SOCIAL CHANGE and development

PRICE 40 cents
(including Tax)

Health

Labour

MARXISM

WOMEN

CO—OPS



ZIMBABWE

FIVE YEARS ON...

The Journal on Social Change and Development is a collective publication which aims to promote discussion on current issues of importance to our readers. We welcome comments and contributions

contents

SPECIAL THANKS TO FERRIE SPIT FOR ARRANGING FINANCIAL AID.

FUTURE FOCUS

The focus for our next issue will be Zimbabwe's Disadvantaged People and will include squatters, former combatants, women and the disabled. We welcome contributions.

NO. 10 **1985**

Office located at:
no. 413 Shepperton House
94 Cameron St.
Harare

P.O. Box 4405
HARARE
ZIMBABWE

phone 790124

We would like to apologise to our Readers and our Contributors for the very late appearance of Issue 10. Unfortunately, due to problems beyond our control the Food and Farming Issue had to be cancelled and will now appear later this year.

Editorial

The first milestone has been reached - Zimbabwe has been independent for five years - a fitting time to review progress and identify problems in the process of socialist transformation. Obviously there are limitations in an evaluation at this early stage. Many new policies have not yet fully matured and borne fruit, and dismantling the past is a difficult task. Nevertheless vigilance is needed if Zimbabwe is to keep time on the socialist track.

This issue focusses on progress towards socialism in several major areas, among them, labour relations, co-operatives, ex-combatants, education, health and the economic status of women. Arnold Sibanda provides an historical analysis of the situation of labour prior to independence in which he traces the gradual emasculation of the unions. Since Independence however, it seems that labour still has many struggles to face, both internal and external to the labour movement itself. It needs to resolve its own internal contradictions in order to strengthen its position vis-a-vis capital and thus to assume its role as leader of other oppressed strata in Zimbabwean society.

The contribution on co-operatives by Cain Mathema raises the issue of legislation relating to co-operatives. He contends that the present legislation does not reinforce the role of co-operatives in socialist transformation (and the same may be true of the recent Labour Relations Bill referred to by Arnold Sibanda's contribution). Mathema argues that the role of co-operatives is secondary to that of the State which must take over "the pillars of the economy" and plan that economy with a prescribed and state-assisted role for co-operatives. This means that the state should facilitate the democratisation of the economy. Meaningful participation by workers and peasants requires state backing.

Turning to social services, the article on education provides a balanced account of achievements thus far and difficulties still to be overcome if a more radical approach is to be adopted and to bear fruit. Cde Mugwagwa's article on Health on the other hand concentrates mainly on successes, and these are obviously considerable within the sector itself. He maintains that "health can be an instrument of social transformation" itself. We would still maintain that "health cannot be transformed without transforming the whole society" (Brian McGarry's editorial May 1984).

Certainly, increases in services have occurred. More equitable access is apparent, and certain qualitative changes have taken place such as greater emphasis on grassroots participation, which should be applauded. Do these changes amount to transformation though? It seems that the chosen development strategy to date has been the "basic needs" approach which emphasises service delivery rather than a restructuring of the overall political economy, involving redistribution of assets and wealth. Without that redistribution, can the lives of the poor in Zimbabwe really be transformed?

Oskar Wermter in his article, "Rural Observations on Equality and Self-Reliance" details the difficulties encountered by peasants in remoter, drier areas of Zimbabwe. He contrasts the suffering of such rural people with the relative comfort of urban amenities, but then concludes that the problems of rural peasant farmers can be solved through self-reliance rather than "through a redistribution of existing wealth". We would suggest that promoting self-help as an alternative to redistribution in a situation of unequal and unjust access to assets amounts to exploitation. Self-help should, we suggest, be adjunct to redistribution. We would welcome readers' views.

The Marxist column stresses the necessity for the continuation of the ideological debate and struggle in order that a Vanguard party may emerge to lead the masses in the struggle for scientific socialism. This article offers a concrete suggestion relating to the process of transformation. However, deeper analyses of the situation in Zimbabwe and further concrete recommendations are needed.

The contribution on the "Armed Struggle and Political Struggle" is the third and final article in a series of articles discussing the South African struggle in the post-Nkomati period.

Back on the domestic front we have reviews of the situation of women 5 years before and five years after Independence. Highlighted are the various forms of discrimination against women with the view expressed that these were rooted in economic, political and cultural practices and, that in spite of post-Independence gains, such as legislation on equal pay for equal work, maternity leave and the setting up of a tax system, there are as yet not institutional mechanisms to enforce and consolidate these gains.

DIANA PATEL
TRISH SWIFT
ARNOLD SIBANDA

ISSUE EDITORS

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 5 YEARS AFTER

To assess the situation of the labour movement since Independence, one needs to cast an eye on its development up to Independence itself.

In Issue No. 8 of this Journal, David Sanders correctly noted that: *"One of the great weaknesses of the popular struggle in this country was that the working class was never mobilised as a class."* Furthermore, a point which needs to be emphasised is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the development of trade unionism from the rise and development of nationalism. A labour historian, Brian Wood, has noted that *"the early struggles of labour and their formalisation into workers unions gave rise to a dramatic mobilisation of the black urban proletariat that eventually led to the era of mass nationalist politics from the late 1950's which ultimately resulted in liberation."* However, this observation should not imply that nationalism was a child of trade unionism, neither should the reverse be asserted.

Immediately after World War 1 indigenous associations and organisations grew in earnest as forms of protest, demand and practical struggle against the colonial capitalist state. As early as the late 1890's and early 1900's, the nascent African petty bourgeoisie formed organisations like the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association (R.B.V.A.), the Rhodesia Native Association (R.N.A.), and so on which fought mainly for the interests of the small urban-based black petty-bourgeoisie and, in a limited fashion, articulated the interests of the working-class in their practical programmes.

With the further development of the capitalist economy - and its requirement that the peasants' land and their means of subsistence be appropriated from them - and the consequent turning of peasants into wage labourers, ethnic-based associations and other kinds of movements mushroomed around the towns and mines. By 1922, capitalists were expressing the concern that the 'native societies' were a prelude to 'undesirable' trade unionism. Indeed, in 1927, the labour unrest caused by the intolerable conditions of work and life climaxed in Shamva Mine Strike which mobilised some 3,500 workers. The workers were made up of disparate social organisations such as dance societies mutual aid associations and religious sects like the Watchtower movement. This event, lasting five days until crushed by the army, signalled that the non-workers organisations had been a spring-board for labour's organisation and struggle.

It was in the same year that the first black labour union, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (I.C.U.) was formed. Its leaders included such important figures as Charles Mzingeli, Masotsha Ndlovu and Job Dumbutshena. The I.C.U. however collapsed due to its own weaknesses when faced with state repression.

Bulawayo Workers' Strike, 1948

While there had been concerted efforts to prevent trade unionism by legislation, such as the Industrial Conciliation Act 1934 and the Native Labour Boards, the further development of the economy, and particularly the establishment - via state intervention - of a manufacturing industry and the struggles of workers, led to new requirements in state and industrial relations. The liberal bourgeoisie called for the inclusion of the 'African' in the definition of 'employee' and the allowing of 'controlled' and 'non-political' trade unionism. The policies and programmes pushed were intended to create a pro-European 'native middle-class' which would lead the rest of the Africans and help to prevent anti-European nationalism.

Workers of All Countries, Unite!
Vashandi Venyika Dzose, Batanai!
Zisebenzi Zamazwe Wonke, Bambanani!

Nationalism had by this time taken root and the fear was of the fusion of the 'political struggle' with the 'economic struggle', for such fusion usually threatens not only colonialism, but capitalism itself. However, the liberals lost to the settler class alliances that brought U.D.I. into existence.

In the 1950's, trade unionism and nationalism were inextricably married. The old African National Congress had much support from the Trades Union Congress. In fact, four out of its five top executive members were union leaders who included J.Z. Moyo, Reuben Jamela and J.T. Maluleke, who were detained in the 1959 emergency. Co-operation between trade unionists and nationalists was significant, although at times there was resentment by some unionists over the participation of some union leaders in politics.

The labour movement suffered greatly from state repression. Some able and experienced labour leaders escaped to foreign lands or were detained. Between 1965 and 1971, state repression of trade unionism and nationalism intensified. But the trade unions, together with the other non-directly political African organisations, assumed a para-political character. Union leaders realised or were becoming more and more aware that to gain meaningful changes in the workers' conditions of existence, the political structure itself must change. They thus addressed themselves to such political issues as housing, education, residential segregation, tribal trust lands development, the 1971 settlement proposals etc.

The colonial state was alarmed by the progressive politicisation of trade unionism. Colonial Labour Minister, Ian McLean declared in 1971 that, *"when ...union officials...choose to advise Government on how to do its job, or castigate the Government on political grounds, then I would suggest that sound principles of trade unionism are being perverted for what can only be described as ulterior motives."*

The repression of labour is seen in that the number of work stoppages recorded by the Department of Labour fell from 138 in 1965 to only 19 in 1971. 'Industrial peace' was not an indication (it never is so in capitalist society!) of satisfaction and discipline on the part of the labour force but its repression by the capitalist state and its relative weakness in the face of such repression.

An amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1967 controlled the flow of funds to the trade unions, while a later amendment, as explained by the Colonial Minister of Labour, had the effect of *"removing the right to strike...when the President is satisfied that a strike... would prejudice the public interest."*

There is no recorded legal strike since the enactment of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1959. Collective action by labour was dealt with by the repressive security legislation and the Emergency Powers of the state.

The repression of the labour movement, the divisions in the nationalist ranks and little articulation of workers'

Some things have improved and some things have got worse since independence. For example, education has progressed; all our children can go to school and go further than before. But prices are far too high and they keep rising, and at work we often can't get the spare parts we need. I know that there are always a lot of problems after a war, but the cost of everything is just too high.

AARON MUNYENGETERWA - mechanic

demands in nationalist politics, rendered the labour movement weak, divided and nearly defeated. In the late 70's most African-led unions were affiliated to the two labour confederations: the African Trade Union Congress (A.T.U.C.) and the National African Trade Unions Congress (N.A.T.U.C.). These unions, according to I.L.O. estimates for 1978, (which exclude membership in the municipalities) drew a membership of approximately 100,000. In 1978 N.A.T.U.C. claimed about 13 affiliated unions, while A.T.U.C. claimed 12.

The bureaucratic emasculation of labour had become effective. The state had effectively removed the right to strike and established a dispute settlement procedure which was excessively debilitating. When disputes arose, they had to go through a system of arbitration and mediation before a 'legal' strike could be called. No strike was allowed in 'essential services' which were themselves designated by the Minister! Arbitration could be voluntary or compulsory. A 1973 amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act required all disputes to be sent to an Industrial Tribunal appointed by the Minister of Labour. This bureaucratic procedure effectively removed the right to strike, a fundamental and democratic weapon for the worker in capitalist society.

The unionists, despite the fact that unionism and nationalism had appeared as two legs of the same movement, still remained weak politically on the eve of independence. This reflected a major lacuna also on the part of nationalist philosophy and political practice. The workers had never been united as workers in a kind of popular front. By the end of 1979, up to five labour confederations existed, and most of them were labour wings of the political parties of nationalist movements. These included A.T.U.C., N.A.T.U.C., the Zimbabwe Federation of Labour, the Trade Union Congress of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Congress of Unions.

