

**THE KOREAN  
QUESTION AND US  
FORCES IN SOUTH  
KOREA**

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# THE DIVISION OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES

## The 38th Parallel North

The 38th Parallel, which bisects the Korean peninsula, dividing it into a north and south, is an artificial line that was drawn after the Second World War. The line is known to the world as a symbol of national division. The Korean question started with the drawing of the 38th Parallel, and remains unsettled in the international arena to this day.

The United States, which began armed intervention in feudal Korea in the 1860s, signed the Korea-US Treaty with the feudal ruling dynasty of Korea on May 22, 1882. Article 1 of this treaty stipulated that assistance would be forthcoming if any unfair and humiliating incident provoked by another country was notified. (*Collection of Treaties Relating to Korea*, 1985, p. 128.)

In contravention of the treaty, the United States aligned itself with Japan, which was covetous of Korea, and helped it to colonize Korea. The secret agreements that were signed by the US Army Secretary Taft and the Japanese Prime Minister Katsura in Tokyo on July 29, 1905, reveal the intention of the United States of America of making a victim of Korea to further its own interests, behind the screen of the Korea-US Treaty.

The collusion between the United States and Japan, however, culminated in a contradictory situation. Japan was bent on realizing its ambition of a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” and, on December 8, 1941, provoked a war in the Pacific by surprising Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, a US naval base. In January 1942, Japan scrapped all the treaties it had concluded with the United States, attacked and finally occupied the Philippines which had been guaranteed to the US as a colony by the “Katsura-Taft Treaty”.

The hostile relationship between the United States and Japan

forced the US into a strategic stage where it had to change its Korea policy, recognizing Korea as Japan's colony, to fit in with the new situation. In contradiction to its former view that Korea was a part of the Japanese empire, the United States had to "admit" the need for Korea's independence, because of its hostility to Japan.

From November 22 to 27, 1943, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek of China held talks in Egypt that resulted in the "Cairo Declaration". Expressing their resolve to put unswerving pressure on the barbarous enemy (Japan), the declaration said that the three major powers had noted the slavish state of the Korean people and pledged independence for Korea in due course. Thus the Korean question was included in the declaration. (*US Foreign Relations and Diplomatic Documents, Cairo and Teheran Conferences, 1943*, 1961, p. 402.)

The United States had no other alternative, for it understood, although belatedly, that its recognition of Korea as a Japanese colony had resulted in stimulating Japan's belligerency.

Although the declaration was adopted, it was difficult for the United States to defeat Japan single-handed.

By then Japan had occupied Indonesia, the Philippines, and nearly all the islands in the southern Pacific. In November 1943 it further elaborated its plan of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and threatened the United States. The United States recognized that Japan had great war potential and estimated that the war in the Pacific would continue for years even after the defeat of fascist Germany.

Faced with this situation, the United States decided to fight Japan by making use of the strength of the Soviet Union. After Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States approached the Soviet ambassador to the US and requested Soviet participation in the war against Japan. That was the time when the German forces had advanced close to Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union, compelling the latter to commit all its forces to the war against its main enemy. Therefore, the Soviet Union declined the US proposal.

Subsequently, too, the United States made repeated requests for

Soviet participation in the war against Japan. But the Soviet Union was not in a position to take an official stand on Korea's independence from the yoke of Japanese imperialism because it was still engaged in the fight against Germany in Europe and had to maintain the neutrality pact with Japan for the security of its eastern borders.

After the US forces landed in Okinawa the United States began to attach greater importance to Soviet involvement in the war against Japan.

The Japanese government announced that there was no change in the aim of its war despite the changed situation in Europe, issued general mobilization orders throughout the country and built up strong defences in anticipation of fighting in Japan proper. The 80,000 Japanese troops stationed in Okinawa after these preparations fought in stubborn defence against the 451,860 US troops, 1,317 US warships and 1,700 US aircraft that attacked them.

Pilots of the special Japanese air-force units sank many US warships by employing suicide tactics, killing or wounding 46,000 Americans. "Human torpedoes", code-named *Kaiten*, launched from Japanese submarines, sank fourteen US warships including aircraft carriers and large cruisers. The US forces suffered 75,000 casualties and missing men in the Okinawa landing operations. This was the heaviest loss they suffered in the Second World War.

The High Command of the US forces calculated that at least seven million troops would be needed for the campaigns against Japan, of which more than one million would be lost. (*Victory in the Far East*, Korean ed., 1985, p. 17.)

Being a nominal partner in the anti-fascist coalition, the United States was, in fact, refraining from supporting the liberation struggle of people who were opposed to fascism and all other types of oppression.

Truman, a US senator in those days, said that if Germany was stronger they should support Russia, and if Russia was stronger they should support Germany, so that the two belligerents would kill each other as much as possible. (*International Relations in the Far East*,

1870-1945, Part II, 1953, p. 81.) This statement clearly reveals US intentions. In line with this policy, the United States delayed the launching of the second front in western Europe that had been agreed upon with the Soviet Union.

However, in order to see Soviet entry in the anti-Japanese war as soon as possible, the United States concentrated on the transportation of war supplies to the Soviet Maritime Territory. In May 1945 the war supplies thus transported amounted to 781,000 tons, the peak figure during the war.

Meanwhile, in the second half of 1944, the Soviet Union, convinced of victory over Germany, expressed its intention to fight against Japan. In mid-December 1944, the Soviet Union declared its willingness to participate in the war against Japan on condition that the southern Sakhalin and Kuril Islands, which had been lost to Japan in 1904, be returned to the Soviet Union.

In January 1945 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a memorandum to President Roosevelt, which said that Russia's earliest possible entry into the war was essential for obtaining maximum Russian support for their Pacific campaign. (*Malta and Yalta Conferences, 1945*, US State Department, 1955, p. 396.)

On February 11, 1945, a secret agreement was signed in Yalta by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, by which the Soviet Union pledged to enter the war against Japan within two to three months after the surrender of Germany.

This agreement was made in top secrecy, and was not recorded in the proceedings of the Yalta Conference. The Soviet Union published the agreement on February 11, 1946, after Japan's defeat, and the United States also made it public on March 16, 1954.

After signing the Yalta agreement, the Soviet Union made full preparations to fight against Japan. On April 5, 1945, the Soviet Foreign Minister handed a Note to the Japanese ambassador, abrogating the Soviet-Japan Neutrality Pact that had been signed four years before. The Note pointed out that the neutrality pact had lost its significance and that its renewal was impossible.

With the cessation of neutrality, war between the Soviet Union

and Japan became imminent.

On August 8, 1945, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov summoned Japanese ambassador Sato in Moscow to the Foreign Ministry and handed him the Soviet declaration of war against Japan. In this document the Soviet government declared that it would be in a state of war against Japan on the following day, that is, on August 9.

Two hours later, at zero hour on August 9, 1945 (local time at the Zabaikal Front), the Soviet Far East Front Force, under the command of Marshal Vasilievsky, launched their general offensive.

The main objective of the Soviet army in the first stage of the campaign was to destroy Japan's Kwantung Army. The marine force under the command of the Soviet Pacific Fleet landed in Unggi in those days and Rajin on August 11, and in Chongjin on August 14. In support of this campaign, the 393rd Infantry Division, which was the reserve of the First Far East Front Force and then attached to the 25th Army, was sent to the Korean peninsula on August 12.

Simultaneously with the Soviet Union's declaration of war against Japan, all the units of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRI), which had by then completed preparations to liberate their homeland on their own, assumed a general offensive under the command of Comrade Kim Il Sung. They broke through the "impregnable" Japanese imperialist fortresses along the border, followed up their success with advances towards Unggi and Hoeryong, and pushed their way towards Rajin and Chongjin.

Japan's defeat was but a matter of time. When the airborne force of the KPRI was ready for action, and as the 393rd Infantry Division of the Soviet army was advancing towards Chongjin, at 12 o'clock on August 15, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's unconditional surrender on the radio.

The United States found itself facing a rapid change in the war situation.

After the declaration of war against Japan, the Soviet forces were operating on the northern frontier of Korea, whereas the US forces were far away on the southern Pacific. As of August 10, it was impossible for the US forces to arrive in the Korean peninsula earlier



than the Soviet forces. The US force operating nearest the Korean peninsula was at Okinawa, 600 miles away from Korea; the one at the Philippines was 1,500 to 2,000 miles away.

US Secretary of State Byrnes asserted that US forces should be present to accept the surrender of Japanese forces throughout Korea. (Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, 1956, p. 317.) President Truman's special envoy to Moscow, Pauley, and Harriman, US ambassador in Moscow, sent recommendations to the President and the US State Department to the effect that the US forces should immediately land in Korea and Manchuria in order to do so.

The United States, however, had neither the troops nor the time to send forces to the Korean peninsula to cope with the KPRA and the Soviet forces which were advancing southward. (Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, 1955, pp. 433-34.)

In recollection of the situation in those days, Truman said:

We had no troops there and no shipping to land forces at more than a few locations in the southern half of the peninsula. The State Department urged that in all Korea the surrender of Japanese forces should be taken by Americans, but there was no way to get our troops into the northern part of the country with the speed required without sacrificing the security of our initial landings in Japan. (Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, p. 219.)

In the circumstances, as he himself admitted, President Truman told the State-Army-Navy Coordinating Committee to work out a method of occupying a part of Korea by "advancing northward without meeting resistance". From August 10, the coordinating committee set about building up an argument for US forces to set foot on Korean soil by drawing a line across the peninsula.

The committee had several meetings until August 15. The focal point of discussion at these meetings were, who should disarm the Japanese forces in Korea and in Japan.

In the changed situation it was more or less clear that Japan proper could be occupied by the United States alone, so the topic of discussion shifted to the measures to be taken with regard to the Korean peninsula. The point at issue was whether or not to recognize

the whole area of Korea as the Soviet army's theatre of operations.

The coordinating committee entrusted the Strategic Section of the Army Department with the task of resolving the contradiction between the requirements of the United States' Korea policy and its military capability to support that policy, and of working out rational measures. This task was handled by Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel, who played an important role in shaping US military policy in the Strategic Section.

At midnight on August 10, they chose the "38<sup>th</sup> Parallel North" on their map of the Far East as the line to divide the Korean peninsula. The United States had reason to believe that it could persuade the Soviet side to accept the line of division. At that time, the Japanese forces in Korea had jurisdiction over the two areas of the peninsula divided by the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. On February 11, 1945, the "Korea Army", the Japanese forces in Korea, had been dissolved and reorganized into the 17<sup>th</sup> Directional Army and the Korean Military District. The 17<sup>th</sup> Directional Army, a field army under the command of the Imperial Headquarters, had the mission of "defending" Korea; the Korean Military District was in charge of troop replacement, training and logistical support. When the possibility of Soviet entry into the war against Japan increased after the abrogation of the Soviet-Japan Neutrality Pact and the surrender of Germany, Japan placed its Military District in the northern half of Korea under the jurisdiction of the Kwantung Army, and reassigned the 17<sup>th</sup> Directional Army to the "defence" of the southern half of Korea. The idea of a demarcation line that ran roughly along the "38<sup>th</sup> Parallel North" went through investigation by the US Army Department, then by the secretaries of the Army and State Departments through to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, by whom it was finalized from the military point of view on August 13 and 14, 1945. The idea was approved by the coordinating committee on August 14 and by Truman on the same day.

Part of the process of establishing the "38th Parallel" was made public for the first time in the records of the hearing at the Foreign

Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives of the US Congress on September 16 to 17, 1949; the full text of the hearing was published after twenty-seven years.

The United States sent a copy of the draft orders on the demarcation line, accepting the surrender of the Japanese forces, to the Soviet Union on August 15, when Japan surrendered. The Soviet government examined the draft orders and basically agreed to them.

President Truman made a unilateral statement appointing MacArthur, US Army Commander-in-Chief in the Philippines, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces with full rights to accept Japan's surrender, and instructed him to issue the draft orders on the demarcation line accepting the Japanese surrender as "General Order No. 1" of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces.

On September 2, 1945, Japan's surrender was signed aboard US flagship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay.

The same day, MacArthur issued his "General Order No. 1", which said that the Japanese forces in Manchuria, China, in Korea north of the 38th Parallel, and in the Sakhalin and Kuril Islands should surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Far East Front Force, and that the Japanese forces in Japan proper, on the neighbouring small islands, in Korea south of the 38th Parallel and in the Philippines should surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Army. (*Collection of Treaties Relating to Korea*, 1985, p. 352.)

Soviet and US forces started their operations in accordance with this order. The advance units of the 25th Army of the First Soviet Far East Front Force advanced into the area of Korea north of the 38th Parallel, and the 24th US Corps marched into the area south of the 38th Parallel.

Korea was thus divided into two regions. This was the beginning of Korea's partition that has continued over half a century.

Why did the United States pay so much attention to Korea, to the extent of allying with the socialist Soviet Union, despite the anti-communist attitude that formed the basis for all its policy-making? At that time, the United States had no foothold in the Asian

continent. While requesting the Soviet leader Stalin for Soviet entry into the war against Japan at the Teheran Summit Conference in November 1943, US President Roosevelt had proposed the construction of an air-force base for 1,000 US bombers in the Soviet Far East region. The proposal was turned down by Stalin.

In these circumstances, the United States attached special importance to acquiring the Korean peninsula as a bridgehead. Tactical air-force bases established on the Korean peninsula would bring the whole area of the Far East within the radius of operations from these bases. Korea was, therefore, very important indeed from a military point of view.

An article published in the US *Monthly Review* said:

Korea has been at the strategic crossroads for centuries, and China, Russia, Japan and the US armed forces, especially in recent years, have trampled upon it in order to have it in their own hands. For the Japanese Korea was a pistol aimed at them from the Asian Continent; for the Chinese it was a historical bridgehead for invasion of China by Japan; for the Russians it was a threat to Vladivostok; and for the Americans it was the most important link in the whole chain of blockade for destroying further communist expansion. (*Secret History of the Korean War*, Japanese ed., p. 52.)

MacArthur himself once said that he had always considered Korea an immensely valuable military outpost. (*New York Times*, February 4, 1957.)

It was for these reasons that Korea was included in the theatre of operations by the Allied Forces.

At the historic moment of Korea's liberation by the KPRA and the Soviet army, the United States found it impossible to leave the Korean question to be settled by the communists, and chose the "38th Parallel North" as the line of blocking such a settlement. Sibolt, chief of the diplomatic office at the MacArthur Command, said that MacArthur had a strong belief that if communist advance in the Far East was not checked, it would be impossible to occupy Europe and Asia. (*Recollection of Diplomacy for the Occupation of Japan*, p. 186.)

That was why the Japanese forces were disarmed in Korea, not in the Japanese homeland, and by the Soviet and US forces, not by the Korean people.

The attention paid to Korea by the United States was also motivated by its plan to use Korea as a bargaining chip for monopolizing the occupation of Japan.

The “Potsdam Declaration” had stated that both Japan and Germany would be occupied by the Allied Powers. However, the real intention of the United States was not joint occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers. This was revealed at the time of Potsdam Conference: when Stalin said, “Our next conference should be held in Tokyo,” Truman avoided responding to him. Already, the United States was determined to monopolize Japan. The US also objected to the Soviet proposal for two-person supreme commandship of the forces occupying Japan. After examining, on August 15, the draft “General Order No. 1” that divided the Korean peninsula for disarming the Japanese forces and basically agreeing to this proposal of the United States the following day, the Soviet government proposed that the Soviet army’s Chief of General Staff Antonov be included in the two-person supreme commandship of the Allied Forces occupying Japan, rather than appointing only MacArthur.

The United States expected the Soviet Union to raise strong objection to its monopolistic occupation of Japan because the Soviet Union, as a victor in the war against Japan, had legitimate right to its occupation and postwar administration.

The United States’ calculation was that if the Soviet Union was dead against the scheme of sole occupation of Japan by the US, it would make a concession by giving up the whole of Korea as a bargaining chip.

This sinister political and military calculation of the United States making use of the 38th Parallel in Korea was based on its policy of nuclear blackmail.

After the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union had mobilized many of its troops and equipment in preparation for the war against Japan. This was very unfavourable to the US scheme of gaining a

monopolistic position both in Japan proper and in Korea, for Soviet entry into the war against Japan would give the Soviet Union greater influence and a stronger voice in the postwar settlement of the Asian question. The United States, therefore, took the contradictory position of requesting Soviet military participation in the war against Japan while denying it politically.

A summit conference of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain was held at Potsdam in the outskirts of Berlin between July 17 and August 2, 1945. The conference adopted the “Potsdam Declaration” which demanded Japan’s unconditional surrender and clarified the basic principles of peaceful postwar administration of Japan. At this very moment the United States succeeded in making the atomic bomb. On July 16, 1945, the first atomic device was set off in a desert area in New Mexico in the United States.

Now the United States re-appraised the great significance it had earlier attached to Soviet entry into the anti-Japanese war. In this changed situation, where it had the “monopoly of the atomic bomb”, the United States decided that Soviet participation in the war would play only an auxiliary part, not a decisive role, in ensuring the outcome of the war.

Towards the end of the Second World War, the United States began to pursue a policy of nuclear blackmail, a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union, in order to secure a monopoly in the postwar distribution of the “booty”, namely, Japan, Korea and other colonial lands and defeated countries.

The “monopoly of the atomic bomb”, however, could not ensure an increased role for the United States in the war.

