² in November of this year.

This meeting will mainly discuss the following issues:

1. Unity and democracy. The reason the anti-Japanese base areas in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region have developed and strengthened is that their reliance on political, economic, and cultural democracy has forged together the hearts of the people of every social class and political party. At this year's Political Council, we should examine the good and unsuccessful experiences, reflect the ideas of every side, give unity and democracy more substantive content, and mobilize everyone, old and young, male and female, together to increase our strength. Moreover, we will use the model of the border region to

propel the people of the entire country to work together to quickly stop all separatist and anti-democratic phenomena.

2. Military affairs. We have made some achievements in our past work in supporting the military and the families of revolutionary fighters and martyrs as well as in organizing the masses, but there still are flaws. From today on, we should work harder at both tasks and devote ourselves to uniting the military and the people as one and to turning the people of the entire county into fighters to defeat Japanese imperialism. At the Provincial Assembly this year, we should examine this sort of work.

3. Economic and cultural construction in the border region. The legacies that the old society left to the border region are poverty, ignorance, and sickness. For many years now, all the people have waged a struggle, under the leadership of the government, against the phenomenon of poverty. This phenomenon has been eradicated or reduced, and the lives of the people have improved substantially; the new phenomenon of plentiful clothing and abundant food spreads farther every day. But it is not yet universal. Especially because of the demands of the War of Resistance and to prepare against famine, we must increase production. We must therefore call on the people to ensure that within the next two to three years every household has at least one year's worth of extra grain. In order to change the phenomenon of too many treeless mountains in the border region, we should call on the people to plant trees. Within the next five to ten years, each household should have planted and nurtured at least one hundred trees. Production of every sort of industrial good in the border region has increased, but we are not yet self-sufficient. Especially in the areas of cloth, iron, and so on, we must strive to be totally self-sufficient within the next three years. Moreover, we do not want mere quantity; we also want quality. In the area of struggling against ignorance, although we have made progress in recent years, illiteracy is not yet eradicated. We must use every effective means to encourage everyone, male and female, young and old, to learn at least a thousand characters within the next several years. In the struggle against sickness, we must work even harder before we will be able to overcome the phenomenon of "sickness in the midst of prosperity." Within the next several years, we must attain the goal of at least one doctor in every *xiang* [township], and at least one pharmacy in every *qu* [district]. In sum, we should allow economic, cultural, and health campaigns that

are vigorously developing, or that have just started to develop, to take enormous steps forward. The methods for doing this are: government operations or operations by the people. And the most important method is people running things with government help, calling on the people to organize every sort of cooperative. Only if the public and private sectors cooperate and look after each other voluntarily (any kind of coercion or assignment is forbidden), and if the largest number of people are organized into economic, cultural, and health cooperative movements, will we be able to complete the tasks mentioned above. The Provincial Assembly this year should concretely discuss these tasks.

4. Elections. The Border Region Provincial Assembly should hold another election next year. In order to further enable the people to elect to the Provincial Assembly those whom they love and support and to allow these new council members to better reflect the interests of the people and to decide on the plans for the War of Resistance and building the country, at this year's Provincial Assembly we should discuss the regulations and system for elections.

The above four points are the most important issues that must be discussed at this year's Political Assembly. This joint meeting enjoins every level of government, every council member, every level of the Political Assembly, every anti-Japanese group, and every labor hero to engage in heated debate before this session convenes and to prepare your opinions so as to facilitate bringing them forth at the Political Assembly. Such discussion will be beneficial to strengthening the unity of the War of Resistance and making resolutions about every sort of construction in the border region. This is of the greatest importance!

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 179–81, where it is reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) This resolution was drafted by Mao Zedong.

[2.](#) The assembly was held from December 4 to December 19, 1944.

Talk with the British Journalist

Günther Stein

(July 14, 1944)

[The text in *Mao Zedong wenji* is a back-translation to Chinese from the original English text in Stein's *The Challenge of Red China*. According to a note in *Mao Zedong wenji*, p. 193, the Chinese translation was done by the Central Translation Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. Because the English text is widely available in print, and online, at www.marxists.org, we do not reproduce it here.]

Note

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 182–89, where it is translated from the English in Stein, *The Challenge of Red China*, pp. 106–20.

*Notice on the Recent Shape of the Current Political Situation*¹

(July 15, 1944)

Comrades:

This notice is intended to inform you of the recent shape of the political situation.

1. Because the soldiers of Chiang [Kaishek]'s army are obtained through either kidnapping or purchase, the officers are extremely corrupt, and because there is no national and democratic education at all, only promotion of anti-Communist education, most of the army is filled with sentiments of defeatism and has lost the will to fight. During the battles in Henan and Hunan, most of Chiang's troops either collapsed without a fight or collapsed at the first engagement, causing over 400,000 losses. The enemy forces that invaded Henan only had four divisions, whereas Chiang's forces numbered almost 400,000. With the exception of a few assorted troops, who had poorer weaponry and had received worse treatment but had fought relatively well, almost all of them fled at the sight of the oncoming wind. Hu Zongnan had ten divisions that marched from Shaanxi and Gansu into western Henan to participate in the battle, but only one or two divisions could fight a bit, while the others collapsed at the first engagement. Under the brutal oppression of Chiang's troops, people in Henan were generally antagonistic toward them, leading to a mass insurrection to capture the army's weapons. Early on, the Communist Party in these places was wrecked by the Guomindang. Still, after losing hope in the Guomindang, the people in these localities have fervent hope that the Communist army will come and resist the enemy.

2. Hu Zongnan has transferred ten divisions to join the battle in Henan, lightening the threat to the border region, but the troops that directly surround

the border region have not been reduced. The blockade remains, and all actions against the Communist Party continue.

3. Journalists from England, the United States, and the Soviet Union have been in the border region for more than a month. They are very excited. But Chiang arranged anti-Communist propaganda on their trip here and sent some people to watch them and to carry out activities against the Communist Party. But they did not achieve their goal. They have left the border region and might carry out destructive propaganda after they leave. The main journalists from England, the United States, and the Soviet Union, however, are still staying in the border region. They are willing to see more and will go to northwestern Shanxi for a visit. Their news reports to England, the United States, and the Soviet Union will be advantageous to us.

4. [U.S. president Franklin] Roosevelt telegraphed Chiang three times requesting that a U.S. military delegation be sent to Yan'an; these requests were all refused by Chiang. This time, when [U.S. Vice President Henry A.] Wallace came to China, he led all relevant U.S. officials stationed in Chongqing to see Chiang and he formally presented Roosevelt's fourth telegram, forcing Chiang to agree. Eighteen U.S. military officials may arrive in Yan'an in a few days.

5. No progress has been made in the negotiations with the Guomindang. Although the Guomindang has nominally said that it will treat matters according to the Guidelines of the War of Resistance and Nation-Building, it has in fact not acknowledged the legal status of the [Communist] Party. Concerning the issue of the army, it only recognizes ten divisions, or 100,000 soldiers, and wants to demobilize the other 370,000 troops and 2 million militia. On the issue of political power, it only recognizes the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and denies the democratic political power representing 86 million people in the base areas behind enemy lines in North China, Central China, and South China. It refuses to release arrested Communist Party members and has turned down all other terms. Comrade Lin Boqu is still in Chongqing, but a basic adjustment to the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists awaits more difficulties for Chiang and further pressure from the United States.

6. Corruption in the Guomindang's political, military, economic, and cultural bureaucracies is moving toward an extreme point, fermenting a great crisis. Sun Ke, Song Ziwen, Yu Youren,² and many Guomindang members are dissatisfied

with Chiang and his group's obstinate policies. Other parties in the middle, as well as powerful groups in Sichuan and Yunnan, are even more dissatisfied. If Japan continues to encroach inland, a serious incident might occur in Chongqing.

7. In recent months we have made progress on the battlefield behind enemy lines in North China, Central China, and South China. We wiped out many enemy and puppet troops and reclaimed a lot of land. In order to overcome material difficulties, we are enhancing our broad-based production movement. Because good weather and rain arrived on time this year, we can expect a good harvest. For the people, the difference between the battlefield behind enemy lines led by our Party and the forward battlefield led by the Guomindang has become increasingly clear. One is attacking, growing, and consolidating, whereas the other is retreating, withering, and crisis-ridden. With the ongoing enemy attacks, this difference will further reveal itself. We still face many difficulties, however. The Japanese invaders will unleash a ferocious attack on us. Our economic difficulties remain tremendous. We must not be careless and lose vigilance.

8. On the Guomindang question, we will continue the general policy of acting with caution. Though the negotiations have not produced results, they are still ongoing.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 195–97, where it is reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) This telegram was actually sent on July 19, 1944, to Li Xiannian, the Central China Bureau, the Shandong Subbureau, the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Subbureau, the Northern Bureau, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Subbureau, and the Shanxi-Suiyuan Subbureau.

[2.](#) Sun Ke [Sun Fo] was at this time head of the legislature of the Guomindang government. Song Ziwen [T.V. Soong] was at this time head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Guomindang government. Yu Youren (1879–1964) was at this time head of the Control Yuan of the Guomindang government.

*Letter to Xie Juezai*¹

(July 28, 1944)

Comrade Juezai:

I do not have the *Brief Account of the Late Ming in the North and South*² or miscellaneous histories of the Ming period. You might find them at Comrade Fan Wenlan's³ place, and you can go there to inquire. I will send you the book *Tolerant Study Notes*⁴ together with another letter. I also have some other sketch-form novels, and I can send them to you if you need them.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 235–36, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Xie Juezai was at this time deputy chair of the Provincial Assembly of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

². Referring to the two books *Mingji bei lue* and *Mingji nan lue* compiled by Ji Liuqi (1622–1687?) in the early Qing dynasty. The former records events during the late Ming dynasty, 1595–1644, and the latter narrates events during the Southern Ming dynasty, 1644–1645.

³. Fan Wenlan, a noted historian, at this time worked for the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

[4.](#) *Rongzhai suibi* is a common-place book (*biji*) of sketch notes written by Hong Mai (1123–1202) during the Southern Song dynasty about classics, history, philosophy, literature, and the arts, as well as anecdotes and figures of the Song dynasty.

Request That Every Locality Investigate and Reply to Ten Questions (July 28, 1944)

Comrades [Li] Xiannian, [Rao] Shushi, [Luo] Ronghuan, Huang Jing, [Deng] Xiaoping, [Cheng] Zihua, and Lin Feng:¹

Please reply to the following questions by telegram.

1. After going through education on the current situation, rectification, counter-espionage, and rent reduction, is there a “Leftist” phenomenon that has arisen in regard to unity with public figures outside the Party and with implementation of the “Three-Thirds” system?² Have public figures outside the Party become dissatisfied with us, and what are the main points of their dissatisfaction? Do they feel that they have jobs but no authority, and how should we go about making them have both jobs and authority? How can we get them to unite further through the Provincial Assembly, forums, and participation in government work and social causes? At the same time, what Rightist phenomena are there?

2. In terms of rent reduction, does the erroneous tendency of only nominally reducing rents but actually not still exist? Should rent reduction still be an assigned task for this year? At the same time, what are the excessively Leftist phenomena that have occurred during rent reduction?

3. Have the two tasks of “supporting the government and cherishing the people” and “supporting the army and the families of the resistance fighters and martyrs” made progress? What are the respective flaws in the two tasks?

4. In your view, how possible is the large troop rectification and training session this fall and winter, and have you already begun to study this matter or

not? What are the major flaws in military affairs and political work right now?

5. What are the flaws in militia work? Is there still potential for much development? How can we extend the militia and land-mine warfare on a large scale? And how can we fully realize unification of the war effort with production during the militia campaign?

6. Has the coordination of legal and illegal work in enemy-occupied areas and adjacent areas made great progress? Has conflict between the Guomindang and the Communists occurred, and how was it dealt with?

7. In your view, what are the possibilities of realizing [the goals of] the Central Committee's directive on work in the cities?³ Have you already begun to study this task?

8. After this year's big production campaign, will it be possible to consider easing the burden on the people? For example, can we reduce it by 10 to 20 percent and not harm financial administration expenditures?

9. On the basis of this year's production development among the troops and organizations, can we already see considerable improvement in the lives of the soldiers and workers? Or are their lives still very bitter? At the same time, as far as our helping peasants develop production is concerned, can we see an improvement in peasant incomes? What are the attitudes of the peasants toward the household planning system, the mutual-aid organizations, and the cooperatives? In these tasks, is commandism still a serious problem? In the base areas, what are the possibilities for and level of self-sufficiency in the areas of grain, cotton, and every kind of industrial product?

10. What are your views about transferring the work of mass organizations to leading people in all walks of life to develop production, culture, and health after the task of rent and interest reduction has been completed? In your view, is it only after such a change is made that the workers in mass organizations (each national salvation organization) will have something to do instead of merely holding sine-cures? Is every locality in the midst of making such changes or not?

Please send one answer, or divide the questions and send several answers, to the above ten questions (do not answer each question in too great detail; limit your replies to clear responses to the questions). Your answers will help the Central Committee provide appropriate direction about several of the aforementioned tasks this autumn.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 198–99, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1.](#) Huang Jing was at this time secretary of the Pingyuan Subbureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and commissar of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Area Command of the Eighth Route Army. Cheng Zihua (1905–1991) was at this time acting secretary of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Subbureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and acting commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Area Command of the Eighth Route Army. (The others have been glossed in previous notes and can be located in the Index.)

[2.](#) On the “Three-Thirds” system, see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942.

[3.](#) On the “Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Directive on Work in the Cities,” see above, the text of June 5, 1944.

*Develop Guerrilla Warfare Around
Shanghai and Hangzhou and on Both
Sides of the Shanghai-Nanjing and
Shanghai-Hangzhou Rail Lines*
(August 3, 1944)

Central China Bureau:

On how to extend guerrilla warfare to the areas around Shanghai and Hangzhou, and to both sides of the Shanghai-Nanjing railway line as well as the Shanghai-Hangzhou railway line, so that both Shanghai and Hangzhou will be tightly surrounded by our guerrilla warfare, in order to intensify our work in these big cities and prepare to take them over, and on how to organize to the greatest possible extent the sailors along the coast, the sailors on the Yangzi River between Wusong and Shashi, and the sailors on the small rivers on both sides of the Yangzi River so that they will cooperate in taking over the big cities in the future: Please study these two matters and assign specific tasks to the local Party committees and the armed forces on the basis of section and district, and work diligently to fulfill them.

Mao [Zedong], Liu [Shaoqi], Chen [Yi]

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 728, where it is reproduced from Mao

Zedong's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

What the Guomindang Can Do After the Fall of Hengyang¹ (August 12, 1944)

The good news that the American and Chinese Allied Forces stationed on the Yunnan-Burma border had taken Myitkyina was soon reversed by the unhappy news of the fall of Hengyang. The soldiers defending Hengyang were very brave. But no one assisted their efforts because the passive strategies of excluding the people and willingly giving up the initiative by our government and our supreme command could not help them. Although the people were extremely anxious and worried, they could not volunteer to go there to help them.

Hengyang surpasses Changsha in importance. It is the junction of the Guangdong-Hankou rail line with the Hunan-Guangxi rail line, as well as the hub of the network of highways in the Southwest. Its fall means that the connections between the Southeast and the Southwest will be broken and that the great rear echelon in the Southwest will be exposed to a direct military threat. The Hengyang airport was the intermediate station **connecting** the southeastern air force bases and those in the Southwest. Its fall means that the southeastern air force bases that we have established with so much hardship will be useless. If we wage an air strike on Moji in Japan from Jian'ou in Fujian, it is only 1,425 kilometers by air, but that distance becomes 2,220 kilometers if we start from Guilin. **Hengyang** is located where the waters of the Xiang and Lei Rivers meet. The area around these two rivers is primarily responsible for Hunan Province's annual production of 30 million *dan* of rice, and **it is** a highly abundant source of mineral resources **as well**. **These** resources are crucial both for military industry as well as for feeding civilians and the military in the great rear echelon. The loss

of Hengyang will deepen the economic crisis there, while at the same time it will give the enemy **the possibility** of “nourishing the war by waging war.”

The British and Americans have also been very much concerned about **the campaign** in Hengyang. They have pointed out that Hengyang is more important than Changsha. They worry that if Hengyang is lost, then the war will drag on. They worry about the economic crisis in the great rear echelon. The American newspaper, the *Christian Science Monitor*, warns that there are signs indicating that the Japanese are adopting a policy of “defeating China first” (Central News Agency, New York, June 14). *The Times* of London fears that our country will not be able to wait until the Yunnan-Burma Highway has broken through before surrendering to the Japanese, saying, “What a dreadful conclusion it would be if we break through the Yunnan-Burma Highway and it is too late” (Reuters, London, July 1). The newspapers in England, the United States, and the Soviet Union have all repeatedly appealed that the 500,000 troops now surrounding the border region be sent to fight the Japanese. The importance they attach to this campaign is self-evident. The enemy’s Allied News Agency admits that after the enemy captured Hengyang Airport on June 26, General [Claire Lee] Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force sent at least a hundred planes daily to bomb the bandits’ forces. One can see the aggressiveness of this operation.

The people of our country have paid **even closer** attention to this campaign. Especially important are the many active propositions they have raised. An editorial in this paper on June 24 pointed out that the Japanese bandits’ present crime against Hunan is different from their previous “piston strategy.” Now they want instead “to bottle this resistance to death.” It also pointed out that “everything is prepared except for a change in the policies of the Guomindang. We hope that the Guomindang will change and change quickly. How should it change? It should change from a passive war to an active one, from the theory that only weapons matter to that of uniting the people and weapons, from hindering the people to relying on them, from oppressing democracy to implementing it, from opposing the Communist Party to strengthening the unity of the Guomindang with the Communist Party, from relying on foreign strength to combat Japan to taking the initiative ourselves to cooperate with the Allied countries to fight Japan.” These propositions met with the sympathy of people from every walk of life and every party and group in the entire country. There

was one other proposition, which was a demand by the people of Henan to investigate the responsibilities of the generals fighting in Henan.

But what **exactly** do **our government** authorities do? **In short: They don't move.** On June 3, when the Military Commission published the weekly report on the war situation, it declared: "In the campaign in central Henan, because our brave and loyal soldiers did not hesitate to sacrifice themselves and fought without fearing death, in the end 120 kilometers, from north to south, of the Beiping-Hankou rail line returned to the control of our military. The enemy bandits were not able to get what they wanted." **This is a barefaced lie.** They are trying to conceal the failure of the campaign in Henan. They will never investigate responsibilities or study the lessons of experience. On June 10, they published another weekly report on the war situation. In it, the early days of the campaign in Hunan, in which the Japanese forced a Chinese retreat of 100 *li* a day, are described: "Our army resisted every step of the way. The enemy paid the highest price for every inch of land!" On June 28, at a news conference for foreign journalists, Liang Hancoa,² in addition to blowing his own horn and glossing over the situation, also denied that the fall of Hengyang would lengthen the war. He said, "Some people are worried that if Hengyang falls, the war will last another one or two years. I cannot agree" (Central News Agency, Chongqing, June 29). On July 10, He Yingqin said during the central memorial week, "Speaking in terms of overall strategy, we are not worried at all about the enemy's silly attempt to break through our Beiping-Hankou and Guangdong-Hankou rail lines" (Central News Agency, Chongqing, July 10). What an exceptionally free-handed picture this is! Of all the measures of the government, not one calls on and organizes the masses to stand up and participate in the defense of Hengyang or **the Southwest and Northwest. In newspapers the Guomintang in Xi'an have even criticized the strong determination to defend Xi'an and the Northwest expressed by the tens of thousands of the masses who came to the rally in Yan'an commemorating United Nations Day. They believe it to be "a Communist Party conspiracy."** In a word, all the "beautiful rivers and mountains" are taken care of only by the Guomintang; **the people are not allowed to interfere. But, dear Guomintang gentlemen, these beautiful rivers and mountains are not yours; they are the adorable hometowns in which Chinese people are born, grow, and gather together.**

You Guomindangers have tightly bound the hands and feet of the Chinese people and won't let them stand up to defend themselves when the enemy comes. You just flash your guns for an instant and then beat a hasty retreat. It is said that this is a "magnetic tactic," but in reality it is a tactic that forever abandons seizing the initiative and will never want the people's participation. The people have already seen through these tricks of yours.

Our opinions can be summed up as follows: This battle of Hengyang proves yet again that even if you have many soldiers, air domination, and good weapons, it will all be useless without a fundamental political reform. The situation is still the same as before: "Everything is prepared except for a change in the policies of the Guomindang." **This newspaper printed an editorial on June 20 which said,** "If the Guomindang does not change fundamentally, then the dangers of the future can be predicted. We will continue to lose battles; the field armies will continue to suffer more losses; the enemy will break through the Beiping-Hankou and Guangdong-Hankou rail lines; the provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi will be cut off from the rest of the country; the resistance bases in the great rear echelon will shrink dramatically; our sources of soldiers and financial resources will experience greater and greater difficulties; our international status will fall day by day; and all kinds of crises will become more and more acute as time goes by." **It will not be long before these words come true.**

The key to every problem lies in politics, and the key to all politics lies in the masses. Unless the question of whether to include the masses is resolved, we will be unable to do anything at all. If we include the masses, even if in a dangerous situation, there will be a way out. Excluding them will inevitably leave one in the dark. Think about this, far-sighted men of the Guomindang.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 303–6, where it is reproduced from the original draft preserved in the Central Archives. Text in boldface represents Mao's additions during revisions prior to publication.

1. This is an editorial in the Yan'an *Jiefang ribao*. The title was changed from "On the Fall of Hengyang" to the present one by Mao Zedong.

2. Liang Hanco (1898–1975) was at this time director of the Guomintang's Propaganda Bureau.

Han Jun Tells the Inside Story of the Western Shanxi Incident *(August 13, 1944)*

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, August 13) In Yan Xishan's talk with the delegation of Chinese and foreign reporters carried in Western Capital Daily in Xi'an, there were words about the betrayal of the Second Column of the New Army led by Han Jun in 1939 when Yan Xishan was preparing for the winter offensive. In order to let the Chinese people know the inside story of this incident, which saddens friends but pleases the enemy, our reporter conducted a special interview with Comrade Han Jun, who underwent all the hardships and dangers himself. First, Comrade Han Jun told the reporter that in the past he had concealed the facts and remained silent on the cruel and vicious inside story of the Western Shanxi Incident and had never made it public in the press, in the hopes that Mr. Yan would come to his senses. This time because Yan Xishan reversed fact and fiction, openly confused the truth before the Chinese people and people abroad, he could no longer remain silent. Therefore, Comrade Han Jun gave us a detailed description of the process of the incident.

Yan Xishan Is Hostile to the People

After the fall of Taiyuan, Yan Xishan became shaky and was preparing to surrender and compromise. After Wang Jingwei's surrender, Yan Xishan called a meeting of senior cadres to feel out such a peace. He said: "Resistance and peace are a political issue, we cannot say that those who are for resistance are correct

and that those who are for peace are wrong.” At that moment Comrade Bo Yibo said: “The enemy invaded our country and occupied our territory; we want national independence, we can only resist to the very end. Peace and appeasement are surrender, this is to be a traitor to China.” Yan remained silent. It was not the first time that he talked in this way, but this was always exposed and opposed by the Sacrifice League and the New Army. However, Yan’s preparation for surrender never stopped. The Sacrifice League and the New Army believed that to win victory in the War of Resistance, we have to implement democracy and mobilize the masses. Yan is against democracy. He dismissed the popularly elected *xian* heads, district heads, village heads, and other popularly elected institutions. He said: “Political power is a dagger; if it is in our hands, we will be able to rule; but if it is in the hands of the people, we will be in danger, hence we cannot have democracy.” He was also against the establishment of the Peasants’ Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association, of the self-defense army, and so on (but these are the foundations of the Chinese resistance forces). He said: “The peasants are tigers; once they are mobilized it will be dangerous (he is afraid the peasants will fight to the end of the War of Resistance and refuse to obey him), but it is an opportunity if they are not mobilized (he is afraid that the Communists will come and mobilize the peasants). Now it is not a question of whether to mobilize; instead, it is a matter of controlling the electric whip (an electric whip is used to control tigers).” The reason he was against democracy and mobilizing the masses can be attributed entirely to his desire to surrender and compromise. He also said: “Survival is everything, and resistance is only the means.” During the “July 7 Incident,” in order to survive he had to resist a few days; later when he found out that the War of Resistance will be long and difficult, he wanted to surrender. This was also for survival. There are no such words as justice, self-evident truth, or sense of state and nation in his dictionary. While making these preparations, he pretended to be resisting, but in fact he was already collaborating with the enemy and was secretly against the Communists. He held meetings with the enemy in Liucun and Anping. Many of his diplomatic envoys collaborated with the enemy on the road between Xingji and Taiyuan. The commander of the Dare-to-Die Corps repeatedly expressed: “The purpose of our cooperation with you is to fight the War of Resistance to its very end, not to surrender and compromise. We are against anybody who wants to surrender and

compromise.” Consequently, Yan Xishan regarded the New Army as the biggest obstacle in his way to surrender and compromise. He could not make the Dare-to-Die Corps give in, through persuasion or other means, so naturally he began to carry out his “wise counsel.” “Unconsciously” he “transformed” the New Army into a “rebel army” and began to “send armed forces to suppress it.” This is the true inside story of the Western Shanxi Incident.

The Converging Attack on the Dare-to-Die Corps by the Yan [Xishan] and the Japanese Armies

In terms of the Western Shanxi Incident itself, it was Yan Xishan who first broke faith and started the Civil War. Yan Xishan attempted to get rid of the New Army, and he had planned for it for a long time. By October 1939, he ordered Wang Jingguo and Chen Changjie¹ to prepare to attack the New Army. He met with the anti-Communist generals and lobbied **them one by one**, telling them that the strength of the Communists and the Eighth Route Army was expanding every day. With the addition of cooperation from the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-Die Corps, there would be no place for our Shanxi-Suiyuan army to survive. Now was the time to get rid of the New Army and the Sacrifice League, using mutual assistance between China and Japan as proposed by the Japanese, in order to achieve our goal of survival. One reactionary officer (Liu Wuming) asked how to get rid of them. Wang and Chen answered that we should first reshuffle the Fourth Column of the Dare-to-Die Corps and transform it into the “Chinese Anti-Japanese Vanguard Army of Loyal Braves.” Then we will muster six armies in western Shanxi, in cooperation with the Japanese army, to get rid of the Second Column of the Dare-to-Die Corps. Finally, we will get rid of the First and Third columns in coordination with the Japanese army. Not unexpectedly, Yan Xishan soon appointed Chen Changjie as the commander-in-chief of the “rebel suppression” army. On November 29, 1939 (nine days before the Western Shanxi Incident), Chen sent out a secret order to attack the New Army from three directions. The Southern Column consisted of the Sixty-first Army, Eighty-third Army, and the Seventy-third Division of the Garrison Army. Chen held

concurrent command. It attacked Yiquan and Huangtu (the location of the headquarters of the Second Column of the Dare-to-Die Corps) in Xi *xian*. The commander-in-chief of the Northern Column was Liang Peihuang. He commanded the Nineteenth Army and part of the Thirty-third Army attacking the Shuitou-Shikou-Damaijiao area (at that time this was the location of the Western Shanxi Detachment of the Eighth Route Army) along Xi *xian* and Xiaoyi *xian*. The Right Column consisted of the New First Brigade and others, commanded by Cui Daoxiu; it attacked the Quanziping area in Xi *xian*. Meanwhile, the enemy also gathered the more than 5,000 garrison troops between Linfeng and Pingyao and stationed them along the Hanxinling area. So on December 1, 1939, Yan Xishan ordered that the Second Column of the Dare-to-Die Corps prepare to attack and destroy the Tongpu rail line on the fifth to implement the “winter offensive.” When we were just mobilizing the troops to carry out the order of attack and destruction, Yan’s army and the Japanese army began to attack us simultaneously. Our Second Column was encircled and suffered the converging attack of the Japanese and of Yan’s army. The situation was extremely dangerous, and we were facing the danger of being completely exterminated. If we did not engage in self-defense, we would be dead. We **had to** fight against the enemy with bayonets, on the one hand, and defend ourselves against the Old Army, on the other. We fought for twenty days before breaking through the encirclement of the Japanese invaders and the Old Army and then moved to northwest of Shanxi. This is the “rebellion of the Dare-to-Die Corps.” Ever since then, the Dare-to-Die Corps began to be called the “rebel army.”

Who in the End Is the Rebel Army?

Who in the end is the rebel army? Who works hand in glove with the enemy against the people, sabotages the War of Resistance, and betrays the nation? Is it the New Army, or Yan Xishan? The New Army did not work against the people, regarding them as fierce tigers, nor did it attend the Linfen meeting or the Anping meeting to **collaborate with the enemy and betray the nation**, nor did it send Zhao Chengshou, Liang Yanwu, Wang Qianyuan, or anyone else to

Taiyuan, Beiping, or Nanjing to call on the enemy and the traitor Wang Jingwei, nor did it conclude the “present territorial agreement” with the enemy. On the contrary, it was Yan Xishan himself who did these things. It is quite clear that Yan himself knows that the Dare-to-Die Corps is not the rebel army. Before 1939 he praised the Dare-to-Die Corps in every possible way, saying that they were revolutionary youth and all their methods were revolutionary, and he felt ashamed that his Old Army was all muddleheaded, backward, unprogressive, and unable to keep up with the Dare-to-Die Corps. Let’s put aside all this for the time being. Even after the Western Shanxi Incident, he once said in his small circle of a few “faithful comrades”: “The Dare-to-Die Corps was revolutionary and was the most resolute in the War of Resistance,” “Bo Yibo is not a serviceman, but the troops trained by him and his men are capable of fighting the enemy. This is because his methods are revolutionary and progressive.” Then why does he insist that the Dare-to-Die Corps is the rebel army? The drinker’s heart is not in the cup—he has ulterior motives. His aim is to use this to conceal his ugly collaboration with the enemy against the people and the Communists and his real image as a traitor or quasi traitor. It was not the “Han Jun betrayal” or the “conflict between the New Army and the Old Army”; on the contrary, it was a struggle between surrender and anti-surrender, between disintegration and unity, and between progress and retreat. Action speaks louder than words. Even if Yan Xishan had one hundred mouths, it would be hard for him to quibble.

In this affair not only can Bo Yibo, Han Jun, and other Communists and non-Communists who worked in the Dare-to-Die Corps and the Sacrifice League confirm it from their personal experience but Mr. Xu Fanting, a senior figure in the Guomindang (who was appointed the commander of the Provisional First Division by Mr. Yan and later became the general commander of the New Army) can also confirm it from his personal experience. More important, all the ordinary people in Shanxi Province can tell of Yan’s crimes against the public as if enumerating their family treasures.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 309–13, where the first section is reproduced from the August 14, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*, and the second and third sections are reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives; text in boldface was added by Mao.

1. Wang Jingguo (1893–1952) was one of Yan Xishan’s leading generals; Chen Changjie (1897–1968) was the Guomindang general in western Shanxi.

Welcome the Comrades-in-Arms of the American Army Observation Group¹ (August 15, 1944)

The U.S. Army Observation Group, sent by the general headquarters (that is, the headquarters of General [Joseph] Stilwell) of the U.S. forces stationed in China, Burma [Myanmar], and India, **has now arrived in** Yan'an. This is the most exciting **event** since the beginning of the War of Resistance **in China**. We extend a **sincere** welcome to everyone in this observation group who has come so far!

As we welcome **every comrade-in-arms** of the U.S. Army Observation Group, we cannot but think of the glorious achievements of the United States in the world war against the Fascists, and of the American people's great spirit of readiness to battle for a just cause without **fear of** sacrifice. Everywhere you look, from Europe to Africa to Asia, heroic American officers and soldiers are devoting their lives on the field of battle, shedding their blood in the struggle to liberate the people who live under the iron heel of the Fascists. On China's battlefields of the anti-Japanese war, Americans and **the people** of our country have put their shoulders together to wage war, and Americans have become our closest comrades-in-arms. At **this** moment of welcoming **our friends** from the U.S. Army Observation Group, we express our sincere thanks to the U.S. government, people, the soldiers and officers of its army, navy, and air force, and to its brilliant leader, President [Franklin] Roosevelt.

The arrival in Yan'an of **the comrades-in-arms** of the U.S. Army Observation Group is indeed of great significance in the struggle to win the anti-Japanese war. Over the past seven years, **nearly half a million soldiers of the** Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army and **more than 80 million liberated people have been fighting bravely behind enemy lines in North, South, and Central**

China. For quite a long time now, the battlefields behind enemy lines have actually been the most important battlefields in China's War of Resistance. Here, five-sixths of the enemy and puppet troops have been beaten back; here, almost all of the large Chinese cities have been besieged by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army; here, most of the coast occupied by the enemy is under our control. Our Allied friends did not know much about this situation before.

In the past, what the governments and people of the Allied countries understood to be true of China's War of Resistance was entirely the opposite of what I have just described. Their impression was that the main military force of China's War of Resistance is the Guomintang, that the Guomintang has done most of the work in the War of Resistance, that the majority of the enemy and puppet troops have been held back by the Guomintang, and that, in the future, one naturally will have to rely primarily on the Guomintang in the counteroffensive against the Japanese bandits. To this day, these impressions still dominate the thinking of most people among the governments and people of the Allied countries.

The cause of this phenomenon, which is in complete disagreement with the facts, lies mainly in the policies of deception and the blockade by the Guomintang rulers. They deceive foreigners, telling them how hard the Guomintang is working to fight the Japanese. Actually, over the five and a half years since October 1938, their basic policy has been simply to "stand on a hill and watch the tigers fighting." Until now, with the exception of the war zones in Hunan and Burma, the situation in the majority of the war zones has been the same. They deceive foreigners, saying that the Communist Party "does not fight the Japanese," but is always "sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the country." In fact, the one who has resisted five-sixths of the Japanese and puppet attacks is none other than the Communist Party, which supposedly "does not fight the Japanese" but, rather, "sabotages the War of Resistance and endangers the country." As for the Guomintang, which everyday cries "the nation above all," it has only resisted one-sixth of the enemy. Since the Communist Party, first, "does not fight the Japanese," second, "sabotages the War of Resistance," and, third, "endangers the country," why then, did the Guomintang not long ago call

foreigners and Chinese alike to come observe the Communist-controlled areas in order to prove that what the Guomintang gentlemen were saying was not false. But, no, absolutely not; on the contrary, Communist territory is encircled and blockaded as tight as an iron barrel. For more than five years, first, the Communist Party has not been allowed to publish military reports; second, border region newspapers have not been allowed to be printed or sold in other areas; third, neither foreign nor Chinese journalists have been allowed to visit the border region; and, fourth, the people both within and outside the border region have not been allowed to come and go freely. In sum, only the abuse, curses, rumors, and insults of the Guomintang are allowed to spread chaotically to the world; the facts about the Communists and the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army are not allowed to be revealed in the smallest degree. You have only to look at the difficulties and struggles the journalists' delegation endured in order to achieve its goal to know that the policy of the honorable rulers of the Guomintang, which they arrived at after racking their brains but which is still self-contradictory, is, on the one hand, to slander as much as they like and, on the other, not to permit anyone to come see [the true situation].

But reality prevails over eloquence, and truth is higher than everything else; there will come a day when the scales will fall from the eyes of foreigners and Chinese alike, and this is slowly beginning to happen now. The delegation of foreign and Chinese journalists and the U.S. Army Observation Group have broken through the Guomintang's blockade and have come to Yan'an. This is an issue that concerns the 450 million Chinese who are resisting the Japanese bandits and liberating China; it is an issue concerning which of the two positions and two lines in China is true and which is false; it is an issue concerning the Allied countries' victory over the common enemy and the establishment of perpetual peace. The Guomintang say that "the dispute between the Guomintang and the Communists is an affair of the Chinese alone." This is no more than a fig leaf with which the Guomintang try to hide their shame for the crimes they have committed during the anti-Japanese war. That this filthy fig leaf should be tossed into the latrine is now openly discussed among both Chinese and foreigners.

Discussions both abroad and domestically over the past half-year have

reached their final conclusion about the perfunctory job that the Guomindang is doing in the War of Resistance and the fact that it is corrupt and incompetent. Most foreigners and most Chinese in the heartland still do not know the real truth about the Communists, because the reactionary propaganda and blockade policy of the Guomindang have gone on for so long. But the situation is already beginning to change. One can see that things have already begun to change in public opinion abroad over the past half-year. This trip of the journalists' delegation and the observation group to Yan'an will begin a new phase in this change.

Because of the reports of the foreign journalists who have come to Yan'an, foreigners will gradually be able to understand the truth about the Communists, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and the anti-Japanese base areas, as well as their important position in aiding the Allied countries' resistance against the Japanese. The following examples can serve as evidence of this.

On July 1, the *New York Times* published an article titled "Communist Army in China Is Strong," one sentence of which reads: "Undoubtedly, over the last five years the troops under the command of the Communist Party, which is so mysterious to most people in the outside world, have been our valuable allies in the war against the Japanese. Use them properly, and they will surely hasten victory."² This article was written following the reports of the foreign journalists.

As early as January 7, an article appeared in *Amerasia* titled "The Counteroffensive Base of the Chinese Guerrilla Areas." It said, "Many military authorities believe that if the troops in the border region are able to obtain sufficient assistance, this region has the potential of becoming a strong counteroffensive base that will shorten the length of the war against Japan."

On June 10, the American magazine the *Saturday Evening Post* published an article by the famous American journalist [Edgar] Snow titled "Sixty Million Forgotten Allies." This article demonstrated a penetrating understanding of the strategic significance of every anti-Japanese base area behind enemy lines in China and of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army. He wrote, "In February, Admiral [Chester] Nimitz declared that the [U.S.] Navy was planning to build bases on the Chinese coast in order to attack Japan and Taiwan from

there. Either Hong Kong or Canton [Guangzhou] may first be taken by the [U.S.] military. But it is a great distance for bombers to fly from these cities to Japan. Only in more northern places is China closest to Japan. Therefore, the Chinese guerrilla troops there are of great potential importance to us.”³

These are reports about the Chinese Communists that leaked through the gaps between the fingers of the sky-covering hand of the Guomindang.

Now, not only has the foreign journalists delegation arrived in Yan’an but so has the U.S. Army Observation Group. We believe that the comrades-in-arms of these groups will surely make a thorough and deep examination of the situation here, and will also give us further guidance about how the two sides can closely cooperate to be victorious over the Japanese. The Guomindang’s desire to cover the sky with its hand forever is already in trouble.

We congratulate in advance the U.S. Army Observation Group on the success of its work. We hope that this success will allow the U.S. military headquarters to obtain a true understanding both of the Chinese Communist Party, which from beginning to end **has insisted on** a united War of Resistance and has carried out democratic policies and also of the strength of the war effort under the leadership of the Communist Party behind enemy lines. **We also hope it will be used to decide upon correct policies.** We hope that this success will improve the unity between the two great Allied countries, China and the United States, and will hasten the process of the final victory over the Japanese bandits.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 317–21, where it is reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives. Text in boldface is Mao’s additions prior to publication.

¹. This is an editorial from the Yan’an *Jiefang ribao*. The title was changed to the present one by Mao Zedong from the original “Welcome the American Army Observation Group.”

². The original text of this sentence on p. 6 of that day’s *New York Times* reads: “There is no doubt that the communist armies, which have been largely a mystery to the outside world for five years, are valuable allies in the anti-Japanese war and that their proper use—like the proper use of the Balkan Partisans—will speed up victory.”

3. Snow's article in the June 10, 1944, issue of *The Saturday Evening Post* is titled "Sixty Million Lost Allies"; the quotation here is on p. 12.

*Opinion on Reform and Training of the Central China Forces*¹

(August 22, 1944)

Rao [Shushi], Zhang [Yunyi], Lai [Chuanzhu]:²

We have received your telegram of the fourteenth.

1. The training of the Central China forces should emphasize the four categories of drilling, troop management, troop maintenance, and strategy, of which drilling is the most crucial. You can consult Zhang Zongxun's³ full report on drilling during the winter. The experiences therein incorporate mass-movement drilling methods of using soldiers to teach soldiers, officers to teach soldiers, and soldiers to teach officers in a new creation that is a historical breakthrough. Every area in Central China should command all active cadres of the rank of regimental leader or higher to take about ten days to discuss this new training method that they should master, thus ensuring the achievement of outstanding training results. The content of the training should emphasize improving combat skills and the mastering of the four basic skills of throwing hand grenades, shooting, bayoneting, and excavation work. At the same time, cadres should discuss new methods of troop management, creating new ways to organize this task. When discussing troop maintenance, find ways to ensure increased production, improved wages, and increased body strength. When discussing strategy, strengthen leadership methods in battle. These four considerations are urgent; if we can solve them within a year, the combat capacity of our army will be increased several times over, and we will be better able to meet the changing needs of the battlefield. Hold meetings about training, either within army headquarters or in local branches, and do so immediately.

Responsible division and brigade cadres should personally preside over these meetings.

2. On cultivating regimental leading cadres, army headquarters can organize regimental-level training teams or military affairs rectification classes. Attract off-duty brigade and regimental cadres, and select outstanding battalion cadres to participate as well. The classes should not be very long. The curriculum could include studying five major subjects: the art of war, weapons, siege, topography, and management education (troop management, drilling, troop maintenance, and other military and administrative affairs), always taking the improvement of the cadres' leadership skills to be the central idea. With regard to studying military tactics, the best method is a rectification forum, with mutual criticism of past battle experiences. Students will report their own experiences in battle or raise a few questions and ask the other students to give their opinions. After discussion, the group should summarize what has been said. This sort of enlightening, concrete learning based on reality is most in accordance with the needs of our army's cadres. The old method of reading line by line from a book is not only difficult to pay attention to but also is difficult to apply to reality. In Yan'an, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University is preparing to hold a training session for its teachers this winter. First, it will train the teachers, who four months later will return to train their students. Its curriculum is the same as that outlined above. Teachers, no one will now be sent to you; you yourselves must bear the responsibility of being teachers. Select and cultivate teachers from the ranks of students; or use the new method of students teaching students, giving free rein to and studying everyone's special abilities; or else train qualified personnel in the old army and use them as teaching assistants. We feel that the Yan'an army lacks trained personnel, and we therefore rely entirely on you to solve this problem.

3. Special-grade soldiers, such as worker-soldiers and so on, may enter a training course at Resistance University. For the time being, we will not emphasize teaching the use of new weapons and skills. If we form a deep and solid tactical foundation of teaching drilling, troop management, troop maintenance, and strategy, then when we get new weapons, we will still have time to teach the soldiers how to use them.

Please carry out the above ideas as actual circumstances demand.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 203–5, where it is reproduced from a copy of the document preserved in the Central Archives.

- [1.](#) This telegram was drafted by Chen Yi, with some modifications by Mao Zedong.
- [2.](#) Zhang Yunyi (1892–1974) was at this time vice commander of the New Fourth Army.
- [3.](#) Zhang Zongxun (1908–1997) was at this time commander of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

Letter to Qin Bangxian

(August 31, 1944)

Comrade Bo Gu:

I originally revised this article¹ in order to publish it. Later, I felt that the revised version was not in harmony with parts of the original text, so I decided against publication and asked the newspaper to write another article, which did not involve many of the basic issues, for publication. In terms of the shortcomings of the original article, my opinion is as follows: The original article stressed the transformation of the family and did not talk much about maintaining links with mass movements (the same is true of the editorial² which has been published). On the contrary, the crux of the issue is precisely linking the transformation of the family with mass movements. This kind of mass movement includes local mass movements which are not divorced from the family: work-exchange teams and cooperatives, self-defense forces and militias, village congresses, primary schools, literacy groups and *yangge* troupes as well as various temporary mass gatherings. It also includes mass movements that are separate from the family and are far away from the village: joining the army (which creates the revolutionary army), working in factories (which creates the labor market), attending school (which creates intellectuals), going away for other kinds of work, and so on. The central goal of the democratic revolution is to liberate the peasants from the oppression of the invaders, landlords, and compradors, and to establish a modern industrial society. The slogan “strengthen the family” can become a revolutionary one only when it is linked to these types of revolutionary activities. The peasant family must necessarily be destroyed. Joining the army and working in factories are the major means of this destruction and will cause people to “leave the family” one after the other. In fact, we advocate the twofold policy of “leaving the family”

and “strengthening the family.” Expanding the army, rejoining one’s unit, recruiting workers, recruiting students (the latter two will necessarily be more common in the future), migrating, traveling to do revolutionary work, seeking other professions, and so on all encourage one to leave the family. The number of these at present is very large on the battlefields behind the enemy lines, and it will still be large after the war. Of the people left behind, men and women, old and young, we should then encourage them to strengthen their families. In Xingguo *xian* during the Civil War, the people left in some of the families for us to strengthen were only a very small part of the population. If a major change takes place in the current situation, such as taking Beiping, then this seldom-changing peasant population at present in the border region in which we live will find that many people will leave their families. In reality, ceaselessly leaving and ceaselessly consolidating the family is what we need. Therefore, to fundamentally negate the May Fourth slogan, to fundamentally oppose leaving the family, is neither necessary nor permissible.

Without social activities (wars, factories, rent reduction, work-exchange teams, and so on), it is impossible to reform the family. The reform of Li Laicheng’s family in Xiangyuan was made possible precisely by the great tide of the mass movement in society.³ The transformation of families in the countryside from feudalism to democracy cannot be achieved by the good ideas read by an isolated family member in some book or newspaper; it can be attained only through mass movements.

In addition, the foundation of the new democratic society is the factory (social production, both publicly operated and privately operated) and cooperatives (including work-exchange teams), rather than the scattered individual economy. The scattered individual economy—family agriculture and family handicraft industry—forms the foundation of feudal society, not the foundation of democratic society (including old democracy, new democracy, and socialism). This is where Marxism differs from populism. In short, the foundation of the new democratic society is machinery, not handicrafts. We have not yet obtained machinery, so we have not won the victory. If we never obtain machinery, we will never be able to win; we will be doomed to destruction. The countryside at present is our temporary base. It is not, and can never be, the principal foundation of China’s democratic society. Moving from an agricultural

foundation to an industrial foundation is precisely the task of our revolution.

Please give this to Comrades Ai [Siqi], Lu [Dingyi], and Yu [Guangsheng]⁴ for perusal. If you have any suggestions, please let me know.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Also, in the revised text, I have added liberating individuality. This should be included in the revolution of democracy against feudalism. Some people say that we neglect or suppress individuality. This is incorrect. If fettered individuality is not liberated, there will be no democracy, nor will there be socialism.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 206–8, where it is reproduced from the handwritten manuscript.

¹. This refers to the draft of a *Jiefang ribao* editorial titled “Build the Foundation of the New Democratic Society on the Family.”

². This refers to the editorial “Promote the New Type of Family in the Base Areas,” in *Jiefang ribao*, August 25, 1944.

³. Referring to an August 25, 1944 *Jiefang ribao* article promoting “new style families” based on the case of the Shanxi family of Li Laicheng.

⁴. Lu Dingyi (1906–1996) was at this time editor-in-chief of *Jiefang ribao*. Yu Guangsheng (1906–1978) was at this time deputy editor-in-chief of *Jiefang ribao*.

*Adopt New Organizational Forms and New Work Methods*¹ (September 5, 1944)

Yesterday, our newspaper published the Border Region Government's decision on the election and methods of award for labor heroes and model workers. This decision clearly points out the importance of electing and awarding labor heroes and model workers. Furthermore, it provides detailed and specific rules for the methods of election and award. It will surely play a very significant role this winter at the conference for labor heroes and model workers for the entire border region and in future undertakings of comprehensive construction in the border region. This is the solidification and legalization of a new organizational form and new work methods, which deserve our attention.

Since the Party and the government mobilized production movements and various construction projects in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and following the development of this production and construction, we have continually produced all kinds of labor heroes and model workers. These labor heroes and model workers are created in mass movements, and they stand at the forefront of these movements and push them forward. They have become the force that promotes various construction projects in the border region. In the past, however, we did not have a self-conscious understanding of this and were even blind to it. As a result, we did not pay attention to and did not discover labor heroes and model workers. Since we left them as they were without giving them any prestige or fame, they could not give full play to their intended role. After we discovered Wu Manyou and Zhao Zhankui and carried out the Wu Manyou and Zhao Zhankui movements, and through the conference for labor heroes last winter, we gradually understood the role played by labor heroes and

model workers in various kinds of production and construction undertakings. And the election and promotion of labor heroes and model workers also began to spread gradually. More than a year of experience has proven to us that in the development of various kinds of production and construction projects, labor heroes and model workers exist everywhere and are growing everywhere. If only we consciously discover them, then award them after their discovery, publicize them widely, let their influence go deep among the masses, and call on the masses to learn from them, then they can play a very important role in the mass production and construction movements. From this, we further recognized that electing and awarding labor heroes and model workers constitute an extremely important organizational form and work method for comprehensive construction in the border region at present. This organizational form and work method were created by the masses, and now we accept them and make them an important method to develop production and construction movements in the future.

The primary purpose of electing and awarding labor heroes and model workers is to promote and improve work, because labor heroes and model workers have created labor and work standards that surpass those of ordinary people. Since these standards are possible for labor heroes and model workers, they should, under the same conditions, also be possible for all laboring people and working staff. Furthermore, the reason that they have not reached the standards set by labor heroes and model workers is inevitably the result of residual shortcomings in their production or work. If we can further publicize and praise the standards, as well as the conditions and methods, of the labor heroes and model workers among the ordinary masses and working staff, not only can we stimulate their initiative, but they can also discover their shortcomings through mutual comparison. They can further set the standards of labor heroes and model workers as the standards toward which they are working and use the experience of labor heroes and model workers as their own method for improving work. All this will improve their production and work, allow more people to emulate labor heroes and model workers, and popularize the standards of labor heroes and model workers. In the past year, whether in villages, factories, the army, or government offices, if a labor hero or model worker appeared there among the masses, through our discovery, awarding, and making propaganda about him, and calling on everyone to learn from him, the production and work in that place

improved, increased, and developed. This proves that this method is the best one and can be widely used to promote and improve work.

Second, electing and awarding labor heroes and model workers are good methods for producing and cultivating cadres because, truly, they have toughened themselves among the masses and in actual work and have proven themselves in practice to be outstanding elements among the masses. They worked hard in production or work and achieved success in their production or work, demonstrating their creative talent. Furthermore, most of them are upstanding, are in close touch with the masses, and have a relatively good understanding of politics. These are all primary qualifications for a cadre. If we can systematically work hard to cultivate them, increase their literacy, and strengthen their education, their fine character and talent for creation will be developed further and more quickly. Currently, labor heroes and model workers in some places are already beginning to be absorbed into various work departments and are gradually becoming important cadres in various kinds of undertakings. In the past, we produced a large number of outstanding cadres in revolutionary struggle. These cadres are still the backbone of our border region today. Nonetheless, in the environment of the sustained and comprehensive construction facing the border region today, these veteran cadres alone are far from enough. If we fail to recruit a group of new cadres into our various construction projects and organizations, our construction projects will not be accomplished smoothly. The addition of these new cadres does not occur in some other place but precisely in these construction projects themselves and precisely among the masses as a whole. They are precisely the labor heroes and model workers who have been produced by the various construction projects in these mass movements. Leaders in various organizations of the Party, the government, the army, and mass organizations must fully understand this point and carry out the necessary organizational work.

Third, in the comprehensive construction projects in the border region carried out together by the Party, the government, the army, and the mass organizations, labor heroes and model workers have another extraordinary role. It is that they can become the bridge that closely connects Party and government leaders with the masses as a whole. These labor heroes and model workers are scattered in every corner and in every department, and they are closely integrated with the

broad masses. Yet they are not the ordinary masses; they are the active elements among the masses. Naturally, they become the leaders of the masses within a certain range. Through them, the Party and the government can gather the opinions of the masses to improve their leadership. Furthermore, the policies and instructions of the Party and the government can be spread among the masses and be promoted and realized through them. In this way, the Party and the government and the masses can be more closely integrated. We have seen this point quite clearly in the production movement and in other construction work this year. Many labor heroes returned to their villages, publicized the production and construction policies of the Party, the government, and the military, and actively promoted and organized production by the masses. They automatically became the propagandists and organizers of various Party, government, and army policies. It is said that whichever townships and villages had labor heroes, Party and administrative work in these townships and villages seemed to become considerably stronger and was much more easily accomplished.

These three points are objectively the important roles of labor heroes and model workers. Once we consciously understand and master these objective roles, they will become our best method to improve our work, cultivate cadres, and link up with the masses. They will become an organizational form and work method that can be widely deployed in our various endeavors at present. And only by clearly understanding these points can we do a better job in the election and awarding of labor heroes and model workers in the entire border region this year. Thus, this should first be widely propagandized and taught among all Party, administrative, military, and civil affairs cadres.

In order to do a good job in the election and awarding of labor heroes and model workers, apart from the above questions of thinking and understanding, we have to conduct a variety of organizational work in which we should guarantee the realization of the following three items.

The first: conscientious leadership. Last year, the selection of labor heroes in some places was not done conscientiously. There was no prior preparation. Labor heroes were arbitrarily appointed at the last minute without discussion and election by the masses. We must completely correct this defect in elections this year. From now on, all leading departments and work units of the Party, the government, the army, and mass organizations at every level should discuss in

detail the decision of the Border Region Government and should begin making arrangements within their jurisdictions. These include passing on and propagandizing this work, discussing and setting rules for the specific qualifications of labor heroes and model workers in every area and department, investigating achievements, examining work records, and preparing and dividing up the various tasks in election work. Furthermore, they should make inspections at appropriate times. If any defects are discovered, they must correct them immediately and not treat them with a perfunctory and careless attitude.

Second: mobilizing the masses. The selection of labor heroes in many places last year did not undergo the processes of discussion and election by the masses. Instead, they were simply appointed from above after being discovered. This year we must conscientiously rely on democratic election by the masses according to the government's decision. We must begin propaganda and consultation among the masses as early as possible and mobilize the masses as a whole to participate in elections. By doing so, the election of labor heroes and model workers will truly become a conscious movement of the masses, and the mistake of formalism will be avoided.

Third: cautiously ensuring the selection of good candidates. In the selection of labor heroes last year, some of the candidates were not qualified. Consequently, not only were they unable to play the positive roles of labor heroes but they had a negative effect among the masses and rendered the election of labor heroes meaningless. We must pay serious attention to this in this year's elections. To prevent this mistake, we must widely publicize the qualifications for labor heroes and model workers set by the Border Region Government. The candidates should be nominated jointly by the Party and the government in coordination with the masses. Every candidate must be further examined and investigated by the masses according to the qualifications and should be elected by secret ballot. Only conscientious democratic election by the masses can generate truly good labor heroes and model workers. And only truly good labor heroes and model workers can play a positive role among the masses, which will allow us to achieve the goals of improving work, nurturing cadres, and linking with the masses.

The points discussed above are not only appropriate in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region; they can also apply in all the base areas behind enemy

lines. However, in the areas behind enemy lines, combat heroes and militia heroes must be emphasized together with labor heroes and model workers. In fact, combat heroes and militia heroes should be given first priority. The reason is self-evident. The key slogan behind enemy lines is the combination of combat and production. The election and awarding of combat heroes in the army and of militia heroes in the militia should be held simultaneously with the election and awarding of labor heroes and model workers. Some places behind enemy lines do not have much experience in this organizational form and work method, whereas others still have no experience. Nevertheless, we hope that they can swiftly adopt it in order to help develop fighting, develop various construction tasks, and overthrow Japanese imperialism.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, pp. 199–203, where it is reproduced from the September 4, 1944, editorial in *Jiefang ribao*.

- [1.](#) Text revised and finalized by Mao.

National Political Council Is Held, Mr. Chiang Kaishek Makes Inappropriate Comments, and Mr. Lin Hu Refutes Them¹
(September 6, 1944)

[New China News Agency, Yan'an, September 6] The Third Session of the Third National Political Council was inaugurated in Chongqing on September 5. There were 164 Political Council members present, fewer than at any of the council sessions in the past. Mr. Chiang Kaishek was present at the meeting and delivered a speech. He first described the military evolution on China's battlefield: "I certainly will not deny the military failures in the past six months, nor can I deny the special hardships and difficulties during the period of China's War of Resistance." He continued, saying: "(1) The final decisive battle on China's battlefield only begins today. ... (2) Whatever happens, the Japanese bandits cannot escape the tragedy of their defeat in the glory of the entire war against aggression. ... Their attempts to show off on China's battlefield are inappropriate. (3) ... I can guarantee that there is no danger on a military basis because the danger passed long ago." Regarding the reasons for the current military failures and economic difficulties, Mr. Chiang claimed: "The current military or economic difficulties are really the inevitable result of the seven long years of the War of Resistance in our agricultural country. This phenomenon is not at all surprising because our country has never had a foundation. With regard to the military, we have suffered such setbacks every year since the beginning of the War of Resistance, and some of the setbacks have been even worse than this year."

According to the political philosophy of “inevitable and not surprising,” there have been setbacks every year of the War of Resistance and more **in previous years** than this year. Mr. Chiang came to the following conclusion: “We must understand that, no matter how crazy and desperate the bandits may be in the future, they will never be able to threaten our country as they have in the past seven years. The threat that the enemy cast on us has today become a thing of the past.” **He wants to conceal the present military crisis using arbitrary language for the situation. It really is surprising** that the one who holds the country’s power went so far as to say these things. Mr. Chiang **also claimed**: “The only thing related to the future safety or peril and success or failure of our nation and strongly related to both the War of Resistance and building the country is that our country must be unified.” **He continued** by boasting about **his unconditional** unification theory, even saying that Sun Yatsen “devoted himself to revolution for several decades, and the goal for which he fought his whole life was national unification.” **According to** Mr. Yatsen’s testament, “I have been devoted to the national revolution for all of forty years, and my goal has been to seek China’s freedom and equality.” **Mr. Chiang has forgotten this testament. Mr. Chiang also said** that “the current War of Resistance is also for unification of the country” rather than liberation of the nation. **This unification theory under which everything is unified under the Guomindang and oligarchy is in direct opposition to realization of the democratic unification theory** for national unification that has been **urgently demanded by people throughout the country** on the basis of national independence and democratic freedoms. **It includes the melancholy ill wind of murderous intentions.** Mr. Chiang **also claimed**, “Only with national unification can there be national independence; only with national independence can there be national freedom; only with national freedom can there be discussion of freedom of human rights and freedom of the people’s livelihood.” **With cause and effect reversed, this is an entirely Fascist theory. With this theory, there is also a reason for civil war.** This cannot be ignored by people throughout the country and anti-Fascists throughout the world. I recall that the editorial in the *Moscow News* last year on October 10 made this point: “Civil war or any group or political party seeking to force others to obey its orders will place its own narrow interests ahead of national interests. This will only allow China’s enemy to reap the

profits of the efforts of others.” Unfortunately, Mr. Chiang’s oligarchic unification theory is just this. With regard to the current military, political, and economic reforms that are so urgently needed, Mr. Chiang has either avoided discussion or repeated **empty hackneyed phrases**, saying such things as “a national congress will be held within one year after the war is over.” **This is no different from hiding one’s illness for fear of treatment or making empty promises.** Having read all of Mr. Chiang’s long and tedious speech, we found that it tried to conceal the current serious situation on China’s battlefield with thoughtless and self-deceptive empty words **and phrases**. The result will be to blur the people’s alertness of the enemy, relax the people’s strong will in the War of Resistance, and blunt the people’s mobilization in the War of Resistance. The **present emphasis on his bellicose oligarchic unification theory reflects the popular feeling** of anger throughout the country following the defeats in Henan and Hunan, as well as the **demand for complete political reform and elimination of one-party dictatorship.** It shows Mr. Chiang’s forceful refusal to open his eyes and strongly hints at the threat of **preparing for civil war.** Mr. Chiang is **suggesting: anyone who tries to touch a single hair of my oligarchic dictatorship I will slaughter.** The **brilliant view** that “the Japanese invaders no longer pose a threat to China” is especially intriguing, **and we cannot find a suitable explanation except that he is serving as a propagandist for the national enemy.**

Mr. Chiang’s speech has drawn adverse **reactions among** the Political Council members. **This can be seen** in the reply of **veteran Political Council member Mr. Lin Hu²** on behalf of the entire body of Political Council members. **Mr. Lin Hu indicated deep dissatisfaction with** Chiang’s presentation of a false picture of peace and prosperity, insincere optimism, refusal of criticism, and rejection of reform.

Mr. Lin Hu said: “When looking back on the domestic situation and looking forward to the future, not only do we dare not be optimistic but we are haunted by worry. There is the opportunity to revive the country if we can pull ourselves together and work energetically to cleanse the old filth and eliminate the accumulated abuses at this critical juncture when the country is facing prosperity or decline and life or death. Otherwise, if the current situation continues, then the future will be dreadful to imagine. This is not alarmist talk. All the facts are in

front of us for everyone to see and hear. It is no use covering them up, nor is it any use listing them. I ask everyone to think about it. No doubt there are many troops who can obey orders and loyally and bravely kill the enemy as they fight on each of China's battlefields, but how rotten are the ones who are bad? No doubt there are many administrators at various government levels who can perform their duties rationally, but how much trouble is caused by those who are derelict in their duty? These are the things that make us worry about the future of the War of Resistance and national construction. This is the tenth meeting held by the Political Council since the twenty-seventh year [of the Republic, i.e., 1938]. Looking back, we have made some contributions to the policies of the War of Resistance and national construction; however, with the Allied forces winning one victory after another in Europe and the Pacific, the war in Europe may be over by the end of this year. In the Pacific, the Allied forces are now preparing to launch a powerful offensive. The entire war is close to victory. During the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, though, the manpower and materials we have sacrificed are incalculable. In this comprehensive victory of the war, we should make strong efforts to vie for the position of one of the leading roles. Then we can be repaid for all our sacrifices. We must not depend on the victories of the Allied countries for our own victory, thereby bequeathing shame to our Chinese people." This hits the nail on the head. Mr. Lin Hu has refuted all of Chiang Kaishek's erroneous ideas.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 322–25, where it is reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives. Text in boldface was added by Mao.

[1.](#) Title selected by Mao. The last section of the report (beginning with "Mr. Lin Hu said") was lost, but has been restored here.

[2.](#) Lin Hu (1887–1960) was military governor of Guangdong in the mid-1920s. He became a member of the Legislative Yuan in 1945 after the conclusion of World War II and was elected vice chairman of the Guangxi Provincial People's Political Consultative Conference after the establishment of the PRC in 1949.

Death in the Interests of the People Is Weightier Than Mount Tai

Chairman Mao Gives a Eulogy in Person at the Memorial Meeting Held by the Garrison

Regiment in Honor of the Soldier Comrade Zhang Side¹

(September 8, 1944)

(Liberation Daily News report) Comrade Zhang Side, a soldier of the Garrison Regiment of the Central Committee, was only thirty years old this year. But he had already fought for the Party and for the people for twelve years. He climbed the snowy mountains and crossed the grasslands, went through prolonged trials and hardship and was once honorably wounded. He was a Communist Party member who served the interests of the people faithfully. He was unfortunately killed in an accident on September 5 of this year while making charcoal at Shixiagu in Ansai county. The headquarters of the Garrison Regiment of the Central Committee held a special memorial meeting in the XX Square at two in the afternoon on September 8, which was attended by more than a thousand people and at which Chairman Mao personally delivered a speech. Wreaths and elegiac couplets lined the rostrum, and a streamer with big characters, "Salute Comrade Zhang Side Who Died for the Interests of the People," written personally by Chairman Mao, was hung at the center of the rostrum. The glory of the deceased was deeply felt by all those present. The meeting began amid funeral music. After Director Zhang of the political section of the regiment reviewed the glorious past of the deceased, Chairman Mao slowly stepped onto the rostrum, paid his respects to the deceased in deep grief, and delivered an hour-and-half-long speech, which explained in detail the significance of making sacrifices in the interests of the people. Chairman Mao said:

"Our Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army² and New Fourth Army² are an organization³ wholly dedicated to the liberation of the people, which works entirely in the people's interests. Comrade Zhang Side was a member of this organization."⁴

Chairman Mao also said:

“All men must die, but deaths can vary in their significance. In ancient China there was a literatus named Sima Qian who said, ‘Death may be weightier than Mount Tai or lighter than a goose feather.’ To die for the interests of the people is weightier than Mount Tai, but to work for the Fascists and to die for exploiting and oppressing the people is lighter than a chicken⁵ feather. Comrade Zhang Side died for the people, so his death is indeed weightier than Mount Tai.”

Next, Chairman Mao explained the reason for humbly listening to the opinions of people outside the Party and the principle of persisting in doing what is right and correcting what is wrong in the people’s interests. He said:

“Because we serve the interests of the people, we are not afraid to have others point out and criticize our shortcomings, if we have them. Anyone, whether Chinese or foreigners,⁶ can point out our shortcomings. If you are right, we will correct them. If what you propose benefits the people, we will act upon it. ‘Crack Troops and Simple Administration’ was put forward by Mr. Li Dingming,⁷ who is from outside the Party. He made a good suggestion, which benefits the people, so we adopted it. If, in the interests of the people, we persist in doing what is right and correct what is wrong, our organizations⁸ will surely thrive *even more*.”

Chairman Mao also taught us all to show concern for one another, to care for one another, and to help one another. He said:

“We hail from all corners of the country and have joined together for the common objective of revolution. Nonetheless, we still need the vast majority of China’s people with us on this road. Today, we are already a large organization made up of 86 million people,⁹ but this is not enough. To obtain national liberation,¹⁰ more are needed. In times of difficulty, we must not lose sight of our achievements and our glorious prospects, and must pluck up our courage to move *forward*. The Chinese people are suffering, and it is our duty to save them. We must exert ourselves in the struggle. Wherever there is struggle, there is sacrifice, and death is a common occurrence. But we have the interests of the people and the sufferings of the great majority at heart, and to die for the people is much worthier than dying for local tyrants and evil gentry.¹¹ Nevertheless, we should do our best to avoid unnecessary sacrifices. Our cadres must show concern for

every comrade in arms, and all people in the revolutionary organization must care for one another and love and help one another.”

Finally, Chairman Mao called for instituting the holding of memorials and for introducing this widely to the ordinary people. He said:

“From now on, no matter who in our organization dies, whether cook or soldier, we should have a funeral procession and a memorial in his honor. This should be instituted and introduced among the common people as well. When someone dies in a village, let a memorial be held. In this way we express our mourning for the dead and unite all the people.”

After Chairman Mao’s speech, the representative of the regiment pledged on behalf of the soldiers of the whole regiment to act on Chairman Mao’s instructions of learning from Comrade Zhang Side’s model of serving the people’s interests and to carry out at Zhang Side’s final bequest and work harder. The meeting was adjourned at four o’clock.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 111–13, where it is reproduced from the September 21, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. An edited version of this text appears in Vol. 3 of Mao’s official *Selected Works*, under the title “Serve the People.” Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

1. Zhang Side (1915–1944) was an ordinary soldier from a farming background who joined the Red Army in Sichuan in 1935, completed the Long March, and then served in Shaanxi. He was noted for his bravery and his willingness to participate in production campaigns, notably the Nanniwan Brigade that opened up wasteland south of Yan’an. He also served as one of Mao’s bodyguards.

2. [added] → Led by our Party

3. Are an organization → Are battalions of the revolution

4. Member of this organization → In the ranks of these battalions

5. Chicken → Goose

6. Whether Chinese or foreigners → No matter who

[7.](#) Li Dingming (1881–1947) was known as a member of the “enlightened gentry.” He was at this time vice chair of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government.

[8.](#) Organizations → Ranks

[9.](#) Already a large organization made up of 86 million people → We already lead base areas with a population of 91 million people

[10.](#) To obtain national liberation → Liberation of the whole nation

[11.](#) To die for the people is much worthier than dying for local tyrants and evil gentry → To die for the people is a worthy death

Chairman Mao Strongly Encourages Fighters to Persist in Serving the People (September 18, 1944)

(Liberation Daily) At 2:00 p.m. on September 18 in the central auditorium, the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee entertained a group of model study representatives of the rear troops and representatives of the combat heroes of various armies who had come back from behind enemy lines for reform and training. All the departments and committees of the Central Committee and Northwestern Bureau as well as the responsible comrades of the rear troops, were invited and were present at the meeting. They gathered under the same roof with outstanding and valiant representatives from the Eighth Route Army in what was the first grand assembly since its founding. Representatives from the New Fourth Army and the South China Militia who are valiantly fighting the War of Resistance were also invited to attend the meeting.

Speakers at the meeting included Chairman Mao, Commander-in-chief Zhu [De], Vice Commander-in-chief Peng [Dehuai], Comrade Liu Shaoqi, Comrade Zhou Enlai, New Fourth Army Commander Chen Yi, and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Area Commander Nie Rongzhen. After the meeting, all the leading comrades in the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Zedong and all the representatives ate together. During the meal, friendly talk flowed freely between Chairman Mao and the fighters and leaders, and they raised their glasses together in a toast for final victory in the War of Resistance. Later that evening there was a Peking Opera performance, and the gathering did not disperse until well into the night.

(Liberation Daily) Amid thunderous applause Chairman Mao met with all the model study representatives and gave a speech. After briefly extending his welcome, Chairman Mao said:

“You have been elected from among the troops to attend this meeting. You represent the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and simultaneously you represent the ninety million people in our anti-Japanese base areas as well as the 450 million people in all of China. Although you were not elected directly by the people, nevertheless, in the program you carry out and the work you do, you represent the demands of all the Chinese people—to overthrow the Japanese imperialists and to liberate the Chinese nation.”

Chairman Mao continued, and pointed out:

“Since the fall of Wuhan, and especially over the past two years, great and obvious changes have taken place in China’s War of Resistance. At present, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the South China Resistance Militia are resisting five-sixths of the enemy and puppet troops in China. The Guomindang is fighting only against the other one-sixth. In its campaigns in Henan and Hunan, it was as if the enemy had entered a land without people to defend it, and the situation was extremely serious. That China has not fallen is because it has us Communists, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army. It has mainly been we who have maintained the War of Resistance. This is the state of the War of Resistance in China today.”

Chairman Mao went on to say:

“Whether in fighting the enemy at the front or in guarding the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region in the rear echelon, whether in production or in training troops, whether in relations between the people and the troops or between officers and soldiers, our troops have made great progress. But we still have flaws and we must correct them; we must take a step forward to improve ourselves. During last year’s campaign to support the government and cherish the people, we used the method of self-criticism: we may have flaws, but we can criticize one another. An army must have unified leadership and discipline before it can be victorious. Correct self-criticism will strengthen rather than weaken leadership and discipline. Of course, such self-criticism exists only among our troops; it would be impossible among those of the Guomindang. This is because our army is truly a people’s army. Our every soldier, even every cook and every cowherd, serves the people. Our troops must become one with the people; our cadres must become one with our fighters. We must continue to uphold the things that accord with the interests of the people and strive to abolish those things that do not. In doing so we will ensure that there will be no enemies under heaven. Our army has always abided by two guiding principles: first, be merciless to the enemy, crush him, and annihilate him; and, second, be in harmony and unite with the people, our comrades, officers, and subordinates. These are the policies of the Party Central Committee and the Northwestern Bureau; these are also the policies demanded by the whole people.”

Lastly, Chairman Mao cried:

“Our hearts are closely linked with the hearts of all Chinese people! We will defeat Japanese imperialism and liberate the Chinese nation!”

Note

Our source for this document *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 115–16, where it is reproduced from the September 23, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. The core text, minus the editorial comment in the newspaper, also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 209–10.

Authoritative Person in Yan'an Comments on the Negotiations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party

The Remedy for the Present Crisis Requires the Reorganization of the Government and the Supreme Command

(September 19, 1944)

(New China News Agency, September 19) The authoritative person here gave the following comments on the course of the negotiations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and the sending of an inspection delegation to Yan'an by the National Political Council:

It is already four and a half months since Comrade Lin Boqu began negotiations with the representatives of the government, Mr. Zhang Zhizhong and Mr. Wang Shijie,¹ in Xi'an. During this long period, though the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and its representatives have been extremely tolerant and patient and compromised out of consideration for the general interest, because the government, for its part, is incorrigibly obstinate in its erroneous policies, lacks sincerity in the negotiations, and resorts to crafty maneuvers, the negotiations have had no result at all. Every specific issue, even the most trivial one, has not been resolved. Now the progress of the talks has been reported to the Political Council,² and the Political Council has decided to organize an inspection delegation to come to Yan'an. The negotiations between the Guomindang and the

Communist Party, which lasted for four and a half months, have been brought to a temporary end. Hence we can comment briefly on the past talks. The last ten days of April, when Comrade Lin Boqu was leaving for Chongqing, was precisely the time when the Japanese bandits began their offensive on the Chinese mainland. Considering the Guomindang's erroneous policies that have harmed the nation in the past—in military matters, looking on passively and relying on the Allied countries to defeat Japan; in politics, authoritarian dictatorship; in the economy, monopoly; in culture, oppression and muzzling of public opinion—the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee foresaw that in the face of a new offensive by the Japanese invaders the resistance camp in China would suffer serious military losses and major crises in politics, the economy, and all the other fields. In order to avoid this dangerous situation, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee sent Comrade Lin Boqu to Chongqing. The stand and general policy of the Chinese Communist Party in the negotiations were explicitly expressed in the suggestions put forward to the Guomindang government on June 5. This document began with the following words: "In order to overcome the current difficulties, defeat the offensive of the Japanese bandits, and prepare carefully for the counteroffensive, the Chinese Communist side believes that we have only one way, that is, to carry out democracy and enhance unity. For this purpose, the Chinese Communist Party hopes that the government side will solve a few urgent problems." The calm and clear understanding of the situation by the Chinese Communist Party, its great sense of responsibility for, and unselfish and loyal attitude toward, the country and the people could be seen clearly in this proposal. As for the Guomindang government, its position is quite different. It turns a blind eye to the present critical situation and is careless and optimistic about it. It does not seem to blame itself for leading the country and the people into these perils. Throughout the negotiations, it adopted an arrogant and dogmatic attitude, attempted to put the private interests of the Guomindang and its faction alone above the national interests, and to force the others to accept this. **This is apparent if we look at the brief proposed by the government on June 5.³ The brief does not contain a single word about the War of Resistance (this is very much worth noting), does not include a single word about the present difficult and dangerous situation, and does not express any intention of changing and giving up the erroneous policies that have**

done great harm to the country. This brief wants to abolish more than four-fifths of the armed forces that are resisting five-sixths of the invading and puppet troops and that have made extraordinary contributions in the War of Resistance behind enemy lines “within a limited period.” That is, this brief permits us to organize ten divisions, each division, as in the Guomintang military system, with about 10,000 men. The total number is not to exceed 100,000 and the remaining 370,000 regular troops must all “be abolished.” Moreover, they must “be abolished” very quickly. We must ask, isn’t this the tune of the Japanese? If what the Japanese bandits have been trying by every possible cruel means of war to “abolish” but have not been able to do so is really “abolished” now in accordance with the brief of the Guomintang, aren’t they going to be awarded a top decoration by the Japanese emperor? This brief also wants to “put all the democratic regimes,” which are democratically elected by the Chinese people in the liberated areas, which are linked as closely as flesh and blood with the people behind the enemy lines, which share joys and sorrows with the people, and which resolutely lead the War of Resistance “all and without exception under the charge of envoys sent by the individual provincial governments in which they are located.” But where the devil are these “provincial governments?” Nobody knows to what corner of the earth they have fled. What connections do they have with the unrivaled arduous struggles of the people? If one day these gentlemen in the so-called provincial governments can be located, they should be given fair treatment, that is, “discharge them from their posts and prosecute them.” What is worse, are there not also many traitors hidden in these so-called provincial governments? Weren’t traitors like Pang Bingxun and Shi Yousan⁴ formerly chairmen of these kinds of provincial governments? As for the members of these provincial governments who have defected to the enemy and betrayed the nation, they are even more innumerable. In sum, this brief only favors the Japanese invaders and is only the expression of the will of those who think of their own private interests instead of those of the country and the nation. To put it more bluntly, the so-called brief is nothing but the summary of the mean-spirited will of a small clique of Guomintang Fascist elements who think only of the interests of their party, but know nothing of the righteous cause of the nation. It

cannot and should not be accepted by every true patriot, because accepting this brief is as good as assisting the Japanese invaders.

As far as the attitudes of both sides in the negotiations are concerned, the Chinese Communist Party was always sincere and compromised out of consideration for the general interest. The Guomindang government, however, with ludicrous conceit, tried rascally tricks. For the moment, we will not discuss these here, but will deal with the proposition put forward by the Chinese Communist Party itself. On May 21, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee telegraphed Comrade Lin Boqu and put forward twenty suggestions.⁵ On the twenty-second, Lin sent them to Zhang and Wang. Zhang and Wang said that “to put it in this way is no different from denouncing the crimes of the Guomindang,” and they refused to accept them. After learning this, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee reduced the list to twelve suggestions and changed the remaining eight suggestions to oral demands. On June 5, Zhang and Wang still refused to forward it to the government. After many days of argument, they finally promised to forward it to the government. This incident alone proves that the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, in order to respect the opinions of the representatives of the other side, did not hesitate to compromise out of consideration for the general interest and reduced the formal items considerably. Nevertheless, the representatives of the government exposed fully the image of a rascal, since it is the primary responsibility and duty of the representatives in any negotiations to forward the opinions of the opposite side to the institutions they represent. The negotiations are already under way, but the representatives of one side refuse to forward the opinions of the opposite side. This is really a rare case in any negotiations. We cannot think of any terms for characterizing such an attitude other than the tricks of rascals or hooligans.

Apart from this, Mr. Zhang Zhizhong, the representative of the government, and Mr. Chiang Kaishek himself remarked repeatedly at the Political Council: “What the Central Government is seeking is the unification of the military and political order” (Zhang). “Our central government has said more than once that all we want is a unified military order and a unified political order” (Chiang). Regarding this point, we should state clearly that we most resolutely support the unification of military and political order. But this political order must be a political order that represents the will of the people, and this military order must

be a military order advantageous to the War of Resistance. If, however, the political order is a political order that will lead the country toward Fascist tyranny, and the military order is a military order that will result in the failure of the War of Resistance, they will never be obeyed by any patriots or democratic fighters in China, nor will we allow this unification. The Chinese people profoundly despise this worn-out counterrevolutionary theme of “unification.” The heart of the matter is that the political and military order of the Guomintang government at present is exactly this kind of stuff. Its political order is a Fascist political order; its military order is that of defeatism. If we are going to unify everything with this kind of political and military order, it is exactly like climbing a tree to catch fish. Moreover, even if there is unification, it will lead to the catastrophe of losing the nation. Let us not talk about things in the remote past, and let us concentrate on the examples during the negotiations. Jiang Dingwen, Tang Enbo, Hu Zongnan, and Xue Yue⁶ are all so-called loyal followers of the political and military orders of the Guomintang. The result is they were defeated without fighting or were routed at the first encounter and lost troops and territory, plunging the people into an abyss of misery, and they have made a laughingstock of themselves before the people of the world. In contrast, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which are falsely accused by the Guomintang of “sabotaging the unification of military and political order,” are winning victories every day and regaining lost territory every day. This is the unification that really helps the nation and the country. This sharp contrast proves the utter uselessness of the “military and political order” of the Guomintang. Therefore, in talking about the need for the unification of the military and political orders today, we must thoroughly change the character of the military and political orders. If we want to change the character of the military and political orders, we must change completely the military, political, economic, cultural, and other policies of the Guomintang government. We must reorganize totally the government and the supreme command, kick out those capitulators, defeatists, tyrants, and Fascist elements, and put those who can truly represent the interests of the people in charge of the political and military orders and make them represent the will of the various forces and people in the country. Only in this way can we really remedy the present crisis and win victory in the War of Resistance. Only in this way can we talk about the unification of the

military and political orders. Only in this way can the unification of the political and military orders serve the nation and the people. As regards reorganizing the present weak, corrupt, incapable, and oligarchical and dictatorial Guomindang government, Comrade Lin Boqu has put forward this proposal in the report he made at the Political Council, and it can be said that this was precisely the right time. The criticism of the Guomindang government's brief by Comrade Lin in his letter to Mr. Wang Shijie and Mr. Zhang Zhizhong on August 30 is completely in accordance with the principles of the War of Resistance, unity, and democracy. The people in Yan'an still hope that Mr. Zhang and Mr. Wang will come to Yan'an for inspection and negotiation. As regards the matter of the five members who were chosen by the Political Council to come to Yan'an for inspection and an exchange of opinions, this is a very good idea and we welcome it.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 117–21, where it is reproduced from the September 20, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. A long section identified as Mao's major addition to the report, which appears in boldface, is reproduced in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 211–12; it is not clear what other changes or additions he made to the report.

[1.](#) Zhang Zhizhong and Wang Shijie were the two representatives of the Guomindang in the negotiations with the Communist Party.

[2.](#) The Political Council refers to the National Political Council, the highest consultative institution, which was established by a resolution of the Provisional National People's Congress of the Guomindang on March 31, 1938. All its members were designated by the Guomindang government, and the Guomindang members constituted the majority. It was rescinded after the Third Plenum of the Fourth Congress of the Guomindang in May 1947.

[3.](#) Referring to the "brief" of the Guomindang government with regard to solving the problem of the Communist Party by political means; Mao also refers to a draft version of this "brief," above in the text of May 15, 1944.

[4.](#) Pang Bingxun (1879–1963), chairman of the Henan Provincial Government for the Guomindang, surrendered to the Japanese in 1943. Shi Yousan (1891–1940), a Guomindang general active in Hebei, turned

on the resistance forces and signed an “Anti-Communist Pact” with the Japanese in 1940.

[5](#). The content appears in an earlier text, a telegram to Dong Biwu to transmit to Lin Boqu; see above, the text of May 15, 1944.

[6](#). For the Guomindang generals, see above, notes to the texts of May 21, 1944, and June 14, 1944.

*Letter Drafted on Behalf of Lin Boqu
Replying to Wang Shijie and Zhang
Zhizhong¹
(September 27, 1944)*

Venerable Mr. [Wang] Xueting and Mr. [Zhang] Wenbai:²

You two gentlemen's letter of September 10, the reports of both sides on the progress of negotiations at this session of the Political Council,³ and Chairman Chiang [Kaishek]'s remarks on this issue during the session have all been reported to the Central Committee of our Party. The following points constitute our reply to you two gentlemen. Please also transmit it to Chairman Chiang of the National Government and to the Central Committee of your party.

1. We express our satisfaction with the opinion expressed by Chairman Chiang at the Political Council to continue to use political methods to resolve problems. Because a few powerful public figures in our country have not relaxed their preparations for civil war, the threat of civil war remains. Furthermore, the closer it gets to the time for a counterattack, the more serious this threat grows. Their plan calls for combining the counterattack on the enemy with opposition to the Communist Party in order to attain their goal of "killing two birds with one stone." However, Chairman Chiang's declaration at this session is enough for us and our countrymen to relax a bit for now. To the Yan'an inspection delegation organized by the Political Council, we express our welcome. Regarding you two gentlemen's trip to Yan'an, we still look forward to the honor of your visit. As for you gentlemen's question of whether we can send a responsible representative to Chongqing, it depends on the results of the Yan'an negotiations. However, we

can confirm that as long as the National Government and the Guomindang do not refuse to continue negotiations and will guarantee our freedom of travel (as of today, there is no such freedom), although no one will come forth to negotiate immediately, someone will do so in the near future. Although Comrades Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu have been in Chongqing for many years, Division Commander Lin Biao also came here the year before last, and [I, Lin] Zuhān⁴ have been here for five months this time, and none of us has obtained any result from the negotiations. However, so long as there is a thread of hope, we will always send someone to negotiate.

2. Because of the current urgency of the War of Resistance and the fact that the general domestic conditions are still not on a track in accordance with the demands of the War of Resistance, severe crises exist everywhere on military, economic, cultural, and political issues, and there are extremely large gaps between the people and the government, between the people and the military, between officers and soldiers, among officers themselves, and among armies. Everyone in the country suffers feelings of unending anxiety. Torment, bitterness, and hatred grow stronger each day. Everyone feels as if there is no way out. Under such circumstances, the heart of the army has been shaken and the heart of the people severed, so that we cannot stop the enemy's attack and help the Allied countries with their counterattack. The fundamental reason for this series of grave crises is that there is absolutely no democracy under the one-party dictatorship. Because of this, we cannot earn the trust of the people, cannot mobilize and unite the powers of resistance of the whole country, cannot strengthen the hearts of the army and the people, and cannot bring political, military, economic, and cultural arrangements into accord with the needs of the War of Resistance, democracy, and unity. At present, the only possible solution is to demand that the National Government and the Guomindang immediately end their one-party dictatorship and call an urgent assembly, including representatives of all anti-Japanese political parties, all anti-Japanese armed forces, all regional governments, and all popular mass organizations, to establish a multiparty coalition government. This new government should proclaim and implement new policies to thoroughly reform all military, political, economic, and cultural affairs. Only such a new government, rather than a so-called new government that manages only to entertain people but does not alter the essence

of the one-party dictatorship or change its policies, will be able to renew the eyes and ears of China's people, implement Mr. Sun Yatsen's revolutionary Three People's Principles, safeguard the people's full rights to freedom and democracy, give military orders and democratic political orders to energize the War of Resistance, and thus gain the trust of the people. Only such a new government will be able to mobilize all Chinese people, strengthen our forces of resistance, stop the enemy's attack, and implement our counterattack. Only then can we have a national congress and a government truly elected by the people. With such a new government, the unification of our country perhaps will be realized. If the one-party dictatorship continues, there will be no way to gain the trust of the people. Every sort of crisis will only grow worse, and the people will not be mobilized. There will be no way to win the War of Resistance and to overcome the dangerous phenomenon of the alienation of the people's hearts and wills, and the country will not be unified. This suggestion of ours actually represents the demands of the people, as well as those of many members of your own party. [I, Lin] Zuhan have already put forth this suggestion at this session of the Political Council and would like to mention it here once again. You gentlemen's discussions and letters regarding implementing democracy in the past were full of perfunctory words, without any sense of sincerity. Your letter of September 10 was no different. If no decision is made on this issue, even if our two parties can solve a few secondary problems through negotiations, we absolutely will not be able thoroughly to solve the important issues concerning the country and the people.

3. You two gentlemen's letter of September 10 contained words complaining that our "demands increase with time." We have no choice but to refute and correct them. Division Commander Lin Biao raised four points a year and a half ago, but they were rejected by the government at that time. Division Commander Lin worked hard but returned with nothing. During the negotiations that you gentlemen had with [me, Lin] Zuhan in Xi'an this May, we agreed that each side would submit a report to the Central Committee of its own party requesting instructions, because both [I, Lin] Zuhan and you gentlemen had no authority to make a final decision. As a result, only the twelve points that our Party's Central Committee formally raised and the eight points that our Party entrusted [me, Lin] Zuhan to raise verbally on June 4 (which [I, Lin] Zuhan submitted to you

gentlemen in person on June 5) were the opinion of our Party's Central Committee. In addition, it was established that the [results of the] talks in Xi'an must be signed by both sides and be reported to both parties' Central Committees. However, after [I, Lin] Zuhuan signed, you two gentlemen refused to do so, so the agreement was actually invalid. But why did you gentlemen still cite it afterward as proof? You two gentlemen's way of doing things, to put it more politely, is an unfriendly attitude. To put it more accurately, it is playing unwarranted and useless tricks which can only affect the resolution of our problems. As for the missing words "Central China, South China," this was obviously caused by damage to the text of the telegram. After finding the mistake, we immediately added the words to the text. The people's anti-Japanese governments in the large liberated areas of Central and South China have existed for many years now. Is there any sound reason that we cannot demand the government's recognition?

4. You two gentlemen's letter of September 10, like the government's "brief" and you gentlemen's previous letter, is not based upon what would benefit the War of Resistance and, consequently, does not concern real issues and will end in no results. In addition to the aforementioned important issue of implementing democracy, which concerns the life and death of the country, this also holds true for the two issues of demanding the Guomintang government's recognition of both the armies and governments in the broad liberated areas of China. We now clearly inform you two gentlemen once more: We absolutely request that the Guomintang government recognize all the armies and political powers in the liberated areas behind enemy lines. Furthermore, our demands definitely will "increase with time," because the entire war on the battlefields behind enemy lines marks a sharp contrast with the front-line battlefields: On the front lines we are suffering continual losses and retreats, but behind enemy lines we are winning continual victories. The Eighteenth Army Group, the New Fourth Army, and the South China Anti-Japanese Column develop every day, and the reclaimed territories, liberated people, and governments elected by the people increase day by day. Can it be that the Guomintang and its government do not like this? Can it be that Chairman Chiang also dislikes it? It can't be so! Regardless of whether the Guomintang government recognizes us, we will still fight the evil Japanese bandits, and we will fight and drive them to the banks of

the Yalu River and reclaim all our nation's land. We request recognition only because we demand unification; we demand that the Guomintang, the Chinese Communist Party, and the entire country's powers of resistance unite on a foundation of democracy rather than on dictatorship, so that they are able to coordinate with the Allied nations to overthrow the Japanese bandits as soon as possible. [I, Lin] Zuhan think that it is inappropriate for you to maintain your nonrecognition or minimal recognition. Why do you not want those military forces that win victories, and only want those military forces that always lose? Why do you not want the reclaimed territory of this country and instead revile us, and you do not regret losing so vast a tract of land from Zhengzhou to Guilin in a few months and accuse no one? Now I respectfully inform you two gentlemen and request that my messages be transmitted to the Guomintang government and Chairman Chiang. Please do not despise our Communist Party in the future. We request that you recognize the victorious armies and the reclaimed territory of our country because your hateful state of mind is incompatible with the interests of the nation. Please forgive my frank words!

Lin Zuhan

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 213–17, where it is reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Wang Shijie and Zhang Zhizhong were at this time the two representatives of the Guomintang in the negotiations with the Communists.

[2.](#) These are the courtesy names (*hao*) for Wang Shijie and Zhang Zhizhong.

[3.](#) The Political Council, see above, note to the text of September 19, 1944.

[4.](#) That is, Lin Boqu.

The New Fourth Army's Victorious Attacks and China's National Salvation¹ (October 1, 1944)

The New Fourth Army, proclaimed three years ago by Chiang Kaishek to be the “rebel army” for its “sabotaging military order and discipline,” has not only persisted in the War of Resistance in Central China, but has also **repeatedly** attacked and won splendid victories in the past half-year. The **successive** victories of the New Fourth Army stand in sharp contrast to the **successive** defeats of the Guomindang troops on the front-line battlefields over the past half-year. Moreover, this constitutes a serious exposure and mockery of the “military order and discipline” loudly emphasized by Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang government. This “order and discipline” represents defeatism, favors the Japanese bandits, and is unfavorable to the nation. For the Chinese people, these victories raise the Chinese people’s confidence in victory. As for the Allied countries’ strategy to defeat the Japanese bandits, they also provide a very important inspiration. **Only two types of people express deep hatred for the victories of the New Fourth Army. They are the Japanese invaders and Chiang Kaishek of China.** As for Japan’s bitter hatred of us, we need not discuss it. As regards Chiang Kaishek, two things he did were particularly welcomed by the Japanese invaders: The first is his anti-Communist activities; the second is his book, *China’s Destiny*. Of the tens of thousands of anti-Communist activities carried out by Chiang Kaishek, the ambush aimed at the New Fourth Army, the arrest of General Ye Ting, and the declaration that the New Fourth Army is a “rebel army” were most welcomed by the Japanese. In

the spring of 1941, when Chiang Kaishek committed these criminal acts which sabotaged the War of Resistance, jeopardized the country, and betrayed the nation, the Japanese Allied News Agency praised him, saying: “Chiang Kaishek has done nothing good in the past few years, but the dissolution of the New Fourth Army can be counted as a job well done.”

No matter how the Japanese and Chiang Kaishek collaborate to harm the New Fourth Army, it is still developing and expanding; it is still winning victories.

The New Fourth Army headquarters announced its military accomplishments from January to June of this year. It fought more than a thousand times, captured more than ten thousand enemy and puppet troops, and seized more than eleven thousand guns. There were forty-two cases in which puppet troops, involving more than six thousand soldiers, returned to righteousness. It crushed the enemy's and puppet armies' “mopping up” actions involving over three thousand troops twelve times, involving five thousand troops four times, and involving more than seven thousand troops twenty times. It overran 420 of the enemy's and puppet troops' strongholds. Last winter, the enemy's and puppet troops' strongholds totaled 2,972. By the end of June this year, the total number, including new ones, is only 2,693.

Now let us look at the major campaigns carried out by the New Fourth Army in Central China. In the Cheqiao Campaign in central Jiangsu on March 4, the New Fourth Army destroyed fifty-three blockhouses, wiped out a regiment of about eight hundred enemy troops, and captured alive more than forty enemy officers and soldiers. Beginning in the last ten days of March to May, our troops in northern Anhui attacked puppet troops along the 300-*li* front line. They took Guirenji, Xinji, Weiji, and others for a total of 51 strongholds and captured 1,300 puppet troops. On April 19, in the Huaihai region, they overran the Gaogou and Yangkou strongholds. On April 27, our troops attacked Caoxian and the suburbs of Wuwei. On May 3, our troops in Binhai took Chenjiagang in the lower reaches of the Guan River, the major harbor that the enemy used to control the salt in Anhui and captured alive more than four hundred enemy and puppet troops. On May 13, our troops attacked the inner suburbs of Wuhu. In mid-June, our troops in Hubei went south across the Yangzi River and took Hengti. From July 12 to 17, our troops in central Jiangsu took Tianshenggang, Zhanghuanggang, and others,

totaling five harbors on the north bank of the Yangzi River. Since the beginning of July, our troops in eastern Zhejiang have shattered in succession three “mopping-up” actions by enemy and puppet troops against Siming mountain. On July 26, our troops in southern Jiangsu attacked the outer areas of Nanjing and took Xuezhen, Sangyuan, and other strongholds and opened the area stretching from Molingguan to Hengshan to guerrilla warfare. Beginning on August 23, our troops have initiated attacks along the Beijing-Hangzhou National Highway, taking Changxing, destroying Hexi coal mine, and also storming into Lishui and Liyang. Adding up all of this, since March our New Fourth Army has fought a total of thirteen major campaigns.

With regard to the achievements of the political offensive, in June our northern Anhui region initiated a political offensive after the military offensive. Originally the puppet Twenty-eighth Division stationed in Siyang had more than a thousand troops, but desertion left only about three hundred. In quite a few strongholds, we were able to reclaim them by merely shouting to the guards and without firing a shot.

As far as sabotage operations are concerned, from June 25 to July 10 we carried out major sabotage operations in Nantong, Haimen, Qidong, and Rugao; fifty thousand people participated and destroyed 700 *li* of road and 50 bridges.

Altogether, these victorious attacks by the New Fourth Army this year liberated more than 100,000 square kilometers of national territory and a population of more than five million. Our army shrank the area occupied by the enemy in central Jiangsu to as little as 16 percent [of its former territory]. Even in southern Jiangsu where the struggle is the most brutal, our troops opened up new areas. The victories of the anti-“mopping-up” campaigns in early summer and around the wheat harvest completely thwarted the enemy’s and the puppet’s original plans to rob grain. The adjustments in the organization of the enemy’s Central China Army and their attempts to strengthen control over the puppet troops both demonstrate the enemy’s need to devise new countermeasures in the face of attacks by our army.

The significance of the victorious attacks by the New Fourth Army does not stop here. We should also point out the following.

First, of the attacks waged by the New Fourth Army this year, many included storming fortified positions. The victorious storming of fortified positions proves

that after reform and training, their military skills have strengthened. The New Fourth Army **now** has a principal force of 180,000, and there are 500,000 militia guerrillas serving as its reserve. It is the only force maintaining the **field** behind enemy lines in Central China. In the past, people thought that the New Fourth Army was only a guerrilla army. This thinking is wrong and leads to an underestimation of the strength of the New Fourth Army. The victorious attacks by the New Fourth Army this year have refuted this erroneous thinking with facts.

Second, **like the Eighth Route Army**, the New Fourth Army not only has a very strong fighting capacity. Its greatest strength is also its political work. It mingles with the people and is doing very well working on enemy and puppet troops. The combat missions and operations of the New Fourth Army are often supported and aided by the people. In the battle at Cheqiao, forty enemy officers and soldiers were captured alive; this is a new record in the War of Resistance. The puppet soldiers in Central China call the New Fourth Army the “Fourth Master” and **compare it to Zhao Zilong**.² They often talk to their guns like this: “Dear gun, I am only preserving you for the Fourth Master.” In the past six months, there have been forty-two cases in which puppet troops have returned to righteousness, involving more than six thousand troops. This shows the great influence of the New Fourth Army.

Third, the geographical position held by the New Fourth Army is of extreme importance. It controls the entire coast in Central China and the richest valley of the Yangzi River. If the Japanese invaders were to rule this area completely, it would pose the greatest political, economic, and military disadvantage to our country, as well as to the Allied countries.

In the face of the enemy’s attack in **Central China**, the Guomintang simply abandoned resistance and fled in panic. This beautiful territory fell into the enemy’s hands. Only the New Fourth Army is persevering in the sacred War of Resistance in this region and has prepared a forward base for the Allied counteroffensive in the future. The Guomintang **capitulators**, defeatists, and Fascists regard the New Fourth Army as a thorn in their side. They cannot feel at ease until it is exterminated under the guise of “military order and discipline.” The Southern Anhui Incident is an eternal injustice which thoroughly exposed the evil intentions of **Chiang Kaishek** and the Guomintang reactionary clique.

Even today, **Chiang Kaishek** and the Guomindang reactionary clique are still adhering to their old ideas and are **daily** stressing **their** “unification of military and political order.” Yet, **this “unification” does not mean anything else but to “eliminate within a set time”** four-fifths of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and to “pool them together for use within a set time.” **Everybody understands that such a “unification” does not “unify” them into the hands of Chiang Kaishek but in reality “unifies” them into the hands of the Japanese.** Four-fifths of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are “eliminated within a set time,” while the remaining one-fifth is “pooled together for use.” Doesn’t this mean that four-fifths of the liberated national territory would be “unified” into the hands of the Japanese? What a great plan to help the Japanese! There is no doubt that the Japanese emperor will issue a special order for an award.

Nevertheless, the Chinese people are determined not to permit such a conspiracy of betrayal, nor will the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army ever permit such a conspiracy. Take the New Fourth Army for example. It has now become the Great Wall of the people in Central China and has become an intrinsically inseparable part of the people in Central China. The Japanese cannot wipe it out or drive it away, **nor can any other reactionaries** do so.