There was an attempt to unite all these unions in a United Trade Union of Zimbabwe but this had party political, rather than worker oriented interests.

Without a united and class conscious leadership, the workers could not speak with one voice. Neither could they make their grievances known to capital and state at the time of Independence. The new nationalist government had never prepared for this nor had the labour movement forced it onto the political agenda during the liberation struggle. Yet the workers themselves had real and concrete grievances bottled up against capital. A wave of strikes therefore ensued immediately at Independence and involved thousands of workers from factories, mines, farms and plantations. The grievances were not only over pay and working conditions, but also over

Some of my expectations have been fulfilled but very few. I expected that people in rural areas would be able to settle anywhere without getting approval first. I expected that there would be more jobs and no unemployment problem...The government is very young and change does not happen overnight. The government still has to consider problems of drought, refugees and war, which have been a great hinderance to our success.

SECRETARY

cleaning out corrupt and undemocratic elements in the leadership of the unions.

The state responded unfavourably to the workers' strikes at independence. This is evidenced by the utterances of the then Minister of Labour. However, the workers strikes won some concessions which included the appointment of the Riddell Commission and legislation pertaining to minimum wages.

In addition, the demonstrated ability of labour to act precipitated the institution of workers committees in work-places, which were a concrete realisation of the right of labour to be consulted and for its organisational instruments to exist. In a nutshell, the actions of labour in the immediate post-independence period forced out a certain paternalism of the state. This state paternalism continued to manifest itself later, in the awarding of $10 increments to workers earning below $300 per month - an increment which was not won by the workers struggles themselves.

The workers' struggles also prompted the state to call for a unified labour movement. This materialised in the inauguration of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions in February 1981, and to which the majority of registered and unregistered trade unions are today affiliated.

It must be emphasised that the institutional structures which the labour struggles force capital and the capitalist state to erect are indeed gains for the labour movement in a democratic sense, but they can at the same time be instruments to tame or defeat the labour movement. This is so as long as capitalism exists and is the dominant mode of production in a country. Thus, the awarding of minimum wages can be gains for labour, but when they come without an input by such labour, they become hand-outs which make labour's own organisations superfluous and weak. A number of unionists have complained in the local press that they are never consulted on the issue of wages.

One important demand of the workers in the post-independence period has been the repealing of the Industrial Conciliation Act Chapter 267, which was seen to be anti-labour. Accordingly, the independent government introduced

the Labour Relations Bill in 1984, which now awaits gazetting. This Bill, which replaces the aforementioned act and the Minimum Wages and Employment Acts of 1980, has been hailed by the Minister of Labour as a workers' charter, which was a product of ultra-democratic consultation with labour, capital and some local and international 'experts'.

The local press however, has reported unionists expressing concern about the 'workers' charter'. Firstly that they were not consulted. Secondly, that the Bill gives too much power to the Minister, and thirdly, that it removes the fundamental and democratic right of labour to strike - its only weapon under capitalism.

There are indeed certain fundamental issues about the Bill which may cast some doubt as to its status as a 'workers' charter'. Besides the painful and bureacratic method of dispute settlement - which starts from a labour relations officer to a regional hearing officer, then to a Labour Relations Board, from which appeal lies with a Labour Tribunal and from thence to the Supreme Court - without any stated time limit as to when a decision must be reached by each level - the range of spheres which are defined as 'essential services' (and therefore no strike is allowed in them) is so wide that only domestic workers remain outside the 'essential services' sphere. 'Essential services' have been defined to include

health, electricity, water, fire, sewerage, rubbish disposal, production, distribution, supply and delivery of food or fuel, mining of its ancillary services, communications, transport service, road, rail, bridge, etc., or any other service which the Minister may declare to be an essential service!

The power of the Minister in fact extends to cover control of union finances, union elections, its supporting staff and property etc. It also extends to cover overruling collective bargaining agreements, to overrule everyone in the regulation of hours of work, wages, leave and other conditions of employment. This would surely make trade unions and other workers' organisations mere recreation clubs!

What's more, at this stage of the development of the workers' movement and the consolidating of the country's democratic gains, the Bill gives no rights to unregistered trade unions to negotiate with employers, or to call a strike. Such unregistered trade unions, according to the unionists exist in agriculture and food industries, and in domestic employment, the sectors in which there has been blatant exploitation. The Bill has therefore made workers in these spheres - and thousands upon thousands of them for that matter - leaderless and they must look to the Minister of Labour as the possible Messiah!

While there is need to prevent the chaos that can be caused by multiple unregistered unions in any industry, a 'workers charter' should perhaps have come about after careful examination of the state of organisation of labour itself in different industries, and tightened formally and legally such organisation so as to strengthen the labour movement rather than legally demobilising it in the face of well-organised capital.

Perhaps the shortcomings in the Labour Bill reflect serious problems relating to both the nature of state and the labour movement itself. The situation poses the following questions:

a) Why was it possible for such a Bill to come about without full and meaningful consultation with labour? Is it because labour failed to evolve strong and democratic structures for such consultation to be possible, or is it because, given the nature of the present state such consultation would have made no difference?

b) How much of the influence of the interests of local and foreign capital on the State is reflected in this Bill? Witness what are designated as 'Essential Services'.

c) Does the power of the Minister reflect a paternalism of the state which is prompted by a fear of a potentially organised and strong labour movement? Or does it reflect an observed weakness of the labour movement which cannot challenge such power?

All the above questions relate to the problem of characterising the present stage and the nature of the class struggles in our country. What is obvious however, is that the State has emerged less as a pro-workers' state in the transition to socialism but more as a 'police force' of the status quo. The workers movement emerges as weakened but struggling to cleanse itself of the sources of its own weakness, which revolve around petty and narrow-mindedness, low political consciousness of its class interests, corruption and anti-democratic practices which isolate the union leadership from the rank and file.

As the country closes its first five years of independence, one hopes the labour movement continues to cleanse and advance itself into a more conscious and strengthened democratic force which sees its emancipation only in itself taking the leading role in organising other oppressed strata against the capitalist system itself.■

ARNOLD SIBANDA

Rural Observations on Equality and Self-Reliance

Five years ago the Government and the people of Zimbabwe set out to create a society based on equality and to rebuild the country through self-reliance. The imbalance between town and country was to be righted. It was precisely the glaring contrast between the prosperity of a few and the poverty of the majority that had caused the armed conflict then just brought to an end. Have our hopes been fulfilled?

I did not go to any government office in town to get the facts and figures. (Rural dwellers rarely see eye to eye with mostly apathetic big-city bureaucrats.) I offer you merely my rural experience - my field of vision may be limited, but at least I am close to the ground.

As you approach our mission compound you are struck by the contrast between the collection of ramshackle little stores and attached mudhuts this side of the cattle grid and the neat rows of staff houses electrically lit on the other. "You have built a real town here," I was told by a visitor.

Both our primary and secondary schools have doubled their intake of pupils since Independence. But in order to secure properly qualified teachers for our secondary school, we had to build a dozen big houses good enough for any suburban environment, hence the striking contrast to the rural surroundings. The rents are extremely low in effect we subsidize the housing of that part of our population which is the most prosperous. A strange paradox; in order to give our rural youngsters an equal chance, we demonstrate the inequality between the "educated" and the "uneducated". The staff houses of the primary school are much more modest, a fact that has not escaped its occupants who resent the "discrimination".

Down in the Zambezi valley near the border with Mocambique, two badly needed clinics have been built. One was finished over a year ago, but has not yet been opened for lack of water. There are no funds to put down a pipeline to a borehole several kilometres away. The other clinic has water, but has not been opened

either because there is no money to pay the staff and no staff to be paid. Qualified nurses loathe to go to such faraway places which are hot and lonely and without the facilities people used to city life expect. The only functioning shop is at the foot of the escarpment, miles away, serving only the workers of a state farm. Most people have to come to the highveld to do their shopping at a European farm store.
No small-scale shopkeeper survives the crushing burden of the enormous transport costs to such remote areas. If he passes the overhead costs of transport onto his customers, then he further punishes the cash-starved population of this drought-stricken area. If he does not, he goes out of business. The result is no stores in the whole of this border area.

The schools have a similar problem to the clinics. Apart from a few Zintec-trained teachers sent there by government, most are unqualified "temporary teachers". Almost all of our qualified hospital staff are members of Religious Orders for whom economic considerations do not take first place. The rest - and that is the majority - are unqualified, having no diplomas they cannot be so choosy and have to be content with rural appointments. They work harder under more difficult circumstances for less pay, with little recognition and no job security, and yet without them rural hospitals would simply collapse.
The good old "law of supply and demand" of a free market economy is still very much in force : if you have a skill that is scarce and therefore in great demand you sell it to the highest bidder. If you have no such much wanted commodity to offer, you eat more humble pie.
Which brings us back to our "suburb" in the middle of a village environment; you catch a rare fish only with fat bait.

The students of a nearby rural secondary school pay, in addition to their school-fees, a considerable amount into their school's building fund, altogether more than the day scholars pay at our much better equipped mission school. There are no classrooms for the two new Form 1 classes. The wide branches of a big tree protect them from the scorching sun. In mid-morning a heavy downpour sends them running for shelter. They need not worry about getting their books wet - they have not got any. School is over for today. How are their young and inexperienced teachers, themselves not much older than their students, to conduct classes properly under such circumstances? The chances of these students passing O-levels are slim. There is great inequality between older well-established schools and the newly started rural secondary schools.

And yet this is one area where self-reliance does seem to work. Our own primary school parents, spoiled by years of relying on free help from the mission, did not believe us at first when they were told that they would have to raise the funds from among themselves to enlarge their school. Eventually the penny dropped. Now they are exceedingly proud of the four new classrooms which they built entirely from their own resources.

A neighbouring council school raised the funds by making its pupils work over weekends picking cotton on a state farm. A lorry would pick the children up on a Friday afternoon and bring them back on Sunday. Self-reliance? Certainly.(Unless, like myself, you are nagged by the question : where does Self-reliance end and Child Labour begin?) But hardly equality; or could you imagine a headmaster in Highlands collecting his children with a lorry to be taken for cotton picking to a farm in Norton or Banket?

Brian Muromo was the brightest boy in his Grade Seven class. His mother, a divorcee without any support from her vanished husband, cannot pay Brian's boarding fees, especially after two disastrous drought years. The school is meant for disadvantaged rural youth, but it is people like Yulitta Mushayi's father, a council clerk with a regular cash income, who can afford our boarding fees, low though they are, rather than cash-starved peasant farmers. How to balance the obvious inequality? I used to send people like Brian's mother to Social Welfare. Though they were sympathetic, not a single person was assisted.

I discussed the case of Brian's mother this morning with the very active chairwoman of our Women's Club who is about to start a small cooperative sewing school uniforms. I am acutely aware that if I were to give in to Brian's mother's pleas too easily, I might kill the little determination she has to fend for herself. Could she join in the cooperative and earn at least part of the school fees for her son? There is some hope.

In Zimbabwe socialism is understood to mean equality regardless of race, creed or sex, an equitable distribution of land, health care and education for all regardless of income; it means fair wages, a life-style of self-reliance as well as of sharing, the promotion of cooperative ways of production and a national policy of reconciliation.

