War and Politics in Zimbabwe 1840-1900

D.N. Beach



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by
D.N. Beach

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To the memory of the veterans of the
First Chimurenga,
especially
Gutsa Mubayira, who fought for Mashayamombe at Chirozva,
Jim Nyika, who fought with Jenner at Gona,
George Talbot, who escaped the Norton killings,
and Michael Mishi, who lived with his uncle the Kaguvi medium
before the fighting,
all of whom spared the time to tell me
what it was really like.

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MAPS

1. 1840 – 57.
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Maps 1 – 5 are based on the standard 1 : 2 500 000 map of Zimbabwe, and Map 6 is based on the 1 : 250 000 map of Chegutu. Only an historical atlas of at least 1 : 1 000 000 scale can do justice to the complexity of precolonial Zimbabwean political geography. Every effort has been made to locate names accurately, but in some cases names occupy more space than they merit in terms of territory, while the Duma Confederacy, the trans-Save south-east and the far north are only sketchily covered.

Names of the more important rivers are shown on Map 2. Dark arrows indicate where Ndebele raids took place — but not the strength of the raiding force — except in the north-west, where most of the raids shown reached the Zambezi or beyond. Light arrows on Maps 1 and 4 show the main Shona and Rhodesian attacks on the Ndebele. Dotted lines on Maps 3 and 4 show the approximate limits of the Ndebele tributary state. The dashed lines on Map 5 show the approximate limits of the communities that joined in the March and June outbreaks of the 1896 Chimurenga.

The starred 'D' on Map 1 shows the Changamire capital of Danangombe. The starred 'C' on Map 3 shows the Chitungwiza base of the Chaminuka *mhondoro*'s medium. South of Charter on Maps 4 and 5, G, Gu, K, M, R and S represent Gambiza (Njanja), Gunguwo (Njanja), Kwenda (Njanja), Maburutse, Ranga (Njanja) and Sango respectively. 'Mpateni' on Map 5 was a term used in the 1890s for the area inhabited by the peoples shown in that area in Maps 1 – 4. Godlwayo and Nxa were rather to the west of the edge of the map. Ndebele settlements are shown on Map 1 as dots.

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This book is largely based upon previously published articles, and thanks are offered to the editors of the *Journal of African History* for permission to republish Chapters 1 and 5; to the editors of the *South African Historical Journal* for permission to republish Chapter 2; to the History Society of Zimbabwe for permission to republish Chapter 4, and to the editor of the *International Journal of African Historical Studies* for permission to use parts of a review published in 1980.

However, this book also represents part of my doctoral dissertation which was the result of research carried out between 1968 and 1971, and I take this opportunity of thanking those who helped me during this period:

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TERMINOLOGY

Natural place names

Under colonial rule, many names of natural features such as rivers and mountains were mis-spelt, often in an Nguni-ized form of the correct pronunciation. By the early 1970s some of these names had been corrected — usually those of small rivers such as Turgwana and Chimbo — and after Independence in 1980 a Place Names Commission began work on the correction, where necessary, of all names. Not all such changes have been announced, and since past experience has shown that attempts to anticipate the Commission's decisions are not always successful, only those changes appearing so far will be used here.

Human place names

It has become common practice in Zimbabwe to use the post-independence names for towns and districts even when referring to the colonial period. In some cases, such as that of Harare, the region in which the town was built was indeed known to the people by that name, but the historian runs into trouble when using it in the early colonial period. One might perhaps write of the 'Harare garrison' in 1896, but it would be ridiculous to write of official colonial positions such as those of 'Chief Native Commissioner, Harare' or 'Native Commissioner, Masvingo' for that period. So, for colonial centres and colonial titles, colonial terminology has been retained.

Administrative districts pose another problem. Modern districts such as 'Mberengwa' may be named after natural features, but they are in fact much modified remnants of the old administrative districts of the early colonial period, which were marked out for the purpose of tax collection by borders that paid little regard to the real political boundaries of that time. Thus, the 'Victoria' district was an artificial creation that included many different Shona territories. Where possible, the real names of territories have been used, but where one is referring to one of the tax-collector's districts of the 1890s, the colonial name has been used for a colonial entity. Patriotism ought not to clash with historical accuracy: one does not usually refer to Peter the Great ruling from the city of Leningrad in the eighteenth century!

Shona titles

Nowadays, many Shona-speakers use what were originally rulers' hereditary titles as though they are surnames. Thus, one finds many

people sharing the name 'Mutasa', 'Makoni' or 'Mangwende' at the same time. This is a borrowing from European or Ndebele practice, where historically many people did share the same name. Thus, one writes of Linganisa Dhlodhlo, Madhlola Dhlodhlo, Loiswayo Dhlodhlo, and so on. But Shona dynastic titles were not surnames. Only one person at a time could be 'Mutasa' or 'Makoni', and for a second person to claim it was in effect to claim the supreme power in the territory. So hereditary titles in this book are placed *ahead* of the other names the ruler might have had.

FOREWORD

Between early 1968 and early 1971 I wrote a doctoral dissertation, for the University of London, which started out as a study of Afrikaner farmers in the Enkeldoorn region in the 1890s and ended as a study of African politics over an area termed 'Southwestern Mashonaland' in the last half of the nineteenth century. This area included the old districts of Hartley, Charter, Victoria and its outliers and the Shona-speaking eastern part of the province of Matabeleland. Essentially, the thesis dealt with the First Chimurenga of 1896–7 and in the course of explaining why and how certain peoples of the research area did or did not take part in that war of resistance it became necessary to examine the total politics of the previous half-century and the details of white settlement in the 1890s.

After the dissertation was accepted by the University, no attempt was made to prepare it for publication. Partly, this was because, in early 1972, I started work on a fresh subject on early Shona history which led to the publication of *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900–1850*, (Gweru, 1980). Partly, it was because the very detailed research on 'Southwestern Mashonaland' needed to be extended far to the north and east for a publication to be of maximum possible value. And partly it was because, following as it did so soon after T.O. Ranger's *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896–7*, (London, 1967) the dissertation was too much in awe of Professor Ranger's book for its own good. While it showed that *Revolt* was wrong on certain points, as Chapter 5 of this volume shows, it was not until 1978 that more fundamental criticisms could be made.

Now, research on the late nineteenth century is being resumed, with special emphasis on the north and east of Zimbabwe. In the meantime, however, this volume is offered as a summary of some of the work done so far.

Four out of the five chapters were published as articles in journals between 1971 and 1979. They are republished here because very few Zimbabweans ever see historical journals, even though journals are of vital importance in the development of Zimbabwean history. In Zimbabwean history, as in other fields of study, the article in an academic journal is the normal way of releasing fresh research findings, often well in advance of the publication of a book. Articles in journals are published fairly quickly, with one article often provoking a reply, and it happens quite often that within a year or two of the publication of a major book, two or three articles in journals have considerably modified its conclusions. By the time the next major book on the same subject is published, its author tends to assume that the readers are aware of the crucial articles which have been published in the meantime.

In the case of academics, this is usually true, but it is not true for the majority of Zimbabweans. Not very many copies of academic journals circulate in Zimbabwe, and most of these are only to be found in the libraries of the University of Zimbabwe, the National Archives and other research centres. Consequently, a student at the University may be up-to-date on research published until graduation, but will often fall behind after going to work away from the research centres; and many other teachers, students and members of the public may never get to see the academic journals at all. This is obviously unfair to the great majority of Zimbabweans who are interested in history, a subject that is both important to the country and at the same time in a state of constant change as fresh research and new insights become available.

Many Zimbabweans tend to talk of 'old' and 'new' history as though one has only to 'rewrite' the 'old' history to produce a 'new' history that will henceforth remain unchanged. In fact, our knowledge of history changes rapidly, and we should not forget that just as the way we look at history in the early 1980s differs radically from how we looked at it in the 1960s, so we will look at history in the 1990s differently from the way in which we look at it today.

These articles have been slightly rewritten to avoid repetition or to allow for errors which have been corrected by subsequent research. Extra introductions to each chapter explain the context in which each article was originally written, while concluding sections explain how the debate on each topic has progressed since then.

These five chapters represent only a beginning of the history of Zimbabwe in the late nineteenth century promised above, but it is hoped that they will do something to encourage interest among Zimbabweans in the country's rich and challenging pre-colonial past.

D.N. Beach
University of Zimbabwe, 1985

1

The Shona, and Ndebele Power, 1840 – 1893

Introduction

Modern Zimbabwe is unusual, compared with most African states of the same size, in that it has only two main languages, Shona and Ndebele. In most of the rest of the continent, countries tend to have several languages, while only the smaller states such as Lesotho or Rwanda tend to be one-language countries. This is, to a great extent, the result of chance: the colonial governments that established the boundaries of what are now independent states rarely knew or cared whether the frontiers which they drew on the map united or divided the speakers of a language. Chance events in the pre-colonial period also affected the pattern. If Zwangendaba's Ngoni had remained on the middle Mazowe after the 1830s, or if the Gaza Nguni had not departed for southern Moçambique in 1889 from their base in the south-east, and if they had both retained their Nguni languages, we would have a more typically complex situation today.

Since 1890, the people's consciousness of differences between the Shona and Ndebele-speakers has increased. Naturally, the people of the nineteenth century could hardly ignore the differences that existed then, but there were mitigating factors. On the one hand, many Shona-speakers lived under the Ndebele state in comparative peace, and there was quite a lot of intermarriage, within the borders of the state. Indeed, for many Shona, the Ndebele or Gaza way of life was attractive. Those Shona-speakers who chose not to pay tribute to the Ndebele or Gaza knew quite well what they were doing and were prepared to take the consequences. Even in the twentieth century, intermarriage continued to some extent in the new cities and in parts of the countryside where land-grabs by the Europeans forced people together in 'reserves'.

But colonial rule did stress the differences. On the whole, it seems that the Rhodesian governments never encouraged the

'tribal' factor quite as cynically as the South Africans with their 'bantustan' policy, but the underlying idea of 'divide and rule' was not far beneath the surface. As far as the Ndebele were concerned, the Rhodesians tended to have two opposed views. On the one hand, there was a respect for the Ndebele of the nineteenth century that was both romantic and patronizing — and very much like that for rulers of other parts of the British Empire where 'warrior' peoples who had been safely defeated were concerned. (But this never went as far as recognising a revived Ndebele monarchy because that would have involved the return of some land.) On the other hand, and this came out particularly clearly in school textbooks, there was a stress on the horrors of Ndebele raiding and a message that the Shona-speakers ought to be grateful to the colonial government for saving them from extinction.

Inevitably, some of this rubbed off on the Shona-speakers — at least, as far as the raids were concerned — and stuck in the memories of the people. After all, old people could still remember the raids of the *madzviti*, even if some of those *madzviti* might have been Gaza or Ngoni of the 1830s.

A symptom of this was the acceptance of the term 'Shona'. Until the twentieth century, Shona-speakers had had no common name for themselves. Most of them used terms like 'Shawasha', 'Hera', 'Duma' for their local groups, and found them perfectly adequate in local politics. In the eighteenth century, more general terms like 'Zezuru' or 'Ndau' were beginning to come into use, but they were by no means generally accepted by 1900. The spread and acceptance of those terms came as a result of missionary influence. The word 'Shona' was first used by the Ndebele in the 1830s, to refer to the Rozvi, and was then gradually applied by Europeans in the nineteenth century to 'Shona'-speakers as a whole. By the mid-twentieth century the term had largely been accepted by the people themselves. As will be shown below, the term created problems when historians came to write about the nineteenth century.

Until the early 1970s, professional historians had not got very far in establishing even the extent of the Ndebele state proper, let alone which Shona groups paid tribute or exactly where and when raids took place. In the 1960s, even the best books talked of an Ndebele state as a fifty-mile radius around Bulawayo, and of raids in terms of distance from the state, while little attention was paid to the dating of such raids. If one were to believe the worst books of the time, from the instant that the Ndebele established themselves in the southwest in c.1840 they raided every part of the country every year until the 1890s!

R. Summers and C.W. Pagden's *The Warriors* (Cape Town, 1970) was a step in the right direction, in spite of its limited sources and popular tone. It mapped the state and its tributaries and tried to indicate where and when raids occurred.

This chapter started as a paper presented at a History Workshop of the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland at Gaborone in September, 1973. It was published in a shortened form as 'Ndebele raiders and Shona power' in the *Journal of African History*, xv, 4, 1974.

Bear in mind the dangers of using the term 'Shona', inevitable though it is. In most cases we are dealing with those Shona west of the Mutirikwi river and south-west of the Save-Mazowe watershed — in other words, part of the central, southern and south-western Shona. Readers should be careful of the context of each use of the term. The northern Shona of the old Mutapa state, the eastern Shona occupying lands all of the way to the Indian Ocean and the western Shona between modern Botswana and the middle Zambezi hardly come into the picture at all. The impact of the Gaza Nguni state in the same period is only referred to in passing. There is a limit to what can be covered in one article.

Finally, one question will occur to many who read this. In view of the lurking shadow of 'tribalism' that lies behind far too much of the politics of today, should this analysis of the deeds and misdeeds of the past be republished now?

The answer is an emphatic 'yes'. Traditions about the past will survive in the minds of the people in any case, and unless the events to which they refer are properly analysed and discussed, 'tribal' prejudice will flourish regardless.

In fact, as this chapter shows, the history of the nineteenth century was very different from that presented by the colonial textbooks. The Ndebele did raid the Shona, but far less widely and often than has been supposed. Nor was the Ndebele state a crude system of 'savagery': for many Shona it was perfectly acceptable, as they showed in 1896 when most Shona of the southwest joined the Ndebele in the First Chimurenga.

Nor were the independent Shona the shrinking remnants of popular fiction. Within their local fields of action they proved themselves realistic politicians, effective fighters and not averse to some raiding themselves, when the conditions were right. In short, the picture was complex and far from clear-cut, and it is by understanding such complex pictures that modern Zimbabweans can overcome the shadow of 'tribalism' and confront the equally complex problems of the future.

Myth and the Ndebele

Ever since the Ndebele people arrived in the Shona country in the late 1830s they have been subjected to a process of legend-making that amounts to the creation of a mythology.[1] Much of this concerned the internal history of their state, including its relations with subject peoples. This chapter, however, deals with the reality behind the mythology — the actual relationship between the Shona and the Ndebele.

To describe in detail the origins and development of this mythology would be a study in itself. It can be shown how and why the myths arose by taking examples.

Mythology began when the missionary Robert Moffat visited the Ndebele in 1854. He had previously seen them in their home among the Sotho in the 1820s and 1830s, a period when the wars and disturbances of the *mfecane* had produced a situation of violence and insecurity in many parts of southern Africa.[2]

Moffat assumed from the start that, in the fourteen years since the Ndebele had settled down among the Shona, nothing had changed. Continually seeking evidence of Ndebele brutality, he ignored the implications of the Shona raids upon the Ndebele that he noted, and produced a picture of the Ndebele as cruel raiders.[3] This not only helped to found the London Missionary Society mission to the Ndebele, but also founded the myth.

Myths about the Ndebele and the Shona flourished because oral traditions among missionaries, traders and travellers were repeated to new-comers to the country, believed in implicitly and then passed on by word of mouth or writing to others. Many still flourish today. For example, Moffat's son John could write confidently that 'Umpanda is the king of the Zulus near Natal, and of his government Moselekatse's is an exact copy' before he had even entered the Ndebele country.[4] In fact, there were considerable differences between them. It is also a fact that until the 1890s not a single European witnessed an Ndebele raid upon the Shona and described it in writing, yet detailed accounts of Ndebele surprise attacks were current in pre-1890 books by writers such as Montagu Kerr, although the Shona country that he crossed was profoundly peaceful and untroubled by the Ndebele.[5] Kerr, like Baines before him and Knight-Bruce after him, had been 'briefed' by European residents in the Ndebele country, and very few travellers like him managed to shake off the conditioning thus imposed for long enough to draw the correct conclusions from the evidence they themselves recorded.[6]

Another myth, that of the annual raid carried out by the surrounding peoples by the Ndebele on their ruler's orders, was repeated regularly by writers from Mackenzie onwards, in spite of the fact that there was no evidence for it and a good deal against it.[7]

The main reasons for the growth of myths like these lay in the desire of missionaries to gain support for missions to save the souls of the 'savage' Ndebele, or the need of travellers to stress the wildness of the country through which they travelled. Later, other motives appeared. The Rudd Concession of 1888 gave both the British government and Rhodes's British South Africa Company a motive for making the most sweeping interpretations of the extent of Ndebele influence over the Shona, and they went to some lengths to conceal and falsify evidence in order to justify their position.[8] Ndebele raids on the Shona were also used to excuse Rhodes's conquest of the state in 1893 and subsequent white rule up to 1980. 'I hope they do raid the Barotses', wrote the Company's secretary in 1892. 'All these raids and deaths and murders ought to be entered into a book, so that we may always be able to prove justification and their being a cruel damnable race.'[9]

Finally, the Ndebele themselves took part in the myth-making process, as well as the Shona. Many seem to have exaggerated the numbers of people they killed, and concealed their own losses, thus building up their military image.[10] On occasions they would claim that their power extended to the Save river, which was in fact true for only the uppermost fifty kilometres.[11] On the other hand, many Shona seem to have accepted the mythology of the Europeans as fact, and exaggerated the number and impact of Ndebele raids.[12]

Behind this myth was a reality. The Ndebele *did* raid the Shona and other peoples in certain places at certain times, but not out of sheer bloodlust or even because it was essential to their economic system, as has been suggested incorrectly.[13] Ndebele raids were made for a variety of reasons. Sometimes these reasons lay in internal factors within the Ndebele state itself, such as the losses caused to their herds by the lungsickness epidemic of the early 1860s.[14] Another internal reason for raiding was the practice, common to many African societies of that time, of small communities banding together to raid others for women and livestock for their own immediate profit. It will be seen that the Shona were not backward in that respect, and raided the Ndebele as well as each other. But this form of unofficial raiding was not a consequence of the nature of the Ndebele state. On the contrary, both Mzilikazi and Lobengula made it clear that it was to be discouraged because it attracted reprisals. In 1860 Mzilikazi 'told his Machaha they are "making spears" for him by doing so;'[15] and indeed it was this kind

of cross-raiding between Shona and Ndebele that precipitated the fall of the Ndebele state. Europeans noted an increase in this kind of unofficial raiding during the 1868 – 72 succession crisis, when the royal authority was weaker.[16] Such raiding was a serious annoyance to the victims, although the fortunes of individual groups varied considerably. In the area between the Turwi and the Mwenezi, which was subjected to Ngoni, Gaza and Ndebele raids, one group survived the entire nineteenth century with a total loss of two men killed, seven women captured and some stock lost.[17] Others, of course, were hit much harder. A lot depended on the locality.

The real basis of the myth, however, was the number of major raids made upon the Shona and other peoples by the direct order of the Ndebele ruler, and the consequent extent of Ndebele power. Again, behind this myth is a reality, which this chapter will examine. But the overall history of the establishment of the Ndebele state and its expansion can only be understood properly if the historical background is taken into account.

The background to the Ndebele conquest 1838 – 1873

Many accounts put the background of the Ndebele in the Nguni country in South Africa, and this is of course true for the Khumalo dynasty and its *zansi* followers. Without going into the argument about just how far the immigrant Ndebele were culturally affected by the Shona-speaking majority around them, it is a fact that in its early years the Ndebele state north of the Limpopo consisted of a Shona majority ruled by an Nguni minority; that it inherited a lot of the geographical, economic and political structure of its Shona predecessors; that the politics of the Changamire Rozvi affected the initial conquest of the region by the Ndebele; that the Ndebele state's early expansion and raids up to the 1860s were affected by the underlying Shona economic structure, and that the position of the Ndebele on the frontiers of their tributary state was often maintained by alliances with the local Shona. The Ndebele state was not founded in a vacuum.

There had been a long succession of Shona-speaking cultures and political units in the southwest before the Ndebele. All of these had used the same physical environment, with a basically similar economy. Although all of them were primarily agriculturalist, the southwest favoured cattle-breeding and was relatively rich in gold, although this had been largely worked out by the nineteenth century. The export of gold and ivory had linked the area to the trade

of the Indian Ocean, and trade-routes running due north to Zumbo, north-east to Tete, Sena and Manyika, east and south-east to the Inhambane coastline and perhaps even north-west to the Zambezi below the Victoria Falls were all well-established.

The northern branch of the Leopard's Kopje culture had flourished between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries, to be succeeded by outlying branches of the Great Zimbabwe culture. By the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the Torwa state of 'Butua' was being established, with its early capital at Kame. In the early seventeenth century Kame was abandoned and a new capital was built farther east at Danangombe. When in the late seventeenth century the Changamire Rozvi, immigrants from the north-east of the country, conquered the weakened Torwa state they took over not only the stone capital of Danangombe but many of the Torwa sub-rulers as well. The basic population of the southwest appears to have been the same throughout, ancestors of the Kalanga-speaking branch of the Shona, and whereas the Changamire Rozvi remained in control until the 1830s they were linguistically absorbed by the Kalanga.[18]

This was the population that was to comprise up to sixty percent of that of the Ndebele state, together with a certain number of captives from other areas, for it is clear that there was no extermination of the Kalanga and Rozvi during the *mfecane*. Some houses of the Rozvi did flee the area, as we shall see, but before looking at that process we must examine the last years of Changamire rule.

We know very little of the internal politics of the Changamire state until 1768, when a usurper was killed after a civil war. Rather later, Rupandamananga was ruling, and to add to the natural disasters of droughts he faced the rapidly-expanding Mhari in the Runde and Turwi valleys. His internal policies led to a conspiracy, and he was lured into a fatal trap by both his internal and external enemies.

Gumboremvura, his successor, apparently relied to some extent on Mhari support, and although he ruled for a long time he had to face an unsuccessful revolt by his 'son' Mutinhima and two important holders of ritual positions, Mavudzi and Nerwande. This civil war ultimately led to the total division of the main Rozvi dynasty between the Jiri and Gumunyu houses, but in spite of their differences the two factions were able to co-operate on two occasions, in the 1840s or early 1850s and in 1896.

Gumboremvura's successor, known only by the Rozvi praise-name Dlembeu, reigned for a short time before his deposition by Chirisamhuru, who may have been a son of Gumboremvura.

During Chirisamhuru's reign the political geography of the state was as follows: the Mambo himself held the capital sites of Dangombe and Manyanga, while various sub-rulers were arranged around him in a circle. Some, like Mavudzi and Nerwande near the Bubi river, were the holders of ritual positions. Others, such as Ndumba in the Kame area west of the Mbembesi, were related to the main dynasty by marriage. In the Mulungwane hills lived the Mutinhima faction, which was also influential in a wide area east of the upper Runde and on the Kwekwe river.

Other sub-rulers were members of the main dynasty, descended from various Mambos, who (like many members of Shona dynasties) had withdrawn or been forced from the scene of central politics and had assumed local territorial responsibilities. These included Lukuluba, ruler of the Ghoko hills, descendent of Washaya, a brother of a Mambo; Rozani of the Vungu river; Swabasvi of the Somabula forest, descendant of Changamire Dombo; a ruler of the Mpopoti range with the praise-name Dlembeu, and a number of others. These sub-rulers played a great part in the Ndebele conquest of the Rozvi state.[19]

The much-cited Ngoni migrations, the *mfecane*, only confirmed a general trend of economic and political disasters as far as the Shona were concerned, and were neither as damaging nor as final as has been supposed.

To the droughts, civil wars among the Rozvi, wars between various Shona peoples, strife between the Changamire dynasty and the Mwari cult and a tendency towards economic depression were added two substantial and permanent losses of territory. The south-west from the Shoshong hills to the Shashi river fell to the expanding Tswana, and even the death of Kgadi in 1826 at the hands of the Shona did not shake their hold.[20] To the south-east the Tsonga Hlengwe were advancing slowly across the lowveld in the first half of the nineteenth century, taking up territory that had previously been Shona.

As far as the Rozvi were concerned, the *mfecane* took the form of several successive blows as small groups of Ngoni and Sotho crossed their land. Mpanga, Ngwana Maseko and Zwangendaba all invaded the Changamire state before 1835 and were expelled with some difficulty, while a fourth force under Nyamazana even succeeded in killing Chirisamhuru the Mambo.[22] The Ngoni did a great deal of damage, taking grain and cattle,[23] yet it is a measure of the strength of the Changamire state that, weakened as it was, it did not break up. It seems likely that no Mambo was installed immediately after Chirisamhuru's death, but at some point well

before 1852 his son Tohwechipi succeeded him, and as, in this case, he received the support of the Mutinhima house he can fairly be said to have been the next Mambo.[24]

The early stages of Ndebele conquest

The Ndebele invasion differed from those of the Ngoni in several ways. Firstly, Mzilikazi's people made no attempt to attack the central part of the Changamire state, but settled in the western province of Ndumba, west of the Mbembesi. Secondly, they consolidated their power by exploiting the splits between the Rozvi, and by entering into an economic relationship with them. The main body of Ndebele under Gundwane arrived from the Umzingwani valley in 1838–9.[25] Ndumba's dynasty vanished from the scene relatively early,[26] and the main resistance in the immediate area was led by Mutinhima from the Mulungwane hills. Mutinhima, nicknamed *mafuta*, was at first successful in his defence, and may not have been pushed out of the hills until after Mzilikazi arrived.[27]

The Ndebele succession crisis undoubtedly delayed the impact of the Ndebele upon the Shona, but even so it seems to have been surprisingly mild. There are reports of some raids made upon the local people in the first year,[28] but tradition from the Kalanga pointed out that although 'they killed a lot of people . . . none of my family were killed. We did not regard the Matabele as bad people. The only thing they fought over was grain. . . . There was no trouble when the Matabele came'. This was contrasted with the rapacity of the Ngoni during previous invasions.[29] On the Amanzamnyama river the local Kalanga fled briefly and then returned as tributaries of the new overlords.[30]

In short, what had happened west of the Mbembesi was that the place of the Ndumba dynasty had been taken by Mzilikazi and his followers, who had settled down among the Kalanga as the Rozvi had done before them. It was thus logical that the Ndebele should *not* remain on hostile terms with the local Shona because they needed supplies of grain, which would not be forthcoming if raiding was continued for a long time. In 1854 Moffat noted the Ndebele prosperity in grain, and in 1858 he confirmed that the Shona were continuing to live inside the Ndebele-settled area in their own villages.[31]

The Ndebele had thus become rivals of the Rozvi as rulers of the Kalanga and other Shona peoples, and in the period when the Changamire dynasty was weakened by the death of Chirisamhuru Mzilikazi actually took his place as overlord of certain Rozvi families

of the main dynasty. These, including Swabasvi, Lukuluba and Rozani, may have been motivated by internal political jealousies among the Rozvi such as their exclusion from the centre of power and the succession, but they also had an economic motive.

The Ngoni invasions had resulted in the loss of a great number of the prized cattle of the Rozvi.[32] The Ndebele, on the other hand, had plenty of cattle but desperately needed more people. The result was that an exchange took place, in which Mzilikazi distributed cattle to the Rozvi mentioned above in return for young people who were incorporated into the Ndebele state and society.[33] This state of affairs extended over the eastern half of the Changamire state and even as far as Tsunga, the land between the upper Munyati and the Mwanesi range. There, the Nyandoro dynasty had acted as intermediary rulers between the main Rozvi dynasty and the peoples north-east of them.[34] At some time before the great campaigns in that direction in the 1850s and the 1860s Ndebele cattle were distributed there as well.[35]

It was not likely that this situation would endure for long without serious trouble. Firstly, there was the problem of the main Rozvi dynasty, which had withdrawn into the hills that fringed the Changamire state to the east.[36] They were hardly likely to accept the loss of their position without making some attempt to regain it. Secondly, the economic exchange created by the Ndebele was in the long run extremely disadvantageous to the Rozvi and other Shona who took part in it.

The Ndebele appear to have retained ultimate ownership of the cattle that they distributed — although the milk and limited slaughter rights would presumably have been accorded to the herders — but the young people who were levied by the Ndebele were not allowed to return to their own societies. Moffat noted in 1854, that 'there is nothing they deplore so much as their children being taken from them just at a time when they become useful to their parents',[37] and indeed this practice, taken to excess, could ruin any society. Later the Ndebele did not need to recruit so many from their tributaries, and so caused less damage and created less resentment. But the combination of a serious grievance and the existing organisation of the Rozvi state led to the first serious Shona resistance to Ndebele rule.

First, though, a point should be made about the character of war between the Shona and the Ndebele. The Ndebele did not believe in total war any more than the Shona believed in total peace. During the warfare between the Chirimuhanzu dynasty and the Ndebele in the 1850s Moffat was able to note that between the

fighting in 1854–5 and the surrender of Chirimuhanzu in 1857 there had been no further fighting.[38] In 1866 the Ndebele, having attacked Mashayamombe's people earlier in the year, attempted to trade with them in August.[39]

As for the Shona, even the Njanja, whose exploitation of the Hwedza ironfield and wide-ranging hoe-selling network was one of the great economic success-stories of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and who depended for their sales on good relations with the surrounding peoples, did not hesitate to rob 'Portuguese' *zungu* traders passing through their territory. This would hardly endear them to the peoples who had expected to receive the trade goods that the *zungu* were importing.[40]

Another point to be noted is that even when Ndebele raids were major ones, directed against specific targets on the orders of the king, there was a tendency for other people in the area to suffer as well. This was because the Ndebele, whose famed military discipline existed far more in the minds of European writers than it ever did in reality, were prone to scattering across a wide area in search for cattle and women.

This emerges clearly from all detailed accounts from the few Europeans living among the Shona, such as Mauch in 1872, who gives a picture (quite unlike Montagu Kerr's fictitious stereotype of a surprise attack on a surrounded village) of a series of raids over a very wide front, from the western Duma on the Mutirikwi-Pokoteke confluence to the upper Pokoteke, some seventy kilometres, over a period of about three weeks. The Shona, who had at least three days' warning, suffered various losses but were rarely taken completely by surprise.[41]

The same picture emerged from accounts of the 1892 raids on the country from Chivi to Gutu and from those of the 1893 raid on Zimuto.[42] Ndebele raiders also tended to follow up their intended targets if they fled, as when they pursued people from the Chaminuka medium's base near the Mupfure to the northern Shawasha country in 1883.[43] Even Ndebele on a peaceful mission, such as the delivery of a message, would sometimes cover their expenses by raiding.[44]

If the main stimulus behind the great Ndebele campaigns of the 1850s and 1860s was the political threat of the Rozvi dynasty, the economic stimulus of the Shona trade system was extremely important. Indeed, it appears to have provoked the first important expansion of the Ndebele power. In inheriting the Changamire state, the Ndebele had inherited its basic economic framework, which in spite of a regional emphasis on cattle was still aligned to the tradi-

tional exchange of gold and ivory for cloth and beads. As mentioned above, warfare between the Shona and the Ndebele was not total, and it is clear that even during the fighting of 1854 – 5 the trade system linking the Ndebele with the Zambezi and the coast through the Shona country to the east was still functioning.[45] Nevertheless, by the 1850s it had become clear to Mzilikazi that the Shona were difficult to dislodge from their mountain strongholds.[46]

At this point neither side had guns in quantity, although the Shona had been importing a certain number of guns for a very long time.[47] The Ndebele had learned from their experiences south of the Limpopo that guns were useful, and in the 1850s and 1860s they did their best to acquire them.[48] The basic Kalanga population of the Changamire state had been accustomed to import cloth, and their needs also had to be supplied. Although supplies of both guns and cloth were available through the variously friendly, neutral or hostile Shona dominions to the east,[49] it would obviously be desirable for the Ndebele to control the trade routes to a greater extent.

The first expansion of the Ndebele was to the north-west, however. One reason for this was probably that the Ndebele state was too weak in the 1840s to attempt the more hazardous — because more heavily populated and thus better defended — route to the north-east. The badly-watered sand country to the north-west was almost uninhabited and thus offered no resistance to raiders who could easily cross it to strike at the Shona under Hwange, Pashu and Saba on the Deka, Gwayi and Zambezi rivers. These people were not only vulnerable but also offered access to one of the trade routes to the sea. This route was along the Zambezi through the Tonga country to Zumbo, Tete, Sena and the sea, and was economically viable in spite of the distances involved because nearly all the distance could be covered by some sort of water transport.

Water transport, as Selous noted, made goods from the Portuguese ports mentioned above much more competitive than those hauled by wagon from the South African ports,[50] and in the 1860s 'Portuguese' traders were operating near the Victoria Falls.[51] By the early 1850s the Ndebele appear to have established their authority over these Zambezian polities,[52] especially after the death of the Hwange in 1853,[53] although intermittent raids on the area occurred for various reasons as long as the Ndebele state survived.

A Rozvi tradition from the Insiza area suggested that Mzilikazi extended his policy of co-operation with the Rozvi to the point of requesting Chirisamhuru's son Tohwechipi to return from his exile in the direction of the Eastern Highlands and settle down in his own

country, and that it actually worked for a few years before Tohwechipi broke away.[54] It seems certain that the Ndebele tried to get the Mutinhima house to join them, but that they refused.[55]

The 1850s saw a rapid revival of the Rozvi power, and as mentioned above they seem to have sunk their differences sufficiently for the Mutinhima group to recognise the paramountcy of Tohwechipi.[56] Even the Swabasvi house broke away from the Ndebele and joined the Mambo's Rozvi.[57] But it does not seem that there was a single Rozvi command over the rest of the Shona. Even some of the Rozvi under Lukuluba and Rozani remained under the Ndebele,[58] and accounts of the period are full of stories of quarrels and warfare between the Rozvi and rulers such as Hwata, Gutu and the people of the upper Save valley.[59] Shona rulers did attack the Ndebele at the same time as the Rozvi, but it appears to have been on their own initiative.

If the Ndebele exactions of young people provided the basic motive for the Shona resistance to Ndebele rule in the early 1850s, and the revival of the Changamire dynasty gave an example to be followed, the resistance took a thoroughly traditional form. Shona raiders penetrated deep into the country of the Ndebele, stealing cattle and — according to the Ndebele — committing atrocities on women.[60] The most prominent of the raiders were the Mambo, Tohwechipi, his relative Mutinhima, and Chizema the son of the Govera ruler Chirimuhanzu on the Shashe.[61] But these raids provoked an Ndebele response that proved too strong for the Shona. Battles were fought in the mountains to the east of the Ndebele state: at the Mpopoti range against the Rozvi ruler 'Dlembeu Kupengobuta',[62] at Umgulugulu (Guruguru) mountain,[63] and against the Mhari ruler Zingwe, who was killed for refusing to supply young people as tribute.[64]

Tohwechipi was forced to retreat through Chivi past Nyaningwe hill in the direction of Great Zimbabwe.[65] According to a late tradition, by employing *zvitunya* — strong people[66] — who came from the Zambezi to trade and who possessed guns, he was able to defeat the Ndebele, winning himself the name of Chibambamu in the process, some time before 1852.[67] The fighting continued into 1854, and then there was a lull.[68] But by 1857 the situation had resolved itself in Mzilikazi's favour, partly because of divisions among the Shona.

The Chirimuhanzu dynasty surrendered early in 1857,[69] and from then until 1889 became a strong ally of the Ndebele.[70] Indeed, Chizema, who had been so prominent in raids on the Ndebele, was aided by them in his unsuccessful attempt to win a new land for

himself in southern Buhera in the years that followed.[71] As for the Rozvi, they had suffered from the lack of unity among the Shona peoples. In July 1857 it was noted that 'the rulers holding these lands (goldfields in the central Shona country) were tributary to the emperor Changamire, but today, by a betrayal, the 'Mezircaze' (Mzilikazi) has taken possession of them from the said Changamire, who lives as a refugee in Njanja, land of the ruler Gambiza, in the district of the Hera, on the edges of his vast domains'.[72]

It is instructive to examine the situation of Hwata at this time. Hwata was the ruler of a comparatively small Hera polity at the head of the Mazowe valley, but if his territory was small his economic influence was considerable. Not only did he control the goldfields in the northern Shawasha country to the east of him,[73] but he was also close to the locality of the old Portuguese *feira* of Dambarare.[74] This strategic position — probably of importance far back into early Shona history — enabled Hwata to dominate much of the trade of the central Shona country, buying ivory and reselling it to the 'Portuguese' traders,[75] whose houses were to be found in the upper Mazowe valley.[76] Hwata guarded this economic advantage jealously, and when the people near the old *feira* of Maramuca[77] — probably the Devera group that owned the Shurushuru goldfield[78] — attempted to re-open it to 'Portuguese' trade in c.1830 – 50, he attacked both them and the 'Portuguese'. He lost the battle but won the war, for the *feira* was not reopened.[79]

Mzilikazi devoted as much effort to the defeat of Hwata as he did to Tohwechipi, and the continued subjection of Hwata to Ndebele rule until 1889 suggests that Mzilikazi was fully aware of the economic importance of Hwata's area and intended to profit by it.

There seems to have been a period of peace from 1854 to 1860, but from the latter date to 1873 the Ndebele made what was probably their greatest concerted effort to dominate the Shona. They raided over a wide front from Chivi in the east to Mangwende in the north-east and Hwata in the north, and in the northern areas in particular the relatively few raids mentioned in traditions most probably occurred during this period. Even so it does not seem likely that the Ndebele were numerous enough to affect all these areas at once, and in one year, 1863, when the main strength of the kingdom was turned against the Ngwato to the south-west, the only noted effort to the north-west was a raid by associates of the Ndebele on the Deka river area,[80] while one force raided Hwata's associate Chiweshe in the upper Mazowe valley.[81] It should be remembered that even during this period of intense activity total

war did not exist, and the Ndebele both raided and traded with Mashayamombe in 1866.[82]

The Ndebele effort of 1860 was confined to small and unofficial raids to the north-east and another to the south-east.[83] After this, it is possible to make some estimate of the sequence of events in each area affected by the surge of Ndebele activity. In the east the peoples of Chivi,[84] Bere,[85] Zimuto,[86] and the Njanja[87] were attacked in 1861. Bere's Mhari bore the brunt of the attack,[88] and were severely weakened in consequence,[89] while Chivi's Mhari appear to have succumbed to the power of the newly-imported guns and became tributary to the Ndebele. A combination of ambition on the part of Chivi Matsweru's son Makonese and the Ndebele expansion led to the deaths of both Chivi and Bere at about this time.[90]

The attack on the Njanja mentioned above brought the Ndebele back into contact with the Changamire Rozvi, who had arrived in the Hera country — dominated by the two Hera rulers Mutekedza and Nyashanu and the rapidly-expanding Njanja confederacy under Gambiza — by 1857.[91] The Rozvi, led by the Mambo Tohwechipi Chibambamu and his cousins of the Mutinhima house, occupied hills on the frontier between Nyashanu and Gambiza such as Bedza and the Mavangwe range.[92] It is stated that the Ndebele made three major attacks in order to rid themselves of the menace of the remnant of Rozvi imperial power, until in 1866 a prolonged siege forced Tohwechipi to surrender.[93] He was brought to Mzilikazi and later allowed to return. Tradition is emphatic that he left Mavangwe and went to Gutu where he died,[94] but in view of the fact that in 1873 Mtikana Mafu led a major force against the Rozvi in Gutu it seems possible that even the defeat of 1866 did not crush Rozvi resistance to the Ndebele.[95] In view of the tendency of Ndebele raiders to spread across country it seems likely that most of the damage suffered by the Njanja and the Hera of Mutekedza and Nyashanu occurred at this time. Certainly by 1870 the Ndebele had raided Mutekedza, since they had mutilated his sub-ruler Nyoka.[96] This may also be the period of Chizema's attempt to conquer southern Buhera from Nerutanga, which was repulsed by that ruler and the Njanja in spite of his Ndebele backing.[97] The Njanja recall having aided Gutu after this, which may coincide with the 1873 raid there.[98]

The Nhowe of Mangwende recalled in 1898 that 'it was in the following up of the Abarosis that the Matabeli first came to know our country, with the result that they commenced killing and raiding through the different districts'.[99] The Rozvi were not the only

ones responsible, however, because the Ndebele tendency to follow up their enemies applied to Nyandoro of Tsunga as well. Nyandoro had been herding cattle for the Ndebele, but at about this time an Ndebele *nduna*'s murder led to hostilities,[100] and the Ndebele attacked Tsunga — which was flat and nearly indefensible — and was thus one of the very few areas occupied by the Shona that was depopulated by Ndebele action, as the Nyandoro people left *en masse* in the direction of their old home in Fungwi.

They moved to the nearby Nyoka river, and after a year or two raids pushed them further northeast to the Chirume. A few years later more raids drove them to the Matswitswi caves in Samuriwo's land, from which they fled after Nyandoro's death and further raids to Mangwende as refugees.[101] Like the Rozvi, they brought the attention of the Ndebele to those peoples who lived nearby, so that Samuriwo, Chihota, Svosve and Mangwende all suffered.[102] But, as the Mangwende people pointed out in 1898, 'The first time they entered the country very few of Mangwende's tribe were killed, and very few taken prisoners, but they took away with them large numbers of cattle and goats. . . . The Matabeli never came back into this district again but every year they were raiding the districts on the Sabi river'.[103] This marked the farthest point of the Ndebele raiding to the northeast.

The pursuit of the Rozvi Mambo and his associate Nyandoro led the Ndebele straight to the northeast up the watershed of the whole country, over open, grassy plains that were of little significance to their economy except as sources for cattle to replenish their herds after the lungsickness of 1861 had so reduced them that the state actually contracted in size at this time.[104] But the route to the north not only led to the trade routes of the old Mutapa state, but was also of considerable economic importance in itself, running as it did through some of the biggest goldfields still being worked in the early part of the century[105] and across river valleys running west from the watershed that were full of elephants.[106]

The great Ndebele efforts of 1860 – 8 in this area hit the inhabitants very hard. The Ngezi dynasty of Rimuka partly broke up,[107] and the Mashayamombe and Chivero people of the Mupfure valley also suffered. At one point their rulers were forced to flee to the land to the north.[108] However, Mashayamombe at least appears to have returned to his land by 1866, in time to be raided once more.

