

REORGANISATION OF PARASTATALS IN ZIMBABWE

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INTRODUCTION

The issue on the reorganisation of parastatals in Zimbabwe is a complex one. In tackling this challenging task we are going to arrange our discourse along the following milestone path:

- (a) The operating assumptions about the need for the reorganisation of parastatals in Zimbabwe.
- (b) The problem arising from the multiplicity, conflicting, contextual and historical - based measurement of the performance (effectiveness - efficiency combination) of the parastatals in the country.
- (c) At what level(s) should reorganisation be executed given the current structural configurations?
- (d) The recommended structures taking into account both the relative "static" and relative "dynamic" dimensions of organisation structural forms.
- (e) And lastly the recommended strategic management process under the recommended reorganisation.

The Operating Assumptions About The Need to Reorganise Parastatals in Zimbabwe

There is no need to emphasise that reorganisation of institutions is costly, disruptive, may be demoralising to others etc. One can safely say that behind any reorganisation is the implicit or explicit assumption that the current organisation structural form is a missing link or "misfit", that causes the institution under investigation to "malperform" or to perform below expected effectiveness and efficiency dimensions. Here the organisation structure is taken to be a decision variable causally related to efficient and effective organisational performance. Or secondarily the organisation structure has high correlation coefficient with efficiency and effectiveness.

The problems with the above assumptions are obvious:

- (a) the measurement of effectiveness especially, and efficiency on a secondary consideration is very difficult due to the multiplicity of goals, different prioritisation of goal-attainment, biases brought in by evaluators, differences between official and actual goals, time horizon within which goals must be attained, the age of the organisation, the question as to whose goals matters etc.

(b) there are a number of non-structural factors that need to be considered for the purposes of explaining the performance of an organisation at any given time. This brings about the problem of multiple causal and/or correlational factors. Essentially we are dealing with a dynamic, non-linear, interactional multiple regression which require omnivizard mathematician with skills normally not possessed by organisation designers.

Notwithstanding the exacting problems identified, there is a growing concern within the Zimbabwean society that parastatal organisations are relatively less efficient and their output relatively shoddy or inadequate, which makes them (outputs) to be unsatisfactory. Our subsequent discussion is going to be based on the assumption that there is reasonable validity in the above growing concern and also on the accumulated knowledge about the factors that affect organisation performance - as these are brought to bear on the current structuring of parastatals in the country. Obviously a more useful discussion in this area needs to be preceded by thorough research.

Measurement of Effectiveness and Efficiency of Parastatals in Zimbabwe

The measurement of effectiveness and efficiency of parastatals in Zimbabwe is a heavy-weight topic on its own. There is no intention to dwell at length on this area but only to demonstrate that the issues are by no means easy and non-controversial.

At this point it is important to state that our principal focus is going to be on the parastatals of a financial/commercial/ manufacturing type (operating in relatively competitive input, process and output environments) rather than pure utilities type operating in relatively monopolistic market structures. The former category represent what is to be referred to as productive parastatals.

Parastatal effectiveness measures the degree to which a parastatal realises its goals; efficiency measures the amount of resources used by a parastatal to produce its offerings: it is thus the ratio of inputs to outputs. Effectiveness and efficiency do not necessary go together. A parastatal can be efficient but ineffective, or it can be effective but inefficient. Management intervention is aimed at attaining the highest relative level of combination between efficiency and effectiveness.

Problems of Goal-Attainment Measurement

The assumption here is that parastatals have well defined goals, that are measurable, attainable; there is consensus among the insiders and outsiders *within and outside* the parastatals as to not only what goals should be

pursued but also the priorities among the goals: the parastatals are concerned only with ends not means to achieve those ends. The problem with the goal-attainment is that there are numerous goals ranging from economic to social (developmental), different actors in the operating scenes of parastatals such as the ruling party, cabinet, ministers, permanent secretaries, board members, general managers, assistant general managers, technostructural analysts and support staff, employees, outside members of the public have different expectations or use different measurement of goal attainment or have different priorities.