Mai Mashayamombe is an old widow who vigorously tills her little field every year. Last year she received a few bags of fertilizer under some aid scheme. Despite the drought she did not do badly. We bought up her surplus maize for the school kitchen. This year she knocks at my door again, noisily demanding the same assistance, a picture of the Biblical "importunate widow" (Lk.18) trying to wear me out with her incessant talking, and I, like the "unjust judge", very nearly give in. With the cash she got from her surplus she ought to have bought her own fertilizer. Aid is given once to make you move, not every year. It is like an engine, I try to explain, you start it once, afterwards it must run by itself.

There is an extremely thin dividing line between aid that makes a person stand on his own feet and walk, and aid that cripples and perpetuates the dependence. To know which is which can be agonizingly difficult when listening to the people and their tales of woe.

There is a world of difference between the wage-earner who is sure to receive his monthly pay cheque and the peasant farmer who can lay his hands on cash only once a year after the sale of his crop the size of which depends largely on the vagaries of nature. In whatever close contact the agricultural demonstrator may be with his farmers, as a salaried government employee he does not share the basic risk of their lives.

Our teachers may have a few cattle back home and grow some maize. But not for anything in the world would they want to go back to the precarious existence of their fathers' without the safety net of an assured monthly income.

Is that unspoken message coming across to our students? I hope not. The inequality between wage-earners and self-employed peasant farmers can only be overcome if the future communal farmer ceases to envy the wage-earner and reduce the risks of farming life through greater skills some of which we hope a better education will enable him to acquire. Equality, or anything like it, will not so much come from above through a redistribution of existing wealth, though that is also necessary at times in the form of some well-aimed subsidies, but much more through productive self-reliance from below. Insofar as our teachers play a positive and motivating role in putting this message across, I am grateful for the presence of these "suburbanites" in our village landscape.

OSKAR WERMTER S.J.

As far as possible a local community must rely on its own resources. Whatever a community can do for itself, it must not expect central government to do for it. Only when the local resources are really exhausted, can help be sought from some higher authority. At this point generous and quick assistance from the authorities will not paralyze, but further stimulate the self-reliant efforts of people.

URBAN CONSUMER PRICE INDEXES
1975-1984 (both = 100 for 1980)



COMMENTS

The government still publishes separate consumer price indexes for upper and lower income groups in town. Although the old difference between black and white does not correspond to the difference between rich and poor today, it is still true that better paid people eat different foods from the poor, and electricity bills are charged differently in the high income suburbs from those in the low income suburbs that have electricity, so one can still say that the 'cost of living' can be different for the two groups.

Of course comparing the two indexes without also knowing how incomes are changing does not tell us which group is becoming better off, but it is still useful to know whether the rich or the poor are affected most by changes in prices.

For example, the graph shows that from April to December 1980 the price index for poorer urban people dropped: during these months the necessities of life became cheaper for them.

The graph shows that from March 1981 to September 1983 the price index for low-income families was lower than for high-income families. This means the price increases since 1980 were hitting the poor less hard.

This changed in September 1983 when there was a sudden jump in the lower-income index, which followed the signing of an agreement by the government and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) in August 1983, and a big increase in the price of maize meal and other basics.

Achievements & Problems in Education since Independence

Education has been one of the areas of greatest Government achievement since Independence. In a very short time Zimbabwe has been able to outstrip the record of most of its neighbours in terms of the provision of educational facilities. As a result primary education has literally trebled from an enrolment of 819 586 in 1979 to over 2,1 million in 1984. Secondary education has increased sixfold from 66 215 in 1979 to 422 584 in 1984.

The expansion of primary and secondary education has been made possible not only through Government's generous investment in education ($455m in 1984-85 fiscal year), but also because of the highly successful self-help programme. Parents' committees were set up and through these committees parents were mobilised to build their own schools with a low Government subsidy mainly for secondary schools. The self-help school building programme has certainly been one of the most remarkable achievements. As a result the number of schools has grown from 2 578 in 1979 to 5 290 in 1984, an increase of 2 712 schools, amounting to an increase of some 40 000 classrooms all over the country. Although the cost of this mass mobilisation building programme has not been accurately calculated as much of the contribution was in terms of free labour and the manufacture of building materials on site, a rough estimate of $3 000 per classroom would give a figure of $120m as the parental contribution to school development. (The average cost of a commercially constructed classroom is about $14 000). Thus the people's contribution has been almost equal to Government investment in capital infrastructure.

However, in terms of the recurrent expenditure, Government has covered the major cost. Parental contribution to recurrent costs is estimated at well under 10% of total costs.

Much of this new development has taken place in the rural areas, with the result that previously deprived areas now enjoy the beginning of an educational infrastructure. School planning has become a major activitiy of the Ministry of Education, with a primary school serving a five kilometre radius, and a secondary school serving an average of five to eight primary schools.

A similar expansion has taken place at teacher education and university levels. Whereas before Independence some 800 teachers graduated each year, this number has risen to 5 000, half of these through the highly successful ZINTEC (Zimbabwe Integrated National Teacher Education Course) training programme.

ZINTEC has been a success not only in terms of producing large numbers of well qualified teachers, but also in terms of training teachers to serve the people. Much of the success of the programme is due to the fact that the teachers were trained in deprived rural areas where they were able to integrate into the rural community. The course structure also requires a community service project each year.

The University of Zimbabwe has also undertaken an expansion programme, the number of students accepted per year having increased from about 500 to its present 1 500. The University has been constrained by the lack of suitably qualified A level candidates, but it is expected that this shortage will be overcome by 1986 due to the planned expansion of A level places in schools.

In terms of the quality and content of education, there has been a serious attempt at improvement through teacher education and curriculum development. Since Independence there has been unprecedented activity in these fields, although by their very nature improvements in these areas will take some time to consolidate.

Greater emphasis on socialism and on education with production in all colleges has borne fruit in terms of the number of teacher trainees now working within the school system, under the new programme where 50% of the training is done on the job. The suppy of educational materials to schools such as science kits has made this transformation towards a more experimental type of teaching methodology more realisable.

The supply of free books specially written for Zimbabwean schools and based on a more socialist interpretation of reality has gone a long way to freeing Zimbabwean education from its colonial bondage.

Although Zimbabwe is still tied to the British Examination Boards at O and A levels, it is now possible for Zimbabwe to change any of the syllabuses if it so wishes. A programme of localisation of marking was begun in 1984 and it is expected that within a few years all examinations will be localised, although it is likely that the British Board will retain a supervisory role.

Whilst there is little doubt that education has been one of the highlights of Zimbabwe's achievements over the past five years, there are still a number of areas where concerted effort needs to be made to consolidate initial gains. For example, serious inputs need to be made in terms of improving the academic and professional levels of all teachers; supervision of schools needs to be tightened - at present a substantial minority of heads and teachers are neglecting their work and getting away with it; the socialist curriculum needs to be strengthened so that every teacher is able to understand and develop socialist education within the classroom; and education needs to become much more cost-effective. Whilst there is little doubt that good quality education does depend on adequate funding, at the same time it is very important that ways and means be found of providing adequate high quality education at a reasonable price in terms of Zimbabwe's economy. There is a real danger that by retaining the colonial educational cost structure, education can lead to a bleeding of the economy as essential development is deprived of funds because too much is being channelled into education. It is absolutely essential that everyone gets the opportunity to obtain a good education, but the unit cost of education can and must be lowered. The Ministry of Education seems to be unable to develop more efficient and cost-effective means of delivering the goods.

Another vital question is the fate of the millions of school leavers scheduled to graduate in the next decade. Little or nothing has been done to create jobs for them. Unless a serious and deliberate effort is made to expand the economy to accommodate some 2m school leavers, it is likely that the heavy investment in education will backfire.

Finally there are persistent reports of nepotism and corruption within the educational system. If such reports prove to be true, it is likely to affect the development of education disastrously. However with the effective clean-up that has taken place in other spheres (witness the Paweni case), there may be hope that such practices will not be countenanced for long. ■

Meeting the Health Care Challenge



In writing on the state of health care provision during the Rhodesian regime to 1979, the terms, 'inadequate', 'inequitable', 'inaccessible' and 'inappropriate' are often encountered. Further examination of the patterns of health care provision in Rhodesia shows that this was a result of the deliberate, politically motivated, white racist policies of the settler planners to exclude the needy majority black population. The only exception to this general rule being the urban workers, whose proximity to the whites, through daily intermingling at the work place and in the home (as gardeners, cooks and nannies), would have constituted a source of infection. Besides, the urban worker had to be healthy, to provide his/her labour power for the production of

the much needed surplus value in heavy industry, manufacture, trade and commerce. For the urban worker, industrial dispensaries, clinics in townships, general hospitals in sizeable towns, and central hospitals in Harare and Bulawayo were built. These provided curative care to the 20% of the total black population that lived in urban areas.

The plight of the rural people was left to the Missionaries, the Local Councils and the Traditional Medical Practitioners (these were outlawed until 1980). Government provision went only as far down as rural hospitals, which totalled 46 and were intended to cater for the district administrative staff, near whom they were located.

Where the rudimentary care existed, it only emphasised cure, while disregarding the need to create conditions condusive to good health. Preventative, promotive and rehabilitative care was neglected, despite the nature of the predominant disease patterns and the causes of mortality. The major causes of morbidity and mortality, which were and continue to be, the result of poverty and bad environmental conditions, were ignored in the health care pattern that was adopted. Yet, interestingly enough, 90% of the major killers were, and still are, preventable, but only 10% of the whole budget was earmarked for preventative services.

In terms of manpower training and distribution, the urban areas were favoured and the white ruling classes got the lion's share. (*See tables 1 and 2*). Care provision was inversely related to the need for health services. Within the manpower categories, the middle and upper classes dominated, by virtue of the privileges of birth and race. (*See also tables 1 and 2*). In medical school training, pharmacy, denistry, laboratory technology and nurse training, the trainee intake composition, numbers and level of training bore no relationship to the national health care needs.

With all the other factors conducive to good health, such as food availability, adequate income, education, good housing and social participation, considerably limited, if not unavailable, the health status of the mass of the African population was intolerable at Independence in 1980. The worst affected were the vulnerable and 'at risk' groups of women and children under five. These groups also suffered most from the brutality of the war.

The challenge at independence was how to provide for the most needy rural population, in the face of a devastated economy and a destroyed rural infrastructure, with inadequate manpower available. The biggest resource, however, was the people themselves and their determination to drag themselves from the scourges of poverty, hunger and disease and squalor.

The popularly elected government was faced with the task of mobilising, organising and planning for the realisation of development goals, in the shortest possible time. The level of expectations, coupled with the inadequacy of resources - manpower, money and materials - and the inexperience of the incoming government in planning and management of social services,

TABLE 1: RACIAL COMPOSITION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL GRADUATES

Graduation Years	Whites	Black	Asian and Coloured	TOTAL
Up to 1980	220	125	58	403
1981	28	11	3	42
1982	29	16	3	48
1983	46	4	7	57
1984	37	18	6	61
1985	20	42	7	69
TOTAL	380	216	84	680

Source: Planning for Equity in Health, Min. of Health 1981, p.48.

Notes: 1. Assumes no wastage after 1981.
2. By 1981 possibly one third of the white graduates had left the country.
3. From 1980 more black students were recruited.

TABLE 2: RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SRN STUDENTS

Graduation Dates	Blacks	Whites	Others
1981	111	116	8
1982	186	92	5
1983	263	68	3

Source: Planning for Equity in Health, Min. of Health 1981 p,25.

