



THE LAND PROBLEM IN RHODESIA

Alternatives for the Future

R.C. Riddell

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THE LAND PROBLEM IN RHODESIA

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ROGER C. RIDDELL

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PREFACE

Over the past months, Rhodesia's future has grown to be the concern of almost the whole international community. The twelve year old dispute between Britain and Rhodesia that began with UDI in 1965 is now being discussed by the Heads of State of the USA, the USSR as well as many African countries. From one day to the next it seems as if anything could be decided and many Rhodesians, black and white, look on almost helplessly, as people often far away appear to hold the future in their hands. In this situation of turmoil and quick decisions it is critically important for us all to attempt to understand the implications that various 'settlement proposals' and political 'solutions' will have for the future of the country.

Perhaps the central social and economic issue for Rhodesia is the question of *land*. Land has always been an emotional topic and this is hardly surprising because it plays such a dominant part in the lives of most of the country's population. Over 80 percent of the total population live directly off the land while the health of the whole economy depends critically upon the health of the agricultural sector. Many Europeans have spent decades building up their farms and they have sunk all their savings on the land. European agricultural output has increased *twentyfold* since 1944. On the other hand hundreds of thousands of Africans have been forcibly moved from their land; many now have no land while others are having to subsist on tiny plots quite inadequate for the fulfilment of basic needs.

The land question is particularly urgent at the present time because land will form a dominant part in any political agreement for the country's future. However, decisions about the future are currently being made by politicians and 'expert' groups both inside and outside the country with next to no debate within Rhodesia about the implications of these decisions. The whole issue is being 'debated' under a cloud of public ignorance.

The purpose of this book is to attempt to explain the land problem in Rhodesia and to point out the implications of the present policies which at this very moment are deciding our future. It will be argued that many of the 'solutions' offered are based more on political expediency than on economic analysis and they go no way towards solving the basic problems. In particular they offer no hope to the poor, especially the rural poor, who make up the bulk of the rural population. The land question is *urgent* because there is a very real danger that without wider public understanding of the critical issues at stake, decisions will be taken by politicians that may well lead to even greater hardship in the future than the misery and sufferings of the present war.

Chapter I and II provide the background to the present situation. They trace the history of land policies from early colonial days down to the present day and explain both why and how the present distribution of land and people have evolved. The crucial links between land and other policies are stressed: land is not only important for the country's agricultural development but it also plays a critical part in the whole development process that has been promoted. And as Duncan Clarke has shown in his Mambo Socio-Economic Paper No. 7, *The Distribution of Income and Wealth in Rhodesia*, this is a development path which has led to greater and greater inequalities in wealth and income.

Chapter III describes the present position in both the African and European

areas. It documents the increasing poverty in the African rural areas and shows how serious and deep-rooted is the crisis. There is no doubt that without massive 'aid' from commercial agriculture the population of the African areas would face mass starvation. The situation in the European areas is very different. In spite of the impressive overall results of this sector, if one digs below the surface great inefficiencies will be found. An increasing amount of farm land is not being used at all and huge areas of land are severely under-utilised. In general the land problem is one of land abundance side by side with land scarcity, growing poverty and marginalisation of subsistence cultivators.

Chapter IV looks at the proposals being made within Rhodesia to deal with these problems and attempts to examine the likely consequences of adopting these strategies. There is no doubt that these policies will not solve the basic problems outlined in Chapter III. In Chapter V an alternative strategy is discussed which would begin to come to grips with the deep-rooted structural problems of Rhodesian society and lead to a more rational use of the land. Chapters IV and V are deliberately provocative as they have been written in the hope that many more people will come to realise the importance of the policies currently being formulated and play their own part in the decision-making process.

The study suffers from a number of limitations. While every effort has been made to obtain accurate data on land use, agricultural efficiency and population distribution, there are a number of gaps. This has been due in part to the fact that most of the work has had to be done, unfortunately, in Britain and I could only spend a short time in Rhodesia. But perhaps more importantly, many of the critical statistics are clouded in government secrecy and are no longer published. This is partly due to international economic sanctions and restricted access to figures for European agricultural production and land use, but it is also true for the African areas: the Ministry of Internal Affairs now no longer publishes comprehensive data of either agricultural production, migration of people or conditions of land use. If one result of this study is to lead to a greater public demand for *information* then a major advance will have been made. In spite of these limitations, I believe that the urgent need to extend the land debate to a wider audience at the present time warrants the publication of this material.

I am indebted to many people both in Rhodesia and Britain for stimulating my interest in land and helping me to realise its importance for the country's future. In particular the early 1970s I remember living and working with the young people in Chikwizo and Mondoro and experiencing with them the hopelessness they felt for the future. In writing this paper I wish to thank the following for commenting on my ideas and reading previous drafts: Duncan Clarke, Martin Godfrey, Richard Mukonyora, George Smith and Colin Stoneman. Finally I am deeply grateful to fellow students at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, for their stimulation and companionship, especially, Abby Rubin, George Scharffenberger and Paul Spray. None of the above is responsible for the errors, views and omissions recorded below.

Roger Riddell
Barcombe, Sussex
September 1977

CHAPTER I

LAND AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN RHODESIA

A. CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

From the entry of the first European settlers to the country at the end of the last century up to the present day, land has always been a central, controversial and much-debated issue. Indeed, from the passing of the important Land Apportionment Act in 1930 to the present day, Rhodesian land legislation has been altered or amended no less than sixty times.¹

In spite of the prominence of the land issue in political debate and of the important historical analyses of the evolution of land policy, land has not been a central concern of "conventional economic theory" in Rhodesia.² The land question has not been avoided by conventional analysts, but its integral relation to Rhodesia's economic development has not been highlighted. This is largely because conventional analysis has been ahistorical, because it has not incorporated the role of the state in its theoretical framework and finally because it has been little concerned with structural change. Thus, when conventional economists have discussed land they have not analysed the underlying reasons for the evolution of land divisions in the country and so have not understood the crucial links between the various sectors of the economy in the overall process of capital accumulation.³ Arrighi, and more importantly, Clarke have filled many of the gaps left by conventional theory through their analyses of the process of capital accumulation in the history of Rhodesia's settler-colonial economy.⁴ While they have certainly seen the importance of land, their primary concern has been with *labour supplies* and accumulation rather than with *land* and accumulation.

Chapters I and II examine the land question in Rhodesia, showing the evolution of land policies from the turn of the century down to the present day. It is argued that neither the present structure of land and population distribution nor any alternative policies for the future can be fully understood without examining land within the overall process of capital accumulation. Thus particular emphasis will be placed on structural changes and the role that the state and various interest-groups have played in the formulation of policies throughout Rhodesia's colonial history. It is clear that land and labour policies have always been critically related, so a complete understanding of the land problem requires an historical understanding of the country's labour problems.⁵

Rhodesia's development has taken place through a particular process of capital accumulation which has been critical to the dynamic of the whole settler-colonial economy and which has been nurtured by the active participation of the state. In the first 20 years of British South Africa Company (BSACo) rule, the capitalist mode of production gradually took hold of the country until it became the dominant mode in the economy. This was achieved through a combination of military victories, physical force and economic pressures.⁶ While the capitalist mode of production has become dominant, this has *not* led to a destruction of pre-capitalist modes of production. Indeed what is particular about capital accumulation in Rhodesia is that right up to the

present day pre-capitalist modes of production exist side by side yet subservient to the dominant capitalist mode.⁷

Capital accumulation has been achieved through the mobilisation of cheap labour supplies and the creation of the labour Reserves (Tribal Trust Lands). In the Reserves, families engage in below-subsistence agriculture and are not given the means to accumulate capital for themselves.⁸ As a result the father of the family, and sometimes other family members, are forced to look for work to provide for the basic needs of their families.⁹ Because of the existence of the Reserves, labourers 'offer' themselves for work at a price lower than the cost of the reproduction of themselves and their families, and as a result employers do not have to pay the full price for the reproduction of labour. Employers are thus able to obtain a higher surplus-value from their work-force than they would if labour had been fully proletarianised and all pre-capitalist modes of production had been destroyed. Labour is exchanged at a value lower than its cost of reproduction both because it is made to continue its attachment to pre-capitalist modes of production and because the income obtained in the pre-capitalist mode is lower than that needed for subsistence. Thus families are forced both to seek work in the capitalist sectors of the economy and to continue to depend on peasant agriculture to make up the shortfall in wages paid in the capitalist sectors. Thus while it is true that the Rhodesian economy can be regarded as consisting of modern and 'traditional' sectors, unless the essential link between the two is identified, neither the process of accumulation nor the possibilities for change will be understood.

B. LAND AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

Land policies have been central to the whole process of capital accumulation in Rhodesia; indeed it has been because of these land policies and the artificial creation of two distinct land-use patterns by the state — one where land is scarce and the other where land is relatively plentiful — that the basic form of accumulation, built on cheap labour supplies, has been created and maintained.

The creation of cheap labour supplies from the indigenous African population was gradually achieved as a result of the establishment of the Reserves, now called the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). Although the Reserves were formally established as long ago as 1908, they did not prove to be a reliable source of labour until much later.¹⁰ Thus in the early years, extra-territorial supplies of labour proved essential for capitalist development while indigenous labour was obtained through force, taxation and other pressures.¹¹ For example, Africans finding themselves living on what was declared white land were often forced to assume the role of labour. In time, however, following the forced movement of people into the Reserves, natural increases in the Reserve population and positive discrimination against Reserve-based farmers, production within the Reserves fell, land became relatively scarce and more and more people became 'willing' to offer themselves for work in the capitalist sectors of the economy at the prevailing wage rates.

Once this process of deterioration of African agriculture had started, it became cumulative since the lowered and continuously decreasing opportunity cost of the peasantry in the traditional sector was bound to force an ever growing number of men into wage employment.¹²

In the last twenty years or so the supply of labour emanating from the Reserves has begun to exceed the rate at which this number could be absorbed in the modern sectors of the economy. This has led to attempts at increasing the productivity of the Tribal areas and to the repatriation of large numbers of foreign workers. However, today there are still some 126 000 foreign workers in the country. In spite of these changes, the prime purpose of the Reserves is to be the source of labour to the other sectors of the economy at a value lower than its full cost of reproduction. As Clarke argues:

Land formed the foundation of peasant production as well as the social security base for both peasants and rural-dependent labourers ... State land policies were therefore crucial for the 'development' of the peasant economy and central to the process of primitive accumulation upon which capitalist development in Rhodesia was dependent.¹³

Capitalist development has been dependent not only upon the under-development of the TTLs but also upon land policies in the rest of the economy. In the urban areas, Africans have for the most part been prevented from owning land as this would have 'freed' them from their links with the Reserves and led in time to the payments of higher wages and the increased cost of creating a large permanent African urban population. In the late 1950s a number of urban Africans (not more than 10 percent) were permitted to buy houses in the black townships but this has not led to the payment of higher wages across the board. In 1974 only some seven percent of all black employees outside agricultural employment received wages above the poverty line. In that year the urban PDL for a family of six was approximately \$72.00 a month while average black wages outside agriculture were about \$30.00 a month.¹⁴

Private ownership of land has also been allowed for a small proportion of African farmers since the 1930s under the African Purchase Area scheme. Some nine percent of African rural land has been made available for freehold purchase, but less than one percent of African cultivators live in these freehold areas. Thus the creation of limited urban and rural freehold tenure for Africans has made little more than a marginal difference to the process of capital accumulation and the supply of cheap labour.¹⁵ Indeed it could be argued that these policies have brought greater stability to the system through rewarding potential opponents.¹⁶

In contrast to the land policies for the Reserves and urban areas, policies for the white rural areas have sought to make land plentiful for the would-be buyers of farms and to maintain the 'economic' price of purchased land. The aim here has been to encourage the development of capitalist agriculture, which today accounts for some 40 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings, and to provide the conditions for a rapid expansion of capitalist agriculture when international factors (such as high prices for potential agricultural exports) prove favourable. This policy has been successfully achieved through the rigid isolation of capitalist agricultural land from reserve land, while the two areas have been spatially integrated.

The artificial creation of plentiful supplies of land in the European rural areas has itself contributed in an important way to the payment of low wages in both the European agricultural sector and in the economy as a whole. Traditionally European agriculture has been the largest employer of African labour and even today it employs one third of all Africans who work in the modern

sectors of the economy. In the years when the majority of indigenous Africans were still dependent upon tribal agriculture for their subsistence needs, white agriculture had to obtain its cheap labour supplies from abroad. In recent years the number of foreign agricultural workers has decreased but in 1974 foreign workers still constituted 33 percent of the total agricultural labour force. Most foreign workers (excluding the contract workers) and many coming from the TTLs have brought their families with them to the farm compounds.¹⁷ They have been able to subsist here on sub-poverty wages because of the non-wage sources of subsistence provided for them.

In this way a Reserve-type dependent system has grown up on the farm compounds which has directly enabled farmers to pay such low wages in agriculture. The system has also had the added advantage that the farmer can call upon his employees' family members to work on the farm in times of increased labour demand.¹⁸ This system could only have grown up and persisted if land was relatively plentiful in the European rural areas. If a plentiful supply of white land had not been created then the agricultural labour force would have had to have been paid higher wages because the land given them by their employers would not have been sufficient to enable them to earn a supplementary income from family-labour. If wages in agriculture had been higher, then this would have almost certainly created a higher wage-base in the rest of the economy. Thus land policies in the European rural areas have themselves contributed to the cheap labour policy of the whole economy.

NOTES, CHAPTER I

¹ Not all these changes have been equally significant. Important amendments were made, for example, in 1946, 1951, 1961, 1969 and 1977. The continual alteration in land legislation, however, has meant that land issues have always been in the public eye.

² For an historical analysis of land in Rhodesia see Palmer (1968), (1974) and (1977) and Rifkind (1969) and (1972).

³ See Barber (1961), Dunlop in *The Rhodesia Journal of Economics* (1972) and (1974) and Whitsun Foundation (1976).

⁴ Arrighi (1967) and in *Journal of Development Studies* (1970), van Onselen (1977) and Clarke (1975) and (1976a).

⁵ For an analysis of labour and accumulation in post-war Rhodesia, see Clarke (1975).

⁶ This does not mean that military victory has to be a prerequisite for the implantation of the capitalist mode of production, but in the Rhodesian case it speeded up the process. For a discussion of this point see Bradby in *Capital and Class* (1977).

⁷ It is not our intention here to discuss the current debate about the process of accumulation within Southern Africa. For its relevance to Rhodesia see Clarke (1976a).

⁸ This point is discussed more fully below.

⁹ Furthermore basic needs tend to change over time. As Arrighi in *Journal of Development Studies* (1970:211) argues, 'in periods of rising incomes, the subsistence requirements of consumers tends to increase for new goods are added to their budgets and though in the short term their consumption remains discretionary, in time some of them become necessities'.

¹⁰ This is of course a generalisation applicable to the total picture. Conditions in some reserves reached crisis point before they did in others. In 1948, for example, 60 percent of all males were absent from Matebeleland and only 41 percent from Mashonaland South. See Barber (1961:90).

¹¹ Another factor was that the Shona economy (and almost certainly the Matebele economy) was not homogeneous so that the poorer members of the community were more 'willing' to look for work than the richer ones. See Beach in Palmer and Parsons (1977).

¹² Arrighi (1967:38).

¹³ Clarke (1975:255).

¹⁴ Cubitt and Riddell (1974:53 and 111).

¹⁵ It is also important for stratification within the African population.

¹⁶ This point is developed in Chapter III.

¹⁷ These points are discussed in Clarke (1977a).

¹⁸ See Clarke (1977a: Chapter VII).

CHAPTER II

THE CHARACTER OF LAND POLICIES

The purpose of this chapter is not to give a detailed history of land policies in Rhodesia, but rather to highlight those policies which relate to the role land has played in the process of capital accumulation. While an attempt is made to show the consistency in land policies, this does not imply that policymakers at the time placed their own actions within a broader perspective or that they necessarily saw the long run implications of their decisions.¹

A. "TRIBAL" AGRICULTURE AND THE RESERVES

There is a myth, widely held in Rhodesia, that the agriculture practised by Tribal Trust Land farmers today is *traditional* and continuous with farming methods used before the arrival of the white settlers. But this is not so. Traditional agriculture consisted of the system of shifting cultivation. Land was used by both pastoralists and agriculturalists for as long as it remained fertile; when the fertility declined, the land was left to revert to bush and in the interim farmers moved on to other land, there being fewer land constraints then. Production levels were above basic subsistence, for not only did trading take place, but the economy was able to support both mining and manufacturing activities.² And when the European settlers arrived in the country and began their mining activities, they were initially supplied with food by local African agriculturalists at competitive prices and a marketing system quickly evolved to serve the new mining populations.³

As the capitalist mode of production began to dominate the economy, positive steps were taken both to reduce the competitiveness of African agriculture and to establish a permanent labour supply from the indigenous population. The former policy was implemented through the subsidy and encouragement given to settler-farmers, for example, through the capturing of the African grain market, and by refusing to exchange cash in return for African produce.⁴ Later, discrimination against the marketing of African produce and in the allocation of funds to African farmers effectively removed the potential competition of tribal farmers.

From the 1890s to the present day, these pressures together with increases in population have radically altered both farming methods and the previous land-man relationships of traditional farming. 'Tribal' agriculture today is very different from that carried out in the past: land size is fixed; much arable land has been cleared to form permanent fields that are regularly ploughed, usually by oxen; grazing land has been set aside for cattle and is now overstocked while the fertility of the land is in part 'maintained' through the application of manure and artificial fertilizers.⁵

The measures taken against African agriculture directly contributed to and were instrumental in the implementation of the policy of creating a permanent supply of cheap labour. Initially labour was acquired through the imposition of taxes to 'encourage' the people to seek wage employment.⁶ As this was far from successful, resort was made to foreign sources of labour and by 1909 it was estimated that some 54 percent of all labourers came from outside Southern Rhodesia.⁷ A third source of labour was obtained through charging rent

to blacks who were 'squatting' on what had been defined as white farm land; this rent could be paid by the squatters working on the land as tenant farmers.

While foreign supplies of labour have not been eliminated, and taxes have been increased, the most important means of acquiring labour has been through the creation of the Reserves. The Reserves consist of land set aside for the sole use of indigenous Africans where married men (and widows) have the right to farm land which is allocated to them and under the ownership of the tribal authorities.⁸ The African population has gradually been moved into these Reserves where the majority engage in subsistence farming. Today a small number are self-sufficient farmers and even produce a surplus.⁹ But the effect of the measures taken to restrict the competitiveness of African agriculture together with an increasing population farming a fixed area of land has been that the majority cannot provide enough for the needs of their families and so they are forced to look for work outside the Reserves.

The decision to create the Reserves was made very soon after the settlers arrived. In the early 1890s, the first Reserves in Matabeleland had been marked out and by 1902 the allocation of most of the Reserves in Mashonaland had been completed.¹⁰ Initially the aim was to supervise Africans and prevent any further uprisings against the settlers, but quite soon the fundamental role of the Reserves was seen to be the provision of a permanent supply of cheap labour for the rest of the economy. But cheap labour supplies from the Reserves could only be forthcoming 'voluntarily' if reserve farming was carried out at, or better, below subsistence levels and if the Reserves were reasonably full. It took quite a time for this to happen in practice and the initial attempts at pursuing the policy met with some white resistance. In the early 1900s white farmers objected to the removal of Africans into the Reserves as this drove away their short-term sources of labour and even by 1914 the settlers and farmers held the view that large Reserves encouraged idleness and that land should be provided only for those whose labour was not required and then only in areas which could be of no possible use for white settlement.¹¹ But at least part of the desired policy was meeting with success even at this time: a British Commission was sent to Rhodesia in 1914 and a year later it reported that subsistence and tribal society were incompatible with economic progress.¹² The British viewed the Reserves as a temporary measure. The settlers, however, saw them as permanent and in the event the settler view prevailed and the Reserves were confirmed in the new 1923 Constitution. Since that time to this there has never been any attempt to alter the concept or structure of reserve land.¹³

Critically related to the process of formation of the Reserves was the policy of mass movement of the dispersed indigenous population into the created Reserves. Most indigenous Africans were not living in what were later called Reserves when the Europeans arrived in the country so the majority had to be moved there. In 1898 for example, it was estimated that only 38 percent of the Matabeleland African population lived in the Reserves; by 1976 the proportion had risen to about 80 percent.¹⁴ This forced population movement proved to be a massive operation and, as we shall see, it took many decades to complete.

Up to about 1914 it was not a top priority to move the population into Reserves. Administrative staff (and police) were not available to supervise the movements but, more importantly, there were objections from white farmers who feared losing their labour. By 1923, however, the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) reported that movements to the Reserves consisted of a 'conti-

nuous stream'.¹⁵ At the end of the 1920s the first reports of the Reserves being full were received.¹⁶

The next significant changes in African land policies occurred under the 1930 Land Apportionment Act when the racial division of all land in the country (not just the Reserves) was institutionalised. Although less than half the land outside the Reserves was being farmed at the time and only some 50 000 acres had been bought by Africans, European farmers already feared that Africans would demand and take more land. Up to that time, land outside the Reserves was open for purchase by any racial group, but under the new Act a large exclusively European area was declared which consisted of 49m acres and over half the total farming land in the country. As a sort of compensation, Africans were given the right to freehold tenure on the newly created Native Purchase Areas, located adjacent to the Reserves. Under the 1930 Act the Purchase Areas covered 7.5m acres although some 4m were of little use because they lay in remote areas of the country and were unsuitable for farming.¹⁷

Though the Purchase Area concept might at first sight be seen as a step away from the principles lying behind the creation of the Reserves, this has not proved to be so and in practice the Purchase Areas have helped to cushion the opposition to Reserve policies through creaming off the more progressive farmers.¹⁸ Purchase Area farms can be bought by Reserve farmers who have proved their farming abilities (by obtaining Master Farmer certificates) and who have the money to buy the land. In this way not only have the successful farmers been rewarded but an incentive is given to the masses in the Reserves to struggle *within* the system as there is a possible escape route — for the few. The overall effect of the Purchase Area scheme on the supply of labour from the Reserves has been negligible.¹⁹ The area of land at present given over to Purchase Area farming has been cut by half since the 1930 Act and today consists of less than 9 percent of the total African land area. In 1977 there were 8 102 occupied Purchase Area farms compared with 675 000 tribal cultivators and many of these have moved to the Purchase Areas from *urban* employment rather than from the Reserves. There are at present over 440 vacant farms in the Purchase Areas indicating that there may not be enough wealthy individuals able and willing to buy freehold farms.

Since the 1930 Land Apportionment Act there have been alterations made to the distribution of the total land in the country but these changes have not involved a change in the principles applying to African land. In 1930 the Reserves totalled 21.6m acres; in 1950 a further 15m acres were added to the Reserves and this was followed by a further 2m acres in 1962.²⁰ Under the 1970 Land Tenure Act, the division of land into European and African areas was finalised 'for all time' and the Reserves became known as Tribal Trust Lands. Today there are some 165 TTLs distributed throughout the country (most of them lying adjacent to European farming land) covering 40.2m acres. Although the area covered by the Reserves has almost doubled since 1930, this increase in total acreage is highly misleading because the increase has come about through additions from the previously unassigned land which, because of poor rainfall, soil and altitude as well as tsetse fly, is of little use for dryland subsistence farming.²¹ Finally under the 1977 Land Tenure Amendment Act, the TTLs continue to be reserved 'for the exclusive use of tribesmen'.²²

After 1930 the policy of moving Africans into the Reserves was intensified and carried out more comprehensively. Between 1931 and 1941, 50 000 people

were moved into the Reserves and between 1945 and 1959 another 85 000 were moved.²³ Since 1964 at least another 88 000 people have been resettled, most being evicted from European land where they were classified as "squatters", although some of these more recent movements have consisted of shifting people from already over-crowded to less-populated Reserves.²⁴ The most recent policy of settlement has come about as a consequence of the present war and it is estimated that some 500 000 people have been moved into 'protected' and 'consolidated' villages.²⁵

Not surprisingly, the massive population inflow to the Reserves and the adoption of unfamiliar techniques led to an agricultural crisis in the Reserves. As early as the late 1920s reports began to appear about the destruction of the land and overstocking.²⁶ From that time to the present day, agricultural policy for the Reserves has been predominantly concerned with the conservation of the land and the (vain) attempt to promote an ecological balance in a situation of rapid land deterioration and an ever-increasing population.

The first attempts at conservation were begun by Alvord in the late 1920s, amidst protest from European farmers of unfair competition.²⁷ Soil conservation work began in the Reserves in 1936 and the Natural Resources Board was set up in 1941 with special powers to deal with the Reserves. A vigorous attempt at cattle de-stocking began in 1944. The important Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) was passed in 1951 'to provide for the control of the utilisation and allocation of land occupied by natives and to ensure its efficient use for agricultural producers and to require natives to perform labour for conserving natural resources'.²⁸ This Act failed both because the Reserve population was far too large for the economic utilisation of the land to be possible and because there was never any serious attempt to provide permanent homes in the urban areas for those who had left the Reserves as 'migrants', upon which the success of the Act had critically depended. The Act was abandoned in 1962.

In recent years, new government policies have been initiated to stabilize certain areas, to increase food production, to increase the productivity of the land and to provide more employment opportunities in the Tribal areas. These have proved necessary because far too many people have been coming from the Reserves looking for work. The two most important policies have involved the setting up of the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR) in 1968 and the expansion of small-scale irrigation projects.

TILCOR was set up 'to find black jobs for black people in black areas'.²⁹ It is a public corporation able to form subsidiaries and to raise share capital (from the white business community) and the projects it initiates are established "solely on the economic merits of the schemes, irrespective of other considerations".³⁰ Under the TILCOR schemes, tribal land is taken over by the corporation and tribal Africans who participate in the schemes effectively become *tenants* on the land. To date some six 'growth-points' have been established and employment creation has been minimal in relation to the large numbers of Tribal Cultivators and growing landless peasants unable to find productive employment.

Small-scale irrigation projects now cover some 12 000 acres of the tribal areas and provide employment for approximately 6 500 families. Irrigation schemes have not been popular with plottolders because, among other things, those farming irrigated land have to sign lease agreements with the govern-

ment. Many plots lie vacant and some schemes have been failures. The schemes are expensive to set up and they provide no solution to the employment problem in the agricultural sector.³¹ A third policy has been to encourage Tribal cultivators to produce cash crops for the market and African cotton production, for example, has increased remarkably in the last ten years.³² However, in many cases farmers have switched from the production of staple food crops to cotton because of the higher prices; farmers produce only small amounts of cotton and the money they receive is used to buy their basic food requirements. In effect much of this 'cash cropping' is little more than another form of subsistence farming.³³ These more recent policies in the Reserves have been implemented to try to cope with the *excess* labour supply and they have even failed to do this.³⁴ Conditions continue to deteriorate. The Reserves remain the source of cheap labour and the original rationale for the Reserves still pertains.

It is clear that the twin policies of supplying cheap labour from the Reserves and making tribal agriculture economically viable are in principle mutually exclusive. In practice the extraction of cheap labour has proved to be an increasing success and as a result the history of tribal agriculture has been one of growing disaster. An increasing population farming too little land has led to a growing exodus of work seekers to modern sectors of the economy. Eventually those leaving could not all find work outside the Reserves. In 1958 the free flow of foreign workers was halted and since then some 120 000 have been repatriated.³⁵ By the early 1970s new influx controls were introduced in the attempt to halt the flow of work-seekers to the urban areas.³⁶ And still the modern sectors of the economy have not been able to absorb all those leaving the Reserves to look for work. Today the modern sectors are failing to provide jobs for about 70 000 male work-seekers each year.³⁷

The conflict between attempts to make the African areas economically viable and using the Reserves as a pool for cheap labour may be illustrated by a few statistics. In 1925 it was suggested that ideally each African family in the Reserves should be allowed a minimum of 170 acres of land.³⁸ The Morris-Carter Commission reported a year later that, looking to the future, approximately 50 000 farmers with individual tenure could be carried in the Reserves with a minimum of 140 acres each.³⁹ But by 1941 pressure on the land had reached the stage where the ideal minimum had been reduced to 117 acres and by 1948 the Danzinger Committee recommended that 100 acres would be needed by each family. The findings of this Committee included the recommendation that the Reserves should immediately be doubled in area as 60 Reserves had by this time become over-populated and 50 percent of the land was overgrazed.⁴⁰ At the time of the 1951 Land Husbandry Act it was estimated that the Reserves could carry 204 946 families on economic holdings, although Yudelman has maintained that this number was too high an estimate.⁴¹ Today there are some 675 000 cultivators in the TTLs, at least two and a half times as many as the *highest* minimum recommended number. By 1964, 50 percent of all grazing land in the Reserves was either bare or very heavily overgrazed.⁴² Since then the number of cattle has increased by 60 percent and the total grazing area has been reduced in size.

The result has been that real average income of rural households has fallen by about 40 percent from 1948 to 1970.⁴³ It is thus clear that while land policies for the Reserves have overwhelmingly succeeded in providing cheap labour,

the costs in terms of ecological disaster and human suffering have been colossal.

B. LAND POLICIES FOR THE EUROPEAN RURAL AREAS

Land policies in the European rural areas have aimed to promote and assist the development of capitalist agriculture through the encouragement given to white settler-farmers and rural-based multinational corporations to use the vast acreages of land which have been set aside for their use. While capitalist agriculture has historically made more use of foreign sources of labour, more and more indigenous Africans are now working in European agriculture (some 67 percent of the permanent workforce in 1974) and the structure of European agriculture could only have been maintained through the continued success of land policies for the Reserves.⁴⁴

Yet these policies have not been as simple to operate as land policies in the African areas. The potential political and economic power of European agriculture, while it has always been critical in Rhodesian history, has never been completely dominant and it has had to contend with other sources of power related both to the internal workings of the economy and to international forces.⁴⁵ This has meant that although the general policy for rural white land has always been clear, it has been affected in practice by a wide range of political and economic factors in the ninety years of Rhodesia's development.

Even before the final military victory over the Shona and Ndebele in 1896, the new European settlers had expropriated some 15m acres of the country's total of 96m acres of land. After that date and with the realisation that mining was not going to bring a rapid return for the BSACo, attention was turned to the more systematic development of the country's agricultural base. In these early years, capitalist agriculture faced enormous problems, for even when the land had been acquired, it had to be developed and for this labour, capital, a basic infrastructure and in time export markets were all crucial. By 1904 little progress had been made and there was still strong competition from African agriculture: at that time Europeans farmed just five percent of all cultivated land and they were responsible for only about ten percent of production.⁴⁶

In the following year the Company attempted to promote land settlement through a loan ordinance, but this plan was rejected by the Colonial Office in London.⁴⁷ In the next few years, the first phase of agricultural expansion occurred. This was brought about by cheap land policies — in 1908 land was sold for 8½d an acre for ranching land and 3/9d for agricultural land, compared with a price of around 30/- an acre in the Cape — and through favourable prices for exports, most importantly tobacco exports. The number of farmers increased from 948 in 1905 to 2 067 in 1911 and the value of tobacco exports rose from £2 892 in 1906 to £27 028 in 1910.⁴⁸ Yet this apparent progress made little impression in such a vast country and so the Company tried to attract multinational capital to the colony in the attempt both to increase land values and to increase capitalist production. This policy met with little success although in 1911 Liebig's bought a ranch of 1,2m acres at what was described as a give-away price.⁴⁹ In 1918 the BSACo lost its legal battle for the right of ownership of the unalienated crown land and from that date, with the growing numbers and political power of the settlers, it was amenable to the principle of self-government.⁵⁰

Self-government was achieved in 1923 and two years later the Morris-Carter Commission set forth proposals for the racial division of the land, resulting in the 1930 Land Apportionment Act. Pressures from white farmers, brought about by fear of African agricultural competition (quite unsubstantiated at the time) led to the reserving of 49,2m acres for European occupation. This area was to be the base for the future development of white agriculture to the present day.

Of the 49,2m acres reserved for Europeans, only 31m acres had been alienated by 1931 and only 15m acres of that total were being used at the time, the same acreage acquired by the year 1896.⁵¹ And of the occupied land, only some 430 000 acres were actually being cultivated compared with about 2m acres in the African areas.⁵² There were approximately 3 000 white farmers at this time, an increase of only 1 000 since 1911 and a tiny number compared with over 100 000 cultivators in the Reserves.⁵³ Not all these farmers were economically efficient. Those engaged in ranching could not survive without government assistance and only five percent of white farmers earned enough to pay income tax.⁵⁴ To the 1930s, therefore, only a small proportion of European land was being used and even the land that was being used did not constitute a viable farming system.

Since the 1930 Act there have been few changes in European land policies. The total acreage of land reserved for Europeans was reduced to 44,8m acres by the time of the 1970 Land Tenure Act and of that some 38,5m acres constituted farming land. In practice, however, this period saw an increase in land used for agriculture because the land removed from the European land classification was not being used for farming.