Furthermore goals might conflict with each other with respect to whether they are short-term or long-term. Thus high capital investment, up-to-date maintenance programme of equipment, manpower training and development etc have short-term adverse effects on the bottom-line but might have positive long-term effect on the bottom-line. Some goals are incompatible: concern with employees interest achievable say through higher remuneration and uneconomical job enrichment programmes might conflict with the goal to produce a low priced offering and efficient transformation system, or avoidance of innovation on the technical system of the organisation in order to keep high level of employment might lead to failure to penetrate competitive markets at home and/or abroad. Different organisations tend to operate under different environments with respect to resource availability, consumer demand, quality of manpower, government regulations, location, age, size etc.

Systems Approach. This approach focuses on the means to achieve ultimate goals. The ability of a parastatal to acquire inputs, process them (using relevant technical system) and produce outputs acceptable by the environment. Satisfied environment in turn provide inputs to the organisation, thereby maintaining continued viability. A couple measurement variables in ratio terms might take the following form: output/input, transformation/inputs, transformation output, input/input etc (Robbins, 1983). Ability to acquire scarce and valued resources, correct perception of the external environment, ability to use resources to produce desired offerings, smooth day-to-day organisational activities are measures used in the system approach (Daft, 1983).


The Competing-Value Approach This approach is related to different constituency problem identified in our goal-attainment focus. "What you value - return on investment, market share, new product innovation, job security - depends on who you are and the interests you represent" (Robbins, 1983). Here the assessment of the performance of parastatals is founded on values; the efficiency and effectiveness of the parastatals are "in the eye of the

beholder" (Robbins, 1983).

The above approach has led to the pigeonholing of three sets of competing values: the flexibility - control characteristic of organisation life focusing on the value "of innovation, adaptability and change versus authority, order and control"; the initiating versus consideration structures, that is concerned for "people versus concern for productivity and task accomplishment", and lastly those values relating "organisational means and ends, from an emphasis on processes to an emphasis on final outcomes" (Robbins, 1983).

Figure 1 below shows the three - dimensional representation of the competing value approach.

FIGURE 1
A three-dimensional model of Organisational
Effectiveness and Four Models of Effectiveness Values



Source: Adapted from Stephen P. Robbins.
Organisation Theory, Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983.

In summary Figure 1 demonstrates that the evaluators of our parastatals can fall within any of our three categories of organisational effectiveness and might conceptualise individual parastatals along four possible models. The outcome of such evaluation cannot be expected to be the same.

According to the open system model, flexibility, innovation etc represent means that help the organisation to acquire scarce and valued resources, to achieve its growth as ends in organisation activities; under the rational model goal setting, planning, budgeting, programming evaluation etc are means that lead to ends such as productivity and efficiency: the internal process model has as its means information gathering and processing, communication etc whose ends are stability, control etc.; and, organisational or group cohesion and morale are means to the enhancement of the value of human resources.

An elaborate treatment of organisational treatment which could be used with different degrees of moderation is presented in Figure 2 below. Here efficiency and effectiveness are measures to be used within the internal and external domains of our organisation or corporation. The external domain covers what has become known as task environment and general (cultural) environment.

Figure 2
Domains of Organisational Effectiveness

<p><u>Internal Efficiency</u></p> <p>Focus: Output/Input</p> <p>Measures: Units of offerings produced per hours; Rate of Return on invested capital; Level of capacity utilization; Assets turnover; Scrap material per unit etc.</p>	<p><u>External Efficiency</u></p> <p>Focus: Bargaining Position with Environment</p> <p>Measures: Implied or Real cost of capital; Market share, development, penetration etc; New offerings/market development; Cost of inputs; Profit/surplus; Level of government financial allocation etc</p>
<p><u>Internal Effectiveness</u></p> <p>Focus: Management & Employee satisfaction</p> <p>Measures: Manpower turnover; Manpower attitudes; Organisational climate; Human resources commitment; Inter units relationship; Interpersonal relationships etc.</p>	<p><u>External Effectiveness</u></p> <p>Focus: Societal approval and satisfaction</p> <p>Measures: Community satisfaction with the organisation; Satisfaction of resource supplies; Satisfaction of the consumers/users; Social responsiveness and initiative; contribution to the quality of life of Zimbabweans.</p>

Source: Adapted from Ralph H. Kiliman and Richard P. Herden, "Towards a systematic methodology for evaluating the impact of Interventions on organisational Effectiveness", Academy of management Review 1 (1976). Quoted by Daft, 1983.