Mzilikazi's attempt to trade for ivory later that year suggests economic motives.[109] Economic motives almost certainly lay behind the very determined efforts made to subject the Hwata trading centre. For four years from 1860 – 1 the Ndebele attacked, even

sending Lotshe to raid Hwata's associate and neighbour Chiweshe at a time when the greatest need for men lay on the Ngwato front to the south-west in 1863. Finally Hwata surrendered in 1864, and was captured to be returned to his home as a tributary ruler.[110] However, Hwata like the Mambo Tohwechipi appears to have attempted to break away from this relationship, because a major campaign was required in 1868 to subject him again.[111] Even in 1870 his allegiance to the Ndebele was thought to be superficial,[112] but he remained at least nominally tributary until 1889.[113]

The wars of the 1850s established the dominance of the Ndebele in the vicinity of the old Changamire state. The campaigns of the 1860s wiped out the last power of the Rozvi and gave the Ndebele strong economic advantages in the north. In spite of the dissensions of the succession crisis of 1868 – 72, in terms of the relations between the Shona and the Ndebele, the latter were by 1873 at the zenith of their power. It is thus ironic, in view of the myths of Ndebele supremacy, to note that their first serious defeat, and the first sign of a reversal of the balance of power that was to lead in the end to the revolt of many of the Shona tributaries, occurred only six years later, in 1879.

Ironic, but not surprising. The Shona after all were descendants of the creators of the most impressive Iron Age material culture in Southern Africa, the Great Zimbabwe-Kame culture. They owned what was left of considerable goldfields, and had many elephants available. Their political institutions and territories were small only by comparison with the few super-states of Southern, Central and East Africa. By comparison with most polities of that area many Shona rulers held quite big territories. Most of them owned superb defensive sites.

Moreover, developments to the south were beginning to aid the Shona. The opening of the Kimberley diamond fields in 1867, the increased availability of guns as Europeans adopted rifles, the expansionist ambitions of Britain and the Afrikaners — and Portuguese counter-moves — all tended to aid the Shona in the short run, though not in the long. Under the circumstances it is surprising that the Ndebele accomplished as much as they did.

Ndebele-Shona relations at the peak of Ndebele power

Before describing Ndebele reactions to the revival of Shona economic and military power, the extent of Ndebele domination should be noted, with special reference to the alliances between the

Ndebele and local Shona interest-groups upon whose presence they partly relied to maintain their influence in the border tributary lands. By 'tributary land' is meant a land whose people entered into a relationship with a more powerful people, paying some kind of tribute in return for immunity from raids at regular intervals. The tribute generally involved symbolic articles or services, such as skins, feathers, hoes, spears, tobacco or the building of huts.[114] These articles and services did not involve such a serious economic burden as the permanent removal of cattle or young people, but they represented a considerable diversion of valuable man-hours nonetheless. Consequently there was an understandable desire among many people to avoid paying tribute that ran counter to the strong attraction of Nguni society to those who for various reasons found their own insufficient for their needs.[115]

The dividing-line between those who were tributaries and those who were not was not absolutely rigid. Some groups occasionally paid tribute in order to escape being raided, but generally resisted.[116] Others who paid tribute were occasionally raided in spite of this by raiders not under the overlord's control.[117]

As mentioned above, the Hwange area came under the military domination of the Ndebele in the early 1850s. After the death of Hwange Lusumbami in 1853[118] most of the Nambiye fled to the Zambezi, but shortly after his accession Lobengula persuaded most of these refugees to return as his tributaries.[119] The Shangwe of the Mafungabusi plateau under Chireya were raided twice in Mzilikazi's reign, before coming under Lobengula's rule at the price of a tribute in tobacco.[120] The Hurungwe area between the Munyati and Angwa rivers was subjected to a few raids along the Zambezi, in which some groups collaborated with the Ndebele and others resisted with considerable success, but no permanent tributary relationships seem to have existed.[121]

The Ndebele had a surprisingly good relationship with the Shona spirit mediums of the Mupfure and Mhanyame valleys. They paid tribute themselves to the great mediums of the Nyamuswa-Wanewawa cluster of spirits, as well as to the Chikono medium of the Neuso group at the Mupfure-Munyati confluence. It is claimed that this situation came about by 1868.[122] Nemakonde, the local overlord of the area, came to pay tribute to Lobengula,[123] and it is possible that by 1886 he too was receiving a counter-tribute from the Ndebele.[124] Evidently the Ndebele found themselves reliant to some extent on the religious powers of the Shona to the north of them, although Nemakonde's position in a rich gold-and ivory-producing area may also have been important. The Ndebele also

had a cordial relationship with the great Chaminuka medium who lived near the Rwizi polity on the Mupfure, of which more will be said below.

The situation with regard to the Nemakonde and Rwizi areas, where the Ndebele relied upon certain Shona religious forces, was repeated almost all the way down their north-eastern and eastern frontiers of influence. In the Hwata tributary area the dynasty was divided into houses descended from Hwata Shayachimwe, and the protracted succession struggle between them after Hwata Gwindi's death in c.1887 suggests that he may have relied upon Ndebele aid to maintain himself after he surrendered in 1864.[125]

The same was true in Mutekedza's land (where the house of Musonza had managed to secure the title for themselves in the face of opposition from the older Masarirambi house, and submitted to the Ndebele),[126] and in the Chirimuhanzu dynasty (where the house of Simba managed to maintain an almost continuous succession from father to son from 1857 to 1954, cutting out uncles, brothers and cousins with the help of various powers, including the Ndebele).[127] The point is that although it is true that all of these political interest groups relied upon Ndebele help to maintain themselves, it is also true that the presence of these interest groups made it much easier for the Ndebele to maintain their own influence on the frontiers of their tributary area.

In a similar way the Ndebele interacted with the Shona to deal with external threats. Thus they made an agreement with Adam Render, the son-in-law of Mabika, a powerful sub-ruler of Charumbira, that he would help to keep the Duma from advancing further west.[128] In the great Matibi polity of the lowveld, the ruler called in the Ndebele to drive back the advancing Tsonga Hlengwe under Vurumela in return for becoming a tributary, which they did,[129] It seems likely that this occurred after Lobengula succeeded to the Ndebele state, for it is surprising but apparently true that although the Ndebele penetrated for hundreds of miles to the north-west and north-east before that date, it was only from 1870 onwards that they established their power in the hills of the Mpateni west of Mberengwa mountain.

One raid was made to the south-east in 1860,[130] and in the 1860s a raid was made against the Rozvi ruler Mtubayedzi who was suspected of conspiring with the Afrikaners;[131] but according to Insiza traditions a raid on Mpateni was defeated in 1869 and dominance was only established in 1870.[132] The reasons for this late advance may lie in the difficulty of the area and its relative lack of importance compared with other areas. The power of the Dumbu-

seya people who dominated much of the lands west of the Runde and were only finally defeated in the 1880s by an alliance of Lemba, Ngowa and Ndebele, was also a factor.[133]

Once more it can be seen that local factors made the task of the Ndebele easier, for they could rely upon the support of such rulers as Mposi of the Lemba, who were indebted to them.[134] And, although it is not the purpose of this chapter to deal with affairs well inside the Ndebele state, it is worth noting that just as the Ndebele were aided by Rozvi support in the establishment of their state, so they continued to rely upon it in at least one case, that of Lukuluba, whose ruling house in the nineteenth century, relying upon Ndebele support against its rivals, was itself a factor aiding the Ndebele.[135]

In outlining the limits of Ndebele power in this way, it will be noticed that some tributary areas lay well outside the main body of Ndebele influence. Some, such as Nemakonde and Chireya, lay beyond almost uninhabitable waterless, fly-infested or sandy lands, but Hwata and Mutekedza were separated from their overlords by independent territory. This may seem odd to those accustomed to neatly-bordered modern states, but in fact such enclaves are common in history, where government was not on such rigid lines as to prevent access to them. Indeed, the Dumbuseya appear to have operated as a semi-independent sub-state ruling the Ngowa, Romwe and Lemba homelands while being themselves almost surrounded by Ndebele power.

In another way the realities of African politics differed from European preconceptions. On several occasions the Ndebele claimed that their limit of power was the Save river.[136] If they were talking about the upper fifty kilometres from its source, where their tributary Mutekedza bordered on independent Svosve's Mbire, then they were correct, but if they meant the whole river, as Europeans assumed they did, then they were boasting. It is perfectly clear from local oral traditions[137] as well as from Portuguese sources that they generally respected the Mutirikwi river as their border with the Gaza Nguni, regardless of their actual power on each side of it.[138] In practice, the Gaza were the only power with any effective tribute-relations with the Duma.[139] There may have been one Ndebele raid into the Rozvi refuge in Bikita.[140] North of the Duma, neither the Ndebele nor the Gaza achieved any permanent hold on Gutu or Nyashanu,[141] while north of the Save Gaza influence was limited to tribute-collection as far as Mbava's Rozvi in the Ruzawi-Save angle,[142] and one extremely destructive raid up to Mangwende's and Chinamhora's lands, probably in the 1860s.[143]

South of the Duma, Ndebele and Gaza raiders overlapped in the Runde-Turwi confluence area and clashed among the Tsonga Hlengwe in the lowveld, most of whom followed the Gaza.[144]

The checking and defeat of the Ndebele, 1879 – 93

It has been argued before that the balance of power between the independent Shona and the Ndebele was *beginning* to change in favour of the former in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The sale of gold and ivory and the labour opportunities of Kimberley and the Rand made it possible for the Shona, who in the 1860s had been fatally short of guns in the face of the Ndebele, who possessed them, to re-arm.[145] Guns, which entered the Shona country in the hands of 'Portuguese' traders, Venda mercenaries and gun-runners from the Ndebele kingdom, as well as through Shona long-distance traders and migrant labourers, made the hill strongholds of the Shona almost impregnable even against gun-using Ndebele and Europeans, as the 1896 – 7 risings were to show.

As mentioned above, only six years were to elapse between the final victory of the Ndebele over the Rozvi and their first really significant defeat. In 1897 the missionary Cockin wrote that 'latterly some of the kraals attacked have shewn fight and being many days away and the towns denser, the Amandebele are becoming afraid to go there so much. Cattle and sheep and slaves (are) not coming in so freely now from these distant raids. . . '[146] and it is probable that he was referring in particular to the war with Chivi. In the 1860s Chivi was evidently tributary to the Ndebele, but in the reign of Mazorodze, who ruled from 1870 at the latest, the Mhari began to acquire guns from the Venda and to build up a considerable herd of cattle, guarded by a group of men.

This represented a threat to Ndebele power in the area, and in 1879 a major force under Lotshe and Manyewu attacked the Mhari capital of Nyaningwe. Although the Ndebele force consisted of the Mbizo *ibuto* and probably outnumbered the defenders of Nyaningwe, they were repulsed with the loss of 20 men, their only success being the capture of Chivi himself on an outlying hill. The loss of 20 men was not significant in itself, but the defeat was, and even the execution of Chivi did not hide the fact that although the Ndebele could operate over the open ground, they could not take the hill-strongholds of the Mhari, who were henceforth independent.[147]

The year 1880 saw the defeat of the Gaza by Gutu in the similar

battle of Rasa mountain,[148] and the beginning of a rift between the Ndebele and their ally the Chaminuka medium of the upper Mupfure. Up to then, Lobengula had paid the medium tribute in return for religious services,[149] and in that year they combined to raid the Shona north of the Mhanyame. But at the same time the Chaminuka medium claimed that he, and not Lobengula, had the power to grant hunting-rights to Europeans in the area, and his son Jugu 'had said that his father would now show Lobengula that the country beyond the Umniati river belonged to him, Chameluga' and that if necessary he could drive away the game sought by the Europeans by his magic.[150] It is therefore not surprising to find that in 1883 Lobengula had the Chaminuka medium killed. His men raided as far as the Shawasha country of Chinamhora,[151] whose people had taken Chaminuka's cattle,[152] which in all probability had been taken from them in 1880.

In 1882 Selous noted that the Ndebele had reached the Mukwadzi river west of the Mvurwi range,[153] and in 1887 there was a major raid on the Mvurwi area[154] that was probably the one led by Gwasagwasa against the Shona ruler Chipuriro, far to the north.[155] This may have represented a revival of the policy of the 1860s of gaining control of the trade routes to the Zambezi, for beyond Chipuriro lay the *prazos* of Matekenya, José de Araujo Lobo, who had earlier been in contact with the Ndebele, buying their ivory.

In 1888 a major raid struck at the Mashayamombe and Rwizi people of the Mupfure valley. The reason for this is not known.[157] The attack on Rwizi may have been to prevent a renewal of the Chaminuka cult, while the fact that a very large number of people were removed from Mashayamombe's may mean that this was the raid recalled in tradition that resulted from a civil war among Mashayamombe's people in which one side called in the Ndebele.[158] But it may also have resulted from the fact that the Shona were undeniably growing stronger. Isolated Ndebele were liable to be killed if they were discovered.[159] In 1887 a whole party of Ndebele was killed,[160] and indeed the 1888 raid 'suffered so severely that Lobengula was very angry and another one was sent out in another direction.'[161] Montagu Kerr, with his preconceived ideas, was amazed to hear the Shona at the head of the Mazowe valley in 1884 coolly discussing their chances of success, with some hope of victory, but it seems that in the 1880s the Shona were indeed beginning to turn the tide of Ndebele power.[162]

In view of the general role of the Portuguese in African history it is strange to find that the general effect of their efforts to take over the whole northern, eastern and central parts of the Shona

country in 1889 was beneficial to the Shona. The effect of the Andrada and Cordon expedition of that year was to give nearly every Shona polity north of the Munyati a considerable increase in the size of its armoury. The 'Portuguese' *zungu* expedition to the whole Charumbira-Mapanzure-Bere group of peoples in 1872 had only 48 guns for sale,[163] but the 1889 expeditions would give this many to a single ruler. Even the small polities got ten guns, and powder and ammunition were supplied as well. This was a huge increase in Shona fighting strength, and from both oral traditions and some of Cordon's treaties[164] there is no doubt that the whole tenor of this major political development was anti-Ndebele.

The effect on the balance of power between the Ndebele and the Shona was immense. Hwata, divided into factions after Gwindi's death, Nemakonde and Mutekedza all abandoned their allegiance to Lobengula and accepted the Portuguese guns and flag, which were to be found as far south as the Njanja country and beyond. No major raiding forces of Ndebele ever again entered the central Shona country. There are strong suggestions that the revolt against Ndebele power even extended as far south as Gutu, where from 1889 the rulers no longer had the Gaza state to balance against the Ndebele, and to Chirimuhanzu, where the death of Bangure allowed his brother Chatikobo, aided by some Rozvi, to lead the people into their first revolt since 1857.[165]

It is equally strange to find that in the deceit and treachery that surrounded the arrival of Rhodes' British South Africa Company from the granting of the Rudd Concession in 1888 to the foundation of Salisbury in 1890 the Ndebele actually benefited from the occupation in any respect at all. Yet it is true that although there can be no doubt that Lobengula was thoroughly opposed to the arrival of the British on his eastern frontier, he remained functionally neutral to the extent that he did not attack Rhodes' column, and that once the British had driven away the Portuguese and captured the formidable Gouveia, Manoel António de Sousa, he took advantage of the British presence to regain control over Nemakonde and Chirimuhanzu, although Hwata and Mutekedza remained lost to him. Even so, this was only possible with the co-operation of Shona interest groups.

In a *coup d'état* in 1891 Chinyama, son of Bangure, drove out his uncle Chatikobo and became the new Chirimuhanzu with Ndebele aid.[166] At the end of the year an Ndebele force visited the Nemakonde area and, after consultation with the most important spirit medium, killed Nemakonde Hodza and four others in an action that has all the marks of a *coup d'état* by an internal

group.[167] During 1892 a similar split in the Gutu dynasty and an appeal for Ndebele help by Makuvaza led to a joint Chirimuhanzu-Ndebele force installing him as ruler,[168] and at this time a small party of Ndebele even reached the highlands across the Save, perhaps the furthest point ever attained in that direction, in this last rather feeble demonstration of Ndebele power.[169]

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the events and negotiations that led to the 1893 War that broke the Ndebele state, except insofar as they concern the Shona. The lowveld area had been subjected to raiding for years, partly at least by unofficial raiding parties, causing Matibi to move away from his northern lands into the remote lowveld in the late 1880s.[170]

The decisive area, however, was around Chivi and Zimuto. Chivi was raided in late 1891 — to the delight of Rhodes, who was trying to prove Lobengula's dominance of the area,[171] — but in July and August 1892 a major raid on the recalcitrant Chivi and Zimuto led to an appeal by Chivi to Rhodes' deputy Jameson.[172] This in turn led to a demand that Ndebele raiders stay away from the town of Victoria and the main road.[173] This demand was fully complied with, as far as the Ndebele ruler was concerned, until the crucial raid of July 1893.[174]

Even that raid came about partly as a result of Shona actions. In early June 1893 a joint party of raiders from Bere and the Makamure house of Zimuto stole cattle from Mpakame, a Shona tributary of the Ndebele at Guruguru hill. He complained to his overlord, the Ndebele-ized Rozvi, Lukuluba at the Ghoko range. Lukuluba raided Bere in retaliation, but on being turned back by Rhodes's police, reported in turn to his superior, Mgandane of Nxa.[175] This led directly to the famous July raid on Bere and Zimuto near Victoria, to the fight of 18 July and Rhodes's decision to overthrow the Ndebele state.

Even before the British columns set out, however, Shona raiders were moving in to take Ndebele cattle.[176] As the Victoria column began to move towards its rendezvous in the north with the Salisbury column, it was joined by large forces of Shona. Zimuto sent 120, Madziviri 50, and Gutu abandoned the Ndebele who had put him in power the previous year and sent 80. As the force approached Chirimuhanzu its ruler Chinyama followed Gutu's example and offered 300 men.[177] Later, Chivi's men marched through Victoria to catch up with the advancing columns.[178] These Shona, acting in concert for the first time in their particular histories, fought at the Shangani battle with some success, considering that they were left outside the defensive laagers.[179]

Meanwhile in the south Matibi (whose relations with the Ndebele had been deteriorating to the point of outright war as he was repeatedly raided) experienced a further raid in late 1893 and retaliated in force together with the police at the post station who had also suffered, and penetrated deep into Godlwayo.[180] These Anglo-Shona alliances of 1893 had a profound effect on the subsequent history of the southern Shona, especially in 1896. As the Ndebele state fell, Shona raiders from all over the southern Shona country and from as far away as the upper Save valley began to move towards the Ndebele herds, and the end of Ndebele power in the summer of 1893 – 4, as in the early 1850s, saw Shona raiders striking deep into the Ndebele kingdom.[181]

Conclusion

Immediately after the conference paper and article, upon which this chapter is based, were produced, another researcher examined the situation. This was Dr. J.R.D. Cobbing, whose thesis 'The Ndebele under the Khumalos, 1820 – 1896' was successfully submitted to the University of Lancaster in early 1976. It is unfortunate for Zimbabwean history that such an important piece of research has not yet been published in full. In virtually every sphere of Ndebele history, radical changes to Ndebele historiography were proposed and in most cases convincingly proven.

Cobbing looked at the Ndebele state as the core of his study and used a much wider range of sources than I, who tended to see the Ndebele as the western boundary of my own study of the southern and central Shona. One of the consequences of this was that, in the zone of Ndebele influence all the way from the western banks of the Mhanyame round to the northern frontier of the Tswana country, his study remains the most detailed work on Ndebele raiding and influence on tributaries.

Only in the area of the Zambezi river between Zumbo and Hwange has an even more detailed study by Dr. T.I. Matthews, 'Portuguese, Chikunda and peoples of the Gwembe valley: the impact of the "Lower Zambezi Complex" on southern Zambia', *Journal of African History*, xxii, 1, 1981, modified his conclusions.

In the eastern arc covered by this chapter, from the Mhanyame to the Limpopo, Cobbing was able to uncover further information on Ndebele raiding. The 1850s campaigns against Chirimuhanzu can be shown to have extended to Zimuto, Gutu and the Njanja. People on the upper Mbembezwana, quite close to the Ndebele state,

were raided in 1870 and again, possibly after they had submitted, in 1883 by the force that killed the Chaminuka *svikiro*. The case of Vurumela was more complex than I indicated in my paper. Three extra raids were noted in 1886, of which one reached the upper Save and lost 100 men; possibly this was the one noted by reference 160 for 1887.

Otherwise, Cobbing's picture is not unlike the one given here, as far as actual events are concerned. We have differed on the interpretations of events (historians do this all the time: it is one way to the truth), and when his work is published we may continue to do so.

I should point out a few factors relevant to this chapter, however. The beginning of more effective resistance by the central and southern Shona to the Ndebele was only a beginning. Without the guns handed out by the Portuguese to the central Shona in 1889, the latter would have taken a long time to become really secure. With the Portuguese guns it was another story, but since the Ndebele did not raid the central Shona after that we do not know exactly what would have happened. The experiences of the Rhodesians in 1896 – 7 give us a good idea, though. It took an armed force in each district, supplied by wagon trains, to occupy and destroy the croplands in the rainy season to defeat the central Shona in 1896 – 7, and I doubt very much whether the Ndebele could have done this. As for the southern Shona, whereas they were slowly showing more resistance after about 1879, it was the Rhodesian war on the Ndebele of 1893 which provided the catalyst. Without that, the five southern rulers who joined in the attack would have been a lot more cautious. The effects of their doing so were very important, however, as Chapters 3 and 5 will show.

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142. *Gold and the Gospel*, 73 – 7.
143. N 3/33/8 NC Marandellas to Acting CNC Salisbury c.1 January 1904 and W. Edwards 'A short history'; 'Mafohla' (pseudonym of F.W.T. Posselt) 'A raid and what led to it' *NADA* 4, 1926; Edwards, 'Wanoe', 15.
144. N 3/33/8 NC Chibi to Acting CNC Salisbury 9 February 1904.
145. *John Moffat*, 152; *Leask*, 69, 190.
146. Hist. Mss. LO 6/1/4, J. Cockin to Mullens, May 1879.
147. Chapter 2 below.
148. N 9/1/6, NC Gutu to CNC Salisbury 31 March 1900.
149. Selous, *Hunters Wanderings*, 331 – 2;
150. Selous, *Travel and Adventure*, 465 – 6.
151. *Ibid.*, 113 – 6.
152. J. Chidziwa, 'History of the vaShawasha', *NADA* ix, 1, 1964, 29.
153. Selous, *Travel and Adventure*, 50 – 3.
154. *Gold and the Gospel*, 32, 34.
155. NB 6/1/1 NC Selukwe to CNC Bulawayo, 31 March 1898; Hist. Mss. WI 8/1/2 Ntabeni 53 – 5.
156. *Gold and the Gospel*, 51; L. Decle, *Three years in savage Africa*, (London 1898) 141.
157. *Gold and the Gospel*, 27 – 30, 69.
158. Chapter 4 below.
159. *Gold and the Gospel*, 27 – 8, 31; Kerr, *Far Interior*, i, 64.
160. *Gold and the Gospel*, 67.
161. *Ibid.*, 65.

162. Kerr, *Far Interior*, i, 151.
163. *Carl Mauch*, 213.
164. *Memoria e Documentos*, 27 – 8, 268 – 76, 333; *Boletim Oficial . . . de Moçambique*, 51, 21 December 1889, 725; *B.O.M.*, 12, March 1890, 152; *B.O.M.*, 20, 17 May 1890; Arquivo do Ministério dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Lisbon, Soberanua de Portugal na Zambezia, Caixa 2, 1889, J.C. Paiva de Andrada to Minister of Marine, 18 August 1889; Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon, Moçambique, 2a. Repartiçao, 6a. Caixa, 1889, J.C. Paiva de Andrada to Francisco Costa, 15 and 27 December 1889; PRO FO '179/279 No. 57, 'Memorandum on the rights of Portugal'; D.N. Beach, 'The rising in southwestern Mashonaland 1896 – 7', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1971, 174 – 197; UZHD Texts 53 – 4, 60 – 1, Chegutu.
165. CT 1/12/8 A.R. Colquhoun to F. Rutherfoord Harris, 10 December 1890; CT 1/5/2 R.G. Nicholson to F. Rutherfoord Harris, 7 November 1890; LO 5/2/3 Lt. Col. Pennefather to F. Rutherfoord Harris, 4 September 1890; UZHD Text 26 Chirimuhanzu; N 9/4/13 NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury 1 November 1902.
166. UZHD Text 26 Chirimuhanzu; Hist. Mss. WI 5/1/1, 7 April 1897.
167. A 2/8/1 L.S. Jameson to Acting Secretary, BSAC Cape Town, 2 December 1891.
168. DV 5/1/1, Chaplin to L.S. Jameson, 25 March 1892; CT 1/15/2, L.S. Jameson to Acting Secretary, BSAC, Cape Town, 15 July 1892; A 1/9/1 telegraphic conversation A.19, August-September 1892; NB 1/1/9, ANC Gutu to CNC, 9 September 1900.
169. Houghton Library, Harvard, Diary of W.L. Thompson, 29 – 31 August, 1892. I am indebted to Dr. J.K. Rennie for this reference.
170. Hist. Mss. BE 2/1/1, Diary for Tshakoma mission, 1st. quarter, 1887.
171. Chapter 2, below.
172. LO 5/2/21 F.R. Harris to London Board of BSAC, 27 July 1892.
173. A 2/1/4, H.M. Hole to J.W. Colenbrander, 5 September 1892.
174. Beach, 'Rising', 230 – 5.
175. E.G. Howman and J.H. Stanley Adams, 'The hand of glory', *NADA* 6, 1928, 33 – 4; 'Mziki (Campbell)' *Mlimo*, 30 – 1; CT 1/14/1 C. Lendy to L.S. Jameson, 18 June 1893.
176. Hist. Mss. CO 4/1/1, B. Dawson to J.W. Colenbrander, 24 September 1893.
177. Hist. Mss. MO 14/2/1 8 and 10 October 1893; Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/3; Hist. Mss. WI 9/2/4, 16 October 1893.
178. CT 1/14/2 F.R. Harris to H. Loch, 28 October 1893.
179. W.A. Willis and L.T. Collingridge, *The downfall of Lobengula*, (London, 1894), 107.
180. DV 1/1/1 Hay and Crowne to F.R. Harris, 7 March 1894; DV 7/2/2 Trial of H.D. Hay, 14 December 1893; L 2/3/8 Vigers to Duncan, 7 December 1893.
181. N 1/1/3 NC Hartley to CNC Salisbury, 19 February and 15 July 1895; N 1/1/2, NC Charter to CNC Salisbury, 30 January and 19 February, 1895; N 1/1/12 NC Victoria to CNC Salisbury 2 and 16 October 1894; A 15/1/1 NC Victoria's report to 10 December 1894.

2

The Adendorff Trek in Shona History

Introduction

Until about 1970, historians who dealt with the signing of treaties between African rulers and the oncoming colonial powers in the nineteenth century were apt to stress the fact that the African rulers could not read what was on the written treaty and thus were cheated. This was usually true. Historians did not so often ask themselves why — if this was so — the rulers put their marks on treaties at all. A popular image emerged of the naive and credulous ruler who would sign away his lands for a few blankets or guns. This was hardly an accurate picture of the extremely shrewd operators who tended to rise to the top in nineteenth-century African politics. So why did such rulers sign treaties? The answer was usually that they saw the verbal agreement which preceded the drawing up of any document as being at the heart of the matter. Just what that verbal agreement was about varied from case to case, but very often it had to do with both the external threats and the internal political struggle in and around each area.

Many treaties were signed in this country in the late nineteenth century. Some were made with powerful colonial forces who intended to use them to take over the land. Others were made with groups of 'chancers' who proposed to sell them to the highest bidder. In either case, they can often tell us a lot about the internal histories of the peoples involved.

The 'Adendorff concession' was one of these. For many years it was regarded simply as a minor mystery in the power struggle between the British and the Afrikaners. As will be shown, one of the rulers with whom treaties were supposed to have been signed had never done any such thing. Two of his subordinates had, however, and their reasons for doing so reflected both internal and external issues of the time. One of the factors behind the situation in the central and southern Shona country (outlined in chapter 1), was

that not only were there scores of small Shona political units but that in each of them there were many houses and interest groups. The situation in Chivi was not unusual. It is in such micro-studies of society that we uncover the dynamics of nineteenth-century Zimbabwean society.

This chapter was originally published in the *South African Historical Journal*, 3, 1971. The chapter refers to Afrikaner and African missionaries who took part in the treaty affair. The background to them and their German counterparts was published in D.N. Beach, 'The initial impact of Christianity on the Shona: the Protestants and the southern Shona', in *Christianity South of the Zambezi*, ed. A.J. Dachs, (Mambo, Gwelo, 1973). There is an excellent analysis of the Transvaal background to the would-be Adendorff trekkers in R. Wagner, 'Zoutpansberg: the dynamics of a hunting frontier' in *Economy and Society in Pre-industrial South Africa*, eds. S. Marks and A. Atmore, (London, 1980).

The background of treaty politics

On 24 June 1891 a body of Afrikaners attempted to cross the Limpopo river, but were prevented from doing so by a force of the British South Africa Company's Police. Although the repercussions continued for some months, this incident was the climax of a movement known as the 'Adendorff' or 'Banyailand' Trek. It has been commented upon by several writers, but not in the context of Shona history.

Some Afrikaner authors have seen the 'Banyailand' Trek movement as an episode in Anglo-Afrikaner relations, in which the Chartered Company prevented the expansion of Afrikanerdom into the land north of the Limpopo.[1] Other authors, writing from the British point of view, saw it as a threat to the position of the Company in the Limpopo-Zambezi region, because the Rudd Concession of 1888, by which Lobengula's Ndebele state supposedly granted the Company the right to occupy the Shona country, did not admit of an independent 'Banyailand'. If such an independent area existed, then the Rudd Concession was largely invalid.[2]

Yet in fact the Afrikaners who gathered on the Limpopo in 1891 were, unknowingly, symbols of a new trend in Shona history.

The word 'Banyai' is a corruption of the Shona word *vanyai*, the plural form of the word *munyai*. *Nyai* implies a messenger or a servant, and it has occasionally been applied to sub-groups of the Shona. For example, in the eighteenth century it was applied to a

part of the armed forces of the Mutapa state, but by the late nineteenth century it had a more limited meaning.

In the 1880s *vanyai* was used by the people of the Transvaal to describe the southernmost members of the Shona who lived on the northern edges of the Save-Limpopo lowveld, without much regard for their origins. The *vanyai* of the 1880s were in no way distinct from the remainder of the Karanga-dialect speakers of the Shona, but at the time of the Adendorff Trek and afterwards many European writers incorrectly assumed that they were different from the Shona as a whole.[3]

In the late nineteenth century the Shona beyond the limits of control of the Ndebele and Gaza states presented a picture of great disunity, for they were divided into many independent territories of varying sizes with no central body of authority.

In the eighteenth century there was a slow movement of Shona people from the north and east into the region, in which peoples such as the Duma, Vaera-Shiri, Rufura, Mhari and Govera settled among (or submerged) older Shona dynasties. This process was still in motion at the time of the Ngoni invasions, where in the modern Shurugwi, Zvishavane and Mberengwa districts the Mhari and Ngowa were moving slowly west.[4] These peoples all came under the Changamire state, but there are suggestions that they were stronger in relation to the Rozvi than the older politics they replaced. In the Shurugwi, Chivi and Gutu districts the Rozvi permitted the newcomers to supplant longer-established vassal dynasties, which suggests that the Mambo lacked the power or the inclination to support his subordinates.[5] Indeed, according to one tradition probably collected in Mberengwa in 1897 – 1902, a Rozvi Mambo actually died in battle against Chivi's Mhari.[6]

Whether this is true or not, it certainly implies that Rozvi overrule did not mean national unity. In any case, when the various Ngoni migrations invaded the country in the early nineteenth century the Rozvi seem to have received little or no help from their southern Shona vassals, and were forced to fight their battles with only the forces of the 'household' under leaders such as Tumbare.

The Shona were divided into totem clans and dynasties, but only the latter were normally effective in politics. The clan-totems, such as *moyo* (heart), *shumba* (lion) or *gumbo* (leg) were important as symbols of the origins of the major dynasties and as factors in the inter-family relations that played such a part in Shona politics, but it would be difficult if not impossible to prove that they ever corresponded to political realities in the ninteenth century. Thus the Mhari and the Govera both had the *shumba* totem and lived in

the central part of the Karanga-dialect area, but they do not seem to have regarded themselves as allies on that account.

The dynastic grouping did sometimes equate with an effective political unit. For example the Ngowa dynasties appear to have been united in their hostility to the Mhari from the 1840s onwards — but with the partial exception of Musipambi's house, which submitted to Chivi. Similarly the Duma who moved into the Great Zimbabwe area in the early part of the century presented a generally hostile front towards Nemanwa's Manwa and Charumbira's Nini, but the Mugabe, Murinye and Shumba Chekai dynasties of the Duma fought among themselves up to 1892.[7]

The dynasty was the most effective Shona political unit, but even so it was remarkably decentralised. The succession to the title varied from dynasty to dynasty, but in general the system was subject to two conflicting tendencies. On the one hand there was the well-established custom that the title should pass from son to son of the ancestor who founded the dynasty, while on the other hand each son's house, sought to keep the title for its own members. Sometimes this led to a state of equilibrium in which the title rotated between the dynastic houses, but very often inter-house fighting took place, after which the winning house-head would keep the title for himself and his sons, and so the whole process would start again. The defeated houses sometimes received special hereditary titles and functions or special grants of land in compensation for their lost rights to the succession, or they would move off to found new dynastics elsewhere, or they would simply sink into obscurity within the polity. When one remembers that the income from the goods traditionally due to a ruler was limited; that consequently, lacking the wealth to pay for an army, he tended to follow the opinion of the majority of his house-heads who were themselves subject to popular opinion; and at the same time remembering the great latitude allowed to a dissident house-head, one can understand something of the background to the situation that confronted the Afrikaners and the British in Chivi's dynasty in August, 1890.

This necessarily brief portrait of Shona political systems has pointed out their limitations, but it should be made clear that within these limitations the Shona achieved a great deal. Some territories reached a great size: the 1904 estimate of 27 970 people under Gutu's rule is probably too low, while his territory approached 4 350 square kilometres.[8] The average size of a territory in the southern Shona country was perhaps half this.

The complexity of Shona polities led to a general skill at diplo-

macy, and Shona diplomats accomplished a great deal in the period of the 'scramble'.

Skilled agriculturalists, the Shona were also masters of many crafts, and readily adopted new techniques such as that of the gunsmith. Their relatively democratic social and political system was backed by a resilient although rather decentralised monotheistic religion.

One essential point to be noted is the differences in political geography between the Shona territories of the undulating, badly-watered lowveld and those polities of the high plateau and the broken country where the rivers cut from the highveld to the lowlands. In the lowveld territorial boundaries were rather vague and enclosed large areas in which the people often moved long distances in order to find water, grazing or game. In the mountains or on the plateau, territories tended to be smaller, and demarcated by definite borders along streams or ridges. In both cases the people usually lived on or near rocky hills that constituted natural fortresses, and if the frequency with which such strongholds are mentioned in early traditions is a clue, then the Shona preference for such places predated the Ngoni invasions.

The politics of the south in the nineteenth century

A sample history, which also has a great deal to do with subsequent Shona-Afrikaner relations, will illustrate the kaleidoscopic character of Shona politics. In the late eighteenth century a people who had assumed the *shumba* totem occupied the upper Mushandike valley. Their title was Chivi, which means 'sin', and by the early nineteenth century they were known by the name of Mhari, which has several interpretations.[9] One of the members of the dynasty, one Tavengerweyi, crossed the Turwi river into the territory of the *dziva*-totem Ngowa people, under Kuvirimara Zengeya. Tavengerweyi and his people entered into a *torwa* (stranger) relationship with the Ngowa, by which they became Kuvirimara's subordinates. The Ngowa then occupied an area from the Turwi westwards across the Runde into an area that was at that time being occupied by migrating houses of the Ngowa dynasty.[10]

Gradually, Tavengerweyi's Mhari grew in numbers, until in the end the Rozvi, to whom Kuvirimara paid tribute, connived at a *coup d'état*. Tavengerweyi was allowed to replace the Ngowa as the local ruler, and about the same time, by a process that has so far received little attention from historians, succeeded to the Chivi

title, excluding his brothers and uncles from the succession. These relatives spread out to the north and west to found the Mapanzure, Nhema, Banga, Munikwa, Madamombe, Rera and Bere dynasties.

The ancestral spirits, *mhondoro*, of the Chivi dynasty, Chikanga and Murarapavi, retained a certain amount of theoretical politico-religious influence over the scattered Mhari, but in practice the residual Chivi title had no such influence.[11] Thus in later years the Nhema, Banga, Munikwa and Mapanzure dynasties submitted to Mzilikazi and co-operated with the Ndebele until 1893, while the eastern Mhari such as Chivi and Bere tended to resist.

Meanwhile Chivi's dynasty consolidated its position. Matsweru succeeded Tavengerweyi as Chivi, and the Ngowa were driven out. After a well-known massacre, probably in the 1840s, only Musipambi's house of the Ngowa remained under Chivi's rule, which did not extend west of the Runde. There, the Ngowa dynasties of Mazvihwa, Mataruse and Mazvivofa remained actively hostile to Chivi until 1896. The Chivi dynasty, confined between the Turwi and the Runde, expanded to the north-west and the south-east. To the north-west, the small Mhari dynasties of Madamombe and Rera and the Shiku polity paid tribute to the Chivi ruler, whose main centre of power was around Nyaningwe hill. To the south-east, the Mhari advanced steadily into the territories of Nemavuzhe's Govera and Chinaka's Pako.

As each house of the dynasty began to overcrowd its hill-stronghold and the surrounding fields, new parties would set out to seize more land. Thus Rungai hill fell to Makamure's house, while Masunda's house captured Chirogwe hill from the Pako and drove them into exile beyond the Turwi and Runde. This process of expansion was still going on in the 1880s. Nyenyera of Masunda's house and Chivasa of Matsweru's house seized Guhudza and Chisinge hills from Nemavuzhe's people in a move that marked the limits of Mhari expansion in this direction.

It can thus be seen that Shona dynasties showed a great deal of vitality in local politics. Therefore it was not surprising that they also reacted, in the course of time, to the far greater problems posed by the establishment of the Gaza and Ndebele states.

In the years after the Ngoni invasions of the 1820s and 1830s the southern Shona country was subjected to raids from the east, south and west, carried out by several different peoples. The Ngoni of Ngwana 'Masesenyane' and 'Mpanga' passed through the Great Zimbabwe region, and had time to incorporate a number of Shona into their groups before they continued towards the north.[12] After 1862 the Gaza Nguni established themselves in the mountains east

of the Save river, and until they moved towards the coast in 1889 they exercised their power for a great distance to the west. Most of the Duma people paid tribute to the Gaza, and according to tradition the Mutirikwi river became the agreed boundary between the Gaza and Ndebele raiding parties.[13]

South of the Mutirikwi, in the lowveld, Gaza power reached to the Mwenezi and Bubi rivers, and most if not all of the Tsonga Hlengwe came under their sway, so that they became known as 'Shangaans'. The Hlengwe themselves were liable to move westward, and on one occasion Matibi's Pfumbi called in the Ndebele in order to repel Vurumela's section of the Tsonga.[14] From the south, the Venda crossed the lowveld, sometimes trading for cattle with people such as Ziki's Duma,[15] sometimes acting as mercenaries in Shona disputes, as in Chivi and Nemavuzhe,[16] and sometimes raiding. The effects of these Venda raids were still noticeable in 1892.[17]

The Ndebele state also influenced the southern Shona country, but there are good grounds for believing that this influence was neither as strong nor as well-established as European observers later believed. It is true that in 1890 the Ndebele placed markers on the Limpopo in order to indicate the limits of their power,[18] and that they raided the lowveld and the southern plateau until 1893,[19] but there is also a great deal of evidence that suggests that their power was limited.

There were two basic groupings of Shona with regard to their relations with the Ndebele state: those who entered into a regular political relationship with the Ndebele and paid tribute of some kind, and those who did not. In this latter category, some territories were beyond the reach of raiders, some successfully resisted them and some occasionally paid tribute in order to escape raids, but did not do so regularly.

The regular tributaries of the Ndebele included Chirimuhanzu on the Shashe river and the peoples of the modern Shurugwi and Zvishavane districts. However, south and east of Zvishavane Ndebele power was limited, and seems to have been extended to these limits relatively late, in Lobengula's reign. These limitations of Ndebele power are aptly illustrated by the histories of three Shona dynasties, those of Matibi, Nyajena and Chivi.

The Pfumbi dynasty of Matibi covered a great deal of the southern part of the Shona country between the Bubi and Mwenezi rivers, and extended across the lowveld to the mountain of Marungudzi near the Limpopo. We have seen that Matibi called in the Ndebele in order to drive back Vurumela's Tsonga, and he is

known to have paid tribute after this.[20] Yet he did not remain entirely under Lobengula's control. In 1887, tired of the exactions of the Ndebele, he moved out across the badly-watered lowveld to Marungudzi. This was against Lobengula's wishes, and it was not the state's power but severe droughts that forced his people to return in 1889.[21] From then until 1893 Matibi's people were raided by the Ndebele, and it appears that the regular political relationship had broken down.

