

THE CHITEPO ASSASSINATION

David Martin & Phyllis Johnson

Zimbabwe Publishing House
P.O. Box BW-350
Harare, Zimbabwe



**Book
Centre**

**Zimbabwe Publishing House (Pvt) Ltd,
P.O. Box BW-350,
Harare, Zimbabwe**

© David Martin and Phyllis Johnson 1985

First published by ZPH 1985

Cover design by David Corbet



ISBN 0 949225 04 5

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publishers.

Typeset and printed in Zimbabwe by Zimpak
Origination by Colorset (Pvt.) Ltd.

CONTENTS

PROLOGUE	1
PART I: The Prelude	3
PART II: The Assassination	38
PART III: The Aftermath	60
PART IV: By Way of Epilogue	85
AFTERWORD	99
Appendices	
Notes	
List of Abbreviations	



A map of the region in 1975,
showing the main places
referred to in the story

PROLOGUE

Just after 8 a.m. on 18 March 1975 an explosion shattered the morning routine in Chilenje South and echoed across the southern suburbs of Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia, headquarters of liberation movements fighting against colonial or minority administrations in southern Africa. A pall of smoke and dust in the early morning sunlight cast grey shadows across the drive at 150 Muramba Road, shrouding the mangled remains of a pale blue Volkswagon. In the wreckage lay the body of Herbert Chitepo, 51, National Chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and leader of its *Dare reChimurenga*, or war council, that was directing the guerrillas infiltrating across the Zambezi River into Southern Rhodesia to fight against the white minority regime of Ian Smith.

Chitepo's death had repercussions that echoed across southern Africa and well into the future of the independent state of Zimbabwe, just as the sound of the blast had echoed down the wide streets of the Zambian capital. Who planted the bomb that killed him? Was he, as the Zambian government decided, a victim of regional feuding within ZANU between the Karanga and the Manyika? Was the Zambian government involved in the murder, as many in ZANU charged, because Chitepo and ZANU stood in the way of their 'detente' exercise with South Africa and their attempts to force a ceasefire in the Rhodesian guerrilla war? Or was it a covert operation aimed at disrupting the war, and was Smith's government the real villain? For ten years, the true story of the crime and its perpetrators remained a secret, known only to a handful of people involved in the planning, while those who did not know accepted or

propagated whichever version best suited their interests and opinions.

In 1985, ten years after Chitepo's death and five years after Rhodesia became the independent state of Zimbabwe, the authors stumbled across someone who knew. This was the first link in a chain to others who knew and of a meticulous piecing together of details of the action and its motive — sifting fact from rumour, bias and folklore; seeking information from those who did not want to talk as well as those who would — and in the process lancing a festering sore in the side of the new Zimbabwe nation — raising old tribal, regional and international suspicions; testing the delicate balance of racial reconciliation — in the firm belief that only the truth could begin the process of healing. This belief was shared by Prime Minister Mugabe, who fully supported the search for truth and said the whole story must be told, regardless of the consequences. This then is the account of *The Chitepo Assassination*, and the names of people and places are real.

Chitepo was a central figure in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle, and the history of its latter years is bound up in the aftermath of his death. To understand the significance of his assassination, it is necessary to know the circumstance, and to know what went before and after. Thus the shape of this book, which has a Prelude and an Aftermath. No one person knew all of the details and some who did would not reveal them without an undertaking that their names would not be used. Their names are not relevant to the central theme, but the identity of the principals will become clear as the story unfolds. Our objective in writing this story is not to see the perpetrators brought to book; they are, anyway, beyond the reach of the Zimbabwe legal system. Rather it is to reveal the truth about a very important part of Zimbabwe's history, laying to rest the spirits that have remained disturbed for a decade.

PART I: The Prelude

Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo was born near Inyanga (Nyanga), in the lush eastern highlands of Rhodesia, in June of 1923, the year the British South Africa Company, a legacy of Cecil Rhodes, lost its grip on the country that bore his name. The white settlers had voted for 'responsible' self-government, rather than closer ties with South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia was annexed as a British colony. Only 60 Africans, of an African population of 900 000, were allowed to vote. With the advent of internal self-government, a British governor was appointed and Britain retained certain reserve powers, the most vital of which was the right to veto any legislation discriminating against Africans. At no point, as the settlers evolved a society founded on discrimination against the African population, did Britain use this veto until the November 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). One of the earliest nationalists, Abraham Twala, a Zulu Anglican teacher, wrote in 1922 that 'experience has taught us that our salvation does not lie in Downing Street' (the office of the British Prime Minister). It was a perceptive observation, one shared by a generation of nationalists who took up arms 40 years later. Among them was Herbert Chitepo.

Chitepo was a man of contrasting images. He was a warm and compassionate family man whom his Rhodesian adversaries regarded as the 'brains' behind the guerrilla war and whom his comrades described as the 'architect' of *chimurenga*, a Shona word for revolution or armed struggle. Born into a poor peasant family, he rose to become his country's first black barrister. His parents had died when

he was very young and he was brought up by Anglican priests at St Augustine's mission school near the eastern city of Umtali (Mutare), where Rhodes had first entered the country 30 years earlier. The young Chitepo was a brilliant scholar, always at the top of his class, and from St Augustine's, where many of Zimbabwe's future leaders studied, he went to Adams College in Natal for his secondary education and then to Fort Hare College where he gained a Bachelor of Arts degree in English. Early in the 1950s he went to London to study law, and was called to the bar at the Middle Temple.

Back at home in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Chitepo defended many nationalist figures in Rhodesia before being appointed as the first African Director of Public Prosecutions in Tanganyika (Tanzania) in 1962, soon after that country's independence. He combined his legal base with nationalist political work and was a founder member of the National Democratic Party in 1960, becoming its legal advisor during the Rhodesian Constitutional Conference in London the same year. He was a founder member of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) in 1962, and one of those who broke way in August 1963 to form ZANU. He was instrumental in the decision later that year of the Dar es Salaam-based Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to recognize ZANU as well as ZAPU. At ZANU's first congress, in Gwelo (Gweru) in 1964, he was elected in absentia as National Chairman.

By that time, the Rhodesian Front had been formed and elected into government by the white voters of Rhodesia, and Ian Smith had deposed Winston Field as leader because the latter was reluctant to consider a unilateral declaration of independence from Britain. Smith soon banned ZANU and the Peoples Caretaker Council (PCC), the successor to ZAPU, in August 1964. Most nationalist leaders were arrested and began a decade in detention

while the lieutenants they had sent outside directed the faltering start of the armed struggle.

The British electorate had chosen the Labour Party, led by Harold Wilson, in late 1963, which momentarily appeared to provide some respite. But Smith was determined to achieve independence under white rule at any cost and could not be dissuaded. In November 1964 he faced his white constituency in a referendum with a single question: 'Are you in favour of independence based on the 1961 constitution?' It was a safe bet — 58 091 voted in favour and only 6 096 against. Again, few Africans were allowed to vote. In May 1965 he followed this up with a general election in which the Rhodesian Front won all 50 'A' roll (white) seats, and the stage was set for UDI. What, if anything, would Britain do? The answer came in October, when Wilson said, 'the demand for Britain to attempt to settle all Rhodesia's constitutional problems with a military invasion is out.' With the military option firmly ruled out, the way was clear for the Smith government to rebel. UDI was declared on 11 November, and majority rule was not to be achieved until 15 years later, after well over 30 000 lives had been lost.

The year 1966 was one of major decisions for Chitepo. He decided to leave his prestigious job in Tanzania and move to Zambia to devote himself full time to reorganizing the party and beginning the armed struggle in earnest. It was a decision which separated Chitepo from many of his contemporaries who sat out the struggle in academic institutions and comfortable jobs, and it was a role which inevitably radicalized his views. He was ZANU's most senior leader at liberty and under his guidance the party shaped its military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). On 28 April 1966, a few months before he took over the party's external leadership, the first shots of the war were fired in what became known as the Battle of Sinoia (Chinhoyi), where seven ZANLA guerrillas died in a shoot-out with Rhodesian

troops. This battle is marked as the official start of the second *chimurenga* — the first organized act of armed insurrection since the fighting of the 1890s following the settler occupation.

The war that ensued can be divided into three phases. The first phase, which began in 1966 after UDI and ended in 1968, was marked by two major actions. The first, the Battle of Sinoia, was part of ZANU's response to UDI and three other groups, infiltrated from Zambia at the same time, were captured and imprisoned. The second action involved a combined force of guerrillas from ZAPU and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa who, in the latter half of 1967, were involved in a series of skirmishes with Rhodesian security forces in the north-west of the country. Both incidents attracted headlines and a little more support from the OAU Liberation Committee, but, in reality, were defeats for the guerrillas.¹ Rhodesian military power at that time was intimidating and the guerrillas had no chance of winning a conventional confrontation. Of the estimated 150 guerrillas infiltrated in this phase, the Rhodesians say three-quarters were killed or captured, and there is every reason to believe this figure is accurate. These defeats were followed by a lull phase while a new strategy was being worked out, particularly by ZANU. The third and decisive phase, based on political mobilization of the population, was launched with an attack on a farm near Centenary on 21 December 1972.

Chitepo was a tireless worker, taking voluminous notes at party meetings which often stretched into the early hours of the morning, and he was well-known as a gifted orator. Psychologically and ideologically he had matured by the time he addressed the Sixth Pan-African Congress in Dar es Salaam in 1974. He proposed a global strategy against imperialism, declaring that 'the basic approach, we submit, is both to give more material assistance to national liberation movements of Africa and simultaneously to

launch our attacks on capitalism and all its manifestations on all fronts, in the developing areas and in the heart of capitalism — North America and Western Europe.' This two-pronged strategy, he said, was the best way to defeat racism, capitalism and imperialism.

'Each movement, each country, or each nation should shoulder the main burden of liberating itself' but, strategically, concentration should be given to capitalism's weak periphery in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 'Once these areas are liberated they will become bases for the final assault on imperialism at its centre. In other words, underdeveloped areas would provide revolutionary bases from which revolutionaries launch their attack against imperialism. By cutting off the tentacles of imperialism in the periphery we will deprive the white working class in capitalist countries of their high standards of living they have enjoyed because of the super profits that the multinational corporations reaped in under-developed countries. It is only when the exploited working class of both black and white realize that they have a common enemy, a common oppressor, and a common exploiter that they will unite and jointly seek to overthrow the capitalist system. This is our global strategy against capitalism, racism and imperialism.'

Such speeches certainly did not endear Chitepo to the Rhodesian regime, or to the West; nor did his role in the formulation of ZANU's new military strategy in the 1970s. While the Battle of Sinoia had brought ZANU considerable publicity and some additional support, it was not a victory. In 1971, some 18 months before ZANLA began its decisive offensive in the north-east, Chitepo told a Danish newspaper that 'it is useless to engage in conventional warfare with well-equipped Rhodesian and South African troops along the Zambezi. Two years later, in a clear self-criticism of military policy during the 1960s, Chitepo said, 'We have since tried to correct this tragic error by politicizing and mobilizing the people before mounting any

attacks against the enemy. After politicizing our people it became easier for them to co-operate with us and to identify with our programme.'

Chitepo's fiery language and the fact that he was the front man enunciating radical party policy inevitably made him a target — of some 'friends' as well as foes. Addressing a *Chimurenga* Day rally in 1968, he insisted that the only language the Rhodesian Prime Minister would understand was violence. 'Zimbabwe was taken from us through bloodshed. Only bloodshed — a bloody *chimurenga* involving four and a half million of us — can restore Zimbabwe to its owners.'³

On 24 October 1964, Northern Rhodesia shed British colonial rule and became Zambia. For the first time, the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia had an independent black-ruled state immediately over its border. Zambia's president, Kenneth Kaunda, and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) had shown themselves to be very close to ZAPU, then thought to be the largest nationalist movement opposed to settler domination in Rhodesia, and to its president-for-life, Joshua Nkomo, who was under restriction in Rhodesia. An independent Zambia, the Rhodesians reasoned, could provide a base for training and infiltration by Zimbabwean guerrillas.

Zambia had become independent after the collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Malawi). With the break-up of Federation, the British government of Prime Minister Sir Harold Macmillan had insisted on putting the whole of the federal air force — in reality part of Britain's strategic world force — into the hands of the white minority in Salisbury. The federal air force, equipped with Canberra bombers and Hawker Hunter jet fighters, was then the most powerful on the African continent. Britain ridiculed suggestions that one day it might be used against Rhodesia's independent neighbours

and vetoed a Ghanaian resolution at the United Nations (UN) aimed at blocking the transfer.

In regional military terms, Rhodesia was massively powerful. It had four infantry battalions with adequate artillery, plus armoured car and parachute groups. The British South Africa Police (BSAP) was 5 000-strong and could call upon 22 000 reservists. The Canberras, Hunters, helicopters, training planes and some obsolete Vampires provided sufficient air power to support ground troops and armour — and to strike against neighbours. The intention to maintain military superiority had been illustrated only three months before Zambia's independence by the Rhodesian Finance Minister, John Wrathall, who had more than doubled the defence budget from £2.5 million to £5.9 million. This, he explained, would provide a 'solid base' to deal with future problems.

Thus in late 1964 when Zambia became independent, and a little more than a year before UDI, the public display of military might was there for all to see. What was not public was the new covert direction Rhodesia was moving in.

The previous year, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Winston Field, had directed that an organization be set up to protect 'the security of the state'. He chose for the task Ken Flower, a Cornishman who had settled in Rhodesia 25 years earlier and served with distinction in the BSAP. His mandate was to take over all responsibility for intelligence-gathering and for maintenance of the security of the state, bringing together functions then handled by a variety of ministries including Law & Order, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs, as well as the police, the army and air force. When the Federation was dismantled on 31 December 1963, and the other two members were moving toward independence, the British government handed over to its remaining colony — as well as the military structures and hardware — the intelligence network. The Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISB), which

Southern Rhodesia inherited, handled all external liaison and had close links with the British internal service, MI 5. It also had intelligence links in the other two federal states, although most of the staff were based in Salisbury. The Rhodesian colony inherited the staff as well as all of the records and registry, representing 10 years of work.

The Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) which Flower set up came under the office of the Prime Minister and as its Director-General (DG) he reported to the Prime Minister, who, for almost all of the life of the Rhodesian CIO, was Ian Smith. Known to its employees as 'The Firm', the CIO operated as a series of 'watertight' compartments' in which officers from one desk reported only to their section head and did not discuss their work, show documents or disclose sources to any other desk. 'Even within the CIO we operated on a need-to-know basis,' said one former operative.⁴ Decisions were taken, ideas exchanged and information discussed at meetings in the DG's office at 8.30 each morning, attended by the heads of internal and external intelligence and, when necessary, the heads of key desks. The meetings, known in CIO jargon as 'prayers', seldom lasted more than 30 minutes and afterwards the head of internal intelligence would produce a short briefing paper for the Prime Minister.

The CIO had separate departments for internal and external intelligence-gathering, although they both had specialized geographical areas which were often parallel. African nationalism was a subject of internal attention, but would overlap with external over recruitment of guerrillas and military training in Tanzania or Zambia or Yugoslavia, for example. Conversely, Botswana was often handled by Special Branch, part of internal, in Bulawayo. The director of internal intelligence, called DIN or Branch 1, was normally the officer commanding Special Branch and was responsible to the Commissioner of Police as well as the DG. For much of the CIO's life, this post was filled by Derrick 'Robbie' Robinson, a British-born former police

officer. The director of external intelligence, called DEX or Branch 2, was Ken Leaver, a Cockney who, after many years in the police and SB, had set up the first native affairs section in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. His external department in CIO worked closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in handling all external liaison, including with other intelligence organizations such as the American CIA, which had also been close to FISB. The most important aspect of their operation, however, was evaluation — the sifting and analyzing of information.

One of the earliest CIO advisors, recruited shortly before Zambia's independence in late 1964, was Ian Henderson, who had just been expelled from Kenya after gaining notoriety as head of Special Branch during Mau Mau. He had led the hunt for one of the freedom fighters' most important leaders, Dedan Kimathi, who was captured and hanged. Henderson created the 'pseudo gangs' of Mau Mau defectors who were used to hunt down their former colleagues, and he brought this concept to Rhodesia, where it later became notorious and widely-used.⁵

Leaver organized in his department an action wing, initially called S-desk and later operations or just 'ops'. This was a small but highly-trained group of specialists who undertook reconnaissance and other missions into neighbouring countries to search for guerrilla bases, infiltration routes, arms caches, offices and houses, and in some cases to sabotage them. They worked mostly in collaboration with the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS), designated C Squadron, certainly the most effective military unit of the war. Targets were discussed and approved at morning 'prayers', then a small team organized the details and directed the strike.

One of the earliest covert operations, on 12 October 1966, ended in disaster. A five-man group, carrying their weapons and 45 kg of explosives, was sent to Zambia to destroy the ZANU offices. They were taken under cover of

darkness to the Zambezi River where canoes were waiting for them to cross to the Zambian bank. There a CIO undercover operative based in Zambia was waiting to transport them to their target. Four of the group had begun to load the canoes with the explosives, contained in kitbags, when the explosives accidentally detonated. The four, three SAS men and a BSAP superintendent, were listed as KOAS (Killed On Active Service), Explosion, 12.10.66. and all were posthumously awarded the Rhodesian Meritorious Conduct Medal (MCM).⁶ The Rhodesian President, Clifford Dupont, presented the medals to the wives of the SAS men and to the son of the policeman. Only a handful of Rhodesians knew what the awards were really for or that the Rhodesian undercover war had begun.

ZANU was again the target, for Operation Sculpture, two months later when a Cessna plane took off from Kariba carrying a three-man detail. Their target was the ZANU headquarters in Lusaka, and they carried incendiary devices to destroy documents and records, and to burn the building. The Cessna, with false registration numbers, touched down by moonlight on a private airstrip outside the city. The would-be saboteurs climbed out of the plane, scaled the perimeter fence and were met by an undercover operative, who drove them to their target. There things began to go wrong. People were milling around outside the ZANU offices. One subsequent account said a party was underway and another said there was fighting in the street.⁷ The SAS men watched in frustration from their cover, unable to attack the target because of the large number of people moving about. Finally, with their plane due to return at 2 a.m. to fetch them, they were forced to abort the operation and fly back to Kariba. The landing of the plane, this time on the main runway at Lusaka's international airport, went unnoticed as the airport was closed for the night and security extremely lax or nonexistent. But earlier, when the pilot was practising

landing at night without lights near Bulawayo, his plane was spotted and reported in the local press as an Unidentified Flying Object (UFO).

While both of these potentially spectacular operations into Zambia failed in the 1960s, the 'ops' department later carried out many other successful reconnaissance and sabotage missions over the Zambezi. But they were not the only section to infiltrate Zambia in this period. To the great embarrassment of State House, a book entitled *For the President's Eyes Only* revealed that Rhodesian Special Branch had infiltrated an agent who became one of President Kaunda's closest advisors. The infiltrator was Polish-born John Henry Porembe-Brumer, code-named Z1 and nicknamed the 'Red Fox'. Brumer, according to the book, had been approached by SB in 1963. His initial task was to infiltrate ZANU, which had just been formed.

He did this through the Capricorn Africa Society (CAS), which did not know he was an agent and which had several leading African nationalists among its supporters. The CAS had as its symbol a zebra with white, black and brown stripes to illustrate its multi-racial beliefs, and, in 1952, its Capricorn Declarations ran contrary to the trends of apartheid being institutionalized in South Africa. However, a former Governor of Kenya and Uganda, Sir Phillip Mitchell, later described CAS itself as 'apartheid in sugar coating, but not the less apartheid for that'. In essence, CAS advocated the emergence of a black middle class who would accept a limited franchise in return for the whites giving up the more blatant forms of discrimination. This limited horizon brought it support from both the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office, the latter of which perceived the role of CAS to be 'to produce an emotional appeal to outbid that of African nationalism or communism'.

On 19 March 1964, Brumer flew to Lusaka carrying a letter of introduction from Rev Ndabaningi Sithole, then leader of ZANU, to Kaunda and the Zambian Minister of

Justice, Mainza Chona. He quickly established his 'bona fides' with the Zambian leader as a supporter of the Zimbabwe nationalists by supplying doctored intelligence from the Rhodesians. At the same time, he was feeding information back to Salisbury about Kaunda's attitudes and intentions, particularly towards ZANU, ZAPU, and communist countries. Brumer's greatest achievement, it is claimed in the book, was being asked by Kaunda to revamp Zambia's intelligence services. The book uses a pseudonym for his SB controller, 'Chief Supt Bob MacTavish', but former SB officers say his real rank and name was Asst Commissioner Matthew 'Paddy' Ogle. Some of Brumer's claims may be exaggerated but there can be no doubt that he did get close to Kaunda, indicating the porous nature of Zambian security at that time. He was finally exposed two years later, in April 1966, by British intelligence.

The ruling body of ZANU externally was the *Dare re-Chimurenga* (war council) and elections to this body were held every two years. At the first biennial conference, in Lusaka in April 1969, the leadership was expanded from four to eight, with Chitepo remaining as Chairman. At the second conference, in August 1971, problems emerged which, in part, were due to divisions within ZAPU. Contradictions between two groups in ZAPU, led by James Chikerema and by Jason 'JZ' Moyo, had erupted after Chikerema took a British television crew into a ZAPU training camp, running the risk of identifying the guerrillas who would be infiltrated into Rhodesia. He was forced to apologize to the Zambian government which was pretending there were no guerrilla camps in their country. Moyo and his group accused Chikerema of irresponsibility and dictatorial leadership.⁹ Chikerema responded by accusing them of plotting against him, and then, as if to confirm the accusation of autocratic behaviour, dissolved

the executive and army command, vesting all powers in himself. Moyo declared this move to be 'null and void' and 'a reckless bid for personal power', and fighting broke out between the two groups. As a result of this, the Zambian government handed over 129 ZAPU guerrillas to the Rhodesians, claiming they were 'spies' though some were later sentenced to death and others imprisoned.

Up to this point, ZAPU leaders had refused to discuss unity with ZANU, which they regarded as a splinter group, but the split sharply divided the ZAPU forces and left ZANU as the largest military entity. Now Chikerema turned his attention to ZANU, proposing unity with his faction of ZAPU. This was to sow the seeds of division within ZANU at the 1971 biennial DARE meeting. Given earlier pressure from the OAU and individual African states for a united front between ZANU and ZAPU, and the fact that ZANU had publicly committed itself to unity, it was probably not possible to reject the overture out of hand even though it was clear that it came from a faction of ZAPU and that faction was Shona and, more specifically, largely Zezuru. Three of the newcomers to the 1969 DARE supported Chikerema's proposal, but the majority were against it and, after losing their posts at the biennial conference in what they regarded as a vote against unity, the three resigned. They re-emerged in the leadership of a new party, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), with Chikerema, who claimed that Sithole and Nkomo had stepped down in favour of Robert Mugabe, the prestigious Secretary-General of ZANU who was in detention in Rhodesia. This story, which was not true, and the 'tribal and regional overtones in Chikerema's strategy were bound to raise questions about his real motives.'¹⁰

One point which should be noted about the composition of the DARE at that time is that it did not include a single member who had been for military training or had military experience. This often led to foolish military plans and instructions coming from the DARE, creating tensions

between the guerrillas and the politicians when the latter demanded dramatic, and sometimes suicidal, actions for short term gain in the OAU and other forums. A further area of distrust derived from the Rhodesians finding a large cache of arms which had been smuggled onto Salisbury's industrial site and a rift began to occur between guerrillas and politicians, with the former believing that, where military matters were concerned, the less politicians knew the better. This was borne out by later revelations that a senior party official, who later lost his post, had been the source of information for the enemy and was often mentioned in CIO reports as 'usual source'.

The next biennial conference took place in Lusaka in September 1973. Only four of the DARE members elected in 1971 were returned in 1973. Another electoral challenge to Chitepo's leadership was turned aside when the ZANLA commander, Josiah Tongogara, placed himself and the military firmly behind Chitepo, as he had in 1971. The Zezurus who held posts previously had effectively dealt themselves out of DARE by crossing to FROLIZI and the new composition of the DARE was four Karangas and four Manyikas. The Zambians, as we will see later, tried to argue that the Karangas had seized power from the Manyikas at the 1973 DARE conference, but this is not supported by the facts. The Karangas and Manyikas both increased their representation from three to four, and, with the election of Tongogara as Secretary for Defence, the military had direct representation on the DARE for the first time.

While these internal upheavals were disrupting the nationalist ranks — leaving ZAPU weakened, FROLIZI a regional party and ZANU with a number of disgruntled members — overt and covert diplomatic moves had been taking place. In 1971, ZANU and ZAPU had collaborated inside the country to form the African National Council (ANC), choosing Bishop Abel Muzorewa as leader, to oppose settlement proposals agreed upon by the British

government and the Rhodesian minority regime. The ANC mobilized a massive 'No' vote by the African population, and this was accepted by a British commission headed by Lord Pearce. However, after ZANLA guerrillas resumed the war in the north-east in December 1972, Smith tried to get negotiations going again by reviving the 1971 proposals and drawing Muzorewa into talks. The Bishop, who continuously revealed himself to be lacking in political acumen, indicated he was willing to negotiate on the basis of the very proposals the people had rejected in 1971. Despite demands by the nationalist parties that he cease negotiations with Smith, the Bishop continued talks through the second half of 1973 and the first quarter of 1974.

