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AMERICANS FOR JUSTICE IN THE MIDDLE EAST — P. O. B. 4841 — BEIRUT, LEBANON

The Arabs in Israel – II

THE MIDDLE EAST NEWSLETTER *of January, 1968 (II,1) contained a report on the condition of the Arabs within Israel which was submitted to the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations in the name of the Israeli political movement known as "The Third Force." The report was dated November 21, 1961 and was signed by three prominent Israelis, M. Stein, A. Zichrony and Y.T. Sik for the Central Committee of "The Third Force." The following description of the situation of Arabs under Israeli rule is composed of extracts from a report addressed to the United Nations Secretary-General by a group of Arabs in Israel; the appeal, which was made in 1964, was of necessity anonymous. A French translation of this report appeared in the dossier "Le conflit israélo-arabe," published under the auspices of* Les Temps Modernes *which is edited by Jean-Paul Sartre. The English text which follows was translated from the French which appeared in the* Les Temps Modernes *dossier and collated with an English text provided by the Arab Information Office of New York. The original is on file at the United Nations but is not available to the public.*

Included as a part of this report was the description of the organization and activities—and persecution—of the group of young Arabs who submitted the report in the name of their organization, "Al-Ard Company, Limited." The name "Al-Ard" means "the earth" and is intended to express the concept of the land of Palestine forming an integral part of the Arab heritage. The aims of Al-Ard are (or were in 1964) equality for the Arabs within a state of Israel based on the provisions of the original UN Partition Plan of 1947.

Unfortunately the length of the report precludes publishing it in its entirety in a single issue of the Newsletter; *we therefore here present to our readers substantial extracts from it—extracts which describe with documentation and detail the plight of the Arabs in Israel.*

ARAB LAND

The Israeli Government has promulgated laws for the expropriation of Arab private property and the destruction of Arab villages and farm-lands. In 1948, the Government imposed the Absentees' Property Emergency Regulations, which in 1950 became the Absentees' Property Law. According to this law an "absentee" is any Palestinian who left his (principal) residence in Palestine before the first of August 1948 or one who, for any reason, moved or moves into any of those parts of Palestine under the control of forces opposing the establishment of the State of Israel at any time after November 29, 1947 and until the abolition of the State of Emergency declared by the Government on April 19, 1948.

In fact the "State of Emergency" is still in force and the classification "absentee," with all its legal consequences, is still applied to all the Arabs living in the Triangle[1] as well as to numerous others resident in other districts either militarily occupied by Israel or subsequently ceded to it. Many Arabs did leave their homes; they fled in fear of suffering the fate of the inhabitants of Deir Yassin two hundred of whom were savagely massacred by Jewish irregulars on April 9, 1948.

Furthermore, the Government makes considerable use of Article 125 of the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations to expropriate Arab lands; this article stipulates that:

> Any person, who, during any period in which any such order is in force in relation to any area or place, enters or leaves that area or place without a permit in writing issued by or on behalf of the Military Commander shall be guilty of an offense against these Regulations.

In this way, scores of Arab villages were declared "Closed Zones" after their inhabitants had been driven out; this procedure facilitated the seizure of their lands. Among these villages were Ghabsiah, Amka, Faradi, Kfar Inan, Saforiah, Magdal, Kfar Baram, Mansoura, Mear, Kwebat, Berwa, Damoun, and Rouies.

In 1949 the Government reinforced the Emergency Regulations and the Minister of Defense was empowered to declare any region of Israel whatsoever a "Security Zone" and to evict the inhabitants on ten days notice. It was in this manner that the Arab inhabitants of the two villages Ikret and Kfar Baram in Galilee were forcibly expelled. They appealed to the Court in Jerusalem, but while the case was pending the authorities demolished the two villages. Ben Gurion who was then Prime Minister went so far as to deny to the Knesset that he had had any knowledge of these unfortunate incidents. To add insult to injury, it was on Christmas Eve of 1951 that the village of Ikret—the

[1] *The triangle is the name given to a region in Israel in which there are many Arab towns; it is so-called because of its shape.*

inhabitants of which were all Greek Catholics—was destroyed by the Israeli Army.

In 1948 the Government passed the Fallow Lands Emergency Regulations. These laws authorized the Minister of Agriculture to expropriate all "fallow lands." Land made fallow by the prior application of the above-mentioned Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 and the Emergency Regulations of 1949 was then handed over to Jews for cultivation.

In 1950, the Government promulgated a law on "Land Expropriation in Case of Emergency." This measure gave the Government the right to seize provisionally any land and to confiscate any establishment deemed vital for the "defense" of the state, for national security, for the social services, for the absorption of Jewish immigrants, for the housing of military personnel on leave and disabled veterans. Initially this law was to have remained in force for three years. It was extended to six years even before the three years had expired and then amended so that all lands and buildings seized and occupied under its provisions before August 1, 1958 were permanently expropriated.

In 1953, a law on land ownership was issued. Six months after the law was gazetted, the land of 250 Arab villages was confiscated. By virtue of this law, all land reserved, seized, distributed or utilized since May 14, 1948, for the purpose of advancing development, settlements or security and found to be neglected by its owner was declared property of the Land Development Authority.

The 1953 law determined the value of the indemnity for expropriated land on the basis of the value of the *dunum* on January 1, 1950. This was a flagrant injustice since the value of the Israeli pound was five times less in 1950 than it was in 1953 when the law was passed.

To tighten the screws on the Arabs and to steal legally whatever was left of their land, a new law was promulgated in 1958—the Prescription Law. This law was an amendment of the 1858 Ottoman Lands Law. This law fixed at ten years the duration of time an Arab had to have worked a plot of land for which he applied for registration in his own name. This recording at the Land Registry Office entitled him to ownership of the property. The prescription law of 1958 fixed the period of land use at twenty years. In fact the majority of Palestinian land is poorly drained and a considerable area of this land, especially in Galilee, was not surveyed; consequently registration applications concerning such lands were not considered under Mandatory law. If the Ottoman law had remained in force, the Arab farmers would have been able to provide proofs in support of their claims. However the 1958 modification extending the period of prescription to 20 years made it more difficult and sometimes impossible for them to register the land in their names. This permitted the Israeli Government to seize several thousand *dunums*[2] of Arab land.

