



# **Rhodesia: WHY MINORITY RULE SURVIVES**

- The Roots of UDI
- White Supremacy at any Cost
- The Six Principles
- Proposals and Counter Proposals
- The Unholy Alliance
- The Financial Interests
- The Rhodesia Lobby

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
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# Rhodesia: WHY MINORITY RULE SURVIVES

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## INTRODUCTION

On November 11, 1968, the third anniversary of the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith government, the Union Jack was lowered in Rhodesia for the last time, to be replaced by a new green and white flag bearing the Rhodesian coat-of-arms.

Mr. Thomson, the British Minister responsible for Rhodesia, who was there at the time having discussions with Mr. Smith, discreetly remained away from the ceremony in Salisbury and spent the time visiting neighbouring African territories. He was in an embarrassing position because Britain had refused to recognize the government of Mr. Ian Smith which, on November 11, 1965 had revoked the constitution, declaring Rhodesia to be a sovereign, independent nation.

The 1968 talks between Mr. Thomson and Mr. Smith had begun on November 5 and after the interruption of November 11, continued until November 16, when it was announced that no agreement had been reached.

Mr. Thomson's visit was the sequel to an earlier meeting between the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson and Mr. Ian Smith. The two met from October 9 to 13, 1968 at Gibraltar on board H.M.S. *Fearless*, in their second face-to-face attempt since UDI to negotiate a constitutional settlement. At the end of their four-day talks, a joint communique was issued, stating that "some progress was made but disagreement on fundamental issues still remains".

Mr. Wilson's *Fearless* proposals were set out in a White Paper released by the British government on October 15. The principal safeguards he had asked for, to ensure unimpeded progress to majority rule, were a blocking quarter of elected African seats in parliament and final appeal on constitutional issues to the Privy Council in London.

Within days of his return to Salisbury, Mr. Smith publicly rejected both these provisions and raised some new obstacles. Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson announced in the House of Commons on November 1 that he had sent Mr. Thomson to Salisbury for further talks with the illegal Smith regime.

By the time the Thomson-Smith talks ended it had become evident that even Mr. Wilson's Labour colleagues were unhappy about the concessions being offered to Mr. Smith. In the Commons, 56 Labour M.P.s openly declared their opposition to the *Fearless* proposals, indicating that had Mr. Smith accepted them, the Labour Party would have been seriously divided.

The African states, as well as African spokesmen from Rhodesia, also rejected the suggested terms of settlement. President Kaunda of Zambia expressed the fear that British troops might "march into Rhodesia in a few months, not against the Smith regime but against African liberation fighters". He was assured by Mr. Thomson that Britain's aim "remains the restoration

to the whole people of Rhodesia, 95 per cent of whom are black, the right to peaceful progress to majority rule ”.

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in January 1969, Britain found only three supporters for the *Fearless* proposals. The majority—21 heads of government—declared them to be unacceptable and said they should be withdrawn. Their view, as stated in the final communique issued at the end of the conference, was that “to transfer sovereignty to a racial minority as the result of an agreement with that minority would settle nothing, if the settlement was not freely accepted by the people of Rhodesia as a whole, including the four million African Rhodesians, and seen by the international community, especially the independent African countries to be so accepted. Otherwise internal strife and outside support for guerrilla activities would increase, with the inevitable risk of increasing instability and eventual race war ”.

The negotiations and arguments between London and Salisbury look as though they will drag on indefinitely, unless some bold move is made to end the deadlock. Meanwhile, the majority of the people of the country continue to suffer the injustice of repression under minority rule. In view of the importance of the issues at stake, the International Defence and Aid Fund offers this pamphlet as a guide to the subject, particularly in regard to the historical background and the events of the past three years.



## Chapter One

### The Roots of U.D.I.

Rhodesia is the British colony that was never ruled by Britain, and never administered by the Colonial Office. Though the Union Jack has flown over Salisbury for more than 70 years—from the day in 1890 when it was first raised by the Pioneer Column from the Cape—Rhodesia was the creation, not of British imperial policy, but of South African enterprise. In the story of Rhodesia's origin are to be found all the roots of the crisis that confronts that country, and Britain, and the people of Southern Africa today.

Two forces impelled white settlers to cross the Limpopo River into the land of the Mashona and the Matabele. One was South African political ambition to extend its influence into Central Africa; the other the economic ambition of an expanding financial empire, based on South African mineral resources and drawing much of its capital, then as now, from the City of London. Both forces were embodied in one man, the man who gave his name to the new territory, Cecil John Rhodes.

#### THE DREAM OF CECIL RHODES

Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape from 1890. He was President of De Beers, the great diamond mining and marketing monopoly which he helped to found: he was a partner in one of the biggest companies exploiting the newly discovered gold fields on the Rand. And he was one of the richest men in the world. (He told the House of Commons in 1896 that his annual *income* was between £1 million and £1½ million—a figure which took no account of his considerable capital gains).\*

Rhodes' dream was to push a 'red route' of British possessions up through Central Africa, to link up with the Great Lakes, the Nile and Egypt: British soil from Cape to Cairo. He also saw in Rhodesia a source of immense mineral wealth—"the gold of fifty Rands" he promised his investors. But he found the British Government, then as so many times since, too absorbed in its other global commitments to take risks over Rhodesia. The Government of the time was too preoccupied with protecting the Suez route to India, which was not only the "richest jewel in the Imperial crown", but a valuable source of mercenary troops in war-time, to hazard the expenditure necessary to annex a territory almost as large as France, which would have to be administered and policed at an estimated cost, according to Sir Hercules

\*See *The Politics of Partnership* Patrick Keatley's study (Penguin African Library, 1963) of the history and politics of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. We are grateful for Mr. Keatley's permission to draw on his book for much of the material used in this chapter.

Robinson, High Commissioner at the Cape, of £250,000 per year. So Rhodes set out, with backing from fellow South African magnates such as Charles Dunnell Rudd and Alfred Beit, two royal dukes in London, and Sir Hercules Robinson himself, to form a company to do the job instead. If the British Government was not prepared to take the responsibility for opening up Central Africa for South African and British exploitation, the financiers would do it for themselves. Thus was born the British South Africa Company, child of the great South African mining companies, into whose womb (with the takeover by Anglo-American in 1965) it has now returned. This was the company that was to rule Rhodesia from 1890 to 1923, to run its own government and its own police (a situation unique in British colonial history), and to receive royalties from the exploitation of the mineral resources of both Southern Rhodesia, until they were 'bought over' by the settler government in 1933, and Northern Rhodesia right up to independence in 1964.

The story of how this set of adventurers gained control of Rhodesia is worth retelling, for it has not a little to do with the deep sense of injustice among Rhodesia's Africans today. It all took place less than 80 years ago, within the lifespan of men still living.

## THE BETRAYAL OF LOBENGULA

The land between the Limpopo and Zambesi rivers was, in the 1860's, the home of two African peoples, the Mashona, and the Matabele. Lobengula, King of the Matabele, who ruled the country, was the son of Mzilikazi, a Zulu general who had led his people out of South Africa to save them from subjection to the advancing whites; and Lobengula was determined to keep white settlers out of his territory if he could. But his court at Bulawayo was already besieged by British, German, Portuguese and Boer contenders for mining concessions—among them Rhodes' own emissary, Charles Rudd.

Rhodes stole a march on his rivals by gaining the support of two key persons: the British High Commissioner at the Cape, Sir Hercules Robinson, and Her Majesty's Commissioner for Bechuanaland, Sir Sidney Shippard. (Both men, when they later left the Colonial Service, were handsomely rewarded, Sir Hercules with a directorship of De Beers, and Sir Sidney with the chairmanship of the British South Africa Company). As the British official nearest Lobengula, Sir Sidney was of special importance, since Lobengula, beset by fortune-hunters, was looking for an alliance that might help protect him from their importunities. Indeed, it was after a formal visit made by Sir Sidney to Bulawayo in 1888, that Lobengula decided to grant the concession to Rudd. The document was interpreted to the King, and witnessed, by a missionary, the Rev. C. D. Helm, who had been appointed at Shippard's recommendation, and was actually receiving an 'honorarium' of £200 a year from Rudd himself!

Under the Rudd Concession, the King granted "complete and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated and contained in my kingdoms", authorised "the said grantees to take all necessary and lawful steps to exclude from my kingdoms . . . all persons seeking land, metals and minerals", and promised that he would grant no other concessions without the consent of

Rudd and his partners. In return, Lobengula was to receive 1,000 Martini-Henry rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition, a gunboat for the Zambesi (which never arrived), and the sum of £100 per month.

It was not long before Lobengula discovered the extent to which he had been betrayed—by Rhodes and Rudd, by a representative of the British Crown, and by a representative of the Christian Church. When at last he received his copy of the agreement, he asked two other missionaries (pointedly excluding Helm) to translate it for him. He discovered too late that he had effectively granted the white man unrestricted access to his country when all his diplomacy had been directed at excluding him.

He decided to revoke the Concession and planned to send this information to London with E. A. Maund, a rival to Rhodes, who at that moment was applying for a Royal Charter. Two of Lobengula's advisers set off with Maund for the Cape—only to find themselves arrested as 'vagrants' by Shippard in Bechuanaland, and again by Robinson in the Cape. When the party eventually reached London, Rhodes was already well on the way to gaining his Charter. He simply denounced Lobengula's letter as a forgery, and bought over Maund's company. He appointed his two dukes to his Board—the Dukes of Abercorn and Fife, one a Tory and one a Liberal, and both close to the Prince of Wales—and stilled the fears of the 'humanitarians', who feared for the protection of African rights, by winning over one of them, Albert (later Lord) Grey, as another member of the Board. In 1889 Queen Victoria granted a Royal Charter to the British South Africa Company, on the advice of the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury—grandfather of the present Earl.

## **RHODESIA "GRANTED" TO A PRIVATE COMPANY**

What was it that induced the British Government to give way to Southern African pressure over Rhodesia, that first and decisive time, in spite of the misgivings of a vocal 'humanitarian' campaign, in spite of the news that Lobengula had repudiated the Rudd Concession? Why did the British Government decide to give its legal backing, and by implication its political and military protection, to a project by a private company, which, it must have been clear even then, would mean the virtual rape of Rhodesia from the Africans? (Britain even agreed, two years later, to add Northern Rhodesia to the bargain!)

It seems that the British Government was won over by several considerations, all of which sound ironically contemporary today. It feared that Kruger's Boers, in the Transvaal Republic, might gain control north of the Limpopo. Above all, the British Government apparently feared a 'Boston Tea Party' at the Cape, if it resisted South African wishes, for in South Africa there was a coalition between the 'English' Rhodes and the Afrikaner Hofmeyer. The Simonstown base at the Cape was at the time considered essential as an alternative route to India. Rhodes' 'solution' offered a way of achieving British control without public expenditure.

According to a Colonial Office minute of 1888 a 'cardinal principle' of the deal was to be that "the Company which is to enjoy the profits... shall also discharge and bear all the responsibilities of Government". That is, the

Company was to be permitted to run a government and a police force—subject only to the presence of one British official, an Imperial Resident at Bulawayo who was to be paid by the Company. This man turned out to be none other than Rhodes' own right hand man, Dr. Starr Jameson, who was publicly to disgrace himself seven years later in the Jameson Raid on the Transvaal Republic.

The tale of how Rhodes and his co-conspirators, armed with their Charter and the disputed Rudd Concession, set about achieving their real objective, the occupation of Lobengula's land, is one of the shabbiest in Colonial history. Dr. Jameson was sent at once to Bulawayo, to deliver the £100 and the Martini-Henrys to an unwilling and angry Lobengula; a second letter of protest from the King to Queen Victoria was held up by Rhodes' allies, Shippard and Robinson, for so long that it reached London well after the Charter was gazetted in October 1889; a contingent of Royal Horse Guards in full dress was sent to deliver the news of the granting of the Charter to Bulawayo; and Dr. Jameson followed up this extraordinary charade by telegraphing to the High Commissioner at the Cape the blatant lie that Lobengula had "sanctioned our occupation of Mashonaland".

The new High Commissioner, less amenable than Robinson, demurred that the Rudd Concession conferred no occupation rights, and that these should be formally negotiated with the King. But Rhodes set about recruiting a Pioneer Column. He specified that members should come from every area of South Africa, and that they should come from "both the races" (he meant Boer and Briton). Thus, in Patrick Keatley's telling phrase, the first Rhodesians carried north "the racial virus that already infected the south". The Pioneer Column raised the Union Jack over Fort Salisbury on September 12, 1890, and took possession of Mashonaland in the name of the Queen. Further protests from Lobengula were ignored, and the British Government backed the Pioneers with an Order in Council proclaiming the "territories of the Charter" to be under British "protection" and further proclaiming that "Her Majesty has power and jurisdiction". Dr. Jameson, already Resident Commissioner, and controller of the Company's operations, was appointed Chief Magistrate, giving him charge of executive, judiciary, and armed forces.