The history of Nyajena's Jena people in the nineteenth century is closely linked with that of the Dumbuseya. These latter were originally *moyo*-totem Jena and *zhou*-totem Lemba from Nyajena's country who were defeated and assimilated by an Ngoni force under Ngwana 'Masesenyane'. Taken with the Ngoni to the north, they were defeated by Zwangendaba near Mount Hwedza. They then fled to the modern Zvishavane district, where, from the hills now called Mpopoti and Wedza, they extended their rule as far south as Dumbwe and Chamakuwa hills in the Lemba and Ngowa country.[22]

Von Sicard has described how the Dumbuseya, under Wedza and Mazeteze, employed the tactics they had learnt from the Ngoni in order to create a miniature *mfecane*-style raiding state in the territory west of the Runde.[23] In fact it is possible that this Dumbuseya polity delayed the expansion of Ndebele power into the south-east, for Ngowa tradition asserts that Ndebele raids did not become felt until the reign of Mazviwofa Mazorodze, after the battle of Dumbwe.[24] At all events, the Ngowa and Lemba eventually combined in order to seek Ndebele help, and the battles of Dumbwe and Chamakuwa led to the defeat of the Dumbuseya, who fled eastwards towards the country from which they had originally come, the land of Nyajena.[25]

In the nineteenth century Nyajena's people began to exercise a certain amount of power among the small, quarrelling polities of the Turwi-Runde confluence area. Thus Nyajena aided Madzivire in a war with Gororo, and it was presumably with Nyajena's backing that Madzivire was later able to defeat an Ndebele force at Chirongwe hill on at least two occasions. Gororo himself became tributary to Nyajena. When the Dumbuseya were defeated by the Ndebele, Lemba and Ngowa at Dumbwe and Chamakuwa, they moved east and reached the Nevanje district on the Turwi river, next to Gororo's land. They forced Nyajena, Gororo and Madzivire to pay tribute, and for a while seemed likely to settle permanently. However, Nyajena defeated them in battle, and they were forced to move back up the Runde, where they submitted to

the Ndebele.[26] They settled once more around Wedza and Mpopoti, and by 1892 they were raiding eastwards as far as the Turwi in company with the Ndebele.[27] To Nyajena, who reasserted his influence over the Turwi-Runde confluence area, the Dumbuseya and their Ndebele overlords remained a menace.

The history of Chivi also demonstrates the limits of Ndebele power. After a period of raiding, Chivi Matsweru paid a tribute of hoes and skins, but if the Mhari ever became regular tributaries, it was not for long.[28] In fact the circumstances of Matsweru's death in c.1865 suggest that the Ndebele tried to conquer Chivi by indirect means.[29] According to tradition, Matsweru's son Makonese travelled to Mzilikazi and obtained Ndebele aid in order to overthrow his father. In the course of the raid Matsweru died. Despite his Ndebele backing, Makonese did not rule for long, for the houses of all Matsweru's brothers united to defeat him. Although Mazorodze was due to succeed, it was Masunda who led the resistance, and it was his Venda mercenaries who killed Makonese. Masunda, who had not intended this, apparently killed himself in remorse.

This family tragedy deprived Masunda's house of the right to succeed to the Chivi title until all Tavengerweyi's sons were dead; that is, until 1927. It is not surprising that the powerful Masunda house, which controlled the south-eastern approaches to the territory and yet could not hold the supreme title, sometimes acted in an aggressive manner, from sheer frustration.[30]

One account states that Matsweru's successor Mazorodze was supported by the Ndebele,[31] but in any case, by 1879 he had begun to resist them. He was accused of building up an army, backed by the wealth of great herds of cattle, and in the winter of that year the Ndebele attacked him. A large force under Lotshe besieged the Shona in Nyaningwe and the nearby hills, and met with a serious defeat. The Shona now had large numbers of guns, and from the cover of the hills they 'very nearly completely killed all the Imbizo regiment', as M.E. Weale put it in 1895.[32] In 1890 Major Maxwell at Bulawayo noted that 'they were three months in front of this chief's [Chivi's] stronghold but could make no impression; [they] lost a large number of the Imbiso, brought back no cattle. Loojie and Manyow were in command. This chief is occupying a portion of Matabeleland[!], he has never paid tribute to Loben[gula].'[33] The Ndebele scored only one success: Chivi Mazorodze was captured while visiting an outlying village, and was taken to Bulawayo where he was skinned alive by the Mfengu war-doctor William Zizi.[35]

The death of Mazorodze did not alter the basic situation,

however. The Ndebele could not take the Shona strongholds while the latter had guns, although the Shona could not stop the Ndebele from ranging over the flat country. Thus when François Coillard escorted some African evangelists into Chivi's territory in late 1877 in order to resume their work of 1874 – 5, and called upon the Ndebele for help after he had suffered thefts, the Mhari made no attempt to prevent his departure, because they could not face the Ndebele in the open.[36]

Madhlangove summed up the position when he spoke to F.C. Selous in 1891 on Nyaningwe, while Ndebele forces raided the plain below: 'although I should be strong enough to repulse and rout the six hundred [Ndebele], I would be very stupid if I did it, because Lobengula would lead two thousand or three thousand men against me and would put me to death.'[37]

According to Posselt the Mhari became divided into those who stayed on the plains and occasionally paid tribute, and those who fought from the hills.[38] Yet the Mhari still resisted the Ndebele. In 1888 Nyamondo told the German missionaries Schwellnus and Knothe that there was war in Chivi, where the Ngowa and the Ndebele were attacking the Mhari,[39] and in 1892 Chivi's people inflicted casualties on a raiding force of Ndebele.[40] It is not hard to see why the Mhari should have continued to resist: the Ndebele had raided them and caused losses of life and property, and they had even weakened Chivi's power in the north-west by helping Shiku to break away from Mhari overlordship.[41]

It can be seen from these accounts that the belief of nineteenth-century European observers that the Shona were helpless victims of Ndebele and Gaza aggression was wide of the mark. The Shona lacked the organization of the Nguni states, but they were perfectly able to formulate and follow independent policies. Moreover, the availability of guns in quantity from the 1860s onwards did much to counteract Nguni military strength. Venda gunmen fought in the Chivi civil war of the late 1860s; Venda gunsellers eventually penetrated as far as Chirimuhanzu, seventy kilometres north of modern Masvingo, and Shona people from nearby Serima travelled to the Transvaal to buy guns from the Venda.[42]

By 1887 the people of Chirimuhanzu could choose between Portuguese guns from Sena and British guns obtained — illegally — through the traders in the Ndebele country.[43] The Shona swiftly mastered the techniques of repairing guns, making powder and percussion-caps, and casting ammunition. Equally swiftly, they learned to fight from behind cover and even to adapt their stone wall-building techniques to the new weapon, building sconces of

stone overnight to meet specific tactical requirements.[44] The defeats of the Ndebele by Chivi in 1879 and of the Gaza by Gutu in c.1880 were indications of the growing military strength of the Shona.[45] As the evangelist Gabriel Buys remarked in 1883: 'the Banyai are this year totally different from my earlier experience of them.'[46]

The origins and meaning of the 1890 treaties

Yet although the advance of the 'gun frontier' helped to strengthen the Shona against the Ndebele, it could not solve the problem. Muzzle-loading guns, however formidable in the hills, could not defeat the Ndebele impis in the open. Only the introduction of breech-loading rifles, the formation of a major coalition or the availability of new allies or mercenaries could really keep out the Ndebele. Only one dynasty, that of Matibi, is known to have acquired many modern rifles by 1896. No major anti-Ndebele coalition manifested itself among the southern Shona until 1893, and even then it was in conjunction with the British attack on the Ndebele.

Until 1893, then, the need for allies was paramount; but the available choice was limited. The Gaza had been allies of the Ndebele since 1879, and in 1889 they moved down to the coast, away from the southern Shona.[47] The Venda were not really strong enough to tackle the Ndebele, and in any case they had their own troubles with the Afrikaners. The Paris, Berlin and Dutch Reformed Church evangelists and missionaries were generally welcomed because, as the evangelist Petrus Buys accurately observed in 1883, they were valued for their shooting skill and their potential value *vis-á-vis* local rivals.[48] But even when a ruler such as Matibi was willing to risk Lobengula's displeasure in order to keep 'his' missionaries, the missionaries themselves had neither the strength nor the inclination to fight the Ndebele.[49] Until 1890 the British were far away in the Tswana country, and thus for the southern Shona the only possible allies in the 1880s were the Afrikaners.

The Afrikaners, or *vabhunu* as they were known to the Shona,[50] had been a factor in the Shona country since the 1830s, when Hendrik Potgieter and Carolus Tregardt had investigated the hinterland of Sofala.[51] However, it does not seem that the Afrikaners seriously considered settling in Shona country before 1890. Their hunting parties entered the lowveld every winter, and their trails were well established by the 1870s.

The relations between these hunting parties and the Shona

varied. On one occasion field-cornet Frederik Grobler of Waterberg led an attack upon the village of Zimuto after he had suffered from thefts. It was in this fight that the evangelist Gabriel Buys was killed.[52] But not all Afrikaner-Shona relations were so hostile. J. du Preez, field-cornet of Zoutpansberg, hearing of Grobler's action, advised Zimuto to send witnesses to the Transvaal authorities, so that Grobler could be prosecuted.[53] However, it appears that Kruger decided that the matter was beyond his jurisdiction.[54]

As far back as Mzilikazi's reign, relations between the Afrikaners and the Shona had been regarded with suspicion by the Ndebele. Rightly or wrongly, Mzilikazi decided that Mtubayedzi, a Rozvi ruler of the Mpateni area had been intriguing to get Afrikaner help against him, and these Rozvi were 'almost wiped out' as a result.[55] According to Rademeyer and Preller, a treaty of some kind had been made between Chivi and Potgieter in 1847, but no details have appeared.[56] In late 1890 J.L.H. du Preez and B.J. Vorster stated that from 1874 onwards the Shona requested the Afrikaners 'to come and live with them to protect them from the murder raids etc. committed on them by the nation of Mosallekaats alias [the Matabeles]'; that in 1880 a Shona deputation arrived in the Zoutpansberg to repeat the request, and that in 1884 the Afrikaners 'had a mutual understanding and had procured cession of certain parts of Baijaailand from the Baijaai.'[57] However, du Preez and Vorster were promoters of the 'Adendorff Concession' which they had secured in August 1890, and so their evidence on this point must be regarded with some caution.

The story now comes to the year 1890, to the clash of interests between the Transvaal Afrikaners and the British South Africa Company, and to the ludicrous situation in August 1890 in which each party had secured statements to their own advantage from two men each of whom claimed to be Chivi.

On 30 October 1888 the subordinates of C.J. Rhodes had secured from Lobengula, the right to extract minerals within his territory. The Rudd Concession was the only local agreement upon which Rhodes' British South Africa Company based its right to enter and occupy the Shona country in 1890. Thus the Chartered Company's position depended upon the extent and effectiveness of Ndebele rule, and they assumed that it extended as far as the Save river in the east and even further to the north.[58]

When the Company's Pioneer Column, led by Lieut.-Colonel Pennefather, A.R. Colquhoun and L.S. Jameson, and guided by Selous, began to skirt the Ndebele state proper on its way, they generally assumed that they were in Ndebele-controlled territory.

However, on 3 August, the day after the Column reached the Runde river, Colquhoun wrote to the Company secretary at Kimberley: 'The question of Chibi's independence has been raised by Selous, and Pennefather intends to execute a treaty with him. Both Jameson and I thought it wise not to take the step, but to assume Lo Ben[gula]'s authority. Pennefather will, however, keep the matter private and I have asked him to cut out from his Progress Report a passage referring to the question, and instead to write confidentially to Mr. Rhodes, which he is doing. It was not politic that such a passage should appear in a Report.'[59]

Jameson commented, 'The Colonel seems to have a weakness for the flag and treaty trick á la Mozambique Johnson [sic], within the limits which Loben[gula] claims, using Limpopo on south and Sabi east. This w[oul]d surely be rather dangerous, as it w[oul]d give a handle to opponents saying that making a treaty with one, we ought to make it with all. This the Colonel saw the force of as regards Matipi [Matibi] and Setoutsi [Chitawudze] who themselves ackowledge that they are tributary to Loben[gula]; but Tschibi it seems denies having anything to do with the Matabele, having beaten them off when attacked. Considering that the old Tschibi was skinned alive at Bulawayo four years ago I should think Loben[gula] might fairly claim their conzaing. . . . Selous' mania as to the limit of Loben[gula]'s authority, and his impolitic way of blurting it out, no doubt influenced the Colonel in this matter. . . .'[60]

Rutherfoord Harris' reaction confirmed the danger in which the Company lay: 'Don't let Pennefather repeat that treaty business, although done with the best motives still you and Jameson are right and it is most impolitic: we stand on one pillar only west of 33° East'[61] and 'It is impossible to commence an independent Mashonaland with an infinite number of ragged miserable Chiefs'.[62] Meanwhile, on 3 August Pennefather had ordered Selous and R.G. Nicholson to discover Chivi's true status.[63]

In Nicholson's words, they set out 'with a present of a M[artini] H[enry] Rifle, 100 rounds of ammunition and 2 blankets, with instructions to find out whether he was an independent chief or not. We arrived there on the evening of the 3rd August and interviewed the chief . . . his reply was, to use his own words, which are very significant, "Today I am still Cheba because I 'konzaed' to the Matabele and want to live. If I had not 'konzaed' I could no longer be Cheba and you would not have seen me here".' No Europeans had been near for three years, the ruler added, and on the 5th Selous and Nicholson, returning from the highveld, slept at his

village, escorting him on the 6th to the British camp, where he was interviewed and photographed.[64]

The interview at the camp was most satisfactory to the Company. Jameson wrote that 'Chibi, who lives 15 miles from here, came in yesterday with several of his people — a very satisfactory interview. Inthe first few minutes [he] acknowledged that he paid rent to Loben[gula]. . . . This practically takes us up to Selous' own line, the Sabi, and does away with any necessity for what seemed to me a very dangerous policy — trying separate agreements with what Loben[gula], at all events, considers his tributaries. Colquhoun's swagger parchments will be kept for their legitimate purpose outside Loben[gula]'s lines, Manica etc. . . .'[65] The information was communicated to the press, and all seemed well.[66]

But, in the meantime, a group of the Transvaal Afrikaners had been active. As early as February 1890, Selous had warned Rhodes that J. du Preez had told him in the Zoutpansberg 'that for some years past the Boers in the Zoutpansberg district have been preparing for a trek into Manyaia land.'[67] A consortium planned to rendezvous on the Limpopo in early July, but the Dutch Reformed Church missionary S.P. Helm, who hoped to accompany them to the Shona country, noted that by 7 July only one member had turned up, and so he went on with his evangelists.[68] British pressure on the Transvaal had delayed the consortium,[69] but they eventually set out to secure their concession.

On 3 August Jameson noted that: 'Four days ago four traders of doubtful reputation appeared with two wagons and have continued behind the column since. They profess to wish to trade at Tschibi's. . . .'[70] Pennefather noted that these traders came from the Zoutpansberg and had raised a false alarm about Ndebele following the Column,[71] and according to Nicholson, J. du Preez later confirmed that this was the 'Adendorff' consortium's party of himself, C.J.F. Brummer, H.L. Brummer and C.G. Nel.[72]

But the Afrikaners did not stay with the British column. On the afternoon of 4 August, Helm and his evangelists, who had just crossed the Turwi on their way back from Great Zimbabwe and the territories of Mugabe and Nyajena Musovi where they had been consolidating the work of the African evangelists there the previous year, met one of the Brummers, who had come looking for them. It seemed that the Afrikaner concession-seekers had come in such haste that they had no interpreter of Shona. Accordingly, Helm's evangelist Micha Makhatho was recruited.[73] Helm's party continued past Madzivire's and across the Runde, and on the morning

of 7 August du Preez's party caught them up. They proceeded together to the Bubi, and went their separate ways home.[74]

Du Preez had, on 5 and 6 August, secured a concession from 'Sebasha (alias Schibe)' and [Nyajena] 'Mazobe' [Musovi] respectively. Its content completely contradicted the statements obtained by the British from *their* 'Chivi', and declared these rulers' independence of Lobengula and their willingness to grant extensive rights to the Afrikaners in return for protection and cattle or blankets.[75]

How can this paradox be resolved? The answer is, quite simply, that the Afrikaners and the British had interviewed two different men, neither of whom was Chivi. D.K. Parkinson has shown that, far from interviewing Chivi Madhlangove on his hill-top stronghold of Nyaningwe some twenty-five kilometres from the British Column's route, Selous and Nicholson had reached Chirogwe hill, and had met Chirambamuriwo, a son of Masunda I, whose house had seized the hill from the Pako earlier in the century.[76] As for 'Sebasha', he was in fact Chivasa, of Matsweru house, who had seized Chisinge hill in Nemavuzhe's country in the early 1880s.

In retrospect, it seems likely that on both the Afrikaner and the British sides, individuals suspected their 'Chivi's' *bona fides*, but kept quiet. In December 1891, Selous told the press that on his return through Masunda's area 'I had an interview with him. He then represented himself to be the eldest son of the Tschibi, who was put to death by the Matabele, but as I had been told that Tschibi's real successor lived further to the north, I had strong doubts as to the truth of his statement, the more especially as upon August 2nd, the first day of our visit, a small boy of about ten years of age had been put forward as the present representative of the name. However, as it was not my business to go off my line to discover Tschibi, I gave Masunda a present, receiving from him a cow in return. He then went with me to the camp on the Lundi, where he was interviewed. . . .'[77]

Selous' testimony, in view of his orders of 3 August 1890, hardly accords with his public image as an impartial witness. It seems probable that du Preez also suspected 'his' Chivi's status. Chivasa's position as son of Chivi Matsweru had been immediately apparent to the German missionaries Knothe and Schwellnus who approached his territory in 1888,[78] and to the Posselt brothers, who arrived in 1889.[79] Chivasa's status and the true locality of Chivi Madhlangove should have been known to du Preez, who claimed to 'have known the land of the Baijaai now for the past twenty-eight

years. . .'.[80] On the other hand 'Mazobe' was indeed Nyajena Musovi, ruler of the Jena people east of the Turwi.[81]

In situations such as this it was all too easy for interested Europeans to put leading questions to African rulers, or even to fabricate statements. Thus when Chirambamuriwo was interviewed on 6 August 1890; or when Chivi Madhlangove himself was interviewed by Selous in the presence of Rhodes and Jameson on 4 November 1891, and they declared their subservience to Lobengula; or when Chivasa declared his independence to du Preez on 5 August 1890, these statements by themselves cannot be relied upon. It is much safer for the investigator to examine the whole history of Chivi's relations with the Ndebele up to 1893, as has been done above. Nevertheless, unless one is to dismiss the statements of the two false Chivis purely as examples of Afrikaner and British chicanery, they must be examined in order to see how they related to Shona politics and policies at the time. To begin with, from the Shona point of view, Chirambamuriwo and Chivasa were not far from the truth when they called themselves Chivi. Thus Chirambamuriwo, of the powerful and politically frustrated house of Masunda, might claim to be Chivi because his father Masunda I would have been Chivi if he had not committed suicide, while Chivasa was similarly a son of Chivi Matsweru. To do so implied rebellion against Madhlangove, but such claims could well have been sincere.

In the statements of these two men, one can also see elements of Shona policy. Chirambamuriwo's statement to Nicholson and Selous that 'I am still Cheba because I "konzaed" to the Matabele and want to live' tends to confirm Chivi Madhlangove's comment to Selous in 1891 that although he could defeat small Ndebele forces, he did not care to face another major attack. In other words, although hill-strongholds such as Nyaningwe were impregnable to the Ndebele when defended by Shona gunmen as they had been in 1879 and as they were to be defended in 1892, the military stalemate between the Shona and the Ndebele persisted. If Chivasa was not Chivi, he was at least an important member of the dynasty, while Nyajena Musovi was the ruler of a powerful people who had earlier driven out the Dumbuseya. In the wording of the document the rulers 'signed', one can see an answer to the needs of the southern Shona:

'. . . Sebasha [alias Schebe] and Mazobe, paramount chiefs of Banjailand with counsel and advice from our most important councillors and other sub-chiefs cede, surrender and transfer to [du Preez, Adendorff, de Myer, Brummer and Vorster] for continued use and everlasting occupation and inheritance . . . under their own

presently existing or yet to be declared laws, stipulations and regulations *entirely independent of our people's rights or existence* [this writer's italics] under such form of state government as would hereafter be found suitable to constitute over the land or territory now legally surrendered to them by us . . . [the area concerned is then described] . . . for and under the following considerations: 1. that you will protect us against the continuous raids by other powerful tribes, 2. that for tenure and occupation of the land you will pay a sum of 50 head of cattle or two (2) blankets in place of each beast.' They then add that the 'cession and surrender of territory' has been interpreted and re-read and agreed to, and add their marks as 'Sebasha', dated at 'Chobase' on 5 August 1890 and as 'Mozobe', dated at 'Jena' on 6 August 1890.[82] The wording of this document is somewhat ambiguous, for it was not framed by professional lawyers, but the words 'entirely independent of our people's rights or existence' appear to make it amenable to Shona custom in general and to the needs of Nyajena and Chivasa in particular. In effect, the two rulers were granting settlement-rights to a band of *torwa* (strangers) who would in return act as mercenaries against the Ndebele and would pay tribute.

It was not unusual for such *vatorwa* to remain under their own sub-rulers for purposes of administration and justice even when they were scattered among the villages of the ruling dynasty. It had been on similar terms that Chivi Tavengerweyi's people had settled in the land of the Ngowa ruler Kuvirimara Zengeya early in the century. The use of foreign gunmen as mercenaries had a precedent too, in the use of Venda in the Chivi civil war between Makonese and his uncles' houses. Finally, Chivasa and the rest of Chivi's Mhari had suffered in the past from the raids of the Ndebele, while Nyajena's most formidable enemies, the Dumbuseya, were even then living under Ndebele rule at Wedza and Mpopoti, and remained a menace.

In short, from the Shona point of view the 'Adendorff Concession' was a perfectly reasonable document, and one that answered their needs very well. Had Chivi Madhlangove himself been presented with it, the Mhari as a whole might well have endorsed it.

But of course du Preez, Adendorff and Vorster did not see the treaty from the Shona point of view. There are good reasons, in fact, for believing that they had only obtained the concession in order to sell it to Rhodes, as several people claimed at the time.[83] The area they claimed under the concession, comprising the entire area between the Gaza and Ndebele, the Limpopo and the Zambezi, bore no relation to the territories of Nyajena and Chivi,

let alone of Chivasa. However, they disposed of it to others, who made a serious attempt to put it into effect in the following year.[84]

Had a 'Republic of Banyailand' come into existence it would have run into serious difficulties almost immediately. It applied to two separate areas of rocky mountains and heavily wooded valleys that were hardly large enough for the numbers of trekkers envisaged or at all attractive to European farmers: most of these areas have been left in African hands up to the present. The 'Republic of Banyailand' would have depended for its land policy upon Roman Dutch law, which with its concept of farms held in absolute tenure conflicted with the Shona law of the bulk of the area's inhabitants. Moreover, the apparatus of a trekker Republic, with its President, Volksraad, Landdrosts and Field Cornets, as well as the usual trekker methods of recruiting labour, would have clashed with the rule of the Shona. Some sort of violent reaction would have been certain, and in that difficult country the scattered trekkers would probably have fared badly against the Shona gunmen in the hills.

In the event, the 'Republic of Banyailand' never came about, and therefore we will not follow the progress of the Banyailand trek movement in South African history.

In the Shona country the arrival of the British changed the face of southern Shona politics. The British column passed on, but a large garrison was left at Fort Victoria, and post-stations were erected on the road at the Turwi and Runde. A party of Europeans came to Nyaningwe, discovered that Madhlangove was the real Chivi, went to Chirambamuriwo, flogged him and removed the gun and blankets they had given him and presented them to the true ruler.[85] In 1891, when the Banyailand Trek crisis was at its height, British South Africa Company Police fortified the Naka Pass against the Afrikaners,[86] and J.S. Brabant was discharged from the Police and sent to Nyaningwe as Civil Representative to watch out for Afrikaner emissaries.[87] By the time Rhodes, Jameson, Selous and de Waal joined Brabant at Nyaningwe in November 1891 the British were obviously strongly established, a factor that may well have influenced their interview with Chivi.

In Shona history the Afrikaners who gathered on the Limpopo in June 1891 are symbols of the developing resistance of the Shona to the Ndebele. From individual defences of strongholds earlier in the century the Shona had progressed to making use of mercenaries or allies against the Ndebele, and by 1893 they took this process to its logical conclusion when the forces of Chirimuhanzu, Gutu, Zimuto, Chivi and Matibi united with the British to attack the Ndebele. This union itself had far-reaching consequences in

southern Shona politics, but the Afrikaners were no longer concerned. The arrival of the British in August 1890 and the defeat of the Banyailand Trek movement in June 1891 menat that the Afrikaners were no longer an independent factor in Shona history.

Conclusion

The early 1970s was one of the most prolific periods in the writing of Zimbabwean precolonial history. Within a few years of the publication of this microstudy of the Chivi-Nyajena area, much more detailed studies of the southern Shona appeared. Unfortunately only one has been published.

J.D. White's 'Esitshebeni, some notes on the history and customs of Shabani district', was completed in 1974 and a copy is in the National Archives. Its title is deceptively modest, as in fact it covered, through an examination of the history of the main groups in Zvishavane, a good deal of the history of the surrounding areas. White's use of a very wide range of evidence was very thorough, and made many modifications to the picture given in this chapter. For example, it is now clear that the Dumbuseya, after they split from the Maseko Ngoni in the 1830s, remained east of the Runde right up to their attempt to establish themselves in the Runde-Turwi angle in the late 1860s, and that it was after that that they were resettled by the Ndebele west of the Runde. The Dumbuseya were given a fairly free hand after that, until the Ndebele and others brought them into line in the 1880s.

R.M.G. Mtetwa's doctoral thesis 'The "political" and economic history of the Duma people of south-eastern Rhodesia from the early eighteenth century to 1945' (University of Rhodesia, 1976) supplies an even more detailed picture for the whole region between the Save and Great Zimbabwe. For the nineteenth century, there is a very careful analysis of the relations between the Gaza state and the Duma confederacy.

P. Zachrisson's 'An African area in change. Belingwe 1894 – 1946', *Bulletin of Department of History*, No. 17, University of Gothenburg, 1978, does a similar job for the region west of White's area of study, and confirms the picture of a relatively late Ndebele dominance over the Mberengwa area.

In short, we now know a great deal more about the history of the southern Shona in the nineteenth century, though there are still areas that require more detailed study.

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22. See note 12 above. The Dumbuseya evidently took part in the first battle between Ngwana and Zwangendaba (Liesegang, 320), but missed the second battle in 1835 in which Nxaba and Ngwana combined to defeat Zwangendaba. Mount Hwedza, south of Marondera, should not be confused with Wedza hill or mountain, near Zvishavane.
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25. Von Sicard, 'Dumbuseya', 32 – 5, and MLGTP, DDA, Delineation Report, Zvishavane, 1965.
26. N 3/33/8, Chibi history, 1904.
27. A 1/9/1, H. Paulet to L.S. Jameson, Victoria, 28 July 1892.
28. Franklin, 'Nyaningwe' 83.
29. Matsweru's death in c.1865 is a median dating. According to a raid-list collected in 1898, Matsweru died after Hwata submitted to the Ndebele in 1863 and before Mzilikazi's death in 1868. (NB 6/1/1, NC Selukwe to CNC Bulawayo, 31 March 1898). Masunda I had at least 29 sons, (Zwakavapano, 59) and died shortly after Matsweru, yet Carl Mauch in 1871 described Masunda as a young man (*The Journals of Carl Mauch, 1869 – 1872*, ed. E.E. Burke, Salisbury, 1969, 159). This must have been Masunda II, Manyumbu.
30. See note 9 above. UZHD text 12 Chivi.
31. Franklin, 'Nyaningwe', 84. But this is not likely, under the circumstances quoted: Mazarire, who was not blind, was ineligible for the title because he was a medium (*svikiro*) while according to more recent studies, Musuvugwa and Makamure were younger than Mazorodze. H. Franklin, 'Manyusa (Amanxusa)', *NADA* 10, 1932, 82, Duncan and 'Kandamakumbo', *op.cit.*
32. N 9/1/1, NC Chibi, Annual Report, 1895.
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54. ANGK S. Hofmeyr to J.H. Neethling, 7 December 1883.
55. NB 6/1/1, NC Belingwe to CNC Bulawayo, 31 March 1898.
56. Rademeyer, *Die Land*, 138; Preller, *Die Grobler Moord*, 147.
57. Transvaal Archives (henceforth TA) SSA 319, RA 282/96, B.J. Vorster to Landdrost G.G. Munnik, Pietersburg, 14 October 1890 and Affidavit of J.L.H. du Preez, 18 November 1890. These Transvaal Archives documents are those used by Rademeyer, and were obtained by mail and translated by Mr. and Mrs. C.M. Brand.
58. T.O. Ranger, 'The rewriting of African history during the Scramble: the Matabele dominance in Mashonaland', *African Social Research*, 4, 1967.
59. A 2/12/1, A.R. Colquhoun to F. Rutherfoord Harris, Runde River, 3 August 1890.
60. CT 1/13/6, L.S. Jameson to F. Rutherfoord Harris, Runde River, 3 August 1890.
61. A 1/2/3, F. Rutherfoord Harris to A.R. Colquhoun, Kimberley (telegram), 25 August 1890.
62. A 1/2/3, F. Rutherfoord Harris to A.R. Colquhoun, Kimberley, 29 August 1890.
63. LO 5/2/3, Col. Pennefather to F. Rutherfoord Harris, Runde River, 3 August 1890. Selous' account of this is most deceptive and completely ignores the political reason for this patrol. F.C. Selous, *Travel and Adventure in South East Africa*, (London, 1893), 374 – 8.
64. NAR CT 1/5/2, R.G. Nicholson to F. Rutherfoord Harris, Pietersburg, 7 November 1890. Nicholson claimed that 'Chivi's' fear of the Ndebele prevented him from giving him a cow at the time. There are other possible reasons! The photograph appears in D.K. Parkinson, 'Chief Chibi, 1890', *Rhodesiana* 15, 1966, 64.
65. CT 1/13/6, L.S. Jameson to F. Rutherfoord Harris, Runde River, 7 August 1890.
66. LO 5/2/3, *Cape Times* correspondent to *Cape Times*, BSAC camp, 17 August 1890.
67. CT 1/5/2, F.C. Selous to C.J. Rhodes, Kimberley, 14 February 1890.
68. ANGK Helm's Report, entry for 7 July 1890.
69. ANGK S. Hofmeyr to J.H. Neethling, 27 June 1890.
70. CT 1/13/6, L.S. Jameson to F. Rutherfoord Harris, Runde River, 3 August 1890.
71. LO 5/2/3, Col. Pennefather to F. Rutherfoord Harris, Runde River, 3 August 1890.

72. CT 1/5/2, R.G. Nicholson to F. Rutherfoord Harris, Pietersburg, 7 November 1890.
73. ANGK Helm's Report, entry for 4 August 1890.
74. ANGK Helm's Report, entries for 7 to 23 August 1890.
75. TA SSA 319, RA 282/96, 'Acten van Sessie en afstandt van grond en grondgebied, 5 and 6 August 1890', fair copy by Landdrost G.G. Munnik, stamped 'Landdrost Kantoor, 18 Nov. 90, Pietersburg, Z.A.R.'
76. Parkinson, 'Chibi' 63 – 7.
77. *The Cape Times*, 12 December [in NAR LO 5/2/15].
78. Hist. Mss. BE 2/1/1, Diary of Superintendent Knothe, 15 August 1888.
79. W. Posselt, 'The Early Days of Mashonaland', *NADA* 2, 1924, 73; Hist. Mss. PO 3/2/2, 10.
80. TA SSA 319, RA 282/96, Affidavit of J.L.H. du Preez, 18 November 1890.
81. ANGK Helm's Report, entries for 24, 27 and 31 July 1890.
82. TA SSA 319, RA 282/96, 'Acten van Sessie en afstandt van grond en grond gebeid, 5 and 6 August 1890.'
83. De Waal, *With Rhodes in Mashonaland*, 92 – 5; G.G. Munnik, *Memoirs*, (Cape Town, 1934), 132 – 4.
84. T.R.H. Davenport, *The Afrikaner Bond*, (Cape Town, 1966), 134 – 6.
85. Parkinson, 'Chibi', 65; UZHD Text 13 Chivi.
86. D.K. Parkinson, 'The Fort at Naka Pass', *Rhodesiana* 19, 1968.
87. A 1/15/2, Applications . . . for B.S.A.C. Civil Employment, 12 May 1891, and A 2/1/3, H. Marshall Hole to J.S. Brabant, Victoria, 15 August 1892. Nyajena Musovi's part in the treaties was never discovered, and later writers confused 'Mazobe' with Matibi, who was not involved in the affair. A. Darter, *The Pioneers of Mashonaland*, (London, 1914), 78.

3

The Politics of Collaboration: The Southern Shona, 1896 – 1897

Introduction

When the study of African history got under way on a grand scale in the 1960s, the term 'resistance' began to be applied to the struggle of Africans against the onset and continuation of colonial rule. It was a useful and appropriate word. It avoided the suggestion of the colonial histories, which had usually used the word 'rebellion', that the Africans had accepted colonial rule as being legitimate. It was also sufficiently flexible to cover strikes, maroonage and other forms of reaction to colonial rule that did not involve actual fighting.

Inevitably, however, it evoked memories of the European resistance movements that worked against Nazi rule in Europe in 1939 – 45. This was no problem. But what was the historian to call those Africans who took up arms to join the colonial governments in suppressing resistance? The European parallel was the 'collaborator' who worked with the Nazis during the Second World War, not necessarily out of love for the Germans or Nazism but out of traditional or ideological opposition to those who were running the resistance.

This word also came into fairly widespread use in Africa in the 1960s,[1] but its use encountered certain problems. For example, a retired Rhodesian official objected to its use in the original paper upon which this chapter is based. He called it 'obnoxious and unnecessary' with 'dirty modern connotations', and obviously felt that it linked the Rhodesians of the 1890s with the Nazis of the 1940s.[2] He suggested the word 'co-operation'.

It was not just the colonialists who were embarrassed by the word. In the nationalist climate of the 1960s and 1970s it was not pleasant for many people to learn that their grandfathers had fought on the wrong side in 1896. Whatever one calls it, however, the phenomenon known as 'collaboration' existed right across

Africa, and in most of Africa people have come to terms with it as an episode of the past. But it remains to understand it.

Many studies of resistance and collaboration at the onset of colonial rule in Africa have confirmed the picture shown in this and the next two chapters: resistance, collaboration or neutrality were not neat categories into which different groups could be slotted by historians. Groups often shifted from one category to another and back again, depending on the politics of the day. Sometimes, groups fell into more than one category at the same time.

Similarly, there was no straightfoward relationship between the impact of colonial rule and resistance or collaboration. As this chapter shows, those who collaborated among the southern Shona had been hit at least as hard by colonial rule as those who resisted in other areas. Above all, those who lived in the last years of colonial rule and in the first years of national independence should realise that those who took part in the wars of the colonial conquest period, on whichever side, were not seeing things in terms of nationalism versus colonialism.

There was no true Zimbabwean nationalism in the 1890s, and colonialism in those early years was not recognized fully for what it was. There was a kind of loyalty to the Ndebele state — and even that had been limited by divisions within the Ndebele between 1840 and 1893 — but the loyalties of the different Shona groups were confined to the dynastic units alone, even though *ad hoc* alliances might be made between a few of these in the face of a common threat. The forced labour and cattle-raiding (in the name of taxation) that were the most unpleasant pressures of colonial rule before 1896 were severe enough to lead many into the First Chimurenga, but not so severe as to wipe out the old local rivalries. In short, the people of the 1890s reacted according to their own priorities and not, understandably, according to those of the people of the 1980s. In this, they were behaving just like the rest of the people of Africa at that time.[3]

This chapter is the only one that has not been published previously. It is based on a seminar paper in 1969, 'The politics of collaboration: South Mashonaland, 1896 – 7', presented at the then University College of Rhodesia. This was swiftly updated by my Ph.D. thesis 'The rising in south-western Mashonaland, 1896 – 7' presented at the University of London in 1971. This was summarized in 'Resistance and collaboration in the Shona country, 1896 – 7', a paper presented at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in 1971. None of these was published, and Chapter 5 of this book explains why. This chapter makes use of the material in the thesis.

The seminar papers of 1969 and 1971 should now be of interest only to compulsive collectors of obsolete writings.

Finally, it should be noted that the section below on colonial rule and the southern Shona between 1890 and 1896 is a condensation of the available evidence. It makes the point that the southern Shona had not been treated so gently that they collaborated with the colonial government out of gratitude. On the other hand, ongoing research in the northern and eastern parts of the country makes it clear that the southerners had not been ruled with such comparative severity as to intimidate them into collaborating — although the evidence below, on the way they did so, should be clear enough.

When the First Chimurenga broke out among the Ndebele in March 1896 and then spread to the central Shona in June, a considerable number of people decided to fight on the side of the colonial government. These included some of the Ndebele and Kalanga west of Bulawayo,[4] the Budya of Mutoko, some of Makoni's people, the Manyika and scattered groups within the area of the main risings.[5] The most important to do so, however, lived in a chain from the upper Save river to the southeastern lowveld, primarily the Njanja, Chirimuhanzu's Manyika-Govera, Gutu's Rufura, Zimuto's *ngara*-Govera, Chivi's Mhari and Matibi's Pfumbi.

The strategic implications of this for the course of the war were considerable. The Ndebele and Kalanga collaborators did help to make it easier for the Europeans in Bulawayo to keep in touch with the south.[6] The Budya, who had actually been fighting the government's tax collectors *until* the main Shona rising took place, did a lot to harass the resistance in Murewa in 1897.[7] The Manyika helped to secure the government's communications with the east,[8] while the southerners protected Victoria and the road to Tuli. But the repercussions of the collaboration were more serious than this. The Chimurenga among the Shona outside the area of the old Ndebele state spread from dynasty to dynasty, with the rulers and people deciding on the spot whether to join in or not. If one group decided to go to war, then the word would be spread to its neighbours, who would then make their own decisions. If one of these neighbours decided to stay neutral, however, or to join the Europeans, then its own neighbours farther away from the fighting would usually stay out.

The basic reason was probably that, much though such a group might want to join in against the colonial power, to do so while isolated from the main rising by neutrals or collaborators was militarily risky. The effect of the chain of collaborator dynasties

from the upper Save to the lowveld, therefore, was to prevent the Chimurenga from spreading east, over a very wide front. Quite apart from the effect that the encirclement of the laagers at Umtali, Melsetter and Victoria would have had on the war, some of the most heavily-populated parts of the country, such as Duma, were unable to take part. Indeed, rather more people were thus neutralised or collaborating than joined in the Chimurenga.[9] This was not the only reason why the Chimurenga failed, but it was an important one.

These points are obvious from hindsight. The participants were not aware of them. Instead, as will be shown below, while they had ample cause to join the Chimurenga for the same reasons as everybody else, they chose to work against it for local motives. As will be seen, these local motives were rooted in a very complex series of internal and external rivalries.

The politics of the borderlands, 1880 – 1894

All of the territories we will be dealing with lay on the eastern limits of the Ndebele power in the 1880s. At the northern end of the chain, the Mutekedza dynasty had been paying tribute to the Ndebele since the 1870s, and it was still doing so in 1888.[10] In 1889, however, it abandoned this link and turned to the Portuguese, accepting guns from the Portuguese camp at Mangwende's.[11] The Ndebele did not respond to this because the arrival of the B.S.A. Company's forces in the next year changed the whole situation.

By this time the Mutekedza dynasty was deeply divided. The death of the last of the sons of Musonza in the late 1880s meant that there was no clear successor to the title, and not only were the next houses of Musonza's sons unable to decide among themselves as to whom the next Mutekedza should be — and one of these houses, that of Chiso, was itself split in two — but the Masarirambi house was beginning to try to regain power. 'Masarirambi' had been the original name of the whole dynasty, but early in the century the title was changed to 'Mutekedza' and confined to the lineage of Musonza. The descendants of an early Masarirambi, Chingwere, commenced their return to power in 1889, and sent a separate expedition to the Portuguese to collect guns. From then until 1893 there was no clearly acknowledged Mutekedza, and the territory was on the verge of civil war.[12]

The situation was resolved by an alliance between the Masarirambi faction and the whites. In 1891 a policeman named Short

was placed at the Umniati post station, just south of Fort Charter, and when he left the police he stayed on to trade. At some time between then and 1896 he married the daughter of Muchecheterwa the leader of the Masarirambi group. By 1892 he was evidently involved in Mutekedza politics, and in 1893 he managed to get his father-in-law confirmed as Mutekedza by Rhodes himself.[13] According to tradition, the *mhondoro* of Mutekedza agreed with this.[14] The new ruler then had to face the main onslaught of the Native Department, watched by unsatisfied rivals.

Just to the southeast lay the territories of the Njanja. Although they had been raided by the Ndebele, they had never been regular tribute-payers, and in 1889 they joined in the rush for guns from the Portuguese.[15] But although the supreme dynastic title of Gambiza still existed, its holder was no longer able to control his household, who had become in effect independent rulers in their turn. Thus if one Njanja dynasty followed a certain policy, it did not follow that all the others would do so.