Notes: An increase in black trainees output reflects the change in emjhasis towards producing a cadre who could relate to the most needy section of the population.

made the task of reconstruction and development formidable. This was more pronounced in health care, because, by its very nature, health is needed yester-year, let alone today; yet good health care policy requires meticulous planning that takes a long time to formulate and effect.

TOWARDS INSTITUTING A RESPONSIVE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE

The fragmentation of the health services providers (there were five bodies providing care - Central Government, Local Authorities, Missions, industrial and mining concerns and private practitioners), the maldistribution of health resources and the curative - preventive urban-rural dichotomies; all reflected the weaknesses of the planning form that existed. The underlying reasons, besides the obvious political motivations, were;

- the overcentralisation of the plan its formulation and the implementation of the policies,
- the insensitivity of the planners to the needs of those they were meant to serve.

In short, those involved could not relate to the masses' aspirations and needs.

Instituting a planning and implementation structure that was responsive to the immediate, medium and longterm health needs of the masses was the challenge that faced the Government on taking office in 1980. Two levels of intervention were immediately necessary; from the bottom, where the masses were anchored, and from the top, where the strategy formulation had, of necessity, to originate. By some feat of genius, the two had to be reconciled; and that, with speed. Two factors remained in favour of these two 'entry-points' - a unity of purpose, and the bond of shared experiences throughout the bitter struggle; between the masses at the bottom and the leadership at the top. These two factors, however, were not enough on their own. So, two additional factors interplayed to buttress them effectively; - an internationally conducive climate and a sizeable injection of progressive, and not so progressive, but nationalistic returnees from training abroad. In short, a mixed blessing.

This injection was to prove crucial in the fight for the middle ground which, hitherto, was the preserve of a bureaucratic white middle class. In the struggle that ensued, some dilution of the socialist health programme as initially envisaged, had to occur. This has to be understood in the context of class struggles. Within the incumbent group, there inevitably existed some class distinctions, masked perhaps, by the perceived need to dislodge a seemingly common enemy. These class differences would emerge over time, but for the time being, the strategy adopted was to develop and entrench, a self-perpetuating system, in which individual roles, by design, contributed and functioned, as part of a system which no person could singularly manipulate - and change. The trick lay in the speed of implementation of agreed key programmes. With the old order still staggering from the shock of a mass party victory and trying to relocate themselves in the spirit of reconciliation; the main thrust of the approach had to be to ensure the attainment of crucial, irreversible milestones in the process of socialisation of health care provision.

HOW THEN, WAS THIS EFFECTED?

Through a progression of well conceived steps which can be roughly classified under:

(a) the setting up of a strategy core group to assist the Ministers in designing and formulating the re-organisation.

(b) Institution of the Re-organisation for Reconstruction, i.e.

(i) repair, reconstruction and re-opening of clinics

(ii) supporting studies for programmes design in nutrition, sanitation, water supply, immunisation, manpower, etc.

(c) Programming for change of orientation of health care provision in favour of Primary Health Care.

(d) Mobilisation of internal resources through the Military Medics integration, the expanded intakes at the Medical School and other training institutions.

(e) Mobilisation of external support for new programmes.

(f) Community involvement through conducive structures design and development.

(g) Budgetary recognition.

WHAT WAS ACHIEVED?

Brian McGarry, in his editorial comment in the May 1984 issue of this Journal, conceded that, *"health cannot be transformed without transforming the whole society"*. But, the reverse is also true, that health can be an instrument of social trnasformation. The experience of the Zimbabwe experiment to date, does uphold the possibility of the latter.



1. For ease of exposition, only rural primary and secondary levels are shown.

The pace at which health care programmes were introduced and implemented, the planning and management form and structure developed to effect them (*See diagram A*) indeed did consitute initiating agents for social change. Through the clear recognition that health is a developmental problem rather than a medical one, the multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary approach adopted in the design and implementation of health care programmes, provided the necessary and conducive entry-point. Primary Health Care (PHC), through its insistence on accessibility, affordability, acceptability and appropriateness, clearly did provide the best approach. By recognising the need to fully involve communities in the fight for their own health, the Ministry itself underwent a qualitative transformation. By accepting this challenge and participating in the selection of VHW, Community Based Distributors (CBD's) and setting up Village and Ward Health Committees and District Health Authorities, the people became active in planning for their own health, and as active members of their own society thereby effectively redressing the social power balance! Through these tested planning and managment structures, the communities - hesitantly at first - started raising broader questions about their welfare - education, employment opportunities, price levels etc. In the same manner that they learnt to forward their health and health care grievances, they posed broader issues of socio-economic relevance. The socio-political structures, it was realised, initially fostered to bring participation in health care planning and provision, were vehicles for social transformation and development.

Whereas detailing the specific achievements in health status and health care would require considerably more space and time, brief mention may be made of some of the major attainments to date. Unfortunately for health, however, success tends to take time to be realised hence recourse has to be made to crude health care indicators like: resources allocated (manpower, money and materials), personnel trained, facilities built, changes in levels of attendance, volumes of referrals, etc. considered to be the result of raised awareness levels and improved service availability.

Since the government's emphasis was on rural provision, most progress to date has been in that regard. Foremost has been the Village Health Workers (VHW) programme, whose teething problems were discussed in this Journal's May 1983 issue Number 4. To date, the programme has seen the training and placement of 4425 of these community selected, supervised and community based workers. They are trained at 55 training centres constructed in each of the country's 55 districts. However, there is a need to further strengthen technical supervision through the Rural Health Centres (RHC's) and clinics. 450 war damaged clinics and 210 new RHC's will be completed by June 1985, at a total value of $17,53m (*See table 3*).

The RHC's constitute the vehicle through which integrated health care provision was introduced. Their functions range from curative care provision to the supervision of outreach programmes. Despite the re-opening of Medical Assistant Training Schools, the shortage o

TABLE 3: NEW RURAL HEALTH CENTRES 1985

Source of funding	EEC	Govt	African Dev Fund	Lands and Reset	SIDA	TOTAL
Completed	47	51	45	14	10	167
Under Construction	-	-	38	5	-	44
Total	47	51	83	19	10	210
Value (Z$)	2.8m	6m	7.5m	0.483m	.75m	17.53m

Source: Ministry of Health, Physical Planning Unit, 1985

TABLE 4: MINISTRY OF HEALTH EXPENDIT

Year	Expenditure Lev
1974/75	$m 28.9
1979/80	52.3
1980/81	83.7
1981/82	108.9
1982/83	130.3
1983/84	137.6
1984/85	131.4

Source: Ministry of Health

trained manpower in health threatened to be critical. The screening and placement of 2000 former Military Medics in 1981 was therefore a 'shot in the arm' for the Ministry. To improve their effectiveness, six months training was provided for those who had fallen into the B category while those in the C category underwent full training as Medical Assistants. These cadres' best advantage was their knowledge of the rural population's attitudes and their political consciousness. The years spent in the bush, among the masses gave them invaluable experience in mass mobilisation and communication which they could now fully utilise to promote health and consequently development.

It is clear from the above that sizeable new resources were deliberately channelled to the rural areas, especially the 'crescent area' most affected by the liberation war. The introduction of the partially free health service for those earning less than $150 per month further reinforced this, since this would cater for the rural population and the urban poor.

The sucess of health programmes can be assessed from changes in the health status of the 'at risk' group. Data available in 1980 was at most estimated, it gave a rough indication for comparative purposes. Infant Mortality in 1980 ranged from 140-200 per 1000 live births in the rural areas. Maternal mortality was quoted as 145 per 100 000 total births. (*Planning for Equity in Health, p.4*).

The PHC evaluation carried out in June, 1984, showed that major advances had occurred in health. Latest estimates stand at 84-102 infant deaths per 1000 live births. No specific data is available on maternal mortality, but antenatal attendance figures, hospital deliveries and courses to tranditional birt attendants all suggest that major improvements have also occurred there. In addition, the evaluation showed that 96% of the children were breastfed unti the age of 12 months, 81% of the index children had a health card, 89% of the mothers of the index children had received antenatal care. (*Situation Analysis of Women and Children in Zimbabwe, UNICEF 1984, p. 66*).

It is also notable that the Environment Health Projects were a real success wit 111 970 Blair toilets and 7433 protecte wells completed throughout the country in the period 1980 to the end of 1984.

Admittedly, on planning for a whole nation in the period given mistakes are bound to occur. The speed with which 'people-oriented' programmes and projects in health care were implemented, and the level of their success in the face of such formidable adverse factors far outweigh the failures experienced.

Of course, the benefits of good health are not easy to see within short periods - five years in a life time is short, but one would not be wrong to submit that: the Zimbabwean rural resident, irregardless of the drought, is a healthier citizen now (young and old alike) in many if not all respects, than in 1980.

CDE NORBET MUGWAGWA,
DIRECTOR OF CHILD SPACING
& FAMILY PLANNING COUNCIL.

ZIMBABWEAN CO-OPERATIVES, 5 years after

Co-operatives were first introduced into Zimbabwean society by white settler farmers at the beginning of this century. The first co-operatives were formed to market the farmers' produce, and to buy farm inputs without the middle-man. In other words, to sell the farmers' produce in such a way that the farmer gained more than selling through the middle-man.

These settler co-operatives, for e.g. the Salisbury Farmers' Co-operative Society, were racist. The rules and regulations of the society made it clear that only white farmers and traders could be accepted as members. It must be remembered that during the colonial era everything was done on racial lines.

Yet co-operation as understood by its originators in Europe (the working class engaged in fierce battles against capitalist exploitation) had nothing to do with racism. In fact, the International Co-operative Alliance (formed in 1895 in London) principles had nothing to do with artificial restrictions - racism, national chauvinism and sexism. Some of the first co-operatives in Zimbabwe did not even follow the internationally accepted principle of co-operative democracy (one member, one vote). Instead they allowed members to have more than one vote, depending on how rich they were.

Meanwhile, blacks did not form co-operatives until the Co-operative Societies Act of 1956. This Act is still in operation today, and it is administered by the Department of Co-operative Development. This Act is based on British colonialism's experiences and intentions in the British colonies. The Act is formally in line with the International Co-operative Alliance's co-operative principles: it allows the formation of any type of co-operative by any citizen of the country. Co-operatives formed by blacks, Indians and whites were registered under this Act before Independence. However, to all intents and purposes the Act was created for blacks, especially those in the *"African Purchase Areas"*. That is why the Registrar of Co-operatives under this Act, had sweeping powers to control the co-operatives he was responsible for. He even had the power to take over or liquidate a co-operative. He could delegate some of his junior staff to manage a co-operative society. As a result many people thought co-operatives were government institutions. Indeed the government of colonialism wanted to use black co-operatives to reinforce colonialsim, racism and capitalist relations in the country. Unfortunately this Act is still law today. It needs to be changed, so that it is in line with the aims and aspirations of independent Zimbabwe - democracy and socialism.

Of interest is the fact that the white agricultural co-operators refused to come under this Act, regarding it as an Act to deal with *"inferior"* and *"unsophisticated"* people. The white agricultural co-operatives came under the Companies Act, an Act that served the interests of private capitalist ownership. If there was self-reliance in the 1956 Act, it was self-reliance that protected colonialism and racism. There is no way that colonialists and racists could have wanted black Zimbabweans to be independent and to prosper economically. At best, the Act could only produce black farmers and other owners who could be allies of colonialism and racism in the country. Those co-operatives that refused to fall under the 1956 Co-operatives Societies Act, are still outside the provisions of this Act. This state of affairs should be done away with in independent Zimbabwe - we need one definition of a co-operative, and we need one co-operative law, so that no one can define co-operatives to mean something against the socialist goals of Zimbabwe.