From this moment, the inexorable logic of settlement took over in Rhodesia. Occupation would be followed by the destruction of African military power. The Africans had to watch their land being parcelled out to foreigners. They watched foreign police, foreign courts and labour recruiters assume authority in their midst. As their resentment grew, cattle-raiders began to harass the settlers, who demanded reprisals. The British South Africa Company was already under heavy financial pressure, because the cost of administration was rapidly exhausting its capital. The promised El Dorado had not been found, so funds would have to be raised by 'selling' more land and introducing more settlers. Politically, Rhodes found his 'All Red Route' in jeopardy, he was being pressed to regularise his questionable legal relationship with Lobengula, who still maintained that he had authorised no settlement, and he feared that reports of disorder in the country would reach London, and provoke intervention by Imperial troops. All these pressures pointed to one course—a "showdown" with the Africans.

## MILITARY ACTION BY THE COMPANY

When in 1893 a military incident arose at Fort Victoria, over a local white officer's refusal to hand over Mashona cattle raiders to Lobengula's disciplinary force, Rhodes himself (still Prime Minister of the Cape) telegraphed Jameson his celebrated hint that this was the opportunity to break Matabele power: "Read Luke XIV: 31", he instructed—a passage which happens to concern a King "going to make war against another King... that cometh against him with 20,000". Jameson raised a volunteer army, handing each a secret, signed promise of a £9,000 farm in Matabeleland, 20 gold claims, and a share of Lobengula's herd of 500,000 cattle. "The loot shall be divided half to the British South Africa Company, and the remainder to officers and men in equal shares".\*

Lobengula appealed to the Company, and to the Queen through the High Commission at the Cape. His three emissaries were arrested in Bechuanaland, two shot as 'spies' and the third sent home, defeated. On 7th October 1893 Jameson attacked Bulawayo, mowing down the Matabele warriors with his cannon, machine guns and rifles. The warriors were armed only with spears as Lobengula had returned the rifles to Jameson in a grand gesture of repudiation. Five settlers were killed, and about 5,000 Africans. The King fled, with some of his men, and his legendary treasury of diamonds, rumoured to be worth £5 million. He was pursued, and one more battle took place, in which the men of Jameson's Shangani Patrol were wiped out. Lobengula died of smallpox and malaria, somewhere along the Zambesi, in January 1894. His grave, and the hiding place of his mysterious treasure, have never been found.

## THE FIRST WHITE GOVERNMENT

In June 1894, Dr. Jameson declared that "The King being dead, the white Government has taken its place". Matabeleland was opened to white settlement. An Order-in-Council the same year formalised Company rule in Mashonaland and Matabeleland, with provisos that "natives shall not be subjected to any exceptional legislation" except in relation to liquor, arms and ammunition, title to land, and hut tax.

African resentment flared into rebellion once more in 1896, soon after Jameson's disgrace over the Raid on Pretoria.† Settlers barricaded themselves inside their laagers in the towns. A thousand Imperial troops were sent from Cape Town, and the Africans were finally defeated.

For a brief period after this, from 1898 to 1922, the British Government made some attempt to assume responsibility in the colony that was not a

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\*Anyone who finds this well-nigh incredible story quite beyond belief, is referred once more to Patrick Keatley's book, to his list of books for further reading, and to the biography "Cecil Rhodes: The Colossus of Southern Africa" by J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse, MacMillan, 1963.

†The Jameson Raid was an attempt to take over Kruger's Transvaal Republic by force. In December 1895, Dr. Jameson invaded the Transvaal, with a force of 512 men raised in Rhodesia. The insurgents were defeated, and Jameson was captured by the Boers, and sent to Britain for trial for leading an "unlawful" military expedition "against a friendly state". Rhodes was heavily implicated, and had to resign as Prime Minister of the Cape as well as from the Board of the British South Africa Company. Though Jameson was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment, both men were back in senior positions in the company within a few years.

colony. A 'humanitarian' High Commissioner Sir Alfred Milner was appointed to the Cape. He appointed a new official, to be paid and appointed by the Colonial Office, to take control of the B.S.A. Company's police and armed forces; he removed the right of the settlers to pass discriminatory laws about African land; and introduced the first legislature, five members to be nominated by the Company, and four to be elected by the settlers. The Franchise system was based on that of the Cape; that is, it was non-racial, but based on qualifications such as to exclude all but a tiny number of Africans. By 1914, only 51 had qualified, all of them immigrants from South Africa.

By 1907, the settlers had gained a majority in the legislature, and were demanding more independence of the Company. But Britain was still unwilling to take over the expense of administration, and it was eventually Winston Churchill, as Colonial Secretary after World War I, who proposed a referendum to decide whether Rhodesia should become a fifth Province of the Union of South Africa (established in 1910), or receive 'responsible Government' under the Crown. In October 1922 white Rhodesians chose 'responsible Government' by 8,774 votes to 5,989. What they got was complete control of the country including the million Africans, with the exception only that the British Government would have the power of veto over legislation, as a safeguard of African rights. This power was never used in the 39 years before it was surrendered under the 1961 Constitution. So in 1923 some 50,000 whites achieved, to all intents and purposes, political independence. They had a police force, a militia, and though as a 'Colony' the territory was not supposed to conduct its own foreign affairs, from the beginning it was invited to Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences. From 1925 the British Government dealt with Rhodesia not through the Colonial Office, but through the new Dominions Office (later the Commonwealth Relations Office).

## THE FOUNDATIONS OF APARTHEID

Long before self-government in 1923, the basis of a discriminatory society had been laid. It was Rhodes himself who insisted on the links with South Africa, which were to have a decisive influence on all that was to come: he appointed a Company Administrator from South Africa to succeed Jameson. This Administrator introduced South Africa's system of Roman Dutch Law, its Civil Service, school system and system of Native Administration. South Africa thus became the natural source of staff for all these services; and the obvious source of education for Rhodesia's young.

Labour policy was based on South Africa's from the start: a hut tax, to be paid in cash, was imposed on Africans in 1894, together with limitations on African ownership and occupation of land. The cash tax (later to become a more general poll, or head, tax) forced the Africans to leave their own economy to work in that of the white man. On entry into a white area, they found themselves subject to a pass system, as a means of control over freedom of movement and freedom of employment. By 1914, 22 per cent of the total land area of the country had been allocated to Africans. The rest was for Europeans—most of it lying empty, awaiting immigration. These three



impositions—cash taxation, limitation on land ownership, and pass control in 'white' areas—have been the foundation of race discrimination in both Rhodesia and South Africa, and they remain so today.

By 1903, an Immorality and Indecency Suppression Act provided for sentences of up to five years for a 'Native' convicted of illicit sexual relations with a white woman. No penalty was imposed for white men having illicit relations with black women. Similarly, though the death sentence was prescribed for rape, it has never been imposed on a European.

From 1923 onwards, the settlers set about building a social structure on these foundations, that would ensure indefinitely their twin objectives of cheap labour and white privilege. They contrived a franchise to exclude Africans from power; an education system based on race discrimination; and a system of land division to perpetuate economic inequality.

The Rhodesian franchise has always been overtly 'non-racial', since the right to vote has depended on financial and educational qualifications. The theory is that this ensures what white Rhodesians like to call 'civilised standards'. In practice, the franchise has always been manipulated to make certain that political power remains in white hands. Thus the financial qualification for the vote in 1898 was £50 per year; in 1914 it was raised to £100; in 1951 to £240.\*

Schooling was made compulsory for non-African children only, between seven and 15 years. Schooling for Africans was strictly segregated, as in South Africa, and administered by a special Native Education Department, set up in 1930. Between 1928 and 1964 only 94 Africans had obtained High School Certificates, and only 5,701 had finished four years of secondary education.

## THE LAND APPORTIONMENT ACT

Of all Rhodesia's discriminatory measures, probably the most detested is the Land Apportionment Act, first passed in 1930, revised in 1941, and subsequently amended. Like the Group Areas Act in South Africa, it is fundamental because it affects almost all aspects of life, since it governs residence, use and ownership of land. It originally reserved some 49 million acres of Rhodesia (including most of the developed and urban areas) for purchase by Europeans; and a mere 28½ million acres for African occupation (17¾ million acres were left unallocated). And though alterations were made in the following 20 years, the proportions were not substantially changed.† When the Act was finally put into effect in 1947, thousands of Africans were forcibly removed from 'European' land—and in the same year, the Native Urban Area Accommodation and Registration Act was passed, introducing a pass system for all Africans who wished to visit or seek employment in any urban area. Government had now effective control over every major aspect of the African's life: where he should live; where he might work, and for whom; whether he might travel; and how his children should be educated.

\*And it was raised again in 1961 (see below), and in the Constitutional Proposals of 1968.

†Today, 37 per cent of Rhodesian land is reserved for 224,000 Europeans, and 46 per cent for four million Africans.

## FEDERATION

The idea of a Federation of the three British territories in Central Africa—Southern and Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland—was first put forward in the 1920's. But it was resisted at the time by Southern Rhodesian whites, who saw the addition of the two undeveloped northern Protectorates as a financial burden and a racial threat. Then copper was discovered in the north; and after the 1939–45 war, the copper belt became a rich prize, and a potential source of capital for industrial development in the south. So between 1949 and 1952 the then Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins (later Lord Malvern), backed by the Northern Rhodesian settler leader, Roy Welensky, led a full-scale campaign for Federation. They readily found allies in London, among them Lord Salisbury and his fellow-directors of the British South Africa Company.

The Labour Administration of 1945–51 at first found the idea tempting. The three territories seemed logically to form an economic unit. Southern Rhodesia was beginning to process its own raw materials, but had no sufficient internal market. In Northern Rhodesia, money was circulating, and the white community was growing rapidly with immigration of skilled workers to the mines; while Nyasaland, totally undeveloped, remained a pool of labour for both Southern Rhodesia and the copper belt. A common road and rail system, currency and postal system existed already.

However, the massive reaction of Africans in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, persuaded the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, to think again. Africans saw in the plan a conspiracy to impose Southern Rhodesia's race discrimination on the north, and the statements of some of the settler politicians did nothing to allay their fears. "The main reason we need a Federal State in Central Africa is because this will enable us to loosen the grip of the Colonial Office on the territory", said a white M.P., John van Eeden, in the Northern Rhodesian Legislature; and Huggins himself made it very clear that there would be no place for African representation in his vision of Federal Government: "There are not yet enough civilised natives to justify one constituency", he said. On another occasion, he bluntly defined racial "partnership", the ideology on which the Federation was to be based, as the partnership "between horse and rider".

When in 1951, however, the Conservatives returned to power at Westminster, Churchill appointed two men already deeply committed to Federation, to the key Colonial posts: Oliver Lyttelton as Colonial Secretary, and Lord Salisbury in charge of Commonwealth Relations. In 1953, in spite of the outright rejection of Federation by every African political party in the three territories, the "electors" of Southern Rhodesia voted in favour of Federation. There were 45,975 white voters on the roll, and 380 Africans. The final conferences to draw up a constitution were held behind closed doors, and when the African representatives from Rhodesia and Nyasaland asked to see the agenda in advance, the Colonial Secretary refused, and the Africans boycotted the conference. Two Southern Rhodesian Africans attended—one of them was Joshua Nkomo, who went home to oppose Huggins' United Federal Party in the elections, and later to lead the African nationalist movement.



## NO SAFEGUARDS

The Federal Constitution contained no detailed franchise provisions nor any machinery for extending African participation in Government. The main safeguard for African rights was a statutory African Affairs Board, with powers to refer racially discriminatory laws to the British Parliament. Instead of an independent body, as originally envisaged, the Board eventually emerged as a standing committee of six Federal M.P.'s. It acted only once—to declare the 1957 Constitution Amendment Act and the 1958 Federal Electoral Act discriminatory. These split the Common Voters' Roll into Upper and Lower rolls, so that most African voters (through educational and wealth qualifications) were demoted to the lower roll. The number of Federal Assembly seats was increased from 35 to 59, with the effect that, though the number of African members would increase, most, if not all of them, would depend for election on the Upper, white-dominated roll. The British Parliament overruled the African Affairs Board's veto, and the Rev. Andrew Doig, of the Church of Scotland in Nyasaland, resigned, declaring the Board to be a "farce". After the 1958 election, Welensky (now Federal Premier) was able to pack the Board with his own nominees, and it never acted again.

Constitutionally, then, the settlers had found Federation a satisfactory instrument. The next objective was full dominion status, and they began to work for this. Economically, it proved equally profitable. Of £261 million spent by the Federal Government between 1954 and 1959, only £10 million was spent in Nyasaland, the least developed of the territories, the main sums going to Rhodesia Railways, and the Kariba hydro-electric scheme. This financial policy stimulated foreign investment and white immigration, leading to expansion in European-dominated industry and agriculture. In 1954, manufacturing industry and European agriculture amounted to 8.2 per cent and 8.5 per cent of the gross national product respectively. By 1961, they represented 10.4 per cent and 9.5 per cent.

It was perhaps not inappropriate that the deprived Nyasas, who had been united in opposing Federation from the first, should have precipitated the eventual break-up. In 1958, Dr. Hastings Banda returned to Nyasaland, and in 1959 the Nyasaland African Congress launched a nationwide campaign to demand the right to secede from Federation. A number of African leaders, including Dr. Banda, were arrested. The Government of Southern Rhodesia, where no disturbances had taken place, promptly declared a State of Emergency, and detained some 450 African leaders, without trial. Some days later, after declaring publicly that no emergency was necessary, Sir Robert Armitage, the Governor of Nyasaland, did the same. The Africans concluded that he had done so under Federal, that is Southern Rhodesian, pressure. Southern Rhodesian troops poured into Nyasaland, and in the following months more than 100 Africans were killed. There were no losses on the side of the Security Forces.