In concluding this section of our discussion it should be clear by now that the assessment of organisational performance is a very complex exercise. It should always be handled with care, controlled emotions and avoidance of sensational and unqualified statements. Before we can praise or condemn our parastatals it is important to do thorough studies that will enable us to go with relative ease through the jungle of parastatals effectiveness and efficiency. Facts should prevail over opinions, ideologising by the left or right-wingers in our political spectrums and paternalistic foreign-aid givers, squealling by parastatal managers and unduly expectations by the members of the Zimbabwean community.


Structural Levels at which reorganisation should take place

It is important to reiterate that although the assessment of performance by the Zimbabwean parastatals has not been subjected to impartial and thorough research, the growing public concern within the Zimbabwean society that parastatal organisations are relatively less efficient and effective is going to be assumed to be valid for purposes of our discussion.

The organisational levels of parastatals in Zimbabwe can be given (with the chain of command or vertical differentiation shown in horizontal form) as in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3

Organisational Levels of Parastatals in Zimbabwe



A comprehensive understanding of organisation structure is required before we can discuss our recommended reorganisation. An organisation structure has the visible "static" attributes representing the allocated tasks and responsibility of incumbents, formal reporting relationships including degree

of vertical differentiation (number of levels in the hierarchy) and degree of horizontal differentiation (representing division of labour and span of management at the same hierarchical levels) and the major grouping (using different bases) of tasks into departments and the grouping of these to the overall organisation. The "dynamic" attributes can be the most important although there are intangibles and these are represented by co-ordination mechanisms (vertically and horizontally) degree of centralisation of decision making power, degree of formalisation, information systems and communication networks, performance evaluation, reward and sanction systems etc. Obviously the "dynamic" attributes of organisation are not shown by organisation charts (Daft, 1983).

In reorganising the parastatals in Zimbabwe we should be responding to either the "static" or "dynamic" dimensions of organisational structures or to both. This is very important to put on relief. Can we say the problems of performance among Zimbabwean parastatals are, other non-structural factors remaining constant, due to the "static" or "dynamic" attributes of their structural forms? Once more it should be obvious that preceeding any reorganisation thorough and well-directed research is necessary, less we fall into the "one best way" prescriptions of the universalists or semi-universalists.

Guiding Principles

Before spelling out our recommended areas of reorganisation given Figure 3, it is helpful to state our guiding principles as follows:

- (a) Both the "static" and "dynamic" attributes of structures should be taken into account.
- (b) There should be consistency among the design parameters (formalisation, centralisation of decision making power etc) and contingency factors (size, environment, technology, values of managers etc) for us to come up with effective structures.
- (c) Decentralisation of decision making power is not a panacea for all performance circumstances; it can be vertical or horizontal, it can be selective or parallel etc (Mintzberg 1979). It should also be consistent with contingency factors and other design parameters.
- (d) Not all structures are equally effective and at certain level of our parastatal organisational hierarchy there should be different structures from parastatal to parastatal.

- (e) The decentralisation of decision making power should go hand-in-hand with corresponding standardisation of performance results.
- (f) During the stage where the government of Zimbabwe is not a dominating force in the ownership and control of the major means of development national development planning is a limited executable concept. The government's economic thrust can only be through institutions its owns or those whose resources it owns.
- (g) There is a need to achieve integrated thrust of parastatals as a government socio-economic arm, as well as adaptive and innovative behaviour of individual productive parastatals. There should be a body with undisturbed and concentrated attention to the socio-economic roles of parastatals.
- (h) The special and specific socio-economic roles of the parastatals should not be subordinated to routine government overall administrative machinery.
- (i) There should be professional management of parastatals without the introduction of ideological anarchy and the loss of ultimate loss of control by the owner - the people of Zimbabwe through their elected government.

- (j) Differentiated rewards for differentiated performance should be encouraged. Remuneration levels of the parastatal managers and employees should not be unduly tied to governmental administrative scales.

Recommended Reorganisation ("Static" attributes Emphasis)

Figures 4 and 5 show the simple and relatively complex reorganisation of the "static" attributes of organisational structures of parastatals respectively. The difficulty we have here is that of dealing with a portfolio of parastatals rather than one particular parastatal. The thrust at parastatal level of the structural configuration is going to be aggregate, with obvious limitations.

FIGURE 4

Simple Reorganisation of Parastatals showing also the position of related Institutions.