On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in Japan, and on August 9 another one on Nagasaki. This was aimed at demonstrating the United States’ role in the Japanese war in order to occupy a preferential position in the postwar settlement of the Asian question.

In spite of the bombings, Japan sent a Note to the US government through Switzerland, refusing to accept unconditional surrender. Even Churchill said that it would be a mistake to think that Japan’s

fate was decided by atomic bombs.

As you can see, the “38th Parallel North” that runs across Korea was not a mere demarcation line for disarmament, but a product of the United States’ Korea policy. But nobody knew that the line was to mark the beginning of the partition of Korea.

## **THE ORIGIN OF THE KOREAN QUESTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS**

The Korean question finding a place on the UN agenda was a product of the United States’ policy of occupying south Korea.

A conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain held in Moscow between December 16 and 26, 1945, discussed the Korean question. The Korean section of the decisions of the Moscow Conference, which were announced on December 27, 1945, was as follows:

...

1. A provisional democratic government of Korea shall be established for the purpose of rebuilding Korea into an independent state, providing conditions for its development on democratic principles, and quickly eliminating the evil effects of many years of Japanese rule. The provisional government shall take all the necessary measures for the development of Korea’s industry, transport and agriculture, and the national culture of the Korean people.

2. A joint commission shall be organized with the delegate of the US forces in south Korea and that of the Soviet forces in north Korea in order to help the establishment of the provisional government of Korea and to prepare measures appropriate for the purpose. The commission shall cooperate with democratic political parties and social organizations in drafting its proposals. ...

3. The joint commission, with the participation of the provisional democratic government of Korea and democratic organizations, shall prepare measures to help and cooperate (effect trusteeship) in the Korean people’s political, economic and social progress, the

development of their democratic self-government, and the establishment of the independence of the state of Korea.

The proposal of the joint commission should be discussed with the Korean provisional government and then put to deliberation by the governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and China, for the purpose of drawing up an agreement for four-nation trusteeship that would last five years.

4. A conference of representatives from the headquarters of the Soviet and US forces stationed in Korea shall be convened within two weeks in order to deliberate pressing matters related to north and south Korea, and to take measures for regular coordination between the Soviet and US headquarters in administrative and economic fields. (*Collection of Reference Documents on the Korean Question*, Vol. 1, Foreign Ministry, 1954, p. 10.)

The Korean people actively supported the decisions of the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference, and political parties and social organizations in north Korea made a joint statement in support of the decisions on January 2, 1946.

The United States, however, adopted a dishonest attitude both before and after the Moscow Conference.

The Soviet and US forces stationed in the two parts of Korea set about their operations as prescribed in "General Order No. 1". On August 20, 1945, General Chistyakov, Commander of the 25th Army of the First Soviet Far East Front Force, stationed in north Korea, issued a proclamation that read as follows:

Koreans, Korea has become a free country. This, however, only means the first page of Korean history. A thriving orchard is the result of human labour and energy. Likewise, Korea can achieve happiness only through the heroic struggle and unremitting efforts of the Korean people.

Koreans, remember! Happiness is in your own hands. You have won freedom and liberation. Everything is now entrusted to you.

The Soviet army will provide all conditions for the Korean people to start free and creative labour. The Korean people must create their own happiness. ...



The proclamation issued by the Soviet army on the very first day of its presence in north Korea reflected its sincere wish for the Korean people to build a happy new society, and expressed its faithful attitude to the international law on national self-determination.

On August 25, Chistyakov made a statement that he would respect the people's committee to be established by the Korean people, and support the people's committee accepting administrative authority from the Japanese government-general.

By November 1945, people's committees were organized at city, county, sub county and ri levels in the six provinces of north Korea, and on February 8, 1946, the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea headed by Kim Il Sung was organized.

In north Korea the people started exercising their legitimate right to self-determination, with state power in their own hands.

However, "Promulgation No. 1", issued to the people of south Korea by MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of US Army Forces, Pacific, at Yokohama, Japan, on September 8, when the US forces landed at Inchon, presented a sharp contrast to the Soviet proclamation. It read as follows:

To the people of Korea:

As Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, I do hereby proclaim as follows:

By the term of the Instrument of Surrender, signed by command and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government and by command and in behalf of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the victorious military forces of my command will today occupy the territory of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude. ...

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, I hereby establish military control over Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude and the inhabitants thereof, and announce the following conditions of the occupation:

## Article I

All powers of Government over the territory of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude and the people thereof will be for the present exercised under my authority.

## Article II

Until further orders, all government, public and honorary functionaries and employees, as well as all officials and employees, paid or voluntary, of all public utilities and services, including public welfare and public health, and all other persons engaged in essential services, shall continue to perform their usual functions and duties, and shall preserve and safeguard all records and property.

## Article III

Persons will obey promptly all my orders and orders issued under my authority. Acts of resistance to the occupying forces or any acts which may disturb public peace and safety will be punished severely.

## Article IV

Your property rights will be respected.

## Article V

For all purposes during the military control, English will be the official language. ...

This proclamation was intended to have been issued to a defeated Japan on September 3, but was announced to south Korea without any amendment. As can be seen from this, the United States treated the Korean people from the outset as the people of a defeated country, not a liberated nation.

Mark Gayn, an American correspondent who was in Seoul in 1946, had this to say, "We were not a liberation army. We rushed there in order to occupy it, in order to watch whether the Koreans obey the conditions of surrender. From the first days of our landing we have acted as the enemy of the Koreans." (*Japan Diary*, Vol. II, Japanese ed., p. 166.)

This shows that the United States flagrantly violated the United Nations Charter which reaffirms faith in basic human rights, human dignity and value, women's equality and equality between large and

small nations, and stipulates respect for people's equality and the principles of self-determination, a charter that the United States had signed only two months earlier together with 51 allied countries.

In addition, the US administration sent to MacArthur a strictly confidential document in the form of an appendix to "General Order No. 1", a document that ordered him to maintain the Japanese ruling machinery in south Korea on a tentative basis since there was no possibility of the US forces' immediate arrival in the area south of the 38th Parallel.

On August 20, MacArthur sent special telegraphic orders to the governor-general in Korea, Abe, who was awaiting trial as a war criminal, asking him to be responsible for maintenance of peace in south Korea in cooperation with the commander of the Japanese forces in Korea.

The US 24th Army Corps commander Hodge and the US Seventh Fleet commander Thomas arrived in Seoul on September 8 and accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces in south Korea, but they did not even keep Abe and other high-ranking war criminals in custody. Instead, at a press interview held after the ceremony of accepting surrender, Hodge announced that Governor-General Abe and other Japanese officials would temporarily remain in their posts for the maintenance of administration.

The maintenance of the functions of the Japanese governor-general triggered off a strong reaction of indignation among the south Korean people. Alarmed by this, the United States declared the cancellation of the rule of the Japanese governor-general, and at the same time announced the installation of a military government. Japanese officials in the government-general were removed and, on September 15, US officers took their place.

Later, on October 16, 1945, the US State Department decided to employ Koreans as "advisers" to the US military government in south Korea for "advice" on internal affairs. For this purpose, the US State and Army Departments selected their faithful servants from among the Koreans in exile in the United States, and sent them to south Korea.

In this manner, the United States issued a proclamation and instituted military government in liberated Korea as if it were an enemy country, while introducing indirect rule in Japan, a defeated country.

The policy pursued by the US military government authorities in south Korea in the years immediately after liberation trampled upon the Korean people's right to self-determination, and was strongly condemned by them. Not only the masses, but even some leading figures in south Korea who had pinned hopes on the United States' "commitment" to "help" Korean independence gradually distanced themselves from the United States.

Reviewing the first three months of military government, Hodge, Commander of the US forces, said:

Indignation against the Americans is growing in south Korea. Under the present circumstances and policy, the US occupation of Korea is undoubtedly falling into political and economic mire. Without some other measures, therefore, it would be impossible to regain credit for the prestige of the United States in the Far East. (Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, p. 318.)

Pointing out that it was a matter of shame that US generals issued proclamations one after another that trampled upon the Korean people's liberty and right to self-determination, in gross violation of the principles of respect for the basic human rights and nations' right to self-determination stipulated in the United Nations Charter, an American military historian said that this was due to their inability to provide political leadership. (*Korean Question*, 1957, pp. 48-49.)

The United States also created difficulties in implementation of the decisions adopted by the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference. It encouraged Syngman Rhee and other ultra-rightist reactionaries to launch a campaign against what they called "sinhakthongchi" (trusteeship), contrary to the decisions of that conference. The Syngman Rhee clique organized a general mobilization committee to conduct the campaign. Provoking hostility to the fact that the decisions were adopted at Moscow, they distorted the fact as if the five-year plan of "sinhakthongchi" for Korea had been decided at

Soviet insistence.

Wilfred Burchett, an Australian journalist, described the situation as follows:

In south Korea all the newspapers, all the political parties and social organizations that had some influence on the masses, and all the illustrious men of letters were for reunification. But all these organizations, newspapers and individuals were terrorized. The terrorists broke into newspaper offices, beat editors, destroyed printing machines, and took away the stereotypes that carried articles in support of reunification. They always acted under police protection. In the provinces posters advertising “no reunification” and “no *sinhakthongchi*” were put up everywhere, and more than once it was found that the paper and money for these posters came from the US Military Government. (*This Monstrous War*, p. 55.)

This was the campaign organized by Syngman Rhee with the wires being pulled by the United States.

The decisions of the Moscow Conference do not contain the word “*sinhakthongchi*”. In the original document the Soviet government used the word “*opeka*” which means “looking after”, or “*hugyon*” in Korean. The Korean word “*hugyon*” strongly connotes “protection”.

The United States used the word “trusteeship” in the English original of the decisions and let Syngman Rhee translate it as “*sinhakthongchi*”. The Korean word “*sinhakthongchi*” strongly connotes “domination”. In the English and Russian originals the words “trusteeship” and “*opeka*” were used because an English-Russian dictionary denoted them as having the same meaning. The United States, however, ignored all the progressive aspects of the decisions and distorted and exaggerated the meaning of a word in order to use it for an anti-communist campaign.

The idea of trusteeship for Korea was proposed by the United States. It implied an equivocal meaning at the very outset. In order to get a clue to this ambiguity, it is necessary to look into the Cairo Conference held between November 22 and 27, 1943.

The declaration of the American side at that conference, which

was drafted by Harry L. Hopkins, special assistant to US President Roosevelt, referred to the Korean question by saying: We remember that Japan has treacherously plundered Korea, and we adopt a decision that Korea should be a free and independent state at the earliest possible moment after Japan's defeat. On November 25, however, the words "at the earliest possible moment" were changed to "at the proper moment", and later replaced again with "in due course". (*Diplomatic Documents of the United States, Cairo and Teheran Conferences, 1943*, 1961, pp. 402-04.)

This was then agreed upon during the talks on November 27 and was announced on December 1. If the expression "in due course" suggested the method, it can be construed as meaning "through proper procedures"; if it suggested the time, it could be understood as meaning "at a proper time". The expression, which underwent a number of changes, could be interpreted one way or the other.

On December 4, 1943, three days after the publication of the declaration, Korean nationalists in China paid a visit to the US Embassy in China and asked what the expression meant. The embassy avoided giving an answer and only reported the fact to their government.

Even some politicians in the United States admitted that the meaning of the declaration was ambiguous. A US Congressman, Sheper by name, said that the pledge made in the "Cairo Declaration" was one of the most ambiguous of expressions, and that it might mean a period up to 200 years. (*Congressional Proceedings*, Vol. 91, 1945, p. 6686.)

US Secretary of State Cordell Hull said in his *Memoirs* that the Cairo decision on Korea was imprudent, and that the Koreans wanted independence as soon as their country was free, not "in due course". (Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, 1948, p. 1584.)

*New York Times* of December 3, 1943, also pointed out that the decision did not necessarily accord with the interests of the Korean people.

At the press conference that followed the announcement of the declaration, Roosevelt said that Korea's independence would be

realized in line with the United States' Philippines policy. He thus linked the ambiguity in the "Cairo Declaration" with US experience in the Philippines. This gradually cleared up the ambiguity of "in due course".

Before the announcement of the declaration, on November 15, 1942, Roosevelt said in a radio address: The Philippines' recent history of forty-four years provides a model for the future of the world's people and other small nations in the true sense of the word. (*Franklin D. Roosevelt's Published Documents and Speeches*, 1942, p. 473.)

The "Philippines' experience", as referred to by him, was roughly as follows. In the US-Spanish War of 1898, the United States had defeated Spain, seized the Philippines, a Spanish colony, instead of 20 million dollars as war reparations, and established a military government there. William McKinley, the then US President, ordered that the mobs in the Philippines should be calmed down even if it meant killing the last man among the Philippine patriots who were demanding independence. By his orders, a large number of the Philippine people were massacred. On Luzon Island alone, 600,000 people, or one-fifth of the population, were killed. In 1901 the United States replaced their military government with rule by a governor-general. In 1934 they changed it to neo-colonial rule by their local agent under the guise of "autonomy". It took more than four decades for the United States to stamp out all the Philippine patriots, establish a regime of faithful stooges and give it "independence".

This was the experience that was to be imposed upon the Korean people.

An American scholar wrote that the phrase "in due course" in the "Cairo Declaration" and its hidden intention were, needless to say, those of Roosevelt. (K. Burger, *The Korean Question*, 1957, p. 36.)

It was the United States that raised the issue of trusteeship in Korea. The idea of trusteeship, or looking after, was internationally agreed upon at the Yalta Conference. But the Soviet and US sides had fundamentally different concepts of the term.

The United States considered trusteeship to be the authority of

the state that holds trusteeship over and looks after the inhabitants and their territory, whereas the Soviet Union recognized it to be assistance to self-government and self-determination of the state that is looked after.

Because of this attitude of the United States, Syngman Rhee's "campaign against trusteeship" after the adoption of the decisions of the Moscow Conference laid artificial obstacles to the settlement of the Korean question.

The Soviet Union was indignant at this development. On January 22, 1946, the news agency Tass reported that the Americans had encouraged reactionary demonstrations against the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, that were agreed to also by the representative of the United States.

In an interview with Harriman, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who was on a farewell visit on January 23, 1946, Stalin said, "The programme of four-power trusteeship was made at the Moscow Conference in last December, but I have got the news that the US delegate in Korea is already violating the agreement." He added that the Americans were saying that only the Soviet government liked the idea of trusteeship for Korea, but in fact it had been proposed by Roosevelt. He went on to say, "Trusteeship is by no means needed by the Soviet government more than the United States. If the two countries deem it unnecessary, trusteeship may be abolished." (A. Harriman, *Diplomatic Battle between Emissary, Churchill, and Stalin*, Vol. II, 1985, Korean ed., p. 619.)

General Stikov, Military Commissar of the First Soviet Far East Front Force, held a press conference on January 26 in order to tell the truth to the Korean people. He made public in detail the US proposal for ten-year trusteeship, the Soviet proposal for reducing it to five years, and other processes of the Moscow Conference .

The US proposal on the Korean question at the Moscow Conference was as follows:

1) A single military administration which is directed by the commanders of the US and Soviet forces stationed in Korea shall be established in Korea, and the military administration shall govern



Korea until trusteeship is set up. Koreans can be employed as administrative personnel, consultants and advisers as far as possible under the command of the military commanders only within the military administration.

2) During the period of trusteeship, an administrative organization composed of representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China shall be established in Korea, to be placed under the jurisdiction of the high commissioner, and to exercise legislative, administrative and judicial powers in Korea. This government shall be enforced for five years and, if necessary, shall be extended another five years.

3) During the aforesaid period the question of establishing the government of Korea shall not be considered. (*Collection of Documents on the Korean Question, Appendix 2, Comparative Reference to the Soviet and US Opinions*, Foreign Ministry, 1954, p. 1.)

The Soviet Union objected to this proposal and made the following counter proposal:

1) A democratic provisional government of Korea shall be established, and Korea's reunification shall be realized with the participation of the provisional government.

2) The Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and China shall be in charge of trusteeship for Korea, which is aimed at taking prompt measures necessary for aiding the Korean people in their political, economic and social progress, and in the democratic development and establishment of the independent state of Korea.

3) The plan of trusteeship must be drawn up with the participation of the provisional government of Korea, the democratic political parties and social organizations of Korea.

4) Four-power trusteeship must be realized through the provisional government of Korea and its organization. (*Ibid.*)

This was a heavy blow to the US military government which encouraged the anti-trusteeship campaign.

Hodge sent a letter to the US State Department, saying that Stikov's statement might enable the Korean people to realize that the

United States had “sold them out”, and that this placed the United States in a very difficult position. He also sent a letter to MacArthur to the effect that he would agree to being dismissed in order to save the face of the United States. (US Army Department, *History of the US Forces in Korea*, pp. 89-92.)

After the formation of the Soviet-US Joint Commission in accordance with the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, the United States proceeded to obstruct the work of the commission in every way.

A conference of the representatives of the headquarters of the Soviet and US forces in Korea was held in Seoul between January 16 and February 5, 1946. The conference established the Soviet-US Joint Commission and adopted a decision that it should start functioning within a month.