We celebrate the victories of the New Fourth Army. We cherish the memory of Commander Ye Ting and other faithful and brave generals and soldiers who are still in jail. We will still encourage the commanders and soldiers in the New Fourth Army to strengthen themselves, enlarge their own troops, and **create closer links within the army and between the army and the people.** Be prepared to demonstrate fully **your heroic** skills in the anti-Japanese counteroffensive with the Allied countries!

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 329–34, where it is reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives. Text in boldface was added by Mao during revisions.

¹. This is an editorial in the Yan’an *Jiefang ribao*. The title was changed from “The New Fourth Army’s

Victorious Attacks” to the current one by Mao.

2. Zhao Zilong (also known as Zhao Yun), a general of the later Han period, was made famous in the novel *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* as a heroic warrior and loyal servant who was able to survive seemingly insurmountable challenges.

*Zhang Pingqun's Speech Is Erroneous,
the People Demand Immediate
Reorganization of the Government and
the Supreme Command¹*
(October 8, 1944)

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, October 8) According to the October 4 telegram of the Central News Agency in Chongqing, at the news conference held for Chinese and foreign reporters, when a reporter asked for the government authority's opinion on organizing a coalition government, the government spokesman Zhang Pingqun replied: "This idea is not worth discussing, and I am not going to discuss it." The observer in Yan'an said: Three weeks have already passed since Comrade Lin Zuhan [Lin Boqu], **the representative of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee**, put forward the suggestion to hold an urgent national affairs conference and to establish a democratic coalition government in the **National Political Council**. With the increasingly worsening crisis on the front-line battlefields and the gradual exposure of the Guomintang dictatorship's corruption and incompetence, the immediate reorganization of the National Government and its supreme command has become the common plea of all patriotic **compatriots** in our country (**including many** Guomintang members) and all friends in our Allied countries. **Quite unexpectedly, the Guomintang authority** shows contempt for this appeal. Zhang Pingqun is the spokesman of the Guomintang authority. His words exposed the ferocious face of the Guomintang authority's dictatorship, arbitrariness, incorrigibly obstinate nature, and its lack of any sense of democracy. Now the threat from the enemy

grows greater every day. The enemy is closing in on Guilin, the gate to the great rear echelon is wide open, the nation is in dire peril, and it is a matter of extreme urgency. We can only save the nation from this crisis **by eliminating immediately the oligarchic dictatorship** and reorganizing the National Government and the supreme command. We must win the War of Resistance in China, and the common cause of the Allied countries must win. **To eliminate the Guomintang oligarchic dictatorship** and to reorganize the National Government and supreme command **have become** the unanimous demand of the people of the entire nation and the people of friendly countries. **But somehow, according to those Guomintang gentlemen, these issues are “not worth discussion” and “will not be discussed.”** Are they really “not worth discussion”? The people of the entire great rear echelon are either already suffering, or will suffer, the devastation, oppression, and outrages that the enemy inflicts. The people demand an immediate investigation into the Guomintang’s responsibility, and this responsibility is worthy of discussion. Is it really “not going to be discussed”? Though you may insist on “not,” the life and death of the people and the survival or demise of the nation must be discussed. Regardless of whether the Guomintang authority will “discuss” it, the demand to **eliminate the oligarchic dictatorship and to reorganize the National Government and supreme command** is irresistible.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 337–38, where it is reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives. Text in boldface is Mao’s additions during revisions.

- [1.](#) This is a commentary by the Xinhua News Agency. The title was added by Mao.

*Chiang Kaishek's Speech Is Dangerous, Comments the Yan'an Observer*¹ (October 11, 1944)

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, October 11) The Yan'an observer made the following comments on Chiang Kaishek's speech on the Double-Ten Festival:

One of the distinguishing features of this speech² is its utter lack of content and its failure to answer any of the questions about which the people are deeply concerned. Chiang Kaishek declares that the enemy is not to be feared because there are still vast territories in the great rear echelon. So far, the autocratic Guomindang leaders have shown neither the desire nor the ability to introduce political reforms or to keep the enemy at bay, and "territory" is the only capital they can fall back on for resisting the enemy. But it is plain to all that without a correct policy and without human effort this capital is not enough, for daily the Japanese are³ threatening the remaining territories. *The Yan'an observer believes that Mr. Chiang [Kaishek] has acutely felt this threat, as is shown by the very fact that he has repeatedly assured the people that no such threat exists and even says, "In the twenty years since I founded the army at the Huangpu [Whampoa] Military Academy, the revolutionary situation has never been as stable as at present."* He also keeps repeating that we must not "lose our self-confidence," which actually indicates a loss of confidence among many people within the ranks of the Guomindang and among many prominent public figures in the great rear echelon.⁴ Mr. Chiang⁵ has been casting about for some way to restore that confidence. But instead of looking for such a way by examining his policy and work in the political, military, economic, and cultural fields, he resorts to the rejection of criticisms and the whitewashing of his mistakes. He says that all

“international observers” are “ignorant of the heart of the matter” and that the “babble of foreign criticism of our military and political affairs” is entirely due to credulous acceptance of “the rumors and tricks of the invaders and Chinese traitors.” Curiously enough, such foreigners as *Winston Churchill* and Franklin D. Roosevelt, as well as such Guomintang members as Song Qingling⁶ and Sun Ke, the majority of the members⁷ of the National Political Council and all Chinese who are not devoid of conscience do not believe the blandishments offered by Mr. Chiang and his trusted followers and are also raising a “babble of criticism of our military and political affairs.” Mr. Chiang is annoyed, but not until this year’s Double-Ten Festival did he succeed in discovering what he regards as a compelling argument, that is, that these people believe the “rumors and tricks of the invaders and the Chinese traitors.” Thus, in his speech, Mr. Chiang vehemently denounced these “rumors and tricks of the invaders and the Chinese traitors” at great length. He fancies that, having made his denunciation, he can silence all foreigners and Chinese.⁸ And anyone who again raises a “babble of criticism” of our military and political affairs will be put down as a believer of “the rumors and tricks of the invaders and the Chinese traitors.” *The Yan’an observer* considers Mr. Chiang’s accusations incompatible with his status as a leader in the War of Resistance.⁹ This is because the invaders and the Chinese traitors have never opposed¹⁰ but, on the contrary, have warmly applauded the Guomintang for its oligarchic dictatorship, its inability in the War of Resistance, its corruption and incompetence, and the Fascist decrees and defeatist military orders of the Guomintang government. Mr. Chiang’s *China’s Destiny*, a book that has met with general disapproval from foreigners and Chinese,¹¹ has won sincere and repeated praise from the Japanese.¹² The enemy and Chinese traitors have not said a word about the reorganization of the National Government and its supreme command because it is precisely their cherished wish to preserve this government and its supreme command, which continue to oppress the people and to lose battles. Is it not a fact that Mr. Chiang and his group have always been the target of Japanese inducements to surrender? Is it not also a fact that the Japanese have¹³ long since abandoned the “annihilate the Guomintang” part of the slogan “oppose the Communists, annihilate the Guomintang,”¹⁴ while “oppose the Communists” remains? To this day, the Japanese have¹⁵ not declared war on the

Guomindang government. They even say that no state of war exists between Japan and the Guomindang government. To this day, the property of the Guomindang bigwigs in Shanghai, Nanjing, Ningbo, and the surrounding areas is being well looked after.¹⁶ The enemy chieftain Shouroku Hata has sent his representatives to offer sacrifices at Mr. Chiang's ancestral tombs at Fenghua. In Shanghai and elsewhere, emissaries dispatched secretly by Mr. Chiang's trusted followers are maintaining almost uninterrupted contact and carrying on clandestine negotiations with the Japanese,¹⁷ especially when the Japanese intensify their offensives.¹⁸ Aren't all these things facts? Are the foreigners who¹⁹ raise a "babble of criticism" against the military and political affairs of Mr. Chiang and his group really "ignorant of the heart of the matter," or are they instead only too well acquainted with it? After all, is "the heart of the matter" to be found in "rumors and tricks of the invaders and Chinese collaborators" or in Mr. Chiang²⁰ and his own group? *When the "leader of one of the four great powers," on a national holiday such as this, characterizes the serious criticisms of foreigners (including Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt) as "giving credence to the malicious inventions of the enemy and Chinese traitors," he really harms the dignity of the Republic of China. Particularly interesting is the demand put forward by Mr. Chiang in his speech according to which we should "be able to stand by ourselves, strengthen ourselves, and take upon ourselves the responsibility of fighting the war independently."*²¹ *The Yan'an observer believes that this is a manifestation of Chiang Kaishek's xenophobia. Some people consider that in view of the present developments of the war and of the corruption and incompetence of the Guomindang government and its supreme command, it is necessary to establish an Allied joint command in the Chinese theater. To resist this demand, those who ordinarily depend solely on foreign assistance as their magic wand now also talk about "independence and self-strengthening" and insist that we "take upon ourselves the responsibility of fighting the war independently."*

In another statement in his speech, Mr. Chiang denies that civil war will break out in China. But he adds, "Certainly no one will ever again dare to rebel against the Republic and sabotage the War of Resistance, as Wang Jingwei and his like have done." *The Yan'an observer maintains that here Mr. Chiang is seeking, and in fact has found, an excuse for civil war. Any Chinese whose memory is not too*

short will remember that in 1941, at the very moment when the betrayers of China were ordering the dissolution of the New Fourth Army and the Chinese people were rising to avert the crisis of civil war, Mr. Chiang made a speech in which he said that there would never be any war to suppress the Communists and that, should there be a war, it would only be a punitive one to put down rebels. Those who have read *China's Destiny* will also remember Mr. Chiang's remark that the Chinese Communist Party was "in league with" Wang Jingwei in 1927 during the period of the Wuhan government. In the resolutions of the Eleventh Plenum of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee in 1943, an eight-word label was attached to the Chinese Communist Party—"sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state." After reading²² his present speech, *the Yan'an observer feels that* the danger of civil war not only exists but is actually growing. From now on, the Chinese people should firmly bear in mind that one fine morning our Generalissimo²³ will order a punitive expedition against the so-called rebels and that the charge will be "rebellion,"²⁴ "sabotaging the War of Resistance *and endangering the state,*" and doing what "Wang Jingwei and his like have done." Our Generalissimo²⁵ is good at playing this game. Yet he is no good at denouncing as rebels people like Pang Bingxun, Sun Liangcheng, and Chen Xiaoliang²⁶ or at launching punitive expeditions against them, but he is very good at denouncing as "rebels" the New Fourth Army in Central China and the Dare-to-Die Corps in Shanxi and is exceptionally good at launching punitive expeditions against them. The Chinese people must not forget that, while proclaiming that he will not fight a civil war, our Generalissimo²⁷ has already dispatched 775,000 troops who are now engaged²⁸ in encircling or attacking the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the people's guerrillas in southern China.

The Yan'an observer concludes that Mr. Chiang's speech has nothing to show on the positive side, and he has in no way met the eager desire of the Chinese people *and public figures of the Allied nations* to strengthen the front in the War of Resistance²⁹ *constructively.* However, on the negative side, the speech is fraught with dangerous possibilities. Mr. Chiang's attitude is becoming more and more anomalous, as shown in his *firm rejection of the advice of allies,* stubborn opposition to the people's demand for political change, his bitter hatred of the Chinese Communist Party, and his hint at a pretext for the anti-Communist civil

war he is preparing. Nonetheless, *the Yan'an observer believes that* he will succeed in none of his schemes. Unless he is willing to mend his ways, he will be lifting a rock only to drop it on his own foot. We sincerely hope he will change his ways because his present course of action will get him absolutely nowhere. Since he has proclaimed “a greater latitude in voicing opinions,” he should not stifle the “babble of criticism” by threatening and silencing people with the slander that they believe in “the rumors and tricks of the invaders and Chinese collaborators.” Since he has proclaimed that “the period of political tutelage will be shortened,” he should not reject the demand for reorganizing the government and the supreme command. Since he has proclaimed that “the Communist problem should be solved politically,” he should not again seek a pretext *through slandering the Chinese Communist Party* for preparing for civil war.

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 127–31, where it is reproduced from the October 12, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

[1.](#) Chiang Kaishek’s Speech Is Dangerous, Comments the Yan’an Observer → On Chiang Kaishek’s Speech on the Double-Ten Festival

[2.](#) This speech → Chiang Kaishek’s Double-Ten speech

[3.](#) The Japanese are → Japanese imperialism is

[4.](#) In the great rear echelon → In the Guomintang areas

[5.](#) In all the following cases: Mr. Chiang → Chiang Kaishek

[6.](#) Song Qingling (1893–1981) was Sun Yatsen’s second wife. Unlike her younger sister, Song Meiling [Soong Mei-ling] who married Chiang Kaishek, Qingling consistently supported the left and the Chinese Communist Party.

[7.](#) The majority of the members → Many members

[8.](#) Foreigners and Chinese → Chinese and foreigners

- [9.](#) Incompatible with his status as a leader in the War of Resistance → Are ridiculous in the extreme
- [10.](#) Opposed → Criticized
- [11.](#) General disapproval from foreigners and Chinese → General disapproval
- [12.](#) The Japanese → Japanese imperialism
- [13.](#) The Japanese have → Japanese imperialism has
- [14.](#) The slogan “oppose the Communists, annihilate the Guomintang,” → The two slogans “oppose the Communists” and “annihilate the Guomintang,”
- [15.](#) The Japanese have → Japanese imperialism has
- [16.](#) Being well looked after → Being well looked after by the invaders and the Chinese collaborators
- [17.](#) The Japanese → The Japanese invaders
- [18.](#) Especially when the Japanese intensify their offensives → And these contacts and negotiations become more frequent whenever the Japanese intensify their offensives
- [19.](#) The foreigners who → Those who
- [20.](#) Mr. Chiang → Chiang Kaishek himself
- [21.](#) Chiang Kaishek had threatened to do this if the United States insisted on imposing General Stilwell as commander in China as a condition of further aid.
- [22.](#) Reading → Re-reading
- [23.](#) Our Generalissimo → Chiang Kaishek
- [24.](#) “Rebellion,” → “Rebellion against the Republic,”
- [25.](#) Our Generalissimo → Chiang Kaishek
- [26.](#) All three were Guomintang generals who openly defected to the Japanese.
- [27.](#) Our Generalissimo → Chiang Kaishek
- [28.](#) Engaged → Engaged exclusively
- [29.](#) War of Resistance → Anti-Japanese war

Arrangements for Establishing the Western Henan Base Area¹ (October 14, 1944)

Zheng [Weisan], Li [Xiannian], Ren [Zhibin], and Chen [Shaomin]:

We received your telegram of September 29. (1) Two regiments as the first detachment of the Eighth Route Army marching south led by Pi Dingjun (commander-in-chief) and Xu Zirong (commissar) crossed the Yellow River north of Xin'an one month ago. On September 30 they arrived in the area east and west around the Dayudian and Qi mountains in the region of Dengfeng, Linru, and Yuxian. They are engaging in the establishment of a base area and are also operating in different areas in divided groups. There are still some follow-up units that are crossing the river north of Xin'an and marching southward. Guerrillas organized by local Party members are already operating in the Luoyang, Yichuan, and Yiyang areas. The masses very much welcome the arrival of our army in Henan. The situation with the enemy and the diehard elements is still not very serious. (2) The Central Committee has decided to send Dai Jiying, Wang Shusheng, Liu Zijiu, Chen Xianrui,² and others to lead two veteran regiments and a large number of cadres from northern Shaanxi to enter Henan to operate there. They will build the Henan People's Liberation Army and struggle for the liberation of Henan. Wang, Dai, Liu, Chen, and others will depart from Yan'an in a month. The troops that the Central Committee assigned to the Fifth Division as well as a large number of cadres will also depart at the same time. (3) The troops you sent to southern Henan should persist in their operations, set up strongholds, develop local armed forces, and manage to establish contact with Pi's and Xu's troops.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 731–32, where it is reproduced from the transcript of the document preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Military Commission of the Central Committee to Zheng Weisan, the commissar of the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army, Li Xiannian, the division commander, Ren Zhibin, their deputy commissar, and Chen Shaomin, the deputy secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Border Region Party Committee.

[2.](#) Dai Jiying was at this time political commissar of the newly established Henan Military District of the Eighth Route Army. Wang Shusheng was commander-in-chief, and Liu Ziji was deputy commissar. Chen Xianrui was at this time commander-in-chief and commissar of the Third Detachment of the Western Henan Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army.

*General Policy for the United Front in Culture and Education*¹

*Speech at the Conference on Culture and Education in the
Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region
(October 30, 1944)*

In front of an audience of more than a thousand people at the Conference on Culture and Education in the Border Region on October 10, Chairman Mao announced a united front policy for the new democratic cultural movement in the liberated areas. In the speech he addressed issues such as the importance of cultural work, the social bases of China's new democratic culture, the necessity of a united front in the cultural field and for intellectuals and the worker and peasant masses to combine with each other, and that the needs and free choice of the masses must be the two basic principles in this work. Chairman Mao first stated: The general goal of all our work is to overthrow Japanese imperialism. Even though Japanese imperialism, like Hitler, is approaching its doom, it still has strength. The Chinese people and especially the liberated areas of China must continue their efforts. Only by doing so can we achieve the goal of finally destroying the enemy. In our efforts, the war comes first, then production, then cultural work. An army that does not engage in production is a starving army; an army that does not have culture is a stupid army, and a stupid army cannot defeat the Japanese aggressors,² liberate the people, and build an industrialized new China. Therefore, we must have culture. That some comrades have looked down on cultural and educational work in the past is a mistake. After this conference, we all should pay due attention to cultural and educational work.

Concerning the character of our culture, Chairman Mao pointed out: It should be a new democratic culture, namely, the culture of the broad popular masses

against Japan, against Chinese traitors, and against dark feudal traditions. The political and economic bases of this type of culture are popularly elected government, rent and interest reduction, and a private economy led by factories of various scales and cooperatives in different forms. The new democratic culture reflects these social forms as well as pushes them forward continuously.

Chairman Mao said: At present, Chinese industry is still weak and small and the industry of the liberated areas is even more so, but they have an unlimited future. China must use industry as the foundation in overcoming its backwardness. The economy of the liberated areas has its progressive side and backward side. The culture of the liberated areas also³ has its progressive side and its backward side. Liberated areas have⁴ a new culture of the popular masses that reveals the leading direction as well as⁵ the widespread backward feudal vestiges, that is, there are⁶ more than a million illiterates and 2,000 practitioners of witchcraft in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region⁷ alone. Feudal superstitions and ideas are still influencing the masses⁸ of the border region in various aspects of their cultural life. It is even more difficult to combat⁹ the enemies inside the people's minds than to fight Japanese imperialists. The task of the Conference on Culture and Education in the Border Region,¹⁰ whether in education, health, newspaper, or other work, all is to¹¹ call on the 1.5 million people¹² of the border region to rise up themselves and struggle against their own feudal, superstitious, illiterate, unhygienic, and other old habits. It is impossible to wage this difficult struggle without a broad united front.¹³ For example, in our education,¹⁴ we must not only have fairly concentrated, fairly regular, middle and primary schools but also relatively irregular village schools, and newspaper-reading groups and literacy classes that are widely available and dispersed. Not only must we have schools teaching new materials and run by the local people,¹⁵ but we must also utilize and transform the old-style village schools. In the arts,¹⁶ we must have not only modern drama but also the Shaanxi opera and the yangge dramas. Not only must we have new Shaanxi operas and new yangge dramas, but we must also utilize and transform¹⁷ the old opera troupes and especially 90 percent of the old yangge.¹⁸ This approach is especially¹⁹ necessary in the field of medicine. In the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region the infant mortality rate is as high as 60 percent, the adult morality rate is as high as thirty per thousand,

and 7,800 oxen, 4,000 donkeys, 210,000 sheep, and 2,300 mules died last year.²⁰ At the same time, people generally believe²¹ in witchcraft. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to rely solely on doctors of Western medicine²² in a few government organs and army units, who have the important task of serving those units. Of course, Western medicine²³ is more scientific than²⁴ Chinese medicine. But if under these conditions, doctors of Western medicine are not concerned about the people,²⁵ do not train more doctors of Western medicine²⁶ for the people of the border region, do not unite with, help and transform the thousand doctors of Chinese medicine and the veterinarians of the old type²⁷ in the border region,²⁸ then they will actually be helping the witch doctors and assisting in the death of people and animals in the border region.²⁹ So a united front of the new and the old is absolutely necessary. The two principles for the united front are both applicable here:³⁰ The first is unification, and the second is criticism, or education and reform. Capitulation to the old is wrong,³¹ and so are excluding and disparaging them.³² Our task is to unite with all the old styles and the people of the old type³³ who can be useful, and to help, convert, and reform them. In order to reform them, we must first unite with them. If we do it properly, they will welcome our help and efforts to reform.

Our culture is a culture of the popular masses; thus, our cultural workers in all areas must serve the popular masses with great enthusiasm and devotion. On this point, Chairman Mao earnestly urges all intellectuals to completely rid themselves of the bad habit of separating themselves from the masses,³⁴ serve the people with a spirit of complete dedication including their lives, and link themselves closely with the workers, peasants, and soldiers.³⁵ Cadres of worker and peasant origin should also treasure and trust these revolutionary intellectuals. Concluding his speech, Chairman Mao stressed two basic principles of the work style of linking with the masses; namely, act in accordance with the needs and free choice of the masses. We must³⁶ proceed from the masses' practical needs and not from the good intentions of any individual or from historical dogma. Appropriate methods should be used in light of the particular time periods and local conditions, For instance, even though the guiding principles for both the border region and the liberated areas are the same, various specific methods, appropriate for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region but not for

other liberated areas, which in a direct war environment or with a more dense population and more advanced cultural levels, should not be arbitrarily copied and other methods that are suitable to local conditions should be used. If³⁷ objectively the masses have a certain need³⁸ but subjectively they are not yet conscious of this need,³⁹ leaders and staff workers⁴⁰ should wait patiently. No change should be made until, through our work, the masses⁴¹ have become conscious and thus willing⁴² to carry it out.⁴³ They should in no way be forced and ordered to carry it out.⁴⁴ Unless they are conscious and willing, any kind of work that requires their participation will turn out to be a mere formality and will fail. The saying “Haste does not bring success” applies to all work,⁴⁵ particularly the cultural and educational work of reforming the thinking of the masses.⁴⁶

Chairman Mao’s speech pointed out the proper solutions to several essential questions in the cultural and educational work of the border region, namely, a united front in cultural and educational work, the importance of cultural and educational work, the link between intellectuals and the worker and peasant masses, and the principles of need and free choice in this work. The speech drew great attention from representatives, and especially cadres, attending the conference. It will be followed by further development of the cultural united front in the border region and cultivation of correct styles of work in cultural work.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 133–37, where it is reproduced from the November 1, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

1. General Policy for the United Front in Culture and Education → The United Front in Cultural Work
2. Japanese aggressors → The enemy
3. Also → Already
4. Have → Already have

5. As well as → And still
6. There are → There are still
7. In the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region → Among the 1.5 million people of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region
8. The masses → The broad masses
9. It is even more difficult to combat → These are enemies inside the minds of the people. It is often more difficult for us to combat
10. The task of the Conference on Culture and Education in the Border Region → We
11. Is to → Must
12. The 1.5 million people → The masses
13. United front → United front. And this united front has to be particularly broad in a place like the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, which has a sparse population, poor communications, and a low cultural base to start from and in addition is fighting a war.
14. For example, in our education → Hence, in our education
15. Schools teaching new materials and run by the local people → Schools of the modern type
16. In the arts → In the work on arts
17. Transform → Gradually transform
18. Especially 90 percent of the old *yangge* → The old *yangge* troupes, which comprise 90 percent of all *yangge* troupes
19. Especially → Even more
20. In the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region the infant mortality rate is as high as 60 percent, the adult mortality rate is as high as thirty per thousand, and 7,800 oxen, 4,000 donkeys, 210,000 sheep, and 2,300 mules died last year. → In the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region the human and animal mortality rates are both very high.
21. People generally believe → Many people still believe
22. Doctors of Western medicine → Modern doctors
23. Western medicine → Modern medicine
24. More scientific than → Has advantages over

- [25.](#) The people → The sufferings of the people
- [26.](#) More doctors of Western medicine → Modern doctors
- [27.](#) Doctors of Chinese medicine and veterinarians of the old type → Doctors and veterinarians of the old type
- [28.](#) The border region, → The border region and do not help them to make progress,
- [29.](#) Assisting the death of people and animals in the border region → Showing indifference to the high human and animal mortality rates
- [30.](#) The two principles for the united front are both applicable here: → There are two principles for the united front:
- [31.](#) Capitulation to the old is wrong → In the united front, capitulationism is wrong
- [32.](#) Excluding and disparaging them → Sectarianism with its exclusiveness and contempt for others
- [33.](#) With all the old styles and the people of the old type → All intellectuals, artists, and doctors of the old type
- [34.](#) To completely rid themselves of the bad habit of separating themselves from the masses → [We] must link ourselves with the masses, not divorce ourselves from the masses
- [35.](#) Link themselves closely with the workers, peasants, and soldiers → Link ourselves with the masses
- [36.](#) We must → All the work for the people should
- [37.](#) If → Often
- [38.](#) Have a certain need → Need certain reforms
- [39.](#) This need → This need, and are not yet willing or determined to make the change
- [40.](#) Leaders and staff workers → We
- [41.](#) The masses → Most of the masses
- [42.](#) Willing → Willing and determined
- [43.](#) Carry it out → Carry out the reforms
- [44.](#) They should in no way be forced and ordered to carry it out. → Otherwise, we shall isolate ourselves from the masses.
- [45.](#) The saying “Haste does not bring success” applies to all work, → In all work “haste does not bring success.” This does not mean we should not be efficient but that we should not be impetuous; impetuosity

leads only to failure,

[46](#). Particularly the cultural and educational work of transforming the thinking of the masses. →
particularly the cultural and educational work of transforming the thinking of the masses. There are two
principles here: one is the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the other is
the wishes of the masses, who must make up their own minds instead of our making up their minds for them.

Prepare Forces to Develop the Jiangsu and Zhejiang Areas¹ (November 2, 1944)

Rao [Shushi], Zhang [Yunyi], and Lai [Chuanzhu]:

The U.S. Army might land at Hangzhou Bay, but our work around that area is very weak. In order to coordinate with the landing of the U.S. Army, as well as to get ready to take over Hangzhou, Shanghai, Suzhou, Nanjing, and the other big cities, besides Su Yu² leading two regiments southward, you should think about the following steps.

1. Establish the Jiangsu-Zhejiang Military Area Command, with Su Yu as the commander-in-chief and Tan Zhenlin³ as the commissar. They will have unified command of southern Jiangsu and the whole of Zhejiang, and, if necessary, a Central Committee Subbureau will be set up to provide leadership in the future.

2. Apart from the two regiments dispatched, prepare to redeploy five to six more regiments from the First, Third, Second, and Fourth Divisions respectively and send them south.

3. Muster large numbers of cadres from military units and from different regions and gradually send them to Jiangsu and Zhejiang after two to three weeks' training.

4. Make concrete arrangements for work in every major city.

5. Make concrete arrangements for work in every district in Jiangsu and Zhejiang (eastern Zhejiang district, eastern Shanghai district, the Hangzhou and Jia-ding district, western Zhejiang district, southern Zhejiang district, as well as all the districts in southern Jiangsu).

Of the aforementioned items, please give us your opinions about which are

practical or impractical and which are more urgent than others.

Mao [Zedong], Liu [Shaoqi]

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 733–34, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) This is a telegram from Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi to Rao Shushi, the acting commissar and the head of the Political Department of the New Fourth Army, Zhang Yunyi, the vice commander, and Lai Chuanzhu, the chief of staff.

[2.](#) Su Yu (1907–1984) was at this time the commander and commissar of the First Division of the New Fourth Army.

[3.](#) Tan Zhenlin (1902–1983) was at this time the commissar of the Second Division of the New Fourth Army.

Conversation with [Patrick J.] Hurley¹ (November 8, 1944)

We welcome General [Patrick J.] Hurley to Yan'an and are grateful for the zeal with which he has aided the united Chinese War of Resistance. It is difficult to deal with circumstances in China. Colonel [David D.] Barrett,² who has spent many years in China and some time in Yan'an, understands this very clearly. Many of our other American friends are also aware of this. China has abundant manpower and material resources; what we need is unity. But we must have democracy to achieve unity. That is, we need to unite the strength of our whole country to fight the Japanese on the basis of democracy. Currently, the war against the Fascists in the rest of the world is going very well; it is only on the front lines in China that the fight is not going so well. This is because China lacks democracy. We greatly welcome General Hurley's coming here to lend the Chinese people a hand and to promote Chinese democratic unity. This is especially true now, when the Japanese bandits are penetrating southwestern China and the Americans need Chinese coordination with their attack on the Philippines. Yet the front line for which the Guomindang is responsible loses battles every day. The Chinese people and their Allied friends are very much concerned, and we hope that with General Hurley's forceful assistance, the Chinese situation can take a turn for the better. We hope to turn from the present direction of shattered unity, depleted military strength, broken democracy, and bad relations with the Allies to the direction of strengthening unity, greater military strength and democracy, and enjoying good relations with the Allies. If we can attain this through General Hurley's help, all the Chinese people will be grateful.

This morning, General Hurley expressed a desire for a free, open, and candid conversation. I will now follow the method you proposed to say a bit.

Until now, the Guomintang has been a major political party with a vast army. This army fought rather well during the first two years of the War of Resistance, and it can still be considered to be fighting the Japanese. The Guomintang authorities still have not fundamentally destroyed national unity. This is one good aspect of the party and the government led by Mr. Chiang Kaishek. Therefore, we have always been willing to cooperate with Mr. Chiang to fight the Japanese. We have never abandoned this. We should, however, look at another aspect, which is the difficulties, shortcomings, and serious crises facing China. If we do not consider this aspect, we will be unable to solve problems. The present policies of the Chinese government (they remain the same at present, but we hope they will change) are detrimental to the unity of the people of all China and prevent the people of all China from rising up to fight the Japanese.

China is now divided into three regions: the areas occupied by the enemy, the liberated areas under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party members and those with no party affiliation, and the areas directly under the control of the Guomintang.

The Guomintang authorities do not concern themselves with the first type of areas, the areas occupied by the enemy. The Guomintang authorities also do not concern themselves with organizing an underground army to coordinate fighting with Allied landings in these areas.

With regard to the second region, the liberated areas, the Guomintang authorities do everything they can to prevent, restrict, shrink, and annihilate them. But the liberated area nevertheless grows larger with every passing day. Why do you think the liberated area has expanded in this way? It is the result of eight years of arduous struggle by the broad masses. They must fight the Japanese in the front, while at the same time the Guomintang is destroying them from the rear. They are in the extremely difficult position of being attacked from two sides. As to how the Guomintang works to encircle, attack, and send spies to the liberated area to cause havoc, one can say that they have thought up a million ways; it is difficult to fully recount them here.

In the third region, the areas directly ruled by the Guomintang, there exist grave crises, of which the military crisis is the most profound. Since April of this year, the Guomintang army has shrunk from between 2 million and 3 million troops to 1.95 million troops in the face of attacks by the Japanese bandits. Most

of the soldiers cannot fight; they simply collapse at the first encounter. In the great rear echelon, the people cannot support themselves and bandits run amuck. The people's trust in the government has never been as low as it is today. People from all walks of life, including university professors, students, members of lesser political parties, and even Guomindang members, are dissatisfied and resentful of these authorities.

The above is a summary of China's three regions. We hope that our Allied friends can understand the true situation.

The Japanese bandits have now penetrated southwestern China, and the U.S. Army urgently needs China to cooperate in its attack on the Philippines. How can we quickly solve this problem in order to unite all the strength of China, cooperate with the Allies to quickly defeat Japan, and establish a free and democratic China? This morning, General Hurley said that the United States would supplement our strength and help us to solve this problem. We Chinese people are very happy about this.

General Hurley has raised a few points about how to resolve our difficulties, which we hope can be the basis for reaching an agreement. We feel that there are still a few problems, which, although they have not been written into a treaty, deserve to be raised and discussed.

The majority of Chinese people, including those of us in the Chinese Communist Party, primarily hope that the policies and organization of the National Government will be changed rapidly. This is the starting point for the resolution of the problems. Without these changes, we may still come to some agreement, but such an agreement would have no foundation. Therefore, it is necessary to reorganize the current National Government, establishing a coalition government that includes all anti-Japanese parties and factions and those who belong to no party or faction. At the same time, established policies of the government that are not suitable for uniting the people of all China to fight the Japanese must be changed and be replaced by those that are suitable for uniting the people of all China to fight the Japanese.

This reform is necessary, first, to ease the serious military, political, financial, economic, and other crises in the areas directly under Guomindang rule. Although the liberated areas face extreme difficulties, there is no crisis. If the present National Government is not reorganized, there will be no way to firm up

the morale of the army in the great rear echelon or to ease the crises in the areas ruled by the Guomindang. The Guomindang always complains about insufficient Allied assistance in arms and ammunition, but if the government is not reorganized, and the old policies are not changed, all the tanks, planes, and other new weapons in the world will not help. Every unit under Guomindang control is extremely corrupt. The primary reason for reorganizing the government is to ease the crises in the area under Guomindang rule. If the Guomindang believes it holds power firmly and refuses to change, what can anyone do? Nonetheless, it will then have no way to remedy its own crises.

With regard to the “democratic order of government,” I feel that perhaps the National Government needs, first, to be reorganized into a coalition government and change its policies. Mr. Chiang, however, has repeatedly expressed his desire to delay dealing with this issue until a year after the end of the war. When people have raised the issues of reorganizing the government and establishing a coalition government to him, he has slapped them down. If this situation continues, it will only prolong and widen the crisis, causing the National Government to face the danger of collapse. This danger is felt not only by we Chinese Communist members but also by our foreign friends, such as numerous foreign reporters.

Therefore, the origin of the crisis in areas ruled by the Guomindang lies in the Guomindang’s erroneous policies and corrupt apparatus, not in the existence of the Chinese Communist Party.

Now, let us take a look at how we Chinese Communist Party members work.

In the enemy-occupied areas, we have organized underground armies and have prepared to coordinate with the fighting by the Allied forces.

In the liberated areas, we have carried out work openly, organized the people, practiced democracy, and persevered in the War of Resistance. We have never impeded the Guomindang, but the Guomindang has impeded our democratic anti-Japanese activities. Of the Guomindang army, which is 1.95 million strong, 775,000 have been used to encircle us, a part of which is used to attack us. Even under these circumstances, we still use all of our strength to fight against the Japanese.

In the Guomindang area, when an authority sees a Chinese Communist Party member, it either arrests or executes this person. Since 1939, our Party there has been forced to go underground. Only in Chongqing can a small number of

Chinese Communist Party members still work openly in the Eighth Route Army office and the *New China Daily*. In Xi'an as well, only a few Communists can operate openly. In all the other places in the great rear echelon, our Party has been forced to work underground. In spite of this, we have not caused workers', shopkeepers', or students' strikes. We still support the National Government in its fight against the Japanese.

Therefore, I venture to say once more that the origin of the crisis in the Guomintang-controlled areas lies in the Guomintang's erroneous policies and corrupt organization, not in the existence of the Chinese Communist Party.

In contrast, our 630,000 soldiers and 90 million people behind enemy lines have held fast to the "oxtail" of the Japanese bandits, thus protecting the great rear echelon. Without this force to hold on to the "oxtail" of the Japanese bandits, the Guomintang would have fallen to the Japanese long ago. In June of this year, the Guomintang authority announced a scheme in which 80 percent of our army, as well as the democratically elected governments of the liberated areas, would all be eliminated. If this scheme is implemented, there will be no one left holding the Japanese bandits' "oxtail." This will only end up harming the Guomintang itself.

Of the main points raised by General Hurley this morning, one is about the reorganization of our army. It states that after reorganization, our officers and soldiers will receive salaries and subsidies equivalent to those received by the Guomintang army. I fear that Mr. Chiang himself wrote most of this item. I think that the army that should be reorganized is the one that has lost its combat ability, disobeys orders, is mired in corruption, and scatters at the first sign of a fight. For example, the armies of Tang Enbo and Hu Zongnan need to be reorganized, not the courageous and skilled Eighth Route and New Fourth armies. The U.S. Army Observation Group is now visiting the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, northwestern Shanxi, Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei [Border Region], and other anti-Japanese base areas. We have several dozen base areas behind enemy lines, seventeen of which are large. We are willing for you to organize an inspection team of a few hundred people to go to each base area and draw your own conclusions as to which army really needs reorganizing. The public opinion of the Chinese people is that whichever army is corrupt should be reorganized. As for salaries and remuneration, soldiers in the Guomintang army are plagued by both cold and hunger to the point that they can hardly walk. The

soldiers' monthly salary is only 50 *yuan*, which is only enough to buy a pack of cigarettes. Our army has enough to eat and warm clothes to wear; when they march, they are quite energetic. Now they want us to receive the same salary as the Guomindang army. Wouldn't our army also lack enough to eat and to wear? Wouldn't we also lack the strength to march? How would this work?

Our opinion is basically as stated. We in Yan'an deeply thank General Hurley for his enthusiasm to help China, which led him to take great pains to go on this long journey. As for the actual situation in China's three regions, we felt the need to tell you.

On the basis of not destroying the strength to resist in the liberated areas and not blocking democracy, we are willing to come to terms with Mr. Chiang Kaishek, even if fewer problems are resolved and solutions take longer to find. We do not demand that all problems be solved in an instant. Nonetheless, we cannot accept destroying the strength to resist in the liberated areas and impeding democracy.

I am very willing to meet with Mr. Chiang Kaishek. There have been difficulties in the past, so we did not have that opportunity. Today, we have the help of General Hurley, so at a suitable time I am willing to meet with Mr. Chiang.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 220–25, where it is reproduced from the transcript of the conversation preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Patrick J. Hurley (1883–1963) was a brigadier general in the U.S. Army. In September 1944 he went to China to “mediate” relations between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party as a personal representative of President Franklin Roosevelt.

[2.](#) David D. Barrett (1892–1977) was a colonel in the U.S. Army. He was at this time a military attaché in the U.S. embassy in China and the head of the U.S. Army Observation Group.

*Letter to U.S. President [Franklin]
Roosevelt*
(November 10, 1944)

Your Excellency President Roosevelt:

I have had the pleasure of receiving your envoy General [Patrick] Hurley. For three days we amicably discussed all matters relating to the important cause of rallying all Chinese and all military forces in order to defeat Japan and rebuild China. To that end, I proposed an agreement. The spirit and orientation of the agreement are the essence of the goal that the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people have been pursuing in our eight years of the United Front against Japan. We have always been willing to reach an agreement with Chairman Chiang [Kaishek] that will further the welfare of the Chinese people. Now, with General Hurley's help, we have hope of realizing this goal. I am very pleased to extend my thanks to your envoy for his outstanding talent and his sympathy toward the Chinese people.

The Central Committee of our Party has unanimously passed the full text of this agreement and is prepared to support the agreement with all our force in order to make it a reality. The Central Committee of our Party authorized me to put my signature on this agreement, as was witnessed by General Hurley.

I now ask General Hurley to relay this agreement to you in the name of our Party, our army, and the Chinese people. Your excellency, Mr. President, I would also like to express my thanks to you for your immense efforts at uniting China in order to defeat Japan and make possible a united and democratic China.

We, the Chinese people and the American people, have had a deep friendship of long historical standing. I sincerely hope that through your efforts the success of the great people of China and the United States can forever go forward hand in

hand in the cause of defeating the Japanese enemy, rebuilding everlasting world peace, and building a democratic China.

Chairman of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party

Mao Zedong

November 10, 1944, Yan'an

Note

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), pp. 39–40.

Congratulatory Telegram to Roosevelt Upon His Reelection (November 10, 1944)

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, November 10) President [Franklin] Roosevelt was re-elected and Chairman Mao has sent a congratulatory telegram. The telegram is as follows:

Your Excellency President Roosevelt: I have learned of your Excellency's reelection and would like to extend my congratulations.

Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 205, where it is reproduced from the November 10, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

*The Major Direction of Development in
Southern China in the Future Is
Guangxi and Nanlu¹
(November 14, 1944)*

Comrade Lin Ping:

1. We agree with every point you made in your telegram of November 11.
2. Please pay special attention to Xijiang and quickly develop toward Guilin and Liuzhou. This will allow you to contact units of the Hunan forces² that are moving southward toward Guilin (keep this a secret from outsiders). This will make it easier to send cadres to you. Thus, you'd better send more troops and cadres to Xijiang. Your major direction of development in the future is toward Guangxi and Nanlu.³
3. Please ask those going to Qiongya to bring the Central Committee's regards to Comrade Feng Baiju⁴ and the entire unit, and tell them that they have two tasks. First, to send capable units to expand toward Nanlu and to make contact with you. Second, to occupy all of Qiongya.
4. You should set up a large school to train military, political, and local work cadres. The term can be as short as a few weeks or as long as three to four months. They should be trained in groups, and most of them should be sent to Guangxi.

The Central Committee

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 735–36, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Committee to Lin Ping, the secretary of the Guangdong Provisional Work Committee and the commissar of the Dongjing Column of the Guangdong People's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army.

[2.](#) Hunan forces refer to the First Independent Guerrilla Army of the Eighth Route Army, generally called the South Bound Detachment.

[3.](#) Nanlu refers to the Leizhou Peninsula of Guangdong.

[4.](#) Feng Baiju (1903–1973) was at this time commander-in-chief and commissar of the Guangdong Qiongya People's Anti-Japanese Independent Guerrilla Column, generally known as the Qiongya Column.

*Inscription for the Special Issue
Commemorating the Passing of Mr. Zou
Taofen¹
(November 15, 1944)*

With a deep love for the people, sincerely serving the people, bending his back to the task until his dying day—this is the spirit of Mr. Zou Taofen and this is why he deeply touches us.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Nianpu*, Vol. 2, pp. 558–59, which indicates that Mao drafted this text for *Jiefang ribao*'s special issue commemorating Zou Taofen.

¹. Zou Taofen (1895–1944) was a noted liberal journalist in Republican China and a leader of the anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement in the 1930s.

Letter to Guo Moruo¹

(November 21, 1944)

Brother Moruo:

I have read your letter with respect. You praise me too much, and I dare not accept it. But I will study hard to live up to my old friend's expectations of me. Since our parting in Wuchang, I have been buried in work all day and have lacked the opportunity to read and study. Thus, I admire your accomplishments. We have taken your "Commemoration of the Three-Hundredth Year Since *Jiashen* [1644]"² as an official rectification document. A small victory leads to arrogance, while a major victory leads to even more arrogance. This leads to repeated losses. It is worth paying attention to how to avoid this problem. If you can use your great pen to write about the experience of the Taiping army,³ it would be very beneficial. Nonetheless, I dare not make a formal proposal because I am afraid that it would burden you with too much. I recently read *Before and After the Xinhai Revolution*,⁴ which is almost the same as my experience in Hunan at that time. For an immature bourgeois revolution, that kind of outcome is inevitable. Don't you think that this anti-Japanese war is mature? The international conditions are good, while it is up to us to work hard domestically. Although I always remain extremely cautious and am afraid that something might go wrong, who knows from where a setback will come. If you see any mistakes or shortcomings, please let me know as soon as possible. Your historical commentaries and historical plays greatly benefit the Chinese people. We only complain that there are too few, not too many. Your energies will not be wasted. I hope you continue to work hard. I am assuming that since Comrade [Zhou] Enlai has arrived, you already know the current situation here, so I won't elaborate on it. We all hope to see you. Will there be such an opportunity?

I wish you good health, happiness, and great energy!

Mao Zedong

November 21, 1944, in Yan'an

Notes

Our source for the document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 241–43, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

- [1.](#) Regarding Guo Moruo, see above, note to the text of January 9, 1944.
- [2.](#) “Jiashen sanbai nian ji” was written by Guo Moruo on the historical experience and lessons of the peasant uprising led by Li Zicheng in the last years of the Ming dynasty. It was published in the Chongqing *Xinhua ribao* in March 1944.
- [3.](#) The Taiping army refers to the peasant armed forces established by Hong Xiuquan, a heterodox Christian convert who led the large-scale revolt, generally known as the Taiping Rebellion, from 1851 to 1864.
- [4.](#) *Fanzheng qian hou* (Shanghai: Xiandai shudian, 1929), written by Guo Moruo, mainly reflects the author’s experience in Sichuan from 1910 to 1911.

*Letter to Liu Yazi*¹

(November 21, 1944)

Dear Brother Yazi:

You have suffered more than enough hardships and disasters during the eighteen years since our departure from Guangzhou, but you are not crushed. Instead, you are still standing, majestic and independent. I celebrate you and the Chinese people for this! “Wherever we are, we will both worry about our country; we cannot forget Guangzhou, where we drank tea together.” This is the poem you wrote for me several years ago, yet I still cannot write a single word today to answer you. After seeing your photo, you look older. How is your spirit? Are you in good health? I really hope I have a chance to see you, but I do not know if it is possible.

Wishing you good health!

Mao Zedong with respect

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 244, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹ Liu Yazi (1887–1958) was a noted democrat and poet who joined Sun Yatsen’s Revolutionary Alliance in his early years. After serving on the Supervisory Committee of the Central Committee of the Guomindang, he was expelled from the Guomindang for his criticism of Chiang Kaishek over the Southern Anhui Incident. He joined the China Democratic League in 1944.

*Letter to Shen Yanbing*¹

(November 21, 1944)

Dear Brother Yanbing:

It has been several years since we parted. I have heard that you have been troubled by illness recently and I wonder if you are feeling better now. Thinking of the past when you were in Yan'an, I still regret today that we did not have enough good conversations and I did not learn much from you. I very much look forward to seeing you, but I do not know if we will have the opportunity.

Wishing you good health!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 245, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Shen Yanbing (1896–1981) was the famous writer known as Mao Dun. He went to Yan'an in May 1940 and taught at the Lu Xun Academy of Arts and Literature.

Letter to Chen Yi¹

(December 1, 1944)

Comrade Chen Yi:

I read your letter and was quite inspired by it. Thank you very much!

I have telegraphed Chongqing today that we will not submit a reply and that Zhou [Enlai] and Dong [Biwu] will both come back. We will delay it for a while and then discuss what we should do next. In terms of the primary policy, just as you said, there is no other option but this.

The achievements in the White [Guomindang-controlled] areas must be recognized. You are quite right. In addition, there are issues such as the “south and north” and the Party in the south. I had wanted to talk about them for a long time, but I temporarily forgot. I am afraid that I may have forgotten other things. It seems necessary to talk about them at the Seventh Party Congress. All that is unfair must be corrected and returned to fairness in order for us to unite together to fight against the enemy. Whenever you have any new ideas, please let me know.

Since you and Nie [Rongzhen] have become publicly known, it is no longer necessary for [Liu] Bocheng to remain secret. He was invited to the meeting at the Party School yesterday, but he did not show up. This is because he was not formally informed that he can appear in public. You can tell him first, and I will also tell him.

Please discuss with Peng Zhen the arrangements for backward cadres. In my opinion, your ideas are very good.

In your thinking, grasp this one thing and you will grasp everything; you will have nothing to worry about, and nothing will block your path. If you are always prepared to hold firmly to the truth and are always prepared to correct mistakes,

there is nothing that you cannot do. If only several dozen leading core cadres in every base area and other places realize this point, all the problems will be resolved. Politically the entire party is maturing day by day. This can be seen from the telegrams coming in from various places.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 246–47, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1.](#) Chen Yi, acting commander of the New Fourth Army, at the time was in Yan'an to attend the Seventh Party Congress.

*Letter to Xie Juezai*¹

(December 1, 1944)

Comrade Juezai:

This document is very good. I have made some additions and deletions; please take them into consideration.

As for changing the name of the Provincial Assembly to the People's Congress, I think this would have a positive impact, both domestically and abroad. Please discuss it with other comrades. The Central Committee wants to discuss this point and other questions related to this session of the Provincial Assembly. Please inform Comrades Gao [Gang],² Lin [Boqu], and Luo [Mai] of this.

Political democracy has its own content; the economy is its material foundation, not simply [the ideas of] political democracy. Culture is a spiritual thing. It is conducive to political democracy but is not simply a matter of politics. Please consider these points.

As for the various rights of the people, we can only say that we have fulfilled some important ones, such as running the government, the right to work, and the rights to speech, publication, and assembly under the limits of current material conditions. As for the right to rest, China in general still cannot consider this, especially the workers and peasants. As for the rights to education and to health care for the old and sick, we are still taking the first steps. The Soviet constitution is the product of several five-year plans. In China, many sections [of the constitution] are still in the realm of the ideal rather than the real. Moreover, we should refrain from mentioning the Soviet constitution in these documents in order to avoid misunderstanding.

Salutations,

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 248–49, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript.

[1.](#) Xie Juezai was at this time deputy chair of the Provincial Assembly of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region; see above, note to the text of July 28, 1944.

[2.](#) Gao Gang (1905–1954) was at this time secretary of the Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Tasks for 1945¹ (December 15, 1944)

What are our tasks for 1945 now that 1944 is coming to an end? What work should we give special attention to next year? There have been tremendous victories in the entire anti-Fascist war, and the overthrow of Hitler may be realized next year. Our only task is to cooperate with the Allies to overthrow the Japanese invaders. Now the United States has already fought its way to Leyte Island and might land in China. At the same time, the Japanese invaders have broken through a continental transportation line from Tokyo to Singapore, and their occupied territory in China has expanded. Will the enemy stop its offensive? I do not think it will stop, and it is possible that it will launch attacks on our southwestern and northwestern regions. During this period, the Japanese invaders will certainly play tricks, attempting to use the Chinese capitulationists to lure the Chinese government into surrender. China's internal situation is still not unified, negotiations between the Guomindang and the Communists have brought no results, and the Chinese people's anti-Japanese forces are being split at the hands of Chinese reactionaries. Combat on the front-line battlefields suffers one defeat after another, the Guomindang authorities still stubbornly insist on their one-party dictatorship and defeatist policies with which all the Chinese people are dissatisfied, and they refuse all suggestions beneficial to the War of Resistance, unity, and democracy. Only the vast Chinese liberated areas founded after great hardships have carried out Mr. Sun Yatsen's revolutionary Three People's Principles or new democracy, united people from all walks of life, established heroic armies, and shattered all the enemy's attacks. In addition, they have been able to launch offensives and have regained large areas of lost territory. Under such circumstances, what should we do?

We must make people of the entire nation understand that we must use the

strength of the people to convene a democratic national assembly to organize a coalition government in which the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and all other anti-Japanese parties and nonpartisans participate. Only in this way can we unify all anti-Japanese forces in China to resist the attacks of the Japanese invaders and drive the Japanese invaders out of China in cooperation with the Allies. We have raised this issue through Comrade Lin Zhan² at the National Political Council,³ and we later raised it again in writing to the Guomindang authorities. Comrade Zhou Enlai recently made a special trip to Chongqing to discuss this matter, but still without any results. At present, it is very clear that negotiations alone will not be successful, and we hope that all people throughout the country will unite to appeal to the Guomindang authorities to change their current policies in order to build a democratic coalition government quickly. This is the general task of the people of the entire nation. The Chinese people, whether in the great rear echelon, enemy-occupied territory, or liberated areas, should all strive for this goal. Only if China has a unified central government that truly carries out democratic policies and is able to mobilize and unify all anti-Japanese forces in China can the victory of the Chinese War of Resistance Against Japan and the liberation of the Chinese people come quickly. Everyone should come up with many ways to achieve this objective.

In the great rear echelon, we must assist the democratic patriotic movement that is being suppressed by the reactionary authorities, we must mobilize every force to resist enemy attacks, and we must be on guard against the conspiracy by the capitulationists who want to betray the nation and surrender to the enemy. There should be many young people and people from other walks of life who wage guerrilla warfare in the enemy-occupied territory, and the broad masses should be prepared to resist the enemy wherever it may appear. At the same time, the liberated areas should energetically assist the great rear echelon with their own brave combat operations and should mobilize guerrilla warfare in new areas. Working hard to establish a democratic coalition government is the responsibility of all people and all patriotic parties in the great rear echelon. In the great rear echelon there are already many parties, many industrialists, professors, students, and even many members of the Guomindang who approve of the proposition of a coalition government and believe that now it is the only correct way to resist the Japanese and save the country. There is still not enough

strength, however, and we should call on the broad masses to stand up and strive for this.

In the enemy-occupied areas, vast numbers of people are suffering from the enemy's cruel oppression and longing for liberation. We must help them organize and prepare for armed uprisings when the time is ripe, cooperate with the army's offensives, drive out the Japanese invaders by collaborating from within with forces from without, and liberate our brothers and sisters. This task must now be raised to the same level of importance as work in the liberated areas. It is extremely urgent work, and we must carry it out no matter how difficult it may be. In this work, the French Communist Party and the French people are glorious models, and we should learn from the French experience. We should explain the necessity of a democratic coalition government to the people in enemy-occupied territories and make them understand that once there is such a government, it will not be long before the people in the enemy-occupied territories will be liberated. We must call on them to stand up and strive for this goal.

The liberated areas have already become the core of resistance to Japan and saving the nation. By the end of November 1944, there were 650,000 soldiers from the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and other people's anti-Japanese armies here, as well as 2 million militia and 90 million liberated people. In the single year of 1944, we had great achievements in the military, political, economic, and cultural arenas, but what work is worthy of special note for 1945?

I believe that the liberated areas in China should pay attention to each of the following in 1945:

1. Expand the Liberated Areas. There are many areas close to or a little bit farther from each of the liberated areas that are occupied by the enemy and its puppet regime and are not strongly defended. Our troops should attack these places, wipe out the enemy and its puppet regime, expand the liberated areas, and shrink the enemy-occupied areas. Under present conditions, we must take over all the weakly fortified areas that we can and convert them all into liberated areas, thereby forcing the enemy to live between extremely cramped cities and important transportation lines, tightly surrounded by us. When total conditions are ripe, we will drive the enemy out completely. This kind of offensive is absolutely necessary as well as possible. Our troops have already carried out many such offensives, with particularly great achievements this year, and we

should continue to do this next year. In all of the places newly occupied by the enemy and the places where liberated areas have not yet been established, such as Henan, we must call on the people to organize armed forces to oppose the invaders and build new liberated areas. Several years of experience have proven that it is very effective to organize “armed work teams,” which, after training, are good at carrying out military and political tasks. They can penetrate the rear areas behind enemy lines to attack the enemy and its puppet regime and to organize the people to cooperate with the fighting on the front lines of the battle in the liberated areas. This should be done in every location.

2. The enemy offensive (“mopping up”) will not stop. We should always be alert and prepared at any time to use counter-“mopping up” to shatter the enemy offensive. It is wrong not to be on guard like this. Do not think that we are strong now and the enemy is weak, and that the comparative position between the enemy’s strength and ours has now changed. We must be aware that the enemy is still strong, and it will never forget to launch attacks against us. We are still weaker than the enemy, and we must still work very hard. In addition, we must carry out correct military and other policies; only in this way can we change the situation. Only when we are at an advantage will the enemy’s attacks become impossible.

3. Reform and train the present self-defense army and militia, and strengthen their fighting capacity. There are not enough self-defense army soldiers and militia and, with the exception of certain special places where it is impossible to do so, every location should make the strongest possible effort to expand their numbers. Of the 90 million people, apart from the old, the children, and the ill, all male and female citizens should be incorporated into the self-defense army. Without breaking away from production, they should shoulder the task of defending their hometowns and assisting the army. From among the self-defense army, we should choose the sharper and more capable elements and incorporate them into the militia or the core members of the self-defense army. Under the principle of “combining combat with production,” they will fight in cooperation with the army or they will fight independently. Of the 90 million people, at least 5 percent, or 4.5 million, should be militia, in other words, twice as many as the present number. Some areas have not yet paid full attention to this task. In such places, there are too few militia, they lack reform and training, and they are not

of high quality. This situation must be changed in 1945. Both the self-defense army and the militia must not be away during the farming season, must minimize lost work time, and not obstruct production. Here, the method of exchanging labor is necessary. The fighting militia organization and the production labor exchange organization can cooperate with each other regularly. The leading bodies of the self-defense army and the militia must be democratically elected. Only in this way can the self-defense army and the militia be enlarged and their fighting capacity increased. An important combat method of the militia is the use of land mines, and the land-mine movement should be popularized in all villages. Widespread manufacture of all types of land mines as well as technology training in explosives have become extremely necessary.

4. Reform and training of the regular army and the guerrilla forces. In 1945 all troops should undergo reform and training once in rotation. They should reform and train in accordance with the new methods, and a mass troop-training movement should be carried out.

5. In the old areas, we should replenish the lost numbers of the original armies. In the newly developed areas, we should enlarge the military where economic conditions allow. Whether replenishing or enlarging the army, we must keep in mind that it must be done without increasing the financial burden on the people. If we violate this point, we are sure to fail.

6. Unity within the army is extremely important. Our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army have won glorious victories by always relying on unity between officers and soldiers. The influence of the pernicious warlord habits of the Chinese warlord armies still exists in our army, however, and these pernicious habits are very serious in some troops. In 1945, we should work extensively to eliminate all the ugly phenomena that exist in relations between officers and soldiers. Such vile habits and erroneous policies as beating and verbally abusing soldiers, not caring about their provisions, illnesses, and other difficulties, punishing them without considering their mistakes and shortcomings and not using the method of patient persuasion and education, and humiliating or executing deserters should all absolutely be eliminated. Many units are still neglecting this work because they do not understand that it is the extremely important political foundation of the fighting capacity of an army. The one-year plan for reform and training that has now begun should place equal emphasis on

military and political reform and training, and the two should be combined. The political aspect should be emphasized at the start of reform and training, focusing on improving the relationship between officers and soldiers, strengthening internal unity, and mobilizing a high level of enthusiasm among the officers and soldiers. Only then will military consolidation and training be carried out easily and more effectively. To carry out this work, a campaign to support the officers and cherish the soldiers should be held in each army, and the officers should be called upon to take care of the soldiers while the soldiers are called upon to support the officers. The shortcomings and mistakes of each should be made public and promptly corrected. This can help us to achieve the goal of uniting well internally.

7. Strengthen the work of supporting the government and cherishing the people, and supporting the army and giving preferential treatment to family members of anti-Japanese soldiers in order to further improve the relationship between the army and the people. Relations between the people in our liberated areas and our Eighth Route and New Fourth armies have always been good, which is why we can defeat the enemy and strengthen and develop the liberated areas. The pernicious habits of the old army, however, may similarly infect us. Harmful phenomena in relations between the army and the people, such as the army's unreasonable attitude, impairing the interests of the people, poor discipline, and disrespect for the government, also occur frequently. In addition, phenomena such as localities not helping the army enough and doing a poor job in giving preferential treatment to family members of the anti-Japanese soldiers also exist. In 1943, we pointed out the importance of this work, yet many places still have not paid attention to it. In January 1945, according to the lunar calendar, all liberated areas should hold a broad campaign to support the government and cherish the people and to support the army and give preferential treatment to family members of the anti-Japanese soldiers. Great successes must be achieved. Those who have already had achievements must continue with their work and examine the results of these two tasks. If all our troops are united, from the officers to the soldiers, and politically strengthened like iron, with military skills and tactical training along with the support of the people the Chinese people's cause to resist the Japanese and save the nation will be staunchly guaranteed.

8. The national United Front is the basic political line for the Chinese people to resist the Japanese and save the nation. In the liberated areas, this is primarily manifested in the “Three-Thirds” system⁴ of government work in which every class and every party cooperates. Every location has some who have done good work in this regard and some who have not, and every location should summarize its experiences. The Communists must discuss more, talk more, and meet more with other parties and nonpartisans to clear up rifts, eliminate misunderstandings, and correct harmful phenomena in their relations, so that they can collaborate to carry out government work and various social causes. All the people who participate in the work of the people’s representatives congress (the Provincial Assembly), government work, and social work should be respected and given positions and power due them, without regard to which party they belong or whether they are nonpartisans.

9. All areas have made achievements in rent reduction. Some places, however, have had somewhat fewer achievements, superficially reducing but actually not reducing and retaining the idea of “granting favors.” On the other hand, there are also the phenomena of excessive reductions or failure to collect the rent at all after the reductions. Both these two erroneous tendencies should be corrected. After rent reduction, the lease should be renewed when it expires so that the peasants will have land to work, unless it is in the interest of both the landlord and the peasant that the landlord takes back the land to work it himself. Rents should be examined in the old areas where rent reduction is not thorough. In the newly liberated areas where the rent has not yet been reduced, a campaign should be mobilized to reduce rents. It is wrong not to reduce rent, and reducing too much is not right either. The government should help landlords who are having difficulty making a living because they have been devastated by the enemy or for some other cause to resolve their difficulties by giving them the opportunity to work in agriculture, industry, commerce, or other businesses. We must regard this as part of government work and use it to unite them to fight against our common enemy. We are now in the countryside, and resolving the land problem correctly is a key link in supporting the long-term war. I hope that everyone will give this his full attention.

10. This year by far the highest number of localities has carried out production campaigns, and many have had outstanding achievements. This is extremely

gratifying. There are also, however, some places that have still not started to carry out these campaigns, some that have achieved little, and others where the military has had achievements, but the people have not. In 1945, we must universally and without exception carry out a widespread production campaign on a large scale. All troops must engage in production and self-sufficiency in addition to combat and training, and offices and schools must also do the same. Only under special circumstances will reductions or exemptions of production be permitted. Under the principle of freedom to choose, we must mobilize the people to organize production mutual-aid groups, such as work-exchange teams, mutual-aid organizations, and labor-exchange classes. Our local workers must use tremendous energy to help the people organize these mutual-aid groups in order to restore and develop production on a large scale. Not only should the people have enough clothing and food, they should also gradually have a surplus. The slogan of “for three years of cultivation have a year’s worth of spare grain” can be realized in the liberated areas behind enemy lines, except in those places that were badly devastated by the enemy. We must strive to be self-sufficient with regard to industrial products in our liberated areas, and we must work hard to reach the goal of becoming completely or mostly self-sufficient within several years. It is possible to achieve this goal through the efforts of public, private, and cooperative management. Thrift is what complements production, and waste must be reduced as much as possible. “Develop the economy, guarantee supply” is our un-swerving financial policy. It would be a mistaken policy not to develop our basic economy and instead try to solve the superficial financial problems. If we have conscientiously developed both the public and private economy, we can sustain the war, however long it lasts, without exhausting our energy. This is an extremely important point that must be fully and clearly understood by all working people and all army personnel in order to organize them to engage in a large-scale production campaign. In the public economy, the individual distribution system of equal distribution based on quality [of work] can and should be carried out in many sectors. We must be careful not to violate the two principles of “consideration to both the army and the people” and “consideration to both the public and the private.”

11. In order to defeat the Japanese invaders, we must pay attention to cultural and education work, in addition to paying full attention to the military, politics,

and the economy. The great majority of intellectuals in our liberated areas are good people. Their shortcomings and even their mistakes can be corrected through work. They are a valuable asset in the people's cause and should be highly regarded. Many of them are engaged in military, political, and economic work, and many others are doing cultural, educational, artistic, and health work. All of these personnel should be highly regarded. The direction pointed out this year at the Cultural and Educational Work Conference in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region can be applied in every location. Dictators foster the ignorance of the people, but we foster the people's intelligence. We must enable all people gradually to escape the states of ignorance and poor sanitation. Every local government and Party organization should place newspapers, schools, art, and health, these four aspects of cultural and educational work, on its own daily agenda.

12. Use mass democratic elections to select superior elements from the army, the countryside, the factories, and government offices as combat heroes, labor heroes, and model workers. We should reward them and educate them, and we should inspire and unite the masses through them. For several years now, this system has already proven to be very effective in raising the fighting capacity of the military, promoting agricultural and industrial productive forces, and raising the working capacity in government offices and other organizations. This movement should be widely popularized everywhere.

13. In order to defeat the Japanese invaders, we need a large number of capable cadres. Our current number of cadres has greatly increased from before, but it is still not nearly enough. The capabilities of cadres have also increased but are still quite insufficient. In particular, the literacy, understanding of policies, and professional skill levels of the low-ranking and junior cadres, whether military or local, are generally not high, and some are even very low. This is because they are busy with work and seldom have the opportunity to receive education. In 1945, cadre education in each location should focus on training military (company to squad) and local (district, township) low-ranking and junior cadres. The incumbents should be trained using the rotation method, and those who do not hold office should be trained using the school method. They should be improved according to a plan.

14. An extremely great fault in our work style is that some of the workers are

accustomed to acting arbitrarily and are not good at inspiring criticism and discussion among the people or at employing a democratic work style. Of course, we are comparing the work styles within our liberated areas, not comparing the work styles in our liberated areas with the Guomindang areas. Our liberated areas are democratic places, and the Guomindang areas are feudal places. These two areas differ in principle. Many people in our armed forces, though, have not learned how to employ a democratic work style, and the bureaucratic work style passed along from the old society still persists. Other people are not supposed to offer different opinions, and, if they do, they are unhappy. They like hearing flattery but not criticism. People do not dare to offer their opinions boldly because they are afraid of meeting with rebuff, being attacked, and suffering retaliation. This is a very bad work style, and it is hindering the progress of our cause as well as the progress of the working staff. I propose that each location carry out education on this point and widely promote a democratic work style inside and outside the Party. Everyone is permitted to speak, unless he is a hostile element or his words are malicious attacks, and it does not even matter if he is wrong. Leadership personnel at each level have the responsibility to listen to other people. Two principles should be applied: (1) Say all you know, and say it without reserve; (2) The speaker is guiltless, the listener is suitably warned. If “the speaker is guiltless” is not a reality, then it will not be possible to obtain the results of “say all you know, and say it without reserve.” Since the Rectification movement, our work style has made great progress. This has been praised by all good and honest people, and this is very glorious. Yet we still have very serious shortcomings, and many of us still lack a democratic work style. We must correct this shortcoming. All our working cadres, regardless of whether they hold a high position or low, are the servants of the people. Everything we do is to serve the people. Are there some bad things that we are loathe to cast away? Once we have corrected this shortcoming, we will be able to unite a broader group of people and our cause will enjoy greater and faster development.

15. In addition to these items, an extremely important task confronting the people in the liberated areas is to think of all kinds of ways to promote the formation of a coalition government. Continuing negotiations with the Guomindang and other parties is one way, and having all the people stand up and make their demands known is another way. There may be still other ways. In

short, we must make every effort to establish as quickly as possible a democratic coalition government that is in keeping with the demands of the War of Resistance of the entire nation.

Certainly much work has been done and should still be done in our liberated areas, but what I believe is now worth pointing out are the fifteen items discussed above. Others have been omitted. The situation and work measures for each liberated area are different in many respects, and every location should assign work based on its own characteristics so as to complete each task properly.

The year 1945 should be a year in which the Chinese people's War of Resistance Against Japan will develop further. The people of the entire nation hope that our liberated areas will be able to save China, and we also have the same determination and courage. I hope that all the soldiers and people in our liberated areas will work together. Whether Communists or not, we must all unite in the struggle to strengthen anti-Japanese work in the liberated areas, to organize the people in enemy-occupied areas, to assist the people in the great rear echelon, and to establish a democratic coalition government!

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 737–47, where it is reproduced from the December 16, 1944, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

[1.](#) This is speech that Mao Zedong delivered at the Provincial Assembly of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

[2.](#) Lin Zuhan, better known as Lin Boqu, was at this time chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government. He represented the Communist Party in the negotiations with the Guomindang.

[3.](#) On the National Political Council, see above, note to the text of September 19, 1944.

[4.](#) On the “Three-Thirds” system, see above, note to the text of January 26, 1942.

Troops of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Region Should Strive to Expand into Areas Occupied by the Japanese Army (December 18, 1944)

Comrade [Cheng] Zihua:¹

I have received your telegram of December 12.

1. The enemy's policy toward Chiang [Kaishek] is still attack, on the one hand, and seduce, on the other. Now is another seduction phase, but it is quite possible that it will attack again in the future.

2. Chiang is unwilling to make any concessions in principle to our Party, and our Party should insist on a coalition government. On this basis, we will not shut the door to negotiations. We should not talk about anything else, the result of which would be still further delays.

3. The enemy-occupied territory is expanding. If our Party is able to carry out the correct policy, we will be able to strengthen existing troops. Furthermore, we can also expand our troops in the newly developed regions.

4. It is possible that Henan, Hunan, Guangdong, and Zhejiang provinces will witness major developments next year. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region transferred 6,000 troops and cadres to Henan and Hunan.

5. Henan is developing. In addition, Hu Zongnan and Tang Enbo have moved more than ten divisions southward, so we no longer feel the threat and thus do not need to deploy more troops.

6. I hope that you will strive to develop into the enemy-occupied areas of Yanbei, eastern Suiyuan, Chahar, Rehe, and eastern Hebei, expanding the

liberated areas. Meanwhile, you should work hard to carry on the work in the cities.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 749–50, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Cheng Zihua was acting commander-in-chief and acting commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Area Command of the Eighth Route Army; see above, note to the text of July 28, 1944.

*How to Run a Local Newspaper*¹

(December 20, 1944)

Local news should cover at least two and at most three pages. When arranging the news, the stress should be on the local, then the domestic, and finally the international news. As for news concerning other regions and around the world, this should be changed. The articles by the New China News Agency should not be printed in their entirety. Some should come out in digests, while others should be printed in booklets. The newspaper is not run for the New China News Agency but is for the people in the Shanxi-Suiyuan Border Region. Therefore, it should meet the needs of the people in the region (staying in touch with the masses and serving the masses). Otherwise, it will separate itself from the masses and lose the meaning of local guidance.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 120, where it is reproduced from the transcript preserved by the Xinhua News Agency.

¹. This is a directive from Mao Zedong to *Kangzhan ribao* (War of Resistance Daily) in the Shanxi-Suiyuan Border Region.

*Letter to Deng Baoshan*¹

(December 22, 1944)

Venerable Brother Baoshan:

We will not forget that you made great efforts to change the situation last year. In particular, we will not forget your great beneficence in holding the northern front and protecting the border region in the eight years of the War of Resistance. Another year has passed since our meeting and talk last autumn. The situation is developing very quickly. The entire international and domestic situation has changed. Many words I want to say will be communicated by [Liu] Shaoting² in person. In sum, only with the united forces of the people can we defeat the foreign invaders and rejuvenate China. There is no other way. If we want a simple summary of the eight years of the War of Resistance, my humble opinion is that these words are quite appropriate. I wonder if you agree with me or not? When will we meet and talk with each other again? I am looking forward to it very much.

Respectful Salutations.

Wishing you good health!

Sincerely yours,

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 250–51, where it is reproduced from the

manuscript.

[1.](#) Deng Baoshan (1894–1968) was commander of the Twenty-first Army Group and commander of the First Army of the Guomintang army, and commander-in-chief of the Shanxi-Shaanxi-Suiyuan Border Region during the War of Resistance. Mao and the Chinese Communist Party leadership addressed a letter to Guomintang military leaders, including Deng Baoshan, on October 26, 1936; see Vol. V, pp. 420–23. Deng later led his army to join the Communist side in early 1949.

[2.](#) Liu Shaoting (1894–1973) was a member of the Provincial Assembly of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region during the War of Resistance.

We Must Diligently Educate Model Heroes (December 24, 1944)

Comrade [Cheng] Zihua:¹

The way in which you handled Li Yong's election loss was correct.² What needs attention is that Li Yong's arrogance stems mostly from the fact that we did not educate him sufficiently to make him avoid arrogance. Phenomena like that of Li Yong also occur in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and might occur elsewhere as well. The responsibility lies mainly not with the individuals themselves but, rather, with those who lead them. Henceforth, all elected model heroes must be instructed diligently to avoid arrogance. Only in this way can they be cultivated into permanent model figures. If we only praise them but do not educate them, then the loss of elections through arrogance will be inevitable. Please pay attention to this point.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, p. 246, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

- ¹. For Cheng Zihua, see above, note to the text of July 28, 1944.
- ². This refers to the case of Liu Yong in the election of labor heroes in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region.

1945

New Year's Congratulatory Message
Strive to Bring About Victory as Quickly as
Possible
(January 1, 1945)

The year 1944 is over. It was a year in which there were changes of decisive significance in the war against fascism. This is indicated in the following glorious successes on the European battlefield: All Soviet territory has been regained; the second front in Western Europe has been opened by the Allied forces; the Finland-Bulgaria-Romania Axis subordinates have surrendered; there have been tremendous developments in the people's liberation movements in France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Poland, and the territories of these countries have been completely or mostly liberated. In 1944, the strategic plan to lay siege to the German enemy from the east, west, and south was achieved, and the war is already now being carried out along Nazi Germany's own border. Soviet artillery is bombarding the lines of defense in eastern Prussia, and British and U.S. troops are attacking the western wall of the German enemy. No matter how hard the German enemy battles and even attempts counterattacks in some regions, Hitler is still sure to lose the war. Every struggle by the German invaders can, at most, delay their defeat for only a few days, but they will never be able to resist the final united offensive of the Allies in 1945; 1945 will be the year in which Nazi Germany suffers its final extermination.

In the Pacific Ocean, U.S. troops launched a large-scale offensive against the Japanese enemy in 1944. They broke the inner and outer defense lines of the Japanese enemy one after another, from the Marshall Islands and New Guinea through the Mariana Islands and Palau to the Philippines. Moreover, they put

Japan's own territory under strategic bombardment by the U.S. Air Force. During the past year, the Japanese enemy lost territory and suffered heavy casualties on the sea, and it was in a completely defensive position. The Japanese enemy, however, still maintains its principal naval forces. Its land forces, in particular, have not suffered great losses and even have made great progress on the Guomindang battlefield in China. In 1945 on the battlefields of Asia, therefore, the fighting certainly will be more brutal than it was in 1944. How soon victory is achieved in the Pacific War will be determined, to a large extent, by China's war efforts as well as by the unified counteroffensive of the Allied countries by sea and by land in Asia. In order to strengthen the war effort in China and to prepare to carry out the counteroffensive on China's battlefields, the military, political, and economic crises that have resulted from the Fascist and defeatist policies of the Guomindang rulers must be overcome. The only way to overcome these crises is to eliminate the corrupt one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang, reorganize the National Government and supreme command, and establish a coalition government and a coalition supreme command.

In 1944 great changes took place on China's battlefields. The five years and four months from 1939 until April 1944 constituted one phase on China's battlefields. During this period, the Japanese bandits stopped their frontal attack and concentrated on attacking the liberated areas behind enemy lines. The Guomindang rulers only assumed a pose of resistance, militarily and diplomatically, but they were extremely active against the Communists and the people. The army and people in the liberated areas behind enemy lines, therefore, were in a very difficult situation. They shouldered all the major responsibilities for persisting in the War of Resistance on China's battlefields. During this period of more than five years, the cities and villages in the liberated areas behind enemy lines suffered more than a dozen rounds of burning and killing by the enemy invaders. It has become a common phenomenon, not at all rare, and in the border region, some have even been through sixty or seventy such burnings and killings by the enemy invaders. With this unprecedentedly serious devastation, nothing is left of the people's past savings. Because of the ten great policies carried out by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, however, unity has been strengthened, fighting is stronger and more resolute, and since the second half of 1942, the liberated areas have been gradually growing instead of

shrinking. We have defeated Okamura Yasuji,¹ we have destroyed the three anti-Communist waves of the reactionary faction in the Guomintang, and we have brought about unprecedented historical miracles. On the Guomintang battlefield, the enemy had not launched a large-scale attack in five and a half years, and the Guomintang army has adopted a passive policy of avoiding war that calls for retreat when the enemy arrives. The morale of the soldiers is at its lowest point, and they are shattered upon seeing the enemy. In addition, in the great rear echelon under Guomintang rule, there is authoritarian dictatorship, widespread embezzlement, dissension and discord in the party, administration, military, and among the people, and extreme corruption in the bureaucratic organizations. The Japanese invaders regard the Chinese people as “fierce tigers,” but they regard the Guomintang government as “caged fierce tigers,” even claiming that they “do not regard Chongqing as their enemy.” Since last April, however, because of the unfavorable strategic situation that has resulted from the counteroffensive by U.S. troops in the Pacific, in addition to the maintenance of a large military presence behind enemy lines, the enemy has had to use part of its forces to attack these “caged fierce tigers” that they “did not regard as their enemy” in order to link the transportation lines on the mainland and drive out the U.S. air bases on land. When the Japanese invaders resumed their attacks on the Guomintang battlefield in April of last year, the Guomintang troops collapsed at their first encounter. Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi provinces fell to the enemy in succession, and in less than six months, they [the Japanese] achieved their objective of fighting through to establish the transportation line on the mainland. During the same period, however, the Chinese liberated areas won one victory after another and liberated 80,000 square kilometers of national territory and 12 million compatriots. The changes on China’s battlefields in the past year clearly reflect the two policies, two political lines, and two approaches in the War of Resistance Against Japan: The policy of a passive War of Resistance, waiting for victory, preserving strength, and eliminating the opposition has led to collapse and crisis; at the same time, the policy of an active War of Resistance of new democracy has led to great victories in the War of Resistance.

Because of the military failures resulting from the Guomintang’s erroneous policies, the Guomintang battlefield is in a grave situation. If we continue to allow the Japanese invaders to penetrate our national territory, then they will be

able to temporarily recover from their decline, prolong the war, and increase the suffering and sacrifice of the Chinese people and the people of the Allied countries. Failure to recognize this point or to emphasize its seriousness is the same as not taking responsibility for the people of China or for our allies. In fact, collapse on the Guomindang battlefield has already enabled the Japanese invaders to recover from some of their strategic decline and has already prolonged the war and increased the suffering and sacrifice of the people. Responsibility for this should be borne by the reactionaries in the Guomindang.

Under these circumstances, the task of compatriots throughout the country is, on the one hand, to launch counteroffensives wherever it is possible and to prepare counteroffensives where necessary. On the other hand, we must work hard to stop the enemy invaders' progress toward the great rear echelon. In Comrade Mao Zedong's "Tasks for 1945," our task is summarized in four slogans: "Strengthen anti-Japanese work in the liberated areas," "Organize the people in enemy-occupied territory," "Assist the people in the great rear echelon," and "Establish a democratic coalition government."

Of the four, the core slogan is to establish a democratic coalition government. This is the goal for which all Chinese people in the three different areas (the liberated areas, the great rear echelon, and enemy-occupied territory) should strive. Because the lessons of 1944 have already been clearly pointed out, if we do not thoroughly reform and eliminate the erroneous policies of the Guomindang rulers, adopt new democratic and united military, political, economic, and cultural policies for the War of Resistance, and expel defeatist and Fascist elements, corrupt officials, local bullies, and evil gentry from the government and replace them with new persons who can represent the will and strength of the people and lead China toward victory and freedom, we will be unable to stop the continuing penetration of the Japanese invaders, much less to cooperate with the Allied countries to launch a joint sea and land offensive on the battlefields of Asia. Only with a democratic coalition government can we remedy the battlefield crises in China, and only with a democratic coalition government can we shorten the war and work toward an early victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan!

Today the War of Resistance Against Japan has already entered its ninth year. During this long period, our compatriots throughout the country have tasted all

the bitterness of war, and we are longing for a quick victory. The Japanese invaders, however, want to prolong the war, and the reactionaries in the Guomindang with their erroneous policies are helping the Japanese invaders delay a Chinese victory and are increasing the suffering of the people. At the beginning of this New Year, we hope that all compatriots throughout the country will strive for a quick victory in the War of Resistance with a serious attitude and thorough work. Especially during this year, we must bring about the prerequisite conditions to secure a quick victory—a democratic coalition government.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 151–54, where it is reproduced from the January 1, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

[1.](#) Okamura Yasuji (1884–1966) was commander-in-chief of Japan’s China Expeditionary Army beginning in November 1944. As of December 1944, Operation Ichigo had achieved its aim of creating a land corridor from Hanoi to Manchuria, as Mao acknowledges later in this text and in the text “Tasks for 1945” of December 15, 1944.

Completely Master Economic Work in Two to Three Years¹

A Speech at the Conference of Labor Heroes and Model Workers of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (January 10, 1945)

Labor Heroes and Model Workers!

You have attended this *conference for over ten days* and have summed up *a lot of very good* experience; we all welcome you and respect you. You have three strong points, and you play three roles. First, there is the role of the initiator. In other words, by your outstanding efforts and your numerous innovations, you have made your work a model for others, raising work standards and inspiring others to learn from you. *You are the leaders in the production campaigns and in every sort of construction work.* Second, there is the role of the backbone. Most of you are not yet cadres, but you have already become the backbone and the core of the masses. With you, it is easier to move our work forward. In the future, you may become cadres; at present, you are cadres in reserve. Third, there is the role of the bridge. You are the bridge between the leaders above and the broad masses below. Through you, the opinions of the masses are transmitted to the leadership; the opinions from above are transmitted below.

You have many good points and have performed great services, but you must always remember not to be arrogant. You should be respected by everyone, but this also easily leads to arrogance. If you become arrogant and are no longer

modest and hard-working, and if you do not respect the people, the cadres, and the masses, you will no longer continue to be heroes and models. In the past, some were like this. I hope you do not learn from them.

This conference has summed up your experience *very well*. The summary is a very good one and is applicable not only here but also in other areas. I will not dwell on this. I would like to say a few words about our economic work.

In the past few years, we have begun to learn about economic work and we have achieved major successes in this field. Nonetheless, it is still only a beginning. We must see to it that within two or three years the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the liberated areas behind enemy lines are completely or largely self-sufficient in grain and manufactured goods and even have a surplus. We must achieve still greater successes in agriculture, industry, and trade. Only then can we regard ourselves as acquiring more knowledge and learning to do better. If a place has seen no improvement in the living conditions of the troops and the people, if the material foundation for the counteroffensive remains unstable, and if agriculture, industry, and trade stagnate or even decline instead of expanding year by year, this proves that the personnel of the Party, the government, and the army there have not learned how to do economic work. That place *will* experience the great majority of the difficulties. I must again bring to everyone's attention one point, which is that our thinking should be appropriate to our current environment. Our current environment is the countryside. This point would seem not to be problematic. Who does not know that we are living in the countryside? Yet that is not the case. Many comrades do not understand the countryside at all, even though they live there and imagine that they understand it. *Some* at least do not understand it deeply. They do not proceed from a rural environment which is built on the individual economy, carved up by the enemy, and is therefore involved in guerrilla warfare (*at the front*). The result is that their *handling* of political, military, economic, and cultural problems or of internal Party affairs and the workers', peasants', youth, and women's movements is often inappropriate or not completely appropriate. They approach rural affairs from an urban viewpoint and make many inappropriate plans subjectively. When forcefully implementing them, they often run into a brick wall. In recent years, our comrades have made much progress because of the Rectification movement and the setbacks they have experienced in

their work. But we must *still* take care to adapt our thinking fully to the environment in which we live before we can obtain quick and positive results in every field of work. If we truly understand that our environment is the countryside which is built on the individual economy, carved up by the enemy, and is therefore involved in guerrilla warfare, and if everything we do starts from this point, it would seem that we will achieve results very slowly and unspectacularly. In reality, however, how does the effectiveness of this work compare to the work of those who do not start from this point but start from another point such as an urban perspective? In that case, this work is definitely not too slow but is, on the contrary, very fast. If we were to start from the latter point and depart from our present-day realities, the issue would not be about achieving fast or slow results but would be about always running into snags and getting no results at all.

Clear proof of this fact is provided by the great success of the present form of the army and the civilian production movement we have promoted.

If we want to drive out the strong Japanese invaders from the rural base areas and want to prepare for the attack on the major cities and for the recovery of all lost territory, this is not a short-term affair. We should prepare for a prolonged war. The War of Resistance has already lasted for eight years. The wealth of the countryside has been destroyed by the enemy. The drain put on us has been very great. Yet we still have to sustain the war and we also have to store up the strength for a counteroffensive. Only then can we drive out the Japanese. In the work of sustaining the war and preparing for the counteroffensive, apart from military, political, and cultural work, preparation of material strength is the basis of all our work. Without this condition, holding out in the present and in the future counteroffensive will be out of the question.

Nonetheless, how can we attain this aim, situated as we are in the countryside founded on the individual economy, carved up by the enemy, and involved in guerrilla warfare? We cannot imitate the Guomindang, which does not lift a finger and depends entirely on the efforts of the Allied countries.² It needs the help of foreigners even for such daily necessities as cloth. We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it. We depend on our own efforts and on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people. But what methods do we have? We use the method of launching large-

scale production movements simultaneously among the army and the people.

Since we are in the countryside, where manpower and material resources are scattered, we have adopted the principle of “unified leadership and decentralized management” for production and supply.

Since it is the countryside, the peasants are scattered individual producers employing backward tools of production³ and are subjected to feudal rent exploitation. In order to heighten the enthusiasm for production and productivity, we have adopted the policies of reducing rent and interest and of organizing mutual aid. I have obtained information from various places in North and Central China, all of which shows that after rent reduction, the peasants’ enthusiasm increases greatly and they are willing to organize mutual-aid groups like our labor-exchange teams here. Thus, three people can do as much as four people. If this is the case, 90 million people can do as much as 120 million people. There are also instances of two people doing as much as three people. If instead of adopting the principle of “coercive command which does not achieve the speed it desires,” we adopt the principle of “patient persuasion and demonstrations through models,” it will be possible for the majority *or all* the peasants to organize into mutual-aid groups for agricultural and handicraft production within the next few years. Once these production groups become the norm, not only will output increase greatly, but all kinds of innovations will emerge. Politics will be raised, culture will progress, health will be emphasized, gangsters reformed, customs transformed, and before long tools of production will be improved. When all this occurs, our rural society will be built on new productive forces.

If our personnel conscientiously study this sort of work, and most energetically help people in the countryside to launch production campaigns, the countryside will have a plentiful supply of food and daily necessities within a few years. Not only will we be able to sustain the war and cope with the lean years, we will also be able to store a large supply of grain and other necessities for use when we carry out the counterattack.

We should organize not only production by the peasants but also all the production by the army and government offices.

Since we are in the countryside, which is constantly ravaged by the enemy and is involved in a protracted war, it is imperative for the army and government offices to engage in production. It is possible for them to do so because guerrilla

warfare is scattered. Moreover, the troops and government personnel in our Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region are too numerous in proportion to the total population. They will go hungry if they do not produce for themselves. If we take too much from the people, the people will not be able to bear the burden and they will go hungry. Therefore, we decided to launch large-scale production movements. Taking the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region as an example, the army and the government require 260,000 *dan* of fine grain (rice) every year (1 *dan* equals 300 *jin*). They take 160,000 *dan* from the people and produce 100,000 *dan* themselves. If they do not produce for themselves, either the army or the people will go hungry. But because we launched the production movement, not only do we not go hungry, but both the army and the people can eat very well.

With the exception of food, clothing, and bedding, government offices in our border region are largely self-sufficient in all other expenses. Many units are entirely self-sufficient. Many other units are self-sufficient for part of their food and clothing and bedding needs.

The deeds of the troops in the border region are even greater. Many of our troops are entirely self-sufficient in food, clothing, bedding, and everything else. That is, they provide for themselves 100 percent and do not take anything from the government. This is the highest standard and the top grade, and it has been attained gradually over a period of several years.

This standard cannot be adopted at the front, where we must fight. At the front, a second and a third standard may be set up. The second standard requires that, except for grain, clothing, and bedding that are supplied by the government, units achieve self-sufficiency through production of cooking oil (5 *qian* daily), salt (5 *qian* daily), vegetables (1 to 1.5 *jin* daily), meat (1 to 2 *jin* monthly), as well as in expenses for coal, office supplies, miscellaneous items, education, health, cleaning weapons, tobacco, shoes, socks, gloves, towels, toothbrushes, and so forth. These items amount to 50 percent of the total expenditures. This standard can be gradually attained in two to three years. Some places have already attained it. This standard may be adopted in the established base areas.

The third standard applies to outlying districts and to the guerrilla zones, where they cannot provide 50 percent for themselves but can provide 15 to 20 percent. Reaching this standard is good enough there.

In short, apart from those in exceptional circumstances, all army and

government units must engage in production in the intervals between fighting, training, or working. In addition to using such intervals for collective production, they should organize some personnel specializing in production to set up farms, vegetable gardens, pastures, workshops, small factories, transport teams, and cooperatives or to form partnerships with the peasants to grow grain and vegetables. Every⁴ office or army unit should establish its own household duties. An idler's vile habit of being unwilling to engage in household duties is disgraceful. Nonetheless, to stimulate the development of production, we should also institute a system of individual bonuses according to the quality of the work to provide bonuses for those who directly participate in production. Further, as an effective way of pushing production work forward, we also need for the head of each unit to assume responsibility and personally take part, in addition to establishing unity between the leading group and the broad masses and unity between the general call and specific guidance.

Some people say that if the army engages in production, it will be unable to train or fight, and that if government offices engage in production, they will be unable to do their work. This type of talk is incorrect. In recent years, army units in our border region have undertaken a large amount of production, enough to provide themselves with ample food and clothing. Meanwhile, they have trained extensively and participated in political and cultural study. They have done so with greater success than before. Also, there is greater unity than before within the army and between the army and the people. Although there was a large-scale production campaign at the front last year, we achieved great military successes all year and began a training movement everywhere. Because of the production, the livelihood of government personnel has improved, and they feel more at ease and *work* with greater efficiency. This is the case both in the border region and at the front.

Thus, if government offices and troops living in an environment of rural guerrilla warfare undertake a drive for production and self-sufficiency, their fighting, training, and work will be even more energetic and dynamic. Their discipline and their unity both internally and externally will also improve. This is the outcome of China's protracted war⁵ and is our glory. Once we master it, we will not fear any difficulties. We will grow in vigor and energy year by year and become stronger with every battle. Only then will we overwhelm the enemy. We

definitely have no fear of being overwhelmed by the enemy.

Nonetheless, our comrades at the front need to pay attention to another point. Some of the recently established areas have abundant resources, but those working there hold on to the abundance and are unwilling to economize or to engage in production. This is very bad, and they are bound to suffer for it later. We must treasure our manpower and material resources everywhere and must not take a short view and be wasteful and extravagant. Everywhere, from the very first year of our work, we must bear in mind the many years to come, the sustaining of protracted war, the counteroffensive, and the reconstruction after the enemy leaves. On the one hand, we must never be wasteful or extravagant. At the same time, we must actively expand production. In the past, some places did not give adequate consideration to the long term and did not pay attention to economizing manpower and resources or to developing production. They suffered a great deal. The lesson is there, and we must pay attention to it.

As for manufactured goods, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has decided to become completely self-sufficient in cotton, cotton yarn, cloth, iron, paper, and many other things within two years. Originally, we did not have these things or produced them only in small quantities. We must *now* grow, manufacture, and supply all of them and become completely independent of the outside. The entire task is to be accomplished by public, private, and collective enterprises. For all items, we demand not only a large quantity but also good quality. They must withstand wear and tear. The Border Region Government, the Joint Defense Headquarters,⁶ and the Northwestern Bureau⁷ are absolutely right in paying close attention to these matters. I hope that the same thing will be done in all places at the front. In many places, it is already being done, and I wish them success.

In our border region and in all the liberated areas, it will take another two to three years for us to master all economic work *completely*. The day when we grow, manufacture, and supply all or most of our own grain and manufactured products and when we even have a surplus will be the day when we completely master economic work in the countryside. After we clear the cities of the Japanese, we will undertake new economic work. We must exert ourselves and learn [to do it] because China depends on us for its reconstruction.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 159–67, where it is reproduced from the 1947 edition of *Xuanji*, Vol. 5. The official edited version of this text appears in post-1949 edition as “We Must Learn to Do Economic Work.” Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi

1. Completely Master Economic Work in Two to Three Years → We Must Learn to Do Economic Work
2. The Allied countries → Foreigners
3. Tools of production → Tools of production and where most of the land is still owned by landlords
4. Every → In our present circumstances, in order to tide over the difficulties, every
5. Protracted war → Protracted guerrilla war
6. The Joint Defense Headquarters → The Joint Defense Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army
7. The Northwestern Bureau → The Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party

*Letter to Liu Kunlin*¹

(January 11, 1945)

Comrade Kunlin:

I have received your letter. I have forwarded this letter and your previous letters to the Organization Department of the Central Committee, and I also have asked them to talk with you about it.

You have long been distrusted; no wonder you are not satisfied. But real gold does not fear the furnace; you should still be patient and wait until your comrades get to know you. There is no other way than this. After reading this letter of yours, it seems that your problem will be solved, and I hope you will wait patiently.

I have been rather busy recently, and for the moment we cannot have a talk. You will be in Yan'an for a while, and we will have a chat in the future.

Comradely salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 252–53, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Liu Kunlin (1898–1980), a student at the Central Party School, was under investigation for quitting the Party in 1928.

*Production Is Both Possible and Necessary in the Guerrilla Zones*¹

(January 31, 1945)

Whether we can and must launch military and civilian production movements in the relatively established base areas of the liberated areas behind enemy lines was resolved early on and is no longer a question. But whether we can do so in the guerrilla zones and in the most distant areas behind enemy lines was not *completely* settled in many people's minds in the past. This is because of the lack of *factual* proof.

But now we have *plenty* of proof. In 1944 production was undertaken on a considerable scale in many guerrilla zones in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, and it produced excellent results, according to Comrade Zhang Pingkai's report² on the production movement of the guerrilla units in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region (published on January 28 in this paper). The districts and units listed in Comrade Zhang's report include the sixth district of central Hebei, the fourth district contingent of the second district, the eighth district contingent of the fourth district, the Xuding detachment, the Baoman detachment, and the Yunbiao detachment, as well as the troops in Dai and Guo *xian* in Shanxi Province. Conditions in those areas are extremely harsh: "The place bristles with the enemy's and its puppet troops' strongholds and blockhouses, and it is crisscrossed with ditches, walls, and roads. The enemy takes advantage of the *relative* superiority of its military and transportation conditions to launch frequent surprise attacks, encirclements, and 'mopping-up' campaigns against us. In order to deal with this environment, guerrilla units often have to shift their positions several times a day." Nevertheless, they managed to carry out production *movements* in the intervals between fighting. The result is:

“Everybody is now better fed. Each person has half a *qian* of cooking oil and salt and 1 *jin* of vegetables per day, as well as 1.5 *jin* of meat per month. Furthermore, toothbrushes, toothpowder, and notebooks for literacy, which for years were unavailable, are now all provided.” Just look! Who says that production is not possible in the guerrilla zones?

Many people claim that there is no spare land in the densely populated areas. Is there really no spare land? Please look at the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region: “First, the land problem has been settled in accordance with the principle of giving primary attention to agriculture. They have used a total of nine methods: first, razing walls and filling in ditches used for blockades; second, destroying motor roads³ and then planting crops on their side; third, making use of small tracts of abandoned land; fourth, providing armed cover for the people’s militia when they attempt to plant crops around the blockhouses on moonlit nights; fifth, plowing the fields in partnership with peasants who lack labor power; sixth, using disguised troops to plow the fields more or less openly around strong points or blockhouses; seventh, making use of river banks by building dikes, removing the sand, and turning the banks into fields; eighth, helping peasants bring dry land under irrigation; and, ninth, helping in the farm work in every village in which they are active.”

If agriculture is possible, then perhaps handicrafts and other modes of production remain impossible. Is that actually the case? Please look at the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region: “The troops outside the blockade trench lines do not confine their production *only* to agriculture but have also developed handicrafts and transportation as in the established areas. The fourth district contingent set up a felt cap workshop, an oil press, and a flour mill and has earned a profit of 500,000 *yuan* in local currency in seven months. Not only has it resolved its own difficulties, but it has also satisfied the needs of the people in the guerrilla zone. The soldiers can now supply all their own woolen sweaters and socks.”

Since fighting is so frequent in the guerrilla zones, perhaps troops engaging in production would affect their fighting. Is that really so? Please look at the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region: “Applying the principle of integrating labor power and armed strength, they give equal weight to the tasks of production and fighting.” Take, for example, the fourth district contingent of the second district.

When they began their spring plowing, they sent a special detachment to attack the enemy and at the same time launched a powerful political offensive. Precisely because of this, there was also vigorous military activity and the combat effectiveness of the troops increased as well. From February to early September, this small detachment fought 71 *small and major* engagements, took the strongholds of Zhudongshe, Shangzhuang, Yezhuang, Fengjiazai, Yatou, and so on, inflicted 165 casualties on the enemy and puppet troops, and captured 91 puppet soldiers, 3 light machine guns, and 101 rifles and pistols.” “Coordinating the propaganda for military activities and for major production movements, they immediately launched a political offensive: ‘Attack whoever tries to sabotage our major production drive.’ In the town of Dai and Guo *xian*, the enemy asked the inhabitants: ‘Why has the Eighth Route Army become so fierce recently?’ They replied: ‘Because you are sabotaging the major production movement in the border region.’ The puppet troops said to one another: ‘Better not to go out while they are carrying out this major production movement.’”

Is it possible for the people in the guerrilla zones to launch major production drives as well? Are the peasants interested in increasing production in such zones where rent has not been reduced or has not been reduced thoroughly? This point has received an affirmative answer in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region: “Furthermore, the development of the production drive among the troops outside the blockade trench lines has also given direct help to the local people. On the one hand, they provide armed cover for the masses engaging in production, and, on the other hand, they give general help through their own labor. Some units have made it a rule to assign 50 percent of their labor power to provide free help to the masses during the busy farming seasons. Thus, the enthusiasm of the masses for production has increased greatly. Relations between the army and the people have become still more harmonious, and the masses all have enough to eat. Hence the sympathy and support of the masses in the guerrilla zones for the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army have grown.”

All doubts have thus been answered as to whether the army and the people in the guerrilla zones can and must carry out large-scale production movements. We require that all army, government, and Party personnel in the liberated areas, especially those in the guerrilla zones, completely understand this point, for once the “can” and the “must” are understood, production can be undertaken

everywhere. This was precisely the starting point in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area: “In the production drives of the troops outside of the blockade trench lines, the cadres reoriented their thinking, paid attention to production and to the integration of labor power with armed strength, and nurtured heroes and models from among the masses (there were sixty-six heroes and models in the preliminary summary). As a result, the troops outside the blockade trench lines not only fulfilled their production tasks on schedule within the short space of five months, but also introduced a number of practical innovations.”

In 1945, the entire liberated area must carry out a greater army and civilian production movement than ever before through the united efforts of all, and in the coming winter we will compare the achievements in all areas.