The most significant change in land classification since 1930 occurred in March 1977 when the most recent Land Tenure Amendment Act was passed. This followed the 1976 Quenet Commission which had proposed a fairly widespread end to racial discrimination. Since the 1977 Amendment, land in Rhodesia is now no longer to be classified in racial categories and the legal position has largely returned to the pre-1930 position. The TTLs are still reserved for 'the exclusive use of tribesmen' but, with the exception of residential urban land, all other land in the country is to be open to purchase by all races and it is now termed Industrial and Commercial Land.⁵⁵

This recent change in land legislation has been heralded in both the Rhodesian and international press as a radical step forward by the Rhodesian Government on the road to a more egalitarian economic system. It is nothing of the kind. In principle some, though not all, racial aspects of land legislation have been removed from the statute books so that Africans are now allowed to buy land in the previously-white *rural* areas. In practice it may well happen that some Africans will purchase farming land in these 'European' areas, but given the constraints within the present economic system, there will not be a rush to buy land (nor has there been) because there are so few blacks wealthy enough to afford the price of the land. As we have seen there are some 442 vacant farms in the African Purchase Areas and if Africans cannot afford to buy land here there is not likely to be a great demand for white rural-farming land.

But even if Africans do purchase farming land in the 'European' areas, this will not alter the basic structure of the Rhodesian economy. The TTLs still exist and will continue to be a source of cheap labour for the other sectors of the economy. This latest move should be seen more as an attempt to ease pre-

sent political unrest than to bring about fundamental change. It is true, however, that the decision to open up all rural land outside the TTLs to non-racial capitalist development is a far more 'rational' policy than keeping freehold land racially divided for it increases the number of potential buyers in the land market and it is consistent with the overall character of capital accumulation. What is more, this is just the argument used by the government. In introducing the new bill to parliament, the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources argued 'this bill does not remove the basic framework of the Land Tenure Act but ... goes a long way towards removing racial discrimination in the more highly developed parts of the country'.⁵⁶ And a government Information publication argued a month later that Rhodesia's present land policies are not a sudden aberration, but 'have developed from a series of historical events commencing in 1891 ...'.⁵⁷

From the initial racial division of land in 1930 to World War II European agriculture saw few changes. From 1944 to the present day, however, land policies for the European rural areas have provided the framework for a dramatic expansion in capitalist agriculture. The 1944 Land Settlement Act provided the incentives for the first really successful attempt at European land settlement which was aided both by favourable international prices for Rhodesia's agricultural exports and, nearer to home, the setting up of the Federation. From 1944 to 1976 the number of farmers has doubled from 3 640 to 6 682; gross output has increased twentyfold from \$16,2m in 1944 to \$362m in 1975 and the area under crops has more than doubled from 540 000 acres in 1944 to 1,42m acres in 1976. Whereas in 1905 white farmers were responsible for 10 percent of marketed output, in 1975 they produced 92 percent of a vastly increased total.⁵⁸

Plentiful land in the European areas has meant that increases in production could come about through expansion onto unused land and the more intensive use of underutilised land with the essential ingredient of cheap labour supplies. Real wages in agriculture stagnated between 1893 and 1948 and in 1974 they were no higher than they were in 1948. Wages as a percentage of gross agricultural profit fell from 12,6 percent in 1965 to 7,6 percent in 1974.⁵⁹ The provision of cheap labour to agriculture has proved to be a continuing success and even the large multinational agricultural producers make no secret of their reliance on the Reserves for their labour needs.⁶⁰

In spite of these successes, the European agricultural sector still makes a highly *inefficient* use of the land. While the Reserves are overflowing with an excess population and the land is fast deteriorating, most of the European land remains underutilised. Of the 38m acres of farming land in the European areas some 7m is suitable for cultivation. In 1965 only one sixth of this 7m acres was being cultivated and by 1976 some 70 percent was still not being cultivated. Further, in certain areas of the country 25 percent or more of the European farms are lying unused. In the period 1975/76, 4 023 farms out of the total of 6 682 (60 percent) were not profitable enough to pay income tax. Thirty-two percent of all European farms cover only 2 percent of the land area and the evidence suggests that these small farms can only survive because of government assistance.⁶¹

Land policies in the European rural areas have evolved through deliberate design and the aim has been to provide a large area of land for potential capitalist agricultural development and to encourage settlers and big companies to

make use of the unused and underutilised land. One important consequence of this policy has been, ironically, to hold back greater potential agricultural development. By making it comparatively easy for white settlers to acquire land, the numbers of inefficient farmers have been large and this has greatly strengthened the essentially conservative nature of the European farming community, leading to a perpetuation of price-supports and marketing arrangements which have helped maintain these farmers on the land. The result has been to create and perpetuate the situation where underpopulated, unused and underutilised European land exists side by side with over-used and over-populated African land.

C. URBAN LAND POLICIES

European interests have always been paramount in the urban areas of Rhodesia and today all the main towns are located in the European areas. From the days of the first white occupation of the country, Europeans have been able to own land in the urban areas for both residential and industrial and commercial purposes.

In contrast, the African population has traditionally only been allowed to enter the urban areas when looking for work. In harmony with land policies for the Reserves, it has always been assumed that the Reserves are the 'traditional' homes of Africans and that their time spent in the urban areas could only be considered as temporary. These assumptions have been critical to the whole process of capital accumulation, for as long as Africans entering urban employment have been seen as temporary migrants, the wage paid to them has been related to the costs of reproduction of a single person and not the needs of the whole family. The over-riding aim of urban land policies has been to maintain supplies of cheap labour and to minimise the costs of urban African housing. As the urban economy changed, particularly after World War II and both more permanent and more skilled workers for industry and commerce were needed, so wage levels and urban residential rights were altered and adapted to these new conditions.⁶² The history of urban land policies reflects the changes which have had to be made to the principle of cheap labour in the face of other pressures, but the basic principle has never been abandoned.

1906 saw the first urban legislation related to Africans when the Native Urban Locations were created adjacent to European townships for the temporary occupation of black migrant workers. At this time responsibility for African house building was left almost entirely to the Africans themselves, if they were not housed by their employer. In these early days before population pressures from the Reserves forced many people to look for work outside the rural areas and before rapid industrialisation took place, there was little African urbanisation. By 1925 the African urban population stood at 24 874, only two percent of the total black population; these people were employed mainly as servants or as unskilled workers. By 1936, however, the "excessive" influx of Africans to the urban areas had created a problem to the extent that the Native Registration Act was passed to control the numbers of 'loafers' in town. Yet by 1939 there were only 2 500 units of accommodation for Africans in Salisbury.

From the 1940s it became increasingly clear that a more formal approach to urban Africans would have to be adopted to provide more stability to the

urban working population. In 1941 an amendment to the Land Apportionment Act provided, among other things, for the establishment of urban black townships. More important was the 1946 Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act which 'compelled local authorities to provide adequate housing in the Native Urban Areas and forced employers to provide free accommodation for workers on their premises or to hire it in the Native Urban Areas'.⁶³ Palmer argues that although the Act was needed it proved highly unpopular with Europeans in general and the municipalities in particular.⁶⁴ The latter responded by providing above all hostel accommodation for single workers, housing often as many as six people to one room, so reinforcing the separation of workers from their families.⁶⁵

During the 1950s there was a rapid expansion in urban employment, due principally to the growth in commerce and industry. And it was during this time that a change in relation to African urban labour could be observed. There was a partial shift away from the total commitment to maximise cheap labour supplies towards the provisions for a more stable labour force, particularly in relation to skilled jobs.⁶⁶ Urban wages rose substantially at this time and by 1960 the Land Apportionment Act had again been amended to allow a limited number of residential rights to be given to Africans through granting freehold and leasehold tenure for a limited number of blacks in the townships. This was *not* a widespread measure and of course intending purchasers had to have the money to buy their plots, a severe constraint because the majority were in receipt of sub-poverty wages. This change of policy did not alter the basic structure of accumulation in the economy because 'very few primary industry workers had their full costs of reproducing their labour wholly met from wages. Accumulation was therefore based on an essential element of value transferred from non-capitalist to capitalist production.'⁶⁷ This point is reinforced by the fact that a crucial assumption of the 1951 Land Husbandry Act was that urban workers would be able to obtain permanent urban security for themselves and their families; but this was never implemented and for this and other reasons the Act was abandoned in 1962.⁶⁸ By 1976 only ten percent of all African workers outside agricultural employment were paid wages higher than the PDL income for a family of six.⁶⁹

These moves to liberalise African urban policies in accordance with the 1958 Plewman Commission recommendations, which the Whitehead government began to implement, were partly responsible for the Rhodesian Front parliamentary victory in 1962. The Rhodesian Front 'were pledged to reverse the policy and to revert to the former period which the vast majority of the electorate had never really abandoned.'⁷⁰

By the early 1970s there had only been a minimal expansion in Home-ownership Schemes for urban Africans and in 1974 only about five percent of the total Salisbury African population and 10 percent of the Bulawayo population lived in such accommodation.⁷¹ In these two cities, 153 000 lived either in single hostels, as tenants with other urban Africans or in 'kias' at the bottom of gardens in the white suburbs. In Salisbury in 1972 there was a waiting list, growing each year, of 10 000 accommodation units for Africans who were already employed and it was estimated that 95 000 people were living "illegally" in the city.⁷²

In the last few years cheap African housing has been built in the townships, but a standard lower than in the late 1950s and with the intention that com-

panies should buy houses for the use of their employees, so tying labour to particular jobs as well as encouraging the maintenance of rural links. The most recent attempt to keep down the cost of housing urban Africans has come with the siting of new townships in the rural areas near to the urban centres. Some 10 000 new units are currently being built in a huge complex at Seki TTL, some 10 miles from the centre of Salisbury. Another "cheapening" policy is the periodic sanctioning of squatter settlements (under control) in the urban areas.⁷³

The most recent changes in urban land policies have come under the 1977 amendment to the Land Tenure Act. There has been no attempt to make any alterations to the residential urban areas so the divisions between black townships and European suburbs remain fixed as under the previous legislation. In regard to Industrial and Commercial Land, however, the Minister may now, at his discretion, declare any such urban land non-racial.⁷⁴ This means that Africans would be able to start businesses in previously-white urban areas as well as in their own townships. The effects will be similar to those already described for rural land. The amendments are certainly in accord with the desire to increase efficiency in the urban economy as accumulation will now no longer be hampered by the racial ownership of capital. But, because there has been no attempt to alter the *residential* status quo, these changes will not prove to be inconsistent with the basic method of primitive accumulation in Rhodesia or with the whole history of urban land policies. Indeed, in the prevailing political climate they represent one possible means of ensuring on-going viability of the present system amidst substantial threats on both political and economic fronts.⁷⁵

D. STATE IDEOLOGY, INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS

It should not be surprising to find that consecutive governments have articulated their land and labour policies with an ideology consistent with these policies. Recent policy statements, as we have seen, stress that land legislation has developed in a regular and consistent pattern stretching back to 1891. Put briefly, government land policies are based on the following legitimizing beliefs. Development could only have taken place because of and through the expertise of the Europeans and so structures had to be created to ensure the greatest possible expansion of European-based enterprise. Traditionally, Africans have always been used to a slower pace of life and one based on inefficient tribal agriculture. They can, however, participate in the development of the country if they will willingly accept employment in the modern sectors of the economy. And their contribution will be rewarded by commensurate wage payments. In time, as European influence and ways of life extend to Africans, some will be ready (indeed some now appear to be ready) to participate in the development process on an equal footing with Europeans, but at present the great mass are not yet ready and so the Tribal Trust Lands have to be maintained to enable Africans to continue their 'traditional' lifestyle.

Economic development has been based and organised on these beliefs and the historic path of capitalist development — reinforced by legislation, economic incentives and social mores — has in its turn confirmed these basic beliefs and assumptions.⁷⁶

In 1936 Huggins, the Prime Minister, explained the rationale for migrant la-

bour and the subservient role that Africans should play in the development process:

the native is a visitor in our white towns for the purpose of assisting the white people who live there ... and no other native should be present unless of some assistance to the white people.⁷⁷

The same ideas were expressed by the Minister of Internal Affairs some 35 years later when in 1973 he argued:

It is no good Africans flocking to the towns if there is no work for them there. They are very welcome if there is work and the European is doing everything in his power to increase job opportunities for Africans.⁷⁸

It is argued that because African areas are different from European areas (even though it has been through direct government policies that these differences have been established), their development paths should be different for the future. Furthermore, it is argued that development for the African areas lies overwhelmingly in the hands of the Africans themselves. Just before he took over as Prime Minister, Huggins outlined the principles upon which his and subsequent governments' policies would be based:

A fundamental principle of our policy is that in the interests of the natives themselves, no less than in the interests of the Europeans, it is essential to recognise that the social and economic development of the native must follow different lines from those applicable to the European race.⁷⁹

In 1960 the Secretary for Internal Affairs argued:

It is therefore contemplated that the African's political and economic development will in the main take place in the Tribal Trust Lands.⁸⁰

In 1967, the government invited Professor Sadie to advise them on future development for the country and published his report on *The Planning and Development of Rhodesia*.⁸¹ In this report, Sadie argues that development in the modern sectors of the economy has to be in the hands of the Europeans because from their hands emanates the spirit of enterprise which is the *fons et origo* of economic advancement. Such prominence is given to modern sector expansion that stagnation in the tribal areas is a *sine qua non* of the whole development process. For, argues Sadie, if there is a potential conflict between higher rates of growth and a more equal income distribution, then the latter is to be ignored as 'less harmful and likely to be at variance with and impose a harmful restraint on the basic premise'.⁸² And, he maintains, living standards in the Reserves need not be advanced as long as one 'accepts that people living in the less developed areas were satisfied with their existing standards'.⁸³

The problem of development in the Tribal areas lies predominantly with what the government apologetically calls: *The African*. This viewpoint is well summed up by the Minister of Finance in 1968:

What stands out like a gangrenous wound is that we are really little further forward in the development of a vibrant economy in the tribal areas than we were half a century ago ... the most frustrating reason is the rural African himself.⁸⁴

In 1972, the Secretary for Internal Affairs argued similarly that:

I think we have shown the development and progress of the Tribal Trust Areas can flow only from the African's own efforts.⁸⁵

So much for the stated beliefs of various governments and their advisors. To show the self-fulfilling nature of government ideology one needs to look no further than the respective economic assistance given to European and tribal agriculture to account for the differences in development. It is this factor together with the institutionalisation of very different types of land which must account for the marked differences between the two sectors.

The European rural areas are well served with road and rail services; 36 percent of European land is within 10 miles of a station or siding service and only 6 percent is more than 50 miles from the line of rail. In contrast, 40 percent of African land is more than 50 miles from the railway and only five percent lies within 10 miles. Further, many tribal area roads are impassable during the rains.⁸⁶ Levies are imposed on African agricultural produce but not on European produce and there are differential pay-outs for identical products depending upon the racial origin of the producers.⁸⁷ Government expenditure in the two sectors varies enormously. Up to the early 1940s, the government spent large sums of money on European agriculture for credit, price supports, capital development and agricultural services.⁸⁸ In the same period, public expenditure on African agricultural development was negligible in comparison.⁸⁹ From 1945-54 £12m was spent on European agriculture and only £2m on African agriculture.⁹⁰ More recently, between 1973 and 1975, the government paid out the vast sum of £55.2m for subsidies, losses and assistance in the European sector — approximately \$8 000 per farmer.⁹¹ In comparison, it paid out \$0.4m to African farmers — approximately \$0.60 each.⁹² Finally, in the Estimates of Expenditure for the year ending 30th June 1977, government expenditure for European agriculture was estimated to be \$24m for subsidies, losses, assistance and loans; total African expenditure was estimated to be \$6m, of which \$1.4m was for 'protective security'.⁹³

Statutory funds made available for credit to African peasant farmers in 1975 were no more than \$1m as against \$11m for white farmers. The ratio of extension staff to farmers is about 1:600 for tribal farmers and 1:35 for the white farming sector. And so the list can be continued. What it clearly shows is the priorities given by government to the two sectors in the development process.⁹⁴ Land in the European areas is set aside for as rapid development as possible while land in the Tribal Areas is reserved for subsistence-oriented farmers so as to maintain the steady flow of labour to the modern sectors of the economy. And government ideology justifies this pattern of development by maintaining that Africans are incapable of developing like Europeans. Given the support that each receives, this is absolutely true.

In spite of the undoubted results that land policies have had over the past ninety years, it is important, in conclusion, to consider the constraints, both internal and external, which have affected and continue to affect these policies.

Internally, land policies have been dependent upon the co-operation of both the black and white populations. The African population has, until recently, implicitly 'consented' to the position in which it has been placed. In the past, Africans have, in practice, accepted their role as servants of the white economy and this has been proved by the growing numbers who have 'offered' themselves for work at the going wage-rates. This acceptance has been strengthened through a whole range of incentives which have held out the attraction of upward mobility for the favoured few. These have included education, freehold tenure on Purchase Area farms, increases in wages in the non-agricultural sec-

tors of the economy since the 1950s,⁹⁵ security and status for especially rural civil servants and more recently the removal of racial discrimination for the African elite. Further, there have always been what could be called class differences within the African areas: while a high proportion of Africans in the Reserves have become highly dependent upon wage labour, others have managed to remain self-sufficient in the Tribal Trust Lands and some even employ their own labour. In recent years, however, with the growing problems of landlessness and lack of employment opportunities, the continual suppression of African political movements and a widening experience of conditions abroad — especially the recent changes in neighbouring countries — opposition has been growing fast. This has led to greater efforts by the government to maintain African passivity which in turn has led to greater opposition. The escalating war and the increased repression which has accompanied it provides evidence of the fragility of the present system and it appears that some sort of change is inevitable.

Success has also had to depend upon the growth of the modern sectors of the economy, the availability of funds to channel into further development and the co-operation of the European electorate. In certain periods of time, the ability of the state apparatus to maintain the unity of the white population has been tested. In the 1950s there was a conflict between the larger and growing industrial and commercial firms, who desired a more stable and higher paid workforce, and white artisans, small-scale producers and the farming community who supported the status quo position of low wages and unskilled labour. Around UDI there was a conflict between foreign-based and local capital interests. These conflicts have never been completely resolved. Today the unity of the various white interest-groups — essential for the maintenance of the present system of capital accumulation — is again threatened. With the financing of the war — which now accounts for 35 percent of the government budget — the present depression in world capitalism and external pressures for change all affecting the present situation of economic stagnation and negative growth-rates, the alliance of various white interest-groups is very fragile. Change could come about if the various white groups begin to separate so as to defend their own particular economic interests. But in Rhodesia the state system has grown to be a particularly powerful force which has to this point in time been able to ensure group cohesion.

Many of the internal constraints on land policies are intricately related to external constraints. The success of present policies has been largely due to Rhodesia's links with other countries and the wider capitalist system,⁹⁶ for Rhodesia has always been a very dependent economy. Rhodesia's capital expansion has been essentially dependent upon the willingness of foreign capital and finance to invest in the country and upon the country's ability to sell her exports. As the present crisis becomes more acute, certain elements of foreign capital may press more strongly for specific kinds of change in the present rigid structure of the economy.

But capital and financial dependence have not been the only external factors, foreign labour has also been critical. The success of Rhodesia's land policies, both in the Reserves and in the European farming and urban areas, has depended upon the supply and management of foreign labour, willing to work at the going wage-rates. Without this foreign labour supply, wages would have had to rise substantially and the rigid land divisions might not have been

maintained. But Rhodesia's dependent position has been shown perhaps most clearly by the fact that *her* labour has been demanded by that larger capitalist centre, South Africa. In the early 1940s, Rhodesian labour was going to the South African mines at the same time as the Compulsory Native Labour Act was introduced to force some 11 000 Rhodesian Africans to work on white farms within Rhodesia because of an acute labour shortage in the country.⁹⁶ It has been estimated that at present some 80 000 Rhodesian African males are working illegally in South Africa.⁹⁷ More recently, South Africa has helped to ease Rhodesia's *excess* internal labour supply; in January 1975 Wenela (The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association) began to recruit within Rhodesia for the South African mines. 15 452 adult males were recruited in 1975 and about 26 000 by October 1976.⁹⁸

With the cutting off of economic links with Malawi (for labour), Zambia and Mozambique, Rhodesia's dependence upon South Africa has increased enormously, particularly in relation to the country's ability to maintain its connection with the international capitalist system. The success of Rhodesia's current land strategy and the maintenance of her present economic structure depend critically upon her relations with South Africa.

NOTES, CHAPTER II

¹ Huggins, the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister for some 25 years, argued that there was virtually no long term planning; legislation affecting land problems, he maintained, was initiated usually in response to difficulties that had already become acute. Rifkind (1969:107).

² See Beach in Palmer and Parsons (1977:58), Phimister in *African Affairs* (1974) and MacKenzie (1974).

³ Phimister in *African Affairs* (1977:221).

⁴ Africans needed cash to pay their taxes. See Phimister in *African Affairs* (1974/223-224).

⁵ The argument here is not that these practices are wrong, but that they are different from traditional farming methods.

⁶ See Barber (1961). For a microstudy of the displacement of the pre-colonial economy see the study on the Inyoka tobacco industry of the Shangwe people by Kosmin in Palmer and Parsons (1977:268-288).

⁷ Arrighi in *Journal of Development Studies* (1970:213).

⁸ As we shall see in Chapter III, in practice large numbers of peasants do not have access to land.

⁹ It is very difficult to give a precise figure because no comprehensive analysis has been carried out. From micro-studies it appears that about ten percent of peasants could perhaps be considered as self-sufficient. See Weinrich (1975).

¹⁰ Rifkind (1969:23).

¹¹ Palmer (1968:24).

¹² Rifkind (1969:28-29).

¹³ Not even in the 1977 Amendment to the 1970 Land Tenure Act. See below.

¹⁴ Rifkind (1969:25). In 1909 the proportion of Africans living in the Reserves stood at 54 percent. Arrighi in *Journal of Development Studies* (1970:213).

¹⁵ Palmer (1968:39).

¹⁶ Palmer (1968:42).

¹⁷ Palmer (1968:42).

¹⁸ The Purchase Areas have also been an outlet for rural investment of surplus earned by 'successful Africans'.

¹⁹ The PAs rely as well on labour from the TTLs. See Cheater (1974).

²⁰ The 15m acres given to the African areas in 1950 were initially called The Special Native Area, but were included in the TTLs under the 1970 Land Tenure Act.

²¹ See Dunlop in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1972).

²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Section (1977:9).

²³ Arrighi in *Journal of Development Studies* (1970:217).

²⁴ Figures calculated from the Annual Reports of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1964-74. After 1974, figures for population movements have not been published.

²⁵ For an account of consolidated and protected villages see Weinrich in *Journal of Southern African Studies* (1977), and Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace in Rhodesia (1977).

²⁶ Arrighi in *Journal of Development Studies* (1970:217).

²⁷ Palmer (1968:51).

²⁸ Quoted in Bulman (1971:9).

²⁹ Palmer (1974:7).

³⁰ Hughes (1973:220) and Weinrich (1975).

³¹ See, for example, Weinrich (1975:37-41, 231-234).

³² See Stubbs (1977), Cross (1977) and Dankwerts in Leistner (1976:98-99).

³³ See Cross (1977).

³⁴ For a discussion of the employment problems see Clarke (1976b) and (1976c).

³⁵ This has been subsequent to the 1958 Foreign Migratory Labour Control Act. Up to 1958, it has been estimated that the net immigration of Africans to Rhodesia since 1901 was 455 000. Census (1969:5).

³⁶ The African (Registration and Identification) Amendment Act 1973 and the Vagrancy Amendment Act 1973.

³⁷ This is the average estimate for the period 1976-1985. See Clarke (1976b:55-60).

³⁸ Rifkind (1969:90).

³⁹ Rifkind (1969:35).

⁴⁰ Arrighi in *Journal of Development Studies* (1970:217).

⁴¹ Bulman (1971:15).

⁴² Yudelman (1964:128).

⁴³ Clarke (1975:106).

⁴⁴ See section D, below.

⁴⁵ For a theoretical discussion of this point see Poulantzas (1975).

⁴⁶ Clarke (1977a:15).

⁴⁷ Lee (1974:6).

⁴⁸ Lee (1974:6, 10).

⁴⁹ Phimister (1976:26).

⁵⁰ Rifkind (1969:31).

⁵¹ Palmer (1968:42).

⁵² Yudelman (1964:237) and Weinmann (1975: Table 29).

⁵³ Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Land Commission (1926:9) and Steele (1973:10).

⁵⁴ Phimister (1976:40) and Steele (1973:11).

⁵⁵ There is some confusion over the present terminology. In his speech on the second reading of the 1977 Amendment to the Land Tenure Act, the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources stated that: "for practical reasons the terms European area and African area in respect of land will be retained notwithstanding the provisions of the bill which allows for non-racial occupation". *Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates House of Assembly*, Vol. 95, No. 15, Col. 1327, 1st March 1977. But in a speech of 2nd June 1977 he referred to general land within the European area and purchase land within the African area as "commercial farming land". Natural Resources Board Conference 2nd June 1977.

⁵⁶ *Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates House of Assembly*, Vol. 95, No. 15, Col. 1316-1317, 1st March, 1977.

⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Section (1977:10).

⁵⁸ *Economic Survey of Rhodesia 1976*, Ministry of Finance, April 1977, Table 3.

⁵⁹ Clarke (1977a:22-76).

⁶⁰ Clarke (1977a:227-253).

⁶¹ See *Rhodesia, Income Tax Statistics*, December 1976. These figures are discussed more fully in Chapter III.

⁶² There were also trade union and political pressures to stratify African workers.

⁶³ Palmer (1974:9).

⁶⁴ Palmer (1974:9).

⁶⁵ Barber argued in 1961 that the capital costs of providing a home for a worker and his family were roughly six times that required to accommodate a single man in the hostels. Barber (1961:39). For a discussion on African housing see Ashton in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1969) and Gargett (1977).

⁶⁶ Clarke (1975:172).

⁶⁷ Clarke (1975:250).

⁶⁸ An important reason being that labour supplies become very evident at this time.

⁶⁹ Clarke (1977c) and Wage Distribution, African Employees, June 1976, C.S.O., Salisbury, February, 1977, DL/1061/100.

⁷⁰ Palmer (1974:11).

⁷¹ Cubitt and Riddell (1974: 18, 42-46, 75-79).

⁷² *The Rhodesian Financial Gazette*, 26th May 1972.

⁷³ For example 'old bricks' in Harare up to 1972 and the Derbyshire settlement near Salisbury to late 1976. For a discussion on the latter see Seager in *South African Labour Bulletin* (1977:83-93).

⁷⁴ *Rhodesia, Land Tenure Amendment Act*, No. 22 1977, Section 8, p. 57.

⁷⁵ I am grateful to Duncan Clarke for this point.

⁷⁶ For a fuller analysis of settler ideology see Clarke in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1974).

⁷⁷ Quoted in Palmer (1968:8).

⁷⁸ *Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates House of Assembly*, Vol. 84, No. 8, col. 552, 1973.

⁷⁹ Rifkind (1969:51).

⁸⁰ Nicolle (1966).

⁸¹ *Rhodesia, Report by J.F. Sadie on Planning For the Economic Development of Rhodesia* (Sadie Report) (1967).

⁸² Sadie Report (1967:12).

⁸³ Sadie in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1972:54-55).

⁸⁴ Wrathall in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1968:59).

⁸⁵ Nicolle in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1972:8).

⁸⁶ Kay (1972).

⁸⁷ Yudelman (1964:165).

⁸⁸ Barber (1961:152).

⁸⁹ Yudelman (1964:159).

⁹⁰ Yudelman (1964: 159).

⁹¹ *Rhodesia, Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General* (1974-76).

⁹² Rhodesia, Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General (1974-76).

⁹³ Rhodesia, Estimates of Expenditure (1976:29-30, 125-127).

⁹⁴ Hullme (1977).

⁹⁵ Part of the increase in wages makes up for the lost consumption due to decline in TTL production.

⁹⁶ Pollak in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1973:112).

⁹⁷ See Clarke (1976b:36).

⁹⁸ Clarke (1976b:36).

CHAPTER III

RURAL LAND USE AND POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

— THE PRESENT SITUATION

INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to make broad generalisations about land in present-day Rhodesia. In relation both to the quality of the land and its agricultural potential and to the distribution of the rural population, the country is characterised by very great differences. Parts of the country contain very productive land and in other parts of the country the land is of little use for farming purposes. Parts of the potentially-productive land have been so over-used that they have lost their fertility while in other parts of the country good agricultural land lies unused. Finally, parts of the land are under-populated while other parts are acutely over-populated. All these differences need to be understood before any attempt can be made to propose alternative patterns of land use for the future. The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the current position, outlining the inequalities and inefficiencies in present land-use. As the aim is to look at land in relation to its agricultural potential, only the rural areas will be considered. After an overview of the national situation, the African and European rural areas will be examined in turn.

A. NATIONAL OVERVIEW

i. *The Natural Base*


The total land area of Rhodesia covers 150 300 square miles or approximately 97m acres. It is 'a relatively small country but it enjoys a rich and varied natural heritage which is unequalled by that of any region of similar size in tropical Africa'.¹ Figure 1 shows the general relief and characteristics of the country. From the South-West to the North-East stretch the High and Middle velds, land over 3 000 feet, which play a very important role in agricultural production.

As well as altitude, agricultural potential is greatly affected by factors such as soil, subsoil, geology, climate and rainfall, vegetation, aspect and relative position within a catchment area.²

The Phillips Report on the 'Development of The Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia' argued that an ecological analysis of climate and vegetation is the most useful indication of an area's agricultural potential.³ The Phillips Bioclimatic Map for Rhodesia is reproduced in Figure 2a. More important for our purposes is the in-depth study carried out by Vincent and Thomas.⁴ Vincent and Thomas surveyed the natural controls governing agricultural land use, primarily on the basis of climatic differences, and divided the country into six Natural Farming Regions. These are shown in Figure 2b. A glance at Figures 1, 2a and 2b indicates the close connection between the higher ground, the humid and mild subarid Bioclimatic Regions and Natural Farming Regions I, II and III.

Vincent and Thomas' analysis of Rhodesia's farming potential has been the most comprehensive survey carried out in the country and their Agro-Ecological survey should provide the basis for any system of farming for either the pre-

FIGURE 1
RELIEF MAP OF RHODESIA



SOURCE
Kay (1970: 14)

sent or the future.⁵ Each of their six Regions 'represents a particular combination of the natural characteristics of climate, soil and relief which tends to find expression agriculturally in a particular system suited to it'.⁶ Their division of the country's land area into six Regions (subdivided into some 22 sub-regions) is based on the assumption that 'for agricultural production to be stable and permanent, it must be based on farming systems in harmony with the controls of nature. In other words we must concentrate on the production of those types of livestock and those crops which in the majority of seasons, with efficient management, do well in various combinations of soil and climate.' The total acreages by Natural Regions are shown quantitatively in Table 1.

Table 1
DIVISION OF LAND BY NATURAL REGIONS

Natural Region	Acreage*	Percent of Land
I	1 515 300	1,56
II	18 144 700	18,68
III	16 938 600	17,43
IV	32 147 800	33,00
V	25 423 000	26,20
X	3 015 000	3,10
TOTAL	97 184 400	100,00

SOURCE: Vincent and Thomas (1960:104)

* Land areas have been given in acres throughout
1 acre = 0,405 hectares.

Region I covers the higher and more mountainous parts of the country. Rainfall in this region is high, above 42 inches a year. The area is suitable for specialised and diversified farming: wattle and pine forests, deciduous fruit, livestock, potatoes, vegetables, tea and coffee.

Region II, chiefly in the North-East of the country, is the area best suited to intensive crop production with subsidiary livestock holding. With an annual rainfall of between 28 and 42 inches, this area is the most important dryland cropping part of the country.

Region III borders Region II, but tends to have a lower rainfall of between 22 and 28 inches a year. Because of the possibility of longer periods of summer drought, this area is less suited to crop-dominant farming and it is more dependent upon livestock production. Vincent and Thomas call it a semi-intensive farming area.

Region IV covers about one third of the total surface area of the country and is approximately equivalent to land between 3 000 and 4 000 feet. Rainfall is comparatively low, between 18 and 22 inches a year, so the area is too susceptible to periodic seasonal droughts and severe dry spells during the rainy season for cropping except in certain favoured localities. Semi-extensive livestock production is recommended for the area with a very limited amount of land given over to arable production, and this will largely be for livestock feed.


Region V is the second largest Region in the country but with even less agricultural potential than Region IV. Rainfall is less than 20 inches a year and the area is only suitable for extensive farming based on the grazing potential of the veld.

Region X, which is scattered throughout the country, is unsuitable for any sort of farming. It consists of excessively broken country, flood-plains, swamps or very poor soil. An example would be the Zambezi escarpment.

In general, the Agro-Ecological analysis of the country shows that approximately 38 percent of the land area is suitable for crop production (Regions I-III) and about 60 percent is suitable for some sort of livestock production (Regions IV and V). This shows that Rhodesia is predominantly a cattle country

FIGURE 2

BIOCLIMATIC AND NATURAL REGIONS OF RHODESIA



SOURCE: Kay (1970:20)

and is in general less suited to crop production.⁸ Of course Vincent and Thomas' analysis is based on the assumption of dryland farming and if artificial variables are introduced, such as irrigation or cattle feeding in the dry season, the agricultural potential will change.

As well as looking at the total land area, Vincent and Thomas also attempted to analyse the total acreage suitable for arable farming within each broad Region. They defined arable land as 'land which has an adequate depth of soil for satisfactory plant growth and which can safely be cultivated, using normal

practices and protection methods'.⁹ Table 2 shows the amount of potential arable land available in each Natural Region. Consistent with their assumptions, low rainfall in Regions IV and V excludes the possibility of dryland crop production.