The first conference of the commission held in Seoul on March 20, 1946, witnessed fundamentally different opinions advanced by the Soviet and US sides. The commission was to prepare the charter and political programme of the provisional government of Korea in consultation with the political parties and social organizations of Korea, and to organize the provisional government. At first the United States proposed formation of a “consultative committee” of Koreans with the right to formulate the provisional constitution of the state of Korea. This proposal was aimed at filling Korea’s provisional government with pro-US forces, so as to realize their domination over the whole of Korea. The directives of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed to Hodge prior to the opening of the conference of the joint commission pointed out that Communists could not represent the Korean people and that they were therefore not acceptable. (*History of the US Forces in Korea*, p. 145.) This position on the part of the US drove the conference of the joint commission to repeating its arguments in vain for a long time. On May 8, on the forty-eighth day of the conference, the functioning of the joint commission was suspended.

After this, the United States sought new measures.

Hodge could not ignore the fact that Syngman Rhee, who aspired

towards establishment of a separate government in south Korea and wanted to take over the reins of government, was being rejected by the people. Therefore, he reported to his government that it would be difficult to depend on Syngman Rhee.

On the basis of Hodge's report, a conference involving the State Department, the Army Department and the Navy Department, was held to discuss the Korean question in Washington on May 22, 1946. State Secretary Byrnes, Army Secretary Jepherson, Acting and Assistant Navy Secretary Sullivan and Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas Heldring participated. On June 6, the matters discussed at the conference were sent by the State Department, with the approval of the Army and Navy Departments, to the MacArthur Command and other relevant organizations.

Meanwhile, the US President relieved Byrnes of the post of Secretary of State and appointed Marshall in his place. In early 1947 Marshall set about examining the United States' Korea policy and, for this purpose, organized a high-ranking ad hoc committee to be led by the State and Army Secretaries. The ad hoc committee adopted a decision that if the Soviet-US Joint Commission did not function as desired by the United States, they would set up a separate government in south Korea.

On April 8, 1947, while on a visit to Moscow, Marshall proposed to Molotov that a date be fixed for the two governments to discuss the issues to be dealt with by the Soviet-US Joint Commission in the second half of 1947. In response, Molotov proposed that the work of the joint commission should be resumed in Seoul on May 20, and that a complete plan for establishing the provisional government of Korea should be submitted to the two governments for deliberation between July and August.

On May 2 and 7 Molotov and Marshall exchanged letters, agreeing on the resumption of work by the joint commission. This was commented on by the June 1947 issue of the American magazine *Life*: "An agreement was reached in May 1947 on resuming the negotiations about Korea, but that was after the United States had adopted a more definite new policy for continuing the

occupation of Korea until its aim is achieved.”

A conference was opened again in Seoul on May 21, 1947, a year and eleven days after the suspension of the operation of the Soviet-US Joint Commission. This was called the second conference of the commission. The June 11 and 12 sessions adopted the contents of the “Questionnaire on the Formation of the Democratic Provisional Government of Korea and the Principles of Its Organization” and the “Questionnaire on the Political Programme of the Democratic Provisional Government of Korea”, and the “Regulations for Consultation with the Democratic Political Parties and Social Organizations in North and South Korea”.

The questionnaires were immediately circulated to all democratic political parties and social organizations. The United States, however, began to carry out its plan of setting up a separate “government” in south Korea even while the questionnaires were being distributed to political parties and social organizations in north and south Korea and joint discussions were going on.

A large number of patriots in south Korea came out in support of negotiations with the north, and only the isolated Syngman Rhee clique supported separate elections.

The United States found itself faced with two choices: whether to participate in the operation of the joint commission as a party to the international agreement or to conduct separate elections. It chose the latter course of rallying the Syngman Rhee clique and making use of his force.

In compliance with the US scheme, Syngman Rhee resumed the “anti-trusteeship campaign” which had been forbidden nominally. In consequence, the work of the joint commission came to a standstill and negotiations were shifted to the government level.

The United States, as the last resort, brought the Korean question before the UN. This was illustrated by the telegraphic message sent to the Secretary of State by J. Coms, political adviser to Hodge, on September 8, 1947:

The American nation and Congress will sooner or later find us in the greatest difficulty as the left-wing forces try to expel us and as

the right-wing forces reject their one-sided demand. This will compel the United States to abandon Korea whether it wants it or not. Unless counter-measures are taken at a conference of the four countries or at the UN, it will be kicked into a difficulty from left and right.

On August 26, 1947, the Under Secretary of the US State Department, Robert, sent a letter to Molotov, proposing a conference on the Korean question in Washington on September 8 of the four countries that had agreed to the decisions of the Moscow Conference, and inviting the Soviet Union to the conference. The US proposal on the Korean question, to be presented at the conference, was enclosed in the letter.

The proposal said that elections should be held to constitute a complete provisional legislative assembly for each zone of Korea (north and south); that a provisional national legislative assembly should be constituted with elected members in proportion to the populations in the two zones; that it should meet in Seoul to set up the provisional government of reunified Korea; and that the four powers who were signatories to the Moscow Agreement along with the provisional government should formulate a provisional constitution through discussion. The proposal recommended that all these processes should be placed under the observation of the UN.

The United States estimated that a preponderance of pro-American forces could be secured through elections in proportion to the population. At that time there were 4.5 million constituents in north Korea and 9.5 million in south Korea. The United States also intended to make use of the voting machine of Britain and nationalist China by proposing the four-power conference in place of the Soviet-US Joint Commission.

On September 4, 1947, the Soviet Union replied in writing to the US, saying that setting up separate provisional legislative assemblies in the north and south, instead of establishing a single centre of power for the whole of Korea, would result in dividing Korea. It urged the US to agree to the Soviet proposal of founding a provisional people's assembly of Korea.

However, the United States began to go to the extreme, as it had planned. On September 17, the US side suspended the functioning of the Soviet-US Joint Commission; in a letter to the Soviet side it said the US government was of the opinion that the question of Korea's independence should be brought to the next UN General Assembly session.

On October 18, the United States officially proposed that the meeting of the joint commission be adjourned. On October 20 the Soviet Union made a statement, withdrawing its delegation from Seoul. Thus the joint commission broke down after a year and seven months of its existence, without carrying out even the most elementary task relating to the Korean question. Having frustrated the working of the commission, the United States brought the Korean question to the UN as it had planned.

On September 17, 1947, US Secretary of State Marshall spoke at the Second UN General Assembly Session, shifting the responsibility for delaying the independence of Korea by more than two years on to the Soviet Union, and proposing a US resolution to discuss the Korean question at the UN. He said that only the UN could meet the "Koreans' urgent and just demand for independence", and that the General Assembly should approve putting the Korean question on the agenda of the UN.

Refuting Marshall's statement, the head of the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly declared that going by its charter, the UN had no role to play whatsoever in settling the Korean question because this question was a direct product of the war. Asserting that an international agreement on Korea had been reached in Moscow in December 1945, he pointed out that questions of postwar settlement like the Korean question could not be an item for discussion at the UN General Assembly since there was already an international agreement.

However, six days later, on September 23, the UN passed a resolution including the Korean question in the agenda of its General Assembly, and got it to be discussed by the First Committee. This was the origin of the Korean question in the UN. In consequence, the

international agreement on Korea was nullified, and the Korean people were poised between reunification and division.

No one wishes to live under another's oppression, and no nation wants to be subjugated by another nation. That is why no nation can tolerate its dignity being trampled upon by foreign forces. This is an inevitable requirement that emanates from human nature as well as a historical truth that cannot be denied.

The United States' resolution including the Korean question on the agenda of the UN laid an obstacle in the way of the Korean people to establishing an independent and sovereign state, and became the prelude to the complex and burning problem of Korea.

## **THE DIVISION OF KOREA**

The Korean question was fundamentally different in character from the question of postwar settlement for a country that was defeated in its war of aggression. The case of a defeated country was a question of removing the cause of a new world war. However, Korea was neither an aggressor in the war nor a vanquished country. Therefore, it should have been given the right to sovereignty and independence as soon as it was freed from Japanese military occupation.

There was nothing delicate or obscure about the postwar dealing with Korea. That was why everyone believed, after it was liberated, that Korea would soon become independent.

With reference to the US proposal for trusteeship at the Yalta Conference, Stalin said that if the Korean people themselves could set up a government that satisfied them, trusteeship would not be required. He offered unqualified support for complete elimination of the long years of Japanese military rule in Korea and for Korea's speedy rehabilitation as an independent state.

The Korean people, in fact, were fully capable of building a new Korea by their own efforts. At the UN General Assembly session on November 4, 1947, the delegate from the Philippines, Romler, said that he believed in the ability of the Korean people to find a solution

to their own problems in a free atmosphere with no foreign intervention. An American historian also said that the Korean people had demonstrated their leadership ability during the few weeks after Japan's surrender. (*US Military Government in Korea*, p. 234.)

The United States, however, did not want Korea to be independent; it saw domination of the whole of Korea as the key to its Far East policy.

Edwin W. Pauley, US Presidential Representative on Reparations, who was in Korea on a fact-finding mission during May and June 1946, sent a report to Truman on June 22 titled "View on the Korean Situation, Conclusion and Recommendation", which said the following: "Frankly speaking, ... Korea is an ideological battlefield on which the United States' success in Asia depends. In other words, I think it is a testing ground whether democracy can stand by challenging defeated feudalism or whether communism will grow stronger." (Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, 1955, p. 224.)

This "recommendation" made by Pauley was accepted by President Truman as the policy of the United States. This was confirmed by Truman's statement in 1946 that Korea was the field of ideological battle on which American successes in Asia might depend, and by the secret diplomatic document published in the early 1970s which said that they would stay in Korea long enough to carry out their task, and requested appropriate personnel and sufficient money for carrying it out. (*The United States Foreign Relations. 1946*, Far East.)

Albert C. Wedemeyer, who went on an inspection tour to south Korea as a US presidential envoy in 1947, said in his September 19 special report to Truman that if the US-Soviet Joint Commission was considered a failure, the Korean question should be settled at a four-power conference; if the four-power conference was a failure, it should be settled at the UN General Assembly; and if that too failed, the United States should decide the future of Korea single-handedly. He said that in no circumstances should the United States abandon Korea. The United States started acting in accordance with this line, and the UN put the Korean question on its agenda unilaterally, in



keeping with the plan of the United States.

In the grave situation that arose as a result, in which the division of Korea seemed incumbent, the Soviet Union made a statement in Seoul on September 26, 1947, that both the Soviet and US forces should withdraw from Korea in early 1948 and allow the Korean people to settle their own question.

The statement said, "... Korea can be a sovereign and independent state only when it has its own government that enjoys the support of the people, and only when both the Soviet and US forces have withdrawn from Korea. ... The Soviet delegation makes a statement that if the US delegation agrees to the proposal for withdrawing all the foreign forces early in 1948, the Soviet forces will make preparations for leaving Korea simultaneously with the US forces."

But the United States refused to agree to the proposal, saying that withdrawal of the armed forces was only one aspect of the Korean question. The US plan was to achieve its aim by bringing the Korean question to the UN and making use of its "voting machine". In particular, the United States at that time was in danger of losing its political and military foothold in Asia as Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government had been driven to the brink of collapse by the general counter-offensive of the Chinese People's Liberation Army that was launched in July 1947. Under these circumstances, the United States was spurred to protect its strategic interests in the Korean peninsula.

Regarding this, an American publication wrote to the following effect:

The United States has failed to secure a base in Manchuria in spite of the fact that 140,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's troops moved from southern and western China to northern China and Manchuria, and 50,000 US troops were sent to northern China, after the Second World War. The area of north Korea could be a substitute for a Manchurian base or a broad direct route to Manchuria. (*Who Provoked the Korean War?* Japanese ed., p. 121.)

The US calculation was that bringing the Korean question to the

UN would serve its purpose.

In the course of the Second World War, Germany, Italy and Japan, three of the “six major powers”, were defeated, France was considerably weakened, and the empire of Great Britain, on which the sun had never set, was compelled to withdraw from many of its colonies around the world or to concede its former position in many European and Asian countries to the United States. Britain and France suffered such heavy losses in the war that thereafter they were never able to recover their old position.

The United States alone, among these world powers, was able to strengthen its position during the war. Favoured by conditions in which its mainland was free from the damages of war, the United States rapidly increased wartime production and got enormous profits. Through its policy of “aid” and “lend-lease” to its allies during the war, it gained staggering profits amounting to tens of billions of dollars. In the postwar years, too, it earned significant profits in terms of repayments of loans and reparations.

By 1948 the United States held two-thirds of the world’s gold reserve (worth approximately \$28,000 million), and the value of its industrial output was 53.4 per cent of the total output of the capitalist world.

In the military sphere, having achieved success in the development of the atomic bomb in July 1945, the United States enjoyed a monopoly over “the secret of atomic bombs”. Even during peacetime, it maintained an army of 1,000,000 troops, a 400,000-strong air force, and a 500,000-strong navy. As a result, the United States overtook its former rivals—Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan—in the political, economic and military fields, and was able to step up its domination over them. Britain and France, victors in the war, had to depend on US dollars in their attempts at recovery, and defeated Germany and Japan were in a very bad way.

With the establishment of the UN, the role played by the US government in the operation of the organization raised its position within it. The UN headquarters and its major organizations were located in the United States, and it contributed the lion’s share of UN

expenses among the world powers.

The United States made large investments particularly in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the specialized UN establishments, and this enabled the US to exercise privileges. The American weekly *Business Week*, dated October 22, 1949, wrote roughly as follows: The UN saves the face of the United States. ... Fundamentally speaking, the UN is an American organization. It has been set up by the United States. Behind this success are the efforts of American technicians. ... Perhaps the most important fact is that the UN headquarters is on American land. ... The United States gets hold of as much as it has paid out.

Thus, after the war, there was a realignment of imperialist forces centring on the United States, departing from their former positions of rivalry, and many satellite nations came forward to seek “aid” in American dollars and “protection” by the American atomic bombs. This served the United States favourably in garnering a majority in the UN and gaining the upper hand in the application of the principle specified by the UN Charter of deciding on matters by majority vote.

At the time of the Second UN General Assembly Session, US President Truman declared that the United States was the UN, and that what they were doing was the decision of the UN. (*The United States and the Korean War*, p. 265.) This shows that the UN in those days was a forum where the majority of the member-nations expressed their stand following the movements of the hand of the US delegate, rather than in accordance with the nature of the items on the agenda. Even bourgeois politicians ridiculed the process of debate at the UN by saying that it was the movement of a “voting machine”.

The Korean question, which was illegally brought to the UN by the United States, was discussed in these circumstances from the outset.

On October 17, 1947, Austin, the US delegate to the UN, proposed the US resolution, “The Question of Korean Independence”, at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. The resolution called for organizing a UN Temporary Commission

on Korea and holding elections in the north and south of Korea in proportion to their populations under the observation of this commission to form the government of Korea.

Now that the United States had started discussion of the Korean question at the UN, the Soviet Union had to express its position regarding the matter. On October 28, the Soviet delegate to the UN proposed the Soviet resolution which stated that “The First Committee, because the Korean question on the agenda of the UN General Assembly is originally a question of the Korean people themselves and concerns their freedom and independence, and recognizing that its correct and fair settlement cannot be reached without participation of the representatives of the inhabitants concerned in the discussion, invites to the discussion of this question the elected representatives of the Korean people from north and south Korea.” He declared that if this requirement was not met, the Soviet Union would not participate in the discussion of the Korean question.

In general, if a question that is being discussed by an international organization or at an international conference concerns the destiny of a given country or nation, it is international practice to invite a representative of the nation and hear his or her opinion, and this provides the basis for ensuring the objectivity and legality of the decision on the question.

The United States, however, prevented the Soviet resolution from being passed, and on October 29 proposed an “amendment” to it at the First Committee which said that, in order to ensure proper election of Korean representatives by the Korean people, the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, which will stay in Korea with authority to travel and observe the whole of Korea and conduct consultations, should be established without delay. (*Collection of UN Resolutions on the Korean Question, 1947-1957*, p. 15.) The “amendment” was, in the last analysis, aimed at establishing the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, an instrument for interfering in the affairs of Korea, as soon as possible.

Some of the UN member-nations expressed their reservations

regarding this. The French delegate said that electing representatives under the observation of the commission would delay the hearing of their opinions. The delegate from New Zealand admitted that he had doubts whether the US amendment was really an amendment to the Soviet resolution; although it was presented in the form of an amendment, it was essentially a repetition of the first US resolution. (*Official UN Records of the Illegal Discussion of the Korean Question*, Vol. 1, pp. 17, 25, 31.)

Nevertheless, on October 30, the US delegate insisted that he would not withdraw his “amendment” because it was completely justifiable, and urged that it be put to vote. On November 14, the United States got its resolution “for election under UN observation” pushed through. It proposed that the UN Temporary Commission on Korea which would stay in Korea for the election under UN observation should comprise delegates from Australia, Nationalist China, Canada, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria and Ukraine. There and then, Ukraine stated that it did not recognize the commission itself and that it would not participate in the commission because it was clear that it would be an instrument for intervention in the affairs of Korea.

The Soviet Union, too, declared the debate on the Korean question at the UN illegal, boycotted voting on the US resolution “The question of Korean Independence”, and refused to recognize the existence of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea. The Soviet Union declined the request of the commission for a courtesy call on Chistyakov, delegate of the Soviet forces in Korea, a request that was sent by the UN Secretary-General through the Soviet delegate to the UN.

Thus, the Second UN General Assembly Session, under the auspices of Dulles, head of the US delegation, “decided” on the Korean question on the basis of information offered by the US delegate, and without any investigation of the facts, or hearing the opinion of the people concerned.