## AFRICAN OPPOSITION

Then began the intense, untiring international campaign of the African leadership in exile. Joshua Nkomo of the Southern Rhodesian National

Democratic Party, Mainza Chona of the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia and Kanyama Chiume of the Nyasaland African Congress were instructed by their organisations to remain abroad, in order to counter Welensky's desperate efforts to gain Dominion Status for the Federation. As more and more African States became independent after 1960, these men lobbied them, visited the United Nations, hammered on the doors of the Colonial Office, and tramped the length and breadth of Britain to arouse public feeling against a betrayal of British responsibilities to the peoples of Central Africa. They found allies not only in Africa and at the United Nations, but in the British Labour Party, and in the Church of Scotland, whose missions in Nyasaland had seen Federation at work.

### THE DEVLIN COMMISSION

After the 1959 disturbances, the Government appointed the Devlin Commission, to enquire into the Nyasaland Emergency. Its report called Nyasaland "no doubt temporarily, a police state", and laid much of the blame for the eruption on Federal policies. "Even amongst the chiefs, many of whom are loyal to the government and dislike Congress methods, we have not heard of a single one who is in favour of Federation". Mr. Lennox-Boyd, Conservative Colonial Secretary, formally rejected the report. But there could now be no turning back the tide, and when Iain McLeod replaced Lennox-Boyd after the 1959 election, he appointed the Monckton Commission to provide a working document for the Federal Review Conference due in 1960. Welensky's conditions for accepting the Commission were that its terms of reference should not include the question of whether the Federation should continue to exist; and that British and Federation representation should be equal. There were 26 members, under Lord Monckton, a former Conservative Cabinet Minister. The African nationalists refused to give evidence, insisting that it was not a review they wanted, but the total break-up of Federation. The Commission reported in October 1960—recommending majority African rule for the northern territories, and the right of secession for all three territories. The Review Conference took place the following year, but without reaching any conclusion.

### 1961 SOUTHERN RHODESIA CONSTITUTION

In the three following years, political developments centred on territorial constitutional conferences, through which both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia made significant steps towards the majority rule recommended by Monckton. The first conference, however, was the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference of 1961. Sir Edgar Whitehead, United Federal Party Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, won from Duncan Sandys, then Colonial Secretary, formal abandonment of Britain's residual power to veto Rhodesian legislation, as the price of any constitutional revision at all. Instead, a Constitutional Council was set up to refer to the Courts any *future* legislation conflicting with a Declaration of Rights. The all-white Parliament of 30 was replaced by a House of 65, of which 15 would be Africans. The old Common Roll was replaced by an A and B roll, on Federal lines, and the

financial qualification for the A roll was raised to £720 per year, compared with the £240 that had obtained since 1951. Upward revision of African representation could still be blocked by the settler majority—and once more the African nationalists boycotted the elections.

Whitehead, Welensky and the U.F.P. continued the battle to save Federation for a further two years. Their allies were the formidable Rhodesia/Katanga lobby in the British Parliament, which consisted of a number of powerful Conservative members of the Commons and the House of Lords, directly and indirectly connected with the complex of mining and finance companies operating in the Northern Rhodesian and Katanga copper belt, and in Southern Rhodesia. Among them were Captain Charles Waterhouse, former leader of the 'Suez Group' and Chairman of Tanganyika Concessions; Lord Salisbury, Lord Robins and Julian Amery of the British South Africa Company; and Lords Clitheroe and Colyton. Some £150,000 was spent in a single year through the British public relations firm Voice and Vision, to persuade the British public in favour of Federation. But by February 1963 Nyasaland had won the formal right to secede, Federation was doomed, and it was formally dissolved at the end of the year.

By this time, the Federalists under Whitehead had already been replaced in Southern Rhodesia by the Rhodesian Front. The Front opposed the U.F.P. policy of concessions to multi-racialism in the hope of gaining eventual independence for the whole Federation. Where the U.F.P. had sought to sell to the world the idea of a 'multi-racial' Central Africa based on 'partnership', as a bastion of British traditions against the race extremism of apartheid in the South, the Front aimed at an open alliance with South Africa, and had already drawn its mental frontier against black Africa along the Zambesi.

## *Chapter Two*

### **White Supremacy at any Cost**

#### **RHODESIAN FRONT RULE**

The Rhodesian Front, formed by an amalgamation of four right-wing political parties, was swept to power on a wave of white reaction in the election of October 1962. Its published principles declared inter alia that the Party "believes in the right of each community in Southern Rhodesia to preserve its own identity, traditions and customs"; that it "will ensure that the Government of Southern Rhodesia will remain in responsible hands"; that it will "uphold the principles of the Land Apportionment Act"; "oppose compulsory integration"; "ensure the permanent establishment of the European"; and "protect the standards of skilled workers against the exploitation of cheap labour". It added a note to the effect that "The Front recognises that inherent in the new Constitution there is the intention to ensure the dominance by the African of the European before the former has acquired adequate knowledge and experience of democratic government. The Front believes that this must be avoided. It will therefore, inter alia, seek in consultation with other groups, amendments to the Constitution to avoid this situation arising".

The word Apartheid is not actually used; but the spirit of the ideology shows through unmistakably.

Winston Field, first leader of the Front, had already called publicly for a defence pact with South Africa and Portugal, before he became Prime Minister. White Rhodesia, in choosing him and his party, gave clear notice of where it intended its future to lie—not with ordered progress towards independence under majority rule, such as was envisaged in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; but in alliance with South Africa and Portugal, in a white stronghold south of the Zambesi river.

#### **AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES OUTLAWED**

Winston Field set about initiating negotiations with Britain for independence, in March 1963. By July of that year, the Central Africa Conference at Victoria Falls had decided on the dissolution of the Federation, and within a year the conditions for independence for Nyasaland (Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) had been settled. The Field Government chose to demonstrate its fitness for democracy by declaring the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, under Joshua Nkomo, illegal under the 1960 Unlawful Organisations Act (September 1963), and its successor, the People's Caretaker Council, the following year, together with the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union. All three organisations had campaigned vigorously

against the Field scheme for independence on a white supremacy basis, demanding instead a Constitutional conference, aimed at independence under majority rule, at which the African Nationalist organisations would be fully represented. Nkomo was himself arrested, together with all senior officers of his organisation, soon after his return to Rhodesia from abroad in 1963, and exiled, under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, to a restriction camp, where he has been detained ever since.

The Rhodesian Front Government has specialised in repressive legislation, much of it closely parallel to similar legislation in South Africa. In 1963, the year after the Sabotage Act in South Africa, an amendment was passed to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, imposing a mandatory death sentence for anyone using petrol or some other inflammable liquid or explosives to damage a dwelling house, when a person is within the building, or any other premises, or attempting to do so.\* In 1964, when the Preventive Detention Act of 1959 was due to expire, the Front Government attempted to extend its operation to ten years, but the Constitutional Council unanimously rejected the amendment on the ground that it infringed the Bill of Rights incorporated in the 1961 Constitution; and the Appellate Division of the High Court upheld this view. The Government simply resorted to the Emergency Powers Act (1960), which enabled it to arrest or detain without trial as long as a State of Emergency is in force. And since August 1964, there has been a State of Emergency in force in one part of the country or another, on all but seven days. Since U.D.I., the State of Emergency has been nation-wide and renewed every three months.† In 1964, the Front Government banned the *African Daily News*, the only Southern Rhodesian newspaper aimed at African readers.

### LABOUR'S FIVE PRINCIPLES

The record of the Rhodesian Front was such, in fact, as to unite the United Nations, independent Africa, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers (who met in London in June 1965) and the British Labour Party in the demand that Britain should on no account grant independence to white Rhodesia. The Labour Government set out five principles as the basis for a new Constitution for Rhodesia:—

- (i) that there would be unimpeded progress to majority rule;
- (ii) that there would be no retrogressive amendments to the Constitution to retard African advancement;
- (iii) that there would be immediate improvement in the political representation of Africans;
- (iv) that racial discrimination must end; and
- (v) that the basis of independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

\*Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, Chapter III, p. 157, prepared by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, December 1967. On September 24, 1968, the Rhodesian Parliament gave an unopposed second reading to a Bill to remove the Mandatory Hanging Clauses from the Law and Order Maintenance Act. In future the Courts will decide what penalties to inflict (*Daily Telegraph* 25/9/68).

†1,791 Africans and two coloured persons were detained without trial between January 1964 and August 1965 alone; S.R. Legislative Assembly Debates, vol. 6, 4/8/65.

There the question of negotiated independence for Southern Rhodesia had to end. For the Front was committed to very different principles, and though 'talks' with Britain went on until the very last moment, the Rhodesian leaders had resolved on a different method of achieving their ends.

### **U.D.I.**

Why, since Southern Rhodesia had had effective self-government since 1923, reinforced by the withdrawal of Britain's reserved powers in 1961, was legal independence so important?

There seem to have been two main reasons—the first was the one set out by the Rhodesia Front with its principles in 1962, that even the 1961 Constitution was too 'liberal' for them. The franchise provisions, for instance, could be changed only by a referendum of all the population; and the Constitutional Council, restricted though its powers were, was able to frustrate the Government's effort to re-enact the Preventive Detention Act. The second reason was the restriction implied by the very lack of formal independence—the lack of freedom to operate its own foreign policy, enter into diplomatic relations, make alliances. Both restrictions inhibited the achievement of the Front's objective, of an apartheid-oriented political and military alliance with South Africa and Portugal. By April 1964, white impatience had led to Winston Field's replacement as Prime Minister by the more extreme Ian Smith. Although Mr. Wilson, the British Prime Minister, flew to Salisbury in a final bid to obtain agreement on a new Constitution in October 1965, the decision to 'go it alone' had almost certainly already been taken. On November 5, 1965 a national State of Emergency was declared; and on November 11, came the illegal declaration of independence.

### **"AN ACT OF REBELLION"**

The British Government promptly denounced the declaration as an act of rebellion. The Governor of Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, announced that he had been instructed by the Queen to suspend Mr. Smith and his illegal Government, and the British Prime Minister told the House of Commons that a special enabling law would be enacted immediately, to give the U.K. Government powers to deal with the situation. The imposition of 'voluntary' economic sanctions followed; and mandatory oil sanctions, imposed through the United Nations. But no British troops landed in Salisbury, and no blockade of South African ports prevented their use for the import and export of Rhodesian goods, so the Smith regime remained in power, and set about implementing the next stage of its programme.

### **TOWARDS A POLICE STATE**

The illegal Government's first act was to revoke the 1961 Constitution, and to replace it with a new one, which validated the seizure of independence, and made several significant changes, including the all-important change that amendments to the Constitution would no longer require a referendum among all communities, but a simple decision of Government. The State of Emergency also enabled the enumerated rights under the Constitution to be

suspended, including the provisions forbidding further discriminatory legislation. Armed with this new freedom, the 'Minister' of Justice, Law and Order, Mr. Lardner-Burke, proceeded to make his Emergency Regulations. He instituted full-scale censorship of the Press, and Rhodesia's two daily newspapers began appearing with regular patches of blank white space. On December 7, 1965 he made it an offence to "cause or permit to be heard in public" any broadcast "likely to endanger public safety, disturb or interfere with public order, interfere with the maintenance of any essential service, or hinder the termination of the emergency"—thus making it potentially an offence, for example, to listen to BBC news broadcasts with the volume loud enough to be heard from the street!

Under the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulation of 1966, the Minister assumed powers of arrest and detention without trial, powers to control the possession and distribution of notices, newspapers and circulars, and the taking of photographs; to impose restrictions on freedom of movement, to impose cordons, control traffic, close both public and private places, seize vehicles, and to regulate the possession of arms.\*

The Rev. Zulu gave evidence before the U.N. Committee of 24 on Colonialism in June 1967, on the effect of these regulations on the life of urban Africans. "Both of the two main African locations outside Salisbury", he said "were surrounded by high fences topped with barbed wire. Each location had two main gates, and had become a virtual concentration camp. Africans leaving them to go to work had their hands stamped with indelible ink to identify them as workers, and on return they had to approach with upraised hands to enable the police at the gates to see the mark. At night, police and army units went from door to door, checking on house occupants. All children from the age of 15, whether gainfully employed or not, had to pay 15 shillings a month to be allowed to stay with their families.

"Beer halls were fenced with brick walls, 12 feet high, with broken glass affixed along the top. The walls had two small gates that allowed the passage of only one person at a time. The halls were more like fenced cattle kraals than drinking places. ... The beer halls thus became useful devices for police dragnets".

## DETENTION AND RESTRICTION

In August 1966, a Constitutional Amendment Act was passed by the illegal Parliament to enable it to enact legislation for the detention and restriction of persons at any time, and not merely during a State of Emergency, "in the interests of defence, public safety or public order". And in 1967 a further amendment to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act provided for the death penalty for any 'terrorist' or 'saboteur' found in possession of 'weapons of war'. The onus was to be on the accused to prove that he did not intend to use his 'weapons' to endanger law and order.

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\*Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Chapter III.



## TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND DETAINEES

The Smith government has today at its disposal a machinery of political oppression that runs closely parallel to the repressive laws of the South African Republic, as embodied in the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 and its various amendments, the General Law Amendment Acts of 1962 and 1963 and the 'Terrorism' Act of 1967. At the beginning of 1968, nearly 100 men were in Rhodesian jails under sentence of death for political offences. No official figure for the total number of political prisoners, detainees and restrictees has ever been given, but the Zimbabwe African People's Union estimates between 10,000 and 15,000 people have been detained for varying periods of time during the past nine years.\* Allegations of inhuman conditions of confinement, and of torture of prisoners to elicit information, have been substantiated to the satisfaction of an investigating team appointed by Amnesty International, which reported in August 1966 that the degrading prison conditions had "on the whole affected only the non-white population", and that medical accounts of individuals seen shortly after interrogation by Rhodesian police "have substantiated descriptions of brutality". The report described beatings with sticks, "fists, boots or batons", and threats of castration; and concluded that Rhodesian prisons suffered from inadequately trained staff, shortage of staff and lack of policy for rehabilitating prisoners; that diet given to Africans was nutritionally inadequate; cells were overcrowded and in many cases verminous and unhygienic. Mr. George Silundika, Vice-President of Z.A.P.U., gave the following account of interrogation methods to the U.N. Committee of 24 in 1966:

"When a person was arrested he was taken to some remote area and interrogated by as many as ten policemen. Several had lost their sense of hearing from the treatment they had received. Some were given electric shocks, and electric sticks were sometimes used to frighten them into giving information. Other methods were to strip the prisoners and drive pins through the penis, or hold them face down and beat the genitals in order to force them to sign statements prepared by the police. Another way of attempting to force them to give information was to tie them to a tree and light a stick of gelignite that had been fixed to it. Many had died rather than submit.

A number of resisters in the countryside had been rounded up and shot, having been taken to European farms by white-settler constables, and the African police were not allowed in the area. Other prisoners were starved, some for as long as a month, though 16 days was considered the normal period".

On the detention and restriction camps, Bishop Zulu told the Committee of 24 that conditions were "appalling". He stated that the detention camp at Gonakudzingwa, which he had visited, was in a remote area previously occupied by wild animals; that detainees lived in "inhuman" conditions, with no water system, the huts tin-roofed and like ovens in the hot season and freezing in the winter, no medical, educational or recreational facilities.

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\*Report of the United Nations Committee of June 24, 1967. Christian Care, a Rhodesian organisation concerned with caring for political prisoners, could account for 553 in restriction areas and detention prisons, on April 17, 1968.



"The families of the detainees were breaking up because of the indefinite absence from home of husbands and fathers. Children had become fatherless and had no means of support".\*

### **MORE APARTHEID LAWS**

The Rhodesia Front had come to power on the promise of further race separation, and in 1965 it took a step to halt the tentative trend, established in the days when the Federation was endeavouring to wheedle full independence from Britain, towards de-segregation of the education system. In August it was announced that no more African pupils would be permitted to enter the private schools, registered under the Federal Education Act, which had been accepting them together with white, and some coloured, pupils.

In September 1967 the regime announced that measures would be taken to apply segregation for both patients and staff in Rhodesian hospitals, and to end the employment of African men in white women's wards.

In October, a Municipal Amendment Act, allowing local authorities to enforce apartheid in recreational facilities, public lavatories, swimming baths, parks and sports grounds, was passed by Parliament, but challenged by the Constitutional Council on the ground that it violated the Bill of Rights. In December the Salisbury City Council accepted the principle of implementing the Act.

The Property Owners (Residential Protection) Bill, introduced in 1957, enables European residents to petition for the designation of a residential area as an exclusive area, and for the removal of non-European families living there. Such a petition would have to be supported by over 50 per cent of the property owners in the area, and once such a designation had been made, people of the excluded 'race' would be evicted, and their properties compulsorily purchased. In order to establish whether or not persons would be subject to removal (i.e. what 'race' they belong to), a Denominational Tribunal would be set up, in many ways similar to South Africa's infamous Population Register.

And one more measure closely modelled on Apartheid is the 1967 Censorship and Entertainments Act (parallel with the South African Publications and Entertainments Act of 1963), setting up a Censorship Board to control literature and entertainment in Rhodesia.

Thus, though the basic system of race exploitation had been established years before, it was the Rhodesia Front which set about bringing the whole inequitable system to its logical conclusion, which is apartheid; and thus precipitating the inevitable crisis.

### **THE 1968 CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS**

It is in the light of this already established drift towards apartheid that the

\*Dependents of political prisoners, detainees and restrictees are only entitled to minimum assistance from the Government equal to that paid to an indigent family. In other words, many have been forced to sell their cattle and other possessions before qualifying for any assistance, although the breadwinner has been summarily removed. The Christian Council of Rhodesia and the International Defence and Aid Fund have been among the organisations which have helped these dependents. In addition, the International Defence and Aid Fund is providing educational courses for men in restriction and detention, and has spent over £8,000 on this project in 16 months.

Rhodesia Front's 1968 Constitutional Proposals should be seen. The Whaley Commission had been set up to draft a new Constitution to replace the 1965 (1961-based) Independence Constitution, and it reported in April 1968. Its proposals introduced a form of representation by race, and in particular of weighting 'tribal' as against urban African representation, which was clearly retrogressive compared with the 1961 Constitution; but they also specifically rejected 'apartheid' (territorial separation, and racially separate legislatures), in favour of *eventual* parity of representation of black and white in Parliament. The proposals caused an immediate uproar among the members of the Rhodesia Front, and the party leadership then evolved a new set of proposals, published in July and adopted by a special Party Congress in September.

These proposals advocate a Republican Constitution, to be introduced in two stages, the second stage to bring about the Apartheid—racially separate legislatures which the Whaley Commission had rejected.

In the first stage, the legislature is to consist of a Lower House and a Senate. The Senate will have 23 members: ten whites, elected by the white M.P.'s; ten African chiefs (five Matabele and five Mashona), nominated by the Council of Chiefs; and three persons appointed by the Head of State. The Lower House will have 68 members: 34 whites, elected on a white roll (including a handful of Coloured and Asian voters); 18 members elected on a common roll, with qualifications similar to the present A-roll provisions, and therefore white-dominated; and 16 Africans. Ten of these (again, five from Matabeleland and five from Mashonaland) will be nominated by an electoral college of chiefs, headmen and Chiefs' Council representatives (all of whom are paid employees of the Government), two will be elected by African purchase area farmers. Four only will be chosen by Africans in the urban areas. Thus, whites will retain a 13:10 majority in the Senate, and a 52:16 majority in the Lower House; and of a total of 91 members of both Houses, only six are to be directly elected by the African majority.

The second stage, to be introduced within five years, is the stage of 'apartheid', or 'race federation'. Three Provincial Councils, one white, one Matabele and one Mashona, will be set up, their powers to increase over the five-year period, at the end of which a Federal National Parliament will replace the proposed Senate and Lower House described above. This Parliament will control "national finance, defence, internal security, justice, law and order, international affairs, and indivisible national affairs such as communications, power, major irrigation projects etc.". The Federal Parliament, in which real political power will rest, will be constituted in proportion to each provincial council's *income tax contribution to the national revenue*—and since a tiny number of Africans earn enough to pay any income tax\*, they can expect only an insignificant representation. A two-thirds majority of Parliament will be empowered to introduce complete partition in the event of a break-down in relations between the races. This at last is Rhodesia's

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\*Though Africans produced in 1960 some one-sixth of the total tax raised from white settlers, (Dr. Thomas Franck, *Race and Nationalism* 1960), they pay flat poll, or head tax, not income tax. African wages averaged only £87 p.a. in 1961, while income tax is paid only on incomes in excess of £960 p.a. for married men and £450 p.a. for single men. A further, and crucial, point about the income tax qualification is, of course, that income tax levels can be infinitely manipulated.

blue-print for apartheid. Yet Ian Smith pushed the Constitution through his Congress by only 11 votes, and the dispute within the Party led to the departure of two key Ministers—Mr. William Harper, and Lord Graham. The Front rebels want apartheid now, and they regard even the five-year preparation period as too 'moderate'. Once more, Rhodesia demonstrates the inexorable drift of white Southern African politics, where every confrontation provokes a further move to the right.

## ALLIANCE WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGAL

It was in April 1965—only six months before U.D.I. was declared, and when plans for the declaration were probably already complete—that Ian Smith, in an interview with a Portuguese journalist (subsequently reprinted in the South African *Rand Daily Mail*) made a public call for a military alliance between South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal in Southern Africa. It had long been rumoured both in South Africa and abroad that such an alliance, probably on an informal basis, already existed: certainly political, economic and police co-operation between the three governments was already highly developed, and military co-operation in the form of joint consultations and training operation had been taking place since 1960 at least. But Smith's was the first public call for a formal alliance from a Southern African Prime Minister—and there is no doubt that one of the motives behind U.D.I. was the desire for freedom to develop the alliance on a more formal level.

The "Unholy Alliance" between South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia first took clear shape between 1959 and 1962—the year the Rhodesia Front came to power. It was in 1959 that Dr. Verwoerd first raised his project for a 'Southern Africa Common Market', when discussing his 'self-government' project for the Bantustans. The idea was that a common economy should eventually develop, involving not only the Republic and its 'self-governing Bantustans', but the High Commission Territories when independent. When the idea was revived in 1964, the South African Minister of Defence included "favourably disposed nations in Africa". In 1959, however, there was sharp reaction from the High Commission Territories and the British Labour Opposition, and Dr. Verwoerd lay low for a time.

This plan for a 'Commonwealth of Nations' in Southern Africa was only an expression of a wider collaboration between the three powers that had been developing beneath the surface. Dr. Salazar told the Johannesburg *Star* in 1961: "Our relations—Mozambique's and Angola's on the one hand, and the Federation's and South Africa's on the other—arise from the existence of our common borders and our traditional friendships that unite our governments and peoples. Our mutual interests are manifold, and we are entirely conscious of the need to co-operate to fulfil our common needs".\* In pursuit of this co-operation, leaders of the three Governments met—and still meet—frequently. Dr. Verwoerd and Sir Roy Welensky had several personal meetings, notably in 1959 in Pretoria, when no communique was issued. In 1961 Welensky visited Dr. Salazar in Lisbon, and afterwards expressed

\**Star* Johannesburg, July 8, 1961.

himself tremendously impressed with the Portuguese Government's "progressive outlook and understanding of the difficulties on our continent of Africa". He also visited the Governor of Mozambique, Admiral Rodrigues, at the beginning of 1962. The Federation Defence Minister visited Luanda, capital of Angola, and Lisbon; the South African Defence Minister, Mr. Fouché, visited Lisbon, while a delegation from his Ministry visited Mozambique.

By 1961, press reports were already suggesting that a secret defence agreement had been signed by the three Governments; and these allegations were repeated in April 1962 by Mr. Kenneth Kaunda (then leader of the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia), and by spokesmen of the Zimbabwe African People's Union of Southern Rhodesia. South African officials denied the charges in public, and so did Sir Roy Welensky, on the ground that the Federation *had not legally the right to enter into such an alliance without the consent of the British Government*. (But Welensky elsewhere insisted that the Federation was entirely responsible for its own defence—*Guardian* 23.1.62.)

There was already plenty of evidence of military co-operation. In 1960, Southern Rhodesian army units for the first time took part in training exercises in South Africa; and military missions from both South Africa and the Federation visited Lourenço Marques (capital of Mozambique) at the invitation of the Portuguese army command, and took part in training exercises involving several units and some 2,600 men. This included paratroop training.

And collaboration among the police forces of the three governments had gone far beyond the requirements of courtesy. The case of two men from Mozambique, Edward Ngubeni and Philip Sobral, who were deported from South Africa by the South African police 'on instructions from the Portuguese Government', was given wide publicity in 1962. South African political refugees, who began to leave the Republic in considerable numbers in the early 1960's, found themselves in constant danger while in the Federation.

## ECONOMIC TIES

Behind all these incidents, lies the fact that after 1960, when the rest of Africa set its course firmly in the direction of national independence on the basis of majority rule, the white minority regimes of the south found themselves increasingly drawn together to halt this process. They share similarities in political and economic systems; and there is a high degree of actual economic integration. The main industrial centre of the sub-continent, the Witwatersrand, absorbs migrant labour, not only from the Republic itself, but from Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. The migrant labourers in turn earn income for their own countries which they can ill afford to lose. Further, Rhodesia has no port of its own. Rhodesian and also Transvaal traffic through Mozambique ports is of no small financial significance to Portugal.

These alone are reasons enough for an alliance; a change of regime in one country could not only mean security problems for the rest, but could fundamentally upset their economies. But to understand just how close is the

economic integration, one must examine some of the private financial interests that form the very skeleton of the sub-continent. By far the most important of these are the great mining groups.

These groups are involved in the mining of gold, diamonds, copper and other valuable minerals, but they all have widespread interests in manufacturing industry, real estate, coal, oil and agriculture. Because of their size and the proportion of total national wealth that they control, they have considerable influence in both economic and political spheres. They have direct control over their thousands of employees, special relations with the governments and political pressure groups, and substantial power over the international market for their products. In South Africa, they have unusually close connections with the Press. And through cross-directorships and cross-investments, they are intimately linked with each other.

The 'Cape-to-Katanga' miners, as they have been called, involve the diamond industry, controlled by De Beers, in South Africa; the gold industry, dominated by half a dozen major companies on the Witwatersrand—one of the largest being Anglo-American, in turn associated with De Beers; the copper industry in Zambia and Katanga, also partly controlled by Anglo-American; and the British South Africa Company itself, connected with the others in the past by cross-directorships and cross-investments, and now (since 1965) an Anglo-American subsidiary.

## TIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA

The 'Unholy Alliance' thus has its roots in Rhodesia's own origins; but it was the coming to power of the Rhodesian Front that accelerated its development into the highly-co-ordinated and powerful affair that it is today. As a commentator in the *Rand Daily Mail* (19.7.65.) remarked, "Historical and demographic links are strong. More than half the white Rhodesians or their fathers or mothers came from South Africa. Many family ties span the two countries. Every year, thousands of Rhodesians spend their holidays in South Africa, and the major part of Rhodesia's tourist traffic comes from the South". But, the paper went on, "there was a time when Rhodesia was written off by South Africa as an ally. African rule seemed inevitable within short years. The opposition of Whitehead and Welensky to Right Wing extremism, their endeavour to implement non-racialism and partnership, led to official chilliness towards South Africa. There was an obvious reluctance to be tarred with the South African brush.\*

"This attitude is now being reversed with considerable success and increasing warmth, and great efforts are being made to show the South Africans that the whites in Rhodesia are on top and intend to remain there". The *Rand Daily Mail* pointed to the 1964 trade agreement between South Africa and Rhodesia, so favourable to Rhodesia that exports to South Africa increased by 45 per cent in the first six months of 1965; and the new oil pipeline between Umtali (Rhodesia) and Beira (Mozambique), as evidence of links being forged between the three countries.

\*The *Rand Daily Mail* possibly exaggerates the significance of earlier Rhodesian efforts towards 'non-racialism'.

" All these approaches, the forging of closer ties between Rhodesia and the other States of the white South, are seen here as the beginnings of a much closer association of the white States. There are even visions of the creation of a strong white economic and defensive block straddling the continent from Angola in the west to Mozambique in the east. Inexorably, the scene for such a grouping is being set in Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon. The purpose would be to build a strong economic commonwealth, mobilising the vast wealth and natural and human resources of the area, while creating a bastion against sabotage, subversion and Communist infiltration from East Africa, and maintaining white control of the sub-continent for the foreseeable future.

" It is believed that informal and unofficial talks between the three partners, South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, have already been held. *Nothing can bring the plan to fruition till Rhodesia, the key section to the jigsaw puzzle, becomes independent and can enter into international arrangements.* The possibility of such an arrangement, of course, makes it much easier to break away from Britain and the Commonwealth, for it would give her a natural refuge from the economic blasts that would inevitably result from unilateral action".

The months of 1965 preceding U.D.I. were indeed months of many developments in the Unholy Alliance.

In February, South Africa made a loan of £2½ million to Rhodesia as a "goodwill gesture", according to Dr. Dinges, South African Finance Minister.

T.A.P., Portugal's national airline, started a Boeing 707 service to Johannesburg.

A 39-man Portuguese economic and technical delegation held talks with the Rhodesian Government in Salisbury, and later with South African officials in Pretoria.

A Portuguese-Rhodesian trade pact was signed.

In April, the Mozambique authorities banned transit of all arms and ammunition consigned to Zambia.

The South African Minister of Planning, Mr. Haak, addressed an economic conference in Johannesburg on "A Common Market in Africa—a marketing concept".

In May, the South African Government-constituted Industrial Development Corporation announced a long-term loan to South African companies to build two large sugar mills, costing R3½ million, one in Malawi and one in Mozambique.

The President of the Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa in opening the annual conference of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia in Salisbury, urged the construction of a new rail link between Rhodesia and the Republic via Beit Bridge (i.e. short-circuiting the route via Botswana).

Ian Smith, in a public speech at the beginning of June, recommended the same project for strategic reasons.

In May, too, the Governor of the Bank of Angola visited Lourenco Marques, Salisbury and Johannesburg, meeting Governors of the



Reserve Banks of all three countries, as a preliminary to the establishment of a new Portuguese Bank of South Africa with offices in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Salisbury and in Swaziland.

In June the deputy Mayor of Salisbury proposed an exchange scheme between families in the large cities of Southern Africa, including Lourenco Marques, Durban, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg.

A tax agreement was signed between Rhodesia and South Africa.

Mr. Clifford Dupont, Deputy Prime Minister of Rhodesia, visited the Governor-General of Mozambique, for talks on security.

In July, Mr. John Gaunt was appointed Rhodesia's "diplomatic representative" in Pretoria, and shortly afterwards Mr. Harry Reedman was similarly appointed to Lisbon despite protests from Whitehall, since Rhodesia, as a British colony, has no legal right to establish diplomatic missions abroad.

### RHODESIA'S ALLIES

As the hour of U.D.I. approached, encouragement from Rhodesia's neighbours became increasingly outspoken. South Africa's "accredited representative" in Salisbury, Mr. R. J. Montgomery referred Rhodesians for inspiration to South Africa's exit from the Commonwealth in 1961: "We took up the challenge", he said, "and as you all know, the country has gone from strength to strength. In like manner, Rhodesians have taken up the challenge, and a pattern is developing before our eyes, which promises to be not very different from the one we have in South Africa". (*Star*, Johannesburg 31/7/65). The Governor-General of Mozambique, Gen. J. A. da Costa Almeida, opening the Salisbury Show the following month, told his audience: "I am here as a neighbour and as a friend. We Portuguese know how difficult it is to construct, how much patience, effort and sacrifice must be made to arrive at what we see in Rhodesia. Therefore, we feel desolated with the attitude of those who... are sometimes ready to destroy in one day what took generations to build... We have common borders and interests and we try through loyal co-operation to render better the world we live in". (Newsletter of the Rhodesian High Commission, London, 27/8/65).

Thus, when U.D.I. came, it was not a sudden, impulsive move by an impatient clique in Rhodesia: the ground had been carefully prepared, throughout Southern Africa. It is difficult, so near to the event, to establish the precise extent to which the other Governments were actually party to the plot—both South Africa and Portugal went to some pains, at the time, to express formal disapproval of the act. But the build-up of Unholy Alliance co-operation belies the public protestations. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the world was confronted in November 1965 with a revolt planned and carried through by white Southern Africa as a whole, by the modern equivalents of the South Africa-centred settler forces which 70 years before, under Rhodes, had contrived the rape of the lands of Zimbabwe from the Mashona and the Matabele. And just as another British Administration 70 years ago had been inveigled into sanctioning the betrayal of the Africans through its own refusal to confront South Africa, so Southern Africa calculated in 1965 that the

principle of non-confrontation would operate again, render any measures taken against the rebellion eventually ineffective and force Britain again to accept a fait accompli.

Events after U.D.I. tend to confirm this interpretation, for South Africa and Portugal rallied immediately to defeat the oil sanctions imposed by Britain, and to ensure the survival of Smith's rebel Government.

## SANCTIONS

Before the end of November, Rhodesian officials in South Africa were stating that economic and financial arrangements between the two countries were "back to normal", although "the pattern of trade had changed since U.D.I." (*Sunday Express*, Johannesburg, 28/11/65). On December 1, the Johannesburg *Star* revealed in what way the pattern had changed—South African exporters were expecting a 20–30 per cent increase in Rhodesian trade, and special credit terms were being offered for both South African and overseas trade. The *Rhodesia Herald* (December 11) elaborated by saying that South African importers could obtain quick settlement of bills by presenting them under a letter of credit, thus passing a good part of the risk on to a Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation. To meet the freezing of Rhodesian assets in the U.K., "a good slice" of the £20 million foreign assets shown in the Rhodesian Reserve Bank figures, were revealed to have been transferred to the Republic and to Switzerland, before U.D.I. (*Rand Daily Mail*, 8/12/65).

In his 1966 New Year broadcast, Dr. Verwoerd made his first major pronouncement on U.D.I., attacking the British Government for succumbing to "pressures" from the African States. He said that the South African Government would not support the oil embargo against Rhodesia, nor any other boycott move. "I may not remain silent on attempts by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, if reported correctly, and certain newspapers, to suggest that the South African Government is acting or will act in such a manner, or has ever privately given assurances to Britain, which would be tantamount to secret support of sanctions or certain measures aimed at Rhodesia. This in fact would mean participating in them . . . (South Africa) will not be co-erced into participating in any form of boycott". (*Evening Post*, Port Elizabeth, 1/1/66). On February 28, the Prime Minister elaborated his definition of 'non-participation' in sanctions, which he said implied 'normal trade', and that normal trade meant selling as much as one could. "Selling more is not abnormal trade but better trade. This must be clearly understood". (*Rand Daily Mail*, 28/2/66).

What soon became clear was that South African interests planned not only to develop their own internal relations with Rhodesia in order to cushion the effects of sanctions, but to conspire to defeat sanctions altogether by helping to provide the machinery whereby Rhodesia's international trade could continue. By March, British businessmen were being reported as treating sanctions with open contempt.

As one company chairman in Rhodesia put it "We are now forging closer ties with the South African financial institutions who have the experience and contacts necessary for the type of trading in which we must now become involved". (*Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, 17/4/66).



It was here that the structure of the Southern African economies came to Rhodesia's aid, for a large proportion of Rhodesian enterprises are themselves subsidiaries either of South African companies, or of British or American, French or West German companies, which also have South African or Angolan or Mozambican subsidiaries. As long as trade with South Africa and the Portuguese colonies was unhampered, ways could be found of trading abroad.

## OIL

The first emergency operation was to keep Rhodesia supplied with oil. Rhodesia was believed at the time of U.D.I. to have oil supplies for weeks only, and without Mozambican and South African help, oil sanctions could doubtless have brought down the regime. A Rhodesian organisation called GENTA was set up, to receive "gifts" of oil from the "Friends of Rhodesia" in South Africa, and to purchase oil in the Republic. By the end of January 1966, oil was reaching Rhodesia by rail from Beira, shipped not by tankers but by ordinary freighters; and road tankers were rolling across the Beit Bridge from South Africa, bringing oil at the rate, according to the *Evening Post* (17/2/66), of 70,000 gallons per day. Rhodesia's requirements under rationing were said to be 83,000 gallons per day. While British journalists stood by the roadside watching with amazement the stealthy night crossings of grey-blue lorries with their B.P., Shell or Mobil markings painted out, the Commonwealth Relations Office in London denied any knowledge of the whole business.

It was not long, however, before this clandestine operation was superseded by more professional arrangements. The South African subsidiaries of Shell, B.P. and Mobil financed a new 100,000 gallon petrol depot at Messina in the Transvaal, within easy reach of the Rhodesian border; and the Portuguese oil refining company Sonarep (in which the French Total company has a holding) increased its storage capacity at Lourenco Marques with an investment of £2 million. On April 18, 1966, the *Evening Post* could report that Rhodesia was receiving 100,000 gallons of oil per day by rail, and 45,000 by road. Most of this illegal traffic was supplied from South Africa, and in June, preliminary estimates of the South African Department of Customs and Excise revealed that imports of mineral fuels in the first four months of 1966 had risen to £20 million, compared with £16.3 million for the same period in 1965. South Africa's exports for the same period rose by £4½ million. Although the British Navy dramatically intercepted two pirate tankers, the *Manuela* and the *Joanna V*, and prevented them from unloading their oil at Beira in April, oil continued to reach Rhodesia from Lourenco Marques which was not patrolled by the Navy. Smith claimed early in 1968 (*Observer*, 17/3/68) to have a year's petroleum supply in reserve, and the *Observer* estimated that it is now the Lourenco Marques refinery that supplies the bulk of Rhodesia's needs, at least 200,000 tons a year, openly exported by rail.

## ARMAMENTS

Apart from oil the United Nations in December 1966 banned sales of defence equipment, motor cars, aircraft and spares to Rhodesia. According to the

*Sunday Times*, London (27/8/67), two Portuguese firms in Beira were alone importing over 400 cars a month, for export to Umtali in covered trucks at night. Again according to the *Sunday Times* (4/2/68), the Smith regime is also getting spare parts for its (British) Canberra bombers and Hunter fighters (including complete Avon engines); and is expecting "brand new fighters with British jet engines". These are Impalas, the jet trainers manufactured in South Africa by the Atlas Air Corporation under licence from the Italian firm Aermacchi. The Impala can be adapted to carry guns, rockets or light bombs—and 300, or five times South Africa's maximum training needs, are to be produced.

## EXPORTS

Thus South Africa and Mozambique have provided finance and banking credit for Rhodesia to continue to buy abroad, and have broken the oil embargo and apparently also the arms embargo. Just as important, they have enabled the rebel regime to continue to export its key products: asbestos, copper, chrome, iron ore, and, to a lesser extent, sugar. Here, South African and Portuguese agencies, official and unofficial, have helped in two main ways: either by buying the goods themselves and re-exporting them as South African or Mozambican; or by providing, or accepting, false certificates of origin.\*

The role of ISCOR, the South African Iron and Steel Corporation, which is a government corporation, is a revealing example of the kind of collaboration involved. In March 1966 ISCOR made a £2½ million bid for an interest in RISCO, its Rhodesian equivalent thus making £2½ million sterling available to Rhodesia to finance foreign trade. It also lent its name to RISCO's exported iron ore which goes through the port at Lourenco Marques as South African. RISCO has a sales organisation, Fedmar, in Johannesburg, through which arrangements are made to sell the ore to Japanese and other foreign buyers.

