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**From  
Rhodesia  
to  
Zimbabwe**

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# **The Food Problem**

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**Vincent Tickner**

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FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE-No. 8

# The Food Problem

VINCENT TICKNER

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### About the author

VINCENT TICKNER has been concerned with the problems of basic food supply in developing countries for a number of years. He has worked in different countries of East and West Africa, including post-Independence Mozambique, and Bangladesh. He has taken an active interest in developments in Zimbabwe since 1976. He has been employed by both the Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd (London) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations and currently works as an independent consultant on aspects of government policy in basic food supply. He recently published "New Directions in Food Marketing Policies in Less Developed Countries" in *Food Supply*, November 1978.

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### About the series

FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE consists of a collection of papers which address the social, economic, administrative and legal problems to be faced by an independent government of Zimbabwe. CIIR has launched this series in collaboration with the Justice and Peace Commission in Rhodesia as a contribution to the important debate about the creation of a just society in Zimbabwe — a debate which the Commission has been concerned to promote since its inception in 1971. Each paper will take as its starting point the question: how can the new government of Zimbabwe provide for the basic needs of the poorest sectors of society? The views expressed in individual papers are those of the contributors; they do not necessarily reflect the views either of CIIR or of the Justice and Peace Commission.

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# The Food Problem

## I. INTRODUCTION

To say that food is a 'basic need' is almost platitudinous. In any classification of human basic needs, the provision of food to sustain people at an acceptable level of health is always high on the list. Any responsible government will attempt to ensure that all the people under its jurisdiction are adequately fed. Unfortunately, not all governments accept this responsibility.

With Rhodesia's food producing capabilities, the high level of sophistication of some of its agricultural production techniques and the potential for further expansion in food production that exists, some people might consider it inappropriate to focus much attention on the supply of basic food in the country. However, in this booklet it is contended that past and present Rhodesian governments have not always ensured an adequate supply of food to all sections of the population within the country, and that in the present war between the government forces and the forces of the Patriotic Front, the disruption of food supplies has become worse. Food supplies are now of major importance. In addition, it is contended that the control of food production and distribution, and the maintenance of adequate food supplies to all the population is likely to be a major consideration in a transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. The way in which the food supply sector is organised is likely to be of crucial importance for the social and economic development of Zimbabwe during the 1980s.

This booklet will focus upon the supply of the most basic foods that provide the major nutritional requirements of the population, particularly of the African majority. Food and drink that might be considered luxuries are largely excluded from consideration.

Although the prime focus in this booklet will be on the 'basic need' of food supplies, it rejects the perspective which equates basic needs

with absolute minimum requirements: a narrow lowest common denominator approach. A more expansive approach is taken here which recognises other 'needs' within society and which looks towards a more integrated, progressive and forward-looking orientation to development. It is fully recognised that the need to continue and develop the exportation of agricultural and food products to other countries is and will remain of crucial importance in the development of an independent Zimbabwe.

The maintenance of an adequate supply of food to the whole population is only one consideration. It is also important to evaluate the structure and control of the sector, to see the extent to which both producers and consumers participate in the major decision-making involved in the supply of food, and the extent to which the objectives and operations of individual producing and distributing units are integrated into the wider objectives of the society and the government. In the most genuine democracies, workers play a major participating role in the decision-making of their work units, and the general public has the means to scrutinize and influence decisions within individual organisations and institutions that have an influence on their lives. Another important consideration is the wealth-owning and income-earning capacities of the population within a monetary economy that enable them to purchase their food requirements. In many countries of Africa and Asia the problem of food supply is not so much one of the availability of adequate supplies (although in some countries this is also a problem), but of the capability of the poorer sections of the populations to produce or purchase adequate quantities of food for their nutritional needs.

A final point that needs to be made in this introduction is that this study was made outside Rhodesia and, although Rhodesians both inside and outside the country have been consulted in its formation, it reflects the scarcity of recent reliable information on food production and distribution. The difficulties have been exacerbated by the excessive tendencies towards secrecy and the control of information that have been manifested by the Rhodesian authorities since UDI.<sup>1</sup>

1. Since its creation in 1967, the Agricultural Marketing Authority of Rhodesia (AMA), has supplied annually a detailed report on the general economic conditions and prospects of the agricultural industry to the Minister of Agriculture, as part of its statutory requirements. The Authority has repeatedly pressed, but unsuccessfully, for more of the information in these reports to be made public, which could easily be done without

The continued restriction of easily providable information in Rhodesia, by both government departments and private companies — often in excess of national security considerations — makes the possibility of informed criticism and more general public scrutiny of the development of the economy much harder, and drives the society closer to one in which small groups of informed individuals can take major decisions relating to everyone's lives, while the general public is unable to have a clear picture of what is happening.