Anyone familiar with present-day land use in Rhodesia knows that, especially in the African Areas, Vincent and Thomas' recommendations are not adhered to in practice. In particular, large parts of Regions IV and V are used for crop production. While a large proportion of this type of farming definitely is destructive of the land, as we shall see below, this is not always the case. The reason that, for example, cropping in certain parts of Region IV, need not necessarily lead to a destruction of the land is that this type of farming is of a *subsistence* nature, whereas Vincent and Thomas based their analysis more upon successful commercial farming. It is not being argued that this is a desirable state of affairs, but it is nevertheless true that, in the *short* run, farming can be carried out in different areas at variance with the recommended pattern without destroying the land. In the long term, however, this is quite unacceptable because either the farming system will have to remain permanently at or below subsistence levels or if attempts are made to raise the production levels of the land then the fertility of the land will be destroyed.

TABLE 2

ESTIMATED POTENTIAL ARABLE LAND IN RHODESIA¹

Natural Region	Arable Acreage	Percent
I	210 00	1,5
II	8 396 200	59,4
III	4 869 400	34,4
X ²	672 000	4,7
TOTAL	14 147 600	100,0

SOURCE

Vincent and Thomas (1960:107)

NOTES

¹ Vincent and Thomas only give an estimate of potential arable land in the European and National Areas. This Table has included the African Areas by assuming that the same proportion of land in each area is potentially arable. It also assumes that vleis land can be cultivated: see Vincent and Thomas (1960:108)

² Although Region X is unsuitable for farming, part of it does fall under the definition of potentially arable land.

ii. *The Present Rural Population*

At the end of 1976 Rhodesia's population was 6,7m. Of that number some

FIGURE 3

THE SEVEN PROVINCES
OF RHODESIA

5,6m, or 83 percent, were living in the rural areas with the majority dependent upon agriculture.¹⁰ Rhodesia is divided administratively into seven Provinces; the geographical position of these Provinces is shown in Figure 3. The distribution of the rural population by Provinces is shown in Table 3 and it is clear from the Table that the rural population is not divided up evenly from Province to Province. The rural population of Matebeleland is half that of Mashonaland. Manicaland and Mashonaland South have the highest population densities but Victoria has the highest total population.

Under the Land Tenure Act rural land has been divided up on a racial basis. (Although the 1977 Amendment brought about *legal* changes, in practice the

TABLE 3

RURAL POPULATION BY PROVINCE, 1976

Province	Total Acreage '000s	Total Population '000s	Density: Acres/Person
Manicaland	8 857	974,9	9,1
Mashonaland North	17 134	884,4	19,4
Mashonaland South	10 549	922,3	11,4
Matebeleland North	19 202	452,2	42,5
Matebeleland South	13 429	475,2	28,2
Midlands	13 548	865,6	15,6
Victoria	13 758	987,1	13,9
TOTAL	96 477	5 561,7	17,3

SOURCE

Census of Population (1969 Tables 1-5), Tables 9 and 20, below.


NOTE

These figures exclude those people living in Forest, Park or Specially Designated Areas. In the 1969 Census these totalled 25 500 people in the African areas and 28 690 people in the European areas.

distribution of rural land and rural population is substantially the same as the position before the Amendment; and so for the present purposes we shall analyse the position under the 1970 Land Tenure Act conditions). The division of land by race is shown in Figure 4 and Table 4. Under these land divisions, 82,2m acres of the country, 85 percent of the total, has been set aside for farming purposes. Of this 38,5m (47 percent) has been reserved for Europeans and 43,6 (53 percent) for Africans.

FIGURE 4

LAND DIVISIONS BY RACE IN RHODESIA



SOURCE
Kay (1970:52).

TABLE 4

THE DIVISION OF LAND IN RHODESIA BY RACE

European Area	Acreage
Forest Area	1 863 918
Parks & Wild Life	4 383 447
General Land	38 564 496
Specially Designated Land	18 910
TOTAL European Land	44 831 233
African Area	Acreage
Forest Area	424 840
Parks & Wild Life	630 526
Tribal Trust Land	39 979 963
Purchase Area	3 670 770
Specially Designated Land	291 660
TOTAL African Land	44 997 731
National Land:	6 596 876
TOTAL RHODESIA:	96 425 840

SOURCE
The Land Tenure Act, Chapter 148 (1970: 204-309).

While the European general land area covers 5,1m acres less than the African area, it carries a far lower population. As Table 5 shows, the African rural areas carry 80 percent of the rural population and the European areas only 20 percent.

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL LAND AND POPULATION, 1976

Land Category	Percent of Land	(Population Figures in '000s)			Percentage Population
		African Population	European Population	Total Population	
African Farming (TTL and PA) Land	53	4 440,6	2,3	4 442,9	80
European Farming Land	47	1 089,2	31,9	1 121,0	20
TOTALS	100	5 529,8	33,2	5 563,9	100

SOURCE
Census of Population (1969: Tables 4 and 5);
Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1977,
Tables 1 and 2.

This uneven distribution of the rural population is shown even more clearly by looking at the population densities in the European and African rural areas. Table 6 shows that although the average rural population density was 14,7 acres per person in 1976, this figure hides the fact that the African rural areas are some four times as densely populated as the European rural areas.

TABLE 6
RURAL POPULATION DENSITIES, 1969 and 1976

Land Category	Population Densities, Acres Per Person	
	1969	1976
African Land: TTL Plus PA	14,3	9,9
European Farming Land	40,2	34,4
European Farming Land (European Population only)	(1 272,8)	(1 208,9)
TOTAL, Rural Land	20,4	14,7

SOURCE
Tables 4 and 5, above and Tables 8, 9, 19 and 20 below.

Not only is the rural population more heavily concentrated in the African areas, but the European areas contain a much higher proportion of the more productive agricultural land. A glance at Figures 1, 2 and 4 reveals the overlap between the European areas and the better agricultural land. This is shown quantitatively in Table 7. Only 32 percent of African rural land falls within Regions I-III, whereas some 57 percent of the European land falls within these regions. In practice this means that the figures for population densities in the African and European rural areas seriously underestimate the pressure of the land.

This discussion of land potential and population on a national basis is only of limited value. It has told us nothing about how the land is being used in each area and whether the land, even if densely populated, is adequate for the population it carries. It says nothing about how much land is occupied within each Province and how much lies unused, and finally it ignores the implications of the important fact that in the European areas the Africans present on the land are there as employees on large and medium-sized European-owned farms so that average population densities do not show how the land is divided up within the area. To consider these questions, we now turn to the African and European rural areas and examine each in more detail.

TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL FARMING REGIONS
BY RACIAL LAND CATEGORIES, 1977
in '000s Acres.

Natural Region	Total Area	European Land	Percent	African Land	Percent	National Land	Percent	Total
I	1 515,3	1 075,9	71	197,0	13	242,4	16	100
II	18 144,7	12 519,8	69	4 536,2	25	1 088,7	6	100
III	16 938,6	7 622,4	45	7 283,6	43	2 032,6	12	100
IV	32 147,8	9 001,4	28	17 359,8	54	5 786,6	18	100
V	25 423,0	6 610,1	26	12 965,7	51	5 847,3	23	100
X	3 015,0	60,3	2	1 628,1	54	1 326,6	44	100
TOTALS	97 184,4	36 889,8		43 970,4		16 324,2		

SOURCE

Table 1, above and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Section (1977:7)

B. AFRICAN RURAL LAND

The African rural areas of Rhodesia are made up of 165 Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) and 66 Purchase Areas (PAs). In this section we shall examine how the 4,4m people living in the TTLs and PAs are distributed on the land, the quality of the land they farm and the ability of that land to carry its population.

Table 8 shows the distribution of the African population in the TTLs and PAs, according to the 1969 Population Census — the most recent one carried out in the country. It is clear that in relation both to land area and population, the TTLs are far more important than the PAs. The TTLs carry 95 percent of the African rural population and account for 91 percent of the African farming land. With the exception of Mashonaland North and Matebeleland North, the TTLs are more densely populated than the PAs. In general, both the total population and the average densities vary from Province to Province. Manicaland is three times as densely populated as Matebeleland North and Mashonaland South. Victoria, Midlands and Manicaland together contain 72 percent of the African rural population but cover only 49 percent of the land area.

TABLE 8
AFRICAN LAND AREA AND RURAL POPULATION
BY PROVINCE, 1969 CENSUS

Province	Land Area in '000s Acres		Population		Densities in Acres/Person		Combined Densities TTLs and PAs
	TTLs	PAs	TTLs	PAs	TTLs	PAs	
Manicaland	4 779	201	541,3	20,4	8,8	9,8	8,9
Mashonaland North	6 785	339	330,1	23,2	20,5	14,6	20,2
Mashonaland South	3 557	1 056	437,3	27,3	8,1	38,5	9,9
Matebeleland North	7 281	133	267,1	5,8	27,3	22,7	27,2
Matebeleland South	5 888	242	273,1	6,7	21,6	36,2	21,9
Midlands	6 471	1 092	503,7	23,7	12,8	46,0	14,3
Victoria	5 278	540	572,9	28,4	9,2	18,9	9,7
TOTALS	40 039	3 0603	2 925,5	135,6	13,7	26,5	14,3

SOURCE

Census of Population (1969: Tables 1-5)

The figures in Table 8, coming from the 1969 Census, already seriously underestimate the present population. In the eight years from 1969 to 1976 there has been an estimated increase in the population living in the African rural areas of some 45 percent. To give a more up to date picture of the population structure of the African rural areas, Table 9 shows the estimated 1976 population and land density figures.

We shall now look at the TTLs and PAs separately. Much more space will be given to the Tribal Areas because they constitute the largest area and contain the largest proportion of the population; thus any policy changes related to the African rural areas will be overwhelmingly concerned with the Tribal Trust Lands.

TABLE 9
AFRICAN LAND AREA AND RURAL POPULATION
BY PROVINCE, 1976 ESTIMATES

Province	Total Acreage TTL and PA '000s Acres	Estimated Population '000s	Density Acres/Person
Manicaland	4 980,1	815,8	6,1
Mashonaland North	7 124,7	510,9	13,9
Mashonaland South	4 613,8	672,6	6,8
Matebeleland North	7 414,8	397,3	18,7
Matebeleland South	6 130,3	407,1	15,0
Midlands	7 563,7	765,0	9,9
Victoria	5 818,7	871,9	6,7
TOTALS	43 646,1	4 440,6	9,9

SOURCE
Table 8, above.

NOTE
It has been assumed that the population of the TTLs has increased by 46 percent over the eight year period and the population of the PAs by 25 percent. See Kay (1972:24).

i. The Tribal Trust Lands

The 165 TTLs are at present divided up into 252 separate Chiefdoms which are at the same time both clearly defined *territorial units* as well as the group of *people* who legally inhabit these different areas. Today all land in the TTLs is divided up into arable and grazing land (following Alvord's proposals of the late 1920s) and since the 1967 Tribal Trust Land Act — whose provisions have been incorporated into the 1970 Land Tenure Act — the Chiefs and their particular Tribal Land Authorities have been legally responsible for allocating land rights to rural Africans under their jurisdiction. In recent years, with the growing population pressure on the land, lower land community hierarchies have obtained greater control over the land. Since July 1973 government policy has attempted to encourage these Tribal Development Groups to demarcate definite rights of exclusion over defined areas, including both grazing and arable land, and even to fence off these pieces of land. However, ultimate authority still lies with the Chiefs and their Tribal Land Authorities.¹¹ This section will look at the adequacy of land in the TTLs and the problems facing the Tribal Land Authorities who are having to find land for the rapidly increasing population of the Tribal Areas.

Land in Rhodesia has been divided up by Vincent and Thomas into six Natural Farming Regions. When plans were initiated for the implementation of the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951, attempts were made to calculate the land area necessary for farmers in the TTLs in relation to the Agro-Ecological conditions of the different areas. The purpose was to find that area of land for each farmer which 'if properly farmed would keep the holder and his family occupied ... and provide subsistence food requirements plus a surplus for sale'.¹² This area was called a Standard Unit. The primary aim of this exercise was to help conserve the land and thus the estimated income that each farmer was to obtain from agriculture was not high: eight years after the allocation of a Standard Unit to a farmer, it was calculated that he and his family would be able between them to receive an income equivalent of approximately \$140 a year. The size of a holding was not devised so much to provide for a system of commercial farming throughout the TTLs, but to provide 'a means of eliminating recourse to casual employment in the cash economy as a way of improving "status"'.¹³

While these recommendations did not intend to alter the division of land in the Reserves between individually farmed arable land and communal grazing land, Standard Units showed the total amount of land each farmer would need for his own arable and grazing needs. The total size of each Standard Unit would vary from area to area depending upon the Natural Farming Region in which different Reserves were located. In the highest rainfall areas, a Standard Unit for each family was to consist of 8 acres of arable land and 60 acres of land for grazing, with a minimum of six head of cattle per family unit. It was assumed that cattle were needed both to provide draught, given the low level of capitalisation within the Reserves, and also manure for the arable land. In the lower rainfall areas, the land necessary for both cultivation and grazing purposes would increase. Table 10 shows the recommended minimum acreages for a Standard Unit by rainfall regions: the minimum Unit being 68 acres, but rising to 620 acres in area with less than 16 inches of rain a year. Although the Land Husbandry Act was finally abandoned in 1962, the Standard Unit scheme on which it was based remains valid today because it was dependent

upon the natural conditions of each area. Since that time there has been no other attempt to analyse the land area needed by cultivators in the TTLs.¹⁴

TABLE 10

STANDARD UNITS PROPOSED UNDER THE LAND HUSBANDRY ACT

Average Annual Rainfall	Full Standard Holding Acres of Arable Land	Number of Animal Units	Acres of Grazing per Animal Unit	Approximate Total Acreage per full Holding
28 inches or over	8	6	10	68
24 to 28 inches	8	6	12	80
20 to 24 inches	13	10	15	160
16 to 20 inches	12	15	25	390
Below 16 inches	15	20	30	620

SOURCE

What the Native Land Husbandry Act Means To The Rural African And To Southern Rhodesia, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1955.

Whatever merits the 'ideal' acreages proposed under the Standard Unit scheme have, it cannot be assumed that these Units provide a large enough area of land for farmers. Indeed, there are a number of factors which taken together suggest that the Standard Units may well be too small. In the first place, greatest emphasis was placed, as we have seen, on the conservation of the land rather than on providing an economic holding for farmers: the term 'economic' was never defined and the recommended income levels were low.¹⁵ This means that the farmers would have little extra income to enable them to invest capital in the development of their land. Arable land would thus remain largely labour-intensive. Secondly, a rigid division between arable and grazing land is assumed to continue indefinitely in the future. But Vincent and Thomas specifically stated that crop production should not take place in Regions IV and V (where 70 percent of the African farming land is located). According to their analysis a system of mixed farming cannot be taken as the ideal for the future. Further the Standard Unit scheme assumed a fixity in the relationship between

arable and grazing land and so allowed for no change if and when new techniques demanded this. Finally, even with a low level of capitalisation as envisaged under the scheme, Yudelman for one argued that a family in the high rainfall areas could farm at least 10 acres of arable land; so it could be argued that the Standard Unit divisions institutionalises under-employment.¹⁶ For all these reasons one cannot assume the land area recommended under the Standard Unit scheme would be adequate either now or in the future.

Using the Standard Unit assumptions, it was estimated in the early 1950s that the Reserves could carry 204 946 farming families, or a total population dependent upon agriculture of about 1.2m. Since then the area of the Reserves has been increased, but if one assumes that these ideal acreages still apply then for the present area of the TTLs no more than 280 000 farming families could be carried on the land. Table 11 shows the number of cultivators who would farm on Standard Units today in each Natural Region of the TTLs.

TABLE 11

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CULTIVATORS WHO COULD BE SUPPORTED IN THE TTLs USING STANDARD UNIT ASSUMPTIONS, 1977

Natural Region	Total TTL Acreage 1976 '000s Acres	Approximate Total Acreage Per full Holding	Number of Cultivators
I	280,3	68	4 122
II	4 157,8	68	61 144
III	6 148,6	80	76 857
IV	15 372,8	160	96 080
V	14 006,0	390	35 913
TOTALS	39 965,0		274 116

SOURCE

Walker in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1976:192) and Table 10, above.

NOTE

The average rainfall criteria for the land Husbandry Act holding allocations do not coincide identically with the rainfall criteria for the Natural Farming Regions worked out by Vincent and Thomas. The assumptions made here have in each case led to a higher estimation of the carrying capacity of each Re-

gion. A low estimate would give the total number of cultivators to be 156 529. It should also be remembered that under Vincent and Thomas' scheme there was to be *no* arable farming in Regions IV and V.


It should also be noted that there are some differences in Tables 7, 17 and the present Table over the total amount of land in the African rural area within each Natural Region. The sources (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the C.S.O.) are inconsistent with each other.

Comparing these figures with the present number of cultivators in the TTLs, it can be seen that the Tribal Areas are very heavily over-populated. In 1960 the number of tribal cultivators had risen to 359 000 and by early 1977 that number had almost doubled to the present figure of approximately 675 000. The TTLs are now carrying some 2½ times as many cultivators as the Standard Unit recommendations.

The acute over-population of the TTLs can be seen diagrammatically in Figures 5, 6 and 7. Figure 5 shows the population densities of the TTLs in 1969 and it can be clearly seen how many areas have populations well above the optimum densities. It also needs to be emphasised that since then the TTL population has increased by almost 50 percent.

FIGURE 5


THE DENSITY OF POPULATION IN TRIBAL TRUST LANDS
IN THE VARIOUS AGRO-ECOLOGICAL REGIONS OF RHODESIA



SOURCE
Kay in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1975:9)

FIGURE 6

RHODESIA POPULATION PRESSURE 1969




SOURCE
Kay in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1975: Map 1).

Figure 6 shows the problem on the map of Rhodesia. It can be seen that the vast majority of TTLs are over-populated and a number are termed 'Grossly Over-Populated'. The majority of TTLs which are under-populated lie around the perimeter of the country and most of these areas are in low-lying tsetse-fly infested regions. Like Figure 5, these estimates are for 1969. It has recently been estimated that 22 percent of the Tribal Land of the country falls within the area presently infested with tsetse-fly and where, consequently, livestock production is precluded.¹⁷ Finally, Figure 7 projects the over-population crisis into the future. Given the present land area of the TTLs and population increases, the present structures can only accentuate the current crisis situation.

The acute over-population of the TTLs has led to widespread and accelerating destruction of the land. Once the quality of the land begins to deteriorate,

FIGURE 7

RHODESIA'S AFRICAN POPULATION CHANGING STRUCTURE WITH CURRENT POLICIES



SOURCE
Kay in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1975:11).

it is less able to carry its population; as a result the land tends to be farmed more intensively and thus it deteriorates even more rapidly. Consequently fewer and fewer people are able even to subsist on a given area of land, never mind produce enough to satisfy their basic needs. In the TTLs much of the arable land has been so over-used that some 'thousands of hectares of old, contoured arable land have been abandoned, because they are too infertile to produce a crop'.¹⁸ This decrease in fertility together with more and more cultivators demanding land has led the Tribal Authorities to open up large areas of the grazing land for cultivation. Between 1962 and 1964, for example, some 306 000 acres of grazing land were converted to arable and this practice has continued down to the present day.¹⁹ By 1977 some 5.4m acres of the TTLs had been turned over to arable cultivation; this is some *seventeen* times the 311 615 acres recommended for cultivation under the Standard Unit scheme.

Converting large areas of grazing land to arable together with a large increase in the Tribal cattle population has meant that the grazing areas are bearing the brunt of the over-population of the TTLs and they are becoming increasingly over-stocked and over-grazed.

In 1965 it was estimated that some 50 percent of all grazing land in the Reserves was either bare or very over-grazed.²⁰ Since then the cattle population has increased substantially: between 1960 and 1977 the number of cattle in the TTLs has increased by 70 percent and the stocking rate has fallen from 15.3 acres per livestock unit to 10.1 acres.²¹ Table 12 shows the present stocking rates in the TTLs by Province. The only area which is understocked is Mashonaland North, all other areas carry a livestock population between one third and twice as high as the stocking rate capacity of the land permits.

TABLE 12

LIVESTOCK POPULATION TTLS, 1977

Province	Stocking Capacity Rate '000s LSUs	Present Stocking Rate '000s LSUs	Overstocking Rate, Percent
Manicaland	220	325	+ 47
Mashonaland North	215	176	- 18
Mashonaland South	205	272	+ 33
Matebeleland North	206	323	+ 57
Matebeleland South	247	417	+ 69
Midlands	272	401	+ 48
Victoria	207	423	+104
TOTAL	1 572	2 337	+ 49

SOURCE
Cross (1977:5).

NOTE
One LSU approximately equals one cow, two sheep or three pigs.

This general crisis situation in the TTLs may be illustrated by a few specific examples. In Manicaland Province in 1976 the average acreage of arable land available to each cultivator was less than 5 acres and the total arable plus grazing land available for each cultivator was, on average, only 28 acres.²² If all the TTLs in Manicaland fell within Regions I and II, then at least 68 acres would be needed on average for each cultivator, but many TTLs in the Province lie in Regions IV and V; so far more land is needed. There are, then, in Manicaland at least three times as many cultivators as the land is capable of carrying without the land deteriorating. And the land is being destroyed: some 95 percent of the land is being either damaged or destroyed because less than 10 percent of the soil is receiving manure or fertilizer compatible with the intensive use being made of it.²³ Table 13 compares the recommended acreages required for an average cultivator in each Province with the approximate number of cultivators in each Province. While these figures show how serious the current situation is, it needs to be remembered that the calculations totally ignore the growing numbers of landless people now living in the TTLs who have no access to land whatsoever.

Uzumba TTL in the Mrewa District, Mashonaland South, covers an area of 268 980 acres and is located within Natural Region III. In 1957 the total resident population was 19 414. Under the Standard Unit divisions, 52 130 acres of land were given over to arable cultivation, at the time of the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act, giving approximately 13.5 acres per farming family. This was, at the time, more than adequate for the area. However, this left only 216 850 acres for grazing and all other purposes. Thus no more than 56 acres for each cultivator's grazing needs. But in Uzumba it was estimated that 15 acres were needed for each livestock unit, so, ideally, 90 acres were required for the grazing needs of each farmer. So even in 1957 the land area of Uzumba was insufficient to support the resident farming population.²⁴ In 1969 the population had risen to 30 590 and by 1976 the estimated population was 44 600, 130 percent higher than the 1957 figure and over the period the land area of the TTL has remained unchanged.

Chiweshe TTL is in the Mazoe District, Mashonaland North; it covers an area of 211 914 acres and under the Land Husbandry regulations 35 000 acres should have been set aside for cultivation. In 1957 there were 5 480 cultivators in Chiweshe so each cultivator would have only had on average 6.4 acres for cultivation; but this was less than the minimum acreage required for land in Region II. What happened was that an extra 24 000 acres were taken from the grazing area for cultivation purposes so that in practice each cultivator had on average 10.9 acres of arable land. This left only 154 000 acres for grazing and other needs. If each cultivator had had his requisite six head of cattle then each livestock unit would have had only 5 acres of land average for grazing — one half the required amount. But in 1957 the total *de facto* cattle population was half the required total. While this meant that the stocking rate was ecologically 'correct', it also meant that the land was not receiving enough organic fertilizer to maintain soil fertility.²⁵ The population of Chiweshe has grown from 25 470 in 1962 to an approximate 58 000 in 1976 and, as in Uzumba, there has been no increase in land area. Like Uzumba, Chiweshe is now heavily overpopulated. The experiences of Uzumba and Chiweshe have been repeated throughout the TTLs, though in some areas particularly in the Victoria Province conditions have reached such a crisis point that large numbers of people

TABLE 13
RECOMMENDED AND PRESENT AVERAGE ACREAGE
PER CULTIVATOR IN TTLs BY PROVINCE, 1977

Province	Agricultural Land in TTLs	Approximate Present Number of Cultivators '000s	Present Average Acres/Cultivator	Recommended Average Acres/Cultivator
Manicaland	4 372	126.2	28.0	80
Mashonaland North	6 279	75.6	83.0	120
Mashonaland South	3 337	99.9	33.4	68
Matabeleland North	6 454	62.1	103.9	160
Matabeleland South	5 530	64.8	85.3	160
Midlands	4 513	115.4	39.1	80
Victoria	4 668	130.9	35.7	120
TOTALS	35 153	675.0

SOURCE
Cross (1977:5), Plowes in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1976:244-247) for Manicaland and Table 10.

NOTE

These figures are only meant to be a rough indication of the scarcity of land by Province; the figures bear little relation to the actual problems in any particular TTL because in each Province TTL land falls within different Natural Farming Regions.

have had to be resettled in other parts of the country to avoid the total destruction of the soil and mass starvation.²⁶

This discussion of the adequacy of land in the TTLs has implicitly assumed that if *on average* there was enough land for the population then all would be well. But this is an unjustified assumption because the TTLs are characterised by enormous inequalities in the ownership of cattle, the size of plots held by individual cultivators and in the ability of the rural adult population to obtain any land rights at all. Not only is the land not divided up equally, but pressure on the land tends to be leading to even greater inequalities as well as to more and more would-be cultivators being unable to obtain land. Because of these acute inequalities, average figures for the over-population of the TTLs do not reveal the full extent of the problems of Tribal agriculture and the inadequacy of the land area.

The present system of farming in the TTLs with its division between arable and grazing land assumes that cultivators have access to land and that they own sufficient cattle for draught and to provide manure to maintain the fertility of the soil. But in Manicaland, for example, some 68 percent of cultivators own *no* cattle.²⁷ This inequality in cattle ownership, together with the small number of scotchcarts available for transportation, means that in the Province only about 9 percent of the arable land is receiving organic matter dressing.²⁸ Nationally, it has recently been estimated that some 44 percent of all TTL households do not possess any cattle so making them totally dependent upon the use and availability of cattle owned by their neighbours. Available evidence also suggests that inequalities in cattle ownership are increasing. In 1960 there were 231 000 African livestock owners and 350 000 families living in the African rural areas, so in that year approximately 66 percent of all families owned at least one head of cattle. Today the number is nearer to 56 percent.²⁹ Furthermore, there are also great inequalities in the numbers of cattle owned by those who *do* possess animals. For example, in Karangaland, Weinrich found that in a survey of 575 plottolders, 30 percent had no cattle, 22 percent owned between 1 and 3 head of cattle, 25 percent owned between 4 and 6 head and 23 percent owned over 6 head.³⁰

In Uzumba in 1957 there was a hundred-fold difference in the size of the plots cultivated in the Reserve. Although at the time the average size of an arable land holding was 13,5 acres, many farmers had blocks of 70 acres and one man had a block of 116 acres.³¹ At the other end of the scale, some cultivators had plots of only 0,5 acres. And at that time, some 29 percent of those who qualified for land-rights had no land. Since then the population has more than doubled so the problems are even more acute.

In general the pressure on the land in recent years has led to greater inequalities in landholdings. In the 1948-49 agricultural season, of all the arable land in the African areas 52 percent was cultivated by 30 percent of cultivators. By 1960, 30 percent of all cultivators farmed 63 percent of the cultivated land.³² In 1960 in a sample of 473 holdings throughout the different Natural Regions, 5 percent were smaller than 5 acres, 53 percent were between 6 and 10 acres and 5 percent were more than 40 acres in size.³³ Tables 14, 15 and 16 show land inequalities in three TTLs in more recent years. As it can be seen, there are a large number of cultivators who farm comparatively small arable plots, while larger arable holdings are far from uncommon.

In Mondoro, for example, Table 16 shows that 43 percent of all cultivators

have plots of under 4 acres. Mondoro TTL is in Natural Region III so at least 8 acres would be necessary for each cultivator under the Standard Unit Assumptions.

TABLE 14

LANDHOLDING IN KARANGALAND TTLS, 1966-68

Size of Holding in Acres	Number of Cultivators	Percentage of Cultivators
1-3	209	36,3
4-6	273	47,4
7-9	84	14,6
10 and Over	9	1,7
TOTAL	575	100,0

SOURCE

Weinrich (1975:85).

TABLE 15

LANDHOLDING IN GUTU WEST TTL, 1969

Size of Holding in Acres	Number of Landholders	Percentage of Landholders
0-6	280	29,6
6-12	602	63,7
12 and Over	62	6,7
TOTAL	944	100,0

SOURCE

C. Beaumont, Leadership Survey in Gutu West Tribal Trust Land 1969, Salisbury, 1969, (mimeo).

TABLE 16

LANDHOLDING IN NORTH MONDORO TTL, 1973-74

Size of Holding in Acres	Number of Cultivators	Percentage of Cultivators
0-1	127	18,1
2-4	174	24,8
4-7	122	17,3
7 and Over	280	39,8
TOTAL	703	100,0

SOURCE

Ellis-Jones (1975: xii).

As well as inequalities of landholding, there is the growing problem of landlessness. An indication of the extent of landlessness can be seen from the fact that in 1960 over 15 percent of all adults in the TTLs were paid employees *within* the Tribal Areas.³⁴ Using the same assumptions there would appear to be some 280 000 paid employees in the TTLs today. While these employees do not necessarily have to be landless peasants, the following estimate suggests that there are even more landless within the TTLs. In early 1977 there were 675 000 cultivators in the TTLs and an adult population in the TTLs of some 1 887 000 people; if there are two adults per family then there would be approximately 500 000 landless adults in the TTLs. The time is not far off when the number of landless will equal the number of cultivators. These figures are supported, for example, by Weinrich's study of Karangaland in 1966-68. She found that in the 15-29 age group some 47 percent were landless.³⁵

The situation in the TTLs today presents a distressing picture. While it is certainly true that some TTL cultivators are comparatively wealthy, are able to live above subsistence levels and are even able to employ their own labour, the vast majority are unable to make a living from the land. Not surprisingly with such a low level of capitalisation in tribal agriculture, there is a very high correlation between the size of arable holdings and the net income obtained by a cultivator.³⁶

With too many people living on too small an area of land, cultivators are increasingly unable to support their families and in their attempt to do so they inevitably contribute to the destruction of the soil. As we saw in Chapter II, more and more people are leaving the Tribal Areas to look for work but the lack of employment opportunities elsewhere forces them back to the TTLs where they face a bleak future. The long run deteriorating conditions in the Tribal Areas can be summarised by the following data. In 1962 it was estimated that the availability of maize grown in the TTLs averaged 352 lbs per person a year. By 1977 this had fallen to 231 lbs, some 40 percent less than the

required amount of 385 lbs. The TTLs are the homes of some 60 percent of Rhodesia's total population and 80 percent of the rural population; they are supposed to provide for the subsistence needs of their own present population as well as provide a social security base for the majority of those Africans working in formal employment. Yet current estimates show that 70 percent of the country's national food requirements are provided by commercial farmers and by the year 2000, if the Tribal situation does not change, this figure will be over 80 percent.³⁷

ii. *The Purchase Areas*

In relation to the total structure of rural land use in the African areas, the Purchase Areas (PAs) are marginal. They cover 3,6m acres, 3,7 percent of the total land area of the country, they hold 3 percent of the total rural population, one percent of the country's farmers and they are responsible for only 2,3 percent of total agricultural production in the country.

Whereas in the TTLs arable land is allocated to cultivators by the Tribal land authorities (theoretically without payment) and grazing land is held communally for the use of livestock owners, the PAs are divided up into complete farming units, individually owned or leased, which can be bought or sold but which cannot be legally subdivided.³⁸ There are 66 PAs and, with the exception of Gwatemba PA near Belingwe, all lie adjacent to Tribal land. They differ greatly in size: the largest six make up some 45 percent of the total 3,6m acres of PA land, while 26 of them cover less than 5 000 acres each. Table 17 shows the distribution of PA land by Natural Region; 56,2 percent of PA land lies within Regions I, II and III, compared with only 27 percent for the African areas as a whole.

TABLE 17

AGRICULTURAL LAND IN THE PURCHASE AREAS
ACCORDING TO NATURAL FARMING REGIONS

Natural Region	Area in '000s Acres	Percent of Total Area
I	18,0	0,5
II	622,7	17,8
III	1 324,2	37,9
IV	1 291,8	36,9
V	241,1	6,8
TOTAL	3 497,8	100,0

SOURCE

Report on The Agricultural and Extension Situation in African Purchase Land Areas of Rhodesia, SD/2/6/77, p. 1.

It is particularly difficult to analyse how efficiently land is utilised in the PAs firstly because of the lack of comprehensive data and secondly, but most importantly, because the data that are available generally conceal the enormous differences found within the region.

One of the most significant characteristics of the PAs is the variety found there: large areas of unused land together with heavily over-populated land, some large farms and many very small farms, subsistence type farming and commercially-based enterprises, a few quite profitable farms together with a majority of non-viable units. What this means is that average figures tend to over-estimate the success of farming within the PAs as a whole.