International trade figures indicate transparently enough what has been happening. British imports from Rhodesia dropped 99 per cent in the first quarter of 1967, compared with the same period 1966; but its imports from South Africa rose 20 per cent in the same period. Japan's imports from Rhodesia dropped 99 per cent, while its imports from South Africa rose by 79 per cent. West Germany's imports from Rhodesia dropped 50 per cent, and from South Africa, rose eight per cent. By these methods, Rhodesia was said in 1967 to be making almost a third of her total pre-sanctions export earnings (*Sunday Times*, London, 27/8/67).

U.D.I. has thus produced quite unprecedented economic integration in Southern Africa, which has not unnaturally been accompanied by closer political and military integration. In the first months of U.D.I., Mr. John Gaunt proposed a political and military alliance at a business lunch in Johannesburg (*Rand Daily Mail*), 21/4/66), and in Umtali Ian Smith predicted "great unification in Southern Africa". (*Rhodesia Herald*, 3/6/66).

\*The Rhodesian Tobacco industry has, of course, been severely hit by sanctions, but substantial quantities are still reaching World markets.

Mr. Chad Chipunza, leader of the 'Parliamentary Opposition', expressed his fears that "if Mr. Smith succeeds in riding the storm of independence, we will end up as an unofficial sixth province of South Africa" (*Star*, 21/4/66).

## POLICE COLLABORATION

The police collaboration that had been building up since the early 1960's, has now become a routine matter. Smith's police have repeatedly shown themselves eager to search out and illegally to deport opponents of apartheid, into the hands of the South African authorities.

Two cases that have received publicity in Britain, but provoked no effective action by the British Government, are those of Michael Dingake, and Desmond Francis. Dingake is now serving a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment in the Republic, after being arrested by Rhodesian police at Fig Tree, Southern Rhodesia, on December 15, 1965—just after U.D.I. He was not deported to Botswana, where he was born, but to South Africa, where he was wanted for political "offences". Francis, a young South African teacher who was working in Zambia, is in Pretoria, detained under the Terrorism Act. On January 2, 1968 he drove across the Rhodesian border from Zambia, in order to check train times to arrange for his family to come from South Africa to visit him. He was arrested, detained and questioned by Smith's police, and it was more than a month before his English wife found out that he had been handed over to the South African security police and detained under the Terrorism Act.

The *New Statesman* commented on the Desmond Francis case: "His kidnapping—for that is what it was—is the kind of thing we learnt to expect from the Nazis or the K.G.B. Is there nothing we can do in a case like this? After all, Francis was kidnapped on what is still, in theory, British sovereign territory". (16/2/68).

Both Francis and Dingake found themselves victims of a common Southern African disregard of legal niceties and human decencies in the cause of white rule.

## THE COUNCIL OF THREE

But the heart of the Unholy Alliance is military collaboration—the expression of white Southern Africa's united determination to defend its privileges by force against the movement for popular liberation. Evidence of conferences between Rhodesian, South African, Mozambican and Angolan military and air force commanders dates back to 1962. According to testimony given to the United Nations Committee of 24 on Colonialism, officers of Angola's 2nd Air Force Region met officers of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force in Salisbury and in Luanda in February 1962 (testimony of Jose Ervedosa, report of the United Nations Committee on Colonialism, 1966).

An investigating team of the *Times*, London (12/3/68) concludes that this period may have seen the beginning of the top-level regular military co-ordination that exists today, personified in the Council of Three. These are top-ranking South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese officers, whose names are kept strictly secret, and who have been meeting once a month for

some time past, in Salisbury, Pretoria, Lourenco Marques or Luanda. The Governments concerned deny their existence, but African leaders and officials in Washington, according to the *Times*, know a great deal about them. It seems that their main function is the exchange of intelligence—"a guerrilla wanted by one country could be notified to the other two; if arrested, he would be handed over"—and joint planning. Thus, South African planes and helicopters with South African pilots, and South African police, have been in operation in Angola and Mozambique, as well as in Rhodesia. According to the *Times*, South African journalists have been persuaded not to publish this information.

This collaboration makes of Southern Africa a most formidable military force. South African military expenditure has risen from £22 million in 1960-61 to £127½ million in 1966-67.\* It has a Permanent Force of 17,276 men, supplemented by a Citizen Force of over 80,000 trained reservists. More are being trained at the rate of 25,000 per year. Its army equipment includes Sherman, Comet and Centurion tanks, Panhard and Ferret armoured vehicles, the latest anti-aircraft guns, and radar equipment. F.N. 7.62 rifles, standard NATO issue, are being manufactured in the Republic, and so are napalm bombs and anti-personnel mines. Its air force is equipped with Sabre Mk 6 interceptors, Mirage supersonic jet-strike fighter bombers, Canberra light bombers, Westland Wasp, Alouette and Sikorsky helicopters, as well as the Impalas now being manufactured in the Transvaal. The Navy High Command has 16 Buccaneer low-strike bombers—reported by the joint African National Congress-Zimbabwe African Peoples Union to be in use in Rhodesia.

Rhodesia itself inherited a well-armed air force from the Central African Federation, and had in 1965, 4,300 men under arms, and 6,400 police, now increased by national call-up of trained white reservists. Portugal's strength is in its ground forces—it is believed to have over 60,000 soldiers deployed in Southern Africa, 45,000 in Angola and 16,000 in Mozambique.

## THE THREAT OF WAR IN AFRICA

The most ominous fact about this military build-up in the South is the mounting evidence that it is aimed not only at defending white domination South of the Zambezi, but at forcing its will on the independent African States to the north. In 1967, fighting began between African Nationalist guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union and the African National Congress of South Africa, and Smith's security forces. At the time Rhodesian government Ministers and their South African allies made no secret of their aggressive intentions towards Zambia and Tanzania, the two countries alleged to be aiding the guerrillas. Within days of the outbreak of fighting, Mr. Wrathall, Rhodesian Deputy Prime Minister, was "warning" Zambia against harbouring "terrorists", (*Times*, London, 26/8/67), and in October Vorster made his threat that Zambia would be hit "so hard that you will never forget it". (*Evening Post*, 17/10/67).

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\*R268 million (£157m.) is the estimate for 1968-69.

Zambia is already half surrounded by hostile Unholy Alliance forces, apparently intent on harassing, threatening, bullying. On the west are the Portuguese in Angola, backed by South African helicopters, in action against the liberation forces of the Movimento Popular para el Libertacao di Angola (M.P.L.A.). Already there have been incursions across the border. In late 1966, two Zambians were killed and a third wounded in a raid by Portuguese troops; and in November 1967 the Portuguese shot a Zambian woman in the same area, in one of three border incidents.

In the south is the South African air base in the Caprivi Strip—the tongue of land extending from the northern tip of South West Africa, where South West, Botswana, Rhodesia and Zambia meet. As the *Times* (12/3/68) remarked, this heavily armed base with a two-mile runway just ten miles south of the Zambia border, is “the perfect sally-port from which to ‘hit’ Zambia so hard she will never forget it”. The *Times* adds that “for a defensive nation fearing black invasion, it is a curious location (hundreds of miles from South Africa’s boundaries) for an expensive and immovable military asset. For a confident State bent on a forward military policy, it is an ideal location from which to conduct it”. It is here that the South African helicopters operating in Angola are based; and only last October, Zambia was forced to rush troops and armoured cars to the area, following an incursion by armed South African troops in a helicopter.

But the most dangerous flashpoint at present is the Rhodesia border in the south-west. Five South African police were arrested in Zambia near Livingstone, early in 1968; Rhodesian planes have several times invaded Zambian airspace, dropping leaflets on Zambian villages (*Zambia News*, 24/9/67). In November and December 1967, Zambian reports indicate that there were seven armed incursions by Rhodesian forces, one by South African and two by Portuguese troops. (*Times*, 12/3/68). And it was in this area some five miles from the Portuguese/Zambia border that Zambia’s Luangwa Bridge was blown up, and a nightwatchman killed, on June 9, 1968. According to Patrick Keatley in the *Guardian* (11/6/68) the circumstances of the act pointed to the participation of “trained military personnel”.

This pressure on Zambia is explosive enough in itself. But it does not represent the limit of Unholy Alliance interference in black Africa. The role of South African and Rhodesian mercenaries in the Katanga rebellion is well known, as is the noticeable unwillingness of both the South African and Federation governments at the time to do anything to discourage volunteers from engaging themselves in armed conflict with a neighbouring state and with the United Nations. Expeditions by Southern African mercenaries since then have involved them in Angola, in the Congo and in Biafra. “How”, asks the *Times*, “could South Africa gain from Biafran bellicosity? Could it be that trouble among the blacks is good for the whites?” The latest report is that ex-Congo mercenaries are now engaged in Rhodesia.

It is no accident that Southern African bellicosity towards the rest of Africa has increased so dramatically since 1965, nor that military co-operation in the Unholy Alliance has reached its peak of efficiency in the same period.

It is no accident that the foundations of economic co-operation between the three members of the alliance were laid *before* U.D.I., and that it is this

co-operation that has made nonsense of economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

How does British policy towards Rhodesia, with its insistence that Rhodesia is a separate and British problem, look against this background? Can anyone today maintain that Rhodesia can be wrenched from the Unholy Alliance by *negotiation*—with, as mediator and honest broker, none other than the Republic of South Africa? What will persuade Southern Africa to surrender peacefully its new viability and its new consolidated unity?

## Chapter Three

### Britain and U.D.I.

The British Labour Party in Opposition roundly condemned the 1961 Constitution. Mr. John Stonehouse M.P., who has held a number of different Ministerial appointments in the Labour Administration, described it at the time as "a squalid sell-out to a Government which has a very similar outlook to that of Dr. Verwoerd. . . . The Commonwealth Secretary, has agreed to a new Constitution for Southern Rhodesia which will give, to all intents and purposes, independence to the European minority". (*Tribune*, London, 23/6/61).

Mr. Wilson himself, newly elected to the leadership of the Party, stated in March 1963 that "no Constitution is defensible which fails to allow the people of these territories to control their own destinies. We have bitterly attacked the Southern Rhodesian Constitution for that, and a Labour Government would therefore alter it. We've made that very, very plain. But we would go further. When these questions are debated at the United Nations, you would not find us voting in a collection of now, to some extent, discredited Imperial Powers".

Just before the Labour Government came to power in October 1964, Mr. Wilson committed himself once more in a letter to Dr. E. Mutasa, a member of the Committee against European Independence, in Salisbury: "The Labour Party is totally opposed to granting independence to Southern Rhodesia, so long as the Government of the country remains under the control of a white minority. We have repeatedly urged the British Government to negotiate a new constitution with all the African and European parties represented, in order to achieve a peaceful transition to majority rule".\*

Within a year of coming to power, however, Mr. Wilson's Government was engaged in Constitutional negotiations with Ian Smith's white minority Government, during which it became clear that Britain was prepared to consider granting independence before majority rule. Many people feel that Mr. Wilson had himself thrown away the one weapon which might have prevented the Rhodesians from seizing power—the possibility of Britain using force to prevent such an action. As early as October 27, 1964, the new Labour Administration issued a public statement, listing the consequences that would follow an act of rebellion—military action was not included. On the very eve of U.D.I. (November 1, 1965) Mr. Wilson told the House of Commons that the use of force against Rhodesia was out of the question.

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\*Quoted in 'Labour's Record on Southern Africa', by Ann Darnborough, published by the Anti-Apartheid Movement, June 1967.



The African nationalists interpreted this failure to use, or even to threaten the use of force as a gross betrayal. A statement issued by the Zimbabwe African People's Union just after U.D.I. accused Britain of "tolerating and encouraging" the white minority. Mr. Wilson's speech after U.D.I., when he referred to the possible use of force only to "restore law and order" in Rhodesia, has never been forgotten by the African leadership. Mr. George Nyandoro, Zimbabwe African People's Union Secretary-General, stated that, since Britain did not apparently consider the invasion of Rhodesia by South African troops in August 1967 the kind of breach of law and order it had in mind, he could only conclude that British troops, if they were used, would be used against the African liberatory forces. (*Sechaba*, journal of the African National Congress, May 1968).

## THE NEGOTIATIONS

In December 1965, Mr. Wilson told the House of Commons: "We cannot negotiate with an illegal regime, particularly one which has perverted, distorted, and misused the 1961 Constitution. . . . We cannot negotiate with these men, nor can they be trusted, after the return to constitutional rule, with the task of leading Rhodesia in the paths of freedom and racial harmony". Such negotiations, he told an angry Commonwealth Conference in Lagos in January 1966, "must be with a wider spread and more representative group of persons". He assured the Conference that the oil sanctions imposed by Britain and adopted by the United Nations in December 1965, would bring an end to the rebellion "in weeks rather than months".

Yet in February 1966, when every British newspaper was publishing details of the massive oil-lift across the Beit Bridge, Mr. Wilson's government insisted on the fiction that this was insignificant. On April 9, the United Nations Security Council was concerned enough over the massive breaches of sanctions to call on Britain to use force to prevent oil from reaching Beira for the Umtali pipeline, and the Manuela and Joanna V were accordingly intercepted by British Navy vessels. But this small essay in the use of force went no further. The British Ambassador made a special visit to the South African Prime Minister on April 20, and in the following months "talks about talks" with the illegal regime began in London.