The Government possesses an additional weapon which it uses from time to time for the confiscation of land: it is the Land Ordinance (Expropriation for Public Purposes) of 1943. This law empowered the Government to expropriate a large portion of Arab land around Nazareth, on which a Jewish town was constructed. It was also the basis for the expropriation of the sites of Battour and Shaghur, the land of Battour and Shaghur on which Carmiel, a Jewish city, is being established. Claiming trifling pretexts, or alleging false necessity to proceed in its expropriation, the Government has never been able to hide the sad truth. It appears obvious that it has planned to transform the whole of Galilee into an entirely Jewish entity. Even before the foundation of the State of Israel, David Ben Gurion asked for a loan from Keren Kayemet[3] and in exchange he offered two million *dunums* of land, the price per *dunum* being fixed at one half a sterling pound. When the Keren Kayemet inquired about the whereabouts of this land, Ben Gurion replied that the Haganah[4] would finally occupy the land of Palestine and would deliver according to the terms of the agreement.

Insatiable, the Government continues to promulgate laws, to enunciate decrees and ordinances which create discrimination.

It neglects its obligations and international agreements, defies the resolutions of the United Nations passed on November 29, 1947 (concerning partition) and the 1949 armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan.

In fact Article 8 of Chapter II of the 1947 resolutions stipulates:

> There shall be no expropriation of land possessed by Arabs in the Jewish State, except in the public interest. In all cases of expropriation an indemnity determined by the Supreme Court will be paid before the expropriation.

At the time of its request for admission into the United Nations, the Israeli Government pledged itself to implement the resolutions of the UN concerning Palestine and to respect the armistice agreements. It is important to emphasize this point. Furthermore, it undertook not to promulgate any laws, ordinances or decrees that might be contrary to the content of these resolutions and these agreements. In addition, paragraph 6 of the third part of the Israel-Jordan agreement lays down the principle that:

> The inhabitants of the villages affected by the establishment of the armistice line foreseen in paragraph 2 of this article will be everywhere maintained in their rights of property, of residence, of liberty and protected to this effect.

After having set forth the policy of the Government on matters relating to land expropriation, we now should consider the problem of land property owned by religious trusts (Islamic Waqfs). Contrary to the procedures that were legal and customary under the mandatory regime, the Israeli Government has deprived the Islamic community of the possession of its property, and has taken complete charge of the administration and the revenues of the said property, whereas all the other non-Jewish communities control to a large extent their trusts.

To cover up this abusive seizure of Islamic property, the Minister of Religious Affairs designated a committee that has no effective power whatsoever except to provide a "show window." The members of this committee were chosen for their servility of which they have given proof to the detriment of their brethren.

The annual income from the Muslim property is considerable. Nevertheless the Islamic community does not receive any portion thereof. It follows that all of its religious, cultural, and social activities have stagnated for lack of funds since the establishment of the State of Israel.

In 1955 David Ben Gurion proclaimed that the revenue from the Islamic properties for that year amounted to only 180,000 Israeli pounds, a statement which was far from the

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[2] *A* dunum *is approximately a quarter of an acre.*

[3] *The Keren Kayemet is a national fund which possesses the land of the State of Israel.*

[4] *The Haganah was the Jewish underground army operating in Palestine before 1948.*

truth. The land constituting Islamic property represents one sixteenth of all of Palestine, the largest portions being found in Israel, for example: a) the Waqf of Rubine: 40,000 *feddans*,[5] b) the Waqf of Sidna Ali: 28,000 *feddans*, c) the Waqf of Al-Radwan: 50,000 *feddans*.

The Arab Bedouin tribes in the Negev pose another very important problem. For sixteen years, the Bedouin have been the object of persecution and oppression; they are forced to live in real "ghettos" and only persons in whom the Government has confidence are permitted to see them. Many of them have been expelled from their fertile land and driven on to arid lands described by the Jews themselves as "the very heart of the desert." Their fertile lands have been divided among Jewish farmers or collectives. The Government has not stopped here either. It pursues a harsh policy aimed at the expulsion of even the last Bedouin. It carries out this policy by all possible means: not only persuasion and luring promises, but also threats and intrigues. A recent incident illustrates this method: an Arab was suspected of having killed a young Jewish girl and an insidious exploitation of this incident was initiated which provoked a wave of hatred and provided the military Government with a pretext to unleash a campaign of terror against the Bedouin of the area.

THE MILITARY AUTHORITY

Two hundred and sixty-two thousand Arabs now live in Israel. They are concentrated mainly in Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev. Since the creation of the state, the authorities have imposed a corrupt military Government on these regions. It is characterized by its harshness and its inclination to racial discrimination. It propagates dissension, fear and terror.

The 1945 (Emergency) Defense Regulations, aimed at crushing rebellion and riots, are the esssential weapons of the Military Rule. They give the military governors substantial and arbitrary powers and allow an abusive, autocratic authority. Subjected to these laws, the Arab citizen has lost his essential liberties: freedom of action and freedom of expression. Administrative detention and banishment are extensively used by the military governors who illegally assume the entire administration of Arab affairs to the extent of high-handed interference even in the citizens' private concerns. In his 1959 annual report, the state comptroller complained that the military governors were handling cases outside their competence, not in their jurisdiction but in that of the civil authorities.

* * *

ARAB CULTURE

The high standard of public education under the mandatory authority has declined and reached a nadir during the past sixteen years. Only 5.4 per cent of the students in Arab schools controlled by the Ministry of Education pass the examination for the secondary school certificate *(Bagrut)*. This is mainly due to the following factors:

1. The prejudiced and brutal interference of the "Shin-Bet" (special or secret services) of the military authority in matters pertaining to education. As a matter of fact, those services control the selection and appointment of "teachers" without reference to their credentials and qualifications. They are selected on the basis of services they are likely to render to the military control and to the "Shin-Bet" and are expected only to be docile, and zealous in serving the propaganda machine of the party in power.
2. The lack of adequate space in the schools. Notwithstanding the increase in the number of Arab students, the number of schools and their capacity have remained extremely limited. The Ministry of Education intentionally neglects to apply the provisions of the law on compulsory education in the case of minorities and assigns inadequate and inconvenient premises to these schools.
3. The evident lack of books, laboratory equipment, maps and libraries.
4. The publication of mediocre textbooks by the officials responsible. Some officials abuse their position to profit financially from the publication of inferior books aimed at poisoning the minds of the new generation.

There are five secondary schools for Arabs in Israel, only one of which–in Nazareth–teaches the sciences; all of them lack playgrounds, clubs and adequate space.

The Israeli Government, by means of this policy, endeavours to destroy all links in the minds of the new Arab generation with its glorious past, to smother all national feeling and the hope for a better future. In fact, it offers the Arabs a sinister alternative: assimilation or emigration.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

The Declaration of Independence proclaims the absolute equality of all citizens of the state and provides for the cooperation of the Arabs in all official and public institutions. However, the text has remained a dead letter. The Government pursues a policy which turns the Arabs into second class citizens, represses them and openly encourages discriminatory measures against them and dissension among them. Discrimination has deeply tainted all aspects of Arab life and created permanent feelings of hatred and suspicion.