*Our enemy has also called on its troops to engage in production. At a meeting in the enemy’s Lower House of the Diet on January 25, Representative Miyoshi Nobufusa asked:*⁴ *“This year we have provided 30,000 hectares of land for the army so that the output of sweet potatoes this year will increase by 10 billion kilograms. In terms of developing labor power, will the army also supply it?” General Sugiyama [Hajime] replied: “From the perspective of absolutely guaranteeing the supply of food and fuel, we must accomplish this increase in production no matter what. Apart from sparing some of the land it is occupying, the army itself is determined to become engaged in production.”*

War is not only a military and political contest. *As something with a material foundation*, it is also an economic contest. To defeat the Japanese aggressors *in a protracted war*, in addition to all the other tasks, we must apply ourselves to economic work and master it within two to three years. In the present year, 1945, we must achieve greater results than ever before. This is what the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party eagerly expects of all our personnel and of all the people throughout the liberated areas, and we hope this plan can be completed.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 169–73, where it is reproduced from the editorial

in the January 31, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

[1.](#) Production Is Both Possible and Necessary in the Guerrilla Zones → Production Is Also Possible in the Guerrilla Zones

[2.](#) Zhang Pingkai (1910–1990) was at this time director of the propaganda section of the Political Department of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military District.

[3.](#) Motor roads → Motor roads the enemy could use

[4.](#) Miyoshi Nobufusa was a member of the Japanese parliament, the Diet; Sugiyama Hajime (1880–1945) was minister of war and chief of the Army General Staff.

*Letter to Sun Yi*¹

(February 7, 1945)

Comrade Sun Yi:

I received your letter quite a while ago. I asked Comrade Bian Zhangwu² today and learned that you are still in Yangjiawan. I am really sorry not to have answered your letter until today! After so many years of hard work, I hope that you will have a good rest. The Fifth Army Corps has a glorious history as well as bitter experience. Now you can make a correct summary. When your rest and study in Yan'an are almost over, I would like to have a talk with you. Please let me know when the time comes.

Comradely salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 254–55, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹. Sun Yi (1904–2003) participated in the Ningdu Uprising in December 1931. Later, he took the positions of the chief of staff of the Forty-first Division of the Fourteenth Army of the Fifth Army Group of the Chinese Red Army and the chief of staff of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military District. He was at this time studying at the Central Party School.

². Bian Zhangwu (1900–1954) participated in the Ningdu Uprising in December 1931. Later, he took the position of commander of the Fortieth Division of the Fourteenth Army of the Fifth Army Group. He was a

bureau head of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party during the War of Resistance.

Chairman Mao's Elegy in Memory of Comrade Peng Xuefeng¹ (February 7, 1945)

(Liberation Daily) Chairman Mao wrote his elegiac words mourning Comrade Peng Xuefeng:

Comrade Xuefeng sacrificed his life in the struggle against the enemy. The entire nation and the whole Party are grieved by this loss. In order to compensate for this loss, we should emulate Comrade Xuefeng's brave spirit, work harder to expand the liberated areas, enlarge the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, promote a coalition government and a unified supreme command, quickly wipe out the Japanese invaders with effective and coordinated blows, and let an independent and democratic new China emerge as quickly as possible.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, p. 177, where it is reproduced from the February 8, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

¹. Peng Xuefeng (1907–1944), a general in the New Fourth Army, died in the campaign against Operation Ichigo in Henan in November 1944.

*Resolutely Attack Reactionaries and Win Over Those Who Are Relatively Good*¹

(February 11, 1945)

Resolutely attack reactionaries and win over those who are relatively good. When you attack, attack one unit first before attacking other units. In a campaign, concentrate all your strength to surround and destroy the enemy. This kind of policy was very effective in western Henan. Central Henan should imitate it. This telegram should be forwarded to Pi [Dingjun], Xu [Zirong], Wang [Shusheng], and Dai [Jiying]² for reference.

The Military Commission

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 755–56, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

¹. This is the instruction that Mao Zedong added to a telegram from Liu Ziji, the deputy secretary of the Henan Region Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the deputy commissar of the Henan Military District, and from Han Jun, the commander-in-chief of the Second Military District of the Henan Military District. This document was also transmitted to the Northern Bureau of the Party Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

². For Pi Dingjun, Xu Zirong, Wang Shusheng, and Dai Jiying, see below, note 3 of the following text

“Wipe Out Diehards and Puppets,” February 11, 1945.

*Wipe Out Diehards and Puppets,
Mobilize the Popular Masses, and
Establish Consolidated Base Areas*¹
(February 11, 1945)

The attached telegram² is being forwarded to you for reference. Taking into account the bureaucratism of the Guomindang and the insufficient troops allocated, Hu Zongnan's plan may not be fully carried out. Nonetheless, under the unified command of Wang [Shusheng] and Dai [Jiying], the three units under Wang [Shusheng] and Dai [Jiying], Pi [Dingjun] and Xu [Zirong], and Liu [Zijiu] and Han [Jun]³ should wipe out all the diehards and puppet [troops] in western and central Henan, mobilize the popular masses, and establish relatively consolidated base areas within the next few months. Then you can choose the appropriate opportunity to march south to establish contact with the Fifth Division in order to guard against attacks by Hu's Army.

The Military Commission

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 757–58, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

¹. These are instructions written by Mao Zedong in the name of the Military Commission of the Central Committee to the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army, the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee, Wang Shusheng, Dai Jiying, Liu Zijiu, and the Taiyue Military Area Command of the Eighth Route Army

when transmitting a secret telegram sent by Hu Zongnan to Chiang Kaishek.

2. Referring to the telegram sent by Hu Zongnan, the acting commander-in-chief of the First War Zone of the Nationalist army, to Chiang Kaishek in early February 1945.

3. Wang Shusheng and Dai Jiying were at this time the commander-in-chief and the commissar of the Henan Military District of the Eighth Route Army, respectively. Pi Dingjun and Xu Zirong were at this time the commander-in-chief and the commissar of the Western Henan Anti-Japanese Independent Detachment of the Eighth Route Army (the First Detachment), respectively. Liu Ziji was at this time the deputy secretary of the Henan Region Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the deputy commissar of the Henan Military District. Han Jun was at this time the commander-in-chief of the Second Military Subdistrict of the Henan Military District.

*Letter to Qin Bangxian*¹

(February 12, 1945)

Comrade Bo Gu:

The newspaper today carried Zhang Pingkai's² article "The First Year of the Great Production Movement in the Organizations and Armed Forces of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region." Please broadcast the entire article in installments over several days. This article is vividly written and also has a sense of principle. I suppose the editorial "Carry Out Rent Reduction"³ and the news report on Lujiakou village⁴ were broadcast a few days ago. They are also very good. That our newspaper can write such an editorial indicates major progress. (Who wrote it?)

Please publish and broadcast the "Declaration of the Democratic League."⁵ When it was published in *New China Daily*, the authorities mobilized to confiscate it. Nonetheless, due to the courage of the newsboys, most copies were distributed. When there were none left, one copy sold for 200 *yuan*, which shows the mood of the masses. The red circles on the ten propositions were marked by [Wang] Ruofei⁶ to draw our attention. Please do not leave them out.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 256–57, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Qin Bangxian, better known as Bo Gu, was at this time the head of the Xinhua News Agency.
2. Zhang Pingkai, see above, note to the text of January 31, 1945.
3. This editorial was published in the February 9, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.
4. Referring to the article in the February 9, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*; Mao quotes from this article extensively in the text of January 31, 1945.
5. Referring to the declaration made by the China Democratic League on January 15, 1945.
6. Wang Ruofei (1896–1946) was a member of the Communist delegation negotiating with the Guomindang in Chongqing; also, below, note to the text of June 10, 1945.

The Current Situation and Other Problems

(February 15, 1945)

Comrades:

Today's lecture is sponsored by Division 5 and Division 6 of the Central Party School. It has been quite a long time since comrades in Division 5 and Division 6 and many other comrades came to Yan'an. *Some of you have been here for two or three years*, but I have not yet given even one talk. This meeting today is held especially for the comrades in the fifth and sixth divisions, but many other comrades are also present. *Many comrades want to see the comrades in the Central Committee and want to see the comrades who have just come back from the front. Many comrades are present today, and in the future we would like to ask them to give us talks. It will not be long before the holding of the Seventh Party Congress, and I am very busy. After the Seventh Party Congress, I will have time to talk with comrades. I am the president of this school, but I did not perform my duties in the past (laughter). In the future we must come and speak more.*

The topics I will discuss today have been proposed by comrades. One is the current situation; another is mountaintopism; the third is cadre investigations. In addition, I would like to talk about some other issues.

1. The Current Situation

It is very good that you are all concerned about the current situation. What we call the current situation includes the situation in the world and the situation in China. What is the primary problem in the world today? It is whether the few big countries can unite until the very end to wipe out the Fascists. What is the main problem in China? It is whether China can unite to wipe out Japanese

imperialism.

Concerning the current situation, some newspapers, especially those on the enemy's side, constantly spread rumors, saying that the Three Great Powers—the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—cannot unite, that this unity between them will collapse, and that there are disputes, contradictions, and struggles among them. Are there any disputes among them? There are disputes. There were disputes in the past, and there are still many problems that have not been solved. They are discussing them at meetings. There will still be disputes in the future. Of all the issues, many of them can be agreed upon by every side and can be settled peacefully. Of course, there are disputes about some issues that will take a very long time to resolve. *The people of the Fascist countries and the Fascists* hope that the Three Great Powers will not unite. Still others (such individuals exist in our country as well) are anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. They have long hoped that Great Britain and the United States will one day fight the Soviet Union. There are quite a few like that. There are also quite a number of people in Great Britain and the United States who are anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. They are opposed to the Communist parties and the revolutions there, as well as to the Communist parties and the revolutions in other places. What, then, is the real situation between the three countries? I can say that frictions do exist, but unity remains first and foremost. Ever since signing the agreement to oppose fascism together, these great powers have solved the vast majority of their problems. Now they are holding the Black Sea Conference,¹ and we think they can settle any existing disputes. They can unite. Furthermore, we think they can unite not only during the war but also after the war is over. They can maintain a very long period of peace. What is the reason for this? The reason is that they have a common enemy and defeating this enemy requires that the people in these countries all participate. The Soviet Union is the big thumb, or the principal force. You can all see that in the fight against the Fascists in Europe. Great Britain and the United States together sent only eighty divisions,² while the Soviet Union sent two hundred divisions. The Soviet Union contributed a great force. Without the Soviet Union there could be no victory. Could there be a victory without Great Britain and the United States? Of course, there could not be a victory. But without the Soviet Union, victory would be even more impossible. *Without the eighty divisions of Great Britain and the United States*

and the second front in Europe, without the front in Italy, there could, of course, be no victory. But without the Soviet Union, victory would be even more impossible. So the Soviet Union is the major and decisive force and it is indispensable.

The *consciousness of the people* in Great Britain and the United States is now quite different from that in the past because they have been awakened. Those over the age of forty have all experienced World War I. The government of our country at that time, the Beiyang government, took part in that war. What was the level of consciousness of the people all over the world at that time? It was far worse than it is today. The consciousness of the people in Great Britain and the United States, in Europe, and in China was all the same. *There was, for example, no Communist Party. Only one country had a Communist Party, and that was the Communist Party in Russia. It was not called a Communist Party then, it was called a Social Democratic Party. Except for that, there was no Bolshevik party in any other country. There was only a minority, a small number of people, in other countries. For instance, there were some in Germany. In other countries like France, there were only a few people or a small group that was operating. They had the same beliefs as Lenin and Stalin. The other political parties of the proletariat and workers did not agree with Lenin and Stalin. They were in favor of that war.* Because that war was an imperialist war and a reactionary war, the Russian Bolshevik party led by Lenin opposed it. Nonetheless, some workers' parties under the leadership of the Second International supported the capitalist governments which participated in this war. From this, we can see what the consciousness of the proletariat was like; that is, the level of consciousness was very low. If the proletariat was like this, it is hardly necessary to add that the level of other working people and intellectuals was even lower. What was this China of ours like at that time? *I would say that at present you are very fortunate. The amount of knowledge that Chinese society gave us at that time was very small indeed. We did not know what imperialism was, or what communism was, and may not even have known whether or not there was a Marx in the world, but probably not (laughter). We had never even heard the name of Marx. Between 1914 and 1917, the Chinese people were living in such a country, not to mention before 1914. Those who had participated in the 1911 Revolution, for example, Commander-in-chief, Old Dong [Biwu], Chairman Lin [Boqu] of the*

Border Region Government, Comrade Wu Yuzhang, and Comrade Xu Teli,³ these veterans all took part in it. We were very innocent then. Was there a Party School? (laughter) No, there wasn't (laughter). How could there be a Party School like ours? Was there a Communist Party? No! Nothing of the sort. Was there a Red Army and an Eighth Route Army? No! There were none of these things; we did not have anything like this during World War I. China did not, Great Britain did not, the United States did not, France did not, and Germany did not. No country did except Russia, and though Russia had such things, they were very small in number. During the war, which began in 1914 and continued until 1917, there were only a few thousand Russian Bolsheviks, only a few thousand Party members. During the past thirty years, a Communist Party has come into being in China. How many members does it have now? We now have more than a million Party members. Thirty years ago Russia had only a few thousand Party members; they were still suffering from oppression and did not win victory until the October Revolution in 1917. The victory of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917 divided world history into two periods, before and after the October Revolution; beginning in 1917, Marxism spread throughout the whole world. From 1843 to 1917, a period of seventy-four years, Marxism had been spreading in the world, but we Chinese were unaware of it. The Chinese people learned about the October Revolution the day after it began. Just think, in only two days. For seventy-four years, we did not know [about it], and then in two days we knew about it (laughter). Comrades, the practical influence of revolutionary action is disseminated much faster than essays of theory and propaganda. Of course, there would be no action without revolutionary theory. The October Revolution also did not fall down from the sky. It was the consequence of over seventy years of the Marxist movement. After the end of World War I, it was not until 1921 that the party of Chinese communism came into being. Before that, from the time that Pan'gu divided heaven and earth, and from the Three Emperors and the Five Emperors to fairly recent times, there was no such party. Now, we have over a million Party members. It is twenty-four years from 1921 to now. In these twenty-four years, China has undergone changes, rapid changes. The amount of change in these years exceeds the change in the 2,400 years of Chinese history in ancient times and even exceeds that in 3,000 or 4,000 years. Now the consciousness of the Chinese people has been raised, and I think that it is a very

good thing. Especially during these few years, when the Fascists invaded other countries and killed people everywhere, this raised the consciousness of the people of Europe, the United States, and Great Britain, and continues to raise it. Now one month equals many years in history. In a few months, for example, when we march into Berlin and overthrow German fascism, this may affect the entire world even more. We must understand this point. For this reason, the people in Great Britain, the United States, and Europe are awakened, and our Chinese people in the East are also awakened. Because the people are unanimous in demanding the overthrow of fascism, governments in every country have no choice but to adopt policies for overthrowing fascism. That bunch of reactionaries who exist in Great Britain and the United States as well as in China are against uniting with the Soviet Union, but the vast majority of the people do not agree, so there is nothing they can do. Take the U.S. elections, for example. *The American proletariat has very large labor unions. A few months ago, the United States elected a president, and because of the support of the workers, Roosevelt was re-elected. A great many isolationist elements are opposed to cooperation with the Soviet Union, but because the workers opposed them, they were defeated.*⁴ Similarly, the awareness of our Chinese people prevented the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist plot of Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang (the Fascist factions and cliques within the Guomindang) from carrying out something called anti-communism. There was no applause in the audience, unlike you who asked to see the comrades in the Central Committee, asked to see the comrades who have just come back from the front. You should not look at the things put forward by the Guomindang Fascists, for they are anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. For example, the year before last, many comrades present here participated in this struggle. In July, August, and September, the Guomindang declared that it would dissolve the Communist Party. It argued that the Communist International [Comintern] had been completely dissolved, so why don't you dissolve? It also said something to the effect that communism did not fit with the national character of China, China does not want people like you, and so on. What was the reaction of the ordinary people to such slogans? No one applauded. *In other words, the people all said they wanted nothing to do with that kind of stuff! (laughter) Therefore, our "Chairman" quickly withdrew it. When distributing it, he asked: "Hey, aren't you going to have a look at it?" Everybody*

said, "No, we don't want to see it! We don't want to see it!" For this reason, he withdrew it. Comrades, what is this reason? Isn't it because of our strength? Absolutely. Suppose that this time, when Chiang Kaishek produced his thing, the people in the entire nation wanted to see it, and after seeing it, "Yes! Let's go and attack Yan'an!" The situation would be quite different. You have all experienced the three anti-Communist high tides. They all calmed down in such circumstances. If we can establish such a big Party School in Yan'an, it is because we have guns in our hands! So the first requirement is strength. Otherwise, could we run it? Definitely not. Nonetheless, can we run the Party School without the support of the people of the whole nation? No, we cannot do that either. We cannot run it even with guns in hand. That would be Hu Zongnan running the Party School here. It is still a Central Party School, but I couldn't be the president of that school (laughter).⁵ This is to say that everybody supports the unity of the three great countries, Great Britain, America, and the Soviet Union, and these three countries will unite. Why will they unite? Because the people of the entire world have gained in awareness. Because this unity can guarantee the defeat of fascism and will guarantee the progress of the world in the future. When will the fighting against Japan come to an end? This is a question about which all you comrades are concerned. The United States has now occupied the Philippines. What will it do next? Will it land on the Chinese coast? Is it possible that Japan will be defeated within a few months? In my view, it does not seem likely that Japan will be defeated within a few months, nor is it possible this year. As for next year, we will still have to wait and see. In sum, Japanese fascism still has something in hand. To some extent, now it is imitating us: "When the enemy attacks, we retreat." They do not want to fight to the finish against the Americans. Instead, they want to reserve their resources for a protracted war. Such is their plan. The Japanese believe that Americans do not want to fight a prolonged war; after fighting for two, three, or four years, the Americans would like to go home, while we will still have our strength in hand. The Japanese will use this method, and it is also their idea to fight a guerrilla war. The Japanese are crawling all over this China of ours; they are everywhere. We must ask them to go, and if they will not go, we must drive them out. We must rely on our comrades at the Party School after graduation to go to the various base areas in North, Central, and South China, to work resolutely, and to drive them out. We

do not have enough millet, rifles, machine guns, and troops, and the base areas are not very large. We must increase the amount of millet, rifles, machine guns, and troops, and enlarge the liberated areas. *In a word, comrades who are in their twenties and thirties all have this kind of knowledge: Everything in this world has strength. If you do not move it, it will not move itself. This is the only principle.* This desk, for example, will not go anywhere if I do not move it. This teapot will not come up if I do not pick it up (*laughter*). The Japanese are the same. They will not leave unless we “ask” them to do so. Now our army has developed, and our liberated areas are also expanding at a rapid pace. The production movement has developed in every base area. But this is not enough. Work in the cities is especially insufficient. It is exactly because our strength is still small that the Japanese refuse to leave. Therefore, we must prepare our strength, *and this can't be done in a year or in a few months.*

Can the Guomindang and the Communists unite? Can they unite to fight the Japanese together? *The problem of China's two camps must be settled. Our Communists have only millet, rice, and machine guns, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and so on. The chairman's military force is greater; he has the Central Army and miscellaneous armies. Can these two groups unite and fight unanimously against the Japanese?* Day after day, we demand unity. Now the Guomindang is also paying lip service to unity because it has to. Nevertheless, they hate us to death in their hearts. I have evidence to support my words, and I am not making an irresponsible remark. Why do I say he hates us to death? Because Chiang Kaishek himself has said: “If the Communist Party is not dissolved, I will not close my eyes after my death.” Regarding eyes not closing even after death, an old proverb describes it as “not closing one's eyes when one dies.” *These are his words; you can all check on this and see whether I am lying (laughter). That is what he really thinks in his mind, but he likes to talk as though he wants unity.* Now Comrade Zhou Enlai has gone to Chongqing again to negotiate with them. It does not seem as though the Guomindang really wants to solve the problems. It says that if we want to solve the problems we have to do so according to its methods. At the same time, it refuses to accept any of our proposals. It only wants us to join its government and to send one or two people to Chongqing to eat rice (*laughter*). *He says the rice in Yan'an is not very good, that in Chongqing it is bet- ter.* We reply: Dear chairman, we would like to ask

you to do a few things. First, end the one-party dictatorship. He says this is difficult (*laughter*). Second, set up a coalition government. He says that won't do either. Third, accept the legitimate status of all the parties. He says this is possible. We say we have to see how this is done because legitimacy under a police state means obedience to the laws of a police state. Fourth, we say that your espionage agency is unnecessary and should be eliminated. He says that this is out of the question and that these agencies are excellent (*laughter*). Fifth, we say that some things have to be eliminated, such as orders and laws that oppress the freedom of the people. He refuses this as well. Sixth, we ask him to release all political prisoners, but he will not release any of them. We say please release Zhang Xueliang!⁶ Release Yang Hucheng!⁷ Release Ye Ting! Release hundreds and thousands of Communists! Nevertheless, he has a policy, which is called "do not release a single person." *We say, do not execute even one, and learning from us, he says "do not release even one" (laughter).* In addition, we say please withdraw the troops surrounding the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The ordinary people are not happy about your surrounding our border region. You do not have the troops to fight against the Japanese. Please send the troops in North and Central China that are attacking us to fight against the Japanese! He also refuses to do this. Finally, we ask whether he supports our liberated areas. We ask him to recognize all the anti-Japanese troops and democratically elected governments. No agreement can be reached about this recognition either. It was discussed last year, and he said four-fifths of the anti-Japanese army led by the Communist Party should be dissolved; that is, we should keep four divisions and dissolve the rest. *We do not know whether the Japanese talked to him on that occasion (laughter) and put it this clearly (laughter). Of the eight proposals, he refused to accept even one and only wanted us to eat rice (laughter). We say millet is fine, but we want you to accept the eight proposals.* You can first accept two or three or three or four proposals! He says he will not accept even one. This is the situation in the negotiations.

In sum, comrades, it is up to the comrades present today and our comrades working in Northwest, North, Central, and South China to expel the Japanese invaders. It is also up to the Chinese people who will produce more millet, rice, rifles, and machine guns, provide more troops, expand the liberated areas, organize guerrilla forces in the Japanese-occupied territory, and develop

democratic movements in the Guomindang-controlled territory. It is essential to accomplish these things. Some other things, such as the unity of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, *we say are essential, really essential. Extremely essential, completely essential. If we only have the New Fourth Army, the Eighth Route Army, and the Communist Party, is millet essential? I say that there is this one condition, the others are all conditions, too, but the primary condition is to expand your strength. If you only have this one thing, if you do not increase your strength, there will still be limits. What strength does our Party School prepare? I say to study well is to increase your strength.*⁸

This is what I have to say about the current situation.

2. The Problem of Mountaintopism

At present, everybody is discussing the problem of mountaintopism. This is a problem that exists in reality. *That is, there is this thing in the world and we give it the name of mountaintopism. The so-called world is China, is the Communist Party.* Our Party is made up of many parts. This so-called mountaintop *was not bequeathed to a man by his mother one day, with her saying, "When you grow up, I want you to go establish a mountaintop."* This is a product of Chinese society; it is a product of China's revolution. This Chinese society of ours *is no good.* The people suffer from the oppression of imperialism and feudalism, and because they suffer from oppression they want revolution. *Under the leadership of the proletariat, the Chinese people have carried out a revolutionary movement. They have given birth to a vanguard called the Communist Party, which has a history of twenty some years.* China is also an agricultural country where transportation is very inconvenient. During the Civil War period, the Party and the revolutionary forces were divided into the White area and the soviet area by the enemy. The White area had this province and that province, while the soviet area had this soviet area and that soviet area. This lasted for a very long time, over ten years. It has been the same during the War of Resistance. It has lasted for a long time, eight years. It has also been this base area and that base area. This China of ours produces bean curd; *foreigners don't eat bean curd.* We were cut into many pieces, like cutting bean curd. This was not done by ourselves but by the enemy.

During the Civil War, we did not run a Party School such as we have now. Now, we probably have people from the Northwest, North China, Central China,

South China, the Northeast, and everywhere else in the country (*apart from Inner Mongolia and Tibet*) who come here to study. Yet our base areas are still divided by the enemy and do not connect into a whole body. *In the countryside, people do not regard us as a complete unit. Instead, they call it sparrow warfare; the sky is full of sparrows. Common people like Wu Manyou live in the Liulin district of Yan'an; here is a Wu Manyou, there is a Zhang Manyou, there is another Li Manyou. The households are widely separated from one another; this is called an individual economy. The individual economy in the countryside is cut into small pieces like bean curd by the enemy.* When the revolutionary party and the revolutionary army in a place rise up together to fight against the enemy, it is natural to form various groups and various mountaintops. Therefore, I say that mountaintops are a product of Chinese society and of the special circumstances of the Chinese Revolution. We should acknowledge this. If we want to eliminate this, we need to open a Party School to analyze it and discuss it clearly. Nonetheless, mountaintopism will not be completely eliminated until in the future we win victory over the whole country, gain control over the big cities, and possess convenient transportation, national newspapers, telegrams that reach all parts of the country, and hold meetings with ease. Now we discuss mountaintopism not only in the Party School but also in all the departments in Yan'an. We suggest that every department hold meetings. Those who struggled in the various base areas and those in different armies should hold meetings to examine history and to make self-criticisms and self-analyses. What is the purpose of this? The purpose is to eliminate [mountaintopism] and cause it to melt and to transform the entire Party into a single body. Every part must examine its history under one condition, which is that the guiding thought must be correct. Only in this way can such examinations be beneficial and bring only benefits and no harm.

What is correct guiding thought? *What is incorrect guiding thought? Because everyone here is now discussing this question, I put forward my analysis of this question, raise here a few suggestions, and ask you all to discuss them.*

First, I say we must start from unity, from the unity of the entire Party and the 1 million Party members, and from the interests of the 450 million people. When we discuss this issue, or any other issues, this is our starting point, our standpoint. Do we have any other starting point and standpoint? No, we do not.

We have only this one. Our standpoint is that of the whole Party and of the people of the whole country.

Second, we must analyze. To analyze is to criticize. We must criticize ourselves as well as others. When we analyze something, we first have to break it down into two aspects. We find what is correct, what is incorrect, what should be encouraged, and what should be discarded. This is criticism. To analyze one's own work and one's history is self-criticism. To analyze others is to criticize them. When we are criticized, it is always uncomfortable and hard to bear. Now there is a draft resolution in the Central Committee that encourages everyone to speak out. Whenever you find defects and errors in our work, there is no problem in speaking out. There are sure to be defects in our work. We should analyze them. If something is done correctly, we must acknowledge that it is correct. If it is done incorrectly, we must revise it. There are the two points I talked about here last time: hold firmly to the truth and correct mistakes.

What is correct is the truth. Truth is something that has proved to fit objective reality in our struggle. Because it fits the demands of the people, it wins us victory in the struggle. We must acknowledge and insist on a truth that has been proved by objective reality. If there are people who oppose this kind of truth, we must explain and criticize. Once we acknowledge a truth, we must hold on to it. What will happen if we do not insist on a truth? There would be a big disaster. To hold back the truth is to hold back the Chinese people, the Chinese proletariat, and even the Communist Party. It would cause the defeat of the revolution. Therefore, whether it is a major truth, a minor truth, a complete truth, or a partial truth, as long as it is a truth, we must insist on it. There are also other things called mistakes—these are inappropriate for the struggle of the people, including incorrect remarks made during a struggle, failures of deeds, and completely or partially incorrect draft proposals. We should discard things that are incorrect. We should get rid of things the people do not need. There is no reason to preserve them. We should revise things that fail in real work, incorrect remarks, incorrect deeds, and incorrect draft resolutions. If nine out of ten items in a draft resolution are correct, and only one is wrong, this one must be corrected. This is called correcting mistakes. Should we adopt the attitude of insisting on the truth and correcting mistakes? Yes, we should. Should a Communist Party member learn to be like this? Yes, he should. Should we be like

this when studying at the Party School? Yes, we should. This is called justice. To insist on the truth is just, and to correct mistakes is also just. *But our comrades must be mentally prepared. I have noted that because many comrades do not have this preparation, they do not analyze things.* This is the dialectic of insisting on the truth and correcting mistakes. The most fundamental principle of dialectics is the unity of contradictions. A unified thing can be divided into two aspects, such as the correct and the incorrect. If we do not acknowledge this, then we are not acknowledging dialectics. If a person thinks that he cannot be analyzed, then he has not made mental preparation for self-criticism. Due to the lack of this preparation, many comrades are always passive and lack any initiative. We want to promote initiative and frequent examination of one's own actions, words, and written decisions. We also encourage you to examine your own work, to see what is correct and what is incorrect, and to persevere in what is right and to correct what is in error. Only with this mental preparation can you do things well. Our Party School advocates this. Comrades who graduate from the Party School should all adopt a uniform attitude of insisting on the truth and correcting mistakes. Moreover, you can propagandize it wherever you go and to whomever you meet. In this way, things will be accomplished easily. Of course, there are many defects and mistakes that you cannot see yourself, so you have to be prepared to invite others to say something. If there are defects and mistakes, then there are. If there aren't, then there aren't. If there are, say so; if there are not, then be silent. It is very good if the comments are correct, because they have expressed truths. It does not matter if they are wrong. Blame not the speaker. *If they are wrong, then what point is there in speaking out? If they are wrong, they can be corrected by others after they have spoken out. If they are wrong, it is still on the whole better to speak out than not to. If you do not speak out, I will not know. Then I will continue to speak too freely, and some of my words will be inappropriate. But after you criticize me I will be more cautious, I will correct my mistake, and there are many advantages in this.*

Comrades! The revolution has still not been victorious after twenty-four years of struggle; this is because our country is too big. *This might be counted a defect. If our country were smaller, supposing it had only a million people, we could be victorious, but what can we do? We are called the Chinese, we are settled here, and there is nothing we can do about it.* The overly large size of the country

results in a protracted revolution. Since the country is too big and we have many enemies, we have not won victory even after three revolutions. We did not succeed in the Northern Expedition, we did not win the Civil War, and we still have not won the War of Resistance Against Japan. Now that we have reached this stage, it is possible to achieve victory. We now have the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and more than a million Party members, and these provide the conditions for victory. According to objective conditions (international conditions and domestic conditions), it is possible to achieve victory. But we still require subjective conditions. What are the subjective conditions? They are whether we want to win and whether we are mentally prepared. These are crucial. How did we fail during the Great Revolution? The objective cause was the powerful force of imperialism, while the subjective reason was that we were not mentally prepared, our thought was confused and our policies were mistaken. As a result, we failed. The Civil War period was more or less the same. We did not achieve victory in either the White area or the soviet area. The objective cause was that the forces of imperialism and the Guomindang were too great. But the primary reason was that our Party was still immature politically and was not prepared mentally. These two periods left us a treasure. This treasure is the people. Very few people are left from the first period. Perhaps there are still 1,000 to 2,000 people, but I will have to look it up. Although the number is small, we have a pile of treasure. It is not gold, nor is it silver. But it is more valuable than gold or silver. We have more survivors from the second period. How many do we have? Remaining Party members total around 20,000. The 20,000 or a bit more than 20,000 people from the first and the second periods are extremely valuable. Now, we have more than a million Party members. Where do they come from? They grew out of the earth. The seeds were these 20,000 people. During the first two periods, we did some things correctly and other things incorrectly, which is called taking a fall. *The older you grow, the less likely you are to fall over. You no longer fall over now, nor do I, because we fell over many times when we were young, and we are now already "over seventy and can do whatever we like."* When I was a young boy, I fell over every now and then, and this left a deep impression on me. When I fell, more often than not I would bleed. If you fall over and hit a stone, you are sure to bleed. The other boys were steadier than I was and not so likely to bleed. I told myself that I was a useless

person. People of the same age as I could run like they were flying and their feet would not bleed, but I often fell over the stones. We can now examine the history of the Civil War. Some comrades also examine the period of the Great Revolution and the period of the War of Resistance. These are very good things. The aim of examination is to summarize the experience and the lessons and not to place responsibility on specific comrades. Putting the blame on these comrades will serve no good purpose. Even if we grind our comrades into powder, what good will it do? Can that solve the problems? No, it cannot.

After many years of practice, the Chinese Communist Party has learned to analyze its present affairs and to start from the unity of the whole Party. We must first start from the unity of the whole Party. Then we analyze and criticize. Afterward, there is unity once again. Unity, criticism, unity—this is our method, and this is dialectics. If something is not done well, what is the cause? The cause is that we did not do it according to the dialectic. Comrade Deng Xiaoping in the Taihang mountains said: How should we go about things? Deal with them according to dialectics. I approve of these words of his. Whenever a department holds a meeting to examine history, whether to discuss the Great Revolution, the Civil War, the War of Resistance, or any other period, the primary starting point is unity. If we talk about unity, then we are friendly and polite to one another. When convening a meeting, we can just shout “unite” and shout “unite” later again. Is that not all? According to the dialectical method, it is not all. We should analyze, criticize, clear up problems, and clarify the seriousness of an issue. To talk unity requires the addition of analysis, which needs to be careful analysis. Look at this side. Look at the other side. Look at them repeatedly so that thought can be more mature. We have a lot of experience that shows mistakes are often made when we look only at one side of things and not at the other side, and when we only listen to one side and not the other side. Why do people grow two ears? Isn't one just fine? This needs to be studied. I think that the advantage of having two ears is that one ear can listen to one side while the other ear can listen to the other side. *Comrade Xu Teli told us: Why do people have such long hands, with the thumb pointing to the sky, and the small fingers pointing forward? Their directions are different, isn't this a defect? No, it is not. If their directions were the same, there would be no society, no Communist Party, no Eighth Route Army, and no China. How will there be no China if their directions*

are different [sic]? Not only will there be no China, there will be no Soviet Union either, no human society. In their work, human beings have to have such long fingers because they must grasp tools, grasp wood. Their fingers have to grow this way in order to grasp. It is because of this that we say “grasp a handful”; there is a reason that the thumb and fingers grow in different directions. Unity. Our Party School is clear testimony. In the Party School’s rectification study, rectification study in the first period two years ago made great achievements. That was the first leg, but it also had many shortcomings. The second leg, Comrade Peng X² told us a lot about it last year. Yesterday I gave comrades in Division 5 and Division 6 a lecture on this.¹⁰ The method that we choose now, the method that I am talking about, is to start from the unity of the whole Party, not to start from the unity of one mountaintop or a small minority of people. Apply analysis to reach a conclusion. This section and the whole Party are united. The development of campaigns works like this. If we are not careful, well, our history has numerous examples of this sort of affair; the first step will be wrong and will therefore not lead to unity. Then the second step of analyzing and criticizing the work will not be appropriate. The consequence will inevitably be disunity. We have often seen this situation in our Party’s history. It is very useful to understand history because it teaches us and raises our consciousness. Blindness slowly decreases and disappears. We now have a whole set of correct methods, which are closely associated with our preparation for victory in China. Can we achieve victory with such a method of learning and study? We can achieve victory. In the past few years of Party work, there was rectification, which aimed at preparing our ideology for victory. Soon, we will hold the Seventh Party Congress, which is also ideological preparation for victory. It prepares for the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the entire country. The objective conditions now provide for the possibility of victory. We must now accelerate preparation of the subjective conditions.

When it comes to the issue of mountaintopism, all comrades must still pay attention to one point. When you go to different places after graduation, you have to take everything into consideration. Before Comrade Wang Zhen¹¹ went south, I told him: The first thing is to see the light, while the second thing is to see the difficulties. To strive to see the light as well as the difficulties is dialectics, or the unity of contradictions. If things are both bright and difficult, aren’t we

contradicting ourselves? Why don't we just talk about the light? Why talk about difficulties at all? There were times in the history of our Party like this, when we only talked about the light and not about the darkness. This is not dialectical. We did not act according to Comrade Deng Xiaoping's suggestion. When we talk about the light, we must also talk about the difficulties. Students went through all kinds of obstacles to attend the Anti-Japanese University in 1937 and 1938. They poured in like an endless tide. I was not too busy then, so I gave them a short talk every three days and a major lecture every five days. I have forgotten most of what I said, but I still remember one thing. I said that you comrades came from Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Yunnan, Guizhou, Suiyuan, and Xinjiang; "Having come a thousand *li*, and not considering that too far, you must surely have some means to profit our state?"¹² The task of the War of Resistance is to serve the country. I said the flag that flies on top of the Qingliang mountains is the flag of new democracy. China wants independence, democracy, and a solution to the problem of people's livelihood. Is this correct? This is absolutely correct. Can we hope to achieve this? We can be very hopeful. Is this the light? Yes, it is, and it is complete light, not just 90 percent light. Nevertheless, if you come to Yan'an imagining that it is wonderful and regard it as paradise, you would be wrong. Yan'an is not paradise, nor is it hell. It is the human world, beneath Heaven and above Earth. What I say is entirely right. The correct approach is to regard Yan'an as a part of Chinese society. There are many defects in this place. I listed seven or eight of them. I also said you should bear them in mind. Otherwise, in three or five months when you graduate, you will heave a deep sigh and say: "Had I known earlier that Yan'an is like this, I would not have come here." As expected, someone later wrote an article titled "Wild Lilies"¹³ and so on. Those people probably did not hear me make these remarks or did not take them to heart. Later, these issues were explained at the Forum on Literature and Arts.

So, how should we view Yan'an? How should we view our revolutionary base areas? We should use the dialectical method and start from the whole. What kind of place is the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region? The border region is one of the Chinese people's revolutionary base areas led by the Chinese Communist Party. The second is located in northwestern Shanxi; the third is in the Wutai mountain; the fourth is in the Taihang mountains; the fifth,... There is Tai

mountain in the east and Heng mountain in the south. There are also Chinese revolutionary base areas in Central China and South China. They are the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal base areas of the Chinese people. Is this the right definition? Of course, it is. Under this definition, what attitude do we adopt toward any Chinese people's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal base area led by the Chinese Communist Party? First, it is "long live!" [Wansui!] Is that it? Besides "long live," we must be prepared mentally for the fact that every base area has its defects. Ten years from now, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region may still have defects. Even after the Chinese Revolution has achieved victory in all of China, there will still be defects here. It has been over twenty years since the October Socialist Revolution in the Soviet Union. It has completed its Third Five-year Plan. The Red Army is extremely strong and frightens even Hitler when it fights. Nonetheless, it also produced a man called Gorlov.¹⁴ Thus, we need to have mental preparation. When you leave for different base areas, you should shout "long live" when you get there and not just support it 90 percent, because it is a Chinese people's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal base area led by the Chinese Communist Party, and it is carrying out harsh struggles and heroic undertakings. At the same time, you must be mentally prepared for defects such as bureaucratism, tight living quarters, or insufficient millet or rice. Besides, they may not know that you are a regimental commander or a brigade commander. They only know that you have two eyes and one nose. They may not show respect or say "please sit down, comrade regiment commander." They may not hold a welcoming party and, instead, have you sit on a cold bench. Moreover, they may criticize you for small shortcomings. In this way, it is easy for your heart to produce one thing: anger. So every comrade must be mentally prepared for all kinds of undesirable things, including numerous blockade lines, the enemy's surprise attacks, not holding a welcoming party, not enough applause at the welcoming party, and scattered applause here and there. We need to speak these demoralizing words, but should we only speak demoralizing words? No, we should not. I first spoke encouraging words and did not just speak demoralizing words. But if we just speak encouraging words and about light, light, and light, when there are defects and difficulties in reality, it will not do. We have to tell our comrades: Do not only talk about plenty of clothing and enough food and new weapons; do not make careless promises. We have to be honest with our

comrades, soldiers, and the people. Say “yes” if it is; say “no” if it is not. Every place has defects and difficulties. We should estimate the defects and difficulties in a place beforehand. When we arrive at a place, we have to refrain from criticizing others and adopt an attitude of learning. Once you have settled down and familiarized yourself with the work and once people there have gotten to know you, then you can begin telling them their defects. In this way, they will accept your criticism. They will agree and change their ways. We need to adopt this attitude, which is a modest attitude. When there is a meeting in your department, the leading cadre should often consult, provide proper guidance, and have a good work style. This is an important point. Proper guidance will lead to victory for the movement and to meetings that go well. Improper guidance will result in meetings that go badly.

3. The Question of Examining Cadres

I talked about this here last time, but many comrades did not hear me, so I will repeat the talk.

The year before last and last year, we examined our cadres. We have carried out such work before in the history of our Party, but it was not done as conscientiously as in the past two years since rectification. In this work, we have secured great achievements, but we have also committed many errors. These are the two experiences.

In the first instance, the achievements are great and have great significance in the Chinese people’s preparation for victory. We have two general policies, which are adopting a serious attitude and adopting a cautious attitude. Why do we say that on organizational issues our Party differs from the bourgeois political parties and also from the political parties of the petty bourgeoisie? Because no parties of other classes have the seriousness and discipline of the Communist Party. The proletariat is an oppressed class, a class without power. If they want to gain liberation and obtain power from a position in which they are oppressed and powerless, they must have strict discipline, centralized unity, consistent thinking, and concerted action. They must preserve the purity of the Party. A model for this type of party has never existed before. *Except for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU], the historical Bolsheviks, which has become the party that leads the So- viet Union. The first line of the first article in the first volume of*

*[Stalin's] History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union talks about the process of formation from a small group to federal Marxism among a very small number of people in Russia to a federation that is now the core of the leadership. The small group is the small finger, the federation is the house. In China it is also from a small group to a federation. Are we now a federation? No, not yet. We are halfway through. We have to start from the small group, from the small group to the base area, and then to the federation. Now we are in the base area, we will soon be in the federation. We should be prepared for victory. The Muslim nationality, the Mongolian nationality, the Tibetan nationality, and other nationalities in China should set up a republican government; then we can move toward a federation. This is the road in the future, but it is not time yet. To achieve this objective, we must at the same time have a serious attitude. How about the purity of the Communist Party, the integration of its thought and action, the unification of its policies? You comrades all know that before rectification our Party was not pure in thought. There was a thick scent of nonproletarian thought, which was primarily petty-bourgeois thought. How is it now? It has greatly improved. Has it been thoroughly cleansed? No, it still has not. We still have work to do. That is why we still have to run this Party School. The purpose of running a Party School and other cadre schools is to ensure the purity of thought within our Party and to ensure that it is Marxist. Furthermore, we need purity in our organization, which is why we examine and investigate cadres. We must have such a serious attitude. Although this is easily said, we often forget it when the time comes to adopt a specific attitude. It seems that it does not matter whether we are not very serious. Conceptually, the values of people in an agricultural society reflect the disorganized state of an agricultural society. Liberalism is a reflection of small-scale production. Comrades, our Party has expanded from a few tens of thousands to more than a million in the past seven or eight years. Our thinking is impure; our organization is impure. Some bad elements have infiltrated. What should we do? *It does not matter, we must develop, we are not afraid. This is a policy of our Party. We admit it and then undergo rectification study. Some bad people and some impure elements snuck into the Party. Among them, there are spies sent by our enemy. Issues such as spies, traitors, recantation and surrender to the enemy, and parties and factions vary in degree. Some are serious, and some are not.* We must be pure in*

organization and should be clear. How was the movement during the past two years? I would say that we have achieved a great deal. We learned how to carry out rectification and how to examine and investigate cadres and party members. We have had great achievements in this respect. Some people cannot see this point and see only the mistakes we made. They bring up dozens and hundreds of cases, but I know of several thousand cases. The number of cases cannot negate the nature of our movement. The nature of this movement is basically correct, and it is helpful to the unity and strengthening of the Chinese Communist Party as well as to the victory of the Chinese people. We have raised many problems, and this has given us experience. With this experience, everyone can undertake Party building work and purify our Party organization and our comrades' thought when we leave here in the future. Of the more than a million Party members, over 900,000 joined after the beginning of the War of Resistance. This raises a problem. Do we want victory? Do we want victory in the entire country? If we do, we must have a Party with discipline, ideological purity, and organizational purity. We must have a Party with a uniform standard. The first section of the conclusion to the *History of the CPSU*¹⁵ states that there must be a party. What kind of party do we need? It is not a social democratic party but a Communist Party, with a revolutionary work style. *Article 2 says we must have theory. Therefore, the experience of this article is of great importance to the entire Party. Hence, we must take note of this achievement. There was a disorientation last year; during the entire year, there were no achievements. How did this happen? It was because when looking at a problem, our comrades have two ears. They listened with this ear for a while, then with that ear for a while, but without analysis, and consequently this led to disorientation. When I explained this to this sort of comrade, he agreed with me.* We must see the accomplishments. This experience has had a great effect on our Party.

The second experience is that we made mistakes, and if you count them they are extremely numerous. Many mistakes were made at the Party School. Who is responsible? I am responsible, because I am the president. A lot of mistakes were made everywhere in Yan'an. Who is responsible? I am, because I gave the orders. If there are mistakes in other places, who is to blame? Here, too, I am to blame because I also gave those orders. Nonetheless, comrades, we must also analyze the mistakes themselves. There is benefit, and there is also harm. The harm is the

making of mistakes. The benefit is also the making of mistakes. When we investigate cadres, we clarify whether some people are comrades or spies and traitors, those who surrender or are members of another party or faction. It is very good to find out about these people. We are friendly to these people and unite with them. Regardless of whether they volunteered information or were forced to do so, we welcome them for speaking out, and we help them rectify their errors. I mean what I say, and the checks I write must be cashed. One check means no execution. Did I keep my promise? Of course, I did. But if you say that you will not execute a single person but in the end kill two, is that not self-contradiction? But, indeed, we did not execute a single person. We have to distinguish truth from falsehood and serious matters from not so serious matters. If they are, they are. What do we do if they are spies, traitors, those who surrender, or elements from other parties? We can unite them in the War of Resistance. If someone took the wrong path before but is now on the right track and is willing to fight in the War of Resistance, then let bygones be bygones. The reason that we announce this point is mainly to help such comrades who took the wrong path. Because the Party had many defects in the past, they were afraid and did not dare to speak out. It is very good that they are now speaking out.

What should we do about those who were wrongly capped as traitors or wrongly accused? If they are not, they are not. We need to remove the hat and apologize. The Party School also made mistakes in dealing with some comrades. If there are such comrades present today, I apologize. Well, then, what attitude should those who were wrongly labeled adopt? When we label them, they should be angry. They think, I am not a spy or a traitor, so why are they labeling me as such? Is it right to label people arbitrarily? It is not right. Now I am removing the label and apologizing to them. What attitude should you adopt? Shouldn't you return my courtesy? Because I paid you a courtesy, if you do not return it, I cannot let it go. Comrades, we treated you as a spy and a traitor instead of as a comrade. We were wrong. This fiery wrath should have targeted the enemy instead of fellow comrades, but it was targeted at comrades. This was wrong. Yet in the beginning, the motive was to aim it at the enemy. The direction of the entire movement was toward the enemy instead of toward comrades. Therefore, those who were wrongly labeled should have their labels removed. All you comrades who were wrongly labeled have truth on your side. You have truth,

while we do not have truth. Thus you should set your minds at ease on this point. Comrades, have there been cases in our Party's history when we wrongly labeled people and then removed those labels? There have been such cases. There were, however, very few cases in which we had an attitude like the one adopted last year. In the past, if we wrongly labeled people, we simply removed the label and did not bother with anything else. This is why I say that admitting our mistakes and apologizing in the work of investigating cadres constitute progress on our part and on the part of the entire Party. We should do the same with everything we say to the people, all our draft resolutions, and all of our various policies. Whenever we make mistakes, we must correct them, make an apology, and do so sincerely. We must have such an attitude.

What is this called? It is an attitude of self-criticism. Stalin wrote a book titled *An Outline of Leninism*,¹⁶ which states that there are four methods of Leninism. One of them is self-criticism. The issue of mountaintopism that I talked about earlier is at its root about the method of self-criticism. In unity, criticism, and then unity, the second step is criticism and self-criticism. We must adopt this attitude if the Chinese Revolution is to succeed. Making a mistake has two different aspects. The first is making a mistake, which is bad. The second is that after making a mistake it will become an experience. For example, in the future if we want to examine and investigate our cadres, both sides will have experience. Because of past mistakes, those comrades who labeled others incorrectly will be more cautious when they label others in the future. Because they have suffered, those comrades who were wrongly labeled will also be cautious when they label others in the future. In the future, our work of examining and investigating cadres and exposing traitors in Beiping, Shanghai, and Nanjing will go much better. Thus, I say there are two experiences. The first is an achievement, whereas the other is a defect. Both are useful in their own ways. We must spread our accomplishments and correct our mistakes. *If we want to achieve victory, we must further develop our achievements and correct our mistakes. The comrades who were wrongly labeled have made a sacrifice; you are called those who have made a sacrifice because you were wrongly labeled. Nonetheless, we should understand that this lesson is helpful to the future development of the movement.* We are adopting a solemn and cautious attitude. There is a struggle between two lines. A solemn attitude is against rightist tendencies. The lack of solemnity is a rightist

tendency and is liberalism. A cautious attitude is against “Leftist” tendencies. Carelessness will lead to trouble.¹⁷

The last time I talked about various revolutionary organizations, I touched on the First Front Army, the Second Front Army, the Fourth Front Army, and the various parts within every front army. My talk was incomplete because I left out the Fifteenth Army Group. After my talk, one comrade wrote me a letter that said that the Fifteenth Army Group had made great sacrifices in the past and should have been mentioned. Today, I want to make it up by talking about issues that I did not mention then.

The first question concerns the South and the North. I have long been aware of this problem, but I forgot to mention it on that occasion. Comrades who are now working in the Northwest, in North China, and in Central China can generally be divided into two groups. The first is southerners who came from another place. The other is local natives. Why do I want to mention this? I do so to draw the attention of our comrades to this problem. The nature of this problem is the relationship between cadres from outside and native cadres, and between military cadres and local cadres. During the War of Resistance, disputes and frictions between outside cadres and native cadres and between military cadres and local cadres occurred often and were common phenomena. I think that comrades from outside should understand something. They should understand the contribution and good qualities of cadres native to the various places in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia [Shaan-Gan-Ning] Border Region, North China, and Central China. Since I did not make it clear and did not analyze it well in the past, those comrades are not to blame. I did not talk about this issue until after rectification and after putting together a lot of experience. Comrades from the South who are still alive and in the Northwest, North China, and Central China number less than 20,000. They made great contributions. Comrades from the North and native comrades should thank them. The people in the Northwest and in North and Central China should thank the veteran Bolsheviks from the South. The Chinese Revolution long developed in the South and did not move to the North until the War of Resistance. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the 1911 Revolution, the Northern Expedition, and the Land Revolution mostly took place in the South. Therefore, the South is a honorable place. However, comrades, these revolutions all failed. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom failed, the 1911 Revolution failed, the

Northern Expedition failed, the Land Revolution failed—all failed. There were both glory and difficulties—which is, once again, to talk about the two aspects. There are veteran Bolsheviks from the South, but there are also veteran Bolsheviks from the North, and quite a few of them. There are some in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and there is also a large group in North China. Comrade Chen Yi said that there are some in Central China as well. The veteran Bolsheviks from the South should not think that they are unique in this regard. We must understand this Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and recognize its defects, which are “its sparse population and backward economy.” *Yes, we should admit this. Nevertheless, where is your narrow territory that is densely populated? You once had Shanghai, where is it now? Where is your central soviet region? You gave them to Chiang Kaishek.* Only this base area was preserved, while all the others were lost. The role of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region is very great. I say that it is the pivot of the Chinese Revolution and is the turning point of the Chinese Revolution. After the Long March, we rose from here and changed from here. After the Long March, our feet hurt, so we came here for a rest and called it a temporary resting place. We are not going to settle here forever because this is a temporary resting place. This place is also the starting point. In a couple of days, you will set out from here. In the future, the Central Committee will leave. Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, all of our troops, except for the New Fourth Army, have left from here. Recently, Wang Zhen also left from here. Dai Jiying also left from here. All the troops in the North left from here. Of course, many veteran Party members in the North and in North China, such as Peng Zhen and Bo Yibo,¹⁸ and many others carried out years of struggle with the enemy in prison. The local Party in the North and in North China also initiated some rebellions, although they failed. Many comrades survived three periods, which are the Northern Expedition, the Civil War, and the War of Resistance. According to Comrade Chen Yi, we also found such comrades in Central China, especially in northern and southern Jiangsu.

Why do I want to mention this? It is because I want our comrades to see the problem. The comrades from outside this region should see this point. It is not just the South that is glorious. It is not just me who is glorious. North China is also glorious, and Central China is also glorious. Not only is the First Front Army glorious but the Second Front Army is also. The Fourth Front Army is glorious, as

is the Red Army in northern Shaanxi. All sections of every part are glorious. Is it that one part is at a higher level, while another part is at a lower level? I think there are no higher levels and lower levels and that everyone is glorious. The South and the North are not higher or lower than the other, and they are both glorious. More than 900,000 joined the Party during the War of Resistance. The several tens of thousands of comrades from outside the region should pay special attention to this. At the same time, the 900,000 should be grateful to these several tens of thousands because they have taught us about the experience of fighting a war. *They have experience, they experienced the Civil War, there was part of the Civil War in the North, but most of it was in the South, they taught the people in North China and in Central China. This is the first issue.*

The second issue is about the Party in the great rear echelon. The Party in the great rear echelon numbers about 10,000. They are led by Comrade Zhou Enlai, Comrade Dong Biwu, and many other comrades present today. When we were examining and investigating cadres the year before last, some comrades felt that the Party in those places was not very reliable. There were many instances of the "Red Flag policy."¹⁹ Based on results of screening from last year, the facts prove two things. First, we should adopt a serious attitude because under the rule of the Guomindang, some evildoers infiltrated us and some impure people infiltrated our Party to sabotage us. We should admit today that some evildoers have infiltrated us, and some impure people have infiltrated us. The second point is not to exaggerate. We must remember not to think that there are too many. What is the exact figure? We cannot tell now. We will not be able to clarify this issue until we win victory all over the country in the future. But it is possible to estimate. Out of 10,000, we can say that the great majority are good and are not spies. Why do I say so? It is because in those places most of them are peasant comrades. The Guomindang do not pay very much attention to them, even in places sabotaged by them. Besides, we adopted a policy of dispersing ourselves like a tray of loose sand, which allows us to hide ourselves. In this way, we are not harmed or we are harmed only slightly. We should also take into consideration the bureaucratism of the Guomindang. We should not regard the Guomindang as miraculous. *To be sure, its spies are formidable. That is the first point. The second point is bureaucracy. It is wrong for us not to admit that they are formidable. Coordinated conspiracy is formidable, like a person with three*

heads and six arms, yet it does not have three heads, only one. Chiang Kaishek, too, has only one head and two hands, just like me. Relatively speaking, we Communists have less bureaucracy, and the Guomindang has more. We ourselves must remember clearly not only the formidable spies but also the bureaucracy. Then how many have problems and how many do not? No one can answer this question now; it can be answered only after we change from a group to a federation. This time when Wang Zhen and Dai Jiying set out to build base areas, they will adopt a serious and cautious attitude. Generally, there are two points. The first is to admit that the local Party has problems. The other is to admit that the majority of the comrades are good, have no problems, and are pure. A small minority is impure and has problems. We should make such an estimate. We should say that comrades working in the South have accomplishments. In general, they have achieved something during the War of Resistance. In terms of strategy, we cannot have only base areas. It requires three parts: the liberated areas, the enemy-occupied area, and the great rear echelon. The three compose the whole, and none of them can be left out.

Finally, on the problem of the work in the White area. In the past, I never thought about this. The other day Comrade Chen Yi told me there was such a problem. He is quite right. In the past we criticized the leadership line of the work in the White area during the Civil War. On some occasions, we were wrong. Because of this, our work in the White area suffered great losses. In the past we said that everything was lost. Now we see that it was not quite that bad. There was some left, but most was lost. The leadership line was wrong and should have been criticized. The purpose of the criticism was to ensure that we did a good job in the future and did not repeat the same mistakes. It did not mean that all the comrades and cadres who worked in the White area did not make any contributions. This is like when we lost the base areas in the South. It did not mean that Red Army fighters and cadres and local comrades and cadres did not make any contributions and did not carry out arduous struggles and make heroic sacrifices. The comrades who worked in the White area are divided into these groups: those who were never imprisoned and are alive, those who were never imprisoned and died, those who were imprisoned and are still alive, and those who were imprisoned and died. These people carried out heroic struggles for the Party and the proletariat. They risked their lives in the struggle. It is because of

this that they were imprisoned. Very few were lucky enough to escape imprisonment. From this, we can estimate the achievements of their struggle.

Because I did not talk about these three issues last time, I have added them today. These are all the issues I wanted to cover today. *I apologize—you comrades have been sitting for a long time.* That is all.

Notes

Our sources for this document are *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, pp. 219–47, and *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 247–69. In general, we have found the texts in the *Mao Zedong wenji* series to be reliable, usually paralleling the texts in the editions compiled by Takeuchi Minoru in the *Mao Zedong ji* collections. In this case, the *Mao Zedong wenji* editors (p. 267) note that their version is based on a printed copy of lecture notes preserved in the Central Archives. The text in *Mao Zedong ji* is taken from a 1967 Red Guard source, *Ziliao xuanbian*, rather than from an original publication from the 1940s. We are mindful of the limitations of both official PRC Mao texts and unofficial Red Guard compilations. (See “Textually Speaking,” in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, pp. 75–103.) Thus, in this translation we do not follow the model of Takeuchi’s volumes and cite every textual variant. In this case, the *Mao Zedong wenji* version omits many passages from the earlier publication. Some of these are simply the kinds of remarks that a speaker might make to underscore an intimacy with the audience and are of little substantive interest, so we have not translated them. At several spots, the *Mao Zedong wenji* editors have also redacted a long, rambling, and inelegant passage into a more pithy few sentences, maintaining most of the vocabulary and meaning of Mao’s more florid original. At the same time, there are passages in the Cultural Revolution text in *Mao Zedong ji* that seem to reflect an imperfect transcription and are not entirely clear. However, in other instances Mao originally expressed views, and used language, that apparently were not regarded as appropriate or worthy of the Chairman by the editors of the *Mao Zedong wenji* but do contribute to our knowledge of the man—these we have translated and are identified by the use of italics. We have therefore combined the two texts, incorporating into the *Mao Zedong wenji* version a number of passages from the *Mao Zedong ji* version (in italics).

1. This refers to the Crimea Conference, also called the Yalta Conference, held from February 4 to February 11, 1945, which produced the Yalta Agreement (secret at the time) and the “Bulletin of the Crimea Conference of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom,” which was published.

2. Here the Red Guard text has “ten divisions,” but since the figure of eighty appears a few lines later, this must be simply a transcription error.

3. Xu Teli was Mao’s teacher at the First Normal School in Changsha from 1913 to 1918; he joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 and at this time was director of Yan’an’s Natural Science Academy; see Vol. I, p. 372, and Vol. V, p. 601. (The other men have been glossed in previous notes.)

4. In the *Mao Zedong wenji* version, the preceding sentences in italics are replaced by the following text: “Take the American elections as an example. The isolationists suffered a big loss because they opposed cooperation with the Soviet Union. The American workers were against them, so they were defeated.”

5. In the *Mao Zedong wenji* version, the preceding long passage is replaced by the following two sentences: “The mass meetings in Yan’an, the telegrams of denunciation, and the articles in *Jiefang ribao* all disclosed the Guomindang’s acts to destroy unity. Thus, the third anti-Communist high tide came to an end.”

6. Regarding Zhang Xueliang, see above, note 12 to the text of May 21, 1944.

7. Yang Hucheng (1893–1949) and Zhang Xueliang instigated the famous Xi’an Incident on December 12, 1936. Yang was imprisoned by Chiang Kaishek and was killed in Chongqing in 1949.

8. These somewhat confusing lines beginning “we say are essential, really essential” are replaced in the *Mao Zedong wenji* version by “are only conditions.”

9. The Cultural Revolution text characteristically substitutes the names of persons not in favor at that time with the letter x. In this case, it almost certainly is Peng Zhen, the top Party leader who was then secretary of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Subureau, vice president of the Central Party School, and acting head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee during the War of Resistance.

10. The lines from “Unity. Our Party School is clear testimony... a lecture on this” have been replaced in the *Mao Zedong wenji* version by: “Unity plus analysis means analyzing various contradictory opinions, erroneous opinions, and everybody’s opinion. It could be that everything is correct except for a couple of bad words. It could be that it is partly correct, partly incorrect. It could be that it is completely incorrect. Distinguish right from wrong. Then settle on a point. This is unity.”

11. Wang Zhen was at this time commander-in-chief of the detachment of the Eighth Route Army that was sent to the South.

12. This is a quotation from the opening lines of the Confucian classic, *Mencius*, Book 1, Part 1:1.

13. Regarding “Wild Lilies” and its author, Wang Shiwei, see above, note 3 to the text of March 22, 1944. Mao’s “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Arts” is above, the text of May 1942.

[14.](#) General Gorlov is the flawed main character who fails to appreciate modern military tactics and refuses to take advice in the play “The Front” by the Soviet playwright Alexandr Evdokimovich Korneichuk.

[15.](#) In this case italics indicates a book title and not material from the Red Guard source.

[16.](#) In this case italics indicates a book title and not material from the Red Guard source.

[17.](#) The *Mao Zedong wenji* version adds a short paragraph: “I have covered the key points I wanted to talk about.”

[18.](#) Bo Yibo was at this time commissar of the First Column of the Shanxi Youth Anti-Enemy Die-to-Die Corps, secretary of the Taiyue Region Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and deputy secretary of the Taihang Subbureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

[19.](#) The reference is to efforts by Guomindang agents to disrupt the activities of the Communist Party.

*Negotiations Between the Guomindang
and the Communist Party Were
Fruitless; Comrade Zhou Enlai Returned
to Yan'an*
(February 17, 1945)

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, February 17) Comrade Zhou Enlai, the representative of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, flew from Yan'an to Chongqing on January 24, stayed there for three weeks, and held many talks with the Guomindang authorities. Because the Guomindang authorities still insist on one-party dictatorship, oppose a coalition government as well as the people and democracy, and plot to gobble up the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies, the result, as in previous negotiations, was that no agreement was reached, and so Comrade Enlai flew back to Yan'an at midnight on the sixteenth. In terms of the content of the negotiations, they were clearly described in the announcement made by Comrade Enlai on the fifteenth. This announcement was carried in *New China Daily* in Chongqing on the sixteenth, and the translated text was given to the reporters of foreign newspapers stationed in Chongqing. The full text of the announcement follows.

The announcement made by Dr. Wang Shijie, the representative of the National Government at the news conference for foreign reporters on Wednesday, is not frank and is unfair. This is because he only talked about the so-called concessions of the government in the negotiations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but did not mention the conditions under which or the

prerequisites with which these so-called concessions would be applicable. First, during the negotiations, the National Government wanted the Chinese Communist Party to transfer all troops under its command to the command of the Military Commission of the National Government. That means putting it under the command of the Guomindang, because the National Government is a one-party dictatorship government of the Guomindang. Second, during the negotiations, the Guomindang insisted that it could not put an end to its one-party dictatorship. Due to these two conditions or prerequisites, these so-called concessions are all either empty or meaningless. They may not even be concessions but may serve to constrict or sabotage the forces of the War of Resistance.

Specifically, first, if we do not transfer the army to the Guomindang government, the Chinese Communist Party will not be made legal. Second, the members of the Military Commission of the National Government have never held a meeting, nor do they have any power. Third, the so-called war cabinet in the Administrative Council under party rule does not have the power to make final decisions. Fourth, without abolishing party rule and without changing the military policy of eliminating those with different views, the reorganization of the Chinese Communist forces by the three-person committee still equals transferring the Chinese Communist forces to the Guomindang government. Furthermore, judging from the achievements of fighting against the enemy, the army that should be reorganized is not the Chinese Communist army but, rather, the Guomindang army. After making clear the above points, you should understand why I, on the behalf of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, turned down the entire proposal offered by the National Government. This is one aspect. The other aspect, which is the more important reason, is that the National Government refused our suggestions for establishing a democratic coalition government and coalition supreme command to unify all the military forces in China and to reform various political, military, economic, and cultural policies. We also proposed to the National Government, the Guomindang, and the China Democratic League that the National Government should call a meeting of all parties to discuss and decide how to put an end to party rule and how to reorganize the government in the form of a democratic coalition government and draft a common administrative program in order to

realize the principles of the coalition government after reaching unanimous agreement. The answer given by the National Government is a kind of consultative meeting, and the predetermined content of the meeting is mainly the continuation of the one-party dictatorship and opposition to the democratic coalition government. Thus I must return to Yan'an and report to our Party Central Committee. As for our hope that the National Government would first release all patriotic political prisoners, abolish all laws and edicts suppressing the people, stop all espionage activities, and withdraw all the troops surrounding the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and attacking the Eighth Route and the New Fourth armies, the government authority did not accept these proposals. This is the main content of the negotiations between the two parties during the past few months. Here, I would like to thank the U.S. ambassador, General [Patrick] Hurley, for his enthusiastic help and ceaseless efforts during the past few months of negotiations between the two parties.

(What follows are the translated notes, taken by a foreign reporter, on the open announcement by Dr. Wang Shijie, the representative of the National Government, made at the news conference for foreign reporters on February 1. They are provided here for reference.)

For the past half a month, government representatives (I am one of them) have negotiated with Mr. Zhou Enlai, the representative of the Communist Party, in Chongqing. The government put forward certain important concessions. They include the following: (1) recognizing the Communist Party as a legal political party; (2) including the senior personnel of the Communist Party in the Military Commission; (3) allowing Communist and other party representatives into the Administrative Council in order to organize a wartime cabinet; (4) Setting up a three-person joint committee to consider the reorganization of the Communist army and the supplying of this army. The government and Communist Party representatives would have equal status in this committee, and an American military officer might serve as its chairman. Nevertheless, the Communist Party feels that it cannot accept these proposals, so it has turned them down. The Communist Party suggested holding a meeting of all parties. The reason the government gave permission to hold a conference once again, including the Guomindang and the Communist representatives as well as the leaders of all the parties and factions as well as the nonpartisans, to consider the method for

transition to political and military unity before the National Congress is that we accept the general idea of this suggestion. Mr. Zhou has brought this proposal back to Yan'an to ask for his party's opinion. I cannot predict what the outcome will be. In the past few months, the U.S. ambassador, General Hurley, worked hard to help the negotiations between the two parties. I express my gratitude here.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 237–40, where it is reproduced from the February 17, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. Text in boldface was added by Mao.

*Letter to Xiao San*¹

(February 22, 1945)

Comrade Xiao San:

Your article “First Step” is very well written. Your attitude is quite different from that during the first few years after you arrived in Yan’an. The article is honest, earnest, vivid, and forceful. Certainly, your articles in the past were also very good, but they are better now. I have benefited greatly from reading them.

In order for comrades in cultural and artistic work to take part in mass rallies more frequently, you have to notify comrades Gao Gang, Jia Tuofu, Tan Zheng, Luo Mai, Li Fuchun, and Peng Zhen,² reminding them not to forget to organize comrades in the literature and arts to participate whenever there are such meetings. Please discuss this matter with them. I will also tell them when I have an opportunity. This year, there are fewer mass meetings for the entire border region. Nonetheless, there are certainly many local meetings, including meetings for Yan’an, Yan’an *xian*, and the districts under Yan’an. It is also necessary to tell the responsible comrades and the propaganda departments in the *xian*, city, and districts about this. Could you please tell them?

Comradely salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source of this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 258–59, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Xiao San [Emi Siao] (1896–1983) was a poet of conservative tastes at the Lu Xun Academy and a Party member, serving at this time as a member of the Standing Committee of the Cultural Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

2. Jia Tuofu (1912–1967) was a long-time Shaanxi revolutionary and veteran of the Long March. He was at this time secretary-general of the Secretariat of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee. (The other men have been glossed in previous notes.)

*Congratulatory Telegram to Stalin on
Soviet Red Army Day
(February 22, 1945)*

Marshal Stalin:

The great victory of the Red Army under your leadership has encouraged the liberation war in China. On the happy occasion of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Red Army, we offer our congratulations!

Mao Zedong

Zhu De

Note

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 249, where it is reproduced from the February 23, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

To Wang Zimu¹

(March 2, 1945)

Comrade Zimu:

I have read your letter. Welcome back. In the past, you did much work of benefit to the Party and the people, and I hope you will continue to do so starting today. You have already corrected and understood the mistakes from a moment of foolishness, and they are past. Don't dwell on them all the time. Perhaps, having suffered a setback, you will now make great progress, and then the mistake will turn into something beneficial.

Comradely salutations!

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, p. 260, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

¹ Wang Zimu (1895–1969) joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he worked in the United Front in Chongqing, Wuhan, and elsewhere. He returned to Yan'an in February 1945 and served as a member of the senior staff at the headquarters of the Eighteenth Army Group.

*Telegram Extending Condolences on A.
Tolstoy's Death*
(March 6, 1945)

Moscow, Comrade [Andrei] Zhdanov, chairman of the Writers Association of the Soviet Union:

I am distressed to learn of the passing away of the famous Soviet writer, Aleksei Nikolaievich Tolstoy. I express my condolences.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 251, where it is reproduced from the March 8, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

New China News Agency Reporter *Comments on Wang Shijie's Talk* (March 8, 1945)

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, March 8) The Guomindang's minister of propaganda, Mr. Wang Shijie, when answering foreign reporters on the seventh, said: "Now the government has decided to put the issue of convening the National Congress to the National Political Council¹ for discussion." The New China News Agency reporter said that Dr. Wang Shijie reportedly studied law in Britain, but it now seems that he has not understood it. What sort of thing is the so-called National Political Council? Isn't it a useless organ appointed by the autocrat Chiang Kaishek? If they submit the issue of the so-called National Congress to such an organ for "discussion" and if the result of the "discussion" says that it can be convened, can it really be convened according to the law of Dr. Wang? The majority of the members of the National Political Council are "comrades" from the same party as our autocrat and our doctor. Why not simply hold a Guomindang congress to decide whether to convene it? Why do we need this organ to "discuss" it? Ever since the founding of the National Political Council and according to its organic law as well as the facts from the past, it has not had any power to decide on issues. Now you want it to "discuss" whether a National Congress should be convened. Based on Dr. Wang's law, it does not matter whether it says "yes" or "no." If all of a sudden it begins to exercise real power, isn't it against the law and discipline? Aren't the members at risk of being indicted by Mr. Ju Juesheng's Ministry of Justice? The most surprising thing is that Dr. Wang Shijie's memory is so poor: Didn't your "leader" Chiang Kaishek say on March 1 that "until the convening of the National Congress, we do not have a responsible association that represents the people and compels the

government to consult public opinion”? Six days later, you forgot it. It seems that you had a kind of “responsible association” and even dared to “discuss” the issue of convening the National Congress. It is said that it was “decided by the government.” To which country in this world does this government belong? It definitely is not Chiang Kaishek’s Chinese government, because Chiang Kaishek just said on March 1 that “until the convening of the National Congress, we do not have a responsible association that represents the people and compels the government to consult public opinion.” This is a suspicious case, and we need to invite Dr. Wang to answer it.

The New China News Agency reporter says: Wang Shijie is again opposing his “leader.” Mr. Wang said: “No matter what, I believe that the government will find a way to let all parties and nonpartisan social leaders participate in the National Congress.” Let us leave “nonpartisans” be. As for “all the parties,” they are doomed not to have the good luck to attend this piglet² convention because according to the imperial edict of the “leader,” they do not have legal status. The imperial edict said that before the Communist Party hands over its army and before the Democratic League and other parties attend the National Congress, they have no legal status. The date this imperial edict was issued was also March 1. It is hard to believe that our doctor has forgotten it. Or are you purposely opposing your “leader?” It must be one or the other.

The New China News Agency reporter says: The group making up the anti-popular clique under Chiang Kaishek has acted like a buffoon recently. It has worsened over time. The Chinese people must bestir themselves and carry out a thorough house cleaning of the nonsensical talk, bizarre performances, crooked minds, and immoral behavior of these unworthy family descendants, and rectify family affairs, the better to fight against the Japanese invaders. Rectification entails inquiring closely into the responsibility of the autocrat Chiang Kaishek for the loss of troops and territory and that has brought calamity to the country and the people, resolutely opposing any sort of piglet National Congress, immediately abolishing Chiang Kaishek’s autocratic dictatorship, and establishing a democratic coalition government.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 243–45, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

- [1.](#) On the National Political Council, see above, note to the text of September 19, 1944.
- [2.](#) Mao uses the term, *zhuzai*, literally “piglet,” to imply illegitimacy.

Explanation of “On Coalition Government”¹ (March 31, 1945)

I

There now exists the possibility that China could become an independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful China. It is the first time since May Fourth and the founding of the Party that this possibility has emerged in the past hundred years. At this moment, we should bring forward an appropriate program and mobilize the people of the entire nation to strive for its realization. That is, we should unite the entire Party and the people of the entire nation to defeat Japanese imperialism and to build a new China. Most of this program existed before. Now we will synthesize and develop it.

In order to attain the goal of building a new China, our principle is to go all out to mobilize the masses. This has consistently been our line since the beginning of the War of Resistance, but there is another line, which is to fetter the masses. Chiang Kaishek fetters the masses; at the Liuzhou Conference² he talked about a so-called spiritual conquest. We are faithful and sincere to our comrades and to the people, and we do not engage in any so-called spiritual conquest. But we use arms to conquer our enemies. In this report of mine I do not say too much about resisting Japan, and some comrades do not quite agree with that. This is because their thought is not straightened out fully. I said even less about resisting Japan in “On New Democracy.”³ As early as 1937 I suggested that only democracy could save China, but some of our comrades did not agree back then; they did not know that the issue of resistance against Japan had already

been agreed upon, that the issue at that time was how to resist Japan. I say that this time the thought of some of our comrades has not yet been straightened out, but this is different from the erroneous tendencies during the period between the December Conference⁴ of 1937 and the Sixth Plenum.⁵ Then they advocated reliance on the Guomindang; they did not want democracy or the people's livelihood; they did not want the Three People's Principles. Wanting the Three People's Principles is a matter of principle, and we must definitely uphold it. Our comrades have very good suggestions, and I have adopted more than 90 percent of them.

Are we too "Leftist" when we propose going all out in mobilizing the masses? I have spent more than half a year trying to figure out what wording to use when dealing with the Guomindang. Is it right to speak in a gentleman-like tone as if holding a press conference? At that time, we had a very good reputation, but neither [Günther] Stein nor [Harrison] Forman⁶ was pleased with my speech. There is a big drawback to such a tone, which is that since we did not really get to the bottom of the issues, we could not expose Chiang Kaishek. Or should we have the attitude of the Soviet Union? That is also inappropriate, because unlike the Soviet Union we are not legal and Chiang Kaishek is no Roosevelt or Churchill. Then should we talk like *Liberation Daily*? That is also no good. *Liberation Daily* may say such things, but it does not say them every day, and it would not be appropriate for our leaders to talk like that. In my report I criticize 90 percent of Chiang, and my criticisms are harsh. But I leave a little space. There is hope, even if it is only less than 10 percent. This hope is necessary; without this space we will make mistakes. I do not say much about the achievements of the Guomindang in the War of Resistance. From a scientific standpoint we should say that the Guomindang are semi-Fascists, but I do not say this so as to avoid boosting their arrogance. How I talk about them changes according to the situation, but the basic spirit is that our independence is stronger. But we still leave some space for Chiang Kaishek.

We adopt an attitude of unifying everyone with whom we want to unite, but there remain some differences and criticism. This point is very important; it would not be good to have no differences. I say that most of the [issues related to the] capitalist classes have to do with land. As for certain elements among the democratic movements in the great rear echelon, people like Sun Ke, we criticize

their lack of determination. After reading Chiang Kaishek's speech of March 1 and our fierce refutation, some people panicked; after they heard of [U.S. ambassador to China Patrick] Hurley's telegraphic response telling us not to make a final conclusion, they were happy again. The middle faction is always wavering. As for the Chinese political forces, the two ends are strong whereas the middle is weak. If China had a Peasant Party, we would distinguish ourselves from it as well. Our Communist Party must get this clear: Only if there are differences can we lead.

The reactionary clique in the Guomindang is also wavering; it is a two-faced faction. On the one hand, it resists the Japanese; on the other, it capitulates. On the one hand, it unites with the Communists; on the other, it opposes the Communists. On the one hand, it unites with the Soviet Union; on the other, it opposes the Soviet Union. We have laid bare all of Chiang Kaishek's lies, and moreover, foreigners are putting pressure on him, too. Hurley's visit to Yan'an and the stationing of the U.S. Military Observation Group⁷ in Yan'an have a great impact, even to the point that the Guomindang espionage agency is affected. [Brooks] Atkinson, Gao Guizi,⁸ and others have said that China is ours, and both Xie Bingxin and Gu Jiegang⁹ participated in the cultural circle's signature campaign. Although I did not mention these things in this report, the spirit is there. We should prepare to greet victory.

Chiang Kaishek will be most unhappy after he reads this report. The middle faction will be both happy and unhappy. The middle faction has a future; the foreigners will support them after Chiang Kaishek fails; their expansion will not hurt us at the moment. But they are wavering. After Chiang steps back, they will support him. On March 1 Chiang published his speech and Luo Longji¹⁰ wrote an essay welcoming "the return of the government of the people." On March 2, we broadcast the New China News Agency reporter's criticism of Chiang Kaishek's speech. On March 10, the Democratic League also published a talk opposing the Guomindang's monopoly of the National People's Congress. Therefore, they can listen to what we say, but they need our firm leadership. I discuss the leadership question a little in my report. In addition to the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the intellectuals, it also includes other democratic elements.

As for foreign countries, the most important thing is to unite with the Soviet Union and to emphasize unity with the other anti-Fascist countries, such as

Britain and the United States. But we also need to be on guard and hope that they will respect the opinions of the Chinese people.

Do I talk too much about Sun Yatsen? Not too much. We must be good at quoting him; there are no drawbacks in doing so, only advantages. Lenin also wanted us to make the most of him. The two fundamental tactics in his last will were to awaken the people and to unite with all the countries that treat us as equals. He spoke best on democracy, saying that [the country] belongs to all ordinary people. Washington and Lincoln both serve now as banners of the Communist Party USA, and we have Sun Yatsen. Moreover, we had a relationship with him in the past; we used to cooperate with him. You cannot blame us for not speaking of him during the Civil War because we had been beaten to the ground then; we never would have stood up if we had not thrown him to the wind. It was like the situation during the May Fourth movement when Confucianism was overthrown. It is different now. A few people in the Party still harbor disrespectful feelings toward Sun Yatsen; they should be persuaded otherwise.

At one point I removed the part in the report on communism, but then I put it back—it would not be good not to mention it. As far as the Party's name is concerned, there are many outside the Party who think that we should change it. But that definitely would be no good because it would hurt our image. So in my report I emphasize the limitless beauty and merit of communism. The peasants like communism, and communism is democracy. In the report, after I talk a little about communism, I take pains to explain the democratic revolution, pointing out that socialism can be reached only through democracy: This is a self-evident principle of Marxism. This differentiates us from populism, whose influence in China and in our Party has been very broad. This report differs from "On New Democracy" in that it confirms the need for broad capitalist development, and its first priority is to oppose despotism. It also raises the issue of opposing old democracy, whose mottos are things like the nationalization of the armed forces. But it does not emphasize opposing old democracy because Chiang Kaishek is an adherent not of old democracy but, rather, of dictatorship. Under the authority of a new democratic government, the broad development of capitalism is not harmful but beneficial, and the report explains three economic components. In the Soviet Union, state capitalism existed for several years. After the October

Revolution, Lenin wanted a kind of state capitalism to develop but did not attain this goal; the rich peasant classes endured for a while longer.

Previously, we did not point out the difference between the general program and concrete programs. In fact, the general program did not change during the period of the Great Revolution, the Civil War, and the War of Resistance, and this program may still be used for a few more years. The essence of new democracy is the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. Concrete programs are different during different eras. A coalition government is a concrete program; it is the concrete form of a united front government. This slogan took a long time to come up with; you can see how difficult it is to find a slogan or a formulation. This slogan has come into being as a result of three things: the massive military losses of the Guomindang; the establishment of coalition governments in some European countries; and the fact that the Guomindang has said that we are all empty talk on the subject of democracy. I never anticipated that as soon as this slogan was brought forward, our comrades in Chongqing would rush to it as to the most valuable treasure and that the support of the people would be so widespread.

If everyone agrees with these basic points of the report, then it will be handed out to the representatives after revision. You may also raise more suggestions about revisions at the congress.

II

Just now, a few comrades raised the question of whether this plenum will be used to settle old scores. Not settling old scores is, of course, not a slogan; summarizing experience can be said to be a kind of settling of accounts, but in doing so we should never seek to sabotage anyone. Comrades attending the Seventh Party Congress should use good reasoning and a good attitude to persuade the representatives of the congress that they need this kind of consciousness. It is better for them to present the historical issues to the Seventh Plenum for resolution so that they themselves may concentrate all their strength on finishing the tasks of the War of Resistance and nation building. Historical mistakes of the

past are primarily a social phenomenon, arising from the fact that the Party was not politically mature. Comrades who made mistakes did so because of a lack of consciousness; it was because they thought they were in the right that they wanted to overthrow everything both inside and outside the Party. But now everyone is enlightened and our thought on the main issues is unified. Comrade Wang Ming¹¹ recently wrote me a letter advocating opposition to the Guomindang reactionary clique and unification of the entire Party; these are good points. If we discuss historical issues during the congress, the meeting will drag on for two to three weeks, the focus of discussion will shift, and the results will not surpass the present draft resolution.¹² If we are going to talk about military history, the history of North China, and every faction, we will not come to any conclusion. The draft resolution does not mention everything; it does not discuss quality, illegality, or factionalism. Not talking about these things is at most a drawback, but talking about them incorrectly would be a mistake. This is the policy that was adopted at the Zunyi Conference¹³ and at the Sixth Plenum.

There is a military matter that needs explaining in this political report: namely, the question of establishing a joint people's army. Over the course of the War of Resistance, great changes have taken place within our army: Some leaders are not Communist Party members. It is not possible for everyone in the military to be a Party member. Even during the Civil War era, no more than one-third of the Red Army were Party members. If some troops cooperate with us and then stop cooperating later on, we should just let them go, give them some leeway, and not step on anyone's toes. Even if they later become enemies again, it will be just the same as it was before we cooperated. Shandong has done a good job of cooperating with other military forces. Many areas are still dominated by "leftism," and we should patiently persuade them to come around.

There are three possibilities for coalition government. The first is a bad one which we hope not to see; it would require us to hand over our troops and become bureaucrats. Naturally, we will not give up our troops, but if the government remains dictatorial, should we become bureaucrats? We will not publicize an intention to do so, but we will not refuse either. We must prepare for this possibility. The bad thing about this would be to be a bureaucrat in a dictatorial government, but this could be explained to the masses (that we are compromising for the general good, but we do not approve of the government).

But there is also a good side to this: We could do some propaganda work. The second possibility is also that Chiang Kaishek is the government head. The government form is democratic, with recognition of the liberated areas, but in essence it is Chiang Kaishek's dictatorial government. The third possibility is that we are the core. When we have 1.5 million troops and 150 million people, when Chiang Kaishek's strength has shrunk and weakened even further and there is no possibility of an alliance, we must do it this way. This is the fundamental direction and law of Chinese political development. The country we must establish is such a country. This is not written in this report. In addition, the policy of the Seventh Congress is only to solve those problems that are ripe for resolution, and so the historical questions that have been assigned to the Seventh Plenum now to resolve are ripe. We should not hurry to resolve historical issues in every area yet because the timing is not right.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 272–79, where it is reproduced from a printed transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) This is a speech made by Mao Zedong at the Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

[2.](#) Referring to the military conference held by Chiang Kaishek in Liuzhou, February 23–25, 1940.

[3.](#) Mao's article of January 15, 1940, translated in Vol. VII, pp. 330–69.

[4.](#) The December Conference refers to the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Yan'an held December 9–14, 1937. The meeting mainly discussed the Chinese Communist Party's policies in the United Front with the Guomindang. Wang Ming made a report at the conference, putting forth the policy of "everything must go through the United Front."

[5.](#) Regarding the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Congress (September 29–November 6, 1938, in Yan'an), see above, note 4 to the text of May 21, 1944.

[6.](#) On Günther Stein, see above, note to the interview with Mao on June 12, 1944. Harrison Forman (1904–1978) was at this time a correspondent for United Press International and the London *Times*, stationed in Chongqing. In June 1944 Forman also visited Yan'an and interviewed Mao Zedong.

- [7.](#) Regarding the U.S. Military Observation Group, see above, text of August 15, 1944.
- [8.](#) Brooks Atkinson was at this time a correspondent for the *New York Times*, stationed in Chongqing. Gao Guizi (1891–1959) was commander of the Seventeenth Guomintang Army.
- [9.](#) Xie Bingxin (1900–1999) was a noted writer. Gu Jiegang (1893–1980) was a noted historian.
- [10.](#) Luo Longji (1898–1965) was an executive member of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League.
- [11.](#) Regarding Wang Ming, see above, note to the text of October 14, 1943.
- [12.](#) This refers to the draft of the resolution on Party history, which was passed on April 20, 1945; see also, below, Mao’s speech on the topic in the text of April 20, 1945.
- [13.](#) Regarding the Zunyi Conference, see above, note to the text of March 5, 1944.

Reply Telegram to the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army

(March 31, 1945)

That same day we sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and to Comrade Mao Zedong to inform them of the good news. In addition, we reported our plan for the next step. On March 31 we received a telegram in reply from Comrade Mao Zedong. The text of the telegram follows:

The telegram that you have taken over Pingjiang and that the people have welcomed you was received today, and we are very pleased! I agree with your plan of working in northern Hunan for a while to build base areas that will connect the north and the south (including Congyang, Tongcheng, Pingjiang, Liuyang, Yueyang, Xiangyin, Changsha, and Xiangtan) and then to continue marching to the south. However, you should pay attention to your tactics. Do not attack the diehard troops voluntarily. Wait until they attack you and then strike; take a stand of self-defense.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 252, where it is reproduced from Wang Shoudao, *Yi Nanzheng* (Recollections of the Southern Campaign) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981). Wang Shoudao was at this time political commissar of the Hunan People's Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army.

Get to Work on Your Own, Overcome Difficulties

(April 9, 1945)

Zheng [Weisan], Li [Xiannian], Chen [Shaomin]:

I have received both Zheng's telegram of March 14 and the telegram by all three of you April 2.

1. It is difficult to send more troops, and you should not count on it.

2. You did the right thing by moving your focus to the western side of the railway¹

and to develop in the direction toward Laohekou. You can adjust the deployment of the troops yourself.

3. I have ordered the Organization Department to consider sending some financial and popular movement cadres.

4. Except for food, other expenses should be resolved from mainly relying on tax revenue to mainly relying on production and self-sufficiency. You should give a free hand to each district to solve its own problems through production. Only this method is the most dependable one. In the three years of 1940, 1941, and 1942, the financial difficulties in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region were worse than yours. Beginning in 1943, we solved them through this method. A border region with a population of only 1.5 million was able to feed 100,000 public servants without harm to the people. The difficulty in the two areas of Wutai and Taihang was also greater than your difficulty, but a major production campaign last year alone changed the situation. This year should be the year in which you begin a major production movement. Do not miss the opportunity for spring plowing. I hope that you will have a realistic discussion at the finance

meeting, the slogan of which is to “get to work on your own, overcome difficulties.” Meanwhile, after consideration, the amount of public grain will be increased, which will surely guarantee supply. With regard to the expansion of troops, you should recruit in newly developed areas and recruit soldiers with consideration of the amount of burden the people there can tolerate. As for inadequacies in mass work, you should order the entire Party, administration, military, and civilian personnel to undertake mass work together and to combine the work of attacking the enemy together, engaging in production and becoming self-sufficient together and doing mass work together. In sum, all problems depend on the strength of the broadest masses for solution. Let go and give the responsibility of solving problems to the subregions and to the broad masses. You leading comrades at the top should only summarize their outlines, appeal to them, and provide guidance, examination, and adjustments. Adopt the principle of concentrated leadership and dispersed management. Never try to assume all the heavy duties at the top; that will make the subordinates look to you for food, clothing, and solutions. Even if you are busy and frantic with anxiety, you will still be unable to satisfy everyone. These are methods resulting from the characteristics of guerrilla war. I do not know whether you will regard them as plausible. Please consider them and try to put them into practice.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 280–81, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

- [1.](#) Referring to the Beiping-Hankou railway line.

Telegram Extending Condolences to Truman on the Death of President Roosevelt

(April 13, 1945)

(Yan'an, April 13, via the New China News Agency) After learning the sad news of the death of U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt, various circles in Yan'an unanimously mourn his death. Apart from expressing their mourning by sending a telegram to President Harry S Truman (the original copy of the telegram follows) and a letter to the U.S. Military Observation Group, Chairman Mao and Commander-in-chief Zhu De sent Ye Jianying and Yang Shangkun to the U.S. Military Observation Group to express their condolences. (The latter is omitted.)

Washington, President Truman:

To our great sorrow, President Roosevelt has passed away. We express our deep sorrow and mourning to the American people and to the president's family. The entire world will be in deep sorrow over this great loss.

Mao Zedong

Zhu De

April 13, 1945, Yan'an

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 255, where it is reproduced from the April 14, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

Explanation of the Draft “Resolution on Certain Historical Questions”¹ (April 20, 1945)

This resolution not only concerns internal matters of the leadership; it also has to do with the entire Party and concerns the people of the whole country and is responsible for the whole Party and for all people. If our discussion of which policies or which parts of which policies are correct or incorrect is compatible with reality, and if it ideologically represents the past twenty-four years of history, then it will be good for the future struggle, and for the Party and the people. The standard for what is correct and what is wrong, naturally, is Marxism, but at the same time, the standard is also the people's interests. The people do not entirely understand the circumstances of the various political factions, but they do know how to judge according to their policies. The Guomindang has devoted itself to the National Revolution for fifty years now. It has done some good things along the way, but it has done even more bad things and so the people do not like it. We have done good things, but we have also made some mistakes. Now the resolution addresses these problems, and it is therefore connected to the people of the entire country.

There are two questions about this resolution: Do we present it or not? And if yes, how? If we do not present it, we are afraid we will be making a mistake. If we follow the prevailing trends, we must do it. But the resolution has some flaws that must be corrected. Therefore, today we ask only that it be basically passed. I think that the basic ideology in the resolution is not bad: that the petty-bourgeois ideology within the Party should be corrected so that the revolution will not be harmed. It is not certain that every historical question is recounted absolutely correctly. Right now, we can only prepare things so that, after twenty or thirty

years, its merits still outweigh its faults. That would already be very good. How should we do it? Should we submit it to the Seventh Congress or to the Seventh Plenum for discussion? We originally prepared to submit it to the Seventh Congress; later we decided to hand it over to the Seventh Plenum. This is a problem of policy. It was not decided casually, but because in this way we can avoid the congress focusing on historical questions.

The resolution also deals with other questions: Was the Fourth Plenum² fundamentally mistaken? We have now cleared up the matter: the Fourth Plenum was fundamentally mistaken. Why isn't the question of the Communist International [Comintern] brought up? We intentionally have not brought it up. The Comintern no longer exists, so we are not going to push off any responsibility onto it. In general, the Comintern's treatment of the Chinese Revolution has been that its merits outweigh its faults. It is just like that with the Jade Emperor: He usually gives you rain, so even if he sometimes does not, his merits still outweigh his faults. Without the establishment and aid of the Comintern, the political party of the Chinese proletariat would not be here today. They need us, and we need them too.

The policy of "cure the illness to save the patient" has been proven effective. Which aspect to emphasize depends on the timing. After December of the year before last, we paid too much attention to curing the illness while not doing so well with saving the patient. So, beginning last year, we added more "licorice root" to the treatment. The current situation is the same. In 1940, it was not permitted to speak of a political line; we spoke of a political line again in 1941, and then the problem of Comrade Wang Ming emerged. While he was recovering from his illness, we had a rectification and we discussed the line questions in the history of the Party. The saying "Xiang Zhuang performed the sword dance to cover his attempt on Liu Bang's life"³ is in fact real. But there are many Liu Bangs; even Xiang Zhuang himself must be included in their ranks. The process of development is always like this. Now this resolution is relatively good; it has unified the two aspects of "cure the illness" and "save the patient." Comrade Wang Ming wrote this letter.⁴ The matter of whether it contains errors can be studied further, but his attitude is good. We should welcome him. The opinions of many other comrades are very good. Mistakes are not a question of a minority of people. It is easy to write down a few names, but the problem does not lie with

these few people. If we simply get rid of a few people without summarizing the historical experiences, it will be just like when the Party still continued to make mistakes even after Chen Duxiu⁵ made mistakes. We must acknowledge that Chen Duxiu made contributions to the Chinese Communist Party and to the Chinese people, in general, like the Russian [Georgi] Plekhanov.⁶ Li Lisan⁷ also made contributions during the era of the Great Revolution. The Party is a political organization, not a clan or a professional organization. Party members come from everywhere and have joined together because their political views are similar. When political views differ, there will be disputes, and during disputes you must draw clear boundaries.

Previously many comrades suffered because China did not have revolutionary leaders like Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin. This was also the case for me. China's backwardness could not give birth to a great man like Lenin. Now there is a task for us: to strengthen our study of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and I am the first one who needs to do this. We must unite with those who have made political mistakes in the past but have now corrected them. The entire Party must unite as a harmonious household, as the resolution says. This promise must be redeemed. The resolution credits me with many good things. I don't oppose this, but this does not at all mean that I do not have deficiencies and faults. It is only in consideration of the Party's interests that they are not written in the resolution. This is something that everyone must recognize clearly and myself first of all. By the time Confucius was seventy, he could do what he desired without transgressing the bounds of correctness. But even if I reach the age of seventy, I know that I will still transgress certain bounds.

There are two keys to the War of Resistance: rectification and production. Without these two things, the Party would not be able to make progress. Twenty-five thousand Party members have developed into hundreds of thousands, most of whom are peasants and members of the petty bourgeoisie. Without rectification, the Party's character would have changed to being proletarian only in name and bourgeois in reality, so Yan'an could not but leave its sickbed: Wang Shiwei,⁸ the "Light Cavalry," and the "Northwest Wind"⁹ occupied the dominant position but only after rectification was the leadership of the proletariat saved. This is also true of the production campaign. Without it the Party would have gone backward and collapsed. All this has taught us that we must figure things

out as we go along, as the proverb says, “In making a straw sandal, you have no model to follow; you figure out how to do it in the process of making it.” This makes sense. In this way, little by little we have learned to move forward. We have by no means learned everything by now; we just make somewhat fewer mistakes.

I must also say a few words about preventing enemy exploitation. Others have set up an “extraordinary committee,” and they have exploited the time when we did not yet have the resolution, saying that the Fourth Plenum is correct. Now that we have the resolution, they want to exploit it even more than before and they want to sow discord. We must be prepared. Unity-criticism-unity, following this principle we will not fear someone sowing discord. But those rumors are different: We need to hunt them down and analyze them. Many of them are just idle chit-chat, without evil intentions; many others are mistaken, but not necessarily malicious either. As for those that are malicious, we must listen to them because only through listening can we discover their evil intentions. In sum, if we have flaws we must change them and if we do not, we must take other people’s criticisms to spur ourselves. If we use these rumors to reinforce our own responsibilities, then we can discharge a great burden and become less irritated. In 1941, there were ordinary people in the border region asking why the Thunder God did not strike Mao Zedong dead. This aroused my vigilance. After analyzing the reasons, I found that the grain tax burden was too heavy. So we developed a great production movement. Last year, there were those at the Party School who said that I was a bureaucrat, and this made me decide to go to the Party School to get closer to the people.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 282–86, where it is reproduced from the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

¹. This is a speech made by Mao Zedong at the Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Congress. The text of “Resolution of the CCP CC on Certain Historical Questions,” dated April 20, 1945, is also translated in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 1164–79.

2. On the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Party Congress (1931), see above, note 6 to the text of March 5, 1944.
3. This quotation is from “Xiang Yu benji” (Basic annals of Xiang Yu) in *Shiji* (Records of the grand historian). In 206 BCE, after Liu Bang, then one of the two most powerful rebel leaders and later the first emperor of the Han dynasty seized Xianyang, Xiang Yu, the other most powerful rebel leader, invited him for a banquet. During the banquet, Xiang Yu’s cousin Xiang Zhuang performed a sword dance in an attempt to kill Liu Bang.
4. Referring to the letter written by Wang Ming to Ren Bishi and for transmittal to Mao Zedong and others who attended the enlarged Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Congress.
5. On Chen Duxiu, see above, note to the text of March 30, 1942.
6. Georgi Plekhanov (1857–1918) was a Russian revolutionary and Marxist theoretician.
7. On Li Lisan, see above, text of March 30, 1942.
8. Wang Shiwei, see above, note 3 to the text of March 22, 1944.
9. “Light Cavalry” and “Northwest Wind” were “wall newspapers” in Yan’an that carried articles by Wang Shiwei and others critical of the Chinese Communist Party in spring 1942.

Working Principles of the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party¹ (April 21, 1945)

Comrade representatives! Today we can have a very good meeting. This is very good timing. We now have a very strong force, and our Party is more united than ever before.

What is the orientation of our congress? It should be: unite together to strive for victory. In short, one is unity, and the other is victory. Victory refers to our objective; unity refers to our front line and our army. We must have a unified army to beat our enemy and to strive for victory, but the most important thing that plays a leadership role in the army is our Party. Without our Party, it is impossible for the Chinese people to win victory.

The struggle of the Chinese people to demand emancipation, even without considering the distant past and speaking only of relatively recent history, has been going on for more than one hundred years. It has already been one hundred and five years from 1840 and the Opium War launched by the British to 1945. In the more than one hundred years, many great changes have taken place. The greatest change is from the old democratic revolution to the new democratic revolution. Before, there was no proletariat leadership. When the bourgeoisie just began to appear or became a little stronger or grew even stronger later and when the proletariat still did not have its own vanguard team, the proletariat's level of consciousness was still not high. Yet the bourgeoisie had a lot of advantages. It had the advantage in terms of culture, economy, and political experience. It had a political party, slogans, and its own goals for struggle. In contrast, the proletariat

did not have these and followed the bourgeoisie. It is only in the past twenty-some years that the proletariat has had its own political party, slogans, and goals for struggle.

The best-known struggles in modern Chinese history include the Opium War, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom movement, the Sino-French War, and the Sino-Japanese War in the twentieth year of the reign of the Guangxu emperor [1894]. Later there were the Hundred Days Reform [1898] and the Boxer movement [1900], after which came the Xinhai Revolution [1911]. The revolution opposed two things. The first is called oppression by foreign countries, while the other is called oppression by the feudal system. The Chinese people are always dissatisfied with these two things and always want to rise up and resist them. They rose up once but were suppressed; they rose up again and were suppressed again. This history lasted for about eighty years. Under what circumstances did the May Fourth movement in 1919 take place? It occurred after World War I.