The people of north and south Korea categorically rejected the involvement of the commission in the Korean question, considering

it an act of intervention in their internal affairs. Because of the strong protest by the people of the north, the commission was not able to set foot on north Korean soil. The south Korean people, too, waged a mass struggle from the first day of the commission's presence there. On January 9, 1948, workers of the Kyongsong Electric Company went on strike, and this was followed by struggles at many factories in Seoul. Many social organizations in south Korea, too, expressed their determination to resist by making the following statement, "The UN resolution will only delay the settlement of the Korean question, bring about the partition of national territory, the division of the nation, the delay of troop withdrawal, and subjugation. We will defend this land at the cost of our lives from aggression by any imperialist forces, and fight until we achieve sovereignty and independence through north-south reunification". (*Tokrip Sinbo*, January 30, 1948.)

The south Korean people's struggle to reunify Korea by rejecting foreign intervention spread, on February 7, into a massive anti-US national resistance involving all sections of the population. They fought under the slogans, "We are against the division of Korea and the UN Temporary Commission on Korea which implements the plan of aggression!" and "Leave the establishment of reunified national government to the Korean people!"

The mounting struggle of the Korean people caused vacillation and unrest even within the UN Temporary Commission on Korea. On February 4, 1948, the Syrian delegate to the commission said that under the current political situation free election was impossible, and that even if election was held, it would contradict the UN Charter. The delegate from El Salvador said that the commission should quit its work in view of the impossibility of achieving its purpose. Similar criticism was also voiced by the Australian and Canadian delegates. (*Official UN Records of the Illegal Discussion of the Korean Question*, Vol. 1, p. 101.) The United States decided to hold a separate election in south Korea and to justify it under the cloak of the UN "decision". A dispatch from Washington reported that the United States' plan was to obtain recognition for the new

government of south Korea at the UN Committee and General Assembly. (*San Francisco Chronicle*, May 29, 1948.)

Having failed in this attempt at the UN Security Council on account of the veto power of its permanent member, the Soviet Union, the United States then schemed to get the Korean question discussed at a “small assembly” with no powers of decision, and to concoct a “decision” favourable to it. During the Second UN General Assembly session, the United States formed a “small assembly” by using its “voting machine”, which had its sittings between the General Assembly sessions.

The United States persuaded Menon (an Indian), head of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, to request the “small assembly” to hold “consultation” and propose “recommendations” for finding a solution to the situation, in which a nationwide “election” under UN observation was impossible under the present circumstances in Korea.

On February 11, 1948, Menon submitted to the “small assembly” a “written opinion” about the “difficulty faced” in Korea. On February 19, US Secretary of State Marshall called a “UN small assembly” session where he proposed a US “resolution” that if observation of the election throughout Korea by the UN Temporary Commission on Korea was impossible, a separate “election” should be held in that part of Korea to which the commission could have access for the establishment of a government. He asked the delegates of the various nations to vote for the “resolution”. This meant the division of Korea.

Opinions against the “resolution” were expressed even among the delegates to the “small assembly”. The Swedish delegate said that there was no objective information about the situation in Korea, and that he could not agree to a discussion of the Korean question by the “UN small assembly”. The Norwegian delegate pointed out that the adoption of the US resolution by the “UN small assembly” would mean abuse of the authority given by the UN General Assembly. The Canadian delegate said that he could not believe that “the majority of the south Korean people supported the US plan.” Delegates from

Australia, Egypt, Brazil and other nations, too, expressed their disagreement. In consequence, the meeting was dragged out to the sixth session.

However, the United States got the “resolution” passed on February 26, 1948, by setting its “voting machine” in motion. An American journalist wrote that within the UN only Nationalist China strongly supported the idea of a separate election, and that in Korea only the right-wing force of Syngman Rhee was in favour of it. (*Korea Today*, Harvard University, 1950, p. 227.)

The decision adopted illegally by the “UN small assembly” said the following:

“It is decided that ... the small assembly is of the opinion that implementing the assembly’s plan in the area of Korea accessible to the UN Temporary Commission in accordance with the item of the decision of the UN General Assembly is the mission entrusted to the commission.” (*UN Yearbook, 1947-1948, 1949*, p. 284.)

This decision presented the grave situation of national division before the Korean people. On February 20, 1948, the 24th Session of the Central Committee of the Democratic National United Front of North Korea issued an appeal to all Korean compatriots. The appeal made public for the first time all the activities of the Soviet and US forces during the two-and-a-half years of their presence in Korea, and exposed the actions taken by the United States to block the implementation of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Three Foreign Ministers, frustrate the work of the Soviet-US Joint Commission, and divide Korea.

Pointing out what the election would be like in south Korea with democratic political parties and social organizations having been driven underground, and even nationalists being arrested, imprisoned, tortured and killed, the appeal said: “Let us demand a general election throughout Korea after the withdrawal of foreign troops. Let us assert an all-Korea election of the people’s assembly on the principles of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. The people’s assembly so elected will approve the constitution and establish a democratic government.”



On March 25, political parties and social organizations in north Korea sent a declaration against the separate election to their counterparts in south Korea.

In the deepening crisis caused by the United States, Kim Ku, Kim Kyu Sik and other nationalists in south Korea supported the line of establishing a unified government for all of Korea, finally broke with the United States and the Syngman Rhee clique that had instigated the idea of a separate election, and came out in favour of north-south political negotiations in order to prevent division of the nation.

Declaring that the UN was a foreign organization that had no right to meddle in Korea's affairs, Kim Ku came out against the election under UN observation; Kim Kyu Sik, too, was opposed to it because it would mean permanent division of the country.

From April 19 to 23, 1948, at the proposal of Kim Il Sung a joint conference of 16 political parties and 40 social organizations from north and south Korea was held in Pyongyang for the first time since liberation. The conference decided to oppose the separate election, compel the foreign troops to withdraw, and fight for the building of a unified democratic state, and issued an appeal. Following the conference, the attendants adopted a joint statement to this effect in Pyongyang on April 30.

The United States, in flagrant denial of the Korean people's will, went ahead and conducted the separate election in south Korea on May 10. A secretary to the US government at that time recommended that the US Military Government must closely study the experience of the referendum in Saar prior to the election in south Korea and apply the lessons gained from it. (*Official UN Records on the Illegal Discussion of the Korean Question*, Vol. 1, p. 198.)

Before the election, the United States cast a network of repression all over south Korea. Warships were deployed at Pusan, Inchon and other major ports, and large bombers and reconnaissance planes were mobilized. "Polling-stations" and police stations were surrounded with barricades, and armed police troops and terrorist bands were posted along every lane and between buildings. A UP dispatch reported that the US troops alone were reinforced by 50 per

cent during the two weeks around the election (UP, May 30, 1948), and the cities were like those under martial law. (*Kyonghyang Sinmun*, May 12, 1948.)

The United States also resorted to terrorism against patriots and inhabitants in south Korea and massacred them. From February 7 to June 6, 1948 alone, 8,293 cases of arrest were reported, and according to the document (A-AC, 19-W39) compiled by the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, 417 persons were killed and 768 people were injured. (*Official UN Records on the Illegal Discussion of the Korean Question*, Vol. 1, p. 119.)

The fraudulent election was held on May 10, with violence in broad daylight ruling over all parts of south Korea. The US army and puppet police troops drove voters to the “polling-stations” at the point of bayonets and by wielding clubs, beating and even shooting at persons who refused to fall into line. Violent acts were perpetrated even in districts which had been prepared for the observer teams of the commission to “prove” fair elections. The people who went to the “polling-stations” under the threat of the police and terrorist bands, were subjected to bodily searches and spied upon. Those who disobeyed or refused to obey were beaten or killed. A delegate to the commission who observed the “election” admitted that the atmosphere was not conducive to free elections. (*The UN and Korea’s Peaceful Reunification*, p. 104.)

An AP dispatch, dated May 12, 1948, reported that 500 persons were killed on May 10. Wilfred Burchett, an Australian journalist, said that some of them had lost their lives because they refused to vote, and some due to the disturbances at “polling-stations”. (*This Monstrous War*, p. 74.)

The south Korean people waged an all-out struggle against the traitorous May 10 separate election. On May 8, one million workers in south Korea went on a general strike, and on the election day workers, peasants, office employees, students and other sections of the population rose in different forms of struggle against the election—in demonstration, revolt, student strike, refused to vote. Fighting under the slogans, “Oppose the separate election!” and “UN

Commission on Korea, get out!” they destroyed 46 “polling-stations”, hundreds of “election offices”, and 73 police stations.

On Jeju Island, there was no voting at all in two of the three election districts, and in the third district the majority of voters refused to cast their votes. In Taegu and Hamyang, 80 to 90 per cent of the electorate did not turn up at the “polling-stations”. The “May 10 separate election” was, therefore, in fact, a failure. The United States rigged the election, installed Syngman Rhee as “President” on July 20, got the “Republic of Korea” declared on August 15, and staged a farce of the transfer of power to it from the US Military Government. It made a statement recognizing the “Korean government” established in south Korea as the government that was conceived by the decision of the UN General Assembly on November 14, 1947.

The line that had been drawn along the 38th Parallel North by the United States in 1945, on the excuse of disarming the Japanese troops, became the line of Korea’s division.

In the face of the imminent danger of national division, a conference of leaders of north and south Korean political parties and social organizations was convened again in Pyongyang in north Korea, on June 29, 1948, which decided to hold a general election in north and south Korea. The election was held on August 25, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was founded on September 9. This was a sole legitimate state established by all the constituents of the Korean peninsula.

At the Third UN General Assembly Session held in Paris in December 1948, the United States once again presented the Korean question and manipulated the south Korean “delegate” to the UN to deny the establishment of the DPRK on the ground that the general election was not held under UN observation. He alleged that the “election” held in south Korea and its results were the “expression of the people’s will in a stable situation”, in an attempt to justify the government of south Korea. In addition, the delegate of Nationalist China presented what he called the report of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea. The report said, firstly, that the “election and

the formation of the national assembly and the government” in south Korea under the observation of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea were a “true expression of the free will of the south Korean people”; secondly, that “the US occupation force had gradually transferred to it the functions of government and administration,” and that “the commission was of the opinion that the Koreans’ support for the government was sufficient for it to perform its duties”; and thirdly, that “the commission was ready to assist the organization (UN) in the settlement of pending issues” if the General Assembly required it to do so. (*Official UN Records on the Illegal Discussion on the Korean Question*, Vol. 1, p. 159.)

Citing that the “joint resolution” proposed by Australia and China (Nationalist) on December 6 as the UN’s line on the Korean question and as “one step forward”, the US delegate Dulles commented that “the UN must provide legal proof for what has been done under its observation.” He said that this evidence was needed for the “ROK government” to maintain its dignity and authority at home and abroad, and that it would be unthinkable for the UN to deny the results of its creative plan. (*Documents on the United States Foreign Relations*, Vol. 10, p. 174.)

The “joint resolution” contained a request for “approval of the conclusions arrived at by the Temporary Commission in its report” (Article 1), for “refraining from any action” by UN member-nations, that might “adversely affect the south Korean government”(Article 8) because it was a “legitimate government that was effectively exercising its authority to control and administer” (Article 2), and for “establishing relations with it on a governmental level” (Article 9). (*Collection of UN Resolutions on the Korean Question, 1947-1957*, p. 41.)

The “joint resolution” was opposed by many of the delegates. At the meeting of the First Committee on December 7 and 8, the Polish, Czechoslovak, Soviet and other delegates exposed the illegality of the “elections held under UN observation” in south Korea and of the south Korean “government” on the basis of facts. The delegate from Myanmar declared that he would abstain from voting because Article

2 of the joint resolution recognized the permanent division of Korea. The delegate from the Netherlands said that it was unjustified to call the government of south Korea the “ROK government”. The Indian delegate declared that he would withhold agreement to the resolution because Article 2 mocked at the UN.

The United States let the delegate of its satellite propose that the discussion of the Korean question at the First Committee be finished by the morning of December 8, and got the resolution pushed through.

The south Korean people rose in struggle against the United States and the Syngman Rhee regime that tried to finalize the division of Korea.

In October 1948, an “ROK” army unit in Ryosu, together with the local people, rose in revolt and issued a manifesto that announced, “The Ryosu people’s committee seizes all the political powers in Ryosu”, and gave a call to “Defend the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at any cost!” On November 30, 260,000 people participated in the struggle in Seoul and other areas of south Korea.

A south Korean publication reported, “The government is suffering a ceaseless rebuff from the people ever since its early days. ... It hasn’t won unqualified support from them, and the government and society are separated from each other.”

Leon Prou, an AFP reporter, said, “I cannot but think that the effect of this rebellion is very serious, because there is a danger of the ‘ROK government’ finding itself in a very bad position at a time when the UN General Assembly is going to appeal for recognition of the ‘ROK government’. ... How can one recognize a ‘government’ that has met with resistance from its own army?” (*Asahi News*, November 2, 1948.)

The United States got the “joint resolution” on the Korean question pushed through in the First Committee of the Third Session of the UN General Assembly on December 8. Trygve Lie of Norway, the first UN Secretary-General, led all UN policies along pro-US lines. The “voting machine”, especially that was bought over with

American dollars to form a majority, ensured that all items on the agenda were decided according to the intentions of the United States.

David Conde, an American journalist, wrote that this was because they had to take into consideration US aid and loans at present and in the future. (*Modern History of Korea*, Vol. 1, p. 500.)

On December 12, 1948, the Third UN General Assembly session adopted the criminal decision that recognized the puppet government of south Korea as the “only legitimate government in Korea”.

Finding it impossible to dominate the whole of Korea, the United States thus divided one country and one nation into two without hesitation.

The Korean question that was raised for the independence of Korea in the international agreement ended up in its division. However, the Korean question which was manipulated by the United States did not come to a settlement with the division of Korea.

Channing Liem, the then first secretary of the chief adviser to the US Military Government, wrote:

As a member of the US delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, Dulles had played a leading role in inducing the UN to recognize the Rhee regime as the only legal government of Korea, having been established as a result of the “valid expression of the will of the Korean people”. In doing so, Dulles’ interest was not in promoting democracy in Korea nor in supporting Rhee, per se, but in establishing a base in East Asia from where the United States could launch a titanic roll-back campaign against communism in Asia. ...

Dulles’ ambition was to help Rhee win the Presidency of south Korea with the purpose of gaining a base on the Asian mainland not only for the conquest of North Korea but also China. (*The Korean War: An unanswered Question*, pp. 16-17.)

The Korean War that broke out on June 25, 1950, shows that the major task of the United States’ Asia policy was to dominate the whole of Korea.

The tragic division of Korea which had been liberated after

Japan's defeat provides a historical lesson to the Korean people that their problems should be solved by their own efforts.

The division of Korea was neither the outcome of political developments within Korea nor brought upon by the will of the Koreans themselves. It was imposed upon them by the United States.

## **PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE UNITED STATES**

### **THE JUNE 25 KOREAN WAR**

Paragraph 4, Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner...." This stipulation was flagrantly violated by the United States during the Korean War (June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953). The war started with an attack launched by Syngman Rhee's army at the instigation of the United States, but the United States manipulated the UN to brand the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the "aggressor". This was followed by the commitment of US-led multi-national forces in the Korean War, under the flag of the UN. The Indian newspaper *Crossroads*, in its issue dated December 22, 1950, reported:

Colonel Eida who had formerly worked at MacArthur's Headquarters and was transferred to the US military advisory group in Iran said at an interview with the staff officers of the Iranian army in December 1950, "The US plan was to occupy the territory of Korea north of the 38th Parallel with Syngman Rhee troops' direct participation and the assistance of the US ground, naval and air forces."

This shows that the war was necessary to the United States and was therefore unavoidable.

The United States, having set up a separate government in south Korea and divided Korea with the “help” of the UN, proceeded to make preparations for war in real earnest. By 1949 it had given Syngman Rhee “military aid” of 110 million dollars for modernization of the “ROK army”. Included in the “aid package” were 105,000 rifles and carbines, 2,000 heavy and light machine-guns, 50 million rounds of ammunition, mortars, howitzers and other artillery, 5,000 trucks, 50,000 mines and other explosives, 79 warships and boats, and 20 airplanes. (UP dispatch, May 2, 1951.) In addition to the arms build-up, armed provocations and invasions against the area north of the 38th Parallel had increased. In 1947 such invasions were carried out on approximately 270 occasions, and in 1948 the invasions were on a larger scale. By 1949 nearly all the regiments and divisions of the army and the naval and air forces were mobilized in the invasions. Invasions were carried out on 2,617 occasions covering the entire area of the eastern, central and western sectors along the 38th Parallel.

All these military actions were undertaken following the plan of “northern conquest” drawn up by the United States. When liberating Seoul after the outbreak of the war, the Korean People’s Army captured a military map from the army headquarters--a map that had been published by a US military map-printing shop and which showed details of the US plan of “northern conquest”. The armed attacks on the area north of the 38th Parallel were an implementation of that plan.

At a meeting of division commanders held at the army headquarters in October 1949, Robert, chief of the US Military Advisory Group, said that while most of the attacks against the area north of the 38th Parallel were carried out under his orders, in some cases the units had attacked at their own discretion, without success, resulting in wastage of a tremendous amount of ammunition and fatal losses. He stressed that in the future the “ROK” army’s attacks against the area north of the 38th Parallel should be carried out only under the orders of the US Military Mission. (*The United States Was Defeated*, p. 14.)