The Arab minority, which amounts to one-tenth of the population, fulfills its civil obligations and pays all kinds of taxes. Nevertheless, Arab civil servants constitute only 1.5 per cent of the total. During an election meeting in 1961, a Jewish veteran stressed that "It is up to the Government to shape the Arabs of Israel into a class of workers at the service of the Jewish masses." That is certainly the policy of the Government which is striving to achieve the maximum in the minimum time.

The policy of racial discrimination against the Arabs of Israel affects all aspects of life, mainly:

- Public utilities: To this day, the majority of Arab villages lack a supply of drinking water, electricity and adequate roads.
- Public health: Many villages are totally deprived of sanitary services. The recent incident in the village of Kisra where twelve children died of measles is a flagrant proof of this negligence.
- Local authorities: The Arab communities must be content with "designated" councilmen, or go without any.

[5] *A "feddan" is an Egyptian land measure roughly equivalent to an acre.*

– Last but not least, the Government denies the Arabs the fundamental liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of expression and political freedom. Not content with open opposition to the creation of an independent Arab political party, and with the destruction, by every means, of the national status of the Arabs in Israel, the authorities press the Arab youth to join Zionist and non-Zionist parties in the hope of smothering national feelings and in order to facilitate their assimilation within the Jewish milieu.

* * *

The hope of the Israeli Government is that systematic pressure and terror will produce among the "Israeli" Arabs a state of fear, despair and submission. We declare that this shall never be. We are determined to resist oppression and resolve to struggle for our rights, recalling that outrageous exactions can only result in resentment if not hatred. The Government also hopes that the Arabs will launch violent disorders which it would exploit to justify to world opinion repressive actions against the minorities. Once again, we believe that this Machiavellianism will have repercussions beyond the frontiers of Israel and will affect the whole Arab World and all people of conscience everywhere.

We here condemn Israel for its unlawful policies. If the United Nations remains a passive onlooker, it will have to bear along with Israel the entire responsibility for the consequences of this policy. The fate of the 262,000 Arabs in Israel is not inconsequential. The Arabs appeal for justice, understanding and reason. What was fitting for Israel after the Second World War and remains so today should be applied to the minorities living within its frontiers.

Peace and stability in the area are in the hands of the Israeli leaders. The dubious future of Israel depends upon its behaviour—and on that alone.

– Al-Ard Company Limited

INTERESTED PERSONS can join AJME by mailing name, address and citizenship (along with a contribution) to Mrs. F. Renno or Mrs. J. Dagilaitis; AJME; POB 4841; Beirut, LEBANON (by air mail, if possible). Category of participation should be indicated; there are three—Member (for U.S. citizens), Associate (for persons of any nationality), and Patron. Members and Associates contribute at least $ 10.00 or L. Lebanese 30.00 annually; Patrons donate what they wish. Checks should be made out to "Americans for Justice in the Middle East."

Our readers are urged to share the material in *The Newsletter* with their friends, local newspapers and representatives in government. *The Middle East Newsletter* is edited by Robert Joseph Fraga and Anne Ricketson Zahlan; it is published ten times a year at Beirut, Lebanon by Americans for Justice in the Middle East.

THESE ARAB REFUGEES EXIST

What follows is a reply by an official UNRWA spokesman to an article by Ira Hirschmann which appeared recently in LOOK Magazine. In the credits which preceded the LOOK article, Mr. Hirschmann was described as having undertaken "fact-finding missions" both for UNRWA and for the State Department. That this is not the case was revealed in a letter to LOOK by Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. The text of the letter, which was made available to AJME by the United States Embassy in Beirut, is reproduced below:

> *In his article on the Arab refugees in the September 17 issue of LOOK Magazine, Ira Hirschmann says he received a "commission" from the State Department to do a survey of the refugee problem. That statement is incorrect.*
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> *Mr. Hirschmann was received at his request at the State Department prior to and following his trip to the Middle East but at no point was he given any assignment or "commission" from the State Department. The views presented in his article, therefore, are his own and do not represent the position of the State Department.*
>
> *In view of the number of inquiries we have received on this point, I would appreciate it if you would print this letter setting the record straight.*

Mr. Ira Hirschmann, in an article entitled "The Case of the Missing Arab Refugees," in a recent issue of *Look* Magazine, charges that UNRWA's programme includes relief for 200,000 to 500,000 non-existent Arab refugees.

The 180,000 children who attend UNRWA/UNESCO schools every day certainly exist, and so do the 3,300 students in UNRWA's centres for vocational and teacher training. UNRWA has also verified the existence of 57,000 students who are given some financial help in government and private schools.

The refugees who make a total of 6 million visits each year to UNRWA health clinics also exist, and so do the

113,000 children who drink a glass of UNRWA milk daily, and the 46,000 young children who daily eat a hot meal provided by UNRWA. The inhabitants of UNRWA camps, for whom water and sanitation services are provided, also exist.

All these services, by their very nature, cannot be provided for non-existent persons. Together they account for two-thirds of UNRWA's expenditures.

The remaining one-third of the budget represents the distribution of food rations, mostly flour and soya bean oil provided by the United States as part of its contribution to UNRWA. As Mr. Hirschmann notes, these rations provide 1,500 calories daily, and cost about four cents a day. They are distributed on a family basis each month and the number of rations issued is about 863,000. Some 500,000 names on UNRWA's registration lists are not included in this distribution.

Every agency providing welfare assistance has difficulty with eligibility, and has to struggle constantly to exclude those who are not eligible. Since it began operations, UNRWA has removed 300,000 names because of death, false or duplicate registration, or other reasons. In addition, UNRWA has suspended the eligibility of a cumulative total of 355,000 persons found to be absent from the territory or having a family income of more than about $ 35 to $ 40 a month; of these, 145,000 later lost their income or returned from absence—but even so there has been a net decrease of 210,000.

In the meantime, of course, many children have been born. The death rate, fortunately, is low. Mr. Hirschmann is probably right in suggesting that it cannot actually be as low as 6.0 per thousand, although this is virtually the same as the rate reported for Israel by the London *Economist*.

Admittedly, the ration rolls are not perfect, but UNRWA works constantly to improve them. There have been abuses, including the sale of ration cards, but Mr. Hirschmann is the first person to report such sales on the streets of Beirut; the Government of Lebanon has been very effective in prohibiting traffic in ration commodities. In Jordan, where ration "merchants" did operate at one time, the traffic has been almost completely stopped, and the Government now enforces the prohibition vigorously.

It might also be noted that when the assistance to be controlled amounts to so little—six dollars a month for a family of five persons—intensive investigations costing several times this sum would not be justified.