It is said that human history is 500,000 years old. During these 500,000 years, one period was the history of barbarism; another was the history of civilization. The history of civilization is only about 5,000 years or a little more. Our China has a very long history, but it is only 4,000 to 5,000 years. From the beginning of the reign of the Yellow Emperor to the Xinhai Revolution is 4,609 years; it is still only 4,643 years if we add the 34 years after the Xinhai Revolution. In fact, the age of the so-called Yellow Emperor was still not civilized society. Civilized society began with slave society. In China, according to reliable historical sources, it began in the Shang and Zhou dynasties. It took 5,000 years of civilized society for World War I to occur. This world war took place because when world capitalism developed into the twentieth century, capitalists collided with capitalists over fewer markets, with some grabbing large places and others grabbing smaller places. This was the so-called age of imperialism. The first worldwide war in the entire history of mankind broke out in 1914. Those of you here who are over thirty all know this and still remember it. This war, as I have just said, is a reflection of global economic development. When the world economy developed to that degree, such a problem occurred. Marxists long ago predicted this point.

This war was destructive, unjust, and damaging to the interests of humanity. It was a war to seize and occupy markets. These were its negative aspects.

Nonetheless, it also had positive aspects, which included the outbreak of the October Revolution in Russia, the founding of communist parties in many countries, and the creation of vanguard teams by the proletariat itself in many countries, including China. The world war was followed by a period of world revolution. First, the October Revolution broke out in Russia. It was followed by revolutions in Germany, Hungary, and Italy, but they were all defeated because the proletariat in these countries was still divided into communist parties and social democratic parties. Moreover, the proletariat had not sufficiently awakened. Only the October Revolution in Russia succeeded. The face of the world and the direction of history were changed after World War I and the victory of the October Revolution. World history has been developing and making progress for several thousand years, but it did not produce a new direction until after World War I and the October Revolution. Slave society, as well as feudal society and the capitalist society that followed, were all societies in which some exploited others. The new direction of history after the October Revolution is to abolish systems in which some exploit others. The Russian people have achieved victory. Many countries have a communist party. Our Party was founded in 1921, and it now has twenty-four years of history. The Japanese Communist Party was founded in 1922; the Communist Party of India was founded in 1920. This is the case in several major countries in the East. Communist parties in other countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States were all founded at around this period. In 1919, Lenin organized the Third International.

Beginning with the May Fourth movement in China, the old democratic revolution transformed into the new democratic revolution. The May Fourth movement was mobilized by the masses. It was an open opposition against their own enemy by the armies of the masses on the streets. At the beginning, only awakened and progressive students participated. By the time "June Third" [movement] occurred, it was not just the students in Shanghai. The broad ranks of workers and businessmen also took part. Later, Hankou, Changsha, the Yangzi River Valley, and the Pearl River Valley were all engulfed in this wave. The May Fourth movement involved the most awakened elements in China. The awakened elements at that time included Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. The May Fourth movement had a Left wing and a Right wing, and Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao

represented the Left wing. At that time, there was still no communist party in China, but a few people already had the beginnings of Communist thought.

The cannon shot of the October Revolution taught the proletariat and other progressive elements in the whole world a lesson in communism. Marx and Engels founded Marxist doctrine in 1843 (three years after the Opium War), but its influence in the seventy-four years between 1843 and 1917 was restricted mainly to Europe. The majority of the people in the world still did not know about so-called Marxism. Marxism originated in Europe and began spreading in Europe at a relatively slow pace. At that time, with the exception of a few Chinese students abroad, ordinary people did not know about it. I, too, did not know that there was a Marx in this world. Today, children of fourteen or fifteen years old all know about him. That is why I say, comrades, you are very fortunate. At that time, even after fully growing up, we still did not know how high the sky was or how thick the earth was and definitely we did not know there was imperialism or Marxism in this world. Even after attending school, we only got to know a few bourgeois heroes like Washington and Napoleon. Before that, there were some people like Liang Qichao and Zhu Zhixin² who mentioned Marxism a bit. It is said that there was another person who translated and published Engels's *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* in a magazine. The bottom line is that I did not see it then, and even if I did see it, it just slipped through my fingers momentarily without my notice. Zhu Zhixin was a member of the Guomindang. From this we can see that the Guomindang first spoke of Marxism. In spite of this, no one in China in the past really knew about Marxist communism. The cannon shot of the October Revolution flew faster than an airplane. It probably takes more than one day for a plane to get here from Moscow, but this news took only one day. That is, the revolution in Russia took place on November 7. By November 8, China already knew about it. At that time, the revolutionary party in Russia was called the Radical Party. For more than seventy years, Marxism had spread so slowly, but after the October Revolution it spread very quickly. Because it spread so quickly, the spiritual appearance of the Chinese people was quite different in 1919. After the May Fourth movement, the Chinese people had quickly learned the slogans to overthrow imperialism and feudal power. Before that, who knew to propose such slogans? No one! Such slogans and such clear programs were put forward after the Chinese proletariat

created its own vanguard—the Communist Party.

In 1921 our Party held the First Party Congress. Of the twelve representatives who are still alive and are still Communist Party members (those who became traitors like Zhang Guotao³ and others do not count), one is Chen Tanqiu,⁴ who is imprisoned by the Guomindang in a Xinjiang prison. Another is Dong Biwu, who has flown to San Francisco. I am one as well. Of the twelve representatives, two of them are now traitors in Nanjing. One is Zhou Fohai,⁵ and the other is Chen Gongbo.⁶ The meeting was held in July, and now we consider July 1 the anniversary of the Party. Originally it was to be held in Shanghai, but because the police wanted to arrest us, we ran to South Lake in Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province. It was held on a boat. Did we publish a declaration? I do not remember. We did not know how many Marxisms there were or how to do things in this world. The so-called representatives were never as smart as you comrades, who now know this and that. We did not know anything about the economy, culture, Party affairs, rectification, and so on. I was like that then, and the others were about the same. Chen Duxiu was not present at that meeting; he was in Guangdong serving as the director of the Education Department. There is a proverb in China's *Zhuangzi* that says: "At its beginning it is simple, but when accomplished it will be huge."⁷ We have not "accomplished," but we are already very great. The first line on the first page in the first volume of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* states that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] evolved from a small Marxist group to the party that leads the Soviet Union. We also evolved from a small group to establish a party. We will develop through the base areas to the entire country. We are now still in the base areas and have not yet reached the entire nation. At the beginning, we were also a small group. I was given a form at this congress. One of the items asked me to fill in who introduced me to the Party. I said that no one recommended me. We did everything by ourselves then, and we did not know much. We can be described as young and ignorant and lacking in understanding about the ways of the world. Nevertheless, in the twenty-four years after that, we became extremely serious and turned the world upside down! The whole world has been turned upside down as well. It has been an earth-shaking twenty-four years for China and an earth-shaking twenty-eight years for the world. These twenty-eight years are the years after the victory of the CPSU. The twenty-four years since the

founding of the Chinese Communist Party are also very different from before. The broad masses of the people must be made aware of this.

There have never been people like this in all of history, nor has there ever been a Communist Party like this. During these twenty-four years, after the Communist small groups and after the Northern Expedition, we grew stronger on a grand and spectacular scale. But in the middle of it, we were shot by the other party and fell down to the ground. As we struggled to stand up and regain strength, we again fought against it, and this was the Land Revolution. From 1921 to 1927, it was mainly the Northern Expedition. From 1927 to 1937, it was the Civil War. From 1937 to the present, it has been the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Few comrades today have experienced all three periods, but many comrades have experienced two of the periods. I am talking about the entire Party. We have not collected these statistics for the representatives who are here today, so we still do not know whether those who have experienced all three periods, those who have experienced two periods, or those who have experienced one period, are more numerous. This is the way we traveled in the past twenty-four years: seven years from the founding of the Party to the Northern Expedition, ten years of Civil War, eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Our Party has tasted all manner of bitterness and hardship, as well as grandeur and brave struggles. In all of history, there has never been a group in China like the Communist Party, which does not hesitate to sacrifice everything and any number of people to carry out such a grand undertaking.

During the seven years of the first major revolution, the total number of Party members did not exceed 60,000. We were slapped down to the ground by others. Like a basket of eggs dropped on the floor, many were broken but not all of them. We picked up the good ones and began to hatch chicks. This was a major experience. We were shot at by others and got angry. We started again and did very well. For instance, we overthrew feudal power and overthrew imperialism, as was quite correct. Because Chiang Kaishek worked hand in glove with imperialism and feudal power, we proposed the revolutionary slogan of overthrowing Chiang Kaishek and fought against him for ten years. It was not wrong to fight against Chiang Kaishek, but there were many disagreements as to how to organize the army and, after having organized the army, how to fight.

This is what we discuss in the “Resolution on Certain Historical Questions.”⁸ In general, the disagreements did not go beyond these three questions: first, who is the enemy; who is a friend; second, how to organize our army; third, how to fight. Of the disagreements that arose on these three issues, the opinions of some comrades were basically more appropriate, more fitting for China’s conditions, and relatively more correct. They were better on how to organize our army and how to fight, but they were not perfect. At that time, the comrades in our Party were from all over the country. Most of them did not know each other, except for a few, for whom the Guomindang had offered a few thousand *yuan* in reward for their capture. Nonetheless, their opinions could be the same, perhaps on this issue or perhaps on that one.

I have met Sun Yatsen, and there are still some comrades here who have met him. He passed away in 1925. I saw him on the thirty-ninth year of his devotion to the National Revolution. At that time, he was already close to sixty. Then the Guomindang was holding its first party congress. Venerable Lin [Boqu] here was also one of the participants. We attended the Guomindang congress as Communist Party members and were the “cross-party elements.” We were Guomindang members while being Communist Party members at the same time. At that time, we helped to organize the Guomindang in every province. Back then, we were forced to participate because the Guomindang did not know anything about organizing. For thirty-nine years, it had been engaged in the National Revolution but it did not hold a single party congress. It was not until 1924, after we had joined the Guomindang, that the first party congress was convened. We drafted the declaration and took care of many things for them. There was a Borodin⁹ who was the adviser and a member of the CPSU. There was also a Qu Qiubai, who was a Communist Party member who joined the Guomindang. Sun Yatsen had one merit. When he did not know what to do next, he came to us. He listened to everything that Borodin said. At that time, it was called “learning from Russia” because he never succeeded in his thirty-nine years of conducting revolution. Back then, we proposed overthrowing imperialism, overthrowing feudal power, overthrowing corrupt officials, and overthrowing local bullies and evil gentry. Many people were against us, saying that the members of the Central Committee were thirty-six rebel leaders. The organization of the army was also a collaboration between the Guomindang and

the Communist Party. There were members of both parties among the important army and party cadres at that time. Chiang Kaishek was the commander of the First Army, while Comrade [Zhou] Enlai was the party representative. Tan Yankai was the commander of the Second Army, while the party representative was Comrade Li Fuchun.¹⁰ The party representative of the Sixth Army was Venerable Lin. It was a coalition government then, and the military was a major component of the government. Therefore, there has been a coalition government before.

The Northern Expedition succeeded on a grand scale. Nonetheless, toward the end of this period our Party did not do very well, producing Chen Duxiu-ism. Later, Chen Duxiu was against us and formed the Trotskyist Chen Liquidationist Faction. In spite of that, we can talk about Chen Duxiu today. He did make some contributions. He was the commander-in-chief during the May Fourth movement. In fact, the entire movement was under his leadership. He and the group of people around him, such as Comrade Li Dazhao and others, played a very important role. At that time, we were learning to write in the vernacular and we learned from him that essays should be punctuated. This was a major invention. We also heard from him that there was Marxism in the world. We are the students of his generation. The May Fourth movement prepared cadres for the Chinese Communist Party. There was a magazine called *New Youth*, which was edited by Chen Duxiu. Some who were awakened by this magazine and by the May Fourth movement later joined the Communist Party. These people were greatly influenced by Chen Duxiu and the group of people around him. It can be said that they gathered together some people and thus founded the Party. I would say that in several respects Chen Duxiu was like [Georgi] Plekhanov¹¹ in Russia. He carried out the work of enlightenment and created the Party, but his thinking was not as good as Plekhanov's. Plekhanov carried out very good Marxist propaganda in Russia. Chen Duxiu, however, was not like that, and he even had some mistaken opinions, although he created the Party and should be credited with that. Later Plekhanov became a Menshevik; Chen Duxiu was China's Menshevik. After the Nazi-Soviet War [i.e., World War II], Stalin put Lenin and Plekhanov together in one of his speeches. The *History of the CPSU* also mentions him. In the future when we write our Party history, we should also talk about him. In terms of Comrade Li Lisan,¹² who committed "Left" errors during the

Civil War, he and Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi led the workers movement in Anyuan before the first major revolution. Later, during the May Thirtieth movement in Shanghai, he played a very important role and he should also be credited for it.

Now let us talk about the “Resolution on Certain Historical Questions.” This resolution has already been carefully discussed by you comrades. You comrades suggested that it be handled at the Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Congress rather than at this congress in order to guarantee a united and successful congress. It is a very good suggestion that takes into account the entire Party, the people of all China, and the future of the Party. The resolution was passed in principle yesterday at the Seventh Plenum, and it will be handed over to the new Central Committee after this congress adopts the revisions.

The working principles of this congress are unity and victory. The eyes of the congress should look forward instead of backward. Otherwise, it will affect the success of the congress. The eyes of the congress should look toward the 400 million people in order to organize our ranks.

We have not won victory yet; our force is still small, and we still have difficulties before us. We have more than 900,000 troops, but they are not concentrated. Instead, they are separated and are fighting “sparrow warfare.” We have a population of more than 90 million in our base areas, but they are not in one solid area and they are separated from each other as well. Our enemies are still very powerful. There are the formidable Japanese imperialists, and there is also the Guomindang. These two enemies are not of the same type. While one is guarding our front door, the other is guarding our back door. Therefore, instead of being arrogant and impatient, we must be cautious and modest. We must swear off arrogance and impatience. If one is modest, one is not arrogant and can swear off arrogance. In the past, people used to say “rich businessmen always hide their wealth as if they have none.” If a merchant had a lot of money, he hid it as though he had nothing. We are the same and we must maintain modesty. In our history, there were such lessons that taught us that being big would not do, because being small was more comfortable, with fewer problems. Once we become big, we will become bloated. We will lose our heads and become arrogant. Our hearts will become impatient, even extremely so. Impatience is linked with arrogance. Arrogance will result in impatience, and everyone who is impatient is also arrogant, imprudent, and careless. Now we have learned the

lesson of prudence. We proposed a historical resolution. It was repeatedly discussed and was read by many. It was not enough that only members of the Central Committee read it. After reading it seven or eight times, they did not find many problems; however, all sorts of problems appeared as soon as everyone read it and studied it. It is very good that you have pointed out many things during the discussions. This is called doing things prudently. We must do everything slowly; the sky will not fall. The sky has never fallen before. Long ago there was the kingdom of Qi. Some people there were afraid that the sky might fall and worried about it every day. This is called the “People of Qi worrying about the Heavens.”¹³ It has been several thousand years, and none of the twenty-four standard histories mention the sky falling. Even if it does fall, a few comrades among us are tall enough to hold it up, so we do not have to worry. After repeated study, the “Resolution on Certain Historical Questions” passed in principle. After the election of the new Central Committee, it will be handed over for careful revisions. Will there still be errors in this way? It is still possible. In ten or eight years, when we write the history of the Chinese Communist Party, we will know. If there are errors, then there are errors, and we will say “this historical fact was missing in the past and that is wrong. We must add it back in now.” This is not a big deal, just like collecting firewood; that which is collected later is always on top. We treat our ancestors in the same way. If there are errors, we will correct them. The principle is to insist on the truth and to correct mistakes.

The *History of the CPSU* was published in 1938. Although the Soviet Union achieved victory in 1917, the Central Committee did not publish the *History of the CPSU* until 1938, after twenty-some years. We can see that it was not an easy task. It is even more difficult to include all twenty-four years of history in this short draft resolution on history. Certainly, we are still not writing Party history but are mainly talking about the “Left” errors in the history of our Party. We are also talking about the struggle between a line that is better suited to the interests of the Chinese people, and another line which is partially suited to the interests of the Chinese people and partially not. Furthermore, we are talking about the struggle between proletarian thought and petty-bourgeois thought. After several years of consideration, it is now the right time to solve this problem, so we wrote a draft resolution to solve it. It is not yet the right time to resolve issues during

the War of Resistance, so we will not solve them now. It is possible that we will find fault with this draft resolution in the future, but the principle of curing the illness and saving the patient will not be wrong.

Do the issues in the draft resolution on history concern the majority or the minority? I would say that they concern the majority and they are issues affecting the entire Party and the people of all China. Hence, we must be modest and prudent instead of arrogant and impatient. These are issues concerning the majority, and these are issues that concern ourselves. It is easy to solve the problems of the minority. Take the listing of names, for example. It is not at all difficult to list the names of one or two people, yet issues concerning the majority cannot be solved that easily. We are very cautious this time while writing this draft resolution on history.

We should also be like this on other issues. We must fight bravely, but we must also be modest and prudent. The lessons of history demand that we be modest and prudent. In the past, some comrades were very impatient and hoped for the victory of the revolution tomorrow. But unfortunately, there was no victory and instead it dragged on for ten years. Then we had 300,000 Party members and several hundred thousand troops. Our heads became bloated, and we became impatient. As a result, only northern Shaanxi was left. Some people say that northern Shaanxi is not a good place because the land there is not fertile and the people are poor. Nonetheless, I would say that we would not have been able to pick ourselves back up without northern Shaanxi. I think that northern Shaanxi is two points. It is a resting point and also a starting point. It is the glory of the people in northern Shaanxi that the Seventh Congress is held here. Northern Shaanxi has become a test region for all our work. All our work is first tested here. We are holding the Seventh Party Congress here, and we are solving historical problems here.

I would like to elaborate on cure the illness to save the patient. The doctrine of cure the illness to save the patient states that the purpose of curing illnesses is to save patients. People are originally healthy, but because they are infected with germs, they become ill. They have to ask the doctor to examine them, and they have to take some medicine. Then they are cured. It is impossible to save patients without curing illnesses, and it is also impossible to cure illnesses without saving the patients. Biases in either direction are no good and should be corrected. Every

comrade should unite under this draft resolution on history, like the unity of a harmonious family mentioned in the draft resolution. In the past we often said to unite as one man. That was rhetoric used in writing. This time we say to unite as a harmonious family. There is struggle in a family. The struggle in a new family is solved through democracy. We should treat our comrades as our brothers and sisters. We can gain comfort from this. When tired, we can take a rest here. We can show our concern for each other and be very cordial to each other. As for making mistakes, it is not just one or two people. Everyone has made mistakes. I have also made mistakes. Everyone makes mistakes, and people's mistakes vary in seriousness. The draft resolution gives me all the credit. Therefore, I will express some opinions about it. It is all right if credit is given to me as a representative of the Party, but if I am praised as if I were the only person in the Party, then our Party would not be a party. We must be aware that more often than not the ranks are not very tidy. Thus we must often shout line up, line up left, line up right, and line up center. We should line up with the standards of the Central Committee and the congress. To keep up is the principle; deviations are a fact of real life. When a deviation occurs, we will call for lining up. Nevertheless, officers cannot beat soldiers. That is to say that there should be a correct relationship between cadres and Party members. Within a rank, people's thinking at times is correct and at times is erroneous, and often it is not tidy. But we should have a good attitude toward comrades who have made mistakes. It is rare that someone is expelled from the family. Although it is still not clear what Ah Q's¹⁴ family name was, we have never heard that he once was expelled from his family. Ah Q was very brave in the struggle. His shortcomings include subjectivism, factionalism, Party formalism, and the lack of any spirit of self-criticism. He wanted to expose the shortcomings of others, but he did not want others to expose his own shortcomings. His dogmatism and Party formalism were formidable. A long bench must be called a long bench and never a stool. Calling it a stool is committing a line error. He was that dogmatic and relied that much on Party formalism! Nonetheless, the author who wrote Ah Q still liked him because the reactionaries executed him. Thus we should unite with those who have shortcomings and have made mistakes.

There are two isms that often create trouble within the Communist Party: one is dogmatism, and the other is empiricism. This resolution says that I have been

attacked many times. I think it should be crossed out. It also says that the anti-Luo Ming¹⁵ line was an attack on me. Although it is true, it is better to cross it out. It is not necessary to write this. I made mistakes, too. In 1927 I wrote an article. It had Marxist views, but it lacked a Marxist view on economic issues. Thus, economic issues were discussed incorrectly.¹⁶ In addition, in more than twenty years of work, I have made numerous mistakes on military and political issues as well as in Party affairs. These are not recorded in it, but it is not denying them. Because according to the actual history and the actual situation, I did make mistakes. Another example is the writing of this draft resolution. It has been rewritten many times. Without everyone's opinion, it would not be so complete. Most of us are the products of a semicolonial, semifeudal society. We have only limited knowledge and limited skills. If you say that I have no skills whatsoever and that I do not know anything about Marxism, I would have to disagree. A Trotskyite named Ye Qing,¹⁷ who was once a Communist, said that Mao Zedong did not know anything about Marxism-Leninism and that his only ism was Mao Zedong-ism, which represented the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie. I do not agree with this. He made it seem as if I had no Marxism-Leninism while he had plenty, or even all. If you say I have huge piles of Marxism-Leninism, that is also wrong. People shout "long live," but I say that I am fifty-two years old. Certainly such a long life is both unnecessary and inappropriate, but it does introduce a task. We still have to go forward and still have to grow bigger. If I say that I know a little about Marxism, that also introduces a task, and we must also move forward. In the entire history of the world, there has never been knowledge or things that are perfect and that do not develop further. The Earth is developing; the sun is developing. This is the world. If development ceases, it would not be the world. The whole universe is more advanced than in the past. After we do not know how many millions and millions of years on Earth, living organisms, animals, and humanity appeared. Moreover, humanity, in the course of a history of hundreds of thousands of years, generated civilized society, capitalist society, and socialist society. The Marxist view of the universe teaches us to understand that in the future humanity will still progress to a Communist society. After the new democratic society, China will continue to progress until there are no more classes and no more political parties. The Communist Party and the Guomindang will all become useless, as will the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth

Army. In the very distant future, the sun and the Earth will all be destroyed. New things will appear after the old are destroyed. People with a Marxist perspective must view issues this way. Nevertheless, do we still need politics today? Yes. What is politics? Sun Yatsen said that politics is everyone's affair. Scientifically speaking, his words are incorrect. His words only have a revolutionary meaning, which is anti-feudalism, because the politics of a feudal society is the dictatorial rule by the emperor alone. Yet there were many people in primitive Communist society but no politics. Politics did not begin until slave society. To some extent, politics is class struggle. Engels said that there were three kinds of class struggle: political struggle, economic struggle, and theoretical struggle. The last two struggles also have political characteristics. Marxists should have this perspective. This is the perspective of thorough revolution. Accordingly, we must go all out to expand and strengthen the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army through war and class struggle.

Nothing in this world is perfect. The son is closer to perfection than the father; the grandson is closer to perfection than the son. Latecomers surpass those who came before.

At this congress, many comrades were not elected as representatives and cannot attend or audit. They are very anxious. In fact, this is not important. We can explain everything to them. Take me for example, I "attended the First, the Third, and the Fifth but was absent from the Second, the Fourth, and the Sixth." I did not attend any of the even numbered congresses. I attended the Fifth Party Congress but did not have the power to vote. At that time, I was the secretary of the Peasant Committee and proposed a draft resolution on the peasant movement. The Central Committee did not pass it, and the Fifth Party Congress did not adopt it either. Now the Party is fairer than in the past, but there will still be unfair episodes.

This is to say that nothing is perfect. This gives us the task of progressing toward perfection and toward relative truth. Nonetheless, we will never reach absolute perfection and will never arrive at absolute truth. Therefore, we must work tirelessly.

Now there is another "communist party," which is an "extraordinary committee" made up of some traitors gathered together by the Guomindang espionage agency. They have already issued a declaration, and their slogan is to

overthrow Mao Zedong. The enemy will surely make use of our resolution on history after its publication. Nonetheless, we do not care whether they are going to make use of it, we will still produce this resolution on history. We will not listen to any provocation by any enemy. There might also be some provocations by people with ill will within the Party. Do not be afraid of such provocations. Within the Party and the revolutionary contingent, we have a principle, which is unity, unity on the foundation of principle.

To sum up, our Party has achieved much in the past twenty-four years and there have been great achievements. We must continue to grasp tightly the weapons of Marxism and must have the spirit of self-criticism. The entire Party should unite together as brothers and sisters and work hard for the victory of all China. We will never give up until we achieve final victory!

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 287–320, where it is reproduced from the July 16, 1981, issue of *Renmin ribao*.

[1.](#) This is a report delivered by Mao Zedong at a preparatory meeting for the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

[2.](#) Liang Qichao (1873–1929) was an important activist in the Hundred Days Reform of 1898. After the 1911 Revolution, he founded the Progressive Party (Jinbu dang), which became the Research Clique (Yanjiu xi) in 1916. From 1902 to 1904, he edited *Xinmin congbao* (New Citizen Journal) in which he discussed Marx several times. Zhu Zhixin (1885–1920) was a member of the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmeng hui) and a well-known democrat in modern China.

[3.](#) On Zhang Guotao, see above, note 7 to the text of March 5, 1944.

[4.](#) Chen Tanqiu (1896–1943) was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. He had been the representative of the Communist Party in Xinjiang and the director of the Xinjiang Office of the Eighth Route Army since 1939. Chen was captured by the warlord Sheng Shicai in 1942 and was secretly executed in September 1943. Clearly, Mao did not yet have this news.

[5.](#) Zhou Fohai (1897–1948) attended the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, but quit the Party in 1924. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he took the position of deputy head of the

State Administrative Council of the Wang Jingwei puppet government.

6. Chen Gongbo (1892–1946) attended the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, but quit the Party in 1922. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he took the positions of head of the legislature, head of the State Administrative Council, and acting president of the Wang Jingwei puppet “National Government.”

7. See “Renjian shi” (The Realm of Human Interactions), in the ancient Chinese philosophical classic, *Zhuangzi*, ch. 4.

8. The resolution is translated in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 1164–79.

9. Mikhail Borodin (1884–1951) was a Russian diplomat. He went to China in October 1923 as representative of the Communist International and of the Soviet government to serve as a political adviser to the Guomindang. He returned to the Soviet Union in 1927.

10. Tan Yankai (1880–1930), a noted Chinese military and political actor, was active in the early Republican overnments. In addition to the post mentioned by Mao, Tan served as the first internationally recognized ead of the Nanjing government of the Guomindang in 1928. Li Fuchun (1900–1975) was at this time deputy ead of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

11. On Georgi Plekhanov, see above, note 6 to the text of April 20, 1945.

12. On Li Lisan, see above, text of March 30, 1942.

13. This is a set phrase in Chinese which Mao’s listeners knew meant “groundless fears.”

14. Ah Q is the protagonist in Lu Xun’s story “The True Story of Ah Q” (*Ah Q zhengzhuan*).

15. Luo Ming (1901–1987) was a senior Chinese Communist Party official. In 1933, when he was the acting secretary of the Fujian Party Committee in the Central Revolutionary Base Area, the “leftist” leaders labeled his policies an “opportunist and escapist line.”

16. The editors of *Mao Zedong wenji* (Vol. 3, p. 302) suggest with an example that Mao is here referring to his 1927 “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” from which he excised some economic interpretations. Mao’s original text and the changes are noted in our translation in Vol. II, pp. 429–64.

17. On Ye Qing, see above, note 14 to the text of March 22, 1944.

Comrade Mao Zedong's Opening Speech at the Seventh National Congress¹ (April 23, 1945)

Comrades! The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party opens today. This is a congress that concerns the destiny of 450 million people.² Ours is a congress for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the building of a new China, for final victory through unity of the whole nation³ and of the people of the whole world.

The times are very favorable. In the West, the war against Fascist Germany is about to be successfully concluded.⁴ In the East, the war against Fascist Japan⁵ is also near victory. We are⁶ now on the eve of victory.⁷

Facing us and all of China's people there is light and there also is darkness.⁸ The Japanese aggressor⁹ has not yet been defeated. But even after its defeat two prospects will still confront us. Either a China that is independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous, and strong¹⁰ or a China that is semicolonial, semifeudal, divided, poor, and weak.¹¹

What is our task?¹² Unite¹³ all the forces in the nation capable of being united in order to defeat¹⁴ the Japanese aggressor and build a new China¹⁵ that is independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous, and strong, strive for the bright future, and oppose a dark future.¹⁶ This is our task.¹⁷

Is it possible for us and for the people of China to realize this task? I believe it is.¹⁸ (1) *China not only has another political party, it also has a powerful Communist Party with rich experience and a membership of 1.21 million.* (2) *China not only has other areas but also has powerful liberated areas with a population of 95.5 million, an army of 910,000, and a militia of 2.2 million.* (3) The

support of the masses throughout the country. (4) The support of innumerable people in the whole world.¹⁹ With these conditions,²⁰ it is entirely possible to defeat the aggressors and build a new China.

We must have a correct policy. The fundamental point of our policy is to unite all possible forces within the whole nation and around the world to²¹ defeat the aggressors and build a new China.

In the twenty-four years of its existence since its birth in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party has gone through three historical periods of heroic struggle—the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution,²² and the War of Resistance Against Japan—and has accumulated a wealth of experience. Now our Party has become the center of gravity of the Chinese people’s struggle to resist Japan and save the nation.²³

We should be modest and prudent, guard against arrogance and rashness, and serve the Chinese people heart and soul. *We should struggle* to unite them to defeat the Japanese aggressors in the present and to build a new democratic state in the future. Provided we do so, provided we have the correct policy, and provided we make a united effort, we can definitely fulfill our task.

Down with Japanese imperialism!

Long live the liberation of the Chinese people!

Long live the Chinese Communist Party!

Long live the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party!

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 179–82, where it is reproduced from *Jiefang ribao*, May 1, 1945. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s (under the title “China’s Two Possible Destinies”); for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

1. Comrade Mao Zedong’s Opening Speech at the Seventh National Congress → China’s Two Possible Destinies

2. [after “people.” add] → What is the significance of our congress? It is a congress, it should be said, that

affects the destiny of China's 450 million people. China can have one of two destinies. Someone has written a book about one of them; our congress represents China's other destiny and we, too, shall write a book about it. The aim of our congress is the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the liberation of all the people of China.

3. The whole nation → All the Chinese people

4. In the West, the war against Fascist Germany is about to be successfully concluded. → In Europe, Hitler will soon be overthrown. The chief theater of the world anti-Fascist war is in the West, where the fighting will soon end in victory, thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Red Army. The guns of the Red Army can already be heard in Berlin, which before long will probably fall.

5. Against Fascist Japan → To overthrow Japanese imperialism

6. We are → Our congress is

7. Victory. → Final victory in the anti-Fascist war.

8. Facing us and all of China's people there is light and there also is darkness. → Two roads lie before the Chinese people, the road of light and the road of darkness. Two possible destinies await China, a destiny of light and a destiny of darkness.

9. The Japanese aggressor → Japanese imperialism

10. [after "strong" add] →, that is, a China full of light, a new China whose people have won liberation,

11. [after "weak." add] →, that is, the old China. The new China or the old China—these are the two prospects facing the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party, and our present congress.

12. What is our task? → Since Japan is not yet defeated and since the two prospects will still face us even after its defeat, how should we set about our work? What is our task?

13. Unite → Our sole task is boldly to mobilize the masses, expand the people's forces and unite

14. In order to defeat → In order to struggle under our Party's leadership to defeat

15. A new China → A bright new China, a China

16. Strive for a bright future, and oppose a dark future. → We must strive with all our might for a bright future, a destiny of light, and against a dark future, a destiny of darkness.

17. This is our task. → This is our one and only task! Indeed, it is the task of our congress, of our whole party, and of all the people of China.

18. Is it possible for us and for the people of China to realize this task? I believe it is. → Is it possible for our hopes to be realized? We believe it is. The possibility exists, because we already enjoy the following

conditions:

[19.](#) The support of innumerable people in the whole world. → The support of the people of all countries, and especially of the Soviet Union.

[20.](#) With these conditions, → With these conditions—a powerful Communist Party, powerful liberated areas, the support of the masses throughout the country and the support of the people of the world—can our hopes be realized? We believe they can. China has never before enjoyed these conditions. Some have been present for a number of years, but never so fully as today. Our Communist Party has never been so powerful, the revolutionary base areas have never had so large a population and so large an army, the prestige of the Communist Party is higher than ever among the people, both in the Japanese-occupied and the Guomindang areas, and the revolutionary forces of the Soviet Union and the people of all countries are stronger than ever before. One must say that, with these conditions,

[21.](#) Is to unite all possible forces within the whole nation and around the world to → Is boldly to mobilize the masses and expand the people's forces so that, under the leadership of our Party, they will

[22.](#) Agrarian Revolution → Agrarian Revolutionary War

[23.](#) [after "nation." add] →, the center of gravity of their struggle for liberation and of their struggle to defeat the aggressors and build a new China. China's center of gravity lies right here where we are and nowhere else.

On Coalition Government

(April 24, 1945)

Political Report to the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

1. The Fundamental Demands of the Chinese People

Comrades! The long-awaited Seventh National Congress of our Party has now begun, and I am reporting to you on behalf of the Central Committee. The current situation demands that our congress discuss and decide many important issues. After that we will explain our ideas to the Chinese people. If they agree with our ideas, then we will join with them in putting these ideas to work.

Our congress is being held under the following circumstances. A new situation has emerged after nearly eight years of resolute, heroic, and indomitable struggle waged by the Chinese people with countless sacrifices and amid untold hardships against the Japanese aggressors: In the world as a whole, decisive victory has been gained in the just and sacred war against the Fascist aggressors, and the moment is near when the Japanese aggressors will be defeated by the Chinese people in coordination with the Allied countries. But China remains divided, *the Japanese aggressors still oppress us*, and China still faces a grave crisis. Under such circumstances, what should we do? Undoubtedly, China urgently needs to unite representatives of all political parties and groups and people without any party affiliation and establish a provisional democratic coalition government in order to institute democratic reforms, overcome the present crisis, and mobilize and unify all anti-Japanese forces in the country to fight in effective coordination with the Allied countries to defeat the Japanese aggressors, and thus to enable the Chinese people to liberate themselves from the latter's clutches. After that, China needs to convene a national assembly on a broad democratic basis and set up a formally constituted democratic government, which will also be in the nature of

a coalition and will have a still wider representation of people from all parties and groups or without any party affiliation, and will lead the liberated people of the whole nation in building an independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful new nation. In short, China must take the line of unity and democracy to defeat the aggressors and build a new China.

We believe that only in this way can we reflect the fundamental demands of the Chinese people. Therefore, my report will deal mainly with these demands. Whether China should establish a democratic coalition government has already become a matter of deep concern for the Chinese people and for democratic public opinion in the Allied countries, and so my report will therefore lay particular stress on explaining the issue of coalition government.

In the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Chinese Communist Party has overcome many difficulties and achieved great successes. But as things stand, serious difficulties still confront our Party and people. The present situation demands that our Party should work still more intensively and conscientiously, continuing to overcome difficulties, as it struggles to fulfill the fundamental demands of the Chinese people.

2. The International Situation and the Domestic Situation

Can the Chinese people realize these basic demands or not? *We believe that both possibilities exist*; it will be decided by the level of their consciousness, their unity, and their effort. However, the current situation, *both* international and domestic, offers favorable opportunities for the Chinese people to succeed. If the Chinese people can make good use of these opportunities and continue to fight on staunchly, vigorously, and persistently, they will without a doubt defeat the aggressors and build a new China. The Chinese people must redouble their efforts in their struggle to accomplish their sacred tasks.

What is the present international situation?¹

*Contrary to the predictions of Chinese and foreign reactionaries, the three great democratic countries, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, continue to be united. Certain disputes between them did exist in the past, and some new conflicts may also arise in the future, yet unity in the end dominates all. This is a condition that determines all else, as has been testified by the Crimea Conference.*² *This is a condition born at the critical moment, when great changes*

are taking place in world history—the 1940s. It is the time when the Fascist war of aggression has broken out and turned into a war that threatens the people of the whole world, when the reactionary forces that actually help the Fascist aggressors and oppose the unity among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union have been overthrown from the political arenas in many major countries (not every country), and the anti-Fascist forces that support the unity among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union have seized the advantage, that has produced this condition. Ever since this condition emerged in the world, the appearance of the world has changed. All Fascist forces, as well as their specters in each nation, will necessarily be eliminated. Important international issues must be resolved through discussion among the Three or Five Great Powers. The domestic issues of each country must be resolved without exception on the basis of democratic principles. The world will unquestionably take the road of progress and not the road of reaction. *These are the new features of our world.* Of course, we must remain very much on the alert and reckon with the possibility of certain temporary or perhaps even serious twists and turns in the course of events. In many countries, there are those who begrudge the people at home and abroad their unity, progress, and liberation, and the reactionary forces of world separatists who begrudge the continued unity of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and France in leading the new world order are still very strong. Anyone who loses sight of this possibility will make political mistakes. The general trend of history, however, is already clearly decided and cannot be changed. *The new features of the world have already appeared.*

These new features are bad only for the Fascists and for the reactionaries of all countries who are in fact their helpers (*including those in China*). They are a blessing for the people and for the organized democratic forces in all countries.

The people, and the people alone, are the creative force of the world.³ The Soviet people have created great strength and have become the main force in the defeat of fascism. The *glorious* efforts of the peoples of the Four Great Powers of Britain, the United States, China, and France, plus those of the other anti-Fascist Allied countries, have made the destruction of fascism possible.⁴ *After fascism has been overthrown, the people of every country will build a stable and permanent world of peace. The United Nations meeting that is to be held in San Francisco on April 25 will be the starting point of such a peace.*

War has educated the people, and it is the people who will win the war, win the peace, and win progress. *This is the law of the present new situation in the world.*

This new situation is very different from that in World War I *and the era of "peace" after it.* At that time, there was not yet a Soviet Union *such as it is today* and the people were not politically awakened as they are today in Britain, the United States, China, France, and other anti-Fascist Allied countries,⁵ *and naturally there was no such world unity as there is today led by the Three Great Powers or Five Great Powers.* We are now in a completely new situation.⁶ *Now it is the case that the people who are awakened and united and who are becoming increasingly awakened and united and the organized strength of the people have determined the destination for the wheel of world history and the road to take to that destination.*

This does not mean that there will be no more struggles after the defeat of the Fascist aggressor countries and the emergence of general peace.⁷ The widespread remnant forces of fascism will certainly continue to make trouble. Within the camp now fighting Fascist aggression, there remain anti-democratic forces⁸ which will still oppress the people.⁹ Therefore, after the realization of international peace, the struggle between the broad anti-Fascist popular masses and the remnants of fascism, and the struggle for and against democracy,¹⁰ will still continue in much of the world. Only after long and sustained efforts to overcome the remaining forces of fascism and anti-democratic forces¹¹ can there be the broadest possible popular victory. To be sure, that day will not come very quickly or easily, but come it surely will. Victory in the anti-Fascist *war—in the righteous* World War II—will pave the way for the victory of the people in their postwar struggles. And only with the victory of this latter struggle will a stable and lasting peace be ensured. *This is the brilliant future for the people of the world.*

Thanks to the unity of the three great democratic countries of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the other European countries, the war which will ultimately defeat Fascist Germany will soon be over. The Red Army is already attacking Berlin, and this nerve center of Hitler's will fall in a matter of days. The Allied forces of Britain, the United States, and France are launching a final attack on Hitler's remnant forces. The Italian people have risen up. All these

things will ultimately lead to the defeat of Hitler. After Hitler has been defeated, the following situation will appear in the world: the liberation of Europe and an immediate increase in the possibility of the liberation of Asia, leading ultimately to the liberation of Asia.

Britain, the United States, and China are united around the cause of opposing the Japanese aggressors. As a result of eight years of long and bitter struggle by the Chinese people in the war, Britain's cooperation in the struggle in the East, and particularly the victory of the United States in the Pacific, the war has reached the gates of Japan. The Japanese aggressors are now in an extremely disadvantageous position, and the morale of their soldiers as well as that of their people has become shakier. Yet they still have strength, and they are preparing for a protracted struggle; moreover, they want to seek a compromise peace through the wavering elements within China and the Allied countries. Nonetheless, the interests of all the people in every Pacific country demand that the Japanese aggressors be completely wiped out. The Soviet Union has already abrogated the Treaty of Neutrality between the Soviet Union and Japan, and this has greatly elated the Chinese people and the people of every Pacific country. Under these circumstances, we should put it this way: There is still a difficult stretch to pass through before the Japanese aggressors are ultimately and completely wiped out; we must never underestimate the enemy, yet we are more confident of victory, and we can surely be victorious.

The Chinese people have never before experienced an international environment that is as advantageous as it is now, and this environment encourages the Chinese people to sustain the protracted war.

What is the current domestic situation in China?

China's protracted war has exacted and will continue to exact great sacrifices from the Chinese people, but at the same time this very war has tempered and in the future will continue to temper the Chinese people who are struggling heroically. It has awakened and united the Chinese people to such a degree that not only in ancient China but also in all their great struggles in the past hundred years, there has never been such unity. The Chinese people face not only a formidable national enemy but also powerful domestic reactionary forces that are in fact helping the enemy; this is one side of the picture. But the other side is that the Chinese people are not only more politically conscious than ever before, but

have built powerful liberated areas and a nationwide democratic movement that is growing day by day, and these constitute favorable domestic conditions. If the defeats and setbacks in the Chinese people's struggles over the past hundred years were due to the absence of certain necessary international and domestic conditions, then today the situation is different—all the necessary conditions are present, and there is every possibility of avoiding defeat and winning victory. We shall be victorious if we can unite the whole people in resolute struggle and give them proper leadership.

The confidence of the Chinese people that they can unite to defeat the aggressors and build a new China has now grown enormously, and the time has come for them to overcome all difficulties and to achieve their fundamental demands of great historical significance. Is there any doubt about this? I think not.

Such is the general international and domestic situation today.

3. Two Lines in the Anti-Japanese War

The Key to China's Problems

In speaking of the domestic situation, we have to make a concrete analysis of China's War of Resistance.

China is one of the five great countries taking part in the war against fascism, and it is the principal country fighting the Japanese aggressors on the continent of Asia. Not only have the Chinese people played, *and will continue to play*, a very great role in the anti-Japanese war, but they will also play a very great role in safeguarding peace in the postwar world and a decisive role in safeguarding peace in the East. *The people of China in their* eight-year anti-Japanese war have made very great efforts to liberate themselves and to help *the victory of* the Allied countries. These efforts have been made primarily by the people of China. Vast numbers of officers and men in China's armed forces have fought and shed their blood at the front lines; the workers, peasants, intellectual circles, and industrial circles of China have worked hard in the rear areas; the overseas Chinese have made donations to support the war; and all the anti-Japanese political parties, except for their members who are opposed to the people, have played their part in the war. In short, with their blood and sweat the Chinese people have heroically fought the Japanese aggressors for eight long years. But for a number of years the Chinese reactionaries have been spreading rumors and misleading

public opinion in order to prevent the world from knowing the truth about the role played by the Chinese people in the war. At the same time, there has as yet to be a comprehensive summation of all this experience gained by China during these eight years of war. Therefore, our congress should make a proper summation of all this¹² in order to educate the people and to provide our Party with a basis for the formulation of policy.

When it comes to such a summation, it is plain to all that there are two different guiding lines in China. One is able to defeat the Japanese aggressors, while the other not only cannot defeat them but in some respects actually helps the Japanese aggressors and undermines the anti-Japanese war.

Owing to the Guomindang government's passive policy of resistance to Japan¹³ and its reactionary domestic policy of active repression of the people, there have been military defeats, enormous territorial losses, financial and economic crises, oppression and hardship for the people, and the disruption of national unity, and it has been an obstruction¹⁴ to mobilizing and uniting all the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people for effective prosecution of the war, and it has hindered the awakening and unity of the people. Yet this political awakening and this unity have never ceased to develop, but have moved forward along a tortuous course, under the twofold repression of the Japanese aggressors and the Guomindang government. Clearly, there have been two lines in China for a long time, the Guomindang government's line of oppression of the people and of passive resistance, and the Chinese people's line of enhancing their own consciousness and unity to wage a people's war. Herein lies the key to all of China's problems.

History Follows a Tortuous Course

To help people understand why this issue of two lines is the key to all of China's problems, it is necessary to trace the history of our anti-Japanese war.

The Chinese people's anti-Japanese war has developed along a tortuous course. This war began as far back as 1931. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese aggressors occupied Shenyang [Mukden], and within a few months they seized the Three Eastern Provinces and the Guomindang government adopted a policy of nonresistance. However, the people and a patriotic section of the troops of the Three Eastern Provinces, led or assisted by the Chinese Communist Party, opposed the will of the Guomindang government and organized the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army¹⁵ which engaged in heroic guerrilla warfare. This

heroic guerrilla warfare grew to great dimensions and, despite many difficulties and setbacks, was never put down by the enemy. When the Japanese aggressors attacked Shanghai in 1932, a group of patriots in the Guomintang once again defied the will of the Guomintang government and led the Nineteenth Route Army in resisting the attacks of the Japanese aggressors. In 1933 the Japanese aggressors invaded Rehe [Jehol] and Chahar provinces, and for the third time a group of patriots in the Guomintang defied the will of the Guomintang government¹⁶ to organize the Anti-Japanese Allied Army to resist the enemy. But in all this fighting against Japan support came entirely from the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party, other democratic groups, and overseas Chinese,¹⁷ while the Guomintang government with its policy of nonresistance contributed nothing. On the contrary, the anti-Japanese movements in Shanghai and Chahar were both wrecked by the Guomintang government itself. In 1933 the people's government established in Fujian by the Nineteenth Route Army was also destroyed by the Guomintang government.

Why did the Guomintang government of that day adopt a policy of nonresistance? The main reason was that in 1927 the Guomintang *government* had wrecked the United Front of the Guomintang and the Communists and the unity of the Chinese people.

In 1924, Mr. Sun Yatsen, accepting the proposals of the Chinese Communist Party, called the First National Congress of the Guomintang, in which the Communists took part, that adopted the Three Great Policies of alliance with the Soviet Union, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers, established the Huangpu [Whampoa] Military Academy, and formed the national United Front of the Guomintang, the Communist Party, and various circles among the people. As a result, the reactionary forces in Guangdong Province were destroyed in 1925,¹⁸ the triumphant Northern Expedition was carried out during 1926–27, most of the areas along the Yangzi and Yellow rivers were occupied, the northern warlord government was defeated, and the people's struggle for liberation unfolded on an unprecedented scale never before seen in Chinese history. However, at a critical moment in the progress of the Northern Expedition, in the late spring and early summer of 1927, the treacherous and reactionary policies of the “party purge” and massacre adopted by the Guomintang authorities wrecked this national United Front—the United

Front of the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and various circles among the people, which embodied the Chinese people's cause of liberation—and all its revolutionary policies. Yesterday's allies, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, were now regarded as enemies, and yesterday's enemies, the imperialists and feudal elements, were now regarded as allies. So it came about that a sudden attack was perfidiously launched against the Chinese Communist Party and the people, and the dynamic and vigorous Great Revolution was buried. Thereafter, civil war replaced unity, dictatorship replaced democracy, and a China covered in darkness replaced a China full of brightness. But the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people were neither cowed nor conquered nor exterminated. They picked themselves up, wiped off the blood, buried their fallen comrades, and went into battle again. Holding high the great standard of revolution, they rose in armed resistance and over a vast territory in China they set up people's governments, carried out land reform, built up a people's army—the Chinese Red Army—and preserved and expanded the revolutionary forces of the Chinese people. Mr. Sun Yatsen's revolutionary Three People's Principles, which the Guomindang reactionaries had discarded, were carried forward by the people, the Communist Party, and other democrats.

After the Japanese aggressors invaded the Three Eastern Provinces, the Chinese Communist Party in 1933 proposed to all the Guomindang forces then attacking the soviet areas¹⁹ and the Red Army that an armistice agreement be concluded to facilitate united resistance to Japan on the basis of three conditions: *one*, the attacks should stop, *two*, the people should be granted democratic rights, and, *three*, the people should be armed. But the Guomindang authorities of the day rejected the proposal.

From then on, on the one hand, the Guomindang government's policy of civil war became increasingly vicious. On the other hand, the voice of the Chinese people grew increasingly powerful in its demand for an end to civil war and for united resistance to Japan, with various kinds of popular patriotic organizations being formed in Shanghai and many other places. Between 1935²⁰ and 1936, under the leadership of the Central Committee of our Party, the main forces of the Red Army north and south of the Yangzi River went through untold hardships and moved to northwest China, joining forces with Red Army units there. It was during those two years that the Chinese Communist Party decided

on, and carried out, a new and comprehensive political line in keeping with the new situation—the line of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, with united resistance to Japan and the establishment of a new democratic republic as the goal of our struggles. On December 9, 1935, the student masses in Beiping launched a heroic patriotic movement under our Party’s leadership; they formed the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard Corps and spread this movement to all of the big cities in China. On December 12, 1936, the two patriotic Guomintang groups which favored resistance to Japan, the Northeastern Army and the Seventeenth Route Army, together staged the famous Xi’an Incident in courageous opposition to the reactionary policy of the Guomintang authorities to compromise with Japan and to slaughter at home. At the same time, other patriots in the Guomintang were likewise dissatisfied with the policy of the Guomintang authorities at the time. These were the circumstances in which the Guomintang authorities were forced to abandon their policy of civil war and to acknowledge the demands of the people. The peaceful settlement of the Xi’an Incident became the turning point, creating national unity²¹ under new circumstances and promoting the national anti-Japanese war. In May 1937, shortly before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, our Party convened an historic national conference. *At this conference*²² the new political line, followed by our Party²³ since 1935, was endorsed.

From the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, to the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, the Guomintang government was relatively active in the war against Japan. During that period, *because of* the large-scale Japanese attacks and the mounting patriotic indignation of the whole people, the Guomintang government was compelled to make resistance to the Japanese aggressors the center of gravity of its policy. This brought about²⁴ an upsurge in the struggle of the whole army and people against Japan, and for a time there was a new and dynamic atmosphere. At this time, all the people, including us Communists and other democrats, earnestly hoped that the Guomintang government would seize the opportunity, when the nation was in peril and the people were filled with enthusiasm, to institute democratic reforms and put Mr. Sun Yatsen’s revolutionary Three People’s Principles into practice. But their hopes came to naught. During those two years, on the one hand, there was relatively active resistance, but, on the other hand, the authorities continued to oppose the

mobilization of the masses for a people's war and to place restrictions on the people's spontaneous efforts to unite for anti-Japanese and democratic action. On the one hand, the government²⁵ somewhat changed its previous attitude toward the Chinese Communist Party and the other anti-Japanese parties, while, on the other hand, it continued to deny them equal status and to restrict their activities in many ways, and many patriotic political prisoners were still not released from prison. Above all, the Guomindang government still maintained the oligarchic autocratic form²⁶ it had assumed ever since launching the Civil War in 1927, so it was impossible to set up a democratic coalition government to bring the nation together.

During this period²⁷ we Communists pointed out that there were two lines for China's anti-Japanese war: either an all-embracing people's war, leading to victory or a partial war in which the people remained oppressed, leading to defeat. We also pointed out the war would be protracted and would inevitably involve many obstacles and hardships, but by their efforts the Chinese people were sure to win the final victory.

People's War

During this period, the main forces of the Communist-led Red Army, which had moved to northwest China, were redesignated as the Eighth Route Army of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army, while the Chinese Red Army's guerrilla units, which had remained in various places on both sides of the Yangzi River, were given the new designation of the New Fourth Army of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army, with each continuing to fight on the North China front or the Central China front. During the Civil War period, the Chinese Red Army preserved and developed the democratic tradition of the Huangpu Military Academy and of the National Revolutionary Army of the Northern Expedition days and grew to several hundred thousand men. This number²⁸ was reduced to a few tens of thousands as a result of the ruthless destruction wrought in our southern base areas by the Guomindang government, our losses during the Long March, and other causes. Consequently, there were some who looked down on this army and thought that the main resistance to Japan would have to rely on the Guomindang. But the people are the best judges. The people knew that despite their small number at the time, the Eighth Route and the New Fourth

armies were of high quality, that they alone could wage a real people's war, and that boundless prospects would open up before them once they reached the anti-Japanese front and joined with the broad masses there. The people were right, for now, as I make this report, our *regular* army has already expanded to 910,000 men and our militia has grown to²⁹ more than 2.2 million men. Even though our regular army is smaller by several hundred thousand³⁰ than the present Guomindang forces (including units under local as well as central control), it has already become the main force in China's anti-Japanese war, judging by the number of enemy³¹ and puppet forces it is engaging and the extent of its battlefronts, by its combat effectiveness, by the mass, *militia, and self-defense army* support it enjoys in its operations, and by its political quality, cohesion, and unity.

This army is powerful because all its members have a discipline based on political consciousness; they have come together and they fight not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but *for a just people's war*, for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation. The sole purpose of this army is to stand firm with the Chinese people and to serve them wholeheartedly.

Guided by this purpose, this army has an indomitable spirit and is determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield. No matter what the difficulties and hardships, so long as a single man remains, it will fight on.

Guided by this purpose, this army has achieved remarkable unity in its own ranks and with those outside its ranks. Internally, there is unity between officers and men, between the higher and lower ranks, and between military work, political work, and rear service work; and externally, there is unity between the army and the people, between the army and government organizations, and between us and our friends, and anything that impairs this unity must be overcome.

Guided by this purpose, this army has a correct policy for winning over enemy officers and men and for dealing with prisoners of war. Without exception, all *enemy or puppet forces* who surrender,³² who come over to our side or who, after laying down their arms, wish to join in fighting the common foe, are welcomed and are given a proper education. It is forbidden to kill, maltreat, or insult any prisoner of war.

Guided by this purpose, this army has built up a system of strategy and tactics that is essential for people's war, and it is skilled in fluid guerrilla warfare adapting to changing concrete conditions and is also skilled in mobile warfare.

Guided by this purpose, this army has built up a system of political work that is essential for people's war and struggles to achieve unity in its own ranks, unity with the friendly armies, and unity with the people, while crushing enemy forces and ensuring victory in battle.

Guided by this purpose, the entire army, operating under conditions of guerrilla warfare, is able to use, and has in fact used, the intervals between battles and between training periods to produce grain and other daily necessities, thus becoming wholly, half, or at least partly self-supporting. Thus, economic difficulties are overcome, living conditions improved, and the burden on the people lightened. Every possibility has been exploited to establish a number of small-scale armament works in various military base areas.

Furthermore, this army is powerful because it has the people's self-defense corps and the militia—the vast armed organizations of the masses—fighting in coordination with it. In the liberated areas of China all men and women, from youth to middle age, *and even old age*, are organized in the people's anti-Japanese self-defense corps on a voluntary and democratic basis and without giving up their work in production. The crack troops of the self-defense corps, aside from those who join the army or the guerrilla units, are brought into the militia. Without the cooperation of these armed forces of the masses, it would be impossible to defeat the Japanese aggressors.³³

This army is also powerful because it is divided into two parts, the main forces and the regional forces, with the former available for operations in any region whenever necessary and the latter concentrating on defending their own localities and attacking the enemy there in cooperation with the local militia and the self-defense corps, and this division of labor has won the wholehearted support of the people. Without this correct division of labor—if, for example, attention were paid only to the role of the main forces while that of the localities were neglected, well then, under the conditions in China's liberated areas it would be impossible to defeat the Japanese aggressors.³⁴ Among the local forces, numerous armed work teams have been organized, which are well trained and hence better qualified for military, political, and mass work; they have achieved

great success in penetrating the rear-most areas behind enemy lines, striking at the enemy, and arousing the masses to the anti-Japanese struggle, in coordination with the formal military operations in the various liberated areas.

Under the leadership of their democratic government, all the anti-Japanese people in the liberated areas of China are called upon to join organizations of workers, peasants, youth, and women, and cultural, professional, and other organizations, to perform wholeheartedly various tasks in support of the armed forces, including rallying the people to join the army, transporting grain for the army, caring for the families of the anti-Japanese soldiers, and helping the troops meet their material needs. In this respect, it is even more important to mobilize³⁵ guerrilla units, militia, and self-defense corps to make widespread raids and lay land mines against the enemy, gather intelligence about him, comb out traitors and spies, transport and protect the wounded, and directly assist the army's operations. At the same time, the people in all the liberated areas are enthusiastically taking up various kinds of political, economic, cultural, and health work. The most important thing in this connection has been the mobilization of all the people for the production of grain and other daily necessities and ensuring that all government institutions and schools, except in *a few* special cases, devote their free time to production for their own support in order to supplement the self-sufficiency production campaigns of the army to help to create the great upsurge of production which has sustained the protracted anti-Japanese war *and has been the special characteristic of China's liberated areas*. In China's liberated areas, the enemy has wrought great havoc. Floods, droughts, and damage by insects have also been frequent. But the democratic governments there have led or are leading the people in overcoming these difficulties in an organized way, and unprecedented results have been achieved by the great mass campaigns for pest extermination, flood control, and disaster relief, thus making it possible to persevere in the protracted anti-Japanese war. In a word, everything for the front, everything for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and for the liberation of the Chinese people—this is the general slogan, the overall orientation for the whole army and the whole people in the liberated areas of China.

This is genuine people's war. Only by waging such a people's war can we defeat the national enemy. The failure of the Guomindang is due precisely to its

desperate opposition to people's war.

Once it is equipped with modern weapons, the army of China's liberated areas will become still more powerful and will be able to accomplish the final defeat of the Japanese aggressors.

Two Battlefronts

From the very beginning there have been two battlefronts in China,³⁶ the Guomintang battlefront and the battlefront of the liberated areas.

After the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese aggressors stopped their strategic offensive against the Guomintang battlefront and gradually shifted their main forces to the battlefront of the liberated areas; at the same time, taking advantage of the defeatist sentiments of the Guomintang government, they declared their willingness to arrive at a compromise peace with it, and, adopting a policy designed to deceive the Chinese nation, they induced the traitor Wang Jingwei to leave Chongqing and establish a puppet government in Nanjing. Beginning at this time, the Guomintang government began to change its policy, gradually shifting its emphasis from the external to the internal.³⁷ This was first manifest in its military policy, in which, to conserve its own military strength, the government adopted the policy of passive resistance to Japan, throwing the burden of fighting onto the battlefront of the liberated areas by letting the Japanese invaders attack the liberated areas in force, while they themselves sat on the mountaintop watching the tigers fight.

In 1939, the Guomintang government adopted the reactionary "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties," in a stroke taking back from the people and the anti-Japanese parties some of the rights it had granted during the early period of the anti-Japanese war.³⁸ From then on, in Guomintang-controlled areas all the democratic parties, and primarily the Chinese Communist Party, have been driven underground. In each province under Guomintang control, the prisons and concentration camps are packed with Communists, young patriots, and other democratic figures. In the five years from 1939 to the autumn of 1943, the government launched three large-scale "anti-Communist high tides" that reversed national unity and created serious danger of civil war. It was during this period that the infamous "disbanding"³⁹ of the New Fourth Army was ordered and nine thousand⁴⁰ of its troops in southern Anhui were annihilated. Down to

the present, the attacks by Guomindang troops on the forces of the liberated areas have not ceased, nor is there any sign that they will. Under these conditions, reactionaries have been pouring out slanders and calumnies of all sorts. “Traitor party,” “traitor army,” “traitor areas,” and “sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state” are all the satisfying products of these reactionaries in opposition to the Chinese people.⁴¹ To deal with the crisis, on July 7, 1939, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a manifesto setting forth the following slogans: “Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation! Persist in unity and oppose splitting! Persist in progress and oppose retrogression!” In five years, acting on these timely slogans, we⁴² vigorously repulsed the three reactionary and anti-popular “anti-Communist high tides” and overcame the crisis on each occasion.

During these years, there was actually no serious fighting on the Guomindang battlefield. The sword-edge of the Japanese aggression was mainly directed against *the battlefield in the liberated areas*. By 1943, the battlefield in the liberated areas was pinning down⁴³ 64 percent of the Japanese forces invading China and 95 percent of the puppet troops. The Guomindang battlefield, however, faced only 36 percent of the former and 5 percent of the latter.

In 1944 the Japanese aggressors launched operations to force China’s north-south trunk railways open for traffic for themselves. On the Guomindang front, they had⁴⁴ no idea what to do and were totally incapable of offering any resistance, so that within a few months extensive areas in Henan, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guangdong provinces had fallen into the enemy’s hands. It was not until then that some change took place in the proportion of enemy forces engaged on the two fronts. Even so, now at the moment of this report, of the 40 divisions comprising 580,000 Japanese soldiers in China (not counting those in Manchuria), 22 divisions, comprising 320,000 men or 56 percent of the total forces, are engaged on the battlefield in the liberated areas, and no more than 17 divisions, comprising 260,000 men or 44 percent, are engaged on the Guomindang battlefield. The ratio of those engaging the puppet troops has not changed at all.

It should also be pointed out that the puppet troops, numbering more than 800,000 men (in both regular and local forces) are chiefly composed either of Guomindang units that surrendered under their commanders or of units organized by Guomindang officers after their surrender. The Guomindang

reactionaries have furnished these puppet troops in advance with a false and traitorous theory, namely, “saving the nation through a devious path,” and have given them moral and organizational support since their surrender, directing them to attack China’s liberated areas⁴⁵ in coordination with the Japanese aggressors. In addition, they have mustered large forces, totaling no less than 797,000 men, to blockade and attack the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and other liberated areas *in the enemy’s rear*. This grave situation is being kept from the knowledge of many Chinese and foreigners by the Guomindang government’s news blackout policy. *Many people know that there is a Mihailović⁴⁶ in Yugoslavia, but they have no idea that there are dozens of Mihailovićs in China.*

China’s Liberated Areas

China’s liberated areas⁴⁷ now have a population of 95.5 million. They extend from Inner Mongolia in the north to Hainan Island in the south, and almost everywhere the enemy goes, he finds the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, or some other people’s forces in operation. This vast liberated territory consists of nineteen major liberated areas, covering greater or lesser parts of the provinces of Liaoning, Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, and Fujian, with Yan’an as the center from which guidance is given to all these liberated areas. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region west of the Yellow River, with a population of 1.5 million, is but one of the nineteen areas forming this vast liberated part of China and, indeed, the smallest in population except for one in eastern Zhejiang Province and another on Hainan Island. Unaware of this, some people think that China’s liberated territory consists chiefly of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, but this is a misconception resulting from the government’s policy of blockade. In this vast liberated territory, all the requisite policies of the Anti-Japanese National United Front have been put into practice, and popularly elected governments, that is, local coalition governments, have been or are being set up, in which Communists and representative personalities of other parties⁴⁸ or without any party affiliation are cooperating, and the entire strength of the people has been mobilized. As a result, despite the formidable pressure of the enemy, the Guomindang’s military

blockade and attacks and the complete absence of outside help, China's liberated areas have stood firm and have grown steadily, reducing the territory occupied by the enemy and extending the liberated areas; they have become the model for a democratic China and the core⁴⁹ driving out the Japanese aggressors and liberating the Chinese people in military cooperation with the Allied countries. The armed forces of China's liberated areas, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the other armed forces of the people, have not only set a heroic example in fighting Japan, but also have set an example in carrying out the democratic policies of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. On September 22, 1937, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a declaration affirming the necessity of Mr. Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles for China today and our Party's determination to fight for their complete realization. This declaration has been completely put into practice in China's liberated areas.

Guomintang-Controlled Areas

Persisting in its dictatorial rule, the chief ruling clique of the Guomintang has followed a policy of passive resistance to Japan and a domestic policy of opposition to the people. This way, its armed forces have shrunk to less than half their original size, and most of them have virtually lost their combat effectiveness. There is a profound rift between this clique and the broad masses and a grave crisis of mass impoverishment, seething discontent, and widespread revolt. Not only has its role in the war been sharply reduced, but it has also become an obstacle to the mobilization and unity of all the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people.

Why has such a grave situation arisen under the leadership of the Guomintang's chief ruling clique? Because that clique represents the interests of China's big landlords, big bankers, and big compradors. This tiny reactionary stratum monopolizes all the important military, political, economic, and cultural organs under the Guomintang government. They place the safeguarding of their own interests above resistance to Japan. They, too, say "the nation above all," but their actions do not accord with the demands of the great majority of the nation. They, too, say "the state above all," but what they mean is the feudal-Fascist dictatorship of the big landlords, big bankers, and big compradors, and not a

democratic state of the people. Therefore, they fear the people will arise, they fear the democratic movement, and fear full mass mobilization for war against Japan. Herein lies the root cause of their policy of passive resistance to Japan and their reactionary domestic policy against the people, democracy, and the Communist Party. We would like to ask why they adopt a two-faced policy such as this.⁵⁰ For instance, on the one hand, they resist Japan but, on the other, they pursue a passive war policy, and, moreover, they are the constant target of Japanese inducements to surrender; they talk about developing China's economy, but in fact they help⁵¹ bureaucrat-capital—that is, the capital of the big landlords, bankers, and compradors, and monopolize the lifelines of China's economy, ruthlessly oppressing the peasants, the workers, the petty bourgeoisie, and the liberal bourgeoisie; they talk about putting "democracy" into practice and "handing state power back to the people," yet they ruthlessly suppress the people's movement for democracy and refuse to introduce the mildest democratic reforms; they say that "the Communist problem is a political one and should be solved politically," yet they ruthlessly suppress the Chinese Communist Party militarily, politically, and economically, regarding it as "enemy No. 1" and the Japanese aggressors as only "enemy No. 2," while day in and day out they busy themselves with preparations for a civil war and plots to annihilate the Communist Party. *Within the Guomindang itself, on the one hand, they talk about "sincerity and unity," but, on the other hand, they actually encourage the forces of the Central Government faction to bully the forces of the localities (the "miscellaneous forces"), the dictatorial faction to bully the democratic faction, and conflict between the different factions so as to help their dictatorial rule.* They say they will establish a "modern state," yet they work desperately to maintain the feudal-Fascist dictatorship of the big landlords, big bankers, and compradors. While maintaining formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, they are in fact hostile to it. *While relying on the aid and assistance of Britain and the United States, they oppose British and American liberalism.* They chant "Asia before Europe" in chorus with the U.S. isolationists in order to prolong the life of Fascist Germany, which amounts to prolonging the life of Fascists everywhere, including their own Fascist rule over the Chinese people, yet at the same time they play all kinds of tricks in the international community,⁵² masquerading as anti-Fascist heroes. If you look for the root of these contradictory two-faced policies, you will

find they all stem from this very social stratum of the big landlords, big bankers, and big compradors.

Nevertheless, the Guomindang is a complex party. Though it is controlled and led by the reactionary clique representing the stratum of the big landlords, big bankers, and big compradors, it must not be entirely identified with this clique. It has many⁵³ leaders who do not belong to this clique and who are even slighted, pushed aside, or attacked by it. Even more⁵⁴ of its cadres and rank-and-file members, and many members of the Three People's Principles Youth League, are dissatisfied with the leadership of this clique, and some even oppose it. The same is true of all the armies, government organs, and economic and cultural institutions that this reactionary clique controls. There are quite a large number of *progressive* democratic elements in all of them. Moreover, the reactionary clique itself, divided as it is into several contending factions, is not a close-knit body. Undoubtedly, it is wrong to regard the Guomindang as a homogeneous body of reactionaries.

A Contrast

The Chinese people have come to see the sharp contrast between the liberated areas and the Guomindang-controlled areas.

Is it not clear enough? Here are two lines, the line of a people's war and the line against a people's war and for passive resistance. The result is that one is victorious, even under the difficult conditions in China's liberated areas with their total lack of outside aid. The other leads to defeat, even under the extremely favorable conditions in the Guomindang areas that receive foreign aid.

The Guomindang government attributes its failure to a lack of arms. Yet one may ask: Is it the Guomindang troops that are short of arms or the troops of the liberated areas? Of all China's forces, those of the liberated areas lack arms most acutely, their only weapons being those they capture from the enemy or those they manufacture under the most adverse conditions.

Is it not true that the forces directly under the Central Government are far better armed than the provincial troops? Yet in combat effectiveness, most of the central forces are inferior to the provincial troops.

The Guomindang commands vast reserves of manpower, yet its erroneous recruiting policy makes manpower replenishment acutely difficult. Though cut

off from one another by the enemy and engaged in constant fighting, China's liberated areas are able to mobilize inexhaustible amounts of manpower because the militia and self-defense corps system, which is well adapted to the needs of the people, is applied everywhere and because misuse and waste of manpower are avoided.

Though the Guomintang controls vast areas abounding in grain, and the people supply it with 70 million–100 million *dan*⁵⁵ annually, its army is always short of food and its soldiers are emaciated because the greater part of the grain is embezzled by those through whose hands it passes. But although most of China's liberated areas, which are located in the enemy rear, have been devastated by the enemy's Three-all policy,⁵⁶ and although some regions like northern Shaanxi are very arid, we have successfully solved the grain problem through our own efforts by increasing agricultural production.

The Guomintang areas are facing a very grave economic crisis in which most industries are bankrupt, and even such necessities as cloth have to be imported from the United States. But China's liberated areas are able to meet their own needs in cloth and other necessities through the development of industry.

In the Guomintang areas, the workers, peasants, shop assistants, government employees, intellectuals, and cultural workers live in extreme misery. In the liberated areas, all the people have food to eat, clothing to wear, work to do, and *books to read, and some places are already self-sufficient in clothing and food.*

It is characteristic of the Guomintang areas that, exploiting the national crisis for profiteering purposes, officials have concurrently become traders and habitual grafters without any sense of shame or decency. It is characteristic of China's liberated areas that, setting an example of plain living and hard work, the cadres take part in production in addition to their regular duties; honesty is held in high esteem while graft is strictly prohibited.

The Guomintang areas deprive the people of all their freedoms. China's liberated areas, by contrast, give the people complete freedom.

Are others to blame, or are they themselves to blame?⁵⁷ Are foreign countries to blame for not giving them enough aid, or are the Guomintang government's dictatorial rule, corruption, and incompetence to blame? Isn't the answer obvious?

Who Is “Sabotaging the War of Resistance and Endangering the State”?

In light of indisputable evidence, is it not the Guomindang government itself that has sabotaged the Chinese people’s War of Resistance and endangered our country? For fully ten years, this government devoted itself wholly to civil war, turning the edge of its sword against the people while utterly neglecting national defense and by its policy of nonresistance it gave away the Four Eastern Provinces.⁵⁸ When the Japanese⁵⁹ drove south of the Great Wall, it put up a flurry of resistance and then retreated from the Marco Polo Bridge all the way to the province of Guizhou. Yet the Guomindang goes on saying that “the Communist Party is sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state” (see the Resolution of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang, held in September 1943). Its only evidence is that the Communist Party has united with *every party, every faction, and* all sections of the people to create the liberated areas which are heroically resisting Japan. The logic of these Guomindang people is so different from that of the Chinese people that is it any wonder that there has been a failure to arrive at a common language on so many problems?

Here are two questions.

First, what exactly has made the Guomindang government abandon so vast and so well populated a territory, stretching from Heilongjiang Province to Marco Polo Bridge and from Marco Polo Bridge to Guizhou? Can it be anything other than its policy first of nonresistance and then of passive resistance to Japan, and its domestic policy of opposing the people’s war?

Second, what exactly has enabled China’s liberated areas to smash the ruthless and prolonged attacks of the enemy and puppet forces, to recover such vast territories, and liberate such an immense population from the grip of the national enemy? Can it be anything other than the correct line, the line of people’s war?

“Disobedience to Government and Military Orders”

The Guomindang government also constantly accuses the Chinese Communist Party of “disobedience to government and military orders.” Well, all we can say is: How fortunate it is that the Chinese Communists have maintained the common sense of the Chinese people and have not obeyed such “government and military orders” as in fact this would have meant handing over to the Japanese⁶⁰

the liberated areas that the Chinese people had recaptured from them amid great difficulties and hardships. Some examples are: the “Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties” in 1939, the orders for the “disbandment of the New Fourth Army” and for its “withdrawal north of the old course of the Yellow River” in 1941, the order for the “dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party” in 1943, the order for us to “disband all troops except for ten divisions within a definite time limit” in 1944, and the proposal which the Guomintang government calls “a concession” in the recent talks with us that would require us to hand over our armed forces and local governments in exchange for a few posts in its dictatorial government, but without the formation of a coalition government, and so forth. Fortunately, we have not submitted to this sort of thing and have thus preserved an undefiled stretch of soil and a heroic anti-Japanese army for the Chinese people, and so, should not the Chinese people congratulate themselves on such “disobedience”? Does not the Guomintang government feel it has done enough after presenting the Japanese⁶¹ with the vast populated area from Heilongjiang to Guizhou through its own Fascist government decrees and defeatist military orders? Aside from the Japanese⁶² and the reactionaries who welcome these “government and military orders,” how can such things be welcomed by any Chinese patriot with a conscience? Unless there is a coalition government, not in form but in fact, not a dictatorship⁶³ but a democratic government, is it conceivable that the Chinese people would permit the Chinese Communists to hand over the liberated areas, where the people have won freedom, as well as the people’s armies, which have performed signal service in the resistance to Japan, to the Guomintang dictatorial⁶⁴ government, which is both defeatist and Fascist? Without the liberated areas and the people’s army, could the anti-Japanese cause of the Chinese people be what it is today? And can one possibly conceive what the future of the Chinese nation would be?

The Danger of Civil War

To this day, the chief ruling clique in the Guomintang persists in its reactionary policy of dictatorship and civil war. There are many signs that it has long been making, and is now stepping up, preparations for this: It is waiting for the forces of a certain Allied country to have cleared a considerable part of the Chinese mainland of the Japanese aggressors, and then it can start a civil war. It

also hopes that the generals of certain Allied countries will do the same job in China as General [Ronald] Scobie⁶⁵ has been doing in Greece. It applauds the butchery perpetrated by Scobie and the reactionary Greek government. It is planning to plunge China once again into the maelstrom of civil war, as in 1927–36.⁶⁶ Behind the smoke screen of “convening the National Assembly” and “political settlement,” the ruling clique of the Guomindang is secretly preparing for civil war. If our fellow countrymen fail to take note, fail to expose its schemes and to put a stop to these preparations, then one fine morning they will hear the cannonade of civil war.

Negotiations

After obtaining the consent of other democratic parties, the Chinese Communist Party put forward the demand at *the meeting of the People’s Political Consultative Council* in September 1944 that the Guomindang dictatorship be abolished⁶⁷ immediately and a democratic coalition government be formed for the purpose of defeating the Japanese aggressors, building a new China, and preventing civil war. This was undoubtedly a timely demand, and in the space of a few months, it has won the warm response of the broad masses.

We have had many rounds of negotiations with the Guomindang government on the question of abolishing the one-party dictatorship, forming a coalition government, and instituting essential democratic reforms, but it has rejected all our proposals. Not only is it⁶⁸ unwilling to abolish the one-party dictatorship and form a coalition government, it is unwilling to introduce a single one of the urgently needed democratic reforms, such as the abolition of the secret police, the annulment of the reactionary laws and decrees that suppress the people’s freedom, the release of political prisoners, the recognition of the legal status of the political parties, the recognition of the liberated areas, and the withdrawal of the armies blockading and attacking them. Consequently, political relations in China have become very strained.

Two Futures

In light of the situation as a whole and of the above analysis of the actual international and domestic state of affairs, I would ask everyone here to be on the alert and not to expect that our cause will proceed smoothly and easily. No, it

will not, because actually there are two possibilities, two futures, one good and one bad. That dictatorship⁶⁹ will continue and democratic reforms will not be allowed, that the stress will be on opposing the people instead of the Japanese aggressors, and even that civil war may break out after the Japanese aggressors are defeated, dragging China back into its old miserable state, without independence, without freedom, without democracy, without unity, without wealth or power—this is one possibility, one future. This possibility, this future, still exists, and it has not ceased to exist, nor has it automatically vanished simply because of the favorable international situation and the increased political consciousness and organized strength of our people. Those who hope that this possibility or future will become a reality in China are the reactionary clique within the Guomindang at home and the imperialist-minded reactionaries abroad. This is one aspect which must be taken into account *and cannot be ignored*.

But there is another aspect and, again in light of the situation as a whole and the foregoing analysis of the international and domestic state of affairs, we can gain added confidence and courage to grasp⁷⁰ this second possibility, this second future. It is that of overcoming all difficulties, uniting the whole people, abolishing dictatorship,⁷¹ carrying out democratic reforms, consolidating and expanding the anti-Japanese forces, thoroughly defeating the Japanese aggressors, and building an independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful new China. Those who hope that China realizes this possibility, realizes this future in China, are the broad masses, the Communist Party and other *democratic elements and parties* at home, and all the foreign countries that treat us as equals, the foreign progressives, and the foreign masses.

We know full well that we Communists together with the whole Chinese people still face great difficulties and many obstacles and have a long and tortuous road to travel. But we know equally well that, with⁷² the whole Chinese people, we shall overcome all the difficulties and obstacles and accomplish the task that history has entrusted to China. The great task for us and for the Chinese people⁷³ is to use every ounce of our energy to oppose the first possibility and to fight for the second possibility, to oppose the first future and to fight for the second future. Essentially the *most important* international and domestic *conditions* favor us Communists together with the Chinese people as a whole.

This I have just now made quite clear. We hope that the Guomintang authorities will have the courage to change their present erroneous policies in view of the general world trend and the popular feeling in China, so that the war can be won, the sufferings of the Chinese people can be reduced, and a new China can soon be brought into being. It must be understood that, however tortuous the road, the Chinese people will certainly accomplish the task of achieving independence and liberation and that the time has come for them to do so. It falls to our generation to fulfill the great aspirations cherished by countless martyrs in the past century, and any attempt to stop us will undoubtedly end in failure.

4. The Policy of the Chinese Communist Party

I have now analyzed the two lines in China's anti-Japanese war. *In my opinion*, such an analysis is absolutely necessary, for up to this very moment many Chinese people still do not know what is really going on in China's anti-Japanese war, and many people in the Guomintang-controlled areas and in foreign countries are being kept in the dark by the Guomintang government's blockade policy. They knew practically nothing about China's liberated areas until investigatory groups of Chinese and foreign correspondents *and the U.S. Army Observation Group* came here in 1944. *On January 28, 1945, the New York Times said: "There is no better solution to the issue of the Chinese Communist Party than to let people travel freely back and forth between the two areas. In this way many misunderstandings will disappear."* But as soon as this group returned, the Guomintang government, which was very much afraid,⁷⁴ bolted the door and refused to let any other correspondents come here. Similarly, the Guomintang government has suppressed the truth about the Guomintang areas. Therefore, I feel that we have the duty to give the public as much of the true picture of "the two areas" as possible. Only when the people see the whole situation in China clearly will they understand why there is such a difference in policy between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party [Guomintang], the two biggest political parties in China, and why there is such a struggle between their two lines. Only then will the people understand that the dispute between the two parties is not an unnecessary or unimportant or merely capricious dispute, as some have alleged, but is one of principle, on which the lives of hundreds of millions of people depend.

In China's present grave situation, the Chinese people, the democrats and the democratic parties of China, and the people *and the many Allied governments* in the other countries that are concerned about the Chinese situation all hope that unity will replace disunity and that democratic reforms will be introduced, and they all want to know what the policy of the Chinese Communist Party is for solving the many vital problems of today. The members of our Party, of course, have a still deeper interest in these matters.

Our policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front has always been clear and has been tested in eight years of war. Our congress should make a summation of this as a guide for our future struggles.

Here I shall explain a number of the definite conclusions arrived at by our Party concerning the major policies for solving China's problems.

Our General Program

To mobilize and unify all the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people and to completely wipe out the Japanese aggressors and build a new China that is independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous, and powerful, the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party, and all the anti-Japanese democratic parties urgently need a mutually agreed-upon common program.

Such a common program may be divided into two parts, the general and the concrete. Let us consider first the general program and then the specific program.

On the major premises that the Japanese aggressors must be completely destroyed and a new China must be built, we Communists and the overwhelming majority of the population are agreed on the following fundamental propositions at the present stage of China's development. That is: First, China⁷⁵ should not have a feudal, Fascist, and anti-popular state system under the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie because eighteen years of anti-popular government by the chief ruling clique of the Guomindang have already proved its complete bankruptcy. Second, China cannot possibly have, and therefore must not try to set up, a state of the old type of democratic dictatorship, a dictatorship of the liberal bourgeoisie alone.⁷⁶ On the one hand, the Chinese liberal bourgeoisie⁷⁷ has proved itself very flabby economically and politically, and, on the other hand, for a long time now a new factor has been present, namely, the awakened Chinese proletariat with its leader, the Chinese Communist Party,

which has demonstrated great capacity in the political arena and assumed leadership of the peasant masses, the petty bourgeoisie,⁷⁸ the intellectuals, and other democratic forces. Third, at the present stage, when it is still the task of the Chinese people to fight national oppression and feudal oppression, and the necessary social and economic conditions for a socialist state are still lacking, it is likewise impossible for the Chinese people to institute a socialist state system, *and therefore they should not even try to do so.*

What then do we propose? We propose, after thoroughly wiping out the Japanese aggressors,⁷⁹ the establishment of a state system which we call a New Democracy, namely, a united front democratic alliance based on the overwhelming majority of the people.⁸⁰

It is this kind of state system that truly meets the demands of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population. This is because it has been winning the approval of all possible people among, first, millions of industrial workers and tens of millions of handicraft workers and farm laborers, and, second, among the peasantry, who constitute 80 percent of China's population, that is, 360 million out of a population of 450 million, and, third, among the large numbers of the petty bourgeoisie,⁸¹ as well as the liberal bourgeoisie,⁸² the enlightened gentry,⁸³ and other patriots.

Of course, among these classes there *are still different demands, and as a result there are* contradictions, such as the contradiction between labor and capital.⁸⁴ It would be hypocritical and wrong to deny the existence of these different demands and contradictions. But throughout the stage of *the* new democratic system, these differing demands, these contradictions, need not and should not be allowed to grow and transcend the demands which we all have in common. These different demands and contradictions can be regulated. Given such regulation, the establishment of the politics, economy, and culture of the new democratic state can be accomplished.⁸⁵

The politics of New Democracy which we advocate consists of the overthrow of external oppression and internal feudal and Fascist oppression, and then setting up not the old type of democracy but, instead, a political system which is a united front of all the democratic classes. These views of ours are completely in accord with the views of Mr. Sun Yatsen.⁸⁶ In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang, Mr. Sun wrote:

The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the People's Rights [*minquan zhuyi*] of the Guomindang represent a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

This great political injunction of Mr. Sun's must be obeyed⁸⁷ and firmly put into practice by the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party, and all other democrats, and they must wage a determined fight against all individuals and groups that violate or oppose it and thus defend and develop this completely correct political principle of New Democracy.

The organizational principle of the new democratic political formation⁸⁸ should be democratic centralism, with the people's congresses determining the major policies and electing the governments at each level. This is at once democratic and centralized—that is, centralized on the basis of democracy and democratic under central guidance. This is the only system that can give full expression to democracy with full powers vested in the people's congresses at all levels and, at the same time, guarantee centralized administration with the governments at each level exercising centralized management of all the affairs entrusted to them by the people's congresses at the corresponding level and safeguarding whatever is essential to the democratic life of the people.

The issue of the state and of political power in New Democracy include the issue of federalism. On the basis of the principles of free will and democracy, all the nationalities within the boundaries of China should organize a Chinese People's Federal Republic and, moreover, organize a federal central government on the basis of this federation.

The army and the other armed forces constitute an important part of the apparatus of the state power of New Democracy, without which the state cannot be defended. As with all other organs of power, the armed forces of New Democracy⁸⁹ belong to the people and protect the people; they have nothing in common with the army, police, and so forth of the old type, which belong to the few and oppress the people.

The economy of New Democracy which we advocate is likewise in accordance with Mr. Sun's principles. On the land question, Mr. Sun championed "land to the tiller." On the question of industry and commerce, Mr. Sun stated in the manifesto quoted above:

Enterprises, such as banks, railways, and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administered by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: This is the main principle of the regulation of capital.

At the present stage, we fully agree with these views of Mr. Sun on economic questions.

Some people suspect that the Chinese Communists do not approve of the development of individual initiative, the growth of private capital, and the protection of private property, but they are mistaken. It is foreign oppression and feudal oppression that cruelly fetter the development of the individual initiative of the Chinese people, hamper the growth of private capital, and destroy the property of the people. It is the very task of the New Democracy that we advocate to remove these fetters and stop this destruction, to guarantee that the people can freely develop their individuality within the framework of society and freely develop such private capitalist economics as will benefit the livelihood of the people and not “dominate the livelihood of the people,” and to protect all appropriate forms of private property.

In accordance with Mr. Sun’s principles and the experience of the Chinese Revolution, China’s national economy at the present stage should be composed of the state sector, the private sector, and the cooperative sector. But the state here must certainly not be one “privately owned by the few” but a new democratic state “publicly owned by all the common people.”⁹⁰

The culture of New Democracy should likewise be “publicly owned by all the common people”—that is, it should be a national, scientific, and mass culture and must under no circumstances be a culture “privately owned by the few.”

Such is the general or fundamental program which we Communists advocate for the present stage—that is, the entire stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. This is our minimum program as compared to our maximum program of socialism and communism. Its realization will carry the Chinese state and Chinese society a step forward, from a colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal condition to that of a new bourgeois-democratic state and society,⁹¹ *and after thoroughly wiping out the Japanese aggressors, an independent, free, democratic, rich and powerful state with the aforementioned character should be set up.*

The fulfillment of this program⁹² will still not turn China into a socialist

society. *This is not a matter of what some people subjectively wished to promote; rather, it is simply the case that the political and social conditions in China objectively do not allow people to do so.*

We Communists have never concealed our political views. Certainly and beyond all doubt, our future or maximum program is to carry China forward to socialism and communism. Both the name of our Party and our Marxist world outlook unequivocally point in *the direction of* this supreme ideal of the future, a future of incomparable brightness and splendor. On joining the Party, each of us⁹³ has two clearly defined objectives at heart, the new-style bourgeois democratic revolution now⁹⁴ and the *proletarian* socialist revolution in the future,⁹⁵ and for those he will fight despite the animosity of the enemies of communism and their vulgar and ignorant calumny, abuse, and ridicule, which we must firmly combat. As for the well-meaning skeptics, we should explain things to them with goodwill and patience and not attack them. All this is exceedingly clear, certain, and unequivocal.

All Communists and those who sympathize with communism in China must, however, struggle to achieve the objective of the present stage; they must struggle against foreign and feudal oppression to deliver the Chinese people from their miserable colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal plight and establish a *new bourgeois- democratic*, new democratic China,⁹⁶ a China of the revolutionary Three People's Principles of Mr. Sun Yatsen, a China which is independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful. This is what we have actually been doing; together with the masses of the Chinese people, we Communists have been fighting heroically for this objective for the past twenty-four years.

If any Communist or Communist sympathizer talks about socialism and communism but fails to fight for this objective, if such a person belittles this bourgeois-democratic revolution, relaxes or slows down ever so slightly and shows the least disloyalty and coolness or is reluctant to shed blood or sacrifice life for it, then, wittingly or unwittingly, such a person is betraying socialism and communism to a greater or lesser extent and is certainly not a politically conscious and staunch fighter for communism. It is an unalterable truth of Marxism that socialism can be attained only via the stage of democracy. And in China the fight for democracy will be a protracted one, so it would be a sheer illusion to try to build a socialist society on the ruins of the colonial, semicolonial,

and semifeudal order without a united new democratic state, without the development of the state sector of the new democratic economy, of the private capitalist and cooperative sectors, and of a national, scientific, and mass culture, that is, a new democratic culture, and without the liberation and development of the individuality of hundreds of millions of people—in short, without a thoroughgoing bourgeois-democratic revolution of a new type.⁹⁷

Some people fail to understand why, far from fearing capitalism, Communists should advocate its development.⁹⁸ Our answer is simple: Substituting the development of capitalism⁹⁹ for the oppression of foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism is not only an advance but an unavoidable process, which benefits the proletariat as well as the bourgeoisie.¹⁰⁰ It is not domestic capitalism but foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism that are superfluous in China today; indeed, we have too little capitalism. Strangely enough, some spokesmen of the Chinese bourgeoisie are shy about openly advocating the development of capitalism but refer to it obliquely. There are other people who flatly deny that China should permit an expanded¹⁰¹ degree of capitalist development and who talk about reaching socialism in one stride and “accomplishing at one stroke” the tasks of the Three People’s Principles and socialism. Obviously, these opinions either reflect the weakness of the Chinese liberal bourgeoisie¹⁰² or are the efforts of the Chinese landlords and the big bourgeoisie to deceive the popular masses. From our knowledge of the Marxist laws of social development, we Communists clearly understand that, under the state rule of New Democracy,¹⁰³ in China it will be necessary in the interests *of the state and the people, and* of social progress, to facilitate the development of the private capitalist sector of the economy¹⁰⁴ beside the development of the state sector and of the individual and cooperative sectors run by the laboring people. We Communists will not let any empty talk or deceit befuddle us.

Some people doubt whether we Communists are sincere when we declare that “the Three People’s Principles are what China needs today, and our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization.” This is the result of their failure to understand that the basic tenets of the Three People’s Principles, which Mr. Sun Yatsen put forward in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang in 1924 and which we have accepted, coincide with certain basic tenets of our Party’s program for the present stage—that is, our minimum

program. It should be pointed out that the Three People's Principles of Mr. Sun Yatsen coincide with our Party's program for the present stage only in certain basic tenets and not in everything. Our Party's program of New Democracy is, of course, much more comprehensive than Mr. Sun's. In particular, our Party's theory, program, and practice of New Democracy have greatly developed with the development of the Chinese Revolution in the twenty years since Mr. Sun's death and will develop still further. In essence, however, these Three People's Principles are *a new democratic Three People's Principles, a new Three People's Principles*¹⁰⁵ different from the previous, old Three People's Principles. Naturally they are "what China needs today," and naturally "our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization." To us Chinese Communists, the struggle for our Party's minimum program and the struggle for Mr. Sun's revolutionary, or new, Three People's Principles, are basically (though not in every aspect) one and the same thing. Therefore, as in the past and the present, the future will prove: The Chinese Communists will be the most sincere and thoroughgoing executors of the Three People's Principles¹⁰⁶ in the future as well.

Some people are suspicious and wonder if, once in power, the Communist Party will follow Russia's example and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and a one-party system? Our answer is: A new democratic state based on an alliance of the democratic classes is different in principle from a socialist state under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Throughout the stage of New Democracy China cannot possibly have a one-class dictatorship and a one-party government and therefore should not attempt it,¹⁰⁷ and so we have no reason for refusing to cooperate with all political parties, social groups, and individuals, provided their attitude to the Communist Party is cooperative and not hostile. The Russian system has been shaped by Russian history; in Russia, exploitation of man by man has been abolished as a social system, and a political, economic, and cultural system of the newest type of democracy—that is, socialism, has been put into effect, so the people support the Bolsheviks¹⁰⁸ alone, having discarded all the anti-socialist parties. All this has shaped the Russian situation, which is perfectly necessary and reasonable there. But even in Russia, where the Bolsheviks are¹⁰⁹ the sole political party, the system practiced in the organs of state power is still one of an alliance of workers, peasants, and intellectuals and an alliance of Party members and non-Party people, and not a system in which the working class and

the Bolsheviks alone may work in the organs of the government. The Chinese system is formed by Chinese history,¹¹⁰ and for a long time to come there will exist a special form of state and political power, a form that is distinguished from the Russian system but is perfectly necessary and reasonable for us, namely, the new democratic form of state and political power based on an alliance of democratic classes.

Meanwhile, we have also answered another question. That is to say, the reason you Communists advocate the establishment of a coalition government now is that there is not yet a democratic electoral system and for a united resistance to Japan a coalition government is necessary. In the future, however, when there is a democratic electoral system, why won't you let the majority party in the National Congress form a one-party government but still insist on forming a coalition government? We answer: This is determined by China's historical conditions. As I said earlier in this report, in China there has long been a new condition which changes everything, and that is the existence of the Chinese Communist Party, which not only represents the proletariat, but at the same time also, according to its program and actual struggle, represents the overwhelming majority of the peasant class, petty bourgeoisie, and intellectuals, as well as the other democratic elements. If any government intends to exclude the Chinese Communist Party, it will not be able to accomplish any good thing, and this is simply the basic characteristic of China in the historical period of New Democracy. In 1924 when Mr. Sun Yatsen was still alive, he actually established a coalition government including the Communist Party and, as a consequence, he accomplished a great revolutionary enterprise. The government after 1927 excluded the Communist Party, and, moreover, it waged a cruel anti-Communist war, thus becoming a counterrevolutionary enterprise. Though the Guomindang government has sustained itself down to today through the eight years of the War of Resistance and because the Japanese aggressors stand before us, it has not declared total war on the Communist Party, though it is still trying by means of local warfare, suppression by spies, blockade, and slander to prepare for a civil war and to hamper the attempt to organize a coalition government so as to oust the Communist Party. Nevertheless, it has created for itself the following situation: The more it expels the Communist Party, the further it goes on the road to destruction. If it continues to attempt this exclusion in the future, it will go fully

down the road to destruction. In China's circumstances, what does it mean if a government does not want to include the Communist Party? It means that it does not want the overwhelming majority of the people. No one doubts that the Communists want to be included in the government not to gain government posts but to carry out new democratic reforms. After the introduction of a democratic electoral system in China in the future, whether the Communist Party is a majority or a minority party in the National Congress, the government should be a coalition government which conducts its responsibilities under a new democratic program that is accepted by all, which will better advance the construction of New Democracy. We can see this very clearly now.

Our Concrete Program

Based on the general program described above, there must also be¹¹¹ a concrete program for each period. Our general program of New Democracy will remain unchanged throughout the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that is, for several decades. However, from phase to phase during this stage, when conditions have changed or are changing, it is only natural that we have to change our specific program accordingly. For example, our general program of New Democracy has remained the same throughout the periods of the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution,¹¹² and the anti-Japanese war, but there have been changes in our specific program because our friends and enemies have not remained the same in the three periods.

The Chinese people now find themselves in the following situation:

1. The Japanese aggressors have not yet been defeated;
2. The Chinese people urgently need to work together for a democratic change in order to achieve national unity, rapidly mobilize and unite all anti-Japanese forces, and defeat the Japanese aggressors in cooperation with the Allied countries; and
3. The Guomindang government is disrupting national unity and obstructing such a democratic change.

What is our concrete program or, in other words, what are the immediate demands of the Chinese people under these circumstances?

We consider the following to be appropriate and minimum demands:

The Chinese people demand the mobilization of all available forces for the

thorough defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the establishment of international peace in cooperation with the Allied countries;

they demand the abolition of the one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang and the establishment of a democratic coalition government and a joint supreme command;

they demand the punishment of pro-Japanese elements, Fascists, and defeatists who are opposing the people and disrupting national unity and the creation of national unity;

they demand the punishment of reactionaries who are creating the danger of civil war, and thus the preservation of internal peace;

they demand the punishment of Chinese traitors, punitive action against officers who surrender to the enemy, and the punishment of Japanese agents;

they demand the liquidation of the reactionary secret service and all its repressive activities, and the abolition of concentration camps;

they demand the revocation of all reactionary laws and decrees aimed at suppressing the people's freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, thought, and religious belief, and freedom of the person and the guarantee of full civil rights to the people;

they demand recognition of the legal status of all democratic parties and groups;

they demand the release of all patriotic political prisoners;

they demand the withdrawal of all troops encircling and attacking China's liberated areas and the dispatch of these forces to the anti-Japanese front;

they demand the recognition of the anti-Japanese armed forces and the popularly elected governments of China's liberated areas;

they demand the consolidation and expansion of the liberated areas and their armed forces and the reduction of the occupied areas;[113](#)

they demand assistance for the people in the Japanese-occupied areas to organize underground armed forces for armed uprisings;

they demand that the Chinese people be allowed to arm themselves and defend their homes and their country;

they demand the political and military transformation of those armies directly under the supreme command that constantly lose battles, oppress the people, and discriminate against armies not directly under it, and the punishment of the

commanders who are responsible for disastrous defeats;

they demand improvements in the recruiting system and the living conditions of the officers and men;

they demand preferential treatment for the families of the soldiers fighting in the anti-Japanese war, so that the officers and men at the front will be free from domestic worries;

they demand preferential treatment for disabled soldiers and for the families of soldiers who have given their lives for their country, and assistance for demobilized soldiers;¹¹⁴

they demand the development of war industries to facilitate the prosecution of the war;

they demand the impartial distribution of military and financial aid received from the Allied countries to all the armies fighting in the War of Resistance;

they demand the punishment of corrupt officials and the institution of clean government;

they demand the improvement of the pay for middle- and lower-grade government employees;

they demand the democratic rights of *self-government* for the Chinese people;

they demand the abolition of the oppressive *baojia* system;¹¹⁵

they demand relief for war refugees and the victims of natural disasters;

they demand substantial funds after the recovery of China's lost territory for the extensive relief of the people who have suffered under enemy occupation;

they demand the abolition of exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies and the establishment of a consolidated progressive tax;

they demand the introduction of rural reforms, rent and interest reduction, suitable safeguards for the rights of tenants, low-interest loans to impoverished peasants, and assistance to help peasants organize, in order to facilitate the expansion of agricultural production;

they demand the banning of bureaucratic capital;

they demand the abolition of the present policy of economic controls;

they demand a check on the unbridled inflation and sky-rocketing prices;

they demand assistance to private industry to provide it with facilities for obtaining loans, purchasing raw materials, and marketing its products;

they demand improvements in the livelihood of the workers, relief for the

unemployed, and assistance to help the workers organize, in order to facilitate the expansion of industrial production;

they demand the abolition of party indoctrination in education¹¹⁶ and the promotion of a national, scientific, and mass culture and education;

they demand the guarantee of the livelihood of the teachers and other staff members of educational institutions and the guarantee of academic freedom;

they demand the protection of the interests of young people, women, and children, as well as assistance to young student refugees, assistance to help young people and women organize in order to participate on an equal footing in all work useful to the war effort and to social causes,¹¹⁷ to ensure freedom of marriage and equality between men and women, and to give young people and children a useful education;

they demand that the treatment of minority nationalities in China be improved; that they be granted the right of self-determination and the right to establish a united federal state in cooperation with the Han nationality under the principle of self-determination;¹¹⁸

they demand protection of the interests of overseas Chinese and assistance to those who have returned to the motherland;

they demand protection of foreign nationals who have fled to China from Japanese oppression and support of their struggle against the Japanese aggressors;

they demand the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, and so forth.