A large part of the PAs is not used at all; recent estimates show that 1,3m acres, 37 percent of the total land area, comprise either the unplanned area (1,0m acres) or vacant farms (294 000 acres).³⁹ The remaining 2,3m acres are covered by 8 102 farms whose average size is 284 acres. But this average figure hides the true distribution of farm size. Farms range from 10 acres to 2 000 acres; there are a large number of small farms of less than 150 acres each and a few farms of over 1 500 acres.⁴⁰

As was seen in Tables 8 and 9, above, the population densities of the PAs vary significantly from Province to Province. In 1969 the population density of PA farms in the Midlands Province was 46,0 acres per person and in Manicaland it was 9,8 acres per person. Again, these averages hide a much wider range of population densities in particular PAs. In 1969, 20 percent of all PAs had densities of over 80 acres per person and at the end of the scale 31 percent had densities of 15 acres per person while 10 percent had densities of 7 acres per person which in that year was higher than the average density of all TTLs by Province (Table 8).⁴¹

These figures suggest that much of the land is seriously over-populated and this is supported by evidence of decreasing soil fertility. But at the same time much of the land which is farmed does not make an efficient use of the land. It has been estimated that on average for a farm to be viable it should plough between 25 and 100 acres of crops, depending upon the Natural Region in which it is located. Yet, on average, only 26 acres were under crops on each farm between 1971 and 1975 and most farms being located in Region III should be ploughing far more than the minimum of 25 acres. It was also estimated that farms should have a minimum of 25 livestock units, yet in the same period the average herd size was 21 head of cattle. It has, rather conservatively, been estimated that there is room for at least a 30 percent increase in the value of cattle and small stock production on PA farms which are currently occupied.⁴² The major reason for poor performance of PA farms in comparison with these ideals (and the average figures under-estimate the seriousness of the present situation) is that the majority of farms are too small to be economically viable. The units are too small to be capitalised efficiently — the majority are too small to warrant the purchase of a tractor. This is not altogether surprising considering that the majority of farms were allocated without a view to creating viable economic units. A recent Ministry report summarised the position by arguing that on present-day standards and with current production levels, PA farms in Matebeleland, Midlands, Victoria and Manicaland are non-viable.⁴³

The majority of PA farms are commercially non-viable because the system of farming, as in the TTLs, is overwhelmingly a subsistence-based one. This can

be illustrated by the fact that only 66 percent of total production is sold, the rest is consumed on the farm. Only 42 percent of the maize and 36 percent of the sorghum produced in the PAs is sold to the Grain Marketing Board.⁴⁴ While PA farms are self-contained units, the system of farming is still largely mixed-farming of crop and livestock production, similar to that carried out in the TTLs. Farmers grow crops in ecological regions unsuited to this type of land use and do not have the numbers of livestock necessary to make a living out of cattle farming. There is evidence to suggest that in many cases subsistence farming is less efficient on many PA farms than in neighbouring TTLs.⁴⁵ Those who have managed to obtain PA land have tended to be the more progressive TTL farmers, but Weinrich found in Karangaland that the better TTL farms had higher crop yields than PA farmers.⁴⁶ Part of the reason for this lies in the particular system of subsistence farming which is common in the PAs. In general the smaller PA farms have a very high number of family members living on the land: on average there are some 12 people and 4,5 adults per farm. The type of small-scale farming could thus be called an extended subsistence system, catering for more family members than TTL farms but not leading to proportionately more produce per adult. The average annual income per family-member on these small farms is only about \$35. Further, the extra labour does not appear to lead to better farming practices: only 10 percent of arable land is manured each year and fertilizer applications are inadequate.⁴⁷

In contrast with the majority of PA farms which practice subsistence farming, there are a number of farms which do make large profits, and which are more highly capitalised. But out of the present number of 8 102 farms only 23 earn enough from their agricultural production to qualify for the payment of income tax, that is only 0,3 percent of the total. What is more, many of the more profitable farms are owned by people who have business interests outside agriculture and who, consequently, have less incentive to make maximum use of their land than those who depend entirely on the land. A study of Msengezi PA in 1974 showed that 66 percent of all farmers who had 'fully capitalised' their farms had business interests outside agriculture.⁴⁸

The creation of the Purchase Areas has done very little to solve the basic problems of the African rural areas. A large proportion of the land is not used and the individual tenure system has not proved to be an adequate base for promoting agricultural development or for making an efficient use of the land within the present economic structure. Small farms, low levels of capitalisation, the minimal use made of credit facilities and a large number of family-dependants have all contributed to the maintenance of a subsistence-based system of farming for the majority of PA cultivators. To obtain larger farms, finance is needed and for this reason the majority of bigger farms tend to be owned by people with business interests outside agriculture. If one is looking for ways of solving the land and population problems of the TTLs through constructing a framework for a more efficient use of the land and an increase in agricultural production then the PA scheme does not provide the answer.

C. EUROPEAN RURAL LAND

i. Present Farm and Population Structure

Agricultural land in the European areas in Rhodesia covers 38,5m acres, some 47 percent of all agricultural land in the country. At the time of the 1969 Census it contained some 959 000 people, 24 percent of the rural population in that year. With a far lower population than the African rural areas, the European areas play by far the most important part in the country's agricultural production. In 1976 European agricultural output was valued at \$376m, 76 percent of the total of \$492m. But as \$84,8m of this was produced by tribal cultivators for their own consumption needs it never reached the market. European agriculture was responsible for 92 percent of marketed agricultural produce in 1976. 70 percent of total production came from crop production and the most important products in terms of value were maize, tobacco, sugar and cotton. The other 30 percent came from livestock production: 95 percent from beef and 5 percent from dairy stock.

TABLE 18

AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT IN RHODESIA, 1976

Origin of Output	Value in \$m.	Percent
Gross European Output	376,1	76
African Production for Own Consumption	84,8 ¹	17
African Sales Through Marketing Agencies	30,8	7
TOTAL	491,7	100

SOURCE

Monthly Digest of Statistics, Supplement April 1977, Table 17.

NOTE

¹ This figure is an approximate estimate.

At the end of 1976, the European rural areas contained 6 682 farms which covered 35,6m out of the 38,5m acres reserved for European agriculture. Unlike agriculture in the African areas, where the vast majority of people who work on the land produce crops and livestock for themselves and only a small (yet growing) number work as agricultural labourers, in the European areas the vast majority of people and all Africans working on the land are employees; they are paid a wage and have no direct access to the produce. In 1976 the European areas were farmed by 5 900 farmers and managers and approximately 355 500 African labourers.⁴⁹

The distribution of the population in the European rural areas by Province is shown in Table 19; like the African rural areas, the population distribution is very uneven. Some 55 percent of the population lives in Mashonaland which covers 30 percent of the land area, while 20 percent of the people in the more sparsely populated areas of Matebeleland and most of the Victoria Province live on 47 percent of the European rural land. Comparing this table with Table 8, above, it can be seen that the African land is between twice and three times as densely populated as the European land, but it should also be noted that in Mashonaland North Province the European land is *more* densely populated than the African rural land.

Since 1969 the population of the European rural areas has risen, but not as rapidly as the rural population in the African areas. The number of Europeans employed in agriculture has risen by 5 percent and the number of Africans by 17 percent over the eight year period to 1976. Assuming the same number of dependants in each population group as at the time of the 1969 Census, Table 20 gives the estimated 1976 population on European agricultural land. The average acreage per person has dropped from 40,2 to 34,4 over the period, a much smaller decrease than in the African areas.

Just as the rural population occupying European agricultural land is spread unevenly from Province to Province, so too are the 6 682 farms. Table 21 shows the distribution of farms by Province. There is an approximate correlation of rural population with numbers of farms per Province: the majority of farms lie in Mashonaland and the majority of the population also live there. But there is no simple correlation between the numbers of farms and the area covered by these farms. Forty-nine percent of all farms are found in Mashonaland and only 36 percent are located in Matebeleland, Midlands and Victoria Provinces. In contrast 29 percent of the land area of the European farms is found in Mashonaland while 62 percent lies in Matebeleland, Midlands and Victoria. On average, farms in Matebeleland and Victoria are between twice and three times the size of Mashonaland farms.

The average figures for farm size shown in Table 21 are of limited value, however, because they bear little relation to actual farm size. As can be seen from Tables 22 and 23, the size of white farms varies greatly not only between regions but also within regions. For the country as a whole 32 percent of all farms cover only 2 percent of the white farming land; 76 percent of the farms cover 52 percent of the land and 7 percent of the farms cover one half of the total land areas. 62 percent of the small farms are found in Mashonaland and Manicaland and 78 percent of the larger farms are in Matebeleland, Midlands and Victoria Provinces.⁵⁰ 47 percent of the total farming land comprises farms between 1 000 and 15 000 acres in size and 57 percent of all these farms are in Mashonaland.

The final Tables giving the present use of European agricultural land, Tables 24 and 25, show the acreage under crops of the 6 682 farms classified at the end of 1976. 4 371 farms, 65 percent of the total, had land under crops. 91 percent of farms in Mashonaland North and 75 percent of farms in Mashonaland South recorded crop production.

In all some 1,4m acres were under crops in 1976, this is 3,5 percent of the total European farming area. Table 25 indicates that the majority of farms with crops production have crop acreages between 75 and 1 250 acres each.

TABLE 19
EUROPEAN LAND AREA AND RURAL POPULATION
BY PROVINCE, 1969 CENSUS

Province	Land Area in '000s Acres	Population Figures in '000s			Density in Acres Per Person
		African Population	European Population	Total Population	
Manicaland	3 339,4	132,0	4,0	136,0	24,5
Mashonaland North	5 916,9	312,2	7,0	319,2	18,5
Mashonaland South	5 731,8	204,6	8,8	213,4	26,9
Matebeleland North	3 158,4	44,6	2,3	46,9	67,4
Matebeleland South	8 407,5	55,5	2,6	58,1	144,7
Midlands	5 431,6	83,4	3,3	86,7	62,7
Victoria	6 582,1	96,1	2,3	98,4	66,9
TOTAL	38 567,7	928,4	30,3	958,7	40,2

SOURCE
Census of Population (1969: Tables 1-5).

TABLE 20
EUROPEAN RURAL LAND AND RURAL POPULATION
BY PROVINCE, 1976 ESTIMATES

Province	Land Area in '000s Acres	Estimated Population '000s	Density Acres Per Person
Manicaland	3 339,4	159,1	20,9
Mashonaland North	5 916,9	373,5	15,8
Mashonaland South	5 731,8	249,7	22,9
Matebeleland North	3 158,4	54,8	57,6
Matebeleland South	8 407,5	68,1	123,5
Midlands	5 431,6	100,6	54,0
Victoria	6 582,1	115,2	57,1
TOTAL	38 567,7	1 121,0	34,4

SOURCE

Table 19, above and *Monthly Digest of Statistics Supplement, April 1977*,
Table 6.

NOTE

The estimates assume that the ratio of Europeans to European Employees has
remained at 5,4:1 and Africans to African Employees has remained at 3,1:1 as
in the 1969 Census data.

TABLE 21

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS BY PROVINCE, EUROPEAN LAND 1976

Province	FARMS		Total ¹ Acreage '000s	Percent Acreage	Average Acreage per farm	Average No. ² of Workers per farm
	Number	Percent				
Manicaland	1 016	15	3 105,6	9	3 057	45,0
Mashonaland North	1 442	21	5 293,9	15	3 671	59,8
Mashonaland South	1 853	28	5 139,6	14	2 774	36,0
Matabeleland	1 061	16	10 814,0	30	10 193	20,4
Midlands	896	13	5 665,5	16	6 323	17,2
Victoria	414	7	5 643,8	16	13 632	65,6
TOTAL	6 682	100	35 662,4	100	5 337	39,7

SOURCE

Crop Production in European Areas, 1976, C.S.O. Salisbury, S/AG/07, 1977, Table 5.

NOTES

¹ Total farm acreage for 1976 is some 2,9m acres less than the total acreage for the whole European rural area.

² These figures are taken for the year 1971; *Agricultural Production in European Areas, 1971, C.S.O. Salisbury.*

TABLE 22

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS BY SIZE AND PROVINCE, EUROPEAN LAND 1976

Farm Size in Acres	MANICALAND		MASHONALAND NORTH		MASHONALAND SOUTH		MATEBELELAND		MIDLANDS		VICTORIA		TOTAL	
	Farms	(%)	Farms	(%)	Farms	(%)	Farms	(%)	Farms	(%)	Farms	(%)	Farms	(%)
1-1 000	469	46	140	10	699	38	411	39	265	30	122	29	2 106	32
1 000-5 000	379	37	994	69	865	47	271	26	310	35	99	24	2 918	44
5 000-15 000	136	14	278	19	247	13	203	19	230	25	95	23	1 189	17
Over 15 000	32	3	30	2	42	2	176	17	91	10	98	23	469	7
TOTAL	1 016	100	1 442	100	1 853	100	1 061	100	896	100	414	100	6 682	100

SOURCE

Crop Production in European Areas 1976, C.S.O. Salisbury, S/AG/07, 1977, Table 5.

TABLE 23

DISTRIBUTION OF ACREAGE OF FARMS BY SIZE AND
PROVINCE, EUROPEAN LAND, 1976 ('000s Acres)

Farm Size in Acres	MANICALAND		MASHONALAND NORTH		MASHONALAND SOUTH		MATEBELELAND		MIDLANDS		VICTORIA		TOTAL	
	Acres	(%)	Acres	(%)	Acres	(%)	Acres	(%)	Acres	(%)	Acres	(%)	Acres	(%)
0-1 000	147,1	5	67,1	1	215,6	4	120,9	1	89,3	1	49,8	1	689,8	2
1 000-5 000	967,5	31	2 513,3	47	2 150,9	42	713,2	7	849,9	15	270,2	5	7 465,0	21
5 000-15 000	1 072,9	35	2 053,3	39	1 886,1	37	1 755,6	16	2 015,0	14	797,0	14	9 579,9	27
Over 15 000	918,1	29	660,2	13	891,9	17	8 224,2	76	2 711,2	48	4 526,7	80	7 932,4	50
TOTALS	3 105,6	100	5 293,9	100	5 144,5	100	10 814,0	100	5 665,4	100	5 643,7	100	35 667,1	100

SOURCE

Crop Production in European Areas 1976, C.S.O. Salisbury, S/AG/07, 1977, Table 5.

TABLE 24

AREA UNDER CROPS, FARMS IN THE EUROPEAN AREA 1976

Province	Number of Farms	Number With Land Under Crops	Percent	Total Area Under Crops '000s Acres		Percent of Total ¹ Area of European Land under Crops
				Area	(%)	
Manicaland	1 012	557	55	98,4	6,9	3,2
Mashonaland North	1 442	1 317	91	609,1	42,9	11,5
Mashonaland South	1 853	1 391	75	438,3	30,8	8,5
Matebeleland	1 061	428	40	39,7	2,8	0,4
Midlands	896	443	49	97,4	6,9	1,7
Victoria	414	235	57	137,1	9,7	2,4
TOTAL	6 682	4 371	65	1 420,0	100,0	4,0

SOURCE

Crop Production in European Areas 1976, C.S.O., Salisbury, S/AG/07, 1977, Tables 5 and 6.

NOTES

¹ This figure is a percentage of the total farm area in each Province: column 4 of this Table divided by column 3 of Table 21.

TABLE 25

AREA UNDER CROPS BY FARM SIZE
EUROPEAN RURAL AREA 1976

Acres Under Crops Per Farm in Acres	Number of Farms	Percent of Farms	Total Area Under Crops '000s Acres	Percent of Acreage Under Crops
0-75	1 237	28	32.4	2.3
76-1 250	2 995	68	1 018.6	71.7
Over 1 250	139	4	369.0	26.0
TOTALS	4 371	100	1 420.0	100.0

SOURCE

Crop Production in European Areas 1976, C.S.O. Salisbury, S/AG/07, 1977, Table 6.

ii. The Agricultural Potential of European Farmland

There are two inter-related questions arising from these data that need to be asked: firstly, does the present farming system in the European areas make the best possible use of the land and, secondly, is the land that is being used at present being farmed on the most economically efficient way? Given the rapid deterioration of the land in the African areas, it would appear that a very highly efficient and profitable farming system in the European areas could provide the only justification for maintaining the present agricultural structure. But from the evidence available, in spite of impressive results on some farms, the majority of farms seem to be economically inefficient and much of the land in the European rural areas remains either unused or seriously underutilised.

The total land area set aside for European farming under the Land Tenure Act totals 38.5m acres, but in 1976 only 35.5m acres were classified as existing farmland, thus some 3m acres are not being used. This may partly be explained by the poor quality of the soil but it is also apparent that much land which could be farmed is not being used. In 1968 there were 8 716 European farms, some 30 percent more than the 1976 total. The decrease in the number of farms over the past eight years could be partly explained by adjacent farms being joined together to form larger units, and this has occurred in recent years.⁵¹ But this does not provide a total explanation. Between 1975 and 1976, for example, the number of farms decreased by 137, from 6 819 to 6 681 and the total number of acres farmed decreased by over one million acres — a decrease of nearly 3 percent of the total area. And between January 1976 and March 1977 a net loss of 95 European farmers was recorded.⁵²

Since the war began to escalate in 1974, there have been a number of reports of farms being abandoned, but even before this time a significant proportion of European land has officially been reported as lying unused. In 1970 some 618 000 acres of European farming land was owned but unused.⁵³ Comprehensive statistics for unoccupied farms are not available, but in South-West Matbeleland it was reported in 1973 that 102 out of 368 farms (28 percent) were either unoccupied or used only for residential purposes.⁵⁴ At least 150 000 acres of farming land lies unused in that part of the country. Finally in the first three months of last year at least 24 000 acres of white farmland has had to be sold because the farms had been liquidated.⁵⁵ Thus, while national figures are not available, the evidence suggests that the amount of unused land is considerable and is increasing.

The second question we posed is how far the land which is being used is being farmed efficiently. In 1976 1.42m acres of European farmland were under crops. In 1974 the area under crops was 1.52m acres, so in the two year period there was a drop of 7 percent in cropping acreage. But a more important comparison to be made is between the present area under cultivation and the potential arable land in the European area. It has been estimated that approximately 9m acres of European farming land can be categorised as Potential Arable Land, so in 1976 only some 15 percent of the potential arable land was being cultivated. This shows a serious under-utilisation of the land. Table 26 shows the extent of potential arable land in the European area by Natural Region. These figures assume that no land in Regions IV and V is cultivated. But in practice this is not the case. For example, in Gwanda and Nuanetsi over 1 000 acres of European land are at present under dryland crops.⁵⁶ What this means

is that the under-utilisation of arable land is even greater than the figures suggest.

TABLE 26
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL ARABLE LAND,
EUROPEAN AREAS 1977¹

Natural Region	Total Area ² '000s Acres	Potential Arable ³ Land, '000s Acres	Percentage Potential Arable
I.	1 235,0	170,0	14
II	13 987,0	6 355,0	45
III	10 790,0	2 903,0	27
TOTALS	26 012,0	9 428,0	36

SOURCE

Vincent and Thomas (1960:110-112)

NOTES

¹ Vincent and Thomas define arable land as only lying in Regions I-III; thus the figure of 36 percent potentially arable for all regions excludes, by definition, regions IV, V and X.

² These figures include what is now defined as National Land, as well as European farming land. However, by far the greatest percentage of potential arable land lies within the European farming land.

³ The estimates given here include the area in each Region covered by vleis. See Vincent and Thomas (1960:100) for the assumptions upon which these lands can be included under the definition of Potentially Arable Land.

The under-utilisation of arable land can be illustrated by two examples. The Salisbury South Intensive Conservation Area (ICA) lies wholly within Natural Region II and some 40 percent of the land is classified as potentially arable.⁵⁷ In the 1973-74 cropping season, out of 14 400 acres of land only 677 acres or 4,7 percent of the area were under crops.⁵⁸

The Mazoe Valley area, 15 miles North of Salisbury, is one of the most productive cropping regions of the country. With a well developed supporting infrastructure, it is considered to be one of the most efficient European farming areas. In 1971 the area accounted for 23 percent of the total area under crops in the whole European farming sector. Yet even here the land is under-utilised. The average potential area of arable land in the region is 38 percent of

the total, rising to 79 percent in some parts. But in the 1970-71 season, the acreage under crops and lying fallow (i.e. arable land *per se*) amounted to only 23,3 percent of the total area. And of this amount, between one quarter and two-thirds were lying fallow on particular farms.⁵⁹

To estimate the efficient use of the grazing area is more problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, a large proportion of the potential arable land is being used for livestock production and this tends to over-estimate the overall efficiency of livestock production in relation to the country's total agricultural potential. Secondly, Vincent and Thomas' calculations of the carrying capacity of the European areas assumed typical dryland conditions, whereas in practice cattle are given supplementary feed and so a strict comparison with their recommended carrying capacity of the land is not possible. Finally there is considerable debate at present over what exactly is the correct carrying capacity of ranching land; for example it is argued by Savory that the efficient use of ranching land demands twice the 'recommended' carrying capacity with more intensive short-term grazing.⁶⁰ In spite of these difficulties some estimates can be made of the efficiency of present livestock production in the European areas; in general it appears that livestock production utilises potential grazing land more efficiently than crop production does the potential arable land.

Table 27 shows the numbers of livestock held in the European areas in June 1976. From 1966 to 1976 the cattle population increased by 67 percent from 1,75m to 2,93m head of cattle. (In contrast the area under crops increased by only 28 percent in the same period.)

TABLE 27
NUMBERS OF LIVESTOCK HELD
IN THE EUROPEAN AREAS — June 1976

Livestock Type ¹	Numbers in '000s
Beef Cattle	2 805
Dairy Cattle	126
All Cattle	2 931
Sheep	211
Pigs	111
Equines	10
Goats	40

SOURCE

Monthly Digest of Statistics Supplement, April 1977, Table 19.

NOTES

¹ These figures include African-owned livestock held in the European Areas. In 1976 these are: cattle — 29 000; sheep — 3 000; pigs — 1 500 and goats — 14 000.

Vincent and Thomas estimated that the potential carrying capacity (defined as the production possible on a year-round grazing basis without supplementary feeding) for the European area is approximately 2m head of cattle. The carrying capacity by Natural Region is shown in Table 28. These figures include the National Area as well as the European farming land so, taking into account the quality of the land, they probably over-estimate the potential in the European area by some 20 percent. If the unused potential arable land is included in these estimates, then the potential cattle population would increase to 2,7m, which is some 300 000 head of cattle less than the present cattle population. It thus appears that the grazing land is, on average, making efficient use of the land.

But the carrying capacity is much greater than this figure suggests. Vincent and Thomas distinguish between the *potential for animal production* and the *potential from grazing land*. When the use is made of animal feed then, argue Vincent and Thomas, the carrying capacity can be increased dramatically; in Regions I, and II and III for example the carrying capacity can be increased *threefold*.⁶¹ If one also accepts Savory's assumptions that the carrying capacity of the lower rainfall areas can be doubled under the better management and the intensive use of small grazing areas for short periods of time, then the potential carrying capacity of the European grazing areas would be near to 6,9m head of cattle. This would mean that almost double the present cattle population could be safely carried on the land. In practice there is no doubt that European livestock production is inefficient.⁶²

TABLE 28

ESTIMATED POTENTIAL GRAZING LAND
AND CARRYING CAPACITY IN EUROPEAN RURAL LAND
— VINCENT AND THOMAS ASSUMPTIONS

Natural Region	Potential Grazing Land '000s Acres	Average Carrying Capacity Acres/Head	Total Potential Carrying Capacity '000s
I	895,0	7	127,8
II	3 667,0	10	366,7
III	5 123,0	16	320,2
IV	16 032,0	21	763,4
V	11 417,0	30	380,6
TOTAL	37 134,0		1 958,7

SOURCE
Vincent and Thomas (1960:110).

NOTE
Potential Arable Land has been subtracted and excluded from the Potential Grazing Area.

This does not mean, of course, that in all areas the number of livestock units could automatically be increased. Indeed one of the characteristics of livestock production in the European areas is the serious mismanagement and overstocking of parts of the land and this is leading to the destruction of the veld in some areas of the country.⁶³ This seems to have led to a shift away from the lower rainfall areas in recent years. Whereas 58 percent of the potential carrying capacity of the European areas is found in Natural Regions IV and V there has in recent years been a shift in the beef herd to the higher rainfall areas. By 1971, 50 percent of the national herd was held in the higher rainfall areas.⁶⁴ In general the economics of ranching and land use is a complex issue. One current problem in Matebeleland is that a large proportion of ranches (between 66 and 76 percent) carry too few livestock units for their enterprises to be economic, while other ranches are so big that they are mismanaged and land is being misused and the natural resources are deteriorating.⁶⁵

We now move away from considering the utilisation of the land to the question of land use and farm profitability. The profitability of European agriculture depends upon a wide range of factors including the type of land, the size of farms in different Agro-Ecological Regions, the costs of inputs, the degree of capitalisation, the marketing system and the price of agricultural products. It is not the purpose of the present section to give a comprehensive analysis of European agriculture, but to attempt to find what relation there is between farm size and profitability within the present economic structure.

It would appear at first sight that the wide range of farm size within the same Natural Regions would not be conducive of the most efficient use of the land. This observation tends to be supported by the fact that there is an enormous range of profitability in the European agricultural sector. If profitability can be taken as a guide to economic efficiency then the *majority* of European farms are inefficient. In 1976, some 60 percent of all farms did not have incomes high enough for them to qualify for income tax payments. Further, of those farms that did pay income tax there was a wide range of incomes obtained from farming. Table 29 shows the Farm and Income Tax distribution from 1976 and Table 30 shows the income distribution of those farms which did pay income tax.

TABLE 29

FARM AND INCOME TAX DISTRIBUTION, 1976

Category	Number of Farms	Percent
Self Employed Farmers paying Income Tax	1 772	26
Companies Paying Income Tax	887	14
Farms Paying no Income Tax	4 023	60
TOTAL	6 682	100

SOURCE
Rhodesia, Income Tax Statistics (1976: Tables 3 and 10).

TABLE 30

FARM TAX PAYERS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION — 1976

Size of Taxable Income (\$)	Number ¹ of Farms	Percent of Farms	Size of Taxable income \$'000s	Percent of Taxable Income
Less than 6 000	817	31	2 968,0	5
6 001-30 000	1 515	57	21 985,0	38
Over 30 000	327	12	33 106,0	67
TOTALS	2 659	100	58 059,0	100

SOURCE

Rhodesia, Income Tax Statistics (1976: Tables 3, 4, 10 and 11).

NOTE

¹ These are, of course, only those farms which pay tax and they exclude 60 percent of all farms. See Table 29.

The incomes of the 4 023 farms which did not pay income tax is not known. However, if one assumes that all these farms have incomes lower than \$6 000 a year then the production equivalents (value added) by numbers of farms for 1976, given in Table 31, shows that 72 percent of all farms contributed only 21 percent of the total value added and 5 percent of the farms, only 327 farms in all, were responsible for nearly 50 percent of the total value added for the year.

While it is not known how far the production and profitability of farms is related to the size of holdings, there is a striking consistency between overall farm size, production equivalent and land area. This is shown in Table 32. These figures do tend to support the view that smaller farms do contribute proportionately less to total production and that production is positively correlated with the size of farm. If this is true then, as 60 percent of farms do not pay income tax and are consequently not profitable enterprises, a high proportion of non-profitable farms are likely to be the small farms: farms under 5 000 acres. Of course even this generalisation has to be treated with caution because the whole range of farms are included in these figures and the most efficient size of farm for livestock, crop, sugar, citrus, tea and coffee production is likely to be very different. Yet the available evidence does not contradict the view that the small crop and livestock farms are the least profitable farms and they make the least efficient use of the land.⁶⁶

The income tax figures, which suggest a high degree of inefficiency on many farms, are supported by other evidence. Large amounts of money have been paid out to the European farming sector in the form of subsidies, support

TABLE 31

ESTIMATES OF PRODUCTION EQUIVALENTS
EUROPEAN FARMS, 1976

Taxable Income (\$)	Number of Farms	Percent of Farms	Production ¹ Equivalent (\$m.)	Percent of Production Equivalent
Less than ² 6 000	4 840	72	48,3	21
6 001-30 000	1 515	23	70,8	31
Over 30 000	327	5	106,6	48
TOTAL	6 682	100	226,3	100

SOURCE

Table 30, above, *Monthly Digest of Statistics Supplement*, April 1977, Table 13.

NOTES

¹ Value added.

² It has been assumed here that the 4 023 farms paying no income tax have an average income of \$3 000.

TABLE 32

FARM SIZE, PRODUCTION EQUIVALENTS
AND LAND AREA, EUROPEAN FARMS, 1976

Percentage of Farms	Percentage of Production Equivalent	Percentage of Farms	Percentage of Total European Farm Area
72	21	76	23
23	31	17	27
5	48	7	50
100	100	100	100

SOURCE

Tables 22, 23 and 31 above.

and assistance and a proportion of this money has almost certainly helped to maintain the inefficient farmers on the land. Between 1969/70 and 1976/77, \$138,2m were paid out in subsidies, losses and assistance. About \$91,1m of this (61 percent) has been used to support the tobacco industry because of the particular problem it has had to face under economic sanctions.⁶⁷ But one cannot assume that those tobacco farmers receiving assistance are making efficient use of their land and would in normal circumstances require no government aid. Indeed on the evidence of tobacco yields per acre in the 1975/76 season, only 30 percent of all tobacco growers could be said to be making maximum use of their land.⁶⁸ Thus one is led to conclude that inefficient farmers are being supported by government subsidies.⁶⁹

Another indication of economic inefficiency in white agriculture is the growing dependence in recent years on short term credit. But this increase in credit for farmers has not led to a proportionate increase in gross production. As Table 33 shows, the amount of credit going into European agriculture increased by 67 percent from 1972 to 1976, but the proportion of gross production to credit declined from 3,21 to 3,09 over the same period.

TABLE 33

GROSS PRODUCTION AND CREDIT
EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE, 1972 and 1976

Year	Gross Production \$m	Credit \$m	Gross Production per Dollar Credit
1972	233,9	72,9	3,21
1976	376,1	121,4	3,09

SOURCE

Monthly Digest of Statistics Supplement, April 1977, Tables 17 and 20.

This dependence upon short-term credit and its importance for the survival of many white farms was brought to the attention of the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources during the recent debate on the Land Tenure Amendment Act. Mr. Sandeman remarked that 'The Minister being both a farmer and also an accountant will know that European ownership of land is to a large extent conditional upon facilities from the Agricultural Finance Corporation'.⁷⁰ Between 1972/73 and 1976/7 government spent \$39,5m on agricultural loan and debt appropriation, of which \$15,4m went to the Agricultural Finance Corporation. What is more, in the same period, the 'loss to the exchequer in respect of previous interest-free loans' amounted to \$18,5m.⁷¹ This is further evidence that government assistance is needed and European farmers do, in part, depend upon subsidies.

Another 'subsidy' on which European agriculture depends is the low level of wages paid to African agricultural employees on white farms. In June 1976, 236 669 African workers in the European agricultural sector received cash wages of less than \$30,00 a month. In early 1974 the PDL income for a family of six on a European farm was over \$40,00 a month. From this evidence alone it appears that a very high number of workers receive a wage less than the income required by such a family to purchase its basic needs. This payment of low wages helps to maintain inefficient farmers on the land and so contributes (indirectly) to the inefficient use of the land.

The Report of Farm Management Data supports the view that small farms are in general unprofitable, but the evidence also suggest that the most profitable farms are not necessarily the very large ones. As Table 34 shows, the average acreage of the top third farms is lower than the average acreage for those farms in the middle-profit range. Yet the bottom third, with an average of 4 720 acres, had a profit of only \$621 each for the year and only managed to make a profit of 13c an acre.

TABLE 34

PROFIT LEVELS ON EUROPEAN FARMS
1974

Item	Top Third of Farms	Middle Third of Farms	Bottom Third of Farms
Net Profit \$	24 624	8 413	621
Average Size, Acres	6 239	7 405	4 720
Profit, \$ per Acre	3,90	1,14	0,13

SOURCE

Ellis-Jones (1975:66).

A final example of the inefficiencies within European agriculture comes from a recent agro-economic investigation of beef production in Matebeleland and Midlands Provinces. This maintained that between 40 and 60 percent of all beef farms in the area were non-viable. In a sample survey in the areas it was found that 20 percent of all respondents had incomes of less than \$1 500 a year and 48 percent had incomes of less than \$4 000 a year.⁷² In North Matebeleland it was estimated that at least 800 livestock units are needed for beef ranches to be economically viable; yet only 110 out of 455, or 24 percent could be considered viable on these criteria.⁷³

The lack of precise data makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the land-use efficiency of European owned farms and the use made of the land in the European rural areas, but a number of observations can be made. There is no doubt that a significant and growing area of agricultural land is not be-

ing used at all. There is strong evidence to suggest that the vast majority of potentially arable land is not being cultivated, so indicating serious under-utilisation of the arable land. There is some evidence to suggest that the European land is under-stocked and it is clear that a good number of cattle ranches are run poorly enough to be leading to a destruction of the veld.

There is conclusive evidence to show that the majority of European farms are not profitable and that the 'profits' of the bottom one third of farms are very low. These farms are allowed to continue through a number of direct and indirect state subsidies. Finally it appears that the majority of farms which are subsidized and are responsible for the under-utilisation of the land are the smaller farms. Thus it seems that the smaller crop-producing farms and the smaller livestock farms (the latter will have larger average acreages than the former) make the least efficient use of the land and can only continue to exist through receiving continual support.

iii. Land Ownership

European agricultural land can be purchased on a freehold basis and at present farms are owned by both individuals and companies. In recent years many individual-owned farms have been formed into companies, chiefly for tax purposes, and in some cases smaller individual farms have been joined together to form large complexes. There are, then, both large and small individually-owned farms and large and small company-owned farms and the distinction between individuals and companies does not necessarily describe any difference in type of farm, pattern of land use or degree of capitalisation.