On reviewing their war operations, the United States arrived at the conclusion that it would be impossible for the “ROK” army to occupy north Korea on its own; it therefore re-examined the war plan and changed part of it.

After the review, the United States cancelled the plan of conquering the north in 1949, and postponed the Korean War till the summer of 1950. It made use of the interim period to make preparations for the war involving the United States itself, along with Japan and south Korea. It decided to commit US forces to the war on a full scale from the start, instead of the original plan of achieving the northern conquest by using the “ROK” army alone. The US State Department was to provide diplomatic support for the planning of military operations.

The planning of the criminal war was completed in May 1950. Following the plan, the United States deployed large military forces of south Korea along the 38th Parallel, and assembled many divisions near Seoul as reserves.

Dulles, the Presidential envoy, flew to Seoul on June 17, to look into the war preparations, after which he had a secret meeting in Tokyo to discuss the operations with Defense Secretary Johnson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley and Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces in the Far East MacArthur.

Finding that the war preparations were completed, the United States enforced a news blackout to keep things under the wraps. The US President, high-ranking officers of the military and south Korean authorities deliberately sought to belie the tense atmosphere on the eve of the war by going on holiday trips, angling and holding dinner parties.

Foreign publications reported on this abnormal situation as follows:

Of the many things that take place on the ground and underground in this country that is called the land of the morning calm, there is one thing that reflects a peculiar change in the situation. ... Newspapers and other mass media and politicians have completely stopped talking about such things. (*History of the Korean*

*War*, Part 1, Japanese ed., p. 101.)

Why is the “ROK government” keeping silent for forty days at a time which is judged most dangerous? This is, indeed, a strange thing. (*The Korean War*, p. 22.)

It was said that President Truman was, in fact, visiting his hometown in Missouri and Secretary of State Acheson was on his farm somewhere near Maryland, on the day the war broke out. (*The Korean War: An Unanswered Question*, p. 15.)

Dulles was said to have gone on a tourist’s visit to Kyoto after his interview with MacArthur. (*The Outbreak of the Korean War*, p. 70.) In south Korea, Syngman Rhee was reportedly angling at a lake at 5:30 in the morning of June 25, something hard to believe. Among the units on the front an “All Clear” was sounded, and officers were said to have gone on leave. All this was part of the camouflage.

Ri Song Ga, the then commander of the army’s 8th division, which was deployed on the 38th Parallel at that time, said: “As a division commander on the frontline, I am not sure whether the units in the capital were on alert, but we were. A curfew was ordered, and we started fighting early in the morning of June 25.”

This was how war preparations were finalized in south Korea, Japan and the US proper, under the direction of the United States, and how the powder-keg for provocation of the criminal war was brought to the brink of explosion.

Meanwhile, the United States launched an all-out diplomatic campaign using the UN to justify its involvement in the Korean War. According to an American publication, Dulles hinted to Syngman Rhee that if he was prepared to attack communist north Korea, the United States would help him through the UN. However, Dulles advised him about the need to give the world an impression that it was south Korea that was attacked first and to plan his actions accordingly. (*The Korean War: An Unanswered Question*, p. 45.)

As part of its diplomatic campaign, the United States brought the Korean question to the UN. At a Special Political Committee meeting of the 4th UN General Assembly Session, a “joint resolution” was proposed in the names of Australia, Nationalist

China and the Philippines, which said that the UN Commission on Korea should be maintained in view of the danger of “military clashes”. It further said that a third such “commission” should be set up, with a reconstitution of members, which would “offer its good offices and aid” to speed up “Korean unification” on the basis of the UN “resolution” dated November 14, 1947, and have the authority to use military “observers” for attainment of this purpose.

At the meeting on September 29, the United States delegate Pay proposed that this UN Commission on Korea should be vested with a new comprehensive right which would make it the last authority to observe the occurrence of incidents that might cause disputes, and to provide the UN with all the necessary information about such incidents, their causes, and those responsible for them. (*Official UN Records on the Illegal Discussion of the Korean Question*, Vol. 1, p. 236.) This was part of the United States’ scheme to make use of the UN Commission on Korea to shift the cause and responsibility for provocation onto the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea when the United States initiated the war.

The Special Political Committee meeting of the 4<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly Session, which resembled an anti-communist gathering, continued till October 3. On that day it passed a resolution dismissing some of the commission’s member-nations that were considered to be an obstacle to the implementation of the United States’ Korea policy and replacing them with satellites of the United States. Through the manipulation of the United States, Syria, a hindrance to the commission, was replaced by Turkey, converting the commission into a complete appendage to the United States.

On October 21, 1949, a UN resolution was passed, setting up a third UN Commission on Korea. The formation of this commission signalled the successful completion of the United States’ scheme of usurping the UN flag for unleashing the Korean War, and this was unanimously approved by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1950. (*New York Herald Tribune*, June 26, 1950.)

Commenting on this, a US publication said:

The UN Commission on Korea and the members of its secretariat

were selected on the assumption that the Commission would not only play the role of an excellent blindfold but cooperate in the implementation of the plan of armed attack on north Korea.

In his letter to Syngman Rhee dated November 3, 1949, Jo Pyong Ok said that the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have given due attention to vetting the members of the Commission under pressure from the United States delegation and the State Department. (*Who Has Provoked the Korean War?* Japanese ed., pp. 167-168.)

The remarks made by Robert, Chief of the US Military Advisory Group, at a gathering of south Korean ministers in January 1950, reveal how the UN was involved in the US plan of the Korean War and how it conspired with the United States to push it through.

The plan of northern conquest has been decided. Not much time is left until the beginning of its implementation. We will launch the attack, but we need plausible pretext of the cause. For this purpose the report of the UN Commission is important. The UN Commission will naturally make a report favourable to the United States. However, you must pay attention to this matter so as to win the sympathy of the UN Commission. (*Collection of Reference Documents of the Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question*, Vol. 2, p. 179.)

The United States got “local UN observers” appointed in Korea, independent of the UN Commission on Korea. Towards the end of May 1950, two Australian “observers” arrived in Seoul. They conducted an “inspection” from mid-June to June 23, and submitted a “report of local inspection” on June 24. The report said that their major impression about the general situation in the area along the 38th Parallel was that the “ROK” army was organized completely for defence and was not in a state to assume a large offensive against north Korea. (*Korean White Paper*, p. 47.) In striking contrast, the statement made by MacArthur after his dismissal said that the United States had massed all available war materials and weapons in the area along the 38th Parallel in order to attack north Korea.

American publications commented on how the arrival in Seoul of

“local observers” was a “typical example of the payment of an expensive wager for a long-drawn-out international gamble”, and ironically remarked that the “observers’ report intended to be quoted to support the accusation that north Korea was an aggressor, gave no factual evidence.” (*History of the Korean War*, Part 1. Japanese ed., pp. 102-103.)

All the battles that were fought on Korean soil from January to June 24, 1950, took place in the area north of the 38th Parallel. The United States, however, sent a “military observer team” of the UN Commission on Korea to south Korea in May 1950 to visit south Korean army units deployed along the 38th Parallel and cook up false military information, and launched misleading propaganda that north Korea had occupied a few salient posts in the area south of the 38th Parallel prior to the outbreak of the full-scale war on June 25.

Meanwhile, the United States laid the ground for a UN resolution shifting the blame for the Korean War onto the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

On January 13, 1950, the Soviet Union boycotted the UN Security Council on the question of Chinese representation, and its veto status in the UN was thus in a state of non-use. This state continued till the end of July that year. The US State Department took advantage of these intervening months and made meticulous preparations for convening a Security Council session at which a resolution would be proposed. The resolution was drafted with full care and consideration being given to its wording.

The primary purpose of this resolution was to brand north Korea as an aggressor. Even the measures to be taken in case the Soviet Union attended the Security Council Session were carefully planned. This fact became known to the world on June 5, 1951, one year after the event, during routine hearings about the State Department’s budget at the Senate Appropriation Committee. In a testimony John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of the State Department for the UN, confessed that the “gist of the resolution” to be submitted to the UN had been drafted.

The *New York Times*, dated July 16, 1950, reported that the

United States and UN officials, sweating it out all night, had worked two strategic policies, one to be applied in case of the Soviet Union's continued absence from the Security Council, and the other in case of its sudden attendance to obstruct the discussion of the resolution by means of its veto.

In this situation of worsening tension, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made a number of proposals for the peaceful reunification of Korea. The United States and south Korea, however, responded to them by hastening their war preparations, and the UN was further involved in the United States' plan for the Korean War.

The United States provoked the Korean War by instigating Syngman Rhee's army to attack north Korea all along the 38th Parallel at four o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1950. This was the start of the Korean War.

Just a few hours after the outbreak of the war, the UN called for a session of the Security Council. At three o'clock in the morning of June 25 (American time), Ernest A. Gross, acting US representative to the UN, woke up UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie from his sleep and conveyed to him the US government's "urgent request" for a meeting of the Security Council. The meeting was duly called at two o'clock in the afternoon the same day. At the meeting, Gross produced a "draft resolution" that accused the DPRK of being an "aggressor" without any evidence. This was the "gist of the draft resolution" that had been prepared by the officials of the US State Department, made worse with the addition of the words "north Korea's declaration of war".

In the "resolution", the United States defined the DPRK Government's counter-action as "invasion by the north Korean army" (Preamble) and demanded that it be stopped. It further demanded that "all possible aid should be given to the UN in the implementation of the resolution and that it should refrain from giving any aid to the north Korean authorities," and that the UN Commission on Korea should "observe the withdrawal of the north Korean army". The United States claimed that the "resolution" was "fair" because it was based on the "report" of the UN Commission

on Korea which was working in the field.

A delegate from a non-permanent member-nation of the Security Council declared that the way for “the Security Council to make a correct judgement of the incident” was to invite the delegate of the DPRK to the meeting before making any decision on the Korean question. However, ignoring him and Article 32 of the UN Charter, which stipulates that party concerned shall be permitted to participate in the discussion of the question, the “resolution” was passed by the Security Council. The fact that it was passed at a session of the Security Council, in which the Soviet Union and China did not participate, in gross violation of Article 27 of the UN Charter which stipulates that decisions shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven or more members (including the concurring votes of five permanent members and two or more votes of non-permanent members), further reinforces the illegality of the decision.

Commenting on this, American reporter Stone said that it was neither honourable nor wise to denounce a country as an aggressor without even listening to what it has to say. (*Untold History of the Korean War*, Part 1, p. 66.) An American publication said having ignored some questions arising both in Tokyo and Seoul, the UN General Assembly had pushed through the resolution of the United States that branded north Korea as an aggressor, without getting any further information and without detailed knowledge of the incident that had occurred at the 38th Parallel. (*History of the Korean War*, Part 1, Japanese ed., p. 128.)

After the outbreak of the war, the international community asked for caution and prudent investigation, but once again the United States manipulated the UN to legalize US military involvement against the DPRK. The June 25 “resolution”, while demanding the “withdrawal” of the People’s Army to the area north of the 38th Parallel, did not in any way sanction the full-scale commitment of US forces. However, the United States had decided to “legalize” its intervention in Korea on the strength of the “resolution”. This was brought to light by the US delegate Gross when he said, after the meeting of the Security Council, that the steps to be taken by dint of

the “resolution” would be the use of economic means, military strength, or other sanctions. (*America and the Korean War*, p. 133.)

The Soviet delegate Malik, who attended the UN Security Council later, said, “The argument of the US delegate about the resolution of the Security Council meeting on June 25 is totally unfounded, because it decided nothing on military sanctions, nor did it give anyone the right to such sanctions. The only logical conclusion from all this is that the US government first committed the act of aggression and then labelled it as an action of the UN in an attempt to hide the act of aggression.”

On June 25 and 26, President Truman summoned the Secretaries of the State Department, Defence Department, Army, Navy and Air Force Departments and Chiefs of Staff of the three services to two secret meetings at Blair House. At the first meeting, which was called at 8 p.m. on June 25 itself, three hours after the adoption of the “resolution” of the Security Council, they discussed the matter of offering military equipment to south Korea, sending the US air force to the Korean front, deploying the US Seventh Fleet to Taiwan, and implementing the “resolutions” to be adopted after the June 25 “resolution” of the Security Council. Truman backed the proposal made by Acheson without any amendment, and thus approved full-scale involvement of the US forces. (Truman, *Memoirs*, 2, Japanese ed., 1966, pp. 236-37.) The second meeting that was held at night on June 26 sanctioned Acheson’s proposal for giving full-scale US naval and air force support to Syngman Rhee’s army and for inducing the UN to decide on giving “special aid” to south Korea.

Meanwhile, the United States ordered its delegate to the UN to call a Security Council meeting in haste so that it could adopt a “decision” on the involvement of US forces in the Korean War. Accordingly, such a meeting was convened on June 27, at which Austin, the US delegate, submitted a “resolution” urging the “UN to induce the member-nations to offer necessary aid to the Republic of Korea in order to repel the armed attack”. This “resolution” had a double objective: to legalize US involvement in the war and at the same time inveigle UN member-nations into the war.



The Egyptian and Indian delegates abstained from voting because they had not received instructions from their governments; the Yugoslavian delegate objected to the “resolution” by asserting that negotiations for an armistice should be undertaken. Nevertheless, the “resolution” was passed.

The United States, in fact, had started participating in the Korean War even before this “resolution” was passed. The UN’s role was only to “approve” it, in order to “legalize” the US forces’ involvement internationally. The US newspaper *Minneapolis Times*, dated July 23, 1950, corroborated this by saying that nominally the United States entered the war by the order of the UN, but that in fact the UN had requested assistance under pressure from the United States. On the day the war broke out, the 68th and 339th fighter groups and the 25th bomber group of the 5th US Air Force based in Japan made sorties to Korea; US naval and ground forces also moved to the Korean front by the order of MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the US Far East Command.

Having shifted the blame for the war onto the DPRK and having “legalized” its involvement in the war, the United States called for another meeting of the UN Security Council on July 7, 1950. The circumstances leading up to this meeting were as follows.

US military experts had originally calculated that if the “ROK” army were able to hold on along the 38th Parallel until the full-scale involvement of US forces, the purpose of their war plan would be easily achieved. They had expected the “ROK” army, which had been equipped at a heavy cost, to destroy the north Korean army without difficulty. (*The Riddle of MacArthur*, Japanese ed., p. 258.)

The process of the war, however, proved US calculations wrong. At the point when they thought that Syngman Rhee’s army, which had continued artillery barrage from the night of June 23, could have penetrated the 38th Parallel and invaded north Korea at the dawn of June 25, the south Korean army was beaten back and forced to retreat.

Warned by the undisguised frantic war efforts along the 38th Parallel that there would be an armed attack by the United States

before long, the Government of the DPRK had taken steps to fight it back and was able to launch an immediate counter-attack. In the air, the B-29 “air fortresses” were destroyed by the air force of the Korean People’s Army; on the sea, the heavy cruiser *Baltimore* and other large warships were sent to the bottom of the sea by four torpedo boats of the Korean People’s Army; and on the ground, the advance party of the 24th US Infantry Division was destroyed near Osan.

It was due to this situation, realizing that fighting the war with foreign troops would be cheaper and result in less loss of American lives (*New York Times*, May 19, 1951), that the United States got the UN to call a meeting of the Security Council on July 7. The meeting adopted a “resolution” proposed by Britain and France for organizing an Allied Forces Command. The “resolution” stipulated that military forces and other aid offered by the member-nations according to the Security Council resolutions should be put to use by a unified command under the leadership of the United States.

Following this, fifteen countries, including Britain, France, Canada, Thailand, Turkey, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, sent their armed forces to the Korean front. The United States appointed MacArthur as Commander of the United Nations Forces and established the United Nations Command (UNC) in Tokyo, Japan, on July 24. After the formation of the UNC, the United States assumed a large-scale general offensive. Together with the US armed forces, those of Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France and Japan landed at Inchon and occupied a large area north of the 38th Parallel. The United States used the name of the United Nations in order to justify its acts of aggression on the area north of the 38th Parallel. In the afternoon of October 7, twelve hours after this invasion, the United States placed the Korean question on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, and persuaded eight nations, including Britain, Australia and the Philippines, to submit a “resolution” for the occupation of the whole of Korea. The UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie had declared, in early September, that the question of breaking through the 38th Parallel could only be

decided by the UN Security Council. However, the United States ensured that this question was discussed at a General Assembly session of the UN, where its “voting machine” could be used, in order to avoid the Soviet veto.

Even bourgeois military commentators noted that the fact that the United States was not the proposer of the “resolution” was a mere technical matter, and that, needless to say, just as its wording was American, the UN “resolution” was Truman’s decision. Thus, they laid bare the truth of the eight-nation “resolution”—that it was nothing but the ambition of the United States hiding behind the cover of the United Nations. (*The Korean War*, Japanese ed., 1967, p. 77.)

Further, the United States got another “resolution” adopted at a small assembly session of the UN on October 12 on the administration of the area occupied by the UN forces, the “resolution” which stipulated that the area so occupied should be administered by the UNC.