Thus began the long series of negotiations—adjourned, broken off and restarted. The talks in London in May 1966 were followed by more in Salisbury in August, which were adjourned in reaction to Rhodesian plans to re-introduce preventative detention. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference meeting in London from September 6 to 14 revealed the extent of the gulf between British policy and the wishes of the majority of the Commonwealth Governments. The final communique stated that, while "most heads of Government had expressed the firm opinion that force was the only sure means of bringing down the illegal regime", the British Government had reiterated its stand by the 'Six Principles', and assured the Conference that "any settlement would be submitted for acceptance to the people of Rhodesia by appropriate democratic means".\* No sooner had the Prime

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\*The latter undertaking was in fact the 'sixth' principle, added to the five already described.



Ministers left London, however, than the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bowden, was back in Salisbury (September 19). No further talks emerged from this initiative—Mr. Smith announced that he regarded the “current series” as closed.

The next month, a ‘Special Envoy’, Sir Morrice James, was in Salisbury again, this time to deliver ‘final terms’. The United Nations General Assembly promptly “condemned any arrangement between the Administering Power and the illegal racist minority regime which would not recognise the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence” (October 22, 1966).

On November 4, the Smith Cabinet delivered its formal reply to the ‘final terms’, and according to Mr. Wilson on November 23, “a very wide gap of principle remained”. The United Nations General Assembly once more expressed its concern over the dragging negotiations by deploring the failure of the U.K. Government to put an end to the illegal minority regime. It condemned any arrangement that would transfer power to Rhodesia on any basis which failed to recognise the right of all the people of Rhodesia to self-determination; condemned the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and “those foreign financial and other interests” who were supporting the illegal regime; and called upon all States to render *all moral and material support to the people of Zimbabwe in their legitimate struggle to overthrow the Smith regime.*

## THE SIX PRINCIPLES

This resolution unequivocally placed Britain and the world community at loggerheads over Rhodesia, just as the two Commonwealth Conferences earlier in the year had revealed Britain’s alienation from the majority of the Commonwealth. It was in spite of this disastrous trend in his foreign relations that the British Prime Minister embarked on the ‘Tiger’ Talks with Mr. Smith on December 2. The Six Points of the working document later published made clear the extent to which Britain had retreated. The points were:—

1. Unimpeded progress to majority rule;
2. Guarantees against retrogressive constitutional amendments;
3. An immediate improvement in the political status of Africans;
4. Progress towards the ending of racial discrimination;
5. An assurance that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; and
6. Guarantees that there would be no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

If accepted, these principles could have opened the way for Rhodesian independence under a reworking of the 1961 Constitution, which the earlier Conservative Government had rejected as a basis for independence. They included no provision for dismantling the repressive legislation already passed; and none for widening the crucial ‘A’ roll franchise.

The *Sunday Times*, London (11/12/66), commented that "All the 'entrenched clauses' and 'external safeguards' depend on the sanction of force. Would a Britain that had failed to use force over U.D.I. consider using it to prevent all the subtle brakes that a determined white executive could apply to African development?"

Yet even these concessions, which had apparently satisfied Smith himself, were rejected by the Rhodesian Cabinet, and on December 8, 1966 the British Foreign Secretary went to the United Nations to propose "selective mandatory sanctions" on Rhodesian exports of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, hides, skins and leather. Britain resisted all African attempts to extend the list, to condemn Britain's failure to use force and South African and Portuguese support of Rhodesia.

### SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS

The year 1967 saw the Smith rebels growing in confidence. In January 1967 they set up their Constitutional Commission to draw up a "new Constitution" for Rhodesia; In July Mr. Smith was boasting, "Our independence is something we have, and we have no intention of ever relinquishing it", (*Sunday Times*, 30/7/67); and by September he was jubilant: "We have achieved the impossible, we have actually won!" (*Rand Daily Mail*, 14/9/67). In spite of this defiance, Mr. Wilson sent Lord Alport (former Conservative Colonial Secretary and Governor of the Federation) to Rhodesia in June, in a further attempt to initiate talks, which went on behind the scenes for most of the rest of the year.

While the Rhodesia Front Congress was indulging in what the *Rand Daily Mail* called a "field-day of racial emotionalism, fear and white prejudice", debating Apartheid behind closed doors, British Foreign Secretary George Brown was once more telling the United Nations that Britain ruled out the use of force to settle the Rhodesia dispute—this *after* the outbreak of fighting between African guerrillas and Rhodesian troops on August 19, and the invasion of Rhodesia—British territory—by South African police and army units! Britain, it is true, protested to South Africa. But Prime Minister Vorster simply retorted that "South Africa would act against overseas trained terrorists in every territory where it was allowed to", and that "South African police would remain in Rhodesia as long as they were allowed and as long as it was necessary". (*Transvaler*, 25/9/67).

The inevitable consequence of South Africa's new freedom to operate militarily up to the Zambesi itself imposed new pressure on Zambia. President Kaunda protested to Britain early in October about violations of Zambia's borders, and asked for British aid in protecting his country's security. He accused Britain of "deception of the worst type", since he had five times offered Zambia as a base for British troops to be used against Rhodesia, and had no response (*Times* 6/10/67).

Britain's response was to launch yet another attempt at a "negotiated settlement". Talks were held in London with Dr. Hilgard Muller, South African Minister of External Affairs, followed by talks in Pretoria among

Vorster, Muller, Smith and Lardner-Burke. Mr. Wilson told the *Rand Daily Mail* (18/10/67) that he knew Mr. Vorster and the South African Government were very anxious to promote a Rhodesian settlement. When Mr. George Thompson, Minister of Commonwealth Relations, arrived in Salisbury on November 8, fresh difficulties were raised, and further amendments proposed by the Smith regime to the 'Tiger' proposals. These involved the dropping of certain advances proposed for the system of representation in the Legislative Assembly and the Senate; (for example, the replacement of elected Africans in the Senate by appointed Chiefs), and the dropping of the Privy Council as a final appeal against amendments to Specially Entrenched constitutional provisions.

## THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations General Assembly once more found itself entirely out of patience with these interminable comings and goings: any further talks, it resolved on November 3, "must be with the representatives of all the political parties and not with the illegal regime". It demanded full-scale economic sanctions, a military blockade of sanctions-breaking ports, and the use of United Nations troops to enforce sanctions, under Chapter 7 of the Charter. The resolution was passed by 92 votes to two, with 18 abstentions, among them the U.K., U.S. and France.

Britain's Labour Government has clung to the idea that South Africa is a suitable mediator in the dispute with Rhodesia. It has persisted in this belief against all the evidence of South African conspiracy with Rhodesia; all the evidence of the military threat from the South Africa-Portugal-Rhodesia alliance in Africa; all the evidence that South Africa has not only enabled Rhodesia to evade sanctions, but uses the resultant expanded trade with the U.K. to bind Britain more closely to the Republic. (By 1967 South Africa was Britain's second most important trading partner). Non-confrontation with South Africa is still a central plank of British African policy. The Commonwealth Secretary told the Parliamentary Labour Party on December 12, 1967 that the three governing principles of Britain's Rhodesia policy were:

1. No sell-out—no independence without unimpeded progress to majority rule;
2. No war over Rhodesia;
3. No economic war with South Africa

(*Guardian*, 13/12/67).

The evidence cited in the foregoing chapters has demonstrated that these three principles are incompatible. The United Nations resolution of June 1968, imposing blanket mandatory economic sanctions on Rhodesia had its teeth drawn from the start, simply because it contained no provision for forcing South Africa to observe it.

## BRITISH POLICY

British policy in Rhodesia is interpreted by Africans, as aligning Britain on the side of white supremacy in the struggle for democracy in Southern Africa.

As a joint statement issued by the African National Congress and Zimbabwe African People's Union at the time of the Thompson talks put it: "Once more European politicians in London, Pretoria and Salisbury are holding friendly discussion concerning the situation in South Africa and Zimbabwe, without asking for the views of the 18 million oppressed peoples in those countries" (*Observer*, London 15/10/67).

How is one to account for the reversal of the Labour leaders' policy on Southern Africa? How can a Parliamentary party which in 1961 had denounced the Conservative Government's agreement to the 1961 Constitution as a sell-out to apartheid, find itself in 1966 acceding to proposals that would have made that Constitution a basis for independence for Rhodesia? Why is it that a Prime Minister who, before he was elected, pledged himself to refuse independence to a white minority, put all his energy, after he was elected, into finding a formula whereby this same white minority might be granted its independence, subject only to the best "guarantees" for the black majority he could negotiate? Why is it that a Government which in 1965 declared that it would never negotiate with rebels, found itself within six months doing precisely that?

It is not easy to analyse, so near to the time, just what factors have most influenced the Government. Certainly the economic crisis which faced Labour immediately it came to power, and which has dogged it ever since, has been important to all its calculations. Britain's economic difficulties, and in particular, the close dependence of the pound on American dollar backing, inhibited the Government from acting boldly abroad. The United States influenced by its heavy military commitment in Vietnam, seemed generally to favour caution in Southern Africa.

It is possible to argue that the quickest method of dealing with the Smith rebellion, and the least economically expensive in the long run, would have been the use of troops. The threat of force in the period 1964-65 might have done the trick; and if this had failed, the immediate despatch of British troops to Rhodesia in November 1965. White Rhodesia alone could never have prevailed against Britain, and would almost certainly not have attempted more than a token resistance. And would Verwoerd, whose diplomacy had always been directed at avoiding international conflict over apartheid, have plunged into war with Britain over Rhodesia?

### **WHY NO TROOPS BEFORE U.D.I.?**

Alternatively, suppose that British troops had been flown to Rhodesia *before* U.D.I.—simply as a precautionary measure, to protect the Governor? Such action before the Smith Government had publicly committed itself to unilateral independence might have precluded the possibility of armed resistance. It would have strengthened those forces in Rhodesia opposing U.D.I.; and the presence of British troops might have made possible both negotiation of a Constitution agreed by all Rhodesia's peoples, and its enforcement afterwards. Majority rule could have been assured within the period of occupation, and Rhodesia might now be a growing democracy. No guerrillas would be dying in the field, or resistance fighters rotting in jail. South Africa might have

been taught the valuable lesson that its expansion northward would not be tolerated by the world community; and that the future for Southern Africa lay, in the eyes of the world, not in race rule but in democracy.

Michael Foot, Labour M.P. for Ebbw Vale, warned just after U.D.I.: "If, in six months' or a year's time, the situation were to be that Mr. Smith and his illegal government still hold plenary power in Rhodesia, still clamping their police state on the four million Africans, this country will have suffered one of the most humiliating defeats in its history, a defeat from which our reputation could never recover all over Africa. Our position would be utterly devoid of its moral authority throughout the world". (*Guardian*, 15/11/65).

## THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS

Britain *has* suffered such a defeat. To find some clues to explain why it ignored the warnings, and why, three years later, Ian Smith is still in power, one has to look first not within the Labour movement, but at the complex inter-weaving economic interests involved in Southern Africa. For just as in the 1890's Rhodes found his allies in London, promising them seats on the Boards of his Companies and shares in the profits of exploitation, so today the forces of white supremacy in Rhodesia and South Africa find allies among the foreign investors who share with them the profits of cheap labour economies.

Today, there are nearly 400 British companies with subsidiary or associated companies in South Africa, and more than 190 with subsidiary or associated companies in Rhodesia. Among the latter are household names, the giants of British industry such as I.C.I., Courtaulds, Unilever, Shell and B.P., British Leyland Motor Holdings, Fisons, Guest Keen and Nettlefolds, Associated Electrical Industries, Hawker Siddeley, Imperial Tobacco, the Metal Box Company, the Reed Paper Group, Boots, Brooke Bond, and the Dunlop Rubber Company\*, to name a few at random.

Some of these operate directly through subsidiaries of the British company; but in other cases, as the *Financial Times* (9/10/65) described, "British companies operate in Rhodesia through subsidiaries of their South African subsidiaries; in others, British and South African minority shareholders are combined with local Rhodesian capital—sometimes in private companies, and disguised as bank nominees". The *Financial Times* estimated that between 200 and 300 British companies had interests in Rhodesia, with investments of some £200 million—about £150 million of this in mines, farms and property. Britain also supplied 30 per cent of Rhodesia's overseas purchases—machinery, transport equipment, chemicals and food—valued at £40 million per year.

British financial interests also link up with international interests, not only through the international connections of the big British companies such as Shell and I.C.I., but also through British finance in the great South African mining companies, which in turn have strong American, French, West German and African connections. Foreign investment in Southern Africa thus constitutes a considerable force, with a direct interest in the status quo. It is a force not without the means to make itself heard.

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\**Who Owns Whom* Roskill, London, 1967.

## THE RHODESIAN LOBBY

At the time of U.D.I., at least two Conservative Shadow Cabinet Ministers were directors of companies with interests in Rhodesia. Mr. Reginald Maudling, deputy leader of the Opposition, and former Chancellor of the Exchequer, was a Director of both Dunlop and A.E.I.; and Mr. John Boyd Carpenter, a former Cabinet Minister, was a Director of the London County Freehold and Leasehold Company (whose subsidiary owns and manages offices and flats in Salisbury). According to the Directory of Directors (1967) Members of Parliament with directorships of Southern Africa-connected firms include Mr. Anthony Barber (Chairman of the Conservative Party), Mr. Nigel Birch, Sir Cyril Black, Sir John Eden, the Rt. Hon. Hugh Fraser, Mr. Charles Gresham-Cooke, Sir Arthur Vere Harvey, Mr. Quintin Hogg, Sir Gerald Nabarro, Sir Cyril Osborne and the Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Rippon. These are all Conservative Members of Parliament, and among them are some of the most outspoken supporters of "negotiated settlement", or as others would see it, sell-out, in Rhodesia.