Mr. Hirschmann indicts UNRWA for having "failed almost completely in its original assignment of rehabilitating the refugees." Although UNRWA was not given such a mandate in the General Assembly resolution which established it, a great deal has been done by UNRWA, through its education and training programmes in particular, to help the individual refugees, and their families, to become wholly or partly self-supporting.

The Secretary-General, referring to the process of rehabilitation which had been at work among the refugees, particularly in latter years, told the General Assembly in a recent report:

> This progress has been primarily due to three factors: first and foremost, the rapid economic development of the Arab host countries and of the Arab world generally in recent years; second, the energy, intelligence and adaptability of the refugees themselves, who have fortunately shown themselves to be eager for work and very capable of profiting by any opportunity given to them; and third, the education and training which the host governments, various voluntary agencies and UNRWA have been able to give the young refugees to enable them to take advantage of any opportunities of employment that might come their way. A subsidiary but not unimportant adjunct to these principal factors in the rehabilitation of the refugees has been the economic aid supplied by UNRWA in the form of rations, shelter, and other relief services. The regular provision of this relief assistance over an extended period, even though on a meagre scale, has certainly helped the refugees not merely to survive but to recover their capacity to support themselves.

Certainly it is regrettable that the Palestine refugee problem persists, but it is saddest of all for the refugees themselves. They are the innocent sufferers from events they did not cause, and it is not within their possibilities to produce a solution. Nor is that the task of UNRWA, whose 100 international staff and 11,900 Arab staff as well, would be overjoyed if there could be a "just settlement of the refugee problem." The Security Council, in its resolution of 22 November 1967, included this objective as one of the elements in a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. While waiting for the international community to find that solution, which has eluded all efforts for 20 years, should not the refugees be given the humanitarian help they require and UNRWA be encouraged to carry on its constructive work, and helped to secure the funds it needs to prepare the refugees to benefit from the just settlement when it comes?

We take this opportunity to remind our readers that one year ago, on November 22, the Security Council passed a resolution which proposed a program for securing peace in the Middle East. The resolution, which was subsequently approved and accepted by Jordan and the United Arab Republic, called for the evacuation of territory occupied by Israel, cessation of belligerency, recognition of secure boundaries, freedom of navigation and an equitable solution of the refugee problem. The Israeli attitude to the resolution has been equivocal in that the Israeli government has agreed only that the United Nations resolution could provide the "framework" for arriving at peace.

Jews in the Arab World

A Moroccan Jewish Community During the Middle Eastern Crisis

by LAWRENCE ROSEN

IN A UNANIMOUS VOTE from which there were only three abstentions, the Security Council has requested that Secretary General U Thant arrange for an investigation of the conditions under which Arabs in areas occupied by the Israelis live. The Israelis have indicated, however, that they will not permit such an investigation unless the United Nations also investigates the condition of the Jewish communities in Arab countries. Some Arab governments have refused to comply with this demand on the grounds that it constitutes interference in the internal affairs of their countries. To justify their call for an investigation into conditions in Israeli-controlled territory, they cite the non-parallel nature of the two proposed investigations; the investigation called for by the Security Council cannot be construed as interference in the internal affairs of Israel.

To achieve a greater understanding among our readers of the conditions under which Jews in Arab countries live, *The Newsletter* reprints by permission the following article which appeared in the summer 1968 issue of *The American Scholar*. The author, who has received a Ph. D. from the University of Chicago, studied for two years the social structure of a Moroccan city. Mr. Rosen is presently an Assistant Professor of Anthropology and a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study at the University of Illinois. Although, as Mr. Rosen correctly asserts, the social conditions of the Moroccan community which he studied are not identical with those conditions prevailing in Arab countries to the east of Morocco, this is not to say that the sense of individual justice and humanity which prevailed in the city described in Mr. Rosen's article is unique to Morocco. Undoubtedly the Jewish communities in several Arab countries have suffered as a result of the establishment of Israel. However, some sense of justice has survived, much to Arab credit, as British journalist Irene Beeson writes from Cairo, in an article which appeared in the Beirut English-language *The Daily Star:*

> Rabbi Haim Douek, religious head of the Jewish community of Egypt, told me there are few Egyptian Jews in the country today. No more than about 2,000. They are Egyptian citizens, he said, just like the Jews of Britain are British subjects, and Israeli sovereignty does not extend to them. They are Egyptians, he said, with the same rights and obligations as the Christian or Muslim Egyptians.
>
> At the time of the June war, about 500 Egyptian and other Jews were rounded up and interned, he said. In November he had submitted a petition to President Nasser, asking for their release before the Jewish festive season. The Minister of Interior, Shaarawy Gomaa, told him at the time—quoting President Nasser's words—that the Jews were detained for security reasons. The Minister promised to meet him to discuss the matter after the Arab Socialist Union elections which took place last week. There are now about 230 Jews in detention.
>
> Most of the Jews released were stateless persons, the Rabbi said, and were sent abroad immediately after leaving prison. Of the Egyptian Jews released, those who had a job or business had gone back to work. Those in difficult economic circumstances were looked after by the Jewish community.
>
> Rabbi Douek could not describe conditions and treatment in the prisons; he had not visited the detained people. But parents, relatives or delegates of the Jewish community visited them regularly, and the prisoners were allowed to receive food parcels. He did not think that Red Cross officials had been allowed to visit the Egyptian Jews in detention.
>
> People acquainted with conditions in Egyptian prisons say that treatment of Egyptian Jews is "no worse and no better" than that of other Egyptians—Christian and Muslim. "Egyptian prisons are not pleasant for anybody," said one of these sources.
>
> Rabbi Haim Douek spoke sadly of the Jewish problem in Egypt. "We never had a Jewish problem until Zionism came to the area. Jews had lived in Egypt for 2,000 years. There were Jews in every town and city of the country. In 1948—the year the state of Israel was created and of the first Arab-Israeli war—there were about 80,000 Jews in Egypt," he said.
>
> He did not wish to discuss the political aspects of the subject. "I am interested in spiritual and human questions. I can only tell you that the Oriental Jew was not interested in politics, in Zionism or Israel. It was the political character of Zionism that brought suffering and unhappiness to the Jews of the Middle East.
>
> "From the official point of view there has never been any change in the attitude to the Jews here," the Rabbi added. "Our synagogues were never closed. We were never prevented from worshipping according to our rites."

The few Jews I have met in Cairo are worried, insecure. They said that before 1948 the Jews belonged to one of the most prosperous communities in the country. They point out that even today the names of the largest department stores in Cairo—Shemla, Benzion, Rose Dubaq, Sicurel—are Jewish. Egyptian Jews were happy and prosperous here, they said, and did not want to emigrate to Israel or elsewhere but were forced to by circumstances.