While these talks were taking place, another series of secret contacts was beginning, in the first instance involving Zambia and the Portuguese colonial regime and, after the Portuguese *coup d'état* in April 1974, Zambia and South Africa. The contacts began in the second half of 1973 when, without FRELIMO's knowledge, President Kaunda held secret meetings with Portuguese civilians and members of the armed forces from Mozambique. Subsequently, Kaunda admitted he had not told FRELIMO's leader, Samora Machel, about the contacts. 'I didn't want to bother Samora about it. I just mentioned it to Tiny Rowland' (chief executive of the multi-national Lonrho company).¹¹ Through an intermediary, Afrikaner Dr Marquard de Villiers, Rowland passed on news of the secret contacts to the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, a month before the Portuguese *coup d'état*. 'I gave Mr Vorster the information on the 29th March 1974 that... majors and captains of the (Portuguese) army had been negotiating in Lusaka for a handover of power,' de Villiers said, 'and in fact the new constitution had already been drawn up.'¹² So Kaunda had chosen to inform Lonrho, and through them the South African government, but he had not seen fit to inform FRELIMO that a new

constitution, apparently aimed at preventing them from taking total control, had been drawn up.

A secret State House memorandum written in this period said, 'Nationalist movements such as FRELIMO should be recognised as an important political factor whose assistance in the formulation of a future political framework cannot be ignored.' From this it is clear that Zambia only regarded FRELIMO as a 'factor' in any power handover by Lisbon and not as the sole factor it was to become 18 months later.

The *coup d'état* in Portugal on 25 April 1974 changed the face of southern Africa, disrupting old alliances and creating new ones. The 'unholy alliance' of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa, which had collaborated in attempts to stem the nationalist tide, lay shattered and as it became clear that in Angola and Mozambique yesterday's guerrillas would be tomorrow's governments, Rhodesia and South Africa faced a new and radically-changed reality. South Africa had been completely buttressed against having an independent black neighbour by its partners in the alliance. Now, for the first time, it had to confront the prospect of independent black states on its north-eastern and north-western frontiers. Movements radicalized by the wars in those countries posed a threat of guerrilla infiltration and, in differing ways, Pretoria shaped its new strategy.

Of greatest concern was the implications of the *coup d'état* for Rhodesia. The infiltration of ZANU guerrillas through Tete with FRELIMO's assistance had brought a new dimension to the war. Mozambique's independence under a FRELIMO government would certainly add a new and even more dangerous dimension. Policy planners in Salisbury were under no illusion about the implications. They embarked on a two-pronged strategy — the assassination of nationalist leaders identified as the key figures in the organization and conduct of the war, and the creation of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR),

aimed at obtaining information about ZANU activity inside Mozambique and carrying out sabotage to make it more difficult for FRELIMO to support the guerrillas. Both prongs of the new strategy were developed by the CIO and both were carried out by the operations desk.

Meanwhile, Lonrho continued to work to bring Kaunda and Vorster together, with de Villiers as the principal go-between: 'Our appreciation at the time was that it was in the interests of South Africa that there should be a settlement in Rhodesia that would bring some stability to the area. I think when Tiny told me that Mozambique had thrown in the towel, it became obvious that it would be very bad for South Africa for a black victory in Rhodesia. In fact may I quote Mark Chona (Kaunda's personal assistant) on this, and he was quoting President Kaunda. President Kaunda said that a white victory in Rhodesia was impossible; a black (military) victory was not only possible but he thought undesirable. This impressed Mr Vorster enormously and it was one of the key phrases that made him appreciate that you had to have a settlement here that was not through the barrel of the gun.'

Lonrho set about trying to bring Kaunda and Vorster together in 1974, using various intermediaries, and finally set up a meeting in Paris in July involving Mark Chona and the head of South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS), Gen Hendrik van den Bergh. Chona made a number of trips to South Africa after this to see Vorster; and Zambia's Foreign Minister, Vernon Mwaanga, held a secret meeting in New York with his South African counterpart, Dr Hilgard Muller. From all of these meetings came a remarkable document dated 8 October 1974 and entitled 'Towards the Summit: An Approach to Peaceful Change in Southern Africa'. It was nicknamed 'The Detente Scenario' and the Zimbabwean nationalists, like FRELIMO before them, knew nothing about the commitments Zambia was making.

In the agreement, Zambia 'and friends' undertook to

'use their influence to ensure that ZANU and ZAPU desist from armed struggle and engage in the mechanics for finding a political solution in Rhodesia'. South Africa, for its part, undertook to seek the release of political detainees in Rhodesia, get the bans on ZANU and ZAPU lifted, and withdraw its forces from Rhodesia. These commitments were to be met by mid-December when, if arrangements had proceeded according to plan, Kaunda and Vorster would hold the summit meeting the South African leader had sought for so long.

Events now began to move at a rapid and bewildering pace. On 25 October, in the first of a series of carefully stage-managed speeches, Vorster spoke of southern Africa being at a 'crossroads' where it must choose between peace and the escalation of violence. The price of violence, he said, was far too high. Then he returned to a familiar theme: a regional economic community involving South Africa. Kaunda responded the next day, describing Vorster's speech as 'the voice of reason for which Africa and the world have waited for many years'.¹³

The FRELIMO leader, Machel, had first learned in September what Kaunda was doing and he called Chitepo and Moyo, the external leader of ZAPU, to his Dar es Salaam house to try to warn them obliquely. Dramatic changes might be about to take place and they should be prepared and militarily analyze the situation. Then Machel asked them what their reaction would be if the leaders of their two parties were released from detention in Rhodesia. Both men responded that that was impossible.

On 8 November 1974, the detained leaders of ZANU and ZAPU were flown from Rhodesia to Lusaka to be briefed on the contacts between Zambia and South Africa, and for preliminary talks with the Frontline leaders — President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, Machel and Kaunda. However, the ZANU

representatives were not briefed, nor were they allowed to meet Chitepo and other colleagues in Lusaka, because the detained central committee members had chosen to send Mugabe, the Secretary-General, and Moton Malianga, the Secretary for Youth & Culture. Unbeknown to anyone outside Que Que Prison, Sithole had been suspended as party president a week earlier, a move that, ironically, Mugabe and Malianga had opposed, preferring to wait and combine forces with other party members outside.

The reasons for the suspension dated back to Sithole's statement in court in 1969, when he said: 'I wish publicly to disassociate my name in word, thought, or deed from any subversive activities, from any terrorist activities, and from any form of violence.' This was seen as tantamount to betrayal of ZANU's commitment to armed struggle and to the young cadres who had fought and died in the war. Robinson, the head of SB, had subsequently arranged a meeting in Salisbury Prison between Sithole, who was then in the criminal section, Mugabe and Leopold Takawira, the ZANU Vice-President who died in detention the following year. To their extreme anger, Sithole proposed that they should all renounce violence and agree to work within the constitution in return for their freedom. Mugabe and Takawira found the proposal unacceptable but agreed to convey it to other members of the imprisoned central committee, who also rejected it. Sithole was kept apart from the others for the next four years and there were few opportunities to meet until early in 1974, when a resolution was passed condemning him after he refused to explain his earlier actions and after he held a secret meeting with an SB officer although specifically requested not to do so. Finally, on 1 November, Sithole was suspended as leader. For some, the last straw had been his comment that 'one man one vote' was not an immediate goal but a slogan to be used in mobilization and negotiation.

Mugabe and Malianga could not fully brief the African

leaders because the decision, which both of them regarded as unconstitutional, had been taken so recently that other ZANU leaders and members outside had not been told. So Kaunda, Machel and Nyerere refused to tell them why they had been summoned and, without allowing them to see their colleagues in Lusaka, sent them back to Que Que Prison. A few days later, Kaunda sent an envoy to invite Sithole to visit him as ZANU president or as an individual. The central committee decided they had to comply, but sent Maurice Nyagumbo, the Secretary for Public Affairs, with Sithole to tell the leaders that he had come as a private individual. Chitepo, Tongogara and other DARE leaders were very upset when Nyagumbo told them about the suspension and when he had a row with Kaunda over favouring ZAPU. Chitepo said that 'for a long time President Kaunda had been looking for an excuse to throw us (ZANU) out not only from Zambian soil but also from Tanzania and Mozambique,' Nyagumbo later wrote. 'Chitepo believed that I had now equipped Dr Kaunda with the excuse he had been looking for by the way I had spoken to him that morning.'¹⁴ When Nyagumbo returned to prison and reported on the attitude of the Frontline leaders, the detainees 'suspended the effect of the suspension', but Sithole soon lost the support of the party members through his behaviour and less than a year later he was condemned by the DARE and the military commanders who declared they would only speak through Mugabe.

The pressure on ZANU to desist from armed struggle had already begun, and on 4 December, just before the detained nationalists were flown back to Lusaka for the second meeting, Chitepo uncompromisingly spelt out ZANU's position: 'There will be no talks, no negotiations, no discussions involving our movement until Mr Smith recognizes the right to immediate majority rule. That is not majority rule tomorrow, next week, next year or whenever. It is now. Until we hear that man, the rebel leader of the

rebel regime, speak those words, our war goes on and it will continue until we have liberated every acre of our country. I do not know if we could even sit down with Smith until Rhodesia has gone back on the 1969 constitution and returned to the pre-UDI position. We are not going to be bound by whatever is decided in Lusaka, great as is our respect for the leaders who are gathering there and who have helped us so much in the past.'¹⁵ Chitepo's remarks clearly expressed the position of ZANU, and both he and the party were to become victims of the detente exercise in the coming weeks.

Kaunda was furious at Chitepo's remarks, although he was fully aware of the fact that Smith's position was still hopelessly removed from that of the nationalists. He saw ZANU's obduracy as threatening to derail his side of the bargain with South Africa. For their part, South Africa was supposed to be exerting pressure on Smith to persuade him 'that a political solution is most desirable and very urgent'. The same day Chitepo made the remarks which annoyed Kaunda, Smith had sent the Zambian leader a message expressing concern at reports which indicated that African leaders meeting in Lusaka 'are expecting majority rule to be attained within five years, or the life of one parliament'. Smith said he had made no such commitment and that all he had said was that 'he would be prepared to consider variations of the present franchise, providing there was no lowering of standards'. He wanted Kaunda to make this clear to the other leaders, 'in order that there should be no misunderstanding'. Such a message coming from the man who said there would be no majority rule in his lifetime, nor within a thousand years, clearly indicated that he had made no concession of consequence and that Chitepo's uncompromising position was correct.

So, as the second Lusaka meeting began between the Frontline leaders and Zimbabwean nationalists, the position was that Smith wanted a ceasefire but, although Kaunda and Vorster were apparently thinking of a five-

year timetable to majority rule, the Rhodesian leader was not nor, apparently, did he have any timetable in mind. Nevertheless the nationalists came under pressure to agree to a united front and a ceasefire. The ANC, FROLIZI and ZAPU were all willing to agree to a ceasefire because none of them were fighting. But ZANU was not, for it saw the gains it had made in the war being eroded without any guarantee of success at the conference table.

The stormiest issue at the meeting was the question of unity. While Nyerere, as chairman of the Frontline States, accepted that certain principles must be met before there could be a ceasefire, he was adamant that the nationalists must form a united front. His initial plan was a unified movement with Nkomo as President, Muzorewa as Vice-President and Sithole as Secretary-General. ZANU refused to accept Nkomo, the dissolution of their party or the abandoning of the armed struggle. Tempers frayed; Nyerere accused ZANU of being 'married to disunity' and described Chitepo as a 'black Napoleon'.

Finally, on 8 December, to placate the Frontline States and ensure their continued support, the nationalists compromised, making the ANC the umbrella for their four organizations with Muzorewa as leader pending a congress in four months time. Through this means ZANU avoided the dissolution of the party and, as the only party then fighting, stamped its mark on the agreement in the final clause, which read: 'The leaders recognize the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe'. In reality, the unity agreement was a facade and a ceasefire was never agreed. The only achievement of detente was that some of the nationalist leaders, including Mugabe, Nkomo and Sithole were released after a decade in prison.

The year leading to the Lusaka agreement had been bloody for both sides. War-related deaths were listed by the Rhodesians as 519 in 1974, compared with 287 in 1973. According to the Rhodesian figures, 345 of those killed in 1974 were 'terrorists', and senior Rhodesian officers said 75% of the 'insurgent' leadership had been killed by the middle of the year. The Ministry of Defence announced a massive military expansion in February, changing its role from defensive to offensive, and, in June, the State of Emergency was extended for another year. The first forced movement of 60 000 people into 'protected villages', similar to the *aldeamentos* in Mozambique, occurred in July in Chiweshe 'Tribal Trust Land' (TTL), within 100 km of Salisbury. This was seen as an indication that the 'terrorists' were infiltrating closer to the capital. Publication in mid-1974 of the annual police report for the previous year showed that almost 12 000 people had been arrested in 1973 in connection with 'terrorist' activity in the north-eastern border area, and more than 1 300 cases of 'terrorist' activity had been investigated. In the annual estimates published in August 1974, defence spending showed an increase of 17% to £30.7 million.

As military activity increased so did Rhodesian covert operations, especially into Zambia where the liberation movements had their headquarters and rear base. One was a campaign of indiscriminate bombings which began early in August 1973, claiming several innocent victims. The first bomb, on 6 August, killed a secretary in the Livingstone office of the Minister for the Southern Province. Two weeks later, on 18 August, a parcel bomb exploded in the Chinese Embassy in Lusaka, killing the wife of the chargé d'affaires and injuring another member of staff. The following day, a senior ZAPU leader announced that a suitcase bomb had been placed in ZAPU's Lusaka headquarters but had failed to explode. The person who made the announcement was 'JZ' Moyo.

who was later killed by a parcel bomb in January 1977. On 11 September 1973, a well-known Asian poet, Chiman Vyass, and his wife were killed and their 12-year-old son severely injured when a parcel bomb exploded just after Vyass had collected his mail from the main post office in Lusaka. 'The Asian actually wasn't a target,' a former CIO officer said later. 'I think he was killed by mistake. He was no target, it was the post office that was the target. The Asian was hanging around the wrong place. It was just the general thing of trying to cause panic.'

In 1974, two explosions rocked the Liberation Centre in Lusaka, where the various groups had their offices. The first, in February, was a parcel bomb that destroyed the ANC (SA) offices, killing the deputy representative. Eight months later, on 30 September, an attack reminiscent of the failed Cessna operation in 1966 destroyed the ZANU offices. The blast, in the middle of the night, wrecked three rooms, blew a huge hole in the ceiling and started a fire. The offices were apparently empty at the time. A party statement blamed it on the 'Smith regime's sinister scheme, announced earlier this year, promising large sums of money to people who captured or eliminated' guerrilla leaders. In April 1974 the Rhodesian regime had put a price list on guerrillas and their weapons. A 'senior terrorist leader' was worth \$5 000, a 'terrorist group leader' \$2 500, and an ordinary 'terrorist' \$1 000. A rocket-launcher and a land-mine were the same price, a 'terrorist machine-gun' \$500, and a light personal weapon \$300. The Rhodesians scattered thousands of posters headed 'Reward' throughout the rural areas in the north-eastern war zone. They were printed in English and Shona, and the text read:

'You are reminded that rewards continue to be paid to those persons who give information leading directly to the death or capture of terrorists and their weapons. Do not be afraid to report all you know about the whereabouts of terrorists and their weapons because your identity will be

kept secret and the reward you earn will be paid to you privately. You can choose to be paid in cash or the money can be put into a post office or building society savings account in your name.'

Leading a liberation movement, as Chitepo knew, was a hazardous occupation. He was reputed to have had a price of at least \$7 500 on his head, dead or alive, and the sum may well have been higher. Attacks against leaders and facilities away from the war zones were not new to the African liberation movements, who had lost two of their most respected leaders through assassination. Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of FRELIMO, had been killed by a parcel bomb in Dar es Salaam in 1969; and Amilcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC (African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde) was gunned down in Conakry, Guinea in 1973. Confessions of prisoners, and evidence unearthed before and after the 1974 *coup d'état* in Portugal, revealed that both assassinations were the work of the Portuguese secret police, PIDE.

From the outset, ZANU was the obstacle that stood in the way of the South African and Zambian plan to end the Rhodesian war. In their grand design, they had committed themselves 'to ensure that ZANU and ZAPU desist from armed struggle'. In the case of ZAPU, whose detained leader Nkomo enjoyed Kaunda's patronage, that commitment was easy as the movement was not fighting at this point, largely as a result of divisions left in the wake of the crisis between Chikerema and Moyo; and there were indications that the Zambians hoped their favoured party could regain at the conference table the ground it had lost on the battlefield. ZANU posed a thornier problem. Chitepo and other leaders were unlikely to agree to stop the armed struggle, as events were to show, until Smith conceded the major principles they were fighting for — independence, more or less immediately, and universal adult suffrage.

Although ZANU was unaware of the contacts which had been taking place between South Africa and Zambia, the Rhodesians knew about them. But the Rhodesian interest was in stopping the war, as Smith's message to Kaunda clearly shows, and not in discussing immediate independence or even independence within five years.

Between late September and early November 1974, three secret meetings were held in the north-east, near Mukumbura but just over the border in Mozambique, between Rhodesian SB and military intelligence officers and three senior ZANLA commanders, Thomas Nhari, Dakarai Badza and Cephas Tichatonga. The first meeting, on 21 September, was the day after the swearing-in of the transitional government in Mozambique. Fighting had virtually ceased and Portuguese troops were beginning to disengage as FRELIMO soldiers moved into their bases. It was possible to meet without fear of attack or detection, on Mozambique territory. The settlement in Mozambique had made transit conditions much easier for the Zimbabwean guerrillas, who could now cross the Zambezi River in broad daylight, and it added urgency to Rhodesia's desire to neutralize the guerrillas, by any means, before they acquired a more secure rear base that offered another 1 100 km of infiltration routes. The timing of these meetings merits closer scrutiny. The first occurred at about the same time as the South African and Zambian foreign ministers were meeting secretly in New York, and the second occurred soon after the 'detente scenario' was drafted. The final meeting came a day or two after the temporary release of the detained leaders by Rhodesia (under South African pressure) to meet the Frontline leaders in Lusaka. Simultaneously, leaflets were dropped in the north-east offering substantial rewards for the capture of senior commanders.

On 23 November, just a week after Sithole was returned

to detention in Rhodesia, a rebellion broke out among a few commanders of the guerrilla forces fighting in the north-east. Piecing together the story of what really occurred, and what triggered the rebellion, is difficult as most of the rebels' leaders were subsequently executed. But, over five years later, Rhodesian intelligence and SB officers confirmed details of the clandestine meetings during which the ZANLA commanders were told that their leaders were living in luxury in Lusaka while they were suffering at the front, and that leaders detained in Rhodesia would soon be released as agreement had been reached to end the war; so there was no need to be the last to die.¹⁶ There was also some evidence of funding to the rebels by international capital through employees in Lusaka — some of whom had become ZANU officials although they disagreed with the policies of Chitepo and the party — recalling Lonhro's involvement in the detente process through Rowland, de Villiers and some officials in Zambia.

The rebel leader was Nhari, a teacher who had been smuggled out of the Mount Darwin area by ZAPU in 1967 and sent to Moscow for training. He defected to ZANU in 1971 and at the time of the rebellion he was Provincial Field Operations Commander for MMZ, the ZANLA designation for the area of operations bordering on Mozambique. Nhari's training had given him a philosophy which differed from ZANLA's new strategy on two fundamental points.

The first point of departure was mobilization. ZANLA's new strategy was based on the Chinese model of protracted struggle, of politically mobilizing the people to support the struggle with information, new recruits, food, shelter and so on. The Soviet approach tended to lean towards more direct military action, often in the conventional manner which had proved disastrous in the 1960s. Nhari's second contradiction was, in part, a product of the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s which,

to varying degrees, afflicted all liberation movements. The Chinese supported ZANU while the Russians supported ZAPU, and Nhari argued, with some truth, that the light Chinese weapons were inferior compared to more sophisticated Soviet armaments. Nhari's view was shared by some of the young guerrillas but it had a major flaw — Moscow supported ZAPU and any overture by ZANU, then and throughout the war, fell on deaf ears.

At Chifombo, the rebels lured the commander outside the camp saying they had two white captives whom they did not want to take inside. They took over the camp, while another group moved into Lusaka, unhindered by the Zambian authorities, to kidnap some members of the DARE and High Command. This was the situation Tongogara and Chitepo found when they returned from Romania early in December. They received the news in Tanzania. 'We just couldn't believe it', Tongogara said later. 'There's been a coup! Couping who? Because if you conduct a coup you're couping the party and now what are you? They said some big fish in the party have supervised it.'¹⁸ The two ZANU leaders then had a briefing from a senior FRELIMO commander who told them the dissidents who did not want to fight had come from home and taken control of the camp. He told them FRELIMO had been reluctant to interfere and trigger a battle, and had decided to wait until Tongogara returned. Tongogara took this information to Sithole, who was attending the meetings at Lusaka's Mulungushi Hall, and was surprised when he was told to keep it quiet because Sithole felt it would weaken their position at the talks.

The unity accord was signed on 8 December. When Tongogara went to see him the following day, Sithole had changed his mind. 'You try to solve it,' he said, 'but don't cause any bloodshed. I think the best thing probably is if you find they resist, you can resign and go back to school,'¹⁹ meaning capitulation to the rebels' demands. The same evening, when Tongogara and others returned home his

family had been kidnapped and the rebels had laid an ambush in his garden. When the police were finally persuaded to come, the rebels were disarmed; in their truck, loaded with sub-machine-guns, hand grenades and two bazookas, they found two DARE members being held hostage.²⁰ Tongogara was furious but recognized it as an attempt to 'destroy the armed struggle'. Two senior commanders slipped into Chifombo on a reconnaissance mission²¹ and, a few days later, a strategy was worked out with FRELIMO that the rebels would be called to a meeting and disarmed. Chifombo was recaptured without a fight, with part of a force of newly trained cadres brought from Tanzania, releasing those who had been kidnapped and taking many of the rebels prisoner.

A study of the Nhari rebellion later summarized the causes as 'the sudden explosion in recruitment coupled with administrative deficiencies, enemy action, and the existence of disgruntled politicians'. With reference to the first point, 'within two years ZANLA forces had expanded from about 300 to 5 000. However, the party's capacity to absorb, equip and feed such a number had not expanded correspondingly...The OAU Liberation Committee and the states which supplied were very slow in responding to the requirements of an expanding war.'

Secondly, 'there is incontrovertible evidence that the Rhodesian regime had a very active hand in fomenting the revolt in ZANU. Rhodesian counter-subversion operated on three levels.' First, 'from its intelligence sources the party reckoned that out of every ten people who came voluntarily through certain routes there was one enemy agent. There was a good screening process but also a good chance that some agents might slip through the dragnet. The second level involved a direct propaganda barrage aimed at the cadres in the operational zones. Thousands of leaflets were dropped from the sky urging the comrades to give up, depicting their efforts as futile, their leaders as corrupt and tribally motivated, and exploiting some of the

real grievances such as shortages of supplies....The enemy's crown of success was its ability to meet Nhari and other commanders in the forefront,' telling them of the 'impending settlement plans to which they said the Smith regime, African states and the ZANU leadership had already agreed ... The prior knowledge of an impending accord was an important factor impelling Thomas Nhari to declare himself Chief of Defence over Tongogara and march to Lusaka at the same time as the African leaders were assembled in the Zambian capital in December 1974.' The third level of subversion was 'the diplomatic effort to diffuse the armed struggle through the policy of detente.'

The third basic factor leading to the attempted *coup d'état* in ZANU was the presence in Lusaka of 'disgruntled politicians who were prepared to exploit any situation to regain control of ZANU. This group was prepared to use tribal loyalties as well as army grievances, whether genuine or manufactured, to achieve their objectives. Their chief motive force was the quest for personal power and revenge for past defeats and not primarily tribal or regional hatred.' Those who should be condemned for the rebellion 'are the military men and politicians who allowed themselves to be used as imperialist tools, and to try to whitewash their action is callous irresponsibility. The natural consequence of their action was murder, kidnappings and torture followed by a disruption of the war effort.'²²

For the guerrillas, 1975 was to be a particularly trying time. Many senior commanders had been lost in the war or the rebellion, and commanders with less experience had been rapidly promoted to fill gaps in the command structure. The OAU had withdrawn recognition of ZANU and ZAPU at a meeting of the Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam on 8 January, and had specified that funds

and support would go only to the ANC. The transit of arms and ammunition through Zambia was reduced to a smuggled trickle as relations with Kaunda's government, committed to detente, deteriorated. The transitional government in Mozambique, preoccupied with its own independence set for June, was about to become a member of the Frontline States grouping and the OAU, both of which backed the ANC and the 'ceasefire'; and cadres who withdrew into Mozambique were disarmed.