Soon after independence there were only a few co-operatives registered under the Companies Act, and there were 370 co-operatives that were registered through the Co-operative Societies Act of 1956. The Zimbabwean government have dec red socialism (as understood by Marxist-Leninists) to be the target we must achieve. In accordance with that the government saw co-operatives playing an important role in the establishment of socialism in the country. Indeed, experience in the socialist countries (e.g. the U.S.S.R., G.D.R., Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam and China) show that co-operatives have an important role to play in the construction of socialism, and in the development of socialism to communism. In other words, the Zimbabwean government was not alone in the understanding of the role of co-operatives to achieve self-reliance, democracy, progress and socialism. The government did not only declare this policy, it also encouraged the formation of co-operatives for socialism. It provided land and funds for collective farms. Funds (demobilisation monies) that were provided to combatants also brought about some retail collectives and transport collectives. (Through the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and the Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO), the government grants loans to co-operatives and individual members of co-operatives). Money has also been provided to educate and train co-operators. The government gives legal and business advice and protection to co-operatives.

Hundreds of co-operatives have been formed and registered since independence. Co-operators see their co-operatives as one way of taking back the economy of Zimbabwe from foreigners. They see co-operatives as a means towards achieving economic ownership and control, and therefore, genuine independence for Zimbabwe.

By the end of February 1985, 1423 primary co-operative societies in various sectors of the economy had been registered by the Department of Co-operative Development - with a total membership exceeding 105 000. Of these, 266 were collective farms, 37 were credit unions, 200 were retail co-operatives, 36 were transport co-operatives, 221 were industrial co-operatives, 2 were



housing co-operatives amd 1 was a printing and publishing collective co-operative. There are two national co-operatives - the Central Association of Co-operatives Union (CACU), and the Organisation for Collective Co-operatives in Zimbabwe (OCCZIM). CACU represents 14 co-operative unions which in turn were formed by some agricultural marketing and supply co-operatives largely representing peasant farmers. OCCZIM was formed by some collective co-operatives and represents around 300 co-operatives. Applications for the registration of new co-operatives are still continuing, and the number of co-operatives is increasing.

Of significant importance in the past five years has been the collective co-operative movement. From only one collective (Cold Comfort), there are now well over 300 collective co-operatives representing between 20 000 and 25 000 people in the country. Collective co-operatives are worker-owned co-operatives, whose assets are owned equally by all. Collective farmers have become models of socialist farming co-operatives that must play an important role in land reform.

What is still lacking in Zimbabwe is the unity between co-operatives and the trade union movement. This unity is of utmost importance in the struggle for democracy and the construction of socialism. One hopes members of these two movements will soon work towards achieving this unity.

As yet, the co-operative movement in Zimbabwe is not affiliated to the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA). This is because we do not as yet have one united national co-operative organisation representing All co-operatives in this country. CACU and OCCZIM are steps in that direction. They and others who are serious about co-operation must work towards forming this organisation.

There are those who would like to see OCCZIM and CACU fighting one another. If one of them is better than the other in any way (particularly ideologically) then obviously the better one must help the other to improve and become a veritable instrument for democracy, progress and socialism. Anything less than that is to sell out to those who want to castrate the movement, organsation and unity of working people in Zimbabwe, or he/she is the agent of anti-socialist forces in the country.

The large numbers of newly-formed co-operatives has brought a number of problems. Many co-operatives lack management skills; they lack education and training not only in book-keeping, financial management, designing and implementing viable co-operative projects, but they also lack the understanding of the philosophy of co-operation, the co-operative principles, co-operative by-laws, and co-operative law. Some co-operatives were formed by people who thought that the government and non-governmental agencies would pour money into them while they sat and used the money they wanted. The spirit of self-reliance, self-help and self management was not adhered to.

The Government of Zimbabwe, through the Department of Co-operative Development (in the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development) and other ministerial government departments, with the non-governmental organisations (like Zimbabwe Project,



VANGUARD, March/April 1985.

Redd Barner, Canadian University Services Overseas, Oxfam UK and the Lutheran World Federation) have done a lot towards assisting co-operatives to solve these problems in terms of financial assistance, and training in managerial and technical skills.

Some people in Zimbabwe think that co-operatives are the main force to bring about socialism. Laws of social development and experience in the socialist countries and capitalist countries alike dispute such an understanding of the development of history. Certainly, co-operatives have a role to play in the contruction of socialism. But their role is secondary to that played by the State -the democratic, patriotic state (which must eventually be the state of the working people led by the working classes). The state must first take over the pillars of the economy (first of all from the multi-national companies, then from all exploiters) and run it through national plans. The national plans must have room for co-operatives - expecially in a peasant-dominated country like Zimbabwe. History shows that co-operatives in capitalist society can promote capitalist ownership, or promote the development of the revolutionary forces.

A lot has been achieved in five years, and a lot of mistakes have been made (including that of fielding untrained co-operative promoters and extension staff). However, a lot more is yet to be achieved as long as there are people dedicated to the cause of co-operatives and socialism in Zimbabwe, particularly within the civil service. Above all, a lot depends on the co-operators themselves - they must be conscious of their needs and their role. They must strive to take charge of their affairs in the true co-operative spirit of self-help, democracy and anti-exploitation. So far, co-operatives of working people in Zimbabwe have shown that the people of this country have the ability to take charge of the economy and direct it towards socialism. Let us use this to the full in the constitution of socialism. ■

N.C.G. MATHEMA.



mass political struggle vs armed struggle

Post Nkomati, the strategy of armed struggle and its relation to the rising level of political opposition inside South Africa is being widely debated. J. of S.C.D. has recently published three contributions to this debate. However, the way the whole question has been posed in these articles is very problematic.

In article 1 (J.S.C.D. no.8) "armed struggle" is equated with classical guerilla warfare as described by Mao Tse Tung, and is broken down into three stages:

a) small guerilla bands carry out hit and run attacks

b) liberated zones are established

c) the guerilla army is built into a powerful conventional force and takes on the enemy on equal terms. The liberated zones are expanded until the major towns can be captured.

The article assumes that this strategy is appropriate to the South African situation and never asks the crucial question: What are the <u>specific conditions of struggle</u> in South Africa? The only concession to the differences between China ("in which the vast majority of the population lived in the rural areas") and South Africa ("a semi-industrialised country") is a reference to the "combination of armed struggle

and mass resistance". This is, according to the article, the new dimension to the theory of guerilla warfare added by the Vietnamese and Nicaraguan struggles. Mass resistance takes the form of a "united front against the regime in power", and the armed struggle "sharpens the front's striking power".

Apart from the vagueness of this conception, what is striking is the uncritical acceptance of the application of Mao's 3-stage strategy of guerilla war to a society which is structured very differently to pre-revolutionary China. The article thus fails to come to grips with the specific form capitalism takes in South Africa, and the specific character of the South African state.

There are crucial areas of difference between South Africa and those countries where guerilla struggle has succeeded in overthrowing an oppressive regime:

1) The South African Economy. Over the last 40 years South Africa has increasingly become an urban industrial society. A large percentage of the population now lives in the towns and cities. While mining and agriculture are strategically important because of the foreign exchange they bring in (essential for importing the capital goods needed by industry), these sectors no longer dominate the social landscape. Manufacturing industry now produces more and employs more people than any other sector.

The rural population is still significantly large, but it is extremely dispersed and fragmented. Those who are not employed on capitalist farms are largely dependent on the earnings of migrant workers for their survival. They do not have a firm agricultural base, and are thus not a true peasantry but a semi-proletariat. The massive land alienation and "resettlement" policies of the Nationalists have also accelerated class differentiation among rural people.

The "homelands", which together make up only 13% of South Africa, are scattered through the countryside in small fragments, and are mainly surrounded by white-owned land.

2) The South African state. One of the most striking features of the state in South Africa is its political strength, quite apart from the military power at its disposal. One indicator of the stability of the state apparatus is the fact that only three different political parties have ruled in the last 50 years, the N.P. for 36 of these. There have been no coups and no major crises of legitimacy. Governments have been voted into power by the minority electorate. There has been one State of Emergency declared since World War II - in 1960 - but the actual taking of power by the Congress Alliance or PAC was never on the agenda.

Contrast this with the weakness of most of the regimes which have succumbed to revolutionary movements: for example, the Tsarist regime in Russia; the collapsing feudal order in China; the venal Batista government in Cuba; Somoza in Nicaragua, isolated from and hated by even his own class allies; the tottering Portuguese colonial empire in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau. In Rhodesia, the crucial weakness of the settler state was its extremely narrow social base.

3) The South African army. The SADF is an extremely well equipped, well trained and highly sophisticated military machine. R3754 million was spent on defence this year, 15% of the country's budget. South Africa has its own growing armaments industry, and is thus increasingly self-sufficient with regard to weaponry.

Perhaps even more important is the social base of the military. South Africa has a small professional army, but the bulk of its fighting men are conscripts, drawn from virtually the entire adult male population of white South Africa. This is significant because unlike most countries, even the rank and file of this army is made up almost exclusively of members of the privileged strata of society, who show a high degree of ideological cohesion in defending their "way of life" against "the enemy".

While the SADF is not invincible (as the repulsion of its invasion of Angola has shown) and is capable of being "tied down" by a guerilla army operating in remote bush conditions (as in Northern Namibia), it is doubtful whether any guerilla army could, in the forseeable future, confront this powerful conventional army "on equal terms".

4) The South African landscape. Demographically, the South African countryside is characterized by the unevenness of settlement. White farming areas are very underpopulated, and black areas are very crowded, but fragmented and easily policed. The "homelands" are the rural equivalent of the urban ghettoes.

Physically, the northern borders and rural areas are not particularly suitable for guerilla warfare. The west is dry and there is little cover; in the east there is dense bush but accessibility for the SADF is good, since there has been a heavy investment in roads in this zone.

5) South Africa's Allies. In the last few years the major capitalist countries have made their political, economic and military support for the South African regime depressingly clear. Led by the USA, in an agressive and expansionist phase, the welcome accorded P W Botha by the governments of Europe recently underlines the importance of the regime to the NATO alliance. An increasing proportion of shipping bound for Europe and the USA now uses the route around the Cape, with the new oil tankers being too big for the Suez Canal. Easy access to strategic minerals (particularly antimony and vanadium) found in South Africa, should also not be under-estimat as a reason for this support. The right wing governments of the USA, the UK and West Germany count the regime as a solid ally against the spread of the influence of the Soviet Union in Southern Africa.

Together, these factors suggest that a strategy of "classical" guerilla warfare is unlikely to succeed in South Africa. While the first stage of "hit and run" tactics can well be carried out from rear bases in neighbouring countries, the establishment of "liberated zones" requires that large areas of the country side within South Africa can be freed from the rule of the state and can be defended.

In over 20 years of armed struggle this, Mao's second stage, has not been even a remote possibility. Mao's third stage - the confrontation between the guerilla army and the forces of the state "on equal terms" - is, for the reasons pointed out above, even less likely.