To achieve all these demands, the most important thing is the immediate abolition of the one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang and the establishment of a democratic provisional Central Government, a coalition government enjoying nationwide support and including representatives of all the anti-Japanese parties and people without party affiliation. Without this prerequisite, it is impossible to make any genuine change in the Guomindang areas and therefore in the country as a whole.

Only these demands voice the desires of the Chinese masses and also of broad sections of public opinion¹¹⁹ in the Allied countries.

A minimum concrete program which is agreed upon by all the anti-Japanese democratic parties is absolutely indispensable, and we are prepared to consult with them on the basis of the program outlined above. Different parties may have different demands, but all should reach agreement on a common program.

As far as the Guomintang-controlled areas are concerned, such a program is still at the stage of being a demand of the people; as far as the Japanese-occupied areas are concerned, it is a program whose fulfillment must await their recovery, except for the item on the organization of underground forces for armed uprisings; as far as the liberated areas are concerned, it is a program which has already been, is being, and should continue to be put into practice.

Destroy the Japanese Aggressors Completely, and Allow No Halfway Compromises

The immediate demands or the concrete program of the Chinese people outlined above involves many vital wartime and postwar problems which require further explanation. In explaining these problems below, we shall criticize some of the erroneous viewpoints held by the principal ruling clique of the Guomintang and at the same time answer some questions raised by other people.

First, destroy the Japanese aggressors completely, allow no compromises halfway.¹²⁰

The Cairo Conference rightly decided that the Japanese aggressors must be made to surrender unconditionally. However, the Japanese aggressors are now working behind the scenes for a compromise peace, while the pro-Japanese elements in the government are hitching up with Japan's secret emissaries through the Nanjing puppet government, and no stop has been put to this, so the danger of a halfway compromise is not yet entirely past. The Cairo Conference made another good decision, namely, that the Four Northeastern Provinces, Taiwan, and the Penghu Islands should be returned to China. But, given its present policies, the Guomintang government cannot possibly be relied upon to fight all the way to the Yalu River and recover all our lost territory. What should the Chinese people do in these circumstances? The Chinese people should demand that the government destroy the Japanese aggressors completely and allow no compromises halfway. All intrigues for a compromise must be immediately stopped. The Chinese people should demand that the Guomintang government change its present policy of passive resistance and employ all its military strength in active warfare.¹²¹ The Chinese people should expand their own armed forces—the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the other armed units of the people—and on their own initiative develop anti-Japanese

armed forces on an extensive scale wherever the enemy has reached, and they should prepare to recover all the lost territory by fighting in direct cooperation with the Allied nations, and under no circumstance should they rely solely on the Guomindang. It is the sacred right of the Chinese people to wipe out¹²² the Japanese aggressors. If the reactionaries try to deprive them of their rights, suppress their anti-Japanese activities, or undermine their strength, then the Chinese people should firmly strike back in self-defense if persuasion proves unavailing. For such acts of national treachery on the part of the Chinese reactionaries only aid and abet the Japanese aggressors.

Abolish the One-Party Dictatorship, and Establish a Coalition Government

Second, abolish the one-party dictatorship and establish a democratic coalition government.¹²³

To wipe out the Japanese aggressors, it is necessary to carry out democratic reforms throughout the country. Yet this will be impossible unless the one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang is abolished and a democratic coalition government is established.

The one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang is, in reality, a dictatorship of the anti-popular clique within the Guomindang, and this dictatorship is the destroyer of China's national unity, the author of anti-Japanese defeats, and the basic obstacle to the mobilization and unification of the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people. The Chinese people have become fully aware of the evils of this dictatorship through eight years of bitter experience in the War of Resistance, and they naturally demand its immediate abolition. This reactionary dictatorship is also the breeder of civil war and unless it is immediately abolished, it will again bring the calamity of civil war upon them.

So widespread and resounding is the outcry of the Chinese people for the abolition of the anti-popular dictatorship that the Guomindang authorities themselves have been forced to agree publicly to the "earlier termination of political tutelage," which shows how far this "political tutelage" or one-party dictatorship has forfeited popular support. There is not a single person in China who still dares to assert that "political tutelage," or "one-party dictatorship," is any good or that it should not be abolished or "terminated," and that marks a great change in the situation.

It is certain and beyond all doubt that it should be terminated. But how to do it? Opinions differ. Some say terminate it at once and establish a provisional democratic coalition government. Others say wait a bit, convene the “national assembly,” and “hand state power back to the people” and not to a coalition government.

What does this mean?

It means there are two ways of doing things, the honest way and the dishonest way.

First, the honest way. The honest way is immediately to proclaim the abolition of the Guomintang one-party dictatorship, to establish a provisional Central Government composed of representatives of the Guomintang, the Communist Party, the Democratic League, and people with no party affiliation and to promulgate a democratic program of political action such as “The Immediate Demands of the Chinese People” that we have set forth above, with the aim of restoring national unity and defeating the Japanese aggressors. A roundtable conference of representatives of the various parties and people with no party *or factional* affiliation should be convened to discuss and reach agreement on these matters, and action should then be taken accordingly. This is the road of unity, which the Chinese people will firmly support.

Second, the dishonest way. The dishonest way is to disregard the demands of the masses and of all the democratic parties and to insist on convening a so-called “national assembly” stage-managed by the anti-popular clique in the Guomintang and to have it adopt a “constitution” which in practice will be anti-democratic and will buttress the dictatorship of this clique for the purpose of providing a cloak of “legality” for an illegal “National” government—a government formed privately through the appointment of a few dozen members, imposed on the people, and utterly devoid of any foundation in the popular will—thus making the pretense of “handing state power back to the people,” while actually “handing it back” to the self-same reactionary clique within the Guomintang. Whoever disapproves will be accused of sabotaging “democracy” and “unity,” which will then be a “reason” for ordering punitive action against him or her. This is a policy of disruption, which the Chinese people firmly oppose.

The steps our anti-popular heroes are preparing to take in line with this

splittist policy will probably lead them to destruction. They are putting a noose around their own necks and fastening it there, and this noose is the “national assembly.” Their intention is to use the so-called national assembly as a magic weapon, first, to prevent the formation of a coalition government, second, to maintain their dictatorship, and, third, to prepare a justification for civil war. But the logic of history runs counter to their wishes: [it will be] like “lifting a rock only to drop it on their own feet.” It is now obvious to all that the people in the Guomindang-controlled areas have no freedom, and the people in the Japanese-occupied areas cannot take part in elections, while the liberated areas that have freedom are not recognized by the Guomindang government. Such being the case, from where will the national delegates come? How can there be a national assembly? The national assembly they are clamoring for is the one that the Guomindang dictatorship rigged up in every detail eight years ago during the Civil War period. If such an assembly is convened, the people of the entire nation will inevitably rise up against it, and how, it may be asked, will our reactionary heroes get out of that predicament? All in all, the convening of the bogus national assembly will only lead them to destruction, *and create the conditions of disintegration.*

We Communists *do not want to see this happen in China, and hence we propose two steps to rescue China.*¹²⁴ First, at the present stage, to establish a provisional government through common agreement among representatives of all parties and people with no party affiliation. Second, in the next stage, to convene a national assembly after free and unrestricted elections to form a regular coalition government. In both cases, there will be a coalition government in which the representatives of all classes and political parties willing to take part are united on a democratic common program for the fight against Japan today and for national construction tomorrow.

This is the only course China can take, whatever the intentions of Guomindang members, or other parties, groups, or individuals, whether they like it or not and whether or not they are conscious of it. This is an inexorable and historical law¹²⁵ which no force can reverse.

On this and all other problems of democratic reform, we Communists declare: Even though the Guomindang authorities are still stubbornly persisting in their erroneous policies and using negotiations to play for time and allay public

opinion, we are ready to resume negotiations with them the moment they show a willingness to renounce their present erroneous policies and agree to democratic reforms. But the negotiations must be based on the general principle of resistance to Japan, unity, and democracy, and we will not agree to any so-called measures, plans, or empty pronouncements that depart from this general principle, however pleasing they may sound.

Freedom for the People

Third, freedom for the people.¹²⁶

At present, the Chinese people's struggle for freedom is primarily directed against the Japanese aggressors. But the Guomindang government is preventing them from fighting the Japanese aggressors by depriving them of their freedom and binding them hand and foot, and unless this problem is solved, it will be impossible to mobilize and unify all the anti-Japanese forces of the nation. It is precisely to cut the people's bonds so that they can have the freedom to resist Japan, to unite, and to win democracy that our program puts forward such demands as the abolition of the one-party dictatorship; the establishment of a coalition government; the liquidation of the secret police; the revocation of repressive laws and decrees; the punishment of traitors, spies, pro-Japanese elements, Fascists, and corrupt officials; the release of political prisoners; the recognition of the legal status of all the democratic parties; the withdrawal of troops encircling or attacking the liberated areas; the recognition of the liberated areas; the abolition of the *baojia* system; and the many other demands relating to the economy, culture, and the movements of the popular masses.

Freedom is won by the people through struggle, it is not a favor bestowed by anyone. The people in China's liberated areas have already won freedom, and the people in the other areas can and must win this freedom too. The greater the freedom of the Chinese people and the stronger their organized democratic forces, the greater the possibility of forming a provisional and unified coalition government. Once formed, this coalition government will in its turn provide full freedom for the people and so consolidate its own foundations. Only then will it be possible to hold free and unrestricted elections throughout the land after the overthrow of the Japanese aggressors, to create a democratic national assembly, and to establish a regular and unified coalition government. Unless the people

have freedom, there can be no national assembly or government genuinely elected by the people. Surely that is clear?

Freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, thought and religious belief, and freedom of the person are the people's most important freedoms. In China, only the liberated areas have given full effect to these freedoms.

In 1925 Mr. Sun Yatsen declared in his deathbed testament:

For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of National Revolution with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experience during these forty years has firmly convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the popular masses and unite in a common fight with those nations of the world that treat us as equals.

The unworthy successors of Mr. Sun, who have betrayed him, oppress the popular masses instead of arousing them, and deprive them of all their freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, political conviction, religious belief, and freedom of the person. They attach the labels "traitor party," "traitor army," and "traitor areas" to the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and the New Fourth armies, and the liberated areas, which are all genuinely arousing the masses of the people and protecting their freedoms and rights. We hope that there will soon be an end to this reversal of right and wrong, though if it lasts much longer, the Chinese people will lose all patience.

Unity of the People

Fourth, unity of the people.¹²⁷

It is imperative to turn a divided China into a united China in order to eliminate the Japanese aggressors, to prevent civil war, and to build a new China; such is the historical task of the Chinese people.

But how is China going to be united? Through autocratic unification by a dictator, or democratic unification by the people? From the time of Yuan Shikai the northern warlords focused on autocratic unification. But what was the result? Contrary to their desires, what they obtained was not unification but division, and finally they tumbled from power. Following Yuan Shikai's old road, the anti-popular clique of the Guomindang has sought autocratic unification and has waged civil war for fully ten years, only to let in the Japanese aggressors while they themselves withdrew to Mount Emei.¹²⁸ And now from their mountaintop, they are again shouting about their theory of autocratic unification, but to whom

are they shouting? How can any upright patriotic Chinese listen to them? Having lived through sixteen years of northern warlord rule and eighteen years of Guomintang dictatorial rule, the people have acquired ample experience and discerning eyes, and they want democratic unification by the popular masses and not autocratic unification by a dictator. As early as 1935, we Communists put forward the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and we have fought for it ever since. In 1939, when the Guomintang was enforcing its reactionary “Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties,” thus creating the imminent danger of capitulation, split, and retrogression, and when it was shouting about its theory of autocratic unification, we again declared: “There must be unification based on resistance and not on retrogression; only unification based on resistance, unity, and progress is genuine, and any other kind is a sham.” Six years have passed, but the issue remains the same.

Can there be unity if the people have no freedom, no democracy? There will be unity as soon as they have both. The Chinese people’s movement to struggle for freedom, for democracy, and for a coalition government is at the same time a movement of unity. When we put forward many demands on behalf of the struggle for freedom, the struggle for democracy, and coalition government in our concrete program, it is precisely for this goal. Unless the dictatorship of the Guomintang anti-popular clique is abolished and a democratic coalition government is formed, not only will it be impossible to carry out any democratic reforms in the Guomintang areas or to mobilize all the armies and the people there to wipe out¹²⁹ the Japanese aggressors *completely in coordination with the Allied countries*, but the calamity of civil war will be increased. This is plain common sense, and is understood by many people. Why do so many democrats, with and without party affiliation, including many in the Guomintang, unanimously demand a coalition government? Because they are clearly aware of the present crisis and realize that there is no other way to overcome it and achieve both unity against the enemy and unity for national construction.

The People’s Army

Fifth, the people’s army.¹³⁰

Without an army standing on the people’s side, it is impossible for the people to win freedom and unification, establish a coalition government, thoroughly

eliminate¹³¹ the Japanese aggressors completely, and build a new China. As yet, the only armed forces that stand wholly on the people's side are still only the elements of the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies,¹³² and they are far from sufficient, yet the anti-popular clique in the Guomindang is ceaselessly intriguing to undermine and destroy these armies.¹³³ In 1944 the Guomindang government presented a so-called memorandum demanding that the Communist Party should "disband, within a definite time limit," four-fifths of the armed forces of the liberated areas. In 1945, during the most recent negotiations, it has further demanded the handing over of all the armed forces of the liberated areas by the Communist Party, after which it would grant the Communist Party "legal status."

These people tell the Communists: Hand over your troops, and we will grant you freedom. According to this theory, a political party that does not have any army should enjoy freedom. Yet whatever freedom the Chinese Communist Party enjoyed during 1924–27, when it had only very small armed forces, vanished with the government's policy of "party purge" and massacre. And today, the China Democratic League and the democrats within the Guomindang, who have no armed forces, have no freedom either. Let us take the workers, peasants, and students and the progressively inclined people in cultural, educational, and industrial circles under the Guomindang regime—for the past eighteen years, none of them have had any freedom.¹³⁴ Can it be that they¹³⁵ have been denied freedom because they organized armies, perpetrated "feudal separatism," created "traitor areas," and violated "government and military orders"? No, not in the least. On the contrary, they have been denied freedom precisely because they have done none of these things.

"The army belongs to the state"—that is perfectly true, and there is not an army in the world that does not belong to a state. But what kind of state? A state under the feudal and Fascist dictatorship of the big landlords, big bankers, and big compradors? Or a new democratic state of the broad masses of the people? The only kind of state for China to establish is a new democratic state and, on this *national* basis, it should establish a new democratic coalition government; all the armed forces of China must belong to such a government of such a state so that they may safeguard the people's freedom and effectively fight foreign aggressors. The moment a new democratic coalition government *and united command* come into being in China, the liberated areas of China will hand their

armed forces over to it. But all the armed forces of the Guomintang will have to be handed over to it at the same time.

In order to defeat the Japanese aggressors and build a new China, for China's freedom and unification, to prevent civil war and safeguard internal peace, the Chinese people must perform one compulsory duty—that is, to transform those armed forces of the Guomintang government that often suffer defeat in the war against Japan, but whose purpose is to oppose the people, to expel those who are not one of them, and to prepare for civil war, to reform them, and so to turn them into the armed forces of the people. The soldiers and the great majority of the officers in the armed forces of the Guomintang were originally good men, and they were originally active in the resistance against Japan and fought bravely in the past. They were reluctant to oppose the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the liberated areas. It is only because the Guomintang command and its corrupt generals, in violation of the democratic traditions set up by Mr. Sun Yatsen personally when he was still alive, imposed their own defeatist and Fascist leadership and reactionary political work and reactionary secret service network, which forced this army to take a reactionary stand and put this army in a grave situation. Both the internal relationship between the officers and the soldiers and the external relationship between the army and the people are worsening, and their fighting capacity is weak, their life is miserable, the recruiting system is all but ineffective, and what is worse, it does not allow people in the rural areas to arm themselves to protect their villages and defend their country. All these things must be reformed, and none should be allowed to continue for long. Such a reform is not only the demand of the Chinese people but also the demand of the broad public opinion of the Allied countries and that of all the soldiers and a large number of officers within the armed forces of the Guomintang itself.

In 1924 Mr. Sun Yatsen said: “Today should mark the beginning of a new epoch in the national revolution.... The first step is to unite the armed forces with the people. The next step is to turn them into the armed forces of the people.” It is because they have applied this policy that the Eighth Route and the New Fourth armies have become “the armed forces of the people,” that is, the people’s army, and have been able to win victories. During the earlier period of the Northern Expedition, the Guomintang armies took Mr. Sun’s “first step” and hence won

victories. In the latter period of the Northern Expedition, they abandoned even the “first step,” took a stand against the people, and hence from that time right down to the present, they have become more and more corrupt and degenerate; “in their element when fighting civil war,” they cannot but “be out of their element when it comes to fighting external war.” Every patriotic officer of good conscience in the Guomindang army should set about reviving the Sun Yatsen spirit and reforming his troops.

In the work of reforming the old armies, a suitable education should be given to all officers who are capable of being re-educated to help them get rid of their obsolete outlook and acquire a correct outlook so that they can remain and serve in the people’s army.

To struggle for the creation of an army of the Chinese people is the duty of the whole nation *and of all democratic parties*. Without a people’s army, the people have nothing. On this question there must be no empty theorizing whatsoever.

We Communists are ready to give our support to the task of reforming the Chinese army. All those military forces that are willing to unite with the people and to oppose the Japanese aggressors instead of opposing the armed forces of the Chinese liberated areas should be regarded as friendly troops and should be given proper assistance by the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies.

The Land

Sixth, the land problem.¹³⁶

To wipe out the Japanese aggressors and build a new China, it is imperative to carry out land reform¹³⁷ and to liberate the peasants. Mr. Sun Yatsen’s thesis of “land to the tiller” is the correct one for the present period of our revolution, which is bourgeois-democratic in nature.

Why do we say our revolution in the present period is “bourgeois-democratic in nature?” We mean that the target of this revolution is not the bourgeoisie in general but national and feudal oppression, that *all* the measures taken in this revolution are in general directed not at abolishing but at protecting private property, and that as a result of this revolution obstacles in the way will be cleaned up so that capitalism will still be able to grow.¹³⁸ “Land to the tiller” means transferring the land from the feudal exploiters to the peasants, turning it into the private property of the peasants¹³⁹ and liberating them from feudal

agrarian relations, so that the old, primitive form of agriculture will progress to a modernized level, so that industry will gain markets, thereby making possible the transformation of an agricultural country into an industrial country. Thus, “land to the tiller” is in the nature of a bourgeoisie-democratic and not a proletarian-socialist proposition; it is the proposition of all revolutionary democrats and not of us Communists alone. The difference is that, in China’s circumstances, we Communists alone treat this proposition with special seriousness and do not just talk about it but put it into practice. Who are the revolutionary democrats? Apart from the proletariat who are the most thoroughgoing of the revolutionary democrats, the peasants form by far the largest group of revolutionary democrats. The overwhelming majority of the peasants, that is, all except *some of* the rich peasants who are feudal remnants, actively demand “land to the tiller.” The urban petty bourgeoisie are also revolutionary democrats, and “land to the tiller” will prove to be their advantage as well, for it will help to develop the productive forces in agriculture. The liberal bourgeoisie¹⁴⁰ are a vacillating class—they approve of “land to the tiller” because they need markets, but many of them are afraid of it because for the most part they have ties with landed property.¹⁴¹ It is the anti-popular clique within the Guomindang which strenuously opposes “land to the tiller” because it represents the stratum of big landlords, bankers, and compradors. China has no political party representing the peasants exclusively. The political parties of the liberal bourgeoisie¹⁴² have no thoroughgoing land program. Because of this, the Chinese Communist Party has become the leader of the peasants and all other revolutionary democrats, being the only party that has a thoroughgoing land program,¹⁴³ fighting earnestly for the peasants’ interests and therefore winning the overwhelming majority of the peasants as its great Allied army.

From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Communist Party carried out Mr. Sun Yatsen’s policy of “land to the tiller.”¹⁴⁴ It was precisely the reactionary clique within the Guomindang, that gang of unworthy followers of *Mr. Sun Yatsen*, who bared their teeth, showed their claws, and fought against “land to the tiller” in ten years of war against the people.

The Communist Party has made a big concession during the Resistance War¹⁴⁵ period by changing the policy of “land to the tiller” to one of reducing rent and interest. This concession was a correct one, for it helped to bring the

Guomindang into the resistance against Japan and unified the resistance of the peasants and landlords of the liberated areas in the anti-Japanese war.¹⁴⁶ If no special obstacle arises, we are prepared to continue this policy after the war, first extending rent and interest reduction to the whole country and then taking proper measures for the gradual achievement of “land to the tiller.”

However, those who have betrayed Mr. Sun oppose not only “land to the tiller” but also the reduction of rent and interest. The Guomindang government has not carried out the decree for a “25 percent reduction in rent” and similar decrees that it has promulgated itself; only in *China’s* liberated areas have they been enforced,¹⁴⁷ and for this crime the liberated areas have been labeled “traitorous areas.”

In the course of the Resistance War¹⁴⁸ a so-called theory of two stages, a national stage,¹⁴⁹ and a stage for democracy and people’s livelihood, has made its appearance, and this theory is wrong.

Faced with a formidable enemy, we should not raise democracy and people’s livelihood;¹⁵⁰ better wait until the Japanese are gone—such is the absurd theory put forward by the anti-popular clique of the Guomindang to prevent complete victory in the anti-Japanese war. Yet there are people who have been echoing this theory and have *unconsciously* become its servile adherents.

Faced with a formidable enemy, it is impossible for us to drive out the Japanese¹⁵¹ unless we deal with democracy and the people’s livelihood.¹⁵² This is the correct theory of the Chinese revolutionary democrats,¹⁵³ which has been proven by all of modern Chinese history, particularly by the history of the eight years of the War of Resistance,¹⁵⁴ *and has been proven by the anti-Fascist struggle of the people in France, Italy, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and other countries. Instead of reduction in rent and interest like ours, what is being carried out in Poland and other countries is “land to the tiller.”*

In the period of the anti-Japanese war, *everything must make way for resisting Japan and instead of being isolated*, reduction of rent and interest and the other democratic reforms all serve the resistance against Japan. In order to unite every social class to oppose the common enemy,¹⁵⁵ we have abstained from abolishing ownership of land by the landlords *and have only reduced rent and interest*; at the same time, we have encouraged them to transfer their assets to industry and

meanwhile given the enlightened gentry the opportunity to take part in public activities and in the work of government alongside other representatives of the people. As for the rich peasants, we have encouraged them to develop production. All this is part of the resolute line of democratic reforms in the rural areas and is absolutely necessary.

There are two lines: either stubbornly oppose the Chinese peasants' efforts to settle the problem of democracy and the people's livelihood and become corrupt, ineffectual, and utterly incapable of fighting Japan. Or firmly support the Chinese peasants in their efforts and gain the greatest of Allied armies, constituting 80 percent of the population, thereby forging tremendous fighting strength. The former is the line of the Guomintang government, the latter is the line of China's liberated areas.

The line of the opportunists is to vacillate between the two, to profess support for the peasants and yet lack the resolve to reduce rent and interest, arm the peasants, or establish democratic political power in the rural areas.

Using all the forces at its command, the anti-popular clique of the Guomintang has directed every kind of vicious attack: open and secret, military and political, both with bloodshed and without, against the Chinese Communist Party. Taken in its social setting, the dispute between the two parties is essentially over this issue of agrarian relations. Where exactly did we give offense to the Guomintang reactionary clique? Is it not on this score? Has it not been precisely by rendering the Japanese aggressors great help on this score that this Guomintang anti-popular clique has won favor and encouragement from them? Have not all the charges against the Chinese Communist Party—"sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the state," "traitor party," "traitor army," "traitor areas," and "disobedience to government and military orders"—been leveled precisely because it has done conscientious work in the true interests of the nation in this sphere?

Peasants—they are the source of China's industrial workers and, in the future, additional tens of millions of peasants will go to the cities and enter factories. If China is to establish powerful national industries and many large modern cities, there will have to be a long process of transformation of the rural population into the urban population.

Peasants—they are the market¹⁵⁶ for China's industry, and only they can

supply foodstuffs and raw materials in great abundance and absorb manufactured goods in great quantities.

Peasants—they are the source of the army,¹⁵⁷ for soldiers are just peasants in military uniform, the mortal enemies of the Japanese aggressors.

Peasants—they are the main political base¹⁵⁸ for democracy in China at the present stage, and Chinese democrats will achieve nothing unless they rely on the support of these 360 million peasants.

Peasants—they are the main base of China's cultural movement¹⁵⁹ at the present stage, so should the 360 million peasants be left out, would not the "elimination of illiteracy," "popularization of education," "literature and art for the masses," and "public health" become largely empty talk?

In saying [that the peasants are] "the main base,"¹⁶⁰ I am of course not ignoring the political, economic, and cultural importance of the rest of the people, numbering about 90 million, and in particular I am not ignoring the working class, which politically is the most conscious and therefore qualified to lead every democratic movement¹⁶¹ *among the Chinese people*. Let there be no misunderstanding of this point.

It is absolutely necessary not only for Communists but for every democrat in China to grasp these points.

When the land system has been reformed, even by such an elementary reform as the reduction of rent and interest, the peasants will become more interested in production. Then as the peasants are helped to organize farming and other cooperatives on a step by step, voluntary basis, the productive forces will grow. These agricultural producers cooperatives at present can only be collective, mutual-aid labor organizations based on an individual peasant economy (that is, on private ownership by the peasants), such as labor-exchange teams, mutual-aid teams, and work-exchange groups. Even so, the development of productivity¹⁶² and the increase in output are already astonishing. Such systems have become popular systems in China's liberated areas¹⁶³ and from now on should be spread as much as possible.

It should be mentioned here that cooperative organization such as the labor-exchange team has existed among the peasants for a long time, but in the past it was only an indication of their wretchedness.¹⁶⁴ Today the labor-exchange teams in China's liberated areas are different both in form and in content, and they are

a manifestation of how the peasant masses increase the productive *forces* and strive for a better life. In the final analysis, the impact, good or bad, great or small, upon the people of the policies and practices of any Chinese political party depends on whether and how much these help to develop the productive forces of the Chinese people. Do they fetter or liberate these forces? The social productive forces of China can be liberated and the welcome of the Chinese people can be earned only by destroying the Japanese aggressors *completely*, carrying out land reform, liberating the peasants, developing modern industry, and establishing an independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful new China.

It should be pointed out further that it is not easy for intellectuals who come from the city to work in the countryside to understand the current characteristics of the rural areas, that is, that they are still based on a scattered and backward individual economy, and that, moreover, the liberated areas are temporarily cut off from one another by the enemy and are involved in a guerrilla war. Failing to understand these characteristics, they often inappropriately approach and handle rural problems and rural work from the viewpoint of life and work in the cities, and so they divorce themselves from the realities of the countryside and are incapable of becoming one with the peasants.¹⁶⁵ Such phenomena should be overcome through education.

China's many revolutionary intellectuals must awaken to the necessity of uniting with the peasants. The peasants need them and await their help. They should go to the countryside enthusiastically, doff their student garb and put on rough clothing, be willing to start with any work however trivial and so learn what the peasants want and help to arouse and organize them in the struggle to accomplish the democratic tasks in China's democratic revolution.

After the Japanese aggressors are wiped out, we should confiscate the land usurped by them and the chief traitors and distribute it among those peasants who have little or no land.

Industry

Seventh, the problem of industry.¹⁶⁶

In order to defeat the Japanese aggressors and build a new China it is necessary to develop industry. But under the leadership of the Guomindang government, everything depends on foreign countries and its financial and

economic policy is ruining the entire economic life of the people, so that in Guomindang-controlled areas a few small industrial enterprises are all that can be found, and in most cases they have been unable to avoid bankruptcy. Without political reform, all productive forces are being ruined, and this is true both of agriculture and of industry.

All in all, there can be no industrialized China¹⁶⁷ unless there is an independent, free, democratic, and united China. To wipe out the Japanese aggressors is to seek independence. To abolish the Guomindang's one-party dictatorship, establish a democratic¹⁶⁸ coalition government, *give the people freedom and unity*, and establish a people's army,¹⁶⁹ and carry out land reform and liberate the peasants, this is to seek freedom, democracy, and unity. Without independence, freedom, democracy, and unity, it is impossible to have¹⁷⁰ *a national* industry on a really large scale. Without industry, there can be no solid national defense, no well-being for the people, no prosperity or strength for the nation. The 105 years since the Opium War of 1840, and especially the eighteen years since the Guomindang came to power, have brought this important point home to the Chinese people. A China that is not poor and weak but rich and powerful is tied to a China that is not colonial or semicolonial but independent, not semifeudal but free and democratic, not divided but united. In semicolonial, semifeudal, and divided China, many people have for many years dreamed of developing industry, building up national defense, and bringing well-being to the people and wealth and power to the nation, but all their dreams have been shattered. Many well-intentioned educators, scientists, and students have paid no attention to politics in the belief that¹⁷¹ they could serve the country with their knowledge, but this too has turned out to be a dream, a dream that has been shattered. This is good news, this shattering of these childish dreams, for it marks a starting point on China's road to wealth and power. The Chinese people have learned many things in the anti-Japanese war; they know that after the elimination¹⁷² of the Japanese aggressors they must build a new democratic China enjoying independence, freedom, democracy, unity, wealth, and power, all of which are interrelated and indispensable. If they do so, then China has hope. The productive forces of the Chinese people will be released and given every possibility to develop only when the political system of New Democracy is realized in all parts of China. More and more people are coming to understand

this point every day.

When the political system of New Democracy is achieved, the Chinese people and their government will have to adopt practical measures in order to build heavy and light industry step by step over a number of years to raise China from the *status* of an agricultural country to *that of* an industrial country.¹⁷³ *The so-called independence, freedom, democracy, and unity of New Democracy* cannot be consolidated unless there is a solid economy as its base, a much more advanced agriculture than at present, and a large-scale industry occupying a predominant position in the national economy, with communications, trade, and finance to match.

We Communists are ready to fight for these objectives in cooperation with all the *anti-Japanese* democratic parties and industrial circles throughout the country. The Chinese working class will play a great role in this undertaking.

Ever since World War I, the Chinese working class has consciously fought for the independence and liberation of China. The year 1921 witnessed the birth of the Chinese Communist Party, the vanguard of the working class. From this, China's struggle for liberation then entered a new stage. During the ensuing three periods of the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution,¹⁷⁴ and the anti-Japanese war, the working class and its¹⁷⁵ vanguard have worked extremely hard and made invaluable contributions to the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people. In the struggle for the final elimination¹⁷⁶ of the Japanese aggressors, and especially for the recovery of large cities and important lines of communications, the Chinese working class will be of great use. It can be predicted that after the anti-Japanese war, the effort and contribution of the Chinese working class will be even greater. The task of the Chinese working class is to struggle not only for China's independence, freedom, democracy, and unity but also¹⁷⁷ for China's industrialization and modernization of agriculture.

The policy of adjusting the interests of labor and capital will be adopted under the new democratic state system. On the one hand, it will protect the interests of the workers, institute an eight- to ten-hour working day according to circumstances, provide suitable unemployment relief and social insurance, and safeguard trade union rights; on the other hand, it will guarantee legitimate profits to properly managed state, private, and cooperative enterprises. *In this way*, both labor and capital will strive together to develop industrial production.

In order to develop industry, there is a need for a great deal of capital. But where does it come from? It comes from nowhere but the following two sources: mainly from the accumulation of capital by the Chinese people themselves, with some assistance from foreign aid at the same time. We welcome foreign investment under the condition that Chinese laws are observed and the Chinese economy benefits. The cause which will benefit both the Chinese people as well as the people in the other countries is that after China has obtained a stable domestic and international peace and has completed a thoroughgoing political and land reform, she will be able to energetically develop large-scale light and heavy industry and modern agriculture. Under these circumstances, the capacity for foreign investment will be enormous. A China that is politically backward and economically poor will help neither the Chinese people nor the people in other countries.

When the Japanese aggressors are wiped out,¹⁷⁸ the enterprises and property in China of the Japanese aggressors and of the chief traitors will be confiscated and placed at the disposal of the government.

Culture, Education, and the Intellectuals

Eighth, the problem of culture, education, and the intellectuals.¹⁷⁹

The calamities brought upon the Chinese people by national and feudal oppression include calamities in national culture. Progressive cultural and educational institutions and cultural workers and educators have particularly suffered. To sweep away national and feudal oppression and build a new democratic, *independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful* China,¹⁸⁰ we need large numbers of educators and teachers for the people and also people's scientists, engineers, technicians, doctors, journalists, writers, men of letters, artists, and rank-and-file cultural workers, imbued with the spirit of "serve the people" and "*becoming one with the people*" while undertaking these formidable tasks. All *such* intellectuals who have served the people should be esteemed *by the government and society* and regarded as valuable national and social assets. The problem of the intellectuals becomes particularly important in China because the country is culturally backward as a result of national and feudal oppression and because intellectuals are urgently needed in the people's struggle for liberation. Many revolutionary intellectuals have played a very great role in the

people's struggle for liberation in the past half-century, and especially since the May Fourth movement of 1919 and in the eight years of resistance to Japan,¹⁸¹ and they will play an even greater role in the struggles to come. Therefore, the task of the government¹⁸² is systematically to develop all kinds of intellectual cadres from among the ranks of the people and at the same time to take care to unite with and re-educate all useful intellectuals already available.

The elimination of illiteracy among 80 percent of the population is a necessary condition for *establishing* a new China.¹⁸³

Proper *but* resolute steps should be taken to eliminate all slavish, feudal, and Fascist culture and education.

The serious ignorance of sanitation and epidemic diseases which result from national and feudal oppression and which are torturing the Chinese people spiritually and physically must be countered through vigorous action to prevent and cure endemic and other diseases among the people and to expand the people's health services.¹⁸⁴

The old-style cultural and educational workers and doctors should be given suitable re-education so that they can acquire a new outlook and new methods to serve the *Chinese* people.

The purpose of the Chinese people's culture and education should be new democratic, that is, China should establish her own national, scientific, and people's mass culture and education.

As for foreign culture, antforeignism is an incorrect policy. We should rather draw as much as possible on what is progressive in foreign culture for reference in China's cultural movement.¹⁸⁵ Blindly following¹⁸⁶ is also an incorrect policy in the development of China's new culture. We should rather draw on it critically to meet the actual needs of the Chinese people.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, as regards ancient Chinese culture, we should not reject it completely, nor should we blindly copy it but, rather, draw on it critically so as to help the progress of China's *new democratic* culture.

Under the general orientation of struggling for the liberation of the Chinese people, Communists should unite well with all intellectuals regardless of their class, religious beliefs, or party affiliation.

Minority Nationalities

Ninth, the problem of the minority nationalities.¹⁸⁸

The anti-popular clique of the Guomindang denies that many nationalities exist in China and labels minority nationalities such as the Mongolians, Muslims, Tibetans, Yi, Miao, and Yao as “clans.”¹⁸⁹ It has taken over the reactionary policies of the governments of the *Manchu* Qing dynasty and of the northern warlords in relation to the minority nationalities, oppressing and exploiting them in every possible way. Clear cases in point are the massacre of Mongolians of the Yikezhao League in 1943, the armed suppression of the minority nationalities in Xinjiang since 1944, and the massacres of the Muslims in Gansu Province in recent years. These are manifestations of an erroneous *Fascist* Han chauvinist ideology and policy for nationalities, *which completely contradicts Mr. Sun Yatsen’s doctrines.*

In 1924 Mr. Sun Yatsen wrote in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang: “The Guomindang’s principle of nationalism has two meanings: the nationalities of China seek, first, their own liberation and, second, the equality of all nationalities in China.” “The Guomindang solemnly declares: we recognize the right to self-determination of all nationalities in China and that a free and united Republic of China (a free union of all nationalities) will be established when the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord war is victorious.”¹⁹⁰

The Chinese Communist Party is in full agreement with Mr. Sun’s policy on nationalities as stated here, and Communists must actively help the many people of all minority nationalities to fight for it and help them, including all their leaders who have ties with the popular masses, to fight for their political, economic, and cultural liberation and development, and to establish their own armies which will safeguard the interests of the popular masses. Their spoken and written languages, their manners and customs, and their religious beliefs must be respected.

The attitude that the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the liberated areas in north China¹⁹¹ have for years adopted toward the Mongolian and Hui nationalities is correct, and the work they have done has been fruitful.

Foreign Policy

Tenth, the problem of foreign policy.¹⁹²

The Chinese Communist Party agrees with the Atlantic Charter and with the

decisions of the international conferences of Moscow, Cairo, Tehran, and the Crimea [i.e., Yalta] because these decisions all contribute to the defeat of the Fascist aggressors and the maintenance of world peace.

The Chinese Communist Party particularly expresses its warm agreement with the resolution made at the Crimea Conference. The Crimea Conference decided: in order ultimately to defeat Fascist Germany and, moreover, wipe out fascism as well as the roots of fascism; wipe out the last remnants of fascism in the liberated areas in Europe, establish domestic peace in every country, and set up democratic systems as the people in each country choose; and as regards the procedures for setting up these democratic systems, "to organize temporary political institutions which will broadly include the representatives of all democratic elements in the population. In addition, they will guarantee that governments which will carry out the will of the people will be set up through popular election as soon as possible." The Crimea Conference also decided that Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union will unite as one to maintain "stable and enduring" world peace and will set up organs of world peace without delay.

We believe that the Crimea line is in accordance with the basic policy of the Chinese Communist Party in solving problems in the East as well as in China. While wiping out the Japanese aggressors and solving the China problem, the following points must be realized. First, the Japanese aggressors must be defeated once and for all, and Japanese fascism and militarism as well as the causes that led to them must be eliminated thoroughly; no halfway compromise should be allowed. Second, the remaining forces of Chinese fascism must be eliminated and nothing should remain. Third, domestic peace must be established in China, and civil war should not be permitted again. Fourth, the authoritarian rule of the Guomindang must be abolished; after that, it should be replaced first by a nationally unified provisional coalition government which will widely include representatives of all the democratic elements in the Chinese population. This is the first step; thereafter, after the national territory has been regained, and through a free and unconstrained election, a formal coalition government which will carry out the will of the people will be set up. This is the second step; neither of these two steps should be omitted. Based on the Crimea line and according to China's specific situation, we must do this.

The fundamental principle of the foreign policy advocated by the Chinese

Communist Party is that China will establish and strengthen diplomatic relations with all countries and settle all questions of common concern *during as well as after the war*, such as coordination of military operations in the war, the peace conference, and trade and investment, on the basic conditions that the Japanese aggressors must be completely defeated and world peace maintained, that there must be mutual respect for national independence and equality, and that there must be promotion of mutual interests and friendship between states and between peoples.

The Chinese Communist Party fully agrees with the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the establishment of an organization to safeguard international peace and security after the war. The Chinese Communist Party welcomes the United Nations San Francisco Conference. It has appointed its own representative for China's delegation to this conference in order to express the will of the Chinese people.

We hold that the Guomindang government must cease its hostility toward the Soviet Union and speedily improve Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union was the first country to renounce the unequal treaties and sign new, equal treaties with China. At the time of the Guomindang's First National Congress, *personally* convened by Mr. Sun Yatsen in 1924, and the subsequent Northern Expedition, the Soviet Union was the only country to help China's war of liberation. When the War of Resistance¹⁹³ broke out in 1937, the Soviet Union was again the first country to help China oppose the Japanese aggressors. The Chinese people are grateful to the Soviet government and Soviet people for this help. We believe that no final and thorough settlement of the problems of the Pacific is possible without the participation of the Soviet Union.

We believe that the great efforts made by the two great powers of Great Britain and the United States, particularly the United States, in our common cause of opposing the Japanese aggressors and the sympathy and assistance the two governments and peoples have provided China deserve our gratitude.

Nonetheless, we ask the governments of all Allied countries, and of Britain and the United States¹⁹⁴ in the first place, to pay serious attention to the voice of the Chinese people and not to impair *or lose* friendship with them by pursuing foreign policies that run counter to their will. We maintain that if any foreign government helps the Chinese reactionaries and opposes the Chinese people's

democratic cause, it will be committing a gross mistake.

The Chinese people welcome the steps taken by many foreign governments in renouncing their unequal treaties and concluding new, equal treaties with China *to treat the Chinese people in an equal manner*. We maintain, however, that the conclusion of equal treaties does not in itself mean that China has actually won genuine equality. Genuine and actual equality is never the gift of foreign governments *or of the good intention of people in other countries* but primarily relies on the Chinese people's own efforts to make China politically, economically, and culturally an *independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful* new democratic state; otherwise, there will be only nominal and not actual independence and equality. That is to say, China can never win genuine independence and equality by following the present policy of the Guomindang government.

We consider that after the defeat and unconditional surrender of the Japanese aggressors, it will be necessary to help all the democratic forces of the Japanese people to establish a Japanese people's democratic system so that Japanese fascism and militarism may be thoroughly wiped out, together with their political, economic, and social roots. Unless the Japanese people have a democratic system, it will be impossible to wipe thoroughly out Japanese fascism and militarism and impossible to ensure peace in the Pacific.

We consider the decision of the Cairo Conference regarding the independence of Korea to be correct, and the Chinese people should help the Korean people to win liberation.

The United States has already granted the Philippines independence. We hope that *Great Britain will also permit* India to achieve independence. An independent and democratic India not only is needed by the Indian people but is essential for world peace.

As regards the Southeast Asian countries—Burma [Myanmar], Malaysia, the Dutch East Indies [Indonesia], the French colony of Annam [Vietnam], and the Philippines¹⁹⁵—we hope that *after helping the local people in these countries defeat the Japanese aggressors, based on the attitude toward the liberated areas in Europe adopted at the Crimea Conference*, Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Netherlands will *grant to the people of these countries the right to establish* independent and democratic states of their own. As for Thailand, it

should be treated like the Fascist satellite states in Europe.

Mr. Roosevelt, the late president of the United States, once said: "The world has already become smaller." Indeed, the American people who used to be perceived by the Chinese as living in a remote place now seem to have become next-door neighbors. The Chinese people will build a "stable and enduring" world peace together with the people in the other great powers, such as the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and people in every country in the world.

These are the major points of our concrete program.

To repeat, none of the points in this concrete program can be successfully carried out on a nationwide scale without a democratic coalition government enjoying the support of the entire country.

Through its twenty-four years of struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party has attained a position such that should any political party or social group or any Chinese or foreigner adopt an attitude of *writing off* or showing disrespect for its opinion on questions concerning China, this would be extremely inappropriate.¹⁹⁶ There were, and still are, people who try to ignore our opinions and follow their own bigoted course, and *who dare to write off and show disrespect for our opinions*, but they have all ended in a blind alley. What is the reason for this? Simply because our opinions, *our policies, and the general and concrete new democratic programs we put forward and are carrying out in China at the present stage* conform to the interests of the overwhelmingly majority of the Chinese masses. We are¹⁹⁷ the most faithful spokesman of the Chinese people, and whoever dares *to write us off* or to show disrespect for us is in fact *writing off* or showing disrespect for the overwhelming majority of the Chinese masses and is doomed to defeat.

Tasks in the Guomindang-Controlled Areas

I have now given a detailed explanation of our Party's *new democratic* general and concrete programs. Undoubtedly, these programs will eventually be put into effect throughout China; this is the vista that the international and domestic situation as a whole has opened up for the Chinese people. However, *the present situation forces us to make distinctions while carrying them out; that is, conditions in the Guomindang-controlled areas, the enemy-occupied areas, and the liberated areas differ from one another.*¹⁹⁸ Different conditions *in each of*

these three areas give rise to different tasks. Some of these tasks I have already explained above, while others still need elaboration.

In the Guomintang-controlled areas, the people are not free to engage in patriotic activities and democratic movements are considered illegal, and yet various social strata, democratic parties, and democratic elements are becoming increasingly active. The China Democratic League issued a manifesto in January of this year demanding the termination of the Guomintang's one-party dictatorship and the establishment of coalition government. Many circles in society have made similar declarations. Within the Guomintang, too, *a fairly large number of party members as well as many important people* are showing increasing doubt and discontent over the policies of the leading bodies of their own party, are becoming increasingly aware of the danger of their party's isolation from the majority of the *Chinese* people, and are therefore demanding democratic reforms suited to the times. With Chongqing as the center,¹⁹⁹ democratic movements are growing among the workers, peasants, government employees and teachers, merchants, industrial circles, cultural circles, student circles, educational circles, women's circles,²⁰⁰ and even among some of the soldiers and officers. These facts indicate that the democratic movements of all the oppressed strata are gradually converging on a common objective. One weakness of the movement²⁰¹ is that the basic strata of society have not yet joined it on a wide scale and the most important forces, namely, the peasants, workers, soldiers, and lower-ranking government employees and teachers, who are all very important but are suffering so bitterly, are not yet organized. Another weakness is that many of the democratic personalities in the movement are still unclear and hesitant about the fundamental policy, namely, a change in the situation on the basis of democratic principles.²⁰² However, the international and domestic situations are compelling²⁰³ all the oppressed strata, political parties, social groups, and *individuals* gradually to awaken and unite *to practice their sacred rights of resisting Japan and rescuing the nation*. No suppression by the Guomintang government can stop the progress of this movement.

All the oppressed strata, political parties, social groups, and individuals in the Guomintang-controlled areas must extend their democratic movement on a broad scale and gradually weld their scattered forces together in order to fight for national unity, the establishment of a coalition government, the defeat of the

Japanese aggressors, and the building of a new China. *To achieve this*, the Chinese Communist Party and China's liberated areas²⁰⁴ should give them every possible help.

In the Guomindang-controlled areas the Communists should continue to pursue the policy of a broad national united front against Japan. In the fight for objectives, we should unite with anyone²⁰⁵ who does not oppose us today, even though he might have done so yesterday. *Everything the Chinese Communists do will give way to the general objective of mobilizing and uniting all forces to wipe out the Japanese aggressors completely and build a new China.*

Tasks in the Occupied Areas

In the occupied areas, Communists should call on all who oppose Japan to follow the French and Italian examples and form organizations and underground forces of all kinds to prepare armed uprisings, so that when the time comes they can act from the inside in coordination with the armies attacking from the outside and so wipe out the Japanese aggressors. The atrocities, plunder, rape, and humiliation *of every possible sort* suffered by our brothers and sisters in the occupied areas at the hands of the Japanese aggressors and their faithful running dogs have aroused the burning wrath of all Chinese, and the hour of revenge is fast approaching. The victories on the eastern and western fronts²⁰⁶ and the victories of our Eighth Route and New Fourth armies *in the war* have stimulated and heightened the anti-Japanese spirit of the people in the occupied areas, and they urgently want to become organized so as to achieve liberation as quickly as possible. Therefore, we must raise our work in the occupied areas to the same level of importance as that in the liberated areas. Large numbers of our working personnel must be sent to the occupied areas to work. We must train and promote a large group of activists from among the people in the occupied areas to join in local work. We must intensify our underground work in the Four Northeastern Provinces that have been occupied longer than any other occupied region and that form a key industrial area and an area of troop concentration for the Japanese aggressors. With a view to the recovery of these lost territories, we should strengthen our solidarity with people who have fled south from the Northeast.

Communists should pursue the broadest anti-Japanese United Front policy in

all the occupied areas and must unite with anyone who is opposed to the Japanese aggressors and their faithful running dogs in order to overthrow the common enemy.

It is necessary that we warn all puppet armies, the puppet police, and others who are helping the enemy and opposing their countrymen: They should²⁰⁷ quickly recognize the criminal nature of their actions, repent in time, and atone for their crimes by helping their countrymen against the enemy. Otherwise, the nation will certainly show them no mercy the day the enemy collapses.

Communists *and anti-Japanese people* should direct persuasive propaganda at all puppet organizations with a mass following so as to win them²⁰⁸ over to our side against the national enemy. At the same time, evidence should be collected about those impenitent collaborators who have committed the most heinous crimes, so that they can be brought to justice *promptly* when the lost territories are recovered.

Those *reactionaries* in the Guomindang who have betrayed the nation by organizing Chinese traitors to fight the Chinese people, the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and other armed forces of the people must be warned to repent in time. Otherwise, on the day when the lost territories are recovered, they will certainly be punished for their crimes in the same way as the Chinese traitors and their organizations and they will be shown no mercy.

Tasks in China's Liberated Areas

In the great struggle in China's liberated areas, the Chinese people have already turned and are still turning our Party's whole new democratic program into one which they warmly welcome and are determined to carry out. Therefore, it has achieved²⁰⁹ striking results and built up tremendous anti-Japanese strength, and from now on this strength should be developed and consolidated in every way.

Under current conditions, the troops of *China's* liberated areas should launch extensive attacks on all places that can be captured from the Japanese and the puppets, *whether they have been occupied for a long time or are newly occupied*, in order to expand the liberated areas and reduce the occupied areas.

But at the same time it should be borne in mind that the enemy is still extremely powerful and is sure to launch²¹⁰ further attacks on the liberated areas,

so the army and people of the liberated areas must be ready at all times to smash enemy attacks and must work in every way to consolidate these areas.

We should *strive to expand* the armies, guerrilla units, people's militia, and self-defense corps of the liberated areas *under every possible condition* and increase their combat effectiveness by speeding up their training and consolidation in order to build up adequate *military* strength so as to cooperate with the Allied countries in launching a strategic offensive.²¹¹

In the liberated areas, on the one hand, the army must support the government and cherish the people, while, on the other hand, the government²¹² must lead the people in the work of supporting the army and taking good care of the families of soldiers fighting Japan so that relations between the army and the people will become still better.

In the work of *the popularly elected governments based on the Three-Thirds system in the liberated areas, that is, the local coalition governments and mass organizations*, Communists should *continue their past policy*, and continue to cooperate closely with all anti-Japanese democrats on the basis of the *common new democratic program, regardless of which class or party they belong to and whatever religious beliefs they have*.

Similarly, in military work, Communists should cooperate closely with all anti-Japanese democrats who are willing to cooperate with us, regardless of whether they are members of the armies of the liberated areas, *and build up together a big and powerful people's army for the great purpose of wiping out the Japanese aggressors and defending democratic China*.

To increase the enthusiasm of the masses of workers, peasants, and other working people for resisting Japan and for production, we should continue to apply *prop- erly but firmly* the policy of²¹³ reducing rent and interest and of increasing the pay of workers and office staff. Cadres working in the liberated areas must diligently learn to do economic work. All available forces must be mobilized for the extensive development of agriculture, industry, and trade, and the improvement of the livelihood of the soldiers and the people *to prepare the necessary material conditions in order to sustain a protracted war to wipe out the Japanese aggressors*. For this purpose, there must be labor emulation campaigns and awards should be given to labor heroes and model workers. When the Japanese aggressors are wiped out in the cities,²¹⁴ our personnel must rapidly

learn how to do urban economic work.

Our cultural and educational work should be developed in order to raise the level of political consciousness of the people in the liberated areas and, above all, of the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, and in order to train large numbers of cadres. In carrying forward this work, those engaged in cultural and educational work in the liberated areas should adopt forms and select content suited to the existing rural conditions and to the needs and wishes of the people in the countryside.

In all our work in the liberated areas, local manpower and material resources must be used most sparingly, and in every area long-term plans must be made and misuse and waste must be avoided. This is necessary not only for defeating the Japanese²¹⁵ but for building the new China.

In all our work in the liberated areas, we must take care to help the local people administer local affairs and to cultivate many local cadres from among the best local people. It will be impossible to accomplish the great task of the democratic revolution in the villages unless comrades who come from other places become one with local people and help local cadres wholeheartedly, painstakingly, and in ways that fit the actual conditions, and unless they cherish them like their own brothers and sisters.

When a unit of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, or any other armed force of the people arrives at a place, it should immediately help the local people organize forces led by the local cadres, including not only militia and self-defense corps but also local troops and regional forces. This will make possible the eventual creation of regular forces and regular army formations led by the local people. This is an extremely important task. Unless this is accomplished, we can neither build stable anti-Japanese base areas nor expand the people's army.

Of course, all local people for their part should warmly welcome and help the workers and military forces²¹⁶ coming from other areas *so as to accomplish their common task*.

Everybody should be made aware of how to deal with the problem of covert wreckers. It is easy to spot and handle overt enemies and native wreckers. Covert enemies and covert native wreckers are not easy to spot or easy to handle. Therefore, we should take up this matter in all seriousness and at the same time be very careful.²¹⁷

All religions are permitted in China's liberated areas, in accordance with the principle of freedom of religious belief. All believers in Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, and other faiths enjoy the protection of the government²¹⁸ so long as they abide by its laws. Everyone is free to believe or not to believe; neither compulsion nor discrimination is permitted.

Finally, our congress should propose to the people of all the liberated areas that a people's conference of the Chinese liberated areas be held in Yan'an as soon as possible to discuss the issues in coordinating the activities of the various liberated areas, strengthening the work of the various liberated areas in the War of Resistance, helping the people in the Guomindang-controlled areas in their anti-Japanese democratic movement, helping the underground armed forces of the people in the occupied areas, and promoting national unity and the formation of a coalition government. *In fact* China's liberated areas have become the center of gravity in the nationwide people's struggle to resist Japan and save the country, the broad masses throughout the country pin their hopes on us, and it is our duty not to disappoint them. Such a conference would give great impetus to the Chinese people's cause of national liberation.

5. Let the Whole Party Unite and Fight to Accomplish Its Tasks!

Comrades! Our tasks are so enormous, our policies are so concrete and clear,²¹⁹ what should be our attitude in carrying out these policies and performing these tasks?

The present international and domestic situation opens up bright prospects and provides unprecedentedly favorable conditions for us and the Chinese people as a whole; this is evident and beyond doubt. However, at the same time there are still serious difficulties. Anyone who sees only the bright side but not the difficulties cannot fight effectively for the accomplishment of the Party's tasks.

Together with the Chinese people, our Party has built up immense strength for the Chinese nation in the twenty-four years of the Party's history, including the eight years of the anti-Japanese war; the success of our work is obvious and beyond doubt. But at the same time there are still defects in our work. Anyone who sees only the successful side but not the defects likewise cannot fight effectively for the accomplishment of the Party's tasks.

In the twenty-four years since its birth in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party

has gone through three great struggles—the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution,²²⁰ and the anti-Japanese war which is still under way. From its very beginning our Party has based itself on the theory of Marxism,²²¹ for this doctrine is the crystallization of the most correct and most revolutionary scientific thought of the world proletariat. When the universal truth of Marxism²²² began to be integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese Revolution took on an entirely new complexion and the entire historical stage of New Democracy emerged. Armed with Marxist theory,²²³ the Chinese Communist Party has brought a new style of work to the Chinese people, a style of work that essentially entails integrating theory with practice, forging close links with the masses, and practicing self-criticism and mutual criticism.

The universal truth of Marxism,²²⁴ which reflects the practice of proletarian struggle throughout the world, becomes a useful weapon²²⁵ for the Chinese people only when it is integrated with the concrete practice of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese proletariat and people. This is what the Chinese Communist Party has done. Our Party has grown and advanced through staunch struggle against every manifestation of dogmatism and empiricism that runs counter to this principle. Dogmatism is divorced from concrete practice, while empiricism mistakes fragmentary experience for universal truth; both kinds of opportunist thinking run counter to Marxism. In the course of its twenty-four years of struggle, our Party has successfully fought such erroneous thinking, and it is still doing so, thus greatly consolidating itself ideologically. Our Party now has 1.21 million members, with the overwhelming majority having joined during the War of Resistance, and there are various impurities in their ideology, while the same is true of some of the members who joined the Party before the war. The work of rectification in the last few years has been most successful and has gone a long way toward correcting these impurities. This work should be continued and ideological education within the Party should be developed still more extensively in the spirit of “learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones” and “curing the illness to save the patient.” We must enable the Party’s leading cadres at all levels *and in all places* to understand that intimate integration of theory and practice is the hallmark distinguishing us Communists from all other political parties. Therefore, ideological education is the key link to be grasped in uniting the whole Party for great political struggles. Unless this task

is resolved, the Party cannot accomplish any of its political tasks.

Another hallmark distinguishing us Communists from all other political parties is that we have very close ties with the broadest masses of the people. Our point of departure is to serve the *Chinese* people wholeheartedly and never for a moment to divorce ourselves from the masses, to proceed in all cases from the interests of the people and not from the interests of individuals or groups, and to understand the identity of our responsibility to the people and our responsibility to our own leading organs.²²⁶ Communists must be ready at all times to stand up for the truth, because truth is in the interests of the people. Communists must be ready at all times to correct their mistakes, because mistakes are against the interests of the people. Twenty-four years of experience tell us that the right task, policy, and style of work invariably strengthen our ties with the masses in a given time and place. The wrong task, policy, and style of work invariably disagree with the demands of the masses at a given time and place and invariably alienate us from the masses. The reason such evils as dogmatism, empiricism, commandism, tailism, sectarianism, bureaucratism, *warlordism*, and an arrogant attitude in work are definitely harmful and intolerable, and why anyone suffering from these maladies must overcome them, is that they alienate us from the masses. Our congress should call upon the whole Party to be vigilant and to see that no comrade at any post is divorced from the masses. It should teach every comrade to love the people and listen attentively to the voice of the masses; to become one with the masses wherever he goes and, instead of standing above them, to join with the masses and, according to their level of consciousness, raise their political consciousness and help them gradually organize themselves voluntarily and get going all essential struggles permitted by the internal and external circumstances of the given time and place. Commandism is wrong in any type of work, because in overstepping the level of political consciousness of the masses and violating the principle of voluntary mass action it reflects the disease of impetuosity. Our comrades must not assume that everything they themselves understand is likewise understood by the masses. Whether the masses understand and are ready to take action can be discovered only by going into their midst and making investigations. If we work in this way, we can avoid commandism. Tailism in any type of work is also wrong, because in falling below the level of political consciousness of the masses and violating the principle of

leading the masses forward, it reflects the disease of dilatoriness. Our comrades must not assume that what they themselves do not yet understand the masses also do not understand. It often happens that the masses outstrip us and are eager to advance a step when our comrades are still tailing behind certain backward elements, for instead of acting as leaders of the masses such comrades reflect the views of these backward elements and, moreover, mistake their views for those of the broad masses. In a word, every comrade must be brought to understand that the supreme test of the words and deeds of a Communist is whether he conforms to the highest interests of the broad popular masses and whether he enjoys the support of the masses. Every comrade must be helped to understand that as long as we rely on the people, believe firmly in the inexhaustible creative power of the popular masses, and hence trust and become one with the people, no enemy can crush us, while we can crush every enemy and overcome every difficulty.

Conscientious practice of self-criticism is still another hallmark distinguishing our Party from all other political parties. As we say, dust will accumulate if a room is not cleaned regularly. Our faces will get dirty if they are not washed regularly. Our comrades' minds and our Party's work may also collect dust and also need sweeping and washing. The proverb "running water is never stale and a door hinge is never worm eaten" means that constant motion prevents the inroads of germs and other organisms. To check up regularly on our work and in the process to develop a democratic style of work, to fear neither criticism nor self-criticism, and to apply such good popular Chinese maxims as "Say all you know and say it without reserve," "Blame not the speaker but be warned by his words," and "Correct mistakes if you have committed them and guard against them if you have not"—this is the only effective way to prevent *mistakes and defects* and such kinds of political dust and germs from contaminating the minds of our comrades and the body of our Party. The reason for the great effectiveness of the Rectification movement, the purpose of which was "to learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones and to cure the illness to save the patient," was that the criticism and self-criticism we carried out were honest and conscientious, and not perfunctory and distorted. We Chinese Communists, who base all our actions on the highest interests of the broadest masses of the Chinese people and who are fully convinced of the justice of our cause, never balk at any personal sacrifice and are ready at all times to give our lives for the cause, can we be reluctant to

discard any *wrong* idea, viewpoint, opinion, or method which is not suited to the needs of the people? Can we be willing to allow political dust and germs to dirty our clean faces or eat into our healthy bodies? Countless revolutionary martyrs have laid down their lives in the interests of the people, and our hearts are filled with pain as we the living think of them—can there be any personal interest, *errors or defects*, then, that we would not sacrifice?²²⁷

Comrades! When this congress is over, we shall go to the front and, guided by its resolutions, fight to bring about the downfall of the Japanese aggressors²²⁸ and to build a new China. To achieve this goal, we shall unite with all the people of our country. Let me repeat: We shall unite with²²⁹ any class, any party, any group, or individual if it is for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the building of a new China. To achieve this goal, we shall unite our Party²³⁰ on democratic centralist principles of organization and discipline *more solidly and better than in the past*, and we shall unite with any comrade if he abides by the Party's program, constitution, and decisions. In the period of the Northern Expedition, our Party had a membership of less than 50,000,²³¹ most of whom were later dispersed by the enemy. In the period of the Agrarian Revolution²³² we had a membership of less than 300,000, most of whom were likewise dispersed by the enemy. Now we have more than 1.2 million members; this time we must under no circumstances allow ourselves to be dispersed by the enemy. If we can profit from the experience of these three periods, if we are modest and guard against conceit and are able to strengthen unity among all comrades inside the Party and with all people outside the Party, we can rest assured that, far from being dispersed by the enemy, we shall destroy the Japanese aggressors and their servile running dogs resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely, and thereafter build an independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful China.²³³

The experience of the three periods of the revolution, and especially that of the anti-Japanese war, has convinced us and the Chinese people: without the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party, without Chinese Communists serving as the mainstay of the Chinese people, China can never achieve independence, freedom, democracy, unity, wealth and power²³⁴ nor industrialize and modernize its agriculture.

Comrades! I firmly believe that with the Chinese Communist Party armed with

the experience of the three revolutions, we can accomplish our great political task.

Thousands upon thousands of martyrs *of the people and the Party* have heroically laid down their lives for the people; let us hold their banner high and march ahead along the path crimson with their blood!

An independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful China will soon be born.²³⁵ Let us hail that great day!

Down with the Japanese aggressors!

Long live the liberation of the Chinese people!

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 183–275, which reproduces the text from Vol. 5 of the 1947 *Xuanji*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

1. [after “situation?” add]: The present military situation is that the Soviet Army is attacking Berlin, and the Allied forces of Britain, the United States, and France are attacking the Hitlerite remnants in coordination with this offensive, while the Italian people are launching uprisings. All this will eliminate Hitler once and for all. After Hitler is wiped out, the defeat of the Japanese aggressors will not be far in the distance. Contrary to the predictions of the Chinese and foreign reactionaries, the forces of Fascist aggression will undoubtedly be overthrown and the people’s democratic forces will undoubtedly triumph.

2. That is, the Yalta Conference of November 1943.

3. The world → World history.

4. The *glorious* efforts of the peoples of the Four Great Powers of Britain, the United States, China, and France, plus those of the other anti-Fascist Allied countries, have made the destruction of fascism possible → It is their [i.e., the Soviet Union’s] efforts, plus those of the people in the other anti-Fascist Allied countries, which have made the destruction of fascism possible

5. As they are today in Britain, the United States, China, France, and other anti-Fascist Allied countries → As they are in many countries today

6. We are now in a completely new situation → The two world wars represent two entirely different

epochs

7. And the emergence of general peace → When World War II is over and international peace is established

8. Anti-democratic forces → Forces opposing democracy and oppressing other nationalities [*minzu*]

9. The people → The people of the various countries, and of the various colonies and semi-colonies

10. Here the *Selected Works* text adds: “the struggle between national liberation and national oppression,”

11. Anti-democratic forces → Anti-democratic forces, and all the imperialist forces

12. This → This experience

13. Passive policy of resistance to Japan → Policy of passive resistance to Japan

14. It has been an obstruction → This reactionary policy has been an obstruction

15. Organized the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army → Organized the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army and the Anti-Japanese United Army

16. The will of the Guomintang government → The will of the Guomintang government and in cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party

17. Overseas Chinese → Patriotic Chinese overseas

18. In 1925 → In 1924–25

19. Then attacking the soviet areas → Then attacking the revolutionary base areas

20. 1935 → 1934

21. Unity → Cooperation

22. At this conference → At which

23. Our Party → The Central Committee of the Party

24. This brought about → This made it easier to bring about

25. The government → The Guomintang government

26. Oligarchic autocratic form → Oligarchic dictatorial system

27. During this period → At the very beginning of this period

28. This number → By the time when the anti-Japanese war broke out, this number

29. Our militia has grown to → Our rural militia, which has not withdrawn from normal productive work,

as grown to

[30.](#) Is smaller by several hundred thousand → Is still numerically much smaller

[31.](#) Enemy → Japanese

[32.](#) All enemy and puppet forces who surrender → All who surrender in enemy areas

[33.](#) To defeat the Japanese aggressors → To defeat the enemy

[34.](#) To defeat the Japanese aggressors → To defeat the enemy

[35.](#) In this respect, it is even more important to mobilize → This also includes mobilizing

[36.](#) Two battlefronts in China → Two fronts in China's anti-Japanese war

[37.](#) From the external to the internal → From resistance to Japan to opposition to the Communist Party and the people

[38.](#) Taking back from the people and the anti-Japanese parties some of the rights it had granted during the early period of the anti-Japanese war → And completely deprived the people and the anti-Japanese parties of whatever rights they had won during the early period of the War of Resistance

[39.](#) The infamous "disbanding" → The "disbanding," which shocked China and the world,

[40.](#) Nine thousand → More than nine thousand

[41.](#) "Traitor party," "traitor army," "traitor areas," and "sabotaging the War of Resistance and endangering the State" → It is they who have fabricated such labels and expressions as "traitor party"..., for the purpose of realigning the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies

[42.](#) We → Our Party

[43.](#) The battlefront in the liberated areas was pinning down → The army and people in the liberated areas were pinning down

[44.](#) They had → The Guomindang forces had

[45.](#) China's liberated areas → The liberated areas of the Chinese people

[46.](#) The reference is to General Draža Mihailović, Tito's conservative rival in organizing resistance to the occupation of Yugoslavia.

[47.](#) China's liberated areas → China's liberated areas, led by the Chinese Communist Party.

[48.](#) Other parties → Other anti-Japanese parties

[49.](#) Core → Main force

[50.](#) We would like to ask why they adopt a two-faced policy such as this → They adopt a two-faced policy
in every respect

[51.](#) Help → Build up their own

[52.](#) In the international community → In foreign policy

[53.](#) Many → Some

[54.](#) Even more → Not a few

[55.](#) A *dan* is a unit of weight equal to approximately 150 kilograms.

[56.](#) The Japanese army's policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all."

[57.](#) Before this sentence, the *Selected Works* version adds the words: "Who is to blame for all the strange
circumstances that confront the Guomintang rulers?"

[58.](#) Four Eastern Provinces → Four Northeastern Provinces

[59.](#) When the Japanese → When the Japanese aggressors

[60.](#) Handing over to the Japanese → Handing over to the Japanese aggressors

[61.](#) Japanese → Japanese aggressors

[62.](#) Japanese → Japanese aggressors

[63.](#) Not a dictatorship → Not a Fascist dictatorship

[64.](#) Dictatorial → Fascist dictatorial

[65.](#) General Scobie → The British General Scobie [General Ronald Scobie was then in command of III
Corps that pushed the Nazi forces out of Greece in 1944—Eds.]

[66.](#) As in 1927–36 → As in 1927–37

[67.](#) That the Guomintang dictatorship be abolished → That the Guomintang one-party dictatorship be
abolished

[68.](#) Is it → Is the Guomintang

[69.](#) That dictatorship → That the Fascist dictatorship

[70.](#) To grasp → To strive for

[71.](#) Abolishing dictatorship → Abolishing the Guomintang's Fascist dictatorship

[72.](#) With → Together with

- [73.](#) Chinese people → People of the whole country
- [74.](#) Very much afraid → Very much afraid that the true situation in the liberated areas would become known outside
- [75.](#) China → China's state system
- [76.](#) Of the liberal bourgeoisie alone → Of the national bourgeoisie alone
- [77.](#) The Chinese liberal bourgeoisie → The Chinese national bourgeoisie
- [78.](#) Petty bourgeoisie → Urban petty bourgeoisie
- [79.](#) After thoroughly wiping out the Japanese aggressors → After the thorough defeat of the Japanese aggressors
- [80.](#) Namely, a united front democratic alliance based on the overwhelming majority of the people → Namely, a united front democratic alliance based on the overwhelming majority of the people, under the leadership of the working class
- [81.](#) The petty bourgeoisie → The urban petty bourgeoisie
- [82.](#) The liberal bourgeoisie → The national bourgeoisie
- [83.](#) Enlightened gentry → Gentry
- [84.](#) Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "and consequently each has its own particular demands."
- [85.](#) Can be accomplished → Can be accomplished by these classes together
- [86.](#) The views of Mr. Sun Yatsen → The revolutionary views of Mr. Sun Yatsen
- [87.](#) Must be obeyed → Must be respected
- [88.](#) Political formation → State
- [89.](#) The armed forces of New Democracy → The armed forces of the new democratic state
- [90.](#) Here the *Selected Works* version adds: "under the leadership of the proletariat."
- [91.](#) A new bourgeois-democratic state and society → A new democratic state and society
- [92.](#) The fulfillment of this program → The political leadership of the proletariat, the state-owned economy, and the cooperative economy under the leadership of the proletariat set forth in this program are socialist factors. But the fulfillment of this program
- [93.](#) Each of us → Every Communist
- [94.](#) The new-style bourgeois democratic revolution now → The new democratic revolution now

- [95.](#) Socialist revolution in the future → Socialist and Communist revolution in the future
- [96.](#) New democratic China → New democratic China whose main task is the liberation of the peasantry
- [97.](#) Here the *Selected Works* version adds: “led by the Communist Party.”
- [98.](#) Here the *Selected Works* version adds: “under certain conditions.”
- [99.](#) The development of capitalism → Certain forms of capitalist development
- [100.](#) Here the *Selected Works* version adds: “or benefits the proletariat even more.”
- [101.](#) An expanded → A necessary
- [102.](#) Chinese liberal bourgeoisie → Chinese national bourgeoisie.
- [103.](#) Under the state rule of New Democracy → Under the state system of New Democracy
- [104.](#) The private capitalist sector of the economy → The private capitalist sector of the economy, provided does not dominate the livelihood of the people
- [105.](#) A new Three People’s Principles → A program for New Democracy
- [106.](#) The Three People’s Principles → The revolutionary Three People’s Principles
- [107.](#) Here the *Selected Works* text adds: “Beyond all doubt, our system of New Democracy will be built under the leadership of the proletariat and of the Communist Party.”
- [108.](#) Bolsheviks → Bolshevik party
- [109.](#) Bolsheviks are → Bolshevik party is
- [110.](#) The Chinese system is formed by Chinese history → The present stage of the Chinese system is formed by the present stage of Chinese history
- [111.](#) There must also be → Our Party must also have
- [112.](#) Agrarian Revolution → Agrarian Revolutionary War
- [113.](#) Reduction of the occupied areas → Recovery of all lost territory
- [114.](#) And assistance for demobilized soldiers → And assistance for demobilized soldiers to settle down and earn a living
- [115.](#) The *baojia* system was the mutual security and mutual responsibility system for village control employed by the later dynasties, particularly since the tenth century—Eds.
- [116.](#) The abolition of party indoctrination in education → The abolition of Guomindang indoctrination in education

- [117](#). Social causes → Social progress
- [118](#). Be granted the right of self-determination and the right to establish a united federal state in operation with the Han nationality under the principle of self-determination → Be granted better treatment and autonomous rights
- [119](#). Public opinion → Democratic opinion
- [120](#). The official version makes this sentence a subheading.
- [121](#). Active warfare → Active warfare against Japan
- [122](#). Wipe out → Defeat
- [123](#). In the *Selected Works* version, this sentence is a subheading.
- [124](#). We propose two steps to rescue China → We propose two steps for the termination of the Comindang one-party dictatorship
- [125](#). This is an inexorable and historical law → This is a historical law, an inexorable trend
- [126](#). The official *Selected Works* version makes this sentence a subheading.
- [127](#). The official *Selected Works* version makes this sentence a subheading.
- [128](#). I.e., Sichuan Province, the location of this famous mountain.
- [129](#). Wipe out → Defeat
- [130](#). The official *Selected Works* version makes this sentence a subheading.
- [131](#). Eliminate → Defeat
- [132](#). Elements of the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies → Not very large elements of the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies from the liberated areas
- [133](#). These armies → The armies of the liberated areas
- [134](#). For the last eighteen years none of them have had any freedom → For the last eighteen years none of them have had any armed forces, and none of them have had any freedom
- [135](#). They → These democratic parties mentioned above
- [136](#). The official *Selected Works* version makes this sentence a subheading.
- [137](#). Land reform → The reform of the land system
- [138](#). And that as a result of this revolution obstacles in the way will be cleaned up so that capitalism will be able to grow → And that as a result of this revolution the working class will be able to build up the

enough to lead China in the direction of socialism, though capitalism will still be able to grow to an appropriate extent for a fairly long period

[139](#). Turning it into the private property of the peasants → Turning the private property of the feudal landlords into the private property of the peasants

[140](#). The liberal bourgeoisie → The national bourgeoisie

[141](#). [after “property.” add]: Mr. Sun Yatsen was the earliest revolutionary democrat in China, presenting the revolutionary section of the national bourgeoisie as well as the urban petty bourgeoisie and the peasants, he carried out an armed revolution and put forward his thesis of “equalization of land ownership” and “land to the tiller.” But unfortunately he did not take the initiative and reform the land system when he was in power. And when the anti-popular clique of the Guomindang took power, it completely betrayed what stood for. Now...

[142](#). Liberal bourgeoisie → National bourgeoisie

[143](#). Being the only party that has a thoroughgoing land program → Being the only party that has formulated and carried out a thoroughgoing land program

[144](#). The Chinese Communist Party carried out Mr. Sun Yatsen’s policy of “land to the tiller” → The Chinese Communist Party adopted various measures for the thorough reform of the land system and put Mr. Sun’s “land to the tiller” into effect

[145](#). Resistance War → Anti-Japanese war

[146](#). And unified resistance of the peasants and landlords of the liberated areas in the anti-Japanese war → And lessened the resistance of the landlords in the liberated areas to our mobilization of the peasants for the war

[147](#). Only in China’s liberated areas have they been enforced → Only we in the liberated areas have enforced them

[148](#). Resistance War → Anti-Japanese war

[149](#). A national stage → A stage of “national revolution”

[150](#). Democracy and the people’s livelihood → The question of democracy and reforms in the people’s livelihood

[151](#). It is impossible for us to drive out the Japanese → It is impossible for us to build up bases against the Japanese and resist their attacks

[152](#). Democracy and the people’s livelihood → The revolutionary questions of democracy and the people’s

elihood

[153](#). This is the correct theory of the Chinese revolutionary democrats → This is what the Chinese Communist Party has been advocating and

[154](#). Which has been proven by all of modern Chinese history, particularly by the history of the eight years of the War of Resistance → Which has already been put into practice with excellent results

[155](#). In order to unite every social class to oppose the common enemy → In order to lessen the landlords' resistance to the war effort

[156](#). Market → Main market

[157](#). The army → The Chinese army.

[158](#). The main political base → The main political force

[159](#). The main base of China's cultural movement → The chief object of China's cultural movement

[160](#). In saying [that the peasants are] "the main base," → In saying this,

[161](#). Therefore qualified to lead every democratic movement → Therefore qualified to lead the whole revolution

[162](#). Even so, the development of productivity → Even so, the increase in labor productivity

[163](#). Such systems have become popular systems in China's liberated areas → Such organizations have been widely developed in China's liberated areas

[164](#). But in the past it was only an indication of their wretchedness → But in the past it was only a means which they tried to alleviate their wretchedness

[165](#). This is a version of "becoming one with the people" (*yu renmin dacheng yipian*), a central theme in the Rectification movement, highlighted in Mao's testimony of his own personal transformation in his May 42 "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art," translated above.

[166](#). The official *Selected Works* version makes this sentence a subheading.

[167](#). There can be no industrialized China → Industry cannot be developed

[168](#). Democratic → Democratic and united

[169](#). Establish a people's army → Transform all of China's armies into a people's armed force

[170](#). Have → Build

[171](#). Many well-intentioned educators, scientists, and students have paid no attention to politics in the belief that → Many educators, scientists, and students have buried themselves in their own work or studies

d have paid no attention to politics in the belief that

[172](#). Elimination → Defeat

[173](#). To raise China from the status of an agricultural country to that of an industrial country → To transform China from an agricultural to an industrial country

[174](#). Agrarian Revolution → Agrarian Revolutionary Struggle

[175](#). The working class and its → The working class and the Chinese Communist

[176](#). Elimination → Defeat

[177](#). Not only for China's independence, freedom, democracy, and unity but also → Not only for the establishment of a new democratic state but also

[178](#). Wiped out → Defeated

[179](#). The official *Selected Works* version makes this sentence a subheading.

[180](#). China → State

[181](#). Resistance to Japan → The anti-Japanese war

[182](#). Therefore, the task of the government → Therefore, the task of a people's government

[183](#). A necessary condition for establishing a new China → A vital task for establishing a new China

[184](#). Health services → Medical and health services

[185](#). For reference in China's cultural movement → For reference in the development of China's new culture

[186](#). Following → Copying

[187](#). Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "The new culture created in the Soviet Union should be a model for in building our people's culture."

[188](#). The official *Selected Works* version makes this sentence a subheading.

[189](#). Labels minority nationalities such as the Mongolians, Muslims, Tibetans, Yi, Miao, and Yao as "clans"
· Labels all except the Han nationality as "clans"

[190](#). When the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord war is victorious" → When the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord revolution is victorious"

[191](#). Liberated areas in north China → Various liberated areas

[192](#). The official *Selected Works* version makes this sentence a subheading.

- [193](#). War of Resistance → Anti-Japanese war
- [194](#). Britain and the United States → The United States and Britain
- [195](#). Burma, Malaysia, the Dutch East Indies, the French colony of Annam, and the Philippines → Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines
- [196](#). This would be extremely inappropriate → This would be making a serious mistake and courting certain failure
- [197](#). We are → The Chinese Communist Party is
- [198](#). Differ from one another → Differ from one another, making it necessary for us to distinguish among them in carrying out our program
- [199](#). With Chongqing as the center → In Chongqing and other places
- [200](#). Peasants, government employees and teachers, merchants, industrial circles, cultural circles, student circles, educational circles, women's circles → Peasants, cultural circles, students, educational circles, women, industrial and commercial circles, government employees
- [201](#). The movement → The present movement
- [202](#). Namely, a change in the situation on the basis of democratic principles → Namely, that a change in the situation must be sought through the waging of struggle on a democratic mass basis
- [203](#). The international and domestic situations are compelling → The objective situation is compelling
- [204](#). The Chinese Communist Party and China's liberated areas → The Chinese Communist Party and the people of the liberated areas
- [205](#). Unite with anyone → Cooperate with anyone
- [206](#). On the eastern and western fronts → In the European theater of war
- [207](#). Should → Must
- [208](#). Them → The masses who have been misled
- [209](#). It has achieved → Already in the liberated areas they have realized and have achieved
- [210](#). Is still extremely powerful and is sure to launch → Is still extremely powerful and may launch
- [211](#). To build up adequate *military* strength so as to cooperate with the Allied countries in launching a strategic offensive → To build up adequate military strength for the final defeat of the aggressors
- [212](#). The government → The democratic government

[213.](#) We should continue to apply *properly but firmly* the policy of → We must thoroughly apply the policy of

[214.](#) When the Japanese aggressors are wiped out in the cities → When the Japanese aggressors are driven out of the cities

[215.](#) For defeating the Japanese → For defeating the Japanese aggressors

[216.](#) Help the workers and military forces → Help the revolutionary workers and people's forces

[217.](#) Be very careful → Be very careful in dealing with such people

[218.](#) Enjoy the protection of the government → Enjoy the protection of the people's government

[219.](#) Comrades! Our tasks are so enormous, our policies are so concrete and clear → Comrades! Now that we understand our tasks and the policies for accomplishing them

[220.](#) The Agrarian Revolution → The Agrarian Revolutionary War

[221.](#) On the theory of Marxism → On the theory of Marxism-Leninism

[222.](#) Marxism → Marxism-Leninism

[223.](#) Marxist theory → Marxist-Leninist theory

[224.](#) Marxism → Marxism-Leninism

[225.](#) A useful weapon → An invincible weapon

[226.](#) To our own leading organs → To the leading organs of the Party

[227.](#) Can there be any personal interest, *errors or defects*, then, that we would not sacrifice? → Can there be any personal interest, then, that we would not sacrifice or any error that we would not discard?

[228.](#) Fight to bring about the downfall of the Japanese aggressors → Fight to bring about the final defeat of the Japanese aggressors

[229.](#) We shall unite with → We shall cooperate with

[230.](#) We shall unite our Party → We shall unite all the forces of our Party

[231.](#) Less than 50,000 → Less than 60,000

[232.](#) Agrarian Revolution → Agrarian Revolutionary War

[233.](#) And thereafter build an independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful China → And thereafter build a new democratic China

[234.](#) China can never achieve independence, freedom, democracy, unity, wealth and power → China can

ver achieve independence or liberation

[235](#). An independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful China will soon be born → A new democratic China will soon be born

Oral Political Report at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (April 24, 1945)¹

Comrades! I am making a report to you on behalf of the Central Committee. The written version of the political report has been printed and circulated, and everyone has already seen it, so I will not speak from the written version. I shall talk merely about a few of the questions raised in this report and some questions that this report has not sufficiently elaborated. I will speak on three questions: the questions of line, a few policy questions, and a few questions regarding internal Party affairs.

1. Questions of Line

What line should our Seventh Party Congress decide on? What political line? How can we best make this decision? We think that it should be: “Give free rein to the mobilization of the masses and expand the people’s forces, and under the leadership of our Party, defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the people of the whole nation, and establish a new democratic China.” This is the line of our Party, the political line of our Party. When we say under our Party’s leadership, give free rein to the mobilization of the masses and expand the people’s forces we mean organize our troops. Why are we organizing our troops? For no other reason than to defeat the enemy, the Japanese imperialists and their running

dogs. After they are defeated, what will be the result? We will obtain the liberation of the whole nation, the liberation of the whole Chinese people; we will establish a new China, a new democratic China, an independent, free, democratic, unified, rich and strong China. This is our general line.

Is this the sort of line our Party has always had? Yes. Our Party has always adopted such a line. After the Russian October Revolution, the nature of the Chinese Revolution changed, becoming transformed from an old democratic revolution into a new democratic revolution. Particularly after the creation of the Chinese Communist Party, through the three periods of the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution, and the War of Resistance Against Japan, haven't the Chinese people all been striving for a new democratic China? Yes.

Our line, our program in a nutshell, can be summarized as "the revolution of the great popular masses against imperialism and feudalism led by the proletariat." What sort of revolution is the people's revolution under the leadership of the proletariat? It is the revolution of the great popular masses against imperialism and feudalism led by the proletariat. This is the new democratic revolution. Therefore, our politics is the politics of the great popular masses under the leadership of the proletariat against imperialism and feudalism. Our economics is the economics of the great popular masses under the leadership of the proletariat against imperialism and feudalism. Our culture is the culture of the great popular masses under the leadership of the proletariat against imperialism and feudalism. All in all, whether politics, military affairs, economics, culture, or the various revolutionary tasks of the present, they are all of this nature, and the various revolutionary forces are all of this nature. In this line, there is an issue of the army, an issue of the enemy, and an issue of the leader or the commander of the army. The army is the great popular masses of the people; the enemy is imperialism and feudal forces; the leader, the commander, is the proletariat. What does the proletariat lead? It leads the great popular masses. It leads the great popular masses to do what? To oppose imperialism and feudalism.

That is our program in a few words, yet they are often forgotten by some of our comrades. Do they forget to oppose imperialism? Sometimes, they do. However, it is not very easy to forget to oppose imperialism, so they are better at remembering this. They sometimes forget to oppose feudalism. Why do they

sometimes forget to oppose feudalism? Because they forget the peasants.

Do we want the peasants? Or do we want the landlords? On this question, if we want the landlords, then, we will forget the peasants. If we want the peasants, we need not forget the landlords completely. It is easier to want the peasants without forgetting the landlords, but more difficult to want the landlords without forgetting the peasants. What we call the great popular masses mainly consists of peasants. Is it not true that there was a time when we forgot the peasants? We forgot them in 1927. At that time, the peasants stretched out their hands to demand some things and the Communists forgot to give them these things. During the War of Resistance, questions of a similar nature have persisted. Upon whom do we rely to defeat the Japanese imperialists? Upon whom do we rely to establish a new China? Where are these forces? Some people have now become confused; they have forgotten.

The most important part of the great popular masses is the peasants, next is the petty bourgeoisie, and only then the other democratic elements. The main force of the Chinese democratic revolution is the peasants. If you forget the peasants, there is no Chinese democratic revolution; if there is no Chinese democratic revolution, then there is no Chinese socialist revolution, and then there will be no revolution at all. We have read a lot of our Marxist books, but take note: don't forget the word "peasant." If you forget this word, even if you read a million Marxist books, it will be of no use, because you will not have power. Although you can resist a bit by relying on a few of the petty-bourgeois elements and liberal bourgeois elements, without the peasants who is going to feed you? Without food, there are no soldiers. Then you will not be able to resist for more than two to three days.

What we call leadership by the proletariat is leadership by the Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party is the political party of the proletariat. Some comparatively more progressive people emerged within the proletariat who then formed an organization of a political nature called the Communist Party. Of course, there are other elements within the Communist Party; there are other classes such as peasants, people of petty-bourgeois origins, and intellectuals of other class origins. But origin is one thing, joining the Party is another. If your origin is not proletarian, once you join the Party you become proletarian, your thought and actions should become proletarian. The Communist Party exists to

make revolution, and to make revolution, you need to organize troops, and to organize troops is mainly to organize the peasants, though there are also other social strata including the petty bourgeoisie, liberal bourgeoisie, and sometimes the big bourgeoisie and even landlords. Troops require a commander, a leader. For commanders and leaders in China, there are only two: either you want the proletariat, or you want the big bourgeoisie and big landlords. In a society like China's, the two ends of the social spectrum are small, and yet they are both strong. The middle part is big, but it is politically weak. The middle strata are wavering, no matter what middle stratum you are talking about. There are only two classes that are resolute: the proletariat and the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. Their political representatives are the Communist Party and the Guomindang. The liberal bourgeoisie is also competing with us for leadership. Don't think that the liberal bourgeoisie is so revolutionary as to be comparable to the Communist Party. The liberal bourgeoisie has its independent point of view and its independent political organization. Now it is the Democratic League. Within the Democratic League, there are some who are petty bourgeoisie, yet most are liberal bourgeoisie. They have their character. Recently, *Reference Materials* carried a statement made by the venerable old gentleman Zhang Lan, chairman of the Democratic League. I do not know if you comrades have read it. It is his point of view, his independent political view. Recently, during a reception for foreign journalists, Zuo Shunsheng² made another statement with his independent point of view. Now, the position of the Democratic League accords with that of the Communist Party on the question of forming a coalition government, so the Guomindang says that the Democratic League is a fraternal party of the Communist Party. We do need to unite with it and pull together with it, however, it has its own independent point of view. It is now "attacking Left and Right" so as to distinguish itself from both the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang; it is engaged in a two-front struggle. On the one hand, it does not endorse the single-party dictatorship of the Guomindang, while, on the other hand, it does not agree completely with the Chinese Communist Party, so it says that it stands in the middle, between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party. This language is lucid, it is correct, and it defines its own character, which is as a middle force.

During the latter part of the Great Revolution, our Party did make mistakes in

implementing the line of the great popular masses' revolution under the leadership of the proletariat against imperialism and feudalism; then we only talked about the leadership of the proletariat but in reality we had abandoned the leadership. Before that time, during a very long period of time between 1921 and 1926, numerous comrades in the Chinese Communist Party organized workers, and led worker movements and student movements; later, they promoted the reform of the Guomindang and helped organize the Guomindang; lastly, in the course of the revolution, they organized numerous peasant associations with a membership of dozens of millions, mainly in the various provinces in the South, but also in the North. Was this Marxism? The venerable old Lin³ put it very well yesterday when he said that there was Marxism then; Marxism had come to China, and the Chinese people had taken it and adopted it, but it also seemed there wasn't much Marxism, even none at all. That is, at that time there were some who did not understand Marxism; at that time, within the leadership of our Party some who held a dominant position, such as Chen Duxiu, found that when it came to the latter part of the Great Revolution, they no longer wanted Marxism.

What constitutes not wanting Marxism? It is forgetting the leadership of the proletariat, forgetting the great popular masses, and forgetting the peasants. When the landlords cried foul, they poured cold water on the heads of the peasants. Since they wanted the leadership of the proletariat, but they did not want the peasants, do you think they had the right to proletarian leadership? In China, now we follow Marxism. How do we follow it? They did not have proletarian leadership; they did not want this leading position. Then, who else was there to be led? The leadership of the proletariat in the main should be leadership of the peasants, but they did not want the peasants. When the peasants reached out their hands, they poured cold water on their heads because the landlords also reached out their hands. The landlords said: Communist Party, this will not do! So the Communist Party was squeezed between the landlords and the peasants, and, in the end, it was swayed by the landlords and poured cold water on the heads of the peasants. When opposing imperialism and feudalism, if you do not want the peasants, where is the opposition to feudalism? Without opposing feudalism, is there any opposition to imperialism? What is imperialism up to? The imperialists believe that there is fat to be had from China. They want

a slice of it. Of every five people in China, four are peasants, so if we divide our 450 million people into five parts, every part equals 90 million people and there are four of these 90 million people who are the rural population; only one of the 90 million people is the urban population. You use five fingers to fight imperialism, but they say you are using too many fingers, there is no need for so many, so you should cut four and only use one to fight imperialism. Oh, that will be very powerful. "Imperialism" will panic, it will cry, it will cry but cannot get off the stage; it will kneel before us. You see four fingers are cut off, there is only one left, and the proletariat is isolated. It has turned into a commander without troops, a commander of an army of nothing. If you want to be a commander-in-chief, you have to have troops. If you do not have peasants, will the petty bourgeoisie come? They will come to your room to have a look, but when they see that there are very few people, they will be frightened and they will not enter. The petty bourgeoisie are the most changeable. Sometimes, they appear very arrogant and strike their own chests bragging, "I'm Number One," and sometimes, they are so frightened that piss and shit flow all around. You do not have a single soldier in your room, and there is no food to eat; this old gentleman will come and have a look and then will defect. Is he to blame? No. It is our commander-in-chief who is to blame, because you do not recruit soldiers. The temperament of the petty bourgeoisie is like this. He considers power and policy. If you are powerful, he's an activist: "How can I join in? Do you want me to be the advanced force?" When he sees that there are only a few people in your room, he will say, "Next time. I have some other things to do today. My wife is ill at home." It is only when the proletariat recruits the troops, buys the horses, and stocks up grain and fodder, when four of the five fingers are there and half of the fifth being the proletariat, big landlords and big bourgeoisie being the fingernail, the other half is the petty bourgeoisie and the liberal bourgeoisie, then, if you ask again, "Are you coming? Comrade, come for the meeting!" Even if his wife is indeed ill, he will not mention it. He sees you are so powerful. He will say, "There is nothing to do at home. There is food. The old lady's fine."

We did make mistakes. We forgot leadership. We forgot the peasant masses. For what we call leadership, you need to have something to lead. There is the leader only when there is the led; only when there is the led does there arise the problem of leadership. You did not want the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie

defected, the liberal bourgeoisie also defected, and the big landlords and big bourgeoisie concentrated their forces to fight us. The proletariat rolled down from the stage with a broken nose. Then it got up and looked around: “Why do you beat me, your father? Chiang Kaishek, you are no friend!” Then, we became sober again and engaged in the Agrarian Revolution. During the Agrarian Revolution, again, we became impetuous. We still did not want the peasants, did not want the leadership role, did not want the biggest constituent of power within the Chinese people, did not want four of the five fingers. While being impetuous, why didn’t you want the peasants? It was because those who were impetuous only wanted worker rebellions and urban uprisings; they were very enthusiastic about city work. Even when they did want the peasants, it was as something secondary; they did not pay attention to studying the peasants, studying their facial features, their eyes, their height, their surnames, whether Zhang or Li, what they think or what food they have to eat. Some people have marched across numerous provinces and walked 25,000 *li* plus some more and have engaged in the Agrarian Revolution for so many years, and yet if you ask them, “What is a rich peasant?” They say, “Sorry, I have not studied this.” You ask them, “What is a middle peasant?” They haven’t studied that either. Even if you are “looking at flowers while riding on horseback” [i.e., have a superficial understanding], you still need to watch, but they ride their horses without looking at the flowers; the flowers are the peasants. Of course, you can look at the flowers more clearly after dismounting from the horse—that is called carrying out investigation and research. Those who were impetuous did not even want the petty bourgeoisie or the middle classes, and, as a result, they became air force commanders. The more battles they fought, the smaller their own forces became. Our Party shrank in size twice. It became small again after growing big, and then small again after getting big. The first time, of 50,000 Party members, there were not many left in the end. The second time this happened, again, of 300,000 Party members, there were not many left. In terms of percentages, the loss the first time this occurred was smaller. Of the 50,000 people, there were just over 10,000 people left, a fifth remained. The second time this occurred, out of the 300,000 people, no more than 30,000 were left, with only approximately 25,000 organized Party members. That is, less than a tenth remained. Now our Party has grown again, a little finger has become a fist. In the future, we should not permit it to become

smaller again.

Before the War of Resistance erupted, our preparations were like this. After the War of Resistance began, our policy was: “Give free rein to the mobilization of the masses and expand the people’s forces.” At that time, the Center held that only through a people’s war could we defeat Japan. What we call people’s war, basically speaking or in the main, consists of peasant war. We have never said that the anti-Japanese war can be won without the wide participation of the peasants. It has already been over 102 years since the birth of Marxism; of all the genuine Marxists in the whole world, has anyone ever said that we can defeat the enemy without a popular struggle? No one has ever said it. What we call the popular struggle is either the more pacific struggle, such as strikes, ideological struggles, economic struggles, or political struggles, or the apogee of political struggles, war. If someone calls himself a Marxist and yet says that “we can defeat the enemy without a popular struggle,” then, in saying this, he proclaims himself not to be a Marxist, and his original claim to be a Marxist was false. Some people have harbored such thoughts temporarily, it was temporary wavering when it seemed as if we might also defeat the enemy without a popular struggle. What forces did they expect to rely on? For example, rely on the Guomindang, even the diehard faction of the Guomindang, so we could defeat Japan. However, after a time, they again felt that this would not do. At that time, these people did not have much Marxism, and only later did they acquire more. In our Party, there are many cases like this, there are many comrades like this. Our Party held a national conference in May 1937, and in that August the Luochuan Conference, and in November, a meeting of Party activists in Yan’an.⁴ At these meetings, the Center affirmed this line, namely: Give free rein to the mobilization of the masses and expand the people’s forces, and under the leadership of our Party, defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the people of the whole nation, and establish a new democratic China. This line was endorsed by these meetings and decisions were made from it. At these meetings, the Center did not believe that a dictatorial government which would not launch a people’s war could liberate China. This point was written into the resolutions, it was also written into the documents. Can a dictatorial government that represses the people liberate China? Can we rely on them for victory? We absolutely do not believe it! Because if one believed this, Marxism would flee, at least it would

temporarily run away one morning. Later on, you would have to go look for it, to rediscover Marxism. Marxism, if you look for it, will come back; but if you do not look for it, it will not come back, for it does not know whether you want it! We do not believe that we can defeat Japan so easily without mobilizing the vast forces of the people. By putting the question in this manner, we are not lowering the program of the proletariat to the level of the program of the bourgeoisie, but we are raising the program of the bourgeoisie to the level of the program of the proletariat. Such a formulation was once criticized by some; they said it was not Marxist, they said such a formulation was only for the purpose of seeking leadership. They said that the program of the bourgeoisie, particularly the program of the Guomindang which represents the big bourgeoisie and big landlords, was powerful and should be propagandized among the ranks of the vast masses of the people, the peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie. They said that the Communist Party and that lot were useless.

On this question, we need to analyze further and extensively propagandize our position, saying: "Peasants! Petty bourgeoisie! Compatriots! You should know: The Japanese imperialists can be overthrown only if we ourselves unite, reform our nation's system, make it a democracy with a people's army, a people's government, and people's organizations. A China without these is a dark China, and we will not be able to overthrow the Japanese imperialists. Even if we overthrow them by borrowing the power of foreign countries, China will still be dark!" Our propagandists need to say these things. We need to say to the non-Communists, to propagandize to them: "People of the whole nation should unite to organize the people's armed forces, the people's parties, and the people's government. We must reform the Guomindang, the Nationalist government, and the Guomindang armed forces." Why do we advocate reforming them? We want to raise them to the level of our program. What is to be done if you want to lift them up, but they refuse to be lifted? Then we need to rely on the people of the whole country, rely on the growth of the progressive forces, rely on winning over the middle forces, and rely on the democratic elements within the Guomindang. Once before, we had considered the matter of reforming the Guomindang, and it seems that we made a mistake, which is to say that the assessment that the Guomindang could be reformed was incorrect and we could not do what we had planned to do, so the Guomindang has never been reformed. It should be pointed

out that it is not a mistake to want to reform the Guomindang, but the Guomindang will not listen to you. Can the Guomindang be reformed? It is possible, and it is impossible. At that time, if we wanted to reform it, then we needed to create certain conditions, to expand the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and develop divisions within the ranks of the Guomindang, but there was not enough time. The progressive forces never grew very large, there was not enough time to win over the middle forces, and the democratic elements within the Guomindang were throttled by the Fascists, and, as a result, the reform came to nothing. Did we lose our investment? No, not a cent of it. We said we wanted to reform the Guomindang, but that did not mean that we would not expand the progressive forces, not expand the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, or not engage in wide-ranging propaganda; indeed, the propaganda on reforming the Guomindang was a success in and of itself. After the common people heard this, they thought that what the Communist Party was talking about was reasonable and the face of the Generalissimo [i.e., Chiang Kaishek] did not look so good; it needed a bit of a wash. I heard once there was a big meeting held in Xi'an chaired by somebody from the Three People's Principles Youth League. There were many peasants who went to attend this meeting. When the meeting was about to end, somebody on the stage took the lead to chant slogans, and when he shouted "Long live Generalissimo Chiang!" the peasants shouted "Hand over the grain, and pay the taxes quickly!" What was the reason for this? This was because the Guomindang wanted the peasants to attend the meeting for no other purpose than to hand over the grain and pay the taxes. All they had in their minds was handing over the grain and paying the taxes, so when that guy shouted a slogan, the peasants shouted that. The Guomindang's face is very black; if we say we want to wash its face, perhaps 430 million to 440 million out of the 450 million people in the country would agree. We told the Generalissimo to wash his face, but he refused. Not only did we not lose our investment, we made money. We made it possible for the common people to know why we wanted him to wash his face. Comrades, do we still have this same policy today? Are we asking him to wash his face, or do we want to cut off his head? Even today, we still ask him to wash his face, and we do not want to cut off his head. In holding this meeting, we are deciding not to cut off his head. We cannot cut off his head. We still follow the "face-washing policy," asking him to change his

erroneous policies. As to whether he will do it, we shall have to wait and see. Today he will not wash his face, but how about tomorrow? It is hard to say. Old folks do not like to wash their faces very much; old comrades should not blame me for this, for the Generalissimo is also very old. The chances of his not washing his face are greater than his washing it, or he may just wipe it lightly to make a show, or he may not wipe it at all, leaving his head full of sweat, a foul scene.