"The book is now closed for us," a Jewish former schoolmaster told me. His family had emigrated after 1956; he stayed on because he felt his roots were here. But he will emigrate, too, for he has no job and feels insecure.

A thorough discussion of Arab-Jewish relations in the Arab countries since the creation of Israel would be both an encyclopedic and a Sisyphean task. Such a labor clearly exceeds the capacity of *The Newsletter;* nonetheless, the staff hope to make available to our readers additional information on the subject as material is collected and as space allows.

— *The Editors*

THERE HAVE BEEN MANY CONSEQUENCES to last summer's Middle Eastern war but not the least tragic among them is that while the lines separating the Israelis and their Arab neighbors have become still more sharply defined the fundamental relations between Moslems and Jews not as political entities but as religious and ethnic groupings have become increasingly blurred. Both sides have contributed their share to this confusion. On the one hand, many Westerners and Israelis of European origin have tended to attribute to the Arabs the same sorts of anti-Jewish attitudes so prevalent in their own recent histories, and to regard these attitudes as a predominant factor in the present antagonism. The Arabs, on the other hand, have frequently had their own distinction between Jews and Zionists vitiated by the statements and actions of extremists and their own use of their Jewish minorities as pawns in the political wars.

Admittedly there is perhaps no point in the history of the Arab nations—least of all in the highly charged emotional atmosphere of the present—when the political and social relations of Moslems and Jews have not been inextricably bound together. It is, nonetheless, vital for those who wish to come to some understanding of the basis of Moslem-Jewish relations to pry political and social relations apart just enough to attempt answers to some very fundamental questions: Are the anti-Jewish attitudes of the Moslems really the same as those expressed by Western anti-Semites? Are the Jews who continue to live in Arab nations subject to forms of discrimination similar to those associated with Western social history? Or is the very nature of Moslem-Jewish relations, and the whole context in which they are played out, of a rather different type than that which is found in the non-Arab world? The answers to these questions vary significantly from one Arab nation to another and it would be foolish to think that the situation that applies, say, in the states of North Africa is identical with that in Egypt, Syria or Jordan. It is perhaps best, therefore, to begin with a careful examination of how one Jewish community in the Arab world fared during the course of the recent war and why the strain of outside events on local Moslem-Jewish relations was largely absorbed and enervated in a rather short period of time. From the basis of this example one might, then, hope to dispel some of the grosser stereotypes that Westerners have long applied to the relations between Jews and non-Jews living throughout the Arab world.

As a touchstone for the study of this problem Morocco is particularly well suited. At the time of the establishment of the State of Israel one-quarter of all the Jews in the Middle East lived in Morocco, and the Jewish population there still numbers some seventy-five thousand. Admittedly Morocco has been one of the less vociferous opponents to Israel's existence, and there is no doubt that her proclamations of brotherhood with the other Arab countries cannot hide the physical and ideological distance between them and herself. But as an integral part of the Arab world, a nation suffused with traditional Islamic values yet subjected to a full colonial experience, the attitudes expressed by the majority of her citizens toward the Jews living in their midst and the history of relations between the two groups are not greatly different from those found in most of the other Arab states. For nearly two years, including the period of last summer's war, I lived in one of the main cities of the Moroccan interior studying the lives and ideas of Jews and Moslems alike. For nearly two years I had sought to understand how this society was put together and how the members of its different parts viewed one another, and it was only against this background that I was able to understand what was happening in this city, and perhaps other parts of the Arab world as well, when war broke out between the State of Israel and her neighbors early last June.

All along the western edge of the Middle Atlas Mountains of Morocco lie a number of cities and towns that span the predominantly Arab-inhabited lowlands of western Morocco and the pasturelands of the Berber mountaineers. Since almost all members of both groups speak Arabic and are keenly aware of their common Islamic identity, there were few people in the late spring of 1967 who could not take advantage of the fine network of communications in Morocco to follow the mounting tensions in the Middle East. The inhabitants of the city in particular knew that the United Nations peace-keeping force had been removed and that troops were being mobilized. They knew that Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba had been restricted and they knew too that many of the relatives of the city's remaining six hundred and fifty Jews would be among those Israelis arming for war. They felt sure that the war would be over quickly and that after a complete Arab victory the Jews would be allowed to live on under Moslem administration once the lands that had been "confiscated" had been returned to their rightful Palestinian owners. It came as no surprise to them, therefore, when, late in the afternoon of June 5th, the Moroccan radio stations carried the first reports about the outbreak of fighting between the Arabs and Israelis.

The first reports were rather sketchy. They concentrated less on what was actually happening at the front than on what was expected to happen. Military and patriotic songs were interspersed with exhortations to the people from the government, the politicians and the doctors of Islamic law. News bulletins were concerned not so much with the actual fighting as with the contributions of forces being made by the various Arab nations. It was learned, for instance, that

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the Moroccan King Hassan II was preparing to review a vanguard of troops who were to be sent immediately to aid their Arab brethren at the front. (Only later was it learned that it took the five planeloads of Moroccan troops four whole days to arrive in the East because of difficulties with the Algerian authorities. Indeed the war was virtually over before the Moroccans could get into the actual war zone.) Many of the city's twenty-five thousand Moslems gathered that night in cafés to listen to the local newscasts while the Jews huddled in their homes listening to Paris, London and Jerusalem.

By the following morning there was little clarification as to the situation in the Middle East. Despite Moroccan reports that Tel Aviv had been bombed, almost all of the city's Jewish merchants went about their business as usual. They met and talked with Moslems, moved freely about the streets, and sent their children off to the Jewish school. Only the Moslem children seemed embroiled in thoughts of war and one could see groups of them marching along the streets caught up in the same sort of fantasies they display when they burst out of the theater after a James Bond film. Some children did throw stones at the Jewish school but the police were called and quickly dispersed them. The radios that are always blaring from Moroccan cafés were even at this early time beginning to carry classical music in place of the martial airs and the interruptions for news were becoming more and more infrequent.