It seems fair therefore to conclude that the conception of "armed struggle" contained in Article 1 is inappropriate in the South African situation. Must we then also conclude that "violence must be foregone", or that the only alternative is either a "negotiated settlement" (Article 1) or a "struggle for reform within the white framework" (Article 3, J.S.C.D. no.9)? Of course not. Rather, the particular form of "armed struggle" to be waged must be one which takes into full account the concrete realities of politics in South African society.

The explanations given in these three articles for the turn to guerilla warfare in the early 1960's is another unsatisfactory aspect of the debate thus far. All three articles assert that there was no other choice after the severe state repression of the time (i.e. the banning of the ANC and PAC, the arrests of many leaders, etc.). While the leadership may well have felt this to be so, the choice needs to be critically re-assessed in any current discussion of strategy and tactics.

Three different explanations are supplied:

a) "a precondition for armed struggle is a disillusionment with... traditional peaceful processes" (Article 1)

b) "political means of opposing the state have been completely exhausted in the eyes of the majority of the people", and "all avenues of legal opposition have been closed" (Article 2).

c) "the people had exhaused the reformist option" (Article 3).

Which of these is correct? To say that attempts at obtaining reforms had run their course, or that there was a growing disillusionment with the principle of non-violence, is <u>not</u> the same as asserting that <u>all</u> means of political opposition had been explored and found wanting. This distinction is not made clear in any of the articles.

To answer this question, one has to look back and examine the character of political opposition in the 1950's. This reveals that:

a) the central demand was for democratic rights for the black majority and an end to racial discrimination;

b) instead of hoping for a "change of heart", the opposition "was going to exert pressure to compel the authorities to grant its demands" *(Nelson Mandela)*;

c) the methods used were those of *"boycott, strike, civil disobedience, non-cooperation"* *(ANC Programme of Action, 1949)*;

d) mobilisation was on a popular rather than a class basis (SACTU unions organised workers as "one component in a struggle with many fronts" i.e. as a support to the national democratic struggle);

e) organisation took place mainly through mass meetings, and building up a strong organisational base was neglected; and

f) many opposition actions were aimed at influencing white opinion. Some political leaders held that capitalists could be brought to oppose apartheid policies on the grounds of their "irrationality".

In summary, opposition in the 1950's was mainly a politics of mass mobilisation to demand radical reforms in the political and legal structures of society.

It was <u>not</u> a revolutionary politics, and political organisation did not aim at creating a revolutionary situation in South Africa. After the banning of the major mass organisations, these particular forms of political struggle were no longer possible, and a reassessment had to be made. The turn to guerilla war and the sabotage campaign was the result of this reassessment - but it was a choice, a decision based on how the leadership understood the situation; it was not an inevitability.

Was there an alternative, based on a different conception of political struggle? Could not political organisation have taken a different form, appropriate to the changed conditions?

"They are so happy," said State President P W Botha's wife Elize when she visited Soweto at Mayor E T Tshabalala's invitation this year. Former Co-operation and Development Minister Piet Koornhof's wife Lulu was also there. "My husband loves blacks," she said.

Mandela's 'M plan", for instance, had anticipated the need for clandestine organisation. It was aimed at ensuring the continuation of essential political work but from an underground base rather than a public platform. The plan was proposed in 1953, but was never put into full effect. Why not? Why did the leadership turn instead to armed struggle and guerilla war? According to Tom Lodge:

"With their failure to evoke anything from the state other than more repression and greater solidarity among the state's beneficiaries, ANC leaders began to consider violent tactics. Because the (May 1961) Strike had not succeeded in obtaining political concessions many congressmen assumed that the range of non-violent tactics had been exhausted. As there had only rarely been internal criticism of the way these tactics had been used and the purposes for which they had been deployed, this was not altogether surprising. Methods such as strikes, civil disobedience and boycotts, which might have been applied to win short-term material gains, had increasingly been employed to underscore moral assertions. Resistance politics (which characterised some of the efforts of the early 1950's) had set into the politics of protest. As it was by 1961 demonstrably obvious that protest had little persuasive power it was assumed that the means which had been used to make these protests were equally futile." (Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, p.233).

Another factor was the evident popular support in some parts of the country for the use of violence e.g. in the urban centres of the Cape. The Pondoland uprising also led some activists to believe that conditions in the countryside favoured a turn to armed struggle. The success of Castro and Guevara in Cuba was probably another important influence.

With hindsight it is easy to say that alternative strategies should have been given greater consideration. But taken together, the consciousness that permeated the struggles of the 50's, the nature of the organisation concerned, the repressive reaction of the state, the chains of events, i.e. the concrete history of the politics of the period meant that the conditions for a full consideration of alternative strategies did not exist.

Recognition of this fact is what is missing from the otherwise excellent critique of Congress Alliance politics of the time by the Inqaba group *("Lessons of the 50's" March-May 1984).*

Whether or not SACTU, in the abstract, could have "provided a base for working class political organisation and for the transformation of the Congress Movement", the point is that class perspectives were not dominant at the time; in fact SACTU did not pursue an "independent policy in the interests of the workers". This is viewing the past wholly through the eyes of the present.

What have been the concrete results produced by the strategy of armed struggle over the last two decades?

On the positive side, the numerous acts of sabotage and attacks on military or police targets have indeed made the guerilla wings of the liberation organi-

sations a "thorn in the side of the Pretoria regime". The effect on the black population has been to keep the ANC in particular in high profile, and has had a morale-boosting effect at certain stages. Perhaps most importantly, the idea of "armed insurrection" (i.e. revolution) has been kept firmly on the South African agenda. Attempts at reformism and working "from within" the system have failed to shake off the popular support the liberation movements continue to receive for their attitude of confrontation with the state.

However, negative effects can also be discerned. Firstly, the move to arms made it easier for the state to enact highly repressive security legislation, and to use it against all manner of political activists (including trade union organisers). This made internal political work much more difficult to pursue in the years that followed.

Secondly, political organisation, education and mobilisation was neglected. In theory this was meant to continue, but in practice it took a backseat. Partly this was due to the difficult conditions, but it was also because political organisation was seen as subordinate to the now dominant military front. For example, an ANC circular of 1963 stated: *"Political agitation is the only way of creating the atmosphere in which military action can most effectively operate". "The political front gives sustenance to the military operations".*

Much underground work in the 60's and 70's was in fact devoted to recruiting young people for the armed struggle. This led many of the population at large to view the liberation struggle as something that was now being waged from across the border. Political leaders were seen to be either outside the country or on Robben Island.

Thirdly, the vital organic link between the daily lives of the people and the political organisations became much more tenuous. The organisations were no longer even nominally accountable to their constituents, the oppressed majority. Donor countries or organisations supplying bases, training, weaponry and support services became a much more immediate factor. The diplomatic front became a major focus of activity, in order to muster and sustain international support and credibility, which in turn ensured the flow of funds and support.

The result was a net loss to both the people and the organisations - the process of learning from each other, in the "dialectic of party and mass", was made much more difficult, if not impossible.

In turn, the move to armed struggle, together with its relative containment by the state, contributed greatly to the absence of effective opposition during the 1960's and early 1970's.

When internal mass resistance began once again to assert itself, from the 1973 Durban strikes onwards, it was largely in response to the vacuum that existed with regard to active political leadership. There is little evidence to back up the statement in Article 3 that "without the armed struggle it is doubtful whether the mass political organisations of the 1980's would have emerged".

While internal political struggle and externally based guerilla attacks undoubtedly have some mutual influence on each other, this is by no means a direct or simple relationship. The indirectness, the lack of an obvious relation, is precisely what has given rise to the current debate.

A major characteristic of the upsurge in political organisation and activity over the last decade is its independence from the external liberation movement - and this is not a nominal independence for tactical reasons.

Mass political struggle in the 1980's displays significant differences to that in the 1950's, as well as some similarities. These differences are unfortunately ignored in Article 2 (J.S.C.D. no 8), which avoids even mentioning the single most contentious issue currently being debated within the opposition inside South Africa: the question of class and class alliances. The question of the relation between armed and political struggle is being raised in a changed political context. It is not just a question of the relations between the different components of a popular national democratic struggle (as Articles 2 and 3 seem to suggest), but of the nature of the struggle itself. Debate must take full account of the different perspectives being put forward at the present time.

For the Inqaba group, for instance, "the origins of the ANC's turn in 1960's to the policy of guerillaism lay in the failure of its leadership to appreciate that the achievement of national liberation and democracy in South Africa depends on successful struggle of the working class against their capitalist exploiters". For them, "every real step forward in the struggle depends on the mobilisation and organisation of the working class".

For others, this perspective does not give sufficient weight to the reality of national and racial oppression and the subjective dimension of political struggle.

Few on the left, however, would disagree with the central significance of the fact that the independent trade union movement is organising the working class at the point of production, and preparing to build a massive federation of unions. The phenomenal growth of militant unionism, taken together with the recent mushrooming of community and other organisations, and their co-ordination through national umbrella organisations (such as the U.D.F.), shows very clearly that "reformism" is not, and was not, the only option for internal political activity. Until the Wiehahn reforms of 1979 all strikes by black workers were illegal - and many still are. This has not prevented them from happening. A political "space" has been created by means of hard organising work linked to militant action in the face of harsh state repression.

Post Nkomati, the guerilla forces are faced with major logistical problems of bases and entry points. At the same time mass resistance and organisation within the country have reached new heights. The question now is not whether armed struggle and political struggle are complementary, but how. What form should armed struggle take? Should the use of arms be considered now as a means of supporting or defending worker and community struggles, or should the random sabotage campaign be continued? At the level of overall strategy, what weight should now be given to underground political organising work, as opposed to guerilla attacks?

The central issue, ultimately, is how to mount an effective challenge to the state machine which defends the interests of the ruling class in South Africa. This is the same as asking: how can a revolutionary crisis be brought about? Which poses in a real and immediate manner the question: who rules?

Given the specific characteristics of the South African state, under what conditions can such a crisis become a reality? Only in the context of this question can the whole issue of the armed struggle be resolved.

Yet is this not, in the end, a political rather than a military issue? The ruling class needs to be paralysed, so that it loses the ability to use the armed forces of the state to full effect. The history of the South African struggle would seem to suggest that only a massive and deep-rooted political organising of the oppressed, led by the most advanced sections of the working class, will ever be capable of fracturing the unity of the ruling class alliance, and of paralysing the state. At this point of political crisis, armed insurrection becomes a vital necessity to ensure the transfer of power to the majority.

Whether one agrees with this perspective or not, debate must move beyond merely asserting the necessity for both hammer and anvil, and argue for a specific relation between armed and political struggle, a relation which takes into account the realities of South Africa and proposes a way forward.



OBITUARY

The Chief Representative of the African National Congress (SA) in Zimbabwe, Comrade Judson Diza Khuzwayo, died tragically in a car accident on Wednesday 1 May 1985. A courageous freedom fighter who spent 10 years on Robben Island Comrade Khuzwayo will be remembered as an heroic son of Africa. South Africa will be free.



FIVE YEARS AFTER- Progress towards Socialist Construction

The building of a socialist society after the victory over British colonialism was the declared goal of the National Liberation Movement in our country. Therefore, a discussion on the progress made towards socialist construction in the last five years post-independence period would be inadequate if it failed to focus on the development of the National Liberation Movement itself, and its capacity to prepare and mould the builders of socialism - the workers and peasants - towards this end.