## II. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND FOOD SOURCES

A critical starting point for any effective food supply planning is the appraisal of the extent and nature of the population to be fed, its development trends, location and structure according to age, sex and employment. The nutritional needs of people of different age groups, occupations and sexes vary considerably and accordingly over-simplistic 'blanket' appraisals of food requirements are usually inadequate. The spatial proximity of this population to the sources of food production, food distribution depots and storage facilities, retail outlets and transport systems influences the ease and cost involved in supplying it with the food required.

In December 1978, official estimates of the total population were put at 7.04 million of which 6.75 million (96%) were African, 250,000 (3.5%) were European, 24,200 (0.3%) were of racially mixed origin and 10,600 (0.1%) were Asian.

Table 1 shows the distribution of Rhodesia's population by location. It can be seen that 86% of the non-African population lives in the main urban areas, with over 90% of the Asian population living in these areas. At the end of 1978, it was estimated that nearly 23% of the African population lived in the main towns, compared with 13.9% according to the 1969 Census of Population. This substantial increase is due primarily to a rapid urban influx caused by the war together with a certain relaxing of the legal restrictions which have strictly controlled

prejudicing the interests of the state. In the AMA Report and Accounts for 1971, it was clearly stated that "The Authority looks forward to the day when this document can be released for publication, in view of the wealth of information it contains and which would be invaluable to all concerned with determining the future policy to be applied to the agricultural industry".

the movement of Africans into the urban areas. Even after the war ends, it seems unlikely that the relative rise in the urban population will slow down very much, if at all. In the last few years, a number of groups have seen part of the solution to over-population in the rural areas in permitting or even encouraging African migration to the urban areas. This certainly seems to be central to the current thinking in the Ministry of Finance.<sup>2</sup>

The only two towns estimated to have a population of over 70,000 in mid-1978 were Salisbury (official population of 610,000) and Bulawayo (official population of 358,000) of which over 75% are African.

**Table 1: DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, December 1978 (000's)**

Location	European, Asian and Coloureds	per cent	Africans	per cent	Totals	per cent
African rural land, TTLs, PAs	2.8	1.0	4,192.2	62.1	4,194.9	59.7
European rural land	36.9	13.0	1,013.3	15.0	1,050.2	14.9
Urban areas	245.1	86.0	1,549.7	22.9	1,794.9	25.4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>284.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>6,755.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>7,040.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source:* Calculated from *Monthly Digest of Statistics, January 1979, Supplement, Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia 1978*, Ministry of Finance, April 1979, *Urban Development in the Main Centres*, Ministry of Finance, January 1979 and *Rhodesia Census of Population 1969*, CSO, Salisbury, 1976.

*Note:* Estimates for the urban African population include government estimates for the illegal urban population. The location of the African rural population is calculated from 1969 proportions for each area.

From the point of view of food supplies all the major urban areas in Rhodesia are within close proximity of agricultural producing regions and most food processing units are located in or near urban areas. The road and rail transport systems linking these urban areas with the major

surplus producing agricultural areas are good and adequate storage facilities and distribution outlets have generally been available in urban areas. The main handicap to food supplies likely to be created by a massive influx of Africans to urban areas is in the lack of employment opportunities, that has been exacerbated by the downturn in many sectors of the economy since 1975, particularly in manufacturing. The number of Africans employed in the main urban areas decreased from a peak of 378,400 in 1975 to 358,100 at the end of September 1978. As a result, the weak purchasing power of many urban African families imposes a severe constraint on their abilities to satisfy their food requirements.

In the rural areas, which at the end of 1978 accounted for 74.6% of the total population and 77.1% of the African population, the density of population in different areas varies markedly. The legal division of land ownership and control along racial lines until 1977, into European areas, Tribal Trust Land (TTL) and African Purchase Areas (PAs), together with successive policies of moving Africans from European areas into TTLs, have led to most TTLs having much higher population densities than other parts of the rural areas. At the end of 1978, it was estimated that 4.19 million Africans (62.1% of the African population) were living in the TTLs and 1.01 million Africans (15% of the African population) were living in the European rural areas. The policy of restricting the size of units and numbers of families in the PAs has meant that the population densities in these areas are usually lower than in the TTLs. The average population densities in African rural areas in 1976 were put at 9.9 acres per person, compared with 34.4 acres per person in the European areas.<sup>3</sup> The 1977 and 1979 amendments to the Land Tenure Act have resulted in little change to these densities.