The Rhodesians were able to add to the confusion early in the year by circulating 'ceasefire' leaflets telling guerrillas to hide their weapons and surrender to the nearest soldier, policeman or district commissioner, or leave the country. If caught with weapons, the leaflets said, they would be treated as enemies. When the ANC in Salisbury acquired some of the leaflets, the Publicity Secretary, Dr Edson Sithole, who was a member of ZANU, accused the Rhodesians of 'flagrant violations' of the agreement. 'A ceasefire means no more than stopping to shoot and to advance beyond the lines where the respective forces are found,' he said in a statement. 'It does not at all mean surrender.' He reiterated the nationalist position that a formal ceasefire would not be announced until after the date had been set for a constitutional conference and 'meaningful discussions' had begun.²³

Chitepo had been under considerable pressure since the 'unity accord', which he disagreed with, and over attempts to end the armed struggle, which he refused to do. His opposition to the detente exercise and the so-called Unity Declaration had been clearly and publicly stated. He despised Muzorewa, whom he regarded as politically naive and an opportunist, and he was not prepared to see ZANU's gains on the battlefield destroyed by detente or its identity buried under the ANC umbrella. He was also extremely concerned about getting supplies to the guerrillas at the front. Since the OAU Liberation Committee had stopped supplying ZANU, it was becoming

increasingly difficult to transport existing weapons and supplies through Zambia. 'We were not free to carry weapons or transport more cadres to the front,' a senior member of ZANLA security said. 'There were no separate broadcasts, no singing songs, and we were under pressure to accept a military arrangement that meant surrendering the war to the people who had never fought it.' Chitepo had spoken with some alarm to diplomat friends in Lusaka and independent friends in Europe during this period about his deteriorating relations with Zambian authorities and his fear of what action they might take.

At an OAU meeting in Ethiopia in February, Chitepo clashed with members of the Zambian delegation over a statement issued by the ZANU office in Dar es Salaam. The statement criticized Zambia for refusing ZANU access to broadcasting facilities while allowing ZAPU to continue to broadcast. It accused Zambia of collaborating in the destruction of liberation movements in southern Africa and it spoke of Zambia's contacts with South Africa, including visits to Lusaka by van den Bergh, the head of BOSS. The ZANU office in Dar es Salaam had been visited by Tanzanian security, and the statement was reported in a Kenya newspaper which had been introduced into a session of the OAU Liberation Committee, to the fury of the Zambian delegates and the denials of the representatives from Tanzania. A senior Zambian official told a senior ZANU official in a private meeting that 'Zambia would use muscle to crush ZANU.'

The Zambian government was also irritated by similar allegations made by ZANU representatives in the United States and Britain, including a BBC interview in which a ZANU official said that the party had no intention of disbanding its forces or abandoning the armed struggle. He said ZANU had no objection to talks with Ian Smith but 'talks can continue and the armed struggle can continue.' Soon after that an editorial in a Zambian newspaper, the *Daily Mail*, warned 'political leaders from Zimbabwe who

are against unity. These people will soon find themselves in political limbo, they will be physically eliminated or they will find themselves in political limbo.'²⁴

Chitepo did not have a bodyguard until February 1975, a month before his death, after threats against his life. Previously, no ZANU leader had a bodyguard: 'We weren't aware of the need, but after those death threats close security arrangements were tightened,' a former ZANLA security officer said. A few days before his death there was also a threat against his daughter's life by one of the Nhari rebels still at liberty. His daughter, Nomusa, to whom he was devoted, was a student at the University of Zambia, and he hurriedly put her on a plane to Tanzania.

A news story on the front page of *The Rhodesia Herald* on 14 March, four days before his death, said there were rumours in Lusaka and Salisbury that Chitepo had been arrested and would be deported to Rhodesia. The newspaper's correspondent in Lusaka quoted 'a Zambian official close to President Kaunda' as saying the reports were 'absolutely false.' The article was headlined 'Chitepo is not held in Zambia', and, throughout, it referred to Chitepo as the 'director of terrorist operations against Rhodesia'.

For most urban Rhodesians in early 1975, the war in the north-east was still very far away; neither it nor sanctions endangered their predominance and, relaxing around their swimming pools, they saw little reason to give it all up. 'The strategical aim,' Herbert Chitepo had written a few months earlier, 'is to attenuate the enemy forces by causing their deployment over the entire country. The subsequent mobilization of a large number of civilians from industry, business and agriculture would cause serious economic problems. This would have a psychologically devastating effect on the morale of the whites, most of whom had come to Zimbabwe lured by the prospect of the easy, privileged

life promised by the regime.²⁵ Despite the initial successes of the war, it had not yet reached that stage and would not until a new offensive began in 1976. Rhodesians were still willing to listen to President Dupont when he told them: 'Look at our country today. Look at almost any other country. And then get down on your knees and thank God that you are privileged to live here.'²⁶ Few whites yet believed that the war was fuelled by genuine grievances or that it could not be contained, and they accepted assurances that it was being fought to protect Africans in the rural areas.

The war, however, was beginning to discourage potential immigrants and the white emigration rate was steadily rising. Those leaving included a large proportion of young professionals, who could easily find employment elsewhere, and of young people without financial or family ties. A huge publicity campaign to attract immigrants, entitled 'Settlers 74', had been a dismal failure.

Although Prime Minister Vorster denied any South African pressure on Rhodesia, congestion in the ports and over transportation routes was beginning to affect exports and availability of foreign currency. Smith's New Year's message for 1975 made reference to 'transport and harbour capacity' and called on his countrymen to tighten their belts and expect more currency cuts. He dedicated the year to peace, and so did *The Rhodesia Herald* in a front-page caption which said, 'On this the first day of 1975 all things seem possible.'

Under pressure from South Africa, Smith had been holding preliminary discussions with ANC leaders and newspaper headlines reflected hopes for a constitutional conference. This was the public face of a dual strategy. 'If someone suggests a little change here and there, and it does not affect the principle and keeps the reins of government in responsible hands, I am prepared to listen to this,' Smith told his flock. 'But if people want basic

changes then the answer is No.' And his lieutenants began to implement a strategy that would bring a halt to the war for 14 months.

PART II: The Assassination

Herbert Chitepo had been a CIO target since 1969 when he was identified as the 'brains' behind the review in military strategy and the conduct of the guerrilla war. The new offensive in the north-east in December 1972 reinforced this view that he was the key strategist behind ZANLA operations. The trigger which finally activated the long-standing plan to eliminate him was the impending independence of Mozambique and the prospect of ZANLA extending operations down the length of the eastern border.¹

There was a difference of opinion within the CIO as to the possible effects of the spread of ZANLA operations, with some arguing that this would be a positive development for Rhodesia, stretching the guerrilla forces and dividing them even further from the ZIPRA guerrillas who had their rear base in Zambia. But there was no difference of opinion over what action was required 'for the security of the state'. ZIPRA, it was thought, would continue to present a frontal and more conventional offensive across the Zambezi, a threat the Rhodesian security forces had shown they could counter in the late 1960s, and at any rate Nkomo's army was not fighting at this stage. The thrust of Rhodesian covert strategy previously had been to perpetuate the split between ZANU and ZAPU especially since the formation of the Joint Military Command (JMC) in 1972; now, they turned their strategy to assassination to disrupt the war and divide the liberation movement within. Two years later, when ZIPRA operations had increased, 'JZ' Moyo was targeted for the same reason.

The CIO evaluators regarded the Lusaka Declaration of

Unity as very significant — and unexpected. When Kaunda's envoy, Mark Chona, had been in Salisbury in November to fetch the detained nationalist leaders, Smith had wagged his finger at him and said, 'if you can achieve unity, you can come back and cut this finger off.'² Smith had since been holding preliminary talks with ANC leaders, and the newspapers, if not the government, were full of hope for impending constitutional talks. The preliminary talks were scuttled, however, with the arrest of Sithole in early March. The government claimed he was plotting to assassinate some of his colleagues in a bid for the ANC leadership, but produced no evidence. Muzorewa suspended further talks with Smith, pending Sithole's release. The South Africans summoned Smith to Cape Town to explain a move they believed invited a full-scale resumption of the war and jeopardized the future of detente.

Meanwhile, there was something far more worrying to the evaluators in CIO. That was the impending independence of Mozambique, set for 25 June 1975 by a transitional government already in power. Their intelligence had long since told them that ZANU was working closely with FRELIMO, that ZANLA guerrillas had been infiltrating into the north-east through Mozambique, and that they were now crossing the Zambezi River in broad daylight. They predicted the impending spread of ZANLA operations along the lengthy eastern border with Mozambique, a lush and mountainous region, well-forested and difficult to patrol. They identified the 'brains' behind this looming escalation of the war as the same man they held responsible for the new strategy in the north-east — Herbert Chitepo.

Although the ZANU National Chairman had worked closely with other members of the DARE and the ZANLA High Command in evolving the new strategy that led to successful resumption of the war in 1972, Chitepo was the man the CIO knew from their files of press cuttings, agents' reports and interrogations of captured guerrillas. He was

the main public voice of the party, enunciating the ideological line and strategy. He was seen as the 'brains' behind the military offensive, the 'brains' behind the political line, and the 'brains' running ZANU. The major miscalculation was that without him the war would stop.

The headquarters of the Rhodesian CIO were located in the imposing, red-brick Coghlan Building near the centre of Salisbury, a few blocks away from the Prime Minister's office. The main intelligence offices on the top floors were sealed off from the rest of the building by a special barred and gated reception area. CIO officers carried security passes, and any outsider required identification and a telephone confirmation of appointment before proceeding beyond the reception.

The operations or 'ops' department, then called S-desk, was on the eighth floor. This was the action wing of the CIO and the offices of the section were located along a short corridor, where the head of section had the first office on the right. The head of section and the administrative staff came from the BSAP and most of them had served at least 20 years in the police force, including periods in the SB and the Criminal Investigations Department (CID). Along the same corridor were the offices of two other former policemen and two secretaries.

The operatives, the men who were infiltrated into neighbouring countries on reconnaissance and other missions, were former SAS soldiers, highly-trained and experienced in the use of weapons and explosives. The operatives' room was at the end of the corridor. It was a large room and one wall, behind wing doors, was completely covered with maps showing the external team's frontier crossing points, the border area with Zambia from Livingstone in the west to Kanyemba in the east on the Mozambique border, then the Mozambique border areas. The operatives called this the 'play-room.' They kept their weapons there,

plus some explosives carefully separated from the detonators, tools of their trade readily to hand in case they had to scramble for an urgent job. Around the room were desks for the operatives, and in a small office just off the 'play-room' was the section's administrator.

The director of external intelligence, DEX, had his office on the same floor; the head of DIN and the DG had large offices one floor up. That was the floor where morning 'prayers' were held, and where decisions were taken. Smith, as Prime Minister, was kept informed, to give him the opportunity to say 'No', but he seldom disputed proposals from CIO. The head of DEX took the decisions to his operations team to plan the details. Once approval was given, it was their task to assign operatives, who would normally conduct their own reconnaissance, and consider the methods. Preliminary reconnaissance was often done by an undercover agent.

The agent in Zambia was Ian Robert Bruce Sutherland, a farmer who had been doing reconnaissance for CIO for about six years. More recently, he had also been caching arms, ammunition and explosives. Sutherland had succeeded a previous operative in Zambia, who was code-named 'Bernard' and who was married to a doctor whom he divorced before moving to Chipinga (Chipinge) in Rhodesia's eastern highlands, where he was a coffee farmer until he left for South Africa in the late 1970s. An elderly gentleman, 'Bernard' had the advantage of a pilot's licence and his own small plane.³

Sutherland was a slow-thinking and taciturn man, born at Mufulira, on the Zambian Copperbelt, on 22 June 1936. He completed his education in 1953, up to standard six, and worked in the copper-mines and as an apprentice plumber before joining the territorial army. He resigned from the army, with the rank of Sgt-Major, in 1964, just after the break-up of federation and at about the time of Zambia's independence. He then travelled to Japan where he took lessons in boxing and karate, and obtained a black

belt in judo. 'He was a very hard character,' one former operative said, 'quite capable of killing someone if he wanted to, by simply using his bare hands'; but another colleague described him as 'inoffensive'. Sutherland returned to Zambia in June 1965 and bought a farm in Zambia's sugarcane growing region about 5 km from Mazabuka, a small farming town south-west of Lusaka, on the main road and rail route to Victoria Falls. It was plot 493A, and he called it 'Better Ole' farm.

For several years after UDI, until Smith closed the border with Zambia in January 1973, there was a regular flow of white residents of Zambia crossing into Rhodesia at Chirundu, Kariba or Victoria Falls. Many had relatives and friends in Rhodesia, and they often had children in Rhodesian schools. They crossed the southern border for shopping, and for big sports fixtures such as Currie Cup rugby matches. Sutherland was one of these. He was sympathetic to the white minority regime and opposed to the guerrillas fighting against it. The exact circumstance of his recruitment by CIO cannot be determined because most of the classified files were destroyed or flown to South Africa in 1980, just before Zimbabwe's independence. But it occurred in the years soon after UDI, a former operative said, probably around 1969 when 'he was introduced to us' by an old contact from his days in the territorial army, Lawrence McGorian.⁴ At first refusing to accept financial gain in return for information, Sutherland was soon given bonus money paid into a building society in Salisbury, which helped to educate his children at St Michael's Prep School and later at Ruzawi, an elite boarding school for white boys near the town of Marandellas (Marondera), 80 km east of the capital.

The CIO set up a simple telephone code with their Zambian agent, using the names of his two sons at boarding school, Bruce and Grant. A telephone call from the CIO to Sutherland saying something like 'Bruce got his 1st XV colours for rugby on 14 March' would mean that

CIO was planning a mission into Zambia and the operatives wanted to be met by their agent at a previously agreed pick-up point on that date. A call saying something like 'Grant is sick and won't be coming home for the break' would mean they wanted Sutherland to come down for an urgent meeting.

One of the locations for these meetings, just across the border in Rhodesia, was six miles south of the Chirundu immigration post where a rendezvous point had been arranged on a track off a sugar-plantation road. One meeting, which can be pinpointed from Rhodesian immigration files, occurred on 2 September 1972, six months before the border closure.⁵ An immigration declaration shows that Sutherland crossed into Rhodesia at Kariba that day, listing his reason for entry as 'Parts. To collect spares for car'. In response to the question about what money he had available, he answered 'Nil', and vaguely listed his address at destination as Kariba. Responses of that kind at most border posts would lead to the would-be visitor being turned back, but the lack of difficulty encountered by Sutherland is explained by the immigration officer's bold notation contained in brackets - '(met by the P.M.SO)'. Sutherland had been called for a briefing, and the person who met him was the 'ops', or S-desk, administrator, who was also responsible for payment of Sutherlands' 'results' bonuses into an account - (9) 01-627-150 (201) - in his name at the Central African Building Society (CABS) in Salisbury. His sons' school fees totalled \$600-700 per term, and he told other family members that these were paid out of the interest from paid-up permanent shares in the building society.

Sutherland undertook three principle tasks for the CIO. 'He was mainly used for reconnaissance and if we wanted to know whether a camp was in such-and-such a place he would look and see and say "Yes" or "No". If we wanted to know if a camp was occupied he would come back and say "Yes" or "No". And that was the main way he was used

apart from being used for the arms cache and for putting people up who we might put across the Zambezi.' His reconnaissance methods were simple. He would drive to the area he was to reconnoitre 'and then he'd have trouble with his car and get out and look as if he was waiting for help,' a CIO officer said. 'You can always have trouble with your car, you can always go into the wrong place, take a wrong turning and see quite a lot of things.'

Sutherland fulfilled his other functions at his Mazabuka home, a rambling white-painted, typically colonial-style farmhouse where he lived his other life running a mixed farm of maize, sugar and cattle. He also had a profitable trucking operation carrying road-building materials and maize. The comfortable five-bedroom residence was the 'safe house' for CIO operatives who crossed into Zambia on specific missions. Sutherland met them at a pre-arranged point, usually around Siavonga on the north bank of the Zambezi River, just above the Kariba Dam wall. He transported them in a kombi-type van or a Volkswagon beetle, both of which had hidden compartments for arms, ammunition and explosives.

The third task was the storing of an arms cache for the CIO from which people put across on missions could draw arms or explosives. The cache was hidden 200 m from the main farmhouse in a workshop. It was stored underground in a large drum covered with rubber blocks and conveyor-belt mats, providing a false floor and fast accessibility. The weapons — including various calibres of guns and ammunition, rocket-launchers, grenades, land-mines, explosives, primers, batteries and detonators — had been ferried across the Zambezi in canoes by CIO operatives. Sutherland met them many times at Siavonga at night and transferred the equipment to the false compartments in his vehicle. He slept at a Siavonga cottage before returning to the farm the next morning.

The operations department had chosen Sutherland to undertake the initial reconnaissance on Chitepo and some

of the information which he supplied convinced them that the assassination was feasible. Both Sutherland and his wife, Priscilla, who was also born in Zambia, had been instructed in the use of explosives by CIO operatives who later said Mrs Sutherland had been quicker to pick up the details. But neither was experienced in that field, and for the Chitepo operation a real expert was needed.

The assassin chosen by the operations department was already on their payroll. He was an explosives expert and his name was Hugh 'Chuck' Hind. He was born at 21 Civic Street, Glasgow, on 23 October 1940. His father, John Lemnel Hind, was a spirit salesman who had married his mother, Winifred Josephine Docherty, on 26 November 1938. Their home was at 88 Cartvale Road, Glasgow. Hugh Hind had had 10 years of formal education, reaching school-leaving certificate. He was wiry and craggy-faced, with dark hair and a sallow complexion. Brought up in a tough Glasgow environment, he was described by his colleagues as a 'hard man'.⁶

Hind joined the British Army as a volunteer, and went into C Company of the 1st Battalion of the Paratroop Regiment based at Aldershot; later, in the Middle East, he became a middleweight boxing champion. At the beginning of the 1960s, Hind was put forward by his regiment for the army's toughest selection test — enlistment into the SAS. Only a handful of the well over 100 soldiers put forward by their regiments pass each SAS selection test and Hind failed his first attempt. However, he tried again. This time he passed, and joined the regiment which calls itself 'The Elite' and has as its motto, 'Who Dares Wins.' Hind did his training at Brecon in Wales before joining B Squadron, SAS. It was a time when, in the words of SAS colleagues who served with him, there were 'no campaigns', meaning that there was little or no opportunity to practise the considerable and advanced military skills he had learned.

Whether Hind was bored by lack of action or was lured by more money (£316 a month paid tax-free in the Channel Islands) is unclear. But he resigned from the SAS and joined an organization called Watchguard International which had been started by the man who founded the SAS, Col David Stirling, whose exploits behind German lines in the Second World War earned him the nickname 'The Phantom Major'. Watchguard offered a variety of services, according to its tasteful, emerald-green brochure. These ranged from military surveys and advice to the training of close security bodyguards for heads of state and the training of special forces to combat guerrilla warfare and insurgency, including an attempted *coup d'état* by a leader's own army. The Watchguard force were highly-skilled and specialized soldiers drawn mainly from elite British units such as the SAS, the paratroops and commandoes.

Watchguard's offices were in Sloane Street, in London's expensive Knightsbridge area, where, from adjoining offices at 21 and 22 Sloane St, Stirling ran two companies. Television International Enterprises, at 21 Sloane St, sold TV-programme contracts to emergent African nations, the first success being Mauritius. The operations from 22 Sloane St were less public. Watchguard was set up in March 1967 and relied on the 'old-boy network' of Stirling's extensive contacts in Africa and the Middle East. From 1949, Stirling had begun to use his very considerable reputation and religious beliefs to promote the Capricorn Africa Society (CAS), which advocated a limited franchise for Africans and removal of the more blatant forms of discrimination. It was the 'tea-party phase of white liberalism in Africa', one CAS organizer later observed. Stirling had to withdraw from the presidency in 1956 after disagreements with African nationalist leaders, particularly those from Tanganyika and Nyasaland, who regarded the word 'capricornist' as synonymous with 'informer'. But, whatever disagreement he may have had with some of the

nationalists, Stirling's CAS exposure left him with a useful group of contacts later utilized by Watchguard.⁷

One of these contacts was Kenneth Kaunda. Like Stirling, he was a devout Christian; and he gave Watchguard one of its first contracts in Africa. In 1967, Stirling concluded a deal to supply Kaunda with Watchguard's services to train a special squad of close bodyguards, and a paramilitary force which, in effect, was a West German-armed 'counter-coup force', according to one of the Watchguard instructors.⁸ This brought to the region not only the organization, but Hind, the future assassin of Chitepo, a nationalist leader who, ironically, had been an acquaintance of Stirling from CAS days.

The initial 'survey' team arrived in Zambia in late 1967. They were Major Malcolm MacGillivray, son of a respected British diplomat; Dave 'Darkie' Davidson, an Anglo-Indian who was to find the pressure of job discrimination so bad in Britain's 'civvie' street that he went on to become a mercenary in a number of countries including Angola; and Hind. All three men had served in the SAS. They arrived about three months before the main group of Watchguard instructors and their task was to screen would-be recruits for the bodyguard for tribal loyalties, educational standards, aptitude for training and adaptability. The recruits were drawn from the army, the police and the ruling-party (UNIP) youth wing. They were narrowed down to about 130 and put into specialized training in areas such as car ambushes and hijacking drills. Kaunda's white handkerchief, which he was always waving 'over his ticker', was regarded as a perfect sniper's target by the Watchguard team, but he disregarded their advice to dispense with his readily identifiable symbol. After completing the close bodyguard training, Hind and other Watchguard personnel went on to train a paramilitary unit at a special police camp in the Kafue Gorge. The core of this unit, who became the officers and senior non-commissioned officers and trained future intakes, were

those originally selected for the bodyguard course who had failed to make the grade.

It was in this period, while a Watchguard instructor, that Hind first came to the notice of the Rhodesians. Stirling had been under surveillance, initially through the CID, since 28 December 1956 when a file was opened on him which was subsequently given the code number XYP 6691.⁹ The first report contained in his file refers to five telephone calls he made from Salisbury, at half-hourly intervals, to a public telephone booth in Johannesburg on 5 December 1956 in which he discussed, with an unidentified party, the arrests of a number of people earlier that day by the South African police for alleged 'treason'. Thereafter, Stirling's involvement with various African nationalists is traced, phone calls to friends and contacts monitored and mail intercepted.

In January 1970, the Rhodesian intelligence services switched their focus on Stirling from his contacts with African nationalists to his Watchguard activities. An 'H' Section report from SB, dated 24 February 1970, expresses suspicions about Watchguard, stating that the organization is exploiting the fact that it trained the bodyguard of the Kenyan president, Jomo Kenyatta. On 16 December the same year, the Portuguese secret police, the General Security Directorate (DGS), sent a message to Rhodesian intelligence which read: 'This service heard that British Colonel David Stirling is training people in Zambia. Can you confirm and let us know what he is doing there and what people is he training as well as the aims of that instructions (sic).'

The CIO replied the following day: 'With regard to your inquiry we can advise that Colonel Stirling, who was a founder member of the Capricorn Africa Society, controls Watchguard International, an organization which trains bodyguards and/or paramilitary units (PMU). Members of the organization are selected for their experience which ranges over demolition, close battle techniques, sabotage,

assassination and communications. Watchguard International have been engaged in Zambia over the past two years in training Police PMU to approximate battalion strength and the Presidential bodyguard. Recruits are drawn from the Zambian police and military, UNIP and the Zambia Youth Service. The organization is represented in Zambia by Kenyan-born Major Malcolm Colin Mac-Gillivray.'

Hind's name first surfaces on the Stirling file three years later in a somewhat incoherent report, dated 22 November 1973, that refers to him as 'Hyams' and says he is living in Salisbury working for a South African firm which '...prefers him to others because of his past connections in countries to the north of Rhodesia'. The policeman's sloppiness over the spelling of the name drew a rebuke from his superiors but on 12 December the officer commanding SB sent a secret report to Mr J.S.T. Fletcher, Liaison Officer, Rhodesian Diplomatic Mission, Pretoria, suggesting he might bring to the attention of his liaison (presumably South African) background information about Hugh Hind who was then visiting Rhodesia. The memorandum, headed HUGH HIND, read: 'Hugh Hind was born in Glasgow, Scotland on the 23rd October, 1940 and is presently the holder of British passport No. 710057, issued in London, England, on the 11th June, 1971, valid for ten years...

'On the 16th July, 1968, Hind, who gave out that he was employed as a police instructor at the Central Police Mess, Lusaka, visited the Victoria Falls, accompanied by two other men who also described themselves as being Police Instructors. None of the three were observed in suspicious circumstances during their visit and appeared to be on a normal sightseeing tour. (The men accompanying Hind were subsequently identified as being members of the British 22nd SAS Regiment).

'Hind first came to security notice in April, 1969, when he was named as a member of the British 22nd Special Air Service Regiment on loan to the Zambian Police to assist

in the training of the Police Paramilitary Unit. The training team was operating at that time in the Ndola area of Zambia, its members were working in plain clothes. Hind was known to use the nickname 'Chuck' and he was corporal at the time. Hind was known to be part of the select group operating indirectly under Stirling.

'Hind entered Rhodesia via Salisbury Airport on the 4th December, 1973. He declared himself as a Company Executive with Staffmaster Services, 506, Denor House, Durban, South Africa, and gave his last address as 85 Lampard Grove, London N.16, England.'