The “eight-nation resolution” that had been submitted to the First Committee of the 5th UN General Assembly Session on September 27, was pushed through during the session of October 7. The preamble of this “resolution”, which had been manipulated by the United States, said that a unified Korean government should now be established, and that a UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) should be organized comprising Australia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and Chile. Paragraph 1, Article 2 of the “resolution” stated that the UNCURK should assume all the functions hitherto performed by the UN Commission on Korea and undertake the responsibility for politics and the economy of the whole of Korea on behalf of the United Nations. Paragraph 2, Article 2 stipulated that the governments of the nations that sent delegates to this commission should form an interim commission (small assembly) with their delegates in the UN headquarters. This interim commission would give advice in consultation with the UNC in the light of the aforesaid recommendations, and it would start functioning as soon as the General Assembly adopted the “resolution”.

Although the October 12 “resolution” meant vesting the member-nations of the UNCURK with the right to make decisions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly, and was thus a mockery of the United Nations, the “resolution” was passed without any changes.

As the days went by, the facts of the Korean War came to light more and more. People around the world started to bitterly denounce the United States for having provoked the war in Korea, and controversies and contradictions sharpened among the allies of the United States and within the United Nations.

The Government of the DPRK reproduced top-secret enemy documents that revealed how the war was provoked, the documents that the Korean People’s Army had captured from the secret archives of the Syngman Rhee regime when liberating Seoul, and distributed them to the United Nations and other international organizations and many countries. These confidential documents included Report No. 4849 of the information office of the US State Department; the secret letters exchanged between Syngman Rhee and his American adviser Robert Oliver, special envoy plenipotentiary Jo Pyong Ok, ambassador to the US Jang Myon, and diplomatic adviser Yun Pyong Gu; the intelligence plan of the intelligence bureau of the army headquarters; the secret letter from Dulles to Foreign Minister Rim Pyong Jik; and the strategic map for the conquest of the north in 1949.

These documents, along with the statements made by high-ranking officials of the south Korean regime and members of the “national assembly” who had surrendered, were all compiled into a *Collection of Documentary Evidence of the Provocation of the Civil War in Korea by the US Imperialists*, which was translated into many languages under the title *Facts Tell*, and distributed at home and abroad.

Reporters from the French newspaper *L’Humanite*, the British *Daily Worker* and the Chinese *People’s Daily* visited Korea in July 1950, as did journalists from the Polish *Trybuna Ludu* and the Chinese Newspapers’ Photographic Bureau in August the same year.

They investigated the facts and, on this basis, exposed to the world the crimes committed by the United States.

Confusion arose in the ranks of the allies of the United States and UN member-nations. Peren Buck, a US officer who participated in the Korean War, wrote a book entitled *The Korean War, True Record*, which said the following: “As the US forces were evidently driven back, and as the prospect of expanding the war became ominous, many nations of the United Nations suddenly became disobedient and took a resistant attitude. Unfortunately, the power of American domination became almost disreputable in the theatre of war.”

After a “resolution” on the formation of the Allied Forces Command was adopted by the Security Council on July 7, 1950, the Argentine government declared, on July 17, that it would not send its troops to Korea. The Uruguayan government, which had decided on sending its troops to the Korean front in October, withdrew its decision later. On February 17, 1953, twelve Asian countries made a joint declaration that they would not send their troops to Korea. (Japan International Problems Research Institute, *Kokusai Nenpo*, Vol. 1, p. 630.)

Recognizing that the Korean War was being fought by the United States, and that Britain acceded to the request of the United States (Reuters dispatch, September 12, 1950), Britain said that the US policy now appeared to have taken the form of coercion and orders, that the US would brook no disagreement, and that although Britain was a close friend of the United States, British trust in the US’s ability to lead the free world had sadly wavered. (*Economist*, January 14, 1951.)

At the meeting of the First Committee of the 5th UN General Assembly Session on January 20, 1951, there was strong opposition to the “resolution” proposed by the United States. On January 24, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria, in turn, submitted a joint resolution for peaceful settlement of the Korean question, not by means of war.

When the United States attempted to get its “resolution” passed

by the full-dress meeting on February 1, 1951, the Syrian delegate said that the US resolution that had been adopted by the First Committee would most probably expand the war, instead of stopping it. The Egyptian delegate said that his government, in the light of the UN Charter and the requirements of reason, would not tolerate resorting to other means without even trying to use the peaceful means envisaged in the Charter. Delegates from India and some other countries declared that if the US “resolution” was put to vote, they would cast negative votes or boycott it.

The then US Secretary of State Acheson had to admit, in this regard, that the United Nations had turned topsy-turvy, that the United States’ leadership had fallen, and that Asia, Europe and the rest of the world had started cracking. (*Sindong-A*, No. 7, 1970, p. 345.)

During the Korean War, the United States had calculated that it would be able to isolate the DPRK internationally and achieve military domination of the whole of Korea easily by making use of the UN. This, however, was a miscalculation. The DPRK, though endowed with a young army, struck back mercilessly at the aggressors who were in the guise of the UN.

On July 27, 1953, the United States admitted its defeat and designated Mark Wayne Clark, Commander of the UN Forces, to sign the Korean Armistice Agreement, following which, combat actions of the belligerent parties ceased from 22:00 hours on the same day.

A long time has passed since the armistice. The United States, however, does not admit its responsibility for provoking the Korean War but continues to increase tension on the Korean peninsula by maintaining its armed forces in south Korea. In early 2000, the United States held 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary functions of the Korean War in the whole area, even issuing “anniversary posters” to schools. This has served to stimulate the anti-US sentiments among the Korean people and their armed forces.

The Korean War provoked by the United States has left a wound that has not healed in the hearts of the Korean people. The United

States must understand this clearly.

## **ARMISTICE—WAR OR PEACE?**

Nearly fifty years have passed since the ceasefire on the Korean peninsula, but complete peace has yet to reign over this land. Indeed, the unstable framework of the existing armistice threatens to bring not peace, but war. Peace on the Korean peninsula remains an unresolved question till today although we have entered the 21st century, essentially because the old armistice has not been replaced with a new system for ensuring peace.

“Armistice” literally means an agreement to stop fighting for a time; it does not mean the end of a war, nor does it signify complete peace. For this reason, in wars conducted in the past, peace agreements were concluded immediately after the signing of an armistice, within a few months or a few years at the most. The armistice agreements signed between the belligerents after the First World War, for instance, were replaced with peace treaties within roughly six months to two years. Similarly, the agreements for termination of the Second World War were changed into peace treaties within a few years or a decade at the most.

The Korean Armistice Agreement stipulated the convening of a higher-level political conference within three months of its signing as a measure towards restoring peace. However, the holding of such a political conference was thwarted by the United States, and the armistice has not been replaced with durable peace until now. Such a long period of armistice is unprecedented in the world’s history of wars, and is reflective of a very abnormal state of affairs.

Even the state of armistice in Korea has not been maintained smoothly. By signing the armistice on July 27, 1953, an “Agreement between the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the one hand, and the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC, on the other hand, concerning a Military Armistice in Korea”, the United States recognized the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. However,

the Korean military armistice and the United States' Korea policy were incompatible in terms of their content from the very beginning. This is clearly evident in the nearly fifty-year-old history of the Korean armistice.

After the armistice was signed, the United States overtly sabotaged the holding of a political conference for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Clark, Commander of the UNC, who signed the agreement, said in his order that they must face the grave reality that this was not peace but suspension of hostilities; an armistice did not mean immediate withdrawal from Korea, not even early withdrawal; that they could not go home, turning their back on this clash; and that they must maintain their combat power. (Reuters dispatch, July 27, 1953.) The then US President Eisenhower expressed similar sentiments when he said, in a radio address 59 minutes after the signing of the armistice, that they had won an armistice in a theatre of war, but not world peace as yet; that they should try to complete all the undertakings they were engaged in; and that that was the decision and work to which they must devote themselves (UP dispatch, July 27, 1953). These statements clearly show that their intention was to keep trying to dominate the Korean peninsula, making a threat of war linger in this part of the world.

The armistice stipulated that the governments of both parties to the agreement should hold a political conference within three months of the signing of the agreement to discuss the issue of withdrawing all foreign troops from Korea and the matter of peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The American way of thinking, however, went contrary to this stipulation. That is why the United States denied the terms of the agreement at the very outset and made all efforts to scrap it.

On July 27, even as the armistice was being signed at Panmunjom, a sixteen-nation declaration was adopted at Washington, that promised fresh military action in the event of the armistice being broken. Soon afterwards, Clark made a statement that in case there was re-opening of the war by south Korea, the US forces would immediately join forces with it. (*Manchester Guardian*,



August 13, 1953.)

US Secretary of State Dulles declared on July 28 that if the political conference on the Korean question failed to achieve positive results within 90 days, he would walk out of the discussions. (*New York Times*, July 29, 1953.) He visited south Korea on August 4 at the head of a US government delegation that included the US Army Secretary, and concluded an “ROK-US Mutual Defence Treaty” on August 8, 1953.

The political conference was thus doomed to be a failure at the very outset, due to the attitude of the United States.

At the 8th UN General Assembly Session, the United States once again laid the Korean question on the table, as part of its brisk diplomatic campaign to implement its foreign policy on the Korean peninsula. Prior to this session of the UN General Assembly, in August 1953, the United States had demanded that its fifteen satellite nations which had participated in the Korean War should present a united front and undertake joint action (*New York Times*, August 15, 1953.) On the basis of this preparation, the United States asserted at the 8<sup>th</sup> General Assembly Session of the UN, that the political conference should consist of negotiations between the belligerent parties, that the governments attending the conference should be able to act independently with freedom of action, and that they would be subject only to the decisions or agreement made at the conference. Although a number of positive proposals were made, the General Assembly rejected all these and pushed through the “fifteen-nation resolution” which echoed the assertion of the United States that participation in the political conference should be limited to the belligerent parties, that the conference should be concluded by October 28 at the latest, and that if agreement was not reached within 90 days the conference should cease to be valid. Disagreement to this was voiced even by some of the satellites of the United States. A French publication was of the opinion that “Only those who are competent should be allowed to participate in the conference, on the basis of sound argument.” (*Combat*, July 30, 1953.) A high-ranking British official said that the United States’ action expressed a very

dangerous attitude.

The obstructive moves of the United States were even more undisguised at the preliminary talks held at Panmunjom on October 26, 1953, for convening the political conference. The United States' delegate walked out of the talks, with the result that forty-seven days passed with nothing achieved.

The United States then proceeded to frustrate the Geneva conference of foreign ministers on the Korean question. On April 26, 1954, a roundtable conference of foreign ministers of the nations involved in the Korean question and of the countries interested in this question was convened at Geneva, Switzerland. It was attended by delegates from nineteen countries, including the DPRK. On April 27, the DPRK presented a proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, entitled "For the National Reunification of Korea and All-Korea Free Elections", the gist of which was that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea within six months, and that an all-Korea general election should be held to ensure that the Korean question was settled by the efforts of the Korean people themselves.

The US delegate Dulles objected to the proposal, saying that it was aimed at replacing the existing system in south Korea with a communist government. He said that the south Korean "government" should be given greater privileges because south Korea had a larger population than north Korea, and that no free election was possible without international observation. (*Proceedings of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference*, pp. 42-43.) "How could we quit Korea when we have lost hundreds of thousands of lives there?" he added. "We will not leave Korea," he asserted. He went on to say that, if the US forces pulled out from Korea, war would break out again there, and therefore the US troops must stay, for the United States was too far away for it to come to south Korea's "rescue" again. Surrender will bring peace easily and resistance will only make it difficult to realize peace, he threatened.

Many of the delegates to the conference expressed opinions that differed with the US. In his statement on May 13, the British delegate

said that if it was possible to withdraw their troops from Korea without jeopardizing peace, they were willing to pull them out immediately. (*Proceedings of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference*, pp. 243-51). The Australian delegate also expressed the hope that their troops would be able to withdraw as soon as possible, as did the delegate from New Zealand who said that all the countries whose delegates were at the Geneva conference were waiting impatiently for the day to come when they could withdraw their troops from Korea.

Going against the popular mood, the US delegate persisted in trying to get the “sixteen-nation resolution” passed. When he failed in his attempts, he refused to attend the conference, and the deliberations remained suspended for eight days from May 13. Making an appearance at the conference again on May 22, the US delegate said that elections should be held in north Korea only under UN observation, that the Chinese People’s Volunteers should get out of north Korea, and that the US troops would not pull out before a “unified government” ruled over the whole of Korea and the United Nations was given “evidence” of this, because the US troops were “UN Forces”.

The “resolution” was not acceptable to the DPRK, which had fought for three years against the “UN Forces”.

The United States challenged the conference by insisting that it would not continue to participate in the conference unless its demand for “elections under UN observation” was accepted. Finally, it sabotaged the meeting by announcing a ready-made “sixteen-nation joint declaration”.

The United States also ensured that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), which was to inspect and control the correct implementation of the armistice agreement, was rendered dysfunctional. In accordance with the agreement of both parties to the armistice, the NNSC was composed of four high-ranking officers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden, and was to be assisted by twenty neutral nations inspection teams. The NNSC’s

function was to supervise, observe, inspect and investigate the violations of Paragraph 13 C that stipulated the cessation of introduction into Korea of military reinforcements, and of Paragraph 13 D that stipulated the cessation of introduction into Korea of reinforcing war materials. It was also responsible for looking into violations of the armistice outside the Demilitarized Zone, and to implement Paragraph 28 which stipulated its duty to report the results of all these activities to the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). By performing these functions and duties, the NNSC made a certain contribution to ensuring the correct implementation of the armistice agreement on the Korean peninsula.

The Swiss Federal Assembly heard the report of the activities of the Swiss delegation to the NNSC and reached the conclusion that the NNSC had found solutions to many problems since August 1953, and that the Federal Assembly could not think of withdrawing the Swiss delegation under the given conditions. (*Proceedings of the Meetings of the Military Armistice Commission*, p. 527.) A special correspondent of the *New York Times* pointed out that Switzerland was convinced that the NNSC was the only organization that had been supervising the Korean armistice, that in fact there had been no recurrence of combat actions since the ceasefire, and that the Swiss people firmly believed that combat action could not recur in Korea because of the presence of the NNSC there. (*New York Times*, March 25, 1955.) The Polish and Czechoslovak governments were of the same opinion.

Switzerland and Sweden, the members of the NNSC as designated by the UNC, therefore, refused to comply with the United States' request for cooperation in dissolving the NNSC.

The existence of the NNSC was very unfavourable to the United States, and it tried to obstruct the work of the NNSC in every possible way. It did not make advance reports to the NNSC about the rotation and replacements of military personnel and war materials, and even when it did so, it made false reports. In January 1954, because of these obstructive moves, the neutral nations inspection team in Taegu was unable to inspect 66 per cent of the aircraft

shipped into south Korea and 24 per cent of the aircraft shipped out of there by the United States. The United States prevented the inspection teams from working freely in their designated ports of entry. On the excuse of “personal safety”, the United States confined the inspection teams within barbed-wire fences, and escorted team members in vehicles, treating them like criminals. In these circumstances, the NNSC held its twenty-eighth meeting on September 5, 1953, and adopted a decision that the inspection teams might conduct inspection aboard the ships concerned if inspection by other means was impossible.

However, the United States refused to permit the members of an inspection team in Pusan to inspect ships on September 12, 1953. On January 20 and 21, 1954, it prevented the team from even entering the port. When the work of the NNSC continued in spite of the obstruction, the United States began to threaten the personal safety of the inspection teams. On September 1, 1953, a Swedish member of the inspection team was beaten up by an American soldier at Taegu; on July 31, 1954, shots from automatic rifles were fired at the quarters of the inspection team in Pusan; on the night of August 1 the same year, three bombs exploded in the quarters of an inspection team. The United States even resorted to terrorism against the inspection teams. The killing of Major Jigelski, Senior Captain Rudnitz and Junior Captain Jirinski, Polish members of the NNSC, in a plane crash in air space above Taejon on November 7, 1953, was a typical example of such acts of terrorism.

At the instigation of the United States, the south Korean puppet Provost Marshal threatened the NNSC on July 30, 1954, that if the commission did not leave south Korea immediately, he would take steps to make sure it did so. The next day, “demonstrations” were organized against the NNSC in Seoul, Inchon, Pusan, Kunsan and other places.

Finally, the United States’ obstructive moves culminated in the destruction of the NNSC. In early May 1956, the United States called a meeting in Washington of its satellite nations that had participated in the Korean War, and on May 26 it adopted a “resolution”, on the

basis of which the United States sent a letter to the NNSC, unilaterally demanding the withdrawal of the neutral nations inspection teams from south Korea within a week. The NNSC was compelled to pull out its inspection teams from the entry ports of north and south Korea on June 5, 1956. As a result, the NNSC lost touch with its grassroots organizations, and the system of overseeing the armistice agreement was paralysed. This was as good as rendering the NNSC disfunctional.

Having sabotaged the political conference and the Geneva conference of foreign ministers for early settlement of the Korean question, and having made the NNSC disfunctional, the United States started to concentrate on reinforcing the military force in south Korea, thereby trampling upon and undermining the armistice agreement. Paragraph 13 D of the Korean Armistice Agreement stipulated as follows: Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type.

This stipulation had restrained the United States from reinforcing its military force in south Korea. Without repealing Paragraph 13 D of the agreement, it was impossible for the United States to increase its military power in south Korea. Hence, the United States set to abrogating the stipulation.