They also have their counterparts in the House of Lords—Viscounts Amory, Watkinson and Chandos are former Tory Ministers with directorships of companies involved in Rhodesia. Perhaps the most outspoken and most deeply committed to white Rhodesia, are two influential Conservatives connected with the British South Africa Company: Lord Salisbury, director of B.S.A.C. from 1957 to 1961 and still a large shareholder, and Mr. Julian Amery, former Minister of Aviation, a B.S.A.C. director at the time of the merger with Anglo-American, and leader of the right-wing Conservative lobby on Rhodesia. As a prominent member of the right-wing Monday Club, he has made no secret of his sympathy with the Smith rebellion from the beginning. He told British television viewers in November 1965 that he saw no issue of principle dividing Wilson and Smith, and advocated immediate negotiation. In January 1966 he visited Rhodesia, and has since campaigned vigorously against the sanctions policy of the British Government.

Directors of some of these companies involved in Rhodesia also appear on the Council of the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association, now adopted as an official constituent of the Government-backed British National Export Council. Among council members are directors of African Explosives (the South African company jointly owned by I.C.I. and De Beers, which owns a subsidiary in Rhodesia), Harveys of Bristol and the Standard Bank—all active in Rhodesia. Together with the other members of what is now the Southern Africa Committee of the British National Export Council, these are the men who have been campaigning to end the arms embargo against apartheid which, they have persuaded the Council, is an obstacle to the further expansion of trade with the Republic. Through the Southern Africa Committee they also have connections with the South Africa Foundation. Sir Nicholas Cayzer, Chairman of British and Commonwealth Shipping, which runs the main mail routes with Southern Africa, is President both of the Committee and of the London Committee of the Foundation. The South Africa Foundation was formed by South African businessmen (including Mr. Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo-American) in 1959 to promote a more favourable image of Apartheid abroad.



The present Rhodesia lobby, then, is well organised, and has friends in high places. It may already be credited with the cracking of the bi-partisan policy on Rhodesia, which broke down on the issue of mandatory sanctions through the United Nations. It may also be credited with the defeat in the House of Lords in June 1968 of the Government's legislation imposing mandatory sanctions. Whatever may be its direct influence on Government policy, some of its central arguments—that Britain's trade with Southern Africa is essential to her economy, that the Republic should be wooed and not confronted—are accepted at Government level. In February 1965 the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade expressed his determination to encourage South African trade: "We are proud to trade with South Africa, make no mistake about that", (Hansard, Lords, 15/2/65)—and this policy remains unchanged.

It may be assumed at any rate that the companies with interests in Rhodesia would at least be unenthusiastic about economic sanctions, and that they would constitute a permanent pressure group for "settlement" with Smith. Some of their Rhodesian or South African subsidiaries (for whose policies the parent company, it is argued, has no responsibility) are deeply involved in sabotaging the policy by sanctions breaking. Among the British companies whose names have recurred in press and television exposures of sanctions-breaking operations over the past two years are Lonrho, whose British directors were apparently powerless to prevent the oil from continuing to flow through the Beira-Umtali pipeline for several weeks after U.D.I., because they were outvoted by their Portuguese co-directors; Shell and B.P., whose South African subsidiaries built the Messina petroleum store; Turner and Newall, who find themselves unable to control the export of asbestos from their own mines in Rhodesia because it is sold through a South African subsidiary (Southern Asbestos) formed without the knowledge of the parent company; Lancashire Steel, and Stewarts and Lloyds, who have minority shareholdings in the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation, which is exporting iron ore.

It is in fact open to any British firm to continue to develop "normal relations" with its South African associate, and for that South African associate to act as agent for a Rhodesian company. As long as elementary precautions are taken to disguise the origin of Rhodesian exports and the destination of imports, a large proportion of international business can go on as usual. Since sanctions-breaking has inflated South African trade with Britain, it is reasonable to assume that many South African firms, and some British ones, are making handsome profits out of the affair.

## **DANGERS OF NON-CONFRONTATION**

It is obvious, then, that in present conditions no policy of economic sanctions can possibly succeed without the full and active support of the big international companies, and of South Africa and Portugal. It is also obvious that neither the companies nor South Africa and Portugal are ready to volunteer such support. To make the United Nations sanctions resolutions effective, the Security Council would have to assume powers to deal with the sanctions-



breakers, and it is precisely such powers of enforcement that the British Government has consistently opposed, since this would mean confrontation with South Africa. The policy of non-confrontation with South Africa is therefore totally incompatible with a policy of ending the Smith rebellion.

But what is less obvious is the further consequence of non-confrontation. Today, white supremacy and African liberation are at war in Southern Africa. It is as yet a small war. But what happens as the war develops, and the Southern African political and economic system finds itself seriously threatened? If British Government policy continues to allow itself to be so profoundly influenced by the interests of trade and investment in South Africa, will Britain find herself giving increasing assistance to Vorster's police state in its battle with African patriots? Could the logic of non-confrontation lead British Governments into increasing commitment to shoring up apartheid, only to be dragged, willing or unwilling, into an escalating war? Is it too melodramatic to talk of a possible Vietnam in Southern Africa? It is not yet too late to avert such a tragedy. But the prospect is one that our Government must look fully in the face, now.

## **THE DEFENCE AND AID FUND**

If the sanctions policy under present conditions is bound to fail, and if the use of force by Great Britain is not the answer, what is to be done? The Defence and Aid Fund does not advocate the use of force: many of those who support it are pacifists and many others would not counsel the use of force by Britain acting unilaterally. Clearly something must be done to make sanctions effective, and this means control of economic, financial and industrial power. A way has to be found, and Britain must be prepared to give a lead—and to give a lead will mean sacrifice, not only by those who make profits out of trade with South Africa and Rhodesia, but also by the whole population.

We in the Defence and Aid Fund have faith that the British people, who have given so generously of their money, their energy and their sympathy to the victims of race rule in Southern Africa, will not allow such a situation to develop. If we are not to be caught up in the terrifying escalation outlined above, it is necessary that not only a few of us, but all of us, care sufficiently to make Rhodesia a moral issue throughout the land, dependent not upon our immediate self-interest, but on our conscience as citizens, and as members of the human family.

# APPENDIX

## 1. THE 1961 CONSTITUTION.

### Legislative Assembly.

Two classes of Voters: an "A" Roll for citizens who could meet a high standard of qualifications and a "B" Roll for those who satisfied lower qualifications.

"A" Roll voters numbered nearly 100,000 and were nearly all white. They controlled 50 seats in Parliament.

"B" Roll voters, mostly Africans, controlled 15 seats.

### Declaration of Rights.

The constitution embodied a Declaration of Rights but these rights were extensively qualified. The Declaration did not apply to laws in force before November 1, 1962, nor to money matters, marriage, employment, immovable property, nor to the composition of the civil service; and it could be overridden on grounds of public safety, interest or order; morality; or health.

### Entrenched Clauses.

Certain clauses of the constitution were entrenched—those dealing with constitutional changes, franchise arrangements, African land rights, the Declaration of Rights, etc.

Amendments to the constitution required a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly but changes to the entrenched clauses required, in addition, either the approval of the four main racial communities, voting in separate referenda, or the approval of the Queen on British ministerial advice.

### Justice.

The right of appeal from the Rhodesian Appellate Division to the Privy Council was entrenched in the constitution.

### Constitutional Council.

A Constitutional Council of eleven members, comprising at least two whites, two Africans, one Asian, one Coloured and two advocates or attorneys, and a judge as Chairman, was entrusted with the responsibility of examining all legislation to see that it did not contravene the Declaration of Rights. But legislation passed before November 1, 1962 was exempted, as were money Bills and Bills certified by the Prime Minister to be so urgent that it was not in the public interest to delay their enactment. If the Council reported adversely on a Bill, it could be overridden by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly, or by a simple majority after a delay of six months.

## 2. THE SIX "TIGER" PRINCIPLES.

On December 2-4, 1966 when Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith met on board *H.M.S. Tiger* off Gibraltar in an attempt to negotiate a settlement, a working document set out six principles upon which discussions were based. These six principles were:—

1. Unimpeded progress to majority rule;
2. guarantees against retrogressive constitutional amendments;
3. an immediate improvement in the political status of Africans;
4. progress towards the ending of racial discrimination;
5. an assurance to the British Government that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole;
6. guarantees that there would be no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

## 3. SMITH'S COUNTER TO THE "TIGER" PROPOSALS.

British proposals, which Mr. Wilson said conformed to the six principles were rejected by the Rhodesian regime and Mr. Smith presented counter proposals which included the following:—

#### **Legislative Assembly**

- 35 "A" Roll Seats (instead of 33)
- 15 "B" Roll seats (instead of 17)
- 15 Reserved European seats (instead of 17)

#### **Senate**

- 12 Europeans (no change)
- 0 Elected Africans (instead of 8)
- 12 Chiefs (instead of 6)

The total membership of both Houses together would then be 89. The number required for the passage of an amendment to a Specially Entrenched provision would be 67, and the number required for the "blocking quarter" would be 23.

#### **Cross Voting.**

The system of cross-voting, as provided in the 1961 Constitution and the "Tiger" proposals should be abandoned. (Cross-voting was designed to give "B" Roll voters an influence in the election of members from the "A" Roll constituencies and "A" Roll voters an influence in the "B" Roll elections).

#### **Appeals.**

The system of appeals against proposed changes to entrenched clauses of the constitution to a constitutional commission and thence to the Privy Council, should be dropped.

#### **Delimitation.**

Alterations in the composition of the Legislative Assembly and the Senate should not be subject to the Special Entrenchment procedure.

### **4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS.**

After the collapse of the "Tiger" talks, Mr. Smith set up his own Constitutional Commission to devise a new constitution. This Commission's report, published on April 10, 1968, contained the following recommendations:—

#### **Legislative Assembly**

- 40 seats reserved for whites
- 20 seats reserved for Africans (12 to be allocated to "tribal representatives" chosen by electoral colleges; 2 to be elected by African freehold farmers; and 6 to be elected by urban Africans)
- 20 seats for members elected by voters on a qualified common roll. (Qualifications: an income of £900 per annum, or £600 and four years' secondary education; special provision to include chiefs and headmen).

#### **Senate**

- 12 Whites chosen by electoral college
- 6 African chiefs
- 6 Africans chosen by electoral college
- 7 member appointed by Head of State

#### **Delimitation.**

A committee, subject to veto by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, to replace the Delimitation Commission.

#### **Constitution.**

Ordinary amendments to the constitution subject to a two-thirds majority of each House and amendments to the entrenched clauses, including those relating to land tenure and the composition of the legislature, in addition, a three-quarters majority of both Houses sitting together.

#### **Constitutional Council.**

A Senate committee to replace the Constitutional Council.

## 5. THE "FEARLESS" PROPOSALS.

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith had a second meeting from October 9 to 13, 1968 at Gibraltar, this time aboard *H.M.S. Fearless* when Mr. Wilson laid down three basic conditions for a new offer—(a) the terms had to be clearly within the six principles; (b) the Rhodesian negotiators should be able to carry out any agreement they made; and (c) they had to be people who could be trusted to fulfil both the letter and the spirit of any settlement.

At the end of the talks a joint communique was issued stating that some progress had been made "but disagreement on fundamental issues remains".

A White Paper issued by the British Government on October 15, 1968 set out the proposals put forward by Mr. Wilson. The main points were:—

### Legislative Assembly

- 33 "A" Roll seats
- 17 "B" Roll seats
- 17 Reserved European seats, to be elected by European electorate.  
Each block of seats to cover whole country.

### Senate

- 12 European seats, elected by Europeans on the "A" Roll.
- 8 African seats, elected by Africans on "A" and "B" Rolls, voting together.
- 6 Chiefs, elected by the Chiefs' Councils.

### Franchise.

The "B" Roll franchise to be extended to include all Africans over 30 who satisfy the citizenship and residence qualifications. Cross voting to be retained at 25 per cent and applied to all seats in the Legislative Assembly filled by "A" and "B" Roll elections.

### Delimitation.

Alteration in the composition of both Houses and in number of seats to be effected by special entrenchment procedure. But the terms of reference of the Delimitation Commission to incorporate a formula with the overriding objective of dividing constituencies to ensure that the proportion of those with a majority of African voters on the "A" Roll at the time of delimitation is the same as the proportion of African voters then on the "A" Roll for the country as a whole.

### Constitution.

Ordinary amendments to the constitution subject to a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly and Bills to amend specially entrenched provisions, subject to a vote of three-quarters of the total membership of both Houses voting together. In addition, a system of appeal against such amendments, on the grounds of unjust racial discrimination or violation of the Declaration of Rights.

The *Fearless* proposals also included procedures to give effect to Britain's Fourth principle (progress towards ending racial discrimination) and Fifth principle (any settlement to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole)—a Rhodesian commission to deal with the former and a Royal Commission to test the latter.

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