That night an event occurred that I was later to learn had been repeated in a number of Jewish homes throughout the city. While I was seated in the home of a Jewish neighbor, a cloth dealer and head of a large family, a Berber from the mountain community in which the Jewish man and his wife had been born and where they had lived until several years ago came to call on them. He was an elegant tribesman in his long-flowing jellaba, turban and white beard. He was also a very wealthy man who had twice gone on the pilgrimage to Mecca and who was the undisputed leader of his tribal fraction. In the days before the French Protectorate began in 1912 it was this man's father who, in accordance with local custom, had received the sheep sacrificed to him by the Jew's father and had, in turn, accorded the latter his full and jealously guarded protection. With this protection the Jew was able to trade his tea, cloth and sugar for the wool and hides of the Berber tribesmen. Theirs was a bond of mutual trust and great supernatural sanction and it bound the sons and their sons as it had bound the fathers before them. At the moment war broke out the Berber chieftain had begun the long trip to the city with his young wife for the express purpose of assuring this Jewish family that no matter what happened in the Middle East they and all their family had no need to fear for their own safety or the well-being of their property. He spoke calmly and reassuringly of the fact that they were all Moroccans and that the government would continue to protect them. He offered whatever help he could and specifically suggested that during the next few weeks they jointly rent a house in the *mellah*, the old Jewish quarter, where the Jews could live upstairs and he and his family downstairs between them and the outside world. The Jews graciously refused the offer and the Berber then suggested that at least they allow him to leave his own son to sleep on the floor of their house by the door as a sign to all that any attack on this family would be an attack on his own as well. Again the Jews demurred, pointing out that the house could easily be locked and that it was only children who were causing any troubles. They parted late that night with the Berber assuring them that he would be keeping a watchful eye on events in any case.

Throughout the six days the war itself lasted, life in the city remained virtually unchanged on the surface. Those people who felt most strongly about the war, expressed most opposition to Israel's continued existence, and were most certain about a quick and complete Arab victory were the educated urban Arabs. The poorer people of the city and the Berbers of the countryside talked about making a peaceful settlement, the difficulty of keeping straight who was who in the war (Where is Syria? Does Iraq have a common border with Israel? and usually no questions at all), and they stressed that the whole business should certainly not affect the Jews of their own city. A few of the Jews themselves made a point of contributing blood for the Arab civilians being injured in the war but at no time was the Jews' loyalty challenged or their ties to the Israelis considered a threat or even a significant embarrassment to the Moslem community.

Beneath the surface, however, among Moslems and Jews alike, the dominant feeling at this point was one of uncertainty. As one Jewish man put it: "Everything would be all right if people today respected the old ways and continued to treat us as individuals. But nowadays there are so many unemployed people in town who could be turned against us at any moment." A Moslem storekeeper spoke in similar terms: "You have to understand the custom in this country," he said. "People do whatever some big man tells them to do. *What* they are told to do doesn't matter nearly so much as the fact that someone takes hold of things and tells people how they should act. If the government does nothing and someone tells us to kill the Jews that is what we will do. If the government tells us to be good to the Jews we will follow their directions." An attempt to supply some such authoritative direction was not long in coming.

On June 12th the newspapers of Istiqlal, the major political party in Morocco, called for a boycott of "all those who have close and distant ties with 'Israel' and her sinister allies." They also published a list of companies who, they said, dealt with Israel and should therefore be boycotted. The Arabs of the city now had their direction: they said they would have no business dealings with Jews since all Moslems must unite in the face of the outside enemy. Jews remained off the streets, some even afraid to try buying food. Unarmed soldiers joined the local police in casually patrolling the streets of the city as the government began to clarify its own position. On the 14th, the Moroccan representative to the United Nations Security Council spoke at length of the favorable treatment Jews had always received in Morocco, particularly when the Moroccan government refused to cooperate with the anti-Jewish legislation of the Vichy regime during the Second World War. A similar statement from the Royal Cabinet released two days later further emphasized that none of the citizenship rights of Moroccan Jews would in any way be altered by the present situation. Then, on June 15th, the government seized the Istiqlal party newspapers and when the papers reappeared two days later the call for a boycott was only slightly toned down but no specific nations or companies were mentioned by name.

The Jews of the city, meanwhile, played for time. With the boycott in partial effect and some of the Moslems actually being intimidated into not patronizing Jewish-owned stores, individual Jews reasoned that they could close their stores Wednesday and Thursday for the Jewish holiday of Shevuoth, open briefly on Friday the 16th, stay at home over the weekend, and go back to work on

Monday—the day before the Moslem holiday celebrating the Prophet's birthday. The Jews felt that in the interim many even normally unemployed Moslems would become busy harvesting the area's first grain crop in two years, and, unless the fighting in the Middle East resumed and the local Moslems were forced to remain united against an enemy whose presence they could be made to feel personally, internal Moslem differences would reassert themselves and the Jews would once again be able to work within the context of their personal and social relationships with the Moslems. Realizing, however, their complete political impotence, the Jews only feared that in the days following the war they might find themselves used as pawns in the struggle between the various Moroccan political factions.

For the most part this fear proved groundless. Intent on preserving public order and not allowing the politicians to seize the initiative, the King took a strong stand in favor of protecting all Moroccan citizens—Jews and Moslems alike—from violent action. As the United Nations debated on into deadlock, Istiqlal continued to call for a boycott of Jews and the nationalization of some Western-owned firms. Dubbing the boycott an act against the order of the state, the government struck back on July 5th charging that "the boycott is not an Islamic principle . . . Those who incite people to participate in it commit an act that is criminal in thought, in law, and in spirit." And on July 8th, in a most remarkable televised speech, the King himself argued that it was not surprising that the world should regard the Arabs as the aggressors in the recent war since it was they who called for a general mobilization a week before the fighting began and it was they who closed the Gulf of Aqaba. He said that one should never enter into a war until one's own country is at least the economic equal of the opponent, and he stressed the point that internal chaos is far worse than an undesirable international political situation. The King's verbal determination was expressed in action a few days later when the head of the largest labor union in Morocco was imprisoned for charging that the Moroccan government itself had fallen into the hands of pro-Zionist forces. And the papers of the Istiqlal party, threatened with another seizure, turned to a direct attack on those whom they regarded the King as coddling and initiated a series of articles on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the notorious forgery about the Jewish world conspiracy of which the Nazis had made such effective use. Yet even here it is important to note that the Moroccans, like President Nasser himself, had to borrow their anti-Jewish text from another cultural tradition simply because the Arabs lack a well-developed anti-Jewish literature of their own.

Significantly, however, within the city itself the impact of this struggle for power and influence on the national level was very minimal. The King's strong stand against any sort of illegal action against the Jews was not without its impact, but the local situation had already begun to ease well before the King's determination was fully clarified. Most Jews reopened their shops right after the holiday of the Prophet's birthday and Moslems and Jews joked and conversed in near normal fashion. With the passage of time and the continued bickering among the various political factions, the people of the city reasserted their suspicions about all national party leaders and their abiding faith in personal judgments based on face-to-face relations. Those Jews who practiced trades or sold goods without competition from Moslems were fully patronized. Some Arabs and fewer Berbers, perhaps hedging against any later claim that they had supported Israel's friends, avoided Jewish shops that were in direct competition with Moslems but they were cordial in their relationships with the Jewish businessmen themselves. The Berbers practiced this avoidance even less on market day, when there were enough of them in town so they could not easily be intimidated by the urban Arabs.