The two Parties that consistently waged the struggle for national emancipation ZANU and ZAPU were created to oppose British colonialism. That is, to fight a system of oppression, of exploitation, an undemocratic system. Subsequently, an alternative system had to be built. The ideology of scientific socialism was adopted by the two Parties in the early seventies. Why scientific socialism as compared to the various models of 'socialism' that were being proclaimed in other independent African countries? The adoption of scientific socialism reflected a deeper understanding of the enemy that was being fought and the goal of the struggle that was being waged. Not unusually, with the debate on socialism in the Liberation Movement, various contradictions arose due to radical trends in the face of more conservative positions on the part of some leaders. However, the armed struggle continued until vistory in 1980 and at Independence the class composition in the two Parties was highly heterogeneous, a factor that could influence the new road towards scientific socialism.

SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

At independence the ruling Party ZANU, re-asserted its ideological position: *"ZANU's ideological belief is socialism. We believe that the achievement of political power by the people will remain hollow in terms of their material development unless it can translate itself into quantitative and qualitative benefits deriving from their economy".* (Election Manifesto). At the same time there was a recognition that the tasks lying ahead would be tough and immense and only through a correct approach and inspiration from the masses would the Party be able to come out victorious.

The political, economic and military situation at independence was delicate and complicated. The concrete conditions obtaining then had to influence the immediate tasks, for example the consolidation of national independence.

The path to socialism may differ greatly, being determined by each country's specific features of historical development. But there cannot exist various models of socialisms, for ultimately, socialism is a definite system. This means wherever a socialist system has been established, it will be characterised by a number of common features such as social ownership of the means of production, planned economy etc. There can only be differences during the stages of transition to socialism, but as a complete and integral social system there is only one socialism.
The major task of the Party at independence was to study the concrete situation in the country and chart out the path to be followed. This was done and articulated through annual slogans such as, *"The Year of Consolidating Peoples' Power".*

CONSOLIDATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Any measurement of the progress made towards socialist construction should focus on characteristics of the transitional period and how they show themselves in the steps being taken by the ruling Party. The transitional period, from capitalism to socialism varies greatly in length from one country to another, depending on concrete conditions in each of them.
The major prerequisite to any meaningful

organized socio-economic transformation is peace and stability. The major preoccupation of the Party after assuming political power was precisely that.

Why this has been necessary can best be understood by analysing the class forces both internal and external at independence. Internally the security situation was delicate with about three distinct armies hostile to each other and these had to be integrated according to the agreements that had led to independence. The process itself was not easy and it was risky to prejudice it by taking any uncalculated measures. Externally, South Africa was not a disinterested member, fearing a *"Marxist regime"*, it was watching events in the country closely looking for an opportunity to destabilize, at a scale comparable to its activities in Angola and Mozambique. The Republic of Zimbabwe in its nascent stage had to be prudent.

OPPORTUNISTS

Given a situation in which the thrust was on the consolidation of Independence and "reconciliation" was the word, an apparent base was created for furthering action. Reconciliation, which should have meant uniting the people who had been divided by petty loyalties and petty bourgeois politics began to be interpreted as reconciliation of various classes by certain elements, subsequently meaning the downing of weapons against class enemies. An unhealthy situation began to develop in the Party when some senior officials became more business minded and some cadres began to be disillusioned. To an extent, this was to be expected because up to Independence various classes had been united in a struggle against a common enemy - national oppression, however, each entered the struggle for different reasons. With independence, these various interests manifested themselves. The phrases, *"capitalism cannot be destroyed overnight"*, *"for some time we shall live with capitalism"*, became popular and supported the capitalist system.

EMERGENT BUSINESSMEN

The policy of supporting the emergent businessmen as a strategy for promoting the local bourgeoisie vis-a-vis the multi-nationals, inspite of its theoretical justification, has been generally a failure. Politically it has the effect of creating a false bourgeoisie, in fact a petty bourgeois mentality among the strata that gets state support in business, and economically it can never compete with monopoly capital. The emergent businessman, particularly those that are of a post independence creation are hardly involved in production, with the majority of them involved in import-export trade and general dealing activities.

WORKERS COMMITTEES

Perhaps one of the most important measurements of the advancement of a socialist thrust in any newly liberated country, is the position of the worker in the production process. The workers are the builders of socialism and their role in guiding and determining both production and consumption is an indication of which socio-economic system is being established. The contradiction between labour and capital was responsible directly and indirectly for the war of liberation. This point being understood the first step that was taken after Independence was to enhance the position of workers in employment situations. This was done by the creation of workers' committees in various work places which would represent the workers interests and possibly prepare the workers for eventual takeover of the enterprises where they work. Although this was a progressive step, the general trend has been that most of these committees have been corrupted and the complaint has been that they have become mere rubber stamps.

Another progressive step in this line is the passing of the Labour Relations Bill which although full of weaknesses, gives the worker a much stronger position in relation to the employer.

FOREIGN POLICY

Ever since Independence, Zimbabwe has taken a consistently anti-imperialist stand in its foreign policy and has established ever-expanding relations with the socialist countries. Its non-alignment position and frontline position in the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa is a reflection of its inclination towards genuine liberation.

1984 ZANU CONGRESS

The continued commitment towards socialism is best measured through the ruling Party's congress of 1984 at which the

masses, through the elected leaders, reaffirmed their adherence to Marxism-Leninism. The ideology was unwaveringly accepted as the guide towards building a new order and a hasty implementation of a socialist programme was particularly called for during the Youth Congress.
Of particular significance at Congress was the adoption of the leadership code which intends to weed out those leaders who have accumulated private property and endangered the road towards Socialism. The adoption of the code is a reaction to the ugly and opportunistic trend that has emerged within the Party leadership.

A VANGUARD PARTY

The possibility for socialist transformation once independence has been consolidated is not obvious. Only a vanguard Party guided by Marxist-Leninist philosophy can successfully lead a socialist revolution. The purification and purging of the Party of reactionary elements is a major pre-requisite to any meaningful socialist transformation. A leadership code will not create revolutionaries and it can only serve as a stop-gap measure while the Party is re-examining its strategy. The masses of the people continue to push for socialist transformation and each time an attack (verbally) is made upon the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, the masses have popularly supported such attacks. The orientation towards socialism will ultimately lie in the ideological position of the Party and its organisational capabilities in its vanguard role. ■

After the fighting stopped...

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE FORMER COMBATANTS?

The achievement of Independence in Zimbabwe was largely due to the invaluable sacrifice, dedication and fighting of the ex-ZIPRA and ex-ZANLA combatants. Their contribution in our liberation will never be matched, we owe it to them, and they occupy the most venerable place in the history of our liberation.

What has happened to them in the five years since independence? Very little. Most of them are continuing one way or another to consolidate the gains of the anti-colonialist liberation war and have remained as membere of the Zimbabwe National Army. The unity of ex-ZANLA and ex-ZIPRA soldiers in the National Army is one of our greatest achievements as an independent country. This unity must be protected and strengthened so that we can move steadily towards the construction of socialism. The ex-ZANLA and ex-ZIPRA combatants should be the main cadres on our road to socialism.

Paul Weinberg

Some combatants have been demobilised from the army. To date 35 763 people have been demobilised through the Demobilisation Directorate of the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare. With large sums of money involved on the part of government 4 700 have gone on to further education, 2 900 have gone for commercial and technical skills training, 4 383 have joined co-operatives and other self-help activities, 1 579 are self employed and 3 041 are employed in various sectors of the economy. The remaining combatants, 19 160 (53.5%) are not yet formally employed.

There are some who feel that ex-combatants should not be given special treatment in terms of employment training, social welfare etc. But surely they deserve special treatment so that they can continue to further the cause of freedom, democracy and socialism. Our ex-combatants should be in all the strategic positions in the army, in the police, in the civil service, in education and so on. They were in strategic positions during the liberation struggle.

As we have said, the national army has proved that ex-combatants can work together and preserve the independence of this country. Another area where ex-ZIPRA and ex-ZANLA are working together is in the collective co-operatives - these two forms of unity should be used to forge more unity among the patriotic and progressive forces of Zimbabwe. The main contradiction in Zimbabwe today is that between Zimbabwe and the multi-national companies that dominate our economy. The fight now therefore should be to democratise the economy to align with what has been achieved politically. Here again the ex-combatants should come in and work closely with trade unions and peasant organisations to bring about the changes necessary so that the economy (like the politics of Zimbabwe) is owned and controlled by Zimbabweans.

Some people...holding high office in our government do sometimes laugh at the ex-combatants who are without jobs.....I am a freedom fighter who goes to bed on an empty stomach.

Combatant

Now I am Chairman of a farming co-operativ and co-operatives take up all my time. Co operatives are the way to the socialism we fought for and there is no good reason why they should fail, but many people are making mistakes. Co-operatives must not fail and I will work hard to make this co-operative succeed. Maybe I can help other as well.

ANDREW NYATHI - combatant

I expected a return to normal life in rural areas after the war. I expected the destruction of the notorious Protected Villages. I also expected to see the destruction of the old capitalist system and the adoption of a new social order. To a certain extent some of my expectations have been fulfilled, especially the Protected Villages being destroyed. Racial discrimination has been removed for job seekers in the civil service. There are still problems in the private sector.

I believe the problem of land distribution has not been effectively dealt with. The whole question of armed struggle was to redress land inequalities, as well as shifting political power so that blacks could participate in the affairs of their country.

I dont understand why Zimbabwean women complain that they are oppressed after Independence. Were they not aware that they were oppressed before independence?

MAX MUBAYIWA - former combatant & now a student



WOMEN'S ECONOMIC SITUATION

FIVE YEARS BEFORE AND FIVE YEARS AFTER INDEPENDENCE: Issues for Consideration

In the limited space available one can only single out a few issues that illustrate some points about the economic situation of Zimbabwean women immediately before and immediately after Independence. The purpose of raising these issues is for reflection.

Perception of Women's Economic Situation

Census or statistical tables of the pre-Independence period listed the majority of women, especially black women, as "economically inactive". The reason for this lies in the capitalist based definition of what is economic, which only refers to that which has a market value. The dual economy of the colonial era (which still prevails to a large extent) gave rise to a modern industrial and commercial agricultural sector on the one hand, and a largely poor and neglected peasant sector on the other. The modern sector depended on a supply of cheap labour from the communal areas which was heavily subsidised by women's work in agriculture and in the home. Women's participation in the peasant sector was fundamental to the survival of their families. However, because women produced for family consumption and their work in the home provided services for the family, this did not qualify as economic activities according to classical definitions of what is economic. Hence the majority of women were perceived as economically inactive.

Unfortunately this perception still prevails. How many times does one hear exhortations to women to take an active part in national development as if they are not active already within their socio-economic context. There appears to be a need for a new definition and valuation of work to take into account contributions made by women. One way of doing this would be by recording how much and what type of work women do, and then computing a financial value to each category of work based on what it would cost in monetary terms. There is no doubt that the value of women's work as revealed by such statistics could go a long way in changing societal attitudes and perceptions of women's economic contribution especially of women in rural areas.