FIGURE 5

Recommended Structural Reorganisation



The recommended reorganisation can be put forward in the following form:

(a) Productive parastatals (as defined earlier) are removed from their current ministries. Examples of these parastatals would include Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, Cold Storage Commission, Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation, Agricultural Finance Corporation, Small Enterprise Development Corporation, Grain and other Agricultural Marketing Boards, Air Zimbabwe Corporation, Zimbabwe Trading Corporation etc. It should be noted that for others to be fully productive parastatals there should be some relative relaxation in the stipulation of input and output prices.

(b) A Parastatal Planning and development Commission should be established to be responsible for the overall overseeing of the performance of productive parastatals. This Commission is also, from time to time, responsible for the development of new parastatals and/or the divestiture of existing ones.

(c) The general managers or managing directors of individual parastatals report to the Commission, which, in turn, is answerable to the Cabinet. Government Development Corporations which, on behalf of the Government, are more involved in equity participation in other private corporations should also be under the Commission.

(d) Figure 5 shows three possible structural configurations below the level of the Commission. Basically these three configurations represent two basic structural forms: the functional and divisional. The functional structure involves the grouping together of similar and related occupational specialities. It is essentially organised according to resource inputs. Typical functional units are marketing, production, finance and human resource management. This structural form will be recommended for parastatals operating in relatively stable environment (input, process and market), where the competitive or performance emphasis on efficiency (achieved through economies of scale); in-depth-skill development on functional lines is a success factor; best for small to medium-size organisation with only one or few offerings. The functional structure is relatively slow in responding to changing environment in scientific, technical and market fields, it encourages the piling of decision on top of the hierarchy and leads to poor interfunctional co-ordination. The typical co-ordination mechanism and information flow and emphasise intervention by hierarchy, rules and procedures are specified and information flow is typically vertical.

The divisional structure represents the development of self-contained, autonomous units organised around product, market, project, region etc. to deal with sub-environments within the overall environment facing the corporation. The emphasis is on organisational output or clientele critical for the survival of the organisation. Accordingly, where the success factors in the industry call upon client satisfaction, which is a variate; where market segmentation and co-ordination of functional activities around product, market, project, region are considered crucial, the divisional structure is preferable. We can, therefore, say that the divisional structure¹⁵ is relatively suitable in unstable environment, where the organisation should respond to differences in products, regions, clients, and should be considered in large organisations with a number of offerings (Duncan, 1979).

The relevant co-ordination mechanism for divisional structures include the standardization of outputs or the specification of financial results (performance controls): liaisoning role are extensive for those divisions coupled sequentially. Standardisation of skills, management training and indoctrination are important formalisation tools. Occassionally direct supervision is used to back other co-ordination mechanism. After careful study there are also possible rationalisation options with respect to current parastatals being merged into divisionalised units. For instance possibilities might exist along the following lines:

Broadcasting, Post and Telecommunication Corporation with three major divisions (see Figure 5) made up by Broadcasting Division, Postal Services Division and Telecommunication Division; Airtransportation Corporation made up of Air Zimbabwe Division, Air freight Zimbabwe Division; Supplies and Trading Corporation with Government Supplies Division catering for government needs (as currently serviced the Ministry of Supplies), General Supplies Division and Trading Division.

This recommendation, allowing for different structural forms of individual parastatals facing different contingency factors (size, technical system, environment etc) is crucial given the current Zimbabwean situation. Parastatals in Zimbabwe as it is in most Africa countries are "monotonously" structured. The role of legal specialists in structuring the parastatals is based on "one best way" approach to designing organisational systems. Lawyers are experts on developing constitutions for organisation: they are concerned with formal legislative and judicial functions of organisational governance. Their concern is to bring control and order within the organisation. The structuring of socio-economic organisational systems require more devices than those known and emphasized by legal experts. The contingency factors have to be consistent with design parameters. Organisations exposed to different contingency factors should be structured differently; and since the contingency factors are dynamic, the management of change and development should be the norm: this should obviously include the redesign of organisational structural forms (both the "static" and "dynamic" dimensions).