Comrades, who are the main people, what are the main forces, within China competing with us for leadership and wanting to pull China back into the world of the dark? They are the reactionary clique within the Guomindang, the representatives of the big landlords, big bourgeoisie, big bankers, and big compradors.

At the Sixth Party Plenum in 1938, we corrected such erroneous thinking mentioned above—that is, not wanting the Guomindang to wash its face and instead saying its face was very pretty, saying our faces were dirty, or not as clean as theirs, or at least no cleaner. Time and again we supported the Nationalist government, supported the Nationalist government on all issues, and supported the Nationalist government everywhere—these were the slogans representing such erroneous thought. These things are wrong.

We corrected these at the Sixth Plenum, and many comrades came to understand this issue. After the Sixth Plenum, there were still some who thought the Guomindang was very good, very pretty, but later, there came the “Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties,” and the first anti-Communist high tide. After these two incidents, the mask worn by the Guomindang came off, revealing its ugly features. This time, some of our comrades gradually came to understand the situation. After that came the second anti-Communist high tide, the Southern Anhui Incident,⁵ and the third anti-Communist incident, the effort of July 1943 to disband the Communist Party and to eliminate the border region. By this time, illusions regarding the Guomindang within our Party were basically eliminated. The idea of rescuing China and expelling Japan without reforming the Guomindang was dispelled, the thinking that we should mainly not rely on ourselves, not expand our forces, not expand the liberated area, and not remove the restrictions on the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army was changed and the idea that we should give free rein to the mobilization of the popular masses and expand the people’s forces, defeat the Japanese aggressors,

and construct a new China under our leadership was planted. Among the great popular masses and in the minds of our comrades there emerged a new picture. Therefore, ideology is a very strange thing, it takes stages and requires experience to get rid of the bad part, that part that does not conform to Marxism-Leninism or to the realities of China, so purely relying on talk won't work. Lenin said, "We need to educate the people through experience" because the people only believe in experience and not in talk. But we still need to talk. We have two great teachers: one is the Japanese, and the other is the Generalissimo. These two great teachers have given us classes without asking for any salary. Without these two great teachers, the Chinese people would not have been educated; our Party would not have been educated. As for the junior teachers within our Party who are barely literate and cannot discuss many theories, when they set about to lecture, nobody listens. Later, we invited one Japanese and one Chinese, one was the Japanese Fascists and the other was the Generalissimo, and these two teachers helped us to teach and the job got done.

After the Sixth Plenum, our Party resolutely exercised leadership over the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the middle classes, and even the landlords. In the liberated areas, we engaged in reduction of rents and interest, and the landlords also followed us. Because we resolutely exercised leadership, we expanded our military, our liberated areas, and our Party. After that, we defeated numerous offensives by the Japanese aggressors and gradually staged offensives ourselves, like the offensive begun last year, while the offensive this year is even bigger. At the beginning of the War of Resistance we took the offensive, in the middle stage of the war we were on the defensive, and now, we are predominantly on the offensive and secondarily on the defensive, that is, with regard to Japan. With regard to the Guomindang, we have beaten back its three anti-Communist high tides and its numerous offensives, including ideological, political, and military offensives, and what kind of position has this left the Guomindang in? Its influence has dwindled and its forces have shrunk. The Guomindang has also invited a teacher, the same person as our teacher. His name is Okamura Yasuji.⁶ He used to live in Beijing, but now he lives fairly near where the Generalissimo lives. Once this teacher started teaching, the influence of the Guomindang dwindled and its forces shrank. Does the Guomindang still have influence now? Yes. It still has considerable influence. The Guomindang has a saying: "I have

devoted myself to the Nationalist Revolution for forty years”; add twenty more years to it, and now its history totals sixty years. We are not nearly half as old as they are, we only have a history of twenty-four years. Their influence will only leave a place when our influence reaches there, and if our shadow does not reach there, their shadow will not quit. Therefore, I say their influence is low but is not nonexistent; it has only declined, but it still has considerable power. They have 1.5 million troops, while we only have 910,000 troops. They have international standing, and we don’t. They have a population of 200 million, we only have 100 million. They have had sixty years of influence, while we have had only twenty-four.

The result of correctly implementing our Party line during the War of Resistance, resolutely giving free rein to the mobilization of the popular masses and to expanding the people’s forces, to defeating the enemy and to establishing a new China under our leadership, and to opposing imperialism and feudalism has been to push the Guomindang to such a position: Its influence is low, and its forces have shrunk. At the same time, this has promoted our Party to such a position: It has become the center of the struggle against Japan and [the struggle] to save the nation, the center to which the great popular masses of the whole nation look.

Now it has been proven that only such a line is the correct line. The line to compete for leadership and to strive for independence is the line of our Party’s Central Committee, the line that reflects the demands of the majority of comrades within the whole Party, and the line that reflects the demands of the majority of the people in the whole nation. Where has this line come from? Has it dropped from the sky? No. Has it been delivered from abroad? Again, no. It has sprung from China’s own soil. Lu Xun once said: The path emerges as people walk on it.⁷ In the same fashion, our line was created by the Chinese people as they walked it. To compete for leadership and strive for independence is the line of the War of Resistance Against the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs by the great popular masses under the leadership of the proletariat, that is, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The correct nature of this line has now been completely and clearly proven. This is unlike the winter of 1937, or 1938, or even the period just after the Sixth Plenum, even up to the third anti-Communist high tide, when there were still some comrades who did not believe

this line. So, has everybody awakened by now? Has everybody come to believe this fully? Has everybody come to believe in Long Live Marxism? As far as I can judge, the situation varies; some believe Marxism will live for 10,000 years, some, 9,000 years, and still others, 8,000 years ...⁸ Just speaking of our Party members, the perceptions of the 1.21 million Party members vary. Recently, there have been many seminars held in North and Central China that have demonstrated that not only are there many personages outside the Party who are not completely informed and clear about this line of ours, but also there are many within the ranks of our Party who are like this. Therefore, I say among the vast number of our Party members, there is Marxism, but there are different degrees. It varies from those who believe Marxism is going to be around for one year to those who believe it is going to be around for 9,999 years, and, of course, there are also those who believe it will be around for 10,000 years.

Our policy toward the Guomindang is one of unity and struggle. Our struggle is reasonable, beneficial, and restrained. We are struggling against them from the position of self-defense—that's reasonable. Such struggle is partial; we only struggle against them when it is to our benefit to do so. Such struggle is temporary in nature, in order to achieve unity we are restrained. Looking from the other side, struggle which is temporary, partial, and carried out in self-defense should be conducive to unity. Every day the Guomindang wants to attack us, but it does not dare to have a complete falling out with us. Our struggle is also restrained. For example, we sent them a letter, demanding that we send people to attend the San Francisco Conference.⁹ At the beginning, they were unwilling, but didn't we end up going? We suggested three; they said one—OK, one is one, and we didn't make a fuss. Now our delegate has already reached Washington.¹⁰ Comrades, rights are won through struggle; they are not granted to you as gifts—that's why there is the word "struggle" in this world—and our comrades should not forget it. Some say that our Party's philosophy is the "philosophy of struggle." There is a commander-in-chief by the name of Deng Baoshan at Yulin [Elm Grove] who said this. I said, "you got that right." Ever since the emergence of slave owners, feudal lords, and capitalists, they have struggled against the oppressed people, so the "philosophy of struggle" was first invented by them. The "philosophy of struggle" of the oppressed people emerged later, as Marxism only emerged after several thousand years. To abandon struggle, only to want unity,

or not to pay attention to struggle, just muddling through without doing it appropriately or forcefully, is the reflection of the weakness of the petty bourgeoisie. There is another characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie, its revolutionary nature. Their revolution is revolutionary, but somewhat weak. Weakness has now been proven to be completely wrong. Take Zhang Naiqi,¹¹ I had given him a “hat,” “Zhang Naiqi-ism,” and I think it was reasonable for me to do this. Now this man has already patched things up with us, telling Comrade Zhou Enlai that he made mistakes. This is very good. At a Party conference in November 1937, I criticized him; I said Zhang Naiqi’s philosophy is no good, because at that time he advocated “making fewer demands and more suggestions.” This was a manifestation of the weakness of the liberal bourgeoisie, and we defeated his position. He belongs to the middle forces, and it is only through firmly uniting with them that we can educate them through long-term experience. In the future, the liberal bourgeoisie will continue to affect us frequently with their weakness, because that is their character, just like Lin Daiyu in the novel *Dream of the Red Chamber*, who emits a “fragrance” after having a bath. The liberal bourgeoisie also has such a “fragrance,” but this fragrance is the “fragrance of weakness.” Since it produces that “fragrance,” it must find a market to sell it, so it deliberately sends it to Yan’an, which has a bad influence on our Party. Our propaganda, as well, is sometimes too sharp; although roses are lovely, they are very thorny. “While the mutton tastes nice, it is too hot.” For these gentlemen, though the roses are lovely, they do not like them because they are thorny. They like Xue Baochai. They don’t like Tanchun.¹² This is very troublesome. Comrades! More trouble is yet to come. Don’t be afraid of trouble. As long as you want to make revolution, you will have trouble, sometimes a lot of trouble. If you want to stay out of trouble, you can stay at home to smoke your long pipe. Now summer is here, and you can sit under a tree, holding your fan—not much trouble there. Yet there still is turmoil. Didn’t Lu Xun write a story called “Turmoil” [*Fengbo*]? The world cannot avoid turmoil; you cannot be a man if you are afraid of turmoil. If you are indeed afraid of turmoil, you had better go and settle accounts with the King of Hell. Our Party now frequently encounters turmoil, big turmoil, moderate turmoil, and small turmoil; we have no need to fear turmoil. Now that our will is all the stronger, turmoil will not drown us. It is impossible to drown us in the sea of China—it

cannot happen.

A few last words to conclude this section.

First, what is the condition of the peasants? What attitudes do peasants have? Whether over the past eight years or over the past twenty-four years, the peasants have welcomed our policies very much—very much welcomed the policies I have just mentioned. However, as for our Party, as for the leading ideology, we need to distinguish ourselves clearly from the peasants and should avoid getting ourselves mixed up with them. This may not be easy to understand for comrades who have come from peasant origins. “I am a peasant myself, so why can’t I mix with the peasants?” I say now you are a member of the Communist Party. You are a peasant only by origin, but origin and admission to the Party are two different things, for the Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat. But it will take time to become clear about this. If you cannot do it in one year, then take two years; if two years are not long enough, then take three. Don’t say that our Communist Party has held a meeting and you are just reciting the documents of the meeting. There was a comrade who said yesterday that Georgi Dimitrov¹³ once wrote about a German comrade who was making a speech at a meeting of unemployed workers in Berlin by reading out word for word the resolution of the Thirteenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, and, as a result, the common people did not want to hear it. Now we need not copy verbatim the things of the Seventh Congress, either.¹⁴ The Seventh Congress says, “Don’t get mixed up with the peasants.” Go back and say this, and many comrades of peasant origins will not approve. They say they are peasants themselves. What I mean by saying that we should not get mixed up with the peasants is that we should raise the level of the peasants by one more step, to the level of the proletariat. After several decades, we will have raised the level of all peasants outside the Party to the level of the proletariat. If you do not believe this, you are not a Marxist. In the future, we will mechanize and collectivize and that will raise them up.

Second, what about the petty bourgeoisie? Intellectuals of petty-bourgeois origin either inside or outside the Party have their wavering nature, and they have their revolutionary nature. Wavering is their bad side, but generally speaking, this can be overcome through education. As far as the situation within the Party is concerned, the Yan’an Rectification movement is proof of this. Artists

and writers endorse such methods as the Forum on Literature and Art, for in the past they did not know how to do it and our Party provided them with guidelines and educated them. It was not commandism but an effort to bring them around to self-consciousness gradually, and this has been very effective. It takes regular and appropriate propaganda work by our Party to overcome the wavering of the petty bourgeoisie, relying mainly on actual practice, as well as on our own vast strength, the broad liberated areas, and the powerful armies.

Third, how about the liberal bourgeoisie? The liberal bourgeoisie wavers all the more. But the liberal bourgeoisie now wants democracy; it wants democracy as it perceives it, so therefore it is our ally. Such wavering can be turned into neutrality under our firm influence, and [liberals] might even travel with us. Take the slogan of coalition government, for example. It supported it, and during the anti-Communist high tides it held a position of neutrality. The Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party are fighting each other, and they give advice from the sidelines, they tell one side not to do this and tell the other side not to do that. Here is a clear example. On March 1, 1941, the National Congress was convened, but our representatives declined to attend while the Generalissimo categorically wanted us to attend. We categorically declined. We said, "We will only attend if you give us something." They said, "We will give you something after you attend." We said, "We will attend after you give us these things." This was repeated several times. We wanted them to give these things; they wanted us to attend the conference. The result was that the one did not give, and the other did not attend. The potential giver did not give, and we did not attend. In the course of these events, certain personages belonging to the middle forces tried to work on both sides. They told the Guomindang, "Please give something." They told us, "Please attend the conference." This is a classic example of the wavering of the liberal bourgeoisie. There are numerous events of this kind, but given time constraints now, I cannot cover them all at one time. All in all, under our firm influence, it is possible to neutralize the liberal bourgeoisie and even to get them to go along with us.

Fourth, what about the big landlords and big bourgeoisie? Big landlords, big bankers, and the big compradors are the strata represented by the reactionary wing of the Guomindang, and they comprise the reactionary faction within the resistance front in the country. Our attitude toward them is like the attitude of

the Communist Party of Great Britain toward Churchill. There was an article in the newspaper by the secretary general of the Communist Party of Great Britain [Harry Pollitt] which I suggest you comrades read.¹⁵ The slogan that he put forth calls for a coalition government with the Liberal Party, the Labour Party, and the Public Order Party [*Gong'an dang*] [*sic*] to overthrow Churchill during the next election. The word “overthrow” which he used is liable to cause certain misunderstandings in China, for the situation here is different from that in foreign countries. Here, “to overthrow” is to strive to compete for leadership. In the past, we did this—we strove for leadership. We need to pay attention to the character “power” in the word “striving.”¹⁶ Big landlords and big bourgeoisie strive to obtain leadership by any means, in an effort to bring the broad popular masses, mainly the 360 million peasants, under their leadership and away from our influence. Who in China has fat? The peasants are the ones who have the most fat. In invading China the Japanese want to get this fat from the Chinese peasants, and Chiang Kaishek also wants to cut this fat from the peasants, and—take note—in the future there will no doubt be the old gentleman [Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald] Scobie, who will come to cut this fat.¹⁷ In Greece, Scobie, representing Britain, cut the fat from the Greek people. The big landlords and big bourgeoisie want to turn China into a China of darkness, and so they are the long-term targets of our struggle.

Last, the foreign countries. What about the foreign countries? There is no question that the Soviet Union is a friend, the Chinese people’s best friend. I pointed this out very clearly in the written report. As for other foreign countries, the major powers, the allies, we also need to unite firmly with them. But when they do not get it right, we also need to struggle a bit. Why did *Liberation Daily* not publish this? The fact it did not carry this does not mean it never will, and it does not negate the need to engage in a little struggle. It won’t do if they bring out their Scobies. I mentioned this in my report. There are still reactionary forces abroad. The reactionary forces are still very powerful. The present international situation as a whole is good. There is unity in the anti-Fascist front to which the Soviet Union is a party, mainly unity among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. This unity is essential, and it dominates everything. The situation in the world now has already completely changed, and I wrote a great deal on this in the report, quite enough. As for the dark side, I wrote very little. The faces

of those foreigners who support Chiang Kaishek are not pretty; though some behave as if they are bestowing fortune on us from on high, they still do not look good, and we need to be on the alert against this.

This is the first question, which may be called the situation and the line.

2. A Few Questions on Policy

Policy has its various aspects, and there is the general program and there are concrete programs.

The first question: the general program and concrete programs. Have we only begun using such a division now? This was done in the past, too, but it was never written in such a way in the same place: the first being the general program and the second being the concrete programs. For instance, in the pamphlet *On New Democracy*, there was no discussion of concrete policies while only the general program was discussed. We have, however, had concrete policies during different periods, for example, at the beginning of the War of Resistance, there were the Ten Great Programs,¹⁸ and during the middle period each area had its concrete policies, such as the Twenty-one Article Administrative Program in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and the various programs in the anti-Japanese bases behind the lines which have more similarities than differences and share the same character with few differences in their articles. During the Civil War, the Sixth Party Congress decided on the Ten Major Programs,¹⁹ which are concrete programs under the general line of New Democracy, the more concrete programs being the Land Law, the Marriage Law, the Regulations on Political Work, and so on. During the time of the Northern Expedition, there were similar things in which the Party issued various declarations regarding the situation prevailing at that time, all of which are concrete programs. We are now clarifying this question so that our comrades will learn that our general program is New Democracy, and it has rope and holes. “Rope” is like the rope on a fishing net that you hold in your hands, and “holes” are the various holes in the fishing net.

The second question: concerning Sun Yatsen. In my report I said some very nice things about him. We need to adopt a balanced approach with regard to this

gentleman, Sun Yatsen.²⁰ We are Marxists, and we engage in historical dialectics. Indeed, Sun Yatsen did do and say some good things. In my report I did my best to pick out these good things. These are the things we should grasp and should not let go even if we die, and even then, we should pass these things on to our sons and grandsons. However, there is also a difference between us and Sun Yatsen. Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles are not as good as our New Democracy, for New Democracy is indeed more progressive, more developed, and more complete than the Three People's Principles. Our present New Democracy will become even more complete in the future. Within our Party, there is a sense of not liking Sun Yatsen, and this sense is pervasive among numerous Party members. Seriously speaking, this feeling is not balanced and demonstrates a lack of a true awareness. This reflects the sensibilities of the Civil War period when, due to differing circumstances, even Sun Yatsen was dropped. Why did we not talk much about Sun Yatsen at that time? Because we were then thrown to the ground by the Guomindang and after we climbed back up, we became extremely furious. Chiang Kaishek killed people everywhere while waving the banner of Sun Yatsen, so at that time, the masses did not like Sun Yatsen either. During the ten years of the Civil War, they did not want Sun Yatsen, and it is difficult to blame them for that because our forces were extremely small. During the initial period of the War of Resistance, our forces were also quite small, hence even though we wanted Sun Yatsen, our impact was not great, for others looked down on us. In the future, the more powerful we become, the more we ought to want Sun Yatsen, and there will be all the more benefits in doing this and there will be no negative effects. We should raise the banner of Sun Yatsen with a clear head.

The third question: capitalism. In my report, I have already elaborated on the question of capitalism, and I affirmed it quite fully. What good does this do? It does good. I affirmed it with the following qualification, that is, as Sun Yatsen put it, the capitalism which "cannot manipulate the national lifeline." The big landlords, big bankers, and big compradors who do manipulate the national lifeline are not included in this. When drafting concrete programs, some suggested adding the following: "Confiscate the property of the big landlords, big bankers, and big compradors." In fact, by quoting in the main text, Sun Yatsen's "The state shall manage and administer those enterprises belonging to Chinese and foreign

nationals that are monopolistic in nature or so massive in scale as to be beyond the capability of private individuals, such as banks, railroads, and civil aviation,”²¹ this is already implied. If we now talk about confiscation, it is to confiscate the property of the three families of Chiang Kaishek, Song Ziwen [T.V. Soong], and Kong Xiangxi [H.H. Kung], and that will not sound good. This is why I did not talk of confiscating their property, but it is there, for Sun Yatsen has said it. In the later part, I also talk about a new capitalist democratic revolution. They will be the targets of this revolution, for they are no ordinary capitalists. “Ordinary capitalists” refer to middle capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie. The special capitalists who “manipulate the national lifeline,” as Sun Yatsen put it, are not included in them. In the future, under our New Democracy, we will also confiscate properties that manipulate the national lifeline in the big cities and we will confiscate the property of Chinese traitors (I talked about this in my report). We are going to confiscate such property and turn it into state property. In addition, I will talk below on the need for extensive development of the cooperative and state economies, two kinds of economies that should be permitted to develop extensively.

There are only good effects and no bad effects to come from our affirmation of the need for the extensive development of capitalism. For a fairly long time, some people in our Party could not become clear on this question, hanging on to a sort of populist ideology. Such an ideology will exist for a long time in a Party that consists predominantly of members of peasant origin. What we call populism advocates a direct advance from the feudal economy to the socialist economy, without going through the stage of developing capitalism. Russian populism was like this. At that time, the party of Lenin and Stalin criticized them. In the end, they became the Social Revolutionary Party. They were extremely “Leftist” and wanted to develop socialism even faster and not to develop capitalism. The result was that they turned into counterrevolutionaries. The Bolsheviks were quite different. They affirmed that Russia needed to develop capitalism and held that this was beneficial to the proletariat. In his “Two Tactics,” Lenin said, “The bourgeois democratic revolution is more beneficial to the proletariat than to the bourgeoisie.” We need not be afraid of developing capitalism. After the victory of the Russian October Revolution, for a certain period, capitalism was allowed to exist as part of the economy, and quite a large part at that, constituting almost 50

percent of the national economy. At that time, grain was mostly produced by the rich peasants, and only in the Second Five-year Plan were the middle and small capitalists in the cities and the rich peasants in the countryside eliminated. Our comrades are in a great hurry to eliminate capitalism. In the Soviet Union, even after the victory of the socialist revolution, it passed through the period of the New Economic Policy and the First Five-year Plan and then to the Second Five-year Plan, when the collective farms underwent major development and the rich peasants no longer produced most of the grain; it was only then that it proposed to eliminate rich peasants. In this regard, our comrades are in too much of a hurry.

The fourth question: communism. I have already touched on this question in my report, but I did not emphasize it. Why did I not emphasize it? If I were to emphasize it, I would have to list its programs, but we thought it was better not to do this right now, for the program of communism is the abolition of private property and classes. There would only be a little benefit to including this in the report and that would be for the education of Party members, for many of our comrades still do not know what communism is. In the past, when I was attacking local tyrants, I once went to the house of a local tyrant to see if there were any books. An old granny came out and asked me what I was up to. I said that I had come to look for things, and she said, "They were already communized [*gonglechan*] yesterday. Everything was communized. Now there is nothing left to communize anymore." Many of our peasant comrades hold that communism means distributing the property of landlords to them. This, of course, is not correct.

Some say our Party needs to change its name. They say that our program is very good, but our name is no good. "Big as the ambition of the gentleman is, yet his name is unacceptable." Not only Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek sent us telegrams asking us to change our name but also the middle factions. A person like Zuo Shunsheng has said, "Your program is truly very fine. I would join your Party if you were not called the Communist Party." During the three months of the anti-Communist high tide during July, August, and September of the year before last [1943], many things got out. After they read them, they were very happy, and they said that our program was very good but that our name was no good. Many Americans also want us to change our name, and if we were to

change our name, they would like us. They would like us to change our name to Guomindang, and perhaps this is the best name in the world. In addition, there is the third party, but it is no more than third place. It may also be called the Conservative Party. But the question is not what your name is. Or we could take the name of the Conservative Party. The question is not really the name. You can call yourself the Conservative Party, or some other Party, and they will continue to call you the Red Party. An American journalist named [Harrison] Forman wrote a book called *Report from Red China*. Still another American newsman, Edgar Snow, wrote a book called *Red Star Over China*, which has now been translated as *Notes of a Western Tour* [*Xixing manji*]. No matter how you change your name, it will always be Red. You are White, with only the white powder without the makeup, and they will still mark you as Red. Therefore, it is not the name that makes the difference. The name Guomindang may count as a good name, but then why do people still dislike the Guomindang so much? In the past, there were many people who were afraid their children might fall ill or die and so they intentionally gave bad names to their children, calling them “cat” or “dog.” In olden days there was a fellow named Wang Zhen’e (*zhen’e* means “suppressing evil”), but even though his name sounded very nice, he also died. Shall we make up a name for our Party so that it shall never die? No matter what name you give it, as long as it keeps doing the same old things, the substance will not change. There is a journalist named [Brooks] Atkinson, who has something of a liberal tendency, an old democrat. He calls us “moderate democratic centralizers” who are not that Red after all. The representatives of the bourgeoisie all talk like that. So, really, we need not change the name of our Party. The Chinese people like the name of our Party.²²

The fifth question, the Guomindang. We criticize the Guomindang very sharply but also very objectively and not beyond their realities. We credit to their account any little good thing about them. It is a pity that there are not many good things about the Guomindang, so even though we want to credit their account, it is very difficult to do so. We can only do it a little bit, and we put a proviso there; we want the Generalissimo to wash the black stuff from his face. This is our policy. On the one hand, we criticize them very sharply, but, on the other, we also allow some leeway. In this way, we can negotiate and cooperate and hope that they will change their policy. Have we said “down with the

Generalissimo”? No. In my report, I have not mentioned him by name even once. This Generalissimo wrote a “very good” book titled *China’s Destiny*. Originally, I should have mentioned it, but I did not. This was a great pity. Of the people I mention in my report, there are Sun Yatsen and now Roosevelt among the dead and among the living, of the revolutionaries, there is Stalin; among the counterrevolutionaries, there is Hitler. As for the others, the less you mention them, the better. Therefore, by allowing some leeway for the Guomintang we will not make mistakes. If we do not, there is only one realistic conclusion. That is to overthrow them. Then we will have made a political mistake. The Generalissimo has seen this, too, and on several occasions, he wanted to encourage us to make such a mistake, to encourage our forces to sally forth in the direction of Xi’an and to induce us to advocate the overthrow of the Guomintang. Comrades! We need to pay attention to these things, to his efforts to induce us. You say that you want to cooperate, and that is very good. But you must wash your face a bit, for only then will we marry you. If you refuse to wash your faces, they will not look very pretty, and we will not marry you. This is our policy.

On self-defense and counterattack. We shall proceed from the position of self-defense to engage in counterattacks against the attacks of the Guomintang, one is self-defense and the other is counterattack. We must retaliate against and reply to all the attacks waged by the Guomintang, be they large or small or be they by word or by weapon. Especially for attacks by weapon, as long as they attack, we need to eliminate their forces cleanly. We have put forth such a slogan: to eliminate them resolutely, thoroughly, cleanly, and totally. I also mentioned this to the Guomintang staff person responsible for liaison. I said that our policy is, first, based on the philosophy of Laozi, “Don’t be the first under Heaven [to do it].” That is to say, we will not fire the first shot. Second, we “retreat by 90 *li* to avoid battle in accordance with the *Zuo Commentaries* [*Zuochuan*]. When you come, we will turn back, march back for 90 *li*. But it is not necessarily so, it depends on the size of the area. The meaning of “retreat by 90 *li*” is that when you come, we will make some concessions. Third, we “exchange visits according to the rites,” as in the *Book of Rites* [*Li ji*]. If you come to visit me, and I don’t return the visit, this is not compatible with the rites. But if I go to visit you, and you do not reciprocate my visit, this is not compatible with the rites, either. That

is, “If others don’t transgress us, we will not transgress them, but if others transgress us, we will definitely transgress them.” We put forth this slogan as early as 1939, and we still follow this policy. Suppose we have a hundred rifles and you have forcefully taken away ninety-nine. Of course, we will not be happy. But we will not blame you. You do this because you are capable and very smart. However, with even one gun left, we will fight to the end, and as long as we have one gun left in our hands, even if we are thrown to the ground, we will hand over the gun to our sons, and our sons will hand over the gun to our grandsons. There is a story about a foolish old man who moved the mountain.²³ It is about Shanxi, where there are the Taihang mountains and Wangwu mountain. Now these two mountains are relatively low, but in the old days they were quite high and difficult to climb. There was a man called the Foolish Old Man, who was a very stupid old man. Near him lived another old man by the name of the Wise Old Man, who was a very intelligent old man. One day, these two men had a fight. Why did they fight? It was because the Foolish Old Man wanted to move the Taihang and Wangwu mountains and told his son to dig up the dirt and carry it away. The intelligent old man told him not to dig, that the Taihang and Wangwu mountains were so high—how could he dig them up and move them? The Foolish Old Man said: Even though these two mountains are high, after I die, there is my son; after my son dies, there is my son’s son; after my son’s son dies, there is my son’s son’s son. From the father to the son, from the son to the grandson, sons and grandsons, there’s no end to it, and the mountains will not get higher. Later, an immortal, moved by the spirit of this Foolish Old Man, reported this to [the emperor] Shangdi, and Shangdi sent people to move the mountains! This story is carried in books, not something I have made up.

As for the counterrevolutionaries of the world, we must overthrow the Japanese aggressors and the Chinese reactionaries. As for the attacks by the Guomindang, we are engaging in counterattacks from a position of self-defense. If we go beyond self-defense, we will make mistakes. But some comrades in the heat of the moment forget this, and this is not good. We should basically proceed from a position of self-defense. As long as we proceed from this position, we will not make mistakes. Self-defense is reasonable, partial is to our benefit, and temporary entails restraint. This is reason, benefit, and restraint. If we violate this policy, we will make mistakes. There will be a lot of trouble, all the more trouble

between us and the Guomindang.

The sixth question, reforming the old troops. The reform and use of old officers has some ideological problems that require extensive propaganda within our Party. There are numerous old forces with many officers in their ranks who need to be reformed; they cannot be dealt with on an individual basis, and there should be an overall policy. Except for the out-and-out reactionaries who defy reform, most of these officers can be reformed. We made mistakes on this problem in the past, for we did not believe that old officers could be reformed; we thought that these people were difficult to deal with, that they did not have Marxism and Leninism, that there could be no Bolsheviks among them. In reality, however, in the semi-colonial and semifeudal society of China, many of these old officers have been deceived; they needed to earn a crust, to find a way out, but they can find a way out only by coming to our side, so we are not afraid of their rebelling. The most frightening thing in the world is rebellion, but rebellion is also not so frightening. There are two kinds of rebellion, one is open rebellion, and the other is covert rebellion, engaging in espionage. We are prepared for open rebellion, and there have been such open rebellions for many years, though nothing has come of them. We need to be on guard against secret espionage activities, and though we should not harbor the intention to harm other people, we should be on guard against others harming us. Our eyes are looking at them with seriousness and vigilance. Then there are the deserters. If he quits with a gun, we have not lost our investment, for he brought it over with him and now he is taking it away. If you want to quit, we will give you some money and hold a farewell party. We also tell him that in the future if he wishes to come again, he is welcome to do so; this is called politics. For the comparatively progressive troops, we need to render them appropriate assistance, as we did in the past. There are two extreme views on this: One is that we should not take on anybody from the old troops, that we should not trust them, and we should get them to surrender their guns. This is not good. The other is to give everything to the comparatively progressive troops; this is called doing a disservice, and it is no good, either. In our effort to reform the old troops, we need to wage a struggle on two fronts.

The seventh question, our troops. The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the New Army of Shanxi,²⁴ and so on all adopt the policy of the United

Front, for this is the meaning of alliance. The Red Army during the Civil War was also an alliance, an alliance between the workers and peasants and an alliance between the Party and non-Party; all our forces, without exception, are like this. With our forces, unlike the Guomindang forces, we do not require that everyone join the Party. Though we talk of the Party army, that refers to the leadership of the Party and does not require that everyone within our forces be a Party member. Historically, at most, the share of Party members within our forces constituted only about half, and often it was between a third and a fifth, but always in the minority. In our forces, the Communist Party members who are in the minority should cooperate with the non-Party personages who are in the majority. "Personages" refers to the peasants, workers, and intellectuals. Our forces are the forces of the great popular masses. They belong to the great popular masses and serve them. That is, they are of the people, by the people, and for the people; they are the forces of the New Three People's Principles, the forces of New Democracy. They are the forces of the great popular masses opposing imperialism and feudalism under the leadership of the Communist Party. These forces are under the leadership of the proletariat. Some people are not happy upon hearing that they are under the leadership of the proletariat. Others keep on insisting that you are under its leadership and that it is incorrect, and there is a problem if you do not come under its leadership. Such arrogance is no good, and people do not welcome it. Here, we need to make clear the character of leadership. What is this leadership? It is embodied in policies, work, and actions; it is necessary to lead in actuality, not just to talk about leadership. Talk less about it if others do not like to hear it. We need to be clear about the character of leadership, but do not talk about it every day as if you are reciting hymns.

Now our forces are expanding cooperation as much as possible with non-Party personages. Recently, in Shandong three contingents of puppet forces came over to our side. Now they are no longer called puppet forces but, instead, they are called the Eighth Route Army. We held meetings for them in an effort to help them clarify and reform their thought, and, at the beginning, they were afraid. Later on, they gradually overcame ideological obstacles and came to feel more comfortable. This is a very good method, and *Liberation Daily* carried an editorial on it. If the delegates to our congress think this is a very good method, we should make a decision and then everyone should abide by it. This is called cooperation

within and without the forces. As long as they are not opposed to the revolution, we will cooperate with them. At the same time, we keep an eye on them to watch for any espionage activities. What is there to fear in cooperating with democratic elements? If we have food, everyone can eat it. If we have an enemy, everyone can fight him. We cannot pay them salaries, but if everyone pitches in, there will be plenty of clothes and food. We also carry out the Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention [of the Red Army in 1928], so through trial and error, we will succeed. Places like Liangshanbo adopted this policy, and they did a very good job with respect to their internal political work. Of course, they had their problems; they had big landlords and big tyrants in their ranks, and they did not carry out rectification. Lu Junyi²⁵ was compelled to go to Liangshan; he was forced to do so through commandism, and he did not do it voluntarily.

Our policy toward those who are not firm reactionaries is that as long as they are willing to engage in revolution and cooperate with us, we welcome them all as “Master Jiang is fishing, those willing come join him.”²⁶ Master Jiang issued a declaration: “If you are willing, come along. If you are not, forget it.” He understood it very clearly, he could even issue a declaration on fishing. We can also issue a declaration.

The eighth question, expanding the liberated areas. We need to launch offensives in all places where it is possible to do so. But we need to look out for and defend against enemy offensives, and when the enemy attacks, smash him. We need to be predominantly on the offensive, with defense as a supplement.

During the initial stages of the War of Resistance, we went on the offensive everywhere. During the middle period of the war between 1941 and 1942, it was mainly retreat and defense. Between 1943 and 1944, once again offense dominated. In view of the experience of these two years, we have come to two conclusions: One is offense, and the other is defense. We should not be frightened, even by seeing a rope just because we were bitten by a snake, suffering losses in 1941 and 1942. In view of the experience of 1943 and 1944, particularly that of 1944, our task calls on us to wage offensives, expand the liberated areas, and concentrate big (five to six regiments) and small (armed work teams) forces to engage in offensives behind the enemy’s rear. This is because the circumstances of the Japanese bandits have changed, their forces have weakened,

they cannot even look after themselves, while, by contrast, our areas have expanded. The situations for both ourselves and the enemy have changed. The situation of the world has also changed: Berlin is on the point of falling. Therefore, as conditions permit, we should concentrate some forces to attack the points where the enemy is the weakest. This is also very conducive to our defense. Now in the plans for 1945 that are being formulated in various places, the first thing to do is offense and the second thing is defense. This is not adventurism, for we are talking of waging offensives when conditions permit but not when conditions do not permit, and we also are talking about the possibility that the enemy will attack us and that we need to make a point to consolidate the base areas, so this is not adventurism.

The ninth question, preparations for transformation. We need to be prepared to gradually transform dispersed guerrilla warfare into regular mobile war, from a war which is mainly guerrilla war into a war which is mainly mobile war. During the initial stages of the War of Resistance we also advocated this, but it was only a hope then. What was the task then? Some comrades are not clear on this question. At that time, the enemy before us was the Japanese and behind us was the Guomindang reactionaries; we were sandwiched in the middle. Our forces at that time were but the little finger. In 1936, our forces in the whole country, including the guerrillas in the south totaled only 30,000. They increased a little bit in 1937, but not much. Our task then was to augment our forces and to grow, to add one more finger, and then one more and one more still. It was to expand our forces. How could we expand our forces? By relying on sparrow warfare, on guerrilla warfare. Sparrows fly all over the place; they go wherever there is food. At the Sixth Plenum, we made a point and listed eighteen advantages of guerrilla warfare. This is a good method, and it has been proven as such in the past eight years. The sparrows flying all over the sky are seeds, and they will produce numerous seedlings. Once we have these seeds, the Party is established, political power is established, and the base areas are in hand, we have the common folk behind us, there is food to eat, and the cadres have been tested and trained. At that time, we flew everywhere. The enemy before us, the Japanese, attacked us; the enemy in the rear, the Guomindang reactionaries, also attacked us. Both of them were egging us on. Egging us on to do what? To fight big battles by concentrating our forces. One of them encouraged us, the other

cursed us. One said that the Chinese Communist Party was heroic and was the national hero in resisting Japan. The other labeled us as opportunists and said that we were afraid of death. Who wants to be an opportunist? Who is not willing to be a national hero? Yet we still need to learn from the sparrows, though the sparrows are opportunistic and go wherever there is food, and although they remain small sparrows, when concentrated, they number 910,000. Are we always going to be sparrows? Long-life sparrows? The objective reality completely demonstrates that our sparrows are different from other sparrows, for we can grow big and turn into eagles. In Chinese mythology, there is a story that says: once upon a time, there was a giant eagle. It flew from the Arctic to the Antarctic. By a mere flap of its wings, it flew over the best part of China. We are prepared to do the same. We are prepared to expand to 3 million, 5 million, and this process calls for the transformation of small sparrows into big sparrows and then into a giant eagle that can sweep across the whole of China.

We now need to “adjust to the enemy and to the demand for food.” The enemy has many strongholds, yet he only has points, lines, and small fronts. When the enemy wants to establish points and lines, we disperse to establish fronts. This is the meaning of adjusting ourselves to the enemy. People need to eat. When [the people are] concentrated, there is nothing to eat, so we need to be dispersed to have food to eat. This is the meaning of adjusting to the demand for food. During the Civil War, the reason we engaged in the effort to regularize our forces was that we forgot that people need to eat, the road has to be walked by foot, and bullets can kill people. We did not clearly understand these things. The troops did not engage in production but lived off the civilians, so after several months, after a year, all the grain was eaten up. We could only turn back and go on the Long March, which can be termed “heroic.” Now we need to concentrate larger forces and use the bigger forces to overcome the smaller, to attack the weak points of the enemy. You have one hundred men, we have one thousand men, and one thousand men can eliminate your one hundred men. In addition, we also need to regularize. In the report I wrote that the day we obtain new weapons will be the day that we become all the more invincible and will be able finally to defeat the Japanese imperialists. Herein lies the meaning of preparing for transformation. Among the tasks of the liberated areas, I talked about using offense as the main method and defense as a supplement. That is, offense should precede defense. We

ought to be so prepared, because in the future, once we obtain new weapons it will be no good if we are not prepared. Now the situation has changed, and our policies need to change, too; we need a complete and thorough Marxism. In our history, there have been many different kinds of Marxism: There has been fragrant Marxism and stinky Marxism, there has been living Marxism and dead Marxism—quite a lot of Marxism when you pile it all up. The kind of Marxism we need is the fragrant Marxism, not the smelly kind; it is living Marxism, not dead Marxism. We need to be prepared to transform from small sparrows into giant eagles, using one wing beat to sweep across the whole of China and to blow away the Japanese imperialists.

We need to transform, but we cannot expect that everything will change in one morning. It will depend on concrete circumstances; when we have strength, we will attack the fortresses and the big cities. When it is possible to break open the fortress and there is food to eat, we will do it. If we cannot break open the fortress and there is no food, then we will turn back and disperse our forces, “The deaf setting off firecrackers—scattered all over the place.” Also, there is a question that has been in dispute for over ten years, namely, whether we should advance from the countryside to the cities or go from the cities to the countryside. This is an extremely contentious dispute. The correct line is to begin in the countryside first, study the situation in the countryside. People say this is the correct line, and it is Marxism. When Marxists walk and get to a place that they cannot walk through, they need to make a detour, because you cannot go through there. Of course, if you keep walking in the countryside, doing it for a few million years, this is not Marxism either. This is called anti-Marxism. Real Marxism is: If it is necessary to be in the countryside, stay in the countryside; when it becomes necessary to move to the cities, move to the cities. Now we want finally to defeat the Japanese imperialists, so we need to exert great efforts to move to the cities, to be prepared to seize big cities and to engage in work in the cities, and to take control of large railroads, factories, and banks. There is a population of millions there; for example, Beijing has a population of 1 million to 2 million, and there is quite a large population in Baoding, Tianjin, and Shijiazhuang as well. We must prepare well in order to move the focus of our work to the cities. However, we should not forget the countryside after we remember the cities or refuse to engage in rural work when assigned. If I am not assigned to do city work, then I

will cry the cadre policy is wrong. If you go to the city, he goes to the city, too. There are not that many houses in the cities, and if no one goes to live in the countryside, will this do?²⁷ That is why in my report I called on large numbers of intellectuals to go down to the countryside. Don't wear student clothes, wear clothes made of rough cloth. Yet when we take over big cities, the three to five major cities such as Beiping and Tianjin, our Eighth Route Army will need to go there. We will definitely hold our Eighth Congress there, even though some people say this is opportunism. On the contrary, if we still held the Eighth Congress in Yan'an then, that would be more like opportunism.

Urban work should be given equal importance to work in the base areas. This is not rhetoric—it needs to be implemented. We need to send out cadres and to transform thinking. After the conclusion of the Seventh Party Congress, we need to send out cadres one batch after another, as conditions permit, they need to go one batch after another. To engage in underground work in the cities, you cannot behave like the gallant warriors in the novel *Water Margin*, and refuse to change your name under any circumstances; you will have to change your name and your surname. They also did city work at Liangshanbo and the Magic Traveler Daizong did city work.²⁸ Without city work, it would have been impossible to take Zhujiazhuang. If there is no internal wavering in the cities, no internal problems occurring, it will be very difficult to solve problems.

As we transform the mode of warfare from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare and the focus of work from the countryside to the cities, we will also need to prepare for the differing views that will emerge during such transformations. On this question, I think there will definitely emerge varying degrees of differing views, but if we are well prepared, there will be fewer differences, and if we are ill-prepared, there will likely be more differences. The Center should be prepared regarding this question, as should the various localities. You should be clear-headed before the events arise; primarily, the high-ranking cadres need to be clear-headed, then there will be fewer differences.

The tenth question: troops and localities. We need to penetrate deeply into the countryside and to struggle to gain the Guomindang-ruled areas and the areas lost to the Japanese. We need to seize the big cities, though at present, we have not yet planted our flags in Beiping or Wuhan but, instead, they fly above mountains such as the Qingling mountains, the Taihang mountains and Wutai

mountain. Our present base areas are the strategic areas from which to expand. For the moment, however, we have too few people, we need to extend ourselves to cover half the 450 million people in the country. If we are able to extend ourselves to cover 200 million people, we will be in a good position to get things done. Now we have a million troops, but these troops are dispersed. We cannot concentrate 100,000 troops in any single place, for first there is no food and then there are no aircraft or artillery. If we concentrated tens of thousands of troops from Wutai mountain, the Taihang mountains Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong to go and seize Beiping carrying rifles, that would not work. After eight waves of attack, we could not take Ji'an, nor could we take Ganzhou after seven waves of attack. The reason for this was not that there was a lack of enthusiasm or that Marxism-Leninism did not work its magic. The reason was that we had too few weapons with which to attack the cities, so we could not mount the city walls even if we had wished to. In the future, once we have weapons enough to equip 100,000 to 200,000 troops, then we will be able to pull together and break Shijiazhuang, Baoding, and Beiping from the hands of the Japanese. We will fight our way through with no retreat or only retreat for one to two days and then advance again. In the future, we want both "weaponry and a quantity of military"; when we can equip several hundred thousand troops, then the whole country will be in our hands. In the future, we will need 3 million to 5 million troops to be victorious in all of China to achieve peace under heaven and to turn China into an independent, democratic, free, unified, prosperous, and powerful China. When necessary, we can expand our forces by several million, and, even then, the burden on the common folk of the country will not be too heavy, but we will need weapons. Under the present circumstances, the expansion of our forces must not increase the burden on the people. We shall expand our forces under all permissible conditions; however, if we expand everywhere, become overzealous, and run out of millet and rice for a month or two and the common people complain, that will be wrong. Expanding under permissible conditions means that we do not increase the burden on the common people.

The eleventh question: convening a people's representatives congress of China's liberated areas.²⁹ The convening of such a congress is the proposal of our congress to the people of the various liberated areas, and it is a major event. It has not been published in the papers yet. Right now we can only hold a

representatives meeting, where the representatives are not elected but are nominated by the military, the government, and the people's associations. This is simpler. To hold a people's representatives congress, we would need to find out such things as age, and whether people have the right to vote, so it is better to have elections after the end of the war. Of course, if we want to do it now, we can. There are also elections in the various liberated areas, but this time we require that it be done quickly and not too slowly. It is decided to hold this congress, so we need to prepare a declaration to be issued after the congress, resolutions need to be adopted, and a standing leading organization must be established. This organ will not be called a government but will be called the "Federation of the Chinese People's Liberated Areas." This is something we have planned for and have contemplated, but for now it will not be reported or written about in the papers; we will just talk about it here. We will need to convene a meeting, adopt resolutions, and issue declarations, sending telegrams to Generalissimo Chiang to request him to organize a coalition government. Comrades! That political report of mine is titled "On Coalition Government." I have not talked much about this question today, but I will mention this here. Asking the Generalissimo to organize a coalition government, have we put such requests to him? Indeed, we have done this on many occasions. Some time ago, Comrade Zhou Enlai went there to put such a request to him, and is it not the case that every few days our *Liberation Daily* and the New China News Agency put such a request to him? Every time you ask him, he always shakes his head, he's not happy. He says that to organize a coalition government is to "overthrow the government." How can the organization of a coalition government be tantamount to overthrowing the government? We say that we will unite with him, but he says that we want to overthrow his government. We say that we should hold a meeting attended by various parties, but he calls such a meeting a "meeting to divide the spoils." He calls his government the spoils, and he is opposed to others' dividing them. Comrade Zhou Enlai said to Chiang Kaishek that "Mr. Sun Yatsen had said that a National Assembly should be held in the future." He then said, "You treat my government as the government of the Beiyang warlords and regard yourselves as the premier!" It is truly difficult for this person to be reasonable, and he has the temperament of a scoundrel, rather nasty.

At the people's representatives congress of the liberated areas, personages outside the Party should constitute the overwhelming majority. We are prepared to elect an organ and I ask you to think a little as to what name we should give it, perhaps you can come up with a good name. Now the proposed name for it is the Federation of the Chinese People's Liberated Areas. The Guomindang has a government, and we want to avoid confrontation with them. That is why it will be called the Federation of the Chinese People's Liberated Areas. We need to liberate the Chinese people. Who says that should not be done? All people have the right to resist Japan, and all should strive to win this right. It is absolutely impermissible for the reactionaries to obstruct progress and deprive the people of their right to resist Japan. When we mention these things, some will curse us as "self-proclaimed kings and overlords." So we shall be such kings and overlords, we shall be the kings of liberation, the overlords of liberation. What man dares not to want our liberation?

3. A Few Questions within the Party

The first question: individuality and Party character (*parti'nost*). Some people raised this question during the Rectification movement, and outsiders have talked about us, too. One journalist wrote an article in *Dagong bao* (Impartial Daily) saying that the Communist Party wants to eliminate individuality and only keep the Party character and that many of their documents only talk about the Party character and their decisions all concern strengthening the Party character, and so on. Such opinions are incorrect. I talk about this in my report, that China is a semicolonial, semifeudal country, where imperialist and feudal forces have destroyed individuality, preventing the Chinese people from developing their intelligence and talent or their bodies; both have been destroyed. I have said Lu Xun's bones were very strong, and it is a very valuable thing to have a strong-boned man like Lu Xun in a semicolonial country.³⁰ Semicolonial countries are very poor and are where people lead miserable lives and suffer severely from oppression, and, as a result, some people have become the slaves of the foreigners, that is, compradors. In Shanghai, there is something called "foreign

ham”: if someone is kicked by the foreigners, he is said to have been given a piece of “ham.” Those who have been to Shanghai have seen placards in some parks saying “No Dogs or Chinese Allowed.”³¹ The purpose of the national war [*minzu zhanzheng*] is to oppose these things; we cannot let foreign countries oppress the Chinese [*Zhongguo minzu*]*—*we must have independence. It is not acceptable that the savage foreign Fascists oppress the Chinese people and behave in an unreasonable way. On behalf of the people of the whole nation, the Chinese Communist Party demands independence! Without independence for China, there is no individuality, for national [*minzu*] liberation is individual liberation; it is this way in politics, in economics, and in culture. Without a clear, awakened, democratic, and independent consciousness, the broad masses of the people will have no respect. Within the Party, is there any difference regarding this issue? Yes, there is a difference. The Party army has many characteristics that are particular to it in comparison with other armies of the people, for it is an advanced army, an organized advanced army, it is more organized and more tightly structured and integrated than other organizations, and through concerted effort, it strives to attain one single goal. If an army wants such a level of integration, it must follow orders: attention, at ease, look left, look right, march, aim, fire. Otherwise, if the enemy is in front of you and one of you shoots in one direction and another shoots in the opposite direction, you will be wiped out by the enemy. The forces of the Party army are no different; it cannot do without democratic centralism, without democracy or centralism. The dictatorship of the emperor, as in feudal society, will not do, that’s something from feudal times. We are carrying out the democracy of the revolutionary people, which is different from the democracy of the capitalists, the old type of democracy, for it is a more extensive democracy. The Party is an association of outstanding elements among the people who freely and voluntarily bind themselves to accept the Party program, the Party Charter, to obey Party regulations, and are ready to sacrifice themselves. Therefore, some people cannot join our Party, they are not willing to be transferred, they want to decide what kind of work they want to do and where they want to go. Party members, by contrast, must obey the organization and obey Party resolutions.

Is our Party now unified? The Resolution on Party History³² says that there is unprecedented unity, but this means there is more unity than before, not that

there is complete unity. Some comrades say, “If you let it go, there are no problems, but if you bring it up, there are lots of problems.” There is truth in this statement. This is because our Party has expanded forty to fifty times during the period of the War of Resistance, from barely over 20,000 organized Party members in 1936 to more than a million now. It is naturally difficult for such a large Party not to have various differing views, and that is why we did a bit of work and launched the Rectification movement. This was a campaign to push the Party forward; without the Rectification movement, the Party would not have been able to move forward. At that time, the differences in viewpoints reached to such an extent: there was that Wang Shiwei who wrote an article in Yan’an titled “Wild Lilies.”³³ Many people enjoyed reading it. In the spring of 1942 during the Rectification movement at the Central Research Institute there was a wall newspaper,³⁴ and this wall newspaper was very popular, people from Qiao’ergou and Nanmenwai all went to read its articles, and even I went to have a look. At that time, many men of letters would not work together with the workers, peasants, and soldiers, they said that there was no Han of Jingzhou in the border region, but we said Han of Jingzhou is in the border region. Who is he? He is Wu Manyou, Zhao Zhankui, and Zhang Zhiguo.³⁵ I can tell you this story. In the Tang dynasty, there was someone with the surname Han who served as prefectural governor in Jingzhou, so people called him Han of Jingzhou. Later, there was someone named Li Taibai who knew how to write. He wanted to become an official, so he wrote a letter to Han of Jingzhou praising him to the sky and saying that Han was number-one under heaven, while, in fact, he just wanted to meet with Han of Jingzhou so that Han would make him an official. Hence, the Han of Jingzhou story. At that time in Yan’an there were many who wished to find “Han of Jingzhou,” but they looked in the wrong direction and found a Han of Jingzhou who wore makeup, a petty-bourgeois Han of Jingzhou, the Kirkun in the play “The Front.”³⁶ They could not find where Han of Jingzhou was, while in reality, there were Hans of Jingzhou everywhere; they were the workers, peasants, and soldiers. The worker Han of Jingzhou is Zhao Zhankui; the farmer Han of Jingzhou is Wu Manyou; and the soldier Han of Jingzhou is Zhang Zhiguo. The broad masses of Party members still do not clearly understand this question. In general, without rectification it was impossible for the Party to advance. The second job we did was to resolve the production

question. Without production, it is also impossible for the Party to advance. At that time, we had nothing to eat. Wang Shiwei instigated his assistants to oppose us and stood with them to oppose the “three classes and nine grades” and the system of small canteens,³⁷ for at that time there was nothing to eat in the big canteens, but in fact there was not much to eat in the small canteens either. Later, by promoting production we resolved this problem. In 1941 the border region required the common people to submit 200,000 *dan* of grain to the government, as well as to transport government salt, so the burden on them was very heavy, and they complained a lot. That year, during a meeting of the Border Region Government lightning struck and killed Magistrate Li. Some people said, “Aiya, how come the God of Thunder didn’t kill Mao Zedong?” I did some investigation work; there was only one reason for this—the government was taking too much grain. And some of the common people were unhappy. The government indeed procured too much grain. Should we repent and reconsider our policy? Yes. From the birth of the Communist Party in 1921 to the higher cadres meeting in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region in 1942 we had not learned how to do economic work. If we have not learned it, we need to! Otherwise the God of Thunder will strike the people. What was the attitude of the people of Yan’an toward our comrades, whether the ones who had gone on the 10,000-*li* Long March or the 1,000-*li* Long March, whether the old Communist Party members or the youths who came to Yan’an during the War of Resistance? I say it was “respect spirits but keep them at a distance.”³⁸ Why was this? Because even though they thought the Communist Party was very good and they respected it very much, the Communist Party had increased their burden, so they kept their distance. In the spring of last year, when Comrade Zhao Yiming led the *yangge* dance troupe, organized by people from Yangjialing to Ansai to perform, and since at that time the people in Ansai were in the middle of a meeting to nominate labor heroes, they also organized *yangge* dance troupes to join the one from Yangjialing, to perform, I say only from then on was there peace under heaven! Because the intellectuals from outside joined the common people of northern Shaanxi to perform the *yangge*. In the past, the common people treated them like “respected spirits at a distance,” but now they had become one.³⁹ There is also the female intellectual comrade working at Yangjiawan Primary School, and an intellectual, a doctor, who is working in the Qingliang mountains; they

are getting along very well with the common people there. There are Communist Party members like these in all the various base areas; wherever they go, they become one with the people and for the local people they “serve heart and soul and only stop in death.” Therefore, without the two wheels of rectification and production, the cart of revolution could not roll forward, the Party could not advance. There was a time in the past when a third of the comrades at *Liberation Daily* were in the hospital. Comrade Zhou Yang told me that no sooner had the students at the Lu Xun Academy gotten up in the morning than they felt sleepy again. Why? Because they had nothing to eat. If we resolve the two problems of rectification and production, our cause will advance. Rectification is the spiritual basis for advance, and production is the material basis for advance. Our Party has learned rectification and production, moving from the unconscious to the conscious. Our Party now is relatively integrated; indeed, it can be said that it is unprecedentedly integrated, as historical problems have been resolved pretty appropriately. However, there are still problems. As I said at the preparatory meeting the other day, our Party is not completely integrated, and we need higher levels of integration and higher levels of unity. If we want unity, we shall need democracy, for without democracy, without criticism and self-criticism, without clarifying different views, it is impossible to achieve unity. Many unfair things must gradually become fair. Unfair things exist every day, so we need to tackle them every day. Problems are resolved, then they return, then they are resolved once again, and this is the way we make progress. Leading comrades at the Center and in the various leading institutions should make a point to heed the opinions of others; just like a house, you should open up the windows often to let in fresh air. Why don't we have enough fresh air? Do we blame the air? Or do we blame ourselves? Air regularly circulates, but since we have not opened our windows, there is not enough fresh air. If we open our windows, the air will come into the house. What house of ours is this? It is the political house, the political factory. You need to have raw materials to operate a factory, you need workers, technicians, and engineers. How come there is not enough raw materials? Not enough personnel? We need to think about our own responsibility. Have we put up advertisements? Are the advertisements large enough? Have we paid a high price for the raw materials? In fact, the raw materials do not cost much money, and all we need to do is put up a poster

carrying the word “Welcome” and all kinds of raw materials will then come in large quantities. So we should let people express their various opinions. We need to make sure that “those who know can speak up; there shall be no reservation in speaking up; those who speak up are not culpable, yet those who listen ought to be on guard; if the criticism is correct, then mend your ways; if it is not valid, take it as advice.” These are clichés, but they are very significant. I want to make it clear that if somebody talks very well but acts quite differently, if he does not act as he talks, that’s not right.

As for individuality and Party character, Party character is the general, and individuality is the particular. There is no generality without a basis in the particular. Without the particular, how can there be the general? Without the individuality of a Party member, where is the Party character? The Party character is the common character, the general character, the character shared by every member of the whole Party. For example, with principles such as uniformity in policy, coalition government, the programs of New Democracy and its various components, rectification, and production, there should be a unified attitude on the basis of Marxist ideology, for these are things in common. Is each individual Party member different from the other? Of course. You cannot eliminate individuality and make everyone the same by force. Among human beings, there are the old, the young, the male, the female, and various other differences, and there are differences in work, too, between military, political, economic, cultural, and Party organizational work. In military work, there is the difference between officers, political affairs personnel, and logistics personnel. In Party organizational work, there is the difference between the different types of regions in which work is conducted, such as the base areas and the occupied areas. There are also differences in people’s understanding of Marxism; for the same person, there is the difference in his understanding of Marxism when he is young and when he is old. All in all, there are differences in work, in position, in sex, in age, and so on, and to eliminate these differences would be to prevent the comrades from expanding on their strengths. These cannot be unified into the same orbit. There are nine planets in the solar system, Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto, and the Earth is also one of them. They all follow their own respective orbits, move according to a certain sequence, and yet they all came out of the sun through splitting, and they only vary in size

and shape. As for the things on these planets, they are not necessarily the same either. There are no men on the sun. Yet there are men on Earth, and as for whether there are men on one of the other eight planets, I cannot say, since I have not made an investigation yet. In ancient times, there were no men on Earth either. There was no water, no air; only after there was air could there be water, and then there could be living things, and only then men. The stars in the sky often assert their independence as well, just look up into the sky at night, sometimes you see a star escapes! They also assert their independence. All in all, Party members have their varying individuality, and it will not do for one to eliminate the varying types of individuality. The result of eliminating various differences will be the elimination of unity. There will be no unity if the special is done away with. This is one question.

The second question is on the treatment of various types of cadres within the Party. Usually it seems as if these sorts of cadres within the Party have not been fairly treated, so we need to pay special attention to comrades of these types.

1. Theoretical workers. During rectification, we advocated seeking truth from facts and opposing dogmatism, but when we do that, it looks as if the theoretical workers are not faring as well as before. We should value theoretical workers, and we should value theory. Lenin once said: "Without revolutionary theory, there would be no revolutionary movement." Therefore, within our Party, we need to study theory. I said at the Sixth Plenum that the theoretical level of our Party was very low, now it is a little higher than before, but that is not enough. Of course, our Party now has made some progress; however, judging from the requirements of the Chinese revolutionary movement, our theoretical level is still not good enough. Revolution calls on us to be able to explain the Chinese revolutionary movement, its various aspects, its inner connections, including military, political, cultural, and economic, all the different aspects of the entire revolutionary project, as well as its inner connections; it calls on us to sum up experience and to raise it to a higher level, making it well-structured and systematic. What is theory? It is systematic knowledge. The theories of Marxism-Leninism are precisely systematic knowledge based on Marxism.

Comrades who engage in translation work are very important, so do not think that translation work is not good. We now need great translators. I am a country bumpkin, so I need translators to be able to understand a little bit about foreign

things. There are very few within our Party who can read foreign books directly. All those who can read foreign books directly should first translate the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, translate advanced things from the Soviet Union and by Marxists from various countries. We also need to translate a lot of historical things, which, though not Marxist, have some progressive elements, and some things by democrats.

Therefore, we need to value theoretical workers, look up to them, and regard them as those in our ranks who are erudite and cultured; we should respect them.

2. Intellectuals. Not all intellectuals are necessarily theory workers. It is a very good phenomenon that the number of intellectuals in our Party is increasing. A class revolution must have intellectuals in order to triumph; it's just not possible to do without intellectuals. You must have read *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and *Water Margin*, where the three kingdoms of Wei, Shu, and Wu each had its own intellectuals. There were high-level intellectuals and there were ordinary intellectuals; the person who wore the Eight Diagrams gowns and held a goose-feather fan there was an intellectual. The rebellion of Liangshanbo would not have been successful without such people as Gongsun Sheng, Wu Yong, and Xiao Rang.⁴⁰

Of course, it would not have been successful without other people, as well. The proletariat wants emancipation, the poor laboring masses need intellectuals, and all classes need intellectuals who serve their respective interests. Slave owners had intellectuals who served them, these were the saints in the ranks of the slave owners, such as Aristotle and Socrates of Greece. The slave owners in China also had intellectuals who served them, for example, Duke Dan of Zhou, was a saint for the slave owners. Zhuge Liang, Liu Bowen,⁴¹ and Wu Yong in *Water Margin* were all intellectuals during the feudal era. As a result of rectification and cadre screening, it seems that the intellectuals have been demoted a little bit, so it seems a little unfair. It is like a scale with one side lower and the other side higher. Our congress is designed to readjust this balance, making the side of the intellectuals a little higher. Are we going to tilt the balance in the other direction? No. We shall welcome them to serve our Party, to strive for the interests of our Party, and to strive for the interests of the people. Our Party, our military, our government, our economic departments, and our mass organizations should admit a great number of intellectuals to serve us, and we need to respect them.

3. On comrades who work in the occupied territories and areas held by the Guomindang. As soon as these comrades come to the base areas, they feel that they are not faring very well. There are numerous leaders in the base areas, and when watching an opera, it is always the leaders who sit in the front. There are big leaders, middling leaders, and small leaders, so these comrades feel repressed. They also had trouble during the cadre screening. "Where did you come from?" "Shanghai? Xi'an?" "Do you have problems?" After repeated reviews, they are still not completely trusted. "Which hotel did you stay in?" "Do you have a letter of introduction?" Because letters of introduction are required in the base areas, we think that they are also required in order to check into hotels in Shanghai. If you say there is no letter of introduction, that sounds very strange. If we have made a mistake, we should apologize. If we have wrongfully put [political] caps on them, these labels need to be respectfully removed, and we need to admit our mistakes. These comrades are not accustomed to the style of work in the base areas, and this is understandable; it may take three to five years before the styles of work can slowly come together.

4. Local cadres and local military cadres. I have already written in the report that we need to treat the local cadres as if they are our own brothers and sisters. Wherever our troops go, they should help the local cadres organize their own armed forces, their militia, their self-defense forces, their regional corps, and their regional troops and then on this basis, we may organize main force corps and main force units. I neglected this question when I first got to northern Shaanxi. This border region was single-handedly established by Comrade Gao Gang and others, and since we did not deal with this question correctly, people in northern Shaanxi complained. Some said that people in northern Shaanxi can only establish soviet areas but they cannot join the Red Army. The reason for the emergence of such talk is that we have not handled well the question of local forces. As for North China, Central China, and South China, are there also cases in which the question of local cadres and local forces have been mishandled? If there are, we should admit mistakes and correct them just as I must in northern Shaanxi. The presence of these sayings demonstrates that these comrades feel that they have been wronged. I advocate doing investigation and research, however after I got to northern Shaanxi, at the beginning I did not carry out investigation and research in this regard. Now we have done this. At the same

time, I hope that local comrades working in the south, the north, the east, and the west will submit many suggestions. We need to open the window, let the air circulate, hear the news and heed public opinion, and if there are shortcomings and mistakes, correct them. It will not do to get this one wrong. This question once set off a big dispute in our history. After the close of this congress, many will go to different places. Last year, Wang Shoudao and Wang Zhen went to Hunan, and Dai Jiying and Wang Shusheng went to Henan.⁴² I said these things to them when they were about to set off. Don't be afraid to talk a lot, don't be afraid to talk so much that you scorch your tongue and lips, but now it looks like it did not happen, we have not done enough talking. Everyone in the world has shortcomings, and Bolsheviks are not so perfect either, each having more or less some shortcomings. What is this called? This is called Bolsheviks with shortcomings. If you say he is not a Bolshevik, that's very hard to say. "I have fought heroically for the Party. How come I am still not a Marxist-Leninist?" We cannot talk like that. On this point, I think I myself am included. If you say I am a complete Bolshevik, that is not necessarily the case, but if you say there is not a trace of Bolshevism in me, this is not correct either. Many comrades when writing to me still write "with Bolshevik salutations." I thought about it a bit and concluded that we may be called Bolsheviks with shortcomings. One of the shortcomings is that we are carrying something on our shoulders. For example, we have walked farther than others, 25,000 *li* more, and this has added a burden to our shoulders. I am not saying every comrade is like this, neither am I referring to certain specific comrades, so I ask that you comrades do not take me wrong on this. But there are indeed quite a few comrades for whom the 25,000-*li* long trek has become a burden, it has increased the weight on them, and they have turned into camels, for they carry too big a burden on their shoulders. Though you have walked a long way, you lost the base area. Now Jiangxi base area is no more; others have not walked these distances, but there is still a base area in northern Shaanxi. Comrades! You have walked these distances, but you have lost the base area. If they should ask you for a base area, can you afford to repay this? You can't. Neither can I. If we could repay this in cash or in border region script, we could still think of a way somehow, but if we should be asked to give back the Jiangxi base area, that we simply cannot do. These others have not walked these distances, but they have a base area; we have walked these 25,000 *li*

but have lost the base area. Think about it, walking with your feet, one foot after another, has turned into a burden. There is also the Earth's walk, the number of rotations of the Earth around the sun is the number of years it adds to its life; the older it is, the bigger the burden. Older comrades, don't blame me for saying this, I am fifty-two this year, and the miles the Earth has walked have also become our burden. Younger comrades also have their own burdens. Oh, they have sharp eyes and keen ears; sharp eyes and nimble hands are their strength, but it will not do if the younger comrades call the old ones "senile and confused." The younger comrades should not call others "senile and confused," and the old ones should not call others "young and ignorant." Everybody was once young, and the young know fewer things, but they gradually come to know more. Other people may know fewer things than you do, but that does not make you omniscient. If you talk about farming, you will not be as good as Wu Manyou; if you talk about doing factory work, you will not be as good as Zhao Zhankui; and if you talk about being a soldier, you will not be as good as Zhang Zhiguo. Out of the millions of things that exist, we can only work at one or two, we have limitations, and there are numerous things that we cannot do. If we improve our attitude, then when we go to some place, we become one with the people and respect the comrades there, and by raising Communist consciousness, we will be able to reduce the problem of mountaintopism. If we are to eliminate factions, we must recognize the existence of factions and accommodate them, and in this way we may reduce the factions and eliminate them. That is why we need to recognize the existence of factions, and it will not do not to recognize them. After recognizing their existence, we need to accommodate the various elements, groups, and elements with different histories and different problems. If they are spiritually crushed by stones—some of which we put on them with our own hands—then we need to lift them off for them. All stones, be they big ones, medium-size ones, or small ones, as long as they are crushing them spiritually, we need to lift them off. Those stones which were put on them by our own hands need to be taken off by our own hands so as cheer their spirits, liberate them, and engage their initiative. Only in this way can we unite the whole Party and people of the whole country to strive for victory. For this goal, wherever we go, we should not behave as the emissary sent by the emperor; rather, we need first to see others' strong points. We all belong to the new democratic liberated areas, we

are all members of the Communist Party, we are all comrades, and there is no need to look down upon others. During the Civil War, we suffered a great deal from this problem. Most of the comrades in Yan'an have been to the Party School, and the comrades present here all attended the Seventh Party Congress, so you know even more things, and this is very good. When you leave this place, others will definitely respect you a great deal, they will need you to convey to them the spirit of the Seventh Congress because people look to Yan'an and believe in Yan'an. But comrades, we must adopt the above-mentioned attitude and not behave as if we are imperial emissaries. Wherever we go, we need to "do our utmost and only rest when after death." In view of the great sufferings we have been through in history, we must carefully guard against unconscious blindness; we need consciousness, we need consciously to pay attention to this point. Everywhere we go, we need to respect the local people, the local armed forces, and the local government and to establish good relations with them. This is the duty of a Communist Party member.

5. Cadres involved in economic and logistic work. There is logistic work in the armed forces and a great deal of economic work throughout the base areas and the liberated areas. There are a lot of comrades involved in this work. Since in the past we did not sufficiently advocate or engage in propaganda work on economic endeavors, many comrades feel that work in such departments is looked down upon by others and has no status. I have said before that I was told by a comrade in Yan'an when asked to be the chief of the administrative department that he would not be willing to do it. Why was this? Because others looked down upon this position. When others asked him what his job was, he said that he did general work. Why did he say he was doing general work? Because it was not popular to do administrative work, so now we need to make it popular. Some comrades hold that military and Party work are popular, and within the armed forces that military and political work are popular, while logistic work is not popular. Because these jobs are not popular, we should give them a certain status that makes them popular.

6. Cadres doing democratic movement work and cadres in departments for workers, youth, and women. These cadres also feel unpopular. Some people call them "miscellaneous troops," while in fact they are all "core troops." There are no miscellaneous troops. When the major cities have been opened, broad workers

movements, youth movements, and women's movements need to be launched. Our Party is a workers' Party, and too many comrades of worker background in our ranks have already lost their lives. Now there are not many cadres left who engage in the workers movement, perhaps a few dozen or a few hundred, so we need to take care of them and respect them. At the same time, it will not do without cadres doing youth and women's work.

7. Cadres who joined the Party during the War of Resistance. Now we still call these cadres new cadres as if old cadres can only refer to those from the Long March, in which case there are only a few of them, merely ten thousand to twenty thousand. Comrades, most of the comrades present here are old comrades, for you have rich experience, exercised correct leadership, and have been elected as representatives. This is very good. Though the number of cadres who started work during the Great Revolution and the Civil War is small, we cannot do without them, for they have a lot of experience. But if that is treated as a burden, that is no good; one should be light and fast. Comrades, let me tell you some figures! Now, there are more than 1.1 million cadres who joined the Party during the War of Resistance, while there are at most only 20,000 left of the cadres from the Northern Expedition and the Civil War. Let us add them up, the total is around 1.2 million. The eyes of these 20,000 people should not be just on themselves, but also on those over 1.1 million people. Otherwise, you look at me, and I look at you. How great! You look into the mirror again and again, feeling like you are very handsome. Ah, that is no good; we are older and not so very handsome, but those who are younger are more handsome. Most of those who joined the Party during the War of Resistance are young comrades, though, of course, there are also older ones. We have our strong points, and they have their strong points; it cannot do without us, and we cannot do without them either. The eyes of these 20,000 people should be on those more than 1.1 million people; we should respect them, we should not give them the feeling that these 20,000 people are difficult to approach and not easy to talk with, and that before they can talk with you, they need to think over for several days and nights how to do it. We need to enable them, in the words of Hu Shi, to "say whatever they want to say and to say it in a truthful way."⁴³ In other words, we need to become one with them—the new and the old should unite. The War of Resistance has been a long period, we cannot indiscriminately call those who have joined the Party

during this period new cadres, because if you call all of them new cadres, that suggests it is only I who is an old cadre, I, the senior, am number-one under heaven, and you, the junior, you are number-two under heaven.

8. Non-Party cadres. This is also a major problem. Even if we had 4.5 million Party members in all of China, they would only constitute 1 percent of the population and our present percentage, by contrast, is less than 1 percent. Even if we had 4.5 million Party members, there would only be one Communist Party member for every one hundred people. What is his task? His task is to unite the other ninety-nine non-Party personages. We must do this if we want to organize the armed forces to defeat the enemy. If a Communist Party member cannot unite the majority of people, unite workers, peasants, intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie, and other democratic elements, then, he is not a good Communist Party member. Why does the world need Communist parties? What do we want Communist parties to do? Is it necessary to have Communist parties? Ye Qing said that there was no need for the Chinese Communist Party to exist, but his is the formulation of the reactionaries, and we do not approve of it. We ourselves may also raise the question of whether we need the Communist Party. Is it because there is too much millet in the world that cannot be fully consumed and we are forced to eat it, hence the need for the Communist Party? Or perhaps is it because there is too much housing available, a certain portion of which has to be specially allocated to the Communist Party? Of course, none of this is true. The reason the world needs the Communist Party is to unite the majority of the people, organize the armed forces, defeat the enemy, and build a new China. What else is there to do besides these things? Nothing. That is, we eat some millet, eat some rice, and wear some clothes, all in order to work for the people, unite the broad masses, organize the armed forces, defeat the enemy, and build a new China. If the revolution is not carried out in this way, then this revolution can only be the kind that takes the Finance Department as its target. Some people carry out revolution for no other purpose, they spend all their time and energy, even a few decades, to carry out a revolution with the Finance Department as its target. This is no good. Comrades, don't get me wrong, I am not referring to any particular person or a few people, but I have always had the feeling that if we want to get things done, we need to understand the situation and we need to do a little research, especially with regard to various small things, such as concrete

work in production, hygiene, culture, mass organizations, and government work. We need to learn many things from the common people, since our knowledge is lacking; primarily, my knowledge is lacking. How is salt transported? I don't know. How is a cooperative run? I don't know; I have never before run a cooperative. Therefore a task is given to us—that is to learn.⁴⁴ If we lack experience, we need to study, and we need to work, we need to study through work.

Non-Party people make up 99 percent, so it is only by working with them that the revolution can triumph; it would be hopeless to rely only on Party members. Isn't this so? Isn't this the truth? It is the complete truth. There are leaders and cadres among them. We must help them and bring up the outstanding elements among the people, and, at the same time, we must respect them and cooperate with them. Concerning these non-Party cadres, in the future, our leading organs and organization departments in various places will carry out some investigation and research; we need some methods, educational methods, and methods to unite them, such as holding seminars and having heart-to-heart talks, and so on, to help them and to cultivate them.

The last question is to speak the truth. The other day I said that we need to be modest and prudent, guarding against arrogance and impetuosity. Today I want to return to that point: tell the truth, do not steal, do not put on pretenses, and do not exaggerate. To steal is to steal things, to pretend is to be pretentious, “putting spring onions in the pig's nose to pretend it is an elephant,” and to exaggerate is to brag. Speaking the truth—every ordinary person should be like this, and every Communist Party member should be like this all the more.

What is meant by not stealing? I once witnessed an event in which one person changed several nouns in an entire pamphlet written by someone else and called it his own writing, he affixed his own name to it and had it published. [To take what is] not your own work, grab it from someone else, and call it your own, is this not stealing? Thief! There are also thieves in our Party, but only a few individual cases. Such events have occurred in history—this is called “plagiarism.” This is dishonesty. Marx's are Marx's, Engels' are Engels', Lenin's are Lenin's, Stalin's are Stalin's. If Commander-in-chief Zhu says something, it is by him; if Liu Shaoqi says something, it is by him; if venerable old Xu says something, it is by him. If a certain comrade says something, it is by him,⁴⁵ so don't steal. What is

meant by do not put on pretenses? That is, “if you know it, you know it, and if you don’t, you don’t.” Zilu, a student of Confucius, was a very straightforward type of person, and Confucius once said to him: “If you know it, you know it; if you don’t, you don’t. This is knowledge.” If you understand it, you understand it; if you don’t, you don’t. If you understand an inch, you should say so and not claim to understand more. Why is there pretentiousness in the world? Why do some people feel that it is no good not to pretend? This is a social phenomenon. Stealing is a social phenomenon, and so is pretense. Now this phenomenon is prevalent, and within our Party, too. Why? Such people who love to put on airs; did his mother want him to put on pretenses at birth? When he was in her belly, did she swear and pray in front of Bodhisattva Guanyin to give birth to a son who could put on pretenses? Of course not, this is a social phenomenon. In our Party, we have never permitted such pretense. It does not matter if you do not know something; it does not matter either if you only know a little bit of something, even if you know very little Marxism-Leninism and have read very few works by them; it does not matter either if you know that much, that is what you know. I suggest that we read five Marxist-Leninist works. The book by Marx is the *Communist Manifesto*, which he coauthored with Engels but it was mainly written by Marx. The book by Engels is *Socialism from Fantasy to Science*. The two books by Lenin, one is *On Two Tactics of the Social Democratic Party in the Democratic Revolution*, and the other is *The Leftist Infantile Disorder in the Communist Movement*. These two books by Lenin are very well written, as are the two books by Marx and Engels. These four books are pretty thin, it does not take long to read them. In addition, there is the *Short History of the CPSU*, it is thicker. This book is historical as well as theoretical, it has history and theory, for it is the history of a victorious socialist country, it is the history of the success of Marxism in Russia; you should read this book. The four previous books are also both theoretical as well as historical. There are numerous books by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, but if you first read these five, that will be more or less enough.

In addition, there is “don’t exaggerate,” that is, report real figures, “report real figures and settle accounts with real figures.” The comrades present here have discussed Party history, right? Some comrades in their presentations said that during the Civil War they got into the habit of putting emphasis on the good side of things and exaggerating a little in reporting work to their superiors, for that

seemed to make things more presentable. In reality, this does not resolve any problem. Our work is part and parcel of the work of the whole people and is part and parcel of the work of the whole Party, every one of us has a share in it, each of the people has a share in it. How come I am the leader now? It so happened that I was called upon to be the leader—there is no other reason. Originally, Zhang San and Li Si⁴⁶ could both have become leaders, but after talking about it, the job fell to me; I was asked to do it. To whom does this job belong? Does it belong to Zhang San or Li Si? Neither. It belongs to the whole Party; it belongs to the people of the whole country. To whom does Yan'an belong? Yan'an is the Yan'an of the people of the whole country. Once, when talking with a non-Party personage I said some people said that Yan'an belonged to the Communist Party, but this is incorrect. If you say the Communist Party exercises a leadership role here, this is correct, for we have led the common people to fight for this territory. "To report real figures and to settle accounts with real figures" require that our intelligence be based on facts and not on lies. We need to reveal publicly the shortcomings in our leadership work to everyone and invite anyone to come to visit, to come to see if in this brigade of mine, is there horse manure, donkey manure, or microbes? If there is, sweep it up, wash it out, sweep away the bureaucratism. I advocate that people can challenge us. For certain things, we will never do them without pressure.⁴⁷ Mr. Lu Xun once said that essays are the outcome of pressure; if there had been no pressure, they would not have been written. But we do not use the "pressure" of forced confessions.

On telling the truth, we have issued an order that the guns captured in battles at various places should be reported accurately and no fabricated figures should be submitted. If you know it, you know it, and if you don't, you don't; one gun is one gun, and two guns are two guns—that is knowledge. Once this problem is resolved, the style of work of our Party will be more down to earth. We must be honest and down to earth.

Our Communist Party now is already a very large Party, a Party with a lot of experience acquired during the past twenty-four years, and a Party which is preparing for victory. We shall be victorious in the whole country, we have this ambition. The whole Party must unite to fight for the liberation of the people in the whole country!

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 303–55, which is reproduced from a transcript of Mao’s speech preserved in the Central Archives. A version of this text from the Cultural Revolution *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, pp. 271–92. Textual differences of note between the texts are indicated in the notes to this text.

[1.](#) Mao Zedong submitted a written report to the Seventh Party Congress, see above, the text of April 24, 1945, titled “On Coalition Government,” in addition to giving this oral political report to the congress.

[2.](#) Zuo Shunsheng (1893–1969) was chair of the Secretariat of the Democratic League. On March 18, 1945 Zuo announced that the Democratic League would not participate in the Guomintang’s proposed national congress.

[3.](#) Lin Boqu, who was at this time on the Central Committee and chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government; see also Vol. V, p. 269, n4.

[4.](#) These meetings each produced writings by Mao. The first, on May 3, 1937, was “The Tasks of the Chinese National United Front Against Japan at the Present Stage,” translated in Vol. V, pp. 637–50. The Luochuan Conference was an expanded session of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee that passed the “Resolution on the Present Situation and the Duties of the Party” and the “Ten Great Programs to Resist Japan and Save the Nation.” For the second meeting, see Vol. VI, p. 22.

[5.](#) Also known as the New Fourth Army Incident of December 1940–January 1941, in which the Communist army in Central China was surrounded and destroyed by Guomintang forces. For related writings by Mao, see Vol. VII.

[6.](#) General Okamura Yasuji (1884–1966) was in charge of the Japanese army in China from July 1941 until November 1944. Mao is recounting the stages of the invasion of the Japanese army by referring to Okamura’s various residences.

[7.](#) This is the famous last line of Lu Xun’s short story “My Old Home” (*Guxiang*) (1921).

[8.](#) Mao is playing on the Chinese for “Long Live,” which is *wansui*, literally “[live] 10,000 years.”

[9.](#) This was the founding meeting of the United Nations on April 25, 1945.

[10.](#) The Chinese Communist Party delegate to the first UN meeting was Dong Biwu.

[11.](#) Zhang Naiqi (1897–1977) was a noted liberal leader of the National Salvation Association. For more information and Mao’s August 10, 1936, letter to Zhang and the National Salvation Association, see Vol. V, pp.

[12.](#) Contrasting models of femininity from the classical novel *Dream of the Red Chamber*. Xue Baochai is sensible and tactful, a model Chinese feudal maiden; Tanchun is well known for her resolute personality and outstanding management capacity.

[13.](#) Georgi Dimitrov was a leading figure in the International Communist Movement and had been the general secretary of the Communist International. Most recently his ideas figured in the Yan'an rectification documents of 1942 in which his “Cadre Policy and Cadre Education Policy” was one of the core documents. Mao and Wang Jiaxiang also included Dimitrov’s remarks from the Seventh Congress of the Comintern on a list of “reading materials for theoretical study” on November 1, 1941, see Vol. VII p. 833. See also Vol. V, pp. cix–lxx, and Vol. VI, p. xlix.

[14.](#) Mao is referring to the 1935 Seventh Congress of the Communist International, headed by Dimitrov.

[15.](#) It appeared in the April 23, 1945, issue of Yan’an’s *Jiefang ribao*.

[16.](#) This makes sense in Chinese: Mao is asking his listeners to attend to the *li* (power) in *lizheng* (striving).

[17.](#) Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald Scobie was commander of the British III Corps, which had been sent to Greece in fall 1944 as the Nazis pulled out, but became involved in the Greek Civil War against the Communists.

[18.](#) These were passed at the Enlarged Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee at Luochuan, Shaanxi, in August 1937 and are enumerated in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, p. 353, n21.

[19.](#) These are enumerated in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 102, n15. The text of the Resolution of the Sixth Congress of July 9, 1928, in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 341ff., has more than ten items.

[20.](#) The following text appears in the Cultural Revolution *Wansui* version: “But am I taking a partial approach here when saying Sun Yatsen was very good-looking, very handsome, almost as handsome as Lin Daiyu and Yang Guifei were pretty? No.” Mao is being wicked, comparing Sun Yatsen to two famous female beauties of dubious character—Lin, from *Dream of the Red Chamber*, as Mao mentions in the text, above, and Yang, the ill-fated consort to the Tang emperor during the An Lushan Rebellion.

[21.](#) This quotation comes from the 1924 declaration of the First National Congress of the Guomindang.

[22.](#) Another fragment translated from the alternate text: “In the past, the peasants of Jingdezhen of Jiangxi province called the Communist Party the *Gongsandang* [the Party Sharing the Same Umbrella]. This is also quite a nice name. Because they did not have umbrellas, several people shared one. The peasants liked this name.”

[23.](#) This story, known as “Yugong yishan” comes from the *Liezi*; another version of Mao telling it, credited

his closing remarks at the Seventh Party Congress, appears in Mao's *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, as "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains," dated June 11, 1945.

[24.](#) This was originally the Shanxi Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Corps. After Yan Xishan turned against them in 1939, the New Army of Shanxi operated as a part of the Eighth Route Army.

[25.](#) Lu Junyi is one of the thirty-six rebel leaders in the novel *Shuihu zhuan* (Water Margin).

[26.](#) Mao is playing on a popular saying that draws from ancient Chinese history in which Master Jiang drew the attention of the future King of Zhou. The saying has the sense of "putting one's head in the noose" but Mao seems to imply an invitation to former competitors to come over to the Communists.

[27.](#) Another passage from the alternate text here: "Take Beiping, for example, it won't do if the dozens of millions of people in Shanxi, Chahar, and Hebei all go there."

[28.](#) Liangshanbo: The headquarters of the *Shuihu zhuan* "gallant warriors," whose exploits included capturing towns; Magic Traveler Daizong: One of Liangshanbo's leading warriors.

[29.](#) A preparatory meeting for this congress was, in fact, held in Yan'an in July 1945, but the actual congress never convened. Mao returns to this idea in his conclusion to the Seventh Congress; see below, the text of May 31, 1945, Part III, item 10: "On the Chinese People's Liberation Federation" and his deleted comments on a national "Chinese People's Federal Republic," in the text above, "On Coalition Government," April 24, 1945.

[30.](#) Hard bones (*ying gutou*), or integrity, was at the core of Mao's fight with Wang Shiwei, the most notable victim of the Yan'an Rectification movement. See Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and "Wild Lilies,"* esp. p. 96, and our introduction, above, pp. xlii–xliii.

[31.](#) This is an authoritative example of the popular urban myth; while no such signs apparently existed, the idea certainly reflects the racial hierarchy of treaty-port Shanghai. See Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, *Global Shanghai* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 20.

[32.](#) The "Resolution of the CCP CC on Certain Historical Questions" was passed by the last session of the seventh Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee on April 20, 1945; a good scholarly translation of the earliest available version is in Saich, ed., *Rise to Power*, pp. 1164–79.

[33.](#) Mao had raised the case of Wang Shiwei in his comments on April 20, 1945, on the Chinese Communist Party's Historical Resolution; see above, the text of April 20, 1945 (*Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, p. 284). See also Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and "Wild Lilies."*

[34.](#) The *Wansui* text has a further line here: "He had put up articles on the bulletin board, also arguing the

eed for rectification.” The wall newspaper was *Qingqidui* (Light Cavalry), which Wang Shiwei edited. Mao mentions *Qingqidui* in his comments on the historical resolution, *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, p. 284, and Dai Qing discusses Wang’s editorship of it in *Wang Shiwei and “Wild Lilies,”* esp. p. 119.

[35.](#) Three notable labor heroes extolled by the Chinese Communist Party in the Yan’an production campaigns associated with the Rectification Campaign.

[36.](#) Kirkun (Крикун—“Shouter”—in Russian, known to Chinese readers as “Kelikong”) was the journalist who believed hearsay and mixed up the truth in the Soviet drama “The Front,” by Aleksandr Korneichuk, which had been published in Chinese translation in 1942. “Kelikong” became the negative role model in the campaign held in the Chinese Communist Party-controlled areas in 1947 to improve journalism.

[37.](#) Wang meant the three classes of food and five grades of clothing that privileged high cadres; he raised this issue famously in his “Wild Lilies” essay in *Jiefang ribao* in 1942; see Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and “Wild Lilies,”* p. 20.

[38.](#) Mao is mockingly quoting a famous line from *The Analects*.

[39.](#) “*Dacheng yipian*” is Mao’s beloved phrase for cultural and emotional unity between the elite and the working people, famously raised in his May 1942 “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art.” The central significance of the *yangge* dances is analyzed in Holm, *Art and Ideology*.

[40.](#) These are all heroes in the popular traditional novel, *Water Margin*.

[41.](#) Zhuge Liang was the master strategist extolled in *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*; Liu Bowen was supporter of the Ming founder, Zhu Yuanzhang.

[42.](#) Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao were at this time commander-in-chief and commissar of the Hunan people’s Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army, respectively. Mao would write to both of them; see below, the text of July 22, 1945. Wang Shusheng (1905–1974) was a general and the commander in the Shanxi-Hebeilenan Military Region. Clearly all had recently been in Yan’an.

[43.](#) Mao is quoting the famous May Fourth intellectual leader, Hu Shi (1891–1962) and Hu’s well-known 1918 essay promoting vernacular Chinese, “Constructive Literary Revolution” (*Jianshe de wenxue eminghua*).

[44.](#) The alternate text has an additional sentence here: “Otherwise, we could only go to sleep. If we adopted resolution to sleep for three years and do nothing, then our knowledge would still be inadequate.”

[45.](#) The alternate text adds: “If Zhang San said it, it is by Zhang San. No matter if you are Zhao, Qian, Sun, Li, Zhou, Wu, Zhen, Wang, or Feng, Chen, Zhu, Wei, Jiang, Shen, Han, Yang....”

[46](#). Literally, “Zhang Three” and “Li Four,” equivalent to the English “Smith” or “Jones,” though names of some of Mao’s failed competitors do come to mind: Zhang Guotao and Li Lisan.

[47](#). Instead of this sentence, the alternate text gives the following, with the Lu Xun sentence in the middle: Someone said you Mao have bureaucratism. I said: Comrade, you have put it very well. It turned out that two to three years after he came, I the old master had not met him even once nor had I talked with him. Of course, I would acquire the label of bureaucratism. It is this bureaucratism that we want to eliminate. I advocate that people check on me. For certain things, if you don’t put pressure on me, I won’t do them... [Lu Xun]... Today you have given me a lot of pressure and have given me a hard time. I feel really tired standing here for a long time.”

This Year Is the Year When Production and Self-Sufficiency in the Entire Army Should Be Generally Promoted

On the Historical Importance of Rectification and Production¹

(April 27, 1945)

The time for spring plowing has come and we are very pleased to receive the news from the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military District. There, this year's plan of production and self-sufficiency in the army was announced, and this plan was published in this paper on April 22. This plan is: (1) 4 qian of oil and salt, 5 qian of meat, 1 jin of vegetables, and 3 jin of firewood per person daily, as well as 6 jin of meat for Spring Festival and holidays (each unit compensates for the inadequate amount in the allocation from the government); (2) subsidies; (3) public allowances; (4) expenses for books and newspapers; (5) expenses for mules and horses; (6) 2 towels and 1 pair of cloth socks; (7) subsidies for living expenses of the wounded and ill. These seven points are provided as goals of the army's production and self-sufficiency. Nonetheless, it also stipulates:

Because the army inhabits different environments, some units are responsible for only some of these, such as the twelfth and thirteenth subregions and the central Hebei region. The government still provides them with public allowances; in contrast, the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning region is required to improve the living standard of its troops through production.

They [the Military District] themselves also pointed out the three special characteristics of their plan. First, the most important part of the task of production is

the partial self-sufficiency in food and daily necessities, which can raise the living standards of the troops. Second, because self-sufficiency can be achieved only through production, it will make both the army and the individual pay attention to being thrifty. Third, “this year, they will not pass their assigned responsibility to their superior but will instead set out to solve their own difficulties and set up a revolutionary household, which will encourage the notion of self-reliance in the army and eliminate last year’s ideas of depending on the superior and attempting to hand in less or none of their assigned production.”

The whole plan is very good, and its central spirit is the third characteristic mentioned above. In the current circumstances of facing extreme material difficulties and of engaging in dispersed fighting, it is absolutely inadmissible for the leading bodies above to assume full responsibility for material provisions. Doing so would both hamper the initiative of the vast number of personnel at the lower levels and fail to satisfy their demands. We should say, “Comrades, why don’t we all go into action and overcome our difficulties?” If the higher levels would only set the tasks well and give the lower levels a free hand to achieve self-reliance, the problem would be solved, and it would be solved in a more satisfactory way. But if the higher levels do not do this and instead always shoulder loads heavier than they can really carry, dare not to give the lower levels a free hand, and do not mobilize the enthusiasm for self-reliance among the broad masses, then the result will be difficulties at both the higher and lower levels, even with the utmost efforts by the higher levels. *This* problem will never be solved under the existing circumstances. The experience of the past few years has amply borne this out. The principle of “unified leadership and decentralized management” has proven to be the correct one for organizing all economic life in our liberated areas under the present conditions.

The armed forces of the liberated areas already total more than 900,000 men. To defeat the Japanese aggressors, we must increase them to several times 900,000. But so far we have received no outside aid. Even if we get it in the future, we will still have to provide for our livelihood. On that score, there must be no subjectivism whatsoever. *To coordinate with the Allied countries*, in the near future we will have to take the necessary number of military formations from the areas where they are now engaged in dispersed fighting and concentrate them for attack on particular objectives. Such large formations for concentrated

action will not only be unable to engage in production to support themselves, they will also need large amounts of supplies from the rear. Only the local troops and formations remaining behind (and they will still be considerable) will be able both to fight and to engage in production as before. With this being the case, is there any doubt that, as long as fighting and training are not impeded, all troops without exception should take advantage of the present opportunity to learn how to thoroughly resolve the task of partial production and self-provision?

Under our circumstances, the army's production for self-provision, though backward or retrogressive in form, is progressive in substance and of great historic significance. Formally speaking, we violate the principle of division of labor. *In the present world, none of the armies in civilized countries have, can have, or should have such weird things as engaging in the production of the means of livelihood for self-provision.* However, under our circumstances—a country in poverty and disunity (the result of the crimes committed by the chief ruling clique of the Guomindang) and the protracted and dispersed people's guerrilla war—what we are doing is progressive. Look at how pale and emaciated the Guomindang soldiers are and how robust and strong the soldiers of the liberated areas are! Look at what difficulties we ourselves had before we started production for self-provision and how much more comfortable we have been since then! Let us ask two army units here, say two companies, to choose between the two methods, that is, either the higher levels supply them with all their means of livelihood or the higher levels supply them with little or nothing but let them produce for themselves all, most, half, or even less than half of what they need. Which method will yield better results? Which would they willingly accept? After a year's serious experiment in production for self-provision, they will surely think that the latter method yields better results, and they will accept it. They will surely think that the first method yields worse results, and they will not accept it. The reason is that the second method can improve the living conditions of everyone in the army, whereas the first method can never satisfy their needs under the present conditions of material difficulties, regardless of how hard the higher try. Because we have adopted this seemingly “backward” and “retrogressive” method, our troops are able to overcome difficulties in the means of livelihood and improve their living conditions, which means that every soldier is robust and strong. As a result, we are able to ease the tax burden on the people

who are also in difficulty, thus winning their support, which allows us to support the protracted war and expand our armed forces. Thus, we can extend the liberated areas, reduce the enemy-occupied areas, and attain our objective of final victory over the invaders and the liberation of the whole of China. Isn't the historical significance of this great?

Production by the army for self-provision has not only improved the army's living conditions and lightened the people's burden. Because of this, it has also enabled the expansion of the army and brought many side benefits. These side benefits are as follows:

1. It improves the relations between officers and men. Officers and men work together in production and become like brothers.

2. It strengthens the labor mentality. What we now have is neither a completely² mercenary system nor a universal conscription system but a third system, the system of mobilization. It is better than the mercenary system since it does not have³ so many loafers, but it is not as good as the universal conscription system. (Our present conditions still only allow us to adopt the mobilization system and not the conscription system.) Since they are long-term soldiers, this system will⁴ lessen or put an end to the members' labor mentality. Thus, it also creates loafers and certain bad habits characteristic of the warlord armies. But since production for self-provision began, the labor mentality has returned and the loafers have been reformed.

3. It strengthens discipline. Far from weakening discipline in battle and in army life, labor discipline in production actually strengthens it.

4. It improves relations between the army and the people. Once the army began to keep house for itself, encroachments upon the property of the people have decreased or have ended entirely. As the army and the people exchange labor and help each other in production, friendship between them is strengthened.

5. It decreases the grumbling in the army about the government and improves relations between the two.

6. It serves as an impetus to the great production campaign of the people. Once the army engages in production, production in government organs becomes more necessary and more vigorous, and the general campaign of the entire people to increase production naturally becomes more necessary and energetic.

The widespread movements for rectification and for production, which began in 1942 and 1943 respectively, have been and are still playing such a great role.⁵ That is, if we cannot grasp these two links, our revolutionary vehicle will not move forward.⁶ As we all know, among the members of the organization who joined the Party before 1937, only a few thousand are left, and most of our present 1.2 million members come from the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. They have very admirable revolutionary fervor, and they are willing to accept the training of Marxism. Nonetheless, they have brought with them ideas which do not accord or do not altogether accord with Marxism in the Party. The same is true of some people who joined the Party before 1937. This constitutes an extremely serious contradiction, an enormous difficulty. In these situations, could we have advanced smoothly if we did not carry out a widespread movement of Marxist education, meaning the Rectification movement? Obviously, we could not have. But as we have solved or are in the process of solving this contradiction—the contradiction between proletarian ideology and nonproletarian ideologies (including those of the petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie, and even the landlord class, but mainly of the petty bourgeoisie) within the Party, that is, the contradiction between Marxist ideology and non-Marxist ideologies—our Party can go forward with great, firm strides in unprecedented (though not complete) ideological, political, and organizational unity. In the final stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan⁷ our Party can and should grow even larger. But we can handle future development even better under the guidance of the principles of Marxist ideology.

The second link is the production movement. The War of Resistance has gone on for eight years. When it began we had food and clothing. Then things got progressively more difficult until we were in great difficulty, running short of grain, cooking oil, salt, bedding, clothing, and funds. This great difficulty and this great contradiction came in the wake of the major enemy offensives and the Guomindang government's three large-scale struggles against the people (the "high tides of anti-communism") from 1940 to 1942.⁸ Could the vehicle of our anti-Japanese struggle have progressed if we had not overcome this difficulty, solved this contradiction, and grasped this link? Obviously, it could not. But we have learned and are still learning to produce, and so we are again full of vigor and vitality. In a few years, we will not fear any enemy and will overwhelm all

enemies.

Thus, there is no doubt of the historical importance of the two great movements of the spirit and the material, of rectification and production.

Let us further spread these two great movements everywhere as a foundation for the fulfillment of other tasks in our struggle. If we can do so, the final defeat of the Japanese invaders and the complete liberation of the Chinese people will be assured.