US President Eisenhower said that replacing weapons on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness in accordance with the armistice agreement was imposing a great burden on the United States and its allies because it meant supporting the security of "ROK" with outmoded weapons. US Secretary of State Dulles said that the United States was considering the introduction of more modern and effective weapons into south Korea, and that the armistice should be looked at realistically. He went on to say that the agreement had been drawn up five years earlier and had been

intended to be in effect for a shorter period of time, that it would be impractical to replace weapons with those of the same kind after a lapse of five years, and that, therefore, Paragraph 13 D of the armistice should be abrogated. (AP dispatch, May 7, 1957.) Voices were also raised among the ruling circles in the United States that it had become impossible to unify the north and south of Korea without reopening hostilities that would lead to a third world war (UP dispatch, January 9, 1957.), and that a series of local wars were desirable abroad before fighting a third world war (*New York Post*, November 1, 1957.), thus creating a hot atmosphere for repealing the armistice agreement. News dispatches from the United States began to report that a motion would soon be made at the UN headquarters to abrogate the Korean Armistice Agreement, and that Syngman Rhee was preparing to push north sooner or later. (UP dispatch, January 17, 1957.)

Early in April 1957, the US State Department set forth the following policy to abrogate the armistice agreement. First, to legalize military reinforcement in south Korea through the medium of the United Nations; second, to supply new-type weapons to the “ROK” army; third, to supply new-type weapons through the countries that had participated in the Korean War. (INS dispatch, April 5, 1957.)

On June 17, 1957, the United States held talks with the nations that had participated in the Korean War, and on June 21 it declared at the MAC meeting that it would abrogate Paragraph 13 D of the Korean Armistice Agreement. This virtually meant nullifying the armistice itself. After this, the United States openly stepped up its reinforcement of armed forces in south Korea, although it had done it secretly before.

The then US 8th Army Commander Lemnitzer stated that as a result of several years’ effort they had succeeded in abrogating Paragraph 13 D of the armistice agreement and were now able to have new-type weapons in south Korea. (UPI dispatch, February 3, 1960.) According to a report in the *Washington Post*, dated May 2, 1983, the United States shipped more than 1,000 nuclear weapons to

south Korea, including 133 nuclear bombs, 63 rounds of 8-inch howitzer atomic shells, 31 rounds of 155 mm howitzer atomic shells, and 21 nuclear land mines.

In addition to its attempt to repeal the armistice agreement, the United States perpetrated various hostile acts and military provocations against the DPRK. These military acts, which started from 22:20 hours on July 27, 1953, just twenty minutes after the armistice agreement became effective, were mainly in the form of espionage and reconnaissance in force in the 1950s, but they assumed a warlike character in the 1960s.

The Demilitarized Zone, which was established to avoid military clashes, soon became a battlefield where rifle-shots and artillery fire did not cease; it was no longer a buffer zone, and unprecedented tension was created on the Military Demarcation Line. Incidents like those involving the US armed spy ship *Pueblo* on January 23, 1968, and the large reconnaissance plane *EC-121* in April 1969, the Panmunjom incident on August 18, 1976, the shooting incident at Panmunjom on November 23, 1984, and other military provocations perpetrated by the United States on the land, in the air and on the sea of the Korean peninsula, wantonly trampled upon the armistice and created great difficulty in ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula.

From 1976 the United States staged “Team Spirit” joint military exercise in south Korea every year, whose aim was to strike at the DPRK. The number of troops and weapons and equipment mobilized for this exercise and the duration of the exercise increased year after year, virtually leading to a semi-state of war being declared on north Korea on several occasions.

In the 1990s, the situation on the Korean peninsula became even more precarious because of the frantic moves against the DPRK made by the United States and its satellites on the excuse of “nuclear suspicion”.

The Korean Armistice Agreement, which was signed for the purpose of ensuring peace, has therefore been reduced to a farce, and the Korean peninsula has been brought to the brink of war.

On March 25, 1991, the United States “appointed” a general of



the south Korean army, who has neither competence nor justification, as the senior member of the UNC delegation, ignoring the practice under the armistice and thus undermining both the form and content of the agreement.

The UNC, which was one of the signatories to the Korean Armistice Agreement, was entirely composed of Americans, ranging from Turner Joy to Clark, who signed the agreement, to even assistants such as the senior translator and typists, as was shown up during the armistice negotiations that lasted two years and seventeen days. Moreover, the UNC delegation that attended the ceremony of signing the armistice agreement on July 27, 1953, was also made up of Americans, including the senior delegate Lieutenant General Harrison. Therefore, in effect, the United States was an actual signatory to the armistice agreement.

South Korea has no legal standing or capacity to change the Korean armistice mechanism into a system for ensuring peace. That is because the matter of replacing the armistice agreement with a peace treaty must be discussed by the parties to the agreement, and south Korea is not a party to the agreement. According to international law, only signatories to an armistice agreement are parties to the agreement. South Korea neither participated in the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement, nor did they sign it, for, at that time, they were opposed to the armistice negotiations, crying instead for a “single-handed push to the north”.

South Korea has no power to guarantee a system of peace in south Korea. The “Official Letter on the Transfer of the Authority of Operational Command” in July 1950 transferred the prerogative of supreme command of the south Korean army to the US army, and it is still in the hands of the latter. Although the south Korean army claims that they have the “authority of peacetime control”, that is merely a formal claim. It is beyond the imagination to think that the south Korean army can control the US forces in south Korea. The facts clearly show that south Korea cannot be a party to the armistice agreement although the south Korean authorities claim that they were a belligerent party in the Korean War just as they are now a party in

the military confrontation between the armed forces deployed in the Korean peninsula.

Participation in a war or deployment of armed forces does not mean acquisition of the status of a belligerent party or a party to the confrontation as recognized by international law, still less the status of a party to the negotiations for the termination of the war. The First World War, for example, was fought by thirty-six countries and regions on both sides, but only a few countries that had played a leading role were recognized as belligerent parties by international law and signed the agreements and treaties between themselves. The situation was similar in the case of the Second World War, which was fought by more than sixty countries and regions.

In any case, south Korea is not in a position to talk about its status as a party to the armistice agreement. In December 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros- Ghali said that replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace agreement should be settled by the signatories to the armistice agreement. By “appointing” a general of the south Korean army as the senior member of the UNC delegation, the United States completely nullified the armistice agreement.

The Korean peninsula is now in a state of critical tension in which even an accidental firing by an individual soldier may trigger off a war, and there is no systematic device capable of stopping the outbreak of war. There are, if anything, only war-mongering against the DPRK and war hysteria on the part of the United States.

The DPRK has had to take measures against the manoeuvring of the United States to undermine the armistice agreement and threaten peace on the Korean peninsula.

In view of the United States overt moves for arms build-up in south Korea since the 1960s, the DPRK adopted a policy of putting great effort into both economic construction and defence build-up. This has affected the living standards of the people in the DPRK. The DPRK has also delivered hard blows at the military provocations of the United States.

The fact that the United States violated the armistice agreement

on hundreds of thousands of occasions, which had been exposed at hundreds of MAC meetings, clearly shows how the armistice continues to be in a precarious state, as nowhere else.

Whether or not one is ready to replace the outdated armistice with a new system for ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula is a touchstone for judging whether one is for peace or war. The longer the outdated armistice continues, the greater is the danger of war. Insisting on the continuation of the armistice, which is less than effective in controlling the ever-present danger of war, amounts to inviting the outbreak of catastrophic war.

The armed clash that occurred on the Military Demarcation Line in July 1997 is eloquent proof of this. On July 16 that year, soldiers of the south Korean army unexpectedly fired recoilless rifles and 12.7-mm machine-guns at soldiers of the Korean People's Army who were performing their regular patrol duty. They destroyed buildings at the post and wounded soldiers. The Korean People's Army promptly took self-defensive measures and destroyed the enemy's pillboxes and recoilless rifle positions. The spokesman of the Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People's Army, accusing the United States of having entrusted the south Korean army with the administration of the Demilitarized Zone, made a statement on July 18: The outdated armistice can never ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula; if the enemy provokes us again, we will retaliate harder, regardless of time, place and object, and send the aggressors to hell.

Peace is precious to everyone, more so to the Korean people. That is why the DPRK has made unremitting efforts to ensure peace on the Korean peninsula ever since the armistice was signed. The DPRK has made numerous proposals for arms reduction, for replacing the armistice agreement with a peace agreement, and also for a tentative agreement as a systematic instrument to prevent armed clashes and war in place of the armistice agreement which has become ineffective.

By contrast, the United States has never made any constructive peace proposal; instead, it has objected to all the fair and realistic

peace proposals made by the DPRK. It insists that the Korean Armistice Agreement should be maintained until the signing of a peace agreement, and that if the armistice agreement is replaced by a peace agreement, the north and the south should be parties to the peace agreement. This is but a lame excuse for obstructing the process of peace on the Korean peninsula.

The replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace agreement is necessary not only for ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula, but also for the benefit of the United States. If a war breaks out on the Korean peninsula, nobody will be safe; neither people across the strait nor across the ocean will live with peace of mind. In other words, peace on the Korean peninsula means world peace.

It is time the United Nations paid due attention to the unstable armistice that has lasted for fifty years on the Korean peninsula. This armistice is the outcome of the Korean War, in which the United Nations was involved. The Korean War, although actually fought between the DPRK and the United States, was a war in form between the Korean People's Army and the "United Nations Forces". The armistice agreement after the war was signed by the UNC, and on the table in the conference hall of the Military Armistice Commission it is the flag of the UNC that is present, not that of the United States. The UN is thus nominally a belligerent party in the war against the DPRK. However, the *UN Yearbook*, which was written by the UN Secretariat on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the UN, keeps silent about the situation in Korea.

If the UN really wants peace, not war, it must take back its flag which covers up the responsibility of the United States, and fulfil its responsibility of ensuring peace in Korea. This is the only way to durable peace on the Korean peninsula and in the rest of the world.

The United States, as the real party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, must not usurp the UN flag any longer, but adopt a sincere attitude towards establishing a new system for ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula. This is all the more necessary for its own sake.

An armistice is not peace. This is illustrated by the fifty years of the Korean armistice. The outdated system of the Korean armistice must be replaced with a new system for ensuring peace.

## **THE UNC IN SOUTH KOREA**

The UNC in south Korea is a military establishment that was organized by the United States with the armed forces of the fifteen UN member-nations which had sent their troops to the Korean War, according to the “resolution” of the UN Security Council on July 7, 1950. The “United Nations Forces” have fought for three years against the DPRK and are still in south Korea, creating difficulties for peace on the Korean peninsula.

The United States, which provoked the Korean War on June 25, 1950, sent its own troops and those of its satellite nations to the Korean front in the guise of “UN Forces”, in violation of the principle of unanimity among permanent members of the UN Security Council and in the absence of the delegate of the DPRK at the Security Council meeting. At that time the calculation of the United States was that the most favourable course of action open to it was to make use of the UN, which was strongly inclined to follow the United States, to cover up its acts of aggression and justify the war. The absence of the Soviet Union and China from the seat of permanent members of the Security Council provided an opportunity to the United States. Taking advantage of their absence and on the basis of meticulous prior preparations, the United States organized the United Nations Command, appointed MacArthur as its Commander and located its headquarters in Tokyo. Thus, the US troops and those of its satellite nations wore the caps of the “UN Forces” when they went to the Korean front.

In February 1965, French President Charles De Gaulle denounced that the dispatch of the “UN Forces” to Korea was an “act that ran counter to the principles of the UN Charter and went beyond the original character and function of the UN.” (AFP dispatch from Paris, February 4, 1965.) Reports in other foreign press also said that

the July 7, 1950, “resolution” of the UN Security Council was not a “product” of the UN, but a “US resolution”; they called it “Truman’s decision”. (*The Korean War*, 1966, p. 77.)

The UN’s connivance at the arbitrary moves of the United States and the brutality exhibited by the “UN Forces” towards the Korean people during the Korean War have been recorded in the history of the UN as disgrace. After the organization of the “UN Forces”, the United States regrouped its forces and temporarily occupied the area north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel in Korea. It intensified the repression of the Korean people in the occupied area and attempted to establish the system of dominating the whole of Korea.

The soldiers of the “UN Forces” perpetrated large-scale massacres that were beyond the human imagination. UN soldiers who were taken prisoner by the Korean People’s Army were carrying notebooks and “mottoes” which said that they should be ruthless towards the Koreans and that they should never commiserate or sympathize with them.

The then US 8<sup>th</sup> Army Commander Walker sent a letter to his men to the following effect:

Men of the United Nations Forces! In the rugged mountains and forests of Korea you are safeguarding the great honour of all nations and barring the way to communism from Asia and from across the Pacific Ocean. ... The war is fierce. So you must kill as many Asians as possible in order to save your own lives. ... Don’t let your hands tremble even when those who appear before you are children or old people. Kill them! In so doing you will be saving yourselves from catastrophe and fulfilling your duty as men of the United Nations Forces.

Walker’s exhortation was executed to the letter by soldiers of the US army and those of its satellite nations. The US troops who occupied Seoul in September 1950 arrested 75,000 people in three days and killed a thousand of them then and there. They even skinned the heads of twelve persons to take back as “mementos”.

Their atrocities were most rampant in those parts of the DPRK that had been occupied by them. The *New York Times* of February 2,

1951, reported that wherever the communist army retreated, houses and school-buildings that had remained intact were burnt down by the UN troops.

The massacre in Sinchon County surpassed human thinking as an exercise in brutality.

On October 18, 1950, American soldiers who had occupied Sinchon pushed 900 people, including approximately 300 women and children, into the air-raid shelter of the Sinchon County Party Committee, poured petrol over them and burnt them to death. On October 19 and 23, these human butchers buried more than 650 people alive or burned them to death near the bomb shelter. Thus more than 1,550 persons were massacred on three occasions. American soldiers, who came upon innocent Koreans at an explosive magazine in Wonam-ri on December 7, 1950, said, "Is it not too comfortable for mothers and their children to be confined together in the same place? Tear them from each other and keep them separate until the mothers die of heartbreak for their children and the children die of dry livers in search of their mothers." They took the children away from their mothers and moved them to another storehouse. The beasts then gave petrol to the children who were crying for water, set fire to the two places of confinement and threw hand-grenades into them to make sure nobody survived. More than 910 persons, including 400 women and 102 children, were murdered in this way. The final tally of those who were massacred in Sinchon County was 35,383 persons, or one-fourth of the county's population, of whom 16,234 were children, old people and women. These were the atrocities perpetrated by the US troops in just one county during the fifty days of their occupation.

The US air force razed to the ground cities, towns and villages in the DPRK. At the hearings of MacArthur in June 1951, O'Donnell, Commander of the Bomber Unit of the US Far East Air Force, testified that almost entire Korean peninsula was destroyed by the US air force in the early days of the Korean War, and that no town that could be named remained undamaged. (*History of Modern Korea*, Vol. 2, Japanese ed., 1974, p. 419.) On August 5, 1952, Clark,

Commander of the US Far East Command, said that he would so thoroughly wipe the 78 cities and towns of north Korea off the map that no trace would be left of them.

Publications reported that it was difficult to say that selected cities were military targets, and that this decision to exterminate all north Korean inhabitants was one that would make the world shudder. (*History of Modern Korea*, Vol. 2, Japanese ed., 1974, p. 418.)

Bombing by the US air force reduced non-military targets to ashes. Stone, a US journalist, reported that already in September the US Far East Command in Tokyo said that air-raid target had become scarce because most of the plan of bombing industrial facilities had been carried out. Judging from various communiques, he commented, one of the complaints of the UN air force was that there was nothing more to be destroyed.

During the Korean War, the United States did not hesitate to brutally kill prisoners of war either, in gross violation of recognized international rules and regulations. The farce of “voluntary repatriation”, especially, that took place in connection with the armistice negotiations was a serious assault on human dignity and right to independence.

Article 17 of the Geneva Convention (1949) stipulates that no physical or mental torture or coercion to obtain any information shall be used on prisoners of war, that no threat or insult shall be applied to prisoners of war who refuse to answer questions, and that no unfavourable treatment should be meted out to them. Article 14 of the same Convention stipulates that prisoners of war have a right to respect for their human dignity and honour.

In the name of “voluntary repatriation”, the United States forced prisoners of war to sign documents, which were made up and which said things such as “I do not want to return to north Korea,” “I want to stay in south Korea to have political freedom,” and so on, or compelled them to write such statements in blood. Prisoners who refused to do this were tortured, words like “annihilate communism” or “anti-communism” were tattooed on their bodies, and they were



killed brutally. Burchett, an Australian journalist, said that the brutal US policy of massacre was a result of the failure of its policy to obliterate the basic rights of prisoners of war. Tattooing, petitions in blood and other such forms of punishment only strengthened the resolve and unity of the prisoners of war; therefore, overt massacre was resorted to. (*US Army in Korea*, Japanese ed., 1953, p. 75.)

The way in which prisoners of war who refused what was called “voluntary repatriation” were massacred was most cruel. On February 18, 1952, the US army committed six armoured vehicles and one battalion to killing 102 prisoners of war who had families in south Korea and who had refused “voluntary repatriation” and wounding 290 seriously. By another order given by UNC Commander Clark, who said that Koje Island should be made desolate like a grave-yard, 276 prisoners of war were killed in mere four hours, on June 10, 1952. These were some of the atrocities committed by the UNC POW Administration Headquarters in the name of “humanitarian voluntary repatriation”.