The most significant events of the early 1890s involved the southwestern and northern Njanja. In the southwest, the Gunguwo Njanja dynasty made an alliance with two white traders and picked a fight with Maromo's Dzete dynasty just to the north. This little war was inconclusive, but seems to have started a feud that lasted for some time.[16] In the north, the Ranga and Kwenda dynasties of the Njanja accepted African evangelists from the Wesleyan Methodist mission and let them stay. This was also to have its effect later on.[17]

Farther south lay the large territory of Chirimuhanzu. This had become tributary to the Ndebele in the 1850s, and remained so until the death of Chirimuhanzu Bangure in the late 1880s. On his death, his brother Chatikobo managed to take the title and briefly negotiated with the Portuguese. But Bangure's son Chinyama was apparently a favourite with Lobengula, and in about 1891 he managed to get himself installed as Chirimuhanzu with the help of an Ndebele force and Chirimuhanzu fell back under Ndebele influence. Chatikobo was driven into exile in Gutu, but a more dangerous threat existed in the persons of his brothers Chaka and Gwatizo, who had their own ambitions. Chinyama drove them away after a long battle in the Mtao forest, but they remained a threat.[18]

Yet another trader began to play a part in local politics just after this. M.E. Weale began trading illegally into Chirimuhanzu's country from late 1891, and at some time between then and 1897 he married Chinyama's daughter. He proved to be a fairly good son-

in-law over the rest of the decade, and even when he became a government official he tended to act rather more on behalf of his wife's father than for the government, when he had a choice. During these years, Chinyama was busy increasing his own house's power over the rest of the dynasty, and it is highly probable that Weale and his servants played a part in this.[19] Thus, up to 1893 Chinyama relied upon both the Ndebele and Weale for external support.

To the east, in Gutu, a rather similar situation existed. When Gutu Denhere died in 1892, two factions arose under Makuvaza and Rutsate Chingombe. Each group tried to get white support, Makuvaza turning to the Company officials at Victoria and Chingombe using the same traders who had backed Gunguwo to the north. Makuvaza and the Company won,[20] but the former then faced a raid by Chirimuhanzu and the Ndebele.[21] In the end, both factions went to the arbitration of Lobengula, who ruled in favour of Makuvaza. Thus, like Chirimuhanzu Chinyama, Makuvaza became Gutu by hedging his bets and getting support from two powers.[22]

The first two chapters described something of the politics of the borderlands farther to the south. Here, the local politics were less affected by internal disputes and local wars. Instead, the main factor was that of the Ndebele. We have already seen that the Zimuto dynasty escaped paying tribute — at the cost of several raids — and triggered off the 1893 war by counter-raiding the Ndebele; that Chivi similarly held out until 1893; and that Matibi had been gradually moving towards a hostile attitude from the 1880s.[23] The outbreak of the war saw all three of these dynasties take up a predictably anti-Ndebele stance, but it also saw a diplomatic revolution in Chirimuhanzu and Gutu and, after the Ndebele defeat, a temporary weakening of loyalty to the Ndebele in the modern Shurugwi and Zvishavane-Mberengwa areas. All this had a great deal to do with the collaboration of 1896.

The prime cause of the war was the determination of the B.S.A. Company to conquer the Ndebele state. Admittedly, Jameson had tried fairly hard to avoid conflict then, basically because he was not ready for it,[24] and from his point of view the war came a year too soon, but after the July 1893 raid on Zimuto he went ahead. Some Shona from the southern area anticipated him: in September, another raid was made upon Lobengula's herds.[25] Obviously, the southern Shona had correctly assessed the situation and decided to join in against the weaker side.

Others followed: in late September, Brabant went to Gutu and

arrived back on 8 October with 80 men. Bearing in mind that Gutu Makuvaza could have prevaricated, using the common excuse of the time that he could not get his people to follow, as was done when the Company tried to get labourers, it looks as though he had decided of his own accord to abandon one of his benefactors of the year before and to aid the other.[26] Zimuto and Madziviri, his subordinate, sent in another 170 in the next two days, apparently voluntarily. They, at least, had good reason to want revenge for their losses in the July raid which they had themselves provoked.[27] Chirimuhanzu Chinyama was held to be strongly pro-Ndebele, partly because of the events of 1891 and partly because one of his enemies had thoughtfully told the whites that he was likely to attack Victoria.

In the nick of time Weale acted like a good son-in-law and helped to arrange an alliance whereby Chinyama sent 300 men to join the invading column.[28] Like Gutu, he was prepared to abandon Lobengula. His enemy also joined under a rival white leader, to be on the safe side, and after a brief fight between the two groups the whole group of more than 550 southern Shona proceeded with the invasion.[29] Not surprisingly, on 25 October a contingent of about 400 from Chivi set out from Victoria to catch up with the column: after about 35 years of raids and counter-raids, Chivi also had a score to pay.[30]

The southern Shona who took part in the invasion of the Ndebele state were neither equipped nor expected to take part in the main battles, though one group did fairly well at Shangani.[31] They served mainly as pioneers and cattle-guards. Another force of 250 of Matibi's people took part in a separate action in Godlwayo in November, destroying and looting villages.[32] This was much more typical of Shona actions at this time, and virtually the whole of the southern Shona country, even as far as the upper Save and Mupfure rivers, was engaged in raiding cattle from the Ndebele, alongside both the Company's and unofficial white cattle-raiders.

This was made much easier by the confusion that existed among the Ndebele and within the colonial government itself. Even those who had been loyal tributaries of the Ndebele up to 1893 took advantage of this confusion. For example, in 1894 Matenda on the Runde, who had been raided by the Ndebele earlier, lifted 400 head of cattle from the lower Gweru river. He in turn lost them to Mpakame, who in turn lost them to Ndanga, who was then raided by Nhema, who managed to hang onto them in the face of a raid by Chirimuhanzu. All of these latter had been Ndebele tributaries, and none showed any sign of wishing to return the cattle to the Ndebele.[33]

The Company was not in a position to sort out the situation. The newly-created Native Departments of Mashonaland and Matabeleland could not even agree on a boundary between them, and at one time there were two Native Commissioners for the modern Shurugwi region, one for each department.[34] Consequently, when Chivi's people raided Ndebele cattle in 1894, the Matabeleland police and some Ndebele organised a counter-raid and removed 82 head, and 300 sheep and goats and burned some of Chivi's villages.[35] It will probably be impossible to tell just how many Ndebele cattle were raided by the southern Shona,[36] but there is little doubt that they did very well out of the war.

Colonial rule and the southern Shona, 1890 – 6

So far, the picture given of the relations between the southern Shona and the whites looks almost too good to be true. So far, we have seen the southern Shona dealing with the whites, whether officials or traders, as though they were simply another factor in the endless traditional game of power politics, house against house and dynasty against dynasty. Consequently, nearly all the little alliances we have noted seem to have worked out to the advantage of at least some of the southern Shona, whether they were ambitious individuals like Chirimuhanzu Chinyama or whole dynasties like that of Chivi. With hindsight, we know that these first contacts were with a very different kind of being, the capitalist and colonialist system. Yet, up to 1894 the southern Shona had some reason for reacting as they did. All of the elements of the colonial system were present before that date, but it was not until after that year that they became really serious. As we shall see, even under the increased pressures of the new system the southern Shona tended still to think in terms of the old.

The capitalist system made itself felt in four interconnected fields. These were mining, farming, trading and transport and the government. In the southern Shona country all of these were present, and in general they became much more effective from 1894 onwards, but within this area there were many complicated mitigating factors, while one has to compare the impact in different parts of the region, as well as with the other parts of the whole country. Essentially, it was the Native Department that had the greatest effect, but the other fields were of considerable importance.

Mining activities took up few of the physical resources of the country as far as the people were concerned. Operations were con-

centrated on a small area around each mine, and only timber resources were affected. But the mines required labour, and wages were not high enough to attract more than a few volunteers. The southern Shona had preferred to go south to the Kimberley and Rand mines from the 1870s and 1880s, and this continued up to 1896.[37] Those who did wish to work on local mines generally preferred surface work rather than the relatively higher-paid but dangerous underground work.[38] The mine-owners could recruit forced labour themselves, as they did at Tebekwe before 1896,[39] or rely upon the government to supply such labour, although until the Native Department was formed in 1894 it lacked the personnel to do so on a large scale.

Up to 1893, the impact of the mines on the southern Shona was mitigated by the fact that volunteer labourers from the impoverished Zambezi valley and Gaza state were available for underground work.[40] After 1893, this pattern continued, though the Native Department was able to recruit forced labour for the Victoria mines as well as for other districts like Ayrshire. The fact that sixty percent of a force raised in this way from Victoria deserted is an indication of how unpopular this was.[41]

We lack clear figures of recruitment for the mines for the southern Shona country for the pre-1896 period, but we do know how much mining was going on. Underground work in the Victoria mines rose from a mere 43 feet in 1891 to 2 504 in 1894, dropping to 1 834 in 1894, giving us a total of 8 – 10 000 feet over the whole period. This was not as great as the 13 000-plus for Hartley, 15 411 for Salisbury or the 46 500 for the eastern Matabeleland districts, all of which joined in the Chimurenga in 1896. But it was as great as the 8 971 for Mazoe and greater than the 5 508 for Lomagundi, both of which *were* in the Chimurenga, yet it was below the 49 097 for Umtali district, which stayed out.[42] In short, whereas mining activity increased after 1893 in most districts, there is no direct correlation between the areas most affected and the rising. There is no doubt that it was a major cause of the Chimurenga, but it does not explain local politics in 1896.

Farming presents an even less decisive picture. Very large tracts of land had been granted to white farmers by 1896, especially after 1893, and those who started farming operations also required labour and paid even lower wages than the miners.[43] Like the miners, they either recruited compulsory labour themselves, or relied upon supplies from the Native Department. But again there were mitigating factors. The very large estates granted to land companies remained almost completely undeveloped before 1896, and

had very little effect upon the people whose lands had been pegged out.[44] Many other farmers cultivated no more than a few hectares.[45]

The farmers who did the most to work their farms were the Afrikaners, but the presence of Afrikaners did not automatically lead to the people living nearby taking part in the Chimurenga. Thus the Afrikaners to the northwest and east of Enkeldoorn were attacked in June 1896 but those to the south and in the Chikwanda area northeast of Victoria were not. This pattern was true across the whole country. Few farmers had done more to alienate the people than those of Melsetter, yet that district stayed out of the Chimurenga, whereas the Hartley and eastern Matabeleland districts, with very few farmers, were very deeply involved.

The traders and transport riders were the third aspect of capitalism to affect the southern Shona before 1896. Their effect upon the people is even more difficult to quantify than the previous two. This is partly because the documents only occasionally refer to them when they had done something to involve the Company's legal system. Thus, 13 Africans from the Cape, probably transport-riders, stole women and food from Zimuto's people in 1892 until the government arrested them,[46] while two traders who had been raiding local villagers near Charter and the Turwi were eventually removed in 1892 – 3.[47] It is more difficult to gauge their effect because these local traders were often deeply involved in local politics, and when they raided one village it was sometimes on behalf of another. Incidents like these were occurring up and down the country, and do not seem to fit the resistance-collaboration-neutrality pattern one way or the other.

It was clearly the government, and particularly the Native Department, that affected the people the most. The government's magistrates and police were primarily concerned with the defence of the interests of the white community, although they did occasionally intervene in the affairs of the Africans, but the Native Department of 1894 was designed specifically to intervene in African affairs in a number of ways. Firstly, it was to help collect the cattle of the Ndebele state; secondly, it was to collect hut tax in the Mashonaland province; thirdly, it was to supply labour to the mines and farms; fourthly, it was to intervene in African politics and disputes, paralleling the work of the African rulers. To do this, it put Native Commissioners, each backed up by a force of irregular armed African 'police' or 'detectives' into as many districts as possible. Because they stayed in the same area right through the year, they were even more effective than the Ndebele and Gaza raiders whom they resembled in many ways.

The first task, to recover the ex-Ndebele cattle, was undertaken with varying success. In the eastern Matabeleland districts, NCs Fynn and Jackson were particulary effective, and as late as March 1896 they still had 500 head ready for forwarding at Belingwe,[48] whereas NC Driver of Selukwe missed the herd lifted by Nhema from Ndanga and other would-be inheritors of Ndebele wealth, as mentioned above.[49] Over in Mashonaland, the Native Commissioners of Charter district recovered only a few of the 300 head known to be in the district,[50] but at least 330 were recovered from Chirimuhanzu and Chivi by the NC at Victoria in addition to the 82 taken by the Matabeleland police in the raid of 1894.[5]

The taking of the ex-Ndebele cattle in 1894 – 5 was doubtless a very serious annoyance to the southern Shona, especially those who had risked their lives in the 1893 war, but it was as nothing compared with that caused by the taking of livestock for hut tax.

Tax was supposed to be paid in cash, the idea being that this would force men to work for long periods at low wages, but it was also collected in the form of livestock and grain. Prices for these were deliberately kept low, to encourage families to choose to send members to the mines and farms, and thus, for example, 80 cattle and 44 goats fetched only £146 in 1895 in Charter.[52] Even though extra staff were supplied for the southern Shona country, and the Chief Native Commissioner came to intensify tax-collection operations in 1895, the southern Shona region was too large for the Native Department to be able to locate every village in 1894 – 6, never mind find the places where livestock had been hidden. Consequently, they were only able to find about 10 000 cattle and 17 350 smallstock, or about one fifth of the real total.[53] Out of the livestock that it could find, the Department took nearly 3 000 cattle and over 4 500 small stock.[54]

Whereas the more remote parts of each district remained untouched, the central areas, especially around the capitals of rulers like Chivi and Gutu and along the roads and near the towns and villages, were probably fairly thoroughly taxed. In addition, a great deal of tax was paid in gold around Victoria, representing the savings of migrant labourers back from the south,[55] and in grain from Charter.[56] Even after the Company realised that it was taking too much, and suspended tax collection from November 1895,[57] tax seems to have continued to be collected in the southern Shona districts.[58]

Obviously, the southern Shona suffered under the Native Department's system of taxation as much as anyone else: at that rate, the accumulated livestock preserved from Ndebele and Gaza

'The son of Masunda named Chirambamuriwo said that Nyaningwe which you are looking for is this place, he was referring to Chirogwe,' (UZHD Text 13 Chivi). Chirambamuriwo — in the blanket, on the right — claimed to be Chivi in 1890, with the connivance of the British South Africa Company which rewarded him with the rifle shown. This was part of the dispute between Rhodes and the Afrikaners as to the limits of Ndebele power.

All photographs: National Archives, Zimbabwe



'Eighty men of native contingent Gutu's came into camp, singing as usual,' (NAZ Hist. Mss. MO 14/2/1, Diary of A.J.C. Molyneux, 8 October 1893). Gutu Makuvaza was one of several southern Shona rulers who joined in the attack on the Ndebele state.



'Chirimuhanzu asked us to go and fight. He gave Chari two women,' UZHD Text 22 Chivi). Chari — M.E. Weale — was one of several Europeans who made diplomatic marriages into ruling families in the 1890s.

'Ayrshire Mine — out of fifty you sent only twenty arrived — where did they come from so I can get NC to look them up,' (NAZ N 1/1/12) Hulley to Brabant 4 June 1895). Desertion from forced labour was an indication of its unpopularity. These labourers carrying wood are led by policemen.

'About three days before Mr. Moony was murdered, Mjuju thrashed Jim's wife. On the women coming to complain about the matter Mr. Moony thrashed Mjuju,' (NAZ N 1/1/3, evidence of Mhembere, 20 September 1897). This event in the middle Mupfure valley seems to have been the final spark that set off the central Shona Chimurenga of 1896. Muzhuzha Gobvu's village, the flashpoint, was a lot more peaceful when photographed by W.H. Brown in 1891 – 2.



'Shuwawura said if you bring out the child you can have a gun and some blankets,' (NAZ, S.401, 242, evidence of Marembo). Killing women and children was not uncommon in precolonial Zimbabwean warfare. After such incidents as the killing of the Nortons at the farm shown above, the Rhodesians frequently followed suit.

'They both fired with Martinis. Gonto had one he got from the police, they fired at Campbell, Zhanta also had a gun he got from the police, Mashonganyika was the leader of the *impi* and the prisoners were his *indunas*, (NAZ, S.401, 297, evidence of Museza). Gondo and Zhanta were typical of the fighters of the first Chimurenga. Luckier than most, they got sentences of eight years hard labour for attempted murder.



'I have heard what these women say but it is not true. I only want a place where I can live. If the government want me to pay for these things I will pay with a young girl. I want Nyanda, Goronga and Wamponga brought in, they started the rebellion,' (NAZ S.401, 253, Evidence of Kargubi 8 March 1898). Gumboreshumba, the medium of the Kaguvi *mhondoro* spirit, helped spread the Chimurenga in the Chivero Nyamweda, Zvimba and Shawasha regions, but he was more complex than a simple 'resistance hero'.

'Vintcent: "Brabant has been . . . treating native prisoners most (cruelly) and generally misconducting himself." Carrington: "He is likely to bring disgrace on us all. . . " Vintcent: "The old story, drink." (NAZ, A 1/12/14, Vintcent to Carrington, 4 August 1896.) Replaced as CNC for raping Zvimba's daughter, Brabant took command at Charter in 1896 and committed many crimes, cutting the throats of prisoners and shooting African policemen.



'Kunzi's own kraal is a natural stronghold, having been brought to perfection by well thought out artificial fortifications, the stockades being of hewn stone, ten feet high, at least three feet thick and loopholed so as to command every approach,' (NAZ, LO 5/4/4, Gosling to OC BSAP, 19 June 1897). Shona strongholds were often so well-defended that artillery like that used at Makumbe's in 1897 had relatively little effect.



'The small patrols . . . were the cause of a number of Machiangombi's people deserting him, owing to the same harassing and the scarcity of food,' (NAZ, N 9/1/4, annual report of NC Hartley, 1897 – 8). In many ways it was the destruction and removal of food supplies that forced the Shona to end the Chimurenga. This convoy was removing food at Svosve's in 1897.

raiding would be wiped out in a few years. The southern Shona had, evidently, exchanged one system of raiding for another. With hindsight, we know that they were encountering a completely new economic system at much closer quarters than before, but they tended to deal with its representatives as though they were like those of the old Rozvi and Ndebele states. Thus, even when the people were losing their stock, grain and labour to the Native Commissioners, they often tried to maintain a relationship with the first one in their district even after he had been transferred. Thus the Gambiza ruler of the Njanja refused to acknowledge NC Compton-Thomson in early 1895 and claimed that he only 'knew' his predecessors, Brabant and Forrestall who had worked in the area before.[59] The Dumbuseya of the new Belingwe district similarly lost large numbers of cattle to NC Fynn in 1894 – 5, yet when they had to surrender after the Chimurenga in 1896 they preferred to go to him in the Insiza district rather than to his local successor, Jackson.[60]

This characteristic was shown even more clearly in the case of Chirimuhanzu Chinyama. He continued to build up his power as though he was totally independent. In September 1894 he refused to supply labourers to white travellers, 'saying his boys don't work of (*sic*) white men.'[61] He was also suspected of stealing the cattle of the whites, and was refusing to pay hut tax.[62] He managed to get the aid of NC Drew of Victoria in driving his uncle Chaka out of the Mtao forest in October, but this success rebounded upon him. NC Coole of Iron Mine Hill, very probably representing the Chaka faction, warned that further fighting was likely to occur.[63] This almost led to a raid being made upon him by CNC Brabant, but in the end some of his modern guns were taken from him in December, and it appeared that his ambitions had been curbed.[64]

Once again, he was able to use his son-in-law to good effect. Weale had remained in the area in 1894,[65] and although he was posted away to Marandellas district from December 1894 to May 1895, he then returned to the Victoria area as Native Commissioner, with special responsibility for Chirimuhanzu's and Chivi's areas. Weale helped to foil an attempt by the Matabeleland Native Department to take over his father-in-law's area,[66] and then aided him in the subjection of the small neighbouring territory of the Hama dynasty.[67] Thus, although Chirimuhanzu was now forced to pay tax he was doing so though his own special agent.

The Chivi dynasty was also involved in politics of this kind, and again Weale was a factor. Although the Mhari of Chivi had been dominant in that area for decades, there was still a remnant of the

Ngowa, their predecessors, living in the area. A feud between these Ngowa of Musipambi and the Matsweru house of Chivi led to the intervention of Weale. The Musipambi house offered him a girl, and he judged in their favour, thus annoying one of the major rulers in the south.[68] From 1895 to 1897 Weale seems to have treated Musipambi as though he was Chivi's equal. The fact that Weale was raising tax in an unprecedented manner did not stop the people from trying to deal with him as though he was just another African ruler with whom a dynastic marriage could be made. In his case, they were not far wrong.

These were the best examples of the persistence of old political methods in the south, though there were similar cases elsewhere in which political marriages between the ruling dynasties and the new administration took place. But there were others in the south: Gutu Makuvaza once again had to call upon the whites for support against the Chingombe house in 1894 – 5,[69] at the same time lending support to a Hama faction in the war with Chirimuhanzu noted just above, while one Hama group tried to play off CNC Brabant against Chirimuhanzu and Weale.[70] In short, for all of the increased impact of white rule between 1893 and 1896, the labyrinthine politics of the southern Shona went on much as they had before 1893 and as they were to do in 1896 – 7.

Collaboration

When the main Ndebele rising broke out in late March 1896, nearly all of those southern Shona who had been tributaries before 1893 joined in against the whites. Like their previously-independent neighbours in the Mashonaland province, they had ample cause to do so. Although those people west of the provincial boundary had not had to pay hut tax, they had suffered severely from exactions of cattle and forced labour. The commitment of the different peoples of the region to the rising was not quite as straightforward as the sentences above imply.

Firstly, we have already seen that some ex-tributaries of the Ndebele such as Nhema took part in the robbery of Ndebele herds in 1894 – 5. Secondly, there was some armed resistance to Company patrols in eastern Belingwe before the main rising occurred, and it may have happened in territories that were later neutral as much as in those that joined the rising.[71] Thirdly, different parts of these eastern Matabeleland districts came into the rising at different times. Thus the people around Belingwe town — Munyati, Senda,

Mazeteze, Wedza and Masunda — rose on 25 March, but Mposi and Mapiravana did so only after Laing's column had passed through in May on its way south.[72] Similarly, the Ndebele and Shona around Gwelo rose on about 25 March, but the Shona of the Selukwe district, especially Nhema, did comparatively little until June.[73] (Admittedly, it is difficult to assess the true attitude of some groups who had no contact with whites during the Chimurenga: this was true of Shiku and Matenda in eastern Belingwe and of some Mpateni groups.)[74] Fourthly, several groups remained neutral, even when their immediate neighbours joined the rising. Thus the four Ngowa dynasties of Belingwe, Mazvihwa, Mataruse, Mazviwofa and Bvute stayed out of the fighting. They had good reason to do so, for although they had suffered during the two past years of white rule, they had much longer-standing feuds with Wedza, Mazeteze and the Ndebele on the one hand and with Chivi on the other. A few individuals from Mazvihwa joined in the rising, but this was balanced by the free passage given to messengers between the beleaguered garrison at Belingwe and Victoria.[75]

Even so, however tardily some groups in eastern Matabeleland joined the rising, there was no doubt of the importance of the main Ndebele action in March 1896. News travelled rapidly. We have a very clear idea of the way in which it was received in Chivi, and the discussions that took place there were certainly typical of those in every territory, whatever decision was eventually reached. Soon after 25 March, 'a meeting was called at Chibi by some of the chiefs to discuss the advisability of rising.'[76]

Masunda's house, which lay closest to the main road and therefore had suffered the worst from white rule and its by-products, advocated that Chivi's people should join in the rising. But general opinion, expressed by the *mhondoro*, said otherwise. 'The spirit of Chikanga, through his medium Mazaririe, so strongly discountenanced the rising that all thought of it was given up.'[77] The reasons were obvious. Chivi's people had been very badly hurt by white rule, especially by the looting of their cattle, since 1894. But if the Ndebele succeeded in defeating the whites and re-establishing the Ndebele state, how would they look upon their old enemies who had resisted them for so long and who had joined in the war against them in 1893, taking part in the cattle-raids of 1894? They might be grateful for getting help in the war of 1896, but then again they might not. Chivi's people had to make a very difficult decision, and in the end they chose what seemed to them at the time to be the lesser of two evils, and decided to help the whites.

Chivi's contribution was at first limited. By giving free passage

to messengers from Victoria, who were able to cross the Runde into the neutral Ngowa country, Chivi made it possible for the whites in the Belingwe garrison to keep in contact with the rest of the Company's forces and to plan and execute the co-ordinated movements of troops that eventually turned the tide in the Belingwe district. Chivi Madhlangove himself gave his son Tarwireyi the task of carrying messages to and fro and scouting for the Belingwe garrison, even though it meant co-operating with NC Weale who, after the Musipambi affair of the previous year, was highly unpopular with the Chivi dynasty.

In May Chivi informed the Belingwe commander 'that he is willing and anxious to assist in the putting down of the rebellion in this district', while at the same time he sent some of his men to escort Hopper's relief force from Victoria.[78] By August, Chivi was being relied upon to capture refugees from the Ndebele country, and in the same month Wedza threatened to attack him.[79] At this time the Native Department raised a force of 1 800 men from the districts around Victoria — of which, more later — to fight Mutekedza's Hera in Charter district, and a proportion of this was raised by Weale in Chivi, including members from the intransigent and aggressive house of Masunda, which had advocated resistance. This force fought as far north as Hwedza.[80]

Farther south, Matibi's Pfumbi had come to the same conclusion as Chivi's Mhari, for the same reasons. Until May, the area south of Belingwe had remained quiet. One white traveller ran into trouble in Chingoma's country, but was aided by Matibi's people when he reached them in March, while the store at Gondokwe remained untouched even when abandoned, a sure sign that the local people were not in the rising.[81] Once Laing's column arrived in Matibi's territory in May, Matibi and and his sons Machetu and Mketi were most friendly, offering intelligence of the resistance's moves and readily agreeing to provide 300 men to fight in Belingwe. Machetu was frank about his motives. He stated that his people regarded the whites as friends and the Ndebele as enemies, and recalled the collaboration of the Pfumbi in 1893, when they had accompanied the whites on their raid on Godlwayo. Of course, there were intriguing possibilities of loot to be collected in the fighting.

When Brabant arrived from Bulawayo with Yonge's force from Tuli, he was given the command of the Pfumbi forces, but it is apparent from Laing's account that he acted largely as a liaison officer, and that the real command of the Pfumbi forces lay with Mketi. This alliance proved to be a most powerful and effective

one.[82] The Pfumbi fought extremely well, a characteristic credited by white observers to their 'Sotho' descent,[83] but which probably owed more to the fact that a majority of the force of 330 men had breech-loading rifles. Meanwhile, the Shona and Ndebele of the resistance in the Belingwe district, which now extended as far south as Mposi and Mapiravana, were experiencing their own troubles as older rivalries reared their heads.

As Laing and Mketi moved north, the Pfumbi won a sharp skirmish on 4th June. At Mberengwa mountain the Ndebele, including refugees from the lower Insiza, had concentrated at Chiremba's stronghold. On 10 June the Pfumbi bore the brunt of the attack on this centre, and completely defeated the resistance forces, some of the Ndebele refugees scattering as far as the lower Victoria district.[84] A further attack was made on Senda's stronghold on 12 June, in which the Pfumbi again featured prominently.[85] After this, the whites and Pfumbi split, with Laing going on to Bulawayo and the Pfumbi fighting their way back through Mapiravana's country with their loot.[86] Matibi's Pfumbi had repeated their role of the 1893 war for the same reasons, but with much greater effect.

North of Victoria, the sitation was a lot more complex. The rulers of the Selukwe district, Nhema, Banga, Munikwa and Ndanga, had had no whites close at hand to fight because Selukwe town was evacuated, and evidence for their activities over the next three months is scarce and vague.[88] By 12 June, however, they were definitely committed.[89]

This obviously affected their main eastern neighbour, the opportunistic Chirimuhanzu Chinyama. When the main Ndebele rising started in March, he played for safety. As he told his son-in-law Weale, 'he did not know what to do — he did not want to fight the white men, and did not wish to see them go. However, circumstances might become too strong for him and he did not wish to have any white men in his district while the trouble was on.' But he covered his bets, sending some of his relatives as an escort for Weale, telling them: 'If you hear that I have rebelled it will be because I have had to do so against my wish, but that it is not to stop you from fighting for the white man whom I feel convinced will win out in the end.'[90]

This, of course, was what he said in Weale's presence, but his actions bore out his words. He remained quiet for three months, but by early June his neighbour Banga was quite definitely committed to the rising, and this brought him face to face with the dilemma that had confronted Chivi and Matibi earlier: his betrayal of Lobengula in 1893 had been flagrant, and he had little reason to

hope that this would be forgiven by the Ndebele if they won. Moreover, Chirimuhanzu's people had a feud with Banga dating back to the early part of the century.[91]

A final factor was that his uncles Chaka and Gwatizo (with whom he had been quarrelling since 1891, as noted above) chose this moment to act. In the excitement of March, they had already tried to kill Weale for burning down their village,[92] but they had remained quiet since then. But in early June word reached Victoria that they were planning to join the resistance.[93] By the end of the month Chirimuhanzu was asking for help against both Nhema and Chaka, and by 7 July a patrol had reported that it had been fired upon by Chaka's men.[94] From then on, Chaka was treated as a rebel. It is possible that he was being slandered by Chirimuhanzu and Weale, for although the local Afrikaner farmers were in laager in Enkeldoorn and could not be attacked,[95] Chaka left the local trader Coole alone. It is likely that he had played much the same role with Chaka as Weale had with Chirimuhanzu since 1891, and events a little later suggest the same.

Chirimuhanzu was now fully committed to the white side, and added about 500 men to the 200 collected by Forrestall and Weale from Zimuto for an attack on Nhema in mid-June.[96] In July he himself accompanied a force of 2 000 Shona from the Victoria region in another attack on Nhema,[97] and contributed to the force of 1 800 raised from Chivi and the people near Victoria that went north to Charter and Hwedza in August.[98] One member of this force recalled in 1968 that he also fought at Mtao, which suggests that Chaka was attacked on the way up.[99] In October yet another force of Chirimuhanzu's men, numbering 200, joined in the British army campaign against Nhema that ended the campaign there.[100] Chirimuhanzu was now in no danger from the Ndebele-Shona rising to the west, and could devote his attention to Chaka.

On 28 October Chaka went to Victoria (having consulted Coole), protesting his innocence to the administration. He was believed and promised protection. But he was too late: Weale had led some British army troops to burn his village and the fighting went on for two days.[101] Chaka was then regarded as having surrendered, but Chirimuhanzu and Weale had not finished with him. According to Weale, Chaka refused either to pay tax or move out of the Mtao forest, so Weale appealed to the CNC to be allowed to attack him at night with all of Chirimuhanzu's men. At the same time he got the Administrator in Salisbury to stop Coole and the Victoria magistrate from backing Chaka.[102]

This was in January 1897, and in March Chirimuhanzu and

Weale struck against both Chaka and Gwatizo. Weale's police and Chirimuhanzu's men drove Chaka and Gwatizo and their people over the border into Charter district, killing 13 men in the process. NC Taylor of Charter arrested Weale's men, but in the end Chaka and Gwatizo had no choice but to stay in Charter.[103] This vicious little war took place over five months after all fighting connected with the Chimurenga had ceased in the region, earning Weale a fourth clasp to his service medal, but its real significance was that his father-in-law Chirimuhanzu was now finally rid of his uncles and rivals to the title. To round off things neatly, in the same year Weale got Chirimuhanzu's remaining uncle and rival, Chatikobo, permanently exiled in Gutu where he had been living since 1892.[104] Chirimuhanzu's triumph was complete.

Meanwhile, back in 1896, others in the southern Shona region had opted for collaboration. Predictably, these were Gutu and Zimuto who had done so in 1893 like the others mentioned above. When the war on the frontier with Banga escalated in June, Chirimuhanzu called for help, as was noted above, and NCs Forrestall and Ecksteen raised 450 men from Zimuto and 250 from Gutu to aid him.[105] The 2 000 raised for a similar campaign in July also came in part from these two territories,[106] while at the same time NC Drew raised 240 men from Gutu's house of Denhere to fight the Hera of Mutekedza in Charter district. They got as far as Altona farm, where Drew left them while he went on to the fort. In the meantime, Mutekedza's Hera counter-attacked and routed the collaborator force, which had to be withdrawn.[107]

In September, Weale took another 2 000 men from Gutu, Zimuto and Chivi into Mutekedza's country to join the British army, and this time they were considerably more successful, covering a wide area, fighting a battle at the Zabe hills and collecting a good deal of loot.[108] Once again, Zimuto and Gutu seem to have acted on the understanding that, having committed themselves to the white side in 1893 they had poor prospects if the Ndebele won in 1896.

A particularly complicated situation had arisen in Mutekedza's territory. As we have seen, since 1893 Mutekedza Chiwashira had relied upon the support of the BSA Company in general and his son-in-law, the trader Short, in particular. In April 1896, when Beal's column passed through Charter on its way to aid the whites in Matabeleland, NC Taylor raised a force of 200 men, mostly from Mutekedza's people, paying them £1 a month and a blanket each.[109] This force served in several battles against the Ndebele up to 22 May, in which Beal's column had a hard time, and word pass-

ed back into the central Shona country that it had been destroyed.[110] When the main central Shona rising started in the Hartley district in mid-June, the Mushava dynasty lying between Hartley and Charter rose on about 16 June.[111] Over the next three days, the dynasties of Mutekedza, Maromo and Sango joined in.

Mutekedza's decision to change sides thus left him with men fighting on both sides, though he may have believed that his men who had gone south were then dead, though in fact they were not. Possibly, given his weak position as against the houses of the rest of the dynasty, he succumbed to pressure from them; possibly he thought that there was no way that the whites could win; possibly he remembered the effects of white rule over the past few years; probably all three factors counted. Having made his decision, he sacrificed his son-in-law, though his daughter was able to hide Short until he was killed on the 25.[112]

In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Hera commitment to the Chimurenga was uneven; 55 members of the force that had been to the south remained with the whites,[113] while Mutekedza's immediate family began negotiating his surrender in early September, slightly before the rest of the Hera did so.[114]

Mutekedza's collaboration was the first we have noted that had nothing to do with the 1893 war. Instead, it arose from purely local factors. So did that of Njanja dynasties of Ranga, Kwenda and Gunguwo and that of the Nobvu dynasty of Maburutse. In the case of Ranga and Kwenda, the initial cause of their collaboration was the presence of African Wesleyan catechists. When the rising broke out, some of the people of Kwenda wanted to kill them,' but Kwenda said "Don't kill them; if you do so you must kill me first." '[116]

In Ranga's territory the situation was the same. 'One day a rebel chief sent messengers to Ranga, saying "Give us up these baboons; we want to kill them" meaning the teacher and his family. "Go back," said the chief, "to your own kraal, or my men will kill you." '[117] In late July ex-CNC Brabant moved from Charter through Mutekedza's land to Kwenda and Ranga, where he enlisted a force of 120 men and returned to attack the Hera. In Ranga's case his active collaboration with the whites is a little surprising, as his reaction to the passage of the returning forces from Matabeleland had been to flee for shelter. But he and Kwenda did collaborate, even after Brabant had nearly alienated them by his drunken brutality.[118]

The desire to preserve missionaries may seem an odd reason for deciding to work against the apparently successful central Shona

rising of June, though it is clear that through the 1880s and 1890s a number of Shona rulers found them valuable,[119] but there was probably more to it than that. The Njanja of Ranga and Kwenda had established themselves on what had been Hera territory, and it seems likely that there were some long-standing rivalries over land rights involved.[120] This may also have explained the collaboration of the Gunguwo and Chivese houses of the Njanja and Maburutse dynasty, east, and southeast of Enkeldoorn. On 10 July, while Beal's forces were attacking Maromo just to the north, Gunguwo, Chivese and Maburutse arrived at Enkeldoorn with gifts and information for the whites.[121] In Gunguwo's case, there was a grudge against Maromo that dated back to the 1892 war with Maromo when the previous Gunguwo had been killed. It is notable that Bonda, the chief organizer of the resistance in that area had made no attempt to bring these rulers into rising.[122]

The contribution of these rulers to the Company war effort was limited to supplying information and aiding NC Taylor at the Range, though Maburutse and Gunguwo did undertake the perilous journey to Salisbury in the face of danger from both the resistance and Brabant.[123] What is significant, however, is that they should have committed themselves so early to the white side, at a time when the central Shona rising seemed to be succeeding, and that — though they could not know this — they were completing the chain of collaborating territories that ran all the way from the upper Save to the lowveld, with the strategic effect noted earlier.

Conclusion: The rewards of collaboration

We have already seen, at the beginning of this chapter, what the strategic effects of the collaborators of 1896 were. We have seen, in the events of the years up to the First Chimurenga, why they collaborated in spite of the nature of white rule; and we have seen exactly what they did during the fighting. It remains to see what happened to them.

The short answer is that the colonial government fairly rapidly forgot the role they had played, and in the end treated them much the same as those who had resisted and lost or those who had remained neutral. It is therefore not surprising that many of the descendants of the collaborators of 1896 were strongly nationalist from the 1950s onwards. Some of the leaders of the collaboration enjoyed special favours for a few years, but in the end little distinction was made between them and the surviving leaders of the resis-

tance. In particular, collaboration or resistance had little to do with the way in which land was alienated in the coming century.

The reasons for this varied. In eastern Matabeleland, although those who led the resistance had not taken part in the negotiations in the Matopos with the Company and British leaders, they benefitted from the settlement that was made. Thus, when a general *indaba* of rulers from the Matabeleland province met at Bulawayo in January 1897, a very oddly-assorted group turned up from Belingwe District. There were Wedza and Mposi, leaders of the resistance; the Ngowa and Nyamondo, neutrals; and Machetu, the Pfumbi collaborator. All became subsidized Chiefs under the new regime.[124] The failure to distinguish between 'loyal' and 'rebel' leaders was not lost on them at the time. The neutral Chitawudze of southern Mpateni not only objected to being disarmed, but complained that he preferred rule through the Tuli Native Commissioner, not the Bulawayo administration.[125] The collaborator Mketi, having decided to move over the arbitrary line between the Chibi and Belingwe districts, pointedly failed to notify the Chibi office beforehand, or to offer explanations afterwards. He had not fought in 1896 to suit the convenience of the government, but for his own ends.[126] No wonder the Pfumbi had been under suspicion as potential rebels, and no wonder their land was carved up later for ranches.[127]

This factor existed during the fighting, and persisted: given the nature of the outbreak of the Chimurenga, many whites could not believe that even the collaborators could be trusted. Brabant, who tore up the passes of Taylor's policemen and shot them, and recommended the removal of all collaborators and neutrals to Matabeleland, was an extreme case, but he was not the only one.[128] As late as 1899 NC Drew wrote that the local whites of Victoria thought 'that these Natives like all others are sure to rise sooner or later, and that the position will be better when they have done so and been conquered.'[129]

There were some short-term rewards. Chirimuhanzu, Gutu, Zimuto, Chivi and Matibi were among the first to get salaries from the government.[130] Some got extra rewards. Maburutse of Charter District got a salary equal to the most important rulers of the district,[131] while all the Njanja sub-rulers were put on an equal footing with their nominal superior, Gambiza.[132] Chivi not only saw the Musipambi group suppressed and the Pako removed from land they had seized during the fighting, but his son Tarwireyi was granted a special, subsidized title.[133]

But when it came to land, it was another story. Most of Mutekedza's land was lost, not because he had either collaborated or resisted but because it had been alienated — on paper — beforehand. His people were moved into the lands of the northwestern Njanja. Maromo, who had resisted, lost most of his land, but Gunguwo who had collaborated lost all of his, and eventually his title as well, because no reserve was set out for him: in 1896, when the first local reserves were set up, he had been on the winning side and had not then needed one. Gutu lost the western part of his land, and Chirimuhanzu the eastern part of his, because they lay along the main road and were wanted by white farmers. The same thing happened to Zimuto. Only Chivi kept most of his land, basically because it was too remote.

However, one collaborator did do fairly well. No-one will be surprised to learn that he was Chirimuhanzu Chinyama, the J.R. Ewing of the south. A collaborator of the north-east, Makoni Ndapfunya, evidently lived on and died in misery, in spite of having chosen the winning side.[134] Chinyama died in 1902, but he did not do so in misery. True, he lost the services of his son-in-law Weale in the meantime. By 1897 Weale had married another wife, and was busy fabricating a succession system for his superiors that favoured his father-in-law. He also lent him money to pay his taxes.[135] But in 1899 Weale fell victim to one of the waves of fear that swept the rural white population at intervals. A rumour of a rising in Selukwe led Weale to panic and the result was that Enkeldoorn made one of its periodic rushes to form laager. A police patrol visited the scene, Weale's special relationship came out into the open, and he was forced to resign.[136]

But Chirimuhanzu Chinyama survived this. Although his people were disarmed, and he had a few clashes with officialdom, by 1901 he was back in the administration's good books.[137] After his death, although his house suffered a setback in that his uncle Chaka was recalled to become the next Chirimuhanzu, he had a posthumous last laugh: Chaka never managed to get in favour with the government, and when he was deposed for connivance at cattle theft in 1914 the next Chirimuhanzu was Chinyama's son Jumo.[138] Jumo and his house ruled until 1954, and by that time, after a total of over half a century of rule by father and son, the Chinyama house had gained control of a very large proportion of the land left to the Chirimuhanzu people.[139] This final note is not just another example of the flourishing of the ungodly: it demonstrates just how strong the continuities between the pre-colonial world and that of the twentieth century could be, and makes clear the powerful driving forces of local politics that inspired the collaboration of the First Chimurenga.