As in the case of Sutherland, the exact date and circumstance of Hind's recruitment by the CIO cannot be pinpointed. But the beginning of the process certainly occurred while he was working in Zambia training Kaunda's bodyguards and 'counter-coup' paramilitary forces. A former SAS man then working for the Rhodesians recalled meeting Hind and one of the other members of the training team when they visited Rhodesia. 'They came down here on leave while they were working up there. And they liked the place. So we told them "why the hell don't you come down here".'¹⁰ The SAS is like a relatively small and very elite club whose members frequently run into each other in trouble-spots, and another member of the Zambian training team also turned up in Salisbury. He was driving overland across Africa and, just before Christmas 1974, he met Hind in the Red Fox Hotel, a favoured watering-hole for many white Rhodesians with its quasi-British pub decor. 'Chuck told me, "I've got a lapidary business" and I just laughed. He used this story that he was in gemstones, but friends said he was with "the Firm", the CIO.'¹¹

Hind, as the report to the Rhodesian liaison officer in South Africa shows, had first come to the notice of the Rhodesian authorities as a visitor to Victoria Falls in July 1968, some seven months after he had gone to Zambia. Interest in him had increased in April 1969 when it was

learned that he was, or had been, a member of the 22nd SAS. It is believed to have been about that time that he met his former British SAS colleague and was encouraged to move to Rhodesia. Hind is thought to have remained in Zambia until 1970, about the time Stirling withdrew from Watchguard. However, Watchguard continued for some years run by MacGillivray, and Hind may have gone to Sierra Leone in a similar training role until 1971 or 1972. Hind was recorded by SB at Salisbury Airport in December 1973 and again on 18 June 1974, when he was listed in the daily SB airport log as arriving at 14.25 hours on RH 861 from Blantyre. As on his previous visit, he describes himself as a company executive with Staffmaster Services in Durban, and the duty SB officer at the airport notes that he has been advised that Hind is an 'unarmed combat instructor'. The report adds 'Full Customs search revealed nothing of interest to SB'.¹² This attention, and the search, is ironic as by then Hind was certainly on a CIO retainer and it was simply a case of one department not knowing what the other was doing — or, in this case, who worked for whom in the series of 'watertight compartments' that were maintained between various intelligence groups and desks.

One former CIO officer said he thought Hind began working for them in 1972. 'He was dabbling in semi-precious stones and moving back and forth,' one officer said. This provided a good cover and Hind was put on a retainer with bonuses paid for specific jobs. Unlike Sutherland, the officer said, Hind '...was more of the mercenary type. If we wanted something, we would probably say, "Chuck, you can have so much if you do that"'. Using a British passport, and the cover story that he was a geologist, Hind shuttled in and out of Zambia frequently, flying via Malawi or through South Africa and Botswana.

Another of the CIO operatives who worked with Hind said he thought he may have been recruited earlier,

possibly when he was still in Zambia training people for Kaunda. 'We paid him a retainer, a fairly healthy retainer. I would say something like around about \$800 a month, tax-free. I think all that stuff was tax-free. Chuck was working with us although he wasn't actually — he wasn't taken on by government, in CIO. He was on call, with a retainer, if you see what I mean. When we wanted Chuck, he dropped whatever he was doing and came with us.' One very considerable, additional asset Hind had was his contacts in the Zambian police and paramilitary from his days as a Watchguard instructor and from them he could certainly glean valuable information.

Once the decision to kill Chitepo had been approved, the operations team moved into the detailed planning phase. 'As soon as there was a target, normally we always did a recce first. Had a look at it to see where the target was, whether it was possible, what the guards were, where the dogs were, where the wire was, and very often we got our own aerial photographs. And then from that we did our planning. And the planning would involve things like moon phases, and we'd probably have somebody there watching how guards change if any, whether they were dopey or not, whether a chap had wire around his house, or whether it was a place that was quiet at night after, say, 10 o'clock, or whether people were going in and out until 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning on a boozier. All that was taken into consideration. Then we'd make the plan,' a former CIO operative said. 'The time lag from the decision being made was not very long in this case. I think between the first recce and the bang was about a month.'

'It doesn't require much planning for this sort of thing,' another former intelligence officer said. 'Not more than a month at the most. You leave people alone in their own parish to do the job and they decide when and how. The main problem is the availability of the target.' Chitepo's identity was well-known from newspaper photographs, and Hind had access to other information from his old

police contacts. Confirmation of the chairman's current street address, and those of other ZANU leaders, had come in February from a captured 'terrorist', and both Hind and Sutherland knew their way around Lusaka. Hind's instructions were to 'use his own initiative'.

The house at 150 Muramba Road in the Chilenje South suburb of Lusaka, where Chitepo stayed, was a single-storey structure with an asbestos roof, surrounded by a six-foot, wire-mesh fence. The night of 17 March was the first time for several days that Chitepo had slept at home. Zimbabwean contacts in the Zambian Special Branch had tipped off ZANU leaders, about two weeks earlier, that arrests were imminent; so members of the DARE and High Command had begun to vary their movements and sleep at different houses. But Muzorewa, interim leader of the umbrella ANC, had arrived in Lusaka that afternoon to make a special broadcast on Zambian radio, and the ZANU leaders stayed at their homes that night, thinking the presence of an ANC delegation would give them protection from arrest, at least temporarily.

Chitepo had gone to the ZANU office in the Liberation Centre that morning as usual, just after 8 o'clock, stopping on the way to collect another DARE member at 93 Mpelembe St in Kabwata. He was accompanied by two of his bodyguards, Sadat Kufamazuba, who worked in the ZANU office as a clerk, and Silas Shamiso, who had been assigned to him a month earlier after threats against his life. The chairman worked through the morning at the office and in the afternoon, accompanied by Silas and some of his ZANU colleagues, he drove to Lusaka airport to meet Bishop Muzorewa and his delegation. The Bishop expressed surprise when he saw Chitepo at the airport, saying the word at home was that he had been arrested in Malawi. Another member of Muzorewa's delegation remarked that a Salisbury rumour had said Chitepo was

dead. Muzorewa and his aides drove to the State guest-house with Chitepo and other Lusaka-based nationalist leaders. There they had a preliminary meeting to prepare an agenda for a series of meetings the following day. Chitepo, who was well aware of the rumours of his imminent arrest by Zambian authorities, was circumspect in his remarks about ZANU, the ANC and the armed struggle, leading the Bishop to burst out, 'Why can't you speak your mind directly?' The reasons for Chitepo's circumspection would later be distorted at a commission of inquiry set up to clear the Zambian government of involvement in his assassination.

When the meeting ended, at about 5 o'clock, the ZANU leaders including Tongogara, Mudzi, Kangai and Gumbo, moved to Chitepo's house where they had a consultative meeting with the chairman to make their own preparations for the following day. The others left at about 8 o'clock, and Chitepo and his bodyguards had their evening meal. Afterwards, Chitepo, accompanied by Sadat, visited two friends in the Woodlands and Longacres suburbs. They returned to 150 Muramba Road after 9 p.m. and parked the car, as usual, in the carport inside the fence. How late Chitepo worked that night is not known, but all the lights in the house were extinguished well before midnight.¹³ Hind and Sutherland were waiting in their car down the street with the lights and the engine turned off.

Hind had arrived in the Zambian capital at about the same time as Chitepo returned from Malawi 10 days earlier. He flew from Salisbury to Lusaka through South Africa and Botswana. Whether he entered Zambia on a passport bearing his correct name or using a false identity is not known, but on that occasion, as on his other visits to Zambia, his cover was that of a geologist. He was met at the airport by Sutherland who took him on a quick circuit of the city before exiting on the main road south towards Mazabuka and the farm. There was little need for preliminary reconnaissance as they knew the city so well.

Sutherland's knowledge coupled with Hind's contacts in the Zambian police made the planning relatively simple. Identification of the target was not difficult as his photograph appeared often in the press, and his blue Volkswagon, registration EY 7077, was well-known around Lusaka.

Sutherland's Mazubuka farm became the planning and operational centre of the Chitepo assassination. From their base, Lusaka was only an hour away by road and, mostly by night, they kept Chitepo's house under surveillance, studying his habits and those of the others at his house. 'Nothing to stop you driving by a house and seeing if the car is in the garage at one in the morning, two in the morning.'¹⁴ They saw that Chitepo normally travelled with one or two men who appeared to be bodyguards and that they stayed at the house with him. But security at the house posed little problem and the occupants were usually in bed reasonably early. The major difficulty they encountered was the irregularity of Chitepo's movements.

On the night of Monday 17 March, the two assassins watched from their car, parked diagonally, less than 50 metres down the road. Components of the bomb had been withdrawn from the cache hidden at 'Better Ole' farm and taken to Lusaka in the secret compartment in Sutherland's car. Former CIO officers do not know the exact time the bomb was placed on Chitepo's car but they say it would have been after midnight. 'Most of these things were done between 1 and 4 a.m. when most people have gone to bed and are at their lowest ebb' (in their deepest sleep).¹⁵ While Lusaka slept, Hind cut through the fence surrounding the house and placed the explosive inside the front right-hand wheel. Placing the charge, former CIO officers say, would have taken between five and ten minutes.

The bomb, which had been prepared on Sutherland's farm, was a relatively simple device. The explosive Hind almost certainly selected from the Mazabuka cache was PE4, one of the most potent types of plastic explosives. It

can be obtained in various forms rather resembling plastecine or in sheets like gauze which is placed on burns. The charge was probably about four kilograms. The firing mechanism was, in explosives terminology, called a Pressel Switch. This is an extremely simple device with many variables. Basically, it operates by placing two pieces of metal into positions so they are not touching. When they are brought into contact this completes a circuit, detonating the charge. Hind is thought to have used a matchbox and two nails, connected with wire to a small rectangular battery and a detonator. When the car wheels rolled over the nails they came into contact, completing the circuit. The charge was almost certainly attached to the wheel by magnets, although Hind, as an explosives expert, could have used several different methods including a string, tape or some form of adhesive. For a job of this sort, magnets would have been the fastest method. The charge was deliberately located on the front, right-hand wheel to kill Chitepo, the driver.

Unaware of what was happening outside, the occupants of 150 Muramba Road slept. Sadat, who survived the explosion because he was in the rear seat of the car, subsequently told his lawyer what happened. The lawyer's notes read: 'In the morning of 18 March after breakfast, I went out to open the gate. Mr Chitepo started the car engine. Silas was still in the house. I went back in the house and called Silas. I went into the car and sat in the back seat. Silas occupied the front seat next to Mr Chitepo who was driving. As Mr Chitepo was reversing I heard a small noise from the roof of the car. It sounded like a small stone hitting the roof. Mr Chitepo stopped the car immediately. We all looked around and saw that there was a child next door. I personally thought that the child had thrown the stone. None of us got out of the car. Mr Chitepo continued reversing. Then followed the blast. I next found myself in the UTH (Lusaka's University Teaching Hospital) where I regained consciousness.'¹⁶

Alec Dovi, another ZANU member who lived at the house, was inside and, in his subsequent police statement, he said: 'The following morning Sadat came to our room and opened the radio after 0600 hours (and) he left for his room and later prepared breakfast. After eating together with Mr Chitepo they both left the house and went into their motor vehicle and as they were reversing I heard a blast and Sadat was trying to come out of the car and I helped him to come out.'¹⁷

Sub-Inspector Mulomba was at the nearby Chilenje police station when the explosion occurred a few minutes after 8 am. He and other officers ran outside to see what had happened. 'We saw people screaming while running for their safety.' In the driveway of 150 Muramba Road a cloud of smoke and dust hung around the mangled wreckage of what remained of Chitepo's car. The front half of the car had been completely destroyed and the roof torn off. Some 30 metres away lay the buckled steering wheel and human remains. The crumpled car bonnet was on the roof of the house. The front door of Chitepo's house had been hurled inwards by the force of the blast and the house, and two adjoining ones, had been structurally damaged.

In the garden of the house next door lay a young Zambian boy, Sambwa Chaya, who must have been the one Sadat had seen just before the explosion. He was mortally wounded and later died in hospital. In the rear of the car, seriously injured and barely conscious, Sadat lay bleeding and in shock. The two men in the front were dead. Chitepo, as the assassins had intended, had taken the main force of the blast and had died instantly. The post mortem by the Zambian state forensic scientist listed the cause of death as multiple injuries. The explosion had amputated both legs above the knee. He had multiple penetrating wounds and burns on the face, neck and upper chest and metal fragments had penetrated his skull.¹⁸

Police quickly cordoned off the area and explosives experts began to probe the wreckage. One explosives

expert, Mr S.B. Mwenda from the President's Office (Special Duties), said in his report that the bomb had been placed inside the front right-hand wheel and fixed by magnets. The charge, he concluded, was trinitrotoluene (TNT) of which approximately 1.6 kg had been used and this had been placed in a 'brass metallic container which provided the fragmentation effect'. His report concluded that, 'the whole affair looks to be an inside job.'¹⁹

Kaunda and Muzorewa visited the scene together. The *Zambian* leader, *The Rhodesia Herald* reported, 'sat and wept with the nationalist leader's friends and relatives.' It was 'a brutal and cowardly tragedy' he said, adding that it was obviously the work of 'the enemies of unity in Zimbabwe.'²⁰ That, in the *Zambian* terminology of the time, meant ZANU. Muzorewa seemed to adopt a similar line, saying, 'I particularly appeal to those based in Zambia to help the police in their investigations so that the culprits can be brought to justice.' The ruling UNIP newspaper, the *Daily Mail*, went even further the next morning, saying some would blame people who were working with Chitepo. 'The murderers may still be in this country,' the paper said.²¹ Indeed the murderers were but they were not the people that the *Daily Mail* had in mind.

Sutherland returned to his Mazabuka farm and a substantial bonus was paid into the CABS account in Salisbury for his part in the murder. Hind flew back to Salisbury the way he had come, through Botswana and South Africa. His immigration declaration shows he re-entered Rhodesia through Salisbury Airport on 22 March, four days after the assassination. He gave his last address as 'BETTER OLE FARM, MAZABUKA, ZAMBIA'.²² His employer was still listed as Staffmaster Services in Durban but on this occasion he gave a Salisbury address: 9 Sandrise, a comfortable, two-storey town-house at the corner of Third St and Montague Ave costing \$230 a month and conveniently located less than five minutes walk from CIO headquarters. He also listed a CABS account.



REWARDS

You are reminded that large rewards continue to be paid to those persons who give information leading directly to the death or capture of terrorists and their weapons.

Do not be afraid to report all you know about the whereabouts of terrorists and their weapons because your identity will be kept secret and the reward you earn will be paid to you privately. You can choose to be paid in cash or the money can be put into a Post Office or Building Society savings account in your name.

Look at the amounts shown against the terrorists and their weapons in the photograph below.



Other terrorist weapons not shown in the photograph above also qualify for the payment of a reward. The amounts vary according to the type of weapon and the quantity thereof.

REPORT QUICKLY!

Printed by the Government Printer

This is one example of the bounty money offered by the Rhodesian government for information leading to the death or capture of guerrillas. Chitepo's killer received a bonus of about \$10 000, over and above his normal retainer, for assassinating the nationalist leader.



A Zambian police vehicle tows away the wreckage of Chitepo's car. The explosives were placed inside the front right-hand wheel.

G.P. & S. 64507-0--600 000.



Returning residents are not required to complete this form unless directed to do so by an immigration officer at port of entry.

Form No. I.F. 1

Regulations, Section 4.

IMMIGRATION DECLARATION

Immigration Act, 1966

To be completed in English and signed by immigrants and visitors seeking admission to Rhodesia other than a wife accompanying her husband, and children under 18 years of age accompanying parents or guardians. The wife of a returning resident, entering as an immigrant, must complete her own form.

- Name in full (block letters): Surname HIND
First names HUGH
- Date and place of birth 23.10.40 GLASGOW SCOTLAND.
- (a) Marital status

(mark where applicable)

Single <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Married	Widowed	Divorced	Male	Female
--	---------	---------	----------	------	--------

- Give details of wife, and children under 18 years, accompanying you.

Full names

Date and place of birth

Wife
Child
Child
Child
Child

- Passport details:

Self

Wife

Number 710097.
Place of issue LONDON
Date of issue 11.6.71
Date of expiry 11.6.81

- Address at destination 9 SANDRISE CNR THIRD & MONTAGUE AVE

- (a) Race EUROPEAN (b) Nationality BRITISH

- (c) Last permanent address BETTER OLE FARM MAZABUKA ZAMBIA

- (a) Occupation COMPANY EXECUTIVE

- (b) Name and address of employer STAFFMASTER 50% DENOR HSE DURBAN.

- Why have you come to Rhodesia? ONE MONTH (APPROX)

- What money have you immediately available? R\$4 - 21-2K40 - 30 FRS 440

I hereby declare that I and those dependants accompanying me have not been convicted of any crime in any country, prohibited from entering or deported from any country, and are not suffering from active pulmonary tuberculosis, or any other infectious or communicable disease.

(Ignore contraventions of by-laws or regulations where a fine of \$30 or less was imposed.)

I understand this declaration which I have completed truthfully.

DATE-STAMP



DECLARED BEFORE ME:

Signature of Declarant



Immigration Officer

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Visa No. Authority

Date of issue Place of issue


On the day of Chitepo's funeral in Lusaka, and on the eve of the arrest of ZANU members in Zambia, the assassin returned to Salisbury to collect his bonus, giving his 'last permanent address' as Better Ole Farm, Mazabuka, the home of a Rhodesian undercover operative where the bomb was assembled.



The assassin ...
and his home, a town-house in Salisbury near the CIO headquarters.

Killed On Active Service

HIND. — Chuck. My darling
Chuckles, taken away so sud-
denly. The moving finger writes;
and having writ. moves on; nor
all your piety nor wit shall lure
it back to cancel half a line;
nor all your tears wash out a
word of it. — Your everloving
wife.
—2764-D-5




The assassin, still using his cover as a geologist, was killed on another operation in Zambia and his name appeared at the head of the 'Killed on Active Service' list in the classified advertisements column of *The Rhodesia Herald* on 3 February 1977.



More than two years after Chitepo's death, Zambian police arrested the undercover operative and found his arms cache; he was charged only with possessing 'offensive weapons'. He is shown leaving a Lusaka court after being sentenced to five years in prison, a comparatively light penalty which led to public protest in Zambia.



Part of the Rhodesian arms cache found on Better Ole Farm at Mazabuka, Zambia. The cache included rocket-launchers, weapons, ammunition, grenades and explosives.



After being acquitted of murder charges in the High Court of Zambia and released from 20 months imprisonment, (left to right) Joseph Chimurenga, Josiah Tongogara, and Sadat Kufamazuba talk to ZANU members including Simon Muzenda.

from CIO headquarters. He also listed a CABS account.

Hind was normally paid in cash, according to ex-CIO operatives, who confirm that his payment for killing Chitepo was \$10 000. A CIO report later said Hind was recruited on an 'operational/retainer basis with the clear understanding that he also receive bonuses when successful missions were carried out.' A former senior official said later, 'It was our most successful operation of the war... It went off exactly as planned.'

PART III: The Aftermath

The repercussions of Chitepo's murder, and particularly the Zambian response, have had far-reaching effects, some of which persist to this day. The war was effectively brought to a halt and many ZANU guerrillas fighting in the north-east of Rhodesia, cut off without supplies or information, were sacrificed. The bulk of ZANU's leadership, not already detained in Rhodesian prisons, were detained in Zambia and the names of leaders like Tongogara smeared in the courts and the press. Over 1 000 trained ZANLA guerrillas were detained and some were killed in Zambian custody. And, because the Zambian commission interpreted the murder in purely tribal terms within ZANU, divisions exist to this day between the Karanga and Manyika with the latter excluding Tongogara's name from heroic songs, refusing to have schools and other institutions named after him and the Chitepo family initially refusing to have their relative buried at Hero's Acre next to Tongogara. Instead of being symbols of unity in an independent Zimbabwe, some people have used their names to sow the seeds of disunity.

Asst Commissioner of Police, Michael Edden, who was the SB liaison officer with Combined Operations headquarters, first confirmed that the entire sequence of events from the Nhari Rebellion to the death of Chitepo, were interrelated. But, he added, 'we had a great deal of luck.' The motivation, he said, was to 'strike a blow at the heart of the matter; if there was friction in the central committee we could turn it to our advantage.'¹ In 'turning it to their advantage', there was help from unexpected quarters — from some Zimbabwean politicians, from the Zambian

government and, to a lesser degree, from other Frontline states who sought to maintain their credibility at the OAU by publicly pronouncing Zambia's innocence regardless of the consequences.

The CIO had been closely following, and where possible fuelling, the divisions in the nationalist ranks in Zambia from the split in 1971 leading to the formation of FROLIZI, the challenges to Chitepo's leadership, the Nhari rebellion and its aftermath. The murder of Chitepo, the CIO had reasoned, could have the effect of causing further divisions and regional animosity within ZANU. If it appeared to be an internal liquidation, it could also erode ZANU's relations with the Zambian government at a time when they were already seriously strained as a result of the detente exercise and by pressure for a ceasefire and unity with the ANC, FROLIZI and ZAPU. 'I think [the evaluators] were very well clued up,' a former CIO man said. 'Where exactly they got their information from I don't know. But they had a lot of sources they got information from. And they pieced it together very well.' Hind, through his contacts in the Zambian police, and other agents in Lusaka at the time found fertile ground to spread rumour and innuendo about Chitepo's killers and their motives. The local and international press also picked up the story.

There were three principle sources of information available to the press — the Rhodesians who had hoped that the killing would cause division and disarray, the staff of State House in Lusaka who were committed to their detente exercise, and Chikerema who was responsible for much of the division within the nationalist ranks from 1970. The day after Chitepo's death, Chikerema was quoted in the British press as saying ZANU was 'riddled with tribalism' and the murder was organized by the Karangas.² He completely rejected any suggestion that Smith, white Rhodesians or 'imperialist agents' were behind the killing and called on all exiled Zimbabweans in Zambia to co-operate with the police and 'ruthlessly crush'

tribal elements. Later he was to go on record as saying in reference to the ZANU detainees in Zambia, 'if they are found guilty under Zambian law and they are not executed a lot of Zimbabweans will be terribly disappointed'.

Africa magazine, for whom the Zambian government was a guarantor on borrowed funds, began an article, headlined 'Who killed Chitepo?' by quoting Chikerema: 'In our liberation struggle, it is important to make a clear distinction between the crimes committed by Smith against the Zimbabwean people and those that Zimbabweans commit against themselves. To do so is not to subvert the struggle, but to cleanse it.' While not totally excluding other possibilities such as Smith, the thrust of the article was that Chitepo was, in all probability, a victim of the Karanga: 'It has been rightly suggested that it would be naive and dishonest to indict Smith for the murder of Chitepo without taking into consideration other vital circumstantial factors.'³ While many ZANU members fumed over this article, the Rhodesians delighted in reprinting it on the official letterhead of their Foreign Ministry and giving it away to visiting journalists to prove that they were guiltless and that Chitepo was a victim of internal ZANU feuding.

A footnote to the events of 18 March 1975 appeared as a paragraph the following day in the *Financial Times* in London: 'Talks between the South African Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, and the Rhodesian leader, Mr Ian Smith, ended today with a statement expressing unqualified desire that settlement negotiations should be resumed as soon as possible.' The story continued the next day: 'Rhodesian sources are remaining silent about the Smith-Vorster talks amid speculation that the two sides parted with less than full agreement...' A *Times* editorial in London said Smith had emerged from the meeting with Vorster 'with the comfortable agreement for public consumption' that the Rhodesian issue must be solved around a conference table. 'The killing of Mr Chitepo in

Lusaka adds a fresh complication,' the newspaper said, describing him as 'committed to the tough ZANU line' and 'the hardest man to bring into the ANC front.' *The Times* added, 'Whose target was he?'

From ZANU leaders inside Rhodesia and outside the country, responsibility for the murder was laid firmly on the doorstep of the Rhodesian government. Mugabe, the Secretary-General, recently released from detention, said in Salisbury that the murder was 'the evil work' of the Rhodesian regime operating through the 'willing hands of its Zambian agents'.⁴ Edson Sithole, a man of deep conviction who uncompromisingly supported the armed struggle and was later arrested and murdered in custody by the Rhodesian SB, said it was 'the work of forces, black and white, working hard to eliminate from African politics those people they consider militants and unwilling to accept a constitutional position less than majority rule... It is equally significant that it has happened when a belief is growing in certain circles that a settlement could be reached if certain elements were not present.'⁵

Both Mugabe and Edson Sithole made it clear that although they believed the murder was the responsibility of the Rhodesian government they also believed Zambia was implicated. In Lusaka, ZANU's Secretary for Information and Publicity, Rugare Gumbo, said, 'the brutal death of Mr Chitepo is part of the imperialists' scheme of systematically eliminating the leadership that has spearheaded the armed struggle in Zimbabwe.'⁶ The ZANU representative in London was equally emphatic. To all of this, the Rhodesian government responded predictably: 'These allegations were to be expected but there is no evidence to support them and they are categorically denied.'

Amid the charges and countercharges, ZANU officials were occupied with two more immediate concerns. The first was the burial of Chitepo. Throughout the struggle, Mugabe strongly believed that Zimbabweans should be

buried at home and he set about trying to arrange for Chitepo's body to be brought home. This was publicly rejected by the Rhodesians, who said in a statement that, 'in view of Chitepo's history as the leader of a terrorist organisation, which was directly responsible for the murder of a considerable number of black and white Rhodesians, the request was not granted.' Zambia also was unwilling to allow the return of Chitepo's body, fearing that it would generate a public display of support for ZANU.

ZANU officials, who were trying to organize a small funeral at the request of the Chitepo family, found arrangements taken over by the Zambian government, which insisted on a 'state funeral with full military honours'. Chitepo's senior colleagues were prevented from speaking at the funeral and were forced into the background. Muzorewa, who was allowed to speak, said the murder could have been the work of 'a black enemy, using a black agent, who may have lost the vision and purpose of the struggle and could now be working for nothing but self-interest and personal gain.'⁸ One of the female commanders, Catherine Garanewako, was pushed forward to speak in Shona with Kangai interpreting, and they were later warned that they would be arrested for making a revolutionary speech using the name of ZANU, an organization no longer recognized by Zambia. They were both summoned to the State guest-house and castigated by the Bishop for speaking in the time allocated for relatives. 'For me, we were burying my brother today; for her, she was burying her father,' Kangai told him. 'All those thousands of youngsters who were there mourning, in a revolutionary sense he was their father. The only leader they had is Herbert Chitepo. The Bishop just couldn't understand.'⁹

Contacts in the Zambian Special Branch had warned ZANU leaders that arrests would be made immediately after the funeral, so the DARE decided to disperse the

High Command outside Zambia to ensure the continuation of the armed struggle. Tongogara and others were sent to Mozambique, Nhongo to Tanzania, and others to Chifombo and the front. A handful of commanders remained at the camps in Zambia. Mass arrests began on Sunday, 23 March, the day after the funeral, and among those arrested were 50 mourners taken by police from Chitepo's residence.