In relation to the distribution of ownership, however, there does appear to be a higher proportion of individually-owned farms than company-owned farms. In 1976 67 percent of all agricultural tax-payers were individual farmers and 33 percent were companies. As the majority of those not paying tax are almost certainly small individually-owned farms, it seems likely that well over 70 percent of all farms are owned by individuals rather than by companies.

A distinction does need to be made, though, between those individuals who farm their own land and those who own farms but who either leave the land unused or who are absentee landlords and hand the running of the farm over to farm managers. In 1965, 72 percent of all farms were under the control of owner-occupiers, 16 percent were under lessees and 12 percent were managed farms.⁷⁴ Since then it appears that, at least in the lower rainfall areas of the country, absentee landlords have become even more significant, controlling between 30 and 70 percent of all farms in these districts. In 1974 it was reported in parliament that 70 percent of all landowners were absent from their farms in the Plumtree district and these absentee owners controlled some 33 percent of the land. In Marula 60 percent were absent and they controlled 37 percent of the land in the district.⁷⁵ These figures are confirmed by the Agricultural Development Authority's survey of South-West Matebeleland which reported that 'a very large area of land was falling into the control of absentee landlords'.⁷⁶ A similar survey in Matebeleland North reported that out of 455 farms 162 (35 percent) of farm owners were non-resident while 160 owners had sources of income outside agriculture.⁷⁷ In some of these cases land was left unused, in others the farms were managed for the absentee owners. Owners of Rhodesian farms not only live away from their property, they also live outside the coun-

try. Rhodesian farmowners live as far away as South Africa, Britain and Switzerland.

While it was stated above that the ownership of farms does not in general indicate the size of farming operations, there is an exception in that a very small number of very large companies, both local and foreign owned, do play a highly significant part in total European agricultural production. 271 farming concerns, 78 companies and 193 individuals, together contributed 52 percent of total taxable income in 1976. But of greater significance was that the top 11 companies on their own were responsible for 29 percent of total taxable income.⁷⁸ And the top 30 companies had taxable incomes of over \$100 000 each. In comparison the largest individual incomes came from 46 farmers who had on average incomes of just over \$50 000 each.⁷⁹

Of the top companies in the European agricultural sector, foreign-owned companies are more significant in terms of their contribution to total output than local firms. In 1963, foreign companies in agrarian production accounted for 75 percent of the gross profits of companies involved in farming and 61 percent of gross capital formation. And at that time South African companies accounted for 88 percent of foreign profits.⁸⁰ Since then foreign companies have continued to invest in their Rhodesian subsidiaries and to earn large profits.⁸¹ Foreign companies involved in Rhodesian agriculture include Anglo-American, Liebig's, Lonhro and Hulletts Corporation and the larger local interests include Thomas Meikle Trust and Investment Company and T.A. Holdings.⁸² These large companies have almost total control of sugar production and the larger citrus estates and major interests in tea, forestry and cattle ranching. Furthermore in all these areas their interests lie not only in farming but also in large-scale agricultural processing.

iv. Land Values

The value of farming land in a capitalist economy depends largely on the following factors: the quality of the land, the proximity of the land to infrastructural services and markets, access to water, the extent of capitalisation, interest rates, the price of inputs, product prices and future expectations.

In Rhodesia it is difficult to talk of a 'competitive market price' for European agricultural land because of the wide range of institutional influences which have both historically and at the present time affected land values. In the first place the European agricultural sector has been artificially created through dividing rural land into African and European areas. Since the 1930s large areas of land in the European areas have remained unused while land in the African areas has become increasingly over-used and over-populated. Thus the price of land in the European areas, while it may reflect the 'demand' for land in the economic sense, does not reflect the 'demands' which the African population have for land. And even this demand-price correlation may be questioned. To encourage land settlement in the European rural areas, a wide range of grants and loan schemes have been offered for land to prospective European farmers on very easy financial terms. The increased proportion of 'institutional indebtedness' observable in recent years points to the continual state support needed to maintain many people on the land and this has helped to maintain the price of land.⁸³ Further, as we have seen, some 60 percent of all farms have too low an income for them to have to pay income tax. The assistance given to many of these farmers directly contributes to their remaining on

TABLE 35

EUROPEAN FARM SALES AS RECORDED IN PROPERTY & FINANCE, 1976-1977

Province	Number of Farms	Total Area '000s Ha.	Total Price \$'000s	Average Area, Hectares	Average Price, \$	Average Price per Hectare
Manicaland	12	15 069	351,4	1 256	29 283	23,3
Mashonaland North	21	24 332	850,6	1 159	40 505	35,0
Mashonaland South	22	15 400	790,7	700	35 940	51,3
Matabeleland North	10	15 279	456,9	1 528	45 690	29,9
Matabeleland South	5	6 302	142,3	1 260	28 460	22,6
Midlands	12	15 533	340,1	1 294	28 342	21,8
Victoria	5	6 786	161,9	1 357	32 380	23,8
TOTALS	87	98 701	3 093,9	1 135	35 562	31,3

SOURCE

Property and Finance, Salisbury, June, September, October, November, 1976 and January, February and March 1977.

the land and this significantly influences the price of land. Another factor is the present tax structure which encourages people to use land as a collateral for other business enterprises and does not penalise land owners from leaving their land unused. The overall non-competitiveness of land prices (and hence their interest to land speculators) is indicated by the fact that in the post-1965 period land values have risen at a time when recorded profits have been under pressure.⁸⁴ Finally in recent years there have been increased pressures from government to keep Europeans on the land for political and strategic as well as economic reasons. For example intending emigrants are now only allowed to take out of the country a very small amount of money; this makes it financially difficult for people to sell their farms and contributes to the maintenance of the present price of land. For all these reasons it is apparent that the price of land in the European rural areas is significantly effected by important institutional influences.

Nevertheless, there is a land market for European farming land, farms are bought and sold and the price of the land almost certainly does reflect the relative value of different pieces of land. In 1975 the average price of land per hectare was \$34,13. Table 35 gives the details of farm sales by Province in recent months. The average price for a farm of 1 135 hectares (2 803 acres) was \$35 562 or \$31,3 a hectare (\$12,5 an acre). This is some \$3 per hectare lower than the 1975 price and in the three months January to March 1977 the average price per hectare has fallen to \$28,9. Thus it is apparent that in recent months there has been an observable downward trend in average land price. From Table 35 it can be seen that the price per hectare tends to be higher in the relatively more fertile land of Mashonaland. The higher values recorded in Mashonaland South are due chiefly to the relatively large number of small properties sold in the time period, some six units under 100 hectares, where the price tends to reflect the value of farm buildings etc. as much as the price of the land *per se*. The larger farms in Mashonaland South have been sold for a lower average price per hectare; for example in January 1977 a farm of 6 965 hectares was sold for \$144 000, approximately \$21 per hectare.

The total land area covered by the 6 682 farms presently occupied in the European rural areas is 35,67m acres. With an average price from January to March 1977 of \$28,9 per hectare or \$11,7 an acre, the total present value of land is approximately \$396m.

NOTES, CHAPTER III

- ¹ Kay (1970:13).
- ² Kay (1970:18).
- ³ Phillips (1962).
- ⁴ Vincent and Thomas (1960).
- ⁵ A new ecological map has been completed by the Department of Conservation and Extension, updating Vincent and Thomas' work. This is not yet widely available, but the main change appears to be an increase in area categorised as Regions IV and V. See statement by the Minister of Agriculture in parliament. *Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly*, Vol. 94, No. 14, Col. 1379, 25th August 1976.
- ⁶ Vincent and Thomas (1960:40).
- ⁷ Vincent and Thomas (1960:41).
- ⁸ It appears that the new ecological study will indicate an even greater proportion of the country should be reserved for livestock production. See note 5.
- ⁹ Vincent and Thomas (1960:43).
- ¹⁰ This figure of 5,6m does not include those Africans living outside the rural areas but still dependent to a greater or lesser extent on agriculture. This category would include those people who are currently working in town and who will return to the TTLs at the end of their working life.
- ¹¹ Ellis-Jones (1975:11).
- ¹² Quoted in Bulman (1971:11).
- ¹³ Quoted in Dunlop in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1972:4).
- ¹⁴ It may happen that with the new ecological map slightly different results would be achieved, but these would probably indicate even larger acreages for each Standard Unit in each area.
- ¹⁵ Bulman (1971:9-14).
- ¹⁶ Yudelman (1964:127-128).
- ¹⁷ Barnes and Clatworthy in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1976:271).
- ¹⁸ Grant in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1976:254).
- ¹⁹ Kay (1970:86).
- ²⁰ Dunlop in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1972:8).
- ²¹ Stubbs (1977:1).
- ²² Plowes in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1976:244).
- ²³ Plowes in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1976:244).
- ²⁴ Floyd (1959:149-167).
- ²⁵ Johnson (1968:121-135).
- ²⁶ Weinrich (1972:8-9).
- ²⁷ Plowes in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1976:246).
- ²⁸ Plowes in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1976:246).
- ²⁹ Survey conducted by the Principle Agricultural Extension Officer, Ministry of Internal Affairs, quoted in *The Rhodesian Farmer*, 4th March 1977 and Yudelman (1964:86).
- ³⁰ Weinrich (1975:83).

- ³¹ Floyd (1959:153-155).
- ³² Le Roux in *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal* (1966:84).
- ³³ Yudelman (1964:86).
- ³⁴ Hunt (1969:13).
- ³⁵ Weinrich (1975:298).
- ³⁶ See Ellis-Jones (1975:43).
- ³⁷ Cross (1977:5-6).
- ³⁸ According to Chief Mtekedza it is far from uncommon in tribal areas for money to pass hands during land transactions. Interview 7th June 1977.
- ³⁹ Hughes (1973:224).
- ⁴⁰ Hughes (1973:224).
- ⁴¹ Hughes (1973:229).
- ⁴² Report on the Agricultural and Extension Situation in African Purchase Land Areas of Rhodesia, (Report 1977:9).
- ⁴³ Report (1977:9).
- ⁴⁴ Report (1977:5).
- ⁴⁵ Report (1977:14).
- ⁴⁶ Weinrich (1972:3-13).
- ⁴⁷ Report (1977:6).
- ⁴⁸ Cheater (1974:10).
- ⁴⁹ *Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, Supplement, April 1977*, Table 16.
- ⁵⁰ In August 1976, it was stated in parliament that out of 1 050 registered farms in Matebeleland, there are 500 farms over 16 000 acres and 150 less than 1 500 acres. *Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly*, Vol. 94, No. 14, Col. 1362, 25th August 1976.
- ⁵¹ For example A. Firs (Pvt) Ltd has bought a number of neighbouring farms in the Umvukwes/Mazoe District.
- ⁵² *Rhodesia, Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics For March 1977*, C.S.O. Salisbury, 1977, Table 11.
- ⁵³ *Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary For Agriculture For the Period 1st October 1969 to 30th September 1970*, RR 5-1971, p. 8. In 1969 1,6m acres of European general land was unalienated. See *Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Lands 1969*, Cmd RR 3-1970, p. 1.
- ⁵⁴ Agricultural Development Authority (1972:2). In 1976 in the whole of Matebeleland, 370 farms out of 1 050 were said to be vacant and 254 farms to be owned by 'non-resident farmers who probably go out at the weekend'. *Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly*, Vol. 94, No. 14, Col. 1362, 25th August 1976.
- ⁵⁵ *Property and Finance*, January-March 1977.
- ⁵⁶ Walker in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1975:192).
- ⁵⁷ Vincent and Thomas (1960:64).
- ⁵⁸ Ellis-Jones (1975:72).
- ⁵⁹ Davies in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1974:149-155, 1976:61-69).
- ⁶⁰ Savory (1967).

⁶¹ Vincent and Thomas (1960:108).

⁶² The chairman of the RNFU stated in 1976 that cattle production in Matebeleland could go up by 35 percent if all the land were used and a recent Agricultural Marketing Authority study showed that production for the European agricultural sector could be increased theoretically by 15 percent if known production technology were applied more generally. *Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly*, Vol. 94, No. 14, Col. 1362, 25th August 1976.

⁶³ Agricultural Development Authority (1972:32).

⁶⁴ In 1965, 60 percent of the beef herd was held in the lower rainfall areas. Cross in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1971:21).

⁶⁵ Agricultural Development Authority (1973:58).

⁶⁶ Profitable farming does of course depend upon the other factors besides size of land, such as capitalisation and management abilities. It does seem, though, that smaller farms are less efficiently managed and proportionately less capitalised than larger farms. See Hullme (1977).

⁶⁷ Rhodesia, Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General (1968-1976) and Rhodesia Estimates of Expenditure (1971-1976).

⁶⁸ *The Rhodesian Financial Gazette*, 11th June 1976. Results on tobacco farms in the season 1975/76 varied by at least R\$500 per hectare return. Mr. de Kock stated in parliament, 'I believe that it is in the interests of this country for us in the farming field to try to increase our productivity and so to lessen the need for these huge subsidies. I do not believe in the times in which we live that this country can possibly continue to afford this very high subsidization of certain crops'. *Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly*, Vol. 94, No. 14, Col. 1393, 25th August 1976.

⁶⁹ The figures for subsidies losses and assistance do include some African farmers who market their produce, but as European farmers account for 92 percent of marketed produce, these figures almost totally reflect the position within European agriculture. A recent RNFU estimate stated that 30% of farmers on their books are insolvent. See *Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly*, Vol. 96, No. 10, Col. 756, 15th July 1977.

⁷⁰ *Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly*, Vol. 94, No. 18, Col. 1663, 4th March 1977.

⁷¹ Rhodesia, Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General (1968-1976) and Rhodesia, Estimates of Expenditure (1971-76).

⁷² Bembridge and Steenkamp in *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal* (1976:30-32).

⁷³ Agricultural Development Authority (1973:58).

⁷⁴ Clarke (1977a:22).

⁷⁵ Clarke (1977a:162).

⁷⁶ Agricultural Development Authority (1972:32).

⁷⁷ Agricultural Development Authority (1973:58). See also note 54.

⁷⁸ Rhodesia Income Tax Statistics (1976: Tables 3, 4, 10 and 11).

⁷⁹ Rhodesia Income Tax Statistics (1976: Tables 3 and 4).

⁸⁰ Clarke (1977a:163).

⁸¹ Clarke (1977a:244-253).

⁸² Clarke (1977a:163).

⁸³ Clarke (1977a:161).

⁸⁴ Clarke (1977a:161).

CHAPTER IV

PRESENT PROPOSALS FOR LAND REFORM

There are three basic problems related to land in present-day Rhodesia. The distribution of agricultural land is characterised by the acute and growing inequalities, much of the land that is being farmed is so overused that the large areas are facing ecological disaster and at the same time other areas of good agricultural land lie either unused or severely under-utilised. The prospect of dramatic political change in the country and the growing realisation that the land question will be central to any political settlement have highlighted all these issues in recent months. Suggestions for alternative patterns of land use are being debated and proposals have been put forward by political parties, farming groups and academics. Indeed specific changes have already occurred; with the passing of the Land Tenure Amendment Act in March 1977, commercial farming land is now no longer reserved for the sole use of Europeans.

In this chapter we shall evaluate the various proposals for future land use which are currently being debated inside Rhodesia. As will become clear, these do not entail widespread fundamental change and even the most 'radical' proposals envisage only a partial redistribution of the land. None consider the possibility of a thorough-going agrarian and land reform and they would all lead to a maintenance of the present pattern of capital accumulation, built on cheap labour supplies. As a result they are not likely to lead to any long-term solution to the present problems: inequalities will increase, rural poverty will remain and there is no guarantee that long-term agricultural growth will be maintained.

A. THE PRESENT PROPOSALS

The following groups have all put forward their own proposals for land use and agricultural development, though, as we shall see, some are more completely formulated than others:

- i. white political parties. The Rhodesian Front (RF), The Rhodesian Action Party (RAP), The Rhodesia Party (RP) recently absorbed into the National Unifying Force (NUF).
- ii. aspirant political parties. The United African National Council (UANC), The African National Council Zimbabwe (ANCZ)
- iii. groups with institutional interest. The Rhodesian National Farmers' Union (RNFU), the African Farmers Union of Rhodesia (AFUR) and the Whitsun Foundation (WF).¹

In general, all appear to agree that emphasis should be placed on the continuity of the present agricultural system through preserving the 'capitalist free enterprise economy' characterised by a system of individual tenure and leading to an expansion of the land market.² Differences in these proposals relate to the precise incentives that should be given to the various interest-groups, how best to deal with the immediate population pressure on African land, what to do with the TTLs both immediately and in the longer term and finally the problem of African urban tenure.³

The *Rhodesian Front's* policies for the future of land are, not surprisingly, a

continuation of its present policies. Now that there is no longer any racial restriction on land ownership outside the TTLs, there is equal opportunity for all to buy land and obtain loans to develop their land. Beyond this, the RF has no plans to ensure the more productive use of under-utilised land or to encourage unused land to be farmed; it relies on the market mechanism and present incentives. The RF has no specific employment policies, but it is to be hoped that the expansion of employment opportunities in both the urban industrial and commercial sectors and in a more prosperous agricultural sector will lead to an absorption of potential black employees; for those who are unable to obtain jobs the Tribal areas will continue to provide for their needs. Emphasis is placed on the overall growth of the economy and land policies in particular are designed to ensure as rapid as possible a growth in commercial agriculture. The RF's land strategy is summarised as follows:⁴

Land policies in Rhodesia allow a highly commercial and advanced agricultural system to exist side by side with a system presently developing from a subsistence agriculture to a commercial one, and which guarantees land rights for all to make a contribution to Rhodesia's agricultural economy. There is nothing to prevent black farmers or farming syndicates from obtaining agricultural loan finance in respect of rural land which is open to purchase, on exactly the same basis as their white counterparts obtain financial assistance.

And:

Government's policy is to encourage the owners of land to utilize their properties by ensuring stable marketing conditions for agricultural produce.

The newly-formed *Rhodesia Action Party* has a similar approach to the land question as the RF, with one exception. The RAP rejects any move to liberalise the racial laws in the country and advocates the immediate repeal of the March 1977 LTA amendment. Its land policies are based on the permanent division of land into black and white areas: 'there should be a land base for the white man in which his rights are entrenched and a separate base for the blacks'.⁵ Beyond the racial question it appears to have no quarrels with the present strategy.

The only other white political party to give its view on land is the *Rhodesia Party*. In a brief statement the RP emphasizes that private tenure is essential to give the individual a stake in the country. It approves of the removal of racial restrictions on land ownership believing that land occupation should be based on 'effort, ability and conformity to standards'.⁶ In relation to the TTLs and black urban townships, the RP advocates individual ownership of this land, but no details are given of when or how the present system should be changed. In regard to unused land and land that is not being farmed efficiently, the RP argues that expropriation might prove necessary. But any reasons for land expropriation should be clearly given and a system of individual arbitration should be set up to deal, presumably, with compensation.⁷

The most comprehensive strategy on the future of land has come from the *Rhodesian National Farmers' Union* and the *Whitsun Foundation*. In April 1977 the RNFU published its *Land Policy Objectives: An Antidote to Chaos* in which it argues that the only sound basis for Rhodesia's future prosperity lies

in 'equal opportunity for all within a capitalist free enterprise system'.⁸ Like the RF, the RNFU wishes to ensure that 'such standards and safeguards are retained as will enable agricultural production to flourish unhindered',⁹ and, again like the RF, it strongly objects to any policies which, in attempting to relieve the pressure in the Tribal areas, would lead to an expansion in land reserved for TTL-type subsistence agriculture.¹⁰ Where there is acute land pressure and new land has to be made available for African occupation then, argues the RNFU, 'the land in question must be made available only under conditions of freehold title and in terms of an approved national plan'.¹¹ Whereas the RF believes that current commercial facilities are quite adequate to enable African farmers to settle on unused land and expand production, the RNFU argues that more encouragement should be given to the better African farmers to increase their involvement in commercial agriculture. It advocates extensive funding assistance by government and perhaps the co-operation of external aid schemes if all aspirations are to be met.¹²

In relation to Tribal land, the RNFU believes 'that for the foreseeable future, TTLs have a rightful and proper place in the national order of things for those who remain within the subsistence economy'.¹³ But in the future, 'changes will need to be made because the maintenance of the TTL system is not in accord with the capitalist free enterprise system and it hinders another RNFU objective — ensuring that adequate agricultural land areas are available to all genuine farmers'.¹⁴ It is argued that in the TTLs only 10-15 percent of the people have a 'natural aptitude to be farmers' and that these people should be identified and encouraged to stay on the land. 'People who do not have this aptitude, however, must be equally provided for. They must, as far as possible, be attracted towards a lifestyle based on gainful and satisfying employment in commercial or industrial activity'.¹⁵ In other words all 'those who cannot make the grade as individual farmers under the present system should be removed from agriculture altogether. However, when change comes about to promote this policy it should not be disruptive, rather it should occur in an evolutionary way 'with the benefits fully understood'.¹⁶ Policies should be directed towards creating a system of individual tenure in the TTLs as this is 'absolutely fundamental to the proper preservation of both the economy and the land resources'.¹⁷ To further this end, education of the Tribal Authorities should be undertaken 'as a matter of urgency and on a sustained and systematic basis'.¹⁸ However, the RNFU argues that if farmers do not wish to remove themselves from the orbit of the chiefs then land could be leased either to individuals or to communities.¹⁹

The RNFU's land policies are best seen as a speeding up of those advocated by the RF, but paying particular attention to the emergent African capitalist farmers. These proposals have received support from the 9 000 strong membership of the *African Farmers Union of Rhodesia*, made up chiefly of Purchase Area farmers. The vice-president for crops argued in May that his union 'believes that land is put to most productive use if it is held on a freehold title basis with changes in ownership occurring through normal market disposal within a capitalist free enterprise system'.²⁰

In contrast with the rather narrow agriculturally-based view of future land policies advocated by the RNFU, the *Whitsun Foundation* (WF), (a "non-profit welfare organisation whose objectives are to foster economic development as a means of building a strong, unified and harmonious nation") sees a

future land strategy in the context of a total development strategy. However, its policy-suggestions are not very different from the RNFU scenario.

According to the WF, balanced development calls for a rapid growth of the wage sectors of the economy accompanied by structural measures to fully urbanise the non-agricultural wage-earning population, to secure a full and final transfer of that part of the population off the land. This needs to be carried out together with an increased share of investment being allocated to the Tribal areas and a rational location of urban growth centres.²¹

In relation to land use in particular, Whitsun sees little scope for solving current pressures on the land simply through the allocation of unused land because this constitutes such a small proportion of the total land area.²² Because of the great population pressures in the Tribal areas at present, a resettlement operation will also have to include commercial land which is currently under-utilised. In such a land re-allocation programme, Whitsun argues that the better (African) farmers should be put on the most productive land because it is this group of farmers which would farm the land productively and without resource depletion.²³ Not only should land pressure in the African areas be eased by re-settlement on commercial farming land, but changes should also be made within the TTLs. According to Whitsun, a development programme should be initiated to improve the productivity of the land and this should be accompanied, as soon as possible, by a change to a freehold tenure system in the TTLs.²⁴ This is necessary because the present system restricts 'entrepreneurial initiative and on-farm investment'.²⁵ Thus what is needed is a transformation in the method of land use so as 'to preserve its income potential'.²⁶ Whitsun's overall strategy is based on the attempt to create the most favourable conditions for investment and development throughout agriculture and its policies for both resettlement and the change in tenurial conditions in the TTLs are, so it is believed, the best way to promote rapid growth. For those people who would not qualify for land under this settlement scheme (either because they were poor farmers or because all the land set aside had been fully taken up) or would not be accommodated in the transformed Tribal area, Whitsun suggests that a state-farm scheme should be adopted. Presumably this would only be a temporary measure because, as the economy expands, this surplus population would be absorbed in modern sector employment and the land would be converted into individually-owned farms.²⁷

The Whitsun proposals are based on the assumption that the present capitalist economic structure provides the correct framework for future development.²⁸ Its policies aim first of all to ensure stability and continuity in the economy at a time of possible upheaval and then to increase the efficiency of the private enterprise economy through the extension of individual land ownership to all rural areas. Great emphasis is placed on continuity; when pressures for change occur, as they undoubtedly will, these should be dealt with by social and economic restructuring. The most important restructuring will entail the resettlement of the better African farmers on individual plots in the European rural areas. This will help maintain stability during the transition period (to majority rule). 'If majority rule led to a massive and hysterical land grab by Africans the result would be disastrous for all concerned.'²⁹ In short, like the RNFU's policies, Whitsun's proposals are an "antidote to chaos".

The United African National Council's land policies are little different from those suggested by the RNFU and the WF. In general, the UANC wishes to

maintain Rhodesia's free enterprise capitalist economy in an independent Zimbabwe. Its land policies involve the preservation of privately-owned commercial farms, providing they are run efficiently, the resettlement of Africans on unused and under-utilised land and the extension of the system of individual tenure to the Tribal areas. It would not be part of the UANC's strategy to confiscate or interfere with European farms which are using their land efficiently. To assist the re-allocation of unused and under-utilised European land, the UANC would impose a land tax on all landowners. 'Each landowner would place his own value on his land which would be the basis of the land tax as well as the value of expropriation if the land is required by the state.'³⁰ The unused and expropriated land would be made available for resettlement. Resettlement should be strictly controlled and the land would go to the better African farmers (at least Master Farmers). It would not be given away but farmers would buy the land with the help of a liberal loan policy to enable them to acquire the cash necessary to buy their way into the commercial farming sector.

Like the RNFU and the WF, the UANC would like the TTLs to move towards a system of individual tenure, although it comments that this may well be a long-term evolutionary process. Finally, like Whitsun, the UANC would create a special category of state-owned farms which would be set up to employ people who 'do not want a career in farming or town employment'.³¹

The African National Council, Zimbabwe appears to have a similar strategy to the UANC.³² It would not confiscate commercial farms but would want to use both unused and under-utilised land for resettlement schemes. In general the ANCZ has stated that its ideas broadly coincide with the RNFU scheme.³³ The measure of agreement between the internal nationalist groups and the Whitsun proposals is not surprising as the leaders of both the UANC and the ANCZ have been in consultation with Whitsun over economic strategies for the future and both factions appear receptive to its views.³⁴

B. AN EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT PROPOSALS

i. Introduction and Assumptions

In this section we shall examine the effects that the present proposals for land are likely to have on rural land use, commercial farmers and peasant cultivators and on the growing numbers of landless agricultural workers. The evidence strongly suggests that a development strategy based on these proposals will not solve the current land problems of the country and it will not benefit the vast majority of people living in the rural areas. Although the strategy may well lead to an expansion of agricultural production, at least in the short run, it will most probably also lead to little or no improvement for the majority of the 675 000 peasant cultivators and the landless poor. This is hardly surprising because, as we shall see, the assumptions upon which the proposals are based take little account of these groups.

Of course any discussion of policy alternatives must remain at least partially inconclusive because of the uncertainties surrounding the future. However, the likely results of the present land proposals, outlined in the last section, can be ascertained with some confidence for two important reasons. In the first place, all of the proposals are attempts to provide not a radical change in the structure of land use and agricultural production, but a continuity with the present mode of development. Only marginal changes are proposed and these

are designed specifically to maintain the present course of development. Thus past performance provides a good guide for the future. Secondly, we have the experience of other countries which, with similar economic and land structures, have carried out comparable land policies. Evidence from these countries, and particularly the evidence from Kenya, will throw light on the effects that the Rhodesian proposals are likely to have.

Two possible scenarios for the future follow from the present land proposals; the second is more likely to occur and so will be discussed in detail, the first can be dealt with quite briefly. The first scenario would result from the approach of the present government, and the proposals of the RAP; it assumes that no new policies will be applied to the land. There will be no restructuring, resettlement etc. to deal with the growing land problems of the country. The pace and direction of change will be determined by present incentives for purchasing land and increasing production.

The only result of this approach is the perpetuation and acceleration of all the problems which have been described in Chapter III. With no increase in land area for the TTLs and with the present ecological destruction of the land, landlessness will increase and the Tribal areas will become even less able to support their population. Food will become more scarce and unless more is imported to the TTLs, malnutrition and starvation will become more widespread.³⁵ Without substantial aid being given to some thousands of tribal cultivators, the opening up of commercial farming land to all races will make little difference to the solution of these basic problems. In the seven months from the passing of the amendment to the LTA in March 1977 to October only two farms had been bought by Africans.³⁶

Under this approach the commercial agricultural sector would continue its present development pattern. Land prices would remain at their present levels and agricultural assistance and price supports would be maintained.³⁷ Current inefficiencies in land use would continue and preserve the well-over 50 percent of unprofitable farmers on the land. It is clear that this scenario, positing continuity without change when change is being demanded with more and more intensity, provides neither long-term nor medium-term political stability for the country. The lack of political realism which this scenario offers has led to the emergence of alternative proposals by nationalist parties, the Whitsun Foundation and the far from radical RNFU.³⁸

The second scenario faces up to the present political uncertainties and proposes changes in land policies in the attempt to check the actual and potential unrest ignored by the first scenario; it attempts to provide an "antidote to chaos". As we have seen, this approach involves a fairly widespread resettlement of the better African farmers on under-utilised and unused European farming land, the gradual changeover within the TTLs to a system of individual tenure and the creation of a number of state-owned farms to deal with the immediate problem of rural unemployment.³⁹

While in general this approach is clear, a number of particular points have not been clarified. There is no time-scale given for the resettlement period, no indication of the numbers of European farms which will be 'taken-over', no details of whether the land acquired will be sub-divided or farmed as at present. There has, seemingly, been no attempt to look at the present land and rural population distribution to suggest particular areas where resettlement might take place; it thus appears that resettlement will occur where land is 'available'

so producing a higgledy-piggledy pattern of new settlement. Nothing has been said about the size of plots cultivated by peasant farmers in the TTLs, most of which at present are too small to provide even for subsistence needs. Will there be a minimum acreage for individual plots and if so how will land be allocated? The only suggestion made on this issue came from the June 1977 National Agricultural Extension Workshop which recommended that *present* plots should all be registered under individual title.⁴⁰ There has been no mention of consolidating the land in the TTLs or of how the grazing land should be distributed under the system of individual title. Whitsun and the UNAC have suggested that higher wages should be paid to the 355 000 agricultural workers and that a minimum wage should be paid to those workers living on the proposed state-owned farms. However, nothing has been said about what would happen to those agricultural workers who will lose their jobs when the land they work is used for resettlement. There has been no indication of where these state-farms should be located, how many there would be and where the 'surplus' labour would come from. Nor is there any mention of what will happen to the 126 000 foreign agricultural labourers at present employed on European farms. In general there are many unexplained details to this second scenario which need to be confronted if and when these proposals are fleshed out into more concrete proposals.

It is apparent that many of these proposals flow directly from a number of assumptions about the structure of the economy and how it should best develop, the role of agriculture in the development process and the place that land should play in agricultural development. Thus it is necessary to examine not only particular land policies but also the assumptions on which these policies are based. Some of these are explicitly stated while others are implied in the strategies proposed.

The most basic assumption is that land policies, where they are necessary, should be designed to maintain continuity with the present economic structure. All the proposed alterations in present land policies have to be viewed in the context of *order*: the whole purpose of these proposals is to maintain intact the social and economic system which has developed down to the present day. Radical changes and disruption (for example an occupation of the land by the landless) are to be avoided at all costs because it is believed that these would lead to chaos and the breakdown of the present structures, seen as critically important for development to continue. Land policies have to be seen as a process of adapting the economic structure when this is made necessary because of economic, social and above all political pressures for change. In short it is assumed that the present pattern of capital accumulation should continue into the future and land policies are proposed to ensure that this occurs.

It is assumed that the economy should develop through as rapid as possible a growth of the leading productive sectors: the RNFU's policies are aimed at creating the conditions for the rapid growth of commercial agriculture, while Whitsun and Hawkins propose a more balanced growth model, placing emphasis on urban growth and urban location as well as on rapid rural growth. Both groups and all political parties mentioned above assume that agricultural growth will be achieved most successfully by preserving the present 'free enterprise' economy and by maintaining and expanding the system of individual ownership.

Because of the present pressures on African land and the political need to

expand African occupation of under-utilised land all groups (except the RF and RAP) believe that additional financial help should be given to the *better* African farmers to enable them to settle on new land. Thereafter it is assumed that the most efficient use of land will be brought about by the operation of the land market which will lead to the better land being used most productively and the less able farmers being bought out by the more efficient ones. It is believed that these land proposals constitute a 'full programme of land and agrarian reform' which to be successful needs to be implemented in a systematic and controlled way.⁴¹

No mention is made of equality either within the rural areas or between rural and urban areas or of income and wealth distribution, the allocation of land to the landless, the alleviation of poverty or the fulfillment of basic needs. Either these are considered unimportant or else it is assumed that they will be solved by the proposed changes in land and the growth of the economy. Little is said about the employment problem. There is a proposal that Africans should be allowed to own urban land and with the expansion of the urban economy those living in the urban areas would become free from rural dependence. For those left in the rural areas, agricultural employment would come about through either farming individually-owned plots, by working as labourers on larger farms or by working on state-farms until alternative employment opportunities are provided. In time, it is felt that the free working of the land market and the overall growth of the economy should lead to a solution of employment problems.

ii. *Agricultural Growth*

We now consider the effects that these land policies are likely to have in the future. The first point to be raised is the question of the growth of the economy in general and agricultural growth in particular. The assumption that a capitalist free enterprise economy will continue to lead to agricultural growth for a country such as Rhodesia can be seriously doubted, especially in the longer term. Furthermore, the available evidence suggests that a strategy similar to the one proposed for Rhodesia will lead to increased marginalisation of the peasant farmers rather than their integration into the total growth process.