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3. e.g. *Biographical essays on imperialism and collaboration in colonial Kenya*, B.E. Kipkorir, ed., (Nairobi, 1980).
4. J.R.D. Cobbing, 'The Ndebele under the Khumalos, 1820 – 1896', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Lancaster, 1976, 423 – 6, 389 – 90.
5. LO 5/4/2, H. Howard to A. Grey, 12 and 20 March 1897; LO 5/4/3 W.L. Armstrong to A. Grey, 29 April 1897; E.A.H. Alderson, *With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force 1896*, (London, 1898), 80, 98 – 9; T.O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896 – 7*, (London, 1967), 275 – 7.
6. Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 403.
7. LO 5/4/2, H. Howard to A. Grey, 12 and 10 March 1897; LO 5/4/3 W.L. Armstrong to A. Grey, 29 April 1897.
8. Alderson, *With the Mounted Infantry*, 134, 249.
9. Assuming the 1896 population was not much different from that of 1911, as recent work suggests, the most generous figures for the population of the combined Chimurenga area were in the ratio of 280 000 to 365 000 either neutral or committed against the rising.
10. See Chapter 1.
11. PRO, FO 179/279, No. 67, 'Memorandum on the Rights of Portugal in the territories to the south of the Zambezi, communicated by M. de Freitas, 12 July 1890.'
12. LO 5/2/3, Col. Pennefather to F.R. Harris, 4 September 1890; J.T. Bent, *The ruined cities of Mashonaland*, (London, 1892), 273; A 1/9/1 J.S. Brabant to RM Victoria, 26 April 1892; Hist. Mss. ED 1/1/1 Diary of Frank Edwards, 10 October 1892; UZHD Texts 47 Chivhu.
13. A 2/1/2 H.M. Hole to M.D. Graham, 13 November 1891; A 2/1/2 H.M. Hole to H. Short, 9 January 1892; Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/6 draft history by M.E. Weale; A 2/1/4 H.M. Hole to H. Short, 23 August 1892; J 1/8/1 RM Victoria to Public Prosecutor Salisbury, 24 and 28 September 1892; A 2/14/1 Acting Administrator to H. Short, 25 October 1893.
14. MLGTP, DDA Delineation Report, Chivhu, 1964.
15. See reference 11 above.
16. UZHD Texts 34, 35, 38, 41 Chivhu; A 1/9/1 J.S. Brabant to RM Victoria, 26 April 1892.
17. I. Shimmin, 'The Mashonaland Mission', *Work and Workers in the Mission Field*, iii, 18, 416 – 20.
18. LO 5/2/3 Col. Pennefather to F.R. Harris, 13 August 1890; CT 1/5/2 R.G. Nicholson to F.R. Harris, 7 November 1890; UZHD Text 26 Chirimuhanzu; N 9/4/13 NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury 1 November 1902; UZHD Text 33 Chirimuhanzu; Hist. Mss. WI 5/1/1 Diary of NC Williams, 7 April 1897; Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/6 Draft history by M.E. Weale; N 9/1/1 NC Chilimanzi to CNC, Annual Report, 1895.
19. Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/3, draft history by M.E. Weale; UZHD Texts 28, 30 Chirimuhanzu. RC 3/7/1 CNC to Chief Secretary, 22 August 1899; Sr. Mary Aquina, OP, 'The tribes in the Chilimanzi Reserve', *NADA* ix, 2, 1965, 45.
20. DV 5/1/1 RM Victoria to Administrator, 25 March 1892; D 3/1/1 Queen versus J.M. Werrett, 28 June 1892; CT 1/15/2 Administrator to Secretary BSAC, Cape Town, 15 July 1892.
21. A 1/9/1 Telegraphic conversation between RM Victoria and Administrator, n.d. but August or September 1892.
22. NB 1/1/9 ANC Gutu to CNC 9 September 1900.
23. See Chapter 2.
24. This is a case of the older historiography being correct, up to a point: S. Glass, *The Matabele War* (London, 1968) is backed up by other primary sources on Jameson's desire not to start a fight before July 1893. His plans for 1894 were another matter.
25. Hist. Mss. CO 4/1/1 B. Dawson to J.W. Colenbrander, Bulawayo, 24 September 1893.
26. Hist. Mss. MO 14/2/1, Diary of A.J.C. Molyneaux, 8 October 1893.
27. Hist. Mss. MO 14/2/1, 10 October 1893.
28. A 2/1/5 Jameson to Colenbrander 30 June 1893; Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/3 draft history by M.E. Weale; Hist. Mss. MO 14/2/1, 13 and 14 October 1893; Hist. Mss. WI 9/2/4, J.C. Willoughby's draft report, 16 October 1893.
29. Weale (in Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/3) identifies Chirimuhanzu's enemy as Banga, his neighbour to the west. I accepted this in my 1971 thesis, but in view of Willoughby's account in W.A. Wills and L.T. Collingridge, *The Downfall of Lobengula*, (London, 1894), 200, it is much more likely that the enemy in question was Chaka. As will be seen below, Weale had every reason in the 1920s and 1930s, when he wrote his history, to forget his relations with Chaka.
30. CT 1/14/1/2 F.R. Harris to High Commissioner, 28 October 1893 (reverse); M. Gelfand, *Mother Patrick and her nursing sisters*, (Cape Town, 1964), 141.
31. Wills and Collingridge, *Downfall of Lobengula*, 107 – 111, 298.
32. DV 1/1/1 Hay and Crowne to F.R. Harris, 7 March 1894; DV 7/2/2 Trial of H.D. Hay at Victoria, 14 December 1893; L 2/3/8 RM Victoria to Duncan, 7 December 1893.
33. J.D. White, 'Esitshebeni', unpublished book, 1974, 214.
34. EC 4/1/1 Heyman to F. Rhodes, 8 and 13 January 1895 and Vigers to F. Rhodes, 12 January 1895; DV 1/2/1 Duncan to Nesbitt, 30 October 1894.
35. N 1/1/12 NC Victoria to CNC Salisbury 25 November 1894.
36. For a recent analysis of the overall problem, see P. Stigger, 'The Land Commission of 1894 and cattle', *Zimbabwean History*, 11, 1980, 20 – 43.
37. N 1/1/12 ANC Victoria to CNC Salisbury, 3 February 1896.
38. F 4/1/1 CC Victoria to Statist, 12 July 1895.
39. NB 1/1/3 NC Selukwe to CNC Bulawayo 28 March 1898.
40. LO 5/2/29, Secretary BSAC Cape Town to London Board, 30 August 1893; F 4/1/1 CC Victoria to Statist, 12 July 1895.
41. N 1/1/12 Hulley to Brabant, 4 June 1895; N 1/1/2 Brabant to Lingard, 25 July 1895.
42. These figures are based upon a count of reports on the progress of individual mines made in the 'Mashonaland goldfields' letters to LO 5/2/11 – 48 as well as files LO 4/1/2, F 4/1/1 and M 1/1/1, compared with a similar count in LO 5/2/47, G. Pauling to Secretary, BSAC, Cape Town, 21 January 1896. See also LO 5/2/45, Inspection Reports for June 1895 and LO 5/2/41, MC Bulawayo to Secretary, BSAC, Cape Town, 26 February 1896.
43. ORAL HO/2.
44. A land company near Victoria tried to get permission to collect 'rent' from the

people living on its estate in 1896, but failed to get it: A 2/2/4 Inskipp to CC Victoria, 21 January 1896.

45. DE 1/1/2, Farms in District, 10 January 1897.
46. D 3/1/1, Queen versus 14 'Colonial' Africans, 19 December 1892.
47. A 2/1/3, H.M. Hole to E.E Dunne, 13 April 1892; J 2/1/1, Chief Clerk, Law Department, to E.E. Dunne, 29 August 1892; 'Memoirs of D.G. Gisborne' *Rhodesiana*, 17, 1967, 40; D 3/1/1, Queen versus R. Duncan, R.H. Goddard and W. Lantmann, 31 January, 3 February and 1 March, 1893; DV 1/3/1, Public Prosecutor to RM, Victoria, 7 February 1893.
48. White, 'Esitshebeni', 295.
49. This herd was recovered by the Ndebele from Nhema in 1896: LO 5/6/7, NC Gwelo to CNC Bulawayo, 30 November 1896.
50. N 1/1/2, NC Charter to CNC Salisbury, 30 January and 19 February, 1895.
51. N 1/1/12, NC Victoria to CNC Salisbury, 2 and 16 October, 1894.
52. N 1/1/2, NC Charter to CNC Salisbury, 26 May 1895.
53. F 4/1/1, Lingard to Statist, 21 September 1895.
54. This is based on the figures for Charter, Victoria and Tuli in A 15/1/1 Secretary of Natives to Administrator, 19 July 1895, and subsequent reports in N 1/1/12.
55. See reference 37.
56. See general correspondence in N 1/1/2 and RC 1/3/1.
57. EC 3/1/1, Minutes of Executive Council, 6 November 1895; N 4/1/1, CNC Circular, 12 November 1895.
58. S.277, Hut Tax Register.
59. N 1/1/2, NC Charter to CNC Salisbury, 6 January 1895.
60. White, 'Esitshebeni', 310.
61. D 3/1/1, Queen versus Garipanzi and Willie, 18 October 1894.
62. D 3/1/1, A.J. Veale to Sub-Inspector Southey, 6 September 1894.
63. N 1/1/12, NC Victoria to CNC Salisbury, 2 and 16 October 1894; DV 1/2/1 Duncan to Nesbitt, 30 October 1894.
64. DV 1/2/1, Duncan to Nesbitt, 1 November 1894; CT 1/14/1/2, F. Rhodes to Cape Town Office, 10 December 1894.
65. A 2/14/1, Duncan to Weale, 29 March 1894.
66. N 9/1/1, Annual Report of NC Chilimanzi, 1895; N 1/1/12, NC Victoria to CNC Salisbury 25 November 1894 and 12 February 1895.
67. MLGH, DDA, Delineation Report, Chilimanzi, 1964; Aquina, 'Chilimanzi', 48 – 9.
68. UZHD Texts 19, 21, 25 Chibi; MLGH, DDA, Delineation Report, Chibi, 1965; N 9/1/1, Annual Report of NC Chibi, 1895; White, 'Esitshebeni', 176 – 7; NVC 1/1/1, NC Chibi to NC Chilimanzi, 14 February 1897.
69. N 3/1/20, NC Victoria to CNC Salisbury, 28 September 1900.
70. Aquina, 'Chilimanzi', 48 – 9.
71. A 1/12/27, CNC Bulawayo to Administrator, 10 March 1896. It is not certain which dynasty was involved in these two ambushes. It could have been Masunda, who joined the rising three weeks later, but it could equally — and more probably, given the location — have been Mazvihwa, who remained neutral. In either case, this was not an early outbreak of the main rising, which broke out on 25 March: the district was generally peaceful until then.
72. D.T. Laing, *The Matabele Rebellion*, (London, 1897), 106 – 178.
73. The whites moved out of Selukwe so fast that it was not clear whether Nhema, Banga and Ndanga joined the rising immediately or not. The evidence for this area between late March and early June is fragmentary and ambiguous. From early June they were quite definitely involved.
74. White, 'Esitshebeni', 186 – 191, 215.
75. White, 'Esitshebeni', 125 – 6.
76. N 9/4/3, NC Chibi to CNC Salisbury, 3 June 1899.
77. *Ibid.*, 'Kandamakumbo', 'Mazarire', *NADA*, 13, 1935, 21.
78. BA 2/9/1, OC Victoria to Administrator, 26 May 1896; BA 2/9/2, Laing to Carrington, 28 June 1896; UZHD Text 19 Chibi; NVC 1/1/1, NC Chibi to CNC Salisbury, 5 March 1897; Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/6, Draft history by M.E. Weale.
79. A 1/12/39, Vizard to Vintcent, 24 August 1896; BA 2/9/2, OC Victoria to CSO, 4 August 1896.
80. UZHD Text 22 Chibi.
81. A. St. Clair, 'On the white man's trail', *African Monthly*, v, 5, (December 1908), 42 – 5, 48 – 50, Laing, *Matabele Rebellion*, 136ff.
82. Laing, *Matabele Rebellion*, 140 – 4.
83. The Pfumbi were in fact Shona-speakers of recent Venda origin.
84. A 1/12/40, OC Victoria to Vintcent, Salisbury, 29 September 1896.
85. Laing, *Matabele Rebellion*, 178 – 237.
86. Laing, *Matabele Rebellion*, 238 – 40.
87. A 1/12/39, NC Victoria to Vintcent, 24 August 1896.
88. See note 73 above. NC Driver was threatened by an armed force just after he had killed Nhema's cattle under the rinderpest regulations; the Selukwe stores were looted; and immigrant labourers were driven away from the mines, (Hist. Miss. MISC/DR 2/1/1, Driver's reminiscences; A 1/12/31, Inskipp to Administrator, 26 March 1896 and RM Victoria to Secretary to Administrator, 30 March 1896) but similar events took place where the full rising had not yet occurred. One of Nhema's men and two Ndebele on a 'Mwari' mission near Victoria in May — possibly nothing to do with the rising — implicated each other and Nhema at their court-martial, but their evidence was suspect. (A 1/12/35, OC Victoria to Acting Administrator, Salisbury, 4 and 5 May 1896).
89. From 12 June (A 1/12/36, OC Victoria to Vintcent 12 June 1896) it was clear that Nhema and Banga were involved. The evidence for a delayed commitment of these rulers to the rising is reinforced by Chirimuhanzu's lack of concern until June.
90. Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/6, Draft history by M.E. Weale.
91. D.N. Beach, *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900 – 1850*, (Gweru, 1980), 304.
92. Hist. Mss. MISC/LO 5/1/1, Mrs. Loots's Memoirs.
93. A 1/12/36, OC Victoria to Vintcent, 12 June 1896.
94. BA 3/1/2, CSO Bulawayo to High Commissioner, 1 and 7 July 1896.
95. D.N. Beach, 'Afrikaner and Shona settlement in the Enkeldoorn area, 1890 – 1900', *Zambezia*, i, 2, 1970, 29.
96. BA 3/2/1, H.M. Hole to *The Cape Times*, 8 August 1896; A 1/12/36, OC Victoria to Vintcent, 12 June 1896.
97. BA 2/9/2, Hurrell to GOC, 2 August 1896; Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/6, Draft history by M.E. Weale. In this, Weale transposed the attacks of July and October.
98. BA 2/8/1, Jenner to CSO, 17 November 1896.
99. UZHD Text 22 Chibi.
100. BA 2/9/2, Paget to CSO, 19 October 1896.
101. A 1/12/40, CC Victoria to Vintcent, 28 and 29 October 1896; BA 2/8/1, OC Victoria to OC Salisbury, 17 November 1896; BA 2/9/2, Watson to Paget, 4 November 1896.

102. N 1/1/12, NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury, 25 January 1897; N 1/1/12, Lingard for CNC to NC Chilimanzi, 27 January 1897; N 1/1/12, NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury, 4 February 1897; DV 1/2/1, Administrator to Vizard, 17 February 1897.
103. N 1/1/2, NC Charter to CNC Salisbury, 27 March 1897, CNC to NC Charter 28 March 1897. Note by Taberer on NC Charter to CNC 30 March 1897, NC Charter to CNC, 5 and 19 April 1897; A 11/2/12/11, Preliminary examination of Manyanga, 2 February 1904; N 9/4/15, Acting NC Chilimanzi to CNC, 2 June 1903.
104. Hist. Mss. WI 5/1/1, Diary of ANC Williams, 14 August 1897.
105. A 1/12/36, OC Victoria to Vintcent, 19 June 1896; BA 4/1/1, SO Salisbury to CSO, 24 June 1896.
106. BA 2/9/2, Hurrell to GOC Bulawayo, 2 August 1896.
107. BA 4/1/2, OC Charter to Administrator, 6 August 1896; A. Drew, *Historical Fort Victoria*, (Salisbury, 1932), 21.
108. BA 2/8/1, Jenner to CSO, 12 November 1896.
109. A 1/12/10, Taylor to Vintcent, 3 April 1896; A 1/12/13, Beal to Vintcent, 12 July 1896.
110. A 1/12/35 Beal to Vintcent 1 and 6 May 1896; LO 5/6/1 Grey to Kershaw 12 May 1896; A 1/12/27, Evidence of Tshenombi 12 July 1896. See Chapter 5.
111. A 1/12/36, Firm to Administrator, 19 June 1896.
112. Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/6, Draft history by M.E. Weale; A 1/12/36, Firm to Scanlen 26 June 1896.
113. A 1/12/13, Beal to Vintcent, 12 and 13 July 1896; A 1/12/29, Beal to Vintcent 22 July 1896. They were disarmed but did not desert.
114. BA 2/8/1 Jenner to Alderson, in Alderson to CSO, Bulawayo 17 November 1896.
115. UZHD Text 44 Chivhu.
116. H.E. Sumner, 'The Kwenda story', *NADA*, ix, 4, 1967, 4.
117. J. White, 'The Mashona Rebellion', *Work and workers in the mission field*, April 1897, 151.
118. A 1/12/14, Vintcent to Firm and Brabant, 27 July 1896, Vintcent to Judson 1 August 1896; A 1/12/27, Brabant to Vintcent, 29 July 1896; A 1/12/37, White to Vintcent, 14 July 1896.
119. D.N. Beach, 'The initial impact of Christianity on the Shona: the Protestants and the southern Shona', in *Christianity South of the Zambezi*, ed. A.J. Dachs, (Gwelo, 1973), 25–40.
120. Beach, *Shona and Zimbabwe*, 292.
121. A 1/12/37, Beal to Vintcent, 10 July 1896.
122. A 1/12/27, evidence of Tshenombi *et al.*
123. A 1/12/27, Administrator to Strickland, 25 July 1896; A 1/12/39, Judson to Vintcent, 22 August 1896; A 1/12/5, Charter garrison diary, 10 August 1896; A 1/12/3 Charges against Captain Brabant.
124. LO 5/6/8 Acting Secretary to Administrator, Bulawayo to London Board, 15 January 1897.
125. LO 5/6/8 CNC Matabeleland to Acting Chief Secretary to Deputy Administrator, Bulawayo, 21 March 1897.
126. N 9/1/4, NC Chibi to CNC Salisbury, 14 April 1898.
127. BA 4/1/1 RM Tuli to Administrator, 22 June 1896.
128. A 1/12/14 Vintcent to Brabant, 27 July 1896; A 1/12/3, Charges against JS. Brabant; BA 3/1/2 CSO to High Commissioner, 3 July 1896.

129. N 9/1/5, NC Victoria to CNC Salisbury, 31 March 1899.
130. N 9/1/4, NC Chibi to CNC Salisbury, 14 April 1898; DV 1/1/2, CNC Salisbury to NC and CC Victoria, 1 January and 30 November 1897.
131. N 3/1/5 NC Charter to CNC Salisbury 31 May 1904; N 1/2/1 CNC Salisbury to Acting Secretary to Administrator, 10 May 1893.
132. N 1/1/2 NC Charter to CNC Salisbury, 3 August 1897.
133. UZHD Text 14 Chibi; NVC 1/1/1 NC Chibi to NC Belingwe 17 October 1897; NVC 1/1/1 NC Chibi to CNC Salisbury 11 September 1897; N 9/4/12 Acting NC Chibi to CNC Salisbury 1 October 1902; H. Zwakavapano, 'The story of the Masunda Headmanship', *NADA* ix, 1, 1964, 56.
134. T.O. Ranger, 'Notes on the History Honours Easter expedition to Gwindingwi Hill', unpublished paper, c. 1962, 8.
135. RC 3/7/1 CNC Salisbury to Chief Secretary to Administrator, 22 August 1899; N 1/2/3 NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury, 16 November 1897.
136. *Ibid.*; NB 1/1/7 NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury, 23 January 1899; N 9/4/4 NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury July 1899.
137. N 3/14/1 CNC Salisbury to Chief Secretary to Administrator, 1 August 1905; N 9/4/7 Clerk in Charge, Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury 30 April 1901; N 9/4/10 Acting NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury 1 November 1901.
138. N 9/4/13 NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury 1 April 1902; N 9/4/14 NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury, 2 March 1903; N 9/4/15 NC Chilimanzi to CNC Salisbury 30 April 1903; NVG 1/1/1 ANC Chilimanzi to Acting CNC Salisbury 8 September 1905; N 3/4/5 Minute by Cornell, 10 June 1914.
139. Aquina, 'Chilimanzi', 46–7; MLGTP, DDA, Delineation Report, Chirimuhanzu, 1964.

4

Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro

Introduction

This chapter is very different from the three that precede it and from that which follows. It concentrates on the history of a few square kilometres of land, not even as large as the territories of Chivi and Nyajena discussed in Chapter 2, let alone as large as the tracts covered in the other chapters. It pays a great deal of attention to military history, and in particular to the origins of the stone strongholds and forts that are the main physical remnants of the First Chimurenga in Zimbabwe. It also represents a transitional phase in the re-examination of the Chimurenga that took place in the 1970s.

The local focus is important. Articles and books that range widely over the whole country or even a large part of it mention territories and dynasties by the score, but it is sometimes hard to visualize how the Chimurenga affected individual communities. Yet the local community was, after all, the world of the people who took part in the First Chimurenga. By examining the fortunes of the people who lived around the stronghold of Mashayamombe, in a few kilometres of the Mupfure valley, we get a clearer idea of what it was like to live during the Chimurenga. Ideally, in fact, we need such a study for every village or group of villages in the country! Some of the insights gained can be surprising. Although the Mashayamombe region saw the outbreak of the Chimurenga in the central Shona country, and a harrowing campaign of suppression from December 1896 to July 1897, it is odd to find that for periods of up to two months at a time there was no fighting at all, and the people were able to live in peace in the middle of a general war. This goes far to explain just why rulers such as Mashayamombe could be so confident as late as December 1896.

The emphasis on local geography and military history is also important. It is all very well to write of battles in this or that area, but to understand fully what was going on one should have a clear

idea of what it was like to live and fight in the rocky hills and tangled undergrowth of a river valley like the Mupfure. The military aspect of the First Chimurenga has also been neglected in the past. Surprisingly, the colonial victors never produced a comprehensive military history of the war, with every battle or skirmish and its outcome carefully detailed. We have only occasional works like those of Alderson, and these are by no means complete. Now that we are re-examining the Chimurenga from a different viewpoint, such a military history would be of real value. Moreover, although the bulk of the evidence so far available is in the written accounts of white eyewitnesses of the time, it does give us an idea of what the war was like for the African fighters. As we read de Moleyns's account of his attack on the Kaguvi medium on the night of 12 January 1897, it is not difficult to imaginewhat it was like for Kaguvi's men as they waited behind the walls of Kaguvi Hill, hearing the stumbling approach of the police column through the thick bush and rocky outcrops of the south bank of the river.

The physical remains are of importance, too. Most of the colonial forts of the period became historical monuments or protected places under colonial rule, and Mashayamombe's stronghold and Kaguvi Hill were exceptional in that they were among the few recent African sites to be so protected before 1980. It is to be hoped that in future as many sites of this kind as possible will be protected all over the country, so that the Zimbabweans of the future will have some physical remains of such an important period in the country's history. Even the colonial forts have their part to play in the educational programmes that could be built around the campaigns of the First Chimurenga.

This chapter was originally written in fulfilment of a promise to the Chifamba family, who did so much to help me in my research in the Mhondoro region. It was published in the local amateur historical journal *Rhodesiana*, 27, 1972, which is why it has a much less academic tone than the other chapters of this book. It does not pretend to be a complete history of the people of the modern Chegutu-Kadoma region, nor indeed of the entire Mashayamombe territory, either before or during the Chimurenga. As pointed out above, it covers only a few square kilometres, though a very significant few kilometres in late nineteenth century Zimbabwean history.

Finally, as was noted above, this was originally an article that marked a transition in thinking about the First Chimurenga. As I wrote in the introduction to this book, my original thesis did not go far enough in questioning Professor Ranger's *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia* of 1967. By 1972, when the article was written, I was

beginning to wonder whether there had in fact been any degree of pre-planning of the Chimurenga, and traces of this can be found in the text below. For the re-examination of the question, one has to read the last chapter of this book. I have not tried to rewrite this chapter to incorporate the findings of the later one. Instead, I have left it largely unchanged to illustrate the point made in the book's introduction, that history is indeed a discipline in a process of continual change.

Forts, strongholds and local history

The colonial forts of the late nineteenth century in Zimbabwe have attracted attention from local historians,[1] although they were often hastily built and of inferior workmanship to some contemporary Shona fortifications.[2] The circumstances in which they were built varied: some, like Forts Tuli, Victoria and Charter, were originally built as bases for the occupation of the country in 1890 by the British South Africa Company's forces.[3] Others, such as the fortifications at the Naka Pass, were intended for use against other powers.[4] The majority, those constructed during the 1896 – 97 Ndebele and Shona Chimurenga, were the result of interaction between African political organisations — the residual Ndebele state and the Shona dynasties — and the Europeans.[5] But it is not always appreciated that such fortifications could result from purely inter-African politics, so that a dispute between one African leader and another could lead ultimately to the construction of a fort by the Europeans. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how this could come about, and how a simple rock fort could be the result of a long sequence of events in local history.

Twenty kilometres up the Mupfure[6] River from the site of Hartley Hills township on the Chimbo confluence is the hill known as Kaguvi. Here the river runs between hills that come close to the water and extend for a considerable distance to the north and south. On the northern bank these hills form a number of ranges, including the Chirozva complex overlooking the Gonzo Valley, where Chinengundu, the holder of the Mashayamombe title in the 1890s, had his stronghold.[7] At the Nyundo confluence on the south bank stands Njatara Hill,[8] and to the west of this is the massif of Kaguvi. This is well over a kilometre long, lying parallel to the Mupfure, and in fact the eastern end of the hill has a separate name, Chena or Chena's. Kaguvi Hill itself is notable in several ways. It stands above a pool which has never been known to dry up

completely, and which, according to popular tradition, used to give forth the noise of cattle, sheep, goats and cockerels in the years before the Europeans came.[9] The hill is steep-sided, especially on the north, and fairly heavily wooded. The most significant feature lies under a crown of great boulders at the top, a little to the west of the middle of the hill: under this crown is a series of caves, and one of these is of special interest. This cave is one of the highest in the hill, and a gap in its western end looks out over the Mupfure Valley. In its eastern end there is a natural stone seat, and at certain times it is lit up by the sun which strikes down through a cleft in the rocks.

Such a minute description of a small area is normally unnecessary in an historical study, but in this case there is a need for a clear picture if the significance of the events to be described is to be understood. In Shona history as in any other kind of history there are certain places that are of supreme importance, and in the late nineteenth century Kaguvi Hill was one of these: a hill such as this, with an unusual cave and pool, was a natural site for a Shona spirit medium's shrine, and it was here that the nineteenth-century mediums of the Kaguvi spirit settled and gave their spirit's name to the hill. It was here that much of the action of the 1896 – 97 rising of the Shona was concentrated. This will show the interaction of Shona religious and political authorities, and their impact upon the society of the 1890s in the immediate vicinity of Kaguvi Hill. Several important topics will be touched upon, but for reasons of space will have to be developed elsewhere. In the meantime, an attempt will be made to show a microcosm of the Shona rising, and to provide useful information for those interested in Kaguvi Hill, Mashayamombe's stronghold and Fort Mhondoro.

The oldest political unit in the area is the Chivero dynasty. Chivero's people, whose totem is *shava*, eland, and whose praise-name is *mwendamberi*, have been established in the district since at least the early seventeenth century.[10] They held land on both banks of the Mupfure, and for some distance to the north and south, and can fairly be called the *varidziwepasi*, or owners of the soil, of the district. However, from a date provisionally placed in the middle of the eighteenth century, they began to lose their primacy to the Guzho dynasty under the Mashayamombe dynasty. These *mhara* (impala)-totem people, whose praise-name was *mbuya*, formed part of a migration from 'Dzete' in the north-east of the country, the other part settling under the Maromo dynasty near modern Chivhu. The Mashayamombe group acquired settlement-rights from Chivero, and rapidly became the most important dynasty in

the district, itself allocating land to newcomers. It is important to realise, however, that there was no distinct dividing-line between the two territories, and that communities of each existed on either side of the river, sometimes with communities of each group living on adjacent hills. Such an arrangement would only have been possible if Chivero and Mashayamombe maintained cordial relations, and in fact this seems generally to have been the case.

There is little traditional evidence for intervention by the Changamire Rozvi in the affairs of the two dynasties other than the involvement of the Rozvi associate, Mavudzi, in Chivero coronations. This meant that they were effectively independent, and this tradition continued into the nineteenth century in spite of the proximity of the Ndebele state. The effect of Ndebele raiding has often been exaggerated, and in the case of Mashayamombe and Chivero, although the raiders could operate in the open country, they could not take the hill strongholds. Neither Mashayamombe nor Chivero became tributary to the Ndebele, but part of each dynasty was briefly forced to evacuate the area for a time. Nevertheless, the increasing availability of guns began to restore the position for the Shona, and by 1866 at the latest Mashayamombe was re-established on the Mupfure. In the years up to 1889, Manuel António de Sousa, *capitao-mor* of Gorongosa, extended his economic interests into the area, collecting ivory. This Portuguese influence, unlike that of the British and Afrikaner hunters who operated to the west, had connections with a colonial government, and in 1889 Mashayamombe and Chivero, as well as most of the rulers of the Shona country as far south as modern Kadoma and Chivhu, concluded an anti-Ndebele treaty with Sousa and J.C. Paiva de Andrada.[11]

To this brief outline of the political history of the area, a short analysis of Shona religion can be added. Shona traditional religionists today believe in a single, supreme creator-God, Mwari. Normally the worshipper can contact God in two ways: he can make use of the cult based on the shrines now centred in the Ndebele country, where there are mediums possessed by the spirit God himself, or they can contact a *mudzimu*. A *mudzimu* is the spirit of a dead ancestor, who, in the hereafter, can contact God in person and who can also possess a spirit medium or *svikiro* in order to contact his descendants in the flesh. Manuel de Faria e Sousa noted the analogy between Shona religion and Roman Catholicism when he wrote before 1649 that the Shona "believe their kings go to heaven, and call them Muzimos, and call upon them in time of need, as we do on the saints".[12] The technical term for the spirit of a person of political importance is *mhondoro*, lion,[13] and the medium of a

mhondoro usually wields a great deal of power, depending upon the importance of the person whose spirit possesses him. It should be stressed that the Shona people take care to detect charlatans, that the *svikiro* and his or her adherents are sincerely convinced of the authenticity and power of the possessing spirit, and that the medium is most emphatically *not* a witch or wizard, *muroyi*, nor a witch-finder or herbalist, *n'anga*.[14]

More research on the cult of the Kaguvi *mhondoro* spirit needs to be carried out, but a fairly full account of the cult was given in 1969 by Chief Chivero, who lived with his uncle the Kaguvi medium before the 1896 rising.[15] In this version, the first Kaguvi was seen as a young man who was discovered by the daughters of Sororenzou in the forest, and was given charge of Sororenzou's cattle. When he proved to have the power to make rain fall in a drought by magic, he was rewarded by marriage to one of Sororenzou's daughters, Nehanda. This account probably has only a limited value to historians of religion: Sororenzou is simply another name for Mwari, the use of magic by a stranger to bring rain is also used in accounts of the Karivara cult of Gutu, and the whole episode ostensibly involves only six people in an unspecified place at an unknown time. All it tries to do is to explain the original powers of the Kaguvi spirit, though by the 1880s that power was mainly remarkable for the location of game during a dry season.[16] But it is significant that Chief Chivero believed that the original Kaguvi had been the husband of the original Nehanda. He derived his information from his father Makuwatsine, a close associate of Gumboreshumba the Kaguvi medium, and it seems highly likely that this was what Gumboreshumba himself believed.[17] If this were so, it would explain the relationship between the Kaguvi and Nehanda mediums in 1896, when Nehanda evidently recognised Kaguvi's supremacy.[18] Gumboreshumba was not the first known Kaguvi medium, however; Kawodza, his grandfather and a member of the Chivero dynasty, held that honour. Kawodza lived at Kaguvi Hill during the Ndebele raids, and was eventually killed. "When Kawodza was the spirit medium, the spirit which possessed him used to tell him to prepare to fight," says tradition,[19] and Kaguvi Hill was well prepared for fighting. A perimeter of stonewalling runs around the top of the hill, while shorter walls guard the cave and the crown of boulders at the top, making a small inner citadel.[20] If the cave itself, and the natural stone seat inside, had not previously been used by a spirit medium, as is quite possible, it was now that the Kaguvi *mhondoro*'s medium began to do so. The gaps

in the roof of the cave, except that above the seat, were filled with clay,[21] and the whole religious centre became a stronghold as well.[22]

Nevertheless, Kawodza was killed, and the family of his son Chingonga, including Gumboreshumba and Makuwatsine, ended up in the vicinity of the Chinamhora dynasty of the Shawasha people, north-east of modern Harare. There, in the late 1880s, Gumboreshumba became possessed by the Kaguvi *mhondoro*. In the years before the 1896 rising, the new Kaguvi medium became well known, largely as supplier of good luck in hunting, but it seems very probable that his position as the *svikiro* of the spirit husband of the Nehanda *mhondoro* became known at this time.[25]

The outbreak of the Chimurenga around Mashayamombe's

This is not the place for a detailed account of the causes of the 1896 Shona rising, and this must be sought elsewhere.[24] Nevertheless, a brief account of the colonial occupation of the Mupfure valley area must be given, for there is a direct connection between the general causes of the rising there, and the incidents that sparked off the rising itself. In the first years after the arrival of European miners in the area in 1890, relations between them and the Mashayamombe and Chivero dynasties were reasonably cordial. However, after the 1893 war with the Ndebele the British South Africa Company assumed that it had inherited the Ndebele overlordship of the district, and began to tax the people. In fact, as we have seen, the local Shona had been independent, and this taxation was resented. Moreover, the increasing mining development after the war led to a demand for labour that could be satisfied by neither local volunteers nor migrant labourers. Consequently the Company began to force people to work, often for inadequate pay, and by rough methods. "The thing that caused *Chimurenga* (the rising) was sjamboks, since that time people were being forced to work for the government. So these people were the ones who were being beaten thoroughly by sjamboks," recalled one witness,[25] and other evidence supports this view.[26] Had this practice been applied suddenly, or had there been a formal declaration of annexation by the Company to the local rulers, the consequent reaction might have come sooner. As it was, the unfounded assumption of Ndebele over-rule developed into a gradual assumption of the powers of government without any explanation to the rulers. In 1894 the Mining Commissioner at Hartley began to levy taxation on a small

scale,[27] but the failure of this system led to the foundation of the Native Department later that year. H. Thurgood (*Rukwata*) and his successor D.E. Moony (*Moni*) were responsible for the collection of tax and the recruitment of labour, and the fact that they set up a Native Department station at Mashayamombe's meant that they were able to apply a great deal more pressure than the Civil Commissioner had used.[28] Even so, the Company commanded a great deal of strength, and it was not until they were thoroughly embroiled in the Ndebele rising of March 1896, that a rising in the Hartley district became feasible.

Mashayamombe Chinengundu appears to have been the person primarily responsible for the way in which the Shona rising spread. Resistance to the collection of hut tax had been widespread in the Shona country for two years, and fighting had already broken out in the Budya country of Mutoko, but it was from Mashayamombe's that a wave of violence spread out over the country, absorbing such centres of previous resistance as Nyandoro, and Makoni.[29] In May, Native Commissioner Moony reported that Mashayamombe was "in communication with someone in Matabeleland, and had lately sent some young men down". Moony added that he "taxed Old Mashayingombi with this, but he informed me that he had only sent down to the Matabele 'Umlimo' for some medicines to prevent the locusts from eating his crops next year".[30] The "Matabele 'Umlimo' " was in fact one of the mediums of Mwari, stationed at a shrine in the Inyathi district. The officers of this shrine, headed by one Mkwati, were heavily involved with the Ndebele rising, and Moony's comment on Mashayamombe's statement — and rumour of a coming rising — "I attach no importance whatever to the above . . ."[31] have led to his being described as "tragically complacent",[32] but to some extent he was justified in being unalarmed by the story of the locust medicine. Shona religion in general and the Mwari-cult in particular are and were deeply concerned with the well-being of the crops,[33] and it was in fact through the matter of the locust medicine that the Kaguvi medium became involved in the rising.

After interrogating Gumboreshumba the Kaguvi medium after his capture in 1897, Native Commissioner Kenny described what had happened from the *svikiro*'s point of view. " 'Kargubi' was sent for some months before the recent rebellion by 'Mashigombi' and was told by the latter that he, 'Kargubi', would be given some medicine which he had got from Umquarti or 'Gorro' and 'Wampongo' to destroy the locusts . . . Kargubi sent some of his people on receipt of this message from 'Mashigombi' to find out what this

medicine was and to return with some. The messengers returned to 'Kargubi' from 'Mashingombi' with orders from the latter that he required one cow before he could send the medicine. This 'Kargubi' refused to do, and sent his own people to 'Umquarti' for some of the medicine. 'Mashingomba' at the same time also sent messengers to 'Umqaurti' on the same errand. When these messengers got to 'Umquarti' they were informed by the latter, that he was a god and could kill all the whites and was doing so at that time in Matabeleland, and that 'Kargubi' would be given the same powers, as he 'Umquarti' had, and was to start killing the whites in Mashonaland. Immediately on the return of the messengers 'Mashigombi' started killing the whites and 'Kargubi' then sent orders to all the paramounts and people of any influence to start killing the whites and that he would help them, as he was a god, and that the whitemen's guns would not fire bullets, but water".[34] This statement has important implications for the study of the organisation of the whole rising, but these cannot be discussed here.[35] The main point brought out is that Mashayamombe and the Kaguvi medium had had a difference of opinion, and had acted independently of each other. This foreshadowed their eventual quarrel. In the meantime, the Kaguvi medium moved from his home in the Shawasha country, where he had built up his influence, to his family's original home in the territory of Chivero. He settled at a place north of Mashayamombe's on the South Road between Hartley Hills and Salisbury, probably called Mupfumira's.[36] In the Chivero territory, he was in the country where his grandfather Kawodza had been medium of the same Kaguvi *mhondoro*, and nearly all of the evidence for his power in the rising comes from the Chivero-Nyamweda region where Kawodza had operated, and from the vicinity of the Shawasha country where he himself had been the spirit's medium.[37]

Meanwhile at Mashayamombe's, events moved toward the outbreak of the rising. It seems possible that Mashayamombe had contemplated a rising even before Mkwati suggested that he should rise, for such advice as Mkwati gave was only effective where public opinion supported it, and Shona rulers generally followed public opinion.[38] Nevertheless, it seems equally clear that, for security reasons, the plan for the rising was kept to a few: in the event, many Shona were unprepared.[39] The air of tension must have been noticeable, however, and it was not helped by the actions of Moony, the Native Commissioner. Unwisely, Moony had established his camp very close to the village of Muzhuzha Gobvu, a nephew of Chinengundu the Mashayamombe ruler. Tensions

appear to have arisen between Muzhuzha and Moony's messengers and their wives. Tradition says that ". . . it is when this *chimurenga* started, it started . . . because this camp was in Muzhuzha's village and then the fighting started straight away after the beating of Muzhuzha."[40] One of Moony's men described what happened: "About three days before Mr. Moony was murdered, Mjuju thrashed Jim's wife. On the women coming to complain about the matter Mr. Moony thrashed Mjuju. Four men of Umjuju's kraal ran out with guns. These were taken away by Mr. Moony and sent to Hartley to Lukwata (Mr. Thurgood) . . . Janatilla and Jhanda deserted the night before we went to the coolie's, taking their guns with them. On the third day after the guns had been sent to Hartley we accompanied Mr. Moony to the trading station of the coolies across the Umfuli river. On our arrival there we found that they had been killed, so we returned to Umjuju's kraal. . . . Before arriving at Mr. Moony's huts, Makomane deserted with his gun. On getting to the huts Kaseke and Mhlambezi went into Mr. Moony's hut, put down their guns and went away. . . . We were told by Mr. Moony to cook some food before starting for Hartley. Jarivau went up to his wife's hut in Umjuju's kraal. He there saw the impi coming into the kraals. He ran away to Mr. Moony and told him of it, and said 'Let us run.' Mr. Moony then mounted his horse and said, 'Come along, let us go.' The Mashonas followed us up and opened fire on us. . ."[41] Moony's action in flogging a nephew of the ruler — severely, according to tradition — had precipitated the rising.[42] Undisturbed by his messengers' desertions, he now realised what was wrong, and fled with his men. They scattered, and Moony's fate emerges from the evidence of those who killed him. Pursued by a force under Mashayamombe's brother Chifamba,[43] he got as far as the Nyamachecha River, where his horse was wounded. Tying it up, he climbed a small hill, and died in a gunbattle. Ironically, he was killed by a man who had not known of the rising in advance, and had had to borrow a gun on the spot.[44] Just after this, two traders, Stunt and Shell, with seven Africans from the Zambezi, arrived and were killed near Muzhazha's.[45]

The Indian traders were probably killed on 14 June, and Mashayamombe's men immediately went onto the offensive. One force under the ruler's nephew Kakono travelled over seventy kilometres to kill J.C. Hepworth at his farm on the Zwezwe River,[46] while Chifamba Muchena, another of the ruler's brothers, went east to the Beatrice Mine to kill Tate, Koefoed and four labourers there on the afternoon of 15 June.[47] This pattern was repeated

across the country, with a slight time-lag as the news took time to travel. In the Chivero and Nyamweda territories north of Mashayamombe, and east of Salisbury, the Kaguvi medium's influence was particularly strong, as was that of the Nehanda medium in the Mazowe Valley, but elsewhere most of the influence was that of the local rulers and their own *mhondoro*.[49]

The efforts of Mashayamombe and the Kaguvi medium were crowned with success. Throughout the areas under their control, the Europeans and their foreign companions were killed indiscriminately, or driven away. For half a year they enjoyed unbroken military success. This was largely due to the skill of the Shona in defensive fighting. Armed with muzzle-loading guns that were difficult to use in the open, they made use of the cover of their hill strongholds and caves to inflict damage, and to retire when the opposition became too strong. In this way they could nullify the effect of superior forces or defeat smaller ones. Only when they were closely blockaded in their hills were they defeated.