The massacre of prisoners of war reflected the fact that the United States failed in its scheme of “voluntary repatriation”. The prisoners stubbornly fought against the US scheme. On the day of repatriation, they slipped off their American uniforms and boots and loudly sang the *Song of General Kim Il Sung*, waving flags of the DPRK, the flags which they made by tearing up their underwear and dyeing them in their blood.

Forty years after the ceasefire, letters written by some of these prisoners of war were found in south Korea, letters addressed to the World Peace Conference in Paris. The Foreign Minister of the DPRK sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General bringing this to his notice:

“... The massacre by the US army of prisoners of war of our side was a serious crime that wantonly trampled upon the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war and other recognized international laws. ... Just as all the other acts of the US troops were committed in the name of the UN and under its flag, so were the massacres of the prisoners of war of our side.

“In those days, we officially informed the UN Secretariat of the

massacres of these prisoners of war on many occasions, and demanded that these atrocities should be stopped immediately. However, our demand did not receive due attention from the UN and was totally ignored. ...”

Even after the signing of the armistice, repatriation of the prisoners of war was not carried out satisfactorily. Because of the perfidy of the United States, a large number of them were forcibly detained. This was eloquently proved by the case of Ri In Mo, a war correspondent of the Korean People’s Army, who returned to the embrace of his native country on March 19, 1993.

During the Korean War, the United States used bacteriological and chemical weapons which were prohibited by international law. It had refused to sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibited the use of suffocating and other poisonous gases and bacteriological means in war, and had gone ahead with large-scale preparations for warfare using such means.

In the autumn of 1950, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley, US Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenberg, US Army Chief of Staff Collins, and US Chief of Naval Operations Sherman decided to develop bacteriological weapons for experimental use in Korea. Under this plan of germ warfare prepared by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States used bacteriological weapons in the Korean War from the winter of 1950. In March 1951, the germ landing boat No. 1091 conducted germ experiments on prisoners of war. A UP dispatch, dated May 18, 1951, reported that the landing boat carried out 3,000 experiments and that, as a result, 1,400 of the prisoners were critically contaminated and 80 per cent of the rest caught certain kinds of infectious diseases.

After the initial experiments of germ warfare on prisoners of war and in a limited area of the DPRK, in October 1951 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered gradual expansion of germ warfare in Korea on an operational scale.

Colonel Frank H. Schewable, Chief of Staff of the 1st Air Wing of the US Marine Corps, who was captured as his plane was shot down in the DPRK on July 8, 1952, confessed as follows:

“The general plan for the bacteriological warfare in Korea was directed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1951. Then the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave an order to the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Command to detail persons for the purpose and begin germ warfare in Korea, which was to be gradually escalated from the initial small-scale test stage. This order was conveyed to Wayland, Commander of the US Far East Air Force in Tokyo. To execute the order, Wayland ordered the 5<sup>th</sup> Air Force Commander and the 19<sup>th</sup> Bomber Wing in Okinawa, Japan, to start germ warfare.”

With the extension of the operational range of germ warfare, the United States mobilized all the airplanes of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> Light Bomber Wings and the 4<sup>th</sup>, 51<sup>st</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup>, 49<sup>th</sup>, 58<sup>th</sup> and 474<sup>th</sup> Fighter Bomber Wings of the US Air Force, and the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Wing of the US Marine Corps.

Japanese experts actively cooperated with the US in this germ warfare. Lt. Col. Roger Warren of the US Air Force, who was captured by the Korean People’s Army, testified that the United States was able to recruit several Japanese scientists and get them to work in the research institutes for the development of bacteriological weapons, and that these scientists made efforts to discover more effective and newer methods to improve the effect of germ bombs and quickly spread insects infected with germs.

The atrocity of germ warfare perpetrated by the United States during the Korean War prompted the Commission of International Democratic Lawyers and the Chinese Commission for the Investigation of the US Atrocities of Germ Warfare to send their inspectors to Korea and make field investigations in different parts of the DPRK.

From January 28 to March 31, 1952, germ bombs and various devices containing lethal microbes were dropped over 400 places in Korea on more than 700 occasions. The fact that germ and chemical warfare of such intensity continued for nearly a year is testimony enough to the appalling effects of such an atrocity.

Fifty years have passed since the termination of the war, but the UNC still exists, ghost-like, in south Korea, posing a great obstacle

to ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula.

The UNC is a product of the Cold War manufactured by the United States in the name of the United Nations, rather than an organization established by a decision of the United Nations. The UNC is a symbol of the naked power politics of the United States--it was manufactured in violation of Paragraph 3, Article 27, of the UN Charter which stipulates that decisions of the UN Security Council shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven or more members including the concurring votes of five permanent members. The UNC is also illegal in the light of the requirement of Paragraph 32 of the UN Charter, which stipulates that the party concerned shall be permitted to participate in the discussion of the question--the Security Council meeting at which it came into being was attended by the delegate from south Korea, but the delegate of the DPRK, also a party to the dispute, was not allowed to attend. Further, the July 7, 1950, "resolution" of the UN Security Council did not contain any wording directing that the UNC be established.

In this connection, an American publication wrote the following:

It was intended, in the last analysis, to ensure that MacArthur was not placed under the leadership of the UN even while maintaining the "UN Forces" under his command. This was realized by the July 7 British and French joint resolution. This resolution was recognized in general as having established the UNC, but that was not really the case. The resolution established a "unified command", and though it got the right to use the flag of the UN, it was never controlled by the orders of the UN. This fact can be explained by the wording of the resolution. The resolution stated that the UN member-nations who contributed armed forces and other aid in accordance with the Security Council resolution on the Korean question should contribute such armed forces and aid to the unified command which was under the leadership of the United States. The resolution requested the United States to appoint the commander of such armed forces and gave the armed forces the right to use the UN flag. The only paragraph that specified UN authority to supervise the armed forces was the last paragraph, which requested the United States, in vague

terms, “to make proper reports to the Security Council about the progress of the actions taken under the unified command.” The “unified command” was not duty bound to consult the UN or report to it regularly or in other forms. ... The UN gave MacArthur blank-paper credentials....

The General Headquarters in Tokyo...was a unified command in logical terms, but it was, in fact, MacArthur’s kingdom. (*Hidden History of the Korean War*, Japanese ed., pp. 88-90.)

In the last analysis, therefore, the UN lent only its name and flag to the United States, which proceeded to abuse both at its own discretion.

At a press interview on March 20, 1967, Clark, who was Commander of the UNC during the Korean War, said that although he was the Commander of the UNC in Korea, he did not remember ever receiving any instructions from the UN during the war. Nevertheless, the United States still maintains, to this day, that the July 7 UN Security Council “resolution” was the legal basis on which the UNC was organized.

The so-called UNC in south Korea has nothing in common with United Nations forces or United Nations Command in terms of its organization, command system, military operations and other aspects, as stipulated in the UN Charter. According to the Charter, for any armed force taking part in military operations to acquire the position of a UN force, it must be organized thoroughly in accordance with the stipulations of the UN Charter, obey the command system specified therein and act towards fulfilling the purpose of the UN.

The “UN Forces” in south Korea were not organized according to the principles of organizing UN forces as stipulated in the UN Charter. The Charter says, for instance, that UN forces shall be organized by the recommendation of the UN Security Council and in accordance with an agreement signed by the Security Council and the states that contribute troops. However, the “UN Forces” that were sent to the Korean War in 1950 were not the result of any such agreement between the Security Council and the states that

contributed troops. The forces that came to Korea when the war broke out did so before the Security Council adopted the “resolution”, and they were US forces. Ninety per cent of the army troops, 93.5 per cent of the naval force, and 98.6 per cent of the air force of the “UN Forces” that were sent to the Korean front were, in fact, US forces. Armed forces of the satellite nations accounted for a very small proportion.

On May 4, 1951, MacArthur himself declared that if the United States had pulled out its troops from the armed forces that had been sent to Korea, very little would have remained. (*History of the Korean War*, Part 1, Japanese ed., p. 200.)

The command system of the “UN Forces” in south Korea, again, is totally different from that envisaged in the UN Charter. Article 47 of the Charter stipulates that UN forces shall be under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, and that the command of their operations shall be undertaken by the Military Staff Council that is composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent member-nations of the UN Security Council. Going by this, if the armed forces committed to the Korean War were UN forces, they should have been under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council and under the operational command of the Military Staff Council. This was not true, however, of the “UN Forces” in south Korea during the war; nor is it true now. The UNC organized by the United States, then and now, is under the jurisdiction of the US military and obeys the orders of the American commander.

In February 1970, Michaelis, the then UNC Commander, when asked for at the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee whether he could take military action without any further decisions or measures from the UN Headquarters, plainly answered that he could not take any action without orders from his superiors, and that by his superiors he meant the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The UNC in south Korea has taken military actions in contravention of the requirements of the UN Charter. There is no article in the UN Charter which stipulates that UN forces may side with any one party to a dispute and attack the other party. In the

Korean War, however, the “UN Forces” sided with Syngman Rhee’s army and attacked the DPRK and they continue to stand in confrontation against it, as a belligerent party.

The fact that the UNC in south Korea has nothing to do with the UN, that it consists not of UN forces but US forces, is admitted by the Americans themselves and recognized by the world. A Reuters dispatch, dated May 11, 1967, said that what the United States and south Korea were describing as the UNC was, in fact, an organization with American generals and staff officers under the control of the United States. The fact that such an organization, which has no relation with the UN but usurps its name and flag, still exists in south Korea is an intolerable disgrace to the UN.

On November 18, 1975, the 30<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly Session adopted a resolution on dissolving the UNC and withdrawing all foreign troops in south Korea under the flag of the UN. Nevertheless, the United States is trying in every possible way to demonstrate the validity of the UNC, a white elephant that nobody wants. Successive presidents of the United States after the Korean War have continued to maintain that the armed forces in south Korea belong to the UNC, that there are no American soldiers but only “UN Forces” in south Korea, and that American soldiers in south Korea are carrying out international missions as the “UN Forces” based on UN resolutions.

In 1996 the UNC made a report to the UN Security Council for the purpose of justifying its existence, a queer occurrence in view of the fact that it had never made a report to the UN or received an instruction from the UN, but acted only on the orders of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the last forty-six years.

In this connection, the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK published a memorandum on June 25, 1996, under the title, ‘The UNC in South Korea Must Be Dissolved Immediately,’ a document that lays bare the truth of the UNC.

The UNC in south Korea is a mere name; all that remains under it is US armed forces. The governments of the fifteen nations that had sent their troops to the Korean War have withdrawn their troops, without even notifying their withdrawal to the UN. France pulled out

its troops from the “UN Forces” on October 23, 1953, Canada in April 1956, Luxemburg on December 30, 1954, the Philippines and South Africa in October and November 1953, Belgium in 1956, Greece on July 13, 1955, Colombia in October 1954, the Netherlands in March 1956, Ethiopia in December 1954, Australia in July 1953, Britain in July 1957, New Zealand in October 1953, Turkey in July 1956 and Thailand in July 1955. Ethiopia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, South Africa and many other nations have no relations at all with the UNC at present. This shows that the UNC had begun to dissolve itself automatically even before the UN adopted a resolution to that effect.

In a letter sent to the UN Security Council on September 22, 1975, the United States, the only country that remains in the UNC, officially admitted that the UNC was an organization with less than 300 staff officers and an honour guard. When the 30<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly Session adopted the resolution on dissolving the UNC, the United States said that the armed forces in south Korea were not “UN Forces” but US forces. The so-called report that was made by the UNC to the UN Security Council in 1996, twenty years after the adoption of the resolution, cannot be explained in any other terms than an exercise by the United States to demonstrate the value of the existence of the UNC. The UNC in south Korea is, essentially, the US Command.

All the commanders of the UNC have been appointed by the US government, and all these commanders have been Americans. In addition, the Commander of the UNC has been concurrently Commander of the US-south Korean combined forces, exercising the prerogative of commanding the operations of the US forces in south Korea and the south Korean armed forces. In his letter to the Foreign Minister of the DPRK on June 24, 1994, the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that dissolution of the Allied Forces Command is a matter that falls within the authority of the US government and is not the responsibility of any UN organization.

All these facts prove, again and again, that the UNC in south Korea is the US Command in the guise of the UN flag. The UNC



openly fought against the DPRK for three years in the initial period after its organization, and since the armistice, it has created great obstacles to ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula by precipitating the situation to the brink of war.

Governments that continue to leave their flags in the hands of the UNC must understand that the belligerence of the conservative hardliners of the United States has brought the situation to the brink of real war. They must refrain from being inveigled into US scheme.

The United States must disband the UNC in south Korea, and withdraw its armed forces from south Korea without delay. This will be most beneficial to ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

## **CONCLUSION**

More than half a century has gone by since the United States first occupied the southern half of Korea.

The division of Korea into north and south is the worst tragedy to befall the Korean people, and it has brought untold suffering upon them.

The US occupation of south Korea has compelled north and south Korea to live in confrontation, with guns aimed at each other, for many decades, and has caused enormous loss of human and material resources. The extent of calamities that may come in the future is inestimable.

If the US forces had not intruded into south Korea, the Korean nation would not have suffered such a tragedy. So long as the US forces stay in south Korea, peace on the Korean peninsula cannot be hoped for, and the prospect of national reunification is dim. Their presence in south Korea only increases the danger of war and prolongs the division of the Korean nation.

The Korean peninsula has no access to a legal device that is capable of preventing an armed clash or the outbreak of war that may happen any minute because of the ineffectual armistice agreement. This state of affairs is due entirely to the anachronistic policy of the

United States.

Relations between the DPRK and the US that had developed on a relatively smooth basis after the signing of the DPRK-USA Agreed Framework have become tension-ridden once again after the advent of the Bush administration in the United States. The dialogue that had been initiated between the DPRK and the previous US administration has come to a full stop, and the relations between north and south Korea, which had made good progress after the adoption of the June 15, 2000, North-South Joint Declaration, have fallen to freezing point. Conservative hardliners in the Bush team are back to hurling abuses at the DPRK, and are resorting to sanctions and military pressure with greater intensity especially at the present moment, when they are swayed by their sense of triumph in the wars in the Persian Gulf, Balkans and Afghanistan.

In September 2002, the inter-Korean military authorities reached an agreement on military guarantees for the linking of railways and roads. Upon its effectuation, both sides started clearing land mines in the Demilitarized Zone under north-south control. The completion of the project would have been subject to mutual verification under a bilateral agreement.

In the final stage of the project, however, the US suddenly threw a hurdle in its way: it argued that the crossing of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) by civilians as well as soldiers should get approval from the UNC and demanded the lists of verification team members from the north and south.

Actually, the DPRK had held two rounds of general-level talks with the US army side, as well as the south side, to make exhaustive discussions and nail down an agreement on the relevant issues, in consideration of the site of the project—the MDL, the line of stand-off between the belligerents.

Since the armistice, a great many people from the north and south had crossed the MDL but the UNC side had never raised a demand for a list of such visitors, nor the DPRK had ever presented such a list.

The US also alleged that pending the approval of the UNC, the

north-south cooperation projects such as the linking of railways and roads, road tourism in Mt. Kumgang and the construction of the Kaesong industrial zone would run against a hitch. Decades have elapsed since the 30<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly that adopted a resolution on the dissolution of the UNC. But the US still attempts to revive the defunct entity, souring the improving inter-Korean relations.

The whole Korean nation is determined to terminate division and wrest reunification. This cause is in no way subject to approval or control of anyone else.

After the Cold War, the United States shifted the centre of its military presence from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, in an attempt to use south Korea as the stepping-stone to realize its Asia strategy. That is a gross mistake. If the US thinks it can harm any other country with impunity, it will be making a greater mistake. That will invite its own destruction.

On November 14, 2002, the US published a decision to suspend the delivery of heavy oil to the DPRK, an item of the DPRK-USA Agreed Framework, and carried it into practice in December. On January 6, 2003, it instigated the International Atomic Energy Agency to adopt an unjustifiable “resolution” against the DPRK.

The DPRK Government immediately countered by lifting its nuclear freeze, the step which had been taken on the condition of heavy oil supply, and resuming the operation and construction of nuclear power-generation facilities. It issued a statement on January 10, 2003, declaring that its unilateral moratorium on withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty would cease automatically and immediately.

The Korean people and army are resolved that they would have no dealings with the US which is bringing the situation on the Korean peninsula to a head and that if the US infringes on their national sovereignty and dignity, they would wreak their deep-seated vengeance upon it.

Peace-loving people throughout the world now demand that the United States discard its anachronistic DPRK policy and pull out its

military forces from south Korea.

Voices demanding the withdrawal of US forces are also ringing out louder than ever before in south Korea itself. The south Korean people are saying in no uncertain terms that the US military occupation of south Korea is the cause of military tension in the Korean peninsula and an obstacle to peace, that the existence of a foreign military base in the heart of Seoul is a disgrace to the nation, that the American soldiers are bringing unbearable suffering and sacrifice to the south Korean people, that the US forces have no room to stay in this land, and that they must dismantle their military bases and go home.

The United States' act of jeopardizing peace in another country is intolerable both in terms of international law and from the point of view of humanitarianism.

The United States must take practical steps to implement the resolution of the 30<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly on abolishing the UNC in south Korea and on replacing the armistice with a peace agreement. It must withdraw its military forces from south Korea with immediate effect.