In recent years, Rhodesia's commercial agriculture has achieved impressive results; for example in the period 1964 to 1975 the volume of agricultural production doubled in size.⁴² But, as we have seen, this has not been due to the overall efficiency of production, for the majority of farmers do not farm their land efficiently and much of the land remains under-utilised. Thus high growth rates are not necessarily a good guide to the overall efficiency of the capitalist system.

Nor do high growth rates in the more productive sectors of agriculture guarantee high growth rates for the future. A total development strategy based on rapid industrial and agricultural growth will tend to shift the terms of trade against agriculture. This will lead to demands from the agricultural sector for increasing assistance. Inasmuch as this support is forthcoming it will tend to lead to greater inefficiencies in resource allocation and to structural inflation. If agriculture does not receive 'adequate' support there will be an increased possibility of lower rates of agricultural surplus and hence lower rates of agricultural investment. This problem is liable to be accentuated because a highly

skewed income distribution, such as exists in Rhodesia, tends to lead to agricultural earnings being spent on luxuries or on investment outside agriculture rather than on investment to increase agricultural production and raise productivity. There is as well a long run tendency for the capital costs of agricultural production to increase, particularly if production is export-oriented. This is because productivity will almost certainly have to be raised for exports to remain internationally competitive and there is usually a capital-bias in export production. Thus a higher capital-labour ratio will be needed even to maintain production at previous export levels.

A further weakness of the proposed strategy is that it is likely to lead neither to an absorption of the vast numbers of peasant farmers into the dynamic sectors of agriculture nor to an absorption of the rural unemployed into urban employment. In Kenya, the removal of racial discrimination in access to land and the resettlement schemes have not led to the incorporation of the majority of peasant farmers into the dynamic sectors of agriculture. The overall strategy, which is not dissimilar from that proposed in Rhodesia, is leading to increased urban migration and the explosive growth of shanty towns in and around Nairobi, agricultural stagnation in peasant agriculture due to adverse terms of trade, structural inflation and increasing balance of payments crises.⁴³ And in Mexico where the development strategy of the 1950s-1970s gave high priority to capitalist agricultural development, the peasants have not been absorbed into the dynamic agricultural enterprises and the result of the strategy has been to create 'a vicious circle of backwardness and destruction from which the country has not yet been able to recover'.⁴⁴

A survey of countries which have emphasised productivity as the prime reform objective shows that these 'have ended up with ineffectual implementation of programmes and little, if any rise in productivity'.⁴⁵ While the conditions in Rhodesia are not identical to those of other countries, they do serve as an important warning to those who unquestioningly propose a growth-oriented capitalist strategy of Zimbabwe's agricultural sector. The probable advantages of short term gains must not blind one to the fact that such a strategy may well lead to long term problems more difficult to solve, for increasing structural rigidities tend to make marginal change largely ineffectual.

iii. *Equality and Efficient Land Utilisation*

It is a remarkable omission that present land proposals make little or no mention either of the size of plots to be allocated to farmers in the redistribution of land or the likely effect of these policies upon income distribution. We have seen that the growth-oriented strategy can be questioned for its inability to maintain increases in production in the long term, but it can be more vigorously questioned on grounds of equity and efficiency in the utilisation of agricultural land. To assume that the proposed changes will lead to a more equal distribution of income or land is blatantly incorrect: Rhodesian evidence conclusively shows that within the African areas, inequalities have increased in recent years, while the assumption that individual tenure will lead to better farmers taking over the better agricultural land suggests that plot sizes are *intended* to become even bigger leading to even greater inequalities. Increased inequality appears to be an accepted by-product of the proposed strategies.

International experience in the 1950s and 1960s shows that in the poorer countries, growth without redistribution was widespread and that when

growth was accompanied by a narrowing of income distribution and an alleviation of poverty, this only occurred in countries which took positive steps to deal with the problems such as Tanzania, Israel, Costa Rica, Yugoslavia and Taiwan.⁴⁶ It has recently been argued that a trade-off between growth and redistribution is not inevitable, even in a reformist strategy, but that for both growth and redistribution to occur, four dimensions of policy are required, usually to be applied together. These are: accelerating GNP through raising savings and allocating resources more efficiently, redistribution of existing assets, generating income for the poor and transferring income in support of consumption for the poor.⁴⁷ But the Rhodesian proposals, with perhaps the exception of the UANC's, do not include any such policies. There appears to be no plan to take positive steps to alleviate poverty and redistribute income.⁴⁸

At present in Rhodesia 77 percent of all European commercial farming land is covered by 1 658 farms with an average size of 16 000 acres per farm.⁴⁹ In contrast the vast majority of the 675 000 Tribal cultivators have access to plots of less than six acres in size and the majority have no cattle. Current land proposals envisage the resettlement of some of the better African farmers on under-utilised European land and the extension of individual tenure to the TTLs with the probable registration of existing plots. These proposals make no provision at all for either a minimum acreage for peasants or for a ceiling on larger holdings. Both a theoretical appraisal of the likely results of such a land system and the evidence from other countries, particularly Kenya, demonstrate this initial situation of acute inequality will grow worse in the years to come: the rich will become richer and the poor poorer.

In a situation of great inequality in land ownership, the poorer small-holders face a whole range of conditions which seriously disadvantage them. Farming at or below subsistence levels, the peasant farmer's chief pre-occupation is to cover immediate needs for himself and his family rather than to make a commercial profit; the market is seen more as a device for satisfying basic needs than as a device for assisting the accumulation of capital. The peasant tends to be suspicious and to see the market not so much as an opportunity for making a profit but as something which is likely to lead to his greater exploitation. The small-holder has little surplus for reinvestment and because of his lack of knowledge and managerial skills, he is not in a good position to take advantage of the agricultural incentives which are generally available to farmers. The peasant is not likely to be a dynamic risk-taker because any innovation in agricultural production which goes wrong is going to lead to starvation in his family because of the subsistence nature of his farming enterprise.

But even if a poor farmer wants to expand production he will be at a relative disadvantage. The average propensity to save is an increasing function of farm income, so small farms are more dependent upon credit for purchasing inputs than are the larger ones; so with a given mix of factor inputs small farms require proportionally more credit to purchase inputs than do large farms. But given the riskiness of agriculture, small farms are less likely to be creditworthy so that in a free market situation they would be expected to pay a higher price for credit and capital. Further, poor peasant farmers, because of their weaker economic position, are more likely to run into debts that they cannot repay. In a regime of individual ownership of land these peasants are likely to be forced off their land when in debt or else to fall into the hands of the money-lender. It is small wonder that as long ago as 1957, the report of the working party on

African land tenure rightly argued that 'it has been proved in many countries that the surest way to deprive a peasant of his right to land is to give him a secure title and make it freely negotiable'.⁵⁰ The presence of money-lenders in peasant societies is widespread. Many peasants are in continual debt to the money-lender so that even in a good year the peasant has to give his surplus to the money-lender and the vicious circle of poverty continues. The agricultural surplus of the peasant economy is diverted away from the peasant and in the hands of the money-lender it usually goes towards consumption or to the urban economy. In contrast large farms are provided with cheaper credit, greater access to loans, subsidized inputs, capital grants, aids for mechanisation, reasonably efficient technical assistance and the benefits of advanced research. For all these reasons it is clear that 'equality of opportunity' is in practice a highly discriminatory policy when land is divided unevenly between large farms and small peasant holdings.

Evidence from a number of studies has shown that although new agricultural technologies are often scale-neutral, they have in general benefited the larger farms. Large farms are able to adopt new technologies more quickly, they tend to be risk-takers (at least initially) and they have greater access to information than the small peasant farmer. Also, with other factors of production including labour available in highly elastic supply, most of the gains from these new technologies accrue as quasi-rents to land and the supply conditions of labour have permitted an expansion of employment without increases in real wages, even though the new technologies are in general more labour demanding.⁵¹

An initial advantage of bigger farms is also apparent in export production. Quiros argues that in general the export sector expands at the expense of the traditional sector and the available evidence proves that the introduction of a new export crop has seldom favoured the traditional sector.⁵² Finally, international aid assistance for agriculture has benefited primarily the larger and middle-sized farms and has had little effect on the poorer peasants and the landless — except to make them relatively worse off.

All these factors point to the conclusion that an initial maldistribution of land between large and small farms is highly likely to lead to greater inequalities and increasing debt for the peasant farmers. In a system of individual tenure, peasants will lose their land and so have to depend increasingly upon wage labour to earn their living.

The Kenyan experience provides an important example for present-day Rhodesia for a number of reasons. At the time of independence Kenya had an agricultural structure similar to Rhodesia's today: a white-owned sector farming the more productive land in the White Highlands with the rest of the rural areas consisting of Reserve land. Like present-day Rhodesia, there was increasing population pressure in the Reserves, and a growing problem of landlessness, particularly in Kikuyuland, which had led by the late 1950's to demands for land redistribution. The over-riding aim of Kenya's land policies, like the Rhodesian proposals, was to provide continuity in the economy and to avoid radical structural change or disruption through unlawful occupation of the land. Finally, the Kenyan case is important because Rhodesian policy-makers and farmers have both visited Kenya recently and have cited Kenyan land policies as a model for Rhodesia to follow.⁵³

Concern for continuity in Kenya's economy meant that land policies for the

White Highlands, though they involved change, did not consist of any long term planning or of attempts to provide a consistent and uniform system of land use. Land policies both at independence and subsequently have been dominated by wider political issues and have had to be carried out in relation to the broader needs of the economy. One indication of this is shown by the evidence of the 1972 ILO Mission to Kenya which reported that ten years after independence some 2½ million acres of medium-potential land available for development in the country had not been touched.⁵⁴

Resettlement schemes in the White Highlands have proved extremely costly: they cost some £50m and between 1961 and 1969 accounted for one third of all foreign debts.⁵⁵ The schemes have consisted in taking over white-owned farms by African farmers, the settling of some of the Reserve cultivators and landless on both high and low density plots and the setting up of co-operative and state-owned farms as well as maintaining some of the previously white-owned mixed farms.⁵⁶ By 1968 some three quarters of the Highlands had remained untouched by land policies and still in 1977 there was no agreed uniform plan for land settlement in the area.⁵⁷ The approach has been and continues to be piece-meal: as new demands for land have been made — and they have been made continuously since independence — so more land has been allocated. While some of the schemes, like the original Million-Acre scheme, have led to a complete reorganisation of the land as peasants have been allocated small pieces of land on the previously large farms, other schemes have left the larger units intact. In contrast to this unsystematic planning for the Highlands, land policies for the former Reserves have been consistent and uniform. In the mid-1950s under the Swynnerton proposals, land in the Kikuyu district was consolidated and registered under individual title. Since independence this scheme has been gradually extended to most other areas in the country. Progress has been patchy, but it is estimated that some 17m acres will have been adjudicated by 1978.⁵⁸

The result of these land policies has meant that at present ownership of land in Kenya is characterised by a gradation of plot-size from very small plots (often as small as two acres or less per cultivator) up to large plantations owned by African farmers, expatriates and foreign companies. The largest 3 175 farms cover 6.6m acres of land, largely contained in the old White Highland area. Of the total of approximately 1.2m farmers in Kenya in 1969, 225 000 were either farmers or prosperous smallholders who had benefited from the land policies of settlement or registration. The next 250 000 farmers were less successful farmers, but not categorised as poor. The remaining 620 000 farmers, over 50 percent of the total, constituted what the ILO Mission called the rural poor.⁵⁹ They have not benefited from land policies and in general they lack the means to increase the productivity of their land more than marginally.⁶⁰

The Highlands schemes have certainly benefited the new landowners and there are now a number of prosperous middle-size plot-holders farming in the area. However, the evidence from the larger plots is disappointing: there appears to be a sharp decline in land utilisation in plots over 20 acres, and on some farms so much money was paid out for the original purchase of the land that little has been left for farming the land.⁶¹

In the former Reserves, not only have the vast majority of peasant cultivators been by-passed by land policies, but there is evidence both of increasing in-

equalities and also under-utilisation of the land since the introduction of land registration. The majority of small-holdings are so small that they do not provide employment for all family members; in many areas peasants have tiny acreages of land to cultivate and inequalities are increasing.⁶² The creation of a land market has not only assisted the richer peasants rather than the poorer ones, but it has also indirectly played a part in bias towards industrial growth. In Kikuyuland, where land registration and consolidation first took place, over 37 percent of the land is owned by absentee landlords; land is being used as collateral for urban businesses, it is being bought and sold without the land ever being looked at and in some cases the land is not even being farmed.⁶³ In general, small farmers have remained at subsistence levels; on all farms only 30-40 percent of total production is marketed and on the smaller farms this proportion is even lower.⁶⁴ Finally, there is no evidence to show that increases in production, even among smallholders, have been due to changes in the land tenure system and the shift to individual ownership.⁶⁵

The Kenyan evidence, incomplete as it may be, provides little comfort for Rhodesia. Land policies were not based on a rational use of all the land and they have not led to the most efficient utilisation of the land; many of the inefficiencies of the colonial period are still present while new problems have arisen with the new policies. Land policies have provided no long-term solution to the problems which faced Kenya at independence: there is still a growing number of landless peasants, the majority of peasant cultivators are relatively no better off than they were at independence and there is evidence of increasing inequalities in the former Reserves. Recent evidence also concludes that international aid, and particularly UK government aid to Kenya, has helped to widen the inequalities in the rural economy.⁶⁶ Kenyan land policies are certainly important for Rhodesia: they indicate the sort of policies which a land strategy for Zimbabwe would do well to avoid.

There seems to be little doubt that if Rhodesia's present land proposals were implemented they would lead to growing inequalities and the perpetuation of poverty. But it might be argued that however unsatisfactory the present system is, it provides the most efficient economic system and the most stable in a highly unstable world.⁶⁷ But if the object of economic development (at minimum) is to create a system which provides as high a standard of living as possible for everyone and the present system maintains the majority in a permanent state of poverty while a small minority benefits, then the meaning of the word stable is being excessively stretched. Furthermore, the proposed system of land ownership and distribution is clearly not the most economically efficient.

The proposals that we have examined advocate that land policies be framed in the context of a capitalist free enterprise economy. But it is clear that the capitalist system operating in Rhodesia is a far cry from the world of competitive capitalism found in textbooks, which leads to the optimum allocation of scarce resources. The present distribution of land has evolved through a wide range of institutional forces which have led to great inequalities in land ownership and distribution. The price system does not adequately reflect the relative values of land, labour and capital; it is influenced by factors such as price supports and controls for agricultural produce, levies and subsidies, discrimination in marketing and access to credit etc. It is just not true to say that the system is one of free enterprise, it is one of heavily state-controlled capitalism.⁶⁸ To argue that the distribution of resources under this system (which leads to

greater inequalities and so to an even less competitive system) is economically efficient is blatantly false. Equal treatment for unequal partners is inequitable and it leads to sub-optimal efficiency and resource allocation.⁶⁹

It has been argued that large farms are necessary because the higher profit margins on these farms lead to higher savings and so higher rates of investment than on smaller farms where savings tend to be channelled into expanded consumption rather than into investment; as a result it is argued that for an economy as a whole a regime of larger farms will lead to higher overall growth rates and hence a more efficient agricultural structure. But the available evidence refutes this argument. Small farms in fact tend to make better use of their savings for investment than larger ones, if one excludes the subsistence peasant farmer.⁷⁰

Not only do larger farms make less use of savings for reinvestment, larger farms also tend to make less efficient use of the country's scarce resources. Kenyan land policies and current proposals for Rhodesia both appear to lead to increases in inequalities, higher incomes for larger farmers and the increasing marginalisation of the poorer peasants. Large farms, especially those geared to export products, tend to be more capital intensive than small farms and labour productivity is lower on larger farms.⁷¹ But Rhodesia has a growing unemployment problem and is short of capital. A more efficient use of resources would suggest that an efficient agricultural strategy would be more positively related to the resource endowment of the country.⁷²

There is no evidence in Rhodesia to suggest that individual tenure is essential for an economically efficient use of the land. The poor performance of agriculture in the TTLs has been due to a wide range of institutional factors rather than the system of communal tenure. Indeed yields on TTL farms have often been higher than the yields recorded on PA farms. The evidence of the Silveira House agricultural groups shows that very high yields can be obtained with even greater co-operative production than is normal in the TTLs in general.⁷³

One proposal for eliminating the inefficiencies in land utilisation within the present economic system is the UANC's suggestion of introducing a land tax to be levied on all landowners 'to ensure that the best use was made of all land'.⁷⁴ Under a UANC administration every landowner would be required to place a value on his land which would be used as a basis for the imposition of a land tax and as a value for expropriation if the land is required by the state.⁷⁵

The proposed tax sounds simple to operate and attractive, being a two-edged sword, and it may well lead to unused land being farmed or expropriated. But the practical effectiveness of such a tax is in doubt. Although much land is farmed inefficiently, there are problems attached to deciding accurately if particular pieces of land are being farmed efficiently or not. To begin with, different criteria will have to be used in different parts of the country because of the complexity of the Agro-Ecological regions. Then, as Feder argues, concepts such as 'efficient' and 'adequately managed' are slippery concepts and there is little reason why every estate owner cannot be interpreted to farm his land efficiently particularly if the interpretation is in his hands.⁷⁶ Decisions would also have to be made about the precise operation of tax exemptions.⁷⁷ But once allowances are made for certain categories of land owners then the system would lie wide open to abuse.

The most important difficulty with a land tax, however, lies in precisely

where the line is drawn between efficiency and non-efficiency. If the definition is too rigorous then it is likely that a large number of landowners, particularly the European farmers who at present do not run their farms profitably, would have to be expropriated. This is likely to be extremely costly and it could well lead to both political and economic instability if the farmers, feeling they were not being adequately compensated, began to sabotage their farms. Furthermore when the land has been expropriated one is left with the still unanswered question of what to do with the land: whether to split it into small units or to maintain it as larger farms.⁷⁸ Nor must it be assumed that farmers would accept the imposition of land tax without a fight and a progressive land tax is likely to be fought against as hard as compulsory expropriation would be. Finally, the success in implementing such a tax is remote; evidence from other countries shows that 'it is hard to point to a single successful land tax in the Third World'.⁷⁹ If the definition of land efficiency is not so rigorous, then the structure of land is likely to remain largely as it is at present, for few farms will be expropriated. This will leave the present problems unsolved: much of the land will remain under-utilised and most of the potential arable land will remain uncultivated.

Current land proposals are based on the assumption that the country's well-being lies in the continuity of the present economic system rather than in a break with the old and radical change occurring. What is being proposed is the continuation of a system which has led to large inequalities in wealth, income and in the distribution of land. It is a system which benefits a small group of landowners and owners of capital; a small group of managers, administrators, skilled and semi-skilled workers are relatively well paid. The TTLs have evolved to provide cheap labour for the modern sectors of the economy but at present thousands of workseekers are not being absorbed as wage-labour in the modern sectors of the economy while conditions in the Tribal areas continue to deteriorate. As a result the vast majority of the working population are poor, are becoming increasingly marginalised and are more and more dependent upon others for work.

With the present land proposals and with the experience of Kenya to serve as a particular example, this future holds little hope of change for the poor. Peasants may well be allowed to own their land in time, but the vast majority will continue to live at subsistence levels or be dependent upon an insecure job that is poorly paid. A few, probably the better-off to start with, will gain from the proposed resettlement proposals; more are likely to join the ranks of the landless. Little or no attempt is made to counteract the weak position of the poor and landless or to incorporate them into the decision-making process. As a method of providing continuity in the colonial economy the proposals have much to recommend them; as a way of assuring long term agricultural growth, narrowing inequalities, creating a structure which will lead to efficient land use and benefits for the poor, the proposals do not even provide hope.

iv. Land Reform

The proposed alterations in Rhodesia's land structure, involving the settlement of African farmers on European land, the probable creation of state-owned farms and the eventual shift to individual tenure in the TTLs, would bring significant change in the present land structures and might well be considered as an important land reform. Indeed the Whitsun Foundation, among

others, believes that its proposals involve a 'full programme of land and agrarian reform'.⁸⁰ An examination of the current consensus on the principles and aims of land reform, however, leads one to the conclusion that the Rhodesian proposals constitute the very *opposite* of land reform: they typify the great evasions of land reform.⁸¹ The stated aim of these proposals is to provide continuity in the economy and economic arguments have been put forward to justify the policy changes. Whatever economic arguments are put forward, land policies are first and foremost political devices and the political reasons for reform proposals need to be confronted. The rationale behind the present Rhodesian proposals is the maintenance of the present elite in power. Small wonder then that the economic benefits will accrue largely to this elite.

What, then, is land reform? If a man says to you 'we have had a land reform', you must ask him, argues Raup, 'did you bring about an improvement in income distribution, did you improve the social status of the rural poor, did you change the political power structure, have you improved the incentives that persuade farmers to undertake hard and productive work?' If the answer is 'yes', then there has been a land reform.⁸² According to Bell and Duloy, the objective of land reform 'is not only to increase the area of land available to the small farmers and tenants but also to break the semi-feudal structure of labour bondage which still persists in rural areas Land reform clearly involves difficult political decisions and confrontations if it is to be effective'.⁸³ In a similar vein, Jacoby maintains that because the peasant in the developing world has to struggle against considerable odds in implementing land reform, an administration must have a bias in favour of the peasant to balance the superiority of economic forces over the peasant's weak bargaining capacity.⁸⁴ Finally, Lipton defines land reform as comprising compulsory take-over of the land, usually by the State, from the biggest landowners, and with partial compensation, and the farming of that land in such a way as to spread the benefits of the man-land relationship more widely than before the takeover. Land reform here is seen as an equalising policy whose aim is to reduce poverty by reducing inequality. By its impact on rural poverty, argues Lipton, land reform stands or falls.⁸⁵

While these principles and expected consequences of a land reform are not identical, they have enough in common with each other and are sufficiently different from the Rhodesian proposals and their likely outcome to conclude that the Rhodesian policy alternatives do not constitute land reform. The Rhodesian proposals are not designed to help the poorest, and they are not likely to do so; they are not intended to narrow inequalities in land distribution or income distribution and they would almost certainly lead to increasing inequalities; they are not designed to give a more effective power base to the poor, and finally, they are not intended to break up the present labour supply structure. While the Rhodesian proposals would lead to change, this change should not be confused with land reform.

Land policies are in essence concerned with control over land and labour and in agrarian societies these issues are without doubt highly political. That is why Ladejinsky is correct to stress that 'politicians and politicians only make good or poor reforms or do not make them at all. They control the political climate which determines the will or lack of will to proceed with their task'.⁸⁶ And it is because of the over-riding political importance of land policies that the timing and scope of reform are determined more by political pressure than

by the economic and social needs of the people. The initiation of land reform, or policies to avoid reform, depends upon the perceived need of the elite for political legitimacy, and the formulation of policies is determined in general by the relationship between the elites and the landed class.⁸⁷

These remarks, highlighting the political aspects of land policies, describe in general the reasoning behind Rhodesian proposals for land 'reform'. The economic and social problems thrown up by the discussion of the need for changes in land have been present for at least twenty years. Proposals for change in land-man relationships have arisen at the *present time* precisely because of the climate of acute political uncertainty: the power of the landed classes (and the urban elite) is threatened.⁸⁸ Land policies have been designed not so much to solve the social and economic problems which certainly *do* exist, but rather to maintain continuity in an economic structure dominated by a small minority which gains from the preservation of that structure.⁸⁹ As in Kenya, the proposals for change will probably lead to gains for the middle-range peasants, but the underlying conflicts present in society, shown clearly in the land issue, will not be solved.

In Rhodesia it is quite possible, with an even greater escalation of the war and ever-growing government repression, that the poor could rise up with sufficient power to threaten the economic system, which is built on their exploitation, and demand a genuine land reform. Current land proposals are designed, above all, to prevent this from happening.

The Rhodesian proposals, discussed in this chapter, can best be seen as measures of 'counter-reform' and as great evasions. Lipton argues that the two great evasions of land reform are settlement schemes and the reform of tenure conditions — just the two proposals currently being discussed in Rhodesia. These are seen as evasions precisely because they can be used to avoid an attack on the rural power structure which is rooted in an extremely unequal distribution of land ownership.⁹⁰ Feder describes counter-reform as the attempt by the elite to 'change the structure of agriculture in its own image, even using land reform as a stepping stone and turning it into counter-reform'.⁹¹ Similarly Bell has argued in the Indian context that 'in the absence of a mass agrarian movement, the reforming elite will probably settle for less than a radical option, benefiting enough middle peasants to ensure a solid rural power base and relying on the post reform structure to maintain the acquiescence of the unrewarded mass of the peasantry'.⁹² Finally, the World Bank argues that land reform is pursued in practice as a response to political pressures for socio-economic change arising from factors such as increased population, pressure on a limited land base or an ideology of egalitarianism based on a more even distribution of land or income.⁹³ The proposed Rhodesian changes are designed precisely to *combat* these pressures rather than to initiate fundamental change.

At the time of Kenyan independence, the Mau-Mau uprising threatened the 'stability' of the country. Britain and the international agencies were convinced that peace should be brought about by buying out the white farmers and implementing a highly egalitarian set of land policies that could end the war through incorporating the emergent African elite into the power structure of the colonial economy.⁹⁴ It is clear that in Kenya the 'peace' that resulted has not solved the basic conflicts in that society. The chief lesson to be drawn from the Kenyan example for Rhodesia and for those who have power to determine the structures of Zimbabwe's economy, is to have the courage to face up

to the basic conflicts of her colonial economy and to attempt to help change those structures through, first of all, a genuine land reform. If the opportunity is missed now, in a time of great political upheaval, it may well be a long time before the opportunity presents itself again, and when it does it is likely that change will be much more bloody.

NOTES, CHAPTER IV

¹ These are groups within Rhodesia which have put forward proposals for land. Excluded are the Peoples' Movement and ZANU-Sithole within Rhodesia and ZAPU and ZANU-Mugabe outside the country.

² For a discussion of the nature of the present economic structure in Rhodesia see Riddell and Harris in *South African Labour Bulletin* (1977:3-37).

³ All groups are favourable to a political settlement which will include a financial package similar to the US\$1 500 million Zimbabwe Development Fund, a major part of which would be used for 'solving' the problems of the Tribal areas. With more than half an eye on the anticipated aid that would come to the country in the event of a settlement Whitsun summarizes the general position of these groups on international aid:

"Rural development, however, is now a major priority among the multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid agencies and it would appear that in new political circumstances funds from such agencies could well be a source of meeting the development needs of the tribal sector. In fact, in the foundation's judgement, a large measure of the funds from these agencies would be available *only* for rural development projects in tribal areas."

The Whitsun Foundation (1976:16).

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Section (1977:10) and *Rhodesia Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly*, Vol. 96, No. 6, Col. 323, 29th June 1977.

⁵ *The Times*, 30th July, 1977.

⁶ The Rhodesia Party, Land Policy Objectives, mimeo Salisbury, 1977.

⁷ Rhodesia Party (1977).

⁸ Rhodesia National Farmers' Union in *Rhodesian Farmer* (1977). (Hereafter called RNFU).

⁹ RNFU (1977: Objective No. 3).

¹⁰ RNFU (1977: Section 19).

¹¹ RNFU (1977: Section 19).

¹² Wanting both to make sure that African farmers are given the opportunity to expand their farming operations and that only those who are competent should receive land, the RNFU suggests the following:

"Whilst the removal of racial restrictions on the ownership of agricultural land may at the outset produce only a small demand, a political settlement will bring about a complete change of pace and tenancy schemes will make heavy demands for loan monies. The A.F.C. (Agricultural Finance Corporation) and commercial lending agencies will have to gear themselves for this. In addition hopefully, assistance will be provided by international 'aid' funds. Credit agencies must operate using customary criteria of eligibility, management capacity and acceptable securities and guarantees."

RNFU (1977: Section 15).

¹³ RNFU (1977: Section 21).

¹⁴ RNFU (1977: Objective No. 3b).

¹⁵ RNFU (1977: Section 33).

¹⁶ RNFU (1977: Section 23-24).

¹⁷ RNFU (1977: Section 28).

¹⁸ RNFU (1977: Section 24).

¹⁹ RNFU (1977: Section 25).

²⁰ G. Magadzire at the RNFU conference, 18th May 1977, quoted in *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 18, No. 14, 18th July 1977, p.4.

²¹ Whitsun (1976:16).

²² Whitsun (1976:17).

²³ I. Hullme, talk to the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, 15th June, 1977, reported in *The Rhodesia Herald*, 16th June 1977.

²⁴ Witsun (1976:17-20).

²⁵ Whitsun (1976:17).

²⁶ Whitsun (1976:17).

²⁷ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 16th June 1977.

²⁸ In a strategy similar to Whitsun's, one of the University of Rhodesia's senior economics lecturers argues that in a development strategy for the future top priority should be given to growth but that there should be a shift in investment from the urban to the rural economy. Specific land policies should be related to the overall growth strategy. 'Unused or available land in European areas should be made available to African farmers but the land use should be subject to controls to prevent "ecological" in the TTLs from being extended into new areas.' By maintaining continuity with the present economic structure and inaugurating marginal changes, it appears that the development problems of the country will be solved:

"By shifting the bulk of the investment to the rural areas, the deterioration of the tribal trust lands could be halted, the over-population relative to the input of skills and capital would be reduced, the drift of work-seekers to the towns would be slowed and the imbalance between the urban and rural areas would be redressed."

A.M. Hawkins in a talk to the Rhodesian Society of Chartered Accountants, Inyanga, 22nd June 1977, reported in *The Rhodesia Herald*, 23rd June 1977.

²⁹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 16th June 1977.

³⁰ Dr G. Chavunduka in a talk at the Rhodes Club Umtali, reported in *The Rhodesia Herald*, 21st June 1977.

³¹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 21st June 1977.

³² Not that these policies necessarily coincide with those of the external wing of ZAPU.

³³ Josiah Chinamano is quoted as saying that his party's land policies now broadly coincide with those of the RNFU. See *Africa Confidential* (1977:3).

³⁴ *The Times*, 20th May 1977.

³⁵ Malnutrition and starvation have been reported already in the country. See report of the Rhodesia Catholic Bishops' Conference, Social Services and Development Commission, Salisbury, 1976-77.

³⁶ Mr. T. Zawaira, MP in Parliament. See *The Rhodesia Herald*, 13th October, 1977.

³⁷ See Chapter III, Section C, ii and iv.

³⁸ It should be noted that the RNFU is not a completely homogeneous group; it contains farmers encompassing a wide spectrum of white political viewpoints.

³⁹ The RNFU makes no mention of state-owned farms in its proposals.

⁴⁰ This came from the expert group concerned specifically with proposals for changes in land use for the future.

⁴¹ This is the view of the Director of Whitsun, see *The Times*, 20th May 1977.

⁴² *Rhodesia, Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics*, C.S.O. Salisbury, April 1977, Table 17.

⁴³ See Weeks in Oxaal (1975:58).

⁴⁴ Esteve in Banco Nacional De Comercio Exterior (1976:8). Esteve summarises the Mexican strategy as follows:

"The modern sector, backbone of agricultural development, showed signs of lacking an adequate internal dynamic and its dependency on the extraction of resources from traditional agriculture became increasingly evident. The mechanisms that had served to create and stimulate it began to act as curbs on modernisation. Instead of aiming at optimum use of resources, assuming risks to obtain maximum profits and expanding investments, modern agriculture preferred less that optimum exploitation offering fewer risks — technical or market — and began to channel gains into various forms of investments — such as real estate — in urban centres."

Esteve in Banco Nacional De Comercio Exterior (1967:7).

⁴⁵ Tai (1974:474).

⁴⁶ Chenery (1974:xiii).

⁴⁷ Chenery (1974:48-49).

⁴⁸ The UANC does argue that an equitable distribution of income and wealth and opportunity will have to be achieved in Rhodesia, but it has provided no policy for achieving this end. *The Rhodesia Herald*, 21st June 1977.

⁴⁹ See Tables 22 and 23 above.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Jacoby (1968:61).

As Seidman argues:

"The smaller African peasant, unable to expand his sales in competition with the larger estate farmers, inevitably finds himself squeezed out. His only remaining channel for escape from rural poverty is to flee the countryside, vainly hoping to share in the conspicuous consumption which political independence has bestowed on a lucky few of his compatriots."

Seidman in Palmer and Parsons (1977:47).

⁵¹ Bell and Duloy in Chenery (1974:127).

⁵² See *The Guardian*, 24th December 1976, p.15.

We have already shown that the success of Kenya's post-independence agricultural growth is leading to structural rigidities which point to acute problems for the future. Here we are more concerned with the effect of Kenyan land policies on equality, income distribution and efficient land utilisation.

⁵⁴ ILO (1972:172).

⁵⁵ Fleming in *World Development* (1975:53) and Leys (1975:74).

⁵⁶ The details of land policies for the Highlands are well summarised in Holtham and Hazlewood (1976).

⁵⁷ Wasserman in *Canadian Journal of African Studies* (1973:134).

⁵⁸ Republic of Kenya, *Development Plan 1974-1978, Part I*, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1974, p. 217-218.

⁵⁹ ILO (1972:36-38).

⁶⁰ ILO (1972:38).

⁶¹ Leys (1975:91-98).

⁶² See Lamb (1974:132-134).

⁶³ H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo discussed the issues of vacant farms at a seminar at Sussex University, 26th November 1976. For an analysis of land in Kikuyuland see Sorrenson (1967).