The deaths of Tate and Koefoed at the Beatrice provoked the first major attack on Mashayamombe, which was defeated. A (technically Imperial) force of Natal troops, *en route* to the Ndebele rising, was recalled from Charter, and sent to investigate the Beatrice killings. At the Mupfure drift on the main road they met a small force from Salisbury, and 50 men under Captain P.A. Turner began to move towards Hartley.[50] They burned Chifamba Muchena's village, but wounded only one of his men, for the Shona took to their caves. The next day, 21 June, saw Turner in serious trouble in the increasingly difficult country. His scouts were driven away from one village by accurate gunfire — "They kept advancing, getting within 20 yards of us, dropping after each volley."[51] Two scouts were wounded, one mortally. Still fired upon, Turner eventually reached the store and drift below Mashayamombe's, but although the scouts crossed the river, the terrain and the opposition so discouraged Turner that he decided to go back. On 22 June, he retreated under heavy fire towards the Beatrice. He had lost two men killed, three wounded (one seriously), and one missing, as well as seven horses and mules killed and three missing. The Shona loss amounted to one man wounded. There was little doubt as to who had won.[52]

Mashayamombe's men had been closely besieging Hartley Hills, which was on the extreme limits of his territory, since 18 June, but when a massive relief force of some 250 men under Captain C. White appeared on 22 July, they withdrew. They had been able to blockade the 12 besieged so closely that no messages got

through, but White's force probably equalled or outnumbered Mashayamombe's effectives. White had fought twice on the way in, once with Nyamweda's people near the Mhanyame and once with Chivero's people between the Saruwe and Chimbo rivers, near the modern Dorton farm. Having relieved the fort, White crossed the Mupfure River opposite Hartley Hills on 23 July, and tried to reach the Beatrice Mine by the road on the south bank, but on the next day he began to enter the hills of Mashayamombe's territory, and decided to turn back, although not a shot had been fired. On 25 July he recrossed the Mupfure and left Mashayamombe's territory. Mashayamombe's victory was now complete: not a single European remained in his land, and he had suffered almost no loss.[53]

The Chivero dynasty was not so fortunate, however. It had already suffered from the fight at Gapori (Dorton) on 21 July, and now on 26 July White, returning to Salisbury by the South Road, surprised the Kaguvi medium at Mupfumira's.[54] White claimed to have killed 30 to 40 Shona, and collected a great deal of loot, mostly tribute offered to the medium, before going on, unscathed, to Salisbury.[55] This was a serious blow to Chivero, who did not figure largely afterwards, but Gumboreshumba does not seem to have suffered so much. He had nearly been caught, but he escaped to Kaguvi Hill, and there if anything his reputation was enhanced by the associations of the place with his grandfather Kawodza, the last medium of the Kaguvi *mhondoro*. It was a fine stronghold too.[56]

Colonial attacks and internal divisions

For a further two months the Shona of the area lived undisturbed, until in early October a fresh European force entered their territory. This time, the Europeans' object was not to investigate killings or to relieve a garrison, but to inflict a military defeat upon Mashayamombe. The Commander of the European force, Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel E.A.H. Alderson, had at his disposal 622 men, 311 of them regular Imperial troops, but he laboured under difficulties that nullified a good deal of his work, although his ingenuity deserved better rewards than the blame he later received.[57] Firstly, the Europeans were ignorant of the Kaguvi *mhondoro*'s importance, and knew little of the political organisation of the Shona. Faced with a rising on all sides of Salisbury, Alderson had to make his force do as much damage as possible over the widest possible area. He therefore decided upon a campaign that would embrace

the Marandellas, Charter, Hartley and Lomagundi districts, including a converging attack on Mashayamombe, who was recognised to be one of the more important leaders of the resistance. But Alderson's chief difficulty lay in the problem of supplies. When he arrived in Salisbury, he had donated half of his supplies to the hard-pressed laager, and when he left for Hartley on 5 October he had only two week's rations.[58] Unless he could find food in the field, he would have to complete his task in this time, or his horses and men would starve.

Alderson moved directly to the Hartley district, while Major Jenner's force, which had successfully completed the subjugation of the Mutekedza dynasty in the Charter district, closed in from the east. On the afternoon of 9 October they converged on the Mashayamombe-Kaguvi area, having seen no action on the way. For three days the combined forces ranged through the tangled complex of hills and caves that composed the stronghold of the Guzho people, mostly on the north bank but also at Chena's, the eastern part of Kaguvi Hill itself. At the end of this period they had taken and burned a number of villages and seized some cattle, but only 16 of the Shona were killed. Mashayamombe's and the Kaguvi medium's men made good use of the terrain to avoid losses, keeping to the caves or evacuating dangerous positions, and managed to kill three of Alderson's men and wound 13, many seriously.[59] Faced with the shortage of supplies, ignorant of the presence and importance of the Kaguvi medium and with Lomagundi district still untouched, Alderson decided to withdraw.[60] Mashayamombe and the Kaguvi medium, logically enough, saw this as a defensive victory, which won for them another seven weeks of peace.

Alderson was later strongly criticised by the Rhodesians in general and by the Company officials in particular for having failed to leave a fort at Mashayamombe's and with a strategic insight born of hindsight Lord Grey criticised him severely.[61] Such criticisms ignored Alderson's lack of supplies, and the Europeans' ignorance, in October, of the importance of the Mashayamombe-Kaguvi area. In fact, Alderson knew perfectly well what should have been done, and on 23 October he drew up the plan that in 1897 was to be the basis of the Company's victory. "To complete the work in hand," he wrote from Lomagundi, "I have plenty of men to go into any two districts at the same time and drive the rebels out of these, but I have not enough to establish strong posts in two or three districts and still be in a position to effectively clear others. In my opinion posts are absolutely necessary: what happens now is as follows: a patrol goes into one district and breaks up the rebels in

it: they then go into another, the patrol follows, and the rebels then go further on and eventually return behind the patrol to their original district. When each district has been harried by a patrol, I consider that a post should be established of from 50 to 75 men according to the size of the district and the number of natives in it. . . . These posts should constantly patrol and neither allow the natives to sow or reap or to graze their cattle. This appears Police rather than Military work, and I do not think that a sufficient number of the present local forces would be willing to do it through the wet season. It would be necessary to give many of the posts, one being that at Hartley, supplies for four months as wagons could not get there during the wet season. I reported much to the same effect as the above in my conversation over the wire with you on the 1st September and also in an official telegram sent some days previously but of which I have not got the date with me."[62]

Alderson's plan, the authorship of which was unacknowledged, was put into effect in December 1896. By 9 December Captains Perry and Brabant had re-occupied Hartley Hills with a force of police, and had opened negotiations with Mashayamombe.[63] This was symbolic both of the success of the Shona in the fighting, and of the policy that was in the end to defeat them. By the end of 1896, only the Charter and Makoni districts had been recaptured where the rising had occurred, and elsewhere the Shona had beaten off the Europeans, in spite of frequent illusory successes such as that of Alderson at Mashayamombe's. Faced with the prospect of a difficult summer campaign in the wet, and encouraged by the success of the Matopo negotiations with the Ndebele, the Europeans were prepared to negotiate a peace. The Shona were willing to discuss the matter, as they had not been defeated, and because they appreciated a chance to plant their crops. From their point of view, they were negotiating from a position of strength, but, as is well known, this policy eventually failed to bring peace,[64] and when the campaign was resumed it was by means of such forts as Hartley Hills that the Shona were finally defeated.

As Mashayamombe dragged out the negotiations, the Europeans finally began to appreciate and even to exaggerate the Kaguvi *mhondoro*'s role. On 18 December Chief Native Commissioner H.M. Taberer, believing that the Kaguvi medium was encouraging Mashayamombe and other rulers to carry on fighting, recommended that both of them be harried.[65] Lord Grey was unwilling to give up the negotiations, and on 31 December Taberer, at his request, drew up new plans for negotiations.[66] On 9 January 1897, Taberer himself, accompanied by Colonel F. de Moleyns, Commandant of

the B.S.A. police, Brabant and Grey's associate Howard, visited Mashayamombe for high-level discussions. There, they discovered that the situation had been revolutionized by a dispute between the Shona themselves.

We have already seen how Gumboreshumba, the Kaguvi *mhondoro*'s medium, was of a different lineage from that of Mashayamombe, and how he lived on a hill of the Chivero people. We have also seen his independent attitude at the beginning of the rising. A quarrel now arose between the two men. It was customary for mediums to be attended by girls, servants rather than wives, and it was an act of respect for such girls to be offered to famous mediums by rulers. Shortly afterwards, for example, seven girls were taken to Kaguvi on behalf of the Mangwende ruler.[67] Now, however, Gumboreshumba seized some of Mashayamombe's own women. Fighting followed, and Mashayamombe killed two of the medium's men. By the time Taberer's party arrived, a virtual state of war existed between the two parties.

As soon as Taberer heard of this development, he resolved to make the most of it, and told Mashayamombe that he would be left alone while the Kaguvi medium was dealt with, and "that he was not to consider any action taken against the Mhondoro as including him".[68] Taberer at once requested de Moleyns to capture or kill the mhondoro's medium.[69] De Moleyns' subsequent report explains why this ambitious project failed. With 186 men he left Hartley Hills at 5.30 p.m. on 12 January "to try and effect the arrest of the Mondoro and to establish an advanced force across the Umfuli river. . . . The early part of the march while the moon was up was easy, but after midnight the darkness was extreme and it was very difficult to keep touch in the thick bush, but at 3 a.m. I reached a point about one mile west of the Mondoro's kraal with all my force. I was informed by spies sent on by Captain Brabant that the natives were awake, occasionally firing off guns, shooting, etc., and had men on the lookout, and under the circumstances I considered that even if I could effect an entrance into the kraals it was very doubtful whether I could capture the Mondoro, I decided not to make the attempt. I allowed the men to sleep to daylight, 13th, and then . . . reconnoitred the country round Mandoro's kraal and selected a position for a fort, where I established myself, distance 9 miles E.S.E. of Hartley, 1 mile from the Umfuli, and about 4 miles from the Mhandoro's. The fort is on a kopje rather too extensive for the force that I can leave here, but excellently situated for harassing operations, and capable of good defence." Supplies were brought up, and a garrison of 64 men was left in the new fort,

which was named after the cause of de Moleyns' expedition, Fort Mhondoro.[70]

Thus it was that a police fort was constructed, not merely as a base for action against the Shona resistance, but as a consequence of an internal development within Shona politics. This internal dispute continued to dominate the situation, and in fact the Europeans derived their most useful information on the Kaguvi *mhondoro*'s medium from Mashayamombe himself, before the former decided to leave the area. Only in this way was the dispute ended, and with it the participation of the Europeans in this African rivalry.

Grey's aristocratic friend Howard was scathing about de Moleyns' failure,[71] although one wonders whether the plan of locating one man was feasible in any case. Meanwhile, Gumboreshumba had moved to a point a kilometre farther east, as de Moleyns discovered on 17 January, when his men penetrated the empty Kaguvi Hill and looted it. The Colonel was still chary of a direct attack: "I hardly think that H.H. the Commandant General[72] appreciates the difficulty of surprising their kraal when they are barricaded and expecting attack day and night," he wrote.[73] Even so, his scouting work was poor, and news of the next move reached him by courtesy of Mashayamombe. On the morning of 18 January two messengers from Mashayamombe arrived at Fort Mhondoro to warn the Europeans that Gumboreshumba had fled that morning. All that day, and the next morning, de Moleyns' men pursued the medium, but although they found some of his women being held by the people of the neutral ruler Rwizi near the Beatrice Mine, Gumboreshumba had turned aside and safely reached his old home in the Shawasha country, where he continued to lead the rising.[74] His later career and eventual fate are well known.[75]

The end of the Chimurenga in the Mupfure valley

With the departure of the Kaguvi medium, the *raison d'être* for Fort Mhondoro had gone as well. As at Hartley Hills, the sick-list for both men and horses at Fort Mhondoro was heavy, although as late as 1 February a garrison of 102 was maintained.[76] The men from Fort Mhondoro continued to make patrols, and on 30 January they reached the Zwezwe.[77] On 8 and 10 February, Mashayamombe's men fired on the fort, to add to the troubles of the fever-stricken garrison, and it was obvious that the outpost was no longer of much use.[78] By 12 February the police medical officer

was urging de Moleyns to evacuate "Mondora",[79] and on 12 March this was finally carried out. By then only 24 men held the fort.[80]

By this time the focus of the fighting had shifted to the north bank of the Mupfure, where Mashayamombe Chinengundu's people were employing every ruse and every fighting man to hold out against the encroaching European power. Inexorably, Alderson's plan was put into effect. African troops patrolled the croplands,[81] and on 20 February the construction of Fort Martin, close to Mashayamombe's was begun.[82] The men from Fort Mhondoro helped with this encirclement, and on 15 March a new fort was commenced.[83] Two days later, Mashayamombe put a stop to this further encirclement, by making a direct attack. At dawn on 17 March, he assaulted Fort Martin for three hours, and according to Biscoe, who arrived a little later, he actually took the smaller hill at the fort, which was held by the African troops, killing three of them, before being repelled.[84] The construction of the new fort was abandoned, and for the rest of the campaign Fort Martin was the base for the police. During the campaign, Mashayamombe tried practically every conceivable method to keep his independence for a little longer. In March, he tried to bribe the Europeans to go away, with offers of money and guns.[85] As late as July, he tried to divide them by playing off the Native Commissioner at Charter against Brabant.[86] But supplies were Mashayamombe's weak point. It is possible that some of Mashayamombe's people had begun to flee to the Mvurwi region, for he seems to have needed labour as well. At the beginning of January a force of Gora's people from the Mwanesi Range raided the disarmed Shona refugees encamped in the government 'location' in Charter district, killing 16 and removing not only eight head of livestock but all the women and children as well. This was under the orders of Bonda, a minor religious leader from that area, who by that time seems to have been closely associated with Mashayamombe. Certainly the human and animal 'loot' went in his direction, and it was in his direction that Gora's people fled after a severe reprisal raid by the police.[87] Much the same thing happened in late May: Bonda had gone south to Hangayiwa hill in the angle of the Sebakwe and Kwekwe rivers, ostensibly to get Simbobora — an Ndebele who had settled there in 1894 — to join the rising. Instead, Simbobora betrayed him to the police. Bonda escaped and led a reprisal raid in company with Mashayamombe's brothers Chifamba and Chifamba Muchena, in which some Ndebele were killed and more captured. It seems likely that this, too, was partly an attempt to get supplies.[88]

It took more than seven months of siege before Mashayamombe could be overcome. On 24 July 1897, the final assault was mounted, in a repetition of Alderson's tactics of 1896. A force of the 7th Hussars moved in from Beatrice, taking Mareverwa's stronghold east of Kaguvi Hill, while at the same time a major assault was made on Mashayamombe's own stronghold and cave on Chirozva. Ten of the attackers were killed or wounded before Mashayamombe's people retired to their caves under the hill. Dynamite was then thrown into the cave after those inside had refused to come out. The next morning two more dynamite charges were used, and in the end 238 people came out and surrendered. About 40 more were killed in the caves, including Bonda and Chifamba. Mashayamombe himself was shot as he tried to leave one of the caves. Eight cases of dynamite were used to destroy the caves, leaving the battered mass of rocks that forms the heart of the monument today. The Chimurenga was over in the middle of Mupfure.[89]

Epilogue

The physical remains of the campaign had varying fortunes. Fort Martin, on a conspicuous hill near to a farmhouse, remained well known. Mashayamombe's stronghold of Chirozva vanished under woodlands and undergrowth so thick that eventually it took 11 years to relocate it. And, to the south, Kaguvi Hill and Fort Mhondoro sank gradually into obscurity. The Shona had burned the huts of the latter on 23 March,[90] and the name might have been forgotten, except for the chance that Native Commissioner W.E. Scott of Hartley had served in the last campaign. When he began to consider sites for reserves for the people displaced by the fighting, he referred to the south bank of the river, where the fort was, as the "Mondora" district,[91] and later the "Mondoro" reserve was marked out.[92] Ever since then, the area has been called Mhondoro, but the reason for this has tended to be forgotten. The Europeans eventually forgot the importance of this area. A faint echo of the rising sounded in 1922, when the B.S.A. Police Chief Staff Officer wrote, "I should appreciate a description of the native stronghold in the Madzangwe Hills about Fort Martin and the Umfuli River, their extent, nature of the country and so on. Reports to date are very meagre."[93] Naturally enough, the Shona people did not forget. Kaguvi Hill remained well known, partly as a convenient place for keeping cattle,[94] but also as a religious centre. In the dry season of 1967 the medium of the Gwenzi *mhondoro* of the Chivero people

held a ceremony there.[95] Fort Mhondoro's name was forgotten, but although it lay in a less frequented part of the Mhondoro Trust Land, it was visited by honey-collectors, and it lay in full view of the road to the Mupfure Dip Tank.

Fort Mhondoro is not very impressive to look at, nor is its interest in the men who served there. The true importance of Fort Mhondoro lies in its position, and the circumstances in which it was built. It stands as a monument to the internal workings of Shona politics, to the clash between Mashayamombe and the Kaguvi medium, and to the importance of the religious cult that was centred on Kaguvi Hill.

REFERENCES

1. P.S. Garlake, "Pioneer Forts in Rhodesia", *Rhodesiana* 12, 1965; D.K. Parkinson, "The Fort of Naka Pass", *Rhodesiana* 19, 1968; E.E. Burke, "Mazoe and the Mashona Rebellion, 1896–97", *Rhodesiana* 25, 1971.
2. A great number of these European forts were earthworks revetted by timber or stone (Garlake, 'Pioneer Forts', 37–8) and even stone forts were sometimes crudely built. Fort Mhondoro illustrates this, being built of fairly large rocks of all shapes piled one on top of the other and with earth spread along the top of the walls. A Shona fortification on the north bank of the Mupfure, explored by Mr. B.A. Marlborough on 25 March, 1972, showed much more careful work. Flat stones had been selected and placed in two rows in such a way that a relatively smooth outer surface was exposed, and the intervening gap had been filled with rubble.
3. Garlake, 'Pioneer Forts' 41–3.
4. Parkinson, 'Naka Pass' 61–2.
5. Garlake, 'Pioneer Forts' 45–60.
6. See note on Terminology.
7. Chirozva, "the destroyed place", is an anachronism, when applied to the hills around Mashayamombe's stronghold before its destruction in 1897, but it is a convenient use of a modern place-name.
8. I am grateful to Acting-Chief Mashayamombe, to his son, Mr. Christopher Chifamba, and to Mr. B.S. Marlborough for many place-names mentioned in this chapter.
9. Information supplied by Mr. Christopher Chifamba, 27 September, 1969.
10. D.N. Beach, *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900–1850* (Gwelo, 1980), 72.
11. Beach, *Shona and Zimbabwe*, 288 and Chapter 1 above.
12. Manuel de Faria e Sousa, "Asia Portuguesa", vol. 1, part 1, chap. X, in *Records of South Eastern Africa*, ed. G. McCall Theal, (London 1898), 24–5.
13. *Shumba* is the usual word for "lion" in Shona, but in the north-north-east the word *mhondoro* is still used in this sense. In most of the Shona country, *mhondoro*'s secondary meaning, "spirit of a deceased person of eminence held to reside in the body of a lion when not communicating from time to time with the living through an accredited human medium" is used. D.P. Abraham, "The Roles of 'Chaminuka' and the Mhondoro Cults in Shona Political History", in *The Zambesian Past*, ed. E. Stokes and R. Brown, (Manchester, 1966), 28.
14. Concise accounts of Shona traditional religion can be found in M.W. Murphree, *Christianity and the Shona*, (London, 1969), and M.L. Daneel, *The God of the Matopo Hills*, (The Hague, 1970).
15. UZHD Texts, 58–9 Chegutu.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. T.O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 1896–97, (London, 1967), 215–16.
19. UZHD Texts, 58–9, 61 Chegutu.
20. This walling, at least on the south-eastern perimeter, resembles that described in footnote 1.
21. On visiting the cave on 28 October, 1970, Mr. P.S. Garlake remarked that such a feature was most unusual.
22. It should be stressed that although Shona religious figures are not supposed to be involved personally in fighting ("The point of the thing is this, *svikiros* are

not allowed to act as warrior. The people concerned — I mean the relatives of the *svikiro* — have to hide him very much, since they don't want him to be killed," said Chief Chivero), there is a close relationship between Shona religion and Shona politics.

23. The evidence of references 15 – 17 and 19 above is corroborated by N(ative) C(ommissioner) E.T. Kenny's interrogation of the Kaguvi medium in 1897, in N 1/1/6, NC, Mazoe, to C(hief) N.C., Salisbury, 29 October, 1897.
24. Ranger, *Revolt*, Chapter 2.
25. UZHD Text, 60, Chegutu.
26. UZHD Texts 54, 60 Chegutu.
27. L 2/3/40 Mining Commissioner, Hartley, to Acting Administrator, 16 and 23 August, 1894.
28. H. Thurgood, a local trader, became Hut Tax Collector on 20 September, 1894, and was succeeded by D.E. Moony, whose name was often misspelt "Mooney", on 12 September, 1895. From 20 December, 1894, the quasi-official title, subsequently ratified, of Native Commissioner was used.
29. Ranger, *Revolt*, 192 – 3.
30. N 1/1/3, N.C. Hartley, to CNC, Salisbury, 24 May, 1896.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Ranger, *Revolt*, 202.
33. Murphree, *Christianity*, 45; Daneel, *Matopo Hills*, 15 – 17, A.K.H. Weinrich, *Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia*, (London, 1971), 85 – 7.
34. N 1/1/6, NC, Mazoe, to CNC, Salisbury, 29 October, 1897.
35. See Chapter 5 below.
36. On Captain C. White's campaign map it is marked as "Umpumelo's". Hist. Mss. WH 1/1/2.
37. See references 15 – 17 and 19 above.
38. Murphree, *Christianity*, 47; J.F. Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner*, (London, 1969) 96.
39. For example, some of the members of Kakono's force which was sent to kill J.C. Hepworth did not know of their real mission until they were already on their way. N 1/1/3, NC, Hartley, to CNC, Salisbury, 19 April, 1898.
40. UZHD Text, 54, Chegutu.
41. The usual source of the rising's commencement is British South Africa Company's *Reports on the Native Disturbances in Rhodesia, 1896 – 97*, (London, 1898), 51 – 69. It should be appreciated, however, that this section of the work is almost identical with A 1/12/26, Civil Commissioner, Salisbury, to Administrator, 29 October, 1896, which means that it was written long before those involved in the killings were arrested, so that many inaccuracies occur. The "January" cited in A 1/12/26 may be Jarivau, but his account is misleading and inferior to that of Mlembere, whose version is quoted here, N 1/1/3, Evidence of Mlembere, 20 September, 1897.
42. UZHD Texts, 53 – 4, Chegutu.
43. S. 401, No. 391, Regina versus Zuba Umtiva, 20 February, 1899, Evidence of Chingondi.
44. S. 401, No. 246, Regina versus Rusere and Gonye, 24 February, 1898, *passim.*
45. The account of the deaths of Stunt and Shell given by "January" in *Reports* (note 41 above) is generally incorrect. As they walked into Muzhuzha's village one was instantly shot, while the other ran away and was stabbed to death further off in a revolver-versus-assegai duel. S. 401, No. 391, Regina versus Zuba and Umtiva, 20 February, 1899, *passim*. The bodies were probably thrown into the river as "January" described, as this was the usual method of disposal. Muzhuzha's house caused a great deal of confusion among the Europeans during the rising. A good while before 1890 a dispute between the Muzhuzha and Musengezi houses of Mashayamombe led to the death of Muzhuzha I, and to the removal of many of Muzhazha's people by an Ndebele force called in by Musengezi. These Muzhuzha people were partially absorbed by the Ndebele state, and acquired the distinctive pierced-earlobe marks of the Ndebele. After the fall of the state in 1893 they returned home and lived under Muzhuzha II Gobvu, but their appearance led many Europeans to believe that Ndebele were involved in Mashayamombe's rising. UZHD Texts 57, 62 Chegutu.
46. N 1/1/3, NC, Hartley, to CNC, Salisbury, 19 April, 1898.
47. A 1/12/27, Statement by Jan, 16 June, 1896.
48. A 1/12/26, Civil Commissioner, Salisbury, to Administrator, 29 October, 1896.
49. Ranger, *Revolt*, 192 – 3.
50. Lieutenant E.J. Christison's force of Rhodesia Horse Volunteers met Turner's Natal force on 18 June. They set out towards the Beatrice on 19 June, leaving Captain J.F. Taylor to take part of the force to Salisbury. A 1/12/27, Turner and Christison to Administrator, 19 June, 1896.
51. Hist. Mss. AL/1/1/1, Statement of Sergeant Snodgrass, 23 June, 1896.
52. *Ibid.*, and Hist. Mss. AL 1/1/1, Report of Captain Turner, 25 June, 1896.
53. B.S.A.C. *Reports*, 102 – 3.
54. N 1/1/6, NC, Mazoe, to CNC, Salisbury, 29 October, 1887.
55. B.S.A.C. *Reports*, 103. The claims of White's patrol in the matter of Shona killed — more than 80 in all — look suspiciously high when compared with those of Turner's patrol of June, Alderson's of October and with those of the entire 1896 – 97 campaign from December to July.
56. N 1/1/6, NC, Mazoe, to CNC, Salisbury, 29 October, 1897.
57. E.A.H. Alderson, *With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force, 1896*, (London, 1898), 292.
58. Alderson, *Mounted Infantry*, 138, 193.
59. Alderson, *Mounted Infantry*, 201 – 10. The Shona losses were 16 dead and some wounded. LO 5/4/1, NC, Chilimanzi, to Administrator, Salisbury, 10 January, 1897.
60. Alderson, *Mounted Infantry*, 211.
61. Ranger, *Revolt*, 284.
62. LO 5/6/6, Ag. Secretary to the Administrator to London Board, 30 October, 1896, enclosing copy of Alderson, Lomagundi, to C(hief) S(taff) O(fficer), Bulawayo, 23 October, 1896, endorsed "H.H. The Administrator".
63. LO 5/4/1, J.S. Brabant, Fort Hartley, to Administrator, Salisbury, 10 December, 1896.
64. Ranger, *Revolt*, 285 – 8.
65. LO 5/4/1, CNC, Salisbury to Administrator, Salisbury, 18 December, 1896.
66. LO 5/4/1, CNC, Salisbury, to Administrator, Salisbury, 31 December, 1896.
67. LO 5/4/1, A(ssistant) NC, Marandellas, to Salisbury, 20 January, 1897.
68. LO 5/4/1, CNC, Hartley Hills, to Administrator, Salisbury, 9 January, 1897.
69. LO 5/4/1, CNC, Hartley Hills, to O(fficer) C(ommanding) B.S.A.P., Mashonaland, 9 January, 1897.
70. LO 5/4/1, F. de Moleyns to CSO Police, Salisbury, 14 January, 1897.
71. Ranger, *Revolt*, 293.
72. The Commandant-General was Sir Richard Martin, who was also Deputy Commissioner.

73. LO 5/4/1, F. de Moleyns, Fort Mandora (to Salisbury), 17 January, 1897.
74. LO 5/4/1, F. de Moleyns, 45 miles ENE. of Fort Mondoro (to CSO, Salisbury), 19 January, 1897.
75. Ranger, *Revolt*, 299 – 310.
76. LO 5/4/1, F. de Moleyns, Hartley, to C.S.O., Salisbury, 1 February, 1897.
77. LO 5/4/1, A.C.M. Ford, Fort Mondoro, to F. de Moleyns, 31 January, 1897.
78. LO 5/4/2, G.M. Osborne Springfield, Hartley, to O.C. B.S.A.P., Salisbury, 10 February, 1897.
79. LO 5/4/2, H. Haynes Lovett, M.O. B.S.A.P., Salisbury, to O.C., Hartley, 12 February, 1897.
80. LO 5/4/2, R.C. Nesbitt, Fort Martin, to Salisbury, 6 March, 1897. N 9/2/1, NC, Hartley, Half-yearly report, 1 April to 30 September, 1897.
81. N 1/1/3, ANC, Hartley, to CNC, Salisbury, 20 February, 1897.
82. N 1/1/3, ANC, Hartley, to CNC, Salisbury, 6 March, 1897.
83. N 9/2/1, NC, Hartley, Half-yearly report, 1 April to 30 September, 1897.
84. LO 5/4/2, R.C. Nesbitt, Fort Martin, to C.S.O., Salisbury, 17 March, 1897. Hist. Mss. B1 3/1/4, Diary entry for 21 March, 1897.
85. N 1/1/3 ANC, Hartley to CNC, Salisbury, 6 March, 1897.
86. N 1/1/3 ANC, Hartley to CNC, Salisbury, 1 July 1897 and note by CNC, 7 July 1897.
87. N 1/1/2 NC Charter to CNC Salisbury, 24 January 1897; LO 5/4/1 Gosling to OC BSAP 14 January 1897.
88. N 1/1/3 NC Hartley to CNC Salisbury, 12 September 1897; UZHD Texts 54, 62, 65 Chegutu.
89. N 1/1/3 ANC Hartley to CNC Salisbury, 25 July 1897.
90. N 1/1/3, ANC, Hartley, to CNC, Salisbury, 23 March, 1897.
91. N 3/24/1/1, NC, Hartley, to CNC, Salisbury, 30 January, 1898.
92. N 3/24/1/1, CNC, Salisbury, to Under-Secretary to Administrator, 18 March 1898.
93. B 1/6/1, CSO, Salisbury, to Direct Superintendent, B.S.A.P., Hartley, 5 October, 1822.
94. Information supplied by Mr. Christopher Chifamba, 27 September, 1969.
95. Information supplied by Mr. Christopher Chifamba, 28 October, 1970.

5

Chimurenga: The Central Shona Rising of 1896 – 7

Introduction

Professor T.O. Ranger's *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896 – 7: a study in African resistance* (London, 1967) must be easily the most influential book ever written about Zimbabwe. Its effect was felt far beyond the borders of the country, and it stood unchallenged for nearly a decade.

My review of the 1979 edition, published in the *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, xiii, 1, 1980, is still highly relevant today:

> No review of this most influential book can be complete without some reference to the political context in which it was written. When it went to press in mid-1966, the Rhodesian Front was busy laying the foundations for a neo-*apartheid* state and the African nationalist movement appeared to be tearing itself to pieces in bitter factional and ethnic rivalry. As Ranger notes in his new preface, *Revolt* "was designed to be about much more than the events of the two years 1896 and 1897." It was in several ways a message of hope and encouragement to the nationalist movement.
>
> What did *Revolt* offer its African readers? In the first place, they learned that they had a rich and proud past: Ranger brought into play much of the available evidence on the Great Zimbabwe, Mutapa and Changamire states, and showed how their heritage lived on in the Shona "paramountcies", which were far from being the harassed remnants depicted by Rhodesian historians. The Ndebele past was described sympathetically, and it was shown that, in spite of certain unpleasantnesses, relations with the Shona were by no means as bad as had been thought. Secondly, they learned that Rhodesian rule between 1890 and 1896 had been even more unpleasant than they had imagined, with full documentation being supplied from the files of the Native Department itself. The way in which the Ndebele and Shona responded to these pressures was even more inspiring. They achieved almost complete tactical surprise, with a preconcerted, co-

ordinated, almost simultaneous rising in each zone in March and June, 1896. These risings, the one essentially an extension of the other, incorporated the traditional secular leaders of each society, except for an Ndebele king. Under the stresses of the crisis the people were facing, however, a new element emerged out of the traditional religious leadership which to a great extent united the elements that might otherwise have divided the resistance. Two joint operations centres were established at Tabazikamambo and Mashayamombe's, where the religious leaders Mkwati (of the Mwari cult) and the Kaguvi medium (of the Shona *mhondoro* system) co-ordinated the secular and religious hierarchies. This religious leadership not only used the appeal of the past, especially that of the "Rozvi empire", it also offered a "new society" to those who rose. Finally, there was a strong element of continuity between the 1896 *Chimurenga* and the nationalism of the 1960s. In short, *Revolt* served as a "charter for Zimbabwe as a focus for present-day political action."

Ranger's writing technique is of some importance in view of later criticism of the book. His style is brilliant, compelling, and enlivened by many quotations. This, however, is one of the book's weaknesses: Richard Werbner called it a "magnificent mosaic", and in fact about 37 percent of the first two chapters consists of direct quotation. This has two dangerous defects. First, some of the quotations in the book refer to the Luo, the Zulu, the Boxer rising in China, white settlers in Kenya or to colonialism in West Africa and the Sudan. Very interesting, but this is not proof of what happened in Zimbabwe in the 1890s. Second, when it comes to quotations from colonial officials obsessed with conspiracies and "superstition", there is a danger that the author may get too close to the evidence and unconsciously accept basic assumptions that should have been questioned. Ranger accepts the conspiracies happily and reinterprets the "superstition", but when it comes to accepting rather than questioning the assumption of officials that the Shona rising was "simultaneous", it is almost as though Ranger was possessed by the *mhondoro* of Hugh Marshall Hole. Moreover, Ranger's style is so compelling that it tends to lead the reader to join him in skipping over the question of proof. Naming (inaccurately, as it happens) four individuals who went to the Kaguvi medium at Mashayamombe's (actually he was in another place) Ranger goes on to write that "others, in view of their later close collaboration with Kagubi we may guess to have been there" and names figures from three important dynasties (p. 200). It is with an effort that one remembers that there is no evidence for this, and quite a lot against it.

To turn — at last — to Ranger's chapters, the first one on the Shona and Ndebele past has been thoroughly outdated by the work of Ngwabi Bhebe, Hoyini Bhila, Julian Cobbing, Peter Garlake, Tom Huffman, Allen Isaacman, Richard

Mtetwa, Gorerazvo Mudenge, Malyn Newitt, Keith Rennie and myself. Ranger freely concedes this inevitable result of a decade's research in his new preface. Even the current debate between Ranger and Cobbing on the local or Venda origins of the Mwari cave-cult, fascinating as it is, is secondary to the crucial question of whether or not it directed and co-ordinated the 1896 – 1897 risings. The two chapters on the Rhodesian administration of the Shona and Ndebele, on the other hand, survived rather well. True, Ranger missed several points exposed by recent research, notably the survival of the Ndebele state system and the complex interplay of Company-Shona relations from 1890 to 1896 which presaged the Shona collaboration in the latter year. As he stresses in his preface, we need to know more about the economic side of this period and its relation to the alignments of the rising, though whether they will prove to be related to a merging of anti-white, "chiefly" gold and ivory trading interests with (temporarily) pro-white "peasant" producers remains to be seen.

The five core chapters on the actual risings themselves are the ones that really count, however: they have become the foundation-stone for much of the "resistance" writing that has appeared since 1967. If the foundation-stone turns out to have developed cracks, then a fresh examination of the whole structure is called for. The most detailed criticism of Ranger's three chapters on the Ndebele rising comes from Julian Cobbing. In 'The Absent Priesthood: another look at the Rhodesian risings of 1896 – 1897', *Journal of African History*, xviii, 1, 1977, he shows that the structure of the Ndebele kingdom was far stronger in 1896 than Ranger has believed, and that Nyamanda was in fact installed as king during the rising. Whereas Ranger saw the secular leadership as essentially subordinate to the religious leaders, Cobbing has shown how the origin of this idea lay in the prejudices of the colonial officials whose words comprise 44 percent of these chapters, and it is not difficult to see how this basic assumption — suitably Africanized — underlies Ranger's argument. The real evidence for religious organization of the Ndebele rising comes from African sources, and it is here that Ranger's argument is at its weakest. Cobbing demolishes nearly all of his evidence that the "Mwari cult" co-ordinated the rising. As pointed out above, Ranger's habit of pulling in "evidence" from other periods and places is not proof of what happened in 1896. He admits that there is "least evidence about the Njelele shrine," quotes evidence from the 1950s, and then writes that "we may reasonably assume, therefore, that Njelele was influential in the same way in 1896 also" (pp. 148 – 149). As Cobbing shows, the only evidence runs against Ranger's assumption. The Manyenyegweni and Dula shrines were also uninvolved. Ranger makes similar assumptions about Wirirani: he takes evidence from 1900, 1913 and 1932 and says "this, then, is what we may imagine

as having happened" in 1896 (p. 151). Again, Cobbing shows that the Wirirani priest Mwabani was not the (secular) leader Mnthwani who worked with the Ndebele royal priest Umlugulu and that he was evidently the *successor* to the Wirirani priest Nyamazana who was executed by the secular leadership for trying to foist impracticable anti-white medicine upon them. This does show that the Wirirani shrine was antiwhite in 1896, which is no surprise, but it did not lead the local rising. In fact the Ndebele families such as the Mafu did this. This in effect reduced Ranger's "religious" high command to Mkwati at Tabazikamambo and to Siginyamatshe near Bulawayo. But the evidence that Tabazikamambo was ever a Rozvi capital or a Mwari shrine is thin or nonexistent, and although it is clear that Mkwati was important in this area, it is not so clear that he dominated the Ndebele secular leaders to the extent that Ranger thought. Siginyamatshe was *said* to have been important near Bulawayo, but it is by no means clear whether he was in fact a member of the "Mwari cult" or a follower of the Nguni-Sotho "Mlimo." In short, Ranger's picture of a religious leadership of the Ndebele in 1896 has been cut back to two main areas, and he will have to produce evidence from the 1896 documents themselves, not from sources dated before or after them, before "the priests and prophets return" to the Ndebele.

This long review, to which we will return later, appeared in 1980, but in 1978 I had completed a re-examination of the rising among the Shona. It was published in the *Journal of African History*, xx, 3, 1979, as 'Chimurenga: the Shona rising of 1896–7', and it follows here with a slight change of title to stress that we are dealing with neither the southern Shona who figured in Chapter 3 nor the northern and eastern Shona on the borders of Moçambique and Zimbabwe, who will be dealt with in later publications. It should be clear, however, that when I started my re-examination of the Shona *Chimurenga* in 1978 I was already aware that Cobbing had completely redrawn the picture of the Ndebele rising of 1896, demolishing much of Ranger's *Revolt* in the process. It turned out that Ranger's chapters on the Shona rising were equally unreliable, as we will see.

The substance of *Revolt*

In October 1896 H.M. Hole attempted to explain to his superiors how the great rising of the central Shona, which had begun in June of that year and which was still in progress, had come about. Hole's report dodged the entire issue of Company maladministration and placed the blame squarely upon the ingratitude of the Shona themselves: 'With true Kaffir deceit they have beguiled the Administration into the idea that they were content with the government of the country . . . but at a given signal they cast all pretence aside and simultaneously set in motion the whole of the machinery which they had been preparing.'[1] Although Hole conceded that the Shona had shown more ability to organize than he had thought possible, he could not credit the Shona rulers themselves with the ability to 'set in motion the whole of the machinery.' He claimed that, although the Ndebele who were in rebellion in Matabeleland had played a part, the prime mover of the rising was Mkwati, 'the high priest of the M'limo' who sought to offset his defeats in the south-west by bringing in the evil influence of the '"Mondoros" or local witch-doctors.'[2] Hole's report was to be elaborated upon in the months and years that followed, as arguments about Company misrule flourished and more evidence about such other leaders as the medium of the Kaguvi *mhondoro* spirit became available,[3] but one part of his argument became entrenched in local historiography. This was the suggestion that in the politically divided Shona countryside a preconceived and co-ordinated plan of resistance had been agreed upon by the people and kept secret for weeks or months until the signal came for a simultaneous assault upon the Europeans. Hole gave a vivid and imaginative description of this in 1897: 'In almost every kraal the natives, even the women and children, put on the black beads, which were the badge of the Mondoro, while their fighting men, with Kaffir cunning, waited quietly for the signal to strike down the whites at one blow. So cleverly was their secret kept, and so well laid the plans for the witchdoctors, that when the time came the rising was almost simultaneous and in five days over one hundred white men, women and children were massacred in the outlying districts of Mashonaland.'[4]

This picture of a 'night of the long knives'[5] became part of the stock-in-trade not only of popular novelists and journalists but of historians as well. It is not difficult to see why. In the first place, it was one of the nightmares of white Rhodesians even before the Shona rising and it remained so afterwards.[6] In the second place, in the regimented existence of the African people under Rhodesian rule after 1897 it became increasingly difficult to think of radical change other than in terms of conspiracy, and as time passed this attitude began to affect the way in which the people thought about the 1896 risings.[7] Consequently the 'night of the long knives' became a matter of horrified or delighted memory and anticipa-

tion, depending upon the point of view assumed. Yet for the historian of the Shona in the 1890s it posed some peculiar problems. The rising of the Ndebele in March 1896 was much easier to understand in terms of such organization, for the Ndebele had had their own state in the southwest since the 1840s and, as has recently been convincingly shown, that state had not been destroyed in 1893 – 4 and was still very much alive in 1896.[8] The Shona outside the Ndebele state, however, had enjoyed no such political unity since the 1840s or, it seems, before then.[9] How, then, had they achieved such a feat of political organization in June 1896?