Closely related to the above discussion is the problem of initial size or complexity of the parastatals. Parastatals are "Born Old" from a structural sense. All the possible structural attributes are "imposed" upon a new organisation which is supposed to grow, penetrate markets and stabilise itself before it is over-burdened with "monstrous" units, heavy salary bills, fulfilled

technostructural personnel (analysts involved in standardizing work flow, standardizing the intellectual work of the organisation, designing strategic planning systems etc) and support staff (legal counsel, public and Industrial Relations, cafeteria, R & D etc) (Mintzberg, 1979). If the parastatals are "born old" the only growth option available is stagnation, decline or "growing childish."

Recommended Reorganisation ("Dynamic" attributes emphasis)

Under each of the structural forms (functional and divisional) we touched on typical co-ordinating mechanisms. These mechanisms represent the "dynamic" attributes of organisation structural forms. Our interest here is going to be focused on the power over decision making processes. Accordingly the centralisation - decentralisation continuum is going to be our main subject matter.

Conceptualising Centralisation and Decentralisation. Centralisation and decentralisation are common place concept readily "tongue-out" by many. Centralisation and decentralisation deal with where the power to make decision rests: if it rests at a single point in the organisation, which is the same as ultimately resting in the hands of individual or cohesive group of individuals, the power to make decisions is said to be centralised; on the other hand, if the power to make decisions is distributed to many persons within any organisation it is said to be decentralised. This is a simple all-embrasive statement. But it must be appreciated that such a statement still leaves us with a number of problems (Mintzberg, 1979).

- (a) What sort of decisions are we referring to? Are these strategic or operational decisions?
- (b) Does decentralising to a particular unit or hierarchical level highly correlated to decentralisation within that unit or level?
- (c) If power to make decisions is vertically delegated to all the line managers can we say that decentralisation has taken place throughout the organisation?
- (d) Is decisional power always consistently distributed or dispersed?
- (e) The decision-making process is elaborate, covering (i) collection of information, (ii) processing of information, (iii) making the choice (determining what is intended to be done), (iv) authorizing elsewhere what is intended to be done, and (v) executing what is in fact done (Paterson, 1960). Under these circumstances an individual organisation member can only maximise his or her power over the decision making process by engaging in all these steps or in the majority of them including control over action.

- (f) Given the above conceptualisation issues, can we say that the power to make decision in the Zimbabwean parastatal structural configuration shown in Figure 3 is centralised or decentralised; what type of decisions, at what levels, at what points of the decision making process etc?

Our general response to the above issues can be given as follows: either power to make strategic or operational or both decisions is centralised or decentralised; decentralisation to any particular unit or level does not necessarily lead to decentralisation within that unit or units below it; vertical decentralisation only affect line managers, not technostructural, personnel, support staff and operators, to achieve this horizontal decentralisation should go hand-in-hand with vertical decentralisation; decentralisation of power to make decisions might be selectively done e.g. finance and legal decision being retained at the highest level of the organisation but marketing and production decisions being decentralised further down, or parallel decentralisation might be experienced giving say finance, marketing and production decisions to divisional managers (Mintzberg, 1979); few individuals control all the steps in decision making process leading to a situation where power to make decision is either deliberately decentralised or is decentralised by default.

We can only be general in dealing with the question of centralisation-decentralisation in our parastatals. This means we shall follow more a statement of principles rather than the specific forms decentralisation should take place within each parastatal.

The following principles are instructive:

- (1) Decentralisation should be both vertical and horizontal. It should flow from cabinet, through the Commission to operators, technostructural personnel and support staff.
- (2) Decentralisation should be selective and parallel.
- (3) Temptation towards unduly centralisation should be avoided. We should always remember that "----- having the power to make a decision gives one neither the information nor the cognitive capacity to make it." (Mintzberg, 1979).
- (4) Decentralisation benefits should be fully exploited: enabling individual parastatals to respond quickly to unique and local environmental demands; motivating creative and intelligent persons; training middle-line managers for future higher responsibilities etc. The integrated behaviour of parastatals as a group

to meet the government broadly stipulated socio-economic goals of the Zimbabwean society requires that checks and balances should be used by the Commission. This, by itself, should not be construed to mean centralisation or unnecessary additional bureaucratic structures.

We shall now turn to the broad responsibilities among others, of the cabinet, commission for parastatal planning and development and the individual parastatal level.