By 28 March, the Zambian Minister for Home Affairs, Aaron Milner, was able to tell a press conference at his Lusaka home that 'quite a nice number' of ZANU members had been detained. He declined to name them or to give the exact number, and, asked to comment on a ZANU statement that Chitepo had been killed by agents of Smith, he replied, 'one cannot say it wasn't Smith's agents, one cannot say it wasn't ZANU'.¹⁰ He signed a banning order for ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI and closed the offices, saying they were being used for purposes 'prejudicial to the maintenance of peace, order and good government.' Tanzania followed suit in May.

Milner's disclosure of the arrests drew the following observations in three London newspapers. Writing from Lusaka on 28 March, the Africa correspondent of the *Financial Times* observed, 'whether or not the Chitepo assassins are found within ZANU ranks, the arrests will put Zambia in a much stronger position to try to force unity on the divided ZANU and thus to make the merger of the three Rhodesian nationalist parties within the ANC more meaningful.'¹¹ The *Guardian* correspondent in Salisbury wrote that the arrests were being read in the Rhodesian capital as 'a sign of his (Kaunda's) determination to impose unity.'¹² A headline in the *Daily Telegraph* on the same day read, 'ZANU arrests revive Rhodesian peace hopes'; and the correspondent wrote, 'this move has revived hopes in Salisbury of an early end to the guerrilla war, and, observers believe, has salvaged the prospects of a constitutional conference on Rhodesia's future.' The ban

on ZANU is expected to immediately effect the terrorist war being waged in Rhodesia's north-eastern border,' the *Daily Telegraph* said, '...the removal of the ZANU leadership is certain to throw their organization into disarray.'¹³ ZANU's militancy, and not Smith's obduracy, it would seem, was interpreted as the hurdle to a constitutional settlement, and an ulterior motive ascribed to the Zambian government for the arrests — that of trying to achieve a settlement by removing the leaders of ZANU.

Four days later, on 31 March, Kaunda announced in a national radio and television address that he was setting up a special commission of inquiry to study the events and circumstances leading to Chitepo's death. 'We are shocked,' he said. 'We are still grieved and angered. We remain bitter against the murderous act, bitter against the murderers — the enemies of Zambia and Africa. Many Zambians are, to say the least, very dismayed and justifiably irritated by statements made by some Zimbabwe nationals ... We are going ahead with full strength till we find the culprits and identify the real agent bent on disrupting the armed struggle...As always, we in Zambia want to be completely honest about the recent events. We will be honest in the interests of the struggle we have vowed to support until victory is won in Zimbabwe.'¹⁴

On 5 June, the Zambian government announced the names of 57 'former freedom fighters detained shortly after the assassination of nationalist leader Mr Herbert Chitepo early this year.' The *Daily Mail* reported that the 56 men and one woman were being held under the Preservation of Public Security Regulations and, although the government had not given the reasons for the detentions, the newspaper said '...it is likely that some of them may appear before the courts in connection with the murder of Mr Chitepo.' The list of detainees included the remaining five members of the DARE. ZANU charged that all of these events were part of a carefully orchestrated

campaign by the Zambian government aimed at destroying the party and implementing detente and said that, in effect, the party had been publicly tried, convicted and sentenced before the Special Commission of Inquiry even sat. A few days later, the ZANU representative in Botswana, Dick Moyo, one of few members of the High Command still at liberty, was killed by a parcel bomb.

In August, Smith met nationalist leaders in a train on the bridge at Victoria Falls and Vorster got his long sought-after summit when he crossed the bridge to meet Kaunda for lunch. UNIP members wave placards of welcome along his route and one sign said, 'Vorster becomes great in Africa today'.

'The Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo' was chaired by Reuben Kamanga, a member of the central committee of Zambia's ruling party UNIP, and commissioners were invited from 12 other countries: Botswana, The Congo, Ivory Coast, Libya, Malagasy, Morocco, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierre Leone, Somalia, Tanzania and Zaire. However, the Congo, Ivory Coast and Rwanda do not appear to have accepted the invitation. ZANU charged that Zambia had carefully chosen countries sympathetic to its detente exercise and five of the countries were represented by diplomats accredited to Zambia. The most serious representation came from the Frontline States. Botswana sent a member of the central committee of the ruling party and a Senior State Counsel; Tanzania sent a member of the party central committee and the Attorney General; and, belatedly, after the report was already in the first draft, Mozambique sent a special assistant from the President's office.

Most members of the commission were sworn in on 2 July 1975, and President Kaunda then hosted a dinner for

them. 'By coincidence,' the report later said, 'leaders of the ANC, including Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo and Rev Ndabaningi Sithole, were in Lusaka at that time, and were also invited to dinner.' Later that week they were the first three to give evidence to the commission. Kamanga told them at the opening that they should investigate not only the circumstances of the death of Chitepo but also the political set-up of the ANC. The *Times of Zambia*, the official government newspaper (although earlier owned by Lonhro), said the commission must not only discover who killed Chitepo but must also 'sort out' the Zimbabwe liberation movement.

The commission began hearing evidence on 4 July 1975 and heard 41 witnesses before presenting its report to Kaunda on 8 March 1976. The hearings were held *in camera* and the full report has never been made public. However, a summation of the several volumes of the hearings was released in a 61-page report on 8 April 1976. This traces the history of the Zimbabwe nationalist movements through the colonial period and throughout the report displays the Zambian obsession that Chitepo's death was due to tribal feuding within ZANU. While the commission did cover some of the events leading to the assassination, its obsessive belief that the murder could be explained by tribalism clouded its judgement, leading it to fail totally in its stated objective, which was the establishment of the identity and motive of those responsible for the assassination. The commission concluded 'that Chitepo's violent death was not cause (sic) by any racist or imperialist agents, counter-revolutionaries or saboteurs' and instead conveniently fingered members of the DARE and High Command. With their report, the commissioners exonerated the Rhodesian government for almost a decade and misplaced the blame on the ZANU leadership in general and Tongogara in particular.

The report itself contains innuendoes, half-truths and untruths. One-sided testimony is not put into any context,

nor is the vested interest of any witness considered in the report. No expert opinion is quoted to verify that letters and bits of paper produced were in the handwriting of the person alleged, nor is it at all clear if these writings were actually seen by most of the commissioners. Some witnesses chose to speak in Shona but were refused the interpreter of their choice and given one they mistrusted in conveying their testimony accurately. The matter of translation, and thus misunderstanding, was further complicated by the fact that the commission, which functioned in English, French and Arabic, the official languages of the OAU, did not have proper professional interpreters and stenographers for almost half of the time they were taking evidence. By their own admission these facilities were 'inadequate'.

The report's analysis of events, largely on the basis of tribalism, was so inaccurate as to cause a senior official of the other Zimbabwe party based in Zambia to suggest that it was more a reflection of Zambian society than Zimbabwean.¹⁵ It had its basis in a misconception that internal difficulties within ZANU, from the Nhari rebellion to the death of Chitepo, were caused merely by 'The Karangas' trying to seize power from 'The Manyikas' at the 1973 biennial review conference. This was when the face of the DARE had changed after defections to FROLIZI and when the military first had direct representation on the council. The 1973 election involved a series of Machiavellian political manoeuvres, but there were Karangas and Manyikas among both the winners and the losers.

Tongogara and Chitepo abhorred tribalism and each crossed swords at critical times with a handful of people from their respective areas because they firmly rebuffed tribal influences. The commission's report goes as far as to suggest that because Chitepo did not practise tribalism he 'might have lost his thinking. His fellow Manyikas, like Sanyanga, Dziruni and Mutambanengwe, mistrusted him,' the report said, 'for it appeared to them that Chitepo was

aiding and abetting their adversaries...' Cornelius Martin Ditima Sanyanga, a Lonhro company secretary, former chairman of the Lusaka Central branch of ZANU and a provincial committee member until his suspension from the party after the Nhari rebellion, also testified to the commission — and later at the trial as Prosecution Witness One — about tribal differences within the party. 'This was from general talk,' he said. 'I wouldn't have heard it myself...' Simpson Mutambanangwe gave the longest testimony to the commission, two days; Chikerema was next in length of time with eight hours.

The judge from Sierra Leone, who oversaw the first draft of the report, viewed it in legalistic terms and was strongly critical of some of Zambia's actions, but delegates from the Frontline States led a successful assault to amend the draft. 'Lots of other things should have gone into the report,' one commissioner said later, 'but you should keep in mind that the main objective was to clear Zambia's name.'¹⁶ President Kaunda later confirmed this and said the commission was set up because 'all fingers had been pointed at us, that we had killed the late Chitepo'.¹⁷

The 'Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo' had been set up, not to find Chitepo's assassins, but 'to clear Zambia's name politically' and the key commissioners were aware of this. Because of the detente exercise and Chitepo's head-on confrontation with the Frontline States, particularly Zambia, over refusing to subvert the armed struggle, accusing fingers were being pointed at Zambia and questions were being asked among members of the OAU. The Frontline States, finding their position as policy makers and implementers on southern Africa for the OAU weakened, needed to prove, especially to the OAU, that Zambia's credentials were intact. That they were able to do so — by accusing Chitepo's comrades in the continuation of the armed struggle, and locking them up for 20 months — benefited only the Rhodesians and eventually

brought the war to a virtual standstill. That they were not in the end able to stop the war altogether reflects the courage and dedication of those in prison and those committed people who managed to remain outside, and also those among the Frontline governments who finally supported them.

In April 1976, the detainees replied to the accusations that members of the DARE and High Command totalling 23 people 'jointly and severally...actively desired to bring about Mr Chitepo's death, and did in fact bring it about.' In a letter smuggled from prison and copied to the Frontline presidents, the OAU and the UN Secretary-General, the detainees said the commission was 'international' in name only since the chairman, the secretary and the 'chief inquisitor' were Zambians, all evidence was collected and all witnesses selected by Zambian authorities, and the 'Zambian government was itself a suspect.' The letter singled out the commissioner from Sierra Leone — High Court Judge, Mr Justice S.M.F. Kutubu — as one who voiced concern about the role of the group and 'whether they were sitting only to applaud the Zambian law enforcement agencies'. Secondly, the letter said, the methods of the commission were 'perfunctory and highly prejudicial to our case': evidence was heard *in camera*, there was no cross-examination, the accused were not allowed to be present or to call witnesses in their defence and were themselves called on short notice without ample time to consult lawyers. 'On two occasions two of us saw our lawyer harassed and intimidated until the lawyer was forced to abandon the clients.'¹⁸

The commission condemned 18 members of the military High Command but called only three to give evidence, the letter said, and commissioners did not see 46 of the 57 prisoners. 'Why did they not even meet any of the 1 300 ZANU soldiers who were detained by the Zambian authorities at Mboroma Mukushi from March 1975 to

January 1976? If all these people were in fact not involved in Comrade Chitepo's death, why were they disarmed and detained? Why did the commission not ask the Zambian Government for an explanation? If only members of the DARE and High Command were responsible, why did the commission not order the immediate release of the 34 other ZANU comrades and 40 recruits illegally detained for 13 months?' The letter accused the commission of not considering other possible suspects, and criticized its naivety in suggesting that the only possible motive for Chitepo's death was tribal differences. 'The eagerness with which the commission report "rules out the possible involvement of racists, imperialists or their agents" is startling and most disturbing...for the future of the revolution in Zimbabwe and the lives of thousands of young Zimbabweans now under arms...We are convinced now more than ever before, that it is for the resolute stand against detente and Nkomo which Chitepo and us took, that Comrade Chitepo was killed and we are now being processed for our legalized murder. The commission was set up not to get the truth but as a self-cleansing exercise by the Zambian authorities...We wish to reiterate at least for the benefit of posterity that the members of the ZANU Supreme Council DARE, and ZANLA High Command as a whole are innocent of Comrade Chitepo's death...'

Eleven days later, Tongogara, Chimurenga and Sadat appeared in Lusaka's magistrates court charged with Chitepo's murder. *Africa* magazine reported that the commission 'substantially confirms an investigation that was carried out by this magazine soon after the death of Chitepo' (*Africa* No. 45, May 1975).

In a letter from prison on 1 June 1976, Tongogara, Manyika, Chimurenga, Ncube and Sadat gave more details about the torture that was taking place: 'Apart from these gross violations of our human rights by denying us our right to see our lawyers and also to be visited by our friends as stipulated in law, we have also been subjected to some of

the most inhuman torture imaginable. During the height of our interrogation which was from April to June, 1975, most of us were subjected to the most cruel, barbaric and humiliating interrogation that can only be matched by the brutal interrogation often meted out to our comrades at home by the Smith regime's special branch. We were stripped naked and physically tortured. Electric shock methods were used. We were beaten by pieces of broken chairs, forced to do continuous exercises and dumped into cold water for a night. The interrogation usually lasted 72 hours, but some of the comrades spent a week if not even more under torture. Some comrades such as Tongogara, Hlupo Chigowe and Chimurenga were tortured until they fainted and were only revived after the police poured some cold water over their bodies. Others like comrades Charles Dauramanzi and Patrick Mupunzarima suffered broken ribs and fingers. Even comrade Sadat Kufa Mazuva, Chitepo's only surviving bodyguard, was severely tortured before he had even fully recovered from the injuries he sustained in the bomb blast that killed Chitepo. Most of us were never allowed to go to the hospital for treatment. Our wounds were left to heal on their own. Even today the question of going to hospital is a burning issue with prison authorities refusing us permission to see doctors. Of course, they realize that most of the diseases we suffer from now are largely derived from the torture and injuries sustained during our interrogation last year.

'The most shocking phenomenon about our interrogation was that the Zambian Security Officers were not interested in our version of the events leading to the death of Comrade Chitepo. They were interested in their neatly-typed statements which they asked us to copy and sign in our own handwriting so that they would appear as if they were voluntarily made by us. These were the false confessions which Dickson Mupundu, the Zambian Assistant commissioner CID who headed our investigations, presented to the so-called Commission of Inquiry as

evidence that ZANU men murdered Comrade Chitepo. The truth is that these statements presented to the commission by Dickson Mupundu were falsely extracted from most comrades and have since been refuted by the people who made them at the Police Headquarters. And all the comrades who appeared at the Commission of Inquiry denied any responsibility for the death of Comrade Chitepo.¹⁹

A substantial amount of the 'evidence' which had been presented to the Chitepo Commission of Inquiry was subsequently denied in statements taken by defence lawyers representing Tongogara and his co-accused. Although this shed further light on police methods of investigation and attitudes, it was by then too late to influence the findings of the commission. Enos Musalapasi, known as Short, who worked as a mechanic for ZANU, signed a police statement on 16 June 1975 saying he had left the farm in the middle of the night of 17 March, together with Chimurenga and others who had gone to plant the bomb at Chitepo's house. A lawyer's statement recorded later gives a different version of events: 'I was taken to the Force Headquarters. I was beaten severely for full 5 days. And finally they forced me to sign a prepared statement which said that we came to the Chairman's house and set a bomb.'²⁰

Josiah Tungamirai, who had returned from Mozambique with other ZANLA commanders believing that he was going to assist the Zambian police in their investigation into Chitepo's death, was arrested as soon as he arrived in Zambia. 'We were sent to Central Prison and that's when we saw the thing was tough. We found comrades who just couldn't sit or stand. Chimurenga, Dauramanzi, Chigowe, Mabika, they were really beaten. That's when we realized how serious this was. I was called in by the police and asked to write what I know about what had happened. I wrote, then the papers were torn. I was told, "This is rubbish. It's not what we want. You are said to have been involved in the

creation of the bomb which killed Chitepo." I said "No." That's when they started beating me. First exercises — press-ups, arm stretching, put the forefinger down on the floor and circle around it. For about 48 hours. Then they beat me, using broken pieces of chairs, broomsticks and anything that was there, until I was unconscious. Then I was sent back to prison.'²¹ After receiving substantial evidence supporting these allegations, the London-based organization Amnesty International protested to the Zambian government about the torture.

The charges against Tongogara, Chimurenga and Sadat galvanized many Zimbabweans and their supporters into action. A lengthy document was published in London, headed 'The Price of Detente — Kaunda prepares to execute more ZANU freedom fighters for Smith'. It carried a detailed introduction, charging that the ZANU guerrillas had been detained to halt the war and further the aims of detente, as well as the reply of ZANU detainees to the commission's report, an analysis of it and profiles of the accused men. A Zimbabwe Detainees' Defence Committee was established in London and in a letter to possible supporters they referred to the 57 ZANU members in detention in Zambia on suspicion of having killed Chitepo:

'We believe that these men ought to be given a fair and open trial or else be released from detention to continue the fight against the illegal Rhodesian regime. Very sadly, we are not at all convinced that they are going to get a proper trial...

'We also have evidence that some of the Zambian functionaries have used torture and beatings to get self-incriminating confessions out of the detained. We fear that these confessions are to be used as the false basis of finding these men guilty of murder. It is a matter of deep distress to us that the Zambian government should allow the zeal of some of its lowly officials to cause a positive injustice to happen.

'We want (1) an open trial; (2) proper legal representation for the accused; and (3) an observer chosen by the International Commission of Jurists. In this way the true facts will come out, and the truth or otherwise of the guilt of the accused will be established. This is of great importance not only in an abstract sense, but also to the future of Zimbabwe.'

The letter appealed for £10 000 to defend Tongogara, Chimurenga and Sadat and they enclosed a pamphlet giving excerpts of the detainees' reply to the commission report and details about the torture they were being subjected to.

One member of the Zimbabwe Detainees' Defence Committee, Ignatius Chigwendere, wrote a letter to the *Times of Zambia* and, in response, he received a letter from Mainza Chona, the Zambian Minister of Legal Affairs and Attorney General. Chona had led the harassment of the detainees during the Special Commission of Inquiry and if any evidence was still needed to show that the Zambian government had prejudged and convicted the three, he now provided it.

After taking issue with Chigwendere over his interpretation of the commission report, Chona went on to say: 'Otherwise, I know that if a person views any matter from a political angle, it will depend largely upon where his sympathies lie. As one who was involved in divisive multi-party politics, I fully realise that what one wants is for his political colleague to be acquitted or to appear innocent even if one is fully aware of the comrade's guilt. Even if a colleague is rightly convicted or even if an opponent is rightly acquitted, one still feels that a gross injustice has been done. Supporters or adversaries always find a way by which to exploit any political situation or event including the imprisonment or acquittal of a prominent politician. Such reactions are praiseworthy and natural being part of the struggle for any given political objectives. I only hope that you are not over-doing it. Also it is a pity to me that you

are playing dirty politics on your ally — Zambia. To you Zambia is now the enemy!! I wish you people know how Kaunda and Zambia loves and supports you.

'My own personal view is that it is a pity that the ex-ZANU leaders, who killed Chitepo, were cowards. They could have simply told the Zambian authorities that Chitepo was killed by them and they would have been bold enough to justify his elimination. They would not have been killed and very few would have been detained. Instead they were scared stiff and without shame they embarked on accusing Zambia. The anti-Zambian campaign you are now engaged [in] is designed to protect the assassins from being hanged. Yet my own personal belief and yours is that Kaunda cannot hang the guilty in the circumstances in which they committed the crime...'22

This letter was dated 23 June 1976; the case was still in the courts and, coming from the country's minister in charge of legal affairs, it raised serious questions among members of ZANU about the impartiality of the state apparatus.

While members of the DARE and High Command, as well as most of the General Staff and some 1 300 guerillas, were detained in Zambian prisons, Sithole had set about restructuring ZANU. Party members meeting in the Zambian town of Kabwe on 3 May 1975 had insisted that those now detained in Zambia should retain their posts, as was the case with detainees held in Rhodesia. They urged Sithole not to allow himself to be used by the Zambian government. They asked him to demand an end to the torture of ZANU detainees in Zambian prisons, to make provision to feed the families of the detainees, and to refuse to participate in any constitutional talks until they were released. Sithole ignored all these requests, and instead created new leadership structures, bringing in relatives, tribesmen and people who had been suspended

or expelled. This ultimately led to his own removal as ZANU leader.

In Dar es Salaam, in April 1975, Sithole had endorsed Zambia's actions in arresting many of his party's leaders, thus confusing OAU countries who might have opposed Zambia's actions. Then, on 10 May 1976, a month after the Special Commission of Inquiry had announced its findings, Sithole went even further. In a letter, addressed 'Dear Zimbabweans', he said he had hitherto remained silent about Chitepo's death 'not wishing to prejudice in anyway the international investigation that was going on'. The commission, he said, had confirmed his own findings in April-May 1975 and he then developed a thesis — extraordinary for the leader of any liberation movement — of the tribal statistics of the DARE and High Command, blaming the Karanga and Tongogara for Chitepo's death.

As in everything Sithole did, it was necessary to read between the lines. While he said he had kept silent 'not wishing to prejudice' the work of the commission, he seemed quite prepared to prejudice the position of Tongogara, Chimurenga and Sadat a month after they had been charged with Chitepo's murder. The real reasons for Sithole's letter had nothing to do with the death of Chitepo, but rather more to do with his own position.

By late 1975, Nyerere and Machel had decided that detente was leading nowhere and that Smith had no intention of agreeing to majority rule within an acceptable time frame. They set out to create a new force, the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), to bring together ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas to resume the war from Mozambique. Although the attempt at unifying the fighting forces failed, the war had been resumed and those who were fighting did not come under the control of any of the contending politicians. Sithole must have realized that his position was being increasingly eroded and that the Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC) he had been instrumental in setting up in Lusaka was a name without muscle. By endorsing the commission report, deserting those

in detention and agreeing with the Zambian line, he clearly hoped to regain lost ground. It was an attempt which seriously misfired. In a document which became known as the Mgagao Declaration the guerrillas rejected Sithole's leadership and said they would only speak through Mugabe, the Secretary-General. Sithole's failure to heed the advice of the Kabwe meeting and the betrayal of his detained colleagues effectively marked the end of his political career.

On the afternoon of 25 March 1975, a week after Chitepo's death, members of the ZANU central committee at liberty inside Rhodesia held an emergency meeting at the Mushandira Pamwe Hotel in Salisbury's Highfield township. Mugabe chaired the meeting, which was attended by Nkala, Muzenda, Malianga, Nyagumbo, Tekere, Mandizvidza and Edson Sithole. 'The paramount consideration was, what are we going to do to save the war? The external leadership that had managed things had been locked up. Herbert was dead. And it was quite clear if the fighting forces were left leaderless the war was going to collapse.'²³ The central committee decided to send Mugabe and Tekere out of the country immediately to give leadership to ZANU's external followers. A few days later, they went to Inyanga (Nyanga) and slipped through the eastern highlands to Mozambique, guided across the border by Chief Rekayi Tangwena. After Mozambique's independence in June 1975, large groups of students began to disappear from schools in the eastern border area. A curfew was imposed along 400 km of the border a month later, but by September, young recruits were crossing into Mozambique at a rate of 1 000 a week.

As the trickle of recruits turned into a flood, a delegation of four young commanders from Mgagao Camp in Tanzania visited Mpima Prison in Zambia, posing as relatives of the detainees. They 'discussed the whole problem of leadership' and complained that Sithole 'seems to be undoing everything Chitepo has done'. As a result of that and other information reaching the imprisoned DARE

members, 'all of us agreed that Sithole has to go'.²⁴ At the same time, another incident occurred which caused further hostility when Zambian troops opened fire at Mboroma Camp, killing 11 ZANLA guerrillas, including some women and wounding 13 others. Sithole failed to challenge the Zambian account of the incident and, instead of visiting the wounded, flew to America to see his daughter. For the guerrillas in Zambia, it was the last straw.

The final result of the secret contacts at Mpima Prison was one of the most important documents of the liberation struggle — the Mgagao Declaration, signed by 43 of the camp officers. The document expressed gratitude to the OAU Liberation Committee, the Tanzanian government and FRELIMO, but said events had shown that the armed struggle was the only way to liberate Zimbabwe, and unity must be based in the struggle. The document said the ANC leaders had 'proved to be completely hopeless and ineffective as leaders of the Zimbabwe revolution'. It listed specific complaints against Muzorewa, Chikerema and Sithole, singling out the latter for especially harsh criticism over his attitude toward the detainees and his failure to get money to their families to help feed them. The Zambian government was condemned over, among other things, the incident at Mboroma. Finally, the commanders appealed to the Liberation Committee and the Tanzanian and Mozambique governments to allow them to resume the war, asking for transit facilities for trained guerrillas, consignments of their arms and ammunition in Tanzania to be given to them, and for training facilities for the thousands of recruits who had poured into Mozambique in the wake of Chitepo's death.

During the Mpima meeting in September, the detained leaders had told the four commanders that Mugabe, the next man in the ZANU political hierarchy, should take over as leader, pending confirmation by a congress, and the Mgagao Declaration now said: 'An executive member who has been outstanding is Robert Mugabe. He has demon-

strated this by defying the rigours of guerrilla life in the jungles of Mozambique. Since we respect him most, in all our dealings with the ANC leadership, he is the only person who can act as a middleman. We will not accept any direct discussions with any of the three leading members of the ANC we have described above. We can only talk through Robert Mugabe to them.'