The first serious attempt to explain this was made at the Lusaka history conference in 1963 by Professor T.O. Ranger, whose *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896 – 7* was published in 1967.[10] His work remains the standard book on the risings and has led to a considerable body of 'resistance' writing.[11] Since the rest of this paper relates to it, Ranger's arguments must be made clear in summary. His view of the Shona past before 1896 was as different from that of Hole as could be imagined,[12] and a devastating, well-documented account of Rhodesian misrule of the Shona gave ample explanation of why they should have risen,[13] but in his account of how they did so there were some curious resemblances to Hole's report, though very different conclusions were drawn. In the first place, Ranger agreed with Hole that the rising was a 'sudden and co-ordinated attack'[14] a 'co-ordinated force of arms'[15] 'concerted action'[16] 'almost simultaneous'[17] and preceded by a 'period of apparent calm [in which, in early 1896] preparations for revolt were being made.'[18] The way in which it came about was, in Ranger's view, on the following lines — lines that must be described in some detail in order to make the *dramatis personae* and Ranger's argument clear.

Although there had been localised resistance to individual Europeans and to Company rule from 1891 to 1896, and the resistance of Nyandoro in the east of the Salisbury district in April 1896 'was in fact the first intimation of the Shona rising'[19] the real initiative came from the area of the Ndebele rising which had broken out in late March. There, the effective leader of the Ndebele was Mkwati, a Leya ex-slave and priest of the Mwari religious cult. Assisted by the women Tenkela-Wamponga and Siginyamatshe, he had forged an alliance of the kingless Ndebele and their Shona subjects against the Europeans.[20] After limited Rhodesian success in early April, 'Mkwati's counterstroke, on the other hand, was very much more effective. The Shona rising, in the planning of which he was deeply involved', followed his initiative.[21] In April he sent Tshihwa, a

Rozvi Mwari-cult officer from Madwaleni in the Gwelo district to contact Bonda, another Rozvi Mwari-cult officer who lived under the Rozvi ruler Musarurwa in the Charter district, and Mashayamombe, a ruler on the Mupfure river in the Hartley district. Bonda and Mashayamombe's representatives went back with Tshihwa to Mkwati's headquarters at the old Rozvi centre of Taba zika Mambo in the Inyathi district, this being before 24 May. There, they were encouraged to spread the rising into the central Shona country.[22] Tshihwa and Bonda stayed at Taba zika Mambo for the time being, but Mashayamombe's men went back to their ruler, who promptly — still in April — contacted Gumboreshumba, the medium of the Kaguvi *mhondoro* spirit. Gumboreshumba, who was related to the Chivero dynasty of the Hartley district and possibly Pasipamire (the great medium of the Chaminuka *mhondoro* spirit who had been killed in 1883 while co-ordinating Shona resistance to the Ndebele), was then living in the eastern Salisbury district in the territory of the Chikwaka ruler, near the Chinamhora, Rusike and Nyandoro rulers. His spirit Kaguvi had been of little importance before 1896, but under the pressures of the times it was to assume superiority over other *mhondoro*, such as the famous Nehanda of the Mazowe district.[23] The Kaguvi medium had been chosen by Mashayamombe 'when there was need for a man to link the planned rising in the west [Hartley and Charter] with the paramounts of central Mashonaland',[24] and he fulfilled this role by moving to Mashayamombe's, which became practically a 'powerhouse of the Shona rising' from then on.[25]

> At the end of May or the beginning of June 1896 the Kagubi medium summoned representatives of the central Shona paramounts to his new headquarters, using the same pretext as Mashiangombi had advanced [of seeking anti-locust medicine] for sending his messengers to Mkwati. . . . It was a distinguished assembly, or rather series of assemblies. The central Shona chiefs sent trusted headmen or close relatives, in many cases their sons, Chief Chiquaqua, for instance, sent Zhanta, his best warrior and commander of his *impis* before 1890 and again after the outbreak of the rising; Chief Zwimba sent his son; Chief M'sonthi sent his younger brother; Chief Garamombe sent his son. These we know to have been there; others, in view of their later close collaboration with Kagubi we may guess to have been there: men like Panashe, bandit son of Chief Kunzwi-Nyandoro, or Mchemwa [son of Mangwende], or the turbulent sons of Makoni.
>
> At these meetings the progress of the Ndebele rising was given; at this time, it will be remembered, Mkwati was bringing his picked *impi* back to the Umgusa. Assurances of the support of Mkwati and his Ndebele allies were also given and

the Kagubi medium urged the central Shona peoples to join the west in a movement against the whites. Plans for an outbreak as simultaneous as possible were laid; it was to wait until the arrival at Mashiangombi's of Bonda and Tshihwa with the Ndebele warriors; and once it had begun the news was to be carried to central Mashonaland by messengers and passed from hill to hill there by the signal fires. . . .[26]

These conferences held by the Kaguvi medium influenced the Hartley, Lomagundi, Mazoe, Umvukwes, Marandellas and Gutu districts — 'a spread covering virtually the whole area of the Shona rebellion'[27] and were reinforced by most of the local *mhondoro* mediums, including Nehanda in Mazoe and Goronga in Lomagundi.[28] Finally, Tshihwa, Bonda and the Ndebele arrived from Mkwati's headquarters in June, and the signal for the rising was given.[29] Tshihwa went south to raise the Selukwe district,[30] and Bonda went back to Charter.[31] Ranger suggests that, apart from personal contacts made by these two and others[32] with the rulers in these areas — the Charter district was the 'nursery of the Mashona rebellion'[33] 'We may legitimately draw upon some later evidence' from 1913 – 5, when 'chain-letter' messages of the Mwari cult were passed from village to village.[34] In the rest of the area of the rising, the signal was given by messengers from the *mhondoro* mediums and rulers, and by pre-arranged signal fires.[35]

Once the rising had begun, Ranger points out, a feature of the religious organizers was their ability to react and re-plan their strategy in response to the changing military situation. Bonda became a liaison officer for the headquarters of Mashayamombe's and 'we catch constant glimpses of him in the next few months [after June]' carrying messages, raiding loyalists and generally playing a most significant role.[36] Mkwati, forced out of the Ndebele area, arrived at Mashayamombe's with Wamponga determined to carry on the fighting and reinforced the Shona headquarters.[37] At the end of 1896 a new strategy was planned: not only had the Kaguvi medium persuaded the eastern Salisbury rulers not to surrender,[38] but he and Mkwati prepared to move into that area — over the protests of Mashayamombe who objected to their departure[39] — as part of their plan to revive the 'Rozvi Empire'.[40] This plan misfired on the arrest of the Rozvi Mambo-elect, but it led to a strengthening of the power of the religious authorities northeast of Salisbury; the Kaguvi medium was able to appoint a new Seke ruler,[41] and the *mhondoro* mediums of the Budya of the Mutoko district achieved a 'triumph of the pan-Shona teachings . . . over the raiding policy of a chief 'of the Budya, Gurupira, when on his death they persuaded the Budya to turn against Native Commissioner Armstrong's patrol and force it to flee to Umtali, almost starving to death in the process.[42] In the end, however, the rising was gradually worn down by the superior force of the Europeans.

This, in brief, was Ranger's picture of the organization of the Shona rising. 'This supra-paramountcy co-ordination was not achieved through the paramounts alone . . . *We have to*[43] look once again to the traditional religious authorities of the Shona to understand the co-ordination of the rising above the paramountcy level — and also to understand the commitment of the people to the rising at the paramountcy level, a commitment so complete and even fanatical that it cannot be explained simply in terms of loyalty to the paramount chief.'[44] This picture, and Ranger's view of the 'new society', of which more later, remained substantially unmodified for 10 years. My own thesis of 1971 dealt with the Hartley, Charter and southern Shona districts. It added to Ranger's picture of Shona society before 1896 and the nature of Company rule, and pointed out the existence of important Shona groups that fought on the Company's side in 1896 for various reasons. It also pointed out that the actual areas in which the Mwari-cult officers and the Kaguvi medium operated were much more limited than Ranger suggested. Nevertheless, it did not seriously question the Hole-Ranger view of the 'night of the long knives' and the organization that led to it. It did, however, look back into Shona politics in an attempt to seek a political explanation for the unity of the central Shona in 1896, since the influence of the Mwari-cult officers and the Kaguvi medium did not extend far enough in terms of territory. It found the political factor in the growing resistance of the central Shona to the Ndebele in the 1880s, and especially in the Shona-Portuguese treaties of 1889, in which an unprecedented number of central Shona rulers committed themselves to an anti-Ndebele stance. This commitment was not tested against the Ndebele because the BSA Company arrived in 1890, but it served to give the central Shona the degree of unity they needed in 1896, with the religious organizations as a reinforcing factor.[45]

Since 1971 the main published revision of the historical picture of 1896 has been J.R.D. Cobbing's re-examination of the Ndebele rising, in which the influence of the religious factor was shown to have been far less than Ranger stated, and in which the prime mover behind the organization of the rising was shown to have been that of the old Ndebele state, substantially unaffected by its defeat in 1896.[46]

This chapter seeks to summarize my own gradual reconsideration of the evidence on 1896, made during the years since 1971

when my own attention was primarily on pre-1850 Shona history. Essentially, it argues that all analyses of the rising made since 1896, including my own thesis, were wrong on two important points: the rising was not 'simultaneous' or 'almost simultaneous' even within the limitations of Shona communications and technology, and it had not been predetermined and co-ordinated in the way that had been previously assumed. Consequently, the need for a 'religious' or 'political' overall organization fell away, and our understanding of the social and political situation among the central Shona in 1896 must undergo a sharp revision. This chapter relies upon the same basic documents used by Ranger, with some support from fieldwork carried out in Hartley and Charter in 1969 – 70, and involves a close examination of the picture given by Ranger, giving an alternative chronological account of the rising with the differences from Ranger's picture being pointed out *inter alia*. First, however, it is necessary to re-examine the background to the rising and to re-define the nature of Shona resistance to the economy and rule of the Europeans.

Company misrule and early resistance

In the first place, no analysis of nineteenth century Shona history can be complete or accurate without a consideration of the workings of the Shona economy. This has been described and analysed elsewhere,[47] and can be very briefly summarized as follows: the Shona had an economy with an agricultural base, with supporting branches of production based on herding, hunting/gathering, manufacturing and mining. By the late nineteenth century the manufacturing and mining branches and external trade were in most areas in a depressed state relative to earlier centuries, though a certain amount of peasant production in agriculture and migrant labour had emerged as a response to the rise of capitalism in southern Africa after c.1870. The agricultural base remained of paramount importance. It depended upon the preparation of fields and the sowing of grain crops at the beginning of summer — October through to December — and their reaping at the onset of winter, approximately from March to June. Problems of storage restricted the amount of food available at any one time, and consequently the maintenance of the crop cycle from year to year was vital. The danger of *shangwa* (disaster) due to drought or locusts was ever-present. These factors were intimately linked to the 1896 rising in

almost every significant way — its causes, timing, organization and its ultimate defeat.

The remarkable success of the Shona in extracting most of the upper-level gold from the reef mines between c.950 – 1800 accelerated the impact of colonial rule because the BSA Company, unable to make money from mining, encouraged and organized forced labour for very low wages, legitimized stock-raiding in the name of taxation and allowed oppressive methods of labour control, though obviously these were implicit in the South African brand of capitalism that it imported. Space forbids detailing these here, but the scale of colonial operations can be divided into two periods. From 1890 to 1894 these operations were at a relatively low level, essentially because Company activities were focused on the vain hope of finding payable upper reefs in different parts of the Shona country and, ultimately, in the Ndebele state. There was a tendency for the emphasis on mining to shift from area to area; and although cases of forced labour certainly occurred the scale of mining activity was well below that of the period 1894 – 6, so that the impact of labour enforcement upon the Shona was partly cushioned by the Shona and foreign voluntary labour sector. Moreover, there was no permanent labour-coercion force during this period. Taxation was planned, but not implemented until 1894, and European farming activity was at a low level. After 1894 mining activity increased sharply, European farming settlements increased in some areas and a Native Department was created in order to coerce labour and collect tax. Consisting of one or two European officers and a body of African 'police' in each district, it rendered the Shona much more liable to labour and tax exactions. Often labour coercion took place during the agricultural work-season, and tax exactions involved the removal of valuable livestock accumulated and preserved as an insurance against crop failure.[48]

Apart from the relatively lower level of pressure upon the Shona before 1894, there were other reasons why no rising took place before that date. There seems to be little doubt that during this period many Shona believed that the European presence was temporary, like that of the Portuguese between 1629 and 1693 — a presence whose duration was underestimated in Shona traditions.[49] Secondly, many Shona rulers had found the Europeans useful in local politics, and it is remarkable how many of the clashes between the Europeans and the Shona in 1890 – 4 were engineered by other Shona groups to their own advantage.[50] From 1894 onwards resistance to Company rule became more noticeable, but it took the form of isolated and unconnected incidents. One of the reasons

why there was no major rising in 1894 – 5 was probably the number and location of the police force being assembled by the Company for the attack upon the Transvaal: they were placed in small groups across the country, probably to escape interested observers, and provided a police presence to back up the Native Department. From October 1895 they were gradually concentrated upon Bulawayo, leaving only the Native Department, a much reduced police force and the part-time volunteers.[51] October, however, was the beginning of the intensive agricultural season, which in many areas was the more important because 1895 had been a bad year for locusts.[52] When the main Shona rising did break out in June 1896 it was at an optimum time from an agricultural point of view.

Nevertheless, the armed resistance carried out by the Shona before June 1896 is of crucial importance if the 1896 – 7 rising is to be understood. Shona resistance to colonial rule in the 1890s took a number of forms, including desertion from underpaid labour, abandonment of settlements in the face of tax and labour demands, theft,[53] cattle-maiming and other responses, but here we are concerned with actual violence. This took place across the country at different times in 1894 – 6, but the remarkable feature it showed when compared with the 1896 – 7 *hondo* (war) was its restricted nature. In every case, it was limited to the enforcers of labour or tax collection — the police or the Native Department — or actual employers of labour,[54] and did not develop into a general attack upon all local Europeans, who were allowed to carry on prospecting, mining, farming, trading and transporting. This contrasts strongly with the 1896 – 7 *hondo* when, once a Shona group had decided to rise, the attack was extended to almost all Europeans and foreign Africans and included travellers, women and small children who could have had no direct connection with local grievances. Moreover, after this 'preliminary resistance' had taken place, the districts reverted to normal and even the Native Department was allowed to function as usual, whereas in the full *hondo* resistance was more or less continuous up to the moment of defeat.

Examples of this can be seen in many districts. In the Charter district in February 1895 Native Department police collecting tax were fired upon and sjambokked by the Njanja, and in July a farmer near Enkeldoorn was murdered.[55] In Lomagundi district in August 1894 a policeman collecting labour was killed,[56] and in May 1896 a miner was murdered in his own mine.[57] In the Mtoko district, NC Armstrong was threatened by the Budya in April 1895; two of his police were shot by February 1896; his patrols were fired upon by Mkota's Tonga shortly afterwards; NC Ruping's patrol

was attacked in late May by the Budya; fighting occurred again on 7 June and the district remained tense until the news of the main Shona rising arrived.[58] In the Umtali district in April 1896 Marange turned out an armed force to recover his cattle, taken by the Native Department.[59] In 1894 an African policeman was killed at Makoni's[60] and on 9 June 1896 Makoni held a meeting to propose the recovery of his tax cattle from ex-Hut Tax Collector O'Reilly's farm and the killing of the Native Department personnel. On 16 June this was proposed again, and the cattle-recovery began, but as late as 18 June a Native Department policeman was allowed to bring a message to Makoni and to depart alive.[61] In September 1894 in the Salisbury district Nyandoro's men pursued policemen who were trying to arrest his son Panashe; in October 1895 police were fired upon by the same people, and in April 1896 Nyandoro openly threatened the police and local Europeans as well.[62] In the Marandellas district Gezi's people attacked police in December 1895 and March 1896.[63] It is clear that those cases of preliminary resistance that occurred before the outbreak of the Ndebele rising of March 1896 were not part of any general Shona rising, and although Ranger saw Nyandoro's threats in April 1896 as 'the first intimation of the Shona rising' the fact remains that in those Shona areas that resisted between March and the spread of the main *hondo* in June the resistance corresponded to that of before March; even in Mutoko those prospectors outside the NC's camp were not touched until 25 June when news of the main rising reached the local Budya, while in Nyandoro's, Makoni's and Marange's areas the same was true. Nyandoro did not start fighting until 20 June, nor Makoni until some time after 23 June, while Marange remained neutral.

There is however a danger in drawing too neat a line between this preliminary resistance and the full *hondo* of June: whereas such rulers as Makoni did confine themselves to preliminary resistance until a relatively late date, and whereas it will be shown that there was no widespread concerted planning of the main rising in advance of its outbreak, it is equally clear that between March and June the central Shona country was in an exceptionally tense state, and that the possibility of a full war was being discussed by the more militant personalities in several areas, independently of each other. Nyandoro's threat to attack all local Europeans was significant even it it was not carried out, and some time between 14 and 24 May a similar plan to kill the police and local traders and to attack Hartley had been considered by Mashayamombe's people and rejected as inadequate.[64] In Marandellas district Mangwende's

son Muchemwa had been considering a rising for some time, and although NC Edwards later connected such hints as a pair of sandals laid at his door and talk of a bird from 'Mwari' with a deep-laid plot involving all the Shona, they more probably reflected the discussions held by Muchemwa on his initiative.[65] It seems highly likely that even if there had not been interaction between the Ndebele rising and the Shona of Hartley and Charter, in such an environment a major rising would have broken out somewhere else and spread, producing a very different pattern of resistance but a similar effect.

Another important distinction that must be made is between the different activities of the Shona during the rising itself: not all activities were related to the rising, even though in many cases they were made possible by the Company's preoccupation with the Shona *hondo*. Normal Shona politics continued, for example, and sometimes involved violence: in April 1896 longstanding political tensions in the Mutasa dynasty led to the emigration of the Chimbadzwa house to Barwe,[66] while in November the Pako people allied themselves with the Ngowa and took advantage of the situation to try to recovery their ancestral hill Chirogwe from Chivi's Mhari who had seized it earlier in the century.[67] Neither Chimbadzwa nor the Pako appear to have acted as part of any overall commitment to the risings. Similarly, not all clashes between the Europeans and the Shona indicated Shona commitment to the rising, though the Europeans often thought they they did: in April 1896, a rumour that Mutasa was going to attack Umtali led to armed men parading the streets threatening to kill him, and another rumour occurred in November: in fact, Mutasa eventually joined the Company.[68] In October 1896 an attack was made upon Negovano of the Duma by the Victoria forces as the result of a rumour fabricated by a Cape African rapist and thief: again, the Duma were at no time in the rising.[69] Thefts from deserted stores took place in otherwise neutral areas,[70] and several attacks upon Europeans and foreign Africans appear to have been made by groups which did not intend at that time to join the rising or which did not do so, and which were simply taking advantage of the times to carry out robbery. Thus, Chingoma's people attacked Carruthers south of Belingwe, but did not join the rising,[71] while Chipuriro's people killed their ruler's son-in-law Box, Box's brother and also some migrant labourers from the Zambezi.[72] In each case the motive was apparently robbery.

Another similar case involved Matowa of Mbava's Rozvi, whose pregnant daughter was taken from him by the trader Basson,

who caused her to abort her baby. While guiding Basson to safety on Mbava's orders, Matowa decided to take revenge and killed him.[73] Such actions could have varying results: the village whose people attacked Carruthers was destroyed later by Laing's column.[74] Chipuriro was largely unaffected by the rising after the killing of the Box brothers until the defeated leaders of the Shona rising reached his territory in late 1897 and he advised them to surrender.[75] Mbava's people, on the other hand, remained isolated until late 1897, but then seem to have assumed that Basson's death had implicated all of them and so fled over the Save to escape the police.[76] This 'peripheral violence' demonstrates that contemporary European assessments of Shona activity were not always correct, a fact of relevance to the so-called revival of the 'Rozvi empire' of 1896–7.

The coming of Chimurenga

We now come to the central point of this chapter, the reconstruction of the exact sequence of events that brought the central Shona country into a state of war. The Ndebele rose in the last half of March 1896 and most of the Shona members of their state joined them. On the edges of the south-eastern lowveld and across the southern Shona territory the Matibi, Chivi, Chirimuhanzu, Gutu and Zimuto dynasties blocked the spread of the rising by joining in on the side of the Company, as they had in 1893, basically because they feared an Ndebele victory in spite of the fact that they had suffered severely from Company misrule. The implications of their collaboration have been discussed elsewhere.[77] On the north-eastern frontiers of the old Ndebele state, beyond the collaborating dynasty of Chirimuhanzu and the resisting territories of Wozhere, Gambiza *dziva* and Chiwundura *shava*, was a relatively thinly-populated zone comprising most of the Munyati and Sebakwe valleys.[78] Although the few Shona in these areas did not join the rising, Ndebele patrols had reached as far as the Mupfure,[79] and in May some Ndebele from Amaveni raided Payne's farm in the Mwanesi range.[80] (This led Hole to call the Charter district the 'nursery' of the rising, but there is no evidence that this was anything more than an attempt to recover cattle lifted by Payne since 1893).[81] An important feature of this thinly-populated zone was that it allowed good long-distance communications between the central Shona and the Ndebele.[82]

One of the dangers of having a keen appreciation of the part

played by religious leaders in politics is that their purely religious role is sometimes underestimated: this is particularly true of those involved in the train of events that loosely connected the Ndebele and Shona risings. In the first place it must be remembered that there was a very close connection between religion and the economy: religious leaders, of whatever particular cult, were expected to be able to use their connections with the high-god and senior *mhondoro* spirits to produce rainfall and avert *shangwa*, disaster. Like the economy itself, this aspect of religion could not be suspended in wartime. As late as 1897 the religious leader Siginyamatshe was distributing anti-locust medicine in Belingwe while on the run from the police.[83] Such activities were, of course, taken by such officials as Hole to be a cunning cover for a political plot, and Ranger's *Revolt* tends to make the same assumption, yet the evidence for the contact between the Ndebele and Shona risings indicates that it was in the beginning a purely religious-economic contact and only later assumed a political significance. Whatever role Mkwati played in the Ndebele rising, and he was clearly not the supremo that Ranger thought, it is still true that he had been an important local religious figure in the Inyathi-Ujinga area.[84] The summer of 1896 – 7 in the central Shona country had seen renewed attacks on the crops by locusts, and at some time before 24 May Mashayamombe sent some of his people — probably those of Muzhuzha house who had recently returned home after having been forcibly incorporated into the Ndebele state for some time and who still wore Ndebele ear-marks — across the thinly-populated zone to Mkwati near Inyathi, to get anti-locust medicine.[85] The first initiative for contact was therefore not Mkwati's, nor did he send his aide Tshihwa out at this point.[86] When the medicine arrived at Mashayamombe's, the ruler's village became a distribution point: 'I remember the people assembling at Mashangombi's kraal to get medicine for the locusts. *This had nothing to do with the rebellion*,' recalled a witness later.[87] Mashayamombe then decided to make a small profit from this, and sent a message to Gumboreshumba, medium of the Kaguvi *mhondoro* spirit.

Gumboreshumba was of the Chivero dynasty and had the advantage of being the grandson of Kawodza, a previous medium of the Kaguvi spirit. Kawodza had lived in the territory of Chivero, but Gumboreshumba lived in that part of the eastern Salisbury district where the Chikwaka, Nyandoro, Seke, Rusike, Chinamhora and Mangwende dynasties bordered upon each other. His spirit was thought to have been the spirit husband of the Nehanda spirit, and was also thought to have had special rain-making abilities, but Gumboreshumba made the Kaguvi spirit more famous for his ability to find game, an attribute that was especially useful in the famine of the late 1880s in the Chikwaka area.[89] In short, like most Shona religious leaders, the Kaguvi medium had a strong interest in the Shona economy. Mashayamombe's message to him was that he had anti-locust medicine from Mkwati available for distribution, but when an envoy from the Kaguvi medium went to investigate he found that Mashayamombe would not supply the medicine unless a payment of one cow was made. The Kaguvi medium refused to pay this, and sent his own messengers to Mkwati, while Mashayamombe sent messengers at the same time. It was probably about this time that the Kaguvi medium moved from the Chikwaka area back to the area where his grandfather had been famous. It was significant, however, that he did not go to Mashayamombe's but to a village in Chivero's country: from the very beginning, there was a division between him and Mashayamombe.[90]

Meanwhile, another religious leader had made contact with Mkwati, but we have no information as to how, when or why this occurred. Bonda was a Rozvi, born in the Selukwe area of the Ndebele state,[91] which would explain why some Charter traditions refer to him as an Ndebele,[92] but from 1894 he lived in the Charter district, probably in the hills to the west.[93] There, he appears to have founded a small religious centre, and was reputed to be able to make plates of food appear by magic.[94] We do not know how he came to be there, but in early June he was at Mkwati's centre at Ujinga; possibly he had the same need for medicine as Mashayamombe and the Kaguvi medium, possibly he was making normal contact with Mkwati.[95]

Thus, in late May or early June, Bonda and messengers from Mashayamombe and the Kaguvi medium arrived independently at Mkwati's, and all the evidence is that at this stage the religious-economic factor was paramount: they had come for locust medicine. Once there, however, they heard news and received encouragement that was to precipitate the main Shona rising. As mentioned earlier, from late 1895 the main Company forces in the central Shona country had been a small force of police and the Volunteers. In April a major force of 150 volunteers left Salisbury to join the Company forces in action against the Ndebele. To the Shona, it must have seemed as though the Europeans had committed their main strength into the struggle with the Ndebele, especially as they recruited 200 Shona auxiliaries, mostly from the Mutekedza territory on the road to the south.[96] This force fought actions

at Makalaka Kop on 30 April, at Amaveni on 9 May and Nxa on 22 May,[97] and the news carried back to the central Shona country by Bonda was that this force had been destroyed.[98] This was repeated as far away as the Mazowe valley,[99] and it seems that these actions against the Ndebele mentioned above had far more impact upon the situation amongst the central Shona than any actions on the Umgusa, as Ranger suggested.[100]

So far, it will have been noted, 'Mkwati's counterstroke' had not been very much in evidence. The contacts between the Ndebele and the central Shona had been confined to the question of locust medicine. Now the political element emerged, though it is difficult to see Mkwati rather than the Ndebele leadership in general as the prime mover. He did send out one of his aides — Tshihwa the Rozvi from Madwaleni — but the Ndebele secular leadership was even more heavily involved, for it sent some men of the 'Mangoba' *ibutho* to Mashayamombe's and the Kaguvi medium's bases and a force, reputedly led by the influential Manondawana of Insugamini, to back up Bonda in Charter, though only six Ndebele were definitely identified.[101] These forces, then, set out with Bonda and Mashayamombe's and the Kaguvi medium's messengers in the second week of June to precipitate the rising in Hartley and Charter. The 'counterstroke' of the Ndebele — rather than of the religious leadership especially — had finally emerged, though as has been seen it had involved a strong element of the fortuitous in the shape of the locust medicine and the actions of the Salisbury Column, but here the resemblance to Ranger's model of the Shona rising breaks down.

Ranger's major assumption had always been that the political element of contact between the central Shona and Mkwati had been there from the beginning, since April, and that preconcerted planning at what he thought was the joint headquarters of Mashayamombe and the Kaguvi medium had preceded the arrival of Tshihwa and the Ndebele. In fact, there was no preconcerted planning. Not only was there no joint headquarters and there was abundant evidence from each district that the rulers and their people had not known of the rising more than a day in advance in every case, but also there was no conference at the Kaguvi medium's village before the rising. Ranger's main evidence that these took place comes from a misreading of the documents. Zhanta, war-leader of the Kaguvi medium's old ruler Chikwaka, was one of the few actually to visit the medium in his new base, but this was *after* the rising had broken out in the Chivero territory: 'Kakubi sent two messengers to Mashonganyika's, they went on to Gonda's and told

the people they were to come to Kakubi at once. I went with them. I thought he would give us something to kill the locusts. When I got there *I found he had a lot of whitemen's loot*. He ordered me to kill the white men. He said he had orders from the gods. *Some Matabele who were there said watch all the police wives. I returned and gave Chiquaqua Kukubi's orders.*' Since there is no evidence for major thefts around Hartley before the rising, and since Ndebele had already arrived at the medium's village, it follows that this 'conference' took place after 14 June.[102] The evidence of Zhanta's neighbour Zawara, son of Garamombe, only confirms that the Kaguvi medium told Chikwaka's peoiple to visit him, and does not suggest that this was any earlier than 14 June.[103] The evidence from the Zvimba ruler, his brother Musonti and the people of Lomagundi district is only that a message reached the Zvimba ruler from the Kaguvi medium and was then passed on, not that anyone from Lomagundi went to Kaguvi's beforehand.[104] The evidence for the presence of Panashe the son of Nyandoro, Muchemwa the son of Mangwende and the 'turbulent sons of Makoni' at the medium's village either before or after the rising began remains where it originated, in Ranger's guesswork.

How, then, was the news of the rising spread if it was not planned beforehand? The answer is that since it was nowhere near simultaneous, preplanning was not needed and the different Shona dynasties simply joined the rising, opposed it or stayed neutral as the news reached them.[105] The Shona certainly could have carried out a simultaneous or nearly simultaneous rising if they had preplanned one: they had a lunar calendar, and it would have been easy to start the rising on a previously-agreed day after a certain phase of the moon; or the *chiwara* signal-fire system could have been used, for visibility is usually fair to good in June and a line-of-sight system of signals could have carried the signal very rapidly indeed. *Chiwara* fires were used in the Mazoe and Marandellas districts, but apparently only within territories of single rulers, following a political decision by the ruler himself.[106] But the word travelled relatively slowly, taking about five days to cover the 75 miles between Mashayamombe and Mangwende, for example — a painfully slow speed for a prearranged *chiwara* system, but a fair rate for a message to pass by messenger from territory to territory, allowing for a night's discussion in the process. In fact, the word of the rising spread gradually from Mashayamombe's, from Sunday 14 June, and had covered most of the central Shona country by the following Sunday, though some north-eastern areas were not affected until Thursday 25 June. Ranger's *Revolt* obscures the timing

issue by starting with the Marandellas district, which rose on 19–20 June, and only later reverting to the rising's beginning in Hartley.[107]

This brings us back to the situation in the Mupfure valley, with the returning messengers and the Ndebele coming to give news of Ndebele victories at Amaveni and Nxa. The evidence would appear to indicate that Mashayamombe had actually decided to rise *before* his messengers returned, or at least that their return tipped the balance in what was already a very tense situation. On about Thursday 11 June, a clash had developed between the wives of Muzhuzha Gobvu, Mashayamombe's nephew, and those of the police of NC Moony, who lived very close by. This clash escalated, and Moony flogged Muzhuzha. The recollections and traditions of Mashayamombe's people are adamant that this was what caused the rising, and Moony's surviving policemen agreed with this in 1897, making no mention of messengers from Mkwati. It is possible that they had not arrived by then. In any event, Moony's men began to desert on 13 June, and the rising began on the next day with the killing of some Indian traders and Moony himself.[108] The way in which Mashayamombe organized this rising emerges clearly from the evidence concerning the killing of Hepworth on the Zwezwe. Dekwende, medium of the local Choshata *mhondoro* of Mashayamombe, declared: 'The day they were going to murder the white men my eldest brother the live Mashayamombe sent for me and told me we must kill the white men. I only sent out the impi to murder the man I did not go myself.' Dekwende sent his son to call house-head Kakono and others to a conference, and became possessed by his spirit: 'I heard Dekwende order the men to kill the white man. . . . He said this about 8 p.m. in the night before the man was killed.' 'The next morning, Mgangwi, since dead, said I was to come with him to help carry the blankets of Kakono and others, who were going hunting to the Zwe Zwe. . . .' As they approached Hepworth's 'Kagono . . . told us that the eland hunt was a blind and that our real orders from Mashayagombi were to kill the white man.' 'The older men shouted "Ndunduma, the axe is red". ' It is clear from this that even Mashayamombe's brothers did not know of the rising until the night before it broke out and that although the mood of the people was quite ready for a *hondo* nevertheless even Kakono's raiders did not know their real mission until very late.[109] An indication of the general unpreparedness of the people is given by the man who actually killed Moony, Rusere: he had just come from the Kaguvi medium's village and found Moony being pursued, but was so unready that he had to borrow a

gun from his uncle before he could join in.[110] This would suggest that at this early stage the medium himself had not known of the rising — it is noticeable that none of Mashayamombe's people claimed that they had had any leadership from him in the carrying out of the killings, and it was the Mashayamombe medium of the Choshata *mhondoro*, Dekwende, who gave the religious sanction there. Mashayamombe's forces struck east to kill the Europeans at the Beatrice mine on 15 June,[111] west to the Zwezwe[112] and on the evening of 18 June they began the siege of Hartley.[113] By then, however, the rising had spread.

From Mashayamombe's word was carried south-east to the Mushava ruler, in the only case where the Kaguvi medium's name was mentioned outside the Hartley, eastern Salisbury and Lomagundi districts: 'I remember the beginning of the rebellion, a messenger came from Mashangombi saying that Kagubi had given orders for the white men to be killed so the three prisoners and I and two others started early in the morning.'[114] This took place on about 16 June,[115] and by 18–19 June the Charter district was coming into the rising. Here, however, the leading influences varied. Some unnamed messengers came from Mashayamombe, who had close ties with the Maromo ruler of Charter,[116] but there was also Bonda. Although Tshihwa claimed in January 1897 that he had set out from Mkwati's for Mashayamombe's with Bonda,[117] it is curious that neither the Hartley nor the Charter sources from June 1896 to the present mention Bonda being at Mashayamombe's until after the collapse of the Charter rising in September 1896. It seems possible that he went directly to Charter and was not connected with the so-called powerhouse on the Mupfure until he was forced to flee there in about October, and that his arrival and that of Mashayamombe's messengers in Charter was therefore partly coincidental. Once there, Bonda and his Ndebele helped to bring in the Sango, Maromo and Mutekedza dynasties, but this was the limit of his influence.[118] (It was an indication of the unexpected nature of the rising that Mutekedza Chiwashira, who from 1893 had relied upon the Company and his son-in-law Short for support and who had allowed his men to join the Salisbury Column in April, joined in; this left him with men on both sides, which would hardly have happened if he had known of the rising in advance. His daughter was able to hide Short from her father's men until 25 June, but had had no time to help him get into safety.)[119] Bonda's impact was therefore limited to a small area. Tshihwa went straight back to Mkwati, and only helped reinforce the rising in the Selukwe district in July, long after it had started there.[120] No 'chain-letter'

methods of passing messages were recorded in 1896, which is not surprising because this was a ritual used to dispel fever and colds and the only person in 1913 – 5 who thought it had anything to do with 1896 was a rather naive African messenger from Hartley.[121]

The evidence for the spread of the rising north and east from Mashayamombe's not only shows how the 'ripple' effect engulfed areas of preliminary resistance such as Mutoko and Makoni, but gives us a clearer idea of the extent and nature of the Kaguvi medium's influence. If he had not known of the rising on the morning of 14 June, he had certainly thrown his weight behind it by the evening of 16 June, when his messenger arrived at Nyamweda's village on the Mhanyame. Norton's cattle were stolen, and the next day he was killed, though the Kaguvi medium was not always obeyed unquestioningly: 'It was said by Kagubi that the whites must be killed so Mija my father told his people that it was the order so *we said you are wrong father, why should we kill the white men when we work in the town so I killed the Bushman* [servant of Norton].[122] From Nyamweda's the word went north: on 18 June Shona on the Gwebi had joined in.[123] By this time the Company's own system of communications was beginning to run faster than that of the Shona, and although outlying Europeans were surprised and killed north and east of Salisbury, in many cases the telegraph warned people before the Shona started fighting. Thus, Salisbury was already on guard by the night of 17 June,[124] and many of the Mazowe Europeans were warned before fighting broke out on 18 June.[125] In the eastern Salisbury district, 60 miles from Kaguvi's village, the word was brought by Zhanta on the night of 19 June, and the shooting started the next day.[126] The rising also reached the Mangwende area on the night of 19 June, and again the fighting started on 20 June. (The statement by Farrant that the missionary Mizeki was killed on the night of 17 June appears to rely upon Hole's and Edwards's theories and assumes that the *chiwara* fires seen by Mizeki before his death burned for two nights before anyone else noticed them.)[127] In the Makoni territory the preliminary resistance that had been going on since 16 June, and the news coming down the telegraph wire, had led the Native Department to concentrate all available Europeans at Headlands, just east of the Makoni-Mangwende border. When an attack was made on Headlands on 22 June, however, it was made by Mangwende's and Svosve's people following the retreat from Marandellas, and the Headlands party was to retreat all the way through Makoni's territory to the Odzi without being attacked. Makoni can therefore be counted as one of the rising only after 23 June.[128] Of the outlying

areas, the Lomagundi and Abercorn districts came into the rising on 21 June, on 24 – 5 June, the news reached Mutoko, and on 25 June it reached the Darwin district.[129]

The 'ripple effect' covered a very wide area in those crucial 12 days in June, but the area affected by the Kaguvi medium was relatively small. Apart from the single rather ambiguous reference in the Mushava area cited above, and about four references from the Zvimba and Nemakonde areas of Lomagundi where the Kaguvi medium sent a messenger, all the references to his role in leading people into the rising come from only two areas, whereas Ranger mistook the location of events and thought that the Kaguvi-references extended to Mazoe and Gutu and thus 'virtually the whole area of the Shona rebellion.'[130] In fact, the Kaguvi medium was mainly influential in the Chivero-Nyamweda area of Hartley where the previous medium of Kaguvi, Gumboreshumba's grandfather Kawodza, had been active, and his own previous area of operations in the 1880s and early 1890s, the border country between the Salisbury and Marandellas districts.[131] Consequently, though there is no doubt that the Kaguvi medium played a powerful role in these areas, there is nothing surprising about it. Nor, in view of the opinion (which was probably held by the medium himself) that the Kaguvi spirit had been the husband of the Nehanda spirit, is it surprising that Gumboreshumba was for a while more influential than Charwe, the Nehanda medium.[132] In short, the Kaguvi medium was not a supreme co-ordinating figure in the Shona rising, but since the Shona evidently did not need such a figure in 1896 this is of less significance than it might have been.

The containment of Chimurenga

The lack of co-ordination continued after the initial phase of the rising. In an incautious phrase in my thesis I referred to the Shona conduct of their wars as 'almost incurably defensive-minded',[133] which was obviously not precisely true in view of certain long-distance raids made by Mashayamombe in 1896 – 7,[134] but broadly it was true that the Shona rulers fought almost exclusively within their territories and very rarely combined to attack targets.[135] Where rulers and leaders did combine later, it was usually as a result of having been driven out of their own areas by superior force. Thus Bonda and Maromo joined refugees from Charter at Mashayamombe's after the rising collapsed in their area in September 1896,[136] and when the Kaguvi medium was driven out of

his first base in Chivero's country in July, he re-established himself at Kaguvi hill just south of Mashayamombe's. This base, however, was in an enclave of Chivero territory,[137] and although he did co-operate with Mashayamombe's medium Dekwende[138] his establishment remained separate from that of Mashayamombe and in January 1897 a fatal split developed between them. Mkwati and Tenkela, too, eventually reached Mashayamombe's area in early October, but not as part of any preconceived plan. They had gradually retreated eastwards from point to point across the thinly-populated zone and had tried to reorganize Ndebele resistance from Hangayiwa hill near the Sebakwe-Kwekwe confluence, but divisions between their followers prevented this, and only then did they move to Mashayamombe's.[139]

Ranger's picture of Mkwati and the Kaguvi medium forging a new plan to revitalize the rising by reviving the 'Rozvi empire' in late 1896 and early 1897 falls down when the evidence is examined. The Kaguvi medium had been successful in encouraging the eastern Salisbury rulers not to surrender during that summer,[140] but the 'Rozvi empire' idea was a product of the fears of the Native Department, whose officers had in effect undergone a crash course in the significance of Shona history. One incredible rumour of a pan-Rozvi plot had already circulated in the Ndebele state, and Native Commissioners — notably W.L. Armstrong — were all too ready to give credence to rumours.

In late December 1896 three senior Rozvi rulers from the upper Save valley where the Changamire dynasty had made its last stand in the Mavangwe hills, namely Chiduku, Mbava and Mavudzi and the son of the Gambiza *moyo* ruler whose lands bordered Mavangwe, went to Ndanga and called Chikohore Chingombe the leader of the Mutinhima Rozvi house to come back to Mavangwe and be their Mambo.[141] The Changamire leadership had previously been in the hands of the so-called Gumunyu faction, and this selection of a Mutinhima leader as Mambo was significant, but only within Rozvi politics.[142] What alarmed the Native Department was a series of unconnected reports, one from eastern Salisbury that the Kaguvi medium intended to collect reinforcements from 'Chiduku's Rozvi' on the upper Save', a report from Charter that in March 1897 Bonda had gone down to the Rozvi area of the upper Save;[143] a report that Mwari-cult messengers had been in the Hlengwe country in southern Ndanga district; and that, from the upper Save, Rozvi had returned to Ndanga 'and told the Makalakas that it was no use working lands as the Mlimo *had gone to get the assistance of Mudsitu Mpanga Mtshetstunjani and Govia*

to help him wipe out all whites and friendlies'.[144] This looked most sinister, and Ranger assumed that only Chingombe's arrest stopped the full plan from coming into effect.[145] In practice, however, the Rozvi were too scattered to form a cohesive fighting force;[146] Bonda did not in any case go to Ndanga or Mavangwe where Chingombe had been installed, but went towards Maungwe where the Rozvi leader Tandi had recently surrendered;[147] and the story that the *madzviti* (Ngoni) leaders Mpanga and Ngwana Maseko of the 1830s and Manoel António de Sousa (who died in 1892) were going to join the rising was simply false.[148] The whole episode was evidently just another example of ordinary Shona politics being carried on in wartime.