In short, then, despite both a few isolated instances elsewhere in the country in which Jews had indeed been molested and notwithstanding the firm action taken by the Moroccan government to forestall any sort of civil disorder, the primary strain placed on local Moslem-Jewish relations by the course of outside events was largely nullified in a rather short period of time. A partial boycott was indeed put into effect, one which might ultimately put a great strain on a part of the Moroccan Jewish community. But the very fact that the Moslems of the city continued to treat the Jews as individuals rather than as members of a stereotyped group, the very fact that even in the face of a defeat they too felt to be rather humiliating, their relations to the local Jewish community were not significantly altered indicates that the very nature of Moslem-Jewish relations were of a rather different sort than one might generally imagine. The contrast to the West is not only one of overt acts but of an entire sociological context in which geography, history, and the structure of social group relations each contribute to a system that must be analyzed and evaluated in its own terms.

The city with which we are dealing is in almost every sense of the term a marginal one. Situated in an oasis of gardens between the grain-producing plains of western Morocco and the pasturelands of the Middle Atlas Mountains, she effectively bridges the predominantly Arab population of the former zone and the almost entirely Berber population of the latter. In the days before the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1912 the city also stood on the border between the lands over which the King was generally able to exercise his authority and those that were frequently in a state of dissidence vis-à-vis the central government. There is at present in the city a man whom people have nicknamed "the King" because, they say, he is blind in one eye and can only see half of what is going on around him. Aside from being a lovely comment on Moroccan politics this would also seem to be an appropriate characterization of the city itself. For she has always stood with her blind eye turned toward the plains and the central government while her good eye has been directed toward the mountains south of the city. She was almost always at least nominally a government city but her inhabitants and administrators alike knew full well that their real economic and political support lay in the areas that were usually in dissidence. No mere stopping place on the Saharan caravan routes, she had a market of her own for products of her own and a position as entrepôt between mountain and plain, dissident and loyalist, Berber and Arab. It was an economic situation in which Jews had the opportunity to thrive, and it was the overall social situation that brought this possibility to fruition.

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It has been to the Jew's distinct advantage that he stands outside this sociological pool [of the Moslem social structure]. Not sharing in the same relatively limited sphere of prestige resources, the Jew has been able to have an economic dealing with a Moslem that carries with it none of the social and political implications involved in such transactions between two Moslems. A Moslem can hardly compete socially with a person who simply is

not a member of the social grouping within which this competition is taking place. An economic agreement between members of two such social groups is also less a contractual relationship than a symbiotic one: each party recognizes that he will profit best by adhering to the terms of the bargain and that his interests are more closely safeguarded by the controls inherent in their relation of interdependence than they would be by having recourse solely to external legal sanctions. A sense of mutual reliability has grown out of this social situation and however much Jews are regarded as shrewd businessmen by the city's Moslems they are almost never characterized as dishonest or avaricious. The cultural life of the Jews is, then, sufficiently similar to that of the Moslems that the two communities can share many beliefs, values and even saints in common, yet their social lives are sufficiently separate that neither is in direct social competition with the other.

The articulation between the way this society is put together and the way in which members of its different parts view one another is clearly indicated in the kinds of conceptions Moslems express about the Jews. When one discusses the Jews with Arabs and Berbers of all economic and educational levels, one never hears remarks that derogate the Jews for their real or imagined economic position: there is no notion among the people of the city that the Jews have tried to gain financial control of the market place to the detriment of the Moslems. Nor does one hear politically oriented anti-Jewish comments, that is, that the Jews are individually or collectively conspiring to take over the government. Rather, all of the anti-Jewish remarks one hears fit into the sociological category, the gist of such remarks being that the Jews are socially separate if not outcast from the Moslem community. To the Moslem the legitimacy of the Koran lies in the fact that it is believed to be the all-inclusive, precise and unaltered word of God as transmitted through His last prophet. The Jews, say the Moslems, are, however, constantly rewriting their Torah and have thus destroyed whatever truth there was in that document. Moreover, by manipulating their sacred heritage, "the Jews no longer know who their grandfathers are"—a sin of significant proportions to a genealogically concerned Moslem. Moslems also cite as incest the fact that Jews marry their nieces, and one man even claimed that Jews do not circumcise their sons, thus turning the noncircumcised Christian's argument on its head but applying it for precisely the same purpose. Examples of this sort could be multiplied almost without end, but the common point in all of them remains that the Jews are believed to be socially inferior but hardly a threat to the "superior" tradition of the Prophet. The history of the city's Jewish community is the story of how they have been given and developed their own place in this whole socio-cultural context.

The Jews of the city are derived almost entirely not from the Spanish immigrants of the fifteenth century but from those Jews who fled Roman Palestine, Egypt and Cyrenaica in the first centuries A.D., settled out of government reach among the dissident Berber tribes of North Africa, and are said to have converted many of those Berbers to Judaism well before the arrival of Islam. Indeed, one legend has it that the first inhabitants of the city were just such a tribe of Judeo-Berbers. Little is known of the city's Jewry under the early Islamic dynasties of Morocco, but it is doubtful that their overall situation was greatly different from that of the last two centuries before the establishment of the French Protectorate. Then, as earlier, the state was coextensive with the community of Islam, and those who rejected the duties of the latter were also denied the privileges of the former. His status as protegé legitimized by Koranic inscription, the Jew was, however, allowed to live in his own separate community and practice his own law, but he was required to indicate his inferior social and religious position by wearing distinctive clothing, removing his shoes when passing a mosque, and so on. Since "protection" often meant reserving the skills of the Jew for the protector himself, the extent to which the Jew was fairly treated or exploited varied as greatly as the power and personalities of the Kings and their largely autonomous local administrators. The death of a King, or even his local representative, generally threw whole regions into a state of dissidence, and it was at these moments in particular that Jewish communities were attacked. Yet it is important to note that almost without exception in modern times these attacks were aimed squarely at depriving the Jews of their properties and not at eliminating the Jewish population itself. In fact, when the Sultan Moulay el Hassan died in 1894 and a nearby Arab village came to the walls of the city and demanded to be allowed to "eat the Jews," the people of the city not only gave the Jews their own protection but, when the Arab villagers then broke into a neighboring garden and killed a young Moslem boy, Berber tribesmen joined the townsmen in waging a successful war against the Arab villagers.

For those Jews who lived or peddled their goods in the neighboring mountains conditions were probably even better. Here the Jew, who almost always spoke the Berber language fluently, again depended on the personal protection of a local big man. Following Berber custom, the Jewish merchant would sacrifice a sheep at the home of a particular Berber and the latter would then make it known that this Jew was under his protection and any attack on the Jew would be construed as an attack on himself as well. When the Jew led his pack train through tribal lands his protector would send along an armed guard or place his own son on the lead animal as a sign to all of the Jew's status. Should anyone, even a member of the Berber's own family, dare to violate this sanctuary, he would pay heavily in blood or money for his foolishness.