The case in the High Court of Zambia charging Tongogara, Chimurenga and Sadat with Chitepo's murder began in August 1976. The three accused pleaded 'not guilty'. Before the proceedings had gone very far, the defence challenged the admissibility of a statement by the third accused, Sadat, which they argued 'was not freely and voluntarily made and that it was obtained under duress after Accused 3 had been persistently interrogated over a long period of time which also involved assaults by police officers'. The defence team argued that Sadat had been subjected to severe beatings and torture accompanied by lengthy periods of interrogation and that the statement the prosecution wanted to submit, which the defence said had been written in advance by police officers, was neither true nor voluntary. The prosecution strongly denied any impropriety and insisted that the statement was voluntary.

As soon as the trial began, it became immediately obvious that the thrust of the Zambian case would be that Chitepo was the victim of a Karanga plot (although the third accused, Sadat, was not Karanga) against him and the Manyikas in ZANU. The obsession that it was a Karanga plot was fuelled by Sanyanga, as son of the chief in Chitepo's home area, who was an official of the multi-national, Lonrho, and held quite different views on capitalism and imperialism. As Prosecution Witness One, Sanyanga told the High Court on 6 September 1976, that 'there were a lot of misunderstandings between

the Manyikas, to whom Mr. Chitepo belonged, and the Karangas and these misunderstandings filtered down to the ordinary members of the party. These tribal differences later led to a situation where leaders fought for posts being held by the Manyikas.' Sanyanga said the situation had become so 'bad' by March 1975 that he had sought assistance from President Kaunda through his personal assistant, Mark Chona.

The statement Zambian police had taken from Sadat, on which the prosecution was based, said in part: 'Chimulenga (sic) brought a parcel and told me that it was a bomb but that it was not yet connected. He said the bomb was going to be used to kill Chitepo and that I should carry it to the house and hide it somewhere, and that he was coming at night to plant the bomb. He also told me to leave the gate unlocked, and that I should keep awake so that if he comes I can hear him knocking... Sometime that night I woke up and got spare keys from the kitchen and went to unlock the gate. At about 0100 hours I heard a soft knock on my bedroom window. I had kept myself awake all night. I opened the window and saw that it was Chimulenga, I went to the kitchen took the parcel and came through the kitchen door and handed over the bomb to Chimulenga. When I handed over the bomb to Chimulenga he told me to keep watching, to see if there were any people seeing us. I saw him lying down under the driver's side of the vehicle...' ²⁵

The judge, Mr Manival Moodley, held a 'trial within a trial' to determine the admissibility of Sadat's statement and on 20 October 1976, he ruled that the 'confession' was inadmissible as evidence because it was not freely and voluntarily given. 'My conclusion would indicate beyond doubt that Accused 3 was a victim of unfair and improper conduct on the part of the police authorities,' said the judge. In his lengthy judgement, he accused the police of falsifying records, lying, producing forged records and other criminal offences, adding that, 'in view of the grave implications which such criminal conduct has on these

proceedings, and in view of the gross disservice done to what has been hitherto a fair trial, I have no alternative but to request the learned Director of Public Prosecutions to institute a searching inquiry into all the circumstances of this matter, to ascertain the authors of this crime and if necessary to institute criminal proceedings against those responsible in order to uphold the age old maxim that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done.' ²⁶

The judge found that prison records had been tampered with to obscure dates and that, despite the denial in court of Senior Asst Commissioner Dickson Mpundu, who was in charge of the murder investigation, Sadat had been kept at Force Headquarters for more than 24 hours at a time — on at least six occasions - which was illegal. Mpundu himself told the court there was no sleeping accommodation for prisoners being interrogated at Force Headquarters, yet prison records showed that Sadat was kept there on one occasion for four days at a stretch. The judge found no evidence of facilities for 'food, refreshment and sleep'. He found that police evidence in court conflicted with prison records in terms of who collected whom from cells, when and for how long, and that two of the policemen involved in interrogations were not called as witnesses. Medical records from both the hospital and the prison clinic for Sadat, who was still recovering from injuries he suffered in the blast, were 'unsatisfactory and of little assistance'.

One submission by the defence lawyers, A. Pierce Annfield and M.F. Sikatana, was that Sadat had undergone torture while still suffering from his injuries, for which he received little further treatment, and that stitches closing a wound in his left arm were pulled out during interrogation. Chimurenga testified to seeing Sadat with swollen hands and face, and two other witnesses from prison testified to seeing Chimurenga in a condition where he was unable to sit on a chair or walk without support. Tongogara's wife, who visited him on 22 June 1975, four days after his alleged

'confession' is dated, reported that he could not comfortably stand or walk.

The next morning the *Times of Zambia* ran a front-page story headlined 'Police "boob" kills prosecution chief case', a clear inference that the three men had been released on a technicality to join the Geneva conference on Rhodesia due to start a few days later. That belief has continued to this day among some people, that political expediency led to the Zambians losing their own case. The judge's devastating statement was ignored, including the instruction that an inquiry and criminal proceedings should be launched against the Zambian policemen who had tried to frame the accused. President Kaunda subsequently admitted that no action was taken, that there had been no investigation into the conduct of the police, and he claimed the judge was 'anti-Zambian'.²⁷

A Zambian detainee in the same prison as Tongogara, Chimurenga and Sadat recorded his reactions in a diary entry: '20 October 1976, Wednesday. It's happened! The miracle! Tongogara and Co have had their case withdrawn by the State. The Director of Public Prosecutions entered a plea of Nolle Prosequi. I am very happy for them — the innocent men will, it seems very soon, be free. Although we have not seen them and asked them myself about their case, we have heard they are now waiting for their detention orders. Zulu and I have been speculating that since Gumbo and Co have been freed and Tongogara and Co are to be freed shortly, it's definite that the other detainees will be freed soon as well — that is people like Kadungure, Chemba, Manyika, etc. Without doubt today has been a victorious day for all progressives throughout the world. *Pamberi na Chimurenga. Venceremos. A luta continua.*'

PART IV: By Way of Epilogue

On 25 April 1975, five weeks after the death of Chitepo, 'Chuck' Hind married Sutherland's sister, whom he had met through her brother a few months earlier.¹ The couple lived at 9 Sandrise, a town house near the CIO headquarters, and she ran her own business while Hind pursued his interest in gemstones between CIO operations. These operations frequently took Hind to Zambia, always using the cover of a geologist. He was 'in and out like a yoyo', a colleague said, mostly on reconnaissance missions.

The immigration status Hind was accorded, most unusual for a mere 'geologist', is revealed by an immigration officer's note scrawled boldly across his entry form when he arrived at Salisbury airport, after one of his trips to Zambia, on 2 May 1976: 'PM's office requests to facilitate wife'.² The reference to 'PM's office' normally indicated CIO. Hind's application for residence in Rhodesia, dated 17 September 1976 and allocated the CIO reference number 2183/76, provides additional background information. For his countries of residence during the previous five years, he vaguely wrote 'southern Africa'. Later, in response to a more specific question about whether he had resided in any of the countries that were part of the Federation, his answer was that he was resident in Zambia from 1967 to 1971. He said he was a 'visitor' to both Rhodesia and Zambia from 1971 to 1976. In the space beside 'Malawi', he wrote 'in transit'. He described his wife as a Rhodesian resident, born in Zambia, whose nationality was British.

Hind's application for residence said he could read and write Malay, presumably a legacy from his SAS days, and it gave his occupation as 'company executive' with 'practical experience only'. It also indicated he was planning to start his own business. The identity of his two character references provides insight into his true occupation. One was a company director believed to have been a military intelligence instructor. The other was listed as a 'government employee' and, in fact, was employed in the CIO operations department. In response to the question about his financial status, Hind declared a total of Rhodesia \$12 000 — \$2 000 in cash and \$10 000 in 'assets'. The Immigrants Selection Board approved his residence permit on 30 September 1976.

The CIO files on Hind were destroyed or taken to South Africa early in 1980 after ZANU won the pre-independence elections. Traces show that his file was XYS 5009/3, opened 31 May 1969, and that he was involved in 'Military Intelligence, External'.

Hind was killed on one of the missions to Zambia when the car he was in, driven by Sutherland, crashed on the Chirundu road on 28 January 1977. (This was six days after ZAPU vice-president 'JZ' Moyo was killed by a bomb inserted in a parcel he was expecting from a friend in Botswana, but it is not known to the authors whether Hind was involved in this or some other operation at the time of his death.) Sutherland was knocked unconscious by the accident and suffered broken ribs. Hind was 'dead on arrival' at Lusaka's University Teaching Hospital, resulting from 'a road traffic accident causing a broken neck'. The pathologist, Dr G.P. Bhagwat, who conducted the autopsy, gave the cause of death as 'multiple injuries consistent with a road traffic accident. Mrs Hind was informed of her husband's death by a member of the CIO operations section who took along the wife of a colleague to break the news. Unlike the case of Chitepo, the Rhodesians wanted the body back, and the Zambians co-operated

Permission was obtained from the Ministry of Health, the offices of the Lusaka District Governor and the Lusaka City Council to fly back the body which had been embalmed and sealed in a metal coffin by Ambassador Funerals, an undertaker in the Zambian capital.³

The CIO officer's wife who had gone to tell Mrs Hind of her husband's death made the application for cremation at Warren Hills cemetery, just outside Salisbury on the Bulawayo road. She listed Hind's address as his town-house, gave his occupation as 'geologist' and place of death as 'Chirundu road, Zambia'. Hind was cremated on 8 February 1977 and his ashes placed in Block T 47 in the Garden of Remembrance at Warren Hills. A copper plaque placed there by his wife reads, 'Hugh Hind; 28.1.77. God made a heart of gold so true, Blessed it and called it Hugh'.

The accident, death and cremation were not reported in the press in either Rhodesia or Zambia; but the careful cover-up of Hind's true activities in Zambia was blown by one elementary mistake. Daily, during the war, *The Rhodesia Herald* carried a column in the classified advertising section entitled 'Killed On Active Service'. In *The Rhodesia Herald* of 3 February 1977, the first insertion read: 'HIND-Chuck. My darling Chuckles, taken away so suddenly. The moving finger writes; and having writ, moves on; nor all your piety or wit shall lure it back to cancel half a line; nor all your tears wash out a word of it. — Your everloving wife.'

The 'Killed On Active Service' column, the advertising manager of the newspaper said later, was specifically reserved for people killed on active service for Rhodesia. 'It didn't matter whether they were killed in action or in a road accident on the way to operations,' the manager said. 'Either way they qualified. And if anyone wrongly put a name in that column it would have been known because Rhodesia's whites were a relatively small group.' So, although Hind was not formally employed in the armed

forces or intelligence services, and was on a retainer only, the circumstance of his death qualified him to be listed as 'Killed On Active Service'. A number of friends and colleagues, including the wife who had gone to inform Mrs Hind and her CIO husband, placed notices of sympathy in the 'Deaths' and 'Condolences' columns. Another couple who did so were Dennis and Margo Thompson, who gave their address as Durban, the South African coastal city where Hind had previously listed himself as a director of Staffmaster Services.⁴

After the accident, and treatment and recuperation in Rhodesia, Sutherland returned to his Mazabuka farm and, until early November 1978, his CIO operations. On 12 November, Zambian police, acting on a 'tip-off', raided 'Better Ole' farm and uncovered the hidden arms cache. Eleven days later, on 23 November, Sutherland appeared before Lusaka's senior resident magistrate, Mr Joshua Simuziya, and pleaded guilty to a charge of possessing 'offensive materials' without authority, contrary to section 85(1) of the Penal Code. The 'offensive materials', the court was told, were: two Bazooka rocket-launchers, three AK 47 rifles, one 7.62 mm pistol, one 1.12 bore pistol, one 6 mm pistol, 25 slabs of TNT, 50 detonators, 11 explosives, 10 primers for grenades, empty explosive containers, 10 SMG (sub-machine-gun) magazines, one electric detonator, 268 rounds of 9 mm ammunition, 25 rounds of 9 mm ammunition, six coils of detonating cables, 330 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition, 25 rounds of 6 mm ammunition, 12 detonating codes, 24 batteries for improvised land-mines, 90 grenade detonators and 21 hand grenades.⁵

The Director of Public Prosecutions, Chad Kawamba, told the court that the armaments had been transported to the farm of the accused by two white Rhodesian soldiers in 1977. The first, named as Peter Dunn, it was claimed brought materials in a Leyland truck purportedly carrying

timber to Zambia from Johannesburg. The second was named as John Hawes and the method of transport and the cover were claimed to be similar to the first shipment. Mr Kawamba said a brother-in-law of the accused, named as George Tarr, a retired Rhodesian army sergeant, had given Sutherland's name to Dunn and Hawes. The Prosecutor went on to say that on 12 November 1978 the Zambian police had searched the farm and found the 'offensive materials'. They were contained in a drum buried underground in a workshop 200 m from the farmhouse. The top of the drum was covered with rubber blocks which were in turn covered with conveyor-belt mats.

Sutherland's counsel, Ranjit Fernando, whose fees amounting to Kwacha 5 515 were paid by the CIO, presented a defence which, by any stretch of the imagination, was bizarre. His client, he said, had told him the previous evening at Lusaka Central Prison: 'I got involved because I loved Zambia. Zambia is my only home since birth. I have seen Zambia grow and come up to what it is today. I could not bear to see outsiders use Zambia as their battlefield. Why don't they go back to their country?' The weapons, Fernando said, were meant to be used against freedom fighters and not Zambians since Sutherland loved Zambia so much. 'He was not paid to do what he did, but succumbed to his lopsided fanatical conviction that he was doing Zambia some good. He is prepared to take the punishment the court thinks he deserves.'⁶

Sutherland's statement to the Zambian police on 21 November is remarkable for two things — the severity of the warning and the brevity of the statement which followed. In the warned and cautioned statement, he was told that the police were looking into two possible charges against him, 'treason' and 'possession of offensive weapons'. Through caching arms for the Rhodesians he had abetted 'subversion and sabotage', assisting a possible Rhodesian invasion by land and air.

The statement, signed by Sutherland, said: 'I deny certain parts of the allegations. I did store some firearms, ammunitions (sic) and explosives. I stored it for Peter Dunn and John Hawes, who told me that they were Rhodesian soldiers. They came to my farm twice to collect explosives and arms and ammunition. They did not tell me what they were going to use it for on that particular occasion but when they brought the explosives and other stuff they said they were fighting freedom fighters and they said they would like to keep the stuff where they could get hold of it if they needed it. The first load arrived at my farm by one man who was Peter Dunn. He left the stuff in my workshop and in the evening I put it in the drum in a hole in the shed behind the house. [The] second man was John Hawes. He also brought some stuff with a truck and I went through the same procedure with him. The third load was delivered by Peter Dunn and I went through the same procedure again. This is how the stuff was brought but the three AK rifles and one rocket-launcher I purchased from three different Africans who came to my farm on five different occasions. These were also put in the same drum. Question: How was this hole situated in the shed?

Answer: The shed is about ten-foot long, six-foot wide and a [the] hole is the width of the shed and about six-foot wide. It was originally used as a water tank and it was cemented out and at the time I put the drum with explosives in I was already keeping some lorry spares in a wooden box. The hole is covered with eight-by-two inch timbers and had a rubber conveyor-mat on top and to the best of my knowledge only Peter Dunn and John Hawes knew of the stuff apart from myself. I was made to believe that the stuff would be used against freedom fighters but it would not be used against Zambia and also [I] had no intention of taking part in any action against anything or anybody. I must say here that I was never involved in any plans to invade Zambia. That is all I have to say."

Given that the word 'treason' had been used in the caution at the beginning of the statement one would have expected a more substantial explanation than this. There is no attempt to establish exactly who Dunn and Hawes were, when they had delivered weapons and explosives to the farm or — more importantly as it was presumably for an operation — when they had come to the farm to collect weapons from the cache. The only interest which is displayed, in a single question, is the situation of the hole where the cache was located. Any normal police investigation would have asked scores of questions and tried to relate the cache to Rhodesian operations in Zambia including the assassinations of Chitepo and Moyo. That no such attempt was made cannot be dismissed as ineptitude; it is sinister. Our attempts to obtain more information about the case were thwarted. The clerk of the criminal courts record office in the subordinate court registry in Lusaka said that the court record had been 'lost'. The record, which should have been forwarded to the National Archives, had never arrived there. Had we not obtained access to Mr Fernando's case file there would not have been a single obtainable record of Sutherland's meagre statement which, perhaps, was what was intended.

The magistrate seemed receptive to Sutherland's plea that his motive had been 'patriotism'. In sentencing Sutherland, Simuziya said he was taking into account the fact that he was a first offender, that he was a married man with three children, and that, by pleading guilty, he had not wasted the court's time. Then, in an apparent display of sternness, the magistrate went on: 'The accused has been in Zambia for 42 years of his life not because he loves Zambia but because he derives benefit from the country. The accused is well aware that many Zambians have died at [the] hands of the rebel Rhodesian soldiers he was abetting, so I cannot agree with him that he allowed these rebel Rhodesian soldiers to store these offensive weapons

at his farm because he thought they would be used against freedom fighters only. If the accused loved Zambia as he claims, one would have expected that he would report the presence of the rebel soldiers to the security forces in Zambia, but nay, he abetted the activities of these enemy soldiers. The accused is an enemy of Zambia, like the rebel soldiers he was assisting.' Noting that the offence with which Sutherland was charged carried a maximum sentence of seven years imprisonment and, 'given the seriousness of the case', the magistrate sentenced Sutherland to five years imprisonment with hard labour.

The lenient sentence immediately brought an angry reaction from the Zambian public. The following day, the *Daily Mail* carried a story headlined, 'Zambians fume over enemy's light sentence'. One person who rang the newspaper, Mr Felix Banda, expressing his 'disgust' at the 'leniency' of the sentence, said, 'This Sutherland did not deserve any mercy at all. He is a murderer. If I was the judge dealing with the case I would have ordered that the accused be shot publicly for his evil deeds'.⁸

Even *The Rhodesia Herald* seemed amazed by the leniency of the sentence. In a report, datelined Lusaka, on 27 November, it said: 'Even white farmers, who bore the brunt of black Zambian suspicion following the Rhodesian raids on terrorist camps earlier this month, have shown sympathy for Sutherland. "The most reactionary farmer I know said Sutherland should have been shot," one prominent farmer said. "Dislike of some of the admittedly stupid policies of this government is one thing, but bringing in arms to be used against it is quite another," the farmer said.'

Newspapers reported that the public prosecutor's office had been besieged with calls from people demanding to know why Sutherland had got off so lightly and why he had not been tried for treason. Mr Kawamba told the press that Sutherland could be brought back to court if the State found new charges to lay against him.

Sutherland's defence bore little relationship to the truth. He had begun to work for the CIO, not because of his love of Zambia but because of his love for Rhodesia. While it may be true that it was not his intention that the weapons he stored should be used against Zambians, they were certainly intended for use against Zimbabwean nationalists; and his work, in addition to the death of Chitepo, must have resulted in many lives being lost, the bulk of them Zimbabweans, but some of them Zambians. The weapons had not come into Zambia in two trucks in 1977 as Sutherland claimed but were ferried across the Zambezi in canoes, and the cache had existed since the early 1970s. Contrary to his claim in court, he had been paid by the Rhodesians, and his wife, whom he said knew nothing, was fully aware of his activities.

Even his 'love' of his country of birth, Zambia, stood in considerable question. He did not, as listeners to his feverishly patriotic defence of his motives might have supposed, travel on a Zambian passport nor, it would appear, was he even a Zambian citizen. All of his immigration forms to Rhodesia show his nationality as British. From 1 October 1957 to 1 October 1967 his passport was a British one, number D132940, issued in Salisbury. His next two passports, number D818267 valid from 30 October 1967 to 30 October 1972 and CO68618 valid from 31 July 1972 to 31 July 1982, were both issued by the British High Commission in Lusaka.

Zambia's handling of the case, as with so much related to this whole affair, leaves some uncomfortable questions to be answered. According to the evidence presented in court, Sutherland was arrested on 12 November and sentenced 11 days later. The processing of a case of this nature in only 11 days anywhere in the world would be truly amazing. The gravity of the offence, at a time when Zambia was supposedly in a state of undeclared war with Rhodesia, and the leniency of the charge — possessing 'offensive materials' — raise serious questions. Given the

size of the arms cache on Sutherland's farm, his admission that it was to be used against freedom fighters operating from Zambia, and the fact that two prominent leaders, Chitepo and Moyo, had been assassinated and many acts of sabotage carried out, the charge was very lenient indeed.

The comments of the magistrate also raise serious questions. He was concerned by the deaths of Zambians in the hands of the Rhodesians, but neglected to comment on the aggression against Zimbabweans, including the murders of Chitepo and Moyo. The indecent haste with which the affair was handled, the leniency of the charge and sentence, and the apparent total failure to investigate Sutherland's true role, all smack of an attempt by the Zambian authorities to dispose of the case with undue haste before anything more embarrassing could come to light. They had in their custody Rhodesia's main undercover agent, and, equipped with his admission, could have been in no doubt as to his importance. Where their tip-off came from is a matter of conjecture. Some former CIO men believe that Sutherland was given away by a neighbouring farmer. Another possible explanation lies in what must rate as one of the most classic bungles in the CIO history. A CIO officer, having drunk too much in Salisbury's Park Lane Hotel one night, left behind one of the organization's most classified files containing the names of CIO undercover operatives. The file was found in the cocktail bar the next morning and quickly returned by one of the hotel's European staff. Whether Sutherland was compromised by someone who read the file is not known.

Of even greater importance and significance is the timing of Sutherland's arrest when juxtaposed with other events taking place at the same time in the Zimbabwe saga. Sixteen days before Sutherland's arrest, ignoring the protestations of Machel, Nyerere and ZANU, Kaunda had reopened his country's southern border with Rhodesia. By

so doing, the opponents of his decision argued, he was undermining the military and political offensive against Rhodesia. The decision increased Zambia's dependency on Rhodesia and, even if the Zambians were unaware of Sutherland's role in the Chitepo assassination, all of their behaviour once they had him in custody points to some very high-level bargaining to minimize the severity of the charge and sentence he faced. It is also noteworthy that Sutherland's arrest came less than a month after a massive Rhodesian air attack on 18 October on 'Freedom Camp', just outside Lusaka. Several hundred ZAPU supporters died in the aerial bombardment and three days later a large number of ZAPU women supporters were killed in another Rhodesian attack at Mkushi, further north. Against this background, had it not been for the border opening, Sutherland would almost certainly have been dealt with more severely.

Mrs Sutherland and their five-year-old child were brought out of Zambia, initially to Rhodesia. She was paid a large sum of money by the CIO to compensate her for the temporary loss of her husband and to help her settle in Johannesburg, initially at 302 Dalysesford Road, Mondeor, and subsequently at 20848A Louis Botha Avenue. After the Lancaster House agreement, the CIO approached the staff of the British Governor, Lord Soames, to help to secure the release of Sutherland and a second Rhodesian spy, Michael Borlace alias Michael Bourhill, who had been in prison in Zambia since 1 April 1979. Borlace had been an undercover operative for Rhodesia's Selous Scouts and was involved, among other things, in their attempt to kill Nkomo. The Zambians quietly released Sutherland, who was reunited with his family in South Africa, and Borlace as a result of the approach by the British government. The Mazabuka farm was sold on 30 January 1980 and Sutherland and his family today live in South Africa.

All of the others who were involved in, or who knew the details of, the killing of Chitepo are now retired and most of them are living in Britain or South Africa. Several continued to serve in the CIO after Zimbabwe's independence and, as far as is known, did so loyally and to the best of their ability. They were professionals and regarded what had occurred during the war as being in the past, a necessity of war and best forgotten. However, one of those involved went on to work for the South Africans against independent African nations, including Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and it is because of this, and the role we believe he played in exposing something his colleagues wanted to forget, that he is singled out for mention.

His name is Eric John 'Ricky' May. He was born at Worthing in Britain on 1 September 1926 and emigrated to Rhodesia at the beginning of 1947. He joined the BSAP on 12 January 1947 and his police serial number was 4180. May served in the BSAP for almost 28 years and retired 31 October 1974 as an Asst Commissioner in the CID. His records show that he joined the CIO on 1 January 1975 and later became head of the operations section, previously known as S-desk. Former colleagues in the CIO have nothing but contempt for May. He was regarded as a coward who 'jumped at the sound of a door banging' and their forthright comments about him varied from 'he had a yellow streak up his back' to 'he wouldn't know how to let off a firecracker' and 'he would sell his grandmother.'

As head of the operations desk, May was immediately responsible for many of the CIO clandestine operations during the next five years. It was in this period that Chitepo and Moyo were assassinated; reconnaissance operations were carried out in Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia by CIO operatives such as Hind and Sutherland and the role of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) was upgraded.

The MNR, which became the section's major enterprise

had been created as the eyes and ears of Rhodesian intelligence in Mozambique, to gather information about ZANU and ZANLA, their camps, and infiltration routes and, to a much lesser extent at the beginning, to carry out sabotage operations aimed at undermining FRELIMO's ability to support the Zimbabwean guerrillas. The CIO established an MNR training-camp on a farm at Odzi in eastern Rhodesia near Umtali (Mutare) and the control of this came directly under May's department. The training of MNR personnel, their infiltration into Mozambique and the planning of their operations was done by the operatives in May's section, who were former Rhodesian SAS soldiers.