⁶⁴ Hayer and Waweru in Hayer (1976:191-215).

⁶⁵ There was, however, a strong correlation in Kenya between the ending of discrimination in marketing produce for African farmers and a rapid increase in production for the market. See Holtham and Hazlewood (1976:23).

⁶⁶ Holtham and Hazlewood (1976:223-235).

⁶⁷ The Rhodesian Prime Minister recently argued that Africans in Rhodesia 'have become accustomed to free enterprise' and that it provides the best alternative for Rhodesia. See *The Daily Telegraph*, 4th August 1977, p.1 and 28.

⁶⁸ For an analysis of the extent of government control on the Rhodesia economy see D.G. Clarke in *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics* (1972:48-60).

⁶⁹ What is more, the evidence itself challenges the view that the present system is efficient. Land in Rhodesia at present consists of unused and under-utilised land side by side heavily over-used and over-populated land. And the evidence from Kenya after 15 years of post-independence land policies similar to those proposed for Rhodesia shows that the situation is likely to get worse rather than improve.

⁷⁰ Evidence from ECLA for Latin America, from Europe and Japan shows that there is no close correlation between income concentration and national development, while saving propensities appear to be very low precisely in countries where income distribution is the most unequal. See Dorner (1972:83-84).

⁷¹ See Scott, MacArthur and Newberry (1976:248).

⁷² There is also the important question of the creation of structural dependence with a capital-intensive production process. See Chapter V, section D, below.

⁷³ This is discussed in Chapter V, section D, below.

⁷⁴ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 21st June 1977.

⁷⁵ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 21st June, 1977.

⁷⁶ Feder in Stavenhagen (1970:183).

⁷⁷ A tax across-the-board would discriminate both against those farmers, who though perhaps earning a small profit, are helping to acquire essential foreign exchange through exporting and against those who are producing particularly important crops.

⁷⁸ As we have seen, the Kenyan case shows that a series of expropriation over time leads itself to unco-ordinated land planning and no increase in land use efficiency.

⁷⁹ Lipton in Lehmann (1973:282).

⁸⁰ *The Times*, 20th May, 1977.

In the same way as it was widely held (and still is) that in Kenya post-independence land policies constituted an important and far-reaching land reform.

⁸¹ See Dorner (1972), Griffin (1976), Jacoby (1971), Lehmann (1972), Raup (1975), Tai (1974), and Tuma (1965).

⁸² Raup (1975:1).

⁸³ Bell and Duloy in Chenery (1973:119).

⁸⁴ Jacoby (1968:5).

⁸⁵ Lipton in Lehmann (1973:270-271).

⁸⁶ Quoted in Tai (1974:9).

⁸⁷ This is clearly illustrated, for example, in the case of El Salvador. See Latin American Bureau (1977).

⁸⁸ Similarly in Mexico, Esteva argues that the model of capitalist agricultural development was 'blindly imposed by social groups who believed in it as long as it proved profitable'. Esteva in Banco de Nacional De Comercio Exterior (1976:8).

⁸⁹ See Harris in *South African Labour Bulletin* (1977).

⁹⁰ Lipton in Lehmann (1973:272-274).

⁹¹ Feder in Stavenhagen (1970:174).

⁹² Bell in Lehmann (1973:21).

⁹³ World Bank (1975).

⁹⁴ For a discussion of the Kenyan politics of land and the myths surrounding the whole issue at independence see Wasserman (1976).

CHAPTER V

AN ALTERNATIVE LAND STRATEGY FOR ZIMBABWE

A. AIMS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The aims and assumptions of a land reform proposed in this Chapter are fundamentally different from those discussed in Chapter IV. The purpose of land and agrarian reform is to integrate everyone, and particularly the increasing numbers who are becoming marginalised in the evolution of the present system, into the development process. In relation to land, the aim is to provide for: security of tenure for all, control of the land and any surplus produced by those who work the land, participation in decision-making for those policies which relate to agriculture, equality in land distribution and equality of income and lastly rapid growth of agricultural production contributing to overall economic growth that is itself related to the needs of all the people.¹ What is demanded is a reform which will give the people greater control over their lives by giving them both productive employment and greater security for themselves and their families. This should take place within an economic system which is based upon fulfilling the needs of all in society, but particularly of an increasing number who are largely excluded from the benefits of the development process.

These proposals are radical ones and because they do go down to the roots of the conflicts in Rhodesian society they necessarily have implications beyond specifically agrarian and land issues to the whole framework in which reform should take place. In short, they question the present economic structure of Rhodesia. What is demanded is an economic system which will lead to the fulfilment of these aims in the shortest possible time.

For a number of reasons, this type of land reform is unlikely to result from a development strategy based on the present colonial economic structure of Rhodesia. In the first place, the evidence of the past performance of the economy which has produced growing inequalities, increasing poverty and an oppressive political structure designed to exclude mass participation, clearly illustrates that this system is diametrically opposed to the aims proposed. Secondly, as we have seen, suggestions for reform which assume a continuity with the colonial economy are unlikely to lead to the fulfilment of these aims either; a few might gain but the majority of the people will probably not.

It could be argued, however, that even if the present capitalist system will not lead to a movement towards the egalitarian proposals listed above, a newly-structured capitalist system could do so. But this too has to be rejected. Evidence from other countries in the 1950s and 1960s clearly shows that capitalist development in poor countries has not led to higher real incomes for the poorest, so the likelihood of this occurring in a capitalist Zimbabwe appears remote.² What is more important, however, is that there is a fundamental contradiction between the free market capitalist system based on individual ownership of the means of production and the demands made here for self-reliance and self-determination and for the economy to be in the hands of the people. For the capitalist system to operate at all, it has to be based on a class structure where people are divided unevenly between those who sell their labour on the market and those who buy that labour (even if indirectly) to 'marry it to means

of production'.³ But what is demanded here is a structure of man and land relationships which no longer treats the mass of people as labour-power, whose job security is determined by the (inefficient) operation of the market.⁴

But the maintenance of the capitalist system also has to be rejected because of the realities of present-day Rhodesia. Any change in the capitalist system towards a more egalitarian structure would require political support, and support for any capitalist system can only be guaranteed to come from the present electorate (which excludes the poor) and the present and potential African elite who would benefit from the maintenance of the capitalist system. But this group of people would just not be able to 'radicalise' the system enough both to bring about significant change for the poorest and maintain its political power. The enormous inequalities in income, wealth and land ownership are too great to bring about far-reaching changes within the capitalist system.⁵ Finally within a capitalist framework, the power and influence of international capital would also tend to work against the furthering of egalitarian and self-reliant goals. The gap between the small rich elite and the poor majority is too wide to allow for a decisive shift away from the present growth strategy towards the achievement of the egalitarian goals listed above. In theory the capitalist system cannot provide radical self-determination and in practice it will not lead to a more equal distribution of income and land.

We are arguing here not only that a thorough-going land reform is necessary to solve the basic conflicts of rural Rhodesia, but also that the success of such a reform necessitates that it must be carried out within a socialist economic framework. But the rejection of the capitalist option should not be taken to mean that the socialist option is only a second-best alternative. An economic system based on a self-reliance and on the decision-making of central planners and local communities to determine the rate and mode of capital accumulation would provide a far more rational basis both for achieving the aims of a land reform and also for promoting the long term growth of the economy than does reliance on the market forces of monopoly capitalism.

But the socialist option does mean that radical changes would have to take place not only in relation to land but throughout the economy: in agriculture and land use, in industry and in the country's external relations.⁶

The radicalness of this strategy lies not only in the changeover to social ownership of the means of production but also in the emphasis placed on the participation of the people in the development process. Instead of concentrating solely on how to reallocate economic resources to attain higher levels of output, this strategy aims at involving the people from the outset. It does this because of the belief that the 'development of the people as full human beings working in a warm, egalitarian and co-operative atmosphere leads to the rapid development of material output'.⁷

In the rural areas the aim would be to achieve change through the elimination of a class structure which is at present characterised by large landowners, small peasant cultivators and landless labourers which could be brought about by the re-education of the people in socialist values and ideals. Thus the aim of land reform is not simply to change the rural structure of man and land, it is also a total revolutionary movement whereby the poor have the opportunity to gain confidence and understanding in the process of change that is taking place in their midst.

Of course the shift to a socialist mode of production is neither easy nor

would it eliminate the problems of the past; it would be naive to think that the process would not involve a hard struggle. At the outset political control is essential for the process even to begin and in the course of change resistance would probably continue. More about this later. Further, the aims and ideals outlined here cannot all be achieved simultaneously for there are conflicts between them. The basic tension between consumption and saving does not disappear and difficult choices have to be made. In the rural areas in particular the following tensions will have to be faced: how to cope with the existing vested interests and win popular support, how to reduce inequalities without lessening the incentive to production and how to advance on an adequate material base while stimulating the productive forces to generate higher levels of output.⁸

In the following sections a land strategy based on a socialist development path will be discussed. But at the outset two important points need to be emphasized. Firstly, the present discussion is necessarily a partial one: though land policies are critical for any socialist development strategy for Zimbabwe they only form part of the overall strategy. Our purpose here is not to attempt to give a blueprint for such a strategy but rather to outline the sort of land policies necessary for such development. Secondly, even this objective has its limitations. One of the assumptions of this particular strategy of land reform is that the reform process should involve the participation of all the people as it evolves. Thus it is not possible (or desirable) to map out in detail all aspects of reform. Particular decisions will have to be made as the reform proceeds and as specific problems arise. What can be done, however, is to outline a general long term strategy and then, beginning with the situation as it is at present, start to discuss the formulation of more immediate policies which will have to be implemented once a government committed to radical reform comes to power.

B. THE LONG TERM STRATEGY

In this section we shall discuss the long term strategy of land reform for Zimbabwe. In brief, the strategy aims to create a unified land system throughout the country based on the possibilities for agricultural production in the different Natural Farming Regions, full employment, equal access to land for all, a more egalitarian distribution of income and self-reliance.⁹ The distinction between African and European land would disappear as would the differences between commercial and Tribal agriculture. It will be argued that this can best be achieved through establishing a system of rural communes throughout the rural areas.¹⁰

It hardly needs stressing that there is a critical gap between the eventual achievement of the goals outlined in this section and the present land structure of Rhodesia. The particular economic and political problems to be faced in this transition period and the policies suggested to overcome these will be discussed in section D. Here we shall be concerned with the long term goals of a radical land reform.

The present distribution of land and people in the rural areas was discussed in Chapter III. As we saw, the basic problem consists not of a critical shortage of productive agricultural land but in the artificial structures which maintain acutely over-populated African areas and under-utilised European areas side by side. 43,6m acres of African land contains 80 percent of the rural population

with an average density of 9,9 acres per person and 38,6m acres of European land contains the other 20 percent with an average density of 34,4 acres per person.¹¹

A radical egalitarian reform demands that there should be a decisive shift of population from the over-populated African areas to the under-utilised European areas and also that land redistribution should take account of the quality of the land in different Agro-Ecological areas.¹² The most productive areas in the country are located on land above 4 000 feet, stretching from the South-West to the North-East of the country; as this land provides the greatest farming potential in the country, it is clear that the majority of farmers should live and farm in this area. At present, however, this area is relatively under-populated; the very high density areas are found largely in the TTLs lying adjacent to this land, chiefly on land between 3 000 and 4 000 feet above sea level.¹³ Figure 8 shows the areas of the country which provide the greatest potential for rural development and it can be seen by comparing the Figure with Figure 4, above, that these coincide very closely with the European land lying in the central watershed.


Figure 9 shows the distribution of the African population in the country in 1969. It can be seen that the most densely populated regions lie adjacent to the better and relatively under-populated European land. The most densely populated TTLs lie in an arc beginning in the South-East of Bulawayo, moving through Fort Victoria, to the West of Umtali and up to the North-East of Bindura. The most under-populated areas (as shown in Figure 8 the areas with the greatest potential for development) lie from the South-West of Bulawayo up to the area to the North-West and South-East of Salisbury.

The enormous differences between the population densities in adjacent European and African land around the land most suited to rural development expansion is shown in Table 36. The areas shown in the Table stretch from the North-West of the country around Mangula down to areas to the North and East of Bulawayo. In all instances the African areas are at least twice as heavily populated as the European areas and in some cases the African areas carry over eight times the population per acre as the more productive European areas. What Table 36 and Figures 8 and 9 clearly show is that there are large areas of land which have either a 'good' or 'fair' potential for rural development lying side by side heavily over-populated Tribal areas.

The present land and population distribution and the land available for potential development suggest the broad outlines for a resettlement programme. Africans in the over-populated and over-used TTLs should be resettled on the European land lying along the central watershed. Because many of the over-populated TTLs lie next to the land most suited to development it would be comparatively easy for the excess Tribal population to move onto the new land. There will be problems, however, particularly around Fort Victoria, because in some areas there will not be enough land to absorb all who need to move. In these cases, resettlement further afield, for example around Gatooma, would be necessary. Obviously in the present discussion the details and intricate planning necessary for such an operation cannot be gone into, but the broad lines of approach are clear.

This massive resettlement would not only lead to greater potential for agricultural development for those who are resettled, it would also lead to a fundamental easing of land pressure in the African areas which should itself lead

FIGURE 8

AN EVALUATION OF LAND POTENTIAL
FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT 1969


SOURCE

Kay in *The Rhodesia Science News* (1975).

to a greater potential for development in these areas. It needs to be remembered, however, that not all the land on which resettlement would take place is empty land — it contains large European-owned farms and an African labour force. These would need to be absorbed into the new farming structures, either on the land they have been working on as employees, or perhaps, if they are indigenous to the country, in their "home" areas.¹⁴

FIGURE 9

AFRICAN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION, 1969



SOURCE

Kay (1970:75).

The crucial questions of how many people should be resettled, of what should happen to the present population in the 'resettlement' areas and of what should happen to the land in the TTLs bring us to the basic decision concerning the type of farming and tenural system that should be adopted to accompany the resettlement scheme. This will itself have implications for the very process of resettlement. At the present time two very different systems operate. In the commercial farming areas, land is individually owned; most farms are used for mixed farming but there are a number of farms which spe-

TABLE 36
COMPARISON OF POPULATION DENSITIES IN SELECTED ADJACENT RURAL AREAS,
CENTRAL WATERSHED, 1969 CENSUS

Location	Racial Land Category	Population '000s	Area '000s Acres	Natural Farming Region	Density Acres Per Person
Lomagundi	(European)	122,4	2 451,5	II	20,1
Urungwe	(TTL)	43,7	493,0	III	11,3
Mazoe	(European)	49,9	764,7	II	15,3
Chiweshe	(TTL)	39,7	212,9	II	5,3
Shamva	(European)	15,9	312,7	II	19,7
Marandellas	(European)	28,0	837,6	II	29,9
Mangwende	(TTL)	76,5	502,1	II	6,6
Hartley	(European)	57,2	1 321,9	II	23,3
Gatooma	(European)	17,6	1 166,3	II	66,2
Mondoro	(TTL)	44,3	322,3	III	7,3
Gwelo	(European)	26,6	1 453,4	II/III	54,7
Lower Gwelo	(TTL)	20,1	147,2	III	7,3
Selukwe	(European)	9,8	588,3	II/III	59,7
Selukwe	(TTL)	31,8	182,8	III	5,7
Victoria	(European)	17,6	932,2	II/III	52,8
Victoria	(TTL)	22,3	118,8	III	5,4
Bubi	(European)	11,9	1 382,0	IV	116,6
Inkosikazi	(TTL)	7,8	118,3	IV	15,2
Nkai	(TTL)	63,8	1 057,1	IV	16,6
Umzingwane	(TTL)	7,7	437,6	III	56,4
Matopo	(TTL)	11,3	125,0	III/IV	11,0

SOURCE
Lant Tenure Act (1970:
first and Second Sche-
dules), Census (1969:
Table 2).

NOTE
Population figures in-
clude both African and
European populations
for both areas. The
population in the Euro-
pean districts of course
includes African farm-
workers and their de-
pendants living on
European farmland.

cialise in crop or cattle farming. In the TTLs land is communally owned and peasants have the right to farm small arable plots and to graze their cattle on communal land.¹⁵

Under a socialist strategy there would be no individual ownership of the land. All land would be nationalised and taken over by the state. This in itself would be a radical departure from the current position. But even within the socialist framework a choice still remains whether to divide the land up into individually-farmed plots or to farm the land on a completely cooperative basis. In the former case everyone would be given land to farm and farming would take place on small plots, above a basic minimum size, and perhaps with a certain degree of co-operation between farmers. In the latter case, the rural areas would be divided up into communes. Here all land and capital used for production would be held in common, the farmers would work the land together and share in the total output produced.¹⁶

As a long term strategy for Zimbabwe, a far stronger case can be made for the adoption of a system of communes than a farming system based on small individual plots. A communal system is not only theoretically preferable, but the present land structure in Rhodesia suggests this would also be far more appropriate in practice.

From a technical point of view, the pooling of land to form larger units, or the maintenance of larger units rather than dividing the land up into small plots, has a number of advantages. More land is farmed than under a small-farm system because there is less fragmentation and because the infrastructure can be planned to make more efficient use of available farming land. Complete co-operative farming leads to a more efficient division of labour, it leads to greater opportunities for growing a wider variety of crops in larger areas and allows for the mass treatment of weeds and pests. As technological advances in agriculture are not, in general, scale-neutral but tend to be biased in favour of larger acreages, communal farming provides a far more favourable base for future developments than do individual small plots. Individual plots farmed by family members will always tend to lead to labour-intensive production but farming in communes can be either labour-intensive, as in China, or more capital-intensive as in Israel or Rumania. The division of rural land into communes also provides a far more rational and efficient framework for the provision of credit, necessary inputs such as fertilizers and seeds, as well as extension services. Similarly, the marketing of crops is made easier and there is more scope for specialisation of production in relation to Agro-Ecological conditions. Under a system of communes, it is far easier to specialise in production in particular areas, either for internal consumption or for exports, because produce can be moved far more easily from one part of the country to another.

But the advantages of dividing the rural areas into a system of communes extend beyond the purely technical agricultural reasons. Co-operation rather than competition, the essence of socialism, can be promoted and maintained far more easily when there is common ownership of the means of production and co-operation in the work process. Work plans are discussed together, decisions are taken together on what should be grown and how the surplus should be divided up.¹⁷ Furthermore, communes not only provide a basis for a more efficient and rational use of the land but they have advantages beyond land utilisation. Communes provide the key centres for the rural population enabling a more efficient way of bringing educational and health facilities to

the people than if rural land were covered by scattered isolated home-steads. Communes would also provide the basis for growth-centres; for example it is far easier to encourage small-scale industrial production within the commune structure than when a region is covered by a dispersed population. There are also long run national reasons for creating a commune-based agricultural structure. A system of small farms is far more likely to lead to greater income inequalities between the rural and urban areas and hence favour an unbalanced and inequalitarian growth path. Under a commune system this widening of incomes can be more easily controlled.

Farming on individual plots is said to be preferable to farming the land in communes because people work harder, because potential gains are related to individual effort and because productivity per acre is higher on small plots. Further, smaller plots need less management expertise and supervision than do communes which need skilled administration to reach comparable efficiency levels. It is argued, too, that complete co-operation is well beyond the capabilities of most peasant farmers.

In response to these arguments a number of comments can be made. While it is true that skilled management is needed for the successful running of communes, small-scale farming also needs experts and extension advice to promote efficient farming methods. Rhodesia is very short of an adequate supply of experienced extension staff and it would be far more efficient to divide these up among communes than to hope that they would cover hundreds of peasant farmers; in practice extension staff tends to concentrate on the better farmers in an area.¹⁸ Incentives are provided for those working in communes and in China, for example, a points system relates work done to effort extended. Though the system is complex it can and does work. Another problem of maintaining small farms is that in such a situation the former rural elites, such as larger farmers and rural merchants, are highly likely to maintain their power and wage a continual struggle against the transition to socialism.¹⁹

In the Rhodesian context, a socialist land reform which established peasants on individual plots rather than transforming the whole of the rural areas into a system of larger communes would present a number of difficulties. As we saw in Chapter III, the majority of TTL farmers have to farm plots far too small even to provide for the subsistence needs of themselves and their families. Thus a land reform which settled farmers on individual plots on the European land would also have to include a radical reform of the TTLs to give the remaining farmers an adequate acreage of land.²⁰ But to do this would be absurd. As the whole operation would lead to a radical upheaval throughout the rural areas, it would seem more logical to create a communal system straight away as this is far more consistent with the principles of socialist development. What is more, as we have seen, an agricultural system based on small plots provides no long term solution because in time the plot size would have to be increased in response to technical change.

A policy of establishing peasant farmers on viable small farms raises the important question of the present commercial farming sector. At present there are some 4 576 farms which are larger than 1 000 acres in size; together these farms cover 35,0m acres (42 percent of the total farming land of the country) and they are on average much bigger than 1 000 acres — they average 7 650 acres each.²¹ To promote a small farm land strategy for peasant farmers would entail the subdivision of the majority of these farming units so as to accommo-

date the 350 000 farmers who at present cannot be provided with adequate plots in the Tribal areas. The subdivision of larger units is an expensive operation, it leads to alterations in the rural infrastructure and adds to the complexity of marketing produce; it may well lead to the destruction of property as well as to the under-utilisation of capital equipment designed for larger units. The more productive farms, if it is thought desirable, could be left as they are, but operated either as co-operatives or state-farms. But to do this would be to maintain a dualism in the agricultural sector, of big and small units, which a radical land reform should be striving to eliminate. The duality would be likely to lead to growing inequalities between the two types of farming unit and perhaps lead to antagonism between those who have to farm land which will have very different levels of profitability.²² What is more, to maintain the more efficient larger farms and not subdivide them is itself an admission that larger units are relatively more efficient and that the subdivision of the land into smaller units is a short-term measure.

Under the proposed system of communes these difficulties would not arise. The commercial farming structure as it exists at present would form the basis for the creation of communes. Some of the larger unmanageable units might be subdivided while the smaller ones (some 1 557 farms in 1976 were under 500 acres) would be joined together to form larger units. Present farming techniques, if efficient, could be maintained. Resettlement from the African areas would take place and the incoming population would be absorbed onto the under-utilised land and help to farm it as large units.²³ The basic differences between farming the land as communes and as at present would be that: all the land would be nationalised and given to the commune members to farm for themselves, production would take place within a socialist framework rather than the capitalist system and production decisions would result from the resolution of local and national agricultural objectives.

The basis for the creation of communal units would be best related to historical territorial groupings, though this would probably be more of a felt-need in the African rather than the European areas. The largest grouping in the TTLs is the chiefdom (*nyika*) and at present there are some 250 distributed throughout the Tribal Areas. If each were to comprise a commune then there would be approximately 1 000 households to each unit. Below the chiefdoms are the tribal wards (*dunhu*) and there are approximately 1 000 of these in the TTLs. A ward comprises a 'well-defined territory, its boundaries usually marked by natural features such as rivers, streams or hill-tops'.²⁴ Traditionally (although not under the present government) it has been the ward, and not the chiefdom, which has held the basic tribal 'right of avail' to all territory within its boundaries. Thus this division would seem to provide a more natural basis for the formation of communes. If communes were based on the ward division then there would be approximately 270 households to each unit.

In a socialist land strategy for Zimbabwe the size of communes would depend upon the quality of the land, on the total national strategy for development and on the felt-needs of particular localities.²⁵ The Tangwena people in the Inyanga district, for example, would form a natural base for a commune because of the particular history of the group and there will be other local circumstances in other areas which would play a dominant part in deciding the best size. Furthermore, as agriculture develops it is likely that, for example, ad-

jacent wards could be merged together to form larger communes if that is seen as desirable.

In practice the particular size of communes would depend upon factors other than simply land-man relationships. In some areas there may well be a greater potential for the commune population to earn part of its living from extra-agricultural activities, in which case the population carried by the commune need not be related to the carrying capacity of the land. It is clear that a large number of factors need to be considered in estimating the size of communes and potential land use may not always be the dominant consideration. Though communes would provide the basis for land distribution, the creation of a commune system in the rural areas would need to be related to the total socialist strategy of which land considerations form only a part.

This discussion of a radical long term land strategy for Zimbabwe leads to the following conclusions. The acute inequalities in rural land in Rhodesia and widespread poverty among the rural poor demand a radical restructuring of man and land relationships to create a more egalitarian system. This can only take place in practice, it is argued, under a socialist strategy. The larger areas of unused and under-utilised land in the European areas, chiefly located in the central watershed area, allow for the resettlement from the over-populated TTLs of a substantial number of people as part of the strategy. The other part of the strategy would entail providing adequate land in the TTLs for all those remaining dependent upon agriculture. Technical arguments, long run considerations, egalitarian principles and the total socialist strategy all point to the overwhelming conclusion that a system of rural communes would provide the surest base for future rural development. The size of communes would depend upon the harmonisation of a national socialist strategy and local interests and the quality of land in each area. Eventually all rural land would consist of relatively self-contained communes with the rural population distributed throughout the country but with the majority living in the central watershed area.

Land reform is essential in providing the new land structure for future development, but it needs to be emphasized that it does not provide anything like a sufficient condition for that development. Land reform is only a beginning. For development to occur, a whole range of supporting policies need to be promoted both to increase agricultural production and to provide basic services to the rural population.

C. LAND POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL

The place that foreign capital would have in a socialist land strategy for an independent Zimbabwe is a critical issue. Foreign companies play a very important role in commercial agriculture in present-day Rhodesia. They own very large acreages of land (at least one has a ranch of over one million acres), they are responsible for a large proportion of agricultural exports, both of processed and unprocessed products, they employ thousands of people, their estates are often the centres of flourishing rural communities and they account for some 75 percent of gross profits in agriculture.²⁶

Agricultural multinationals cannot be considered in isolation: land policies related to these companies not only have to be consistent with the overall land strategy for the country but they also have to fall in line with the country's total strategy towards international capital. As agricultural multinational

firms are currently large earners of foreign exchange, any change in the country's external economic policies would directly affect these firms. Furthermore some multinationals involved in agriculture have interests in mining, manufacturing and distribution; because of the possibility of retaliation in other parts of the economy it is thus essential for policies related to agricultural multinational firms to be consistent with the policies in all other sectors of the economy.²⁷

It is clear, then, that a discussion of land policies towards agricultural multinationals presently operating in the country encompasses the whole debate about international capital for a socialist strategy built upon self-reliance. The present discussion can do little more than outline the broad issues involved and in particular show how these relate to the land question. A number of extreme 'solutions' are theoretically possible as an approach to international capital in general and to multinational corporations (MNCs) in particular. First would be a policy of total autarchy: all MNCs presently operating in the country could be completely taken over, Zimbabwe would cut off all contacts with the outside world and would neither import nor export any goods. Alternatively, the MNCs currently operating could be allowed to continue, others would be allowed to enter the country, and the relatively favourable government policies towards MNCs would continue. Finally, international capital links and trade links with the West could be severed in favour of establishing links with the Eastern bloc countries, and particularly the developed Eastern bloc countries, both for trading purposes and to obtain the country's capital requirements. It will be shown that none of these alternatives provides a satisfactory solution, for none comes to grips either with the potential benefits to be obtained from international capital, from the West as well as from the East, nor with the basic structural problems which flow from any contact. The most promising approach to international capital lies in adopting a selective strategy for the future which is dependent upon the stage of development reached and the relative effects international capital is likely to have on both the national economy and on particular sectors of the total economy.²⁸

A poor country which follows a policy of total autarchy and excludes the possibility of using international capital is likely to be worse off in both the short term and in the long run than if it opens its doors, selectively to such contacts. No poor country, not even China, is sufficiently endowed with natural resources, technical expertise and know-how to be able to develop sufficiently without contact with the outside world.²⁹ The poorer and smaller a country, the greater is the need for technology, managerial skills and knowledge to increase production and raise productivity. It is through international contacts that a country is able to take advantage of these benefits which are available in other countries. And it is by exporting goods, and its own particular expertise, that the poor country is able to buy these scarce resources from the outside world. Unfortunately, the less a country develops the less powerful it will be at international bargaining and so the more open it will be to both economic and political exploitation. An increase in a country's stock of technology and knowledge is thus necessary to maintain the country's relative self-reliance — never mind to improve it.

The basic problems with opening one's door to international capital is that the benefits that one would thereby derive are not neutral. The importation of foreign capital, technology and managerial skills also leads to the importation

of a particular production process, and usually particular labour relations, which impose their own structures on the host country. The greater the penetration of foreign capital in a country, the more control it will have on that economy and the less able will that country be to pursue a development strategy of its own choosing: it will be locked into the structures of world market forces.³⁰ The available evidence suggests that these problems are just as likely to occur if a country is aligned to the East as to the West, for in both cases 'growth without development' is likely to result.³¹

It is because Western MNCs play such a dominant role in the international economy and because of their control over knowledge and technology that they, above all, are so important for poor countries. But because they are bearers of market forces, MNCs carry with them capitalist relations of production which are at variance with a socialist development strategy of self-reliance. The particular problems which MNCs pose for poorer countries can be briefly listed. They link the host country to the international capitalist system which increases dependence on world market forces. Their production processes tend to be more efficient and technologically advanced than local concerns; so the presence of the MNCs leads to increasing inequalities within the economy.³² As MNCs tend to pay higher wages than local firms, the expansion of their operations leads to growing inequalities of income; also they lead to the penetration of the 'trans-national culture' which leads to increasing demands for luxury goods that can only be imported from abroad. On the other hand other types of MNCs also use poorer countries as sources of cheap labour. While this may provide short term gains for the poorer country in the form of foreign exchange earnings, the long term international implications of this policy are to reinforce the structural rigidities of the international economy which highly favour the developed nations of the world.³³ MNCs are in business to make profits and these profits are repatriated out of the host country. Even with rigorous scrutiny by tax officials it is not unusual for high rates of profits to be made, for example, through the use of elaborate transfer-pricing within companies in different countries. Large MNCs in small countries can become rival power centres to the government of these countries. They will tend to use their power and financial influence to enhance those political groups which support their aims and so they are far from politically-neutral animals.

At present Rhodesia is short of capital, technical know-how and managerial skills which will all be needed for the development of an independent socialist Zimbabwe. Past growth came about largely through the penetration of foreign capital and MNCs have helped to mold the present economic structure through playing a dominant part in the colonial development process. For the future, an analysis will have to be made of where international capital and expertise will be needed and where its presence frustrates the development strategy so much that its costs outweigh its benefits. In particular an assessment needs to be made of the MNCs which operate in the country (and perhaps of those which could be invited to come) to analyse the relative merits of their continuing to operate.

The immediate problem, however, relates to the short term and in particular to the MNCs which are operating in the country at the present time. In relation to agricultural MNCs, the following questions need to be answered. Which MNCs are essential for the country either because they are providing necessary foreign exchange or necessary consumption goods that it would

prove too expensive to have to import? Which ones are providing technology, managerial skills and efficient production techniques which are both benefiting the economy and could perhaps be adapted to be used in other sectors of the economy? Which agricultural MNCs are creating economic enclaves and leading to structural inequalities? Which MNCs are producing exports that are increasing dependence on the international capitalist system? Which ones are importing high-cost capital equipment to maintain production? Which ones are leading to an expansion of employment opportunities, and which ones are not? Finally, is it possible to obtain the benefits which agricultural MNCs bring by buying the technology and expertise and knowledge they have from elsewhere either in the short term or in the longer run?—

In the short term, at least, it appears that agricultural MNCs will be needed: the country does not have the resources to take them over and run them straight away, and for them to stop production at once would lead to too great a loss of foreign exchange, internal production and employment and a great potential loss of technology and expertise that need to be harnessed for the future. But this does not mean that they should be allowed to continue to operate as they do at present. There are a whole range of policies which should be implemented to control the influence that these corporations presently exert. The relationship between MNCs and the government is essentially a bargaining one: the government should attempt to obtain all the benefits it can from the MNC while ensuring that the company will not pack up and leave; the MNC for its part will attempt to strike a bargain on terms most favourable to itself. In this respect it needs to be borne in mind that it is in the interests of the MNC both to argue that its enterprise is a complex one, needing expatriate experts to maintain efficiency, and also for it to hide the true extent of the gains that accrue from its operations. Bargaining is a very skilled art.³⁴

Control can be exerted in a number of ways. The first step to take is to nationalise the land. Even while MNCs are still retained in the agricultural sector, there is no reason why the companies should continue to own the land. In harmony with land policies for the rest of the country, the land presently owned by the MNCs should be nationalised; companies would then only have the use of the land they farm for agricultural production.

The threat of complete nationalisation of the *assets* of MNCs is neither likely to lead to mutual co-operation nor is such a step necessary. Complete nationalisation in no way guarantees that the country will have greater access to knowledge, managerial skills and technology, which are the critically important assets of foreign capital. As Penrose argues, state control of MNCs does not have to entail anything like the purchase of 50 percent interest in the companies.³⁵ What is important is for Zimbabwe to gain the managerial expertise and technical knowledge to facilitate greater national control in the future. This is most easily obtained through insisting that nationals learn the critical technical and managerial skills for production. This also enables the state to know more about the financial structure of the company so facilitating a tax regime favourable to the host country. The ultimate aim is to get the company 'to open its books'. Strict control should be maintained over the use by the company of retained profits.³⁶

Where agricultural MNCs have operations that are involved in agricultural processing as well as in growing crops, it might be possible to take over the crop production end of the venture (which usually involves a simple technique

of production) provided one could be certain that the company would continue processing the produce and not be moved to leave the country completely. Complete takeover is easiest where production processes involve the use of low levels of technology and where they are relatively small-scale operations. It appears that in Rhodesia sugar production and processing would provide the greatest problems for potential long term takeover. But it needs to be added that the expertise for sugar production does not lie solely within Rhodesia and South Africa. If local people could be trained to run the sugar estates by experts from outside Southern Africa and if this could be done more quickly than the MNCs consider possible, then this option should be seriously considered.