Cabinet

1. Specifies broad socio-economic goals of the parastatals.
2. Allocate government financial resources to the Commission
3. Spells out the limits and conditions under which the Commission can raise funds from local and external capital markets for use by the parastatals.
4. Evaluates the performance of the personnel within the Commission
5. Decides on the monetary and fiscal policies conducive to the operations of the parastatals or the Commission.
6. Provides political support to the Commission and parastatals and approves the appointment of senior members of the Commission.

Commission for Parastatals.

1. Decides on the development of new parastatals, acquisition of companies to be turned into parastatals, and the liquidation of parastatal misfits.
2. Manages the overall parastatal portfolio with due attention paid to overall balance in growth, earnings and acceptable risk.
3. Designs, in conjunction with parastatal heads performance control systems to which parastatal heads would be held accountable.
4. Reallocates funds within the parastatal portfolio on the basis of needs and capability to generate them.
5. Authorisation of parastatal capital budgets considered high enough to affect the health of the entire portfolio.

6. Approval of major structural changes engineered from individual parastatals from time to time.

Individual Parastatal Level

1. Development of specific autonomous product-service/market strategies tailored to the unique industry conditions.
2. Development of programmes, budgets and action plans to implement chosen strategies.
3. Development of requisite competitive tools in the areas of product/service quality, pricing, promotion, channels of distribution, resource deployment emphasis etc.
4. Deployment of allocated and retained financial resources to meet strategic requirements.
5. Development of procurement policies and marketing strategies within the broad guides from the commission.
6. Meeting or satisfying performance results jointly developed with the Commission. Accounting to the Commission for these results.

Recommended Strategic Management Process

In our discussion of centralisation - centralisation and the major responsibilities of the cabinet, commission and individual parastatals we have touched on issues of strategic management. At this point we shall merely repeat what has already appeared in the other paper (Shabalala, 1986). The strategic planning process should take the following form: "the cabinet spells out broad socio-economic and scientific-technical development goals of the nation. The parastatal Commission articulates the basic mission and role of the parastatals within the broad goals set by the cabinet. Utilising environmental data from the National Research Institute National Central Statistical Commission and the directorate of Manpower Planning, Development and Utilisation (see Figure 4), the Parastatal Commission would develop broad goals and planning premises or assumptions of the individual parastatals. In the light of the broad goals and assumptions from the Commission, each parastatal would develop its goals, strategies and budgetary requirements. This would be fed to the commission and a committee made up of Senior members of the Commission, members from the technostructural units (National Research Institute National Central Statistical commission, directorate of Manpower Planning, Development and utilisation) and heads of parastatals would review and reconcile plans from each parastatal corporation. In agreement, each parastatal would be accountable

to the Commission for agreed goals, strategies, programmes and resource allocations. The planning process between the Parastatal Commission and productive parastatals would be strictly top-down and bottom-up, that is two way in its thrust. Similarly within each parastatal, top management, functional or divisional heads, the two-way process should be the norm.

CONCLUSION

Our conclusion will do not more than emphasising that the evaluation of parastatal performance is a complex exercise given the multiplicity of goals, the conflicting nature of goals, the contextual differences within which individual parastatals operates, the demands by different interested parties, differentiated values of evaluators, different time horizon etc. Structural factors are not the only factors that affect the effectiveness and efficiency of parastatals. The effectiveness of parastatals has to be assessed through, at least, four domains: internal efficiency, external efficiency, internal effectiveness and external effectiveness.

There is a need to consider both "static" and "dynamic" attributes of organisation structure before engaging in any reorganisation. The structural reorganisation that is recommended moved from cabinet through the Parastatal Planning Commission to individual parastatals which might be structured along functional or divisional lines, depending on prevailing contingency factors.

In dealing with the "dynamic" attributes of the structure we emphasised the need for the proper understanding of the concept of centralisation and decentralisation. It was recommended that decentralisation be both vertical and horizontal, should be selective and parallel and the benefits of decentralisation should be exploited without sacrificing the need for integrated behaviour on the part of the parastatals. Furthermore, typical and co-ordinating mechanisms were recommended in association with different structural forms. The major co-ordinating mechanism to be used by the Commission is standardisation and specification of performance results, training, development and indoctrination of managers and occasional direct supervision to be "in touch with the situation" at parastatal levels.

We also specified, among others, the responsibilities of the cabinet, commission for parastatals and individual parastatal levels. The strategic management process should be two-way in order to allow for adaptive and integrated strategic behaviour of the parastatals under the Commission.

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