As the war escalated, so did the operations of the MNR, and in 1978 a permanent base was established inside Mozambique near the top of Gorongosa mountain. From that base the CIO expanded operations against Mozambique's land transportation routes to Maputo in the south, Beira in the east on the Indian Ocean, and Tete to the north-west.

The Lancaster House settlement of the Rhodesian impasse interrupted the CIO plans and, in March 1980, the MNR, along with the white CIO instructors, were transferred to South Africa. Midway through 1980, May 'defected' to South Africa, taking with him many of the CIO's most classified files concerning covert operations and one of his three secretaries, a Mrs Wickenden, whose husband was one of the four people killed in the accidental explosion in the abortive CIO operation in October 1966. The only thing he seems to have left behind is his wife.

May's activities thereafter are not public knowledge, but it is almost certain that he joined the South African Defence Force (SADF) Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) where he is said to have been given the rank of Colonel and to have continued as one of the key figures in the expanding MNR operations in Mozambique.

Equipped with the CIO files of covert operatives in African states and details of those who had supported the MNR, he was a very valuable person to the South Africans as they dramatically escalated the MNR offensive against the Mozambique government. On 16 March 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati agreement in which both governments undertook to refrain from aggression against the other. In theory, at least, direct South African support for the MNR was terminated and along with it, May's usefulness. For some months it appears that he was involved in South Africa's operations in Namibia and Angola before, in about September 1984, leaving South Africa and returning to Britain. There, former CIO colleagues say, he was employed by an American glossy magazine, *Chief Executive*. His former colleagues believe this to be a thinly-disguised cover for ongoing intelligence activities almost certainly still connected to the MNR.

AFTERWORD

In May 1978, at the height of the Rhodesian war, when we spent two weeks interviewing commanders in the Mozambique town of Chimoio, near the ZANLA headquarters, Tongogara remarked to us that, 'Kaunda almost blackened my revolutionary name. I want it cleared after independence'. Although acquitted by the court, he felt that the charge left a blemish against him. He knew he was innocent and those who visited him in prison in Zambia said he was always certain that justice would be done. He raised the issue in ZANU central committee meetings and, on 24 December 1979, he replied to President Machel in Maputo during their last meeting, 'I want to tell you I knew nothing about the death of Chitepo...' Tongogara didn't get an opportunity to clear his name. Two days later he died in a car accident on his way to Chimoio to inform his commanders of the details of the ceasefire. Some people continued to say that his acquittal was a 'technicality'.

Our search for the truth about Chitepo's death really began in London in late 1979 during the Lancaster House conference. There we met Derrick Robinson, number two in the Rhodesian CIO, for the first time and asked him about Chitepo's murder. He replied that the only thing he would tell us was that Tongogara had nothing to do with it. If he could be so certain about that then it seemed fairly obvious that he knew who killed Chitepo. But he would not be drawn any further.

The next clues came early in 1980. A British journalist, George Gordon, then based in Salisbury for the London

newspaper, *The Daily Mail*, told us he was doing a book on a man who, among many other things, claimed to have killed Chitepo. The man, whom Gordon said had been under contract to the CIO, did not know the reason for killing Chitepo but had only been supplied with a photograph of the ZANU national chairman and his car number and told to eliminate him. Gordon said that the man had previously served in the British SAS and that he had carried out the assassination with another European based in Zambia. Gordon said that although the killer did not know the reason for assassinating Chitepo he speculated that the Rhodesians were alarmed by the December 1974 Lusaka unity agreement and feared that Chitepo would become the focal point for a unified militant nationalist movement. Before that could happen he had to be eliminated and any disunity and confusion this caused was an additional bonus. The same man also claimed to have killed JZ Moyo, rocketed ZAPU's Lusaka headquarters, bombed the *Times of Zambia* offices in Lusaka, killed an Asian poet with a book bomb at Lusaka's main post office and derailed a number of trains.

For reasons we still do not fully understand, Gordon's book has never been published. At first Gordon said it was because of pressure from the British government in general and Lord Soames, the British governor of the transition from Lancaster House to independence, in particular. They argued, Gordon said, that the book, linking the killing to a former British SAS man, could harm relations in the immediate post-independence period and was bad for Mugabe's policy of reconciliation. Whether this argument was made we have no way of knowing. But, in early July 1981, we mentioned to Mugabe the story of Gordon's intended book and the belief that it would not be in the interests of his policy of reconciliation between former adversaries if such a book was to be published soon after independence. 'The author of reconciliation [meaning himself] thinks that it is,' he replied, adding that if

Gordon's book was published we should consider doing a Zimbabwe edition.

It was Gordon's story and naturally, particularly given the fact that he hoped to sell film rights, he was reluctant to give too much away until he got into print. But his story, in some important aspects, tallied with accounts we were beginning to get from former Rhodesian military and intelligence officers. Mike Edden, SB Liaison Officer at Combined Operations, also stated categorically that Tongogara had not been involved. It was a Rhodesian operation, Edden said, adding that they had 'had a great deal of luck'. When we told him that Robinson had also insisted that Tongogara was not involved he replied pointedly, 'he should know!'

Although convinced of Tongogara's innocence, we were no nearer to finding out who was guilty. And Gordon's forthcoming book was not going to help as he would be using pseudonyms for the two killers and their controller. From various other sources bits of information began to come. Chris Munnion, correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph* based in Johannesburg, was doing a book on the history of the Selous Scouts with its former commander, Ron Reid Daly. Munnion asked Daly about the Gordon story and Daly said that the CIO had employed two men on contract to do the killing. One of them was based in Zambia and one of them had been killed in the war. When we again pressed Gordon to find out what was happening to his book he gave us a new reason: one of the two killers had been imprisoned in Zambia for a quite different offence and the book, even if a pseudonym was used, might lead to the Zambians discovering his other activities. Later Gordon explained the continued delay by saying that the assassin was now working for the South Africans and publication could jeopardise his position. He gave out a little more detail naming the controller as 'Ricky May, a former senior official in the CIO. Then, late in 1984, a South African newspaper carried a story about a forthcoming

book written by Peter Stiff, a former Rhodesian SB officer. Stiff's book, entitled *See You in November*, sounded remarkably similar to Gordon's and, like Gordon, he was not intending to use the names of the assassins or their controller but would be using pseudonyms.

The breakthrough we had been seeking came late in 1984 when we were doing an interview on a quite unrelated subject. It occurred to us that the person we were interviewing might just know who had killed Chitepo and when we posed the question his immediate and spontaneous reply was, 'Yes, a great friend of mine'. He went on to name him as 'Chuck' Hind and the second man, who was based in Zambia, as Ian. He said May had been their controller and it was he who devised the plan to kill Chitepo. Finally we had the elusive pieces of the jigsaw — the names of the assassins — and equipped with this vital new information the process of cross-checking and following new leads became relatively easy.

We would like to thank all of those people who assisted us in our search for information. To some we gave an undertaking that they would not be identified; others cannot be mentioned because of their present jobs in the Zimbabwe government. But we must thank Wendy and Diana who helped with the research, and Robina who typed much of the manuscript; Kephass who was unperturbed by all the unusual comings and goings; Constance who proofread at all hours of the day and night; Lazarus who provided transport at odd hours; Bish, Elizabeth and Tony who worked so hard on the production; and the staff of ZPH who graciously tolerated our absence without being able to know why we were away. Special mention must go to Col Ivey (Retd), who commanded a remarkable printing operation, and his staff at Zimpak and Colorset, including typesetters Batsirai and Thoko.

We had not intended to write this book but were

planning to include the information in a future work. However, so important is the issue to Zimbabweans and to their relations with each other, that we accepted the urging of friends to publish the details now, on the tenth anniversary of *The Chitepo Assassination*. It is dedicated to the children of Zimbabwe — may they uphold the principles for which their fathers gave their lives.

D Martin, P Johnson
Harare 18 March 1985

Appendix 1

We conducted three interviews with one former Rhodesian CIO officer. It was during the first interview that we asked if he knew who had killed Chitepo and he replied, 'Yes, a very good friend of mine'. As a result of this reply, and other information obtained from interviews with other people, we taped, with the person's knowledge and consent, the following two interviews. The relevant sections of these are included as an Appendix because we felt that readers would be interested in following the interviews for themselves and reading details we have not included in the main text of the book. Interviews with other former Rhodesian CIO officers were also taped but we have not included these as they covered similar ground or added only details.

Question: Probably the most sensational operation conducted in Zambia was the Chitepo assassination on 18 March 1975. How did that one begin and how long was it in the planning stage?

Answer: The chap who did all the research on this, as far as I know, was Ricky May.

Question: So the idea originated with him ?

Answer: Yes, between him and Derrick Robinson. They worked out what would come if this chap was knocked off, all the trouble that would ensue afterwards. They were the brains behind that side of it. The operation then got handed over to the Ops side of it. And this is where Chuck Hind was briefed on the thing.

Question: Chuck was based in Salisbury?

Answer: Chuck was working with the Ops side of CIO. Chuck Hind was working with them although he wasn't — he wasn't actually taken on by government. He was on call, with a retainer, if you see what I mean. When they wanted Chuck, he dropped whatever he was doing, and went to them.

Question: How did an idea originate and how did it develop before it went off to the operations people?

Answer: Well, it was thrown together really ... We had this usual thing called "prayers" in the morning where all

these guys got together, all the tops of all the CIO departments — external, internal, you name it. Portuguese, Tanzania, Zimbabwe desks. And they used to have this meeting,... And then they used to start trying to list things, and talk it over to see what was possible and what was probable, and what was true, what was rumour. And I think that, really, is how the whole thing was tossed around. And then eventually one or two plums came up, and they said "Right, we'll see what we can do about that."

Question: Do you remember their assessment of the implications of taking out Chitepo?

Answer: What I can really remember is that it would appear that it caused a complete break-up within ZANU.

Question: How long would this have been in the planning phase, from somebody coming up with the idea to operations being told "Go ahead and do it"?

Answer: Frankly on that particular operation I don't know how long they discussed all this... They might have discussed the thing for a month.

Question: When you're coming up with a plan like that an analysis department obviously looks at what all the implications are and what the achievement will be, and then they say when they've made all these decisions "Right, here's your target". What do you then do?

Answer: Well, Ops then have to look at the thing and find out in their minds what they think of it. And then, as soon as there was a target, normally they always did a recce first. Had a look at it to see where the target was, whether it was possible, what the guards were, where the dogs were, where the wire was, and very often we got our own photographs. And then from that we did our planning. And the planning would involve things like moon phases, and we'd probably have somebody there watching how guards change if any, whether they were dopey or not, whether a chap had wire around his house, or whether it was a place that was quiet at night after say 10 o'clock, or whether people were going in and out until 2 or 3

o'clock in the morning on a boozier. All that was taken into consideration. Then we'd make the plan.

Question: How long was that process in this case?

Answer: In this case it didn't take very long. I think between the first recce and the bang was about a month. But it might have been less.

Question: What did Hind do when he wasn't moonlighting for CIO?

Answer: Chuck was an extraordinary chap. He was working with, I think I'm right in saying, computers. And then his wife and he were going to start a creche. And that really was his side of life. And then we paid him a retainer, a fairly healthy retainer.

Question: Do you recall the amount?

Answer: I would say something like round about \$800 tax free. I think all that stuff was tax free. And his wife was working.

Question: In the CIO?

Answer: No, she worked outside. He in fact married, I don't know whether you know it was Ian's sister or his wife's sister.

Question: Was Ian's last name Sutherland?

Answer: Yes.

Question: So they were closely related?

Answer: Well, the relationship only started when the actual operation started. They'd never met before.

Question: He married Ian's sister or sister-in-law later, as a result of the meeting?

Answer: Yes, as a result of the meeting in Ian's house. You see we used to go over quite a bit from Kariba in canoes to that place straight opposite, that place where people go and have holidays, Siavonga. We used to cross there quite a bit.

Question: Did you have a safe house where you stayed?

Answer: No, we just used to take the stuff across at about 1 or 2 in the morning and shove it into Sutherland's car and he used to drive off.

Question: To his farm?

Answer: Yes.

Question: How far was Sutherland's farm from there?

Answer: Mazabuka. Not a helluva long way actually. Well, he used to book a room there (at Siavonga). And we used to go over, and we used to put the stuff into the car, go back to his room and sleep and then go off the next day.

Question: How long had Ian Sutherland been working for you?

Answer: Ian had been working quite a long time... I should say we took him on in about '67, '68. And he was working for us until he got caught.

Question: Was he recruited on one of Ops earlier missions?

Answer: No, he used to come down quite a lot being a farmer. He had his sons at school here.. and ah, I'm not sure how the original meet-up started.

Question: A lot of Zambians in those days used to come down here before the border was closed, a lot of kids were in school here.

Answer: Right, he always used to bring his kids over. They were at Ruzawi. It is a school out by, I think Wedza. Beyond Marandellas.

Question: And he was on a retainer also?

Answer: Mhmm

Question: Any idea what sort of amount?

Answer: I would say again he probably got \$600 to \$700. But shoved into a bank in Rhodesia to pay for his kids schooling.

Question: The kids schooling came out of this?

Answer: Yes.

Question: When you talk about a retainer, that's just for being available...presumably when there was an operation they got additional money?

Answer: Yes, he would have got a bonus.

Question: I presume when Chuck Hind took out Chitepo he got a fairly healthy bonus?

Answer: Oh yes. That was worth about \$10 000 to Chuck.

Question: Did she [Mrs Sutherland] get compensated for his period in the lock-up in Zambia?

Answer: Well, I should think the money that was paid out was

probably quite a lot, it went into a lot of thousands. I am talking now of something like \$20 000 or \$30 000. She got that to start off with and I don't know if they put any more aside for him or not.

Question: The actual operation of taking Chitepo out, how was that planned? How did that occur?

Answer: Chuck did the reconnaissance as far as I know from what he told me.

Question: How long did they keep him under surveillance?

Answer: Well I'm not actually certain, you see, because, I should say there was about a three week period when everything was being watched. And then Chuck went over there. And then I think about a week to ten days he probably watched, and then he chose the night. And then they left with the explosives made up from the farm at Mazabuka.

Question: So the explosives come off Sutherland's farm?

Answer: Yes, he [Hind] had been staying there.

Question: He stayed there for about a week before?

Answer: Yes.

Question: And he was going up and down doing reconnaissance? You said that before [Hind] went up Chitepo had been kept under surveillance for three weeks. Who was doing that?

Answer: This is what I should say. Yes, that part of it would have been done by Ian Sutherland. Then Chuck comes along and does the final recce because he is the operator. And they go up at night .. midnight, one o'clock in the morning .. went up there. Found his car outside (not in a garage), put the explosive device on, came back.

Question: And the guards?

Answer: No guards available. The guards weren't even taken out.

Question: Do you know what sort of explosive was used?

Answer: Well I am almost certain it was PE4.

Question: What is PE4?

Answer: PE4 is one of the most potent types of plastics. Although it comes in all sorts of stages now, you know, you can get in a plastecine, it looks rather like

one of those gauzes you put on a burn, which is much easier to carry around of course, and put on things. I am almost certain it was PE4.

Question: And what sort of detonator? You mentioned a Pressel Switch.

Answer: Yes. It was a device that, as far as I know, has two pieces of metal separated, and when the weight comes on them it puts the two pieces of metal together and that completes the electric circuit and boom.

Question: And that can be anything? It was described to us as a matchbox with two nails running through it.

Answer: You see, if that's your explosive into that goes an electric detonator. That detonator has two pieces of wire, plus and minus. Now the piece of wire goes around and carries on to the plus on the battery, these miniature duracell batteries. That goes onto the battery and the other one comes round, and the battery is connected. Now from the battery come two pieces of wire, plus and minus, and they're both put on to the two pieces of metal. And those two pieces of metal are separated by something that won't conduct electricity. So when the two pieces of metal come together your circuit is completed.

Question: How would you afix something like that to the inside rim of the wheel?

Answer: Well, you'd do it in all sorts of ways. I think he had a magnetic device for it, you can do it with a magnet. Or you can stick it on with a bit of stuff like stickistuff. Or you can tie it on. Or you can tape it on. You know, anyway that you tie anything onto anything.

Question: And if its made up already, how long would it actually take to put it on the wheel and get out?

Answer: Ten minutes.

Question: That long?

Answer: Well, It might take five. It just depends. Ten minutes on dark night to be safe, I would say.

Question: You mentioned between 1 and 2 o'clock in the morning. Do you know that is the actual time they fixed it?

Answer: I don't actually, no. But most of these things were done between one and four when most people have gone to bed and are at their lowest ebb.

Question: The lowest ebb is the time when they're in their deepest sleep?

Answer: Yes.

Question: After an operation like this do you have a post-mortem?

Answer: Yes. We only had a... well it was a very quick post-mortem, you know, we didn't go into too much detail. When a guy does a thing like that we more or less leave him to it and don't like talking about it too much. But we never went into any great detail. We got the general idea of what had happened. But we didn't have a chance to talk to Chuck very much because he was straight back in again.

Question: He did come back after this thing?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Immediately or ...?

Answer: Practically straight away, yes, there might have been a day or two.

Question: What happened to Mrs Hind?

Answer: She got very neurotic, and said she was going to do all sorts of things, like blow the thing wide open, what everybody was doing and that sort of stuff. There was a fair amount of twittering going on. And she was kept quiet...with quite a lot of money.

Question: What was Sutherland's role?

Answer: He was mainly used for reconnaissance. If we wanted to know if a camp was in such and such a place he would look and see and say "Yes" or "No", or if we wanted to know if a camp was occupied he would come back and say "Yes" or "No". And that was the main way he was used apart from being used for the arms cache and for putting people up who we might put across the Zambezi. So he was really a safe house.

Question: And how did he come to be doing that? Was he approached or did he volunteer or...?

Answer: I'm not absolutely certain how he was picked up. It must have been, I think through somebody who knew him in the territorials and was down here, because he was in the territorial army. There was a chap down here, I think who knew him from the territorial army but I can't swear to his name at the moment. I think it was a chap called McGorian who knew him and brought up the introduction.

Question: Can you describe some of the operations he would have been used on?

Answer: He was used when we wanted to know whether there were camps on, I think it was the road running from Lusaka to Livingstone, there were a couple of camps along there which he looked at for us and he also looked at what was known as DK camp which was on the east road. He looked at that for us.

Question: Were those late or were those early?

Answer: No, they started early and went on for quite a time because we were always interested to know what was happening there.

Question: Those camps remained for quite a long time?

Answer: Yes. The only real operation he was ever involved in was this particular one. But he did keep weapons and he did put up people who went across.

Question: Did he put up people on the farm or just at this place at Siavonga?

Answer: No, at the farm. We used to cross at Siavonga, in fact we used to cross sometimes just above the dam wall and then across to his farm. He'd meet us on the road in a car.

Question: Did he ever transport weapons?

Answer: He had a van which he used to transport weapons in, which had a hidden locker built into it. He had a kombi type van and he had an ordinary Volkswagon, which normally he used to use for coming in and out of here, because of his school children. Just a beetle, but he could hide things in that.

Question: Do you know when he first started storing weapons on his farm. Was that in 1968?

Answer: No, we would have given him a bit of time. I should think it might have been in 1968 because I think we first... yes, I should say the end of 1968, maybe 1969.

Question: Was that the main centre for all of the action?

Answer: As far as I know, as far as we're concerned anyway. He was the only chap that we had a cache with.

Question: And was he the main person used for reconnaissance?

Answer: Yes, he was the main person to do reconnaissance and we did some ourselves.

Question: How did he go about his reconnaissance? He'd be quite obvious roaming around camps and things.

Answer: No, he didn't go as far as roaming around camps. He would drive past and then he would have trouble with his car and get out and look as if he was walking for help. You can always have trouble with your car, you can always go into the wrong place, taken a wrong turning and see quite a lot of things.

Question: What about Sutherland himself? You were saying he had a black belt in judo?

Answer: Yes, he was a very hard character and I think he probably got one of the best black belts there was. You've got to get a good black belt if you study for it in Japan and you've been given your black belt by a Japanese master then.

Question: And did he use this or he just knew how to do it if he needed it?

Answer: No, he knew how to do it. I didn't know when he used it I must say. But I know he could use it. He showed us one or two things.

Question: What could he do?

Answer: Well, I mean, he was quite capable of killing somebody if he wanted to by simply using his bare hands.

Question: If there was something operational that he was on would he paid for that too?

Answer: Yes.

Question: You can't remember how much?

Answer: I don't know. There was meant to be a running scale but it depended upon the danger involved in the

operation, it depended upon how well you did it, it depended on how dangerous the recce was. It was all worked out on a scale.

Question: Do you recall the scale?

Answer: No, I don't. The only one that I really know is that if you did something really big you could get yourself \$10 000 whereas if you did something small it would range from \$500 to \$1 000.

Question: And do you know what codes they used?

Answer: The only code we used was a code which always referred to his children who were in school here. Quite honestly I couldn't give you verbatim but if we rang up and said "Johnnie's sick this term" it might mean on the other side that we would like to see you as soon as possible. Or if we said "Johnnie's got his first XV colours at rugby and he got them on 14th of March" it would mean 14th March maybe we were going to paddle across the river and he would know on the 14th March where to meet us because that had been pre-arranged. But that was the sort of thing and it entirely dealt with his children.

Question: He apparently told his wife and family he had permanent paid up shares in a building society. That is what his sister said anyway.

Answer: Well..all his money was put into CABS as far as I know.

Question: You can't remember anymore about the accident, what operation Hind was on?

Answer: For some reason or other Moyo strikes a bell but if May is going to write a book it will probably be in there.

Question: Why was he (Hind) used on the Chitepo one then? Was he an explosives expert?

Answer: Yes, he was a very good explosive expert.

Question: But why then wasn't he used on other things?

Answer: Because we never really blew anything up like that again.

Question: You are one thousand and one per cent certain it was Chuck Hind who did this job aren't you?

Answer: I bloody know it was. Just as certain as that. Yea. Absolutely positive. No, I know it.

Appendix 2

Since the main part of the book was written, additional information has continued to come to light. Both Hind and Sutherland had deposit accounts at CABS. The number of Hind's account was 9012256342 and it was opened on 21 October 1972. Hind, the former operations section administrator said, was paid in cash and, as not all of his payments went into the CABS account, it is more difficult to trace a payments pattern. However, the deposits appear to reflect the CIO officers' recollection that Hind began working for them in late 1972, becoming more active in 1973 when four deposits totalling \$1 250 were made and 1974 when seven deposits totalling \$2 700 were made.

As Sutherland did not live in Rhodesia deposits were made direct to his account and the payments pattern here is much more revealing. His account number was 9011627150 opened on 8 May 1970 and closed in 1979 while he was in prison in Zambia. The size of the deposits up to the end of 1972 appear to reflect the statement of one CIO officer we have quoted who said that Sutherland was initially not paid but he would have been reimbursed for expenses. In 1973, during the first wave of parcel bombings in Zambia, deposits in Sutherland's account amounted to \$1 671.58. The year 1975 was to be his most profitable. Deposits amount to \$2 585 and the scattered method of payments was clearly intended to leave a false trail. For instance, on 28 April, a little over a month after Chitepo's death, three cheques for \$400, \$90 and \$510, — together totalling \$1 000 — were deposited. That would suggest that the 'bonus' for his part in the assassination was \$1 000. The scattered method of payments is most notable in July, about a month after the ZANU representative in Botswana, Dick Moyo, one of the very few senior ZANLA members still at liberty, was killed by a parcel bomb. On 11 July a total of eleven cheques were paid into Sutherland's account, totalling \$1 010. The final payment shown to Sutherland's account is the largest. On 19 February 1977, a month after 'JZ' Moyo was killed by a parcel bomb in Lusaka the sum of \$1 400 was deposited in Sutherland's account. CIO officers admit that Moyo was killed by their organization although Sutherland's name has not been directly

implicated in this murder by any of the sources the authors have spoken to. This large final payment may, in fact, represent a severance payment as it came 22 days after Hind's death in a car accident with Sutherland driving. Whether he was stood down from operational work to avoid his being compromised after the accident or whether he resigned out of remorse after the death of his brother-in-law is a matter of conjecture. A total of 31 payments totalling \$7 396.58, were made into the account before the final balance of \$157. 69 was withdrawn on 4 August 1979.

Appendix 3

The depth of public anger in Zambia against Sutherland's relatively lenient sentence was evidenced in letters to the Daily Mail published a few days later on 7 December 1978.

Displeased Zambian wrote: 'Sutherland is a murderer and I am of the opinion that he even took part in killing our brothers like Mr Nkhata, the police officers and even soldiers. Thus the idea of having him to feed on our ration for five years is not really pleasing to WE ZAMBIANS. Please couldn't something harder than this be imposed on this traitor?'

Unsigned, from Kabwe: 'Zambia railway locomotive engines were blown off with those same weapons he was storing. Maybe now they were going to be used to blow up one of the passenger trains. We never know... I suggest the best thing is to hand him over to the Patriotic Front so that they can sort him out since he was keeping those weapons for Nkomo to be destroyed'.

And, from Rodwell Siyanga Wamumona: 'I think the Government has been too kind for sentencing the farmer who has sold lives of Zambians for five years. Why can't he be jailed for life or tortured in a way that will lead to his death? The Government should have set up a programme of torture for this man.

This torture should have led to his death; four days of torture and then the fifth day, his death. On the first day they should have cut off one of his legs, the second day another, the third day they should have cut off the arm, the fourth day, another arm and finally the fifth day his head, and death for him.