In short, then, it is no doubt true that the Jews were at times rather heavily taxed for the protection they were accorded and that they were at the mercy of King and local administrator alike. But it is a fact that European writers rarely appreciate that in the pre-Protectorate period such taxation was seldom much greater, the mistreatment seldom much harsher, and the living standards of the Jews not much lower than those of the Moslems among whom they lived. The Jews of the city tended their crafts and businesses, owned property and formed partnerships with Moslems in an atmosphere that was quite different and quite a bit less rigorous than that with which their European coreligionists had to cope.

With the beginning of the French Protectorate in 1912, Jews all over Morocco were able to move outside of their ghettos and take advantage of Western cultural and living standards. They established schools, learned the French language and prospered somewhat from French economic investment. From a population of three thousand at the beginning of the Protectorate the Jewish community of the city grew to nearly six thousand in the late 1940's, although the actual proportion of Jews in the city dropped from one-half to almost one-third. Most Jews welcomed the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 as the fulfillment of biblical prophecy, but few of them actually emigrated

before the end of French domination over Morocco.

Independence in 1956 brought with it a depressed and uncertain economic situation. Although on the national level a Jew was appointed minister of the postal-telegraph-telephone system, locally the Jews were caught in the general economic decline. The Jews of the city had always kept their capital relatively liquid and mobile. The wealthier Jews now began to consolidate their holdings and look for opportunities in France and the large cities of the Moroccan coast, while the poorer Jews were attracted to Israel by offers of work and free passage. As the Jews withdrew their funds from the marketplace the economy became yet more depressed, for the Moslems had long been drawn out into investing by the Jews and in the latter's absence many of the Moslems preferred to hoard their money and avoid economic (and also prestige) competition with other Moslems. Political uncertainty was added in 1961 by the sudden death of the Sultan Mohammed V, who was justifiably regarded as a good friend of the Jews.

But whatever their reasons for departing the city it appears certain that none of the Jews left because of any real breakdown in local Moslem-Jewish relations. Rather than being happy about the situation, the Moslems—Arabs as well as Berbers—were hurt and bewildered by the Jews' departure. Some of them explain that a Jewish big man named Ben Gurion called them and they had to leave, while others say that it was written in the Jews' holy books that they should return to the east. Berbers continued to feel uncomfortable doing business with Arabs, and the shops, but not the exact role, of many Jews have since been taken over by Berber veterans of the French army. The city itself has been subjected to a significant influx of rural people seeking work, welfare payments, and schooling for their children, but the overall social environment remained reasonably close to its traditional pattern right up to the time when war broke out in the Middle East.

This, then, is clearly a very different sort of society from what one is used to dealing with in discussions of Jewish-non-Jewish relations. Fluid yet structured, expandable yet finite, human and yet somehow divine, it is a society composed of a number of individuals who forge ties of kinship and alliance in an attempt to secure themselves as best as possible within a social environment whose variability and malleability in no way discount the minimally defined and far from immutable position in which each man is born. It is a society in which people tend to group one another only on the basis of a very few characteristics concerning one another's social origins and present situation. The stereotype (if one can use that word) that they maintain about one another begins with several minimal features but quickly gives way to an evaluation and relationship based primarily on individual personalities. The stereotype of a particular grouping, then, is compiled of a number of specific cases and remains sufficiently minimal and partial rather than complete and comprehensive, so that an individual may be judged far more by his personal attributes than by a fixed model that compartmentalizes one's view of and relationship to another person automatically. Within one's own group of fellow Moslems the ties of social, political and economic life are so intertwined that whoever stands outside of this context has the opportunity to enjoy a distinctly advantageous intermediate position. But because it will be his personal characteristics that define the content of this inherent position and because no member of the society will abrogate the criteria of personal judgment that his law, his religion and his common sense tell him are applicable to all men, even this outsider will be judged by factors that acknowledge his membership in the community of men, however much they may deny his membership in the community of believers. Socially distinct but not abhorred, politically subservient but not deprived of his own group autonomy, economically envied but not severely discriminated against, the Jew in Moroccan society has long held a position among his Moslem neighbors that is neither unbearable nor ideal. He could survive the old dictum that the friend of my enemy is my enemy simply by being a closer friend to his supposed enemy than to those with whom he shares bonds of religion and blood. He may find himself vulnerable to economic pressures that are nowadays not without their political overtones and therefore more closely approximate the position of his fellow Jews in the Near East, but he will be as aware as his Moslem neighbors that this is a recent occurrence and one that very much rubs against the grain of Moslem and Jew alike.

The Moroccan Jew could, then, feel reasonably calm living among Moslems during the Middle Eastern war because he knew that notwithstanding the extreme provocation of the war itself there was no hard-core hatred of the Jews as a group and that if the Middle Eastern situation did not involve the Moroccans directly the relation of Jew and Moslem would not be altered radically from its former pattern. The Jews of the interior cities were keenly aware of the mild antipathy between Arabs and Berbers, and the social and economic advantage they held by virtue of this fact. Implicitly, they also seemed to know that, as Charles Gallagher has put it, "compared to the Middle Eastern heartland, North Africa is a much more cautious, almost furtive society of compromise, a quality which has been forced upon it by history." For the Jews of this one Moroccan city, then, the whole episode was a heartening reaffirmation of their own conception of their relations with the Moslems living around them. For the Moslem it was a brief but not all-absorbing encounter with supralocal issues. And for the social scientist it was an opportunity to see a set of social and cultural principles put to the test of scope and relevancy.

Jewish communities throughout Morocco will, no doubt, continue to shrink in size for the same economic reasons that have caused their present diminution. Jewish children will continue to move to the large cities of Morocco and France to seek an education and a livelihood, and some of their parents will continue to prepare them for this by speaking only French at home and teaching them only an hour a day of Arabic at school. The younger generation of Jews is already far less aware of and involved in the life of Morocco as a whole than are their parents, and they are consequently more eager to be physically removed from it as well. Just what the long-range effects of the partial boycott in the larger cities of Morocco will be is hard to say, but if it does prove true that the boycott is further weakened by the passage of time or the end to the state of belligerency in the Middle East, the lives of those Jews who leave the interior for Rabat and Casablanca should be no more difficult than they have been in the past. But their departure will not be for want of peaceful relations with their Moslem neighbors, relations that have proved reasonably workable even while the brothers of each have been at war with one another. Perhaps, too, their experience may offer some small hope that a political accord may yet be reached in the Middle East that will reestablish the finest features of earlier Moslem-Jewish relations, while eliminating those aspects that both sides have allowed to compound their present estrangement.

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