Nor was the departure of Mkwati and the Kaguvi medium part of any master-plan: Mkwati's movements in December-January were probably part of an abortive attempt to join an intransigent band of Ndebele under Gwayabana on the lower Mupfure,[149] and when he did arrive in the country north-east of Salisbury the evidence that he did much to keep the rising going is very thin.[150] As for the Kaguvi medium, he left his hills near Mashayamombe's not as part of a grand plan but as a consequence of his having stolen two women from Mashayamombe, and a minor war having broken out between them. Mashayamombe informed the police, and a temporary truce between them lasted while the police tried to capture the medium, with Mashayamombe supplying intelligence. When the medium finally fled back to his old area it was because it was impossible for him to remain.[151]

Resistance continued in 1897, but it remained, as it always had been, a local war fought by each ruler in his territory — until he was driven out of it. The Kaguvi medium continued to be influential in the eastern Salisbury area, but then lost influence when he was driven out of it into the Nehanda medium's area; his power was much reduced. Even in his home area, his influence had had its limitations: in the Seke territory in December 1896, for example, in the abortive ceasefire negotiations the Company had supported the Zhakata house in its bid for the Seke title, and when the Kaguvi medium became involved in this internal dispute all he did was to endorse the Company's nominee.[152] Another notable failure of the religious factor to influence events — assuming any such attempt was made — occurred when NC Armstrong led a force of Budya under Gurupira to join a police attack on the Mangwende-eastern Salisbury resistance strongholds: Gurupira was fatally wounded on 23 April, but far from turning against Armstrong as Ranger has it, the Budya did not lift a finger against him. They remained with the

main force until 29 April, when it set out for Salisbury. Armstrong's party of 13 then started back to contact the telegraph party near Mount Darwin, and accompanied the Budya war-party who had been paid off and were on their way home. Because the Budya had briefly risen in June the previous year Armstrong was in a highly nervous state, and in his melodramatic account he repeated the details of a *mhondoro*-inspired plot to kill him that he claimed he had overheard. But the Budya did not show any hostility whatsoever, but went on into their territory when asked to do so by Armstrong, leaving him to run for Umtali; if he nearly starved to death in the process, it was his own fault for ignoring supply points nearer at hand. When the next patrol came into the area its reception was perfectly friendly. Armstrong's reports had always been rather excited, and it seems that he had simply panicked.[153]

Chimurenga in retrospect

The central Shona lost their war in 1896 – 7 for three main reasons. In the first place, the extent of the rising was checked by a number of dynasties that collaborated with Europeans. Their motives varied: we have already noted that the Gutu, Chirimuhanzu, Zimuto, Chivi and Matibi dynasties in the south collaborated early, in order to avoid the consequences of an Ndebele victory. The western rulers of the Njanja confederacy also collaborated, thus preventing the three resisting rulers Sango, Maromo and Mutekedza from spreading the rising farther east, but it was characteristic of the Njanja at that stage of their political fragmentation that they did so for different reasons. Gunguwo, for example, had been at war with Maromo in 1892, while his neighbour Maburutse *dziva* apparently had a land dispute with Maromo.[154] The north-western Njanja rulers Ranga and Kwenda, on the other hand, refused to kill the African missionaries living with them when asked to do so by Mutekedza and Svosve, and later came in on the Company side.[155] The Budya, as we have seen, did join in the rising in its initial stage after a period of preliminary resistance, but then they remained neutral and collaborated later. They had feuds with the central Shona going back to 1887. And, in the east, the important Mutasa dynasty remained neutral at first and later collaborated. Not only did the collaborators prevent the rising from spreading farther, but they enabled Umtali and Victoria to be used as staging points for the Company counter-offensive, and supplied food and auxiliary troops.

The second reason for the failure of the rising was a purely military one. Although the Company deliberately played down the role of the Imperial troops that came into the war, they did help shorten it. On the other hand, the pattern of the European victory had already become apparent in the first two months of the rising. By withdrawing from all untenable positions, even abandoning whole townships when necessary, they were able to concentrate on a few impregnable points. From there, they were able to concentrate their manpower and put more men into the field than any single Shona ruler; they won many of their battles because they outnumbered the Shona.

The third reason was economic: the Shona rulers were committed to the defence of their fields, without which Shona society could not continue, but they could not prevent Company columns from removing foodstuffs to feed the towns or, later, calculatedly destroying crops. The war ended in late 1897 not so much because of the fighting but because it was vital for the people to start the 1897 – 8 summer crop.

At this point, a few conclusions can be drawn. It has been shown that the 'night of the long knives' theory did not apply to the central Shona in 1896, though it may very well have been true of the Ndebele. In retrospect, it is surprising that such a view should have ruled unchallenged for so long. The fact was that Shona society at that time was too disunited to mount such a vast operation in the total secrecy required for its success. There were too many rulers who were prepared to collaborate. As Maburutse's son remarked in July, 1896, 'The reason he did not report the trouble to the white men was that they did not know it was coming and when it came they ran away.'[156] Not surprisingly, the question of collaboration has remained a sensitive issue among the Shona ever since. For years the Nhowe spat when a Budya passed, and as recently as 1973 a Shona student suggested that 'studies in ethnic origins of these collaborators should be carried out. One should really determine whether they were really Shona or not. This should be done because the 1896 – 7 Shona rebellion was a reaction against white rule by the Shona people. If they are found not to be true or real Shonas, then this may explain the reason why they acted as they did.'[157] Another reason why the 'long knives' theory was impracticable was because there were too many marriages between the Shona and the newcomers. Wives of such men as Short or Billy the Xhosa were loyal to their husbands, and were regarded as a security risk. As the Ndebele at Kaguvi's told Zhanta in June, the wives of the policemen had to be watched.

This brings us to the ideology of the rising. Ranger suggested that the Kaguvi medium had started to build a new society that looked to the future, just as the 'Rozvi empire' plan had looked to the past. He offered the fighters a war medicine that made them invulnerable, received war-loot from many areas and thus 'brought thousands of Shona into membership of a new society, the true believers in the M'Lenga, with their own distinguishing symbols and obligations and their own promises of divine favour. This loyalty to a supra-tribal society and this belief in the millenarians transformation of colonial society helps to account for the fervour of the Shona rising.'[158] In fact, this is reading a lot into the evidence; even allowing for the fact that the Kaguvi medium was not influential over such a wide area as Ranger thought, much of this is commonplace. The medium's name *murenga* meant simply 'rebel, fighter' and was an ideophone of resistance and violence like *chindunduma* rather than an aspect of a high-god trinity, as Ranger tentatively suggested.[159] His promises of immunity from bullets were typical of African warfare at that time, though it was noticeable that the Shona did not rely upon them but continued to make good use of cover, and it was hardly surprising that he should have been offered loot and women — though sometimes he took them anyway. In the end, the Kaguvi medium himself showed that he saw the rising more in terms of a traditional war, in which the loser could pay compensation: '*I have heard what these women say but it is not true. I only want a place where I can live. If the government want me to pay for these things I will pay with a young girl.* I want Nyanda, Goronga and Wamponga brought in, they started in the rebellion.'[160] In short, the ideology of the Shona rising seems to have been strictly traditionalist, and it is difficult to see more than a desire to return to the pre-colonial situation as it was: 'They were sick of having the white men in their country and wanted to drive them back to the Diamond Fields, they said.'[161]

To conclude, this chapter shows how the 1896 Shona *Chimurenga* was not organized, rather than the way in which it was. After the breakdown of the Rangerian model of a tightly-knit Ndebele-Shona religious high command organizing a pre-planned, simultaneous rising, there is no space to show how in fact the rising was organized at the local level, but the example of the Mashayamombe dynasty mentioned here gives some idea of what will be involved in future work on the subject: a portrait of a complex set of personalities and interest-groups in each area reacting with remarkable swiftness and decision to the events and opportunities and pressures of the 1890s, but doing so according to their conception

of their own territory as an independent, undefeated entity, rather than as part of a larger organization that solved 'the problem of scale'. In short, the history of the 1896 central Shona *Chimurenga* promises to be the history of many local *zvimurenga* with their similarities, differences and connexions — or lack of them.[162]

Conclusion

There was a basic similarity between the way in which Rhodesian colonial historians looked at the central Shona *Chimurenga* (rising) of 1896 and T.O. Ranger's seminal *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896–7*: both thought in terms of a pre-planned conspiracy led by religious authorities and a simultaneous outbreak on a given signal. Ranger's reconstruction of the organization of the *Chimurenga*, however, depended partly upon the misreading and misquotation of the sources. In fact, the rising was neither pre-planned nor simultaneous. In the second quarter of 1896 limited resistance to European rule was being carried on in separate, unconnected outbreaks and some communities were thinking of starting a full-scale *hondo* (war); the threat of famine caused by locusts led certain central Shona leaders to contact the religious leader Mkwati in the Ndebele area, then in revolt against the Europeans, in search of locust medicine. News of European defeats transmitted by these contacts led to a full *hondo* in the Mupfure valley, which triggered a 'ripple effect' in which Shona communities resisted or collaborated as the news reached them. The element of religious leadership was limited and the element of central pre-planning non-existent. This makes the success and commitment of the local Shona communities all the more impressive, even though it was a traditionalist rather than a proto-nationalist rising.

The last paragraph was used to conclude the article published in 1979. But publishing takes time, and whereas both this article and a new preface by Professor Ranger to the paperback edition of *Revolt* were published in 1979, both were written in 1978. In March 1978 Ranger summed up his views on the 'resistance' debate over the previous decade, and replied briefly to Cobbing's article of 1977 and to my dissertation of 1971. The new preface then went to press. In August, I produced the first draft of what became this last chapter, and sent it to press. Thus neither the article nor the new preface was aware of the other's existence. In his preface, Professor Ranger promised a fuller reply to his critics entitled 'The priests and prophets return: religion and crisis in the history of

Southern Rhodesia', but by 1985 it had not yet appeared. My review of the 1979 paperback edition of *Revolt* and its new preface was published in 1980 (much of it appears in the Introduction to this chapter), and since then silence has reigned. In a chapter of his *Trade and politics in a Shona kingdom*, (London, 1982), Professor H.H.K. Bhila has dealt with the question of why the Mutasa dynasty of Manyika did not join in the Chimurenga, but otherwise little fresh work on the First Chimurenga has appeared since Independence. Clearly, a great deal of fresh work needs to be done on this extremely complex subject, and in the final section of this book some suggestions are offered.

REFERENCES

1. Unless otherwise stated, all archival and historical manuscript references are to the National Archives Harare. A 1/12/26, H.M. Hole, Civil Commissioner Salisbury to Secretary, BSA Company, London, 29 October 1896, printed in BSA Company, *Report on the Native Disturbances in Rhodesia 1896 – 97*, (London, 1898), reprinted as *The '96 Rebellions*, (Bulawayo, 1975), 69.
2. *The '96 Rebellions*, 55.
3. In October 1896 the Company had not yet identified the Kaguvi medium as a factor in the rising, but by December his influence in the Hartley and Salisbury districts had become apparent, and his role was mentioned in the report by P. Inskipp, Under-secretary to the Administrator, Salisbury, 1897. *The '96 Rebellions*, 79.
4. H.M. Hole, 'Witch-craft in Rhodesia', *The African Review*, 6 November, 1896.
5. R. Hodder-Williams, 'Marandellas and the Mashona Rebellion', *Rhodesiana*, 16, 1967, 32.
6. A 1/12/27, L.H. Gabriel to Sir Thomas Scanlen, Salisbury, 27 March, 1896, passed on a rumour of an Ndebele presence around Salisbury and a long-planned rising. From then on, 'scares', were legion.
7. C.G. Chivanda, 'The Mashona rebellion in oral tradition: Mazoe District', unpubl. University College of Rhodesia Honours Seminar Paper, 1966, 8. Chivanda's criticism of traditions included the observation that the exact sequence of events was not always preserved accurately, a point that my own research confirms.
8. J.R.D. Cobbing, 'The absent priesthood: another look at the Rhodesian risings of 1896 – 1897', *Journal of African History*, xviii, 1, 1977.
9. The prime contender for pan-Shona political unity before 1896 was the Changamire Rozvi state, but this had finally surrendered to the Ndebele in 1866. It is argued in D.N. Beach, *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900 – 1850*, (Gwelo and London, in 1980) that the state had not achieved the degree of political unity previously assumed.
10. Subtitled *A study in African resistance*, London, 1967.
11. T.O. Ranger, 'Primary resistance movements and modern mass nationalism in East and Central Africa', *J. Afr. Hist.*, ix, 3 – 4, 1969; T.O. Ranger, 'African reactions to the imposition of colonial rule in East and Central Africa', *Colonialism in Africa 1870 – 1960*, i, eds. L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, (Cambridge, 1969); T.O. Ranger, 'The people in African resistance: a review', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, iv, 1, 1977, 125 – 146; A.F. and B. Isaacman, 'Resistance and collaboration in Southern and Central Africa, c.1850 – 1920', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, x, 1, 1977; A.F. Isaacman, 'Social Banditry in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Mozambique, 1894 – 1907: an expression of early peasant protest', *J.S. Afr. Studs.*, iv, 1, 1977, 1 – 30.
12. Ranger, *Revolt*, 1 – 45.
13. *Ibid.*, 46 – 88.
14. *Ibid.*, 1.
15. *Ibid.*, 81.
16. *Ibid.*, 196.
17. *Ibid.*, 200, 225.
18. *Ibid.*, 191.
19. *Ibid.*, 86.
20. *Ibid.*, 127 – 190.

21. *Ibid.*, 190.
22. *Ibid.*, 202 – 4.
23. *Ibid.*, 212 – 8.
24. *Ibid.*, 218.
25. *Ibid.*, 282.
26. *Ibid.*, 219 – 220.
27. *Ibid.*, 222.
28. *Ibid.*, 210 – 2.
29. *Ibid.*, 203.
30. *Ibid.*, 203.
31. *Ibid.*, 203 – 4.
32. *Ibid.*, 205.
33. *Ibid.*, 202.
34. *Ibid.*, 204 – 5.
35. *Ibid.*, 209 – 220.
36. *Ibid.*, 205.
37. *Ibid.*, 266 – 7.
38. *Ibid.*, 289 – 92, 285 – 6.
39. *Ibid.*, 292 – 4.
40. *Ibid.*, 289 – 92.
41. *Ibid.*, 291 – 2, 300.
42. *Ibid.*, 303 – 4.
43. My emphasis.
44. Ranger, *Revolt*, 200.
45. D.N. Beach, 'The rising in South-western Mashonaland 1896 – 7', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1971.
46. Cobbing, 'Absent priesthood'.
47. D.N. Beach, 'The Shona economy: branches of production', *The Roots of rural poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, eds. R.H. Palmer and Q.N. Parsons, (London, 1977), 37 – 65; D.N. Beach, 'Second thoughts on the Shona economy', *Rhodesian History*, 7, 1976, 1 – 11; R.M.G. Mtetwa, 'The "political" and economic history of the Duma people of South-eastern Rhodesia from the early eighteenth century to 1945', unpubl. D.Phil. thesis, University of Rhodesia, 1976, 209 – 294.
48. Ranger, *Revolt*, 46 – 88; Beach, 'South-western Mashonaland', 247 – 94; R.H. Palmer, 'War and land in Rhodesia in the 1890s', *War and Society in Africa*, ed. B.A. Ogot, (London, 1972), 85 – 108; I.R. Phimister, 'Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Rand', *J.S. Afri. Studs.*, i, 1, 1974, 74 – 90.
49. e.g. N 3/33/8 NC Marandellas to CNC, c.1 January 1904; Chivanda, 'Mazoe', 5 and N 1/1/9 NC Salisbury to CNC, 21 January 1896.
50. e.g. the Gomwe ('Ngomo'), Mutekedza, Maromo, Gutu, Mugabe and Chirogwe incidents of 1892 – 3.
51. S. 183, vol. 1, BSA Police Regimental Orders, 1 January 1896 – 14 May 1897.
52. N 1/1/5 NC Lomagundi to Secy. Nat. Dept. 26 September 1895; N 1/1/3, NC Hartley to CNC 29 December 1895; N 1/1/9, NC Salisbury to Secy. Nat. Dept. 22 July 1895; EC 4/2/1, CNC to Administrator, 31 January 1896.
53. It is not suggested that all theft was classifiable as resistance.
54. Similarly, not all cases of murder can be definitely linked to aggrieved employees, for lack of evidence.
55. N 1/1/2, NC Charter to CNC, 19 February 1895; J 1/9/1, Ferreira to RM Salisbury, 14 July 1895.

56. CT 1/15/6, MC Lomagundi to Acting Ad. Salisbury, 14 August 1894.
57. N 1/1/5, A.J. Jameson to MacGlashan, Lomagundi, 30 May 1895.
58. N 1/1/6, W.L. Armstrong to H.M. Taberer, 17 July 1898 encl. 'Report on Mtoko's district or Budjla'; *The '96 Rebellions*, 53 – 4, 59; N 1/1/9, NC Salisbury to CNC, 22 April 1895.
59. N 1/1/11, NC Umtali to CNC 15 April and 4 May 1896.
60. A 2/1/6 Acting Ad. to NC Brabant, 8 October 1894; A 2/1/5, G.C. Candler to RM Umtali, 13 August 1894.
61. A 1/12/36, CNC to Acting Ad., 17 and 19 June 1896.
62. W. Edwards, 'Wiri, 2', *NADA* 38, 1961, 8'; EC 1/1/1 Acting Secy. to Council, Salisbury to CNC, 20 April 1896.
63. Edwards, 'Wiri, 3', *NADA* 39, 1962, 19 – 21; Rusike's people fired on police in April 1895, N 1/1/9 NC Salisbury to CNC 6 April 1895.
64. N 1/1/3, NC Hartley to CNC 24 May 1896.
65. J. Farrant, *Mashonaland Martyr, Bernard Mizeki and the Pioneer Church*, (Cape Town, 1966), 202 – 4; Edwards, 'Wiri, 3', 24.
66. N 1/1/11 NC Umtali to CNC 21 December 1896.
67. NVC 1/1/1 NC Chibi to CNC 11 September 1897 and NC Chibi to NC Belingwe 17 October 1897.
68. N 1/1/11 NC Umtali to CNC 6 April 1896.
69. A 1/15/4, OC Victoria to CSO Salisbury 26 October and 6 November 1896; N 1/1/12 NC Victoria to CNC 28 December 1896.
70. A 1/12/31 RM Victoria to Secy. Ad. 30 March 1896; A 1/12/34 Strickland, Charter to Ad. 24 April 1896.
71. A. St. Clair, 'On the white man's trail', *The African Monthly*, v, 5, December 1908, 42 – 5, 48 – 50; D. Tyrie Laing, *The Matabele Rebellion*, (London, 1897), 131 – 4 and NC Belingwe reports.
72. S.401, 338, Regina vs. Kanzanga, Sakara, Kugushu and Tsimota, 30 August 1898, evidence of Kanyenze, Sipolilo, Kakori, 2 June 1898; A 1/12/27, evidence of Masiewo, 8 July 1896; a similar killing of labour migrants took place in the same area in 1901, N 3/1/9 Acting NC Lomagundi to CNC 8 June 1901.
73. S.401, 379, Reg. vs. Chikwaba and Matowa, 22 November 1898, evidence of Chikwaba, 24 August 1898, Matowa, 24 August 1898 and Zirewo 19 July 1898.
74. Laing, *Matabele Rebellion*, 134.
75. N 1/1/6 NC Mazoe to CNC 30 October 1897; LO 5/4/6 Under Secy. Ad. to London Board, 5 November 1897.
76. LO 5/4/6 Report to NC Marandellas 30 June 1897; Lo 5/4/8 Report of NC Marandellas 31 December 1897.
77. Cobbing, 'Absent priesthood', 77 – 9.
78. It is not certain why this area should have been so thinly populated, apart from its being a high sodic-soil area. The Ngezi dynasty between the Zwezwe and the Rutala hills had been fragmented by raiding in the 1860s, but there is no evidence for intensive settlement before the *mfecane* for a considerable distance south of the Zwezwe.
79. N 1/1/3 NC Hartley to CNC 11 April 1896.
80. A 1/12/35 Strickland, Charter, to Ad. 11 May 1896.
81. S.401, 1 – 40 Reg. vs. F.D.A. Payne, 20 May 1895.
82. An apparent anomaly also to be seen in the south-eastern Lowveld, caused by the necessity for the people to travel long distances between settlements.
83. NB 6/3/1 Report of NC Belingwe 30 June 1897; NB 1/1/2 ANC Filabusi to CNC 21 March 1898.

84. Cobbing, 'Absent Priesthood', 76.
85. N 1/1/3 NC Hartley to CNC 24 May 1896; N 1/1/6 NC Mazoe to CNC 30 October 1897. On the confusion caused by Muzhuzha house in the identification of 'Ndebele' near Hartley, see Chapter 4 above. Ranger noted NC Hartley's reference to Mashayamombe's contact with Mkwati for the purposes of getting locust medicine, but read a political significance into it because it also reported the plan to attack the Hartley police and traders. In *Revolt*, 202, he omits the statement that this plan had been abandoned, though he had mentioned it in 'The organization of the rebellions of 1896 and 1897, Part Two, The rebellion in Mashonaland', *History of Central African Peoples Conference*, (Lusaka, 1963), 5.
86. Ranger, *Revolt*, 202 – 3, traces Tshihwa's movements through LO 5/4/1 NC Chilimanzi to CNC 7 and 10 January 1897, and assumes that Tshihwa visited Mashayamombe's three times, on Mkwati's orders in April and June, and with Mkwati in October. Tshihwa in fact made no reference to any journey there in April, only to the 'second' and 'third' journeys.
87. S.401, 391, Reg. vs. Zuba and Umtiva 20 February 1899, evidence of Marowa, 6 December 1898. Italicised words omitted in Ranger, *Revolt*, 220.
88. Pasipamire, the famous Chaminuka *mhondoro* medium killed in 1883, was of the Rwizi dynasty, and his only connection with Chivero was a common totem, *shava*. On his actual role in Ndebele-Shona politics, see D.N. Beach, 'Ndebele raiders and Shona power', *J.Afr.Hist.*, xv, 4, 1974, 647.
89. N 1/1/6 NC Mazoe to CNC 30 October 1897; Beach, 'Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro', 33 – 4; N 1/1/9 NC Salisbury to CNC 3 March 1898.
90. N 1/1/6 NC Mazoe to CNC 30 October 1897. Ranger, *Revolt*, 218, omits all references to this haggling over the medicine price, and to the separate contact with Mkwati made by the Kaguvi medium. On the location of Kaguvi's first base, see this reference and White's map in Hist. Mss. WH 1/1/2.
91. NSE 2/1/1 NC Hartley to NC Gwelo 28 September 1897.
92. University of Zimbabwe History Department Texts 35, 40 – 1 Chivhu.
93. L 2/3/43, Brabant to Ad. 27 August 94; A 1/12/27 Evidence of Tshenombi *et al* 13 July 1896.
94. UZHD Text 35 Chivhu.
95. LO 5/4/1 NC Chilimanzi to CNC 10 January 1897.
96. A 1/12/10 NC Charter to Ad. 3 April 1896; A 1/12/13 Beal to Vintcent 12 July 1896.
97. A 1/12/35 Beal to Vintcent 1 May and 6 May 1896; LO 5/61 Grey to Kershaw 12 May 1896; Cobbing, 'Absent priesthood', 78.
98. A 1/12/27 Evidence of Tshenombi 12 July 1896.
99. A 1/12/27 Evidence of Machine, 4 July 1896 and later statement.
100. Ranger, *Revolt*, 182, 190.
101. LO 5/4/1 NC Chilimanzi to CNC 10 January 1897; A 1/12/27 Evidence of Tshenombi et. al. 12 July 1896. Tshihwa stated that he and Bonda had been told to 'accompany' the "Mangoba', not that the latter were an escort for them.
102. S.401, 213, Reg. vs. Zhanta, evidence of Zhanta. Italicised words omitted in Ranger, *Revolt*, 221. Evidence for robbery in Hartley was very slight from March to June: N 1/1/3 NC Hartley to CNC 29 March, 11 April, 26 April and 14 May 1896.
103. S.401, 215, Reg. vs. Zawara, evidence of Zawara 23 Novembr 1897.
104. The evidence for the southern Lomagundi district shows clearly that a message from the Kaguvi medium arrived in Zvimba's area and was given to the

medium of the recently-dead Zvimba Musundi, Zvimba and his brother Musonti. A son of Zvimba went with a force to spread the word to Nemakonde. S.401, 256 and 301, Reg. vs. Mangojo *et al* 27 May 1898, S.401, 260 and 341, Reg. vs. Msonti, August 1898, S.401, 378, Reg. vs. Samkanga 22 November 1898. There was a man from Zvimba's at Kaguvi's, but he was only involved with the death of the African policeman Charlie sometime after the first killings, S.401, 253, Reg. vs. Kargubi *et al* 8 March 1898.
105. This 'ripple' effect was originally considered by Ranger and rejected because it clashed with the opinion of the Company 'experts' of 1896, 'The rebellion in Mashonaland', 2. Significantly, the word *Chindunduma* often used to describe the 1896 *hondo* means 'ripple' as well as 'rage'.
106. A 1/12/27 Re-examination of Machine, 4 July 1896. Edwards noted that fires were seen on the hills near Marandellas on the evening of 19 June ('Wiri, 3' 25 – 6) and much later wrote they were seen on the previous night and also far to the west at Goromonzi and Jeta, (W. Edwards, 'The Wanoe', *NADA*, 4, 1926, 21).
107. *Revolt*, 191 – 3, 225 – 6. Ranger dates the Mashayamombe outbreak five days too late.
108. Beach, 'Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro', 36 – 8. None of the Mashayamombe's people mentioned Tshihwa, Bonda or Ndebele at their trials.
109. S.401, 334, Reg. vs. Dekwende, 26 August 1898, evidence of Dekwende, Pemimwa, Sipanga; N 1/1/3, NC Hartley to CNC 19 April 1898, evidence of Mandaza.
110. S.401, 246, Reg. vs. Rusere and Gonye, 24 February 1898, evidence of Rusere 3 February 1898.
111. A 1/12/27 Evidence of Jan, 16 June 1896.
112. N /1/3 NC Hartley to CNC 19 April 1898.
113. *The '96 Rebellions*, 62.
114. D 3/5/1 Reg. vs. Marubini, 12 July 1898, evidence of Urebwa, see also S.401, 380, Reg. vs. Mahughlu *et al* 27 November 1898. The evidence for a very short interval between the first arrival of the news of the rising and the decision by the people to rise also emerges in: D 3/5/1 Reg. vs. Kondo and Matungwa, evidence of Biri, 18 April 1898: 'Bill [a Xhosa trader near Charter] had been warned he was going to be killed — he knew he would not get away as there were Mashonas living all round.' S.401, 213, evidence of Wampi, 'Zhanta was Kagubi's postman, he brought a message that day that the Mashonas must kill the whites.' S.401, 241, Reg. vs. Mutama, 27 February 1898, evidence of Chinyanga: 'I remember the word coming to kill all the whites in June two years ago. Next day Joe [Norton] and his driver came to our kraal [and were killed]; S.401, 243, Reg. vs. Chizengeni *et al* 23 February 1898, evidence of Tagamania: 'I never heard of killing the whites till Chizengeni called for his impi to kill him'; S.401, 295, Reg. vs. Mzilingeni and Mtshenge, 21 May 1898, evidence of Mafunga and Mlele — William and Hendrick, Cape Africans, had been at a beer party, started for home 'and just then Kagubi's *impi* came up . . .' and people from the party joined it, followed them and killed them; S.401, 381, Reg. vs. Tshinwada and Tshisaka 23 November 1898, evidence of Chikuni, 'At the begining of the rebellion a messenger from Mashangombe came to our kraal and gave orders to kill all whites and their native servants . . . so at daybreak the prisoners and I took our kerries and went to kill him'; S.401, 255, Reg. vs. Mashonganyika, evidence of Mashonganyika, 'Mr Campbell came the day the god said kill all white people'. These are the cases that

give an indication of the time involved. *None* claim that there was a pre-arranged rising or that there was a long interval between the decision to rise and the actual killings.

115. A 1/12/36, Firm to Ad. 19 June 1896.
116. S.401, 381, evidence of Chikuni; URHD Texts 41 Ctr.
117. LO 5/4/1 NC Chilimanzi to CNC 10 January 1897.
118. A 1/12/27 evidence of Tshenombi *et al*; UZHD Texts 34 – 52 Ctr. The rising in the Charter district appears to have spread rather more slowly than in other districts, which tends to support the idea that Bonda's group and messengers from Mashayamombe influenced the three local resistance rulers independently, A 1/12/36 Firm to Acting Secy. 16 June 1896, Firm to Ad. 18 June 1896, 19 June 1896, 22 June 1896.
119. Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/6, reminiscences of M.E. Weale; A 2/14/1 Acting Ad. to Short. 25 October 1893; A 1/12/36 Firm to Scanlen 26 June 1896 and Ref. 96 above.
120. LO 5/4/1 NC Chilimanzi to CNC 10 January 1897; Hist. Mss. WE 3/2/6, Reminiscences of M.E. Weale; BA 2/9/2 Hurrell to GOC 2 August 1896.
121. N 3/14/5 NC Hartley to CNC 29 March 1915 and linked documents.
122. S.401, 241, Reg. vs. Mutuma, 22 February 1898, evidence of Mutuma, italicised words omitted in Ranger, *Revolt*, 221.
123. A 1/12/27 Report of Jim Matabele, 19 June 1896; *The '96 Rebellions*, 81.
124. *The '96 Rebellions*, 82.
125. *Ibid.*, 83 – 95.
126. P.S. Garlake, 'The Mashona rebellion east of Salisbury', *Rhodesiana*, 14, 1966, 2 – 3; S.401, 225, Reg. vs. Mashonganyika 3 March 1898, evidence of A.D. Campbell. The timing of Zhanta's movements would appear to have been as follows: Two unnamed messengers from the Kaguvi medium travelled to Chikwaka's and summoned Zhanta and a few others to Kaguvi's. Zhanta arrived there and saw the loot gathered and the Ndebele from Mkwati's. The loot probably came from Thurgood's agent George's station nearby. Zhanta then returned to Chikwaka's on 19 June and gave the news of the rising. Assuming that each man travelled only 30 miles a day over the 60 miles between these places, and that each slept a night on the road and at each end of the journey, the first messengers need have left Kaguvi's only on 14 June. But it is unnecessary to assume such a tight schedule: as Zhanta pointed out, when he started he thought he was going to get locust medicine, so the first messengers could well have started before 14 June.
127. Edwards, 'Wiri 3', 24 – 31; Hodder-Williams, 'Marandellas', 29 – 40. The 19th would appear to be the decisive date: Edwards' police deserted that afternoon and the fires were seen that night. Farrant, *Mashonaland Martyr*, 188 – 217. Farrant adopted a pre-Rangerian stance and assumed a general Ndebele presence in each district.
128. A 1/12/36 Scanlen to Firm, 23 June 1896; Edwards, 'Wiri 3', 31.
129. *The '96 Rebellions*, 59 – 60, 63 – 4, 98 – 101; A 1/12/22. note by MacGlashan, January 1897.
130. Ranger located the Nyamweda-Norton area in Mazoe, and confused house-head Gutu *soko* of the Shawasha with the Gutu *gumbo* dynasty of the south.
131. See files S.401 and D 3/5/1 in general.
132. Beach, 'Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro', 33.
133. Beach, 'The rising in South-western Mashonaland', 146.
134. Beach, 'Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro', 38. Other long-distance raids by

Mashayamombe and Bonda in 1897 were on refugee camps in Charter and the neutral Ndebele settlement at Hangayiva, 45 and 65 miles away, respectively, N 1/1/2 NC Charter to CNC 24 January 1897, N 1/1/3 NC Hartley to CNC 12 September 1897. These raids, which were essentially for supplies for the beleaguered Mashayamombe stronghold, involved the killing of several women and children.

135. The joint attack on the Alice mine in June 1896 may have been partly due to its location near the junction of the Hwata-Chiweshe and Nyachuru territories.
136. N 1/1/3 NC Hartley to CNC 6 August 1897.
137. Beach, 'Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro', 39 – 40.
138. A 1/12/14 Nesbitt to Vintcent, 5 August 1896, See Ref. 90.
139. LO 5/4/1 NC Chilimanzi to CNC 10 January 1897.
140. Ranger, *Revolt*, 286 – 7. The Company officials were partly led to exaggerate the influence of the Kaguvi medium because their base in Salisbury lay between the two areas where he did play a great part.
141. Ranger, *Revolt*, 158 – 9; N 1/1/8 NC Ndanga to CNC 2 March 1897.
142. I would now revise my opinion, stated in my thesis, that Muposi Chikore had been an undisputed Mambo before c.1893.
143. N 1/1/2 NC Chapter to CNC 11 March 1897; LO 5/4/2 Report of CNC Mashonaland, 19 March, 1897; LO 5/4/2 Armstrong to CNC 20 February 1897.
144. N 1/1/8 NC Ndanga to CNC 2 March and 30 March 1897. Italicised words omitted by Ranger in *Revolt*, 291. Mpanga and Mtshetstunjani (Masesenyana) are identifiable as *mfecane* Ngoni from G. Fortune, 'A Rozvi text with translation and notes', *NADA* 33, 1956, 72, 80 and K.R. Robinson, 'A history of the Bikita district' *NADA* 34, 1957, 78 – 9.
145. Ranger, *Revolt*, 289 – 292.
146. Most Rozvi groups of any size had committed themselves to the rising long before, and many had been defeated.
147. N 1/1/2 NC Charter to CNC 19 March 1897; LO 5/4/2 NC Makoni to CNC c.February 1897. It is possible that the Kaguvi medium and Bonda did try to get help from Chiduku's Rozvi, though nothing came of it, but the Mavangwe Rozvi 35 miles away were not involved.
148. N 1/1/8 NC Ndanga to CNC 30 March 1897.
149. LO 5/6/7 NC Gwelo to CNC 1 December 1896 and 13 January 1897; LO 5/6/8 Gwelo to CNC 2 February 1897; N 1/1/3 NC Hartley to CNC 9 November 1897.
150. N 1/1/2 NC Charter to CNC 14 March 1897. The evidence that Mkwati started a shrine north-east of Salisbury is thin, and depends upon the correctness of officials' assumptions that a screened cave was a cult centre, N 1/1/9 NC Salisbury to CNC 19 August 1897.
151. Beach, 'Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro', 43 – 4. This uses the same documents as Ranger, who omits mention of this quarrel.
152. LO 5/4/1 Harding to CNC 3 December 1896 and 19 January 1897; N 1/1/9 NC Salisbury to CNC 22 July and 1 August 1897. This uses the same sources as Ranger.
153. LO 5/4/2 Howard to Grey, 12 and 20 March 1897, Armstrong to CNC 20 March 1897; LO 5/4/3 Armstrong to Grey 29 April 1897, CNC to Grey, 10 May 1897; LO 5/4/4 Armstrong to CNC 26 May 1897; LO 5/4/5 Harding to Moleyns, 21 September 1897; LO 5/4/6 Harding to Moleyns 9 October 1897; N 1/1/6 Armstrong to Taberer 17 July 1898; N 1/1/7 Armstrong to CNC 27

February 1897, 19 and 20 March 1897, 14 and 26 May 1897; N 1/1/9 Armstrong to CNC 20 March 1897. This uses the same sources as Ranger.

154. A 1/9/1 Brabant to RM Victoria 26 April 1892; UZHD Texts 34–5, 38, 41 Chivhu; A 1/12/27 evidence of Tshenombi *et al* 13 July 1896; UZHD Texts 41 Chivhu, 68 Bha.
155. UZHD Text 44 Chivhu; H.E. Sumner, 'The Kwenda story', *NADA* ix, 4, 1967, 4; J. White, 'The Mashona rebellion', *Work and workers in the mission field*, April 1897, 151. For reasons why the Njanja would have wanted to preserve their missionaries, see D.N. Beach, 'The initial impact of Christianity upon the Shona: the Protestants and the southern Shona', *Christianity South of the Zambezi*, i, ed. A.J. Dachs, (Gwelo, 1973), 25–40.
156. A 1/12/27, evidence of Marandowri, 13 July 1896.
157. Edwards, 'Wanoe', 24; W. Mangwende, 'To understand the Shona rebellion one has to understand the Shona past', UZHD Honours Paper, 1973, 6.
158. Ranger, *Revolt*, 214–7, 219, 224–5.
159. Ranger, *Revolt*, 219.
160. S.401, 253, Reg. vs. Kargubi *et al* 8 March 1898, evidence of Kargubi. Italicised words omitted in Ranger; *Revolts*, 212, where the statement is taken as a serious comment on the religious organization of the rising. It looks a lot more like an attempt to transfer the blame; of all the prisoners tried, those in the Kaguvi medium's group were possibly the most unstoic.
161. LO 5/4/4 Van Niekerk to CSO 8 June 1897.
162. Ranger's *Revolt* picture of 1896 was so attractive to Zimbabwean nationalists in the 1960s (Cobbing, 'Absent priesthood', 61, 82–4) that for a long time it was looked upon as the last word, rather than the first, on the *Chimurenga*. Later, it began to encounter criticism: in Maputo in 1977 resistance studies stressing the roles of rulers and spirit mediums were considered as 'elitist' (Ranger, 'The people in African resistance', 140) while M. Tsomondo presaged some of the points made here in 'Shona reaction and resistance to the European colonization of Zimbabwe, 1890–1898, a case against colonial and revisionist historiography', *J.S.Afr.Affairs*, ii, 1, 1977, 11–32.

6

Epilogue — and Prologue: Towards Future Work on the Nineteenth Century in Zimbabwe

The process of welding together what were originally five very different kinds of articles and papers into a book for the Zimbabwean public has brought home to me a number of thoughts which at first seem contradictory but which in fact are not.

Firstly, how much more we know about our history now compared with what we knew in 1967. One only has to re-read *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia* to realize that, like most pioneering works, it has been followed by others, even if, like most pioneer roads, its successors don't always follow the same path. But, by the same token, how much of the research that *has* been carried out remains unpublished: I am thinking in particular of the dissertations of Julian Cobbing, Keith Rennie and the late Richard Mtetwa, but a look through the footnotes of this book will reveal many others.

Secondly, however, although the nineteenth century may be the richest of our pre-colonial centuries in terms of source material, how little we know about it. Take, for example, a suggestion by Professor Ranger in his new preface to the 1979 edition of *Revolt*: were the people of the 1890s divided into 'chiefs' with an interest in the gold and ivory trade and 'commoners' with an interest in selling part of their crops to the whites? And did the white farmers begin to compete with the 'commoners', driving them to join the 'chiefs' in the Chimurenga, under the leadership of the religious authorities or not, as the case may be? Was the Mazowe valley the scene of such a process? At present, we simply don't know. We know something about the surviving gold trade, thanks to the work of Professor I.R. Phimister, but we still don't know exactly where the surviving elephants were, let alone who traded in their ivory. We know something about the African commercial cultivators in some areas, thanks to Drs. Mtetwa and Zachrisson and Professor Phimister again, but we don't know much about the white farmers for this

early period outside the research areas of Professor Rennie, Dr. Hodder-Williams and myself. And, even if we did, the complicated politics of the Shona and Ndebele houses, through which such factors made themselves felt in political action, are still unclear in many areas. In asking such questions, let alone answering them, we are lagging behind many other parts of Africa.

Many books end with a plea for more research. In this case, the plea is the more agonized because practically every new project on the history of Zimbabwe started since Independence has been based on the history of the twentieth century. Granted, research into the nineteenth century is not easy. Not many eyewitnesses are left: a fifteen year-old in 1900 would be exactly a hundred today, and there cannot be many such people around. So, for traditions, we shall have to rely upon what people remember of what their parents told them, and experience has shown that such evidence is not always reliable.

The documents are not grouped together in neat files like those of the twentieth century: pre-colonial historians have to look in odd places for their sources and work through mounds of material for the odd grain of relevant evidence.

But — perhaps the republishing of articles that are well known to the academics, for the benefit of the Zimbabwean public, will not be of purely educational value. The pre-colonial period does have its glamour. I hope that no-one, having read this book, will be able to drive from Harare to Masvingo and still think that it is Zimbabwe's most boring road! It has its own armies, battles and marches, it has a rich assortment of characters — characters who were not much like the popular images of Sekuru Kaguvi and Mbuya Nehanda but who were intensely human, and very much like ourselves. And that's only one area: there are many others. Perhaps the small band of researchers interested in pre-colonial history can pick up a few recruits as a result of this book.

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Fuller descriptions of the Shona lands and peoples noted here can be found in D.N. Beach, *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900–1850* (Mambo, Gweru, 1980).


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
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
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
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
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
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SARUWE
Chivero
Mashayamombe

This is the third in the author's series of books about the pre-colonial history of Zimbabwe, the first two of which were *The Shona And Zimbabwe 900–1850* and *Zimbabwe Before 1900.* It covers a wide range of local issues among the central and southern Shona in the 19th Century, but the main themes are the changing relations between the Ndebele and the Shona, and the onset of colonial rule. It also presents the most up-to-date re-examination of Zimbabwe's First Chimurenga of 1896-7 to appear in one volume.

David Beach is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe. He has been researching the early history of this country since 1968.