But even when Zimbabwe has obtained the necessary skills to take over the running of these companies, scarcely half the battle has been won. Money needs to be channelled into research and development so that the country can develop her own technology; where this is not possible (and even the USSR has its problems) then this will have to be sought from elsewhere. But more important still is the next stage to be pursued after companies have been taken over. The whole structure of these companies needs to be altered to bring the company more in line with a self-reliant strategy. Positive steps need to be taken to ensure, as far as possible, that the labour process used by the MNCs does not continue to impose itself on the company once local people have learnt how to use (and hopefully adapt) the foreign technology. A new work ethic has to be created, so that higher levels of technology can be used to further the movement to self-reliance and co-operation rather than to perpetuate the alienation of the workforce.

Beyond these, mostly general, proposals little can be said at present. The decision to take over particular MNCs involved in agricultural production or to encourage others to stay will depend upon a wide range of factors that have to be assessed within the total socialist development strategy. An agricultural enterprise might be maintained not because it necessarily makes the most efficient use of the land or because it produces goods needed by the people, but because it provides essential foreign exchange or because it is in the interests of the whole economy not to antagonise a particular company which is involved in the production of essential goods in another sector of the national economy. However, the more inconsistent a policy towards agricultural MNCs is adopted in relation to the general land strategy of moving the rural communities, the more convinced the people will have to be that this policy is in the national interest. What is clear is that a self-reliant economic strategy demands that steps be taken immediately to lessen the control that MNCs do have on the economy at present.³⁷

D. THE SHORT TERM STRATEGY

i. Political Possibilities

Land reform policies can only be implemented successfully in practice if the policy-makers have the political power to carry through the reform. These 'reforms' which attempt to maintain continuity in the economic structure are easier to implement because they are initiated by the present power elite and they are usually designed to strengthen that power base at a time when it is threatened. But reforms which are designed to radically alter the present structures of the economy directly challenge the beneficiaries of the old system and

so they will quickly lead to political conflict. In the case of an egalitarian socialist reform proposed for an inegalitarian monopoly capitalist country, success can only come about if the poor and marginalised members of the society are able to gain political control from the former political elite. The wide experience of countries attempting such a reform clearly shows that such a transfer of power can only come about through struggle and more often than not this will include armed struggle.

It is possible to discuss a socialist land reform as a realistic alternative in present-day Rhodesia precisely because there is such a power conflict within the country. In recent years this conflict has led to an escalation of armed struggle between those defending the status quo and those demanding radical structural change.³⁸ Central elements of the Liberation movements (both ZAPU and ZANU), as well as groups within the UANC and ANCZ together with the People's Movement inside the country, are committed to radical change and the creation of a socialist strategy for Zimbabwe. This section attempts to map out the short term land strategy that a radical political administration could initiate and to propose tentative ways of overcoming the immediate problems it would face.³⁹ We shall assume here that the political groups advocating radical change will eventually gain political control and maintain political power. Our concern is not to discuss how this will come about, but to discuss the land policies that should be adopted once political power has been achieved.⁴⁰

Political power could be obtained either fairly rapidly or after a long drawn out political and military struggle. If the struggle to obtain political control is a long one, then the land structure is likely to change as the struggle continues. As the possibility of a socialist victory grows, then European-owned farms are likely to be run down and vacated and peasants are likely to move in and occupy the empty land; in time, agricultural MNCs may also abandon their operations as an extension of the war leads to a destruction of the capitalist economy. In this case the military and political struggle will determine what happens to land and suggested policy-alternatives will be of little help.

If, however, political control is obtained fairly rapidly, then the present land structures and rural population distribution will be preserved largely as they exist at present. It is this particular alternative which will concern us here. The incoming administration, committed to pursuing a radical land reform, would have to decide upon a strategy for achieving its long term goals. The experience from other countries shows that a series of short term, often quick decisions would be necessary if the new government is to maintain and widen its political support among the people, maintain production in agriculture while implementing far-reaching structural changes in land and finally if it is not to antagonise the critically-important richer and middle peasants in the process. If the new government were to move too quickly it would have to face growing opposition to its policies; if it were to move too slowly then the forces of reaction might well prove too great for radical changes to be carried out.⁴¹

Perhaps the most important lesson to draw from the experience of other countries engaged in radical land reform is that the process is unique for each country, it cannot be mapped out in advance. The two most critical variables in the reform process are the political control and support the new government has and its ability to organise. If the government taking power had widespread support then it would be able to carry through structural change without too much conflict, but if it had only partial support it would have to move both

more carefully and more slowly. In either event, an early programme of re-education and conscientisation would be important to obtain even wider support. Unless there is mass support at each stage of the reform process and the forces of reaction can be successfully opposed, then thorough-going socialist reform is unlikely to occur.⁴² A weak government is more likely to be forced by external pressures (perhaps as part of the legitimisation process) to carry out reforms that are too hastily prepared or poorly executed.

The second essential ingredient for successful reform is the ability of the new government to carry through its plans, in short its ability to organise. In a changeover to a socialist development strategy, radical changes would have to be made immediately right through the economy to oppose the forces of reaction that would be bound to rise up to defend their interests. To combat these forces, to communicate with the people so as to prepare them for change and finally to maintain control both during, and after these changes occur, the organisational strength of the new government would be decisive. The more preparation, planning and communication with the people that can take place beforehand, the more likely will it be for the initial reforms to be successful. Lastly, the experience of other countries shows that the reform process is an ongoing one and it is thus likely to last for many years into the future.

ii. *Some Proposals for a Possible Transition Period*

The long term goal of a socialist land strategy for Zimbabwe is, as we have argued, to create a system of communes throughout the country. But this is going to be a long process and it would have to be achieved in stages: some change could be achieved gradually, other changes would require discrete steps forward. Compromises need to be made and this has to be clearly recognised. It would not be possible, for example, both to take over the larger commercial farms all at once and form co-operatives while also maintaining the present levels of production. Similarly, it would not be possible to create communes in the Tribal areas at once because this would be resisted by the important middle and richer peasants whose initial support will be critical for the incoming government.⁴³ Even in a socialist state, land reform, like politics, is the art of the possible.

The first stage of the land reform process should entail the nationalisation of all the farming land in the country. But even this step would need to be taken cautiously for it would have to be done without frightening those farmers who are involved in the production of essential foodstuffs or essential export crop production. At present some 70 percent of the food requirements of the TTLs as well as the vast majority of the country's urban food needs come from the commercial farming sector. Thus any reform and any moves towards taking over the commercial farming sector would need to ensure that there is no massive reduction in production for this would lead to starvation and the possible loss of political control by the government. Furthermore foreign exchange is likely to be scarce in an independent socialist Zimbabwe so every attempt should be made to maintain the production of export crops. As at present the country does not have the expertise to take over these large farms, incentives would have to be offered to ensure that production levels were maintained.

It is apparent therefore that the nationalisation of all commercial farming land would have to be tempered by a policy which would provide the necessary incentives to persuade the better farmers to continue to farm their land. But in-

centives should not be given to productive farmers across the board as occurred in Kenya. In a socialist Zimbabwe any incentive scheme *must* be related to the whole long term land reform strategy. As the long term goal is to move to a system of worker participation and co-operative farming on these estates, the highest incentives should be given to those large farms which not only maintain production but which also begin to move towards greater worker participation and the training of new management. The more rapidly this process occurs the higher should be the reward offered to the previous land-owner. If previously-European farms could be converted in, say, two or three years to a fully co-operative enterprise running efficiently then it would be worth giving the original landowner large enough compensation to ensure that this process occurs. Incentives could be related to the feed-back received on particular farms on the progress made towards greater co-operation. Workers on particular farms would know well enough if genuine steps were being taken to incorporate them into the management and decision-making process, so some sort of labour accountability should be inaugurated to monitor the progress made. In similar fashion farmers should be rewarded if they are able to use their managerial skills to help co-ordinate the resettlement of people on vacant and under-utilised land in their districts.

We saw in Chapter III that a high proportion of (mostly small) commercial European farms are run uneconomically and are highly subsidised. To recommend that these farms should be immediately taken over and used for new settlement could be a short-sighted proposal. These too should be incorporated into the over-all socialist strategy. Incentives should be given to these farmers to shift to co-operative farming, to join their small farms together so as to create bigger units and to incorporate local landless peasants into the newly formed farming units.

It is clear that compensation would have to be paid to commercial farmers to ensure necessary production levels were maintained. But what is being proposed is a gradation of compensation for individual (and corporate) landowners. Those who have unprofitable farms, who have unused and under-utilised land and who have no wish to participate in the socialist reconstruction would have their land expropriated at once. Those who maintain high levels of production and move swiftly to a more co-operative farming system should receive the highest compensation. Thus the actual monetary rewards to be given to farmers would depend upon the response that the landowners make to these proposals. It needs to be made extremely profitable for farmers to stay on their land long enough to ensure that new management could be trained to run the farms competently.

As an example, farmers could be paid a good price for the crops they produce as a first step. They would also be paid compensation for each year that they stay and shift towards a more co-operative farming system, with the amount of compensation rising each year they stay until local management was able to take over completely. If enough landowners were willing to participate in the transition process, and perhaps even become full members of the co-operative, then there would be no need to pay any compensation to the farmers not willing to co-operate in the reform process. The highest financial benefits should go to those who maintain production and help in the move away from traditional capitalist farming methods.

The success of this strategy would depend upon the finance that is available

to promote it. Because this part of the total transition process is so critical to the whole socialist strategy and subsequent land reform, it should receive the highest priority from the new government. And, it is hoped, international agencies would be willing to help finance the process.⁴⁴ But even if large amounts of finance were available, the shift to a socialist strategy would probably ensure that many farmers would leave the country and this, together with the growing number of farms that are already vacant, would lead to large areas of farming land in the old European areas becoming vacant in this initial period. Yet as long as production levels remained high enough to cover the short-term needs of the TTLs population (and hopefully to maintain exports) then this state of affairs should be viewed as potentially beneficial.

Not only would the removal of these farmers mean that less money would have to be paid out in compensation, but it would also mean that substantial resettlement from the overcrowded TTLs would take place with a minimum of disruption in commercial agriculture. Resettlement would almost certainly be politically important and it would clearly show the people that the government was sincere in its desire to re-allocate land in a more egalitarian fashion.

There are, however, a number of problems associated with the proposed resettlement programme. Resettlement would need to be carried out fairly quickly, both so it would be *seen* to be a radical and far-reaching reform away from the colonial land system and so that land would not be left idle in the growing season where it would be liable to be invaded by uncontrolled squatters. But if the resettlement programme were rapid, there would not be enough time for the people to be fully prepared to farm the land co-operatively and so, at least in the short term, part of the resettlement area would need to be used for small-scale peasant farming. If that did happen it would need to be stressed that this was a *transitional* measure and that in the longer term the land would be farmed on a co-operative basis. This could be done through initiating a number of policy measures to accompany the resettlement. For example, the land should be allocated in such a way that both the farming and residential land could be adapted easily to a commune system. In addition, the communal marketing of produce, the formation of communal working parties and communal access to credit could all form part of a resettlement package.⁴⁵ As the Kenyan case shows, if resettlement leads to an enriched, large and prosperous small farm sector on European land, this group will prove both economically and politically difficult to dislodge. What is critical to the whole resettlement programme is the organisational ability of both local and national officials. Poor organisation would not only lead to inefficiencies in land allocation, it would also lead to the more powerful peasants selecting the better land and attempting to better themselves at the expense of the weak.

In the Tribal areas it would be equally impossible to move over to a system of communes overnight. Not only would this be politically impossible, but it is also clear that the majority of peasant farmers are not at all ready for such a radical change to take place in their method of farming or their general way of life. There have been two examples of co-operative farming in Rhodesia: Cold Comfort Farm near Salisbury and the Nyafaru Development Company in the Inyanga District. Both have had to close for security reasons. The experience obtained from these two ventures shows that co-operative farming is a realistic alternative to present forms of Tribal cultivation. Clutton-Brock argues that at Cold Comfort Farm a significant proportion of prospective members who ini-

tially appeared unsuitable candidates turned out to be people of high quality. Thus a genuine commune-type of farming organisation is quite possible for Zimbabwe, even if careful thought and planning is needed before similar schemes could be attempted throughout the country.⁴⁶ Thus in the short term, policies should be introduced into the Tribal Areas to encourage the move to fuller co-operation before the final step is taken to complete communalisation.

In this respect it appears that a radical redistribution of Tribal land into more equal smallholdings would not be advisable. To do this would frustrate the longer term goals of greater co-operation. What is more, it would not only cause a radical disruption within the TTLs, but it would highlight the class differences within the TTLs at a time when unity rather than conflict in the peasant population needs to be vigorously promoted. But immediate changes *are* necessary because so many peasants and landless people are living on sub-economic plots and because a time of radical political upheaval provides the best opportunity for the wheels of change to begin turning.

As a first step towards greater co-operation within the Tribal areas, the peasant population could be divided up into 'mutual aid' farming groups. An example of how this type of low-level mutual-aid scheme can work in practice may be illustrated by the very successful operation of the agricultural groups set up by Silveira House development centre in the Mangwende, Mtoko, Mondoro, Chinamora and Wedza TTLs.

The Silveira House groups have been formed in the last few years among TTL peasant farmers, men and women. Their popularity with the people can be gauged from the fact that the numbers of groups have increased eight-fold from 1974 to 1976 and from 1975 to 1976 the number of group-members increased from 705 to 2 056.⁴⁷ But for the constraints caused by staff shortage, the growth of groups would have been even more rapid, for in areas where groups have been formed, neighbouring peasant farmers have been eager to join these groups.⁴⁸

Each group consists of about 20 neighbouring farmers, although some groups have as many as 60 full-time members. The groups are divided up into work-teams with about ten members to each team. Members take it in turn to work on each other's plots where the plot-owner allocates work to the team. About half the week is taken up with co-operative work and for the rest of the week members work their own land. Co-operative work covers all aspects of farming: ploughing, weeding, harvesting, carting manure to members' plots as well as the more arduous tasks of levelling and contouring the land. Co-operation also extends beyond the sharing of labour; seeds and fertilizer are bought in bulk and the marketing of produce is carried out by the group. Each group meets to discuss matters of mutual interest such as future planning, advice on crops and fertilizer use; and each group elects its own committee to deal with paper work etc. With the help of the Silveira House development and extension staff, orientation courses take place for both group leaders and ordinary members while competitions such as 'green shows' help to develop the communal spirit in each district and to encourage better farming techniques. As a result of the courses, groups have now moved into other forms of co-operation such as adult literacy classes and the building of crop storage facilities for the group. The final area of co-operation relates to group finance. Initially the groups have been loaned money by the development centre to cover the purchase of necessary inputs but after three years, with increased marketed sur-

plus, the groups have acquired enough money to start their own savings club. To date all the original loans have been fully repaid.

Not only have these groups led to greater co-operation and widespread popularity in the districts where they have been started, but they have also led to very high increases in production. Whereas the national average yield in the TTLs is two bags of maize per acre, the Silveira groups obtained 12-16 bags in 1972 and by 1976 the average yield had risen to 30 bags per acre.⁴⁹

This example shows both the benefits that can be obtained from even a low-level of peasant co-operation in a relatively short period of time and also that this type of organisation is very popular in areas where the groups have been tried. In time this basic framework could be expanded in a manner not unlike the path towards full co-operation taken in China. For example, the produce grown by all the members of the group, richer and poorer peasants and the landless, could be so divided up that, at a minimum, the poorest should have enough to eat, while the price received from any marketed produce could be determined by the group's willingness to share out the surplus among group members. More time could be spent in co-operative work than at present and the surplus produced could be shared more in relation to work done than to the land farmed by individuals. Next, these smaller groups could be merged together to form larger units. And so the movement to greater co-operation would proceed. Both the speed and extent of co-operation would depend upon the successes achieved and the willingness of the people to go on to a higher form of co-operation.

At present Tribal land is divided up into individually-cultivated plots and communal grazing land; it is obviously important to incorporate the grazing areas into any co-operatively-oriented plan for the future. Just as it would be a retrogressive step to divide the TTLs into more equal small-sized cultivated plots, so too it would not advance the move towards the eventual creation of communes to divide up the grazing land into individual holdings. What a co-operative strategy suggests is that agricultural groups should take over and use the communal grazing land for the use of co-operative members. In this way, a large proportion of Tribal land would immediately be under the control of a group of farmers rather than under individual control. It would then be the decision of the group (with the advice of extension staff) to determine what to do with this land: it could be maintained as grazing land, some land presently cultivated could be turned back to grazing land or alternatively even more land could be cultivated than at present. The decisions would depend upon the ecological suitability of the land for particular types of farming and a movement towards unit planning would help to cut through the widely held, but false, assumption that all land should be used for mixed farming of cattle and arable land.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the extension of group responsibility in the grazing areas would greatly help the improvement of grazing land in areas where cattle ranching is the only profitable farming alternative; it would provide the incentive for a more thorough-going management of the land, improved grazing through fencing, rotational paddocks, vlei improvement, improved grasses, etc.⁵¹ The Natural Resources Board has already promoted this type of approach and it has proved successful, for example, in Msana TTL.

A more difficult decision relates to the ownership of cattle. At present, as we have noted, over 60 percent of all peasant cultivators own no cattle and of those who do own cattle, the ownership pattern is highly unequal.⁵² Eventually the

ownership of cattle would have to be transferred from the individual to the co-operative group and this decision is all the more urgent in areas where cattle farming provides the only profitable way of making a living in agriculture. When and how this decision is made would depend upon the expected political opposition to come from attempting to carry out such a policy. If it were felt that a radical change in cattle ownership could not be brought about at once, then government policies would need to ensure at least that the richer cattle owners (and owners of other livestock) received less favourable treatment than if the cattle were owned by a co-operative group. For example, individually-owned cattle could be subject to high dipping fees and communally-owned cattle could be dipped free of charge. In the same way policies could also ensure that the price of cultivated produce is more favourable to poorer peasants and co-operative groups than to richer peasants. In this fashion the resistance of the middle and richer peasants would be eroded as their economic power decreased; this would ease the eventual "leap forward" to communes. How particular policies are carried out in the future cannot be anticipated at this stage; these would depend upon both the success of initial policies and the political power of the government to implement further change.

Changes at the local level need to be complemented by planning at the national and provincial levels. In time adjacent co-operative groups could be joined together so that the movement of co-operation could grow from the base upwards. But at the same time, planning would also be needed at higher levels to make sure that there would be enough land available for the population in each area, to plan for possible resettlement and to ensure that the land would be divided equitably not only within groups but also between groups. Again, both organisational ability and political power would be essential for the reforms to operate smoothly.

Other policies would also be needed to increase the effectiveness of land reform policies. Large amounts of money would be needed to improve the rural infrastructure and particularly to integrate the former Tribal areas into the rest of the economy. Roads, dams and perhaps even railways would need to be planned and built, but in a way that would encourage the movement to larger agricultural units and the eventual establishment of rural communes. It is also important for other facilities such as health and educational centres to be incorporated into the overall planning strategy. It is in this general area of reform that international agencies could be called upon to participate as they have done in other countries.⁵³

E. AN ANTIDOTE TO CHAOS

Order is essential for the functioning of any society, so when signs of disorder and disruption begin to appear there will inevitably be cause for concern. But one must not be deluded into thinking that order necessarily implies a state of harmony in society: if change can bring about order with greater harmony, then policies designed to preserve the present society may well maintain order but this will be at the cost of greater coercion. To hide the deeper conflicts in society for the sake of maintaining order, will almost certainly lead to a deepening of conflict, an escalation of control and coercion and an order based on authoritarianism and institutional violence. The growth of 'National Security States' in Latin America shows that just this sort of process is occurring today.

The basic assumption behind the proposals in this Chapter is that radical

land reform provides the only starting point for the resolution of the deeper conflicts within Rhodesia. It is *these* proposals which provide the antidote to chaos. Of course any radical change requires struggle and struggle does involve coercion, but the crucial question is not whether there is coercion but: what kind, for what ends and with what base of support and authority.⁵⁴ Both socialist and capitalist societies coerce, there are gainers as well as losers, there is resistance as well as support. Even an income tax law coerces. In the transition to socialism, coercion would be necessary, particularly to oppose the forces that have dominated the poor in colonial society; classes would continue to exist and clashes between them would be expected as those who lose power attempt to slow down or even reverse the process. What is more, poor planning and organisation would mean that mistakes would almost certainly be made. But socialist 'coercion' built on self-reliance provides the basis for higher forms of co-operation and greater national self-determination.

Land provides the focal point around which many of the deeper conflicts of the present society in Rhodesia are centred: it is the land structure which plays the fundamental role in maintaining the vast majority of the population in a state of poverty and increasing dependence. A radical land reform is the first step towards quickly increasing the well-being of the poor and establishing a new economic base which will confront the problems of poverty and under-development. Yet it is clear that even this first step will not be easy. However, to refrain from attempting a radical land reform on the grounds of impossibility would be both defeatist and historically inaccurate.

NOTES, CHAPTER V

¹ The pursuit of egalitarian goals does not mean that growth is now unimportant — with the acute poverty problem which exists in present-day Rhodesia, economic growth will be critically important. What it does mean, however, is that productive growth should be the means of eliminating poverty and that each and every aspect of economic growth needs to be evaluated in terms of its ability to achieve this end.

² For a comprehensive analysis of the period see Adelman and Morris (1973).

³ Murray in *Society for International Development* (1971:63).

⁴ The international implications of this point are of course complex. See Murray in *Society for International Development* (1971) and Hymer in Radice (1975).

⁵ The evidence from other countries (particularly in Latin America where income and land distribution is similar to that found in present-day Rhodesia) shows that it is just not possible to create a newly-structured more egalitarian capitalist system; indeed, the opposite is more likely to occur. See Adelman and Morris (1973: 186-202).

⁶ The transformation to socialism and self reliance is summarized by Raikes in *Review of African Political Economy* (1975:33-34):

"Transformation from a state of under-development and dependency towards socialism and self-reliance can be briefly defined as the convergence of resource use and the needs of the mass of the people. This implies both the transformation of the economic base to make it capable of performing this task and the control (not simply legal ownership) by the masses of the means and processes of production. The transformation of the economic base requires the construction of an integrated industrial base capable of meeting the demands for mass consumption goods and means of production and still more importantly of generating its own skills and technology. This in turn requires as a prerequisite, the democratic control of the economy by the masses, for only in this case will it be possible for planning and investment to aim at these goals."

⁷ Gurley in *World Development* (1975:470).

⁸ Gittings (1975:16).

⁹ The term 'equal access to land for all' of course only applies to those who are dependent upon agriculture for their livelihood. In the overall socialist strategy many people would find gainful employment in mining, manufacturing, commerce and service industries in both urban and rural areas.

¹⁰ One potential problem to this overall strategy is presented by the agricultural plantations currently owned by international capital interests. Many of these enterprises are highly profitable, many are engaged in production not carried out by individually-owned farming enterprises and they make a significant contribution to the country's agricultural exports. The policies to be adopted towards multinational agricultural enterprises have implications not only for future agricultural and land strategies but also for the general policies to be followed in relation to international capital for the total socialist development strategy. The discussion of these important issues will be left to the next section.

¹¹ See Tables 4 and 6 above.

¹² One positive effect of the overall strategy should be a lowering of the rate of population increase in the TTLs.

¹³ This is not to argue that other TTLs are not also over-populated; it is rather that the majority of all TTLs lie in this area.

¹⁴ In 1974, 119 000, or 33 percent of the agricultural labour-force on commercial farms were classified as foreign workers. It is not being argued here that all these should necessarily have to return 'home'. But some decision will have to be made about these workers. The criteria to be adopted,

would presumably, relate to their particular expertise, the length of time they have been in the country and their willingness to commit themselves to the country, permanently in the future.

¹⁵ But, as we have seen, the *right* to arable land in no way guarantees that potential cultivators will be actually given land, because of the vast-overpopulation and scarcity of land in the TTLs. In the present discussion we do not refer explicitly to the Purchase Areas because they form only a very minor part of the overall land and rural population 'problem'. They would, of course, be incorporated into the overall strategy discussed below and would be absorbed into the rural commune structure.

¹⁶ Of course the amount of produce retained by the commune would depend, in part, on the particular tax regime operating.

¹⁷ In practice, the procedure would be far more complex, involving group-teams and a hierarchical decision-making process.

¹⁸ At present in Rhodesia there are on average 500 cultivators to one extension assistant, but in some places there are as many as 2 500 farmers to one assistant. See Reid (1977).

¹⁹ This is the experience of Tanzania. See Green (1977:26).

²⁰ It would also have to be accompanied by a shift towards a more egalitarian ownership of cattle. See section D, ii, below.

²¹ *Crop Production in European Areas*, C.S.O. Salisbury, S/AG/07, 1977, Table 5.

²² In such a system high tax would have to be imposed on the more profitable farms, and this would probably be a strong work disincentive.

²³ By farming the under-utilised land more intensively, it is to be expected that large numbers of people could be absorbed on the land. If one assumes that 4 million acres of European land is at present unused and half the land is under-utilised, then it would be possible to absorb some 250 000 more cultivators onto the land. However this figure is a very approximate estimate.

²⁴ Holleman (1969:87).

²⁵ It is not possible, and probably not desirable at this stage, to say what the precise size of these proposed communes should be. This will vary from region to region: in Natural Farming Regions IV and V far more land would be needed to carry a certain farming population than in Regions I and II. Furthermore, the decision on size of communes would not be decided solely on land use criteria, as we shall explain.

In China, large communes have been created, ranging in size from 1 500 to 10 000 households and averaging about 5 000. In Tanzania the size of Ujamaa villages has been far smaller and these often contain as few as 30-40 families. (It is not being argued here that Ujamaa villages are full communes). In Algeria the state-farms (under workers' control) averaged 2 500 acres but this size has been judged to be too big for the present. See Griffin (1976:29).

²⁶ To give one example, Triangle Ltd is the largest agricultural venture in the country and it plays the dominant part in the country's sugar production. It has investments of \$56m, it farms 209 950 acres of land, much of which is irrigated, it employs 8 500 people and in 1976 it exported over one million tonnes of sugar. It is owned by the Hullels Corporation of South Africa, it is responsible for 54 percent of the company's total profits and in Rhodesia produces 54 tonnes of sugar an acre compared with 40 tonnes in its South African plantations. *The Sunday Mail*, 22nd May 1977.

²⁷ Anglo-American, besides its widespread manufacturing and mining interests, has part or total control of Eastern Estates, Hippo Valley, Mazoe Citrus and Premier Estates. Lonhro has interest in mining, engineering, chemicals, the retail motor trade, electrical industries and textiles as well as owning the large Rhodesian Wattle Company. Lever Brothers with its dominance in soap, detergent toiletries and food production also owns the Cashel Valley estate in the Eastern districts. See Cronje (1976:264-265).

²⁸ It has been argued in some quarters that the solution to the MNC 'problem' for a socialist Zimbabwe is for the state to obtain the controlling interests in all foreign enterprises. This view was

strongly expressed by some participants at an international seminar on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, organised by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, March 1977. However, the experience of countries which have followed this approach and a theoretical evaluation of such a strategy clearly show the superficial nature of this approach, for, as we shall argue, it fails to come to grips with the underlying nature of international capital and the effect that such capital has on the total development process of a poor country.

²⁹ See Vaitos (1974:252).

³⁰ Tanzania and Zambia both provide examples of this problem. Tanzania desperately needs foreign capital and technology to increase national production and tackle the problem of widespread poverty in the country. At present her import bill is some 25 percent of the total gross domestic product. To pay for this, a dependent export-oriented structure has to be maintained; the transformation of production towards greater self-reliance is largely dictated by external market forces. See Tennenbaum (1977:28).

The problem for Zambia has been well summarized by Seidman:

"... new foreign investment attracted into Zambia's manufacturing sector tended to produce more luxury items for the limited high-income elite associated with the export enclave, along with a few profitable mass-produced goods, like beer and cigarettes. This remained true even where government had purchased a majority of shares in the businesses, for government personnel adopted the same import substitution criteria as their foreign partners... Pharmaceuticals, radios, television sets, air conditioners, even private cars are now being 'produced' locally in last-stage assembly and processing factories using imported parts and materials. The import of finished luxury items by high-income groups, in other words, is gradually being replaced by the import of some machinery and equipment and the continuing import of parts and materials, instead of developing local resources. The resulting finished products are often sold at higher than world prices in the tariff-protected markets. The fact is that the complex industries required to produce such luxury items cannot be established in the truncated markets of Zambia or any other African state for a long time to come. Typically, moreover, the machinery and equipment imported for these kinds of industries are relatively capital-intensive, so that the number of new jobs created is limited. The new factories are generally built in the already developed export enclave to take advantage of existing external economies and the urban high income market. Few new job opportunities are spread into rural areas. Peasants seeking to escape rural poverty still have little choice but to crowd into urban slums".

Seidman in Palmer and Parsons (1977:415-416).

³¹ See Arrighi in Arrighi and Saul (1974:138ff). This is illustrated for example, by the fact that the East makes extensive use of Western technology, which it uses more often than not with no adaptation; and in recent years Western MNCs have been allowed to operate in the East, particularly in Eastern Europe, in a similar fashion to the way they do on the West. Of course Western capital is a bearer of market forces and this is not the case for capital from the East. Yet the choice is not always open between Western and Eastern capital and critical problems are still present in opening contact with the East: See below for a discussion of these points.

³² It can be, at least partially, advantageous for MNC operations to create enclaves within a host economy, because the violence of change in world markets will then have a 'relatively' small impact on the rest of the economy.

³³ For a theoretical discussion of this point see Rubin (1977).

³⁴ In relation to the latter point, as the negotiations between the UK government and the oil MNCs in regard to North Sea oil clearly shows, even highly-trained government officials can be hoodwinked into accepting conditions from the MNCs highly unfavourable to the interests of the nation. See MPhil Faculty and Students (1977).

³⁵ Penrose in Helleiner (1976:147-174).

³⁶ One example of how to do this is provided by Tanzania where the use of retained profits has to be approved by the Treasury.

³⁷ It is the changeover period which is most critical in the switch from a capitalist to socialist mode of production for an economy. See Preobrazhensky (1964:79-145).

³⁸ It is thus inaccurate to think of the present war in Rhodesia simply as a racial war.

³⁹ It needs to be stressed, of course, that the desire by different groups for radical change does not necessarily mean that these groups can easily be brought together to form a single radical political administration. Indeed the continual splits both between and within the liberation groups and the leadership conflicts show that unity has by no means been achieved up to the present time. However, increasing mass support for the liberation struggle and an escalation in guerilla recruitment — albeit greatly helped by such government policies as the creation of protected and consolidated villages — does indicate that there is a growing support among, especially rural, peasants, for radical change. For a discussion of the effects of the war see Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia (1975, 1976 and 1977), International Commission of Jurists (1976) and Weinrich in *Journal of Southern African Studies* (1977:207-229). Even if one believes that the proposals in this section are at present politically premature in showing what could be done with radical political control and widespread mass support, they do provide a backdrop against which policies that do emerge in practice could be evaluated.

⁴⁰ The obtaining of political power would not necessarily have to come about through total military victory for the guerilla forces and of course the new government could possibly be formed through co-opting some of the groups presently advocating a far from radical land strategy. It is not our purpose to pursue these speculations.

⁴¹ For a discussion of short-term strategies for land in other countries see especially: Algeria — Griffin (1976), Cuba — MacEwan (1977), Ritter (1974), Seers et al (1965) and Jacoby in *Ceres* (1969). China — Wheelwright and McFarlane (1970), Gittings (1975), Gurley in *World Development* (1975) and Maxwell in *World Development* (1975). Tanzania — Tannenbaum (1977), Green in *IDS Bulletin* (1975).

⁴² Of course the original control by a group representing the poor does not guarantee that the forces of reaction will not rise up in another form later on. Venezuela, Bolivia and Iran are all examples of where this has happened.

⁴³ From micro-studies, it appears that about one tenth of the 675 000 TTL cultivators could be considered 'wealthier' peasants. See Weinrich (1975:85), Beaumont (1969) and Ellis-Jones (1976:xii).

⁴⁴ There seems to be little doubt that international aid would be forthcoming for a socialist Zimbabwe, even if bi-lateral agencies would be less willing to support a radical approach.

⁴⁵ See below for how this might operate in practice.

⁴⁶ See Clutton-Brock (1972).

⁴⁷ Silveira House (1974-1977).

⁴⁸ This has been true especially in Mangwende TTL, where the groups have been in operation the longest.

⁴⁹ Silveira House (1977:45).

⁵⁰ It was an implicit assumption of the Land Husbandry Act that all Tribal land should be split up into arable and grazing land. For a critique of this see Brown (1959:10-22).

⁵¹ See Brown (1959:14) and Savory (1976).

⁵² See Chapter III, section B, i.

⁵³ Tanzania provides an example of World Bank co-operation in infrastructural development projects.

⁵⁴ Green (1977:10).

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
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