During his torture there must be no treatment. I say this because giving A SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS TO SUCH A PERSON IS LIKE SETTING HIM FREE, AND IF SUCH A PERSON IS SET FREE LIKE THAT, NEXT TIME HE WILL DO EVEN WORSE THINGS.'

Appendix 4

Members of the Dare reChimurenga elected at the biennial conferences and their portfolios.

Pre-1969

Herbert Chitepo (Chairman)
Henry Hamadziripi (Finance)
Mukudzei Mudzi (Administration)
Noel Mukono (Defence)

1969 Biennial Review Conference

Chitepo (Chairman)
Hamadziripi (Finance)
Mudzi (Administration)
Mukono (Defence)
Nathan Shamuyarira (External Affairs)
Taziana Mutizwa (Publicity)
Stanley Parirewa (Welfare and Social Affairs)
Simpson Mutambanengwe (Political Affairs)

1971 Biennial Review Conference

Chitepo (Chairman)
Hamadziripi (Finance)
Mudzi (Administration)
Mukono (Defence)
Mutambanengwe (Political Affairs)
Parirewa (Welfare and Social Affairs)
Richard Hove (External Affairs)
Washington Malianga (Publicity)

1973 Biennial Review Conference

Chitepo (Chairman)
Hamadziripi (Finance)
Mudzi (Administration)
Mukono (External Affairs)
Kumbirai Kangai (Labour, Social Services and Welfare)
Rugare Gumbo (Information and Publicity)
John Mataure (Political Affairs)
Josiah Tongogara (Defence)

From the above lists it can be seen how the DARE was expanded from four to eight in 1969. At the 1971 review conference two people lost their places and one resigned. Then, of those elected in 1971, four people were replaced at the 1973 conference and the military was represented for the first time.

Appendix 5

From prison, on 10 April 1976, in the name of the DARE, the ZANLA High Command and some 1 300 ZANU cadres imprisoned in Zambia, the following reply was issued in response to the findings of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo.

REPLY OF ZANU DETAINEES IN ZAMBIAN PRISONS TO THE REPORT OF THE CHITEPO COMMISSION

.....
We have instructed our lawyers, and friends to issue on our behalf the following statement in reply to the serious allegations and slanders against us published by the Zambian newspapers and radio from the Zambian Press Statement entitled *Report of Chitepo Commission*, April 8, 1976. The statement states bluntly that the Commission came to the conclusion, on what evidence we are not told, that members of ZANU Executive Committee, DARE, and ZANLA's High Command totalling 23 people 'jointly and severally, they all actively desired to bring about Mr Chitepo's death, and did in fact bring it about.' We hope, that although the Zambian Government has unjustly put us behind bars it will at least have the decency to allow us to be heard and to defend ourselves which right we have been denied for the past thirteen months. We wish to make the following observations: —

1. The so-called Special International Commission was only international in name. The Chairman was Zambian, the secretary was Zambian and the chief inquisitor Mr Mainza Chona was made no secret of his hatred against us and ZANU, was Zambian. The venue was Zambia. Even more important all the witnesses were carefully selected by the Zambian authorities; all the evidence was collected by the authorities who only presented what was damaging to us actively suppressing what was unpalatable to them and their friends (the ZANU rebels Mukono, Nhari, Mutambanengwe, Mataure, Sanyanga etc.). The Zambian Government was itself a suspect and in fact it gave its testimony to itself as judge also. The foreign commissioners were reduced to the role of passive spectators. The

Commissioner from Sierra Leone, one of the only two lawyers in the group, voiced concern about their role — whether they were called only to applaud the Zambian law enforcement agencies. At first glance it is clear that the Zambian Government swallowed without question all the evidence offered by the ZANU rebel group and the Commission rubberstamped the prejudices of the Zambian Government against us. The Zambian Government got 'value' for its money ie. apparent international approval to liquidate us and our liberation movement.

2. The methods of the Commission were perfunctory and highly prejudicial to our case. Firstly the Commission heard evidence in camera. The witnesses called included people who had nothing to do with ZANU like Chikerema and Muzorewa people who had supported our detention and asked the Zambian Government to hang us. All our sworn enemies were called and given ample time to accuse us in our absence. No cross examination of these false witnesses was allowed. We the accused were not allowed to call witnesses in our defence. We the people who were accused and found guilty were either called at short notice, (often our lawyers were not informed until we stood before the Commission and were not given time to talk to us and on two occasions two of us saw our lawyer harrassed and intimidated until the lawyer was forced to abandon the clients by Mr Chona) or were never called. The Commission has condemned the whole ZANU Supreme Council (5 people) and the Military High Command (18 people) but only three High Command detainees namely, Manyika, Tongogara and Chimurenga were called to give evidence. The rest 15 were simply condemned unheard. Up to now the Commissioners did not see 46 of the 57 languishing in Zambia prisons since March 1975. The Commission admits it only saw 11 of the detained ZANU leaders but 30 of our enemies. To us the Commission was reduced by the Zambian Government to nothing better than a secret inquisition using Star Chamber methods. The result was the Kangaroo justice which has been meted out to us.

3. The Commission report seems to contain some patent contradictions and absurdities. It says members of ZANU's Dare and High Command 'had the means, the motive and the

opportunity' to kill Mr Chitepo. The Commission, clearly untutored in criminal investigation seems not to have considered that several other people including the Mukono — Mutambanengwe group and the racists and imperialists who are studiously whitewashed and absolved also had the means, and could find the opportunity to kill the Chairman of ZANU. After all the Smith regime had publicly put up \$7,500 for Chitepo's head.

4. Moreover the Commission is unbelievably naive to think that the only possible motive for Chitepo's death is tribal differences. The fact that Chitepo as Chairman of ZANU had publicly condemned members of his own Manyika tribe namely Mukono, Mutambanengwe, Mataure, Sanyanga, Nhari for planning and executing a senseless revolt in which they shot and buried alive 45 people, and attempted to kill Comrade Tongogara and his wife and children, and kidnapped or attempted to kidnap many other comrades including Chitepo himself; the fact that these rebels threatened Chitepo's life, these facts were not even considered. Simply because they were from the same tribe, rebels like Mutambanengwe, Sanyanga, Mataure and Madekurozva are called Chitepo's close associates. We have copies of letters and tapes in which Comrade Chitepo expelled these people from the party. Whoever said that a man cannot be murdered by people from his own tribe? Comrade Chitepo was not a tribalist but the beloved leader of ZANU who at the time of his death was loved more by other ZANU leaders from the Karanga, Ndaou, Korekore, Zezuru and Ndebele tribes than by the rebel group from his own Manyika tribe. It is an imperialist slanderous distortion to say that we the people whom Chitepo sided with, had the motive to kill him and those who hated him because they said he betrayed their tribal schemes did not have a motive. The Commissioners either did not finish their home work or they were deliberately misled.

5. The Commission says the decision to kill Comrade Chitepo was taken on March 15, 1975. We are not told who attended. In fact many ZANU leaders were not in Lusaka then. Elsewhere the chief culprits are said to be Comrades Hamadziripi, Tongogara and Chigowe. Yet the report itself admits that Hamadziripi and Chigowe were in Malawi jails. In fact comrade Hamadziripi's passport is date stamped March 18,

1975 the day he left Malawi for Zambia, earlier the same day Comrade Chitepo had been killed. Comrade Chigowe arrived in Zambia on March 19, 1975. Why should these two be associated with the decision any more than Mukono and Mataure also members of DARE?

6. The Commission report says Mr Chitepo asked the Zambian authorities for protection from his colleagues. It does not say what protection if any the government in fact gave him. If not why not? If it gave him protection Chitepo had Zambian protection as well as ZANU protection when he met his death. Is the Zambian Government confessing that its own protection against ZANU was inadequate? Again if Chitepo knew that Hamadziripi and Chigowe plotted to kill him how could he go alone in their company to Malawi? Why did he not flee Lusaka? Chitepo was one of the most intelligent sons of Zimbabwe. For the Commissioners to suggest that he was out of his mind is obviously ridiculous. But to us it shows the extent which the Zambian Government and the Commission swallowed the false testimony of the ZANU rebel group whose "grievances" they endorse and for whose murderous activities there is not a word of reprimand.

7. We also feel that the evidence some of us gave to the Commission was not only suppressed, but has been doctored and deliberately distorted. Comrade Tongogara has never 'exonerated the racists and imperialists'. Comrade Hamadziripi did not at any time say that he killed Chitepo in revenge as reported by the *Times of Zambia*, April 10 1976. These statements are malicious distortions and additions by the Zambian writers of the report and are completely false and unworthy to be included in a document which purports to be respectable and authoritative. Moreover to suggest that Comrade Chitepo did not know the names of his bodyguards and only Comrade Tongogara knew is such nonsensical lies which only the ZANU rebel group could have supplied to the Commission. That the honourable Commissioners gave credence to such trash only shows the superficiality of the investigation on which the Commission reached such a grave decision involving the lives and liberties of 57 freedom fighters. Clearly they never became acquainted with our security system

in ZANU of which Comrade Chitepo was the effective head.

8. The Commission instead of making a thorough investigation of Comrade Chitepo's death were concerned with supporting the Mukono, Mataure, Nhari revolt and taking part in what was our internal politics viz. statements between male and female cadres. We feel it is an insult to Zimbabweans and a complete irrelevance for any foreigner to tell us how to organise our liberation movement. The Commissioners were not experts on guerrilla warfare. If the Commission were genuine in thinking all this was relevant why did they not meet all ZANU cadres and members of the High Command in Zambian prisons? Why did they not even meet any of the 1,300 ZANU soldiers who were detained by the Zambian authorities at Mboroma Mukushi from March 1975 to January 1976? If all these people were in fact not involved in Comrade Chitepo's death why were they disarmed and detained? Why did the Commission not ask the Zambian Government for an explanation? If only the members of DARE and High Command were responsible why did the Commission not order the immediate release of 34 other ZANU comrades and 40 recruits illegally detained for 13 months who continue to be incarcerated by the Zambian Government? *The fact that these questions were not even considered leaves us with no alternative but to reject the Commission Report in toto.* We demand a truly independent International Commission in which the Zambian Government will be represented only by an observer and meeting outside Zambia to investigate Comrade Chitepo's death. No justice can be done if the Zambian Government which has such vested interest in pushing the crime onto our shoulders is allowed to be witness, judge, and inquisitor in its own case.

9. The eagerness with which the Commission report 'rules out the possible involvement of racists, imperialists or their agents' is startling and most disturbing not only for fear of our own lives but for the future of the revolution in Zimbabwe and the lives of thousands of young Zimbabweans now under arms. Zambia, one of the frontline countries goes to such lengths in befriending the enemies of Africa, namely white Rhodesians and South Africans, as to refuse to consider their possible involvement with the murder of the foremost freedom fighter of Zimbabwe, Comrade Herbert Chitepo, Chairman of ZANU. Zambia presumed to negotiate with these countries above our

heads and attempted to force us into a ceasefire and detente and a meaningless unity under Nkomo which Comrade Chitepo and the whole of ZANU rejected. We are convinced now more than ever before, that it is for the resolute stand against detente and Nkomo which Chitepo and us took, that Comrade Chitepo was killed and we are now being processed for our legalised murder. The Commission was set up not to get the truth but as a self-cleansing exercise by the Zambian authorities at least some of whom are bent on killing us and ZANU thus completing the job which ZANU rebels failed to achieve.

10. To single out tribalism as the cause of the revolt in ZANU and the death of Comrade Chitepo is to be simplistic in the extreme. We are amazed at the gullibility of the Commission in taking this view which we know is the view which the Zambian Government has uncritically propagated for a long period. They have in so doing fanned and fostered tribalism in our liberation movements.

11. We are aware that the Zambian Government uses the device of the Commissions of enquiry in order to get support for its actions. None of the Commissions set up since independence ever reported unfavourably against the Government. It would have been presumptuous for us to hope this one would be different simply because it is labelled 'international'. Apart from the open hostility of the Attorney General, Mr Mainza Chona, who admitted and approved of the torture we were subjected to in Zambian prisons (he said he would not follow the law which forbids torture of suspects because the state needs evidence) we know that all the Zambian functionaries had to secure our condemnation or face serious consequences for themselves. After all President Kaunda had already pronounced us guilty without trial and what Commissioner dare disagree with his President?

We are also aware that our cases when they come up before the courts are already prejudiced by the President's statements now backed by the Commission's Report. What judge dare acquit us in the future? Comrade Chigowe was charged of murder and the trial was concluded in January and up to now, April 10th, judgement was reserved clearly waiting for the Commission Report. We know he will not get justice although on

the evidence he should be acquitted. In fact he was convicted in March 1975 and the Commission's and Court's function is simply to give the executive decision respectability.

12. We wish to reiterate at least for the benefit of posterity that the members of the ZANU Supreme Council, Dare, and ZANLA High Command as a whole are innocent of Comrade Chitepo's death. It is in our view absurd to suggest a group of 23 committed and seasoned fighters conspired and passed a resolution to kill one man — their Chairman. That would have been certainly unnecessary and patently imprudent of us even if we had a motive, which we did not have for Comrade Chitepo was on our side and against the ZANU rebels. There could have been a possibility that one or two criminal elements among us who had personal grudges against the Comrade Chairman. We had hoped the Zambian Government through the Commission might help us to discover such elements. But by their methods and prejudgements they have failed to do so and fallen back on the absurd testimony of our rebel group who became their cheap police informers for the very reason of escaping criminal investigation. We also expected other possible culprits to be investigated ie.

- (1) The Mukono, Mutambanengwe, Mataure, Nhari group;
 - (2) Agents of the Rhodesia, South Africa, C.I.A. and other imperialists;
 - (3) Rival Zimbabwe parties eg. FROLIZI, ZAPU and ANC.
- None of this was given any consideration and we fear that whatever happens to us the truth about Comrade Chitepo's death may never be known while this Zambian Government remains in power.

13. For the present we call upon President Kaunda to realise that we are not fighting him or his government. Our only enemy is British imperialism and its manifestation in the settler regime in our country Zimbabwe. We are innocent victims of the lies of a handful of informers who should not have been given credence but should be tried for their crimes against the Zimbabwe people and for betraying the revolution. The Commission report including all the evidence against us and the evidence some of us gave to the Commission, and not only conclusions culled out of context should be published. For President Kaunda has said

'Zambia has nothing to hide.' Furthermore any trial of one or more of us must be in open court and international observers should be allowed to attend. We protest against the secret proceedings of the Chitepo Commission and some parts of the Chigowe trial which the Director of Public Prosecutions demanded to be heard in camera knowing that he had confessions obtained through torture which he wanted to conceal from the public. We do not expect there is much room for justice to be done to us but at least we expect President Kaunda to allow that what his tribunals do to us is open to public scrutiny.

Notes

PART I: The Prelude

1. Simbi Mubako, 'Aspects of the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement 1966-76' (International Conference on Southern African History, Lesotho, August 1977).
2. Interview with Danish journalist, Jasper Soe, published in *Information*, Copenhagen, and quoted in *The Rhodesia Herald*, 18 August 1971.
3. Both Chitepo quotes from *Zimbabwe News* (the official ZANU publication), No. 9, September 1973.
4. During the latter phase of our research we conducted a series of interviews with former Rhodesian CIO officers now living in various countries. All of them had signed the Official Secrets Act of Rhodesia and, theoretically, were not supposed to disclose details of operations. However, the state no longer exists; and of greater concern to them was the possibility of reprisals against them and their families. We gave undertakings to protect their identities. We did so in the belief that the truth about Chitepo's assassination was more important than the names of individuals who worked in the CIO at the time and who knew the story. As a result, throughout the text and footnotes, we refer simply to 'former CIO officers'.
5. Ian Henderson with Philip Goodhart, *The Hunt for Kimathi* (London, 1958).
6. John Lovett, *Contact — Rhodesia at War* (Salisbury, 1977). The SAS men were Warrant Officer Class 2, Robert Bouch; Colour-Sergeant Michael Cahill; and Col-Sergeant John Wright. The policeman was Supt John Wickenden of the BSAP.
7. Barbara Cole, *The Elite — The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service* (South Africa, 1984). Details of both of these stories.
8. *For the President's Eyes Only: The Story of John Brumer, Agent Extraordinary* (South Africa, 1971).
9. In a document entitled 'Observations on Our Struggle'.
10. Mubako, op. cit. See lists of DARE members in Appendix.
11. Interview with President Kaunda.
12. Interview with Dr Marquard de Villiers, Pretoria, September 1980. Kaunda and a member of Rhodesia's CIO confirmed de Villiers' role.
13. For more details of the detente exercise, see *The Struggle for Zimbabwe — the chimurenga war* by Martin & Johnson (Harare, London, New York, 1981).
14. Maurice Nyagumbo, *With the People* (Harare and London, 1980).
15. Chitepo was interviewed on a flight from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka for the meeting by James MacManus of the *Guardian*, London, which carried the story on 5 December 1974.

16. Account of the meetings from interviews with a variety of sources.
17. Biographical information on Nhari from interviews with Webster Gwauya and Elias Hondo, May 1980.
18. Interview with Josiah Tongogara, November 1979.
19. Tongogara, op. cit.
20. The DARE members held hostage were Kumbirai Kangai and Mukudzei Mudzi.
21. The two commanders who slipped into Chifombo were Rex Nhongo and Mayor Urimbo.
22. Mubako, op. cit.
23. Edson Sithole was later arrested and murdered in custody by the Rhodesian Special Branch.
24. Kumbirai Kangai, who was then ZANU representative in the United States.
25. Martin Meredith, *The Past is Another Country* (London, 1979).
26. Ibid.

PART II: The Assassination

1. Interviews with former CIO officers.
2. Interview with Mark Chona, August 1975.
3. There is some confusion as to what Sutherland's code name was and it seems that different levels of CIO administration used their own different codes. One former CIO officer said Sutherland was 'Peter Two'. He had been given this name because 'Peter One' was an agent based in Tanzania. However, another officer said that he though Sutherland's code name was 'Z1', with the Z being a reference to Zambia. Whichever it was, Sutherland was referred to in CIO in-house documents by his codes and not his name, thereby restricting the number of people who knew about him. On all of the other details about his role in Zambia for the CIO and his part in the Chitepo assassination, the former officers are in agreement.
4. Two Former CIO officers confirmed McGorian's name. Sutherland's immigration files show that on 9 February 1969 he visited Rhodesia driving a Volkswagon, registration ES 463, accompanied by McGorian. CIO officers say that McGorian used to travel frequently to Zambia and he was one of their sources of information if not actually on the payroll. There is reason to suspect that Sutherland's February 1969 visit may have coincided with his recruitment as he gave no address at destination, only requesting a one-day visa at Kariba, and the form is marked with the letters 'SB' in a circle. See also the Appendix showing payments to Sutherland's CABS account.

5. We are indebted to a former Rhodesian intelligence officer who, in 1980 when files were being destroyed, salvaged some from the incinerator and shredder. Although these files are far from complete, access to them has greatly assisted us in our research. The Rhodesian code on all of Sutherland's forms was 6141/65 and most of his forms are marked 'SB'.
6. Details of Hind's background were made available by a former Rhodesian intelligence officer, by CIO operatives who worked with him, and by former British SAS soldiers who served with him in that unit and/or later in Watchguard International.
7. For a fuller account of Watchguard, David Stirling and the Capricorn Africa Society, see *British Intelligence and Covert Action* by Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald published in 1983 by Brandon Book Publishers Ltd in Dingle, County Kerry, Ireland. See also reference to CAS in PART I.
9. Details of CIO interest in Stirling are contained in his file, made available by the same former intelligence officer as 5 above.
10. Interview with former SAS colleague.
11. Interview with member of Zambian Watchguard team.
12. Contained in documents relating to Hind supplied by a former intelligence officer, as above.
13. Chitepo's movements on 17 March are described in a statement made to his lawyer, Pierce Anfield, by Sadat, and in interviews with Kangai, as well as in the report of the Chitepo Commission.
14. Interview with former CIO officer.
15. Ibid.
16. From Anfield's notes and trial file which he gave to the authors in 1979.
17. From Dovi's statement to the Zambian police contained in the Anfield files.
18. From Anfield's files.
19. Ibid.
20. *The Rhodesia Herald*, 19 March 1975.
21. *Daily Mail*, Zambia, 19 March 1975.
22. Contained in Hind file made available by former Rhodesian officer.

PART II: The Aftermath


1. Interview with Asst Comm Michael Eddon
2. *Financial Times*, London, 19 March 1975.
3. *Africa* magazine No. 45, May 1975. Article entitled 'Who Killed Chitepo?' by Godwin Matatu, a Zimbabwean journalist based in London and himself a Karanga.
4. *Guardian*, London, 19 March 1975, report by Henry Miller and William Raynor.
5. *Daily Telegraph*, London, 19 March 1975. Also *Guardian* of same date.
6. *The Times*, London, 19 March 1975.
7. *The Rhodesia Herald*, 21 March 1975.
8. *Africa* magazine No. 45, May 1975, Matatu article.
9. Interview with Kumbirai Kangai, May 1980.
10. *Africa Research Bulletin*, March 1975.
11. Bridget Bloom, *Financial Times*, 28 March 1975.
12. James MacManus, *Guardian*, 28 March 1975.
13. Christopher Munnion, *Daily Telegraph*, 28 March 1975.
14. Broadcast 31 March 1975.
15. JZ Moyò.
16. Interview with one of the commissioners from the Frontline States.
17. Interview with President Kaunda.
18. *Reply of ZANU Detainees in Zambian Prisons to the Report of the Chitepo Commission*, 10 April 1976. See Appendix.
19. Letter of 1 June 1976.
20. From Anfield's files.
21. Interview with Josiah Tungamirai.
22. Copy of Mainza Chona's letter to Ignatius Chigwendere.
23. Interview with Edgar Tekere, November 1976.
24. Account of this period mainly from interviews with Simbi Mubako, October 1976; Simon Muzenda, May 1978; and Kumbirai Kangai, May 1980.
25. Statement which Zambian police prepared for Sadat to sign, from Anfield's files.
26. Judge's ruling, from Anfield's files.
27. Interview with President Kaunda.


PART IV: By Way of Epilogue

1. Two former CIO officers described Mrs Hind as being a 'nuisance' after her husband's death and one of them said she had threatened to expose what the CIO was doing. One of the officers said she had been paid to keep quiet. Mrs Hind has denied any knowledge of her husband's activities and said she could not believe it. She also denied being paid 'hush money' by the CIO.
2. Documents rescued by former intelligence officer. See Note 5, PART II.
3. The documents referred to in this paragraph are all available at Warren Hills cemetery in Harare.
4. Dennis Thompson later died. His widow, Margo, subsequently went to live with a *Daily Mail* journalist, George Gordon, who told us in early 1980 that he was interviewing a man who knew the details of CIO external operations, including the death of Chitepo. The interviews were for a book, so far unpublished.
5. Coverage of the court case in the *Times of Zambia* and *Daily Mail*, Lusaka, 24 November 1978.
6. A copy of his lawyer's notes obtained from the case file.
7. Sutherland's statement to police obtained from the lawyer's case file.
8. *Daily Mail*, Lusaka, 25 November 1978. More letters to the Zambian press on this issue are contained in the Appendix.
9. Interviews with several of May's former colleagues.

Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress (South Africa).
ANC	African National Council.
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation.
BSAP	British South Africa Police.
CABS	Central Africa Building Society.
CAS	Capricorn Africa Society.
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency.
CID	Criminal Investigation Department.
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization.
DARE	DARE reChimurenga.
DEX	Director of External Intelligence.
DG	Director General.
DGS	General Security Directorate.
DIN	Director of Internal Intelligence.
DMI	Department of Military Intelligence.
FISB	Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau.
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.
FROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe.
JMC	Joint Military Command.
KOAS	Killed on Active Service.
MCM	Meritorious Conduct Medal.
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance.
PAIGC	African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde.
PCC	Peoples Caretaker Council.
PIDE	International Police for the Defence of the State.
PMO	Prime Minister's Office.
SADF	South African Defence Force.
SAS	Special Air Service.
SB	Special Branch.
TTL	Tribal Trust Land.
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence.
UNIP	United National Independence Party.
UTH	University Teaching Hospital.
ZANLA	Zimbabwe National Liberation Army.
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union.
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union.
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People's Army.
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army.
ZLC	Zimbabwe Liberation Council.





Just after 8 a.m. on 18 March 1975 an explosion shattered the morning routine in Chilenje South and echoed across the southern suburbs of the Zambian capital, Lusaka, headquarters of liberation movements fighting against colonial or minority administrations in southern Africa. A pall of smoke and dust in the early morning sunlight cast grey shadows across the drive at 150 Muramba Road, shrouding the mangled remains of a pale blue Volkswagon. In the wreckage lay the body of Herbert Chitepo, 51, National Chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and leader of its *Dare reChimurenga*, or war council, that was directing the infiltration of guerrillas into Rhodesia. Chitepo's death had repercussions that echoed across southern Africa and well into the future of the independent state of Zimbabwe, just as the sound of the blast had echoed down the wide streets of the Zambian capital. Who planted the bomb that killed him? For ten years, the true story of the crime and its perpetrators remained a secret, known only to a handful of people involved in the planning, while those who did not know accepted or propagated whichever version best suited their interests and opinions. In 1985, five years after Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, the authors stumbled across someone who knew. Thus began a meticulous piecing together of details of the action and its motive. This then is the account of *The Chitepo Assassination*.