Determinants of Women's Economic Situation

Before Independence a person's race, sex and level of formal education were the major determining factors of his/her rate of official economic participation. These factors acting independently or in various combinations ultimately determined one's economic situation. To illustrate, a black woman with little or no formal education was more likely to be engaged in peasant agriculture or the informal sector than in the formal sector. Thus, in 1979, black women constituted only 6,8 percent of the total black and white working population in the non-agricultural sectors. Another reflection of race and sex based economic situation was the preponderance of white and coloured women in secretarial and other administrative jobs. On the other hand, clerical jobs which elsewhere would be regarded as women's work went to a few black men, and some white and coloured women. The black woman secretary or clerk is largely a post independence phenomenon.

Prior to Independence, the majority of black women in the formal sector were employed as nurses and teachers. The relatively high percentage of women in the teaching and nursing occupational

categories was partly due to the fact that these two were the professions most open to aspiring black girls. There were different training levels in these professions i.e. one level after primary school, another level after two years of secondary school and yet another after four or six years of secondary school. These differential entry levels enabled many girls who, for financial and other reasons, could not have gone beyond two or four years of secondary education to enter these two services.

The commonly held assumption before independence that black girls went for these two services out of popularity is losing ground by the movement of considerable numbers of nurses and some teachers to other fields previously closed to them. One possible reason for this exodus might be due to the long term effects of the temporary status of married women teachers and nurses during the colonial era. These women were regarded as temporary employees who had to resign when they became pregnant. This meant that their chances of professsional advancement were much reduced over a long period compared to the men in the same age groups. However this condition was scrapped at Independence, although its effect is still reflected in the absense of women in high positions in the Ministry of Education which is one of the largest employers of women.

Lack of formal education was and still is perhaps the main obstacle to women's employment in the formal sector. As is typical of many countries, girls' educational attainment tends to be lower than that of boys for several reasons. These include negative parental attitudes towards girls' education with preference being given to boys' education especially where there are scarce resources; male oriented recruitment into schools (e.g. more boys only schools than girls only); and a high drop out rate of girls especially after primary school due to pregnancies and lack of funds, among other reasons. It would be necessary to monitor the post independence trends in girld education enrollment and attainment in view of the free primary education and a generally favourable oreintation of the Zimbabwean government.

Given the limited opportunities in the formal sector due to race, sex and educational factors, a considerable proportion of black women especially in urban areas found their economic expression through the informal sector. The informal sector provided self employment through petty trading in vegetables, poultry, handicraft work of sewn, knitted and crochet articles, and beer brewing and/or selling. The apparent attraction of the informal sector trading especially for the young married women was that they could combine household and child rearing activities with some income generating activities.

Perhaps the most significant change that has taken place in the informal sector

since independence is its widespread or mushrooming effect in the rural areas in the form of income generating projects. The most common of these projects are uniform making, poultry, bakeries, and to a lesser extent fence and roof making projects. Most of the rural projects are organised on a

community or group basis unlike the urban ones which tend to be on an individual basis.

Some of the common problems encountered by women in the informal sector include lack of capital, lack of planning and managerial skills, transport and marketing problems and very high competition. However, perhaps one positive effect that can be said of women's limited economic opportunity is the attempt to create new economic roles mainly through the informal sector. While this sector is still fraught with difficulties it gives some sense of purpose and usefulness to a deprived group of women who, because of lack of education, race and sex reasons as well as limited economic opportunities, are disadvantaged.

Women's Economic Gains Since Independence

Most of the economic gains for women since Independence have been in the formal sector. These include legislation to effect equal pay for equal work, unpaid maternity leave, a tax commission to review the tax system which is disadvantageous to married women. However it should be noted that there is no definite mechanism or watchdog instrument to enforce or consolidate these gains. Thus it is quite possible that women can be confined to lower ranks of the employment ladder to avoid paying them high wages, a technique used by whites before independence to keep blacks below a certain level.

In conclusion it should be said that the economic situation of women in Zimbabwe should be viewed within the totality of the national development plans. On the basis of the government policy of growth with equity, it would be difficult to justify some of the discriminatory tendencies and practices that prevail against women in the various sectors of the economy. What is required is a detailed examination of the economic situation of women and men by sectors in order to highlight the imbalances that must be redressed through comprehensive measures. Patchwork or band aid approaches can only have limited and superficial effects.





Issue 9

Dear Sirs,

Your issue on foreign aid contains valuable information, arguments and examples; but some of the analysis seems to lean towards over-easy criticism and self-pity.

a) Patel comes close to concluding that foreign aid is almost "totally a world of disaster". I wonder if this is based on an informed comparison with other fields of expenditure, such as in domestic government, corporations, banks, universities?! Aid projects in fact probably get on average fuller and broader scrutiny than other projects. Misappropriation and large prestige projects are also not dangers unique to foreign aid. And is much local talent underutilised because of aid? Most Zimbabwean professionals seem extremely busy.

b) The article on the IMF is wrong to say that most aid has gone into traditional export areas. Also wrong on devaluation meaning that Zimbabwe gets less US $ for its exports. Devaluation doesn't change the world market prices; instead it makes imports less attractive and exports more

attractive to domestic decision-makers. Then even if all Third World countries together did face the binding constraint on their exports that the article claims, devaluation might still help reduce import dependence.

c) The article on "The Gift of Dependency" criticizes NGO donor's project and programme planning requirements as stifling - even deliberately! - some natural local flow of inventive adaptation: but elsewhere seems to imply that such planning should perhaps become more extensive, given "the unreflecting generosity" of donors which makes it "easy for the local organisation to embark on all kinds of activities without proper investigation.."

D) Sibanda sees expatriate manpower as "a method of foreign domination and exploitation today", with little qualification; yet mentions later for example that "one third of the total (professional?) workforce in the health sector in Zimbabwe is expatriate" (my emphasis). Are his claims that "most expatriates from capitalist countries are very conservative in outlook", or Benny Moyo's claims (in his letter) that most of the books those countries give as aid are full of racism and apologies for imperialism, based on research? - or just bar room exaggeration?

e) De Graaf seems to criticize both mere "gap-filling" by foreign volunteers and demanding that the volunteer be given a local understudy; and both the Peace Corps rejection of a Zimbabwe Government request for 1000 teachers (does this anyway fit a thesis of planned foreign domination?!), as an example of decisions made from outside, and the probable consequences of agreeing to the request. Damned-if-you-do and damned-if-you-don't?

No doubt some of these apparent contradictions could be cleared up by more sophisticated presentation - which is what we need - but isn't there also here the danger of an overly self-excusing and defeatist attitude, where foreign agents get blamed, whatever they do? This may be attractive in some countries, having to explain prolonged disappointments to their citizens. It seems inappropriate for Zimbabwe.

Isn't there a tension between the implied assumption of such great present weakness that foreigners allegedly can largely get their own (wicked?) way, and the belief that without foreigners and aid, hidden local capacities will blossom and see one through? If the local capacity is so grea why is there, supposedly, such present weakness? One exaggerated reply is: corruption by foreign influence. If there is not the capacity to reasonably control the use of aid resources can one reasonably expect a capacity to progress in a much more resource-scarce situation?

For example, if the tendency that Patel notes for appearance of a "beggar mentality" really is strong in aid recipients, is there much hope for such weak malleable agents if they followed McGarry and rejected a lot of aid in the hope of more freedom? Similarly Benny Moyo claims that Zimbabwean students trained in Britain become black Englishmen and ideological spokesmen of the bourgeoisie.

Is this an adequate description of the experience of the thousands who studied in Britain in the 1970's? Are Zimbabwean students such putty. And should one then expect putty to become socialist clay in some scenario of delinking or self-reliance or whatever? It seems more sensible to neither exaggerate what people will become like in some preferred situation, nor exaggerate their degree of present helplessness and domination.

It is then important to try and identify specific and realistic areas where one can make better use of the aid system. Which parts to use and how? At the end of Patel's piece he backtracks: "Properly conceived and used, foreign aid can be a blessing"; but he has little to say on how this potential could be fulfilled. The articles on NGO's and on volunteers do give interesting examples of specific areas where improvements seem necessary and not impossible, e.g. better coordination of training activities. Perhaps future articles can also build in this sort of direction, and go beyond a one-sided litany of problems, to a more refined and usuable critique. Your magazine could be a suitable location for this, as probably the main development issues journal in Zimbabwe.

Des Gasper. ●

Dear Comrades,

I would like to comment on some points made in Benny Moyo's letter about 'Imperialist Aid', as published in issue 9.

While I share Cde Moyo's doubts about the intentions and long-term effects of foreign aid, I want to put the record straight on the involvement of expatriates in Zimbabwe's educational system.

Cde Moyo makes a number of completely unsubstantiated and rather wild accusations about the involvement of foreign teachers that are simply untrue and unfair. It is a cheap trick to accuse unnamed foreigners of being responsible for the things that are wrong in this country, for it will only make it more difficult to really change things. Cde Moyo suggests that it is the decision or wish of those expatriate teachers that the educational system in this country conveys so many western values and non-progressive attitudes. But let us look at the facts:

- the Government of Zimbabwe goes out of its way to recruit foreign teachers, irrespective of motivation, political outlook or background. Candidates who ask 'difficult' questions about the nature of education in Zimbabwe are rejected; commercial solutions are preferred to working with progressive solidarity committees;

- it was the Government of Zimbabwe that approached Peace Corps (the strictly USA-government controlled agency exporting young Americans and their ideology) to place 1000 teachers. Peace Corps turned down the offer luckily for Zimbabwe;

- it is the Ministry of Education that sets the curriculum and decides on books and examinations, in spite of what Cde Moyo suggests about the sinister interference of the British Council;

- many foreign teachers got themselves into trouble with headmasters, the Ministry and parents when they tried to introduce some innovations in their teachings, such as discussing Marxism, the relevance of education under socialism, modern authors, and other subjects that Cde Moyo would find important. The same thing happened when they questioned the extremely authoritarian and bureaucratic school system;

- about those 'imperialist books', it is reflective of the Government's priorities to allow scarce foreign currency to be used to import rubbish from South Africa, junk magazines from Europe or the USA and not to facilitate the importation of critical magazines like South, New Internationalist, Review of African Political Economy or books that could help emerging co-ops, women's groups and communal farmers. I do not know about the books the British Council donated, but I do know about the books on appropriate technology, small-scale irrigation, co-operatives and related subjects imported by foreign based agencies like Redd Barna, Oxfam, IVS and LWF. Who is really importing and prescribing T.S. Elliot or Shakespeare, and who is making it difficult for aid agencies to bring in material to support progressive groups?

In conclusion, I am getting fed up with the easy accusations made against foreigners, 'the world economy', and imperialism without looking critically at what Zimbabwean authorities and local organisations do and decide. Who organised Zimcord and designed the programmes to which donors pledged their money? Who negotiates with the IMF, USAID, and the World Bank? Who invited those British military advisors?

Of course, Zimbabwe faces major external obstacles to any real change and transformation towards socialism, but it might well be that some of the most serious obstacles exist within the country. People like Cde Moyo, who only point a finger at unspecified imperialists without daring to be critical of what is happening locally, confuse matters and avoid practical debate. It might make one look like a dedicated socialist if one just espouses hollow slogans.

MARTIN DE GRAAF

ARTISTS WANTED

We require artistic contributions in the form of illustrations or cartoons. We regret we are only able to pay the artist's expenses, about $5 for filler contributions and up to $15 for full page contributions. Write to Box 4405 Harare or phone 790124.

6 JULY
INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATIVE DAY