Now is the season for spring plowing. I hope that the leading comrades, the working personnel, and the masses in every liberated area will take this opportunity to grasp the link of production and achieve even greater results than last year. Greater efforts must be made this year, particularly in areas that have not yet learned to produce.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 277–83, where it is reproduced from the April 27, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

[1.](#) This Is the Year When Production and Self-Sufficiency in the Entire Army Should Be Promoted—On the Historical Importance of Rectification and Production → On the Production by the Army for Its Own Support and on the Importance of the Two Great Movements for Rectification and for Production

[2.](#) Completely → Old

[3.](#) Have → Produce

[4.](#) Since they are long-term soldiers, this system will → The mobilized soldiers have to lead an army life for a long time, which may

[5.](#) Which began in 1942 and 1943 respectively, have been and are still playing such a great role → Have played and are still playing a decisive role, the one in our ideological and the other in our material life

[6.](#) If we cannot grasp these two links, our revolutionary vehicle will not move forward → Unless we grasp these two links at the right time, we will not be able to grasp the whole chain of the revolution and our struggle will not advance

7. In the final stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan → From now on

8. From 1940 to 1942 → From 1940 to 1943

*Congratulatory Telegram to Stalin to
Celebrate the Liberation of Berlin by
the Red Army of the Soviet Union*
(May 3, 1945)

(*Liberation Daily*) When the news arrived here yesterday that the Red Army liberated the whole of Berlin, Chairman Mao and Commander-in-chief Zhu sent Marshal Stalin a telegram to celebrate. The telegram reads as follows:

Marshal Stalin:

We are overjoyed to hear that the Red Army has liberated Berlin. We are sending our warm congratulations!

Mao Zedong

Zhu De

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 8, p. 17, where it is reproduced from the May 4, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

The Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region Base Area Must Be Established (May 4, 1945)

Wang Zhen, [Wang] Shoudao, and for transmittal to Zheng [Weisan] and Li [Xiannian]:¹

1. Since the diehard enemy is attacking you with six divisions, you may adopt a strategy of mobile warfare, implementing it after you have given it mature thought. A mobile method could be to move the main force to Xiushui and Tonggu, or it could be for Wang Zhen to lead a group of crack troops south. All of this should be considered and decided by yourselves according to conditions.

2. The Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region base areas must be set up, serving as the pivot between the north and the south. The Central Committee will inform you in another telegram regarding the question of the composition of the regional Party committee.

3. The Seventh Party Congress will be over before May 25. A few days after it ends, the 3,100 members of the Ninth Brigade and the 2,100 members of Wen's brigade² will be able to move to Hunan from Yan'an.

4. Did you receive the broadcast of the documents of the Seventh Congress?

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 795–96, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Telegram to Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao, who were at this time the commander-in-chief and the commissar of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Military District, respectively. For Zheng and Li, see above, note to the text of October 14, 1944.

[2.](#) Wen Niansheng was a commander in the 343rd Brigade of the Eighth Route Army. See Mao's reference to Wen's brigade in Vol. VI, p. 145, text of November 8, 1939.

Our Communist Party Must Be One That Labors at Industrialization

(May 22, 1945)

At present, whether Chinese or foreign, all are struggling for the same goal: to defeat the Fascists. When we establish industry in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, our work is all for the same purpose: to defeat Japanese imperialism. Five years ago, the border region only just began to have a bit of industry. At that time, there were only seven hundred industrial workers. In 1942, there were seven thousand workers. Today, there are twelve thousand workers. Thus, industry in the border region has advanced quickly. Although the numbers are small, their significance is extraordinarily great. Whoever does not want to recognize this strength, which has been most developed, which is the most beneficial to [our] vitality and which is sufficient to initiate all changes, is confused and foolish.

Our objective in holding this great meeting is to strive for self-sufficiency in industrial goods within the next two years. First and foremost, we must be self-sufficient in both iron and textiles. If we are able to become entirely self-sufficient, the number of our industrial workers will keep increasing. Comrade Shen Hong and Comrade Chen Zhenxia, both of whom are not members of the Communist Party, are of the same mind as a member of the Communist Party: We are all bitterly struggling in order to defeat Japanese imperialism. If we want to defeat Japanese imperialism, we must have industry. If we want to ensure a secure foundation for the independence of the Chinese nation, we need to industrialize. Our Communist Party must be one which labors at the industrialization of China.

The primary reason for China's backwardness is that we have no new-style

industry. Why is it that the Japanese imperialists dare to bully China? It is because China has no powerful industry. They bully and humiliate our backwardness. Because of this, eliminating our backwardness is the mission of our entire nation. The common people support the Communist Party because we represent the demands of the people and nation. However, if we are not able to resolve economic problems, if we are not able to establish new-style industry, if we are not able to develop the forces of production, then the common people will not necessarily support us.

In the anti-Japanese war, the Communist Party leads troops who are fighting against 48 percent of the Japanese army and 90 percent of the puppet army. From this perspective, we have both experience and achievements. However, with regard to economic work, especially industry, we still do not understand much. However, this single thing determines everything. It determines everything from military affairs, politics, to culture, to thought, to morality, and to religion. It determines social transformation. Because of this, all members of the Communist Party must study economic work, and among them, most must study industrial technology. Our border region is a college campus, and one of the classes is called “Industry.” This meeting of labor representatives is a short-term industrial training course. If we Communist Party members neglect industry, neglect economics, and fail to understand other types of work that is useful, we will know nothing and be able to do nothing. We will just be able to do a sort of abstract “revolutionary work,” and these “revolutionaries” will have absolutely no value. We must resist such empty-headed “revolutionaries” and study the sorts of technological knowledge that will cause China to industrialize.

Note

Our copy of this text is from *Dangde wenxian*, No. 2 (1993), pp. 5–6. It is based on the speech as recorded in the May 26, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

Electoral Policies of the Seventh Central Committee¹

(May 24, 1945)

Comrades, we are having a very successful congress. Three items on the agenda have already been passed, and the conclusion of the congress can be drawn in a couple of days.

The fourth item on the agenda concerns the election of the Central Committee. As regards the general policy for the election, the Presidium has had several exchanges of views and has made a decision. Now I report it to you comrades.

I. Criteria for Election

We are going to elect a leading organ for the whole Party—that is, the supreme leading organ for the whole Party between this congress and the next one—the Central Committee. What criteria are we going to adopt, and what principles are we going to use in the election? The chair of each delegation has reported the opinions of many comrades, this kind and that kind. The Presidium thinks that we should adopt such criteria under which the Central Committee will consist of comrades who can guarantee implementation of the line of this congress. It is relatively good and appropriate to adopt such a principle. This principle should also be our principle in electing the Central Committee.

This time we are going to elect to the Central Committee many comrades who were not members of the Central Committee in the past. That is, two groups of people will be elected to the Central Committee. One group consists of comrades

who were members of the Central Committee in the past. There are not many of them. It has already been seventeen years since the Sixth Party Congress. During the past seventeen years, there have been several elections, at the Third Plenum,² the Fourth Plenum,³ the Fifth Plenum,⁴ and the Sixth Plenum,⁵ yet only twenty-five members remain on the Central Committee. Of these twenty-five people, the majority should continue to be elected to the Central Committee, for they have a great deal of experience. In addition, we should elect a large number of people who have never previously worked on the Central Committee, since they, too, have a lot of experience. The new Central Committee must be enlarged from the old twenty-five-member committee in the past. Our congress must adopt the policy of expanding the Central Committee. Such a policy fits the present situation of our Party, the present domestic situation, and the international situation. That is, the new Central Committee should be neither too small nor too large, but it must be larger than the present Central Committee. Only in this way can it fit the present situation of the Party and its future development, as well as the domestic and international situations.

Based on these criteria and principles, we propose: (1) Should we or should we not elect those comrades who made mistakes? There are now two opinions. One holds that they should not be elected; the other believes that they should. (2) During this election of the Central Committee, we are going to promote many comrades who have never previously worked on the Central Committee. Do we have to take every group into consideration? That is, do we have to take different mountain-tops [*shantou*]⁶ into consideration? There probably are two different viewpoints as well. One holds that we should not; the other believes that we should. (3) The qualifications and criteria for a Central Committee member are whether he will be able to carry out the line of this congress. This is very important, but what about the requirements for this capability? Does it mean that we are going to elect only persons who have all kinds of knowledge? Or is it all right to select them if they have only one kind of knowledge, or a few kinds of knowledge? Our comrades also raised this question. In sum, these are the three questions in this election.

On the first point, should we or should we not elect those comrades who have made mistakes of line? We will elect only those who have never made any line mistakes; those who have made line mistakes will not be elected. The Presidium

thinks that this is a good expectation, a good ideal. This kind of opinion is reasonable, for we suffered great losses in the past because some of our comrades made line mistakes. Comrades! This congress of ours is very different from all our past congresses. I was present at three of these congresses. Generally speaking, the representatives were not very serious about the elections, and only a few of them took them seriously. This time, however, all our comrades are very serious about the election. What does this prove? It proves that we now have experience. In the past, our experience was far from sufficient. [We] thought, since I myself will not be elected to the Central Committee anyway, you just go nominate a group of people whom you like. I will elect anyone whom you nominate. As a result, we ourselves were punished. Things have changed this time. Everyone takes the election very seriously. So there are reasons for raising this question. Nevertheless, in fact, if we do not elect those who made line mistakes in the past, even to the point of electing none of them, that would not be good and would be inappropriate.

Let me talk a little bit about the history of our Party.

We did this sort of thing before, that is, at the Sixth Party Congress we refused to elect Chen Duxiu⁷ to the Central Committee. Was the result good or not? Later Chen Duxiu ran away from the Party and did bad things. Now we can see that it was wrong not to elect him. Is it true that because we did not elect Chen Duxiu at the Sixth Party Congress, our Party never makes any mistakes, everything under heaven is peaceful, and all problems have been solved since then? The Central Committee elected at the Sixth Party Congress was very pure; Chen Duxiu was not there, yet our Party still had shortcomings, it still had disputes, made mistakes, and suffered losses. It is not true that we did not have any disputes, did not make any mistakes, and did not suffer any losses because we did not elect him. There was one reason we did not elect Chen Duxiu—that is, ease and convenience. I talked about this at the preparatory meeting. I said that in the past we did not want to have too much trouble and wanted everything to be simple, and we were unwilling to cooperate with those who had different opinions. This sentiment still exists in our Party, and it is very serious. Another time was the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Party Congress, when Li Lisan⁸ was expelled from the Politburo and was asked to give up his position on the Central Committee. Though nominally he was still a member of the Central Committee, in reality he

had left his position. Everybody thought that in this way the problem of the Lisan line would be solved once and for all. Did it really solve the problem? We drove Chen Duxiu out of the Party once and for all, and as a result we still suffered losses. Li Lisan did not go outside the Party, nor did he do any harmful things. He is still our comrade. But he was forced to leave his position on the Politburo and was also forced to leave his position on the Central Committee. Yet we suffered losses at the Fourth Plenum, and actually we made a mistake on the very day on which we drove Li Lisan away, and we made quite a few mistakes after that. Both of these past two experiences are well worth our attention and study.

Our Party has experience of the other side as well. In the past ten years, from the Zunyi Conference⁹ in January 1935 to the present Seventh Party Congress, what has been the state of the Central Committee? The backbone members of the Central Committee were elected at the Fourth and Fifth Plenums. Only five members are left from those who were elected at the Sixth Plenum.¹⁰ That is, of the present twenty-five Central Committee members, the majority was elected at the Fourth and Fifth Plenums—that is, they were elected at the two plenums at which we made mistakes. Three were elected at the Sixth Plenum. It is precisely during these past ten years that we have made fewer mistakes, and there was also less trouble and we made some progress in our work. Isn't it true that this experience is very important? It is indeed very important experience. At the Zunyi Conference in January 1935, it was those strongly supporting the Fourth Plenum and making line mistakes in the third “Leftist” line who stood out and began to oppose the third “Leftist” line. Together with other comrades they opposed this “Leftist” line. Now many people give this credit to me. I must make it clear that without these comrades as well as many other comrades—all of those who opposed the “Leftist” line, including some of the comrades who played an important role in the third “Leftist” line—without their support, the success of the Zunyi Conference would be unthinkable. The second time is the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Party Congress. Everybody knows that the Sixth Plenum was crucial; without it we would not be able to have such a prosperous situation now. If we had not overcome that kind of tendency at that time, that is, the tendency of not supporting the policy of giving free rein to mobilizing the masses, of being frightened, and of willingly tying ourselves up, if we had not supported the policy of giving free rein to mobilizing the masses, developing ourselves, developing the

Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and expanding the liberated area, and of not being restricted by the policy of the Guomindang reactionaries while at the same time not breaking away from the policy of the United Front, today's situation would be quite different. Who were those people who attended the Sixth Plenum? They were the same group of people. Without the support of those comrades who made mistakes in the past, it would have been impossible for the Sixth Plenum to correct the tendency of Rightist capitulationism. However, from the documents as well as the records of the Sixth Plenum, you can hardly see any sharp criticism of anything by us, for back then, it was impossible to criticize anybody, nor should we have done so. Instead, we confirmed some of the issues positively—that is, we solved the practical problems. As far as the past three years since the rectification of 1942 are concerned, the situation changed even more. The changes were even greater on the eve of the Seventh Party Congress when we issued the Resolution on Certain Historical Questions. I believe that after the Seventh Party Congress, such an important supreme conference of the leadership of our Party, our Party will be able to march in an even better direction. This kind of confidence and estimation has a solid foundation. Although there have been some disputes during the past ten years, we are making relatively smooth progress. It has little in common with the three mistakes of line we made during the Civil War (it would be four times if we count the one led by Zhang Guotao).¹¹ During the Civil War, we liked things to be simple and convenient, and we were unwilling to work together with those who made line mistakes. The style of “brushing aside with a single push” and pursuing “simplicity and clarity” is not good. In the past ten years, we have adopted an attitude of tolerance, and such a policy has helped us a great deal. Consequently, the Seventh Party Congress should absorb past experience, that is, we should not push aside those who made line mistakes in the past. In the Central Committee in the past, some made fewer mistakes than others, and some made more mistakes. Today I must state clearly that I made many mistakes. Are there any people who have never made any mistakes? I would say there are not. How is it possible that someone will never make any mistakes in the world? Hence we say that “everyone makes mistakes; it is only a difference of degree.”

This is indeed the case. If we adopt such a policy and unite these comrades, based on our past experience, we have confidence and reason to predict that we

will have a better future. That comrades who have made line mistakes should not be elected, in my opinion, is not as good as adopting the following principle: although he made line mistakes, he has admitted his mistakes and is determined to correct his mistakes, so we can still elect him. Our Bolshevik party is never ambiguous about our Party principles. Unlike the capitalist class, we must have a policy of “admitting mistakes and correcting them.” Under the guidance of such a principle, we can elect him. This policy is different from the policy of not electing him. That policy is a very fine ideal. Although one must have ideals, one must also be coordinated with a thing called “reality.” We are realists who have ideals, or you may call us revolutionary realists. We are not unprincipled realists. Idealism means principle, and realism means flexibility. The principle of idealism and the flexibility of realism should be combined. This is the revolutionary realism of Marxism-Leninism. None of those who have made mistakes should be elected—this is the ideal. But it is insufficient simply to adopt such a policy. One point is missing, which is that we should elect these people if they recognize and correct their mistakes. Our Party must have a principle that it is not good to make mistakes, but it is good to admit and correct mistakes. We must definitely add this last point, for only in this way will it be complete. These two principles must definitely be combined. Otherwise we are going to make mistakes, we may lose our merits, and we may develop shortcomings and even make mistakes. Only if we establish a very good electoral method can we avoid making past mistakes. In view of the pitfalls we suffered in the past, we should be more careful this time. We should not say that we will not elect those who made mistakes; as long as they admit their mistakes and are determined to correct them, we can still elect them. This is realism; this is also a principle. Although these two principles seem not to be consistent, only by combining these two principles will we be able to do a good job. This is the only correct way. Otherwise, it would not be entirely correct, we would not be able to do a good job, and we would make mistakes. I do not believe that there is any comrade who wants to make mistakes and says, “I am determined to make mistakes.” It will not do if we fail to analyze the problem that some comrades make mistakes, fail to make a concrete analysis of history, and fail to adopt revolutionary realism. That is, if we fail to combine idealism and realism, fail to combine principle and flexibility, we are likely to create defects, shortcomings, and even mistakes. I must point this out for our comrades.

Emotionally, we are reluctant to elect those who made mistakes, but rationally we can. At present, we should unify emotion and rationality, and they can be unified. That is to say, putting emotion under the guidance of rationality, rationality should be primary. For historical reasons, and for the sake of the future, the people of the entire nation, and the whole Party, we must adopt such a policy—a realistic policy. In the past, we were simple and direct toward Chen Duxiu and Li Lisan. Emotionally, we really felt relaxed, happy, and without vexation, however, the result was not joyful but very irritating. Things in this world are always like this. When you want to be happy, you may end up with just the opposite—unhappy; but when you are prepared for unhappiness, it is quite likely that you may have less of it. Therefore, we must resolve not to fear trouble and resolve to cooperate with those comrades who made mistakes. If you seldom come to visit me, I will go to your place. If you have many complaints, I have two ears. If one is not enough, I will also use the other; if you say that the window on this side is not completely open, I will open the one on that side as well. We must practice cooperating with those who had disputes with us, who disagreed with us in principle, and who retaliated against us and deprived us of our Party membership. We will unite and cooperate with them under the principle that they must admit and correct their mistakes. We must indeed practice this. We will not be able to do it without practice, but we will be able to do it if we do practice it. Hence, the contradiction between emotion and rationality can be resolved.

Let me give you another example of Marx and Engels, which is an international experience. While organizing the First International, in order to unite the masses of Spain, France, and Italy, Marx and Engels once cooperated with the anarchists; they also cooperated with the liberal bourgeoisie and the democratic faction of the bourgeoisie in Italy, and with Mazzini.¹² Marx and Engels set a model for us, which tells us that we should avoid factionalism, for in essence this is a matter that concerns the broad masses. Back then the anarchists had a lot of supporters among the masses, so it was necessary to cooperate with them, gradually transform them, and change them by persuasion. Later, the anarchists broke away and the Italian democrats also refused to cooperate, but it did not hurt Marxism at all. If you do not want to do it, then don't!

Both Chinese and foreign experiences tell us that within the Party we should

do our utmost to unite. What is our principle? It is to do our best to unite as many people as possible under our program and to win them over to unite and cooperate with us. I have already said in my report that we should unite with any comrade, as long as he is willing to abide by the program and constitution of the Party and to obey the resolutions of the Party. There is a principle for our unity, namely, that a member must abide by the outline and constitution of the Party and obey the resolutions of the Party. We must unite all our comrades under the guidance of such a principle. This is one problem.

As regards the second point, should we take every aspect into consideration? This question is actually the issue of giving consideration to different mountaintops.¹³ There are also two kinds of solutions. One solution is that we should give consideration to this; the other is that we should not. The Presidium believes that giving consideration to different mountaintops is the only correct solution. Comrade Fu Zhong¹⁴ made a very good speech here yesterday. I agree with every word he said. In the election, should we give consideration to different mountaintops? Should we give consideration to every aspect? In my opinion, the idea that we should not give consideration to different mountaintops and different aspects is also an ideal, but it is not practical in reality. In reality, it is better if we do give consideration. Giving consideration will benefit us more than not giving consideration. There are many mountaintops and units in the Chinese Revolution. During the Civil War period, there was the Soviet area and the enemy-occupied area. Within the Soviet area itself there were many different units. This is the reality of the Chinese Revolution. Without this reality, there would be no Chinese Revolution. After the Civil War came the eight years of the War of Resistance. There were also mountaintops during the War of Resistance. That is, there were many anti-Japanese base areas, and there were also many enemy-occupied areas in the north as well as in the south. Is this a good thing? In my opinion, it is an excellent thing. This is the reality of the Chinese Revolution; without these circumstances there would be no Chinese Revolution. Therefore, they are not bad things but good things. The bad thing is mountaintopism and sectarianism rather than mountain tops. What is bad about the mountaintop? What is bad about the Qingliang mountains? What is bad about the Taihang mountains? What is bad about Wutai mountain? Nothing. Nevertheless, wherever there is mountaintopism, this is not good. Therefore, we should analyze

these problems. I do not mean to say that in any base area everybody is a mountaintopist. The sentiment of mountaintopism varies in degree. Take the First and Fourth Front armies, for example. There are several units within the First Front Army, as Comrade Fu Zhong said yesterday. There are differences between the First, Second, and Fourth Front armies; there are also differences between the Third, Seventh, and Tenth armies. Because each unit works in a different place, the situation varies. If the relationship between each other is not properly managed, it will lead to mountaintopist tendencies; but it is also true that some of them are the result of our poor management. Yesterday Comrade Fu Zhong talked about the relationship between those within and without the mountaintop. If the relationship between them is good, mountaintopism may be eliminated. Nevertheless, since so many things are dealt with blindly, the work is not well done. This is the question we must first analyze. Now we are removing stones and mending relationships. Now let us have a conclusive method and remove all the stones, big and small. In this way, the relationships can be improved somewhat, the number of mountaintops will be reduced and so will mountaintopism. Thus half of it will be eliminated. If we improve relations between us even more, the other half will also be gone. There will be mountaintops but not mountaintopism. Besides, we will call it an ism—Marxism, called Marxism on the mountain. In the past, some people claimed that there was no Marxism on the mountain. Now let us change this “no,” saying there is Marxism on the mountain. If there is no Marxism on the mountain, it means that there is no Marxism at the Seventh Party Congress, for the Seventh Party Congress is being held in the Qingliang mountains.

We must definitely understand mountaintops. In the past we said that we must recognize mountaintops, admit that there is such a thing in the world. Or it would be more accurate to say to understand mountaintops, we must get to know them. We must definitely take account of them, but we cannot do that until we have understood them. Only in this way can consideration gradually reduce them before finally eliminating them. Therefore, to eliminate mountaintops we must first understand them, give consideration to them, and reduce them. This is a dialectical relationship. If the relationships of the mountaintops are properly managed, first within the mountain, then outside it, mountaintopism will soon be eliminated; hence, we do not have to be afraid. Many years in the future, railway

lines will look like a spider web around the whole country. More planes will be coming and going than in the past few days. By then, you will not be able to find any mountaintops even if you try to. Without the development of industry and the convenience of transportation across the whole country, it will be impossible to eliminate mountaintopism completely. Now our revolution has developed. There are more base areas, and they are stronger and bigger. If we get rid of our blindness and are fairly good at resolving contradictions, we will definitely be able to solve the problem in a more satisfactory way.

The Central Committee of the past, that is, the Central Committee before the Seventh National Congress, failed to reflect this reality. That is, it failed to reflect the various aspects of the revolutionary forces in terms of organizational composition. Consequently, that Central Committee was incomplete and had its shortcomings. Since rectification began, we have been suggesting that we should recognize mountaintops and give consideration to mountaintops. This is reflected in policy, but it is not reflected in terms of organizational composition. This is a defect; it is not good. Because of this, we must pay attention to this problem during the election. The new Central Committee should be able to reflect this aspect of our circumstances. It must become a Central Committee with the fewest defects. It is difficult to avoid any shortcomings completely, but we should reduce the number and we can reduce the number.

If we take into consideration the first point just mentioned, we can elect those who made mistakes of line. If we take into consideration the second point, our Party will be able to reflect all aspects of the revolutionary forces. This way, our shortcomings will be fewer.

The third point, should every Central Committee member know everything about all aspects of knowledge? Here, too, there are two views. One believes that every Central Committee member should know everything; the other holds that it is not necessary that every Central Committee member knows everything. The Presidium thinks that the first view is a very good ideal; it has some truth to it. It is certainly a good thing if it can be done. But in reality, no one can master all aspects of knowledge. This so-called knowledge of everything refers to the logic of development of everything. Stalin has said: There are all kinds of human talent in the Soviet Central Committee. There are cultural and educational experts, and there are also experts on economic development. We have all kinds of talent. Our

new Central Committee should also be one which comprises all kinds of talent. It should do its best to take into consideration every aspect, every unit, and every faction. I am talking about doing our best to give consideration to it, but if every aspect is taken care of carefully and completely, that will probably become only a formality. That is not good, nor is it good to completely ignore it. Therefore, we must carry on the struggle between two fronts. As far as those who made mistakes in the past are concerned, if we elect them without taking account of principle and they refuse to admit their mistakes and to correct their mistakes, yet we still want to elect them, this is rightism. But if these people have already admitted their mistakes and have corrected their mistakes, but we keep saying they should not be elected, this is "leftism." The same is true of the requirement for knowledge, they should try their best to know as much as possible.

We will adopt such a policy: It is unnecessary for us to demand that everyone has all kinds of knowledge. It is sufficient if they have knowledge of one or more aspects. If we put these people together, it becomes a Central Committee that knows everything. There is an old saying in China: Three clumsy craftsmen make one Zhuge Liang.¹⁵ If we have people from everywhere, and each person knows one aspect or has several skills, and if we elect several dozen people like this, our Central Committee will be relatively complete. We seek perfection from the collectivity, not from the individual. It is better if we are perfect or relatively perfect, yet in a few years our Central Committee will be imperfect again. For instance, economic construction has just begun. In the future we will develop large-scale industry. Comrade Chen Yun says that we should not destroy the machinery since we are quite new at managing large-scale industry. Why do we propose the policy of not destroying the machinery at this conference? Because we do not have any knowledge in this field. In the past, we did destroy the machinery because of the lack of such knowledge. After entering the cities, we broke the glass and destroyed the machinery as well. For this reason, we raise the issue of not destroying the machinery. Because the past Central Committees were never perfect, the election of another Central Committee may not lead to perfection either. Therefore, we have a learning assignment. Are we superior in military affairs now? Two days ago Comrade Lin Biao said that we are somewhat better than the Guomindang in certain respects. However, we are worse than they are in other respects. For instance, we do not know how to drive tanks, how

to fly airplanes, and how to fire artillery. Our Party is imperfect in this respect, nor is it perfect in economic or cultural construction. What shall we do? We should be relatively perfect, promote realism, and study once again. In electing a Central Committee, we should elect those who have the motivation to learn new things. It does not matter if they do not know this; we will elect them and tell them to learn. Our election should be carried out under the guidance of the following policy: that is, instead of seeking perfection from individuals, we seek perfection from the collectivity and from learning about reality.

In sum, our representatives to this congress should have hope to have a Central Committee which consists of a large number of comrades who have never made any mistakes of line (we do not mean that they have never made any mistakes but that they have never made any mistakes of line). It should also include a group of people who made line mistakes in the past but have made it clear today that they will give up the wrong line and accept the correct line. It should include large numbers of people who are influential nationally (that is, those who have made a name nationwide and are influential around the country). It should also include large numbers of comrades who were very influential locally in the past and who will probably have national influence in the future. They should be promoted to the Central Committee, and we should improve them since we will continue to develop in the future. We now have a population of approximately 100 million. It will continue to grow in the future, and before long we will probably have a population of 200 million, or perhaps a bit more. Therefore, we should start training leaders now, but first of all we should train the Central Committee members. The Central Committee is the leader of our Party. The whole Party should look to it. This is training; to make speeches eloquently is also training; to open the window and let the air in is also training. Though our Central Committee in the past was not large, with only twenty-some members, it really did some work. It should now be expanded somewhat. Hence, we should purposely train some leading cadres. This does not mean to say that we should purposely make "famous cadres," but if such a possibility exists we should make it happen so as to adapt to the ever-developing Chinese Revolution. This Central Committee should also include a group of comrades who know relatively many things. It should also include a large number of comrades who know relatively fewer things, or who specialize in a certain aspect. In sum, the new Central

Committee should include such kinds of comrades: a large number of comrades who have never made any line mistakes; a group of comrades who made line mistakes but have corrected their mistakes; a large number of comrades who have national influence; a large number of comrades who now have local influence but who will probably have national influence in the future; a group of comrades who are knowledgeable about many things, and a large number of comrades who know relatively fewer things. If after consideration of the comrades and if this organizational line of the Presidium is approved, we believe that such a Central Committee will be a Central Committee that has fewer shortcomings. Such a Central Committee will guarantee that the line of the congress will be carried out, including both the political line and the organizational line. That is, this new Central Committee will have both a good grasp of ideology and will be able to unite comrades. Comrades! This congress of ours must elect such a Central Committee. This congress has too many representatives. Some comrades do not want to be representatives, and many comrades asked not to be elected to the Central Committee. This is a good attitude. Confucius once said: "Be cautious when approaching any situation; be good at planning for success."¹⁶ Never say that it is because I was not elected to the Central Committee that the revolution failed; such an attitude is not good. We must elect prudently and carry out our duties with care; only such an attitude is a good one. Only such a Central Committee can guarantee that the line of this congress will be carried out. Such a Central Committee will avoid, or largely avoid, repeating our shortcomings and mistakes of the past. Only such a Central Committee fits into the present state of development of our Party and will fit into its state of development in the future. Only such a Central Committee can have a positive influence on our comrades in the entire Party and on the people in the entire nation. Such a Central Committee will be a Central Committee that has fewer shortcomings, a Central Committee that is relatively dependable, a Central Committee that you can count on. Historical experience demonstrates that if you plan for an easy go, you will not get it; if you plan for trouble, you will have fewer troubles. Generally speaking, that is how things work in the world.

Several other problems need explaining. Some comrades might say that such a Central Committee would be too cumbersome. Others are worried that a group of people would inevitably fall behind and drop out. This raises the question of

what we should do if they make mistakes again. Can we guarantee that they will never make mistakes again? Others say that such an election is not very fair. There are only a limited number of representatives on the list, and since we must give consideration to this aspect or that aspect, this would necessarily mean that some comrades, even those who are relatively very capable, will not be elected, and this is unfair.

First, let us talk about the issue of being cumbersome. Our Party was cumbersome in the past. I will now talk a bit about the history of that unwieldiness. Our Party was cumbersome during the late period of the Great Revolution. There was an erroneous Chen Duxiu line that was not exposed and cleaned up. What was the result? Because of this unwieldiness, the Great Revolution failed; it was a bad result. After the revolution failed, thousands and thousands of people suffered; the Party was also greatly reduced and was forced to go underground. This was the first period. The second period was from the end of the Great Revolution to the Zunyi Conference. During this period there was once a line of putschism and a Lisan line in our Party. Though they were exposed and criticized later, the problems were not resolved. Besides, there was also the third “Leftist” line, which was not exposed and corrected for a long time, and the subsequent Zhang Guotao line. Was such a situation unwieldy or not? Yes, it was. And much worse, it was an unwieldy line. Did we suffer? Yes, we did, and we suffered great losses. This is already written in the “Resolution on Certain Historical Questions.” The third period was from the Zunyi Conference to the Seventh Party Congress. This period can once again be divided into two stages. During the first stage, from the Zunyi Conference to the Sixth Plenum, the rule of the third “Leftist” line in the Party Central Committee was already over, but it had not yet been exposed and corrected ideologically. Whatever a thing is, if you do not solve the problem thoroughly, you will never be able to solve the problem once and for all. As a result, we made some other mistakes. The second stage was from the Sixth Plenum to the Seventh Party Congress. During this period, we gradually and thoroughly exposed and criticized the “Leftist” line. If we compare the above three periods, which period was not cumbersome? The first period had an unwieldy line; the second period had unwieldy lines several times; the third period was a little bit unwieldy before the Sixth Plenum. After the Sixth Plenum, particularly after the three-year rectification, the problem of unwieldiness was

solved. The number of people is still the same—twenty-five Central Committee members. Isn't this a fact? Yes, it is. Therefore, we should look at those comrades who made mistakes and suffered losses in the past with new eyes. Although it is a fact that they did make mistakes, it is inappropriate to say that they are continuing to make mistakes now. It is ten years since the Zunyi Conference, seven years since the Sixth Plenum, and three years since rectification. We have gradually changed our past history of unwieldiness; relatively speaking, we are not now that cumbersome. One is cumbersome, and the other not; they are different in character. Is it a difference in quality or quantity? It is a difference in quality, a difference in nature. We must grasp this nature; otherwise, it won't do. We must remember this history. We must not be frightened by the problem of unwieldiness; to re-elect them will not put our new Central Committee in danger.

Second, will some comrades fall behind? Will they make mistakes again? Some comrades who made line mistakes made very good self-criticisms. Every one of our representatives to this congress welcomes this. When they speak, they hope that with the help of the representatives to this congress that they will correct their mistakes. In my opinion, this tells us a truth, that is, "a real man needs three friends to help him" and "though the lotus flower is beautiful, it must be supported by green leaves." Everyone needs help from other people, mutual criticism, and self-criticism. Only thus can one make progress; only thus can problems be solved. The present situation of the whole Party, the situation of this congress, our experience in the past three periods, the good and bad things in the eight years of the War of Resistance, and the experience in rectification all prove this truth.

There will be fewer problems in terms of falling behind and making mistakes again. Can we say this? Yes, we can, which is more of a guarantee. But is there an absolute and complete guarantee? We cannot say that. The possibility of falling behind, as well as the possibility of making mistakes again, still exists. Those comrades who made mistakes in the past may make mistakes again if they are not sufficiently prudent; those comrades who have never made mistakes are more likely to make mistakes if they are not sufficiently prudent. Because when you push a cart forward, there may be a difference in experience between those who have stumbled and those who have not. Those who have never stumbled while pushing a cart should be more cautious and prudent. It may be just when

you boast “I have never stumbled” that you stumble, and the cart falls over—you never know. Those who have stumbled in the past are often relatively more cautious. Their eyes look everywhere. In addition, those who stand by also frequently remind them: “You must be more careful, for you fell over once before!” Besides, they have more helpers. No matter when, there are always three types: those who are relatively more progressive, those in the middle, and those who are relatively more backward. I cannot guarantee now that this congress will never elect the wrong person. Right now he looks good, but in the future he may prove to be no good. Such a possibility does exist. This time we are going to elect several dozen people. It is possible that some of them will fall behind when they are only halfway through the journey because their feet hurt. Those who have never stumbled and fallen may stumble this time, and those who have stumbled may stumble again. Don’t such things happen in this world? Just like those ordinary people who push carts, it is by no means the case that they will never push carts again simply because they fell over once. If they do not do it well, they may fall over several times. Therefore, it is impossible to guarantee that not a single one of the several dozen will ever fall behind. We are going to choose several dozen Central Committee members to push the carts and carry the millet. Some push, some pull, and it is quite likely that some of the millet might drop, but it is fine so long as tomorrow morning’s breakfast is guaranteed. Of course, we must be very careful; otherwise, if all the grain is lost, we will have nothing to eat tomorrow. At the same time, we do not have to be afraid. Since we produce a lot of millet, it does not really matter much if we lose one or two ounces, or even two or three. If one or two drivers are disqualified, we may elect other people at the Eighth Congress, or we may hold an election at a national conference between the two congresses.

Third, the issue of unfairness. We should give consideration to all sides. There are two different groups of veterans: Those who made line mistakes in the past, and those who did not. We should give consideration to both of them. We should give consideration to the revolutionary forces in every group of those newly recruited, that is, the so-called factions. This kind of consideration, as I said before, should go only as far as possible. It is certainly better to have as much knowledge as possible, but even if they have a bit less knowledge, we may still want to elect them when necessary. Then a problem will occur, since we have to

give consideration to both the veterans as well as to the newly recruited. Moreover, it is not necessary that one has to know every kind of knowledge, and we cannot elect several thousand or tens of thousands of Central Committee members. This will lead to one consequence in the election: some comrades who are better in terms of capability and knowledge and who have contributed a great deal to the Party may not be elected. Isn't this unfair? If we look at it from one point of view, it is unfair; nevertheless, it is fair if we look at it from a larger point of view and from the point of view of the overall situation. Because though there is a difference between those who made mistakes but corrected them and those who have never made any mistakes, if we refuse to elect them and only elect those who have never made any mistakes, we are liable to encounter other shortcomings. Therefore, we must definitely elect them. Of course, this is only my suggestion. Because we have to give consideration to every aspect, it will result in a situation that some comrades will not be elected, though they should be according to their capability and knowledge. Such things will happen; we have to be prepared for it. If we do not make this issue clear here, some comrades may say: those who made mistakes are elected, but those who have never made any mistakes are not. Those people who know less than I do are elected; though I am pretty good, I am not elected. We all have to be prepared spiritually for this sort of thing. Once this congress is over, if some comrades still do not understand this election principle, we should explain it to them very carefully, explain it to them in terms of history, and make it clear by using historical experience.

II. The Number of People to Be Elected

Today we are going to pass the election law. The very first article of the election law provides that we should hand out two candidate lists, the first being the list for the preliminary election, and the second the list for the formal election. After the election law is passed, everybody has to start thinking. The candidates will be discussed in each of the small groups. The Presidium will propose a list for the preliminary selection tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

As for the number of people, the Presidium has been thinking about it for a

long time, but it still has not come up with a fixed number. I will make such a proposal in terms of the number, around seventy people. As I said before, we should give consideration to every aspect, give consideration to the newly promoted, to the more learned, to the less learned, and to those who represent the different revolutionary forces from different places. How big should this number be? It should be around seventy. On the issue of the number of people, three proposals have been discussed. One is around a hundred, one is around seventy, and one is around thirty. That is, there are three proposals, large, medium, and small. Of the three proposals, in my opinion, we should reject the two ends and keep the middle, that is, around seventy. The Presidium thinks this is the best proposal. It will not be able to reflect the present state and development of our Party if it is too small. Our Party has more than a million members today, and it will continue to grow. For instance, we may be able to expand to 2 million Party members in one year. The new Central Committee should be bigger than the old one. Is it appropriate to expand it to around seventy people? I think it is, and we should adopt such a principle. We should adopt a more cautious principle. We should not elect too many, nor should we elect too few. Thirty or forty people are too few; one hundred people are too many; seventy is very good. On behalf of the Presidium, I put forward these suggestions. Of course, it is up to you who will make the final decision.

Comrades, in this election you have to guarantee that the line of this congress will be carried out and that this is crucial to the Party and you have to consider whether this will be beneficial to the Party and the people. It should be absolutely beneficial to the Party and completely for the Party's interests. I would like to make a special suggestion: We have to pay attention to those who are not present at this congress and to those comrades whom we do not know. If their names appear on the candidate lists, we must pay attention to them. Naturally, we do not know everybody at this congress. The chairman of each delegation should introduce them. In this way, we will be able to elect a relatively better (of course, only relatively) leading organ in this election to be the instrument to command the Chinese Revolution. We are Marxists, so we believe in instrumentalism. What is a government? What is a state? Marx and Engels believed that a state was an instrument that one class uses to oppress another class; it is a machine, a tool. What is our government? It is a tool used to oppress the counterrevolutionaries.

What is a counterrevolutionary government? It is a tool to oppress the revolution. In sum, they are all tools; this is the view of Marxists. The Party is the tool of class struggle, and so is the government. The Party's Central Committee as well as the Party's leading organs are all the Party's tools, and they are all the tools of class struggle. Our Party is the leader of the class; the Central Committee is the leader of the whole Party; we will treat them all as tools. Today I want to elaborate on this point. In the past many of our comrades did not understand this issue. They thought that they themselves were heroes, that they came out to make a revolution, and they felt very proud of themselves. It is all right to feel proud of oneself, but it should be a pride in serving as a tool. We are weapons used by class. If we want our class to be victorious, we must elect the vanguard. The masses select their leading tools, the leaders, from practice. It is absolutely wrong if those who are elected think they are extraordinary and if they adopt the attitude of "I am somebody now!" rather than being conscious that they are only tools. That is wrong. If our Party wants to help the people to succeed, it has to become a tool and do so consciously. Every member of the Central Committee, and every leading organ should have such an understanding. This is the historical view of materialism, this is what it says in the song "The Internationale." Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi read it several times here: "Not god, not Caesar, not a hero; we rely completely on ourselves to save ourselves." If one wants to save himself, he will have to elect a Party and select a tool.

In sum, the Presidium of this congress hopes that you comrades and each and every one of the representatives will adopt such an electoral line. The Presidium believes that such a hope reflects the opinion of the great majority of the representatives, reflects the correct opinion of the great majority of the entire Party. Such an electoral line, if approved by you comrades, will be carried out. Comrades, please think it over.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 356–75, where it is reproduced from a transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

1. This is a report that Mao Zedong delivered at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

2. The Third Plenum refers to the enlarged Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Shanghai, September 24–28, 1930. At this plenum, Li Lisan’s “Leftist” line was criticized and partially corrected.

3. On the Fourth Plenum, see above, note 11 to the text of October 14, 1943.

4. On the Fifth Plenum, see above, note 11 to the text of October 14, 1943.

5. On the Sixth Plenum, see above, note 4 to the text of May 21, 1944.

6. As a result of the scattered nature of the Communist base areas, primary loyalty was often given to the base area leaders rather than to the Center, an attitude which the Rectification Campaign had been designed to correct.

7. On Chen Duxiu, see above, note to the text of March 30, 1942.

8. On Li Lisan, see above, text of March 30, 1942.

9. On the Zunyi Conference, see above, note 13 to the text of March 5, 1944.

10. Referring to Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Li Lisan, and Guan Xiangying.

11. On Zhang Guotao, see above, note 7 to the text of March 5, 1944.

12. Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) was an Italian patriot, philosopher, Freemason, and politician. His efforts helped bring about the modern Italian state.

13. In this passage, Mao uses the term “mountaintopism,” or “mountain stronghold mentality” (*shantouzhuayi*) to signify not the fact of seeking safety in the mountains, as many Communists found it necessary to do at this time (which produced factions, or *shantou*), but the conviction of some of these people that their mountain strongholds were the only bastions of pure and genuine communism. In the passage that follows, we have translated this term sometimes literally, and sometimes as “factionalists,” which Mao often uses here as a synonym because these isolated groups tended to regard themselves as set apart.

14. Fu Zhong (1900–1995) was deputy head of the General Political Department of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

15. Zhuge Liang was the brilliant strategist in the novel *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*.

16. See *Analects*, 7:10, where Confucius describes the sort of person he would want if he should ever lead a large army.

Conclusion at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (May 31, 1945)

Comrades, this conclusion of mine will deal with three issues: the international situation, the domestic situation, and some issues of thought and policy within the Party. The questions raised and opinions proposed by you comrades during the discussion can be generally summed up in these three issues.

Our general policy or line is: to go all out to mobilize the masses, strengthen and expand the forces of the people, under the leadership of our Party, to defeat the Japanese invaders, liberate the people of the whole country, and to build a new democratic China. In this policy: “to go all out to mobilize the masses, strengthen and expand the forces of the people” means organizing armed forces; “under the leadership of our Party” refers to the commander-in-chief and the commanding officer; “to defeat the Japanese invaders” refers to the enemy; “to build a new democratic China” refers to the objective.

In terms of the issue of going all out to mobilize the masses, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi gave a very good speech yesterday. We are our own masters, it is up to us whether we go all out. Who would prevent us from going all out? There are many people; among them, Chiang Kaishek. Now the Guomindang has held its Sixth National Congress. One of the thirty political programs passed at this congress says that “the violation of government laws is absolutely forbidden, as are all structures or actions aimed at sabotaging the unity of our diplomacy, military affairs, finance, transportation, and currency system.” Take the unification of military affairs, for example. It means that we should turn over all

our military forces to them and give up the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. This struggle has always existed. The Zhongshan Warship Incident¹ on March 20, 1926, was aimed at preventing us from going all out to mobilize the masses and strengthen and expand the forces of the people. Why did the Great Revolution fail? In addition to the objective reasons, there are subjective reasons, that is, neither Chiang Kaishek nor Wang Jingwei² would allow us to go all out, and we ourselves did not dare to go all out. We should have gone all out back then, yet we did not dare to do that, and consequently we failed. During the Civil War, we did go all out, but we also overdid it a bit and failed to distinguish going all out to mobilize the masses from adventurism. This has been the line of the Central Committee during the period of the War of Resistance. All this congress has done is to approve it and perfect it. If we had not had the many years of experience in the past, it would be impossible for this congress to make the decision to approve this line. Instead of taking a risk, going all out is carried out under the conditions of being reasonable, advantageous, and restrained. Being reasonable, advantageous, and restrained means going all out, but not taking any risks. This policy cannot change until after our victory in the entire nation. We are under great pressure, and it is not easy to liberate the vanguard of the proletariat from the oppression of this spiritual yoke. Such is the history of the Communist International (Comintern) movement. For quite a long time, the Second International dared not go all out to mobilize the masses. The publication of *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Marx and Engels in 1848 was a policy of going all out to mobilize the masses. The Second International violated this policy; it worshiped voluntarism and let everything go its own way. The Comintern and the Russian Bolshevik party restored Marxism and developed Marxism. They went all out to mobilize the masses and strengthened and expanded the forces of the people. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), they first overthrew the tsar and established a worker and peasant democratic dictatorship; then they overthrew the bourgeoisie and built a socialist society. That is why we must publicize this policy and approve this policy. This is the theme in all our reports, in the report by Commander-in-chief Zhu [De], the report by Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi, as well as in my own report, and we all adhere to this policy. This policy of ours will not be eliminated until classes disappear. Since the situation varies from period to

period, the policy may vary as well, but the general orientation will remain the same. As for how to implement this policy, it depends on the surrounding circumstances as well as the internal connections.

I. The International Situation

I have the following words in my report: “The democratic force of the people is sure to win. The world will continue to make progress, and it will certainly never regress.” This is the general trend of history. In the final analysis, is this view correct? Can the world go backward? I did talk about the issue of “going backward” in my report. I said that we should “predict that it is quite likely that history will suffer some temporary, sometimes very serious, setbacks, and in many countries, the reactionary forces that do not wish to see their own people as well as people in foreign countries gain unity, progress, and liberation are still very strong.” If such things happen, then we will have to have another prediction; some of the basic views in the report will have to be revised. In the past four to five years, the international situation has always been contradictory. For a while, it is good news, for a while later, it is bad news, from good to bad, and from bad to good, it will continue to be like this in the future, sometimes good sometimes bad, neither good nor bad, moving forward like a wave. Why is it behaving like this? Because there are two forces fighting against each other in this world. The force of the Soviet Union and that of the people of every country on one side; the reactionary forces on the opposite side. The former wants the situation to turn for the better, and the latter wants the situation to turn for the worse. As a result, this leads to frequent struggle. The present world is a contradictory world. However, to say that the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States are not united, or to say that Great Britain and the United States want to cooperate with the captives of Japan and Germany to organize a third world war aimed at opposing the Soviet Union and the people of the world, does such a possibility exist today? No, it does not, there is no such possibility. Why do I say that? Because such an objective reality does not exist. There are two objective realities now. What I said just now is not based on the objective reality of the

reactionaries; rather, it is based on the objective reality of the Soviet Union and the people of the world. The Soviet Union and the people of the world do not want a third world war; therefore, the danger of a world war aimed at opposing the Soviet Union and the people of the world does not exist. Among the bourgeoisie in Britain and the United States, a group of reactionaries wants to do that, another group does not want to do that, and still another group wants to do it but dares not. The San Francisco Conference³ may end without any result, but it may end with some achievements. The Soviet reporter in San Francisco offered a very good analysis. We can only predict the general trend. There are three possibilities: (1) There are some achievements, but they are not very complete and satisfactory; (2) The conference concludes without any results, but it does not break up (the same as our negotiations with Chiang Kaishek), and will meet again; (3) The worst result is a complete breakup, and the rejection of the resolution of the Crimea Conference.⁴ Based on the present situation, the third possibility is unlikely; the first and the second are more likely. Nevertheless, even if the third possibility does occur, and the resolution of the Crimea Conference is rejected, does this mean that Britain and the United States intend to organize the reactionaries to launch a third world war to attack the Soviet Union? We cannot draw such a conclusion. Molotov⁵ was right in the declaration he made at the San Francisco Conference, when he said that even if this conference was unsuccessful, even if it failed to establish an international security organization to prevent aggression, it did not mean that we would not be able to establish such an organization in the future. We should try our best to establish it, and if we are unable to do so this time, we will try again in the future. His speech was an evaluation of the situation in the entire world, which is the same as our view. That is, we believe in the strength of the Soviet Union, believe in the strength of the people of the world, believe in the strength of India, South America, and the Chinese people. We believe that the bourgeoisie in Britain and the United States are not united internally and not all of them are anti-Soviet. Some people are willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Now the anti-Fascist world war is not yet over; it is only half completed, and Japan is not yet defeated. If we put all these things together, even if this time the San Francisco Conference fails to accomplish anything, we cannot say that it will never accomplish anything. On the day that victory in Europe was declared, Stalin said that Europe had entered a

period of peace. Was Stalin right? He was entirely right. In Europe the time for war is over, the time for peace has come. Stalin's prediction is based on the overall situation. The Soviet Union has won a victory on an international scale. Lenin once said about the Russian Bolsheviks: "If they maintain a correct relationship with the farmers for ten to twenty years, they are sure to win a victory on an international scale (even if the proletarian revolution in other developing countries is delayed), otherwise they will suffer twenty to forty years of misery under the white terror."⁶ He said these words in 1921. Comrades, Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941; was this not in twenty years? When Moscow was in danger, Stalin said: either victory or destruction. Now they have won a victory. The Soviet victory began from the victory on the battlefield in Moscow, it did not begin in Stalingrad. Without the victory in Moscow, there would have been no victory in Stalingrad. Now the flag of the Soviet Red Army is flying in the skies of Berlin. Lenin's words have come true. The Soviet Union has won a victory on an international scale. The only thing remaining now is to try its best to consolidate this victory. The victory of the Soviet Union is the victory of the people all over the world. It is also the victory of the Chinese people.

Capitalism has its own history. A long time ago, there was no such thing in the world. Capitalism did not come into being until two hundred to three hundred years ago. A baby named capitalism was born, and at the same time another baby named the proletariat was born. In the old books of China and foreign countries, there was no such a thing as the bourgeoisie and capitalism, let alone a Communist Party; these are all products of modern times. According to Lenin's analysis, imperialist war results from an imbalance in capitalist development. It weakens the strength of imperialism and makes it possible for socialism to succeed first in a single country. In the past, Marx and Engels said that socialism would succeed in every country simultaneously or at least succeed simultaneously in a few civilized countries. Then in the twentieth century, based on the new situation, Lenin pointed out that imperialism is a dying capitalism, it is the dawn of the socialist revolution. Lenin was right again. World War I led to the October Revolution, the entire history of the world was changed, and world history began a new era. From then on, misfortune befell capitalism, which began a downward journey, while socialism is going upward. In "On New Democracy,"⁷ I also said that capitalism was on a downward journey and

socialism was going upward. Beginning with the October Revolution, one foot of capitalism was missing. The remaining part of capitalism was divided into two groups. One group became Fascist capitalism, the other became democratic capitalism. Now these two groups of capitalism are engaged in a fight. Democratic capitalism is cooperating with socialism, and it has squeezed Fascist capitalism. German fascism is gone, and if it squeezes again, Japanese fascism will be gone as well. Capitalism is like a horse with four hoofs. The October Revolution cut off one of them, and World War II cut off another. Now there are only two left, and it has become a cripple and an incomplete creature. Capitalism is crippled, so how can it walk? In order to be able to walk, it has to install wooden hoofs. Now you tell me whether the capitalism that remains is stronger or weaker than that in the past. It's not stronger, but has become weaker.

Our comrades must be careful, must pay attention to the important things, pay attention to widespread, numerous things. Quite often many comrades are unable to see these things and instead they are only able to see a small number of partial things. The October Revolution cut off one hoof of capitalism; World War II defeated German and Italian Fascist capitalism. The worst things within France collapsed, and so did many small emperors. Changes have taken place in small countries; they all made progress and this cut off another hoof of capitalism. These are all important affairs. We must pay attention to them before we are able to analyze them correctly, before we are able to analyze them without making any mistakes.

At the moment, the news agencies and newspapers in Britain and the United States often seize upon some minor problems and they refuse to give up. They engage in endless quarrels, which appear strange to the people. Why do they do this? In my opinion, capitalism has a special characteristic, that is, "penny wise but pound foolish." They lost one foot in World War I and a second one in World War II, but now they are seizing a single hair and refusing to give it up. They have lost their capital. Not only was fascism defeated, but Great Britain itself was beaten into a state of general weakness. This shows that capitalism has become a cripple. The Soviet Union and the people of Europe have become stronger and bigger. If they do not seize the pigtales, they will have nothing to grasp. Since their capital has been reduced, they have to grasp the pigtales and refuse to give them up. They will never give up, or they will have nothing to talk about. This is

our view, but they have their own purposes. In terms of the anti-Soviet rhetoric of the reactionaries in different countries of the world, its function lies in the following: (1) To prevent the development of the people's forces of the Soviet Union and Europe, and to seize the pigtailed to bargain with the people of the Soviet Union and Europe. (2) To mobilize international and domestic forces to back them up. In order to find people to become their backups, they have to sing a tune that the reactionaries like. Only in this way can they mobilize those reactionaries and unite with those reactionaries so they become their own base. (3) To suppress the revolutionary people. Churchill has found that he is surrounded by the people of Europe and by the British people, therefore he wants to sing a reactionary tune to suppress the people. Based on these things, we will be able to understand why the quarrel at the San Francisco Conference was so fierce. In the future, there will still be quarrels on the issue of the East. Like writing an essay, these disputes should all be included, for they still have two hoofs left, they can still walk, they are still reluctant to give up. Therefore, the dispute is understandable; it would be inexplicable if there were no disputes.

Of the foreign policies of the major powers in the world at the present time, only that of the Soviet Union is active. Britain, the United States, and China are all passive. The mistake regarding the Polish issue will not last for long. The Soviet Union does not have anything to worry about, so it can be active. Both Britain and the United States were forced to participate in World War II. Originally, Britain planned to undertake a "Munich"-style appeasement, with a view to encouraging Hitler to attack the Soviet Union and giving the Sudetenland to Germany. But Hitler—the "laborer" it hired—was rather independent. He first taught his employer a lesson; he beat him until he began to scream. The same thing happened in the case of Japan. Originally, the United States and Britain hired "laborers" to attack the Soviet Union; they gave Japan iron and gasoline—that is, they paid its salary. As a result, Japan began to provoke the Soviet Union along the border. At the same time, it got its pay from the United States and Britain, but once it got its pay, Japan refused to attack the Soviet Union. Instead, it launched an attack on Pearl Harbor. It was only after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor that the United States and Britain declared war on Japan. In addition, Britain and the Soviet Union signed the "Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance," valid for twenty years, and the United States and the Soviet Union

signed an agreement that guaranteed mutual assistance in the war against aggression. Capitalism took the initiative in the eighteenth century, and to some extent this lasted until the first half of the nineteenth century. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, it became corrupted and rotten, turned into imperialism, and put itself in a passive position. Britain and the United States were forced into World War II without any plan. At first, they refused to recognize Yugoslavia, but later they changed their minds. Now they also refuse to recognize Poland, but eventually they will recognize it. Now they refuse to recognize the liberated areas in China as well as the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, but eventually they will also recognize them.

Capitalism is going downhill. Since World War II, capitalism on the European continent has weakened, and so has capitalism in Japan and in Great Britain. Only capitalism in the United States is going uphill. Its production during the war has seen unprecedented development, exceeding its production before the war by one and a half to two times. During its prosperous period in 1928, America's total gross domestic product (GDP) was \$60 billion. Now some people say its GDP is \$200 billion, and others say it is \$150 billion. The secretary of state of the United States, [Edward] Stettinius, said that America's GDP is from \$150 billion to \$200 billion. If we say that the \$60 billion in the past is like two fingers, then it is almost seven fingers now if its GDP is \$200 billion. Since its production has seen such great development, that is why we say that capitalism in the United States is going uphill. Nevertheless, the present prosperity in the United States has a unique character; it is a unique prosperity. An economic crisis in the United States will come soon. In economic terms, the United States is the Himalayas of the world economy, but these mountains are going to collapse. If we look at the problem from a Marxist point of view, this should be our understanding. After all, in the final analysis the economic crisis in the United States cannot be overcome by capitalism itself; it can only be overcome by a proletarian revolution.

Even if this San Francisco Conference is unsuccessful, there may well be a second San Francisco Conference, because the world situation demands such a thing. As far as building an anti-Soviet united front, the British Conservative Party does have such an intention. In the past, such a wall was made up of

countries like Poland and Romania. Now it has been shattered by the Soviet Union. If Britain wants to repeat it, it will be going back to [former British prime minister Neville] Chamberlain's time, yet it is a different era now. Hitler collapsed, the Soviet Union has become strong, the European people have become conscious, and the British people have become conscious. Some elements of the American bourgeoisie want to cooperate with the British reactionaries to oppose the Soviet Union, but the majority wants a better relationship with the Soviet Union. Both England and the United States are realists. On the one hand, they are fighting against Japan; on the other hand, they are engaged in business. Once Japan is defeated, they want to use both of their hands to engage in business.

In sum, after World War I the so-called stability of capitalism vanished and instability often led to crisis. Capitalist economic crisis was in existence before World War I. The interval between these crises varied from eight to ten years; it had its own regulation and cycles. This time, the wartime prosperity of the United States has its own uniqueness, and it will not become stable in the future. If they want peace, want to establish an international security institution, and want to do business, they will have to stabilize postwar capitalism. It may be stabilized, but not for long; the potential of crisis does exist.

Of the few major powers in the world, who is the leader? Is it the Soviet Union or the United States? Some people say that the United States is the leader. This view is wrong. This can be said in economic terms, but in addition to the economy there is also politics. Only when politics and the economy are united will one become stronger. The Soviet Union is such a country. As measured by the economy, the Soviet Union cannot be compared to the United States, yet the Soviet Union has a socialist economy. It produces great and incomparable strength, produces the strong Red Army and the brave people. The Soviet Union is the leader of the people of the whole world. The British people as well as the American people all respect and admire the Soviet Union very much.

China wants to develop its capitalism. What is the characteristic of China's capitalism? I said above that capitalism in the world is divided into two groups. One group is reactionary Fascist capitalism, and the other is democratic capitalism. Reactionary Fascist capitalism for the most part has already been smashed. Democratic capitalism is somewhat more progressive than Fascist capitalism, yet it still oppresses its colonies and oppresses its own people, and it is

still imperialism. On the one hand, it fought against Germany; on the other hand, it oppresses the people. Fighting against the Fascists is a good thing, but oppressing the people is not. While it is fighting against the Fascists, the people have to tolerate its oppression for the time being. Chiang Kaishek is the same. His fighting against Japan is a good thing, but his oppression of the people is not. We should also tolerate him when he is still fighting against Japan. Do not say “Down with Chiang Kaishek!” Chiang Kaishek’s capitalism is semi-Fascist and semifeudal. What we advocate is a new democratic capitalism. Such a capitalism has its own vitality as well as its revolutionary characteristics. From the point of view of the entire world, capitalism is going downhill, but one group of capitalism is still useful when opposing fascism. Another group of capitalism—new democratic capitalism—will be useful in the future. It will be useful in China and in some of the agricultural countries in Europe and South America. Its nature leads it to help socialism. It is revolutionary, useful, and beneficial to the development of socialism.

II. The Domestic Situation

First, the original text of the report “On Coalition Government” included the sentence “the next two to three years will be the key to great changes in China.” This sentence was deleted upon publication not because it was wrong but, rather, because it was better not to say it. But we must have this kind of spiritual preparation and be prepared to deal with great events.

Second, the three congresses. Last September the Democratic League held its national congress, not long ago the Guomintang held its Sixth National Congress, and now our Party is holding its Seventh National Congress. If there is one similarity among these three congresses, it is that they all want to fight Japan. The difference is that the congress of the Guomintang was Fascist in character; in essence it was fascism. There are articles in today’s and yesterday’s *Liberation Daily* criticizing the Guomintang congress; you comrades can go and read them. There is one peculiarity about this congress of the Guomintang: Chiang Kaishek’s words became the orders to the Guomintang. In the past, this

was merely a fact, but this time it has become the formal rule. All the Central Committee members have to swear to be loyal followers of the director-general. None of the bourgeois political parties in the world except the Fascist parties have such a rule. There is another rule: Guomintang party members are not allowed to join other parties. Our Communist Party is not a party that anyone can join. The constitution of the Party stipulates that it [membership] must be approved by a vote at a Party branch meeting. There are requirements for joining our Party, but members can freely leave the Party. What do the aforementioned two rules show? They demonstrate that the Guomintang is weaker than ever before and more frightened. More and more of its party members want to join the other parties. Nevertheless, swearing is far from enough in this world today. If a party relies on swearing rather than on the conscious thought of the individual party members, this party will be in trouble, and its fate can be predicted. The character of the Guomintang is exactly the same as I said in "On Coalition Government." Little has changed; it is still fascism. The Democratic League is old democracy, we are new democracy. This is the basic distinction. The Democratic League may cooperate with us. There are also old democrats in the Guomintang. Though they swore at us, they may still cooperate with us.

Some comrades ask, what influence has the publication of our "On Coalition Government" had on the Guomintang congress and on the outside world? We received a report only quite recently, it did have an influence. Thirty thousand leaflets of "On Coalition Government" were distributed in Chongqing, and every *New China Daily* reader was able to read it. Some of the people who normally do not read *New China Daily* may have read it. Some people did not sleep a wink and spent the whole night reading it. Chiang Kaishek does not like it at all. He says that it is the most serious disgrace the Guomintang has ever suffered. No doubt some of the participants at the Guomintang congress also consider that it is the Guomintang's greatest disgrace. After reading the booklet, Chen Bulei, the secretary in Chiang Kaishek's office, only said two words. They are "civil war." They want to fight a civil war to wipe us out. In spite of that, this booklet has influenced many of their representatives. They say that the Communist Party knows what to do, and everything it says is the truth. Though the Guomintang has several hundred articles, it does not have any solution. The declaration of their congress was drafted beforehand, but their congress was thrown into chaos

the moment our report was published. Their original plan was that their congress would last for ten days and would end on May 15, but it was not over until the 21st. They wanted to refute us, but they did not know how. They wanted to rewrite their declaration, but they found it harder than they had expected. We do not know which gentleman rewrote the declaration that has now been published. It is good that our present congress opened before theirs. Some of their resolutions were influenced by us, such as on the issue of the minority nationalities. They also have to talk about the problem of nationalities now. We proposed to reduce rent and interest rates, so they concocted more than one policy outline on the issue of land and the peasants.

Third, some people have suggested that China might become a semicolony of the United States. I think that this view is entirely correct. During the nearly one hundred years before the War of Resistance, China was a semicolony ruled by several imperialist countries. When Japan launched the war of aggression after the September 18 Incident [1931], the Guomindang was weakened, so it had to rely on the United States. As a result, it is likely that China will become a semicolony ruled mainly by one imperialist country—the United States. The United States as the dominant power will control China, but Britain may be able to squeeze in one small foot. This change will be an enduring difficulty. We Communists must be well prepared in order to deal with it. Japan may be defeated next year. This will be a great change from the past sixteen years [*sic*] since Japan invaded China in 1931, and this change will benefit us. The Japanese invaders will be driven out, but then there comes a “uniquely prosperous” country—the United States. It controls the Guomindang now, therefore we should start a campaign of international communication and try to win over the American proletariat to assist us. Our high-level cadres should pay special attention to the situation in the United States. China may become a semicolony of the United States; this is a new change.

Fourth, one issue needs to be made clear—that is, “be prepared to suffer.” Some comrades hope that I will talk about some of the difficulties; still other comrades want me to talk a bit about hope. In my opinion, there is a great deal of hope. The domestic democratic movement is already on the rise and there is ever more hope for the future. The Soviet Union supports us, and the American and British proletariat will also help us in the future. These are all promising. We should,

however, be more prepared for difficulties. In what follows, I will talk about seventeen difficulties.

First, severe condemnation by foreign countries. Now the newspapers and news agencies in Britain and the United States are cursing the Communist Party. In the future, the greater our development, the more they will curse us, saying: you cannot do it that way. The American press will criticize you. I said: You eat bread, we eat millet; you have strength after eating bread, you have your own mouth, we cannot control it. This is called "There is nothing to be done." We should be prepared to be condemned by the foreigners.

Second, severe condemnation by our own people. Severe condemnation rather than minor condemnation; they will mobilize everybody to curse us, for things such as sabotaging the War of Resistance, endangering the nation, killing and setting fires, sharing property and wives, and inhumanity. We should be prepared to hear whatever curses there are on earth.

Third, be prepared to lose several large base areas to them. We are not talking about a few small areas, nor are we talking about all of them. Instead, we are talking about losing several large areas to them, since they want to fight a civil war in order to "regain the lost territories." They once took away several large base areas of ours during the ten years of Civil War; this time we should again be prepared to lose several large base areas to them.

Fourth, be prepared to lose tens of thousands of troops to them. The Central Committee telegraphed every Central Committee bureau and Central Committee subbureau in 1941, saying that we should make our predictions on the basis of the most difficult estimates. If there were two possibilities, we should set up our policy on the basis of the worst of these. We had half a million troops back then, and we were prepared to lose 250,000, leaving us with 250,000. What is this remaining 250,000? The original half a million is a stretched palm; this remaining 250,000 is a tightened fist. Though it is smaller, it is full of vitality and strength. Now we have nearly one million troops, and we will continue to grow. By the time Chiang Kaishek starts to attack us, we may have a million and a half; we will still have one million if we lose one-third to him, and we will still have 750,000 even if we lose half our troops to him. If we are not prepared for this kind of difficulty and cannot conceive of such a difficulty, we will not be able to deal with such a difficulty if it really happens. But everything will be easy if we are

prepared for it.

Fifth, the puppet troops welcome Chiang Kaishek. The puppet troops would simply change their names and hang up Chiang Kaishek's banner, welcome Chiang Kaishek, and welcome Yan Xishan. This would make things very difficult for us. They will immediately take over the places from which the Japanese have just withdrawn before we can. We should be mentally prepared for this.

Sixth, a civil war will break out. We should try every possible means to prevent civil war. The current revelations are one of the methods. We should often lay bare their conspiracy in the documents for meetings, in the newspapers, and orally. In addition, we should use other methods to prevent civil war. The longer civil war is delayed the better it is, and the more advantageous it will be to us. In the past eight years since the War of Resistance began, our policy has been to prevent Chiang Kaishek from surrendering and from "eliminating the Communists." We should continue our policy in this way, so that he dare not start a civil war arbitrarily, yet we should be prepared for him to launch a civil war.

Seventh, a Scobie⁸ has emerged, and China will become like Greece. We should try every possible means to prevent such a thing. Should it happen, we should adopt a policy of being reasonable, beneficial, and restrained in our struggle. I once told the communications staff of the Guomindang that we have three principles: first, we will not fire the first shot; *Laozi* says "never be the first in the world." We will not take preemptive measures; instead, our policy is to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck. Second "retreat 3 *she*—the most remote region." One *she* equals 30 *li*, 3 *she* equals 90 *li*. This is the story about Duke Wen of Jin in the Battle of Chengpu between Jin and Chu,⁹ and we also want to adopt this policy. Third, "the rules of propriety value reciprocity." This is what the *Book of Rites* says, gifts should always be reciprocated. "It is impolite only to receive gifts but not to give them back, neither is it polite just to give gifts but to receive none." It is impolite if you come to visit me but I do not pay you a return visit, therefore we are going to visit you. I asked the Guomindang communication staff to tell Hu Zongnan about these three policies, hoping that he will also adopt the policies of "never be the first one in the world," "retreat to 3 *she*," and "one good turn deserves another." If so, civil war will be unnecessary. They do not like Marxism; we say that this is Laozi-ism, Duke Wen

of Jin-ism, and Confucianism. No matter who it is, whether it is Scobie or Chiang Kaishek, we will adopt a self-defense policy of reason, benefit, and restraint. We should always bear in mind the policy of never firing the first shot. This does not necessarily seem to be an advantageous policy in the short run, but over the long run it will be very advantageous. Certainly when it is time to fight, we must wipe them out firmly, thoroughly, completely, and totally. Some people ask how we can fight a two-front war. Since they want to fight a two-front war, we can do nothing about it but prepare for it. It is as if we are in prison. The Japanese are guarding the front door while Chiang Kaishek is guarding the back door.

Eighth, "Do not recognize Poland." This is a metaphor indicating that we will not be recognized. Now we are like a middle finger; you do not want to recognize us. In the future, we will become a thumb, and you will still refuse to recognize us. But when we have become a fist or two fists, are you still going to refuse to recognize us? You may refuse to recognize us for ninety years, for a hundred years, but you are sure to recognize us in the 101st year. We have won the support of the people in the entire nation because our policy is correct.

Ninth, tens of thousands of Party members have deserted or are scattered. In the future, if the situation becomes worse, Chiang Kaishek and Scobie will squeeze us from both ends, and shots will be fired from every direction, and some Party members will turn around, desert, and run away. In the history of our Party, the most serious desertion occurred in 1927. Another period when a great many deserted was during the Civil War, when only about 30,000 registered Party members remained. Under bad conditions, some of the pessimistic Party members will desert, and others will be forced to flee. This is the worst it can be, and we are prepared to lose one-third or even a few more.

Tenth, a sentiment of pessimism and fatigue is emerging within the Party. The Chinese Revolution is protracted, and in the twenty-four years from 1921 until now, we have not yet won victory. We must carry on, and many more Party members and soldiers are going to die. The problem of pessimism and exhaustion may appear within the Party. We should make this clear not only to this congress, the Central Committee, and the Central Committee bureaus, but also to the leadership departments such as the regional and the district Party committees. There was once a tradition within our Party never to talk about difficulties, but always to boast that the enemy would collapse, we would win a

great victory, and we were a 100 percent Bolsheviks! Now we should have plenty of confidence to foresee the brightness, as well as plenty of confidence to predict the darkness, and should be fully prepared for everything.

Eleventh, natural disasters spread, scorching the Earth for a thousand miles. Natural disaster refers to the lack of rain. The Jade emperor refuses to help us. The latest report says that there are droughts in many places in North and Central China. Our forefathers said, "Difficulty and hardship will be my helpmates to fulfillment."¹⁰ Difficulty and hardship give the Communist Party the opportunity to temper its skills. Natural disaster is a bad thing, but it contains some good factors. If you never meet with that kind of bad thing, you will never learn the skills needed to deal with that kind of bad thing. Hence difficulty and hardship will make our cause successful. There is no harvest in our border region this year, and this is a very important matter. Therefore, we should practice strict economy from the Central Committee on down; everyone must practice strict economy and be prepared for natural disasters and scenes of desolation. This is the place to show that we Communists have the skills to survive under such conditions! Many places in North and Central China should be prepared for this.

Twelfth, economic difficulties. We are in a very difficult economic situation when there are natural disasters. This is also true even when there are no natural disasters. Hence, we should make great efforts to learn to do economic work. Once we proposed the following slogan: Master the skills of economic work in two to three years. The leading cadre must be in charge, and he should personally engage in economic work to overcome difficulties.

Thirteenth, the enemy forces are concentrated in North China. Some comrades ask: What shall we do if the Japanese invaders retreat from South China and Central China and withdraw all their troops to North China? Now that the strategy of the Japanese Fascists is to fight over every inch of land, it does not seem likely that they are going to withdraw. Nevertheless, we should be prepared for the worst. Even if the Japanese troops along the Yangzi River basin are all withdrawn to North China, does this mean that it is the end of us? The situation of the War of Resistance in China is that Japan will be defeated next year, and it will not have much time to bully us. What shall we do if the enemy concentrates in North China, proposes peace and compromise, and negotiates an armistice agreement with Britain and the United States? We should be prepared to devise

all kinds of solutions to deal with this. Everybody should think about these solutions, and so will the Central Committee.

Fourteenth, the Guomindang carries out a conspiracy of assassination and assassinates our responsible comrades. Such things have happened in history, and hence we should be prepared for any eventuality.

Fifteenth, disagreement arises in our Party's leading institutions. Do not think that such a thing will never happen. Once the aforementioned difficulties arise, many things will happen, and they may well lead to disagreement within the Party. There will be a lot of rumors, no one will agree on what is right and what is wrong, and there will be much dissatisfaction. If we are prepared for this, there will be less disagreement; otherwise there will be more.

Sixteenth, for quite a long time the international proletariat has not assisted us. The Chinese Revolution is a long-term revolution. For a variety of reasons, the international proletariat has not yet been able to assist us. They never expected that our difficulties would arrive so soon. Even if they had expected it, they would not have been able to do anything. Distant water cannot quench present fire. The aid is too slow in coming to be of any help. We should do international communication work, diplomatic work; we sincerely hope that the international proletariat and the great Soviet Union will help us. But if for various reasons there is no assistance, what shall we do? We shall stick to our past policy, the whole Party will unite as one, will be independent and self-reliant, and will overcome the difficulties. This is our guiding principle.

Seventeenth, many other unexpected things. Many things are unpredictable, but we must be able to predict them. In particular, our senior leaders should be prepared for this, be prepared to deal with unusual difficulties, and to deal with extremely unfavorable situations. We should think carefully and thoroughly about all of these things.

I have listed seventeen difficulties. In what follows, I would like to talk about the reasons we will certainly be victorious.

First, temporary losses first, but victory in the end. This principle can never be wrong. The losses the proletariat suffers all over the world are temporary and in the end we will be victorious. Every Marxist should firmly believe this.

Second, losses in one place but victories in others. The development of the Chinese Revolution is uneven. We suffer losses in one place, but win victories in

another. When it is dark in the east, it will be daytime in the west. When it is dark in the south, it will be daytime in the north. We will always find a way.

Third, some people run away, but others will come. The rain must fall; what can we do if it insists on falling? Just let it fall. The wavering elements among the Party members will come to watch the fun when the revolution is on the rise, but they will run away when things are difficult. If they want to leave, let them leave; we will hold a farewell party for them. Today, some of the people run away; tomorrow, some other people who are not afraid of difficulties will join us. This has been proven by the twenty-four-year history of our Party. We are sure that there will be many people coming to join us.

Fourth, some people die, and others will survive. In nature, there are unpredictable situations, and in life, there are unpredictable vicissitudes. We should be prepared for the fact that some people will be sacrificed, but there are always some who will survive. We are such a big Party and such a big nation, what should we fear?

Fifth, if there are economic difficulties, we must learn to do economic work. We should be grateful to He Yingqin. He refused to give any pay to the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. When we found ourselves hard-pressed in this way, we raised the question of whether we should disband, starve, or begin to engage in productive activities ourselves. We were not ready to disband and unwilling to starve, so there was only one solution left—that is, with the leading cadres in charge, we used our own hands to develop production and overcome the difficulties.

Sixth, the Taihang region has experience in overcoming natural disasters, the Communists are good at catching locusts, and these are all very good lessons.

Seventh, a dispute arose within the Party, and this, too, taught us a lesson: It taught us to temper ourselves. A great dispute is a great tempering. It is only after repeated smelting that a piece of rough iron becomes steel.

Eighth, without international assistance, we should learn to be independent and self-reliant. There is one good thing about doing without assistance, and one bad thing about having too much assistance. Under the internationalist principle that all the proletariat of the whole world should unite, we must learn self-reliance and learn to do without assistance. This is a big test for the Chinese Communist Party, a test to see whether we are mature, whether we have the

capacity. There will surely be assistance from the international proletariat; otherwise, Marxism would be ineffectual. But it is not only the international proletariat that should assist us; we should also assist foreign countries. For the past twenty-four years, we have been one branch of the international proletariat, and the struggles of this branch of ours have assisted the proletariat of foreign countries. These struggles have also assisted the Soviet Union and the international proletariat will assuredly support us.

III. Some Problems of Ideological Policy in Our Party

Above, I have talked about the international situation and the internal situation. Now I will deal with a third issue, the problem of ideological policy within the Party. This is also composed of several issues.

1. Leadership

Yesterday, *Liberation Daily* carried an article, by a Russian named Vasiliev, titled "On Scientific Prediction." We translated this article a long time ago. It was written a few months before World War II broke out in 1939, and consequently it did not mention World War II, but in reading it we can still see that it did predict this war.

What is leadership? What is the relationship between leadership and foresight? Foresight means to see beforehand the future trends. Is it still leadership without foresight? I do not think so. Stalin once said: Without foresight, there can be no leadership. In order to lead one has to predict. Before Marxism was born, the whole of mankind never had any predictions, or any clear predictions, about the development of society. Take, for example, the change from primitive society to slave society, the change from slave society to feudal society after a revolution, the change from feudal society to capitalist society after another revolution. These revolutions were often spontaneous. The bourgeoisie have made many good predictions in the field of natural sciences, but they are still blind in the field of social sciences. It was only after Marxism was born that there began to be predictions about the development of society, and mankind's understanding of social development entered a new stage. The Communist Party takes Marxism as

the basis of its thought. It sees very clearly the future and its prospects. It also sees very clearly the direction of development of every social class. For instance, this China of ours has the proletariat, the big bourgeoisie, and the classes in between, and we can clearly see their respective futures. All three classes are active, particularly at the time when the anti-Japanese war is about to be victorious. In this context, they are all preparing what to do once Japan is defeated. The National Congress of the Democratic League, held last September, the recently held Sixth National Congress of the Guomintang, and the present Seventh National Congress of our Party all reflect these concerns. Our articles, our documents at this congress, and our predictions point out the road that the Chinese people are going to take and determine our policy. As Stalin has said, there is no leadership without prediction. Sitting on the top of the command platform, you cannot be called a leader if there is anything you cannot see. Sitting on the top of the command platform, you cannot be called a leader either if you can only see large numbers of ordinary things which appear on the horizon, for that is too ordinary. Only if, when the top of the masts have just appeared and nothing can be clearly seen, you are able to predict that these are the things that will develop into large numbers of ordinary things, and, moreover, you are able to control them, only then can you be called a leader. People normally can see big objects and not small ones, but nevertheless, there are some big objects we are unable to see. For instance, big cities are big objects, and so are the Guomintang and imperialism, and yet we are unable to see them, and commonly say that the Guomintang will “collapse completely.” Japanese imperialism is also a big object, yet we also take an incorrect view of it, thinking that it will be very easy to defeat it, it will be very easy to drive it out. This leads to an underestimation of the enemy and a belief in a quick victory. During the Chen Duxiu¹¹ era, the peasants wanted land, and that was a major matter, a very important and universal issue, but at that time we were unable to see it. Whenever we made a policy mistake, it is certain that we failed to see the big issues. One will also make mistakes if he fails to pay attention to the small things, but these are only separate mistakes of one kind or the other and their scope is not very great. This kind of mistake will not matter much even if there are eight or ten of them. Of course, it is not good to make this kind of mistake either, but after all they are not big mistakes. Whenever there is a big mistake it is because

one fails to see large numbers of ordinary things. So-called prediction does not mean that when some kind of a thing has already appeared in large quantities in the world, you have seen it with your own eyes, and only then do you predict it. Instead, it often requires that you are able to see farther ahead, that is, you are able to see something, and to foresee its general significance in the future, when it has just appeared on the horizon, just begun to reveal its head, and only in small amounts and not universally.

At this congress, we suggested that we should pay attention to the big cities, pay attention to the Northeast, and pay attention to the workers movement. These issues belong to this kind of prediction. Many comrades still lack a feeling for these issues because we are still in the countryside, within the Great Wall. Big cities are a general thing that appears in large quantities. The 40 million people in the Northeast are also a big thing, but in spite of that this is not an urgent and realistic problem from today's point of view, and it does not easily attract our attention. Now our congress has already pointed out that it is our task for tomorrow, and it is something that will appear in large quantities and will have universal significance. It will be unthinkable if we make mistakes regarding this issue. If we cannot solve the problems of industry, the big cities, and the economy, as well as the regularization of the armed forces, the Communist Party will be eliminated. We have been unable to solve these problems for twenty-four years, and we will certainly be eliminated if we are still unable to solve them in another twenty-four years. Industry is in other people's hands, the big cities are in their hands, mechanization is in their hands, the regularization of the armed forces is in their hands, and we have none of these things. If we still don't have them after forty-eight years, aren't we going to be eliminated? We must rely on the common people, but it will not do if we always eat millet and depend on millet plus rifles. It is unthinkable that our Party will ever survive without the big cities, without industry, without the ability to control the economy, and without a regular army. If Marxism cannot solve these problems in China, Marxism becomes useless. In fact, the reason we have been unable to solve these problems is simply that we did not adopt a Marxist standpoint, viewpoint, and method—that is, we were not Marxists. Therefore, we must definitely solve these problems. Relatively speaking, we are better at organizing peasant movements and are new at organizing workers movements. This is the road that our Party has taken: from

the workers movement to the peasant movement and back to the workers movement again. In the past, we began with the workers movement and then went from the workers movement to the peasant movement. Take, for example, the Civil War period and the War of Resistance, during which we were engaged mainly in the peasant movement. In the future, we will again turn to the workers movement, building big industry and building a regular army, and so on. This is our prediction. There must be prediction in order to lead.

Blindness is to lack prediction; it obstructs prediction. Neither dogmatism nor empiricism is able to predict. Furthermore, there is no leadership without prediction, and no victory without leadership. Consequently, we may say that there is nothing at all without prediction. The proletariat has already existed for several hundred years, but it has only been a few decades since the proletariat became a conscious class. Marx founded Marxism in 1843. It was exactly sixty years later, in 1903, that a proletarian political party was born in Russia and in the world. It was called the Social Democratic Labor Party. One faction appeared within the Social Democratic Labor Party. It was called the Bolshevik faction. It was only after this that all of humanity was able to find a new direction. Marxism was born into this world sixty years ago, but it did not become popular, nor was it realized, and it was only sixty years later that such a faction came into being. It later became an independent Marxist political party and tried to realize Marxism through its actions. In 1914, eleven years later, there was a world war. In 1917, another three years after 1914, there was an October Revolution. In the fourteen years from 1903 to 1917, the October Revolution was victorious. If the Bolshevik faction had not appeared in Russia in 1903, and without the actions of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution, there would have been no October Revolution. Would there have been a Communist Party in this China of ours without the October Revolution? Of course a party would eventually have been founded once large numbers of proletarians were created in China, so it is incorrect to say that there would have been no Communist Party, but nobody knows when it would have been created. The creation of the Bolsheviks in 1903, and the victory of the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, changed the direction of the historic development of the entire world. The birth of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 changed the direction of China. Five thousand years of Chinese history changed direction. Our Communist Party is unparalleled by any

of the political parties in Chinese history. It is the most conscious, most capable of predicting, and can see the future very clearly.

We should encourage people to think about the problems. A few years ago, *New China Daily* asked me to write a few words. Based on what I was thinking back then, I wrote two words, “think more.” “Think more” means that we must use our minds. In the past, our comrades did not like to think. We should blame the leaders in the past who did not encourage people to think. The brain is the “office of the mind,” it is the organ of thought. This organ has only one duty, and that is “to think.” Mencius once said, “the office of the mind is to think.” He assigned this task to the brain as early as two thousand years ago. Our whole Party should encourage people to think. When this congress is over and you comrades go back to the different regions, you should tell every one of our comrades that our brains should think more, think about various problems within the Party, think about the problems of classes, the problems of the state, the problems of our people, and so on. Whenever there is a problem, we should analyze it. It does not matter even if we are wrong; if there are mistakes, we should correct them. Our comrades should not talk only about livelihood when they run into one another; do not treat the problem of livelihood as the main topic. We should encourage them to think about all kinds of problems, think more and ponder more, start the machine, start the brain. Besides, we should unload the burden, liberate our thought, and march forward with a light load. Our comrades should also be good at analyzing problems. There used to be a habit within our Party in the past, that is, there was a fixed frame. You had to fit everything into this frame whether you were writing an article or making a speech. This frame was the so-called Party formalism. We must break this frame. The quintessence of Marxism is the concrete analysis of concrete problems. These are Lenin’s words. Unfortunately, this is what we are lacking. Therefore, we should encourage more thinking. This way we can get rid of blindness and make a concrete analysis of concrete problems. When there is a problem and one person is unable to analyze it, everyone should exchange views with one another. We should create such an atmosphere and style of exchanging views. As I do, whenever I have no solution to a problem, I go and ask our comrades and ordinary people. The same is true of combat. We should be good at talking with our comrades. For instance, “Driven to Join the Liangshan Rebels” was created

collectively, and so were “Attacking Zhujiazhuang Three Times” and the “White-Haired Girl.”¹² Let others share your achievements; what is so bad about that? The *Communist Party Manifesto* was written jointly by Marx and Engels. We wrote the “Resolution on Some Historical Questions” and also a political report. If everyone had not come and helped, how could have a single person finished it? First, we must acknowledge this point, which is that one person cannot do something completely but must depend on others as well. This is the leadership method of our Party. We should use this method to inspire the thinking of our comrades while eliminating blindness.

2. Democratic Centralism

As far as this problem is concerned, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi has put it very well: All-out democracy, with a high degree of centralism. I had a talk with him and we both share this idea. The other comrades agree with it as well. In my opinion, we can call it high-level democracy and high-level centralism. We should think more about the two words “all out.” This is a question of degree. Our Party has a tradition of democracy, but sometimes and in some places we have not been democratic enough. Our Party has also always stressed centralism, but sometimes and in some places centralism has been inappropriately applied or there has not been enough centralism. Democracy should be democracy at a very high level, and centralism should also be at a high level. Are there any contradictions between these two? Yes, there are, but they can be unified. Democratic centralism is the unification of these two contradictory things.

We should encourage the free airing of views and open the windows. During the era of feudal dictatorship, some enlightened emperors were willing to encourage the free airing of views and opened the windows. Why should not we Communists? We should be even more willing to encourage the free airing of opinions and open the windows wider. Do not be afraid that sand will come in after the windows are opened. There is some slight disadvantage if a little dust comes in, but it is not very great. Instead, opening the windows and letting the fresh air in does a lot of good. We should look at the problem from the standpoint of benefit and harm. We are carrying out a revolution; are we afraid of democracy? Are we afraid that people will express opinions? If what you say is right, you can come up with a correct principle, and if you are wrong, it does not

matter. If you are wrong, you can also let others learn about an incorrect idea. So we must practice high-level democracy.

Comrades! Our Party is the fairest party, the Party which most speaks the truth. The majority of the people are fair. The majority of the people also know that we must have centralism, and they also demand centralism. Our comrades in the Party have such an awareness. They cannot fail to understand centralism, nor can they limit themselves to obstructing centralism. Of course, there are also anarchism and ideas of extreme democratization. These are the ideas of the petty bourgeoisie. We must criticize them and make it clear that such thinking is wrong. At present, with the increase in the level of our consciousness, our leading cadres as well as our comrades understand the necessity for a high degree of centralism. We are not afraid of criticism by others. We cannot be defeated by criticism. Even those who have made mistakes of line are not afraid of criticism and cannot be overthrown by criticism either, so long as they are willing to correct their mistakes. The less you fear other people's criticism, and the more you are willing to let others speak and give them the opportunity to speak, the less they are likely to criticize. We should learn to listen to casual talk. With two long ears, we should listen to rumors. Our Party members, if they have different opinions, should speak out within the Party organization. They are not allowed to speak outside the organization; this is a principle. But there are still some people who talk outside the Party. This is gossip, and that is a fact. I am not encouraging the spread of hearsay information. I do not mean to encourage everyone to spread hearsay information after the Seventh Party Congress. My point is that hearsay information does exist. There are always rumors around every year. We should go out and listen to them and gather some material. These materials can only be of two kinds: One is right, and the other is wrong. We should gather together the correct ones as well as the incorrect ones and use both of them as raw material. We are now running a factory. The Seventh Party Congress is like running a political factory; our Central Committee is also like running a political factory. What shall we do if these factories do not have raw material? The products manufactured will be good for nothing if we lack raw material. Hence, we should gather raw material. There will be a source of raw materials once the windows are open. Moreover, we should put up some advertisements: "Say all you know and say it without reserve; blame not the speaker but be warned by his

words; correct mistakes if you have made any, and guard against any if you have not." Putting up ads is for the purpose of gathering raw material, gathering more raw material for our political factory. It includes the spreading of hearsay information. If we expand democracy, legalize gossip, and turn the "black market" into a legal market, we will have more raw material. Everyone has opinions and resentments, we should open the windows and ask them to express their complaints fully and to put forward their ideas. Only in this way can we unite the comrades, unify and centralize their wills, and establish a high degree of centralism. Without centralism, there can be no victory, and we will lose and be wiped out. So we cannot do without centralism. We must, however, establish a high degree of centralism on the basis of a high degree of democracy.

3. Cadre Relations

At the moment, this problem is a problem of the peasantry, but in the future it will become a problem for the people of the entire country. Ever since the Civil War began, this issue in essence has been a peasant problem. Earlier I already quoted Lenin's words of 1921 to the effect that the Bolshevik party should maintain a correct relationship with the peasants. These words are extremely important. In my opinion, they can also be applied to the Chinese Communist Party. If the Chinese Communist Party can maintain a correct relationship with the peasants for one or two decades, this will guarantee that the Chinese Revolution will be victorious in the entire world within ten to twenty years. Otherwise, we will have to suffer under twenty to forty years of White terror. If the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party, are unable to maintain good relations with the peasantry, they may be eliminated.

The relationship between veteran cadres and new cadres, between cadres from outside the region and native cadres, and between military officers and local cadres is, in essence, a question of the relationship with the peasants. This is the situation at present. In the future, there will also be a question of the relationship with the people living in the cities. We have spoken repeatedly on this issue. Let us not go back too far. Take, for example, the sectarianism we raised during rectification in 1942. It included issues such as relations between cadres from outside the region and native cadres and between military officers and local cadres. These two issues evoke problems of a historical and popular character.

They are historical and popular problems rather than temporary and specific ones. If we are aware of this point, we will be able to understand that this issue arose from the revolutionary struggle in the agricultural areas. Since we have been active in agricultural areas for a long time, they are either common problems in the agricultural areas or historical and common problems. Why are they historical problems? Comrades, you have to ask yourselves why the soviet area failed during the Civil War. Though the problem of line is certainly one of the reasons, it also has something to do with what we are talking about now, that is, we never trusted the native people and the people from the outside and the region trusted themselves too much. The result was the failure of the soviet area. This was also true of our work in the White area. Wherever the “imperial envoy” went, the work in that region collapsed. Was this not very painful? Our losses in the Guomindang-controlled region were 99.9 percent; there was almost nothing left. The majority of the Red Army and the soviet area became a big blank; the losses were 90 percent. There was very little left, but it was of better quality; the quality was higher.

On the problem of relations between military officers and local cadres, if we say that there was a problem of line during the Civil War period, then we may say that there was no line problem during the period of the War of Resistance, but such a thing did still occur. I have not been to Central and North China, but I have seen it in the border region with my own eyes, I also did such things myself. That is, relations between cadres from outside the region and native ones and that between military officers and local cadres were not very good. We paid a heavy price for this, therefore, it is well worth pointing out and stressing. In 1936 there was a light breeze coming in from the window. Some comrades said that the people in the border region could only create a soviet area, but they could never become the Red Army. After an investigation we found out that we made a mistake, first toward the Twenty-sixth Army, then toward the Twenty-seventh Army. The representatives of the Central Committee sent to various *xian* acted as if they were heroes. They said something like “I took part in the 25,000-*li* Long March; what are you? You are country bumpkins, good for nothing, you can only create a soviet area but can never become Red Army men.” This resulted in complaints from the local people. I will also give you an example about intellectuals. Last Spring Festival, the *yangge* team from Yangjialing went to

Ansai to perform. It happened that the labor heroes there were having a meeting. Our teenage and young comrades from Yangjialing danced the *yangge* together with the labor heroes in Ansai, thus showing that their relationship had improved. I told myself that now it would be peace forever. In the past they would refuse to take the same road while trying to avoid air raids. Now they were dancing the *yangge* together. Comrades! It is a matter of life and death to avoid air raids, yet they were so sharply divided that they did not to take the same road. You can see how serious the problem was. It is the same with the military. It always complains that the locality owes the military something; whenever the topic is raised they can list several dozens of problems. We wanted to persuade them to come back then, but it was very difficult. We should blame ourselves for this, for we failed to analyze and solve the problem systematically. Only solving a problem systematically can be regarded as science. If it is piecemeal rather than systematic, it is not science, even though it may be correct. We solved the problem systematically at the Senior Cadres Conference in the winter of 1942,¹³ and hence we succeeded in persuading our comrades. We failed to explain this systematically before the meeting for senior cadres and failed to persuade our comrades. We are responsible for this. This also applies to economic issues. It was only at the meeting for senior cadres in 1942 that we provided a systematic explanation.

It is now more than two years since the Senior Cadres Conference. Is it true that relations between the military and the locality and between the military and the civilians are perfect? I do not think so. There are many comrades present today from the military forces and the localities of the border region. I do not think they will come to such a conclusion. It is harmful to come to such a conclusion. To say that great progress has been made is a correct conclusion, but there are many places that are far from perfect, and at least one to two years will be required before the problems can be resolved completely. The relationships between the military and the locality, and the local Party and government in North China, Central China, and South China also must make two to three years of effort before they can finally be resolved. Moreover, we will have to grasp them very firmly before they can be resolved. Even the slightest carelessness can easily result in wavering, because the two ears of our comrades in the military are constantly hearing views to the effect that the localities are unworthy of the

army, and the localities and ordinary people are unworthy of the military. We should also carry out a systematic analysis and have a systematic resolution of this problem. Within the army, there are military affairs personnel, political affairs personnel, veteran cadres, new cadres, and cadres from outside the region, as well as native cadres. They all share the same problem of relations with the locality and with the ordinary people. Consequently, the responsible cadres in the military must make up their minds. First, the leaders in the submilitary region and the military region, as well as the leaders above the rank of regimental commander, should make up their minds. They should have a clear understanding of this problem and solve this problem. We now have a million troops, and in the future we will have several million. Whether we can be victorious will depend on whether we will be able to unite the 360 million peasants in China. This is the essence of the problem. It is very easy to waver on this issue, and it is not easy to make up one's mind. Consequently, we should persist in this principle and constantly persuade our comrades. If they cannot be persuaded the first time, try again; we must constantly tell them. We should tell everybody what to do, constantly reminding them of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention.¹⁴ Many things are indeed the fault of the locality now. If we ignore this, the military will not be persuaded. But where should we begin in order to solve these problems? We should start with the military first. And where should the military start? It should start with the major leaders of the military region and subregion. There must be firm principles. We must listen regularly to the opinions of the local comrades, for you seldom have a chance to listen to what local comrades have to say, and they seldom have the opportunity to speak out. I have such experience, and I have heard many different opinions from casual talk, for example, the rumor that people from northern Shaanxi can only create a soviet area, but cannot become Red Army men, and why the Red Army men from northern Shaanxi were not organized into a division. Statements to the effect that Zhang Guotao¹⁵ is learned and Mao Zedong is not. Speculation has arisen as to why the Thunder God does not kill Mao Zedong. These are all rumors; what do I think about them? Why did some people want the Thunder God to kill me? I was really surprised when I first heard this. These words were said in 1941, and the place was in the border region. That year the border region collected 200,000 *dan* worth of grain. In addition, the

border region was required to transport 60,000 horseloads of public salt. This really made life miserable for the ordinary people. There was widespread anger and discontent, and weren't these things all Mao Zedong's fault? Because I also suggested that we collect 200,000 *dan* worth of grain and that we transport salt. At that time, it was indispensable to transport salt, but it was not good to make people do it for a long time. This led us to study financial and economic problems and made us determined to launch a big production movement. The amount of grain for revenue was reduced in 1942 and also in 1943, and thus the problem was solved. Why did people say that Zhang Guotao was more learned than I was? Because the criticism of the Zhang Guotao line made people suffer a lot. Eighteen-year-old kids sent over from the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University were appointed instructors, and they regarded everything as the Zhang Guotao line. Taking an egg from the masses was branded as the Zhang Guotao line. The headquarters of the 385th Brigade telegraphed the headquarters of the rear service corps, reporting these problems. I told them not to make people suffer any more in the name of the Zhang Guotao line. Is that Zhang Guotao line good or not? I say that it is certainly not good. The comrades of the 385th Brigade look at this, however, from a different perspective. Zhang Guotao did not criticize their Zhang Guotao line, but Mao Zedong did; consequently, Zhang Guotao's learning is good, but Mao Zedong's learning is not so good. Did I admit it? Yes, I did, I must admit it. There is a reason people wanted the Thunder God to kill me; there is also a reason people said that I am not as learned as Zhang Guotao. We must analyze these reasons and solve these problems.

Of our comrades in the military, the veteran cadres are the major backbone; here I emphasize the word "major." In the future, in another two to three years, some of the cadres who joined the Party in the early days of the War of Resistance will join the ranks of these mainstays. Many forces have been recruited during the War of Resistance and are led by cadres recruited after the War of Resistance began. This is a good thing, yet the major backbone is still the veteran cadres. Now the number of cadres recruited during the Northern Expedition is less than 1,000. Those who were recruited during the Civil War are no more than 20,000. The longer the time, the lower the number of veteran cadres and the greater the number of new cadres. This is a natural law. The later generations must follow on. The military is an issue of life and death for the

Chinese Revolution. I have made it clear in my report titled “On Coalition Government” that “there will be nothing for the people without a people’s army.” As far as this problem is concerned, the veteran cadres, that is, those who were recruited before the War of Resistance, are shouldering important responsibilities. I said at the Sixth Plenum¹⁶ that the veteran cadres are the glory of the Party; they are also the glory of the whole nation. This is a very high evaluation, which reflects the view of the people and the evaluation of the whole Party. The veteran Bolsheviks are the leadership backbone. Strictly speaking, I mean the important leadership backbone.

So-called relations between the military and the locality are actually about relations between our military and the peasants. We should never neglect this point lest we make mistakes. We must stick to this policy without the slightest hesitation and solve it in an appropriate way. Whenever our armies go to a place, no matter how the rank and file there treat us, no matter how the local party treats us, we should adopt a helpful attitude toward them. If they have shortcomings and mistakes, we should forgive them. As regards our own troops, every military subregion and every military region should adopt a more serious attitude. It is only correct if we are relatively strict with ourselves. It should be like this, and it must be like this, for only in this way will we be able to educate our troops. Many of our departments and organs are far below our requirements, and we must recognize this. Are we or are we not an army of the people? We are, and, moreover, we were a people’s army a long time ago. We should never deny this. Nevertheless, we still have many shortcomings and must make greater efforts.

As regards relations between our army and the people and between the army and the locality, the responsible comrades in our army should first explain this question. Without a systematic explanation, the subordinate officers and soldiers will not believe you, and they will think that you are always repeating an old story. So today we should make this point clear. Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] have already said that we should learn to be a good backbone, that is, we should be good at being teachers and master the teaching method which we should always emphasize. We should always bear in mind one thing—that is, we should always be careful not to hurt the locality, and we should allow the local comrades to criticize us if we ever make any mistakes.

Such is the attitude we should adopt. I do not blame the person who asked why the Thunder God did not take away my life. Instead, I blame myself for collecting 200,000 *dan* of grain as revenue; for this we bear responsibility. Hence we began to study financial and economic issues, for only by doing this will we be able to solve the problem. Otherwise, the Thunder God will truly take away my life some day. Before rectification there were some essays written in Yan'an by Wang Shiwei,¹⁷ collectively titled "Wild Lilies." Why did such a thing appear? Because we did not have enough food to eat; we did not have enough nutrition, so many people felt tired and lethargic and did not have enough vitamins in our food. Thus he was able to capitalize on this. There are no "Wild Lilies" now, not only because we have undergone rectification, but also because our material conditions have improved. I talked about this problem with Comrade Gao Gang of the Northwestern Bureau. I said that we must answer Wang Shiwei's "Wild Lilies"; we should answer him in terms of reality, in terms of developing our economy and having plenty of clothing and enough food. I have been a Communist Party member for several decades, and in the past I did not know how to manage the economy. I must recognize that I did not know how and I must begin to study it now. Comrade Chen Yun told us not to destroy the machines after we enter the cities. There is an issue of learning here; if we are unable to learn the skills they will be destroyed. What should we do after we take over the machines and take over industry? This is not an easy thing, but it is an important issue. There are a great many things which we have not studied and which we need to learn.

On the problem of cadres, I would like to add a few more simple remarks to the effect that all cadres share the same glory. Every front army, every army corps, and every army share the same glory. Those comrades who work in enemy-occupied territory, in territory dominated by the Guomindang, and those who work in the liberated areas all share the same glory. Those comrades who participate in the five major domains of military work, administrative work, economic work, Party work, and cultural work all share the same glory. We cannot say that some elements are especially glorious, and the rest are not glorious at all. We were somewhat blind in the past and did some bad things. What is the long-term and serious lesson from this? It is that we should admit that every department shares the same glory, every department should be paid

attention to, there should not be the slightest manifestation of a bad attitude toward any department, and no department should be bullied or despised. As far as this is concerned, those who were wrong in the past should admit their mistakes. Today, in front of all the representatives present at this congress, I would like to repeat my words. That is, we should admit the wrongs that we have done toward other people in the past and correct them, regardless of whether I did it myself or other comrades did it. As regards comrades in the military as well as those comrades in the localities, we should admit all our past mistakes and correct them. For all the wrongs we did in the past and the inappropriate evaluations we made that annoyed you, we must recognize our faults and correct them.

Furthermore, there are the technical cadres. I forgot to mention them in my last report, and today I would like to make up for this. There are all kinds of technical cadres, such as those technical cadres who work in the communications and economic departments. We should respect all kinds of technical cadres and recognize their contributions. Regardless of whether they are in the military, in the government, or in Party organizations, our comrades in the entire Party should respect them. In the past, they did not receive good political treatment and in the future this should be improved.

4. Rectification, Cadre Investigation, and the Elimination of Traitors

We have achieved a great deal in this work of rectification, cadre investigation, and the elimination of traitors. Did we have any shortcomings and make any mistakes? Yes, we did. I am the president of the Party School, and rectification has achieved rather considerable successes in the veteran Division 1, yet there are still some shortcomings and mistakes. Division 2 did somewhat better and made considerable progress. In the future, rectification should copy the methods of Division 2 and be carried out according to this kind of progressive method.

It was most unfortunate that many people were wronged during the cadre investigation. This caused some comrades great distress, and we also regret it very much. It is exactly what is meant by “when one person is suffering, all those present feel sorry for him.” We share our happiness with all the people on Earth. We should apologize to those comrades who have been wronged. To begin with, I would like to make an apology to them at this congress. We should apologize to

them wherever they have been wronged. Why did we make mistakes? They should have been smaller in quantity, but better in quality, for after all spies are few in number. The method should have been precise rather than careless, but what we did was just the opposite—bigger in quantity and worse in quality. This was where we made mistakes. When the tide was on the rise, everyone without exception believed that there were quite a large number of spies, but when the time came for classification, everyone believed that the number was actually very small. Besides, most of those who were thought to be spies actually were not. In the past, we did not understand this problem, and it was only after the cadre investigation that we grasped it. As a consequence, in the past our evaluation of spies was like a “blind person groping for fish,” and we did not know what the exact number was. Now we know that the number is extremely small.

We have been doing this kind of work for many years. For instance, during the Civil War period, I myself once fought the AB Corps.¹⁸ In the resolution of the Ninth Conference of the Fourth Red Army, there was one article calling for the “elimination of corporal punishment.” Theoretically speaking, bourgeois democracy advocates the elimination of corporal punishment. That being the case, our proletarian Communist Party should have been even more inclined to eliminate corporal punishment a long time ago. It is only feudalism that uses corporal punishment. This resolution was made in December 1929, but in January and February 1930 we began to fight the so-called AB Corps. We said that we should not use corporal punishment, but in the end we did. Many people were killed then, and we must recognize that many people were wrongly killed. Later we made a summary, emphasizing the elimination of corporal punishment once again and that we should not be in a hurry to believe confessions. Because if corporal punishment is not eliminated and if we easily believe confessions, troubles will come. People will make confessions when they are beaten, and once they confess others will believe them, and this belief will lead to great troubles.

During the Civil War period, in the campaign to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, we took a painful detour and had such a mistaken episode. Of course, we should not negate completely the necessity to oppose counterrevolution; it is necessary to oppose counterrevolution. However, at a time when the Communist Party was still immature, we wronged many people in the elimination of counterrevolutionaries and followed a roundabout path, myself

included. During the War of Resistance, we made a mistake in the elimination of counterrevolutionaries in the Huxi area,¹⁹ and in Yan'an there was a "Rescue Campaign."²⁰ In my opinion, this error in Yan'an was not an ordinary one, since Yan'an has had a national influence. Making mistakes also has a positive side, and now I would like to elaborate on that. We made mistakes in the elimination of counterrevolutionaries from beginning to end. We also suffered numerous defeats on the battlefield, and many of our policies of one sort or the other met with numerous failures. However, many mistakes, once we have understood and corrected them and thus obtained experience, will become good weapons. By the same token, once this experience of making mistakes is in our hands, it is no small matter. The Central Committee is here, the Party School is here, the Seventh Party Congress is being held here. Once this problem is solved, the Chinese people will be victorious. Therefore, there is nothing to fear in making mistakes. We must seize these mistakes, turn them into experience, and use them as weapons. We should apologize to those comrades whom we have wronged.

Is there still sectarianism now? I hear that a comrade has said that there is no such thing as sectarianism. How should we look at this problem? In my opinion, we should not be in a hurry to deny sectarianism subjectively. Whether sectarianism exists should be demonstrated by the objective facts and should be proved in our work in the future. There is hardly any effect if we simply deny it subjectively, and it cannot be solved in this way. Some people demand that we should add one article to the Party Constitution: "Safeguard the political life of Party members." Comrades, we should never underestimate this issue. It shows that some comrades were wronged in the examination and investigation of cadres. We must definitely learn a lesson from this, take warning from it, and use it as a weapon. It will be very useful this way.

During cadre investigation, we proposed the policy of not killing a single person and not arresting the majority. The nine policies²¹ were definitely not invented in the beginning. Instead, they were drafted only after several months of gradual reflection and experience. Abolish corporal punishment, never be taken in easily by confessions, plus the nine policies, do not execute a single person, nor jail the majority—once we implemented these policies, no more mistakes were made. Nevertheless, these nine policies were not completely carried out, and many people were not even aware of them.

At present, our comrades should also be on guard against the danger of liberalism. This must be taken seriously. We achieved a great deal in the current examination and investigation of cadres. It is wrong not to make this clear. Lenin said in his book *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* [1918] that it is certain that the class which has been overthrown will definitely seek revenge and try to restore the old order. This will be proven in the future. We have never undergone such dangers in the past. Such dangers will be greatly reduced if we pay attention to them, increase our vigilance, and are on our guard against liberalism. Otherwise we will suffer great losses in the future. There are two sentiments in our Party. One is the sentiment to overdo things. When this trend arises, everyone will be in a hurry, using compulsion and confession, and believing everything. Consequently, mistakes will be made. The other sentiment is liberalism, or turning a blind eye. This is not right either and must be overcome.

5. Preparing for Change

Changing from the countryside to the cities, from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare, from reducing rent and interest to giving the peasants land—all these result from changes in the stages of the democratic revolution. We should be prepared for all these changes, and in some respects we are already prepared. Some comrades want me to explain how these changes are going to take place in the future. I do not think that it is necessary to elaborate on this now. All we have to do is to study the concrete circumstances and prepare on that basis. For instance, we may want to focus on twenty to thirty brigades, arm them with modern weapons, and send them to attack the big cities. This requires preparation. The Military Committee of the Central Committee will be in charge of the specific planning. After going back, every comrade should tell all the localities that preparations must begin immediately, Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] has already elaborated on this problem. Going to the cities is a very big issue. At present, our Seventh Party Congress can only raise such an issue: We must be prepared spiritually. The concrete things that we can do now are to send some people over there, to select some people for training, or to send a few more people to train the underground army. After Japan is driven out, if we take over the cities, our top priority will be to solve the problem of food and clothing. All

you generals present today, if you take Beijing,²² but there is no coal to burn, or if you take Shanghai, but there is no food to eat and the trains and trolleys cannot run, what are you going to do? Consequently, we must be mentally prepared for this now.

There is another point that I would like to stress—that is, the importance of the workers movement. This issue has already been raised at the Seventh Party Congress. We should pay close attention to and train those comrades who previously dealt with the workers movement. The entire situation can change greatly once we have taken the big cities. This transformation has not yet taken place today, and we are not yet aware of the problems. This is a very important change, so we must pay attention to it.

Another problem concerns the Northeast. The Northeast is an extremely important region, and it may be under our leadership in the future. What would be the significance for the Chinese Revolution if the Northeast were to come under our leadership? In my opinion, we can put it this way. Our victory would have a solid basis—that is, our victory would be decided. At present, these few base areas of ours are separated from one another by the enemy. None of our strongholds and base areas are stable. Without any industry, they are in danger of being eliminated. For this reason, we must contend for the cities, contend for any solid piece of land. If we had a large piece of a genuine base area, including the Northeast, then speaking from the point view of the entire nation, the victory of the Chinese Revolution would have a basis, a strong and solid basis. Do we have a basis now? Yes, we do, but it is not consolidated, since we still do not have any industry, any heavy industry, nor any mechanized troops. If we had the Northeast, the big cities would be connected with the base areas. In that case, our victory in the whole country would have a solid basis.

6. On Political Line

This congress of ours gives us a weapon to examine the work of the whole nation. With this weapon, we will be able to examine all kinds of work in the whole country.

On the problem of political line, can we say the following? During the eight years of the War of Resistance, in these eight years and in the context of the entire nation, the line has been correct. This is the first point. Second, with regard

to certain regions, certain periods, certain departments, and certain comrades, there have been mistakes. Here I will not discuss whether these mistakes are large, medium, or small, nor will I specify whether they are mistakes of line, serious mistakes of principle, or mistakes about certain specific issues. All these mistakes are included. The line will be complete if the first and second aspects are combined. It is wrong to ignore either aspect.

7. On Military Line

Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] gave a very good speech on this issue. We may also discuss it in accordance with the above method—that is, in terms of the eight years and the entire nation, the line has been correct, but as regards certain periods, certain regions, certain departments, and certain comrades, there have been mistakes. In the final analysis, what do these “certains” refer to? I cannot explain clearly today, but everybody should study it.

8. Will Our Party Be Able to Lead the Big Landlords and the Big Bourgeoisie?

In my opinion, this depends on the specific circumstances. We may be able to lead, or we may not be able to lead. Sometimes we can, but at other times we cannot. For example, we are unable to lead the big bourgeoisie and Hitler in Germany, nor are we able to lead Wang Jingwei. They want to overthrow us, so how can we lead them? As far as Chiang Kaishek is concerned, it depends on the specific situation. He did make some progress at the beginning of the War of Resistance. It is not wrong if we say he did it because we criticized him and imposed pressure on him. Is this leadership or influence? I call it influence; we have had some influence on him. However, he later created some trouble. He held a Fifth Plenum and wanted to wipe us out; we cannot say that we were leading him. Hence, we must decide things in the light of circumstances. In his article “On the Foundations of Leninism,” Stalin once said that the king of Afghanistan wanted to defend the feudal system, but the anti-imperialist struggle he led for the independence of Afghanistan was in reality a revolutionary struggle. By the same token, the struggle carried out by the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intellectuals for the independence of Egypt was objectively a revolutionary struggle. During the anti-imperialist period, the big bourgeoisie and the big landlord class can also become allies of the proletariat. In our struggle against Japanese imperialism, the big bourgeoisie and big landlord class can

become our allies. Sometimes they are under our leadership.

The leadership authority of the proletariat is mainly targeted not at the big bourgeoisie and big landlord class but, rather, at the peasants and petty bourgeoisie. We should free the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie from the influence of the big bourgeoisie and the big landlord class and put them under our leadership.

How about the formula of “shared leadership”? To me, it does not matter much how you say it but how you do it. Take, for example, the present San Francisco Conference. Stand up at the conference and say, “I want to lead you.” Nobody would say such a thing. All that they said is that the Five Great Powers share the leadership. The Crimea Conference was also led by the Big Three. Therefore, it does not matter how you say it but, rather, how you do it, how the leaders lead. During our cooperation with Sun Yatsen in the past, we also said “under the leadership of Sun Yatsen,” but in fact it was a shared leadership. In the early days of the War of Resistance, we said that we would carry on the War of Resistance until the very end under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang. Was this formulation wrong or not? I say it was not wrong. Because if we wanted to fight against Japan, there had to be a leader. At that time, Chiang Kaishek was the leader of China. He had so many troops, and, moreover, he was recognized by foreign countries. Nevertheless, he later became anti-Communist. We seldom used that word or even stopped using it completely. We changed it into establishing a coalition government—that is, to reforming that government of his. If we speak of shared leadership, it means that you would lead your group, the army of the central government; we would lead the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the broad masses of the people, go all out to mobilize the masses, and strengthen the people’s forces. In spite of that, the “shared leadership” in the past was, in fact, the leadership of the Guomindang alone. That was where the problem lay.

9. Is There Still Any Hope for the Negotiations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party?

We have always advocated negotiations, and this is also stipulated in the documents of the Seventh Party Congress, but there is absolutely no hope of reaching any agreement. At present, however, we will not proclaim this to the

people of the whole country, because once we do that, the next step will necessarily be to overthrow Chiang Kaishek. We say that there is still a slight possibility now, and we will not give it up, which means that we will continue to negotiate so long as there has not been a breakup. We always demand that Chiang Kaishek wash his face and reform. If some day he wears a big colorful mask and launches a civil war, then our Party will call on the people in the whole country to stand up and overthrow Chiang Kaishek. Now we should still try our best to prevent a civil war. We will not refuse to negotiate with him under certain conditions. This is where we stand.

Is there any hope of setting up a coalition government? We should try our utmost to achieve it. In the future, if a Federation of the Chinese People's Liberated Areas can be established, we will still telegraph him and ask him to organize a coalition government. We always invite him, but he always refuses to come, just like a bride who refuses to board the bridal sedan chair. What shall we do then? If you do not come, we will invite you. If you still refuse to come, we will invite you again. So long as there has not been a complete breakup, we will continue to invite you. Even if a breakup is going to take place tomorrow, we will continue to invite you.

10. On the Chinese People's Liberation Federation

We said in our document that we are going to call for a people's representatives meeting of the liberated areas. Once such a meeting is in session, we will set up a Chinese People's Liberation Federation or will call it the Federation of the Chinese People's Liberated Areas.²³ China is seeking liberation, hence the name Liberation Federation. Is it an administrative institution? We have already telegraphed every region that this is not a second central government. It is not like the Central Government of the soviet areas we set up during the Civil War, nor is the same situation as when we were organizing the Soviet Central Government. Its name is not that of a government; instead, it is called a Liberation Federation. Does it have the characteristics of an organ of political power? We say that it has the authority to issue orders and has the characteristics of a political regime. It is an organizational form during the transitional period for the purpose of unifying all the liberated areas for the struggle. When should it be held? Approximately in November.

Here I would also like to talk about cooperation outside the Party. The whole Party should pay attention to cooperation with nonmembers of the Party. Furthermore, we should strengthen this cooperation, so that we will be able to unite more people and unite them even better. A united front is a special science. Many people within our Party have not yet mastered it. Many people are not good at cooperating with non-Party members. We must master this science.

11. Party Character and Individuality

This is a problem about universality and difference, about the relationship between the collective and the individual. In our Party and in our liberated areas, the people enjoy a very substantial degree of freedom, independence, and individuality. In a feudal system, by contrast, the people do not have dignity nor do they have freedom, independence, or individuality. Marx said: "In a bourgeois society, capital has independence and individuality, but the living people do not." In the feudal system in China, the great majority of the people do not have independence and individuality either. The reason is that they do not have any property. Independence and individuality, as well as dignity, all mean the same thing. They are the product of ownership. The Chinese landlord class and bourgeoisie have property ownership. They cause a great many people to go bankrupt. They reduce the peasants and petty bourgeoisie to bankruptcy. Property is concentrated in their hands. They themselves have independence, individuality, and freedom, but the majority of the people has lost their ownership of property. Consequently, they do not have individuality, independence, and freedom, or these are weakened. Therefore, in order to restore their personality we should carry out a revolutionary struggle. For example, we organized workers unions, organized the workers in the capitalists' factories, reduced the rent and interest rates in the liberated areas, and set up the people's armed forces and political power. This will enable the people to have individuality, freedom, and dignity. As far as our Party is concerned, it is one indispensable part of the people from the very beginning. Naturally, it cannot deny Party members of worker, intellectual, and peasant backgrounds their human dignity. If the people have dignity, so will our Party. If the people do not have any dignity, how can our Party have any? We should educate our Party members so that they are conscious and aware of the fact that many people in

society do not have dignity and freedom. We must work hard for their freedom. In the liberated areas under our Party's leadership, not only does everybody in society have dignity, independence, and freedom. In addition, under the education of our Party, their dignity, independence, and freedom are further developed. Regarding this issue, Marx made things very clear in *The Communist Manifesto*. He said: "The free development of each person is the condition of the free development of all." It is unthinkable that each individual cannot develop, but society can. By the same token, it is unthinkable that our Party has a Party character, but each Party member does not and is like a piece of wood. In that case, 1.2 million Party members would be like 1.2 million pieces of wood. Speaking of this, two lines of a poem by Gong Zizhen²⁴ come to mind: "I hope that the Ruler of Heaven will enliven himself and create all kinds of talent." Within our Party I would like to put it this way: "I hope that Marxism-Leninism will enliven itself and create all kinds of talent." We must not let our Party members become paper or pottery figures and make them all resemble one another. Actually, there are all kinds of human beings, and so long as one of these is willing to be subject to the Party's principles, constitution, and resolutions, it is fine if everybody can manifest their full talents under this general principle. If we make this point clear, it will be very helpful to Party progress and to bringing out the initiative of every Party member.

There are two kinds of individuality—that is, a creative individuality and a destructive individuality. This is true regarding our Party, and it is also true regarding society. What is creative individuality? Take the model workers, excellent shots, inventors, and cadres who can work independently. They are not only brave in the struggle outside the Party but also brave in the struggle inside the Party. They are seldom blind, never say what others want them to say, and do not raise their hands before they completely understand what is going on. Such is creative individuality, and it fits in completely and is harmonious with the Party's character. The other type of individuality is destructive and individualistic, placing individual interest at the top of the list and liking to start something new in order to be different. In fact, there are two kinds of starting something new in order to be different. One is revolutionary, such as the model workers, labor heroes, and inventors. They make a lot of good suggestions and make more progress than many people. This is a kind of creative and

revolutionary starting something new in order to be different. The other kind is destructive. It goes beyond the limits of the proletariat and is not in harmony with the Party's character. It follows the orientation, line, and policy of the petty bourgeoisie, and it is wrong. Marx defined two kinds of independence and individuality. One is marked by revolutionary independence and character; the other is marked by reactionary independence and character. Unified action, unified opinion, and collectivism are the Party's characteristics. We should concentrate on many conscious individualities, take unified action, and have unified opinions and a unified will toward certain problems and certain affairs. This is what our Party's character demands. Some argue that the so-called development of individuality actually means that if we support new democracy, there must be another group of people who oppose new democracy. Only this can be regarded as the development of individuality. If we want to fight against Japan, there must be another group of people who oppose fighting against Japan. Only this can be regarded as the development of individuality. If we are against Wang Jingwei, there must be a group of people who support Wang Jingwei; only this can be regarded as the development of individuality. We are firmly against this kind of development of individuality.

Within Party character and individuality, there is Party character as well as individuality in rectification; there is Party character as well as individuality in production; there is Party character and individuality in military work; there is Party character and individuality in government work; there is Party character and individuality in every bit of work and everything we do. This kind of individuality must be unified with the Party character.

12. Theoretical Work

We must absorb the experience of foreign parties and that of the Comintern. I made this clear last time. To strengthen our theoretical study, we must read at least five books. I would like to recommend these five books to you comrades: *The Communist Manifesto*, *The Development of Socialism from Utopian to Scientific*, *Two Tactics of the Social Democratic Party in the Democratic Revolution*, *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, and the *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*. This list includes Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. It will be very good and helpful if 5,000

to 10,000 people have read and generally understood them. You can put these five books in your food bag, read them once or a few sentences after each campaign, put them away if you find them uninteresting, and read a few more lines if they are interesting. You will be able to catch their theme after repeated reading. If you cannot understand them in one year, then spend two years. If you can read all of them once in two years, you will be able to read them five times in ten years. You should write down the date in the back after each reading, I read it on such and such a date. This method should be promoted in every region. We will not assign too many books, but only five as an experiment. Moreover, we should often pay attention to articles such as declarations and outlines of foreign Communist parties in the newspaper. Watch what they are doing. In the past, the Comintern was of great help to the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese people. It helped the Chinese proletariat establish the Chinese Communist Party. It made great contributions. This was made clear in the resolution of our Party when the Comintern was dissolved.

Where did dogmatism come from? Did it come from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin? No, it did not. They constantly remind us in their works, saying that their doctrines are compasses for action and weapons rather than dogma. What they said is not dogma, but we turn it into dogma after we read it. This is because we were unable to understand it and did not know how to read it. How can we blame them? Many people do not take theoretical work seriously, and it seems to them that this work is not serious. It is wrong to waver in one's view toward theoretical work. We should respect the translators and writers of theoretical articles, and we should talk more with them. We will not be able to understand foreign books without translators. They are contributing a lot by translating foreign books. Even if they have only translated one book in their whole life, they have made a contribution. It is wrong if other people do not take this work seriously. Neither is it right if those comrades who do this kind of work waver in their understanding of this work themselves. Some people have repeatedly asked to change their work, claiming that this work is looked down upon and asking to do other work. Do not look down upon those comrades who make translations. If we do not translate some foreign things, how can China know what Marxism is? There have always been translators in Chinese history. Tang Seng was a great translator.²⁵ He built a translation office after coming back from his journey,

translating the Buddhist classics. On the first page of *The Complete Works of Lu Xun*, by Cai Yuanpei,²⁶ there is a preface with several beautifully written sentences. He said that Lu Xun was both a well-read man and a modest man. He translated the works of many foreign literary writers, and his translated works occupy 50 percent of the space in his complete works. Therefore, it is wrong either to look down upon this work or to waver regarding it.

13. Seeking Truth from Facts

First, we can only take one position at a time, and our strength can only be accumulated bit by bit. This is a question of seeking truth from facts. Our experience in the past twenty-four years has proven that it is impossible to overthrow a dynasty with one single blow. The land is gained inch by inch, and this is called “fight over every inch of land.” Our enemies, the Japanese and Chiang Kaishek, will also fight us over every inch of land. The number of guns we have increases one by one. Our region expands little by little, but by putting them together, we will be big and strong and will be able to take over the realm. We should be realists. Naturally, this is revolutionary realism; there is idealist realism. Stalin told us that we should learn pragmatism from the Americans. In addition, we should also have the revolutionary spirit of the Russians and combine the two. We must have a scientific spirit, revolutionary realism, and conscientiously, bit by bit, and, one by one, take over the strongholds of the enemy. Only thus can there be relative stability.

Second, this congress of ours emphasizes the spirit of unity, which means that we should unite under one principle, unite on the basis of the correct line. It is a unity of fresh-mindedness rather than blindness. Comrades! I have told you many times about the story of the foolish old man who moved the mountain, and my purpose is for you to learn this spirit of the foolish old man. We must remove the counterrevolutionary mountain in China and remove the mountain of Japanese imperialism!

Long live the liberation of the Chinese people!

Long live the Chinese Communist Party!

Long live the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party!

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 376–422, where it is reproduced from a transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) The Zhongshan Warship Incident of March 1926 involved the use of the warship and the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy, pitting Li Zhilong, a Communist and the acting head of the Navy Bureau, against Chiang Kaishek. Chiang proclaimed martial law in Guangzhou and ordered that the Communists be either put under surveillance or imprisoned.

[2.](#) On Wang Jingwei, see above, note to the text of March 30, 1942.

[3.](#) The San Francisco Conference, which opened on April 25, 1945, was the founding meeting of the United Nations.

[4.](#) On the Crimea Conference, see above, note 1 to the text of February 15, 1945.

[5.](#) V.M. Molotov (1890–1986) was at this time first vice chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and foreign commissar of the Soviet Union. He was the delegate of the Soviet Union to the San Francisco Conference.

[6.](#) Lenin, “On the Grain Tax.” See *Liening quanji* (Complete Works of Lenin), Vol. 41 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986), p. 378.

[7.](#) See the text of January 15, 1940, in Vol. VII, pp. 330–69.

[8.](#) Sir Ronald Scobie (1893–1969) was the commander-in-chief of the British army stationed in Greece during World War II.

[9.](#) Ninety *li* is about 22 km. Mao’s meaning is to recommend the value of strategic compromise. The Battle of Chengpu took place in Chengpu, which is now the southwestern part of Yuncheng county of Shandong Province, in 632 BCE. In this battle, the Jin army defeated the more powerful Chu army that had many more troops.

[10.](#) Quotation from “Ximing” (“The Western Inscription”), a well-known essay by Zhang Zai (1020–1077), a famous Song neo-Confucian. Like many in his generation, Mao might have memorized this one-page essay in school. His recollection of this penultimate line of “Ximing” is slightly off (using different characters for the various tribulations), but the meaning is the same.

[11.](#) Regarding Chen Duxiu, see above, note to the text of March 30, 1942.

[12.](#) Three revolutionary dramas produced in Yan’an. On “Driven to Liangshan,” see above, Mao’s letter to

the authors, the text of January 9, 1944.

[13.](#) Referring to the Senior Cadres Conference held by the Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in Yan'an from October 19, 1942 to January 14, 1943.

[14.](#) Famous rules for the Red Army in 1927–1928; see Vol. III, p. 283, n2.

[15.](#) On Zhang Guotao, see above, note 7 to the text of March 5, 1944.

[16.](#) On the Sixth Plenum (1938), see above, note 1 to the text of May 21, 1944.

[17.](#) On Wang Shiwei, see above, pp. 851–53 and note 3 to the text of March 22, 1944.

[18.](#) The AB Corps, or Anti-Bolshevik League, was the imagined Fifth Column in the Jiangxi soviet area that culminated in the notorious Futian Incident (1930); see the Introduction and related texts for details in Vol. III.

[19.](#) The Huxi area refers to the border region between Jiangsu, Shandong, and Henan provinces west of Weishan Lake. From August to November 1938, the so-called anti-Trotskyist campaign went to an extreme in this area, and many cadres were wrongly labeled “Trotskyists” and brutally persecuted or executed.

[20.](#) The “Rescue Campaign” took place in the context of the Rectification Campaign of 1942 and represented the most brutal part of the rectification. During the “Rescue Campaign,” many cadres were wronged, tortured, or killed. See Mao’s telegram on these problems in the text of February 26, 1944 and further discussion in the Introduction to this volume.

[21.](#) Regarding the “Nine Policies,” see above, the text of July 30, 1943, titled “On the Nine Guiding Principles for Cadre Screening and the Eight Policies for the Areas Behind Enemy Lines.”

[22.](#) This appears to be an insertion by the editors of *Mao Zedong wenji*, as Mao would have used the current usage in 1945, “Beiping.”

[23.](#) Mao discusses such a federation in his “Oral Political Report” on April 24, 1945, above, in question 11 of Section 2: A Few Questions on Policy, as well in a deleted paragraph of the original text of “On Coalition Government,” on April 24, 1945, above. The Chinese formulations appear in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 334 and 414 and *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, p. 220. A preliminary meeting for such a federation was held in Yan’an in July 1945, but further plans were eclipsed by the Japanese surrender in August.

[24.](#) Gong Zizhen (1792–1841) was a thinker, writer, and poet during the Qing dynasty.

[25.](#) Better known as Xuanzang (602–664), the famous Buddhist monk of the Tang dynasty who traveled to India to collect Buddhist texts.

[26.](#) Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940) was a well-known democrat and educator in modern China. He held the

positions of minister of education, president of Peking University, and president of the Academia Sinica in the 1910s and 1920s.

*On the Question of the Election of
Alternate Members to the Central
Committee of the Seventh Party
Congress¹*
(June 10, 1945)

1. Today is the election for the alternate members of the Central Committee. Comrades, do not think that we can be less careful because this is an election of alternate committee members. This election is still highly significant because we will elect thirty-four members, which is not a small number, and they will be participating in the work of the Central Committee as well as attending meetings. They will have the right to free speech, and they may make suggestions, and when there are vacancies in the formal Central Committee they will fill them. And if the Eighth Party Congress is postponed, the alternate Central Committee members will play an even larger role. We therefore hope that everyone will take this election seriously.

After the election of the formal Central Committee members yesterday, a comrade wrote a letter to the Presidium expressing the hope that we would be careful in this election to elect those comrades to the Central Committee who are able to carry out the line of this congress. The Presidium has already stated this general policy, and I represented the Presidium in issuing a report here, which every delegation considered and discussed for several days. You followed this policy when you elected the formal Central Committee yesterday. So why did this comrade need to bring up this issue again after the election yesterday? What he meant was that some candidates may not be well known or might even have

shortcomings in some areas or have made mistakes, but that in the long run they have shown themselves to be capable of carrying out the line of the congress. We should not refuse to elect someone like this simply because he is not well known or has a few shortcomings or has made a few mistakes. I think that this comrade's opinion is very good and that it represents the opinion of the majority.

2. In yesterday's election, Comrade Wang Jiaxiang² received 204 votes, which was not a majority, so he was not elected. I would like to say a few words about this.

Comrade Wang Jiaxiang has made mistakes. He made mistakes of line around the time of the Fourth Plenum,³ and afterward he made a few more mistakes. But he has also made contributions. His contributions consist mainly of the following:

To begin with, after the Fourth Plenum the Central Committee sent a delegation to the central soviet area. The delegation consisted of three people: Comrades Ren Bishi,⁴ Wang Jiaxiang, and Gu Zuolin.⁵ They arrived after the end of the first anti-“encirclement and suppression” campaign. Comrade Wang Jiaxiang participated in the second, third, and fourth battles against “encircling and suppression.” At that time, we felt that if it had not been for the help of that delegation, especially the help of Comrades Ren Bishi and Wang Jiaxiang, our campaign against “peeling radishes” would not have gone as smoothly. “Radish-peeling” refers to a policy of advocating not fighting and marching around until bumping into a “small radish” and then peeling it. At that time, we upheld the idea of fighting the enemy, of sneaking in among the enemy and finding their weak points and then attacking. Those who upheld “radish peeling” opposed us, saying that our way was just hair splitting and went nowhere. If it had not been for the support and trust of the delegation, especially Comrade Wang Jiaxiang, I and the commander-in-chief [i.e., Zhu De] would have had problems. Even though Comrade Wang Jiaxiang made errors at two later meetings in the soviet area—the central soviet area party congress and the first soviet congress—still, what I have just said is his contribution. Comrade Wang Jiaxiang was injured at the end of the fourth anti-“encirclement and suppression” movement.

Second, everyone who has studied Party history and the Party line knows that in the history of the Chinese Communist Party, there have been two crucial meetings. One was the Zunyi Conference⁶ of January 1935, and the second was the Sixth Plenum in 1938. The Zunyi Conference was crucial, and its influence on

the Chinese Revolution has been enormous. But everyone should know that if it had not been for Comrades Luo Fu⁷ and Wang Jiaxiang splitting from the third “Leftist” line, the Zunyi Conference could not have succeeded. You comrades have given me credit, but we should not forget these two men. Of course, many others participated in the Zunyi Conference, and it also was a long time in the making. Without the participation and support of these other comrades, of course having only the two would not have been enough, but these two broke away from the third “Leftist” line and thus played a large role in the conference. Ever since the Long March, Comrade Wang Jiaxiang has opposed the third “Leftist” line.

Since the Zunyi Conference, the leadership line of the Central Committee has been correct, but it has suffered setbacks along the way. The December Conference at the start of the War of Resistance was one of them. What would have happened if the situation at the December Conference⁸ had continued? Someone said he was told by the Communist International [Comintern] to return to China because the situation here was not good and we needed a new policy. This so-called new policy was primarily based on two issues: that of the United Front and that of the war. On the question of the United Front, the issue was whether we wanted to maintain an independent initiative or to weaken or lose it; on the question of the war, the issue was whether it was a mobile war or a war fought by guerrillas with an independent initiative. The Sixth Plenum decided China’s fate. Though there were some writings before the Sixth Plenum, such as “On Protracted War,”⁹ nevertheless, if not for the directive of the Comintern, the Sixth Plenum would have had a difficult time resolving these questions. And it was Comrade Wang Jiaxiang who brought back the directive from the Comintern when he returned from the Soviet Union after he had recovered from his illness there. Comrade Wang Jiaxiang transmitted this directive.

Third, ever since then, Comrade Wang Jiaxiang has worked at the Central Committee. Although he has shortcomings in his work—for example, there are large shortcomings in his political work—he has also done many good things. For example, he drafted the 1939 resolution on solidifying the Party, the 1941 resolution on strengthening Party spirit, and, in 1942, the resolution on unifying Party leadership, the directive on attitudes toward the cadres of the Fourth Front Army, and the fourth directive on army building. He and Comrade Wang

Ruofei¹⁰ cooperated in drafting the resolution on strengthening Party spirit under his, Wang Jiaxiang's, leadership, and he also led Comrade Ye Jianying in the drafting of the fourth directive on army building.

As for the fact that he has some shortcomings, for example, in his relations with other cadres, this is something that everyone knows. But what I have just told you are things that not everyone knows, since they are internal affairs of the Central Committee, and so I needed to say a few words about them today.

Although he has made Party line mistakes and has shortcomings, he also has made contributions. He is ill right now, and his illness is related to the wounds that he received during the fourth anti-“encirclement and suppression” campaign. We have already copied and distributed a letter that he wrote to me so that everyone may read it.¹¹ Some comrades say he wrote too simplistically, but he did indeed think for a long time before deciding to write.

I believe that he will be able to carry out the line of this congress. And this is proved by looking at the past, at the time when the third “Leftist” line reached its peak after the Fourth Plenum, during the Zunyi Conference, and during the Sixth Plenum.

He was not elected in the election of formal Central Committee members yesterday, so the Presidium has made him the first among the candidates for the alternate committee. We hope that everyone will vote for him.

3. On the question of the Northeast, in my opinion we should elect comrades from the Northeast in this election. The Northeast is very important; from the point of view of our Party and of the immediate future of the Chinese Revolution, the Northeast is uniquely important. If we were to lose all our present base areas, so long as we had the Northeast, the Chinese Revolution would still have a solid foundation. Of course, if no base areas are lost, and we also have the Northwest, the foundation for the Chinese Revolution will be even more solid. Right now our foundation is not solid and we do not think it is. Why isn't it? Because, in terms of the economy, our base areas rely on handicrafts; we do not yet have large-scale industry or heavy industry. Also, in terms of geography, our base areas are not all connected. Therefore, I think we should elect comrades from the Northeast in this election. Of course, this is only a suggestion, which I ask you comrades to consider.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 423–26, where it is reproduced from a transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.

- [1.](#) This is a report that Mao Zedong delivered at the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.
- [2.](#) On Wang Jiaxiang, see above, note to the text of February 21, 1942.
- [3.](#) On the Fourth Plenum (1931), see above, note to the text of October 14, 1943.
- [4.](#) On Ren Bishi, see above, note to the text of January 23, 1942.
- [5.](#) Gu Zuolin (1907–1934) went to the Jiangxi Base Area as a member of the delegation of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the spring of 1938 and was then a member of the Central Bureau of the central soviet region.
- [6.](#) On the Zunyi Conference, see above, note to the text of March 5, 1944.
- [7.](#) Luo Fu, pseudonym for Zhang Wentian. He went to the Central Revolutionary Base Area in January 1931 and was elected to the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Provisional Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1931. He became a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee in January 1934 and chairman of the People’s Committee of the Central Government of the Soviet Republic. He supported Mao Zedong at the Zunyi Conference and drafted the conference resolution. After the conference, he took the place of Bo Gu as head of the Central Committee.
- [8.](#) On the December Conference (1937), see above, note 4 to the text of March 31, 1945.
- [9.](#) Mao’s essay from May 26, 1938, see Vol. VI, pp. 319–89.
- [10.](#) Wang Ruofei was at this time head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and head of the Center for Party Affairs Research; see also, above, note to the text of February 12, 1945.
- [11.](#) The editors of *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 427–28, n13, provide the context and some quotations from Wang Jiaxiang’s two letters to Mao.

*Guiding Principles for Action for the Units Under Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao*¹

(June 15, 1945)

To Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao and to inform Zheng [Weisan] and Li [Xiannian]:

In current operations,² although there have been sacrifices, there have also been gains. For the past several months, your actions in the border regions of Hunan and Hubei have met with success. Only Wang Lingji³ has concentrated on us, and as the area is [too] small for maneuvering our main force, we are already stationed in a passive position. Henceforth, the guiding policies will be restricted to (1) remaining in your current position; (2) developing toward the south. If you succeed in the second policy you should also (1) have Wang Zhen advance southward with crack troops and have [Wang] Shoudao command the remainder in their present locations; [or] (2) the two of you should command an advance southward with the main force (the majority of them), leaving a small section with Zhang Tixue⁴ to create [a force] for the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region to await Zhang Qilong, Wen Niansheng, and others.⁵

There are two goals when you advance southward: (1) to drive straight to the border of Guangdong within about three months in order to create a base area and zone of guerrilla warfare between the five points of Ganzhou, Shaozhou, Wuzhou, Guilin, and Hengzhou⁶ so that you can merge with the units in Guangdong. Qilong, Niansheng, and others will advance to the same area within about eight months and establish a southern front while preparing for being cut off. (2) You will advance to the Hengbao region⁷ and establish a base area. Zhang

Qilong will lead the 39th Brigade⁸ to advance to the region afterward, meanwhile Wen's brigade will advance to the Hunan-Guangdong Border Region to establish communications and also prepare for being cut off.

Please reply with your thoughts as to which of the above policies are the most suitable. At present, the situation is favorable for us. The South Pacific War Zone is under the responsibility of Britain, the U.S. Army is not attacking Guangdong, and the Japanese have abandoned Nanning, shortened their lines of defense, consolidated along the Guangzhou-Hankou railway, and attacked Sannan⁹ and Heyuan to the east. The U.S. military still needs time to transfer eastward from Europe, so the deciding battles between the United States and Japan will be sometime after summer of next year. Thus, you still have between a year and a year and a half or more of time to use. After this, if there is some sort of change, [it is] possible that the Guomintang will start a civil war. At that time, your base area should have a relatively appropriate scope to facilitate the civil war and to make the southern wing [of the army]. This mission has a great deal of significance. We hope that you consider this future in your reply.

The Military Commission

Notes

Our copy of this text is from *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 797–98, where it is reproduced from a handwritten copy.

¹. This is a telegram that Mao Zedong composed on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party Military Commission. It was sent to the commander of the New Fourth Army in the Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi theater, Wang Zhen, and Wang Shoudao, the political commissar of the New Fourth Army who was concurrently secretary for the temporary front and the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region.

². On June 6–7, 1945, the New Fourth Army in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi theater fought against the Guomintang's Ninety-second Division of the Ninety-ninth Army Group.

³. At the time, Wang Lingji (1883–1967) was the Guomintang deputy commander of the Ninth Battlefront and the overall commander of the Thirtieth Army Group.

⁴. At that time, Zhang Tixue (1915–1973) was the assistant commander of the Communist forces in the

Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi theater.

5. Zhang Qilong (1900–1987) and Wen Niansheng (1906–1968) were sharing responsibilities as the political commissars of the Second Guerrilla Detachment of the Eighth Route Army and commanders of the Third Detachment.

6. Shaozhou is now called Shaoguan. Hengzhou is now called Hengyang.

7. A reference to the area around Hengyang and Shanyang in Hunan Province.

8. This is a reference to the second echelon of the 39th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army. In July 1945 it became the Second Guerrilla Detachment of the Eighth Route Army headed southward.

9. This is a reference to Quannan, Longnan, and Dingnan counties in Jiangxi Province.

Responsible Official of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Announces It Will Not Attend This Session of the National Political Council (June 16, 1945)

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, June 16) A reporter from the New China News Agency interviewed a responsible official of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee regarding whether it will send a representative to the National Political Council meeting called by the Guomindang government on July 7. His response is as follows:

The Guomindang government has decided to convene a so-called National Political Council on July 7 of this year, but the Chinese Communist Party will not be sending anyone to attend the meeting. The reasons are:

1. Since last September, the Chinese Communist Party, the China Democratic League, and many other democratic figures unanimously demanded that the Guomindang government immediately eliminate one-party dictatorship, hold a conference with representatives of all parties and independents, set up a provisional democratic coalition government, issue democratic guiding principles, and bring about democratic reforms in order to mobilize and unite the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people and defeat the Japanese invaders through strong cooperation with the Allied countries. Moreover, it has been demanded that after the liberation of the entire territory of the country, based on this coalition government, according to democratic principles, a free and unrestrained democratic election will be held, a national representatives congress will be

convened, a constitution drafted, and a formal government elected. This position, in fact, reflects the public opinion of the majority of the people. But after several talks between representatives of this Party and of the Guomintang government, it has been rejected by the Guomintang government. They are not willing to carry out some of the minimum conditions for restoring unity and establishing a coalition government, such as elimination of the laws that suppress the people's freedom, elimination of secret agents, release of Chinese Communist Party members and all other patriots being held captive, recognition of the legal status of the Chinese Communist Party and the other democratic parties, recognition of China's liberated areas, withdrawal of the troops that are besieging and attacking these liberated areas, and so forth. Instead, they have intensified and strengthened reactionary measures to undermine unity and the War of Resistance Against Japan.

2. The Guomintang authorities did not consult with this Party beforehand about assembling this so-called new National Political Council, nor did it consult with the other democratic parties. It has been manipulated entirely by the Guomintang alone, just like all past National Political Council meetings. According to the law of the Guomintang government, the Chinese Communist Party and the other democratic parties have never had legal status. The Political Council members of the Chinese Communist Party were not chosen by the Chinese Communist Party itself; rather, they were appointed by the Guomintang authorities. Moreover, the anti-Japanese forces led by the Chinese Communist Party have now become the central force for defeating the national enemy and liberating the Chinese people. The Guomintang government's attitude toward the Chinese Communist Party not only runs counter to democratic principles but also does not fit with the status of the Chinese Communist Party's position in the War of Resistance Against Japan.

3. Of particular importance is that the Guomintang's Sixth National Congress ignored all the opposing opinions of the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party, and the other democratic parties, instead clinging obstinately to its decision to hold the so-called national conference on November 12 of this year, which was solely manipulated by the Guomintang and which will divide the people and prepare for civil war. Moreover, in order to carry out the reactionary Guomintang resolutions, many specific methods will be forced through at the

National Political Council that is soon to be held. If this happens, it will be a big mistake, and an anti-national, anti-popular, and anti-democratic large-scale civil war will erupt. It is very clear that this result will help only the Japanese invaders. For each of the reasons explained above, the Chinese Communist Party has decided not to attend this National Political Council meeting to show its objection.

Note

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 285–86, where it is reproduced from the June 17, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

Speech at the Memorial Assembly for Chinese Revolutionary Martyrs (June 17, 1945)

Comrades:

Today the representatives to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and the representatives of the people of Yan'an jointly gather for a memorial assembly to mourn those in the Chinese revolutionary forces who sacrificed themselves on every front during the past few decades. Among these martyrs are several hundred thousand Chinese Communist Party members and millions of revolutionary democrats. Among them are comrades in military work, comrades engaged in all kinds of mass movements, comrades engaged in administrative work, comrades engaged in Party affairs, and comrades engaged in technical work. They range from the very high ranking to cooks, grooms, fighters, workers, and peasants. It is these two groups of people, Communists and revolutionary democrats, who united to fight our enemy. In the beginning, such an army made up of these two groups of people was not big at all. Later, it gradually grew, and now it is quite large. At the beginning, its lines, principles, policies, and methods only had a direction. As for how it could become better and more correct, this was achieved through protracted struggle and through the blood and sacrifice of several hundred thousand Communist Party members and millions of revolutionary people. We have had our Seventh Party Congress, and the Chinese Communist Party has made a set of lines, programs, and policies for building a new China that is independent, free, democratic, unified, and rich and strong. Where did these things come from? They did not come from the brains of a few individuals, and they were not invented by a few individuals. Instead, they

are the results of several decades of struggle by millions of Chinese people led by their vanguard—the Chinese Communist Party. It is only through this experience that we have the resolutions and documents of the Seventh Party Congress.

China has two big enemies, two big mountains that are oppressing our 450 million people. One mountain is imperialism, whereas the other is feudalism. Domestic and foreign oppression are pressing on the heads of 450 million people to prevent them from rising up and are destroying our productivity. The productivity of the Chinese people should be developed. China should develop and become a modern country, a country with ample clothing and enough food as well as wealth and strength. To achieve this, we must liberate productivity and destroy imperialism and feudalism. It is imperialism and feudalism that impede the productivity of the Chinese people. Without destroying them, China will be unable to develop and make progress and will be in danger of being eliminated. Imperialism began to encroach upon China as early as more than one hundred years ago. Now we have been fighting against Japanese imperialism for eight years. It has been over ten years if we count from the Mukden Incident. Japanese imperialism is our number-one enemy. In reality, the domestic reactionaries in China are oppressing the Chinese people hand in glove with the Japanese invaders. These reactionary forces are still very strong. They oppress all Chinese people and constrain their productivity so that they cannot grow. What does the revolution do? It breaks this oppression, liberates the productivity of the Chinese people, and liberates the Chinese people so that they will have freedom. Therefore, we should first obtain national independence and then democracy. Without these two things, China will not be unified or rich and strong. Without independence, China will continue to suffer from imperialist oppression. Without democracy, China will continue to suffer from feudal oppression. Would we then still have unity? There are democrats and reactionaries in the Guomindang. Now the reactionaries are in power. Their so-called unification of China wants China to remain a colony or semicolony of imperialism and to remain a country ruled by a feudal system. China would be without independence and without democracy, which means that the productivity of the Chinese people would not be liberated. Our War of Resistance is not yet over, and we should continue to work hard and unite the people in the entire country to make great efforts before we can defeat our enemy. Nonetheless, the first obstacle that prevents us from

uniting is the Guomindang reactionaries.

The anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist struggle of the Chinese people has undergone several stages. There was the Guangdong Anti-British Corps to resist the British invasion before the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Then there was the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom revolution, the Boxer [rebellion], the Xinhai Revolution [of 1911], and the May Fourth movement, all of which had the character of mass nationalism and democracy. In terms of the goals of these movements, their demands for independence and democracy were the same as ours. There was no Chinese Communist Party during several decades of struggle. These movements were led by other groups and political parties. Because there was no Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese people did not have a thorough revolutionary program which could represent their interests and did not have a correct leader who could steadfastly and consistently lead them to carry on the struggle. Changes took place in the Guomindang. The Guomindang during the Sun Yatsen period was different from the Guomindang in the Chiang Kaishek period. While the former was the Guomindang that pursued the revolutionary Three People's Principles, the latter is the Guomindang that regresses toward reaction. The Chinese Communist Party has never wavered about the revolution, and only the Communist Party can never waver. Only the Chinese Communist Party can carry the revolution through to the very end, regardless of the number of deaths and regardless of all the sacrifices. It is already 104 years since the uprising in Guangdong of the Anti-British Corps to resist British imperialism in 1841. In these 104 years, the number of Chinese who have been killed or imprisoned is incalculable. Ever since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in China, the past twenty-four years saw the deaths of several hundred thousand people among the Communists alone. The revolutionary democrats, who fought against foreign as well as Chinese anti-revolutionary forces along with us, have also lost lives in the millions. In order to eliminate revolutionary forces, the reactionaries adopted the method of killing, thinking that killing would make the revolutionaries retreat and would stop or diminish the Chinese revolutionary movement. Because this is what they thought, they acted accordingly. Nonetheless, everything turned out to be just the opposite of their subjective wishes. The fact is that the more people they killed, the more the revolutionary contingent developed. I say that this is in proportion; it is a rule, an

irresistible rule. The hope and the intent of the reactionaries are that the more people they kill, the smaller the revolutionary army will be, but the hope and the result are two different things.

The aforementioned law can also be proven by the history of the Guomindang. The Qing dynasty and foreign imperialism once oppressed the Guomindang. Did the oppression make the Guomindang smaller or bigger? In the end, the Xinhai Revolution broke out and overthrew the Qing dynasty. The Guomindang uses the methods that the imperialist and the feudal forces once used on them to deal with the Chinese people and to oppress the Communist Party, workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals. I say that they are wrong! The more troops they march over here, the smaller they will become. Our army, however, will become larger. This is a conclusion we draw from the history of the past few decades. Japanese imperialism killed many people, so is it really true that the more it killed the bigger it became? Hitler also killed many, and is it really true that the more he killed the bigger he became? Whether they are from China or from abroad, the more people that the reactionaries kill, the smaller their own forces will become, but the revolutionary forces will become bigger.

The Party that we are building is an eastern Communist Party. The army that we are building is an eastern revolutionary army of the people. We are struggling bravely. It is impossible to diminish or eliminate us by means of killings and oppression. Several hundred thousand Communists and revolutionary democrats in the millions have been butchered, but our contingent still has hundreds of thousands and millions standing up to continue the fight. Take the three periods of the Chinese Communist Party, for example. It recruited fifty thousand Party members in the first period, and they were scattered by one blow. Very few remained. In the second period, we recruited three hundred thousand Party members, and again many were scattered. Again, only a few remained. In the War of Resistance Against Japan we recruited more than 1.2 million Party members. In terms of the army, every comrade knows that there has never been a Red Army in Chinese history. If there really had been one, it would have been Zhu Hongwu¹ in the Ming dynasty who once named his army the “Red Army.” Their flag was red. Some people think that the name Red Army must have been imported from foreign countries. I would say that it is not necessarily the case because you only know about what goes on abroad and do not know the deeds of

our Chinese ancestors. After the oppression and butchery of the people by the Guomindang reactionary clique in 1927, a Red Army was founded in China again. This Red Army is under the leadership of a progressive political party. At the beginning, its numbers were very small. I often tell some of our comrades: "Its beginning is humble, but it must be great toward the end." This is what it says in the classic *Zhuangzi*. "Beginning" means at the very beginning; "small" means a small number; "toward the end" means right before the end; "gigantic" means huge and great. This can be used to refer to things that have vitality, countries that have vitality, people and masses that have vitality, and political parties that have vitality. Is the Chinese revolutionary force "gigantic" now? In 1841, the Anti-British Corps in Guangdong had several ten thousands of troops, and their slogan was to oppose the British invasion. Nonetheless, people back then did not know what would later happen to their children, grandchildren, and descendants. Sun Yatsen led the Xinhai Revolution, but he did not anticipate the May Fourth movement or the creation of the Communist Party. Our ancestors did not predict such an important historical incident as the October Socialist Revolution. Much less did they predict that China would progress to the point of having ranks which carry out the new democratic revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party. They also did not predict that the Chinese Revolution would take such a long time to succeed. At that time, they had only just begun to resist the oppression of the enemy. As far as what the next episode would be, in my opinion they did not give it mature consideration. It was unlike the Seventh Party Congress, where we summarized historical experience, gained a clear understanding of the current situation and the future, and thus firmed up our confidence. Our ancestors failed to predict these, but they are not to blame. They did not have revolutionary social science back then, and they did not have Marxism to arm their brains. We are people whose brains are armed with scientific socialism and who can foresee the future of society. We are more progressive than they were, and we must fulfill what they did not finish. Our public memorial service today can be traced back to the heroes of the Anti-British Corps in 1841. We also mourn and pay our respect to them. The anti-British struggle of the Anti-British Corps and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom movement were both brave struggles. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom had a few hundred thousand troops and millions of peasants. It fought for thirteen years. In the end,

when Nanjing was overwhelmed by Qing troops, none of the troops surrendered, and they were all burned alive. That was the end of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Although they failed, their failure was an unyielding failure. Nobody could make them surrender. There is no Anti-British Corps today, nor is there a Taiping Heavenly Kingdom or a Boxer movement. Nonetheless, there was a Taiping Heavenly Kingdom after the Anti-British Corps, a Boxer movement after the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, a Xinhai Revolution after the Boxer movement, and a Communist Party after the Xinhai Revolution. Because of this, there was the Northern Expedition, the land reform, and the War of Resistance Against Japan. One part or the other part of the revolutionary forces may be eliminated. They will be eliminated and killed by the enemy if they are not handled well. Even hundreds of thousands can be killed by the enemy, but following that more and more people will join our ranks. I have seen such families. You comrades must have seen many such families as well. The reactionary clique killed the father, so three or four of his sons, or even seven or eight plus his daughters, all joined the Communist Party, all came to Yan'an. Therefore, the more the reactionaries kill, the larger the revolutionary army will be.

We are having a big meeting today, and we are confident. The martyrs have left us, and they have passed their responsibilities on to us. We must fulfill this responsibility. Comrades, today is different from the time when these martyrs carried out their struggles. Changes will take place in China in two to three years. Perhaps things will change for the worse, or things will change for the better. In sum, changes will take place. Japanese imperialism will be defeated. After the defeat of Japanese imperialism, Chinese as well as foreign reactionaries will again want to defeat us and the Chinese people. They are determined to wipe out all the people's democratic forces and revolutionary forces in China. By then, there may be such a situation. The whole country would then be in darkness. Yan'an would also be in darkness. It will be as if China is sinking in the ocean. Every day will be night, without the sun and with a great darkness, and we will have to live in terror for another few decades. This is one possibility. There is another possibility, another picture, which is the suppression of the dark forces and those who kill people with daggers. Chinese and foreign reporters asked me some questions when they visited Yan'an last year, including questions in this regard. We are gentlemen who use only our mouths instead of our hands. But if someone

holds a knife and wants to kill us, we will respond accordingly. I once told the communication staff of the Guomindang: we have one hundred rifles. If you have the ability to capture ninety-nine of them, I admire you because you are good at fighting while we are not. If you capture ninety-nine out of one hundred rifles, we still have one left, and we will continue to fight with this last rifle. With the last rifle, you tell us to surrender, but we say we will not. The word “surrender” does not exist in our dictionary, but it may exist in your dictionary.

Comrades, the present international and domestic situations are very good. Our people and our friends, true democrats and we Communists, need to understand more about unity and understand more about the line, principle, and policy of the Communist Party. Understanding the line, principle, and policy of the Party, we will become more united, and others will not be able to scatter us. Comrades, you should be careful because fighting is inevitable in the future since they are already prepared. Now, in reality, they are working hand in glove with our national enemy, Japanese imperialism, intending to wipe out the revolutionary forces of the Chinese people. They would like to wipe out all revolutionary forces. Nevertheless, the result will be just like what I said in the closing speech at the Seventh Party Congress. The revolution is sure to succeed. China belongs to the Chinese people rather than to the reactionary clique. The Americans who visited Yan’an asked me this question, and I told them that I would write you a check. After you return to the United States, it will still be the same group of people when we meet in the future, because China belongs to the people. This is one future. China belonging to the reactionaries is another future. Now the policy of [U.S. ambassador Patrick] Hurley of the U.S. government is reactionary. It supports the Chinese reactionary clique. Our Party now has a clear and sober mind, and a correct line, principle, and policy. We are sure to succeed. We have such confidence. We are determined to erase the dark China from the Earth and to build a bright China. This bright China is the goal toward which the martyrs struggled for a long time. Although they died before succeeding, they left us with experiences and lessons. The revolution has not succeeded today as we hold our memorial ceremony, but we will succeed tomorrow. We have made up our minds to turn China into a China for the people. We must defeat all foreign and Chinese reactionaries, as well as all foreign and Chinese oppressors. We are never going to give up before we defeat them. This objective will be achieved if

our entire Party unites, if the 100 million people in the liberated areas unite, and if the revolutionary democrats in the enemy-controlled areas as well as those in the other areas unite. We will never stop until we have achieved our goal.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 431–38, where it is reproduced from a transcript of Mao's speech preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Zhu Hongwu refers to Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398), founder of the Ming dynasty. Hongwu is his reign title.

Chairman Mao's Telegram in Reply to Seven Members of the People's Political Council Welcoming Them to Come to Yan'an to Discuss National Affairs (June 18, 1945)

(Liberation Daily) Seven members of the People's Political Council, Chu Fucheng, Huang Yanpei, Leng Yu, Wang Yunwu, Fu Sinian, Zuo Shunsheng, and Zhang Bojun,¹ sent a telegram to Comrades Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on June 2, expressing their hope of continuing the discussion of the problem of domestic unity. Chairman Mao and Comrade Zhou Enlai replied via telegram on June 18, welcoming these council members to come to Yan'an to discuss national affairs. Here is the complete text of their telegram:

Chu Huiseng, Huang Renzhi, Leng Yuqiu, Wang Yunwu, Fu Mengzhen, Zuo Shunsheng, and Zhang Bojun, we write for your gracious perusal.

We have had the honor of receiving your telegram. You gentlemen are greatly concerned about unity, which wins our extreme respectful admiration. The Guomindang authorities have refused a multiparty conference, a coalition government, and any other preliminary steps toward democratic reform; moreover, they are creating divisions by means of regular meetings of a People's Political Council which is controlled by one party, and they are preparing for the threat of civil war; for all these reasons, the Guomindang has created and continues to create an enormous national crisis. It greatly pains us to speak of these things. If, because of the people's thirst for unity and the ardent appeals of you gentlemen, the authorities will awaken and give up their one-party dictatorship, convene a multiparty representative meeting, discuss the organization of a coalition government, and immediately carry out the most

pressing democratic reforms, then our Party will be delighted to discuss matters. Please inform us if we may respectfully welcome you gentlemen in Yan'an. Please let us know via telegram before you leave. We look forward to the honor of seeing you and speaking with you.

Mao Zedong

Zhou Enlai

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, p. 289, where it is reproduced from the June 30, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*.

[1.](#) These seven men were all associated with China's Democratic League. Some of the names in the summary differ from the names in the telegram only because Mao and Zhou used the men's familiar names, whereas the newspaper referred to them by their better-known formal names; each surname remains the same.

*The Areas Occupied by the Japanese
Military in Central and Eastern Henan
Are Relatively Well-Suited for the
Establishment of Base Areas¹*
(June 18, 1945)

Party Committee of Henan Region:

According to telegrams we have received, it seems that Mount Funiu is not occupied by the enemy and that Hu Zongnan will use all his strength to get it, so the possibility of our Party establishing a firm base area there is apparently extremely small. But the vast enemy-occupied territories in central and eastern Henan, where it would be better to establish base areas, have not yet been opened. Therefore, please consider the problems of essential deployment and which place in the end would be better. There is only about another year or a year and a half before the Japanese bandits' defeat and the Guomindang's counteroffensive. If our Party loses this time, it will be difficult for us to establish ourselves in Henan later. Besides, the Guomindang is adopting a nonconfrontational policy with regard to the Japanese bandits but a firm policy of war toward us, and its fighting capacity must not be underestimated. Please consider this situation and respond by telegram. With regard to the Gao Shuxun's² troops and other miscellaneous troops, we must strive for their neutrality. Toward any Guomindang troops we must maintain a self-defensive stance.

The Central Committee

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 799–800, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) This is a telegram to the Party Committee of the Henan Region drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

[2.](#) Gao Shuxun (1897–1972) was commander-in-chief of the Thirty-ninth Army Group and commander of the New Eighth Army of the Nationalist army.

*Mainly Fight the Enemy and Puppet Troops, Only Fight the Diehard Troops in Self-Defense*¹

(June 24, 1945)

Comrades of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi [Border] Region Party Committee and the Military and Political Committee of the Hunan People's Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army:

1. It is neither militarily nor politically advantageous to concentrate our troops and repeatedly fight large-scale battles against the superior forces of the Guomindang in the Guomindang-occupied area.

2. The strategic policy for our army is to carry out a dispersed guerrilla warfare in the territories occupied by the Japanese bandits, set up and expand the liberated area, shrink the enemy-occupied territory, build up and enlarge our army, guerrillas, and militia, weaken the enemy's army, the puppet troops, and the diehard troops that are attacking us in concert with the invaders. We should not go beyond self-defense in dealing with the troops of the Guomindang. We can only concentrate on a fairly large force and counterattack the Guomindang troops in self-defense and defeat them when the Guomindang army is attacking us, obstructing our War of Resistance Against Japan in the enemy-occupied area, and when we have a superior military force. The purpose of this is to facilitate our Party build-up of the liberated areas in enemy-occupied territory. We should not inculcate the officers and soldiers with the idea that we are fighting particularly, or mainly, against the diehard troops. Instead, in order to raise their understanding and feelings for setting up liberated areas in the enemy-occupied territory, we should inculcate them with the idea that we are mainly fighting

against the invaders and the puppet troops and that we only fight against the diehard troops in self-defense.

3. We estimate that now there will be only a year and a half left before the collapse of the Japanese bandits. We are pressed for time. Nonetheless, it is currently possible to set up liberated areas in the districts of Hengyang, Baoqing, Xiangtan, and Liling in central Hunan. It will be very difficult to maintain and hold on to these after the collapse of the Japanese bandits. At that time, it is quite possible that our troops will be in an extremely difficult position and may even be forced to return to the north. Moreover, we cannot connect with our forces in Guangdong, which is against our strategic purpose of opening up a new flank in the south in order to restrict one wing of the Guomindang when it starts the civil war. This policy applies to a different region from what we told you in Yan'an, but we think that this policy is correct.

4. Therefore, your present principal forces and the reserve troops under Zhang [Qilong] and Wen [Niansheng] should all march south by way of the enemy-occupied territory (take a zig-zag course along the line between the enemy and the diehard troops) until you have reached the border between Hunan and Guangdong and then connect with our troops in Guangdong. You should be prepared to divide up the cadres and troops into several parts. Build many dispersed guerrilla base areas on the border between Guangdong and Jiangxi, centered in the three counties of Qiannan, Longnan, and Dingnan in the Yizhang; Pingshi, Lechang, Nanxiong area, in the Chenzhou, Daozhou, Linwu, Lanshan, and Lianxian areas; and in the border region between Hunan and Guangxi centered in Yongming, Guanyang, and Gongcheng (if they are occupied by the enemy and the puppet troops). Gradually, they will become consolidated base areas. We should prepare for all conditions so that our army will persist and further develop around the base in the Wuling mountain range when the Japanese bandits collapse and the Guomindang launches civil war. You should be prepared to be cut off from each other and to fight on your own. The only direct support will be your internal unity, your own correct military policy, and the correct policy of uniting the people. If you make serious mistakes in these policies, you will have to accept defeat. You must anticipate this. You must anticipate the most difficult, most dangerous, and the darkest possibilities. In addition, starting from this, you can set out to overcome the difficulties to obtain

bright and victorious prospects.

5. Every leading cadre must be modest, be on guard against arrogance, be extremely cautious, and be on guard against impulsiveness. They should be completely united and avoid and eventually eliminate possible disagreements of opinion. If the situation permits, you should adopt democratic discussion in a committee style, gather the opinions of the majority of comrades, and resolutely carry them out.

6. The current overall situation favors us. If we can unite within our Party and if we do not lose this opportunity and do not make major mistakes in our policy, we believe that you can accomplish the great mission that the Central Committee has assigned you. We hope that you can inform us of your ideas by telegram.

The Central Committee

June 24, 4 p.m.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 801–3, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

[1.](#) Mao drafted this telegram to the Party Committee of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region and the Military and Political Committee of the Hunan Anti-Japanese Salvation Army on behalf of the Central Committee.

On Chiang Kaishek's Speech at the Political Council

The Hurley–Chiang Kaishek Duet Seems to Be a Flop¹ *(July 10, 1945)*

(*New China News Agency, Yan'an, July 10*) Convened to camouflage Chiang Kaishek's dictatorial regime, the National Political Council² met in Chongqing on July 7. It was the opening session with the smallest attendance on record. Not only was no one present from the Chinese Communist Party, but many members of the council from other groups were absent as well. Out of a total membership of 290, only 180 turned up. Chiang Kaishek spoke at this opening session as follows:

The government is not going to submit any specific proposal on questions relating to the convocation of the National Assembly, and you gentlemen can therefore discuss matters fully. The government is ready to listen to your opinions on these questions with the utmost honesty and sincerity.

The New China News Agency reporter comments: This will probably be the end of the whole business about convening the National Assembly on November 12 of this year. The imperialist [U.S. ambassador Patrick] Hurley had something to do with this business as well. At first, this imperialist strongly encouraged Chiang Kaishek to make such a move, and it was this that stiffened Chiang Kaishek's resolve a bit in his New Year's Day speech. His resolve was greatly stiffened in his March 1 speech, in which he announced his determination to "hand state power back to the people" on November 12. In his speech of March 1, he flatly rejected the Chinese Communist Party's proposal, which voiced the general will of the Chinese people, to convene a conference of all parties and to form a coalition government. He gleefully played up the idea of forming a so-called Committee of Three, including an American, to "reorganize" the Chinese Communist army. He had the audacity to say that the Chinese Communist Party

must hand over its troops before he would bestow “legal status” upon it. In all of this, the backing of Master Hurley was decisive. In a statement in Washington on April 2, Hurley did his best to support Chiang Kaishek’s National Assembly³ and other such odious schemes, in addition to playing the hackneyed imperialist tunes of eliminating the role of the Chinese Communist Party, vilifying its activities, and declaring opposition to cooperation with it. Thus, the duet between Hurley in the United States and Chiang Kaishek in China reached its most raucous pitch, with the sacrifice of the Chinese people as their common objective. Since then, the show seems to have floundered. Countless voices have been raised in protest everywhere, among both Chinese and foreigners, both inside and outside the Guomindang, among people with Party affiliations and without. The sole reason is that for all its high-sounding language, the Hurley-Chiang racket is designed to sacrifice the anti-Japanese interests of the Chinese people,⁴ to further wreck their unity, and to lay a mine to set off large-scale civil war,⁵ thereby damaging the common interests of the United States and other Allied countries⁶ in fighting the anti-Fascist war and thereafter establishing peaceful coexistence. *Hurley, as the ambassador of an Allied country, and Chiang Kaishek, as the “head of state” of one of the four powers, really look immature, ignorant, and devoid of the demeanor of statesmen by toying with this political issue that will determine the fate of hundreds of millions of people.* At this moment, he seems to be lying low, busying himself with who knows what, with the result that Chiang Kaishek has to speak dubious words before the Political Council. Previously, on March 1, Chiang Kaishek said:

The conditions in our country differ from those in other countries. Prior to the convening of the National Assembly, we have no responsible organization which is representative of the people and through which the government can consult the people’s opinion.

If that is so, why does our Generalissimo now go to the Political Council to “consult opinions”? According to him, there is no “responsible organization” in all of China through which one “can consult the people’s opinions”; it follows that the Political Council as an “organization” exists merely to eat, and his “consultation” today has no legal basis. Be that as it may, if the Political Council utters even a single word against the convocation of the puppet “National” Assembly, it will have done a good deed and merited grace, even if doing so will

violate the imperial edict of March 1 and the king's law. Of course, it is still premature to make any comment on the Political Council, as we have to wait a few days to see what it will produce for the Generalissimo to "consult." One thing, however, is certain: Ever since the Chinese people began to raise their voices in protest against this National Assembly, even the enthusiasts for "constitutional monarchy" have been worried about our monarch, warning him not to stick his neck into a noose by convening a Parliament of Pigs and cautioning him from becoming another Yuan Shikai. Thus, it is possible that our monarch will stop at this point. But it is absolutely certain that he and his retinue will not allow the people to gain a particle of power if it would cost them a single hair. The immediate proof is that he⁷ has described the people's reasonable criticism as "unbridled attacks." He said:

Under war conditions, a general election is obviously out of the question in the Japanese-occupied areas. Consequently, two years ago the Plenary Session of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee resolved to convene a National Assembly and institute a constitutional government within a year after the conclusion of the war. However, in certain quarters, unbridled attacks were made at that time.

And the grounds for these attacks were that this date might be too late. He thereupon proposed that "a National Assembly be convened as soon as the war situation is stabilized, in view of the possibility that the final conclusion of the war may be delayed." Much to his surprise, these people again made "unbridled attacks." This has put our monarch in a terrible fix. But the Chinese people must teach Chiang Kaishek and his group a lesson and tell them: Whatever you say or do, no lies in violation of the people's wishes will be tolerated. What the Chinese people demand is immediate democratic reforms, such as the release of political prisoners, the abolition of the espionage agencies, and the granting of freedom to the people and of legal status to political parties. You are doing none of these things and instead are simply juggling with the pseudo-problem of the date of the National Assembly; this will not deceive even a three-year-old. Without a minimum of genuine democratic reforms, all your assemblies, large or small, will be thrown into the cesspool. Call this "unbridled attacks" if you like, but every deception of this kind must be eradicated resolutely, thoroughly, cleanly, and completely, with not a trace allowed to remain. The reason is simply that it is a swindle. Whether there is a National Assembly is one thing, and whether there is a minimum of democratic reforms is quite another. The former can wait for now,

but the latter must be introduced immediately. Since our Generalissimo⁸ and his group are willing to “hand state power back to the people sooner,” why are they unwilling to carry out a minimum of democratic reforms “sooner”? Gentlemen of the Guomindang! When you come to these concluding lines, you will have to admit that the Chinese Communists are not in any sense making an “unbridled attack” on you, but are asking you one simple question. May we not even ask a question? Can you simply brush it aside?⁹

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 295–98, where it is reproduced from the July 11, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

1. The Hurley–Chiang Kaishek Duet Seems to Be a Flop → The Hurley–Chiang Kaishek Duet Is a Flop
2. The National Political Council → The Fourth People’s Political Council
3. National Assembly → “National Assembly”
4. To sacrifice the anti-Japanese interests of the Chinese people → To sacrifice the interests of the Chinese people
5. Set off large-scale civil war → To set off large-scale war in China
6. The common interests of the United States and other Allied countries → The common interests of the people of the United States and other Allied countries
7. He → This monarch
8. Since our Generalissimo → Since Chiang Kaishek.
9. Can you simply brush it aside? → Can you simply brush it aside? The question you must answer is: How is it that you are willing to “hand state power back to the people” but not willing to institute democratic reforms?

New China News Agency Reporter
Comments on the Danger of the Hurley
Policy
(July 12, 1945)

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, July 12) The New China News Agency reporter comments on U.S. foreign policy saying: It has become increasingly obvious that the policy of the United States toward China as represented by Hurley,¹ is creating a crisis² for the people of both China and the United States. This crisis can be overcome only by careful consideration of the overall and long-term interests of both the Chinese and American people. This danger is precisely the danger of civil war in China. Sticking to its reactionary policies of passive resistance to the Japanese and suppression of the people's democratic movement, the Guomindang government has lived on Civil War ever since it was set up eighteen years ago; only at the time of the Xi'an Incident in 1936 and of the Japanese invasion south of the Great Wall in 1937 was it forced to abandon its nationwide Civil War for a time. Since 1939, however, Civil War on a local scale has again been waged without interruption. "Fight the Communists first" is the mobilization slogan used by the Guomindang government among its own people, while it gives resistance to Japan secondary priority. At present, all its military arrangements are focused not on resisting the Japanese aggressors but on "recovering the lost territory" from China's liberated areas and on wiping out the Chinese Communist Party. This situation must be taken into account seriously in our struggle both for victory in the War of Resistance and for peaceful construction after the war. The late President [Franklin] Roosevelt did take it into account and, consequently, in the interests of the United States, refrained from

helping one side of China while opposing the other side of China.³

When Hurley visited Yan'an as Roosevelt's personal representative in November 1944, he expressed agreement with the Chinese Communist Party's plan for the abolition of the Guomindang one-party dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic coalition government, *having not forgotten President Roosevelt's wish not to discriminate in favor of the Guomindang*. Unfortunately,⁴ he later changed his tune and went back on what he had said in Yan'an. This change was crudely revealed in his statement in Washington on April 2. In the interim, according to the self-same Hurley, the Guomindang government represented by Chiang Kaishek seems to have turned into the *incomparable* Beauty and the Chinese Communist Party into the Beast, and he flatly declared that the United States would only cooperate with Chiang Kaishek and not with the Chinese Communist Party. This, of course, is not just Hurley's personal view but also that of a whole group of people *of Hurley's generation* in the U.S. government. It is an erroneous and dangerous view *that turns its back on Roosevelt's policy*. At this juncture, Roosevelt died and Hurley returned to the U.S. embassy in Chongqing in high spirits. The danger of the China policy of the United States as represented by Hurley is that it encourages the Guomindang government to be still more reactionary and aggravates the Civil War crisis. If the crisis is not curbed,⁵ *then not only will the necessary result be a long-term disaster for the Chinese people but the U.S. government will have placed a crushing burden on its own back*. This is, it⁶ will fall irretrievably into the deep stinking cesspool of Chinese reaction; it will put itself in the position of antagonizing the hundreds of millions of awakened and awakening Chinese people and will become a hindrance to the War of Resistance in the present and to world peace in the future. Isn't it clear that this would be the inevitable result? A large portion of U.S. public opinion, *many government personnel, and many military figures* are worried about the China policy of the Hurley type with its dangers and wants it changed because as far as China's future is concerned, it sees clearly that the *great* forces of the Chinese people which demand independence, *democracy*, freedom, unity, and wealth and power are irresistible and are bound to burst forth and supplant foreign and feudal oppression. We cannot yet say whether or when this⁷ will be changed. But one thing is certain. If the Hurley policy of aiding and abetting the reactionary forces in China and

antagonizing the Chinese people with their immense numbers continues unchanged, it will place a crushing burden on the government and people of the United States and plunge them into endless trouble. This point must be brought home *increasingly* to the *many* people of the United States.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 299–301, where it is reproduced from the July 13, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

- [1.](#) By Hurley → By its ambassador, Patrick J. Hurley
- [2.](#) A crisis → A civil war crisis in China
- [3.](#) Refrained from helping one side of China while opposing the other side of China → Refrained from adopting a policy of helping the Guomindang to undertake armed attacks on the Chinese Communist Party
- [4.](#) Unfortunately → But
- [5.](#) If the crisis is not curbed → If the Hurley policy continues
- [6.](#) It → The U.S. government
- [7.](#) This → The U.S. policy

*It Is Essential to Develop Zhengzhou, Xuchang, and Other Places*¹

(July 14, 1945)

We would like Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping] to consult with Peng [Dehuai] and Teng [Daiyuan] and reply. It is essential to choose capable personnel from Hebei, Shandong, and Henan to lead the majority of troops across the river westward and to take responsibility for opening up base areas in the large area between Zhengzhou, Xuchang, Yancheng, and the New Yellow River.²

Mao

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 804, where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

¹. Instructions Mao Zedong added to a telegram sent by Yu Keqin, commander-in-chief of the Twelfth Sub-area of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Area Command of the Eighth Route Army, and some others to Teng Daiyuan and Yang Lisan, chief and deputy chief, respectively, of the General Staff of the Front Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army.

². On June 9, 1938, Chiang Kaishek ordered the National army to breach the levees of the Yellow River at Huayuankou north of Zhengzhou in an attempt to stop the advance of the Japanese army. As a result, the Yellow River changed its route. The waterways that the Yellow River passed through after the change of its route were collectively called the "New Yellow River."

Operational Policies for Troops

Entering Henan

(July 15, 1945)

To the Henan Regional Party Committee:

1. After our army entered Henan, it made distinguished accomplishments in terms of fighting the enemy, mobilizing the masses, and building the Party and administration. Your leadership is correct.

2. Your operational policy from now on is to defend on the west and attack on the east and the south. (This means taking a defensive policy toward the area occupied by diehard troops and an offensive orientation toward the area occupied by the enemy.) In time you will completely integrate with Taiyue and Taihang on the north, with units crossing the New Yellow River¹ westward from Hebei, Shandong, and Henan on the east, and the Fifth Division² on the south. We can then gradually recruit millions of the masses, expand the militia, guerrilla, and main forces (if finances permit), and build up dependable military, political, and economic foundations to make all preparations within one year for a major attack by Hu Zongnan. If we do not take the time to finish the above tasks, our Party in Henan will be defeated. We must anticipate this point.

3. You must rely on your current strength and self-reliance to complete the above tasks. You must not hope for the center, Taihang, or Taiyue to provide further assistance in military force, finances, or cadres. It is necessary and beneficial to make the above tasks clear to all responsible cadres and to rely on yourselves in concert with the people of Henan to solve all problems without external aid.

4. You, of course, have various advantageous conditions to complete the above tasks. Nonetheless, you will inevitably run into various kinds of internal and

external difficulties. You should anticipate and spiritually prepare for this. Then you can implement various kinds of cautious, resolute, and appropriate steps and implement various kinds of correct military policies, policies of resolutely mobilizing the masses, financial policies based on rent reduction, interest reduction, and the development of the public and private economy, and internal policies of unifying the various parts of the army and the cadres, especially local cadres, in order gradually to overcome internal and external difficulties.

5. You should establish close connections with the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Central Bureau (which will be established soon) and the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Border Region Party Committee and inform them and us of your various activities.

The Central Committee

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 442–43. where it is reproduced from Mao Zedong's handwritten manuscript.

- [1.](#) On the New Yellow River, see above, note to the text of July 14, 1945.
- [2.](#) Referring to the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army, with Li Xiannian and Zheng Weisan as its commander and commissar, respectively.

New China News Agency Reporter Discusses the Current Situation

The Danger of Civil War Has Never Been More Serious (July 22, 1945)

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, July 22) The New China News Agency reporter publishes his commentary on the current situation. The New China Agency reporter said: In the past half a year, the political situation in China has been pushed to the brink of civil war by the policy of [U.S. ambassador Patrick] Hurley and Chiang Kaishek. The dark situation in China, like that in Greece, threatens the people of all China and threatens the War of Resistance Against Japan and international peace. This dangerous situation raises a serious task for the people in China's liberated areas, for all the democratic parties and groups and people from all walks of life in the regions ruled by the Guomindang, as well as for the tripartite alliance among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. This task is to rectify the Hurley-Chiang Kaishek policy and to check the crisis of civil war. Everyone understands that in order to defeat the Japanese invaders and build international peace, we should never allow a civil war in China and never allow the Hurley-Chiang Kaishek policy to continue without being curbed. Encouraged by Hurley, Chiang Kaishek announced on January 1 and March 1 a plan which is, in essence, a plan to prepare for a civil war. This plan adopts the form of holding a National Assembly and "returning political power to the people." Although this plan has met with some obstacles, and the method of the "National Assembly" had to be revised slightly at the National

Political Council, the crisis of a civil war still continues to develop. With regard to the Hurley–Chiang Kaishek reactionary plan, the Chinese Communist Party expressed its stand of resolute objection from the very beginning. The other democratic parties, including the democratic faction within the Guomindang itself, also expressed their attitude of opposition. On the eve of the convocation of this Political Council, the Chinese Communist Party announced that it will not send any representatives to attend. This action gave courage to many representatives from the democratic faction to oppose the “National” Assembly from within and outside the Political Council. During their stay in Yan’an, the Communist authority exchanged views with Zhu Fucheng, Huang Yanpei,¹ and others of the six members of the Political Council. We expressed the same attitude. The Political Council lasted for two weeks and was over on the twentieth. The theme of the entire meeting was the issue of the National Assembly. In several heated debates, the dictatorial faction and the democratic faction each expressed their own stance. On the nineteenth, a resolution was passed. The New China News Agency reporter points out that this resolution contains some compromise, but does not change the reactionary plan of the Guomindang. This resolution mentions four issues: (1) the date of the National Assembly; (2) the representative character of the National Assembly; (3) the official powers of the National Assembly; and (4) some democratic demands. In terms of the date, the resolution said: “The representatives at this conference cannot reach an agreement; hence, this conference will not propose a specific opinion and will leave it to the government to decide after considering the situation.” In the eyes of the reactionaries, the “date” is not an issue that concerns merely the “prestige of the government.” Instead, it is an issue of dictatorship and civil war. They are determined to maintain one-party rule, or dictatorship, and they do not allow the National Political Council, in which non-Guomindang delegates participated, to make the decision on the date of the National Assembly.

On the issue of a civil war, every military arrangement of the Guomindang reactionaries is aimed at the specific objective of “regaining lost territory” in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and in all liberated areas behind enemy lines and eliminating the Chinese Communist Party. As far as civil war is concerned, they can still fight one without the National Assembly, but they can

fight it even better with the National Assembly. The date “should be decided by the government after consideration of the situation.” What kind of situation will they consider? Of course, they will consider the most favorable opportunity to preserve the Guomindang dictatorship. In particular, they will consider the opportunity for starting a large-scale civil war. It must be said that this point had some positive significance in that in a roundabout way, it did not recognize November 12 as the confirmed date to hold the National Assembly. That is, the National Assembly, a magic weapon that threatens the people, is still in the hands of the dictator. He can use it at any time, but to cope with firm opposition from the people, the date may be changed somewhat. The political situation in China has developed to the following situation: If the Chinese dictator is trying hard to “return political power to the people,” the earlier the better. But the Chinese people are resolutely opposing it. This seems strange and funny, but in reality it shows the unprecedented new environment in which the Chinese dictator and the Chinese people live. This could not have happened during the early and middle periods of World War II and China’s War of Resistance Against Japan, because at that time the Chinese dictatorial system had still not suffered a crisis as serious as this one, because a democratic force as strong as this one among the Chinese people still did not exist, and because the international environment was not as advantageous to the struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people as it is today. The resolution of the Political Council on July 19 did not approve the dictator’s reactionary plan to hold the National Assembly this year and “return political power to the people.” For the dictator, it did not hurt the dictatorial system at all. For the people, it did not increase their rights in the very least. We must remember: The magic weapon of the “National” Assembly is still in the hands of the dictator. Moreover, even without the “National” Assembly, they can still start a civil war. The Chinese people absolutely must not be negligent or careless in the least. **The Chinese dictatorial faction is very sly. They are good at playing tricks in politics and at organizing sudden attacks on the people. The Chinese people, and, above all, the democratic parties, must pay special attention to the next step of this group.** The New China News Agency reporter has said: Because the second article of the resolution by the Political Council is very vague, the reactionary faction can take advantage of it. This article said: “As regards

the representatives of the National Assembly, we ask the government to make proper decisions according to the proposals of the representatives at this conference after weighing the law and the facts, so that the National Assembly will be completely representative.” The “government” referred to here is the government of the dictatorial faction. The “law” referred to here is the law of the dictatorial faction. Now they are writing the resolution, and in the future they will “weigh” the results as a whole. The result cannot be anything but to force the people to accept the continual legitimacy of the whole bunch of “representatives” of the National Assembly from ten years ago. The dictatorial faction will also “weigh” the “facts,” but the result will not be anything else but “electing” or sending more people. In this way, they can boast that it is already “highly representative.”

Nonetheless, the Chinese people and the democratic parties should look at it this way. The “government” must be a nationally unified, democratic coalition government made up of representatives of all the political parties and nonpartisans. We oppose any “National” Assembly put together by the present Guomindang dictatorship. The “laws” must be drafted anew by the coalition government. We oppose any reactionary representative laws or organizational laws of the National Assembly, and so on that are drafted by the Guomindang dictatorship. The “facts” are that the so-called representatives of the National Assembly from ten years ago were fraudulently elected by the Guomindang alone, so we must completely negate them. During the entire period before the enemy is totally wiped out, the national territory is completely liberated, and the people have absolute freedom, we must not allow the election of representatives to the National Assembly. Only after all the old representatives are negated, and when new elections of new representatives are held with all the necessary conditions, can we say that it is “highly representative.” We agree absolutely with the words “highly representative.” From now on, whoever wants to convene a “National” Assembly that does not have any representative character or is not highly representative will suffer resolute opposition. Article 3 states: “When the constitution is formulated, it must be carried out immediately, so that the aim of the government to return political power to the people will be realized as early as possible.” This article shows that the Guomindang

dictatorial faction still insists on this reactionary plan. They have always called for “making and promulgating” the constitution and opposed “implementing” it, but now they are singing a beautiful tune of “implementing it as soon as possible.” What do they mean? They mean to “elect” the big president, imitating Yuan Shikai in becoming the emperor. Today’s dictatorial faction or monarchists in China need this very much. They are anxious to suppress the people and start a civil war with a monarchy (a big president) to maintain their reactionary rule. Article 4 lists several demands. One is “adopting possible political procedures.” The dictatorial faction is sure to play some new tricks with this article. They will continue to shut out and refuse the demands of the democrats to hold a conference of political parties, eliminate one-party dictatorship, and set up a coalition government. The word “legal” was added to the second point, guaranteeing the freedom of the people. The words “according to the law” were added to the third point, to recognize all political parties. In the eyes of the dictator, everything is well. The fourth point, “the establishment of publicly elected institutions at various levels in all the provinces,” is also what the dictatorial faction wants because the “publicly elected” is, in fact, party elected. With these institutions, the throne of the dictator will be more secure. To summarize all the points in Article 4, the dictator will not lose anything. Only one point has meaning, which is requiring that these measures be carried out “before the meeting of the National Assembly.” This shows that the National Assembly is unlikely to be held this year. In his summary, the New China News Agency reporter concludes: There is not the slightest change in the dictatorial system, and the danger of civil war is more serious than ever. Now all the hard facts, including the military operations around the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, prove that the Guomintang reactionary clique is preparing earlier and more actively to start an extremely large-scale civil war in order to assist the Japanese invaders. The decisions on the National Assembly by the National Political Council will not change this dangerous situation. The New China News Agency reporter said that only three conditions can change the political situation in China. First, the army and people in the liberated areas must unite as one, firmly expand the liberated areas and reduce the lost territory,

and resolutely check the civil war. Second, the people's democratic force in the Guomindang-occupied territory must unite as one to firmly oppose civil war. Third, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union must unite as one on the issue of the East and oppose the civil war in China. The Chinese people should work hard to achieve these three conditions and to oppose the danger of a civil war.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 339–44, where it is reproduced from the original of the revised document preserved in the Central Archives. Text in boldface added by Mao.

¹. Zhu Fucheng (1873–1948) was a democratic figure who had been active in the Revolutionary Alliance and the Xinhai Revolution. In September 1945 he helped form the September Third Study Society, a small democratic party. Huang Yanpei (1878–1965) was a Chinese educator, industrialist, politician, and a founder of the China Democratic League in 1944.

Seize the Moment to Establish the Wuling Base Area in Northern Guangdong and Southern Hunan (July 22, 1945)

Wang Zhen, [Wang] Shoudao:¹

1. We have received your telegram of July 18. Where are Taohuashan and Jinjiaping? How is the situation along the way? From there how much time do you estimate will be needed to reach the Wuling mountain range?²

2. The Japanese bandits have transported five divisions (regiments) from Hunan and Guangxi to move northward to deal with the landing of the Allied forces in Shandong. They are not giving up southern China. But in order to shorten their defense line, they have already given up places, including Nanning, Liuzhou, and Ganzhou, and will probably give up some other locations as well. But at least they will have to defend Guangzhou and the entire Guangzhou-Hankou railway line securely. Ji'an and Yuanzhou were not taken; the rumors from the merchants are incorrect.

3. The three big shots'³ meeting in Berlin will settle the two big issues of Europe and Asia. For more than ten days, Song Ziwen⁴ was in the Soviet Union for meetings, yet the problem was not solved. After the meeting of the three big shots, Song will go to the Soviet Union again and may decide on the issue of China and the Soviet Union fighting the war together. All of Chiang Kaishek's preparations are anti-Communist; the danger of a civil war is unprecedentedly severe.

4. Your only task is to seize this precious moment to establish the Wuling Base Area in northern Guangdong and southern Hunan and to merge with our troops

in Guangdong, preparing for the diversion of the southern wing when civil war breaks out. To complete this task, you will encounter extreme difficulties. But it can be accomplished as long as we act in unison and the policy is correct. Do not expect to set up a base area in the districts of Liuyang, Liling, Hengyang, and Baoqing. It is certain that Chiang Kaishek will try to eliminate these base areas with full force after the defeat of the Japanese bandits, which will then put our army in a disadvantageous position. You should march all the way to the south to set up the Wuling Base Area, taking advantage of the conflicts in the border region of the four provinces of Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Jiangxi, where we can still establish a foothold even after the defeat of the Japanese bandits. In addition, it is of great strategic importance to join forces with the Dongjiang Brigade [in Guangdong] so they can gain assistance, preserve and develop this southern force that has been established for many years, and avoid possible failures. The completion of this task also relies on you. You must look into the future when confronting problems. Do not be confused by passing phenomena.

5. Be modest and discreet, not haughty and hasty; this is the attitude that everyone in the Party should adopt. Being modest avoids haughtiness, and being discreet avoids hastiness; haughtiness and hastiness are the biggest enemy to the work of the revolution. I hope you will discipline yourselves to these and educate every cadre.

6. Imagine all possible difficulties in everything, such as serious enemy threats, defeat, running out of food, troops diminishing instead of expanding, internal opinions diverging, disunity, and so forth. Only when you have thoroughly considered these beforehand, are fully prepared spiritually, and have prepared the cadres as well, will you be able to come up with ways of overcoming the difficulties and thus march toward a bright future.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 809–11, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Wang Zhen and Wang Shoudao were at this time commander-in-chief and commissar of the Hunan People's Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army, respectively.

2. The mountain range that runs along the Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Guangxi borders.

3. The three big shots refer to Stalin, Harry S Truman, and Winston Churchill.

4. Song Ziwen (T.V. Soong) was at this time head of the State Administrative Council and minister of foreign affairs of the Guomindang government.

Strive to Reach Wuling by the End of the Year and Join Forces with Wang Zhen's Troops

(July 22, 1945)

Comrades [Zhang] Qilong and [Wen] Niansheng:

1. Where are you now? How many days are you going to rest in Taiyue and Zhongtiao?¹ (You should completely recover from fatigue.) How is the morale of the army? How are the relationships between the army and the people and between the officers and the soldiers?

2. Although you suffered some losses in the campaign to cross Fen River, you finally made the crossing successfully, and this experience will help your campaigns in the future.

3. I have ordered Wang Zhen and [Wang] Shoudao to lead their units to march southward to northern Guangdong. Do not stay for too long in central Hunan. We cannot build up stable base areas in such places. Chiang Kaishek will certainly use all his strength to drive us out after the defeat of the Japanese invaders. Hence, you should march all the way to southern Hunan and northern Guangdong, and rely on Wuling to set up permanent base areas. Your destination is also southern Hunan and northern Guangdong. You should shorten the marching time reasonably, under the condition of not overly exhausting the troops. Strive to reach Wuling and join forces with the two Wangs by the end of the solar year.

4. The liberated area in Henan is newly established, and its economy is in dire straits. You should be prepared to buy rather than to ask the locals for supplies when you arrive.

5. You should keep in constant touch with Wang Zhen and Shoudao by radio.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 807–8, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

- [1.](#) Areas in central and southwestern Shanxi.

Warfare at Yetai Mountain Has Expanded¹ (July 25, 1945)

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, July 25) According to information from central Shaanxi, the warfare at Yetai Mountain has expanded. In addition to the temporary Fifty-ninth Division of the Thirty-sixth Army, Chiang [Kaishek]'s troops attacking at the front have added another division. According to the reports of our scouts, the additional forces are the Sixteenth Army transferred here from the front line in Henan. According to soldiers from the Thirty-sixth Army who fled to our side, they have many modern weapons that were sent by the United States. One is called the rocket gun, please note. Yetai Mountain is an important stronghold, and Chiang's troops are determined to capture it and then penetrate the central Shaanxi subregion and use it as an advantageous position from which to attack the north. The morale of our troops is very high, however, and they will never allow any reactionaries to sneak in easily and to kill the people in the border region. All the people of the central Shaanxi subregion have been promptly mobilized and are assisting the defending troops in the fighting. They are sending tea, carrying wounded soldiers, and are extremely enthusiastic. They have full confidence that they will defeat these reactionaries.

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 248, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. This is a dispatch written by Mao Zedong for the Xinhua News Agency.

Comrade Mao Zedong's Congratulatory Telegram to the Communist Party USA on Its Overcoming Capitulationism and Re-establishing the Communist Party¹ *(July 29, 1945)*

(New China News Agency, Yan'an, July 30) On July 26, the Communist Political Association of the United States held a meeting and decided to rectify the revisionist-capitulationist line of its former chairman, Comrade [Earl] Browder, and to re-establish the Communist Party USA. Before the meeting, the secretary of the Communist Political Association of the United States, Comrade Foster, sent a telegram to Comrade Mao Zedong. On July 29, Comrade Mao Zedong telegraphed congratulations to Comrade Foster. The texts of the two telegrams follow: [Comrade Foster's telegram is omitted.—Editors.]

Comrade Foster and the Central Committee of the Communist Party USA:

We are happy to hear that the special conference of the Communist Association² of the United States has decided to reject the revisionist-capitulationist line³ of *Comrade* Browder and to re-establish a Marxist leadership and that it has reconstituted⁴ the Communist Party USA. We congratulate you warmly on this great victory of the American working class and of the Marxist movement. *In his past activity, Comrade Browder has rendered many services to the struggle of the Chinese people, which deserve our gratitude.* But his whole revisionist-capitulationist line (which found its full expression in *Comrade* Browder's book *Tehran*) essentially reflected the influence of the reactionary capitalist clique in the United States within the American workers movement. This reactionary capitalist clique is now attempting to extend its influence in China too and is supporting the erroneous, anti-national, anti-popular, *anti-democratic* policy of

the reactionary clique within the Guomindang, putting the Chinese people in grave danger of civil war and causing damage to the interests of the two great nations, China and the United States, during and after the war.⁵ The victory of the American working class and of its vanguard, the American Communists, over the revisionist and capitulationist line of *Comrade* Browder will undoubtedly represent a great contribution to the war against Japan, which is being waged at present by the American and Chinese peoples and to the great cause of building a peaceful and democratic world after the war.

Chairman of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 9, pp. 303–4, where it is reproduced from the July 31, 1945, issue of *Jiefang ribao*. Text in *italics*, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in *Xuanji* in the 1950s; for more details see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.

[1.](#) Comrade Mao Zedong’s Congratulatory Telegram to the Communist Party USA on Its Overcoming Capitulationism and Re-establishing the Communist Party → Telegram to Comrade William Z. Foster

[2.](#) Communist Association → Communist Political Association

[3.](#) The revisionist-capitulationist line → The revisionist, namely, the capitulationist line

[4.](#) Reconstituted → Restored

[5.](#) The interests of the two great nations, China and the United States, during and after war → The interests of the people of the two nations

Telegram Regarding Criticism of America's China Policy (July 30, 1945)

Xu [Bing] and Zhang [Ming]:¹

1. The U.S. embassy previously admonished us not to criticize Chiang Kaishek, but they no longer say this. Instead, they now ask us not to criticize [U.S. ambassador Patrick] Hurley. American newspapers regularly criticize heads of foreign states; last year they vigorously criticized Chiang Kaishek. Why can't the Chinese criticize Hurley? He has criticized the Chinese Communist Party, comparing it to a warlord. He even made this comparison for the entire Party. Why can't the Party criticize him? Our criticism separates the American people from the U.S. government, those in the U.S. government who make China policy from the rest of the government, and the incorrect portion of U.S. policy from other correct policies. If the U.S. policy of supporting Chiang and opposing the Communists changes one day, we will stop criticizing this policy; otherwise, we cannot stop. Please explain this opinion to those concerned.

2. As for the telegram to [Secretary General William Z.] Foster of the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA), in addition to publishing it in *New China Daily* (you may remove the term Guomindang), please translate it into English and send it by express mail to the CPUSA.

Mao Zedong

Notes

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 3, pp. 450–51, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

[1.](#) Xu Bing (1903–1972) and Zhang Ming, pseudonym of Liu Shaowen (1905–1987), were both responsible cadres of the Work Committee of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

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About the Editors

Stuart R. Schram was born in Excelsior, Minnesota, in 1924. After graduating from the University of Minnesota in physics, he took his Ph.D. in political science at Columbia University. From 1954 to 1967, he conducted research at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris, and from 1968 until 1989 he was Professor of Politics with reference to China at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. After 1989, he worked at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University, on translations of Mao Zedong's pre-1949 writings, of which this is the eighth volume.

His research dealt with Leninist theories and their application in Asia, Chinese history and politics in the twentieth century, and the influence of the Chinese tradition on the theory and practice of the state in China. His works include *Mao Tse-tung* (1967), *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (1969), *Marxism and Asia* (in collaboration with H el ene Carr ere d'Encausse) (1969), *Ideology and Politics in China since the Third Plenum, 1978-1984* (1984), and *The Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (1989). He has also edited *The Scope of State Power in China* (1985), *Foundations and Limits of State Power in China* (1987). *Mao Tse-tung* and *The Thought of Mao Tse-tung* have been translated into Chinese and published in Beijing.

Stuart Schram died in July 2012 at the summer home in Brittany he shared with his French wife Marie-Annick. He was 88.

About the Co-Editor

Timothy Cheek was born in Canberra, Australia, in 1955. After spending much of his youth in the United States, he graduated in 1978 with honors in Asian

Studies from the Australian National University. He earned his MA in History at the University of Virginia in 1980 and his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages at Harvard University in 1986. He taught at The Colorado College for some fifteen years before taking up the Louis Cha Chair in Chinese Research at the Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia in 2002.

Cheek's research, teaching, and translating focus on the recent history of China, especially the role of Chinese intellectuals in the twentieth century and the history of the Chinese Communist Party. His books include *Living with Reform: China Since 1989* (2006), *Mao Zedong and China's Revolutions* (2002), and *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China* (1997), as well as editing *A Critical Introduction to Mao* (2010), *New Perspectives on State Socialism in China* (1997) with Tony Saich, *Market Economics and Political Change* (1998) with Juan D. Lindau, *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao* (1989) with Roderick MacFarquhar and Eugene Wu, and *China's Establishment Intellectuals* (1986) with Carol Lee Hamrin.