The European rural areas include about 47% of the total farming land, while the African areas account for the other 53%. The implications in terms of agricultural productive capacity of the high densities of population in the TTLs are treated more fully elsewhere.<sup>4</sup> It was estimated that in 1972, the population of the African areas was some 85% in excess of the critical level with reference to the perpetual

2. *Urban Development in the Main Centres*, Report on the Population Influx Problem, published as an annexure to "Proposals for a Five-Year Programme of Development in the Public Sector", prepared by the Ministry of Finance, Salisbury, Rhodesia, January, 1979.

3. R. Riddell, *The Land Question*, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe No.2, CIIR, London, 1977, p.8.

4. See, for example, E.G. Cross, "The Tribal Trust Lands in Transition: The National Implications", *The Rhodesia Science News*, Vol.11, No.8, August 1977.

safety of the land and the degree of overcrowding has since increased rapidly.<sup>5</sup> In 1978, the Government suggested that the TTLs were supporting 2.5 million people in excess of their "safe carrying capacity".<sup>6</sup> The Secretary of Internal Affairs stated eight years ago that in a poor year two-thirds to three-quarters of the peasants do not produce sufficient food for their own needs.<sup>7</sup> It has been estimated in one TTL that in a drought year 37% of the families fall into the "below subsistence" category in terms of nutritional stress (based on minimum dietary standards), 38% in the subsistence category, with only 25% above that.<sup>8</sup> Drought years appear to occur on average about once in every four years.

Over the last year the escalation of the war between the Patriotic Front and government forces in rural areas, the introduction of martial law, the activities of private armies, the restrictions on movement and transportation of goods and the deliberate burning and confiscation of crops by the security forces have led not only to severe constraints upon African farmers in war zones to grow their crops, but also to severe problems in getting adequate supplies of food to the people in certain TTLs. The impoverishment of TTLs and the difficulties of production over the last few years had already been leading to an increased dependence on food from outside of the TTLs (particularly from European areas) to feed the people within them. Transport links to the TTLs and distribution networks within them have long been more difficult than in European areas, with resultant increased distribution costs, that have subsequently increased further, sometimes making the imported food prohibitively expensive. The drought during the 1978/79 rainy season and the death of many African cattle through disease have made matters even worse.

From the point of view of food planning, it is also important to be aware of the age and sex structure of the population. Over 50% of the

5. G. Kay, "The Population" in G.M.E. Leistner, *Rhodesia, Economic Structure and Change*, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 1976, p.53.
6. *Integrated Plan for Rural Development. July 1978*, published as an annexure to "Proposals for a Five-Year Programme of Development in the Public Sector", prepared by the Ministry of Finance, Salisbury, Rhodesia, January 1979.
7. *Rhodesia, Annual Report of the Secretary for Internal Affairs*, 1971, Government Printer, Salisbury.
8. R. Theisen, "The Exploding Population Problem in the Tribal Trust Lands of Rhodesia", Tribal Areas of Rhodesia Research Foundation, Salisbury, 1975, p.3-4 (mimeo).

African population is under the age of 15 years and over 20% are under the age of five years. In 1969, only 2.7% of the African population was 60 years old or over. Because of the extent of adult male migrant labour that is away from the TTLs much of the time, a very large proportion of the people living in TTLs are women, children and old people. In 1969, nearly two-thirds (63.8%) of the entire TTL population was under 20 years of age.

Following the 1969 Census of Population, official estimates put the increase of the African population at between 3.2% and 3.6% a year. A recent estimate puts the rate at 3.3% a year.<sup>9</sup> This is a high growth rate in comparison with other African countries.

Although a greater proportion of the total African population is engaged in waged employment than in many other African countries, the proportion has been dropping over the past 20 years. In 1960, 18.6% of all Africans were in waged employment. In 1975, after six years of very high growth rates of the economy, the proportion had dropped to 15.6%, although the highest number of Africans in waged employment (934,000) was recorded in this year. Since 1975, the numbers of Africans in waged employment had fallen by 56,000 to a figure of 878,000 for the end of 1978; this is only 13% of the total African population.

The markedly 'dual' nature of the economy has meant that labour migration has been a prominent feature of African life for many years. On average, about half of all adult African males tend to be absent from their rural homes at any one time. There have always been considerable seasonal variations in the rate of absenteeism with more migrants returning to the rural areas at the busiest times in the agricultural calendar, but as urban job opportunities have decreased in recent years job retention after such absenteeism has been harder and accordingly, it has been reduced. This has increased the difficulties of performing agricultural functions in TTLs. More urban wives now appear to go and help relatives in TTLs during the planting and harvesting seasons, but this hardly makes up for the lack of returning African males for agricultural work. Although many migrant workers secure food supplies from the TTLs from their families, they depend increasingly on marketed agricultural produce (mainly supplied by European

9. M.A.H. Smout, "Urbanisation of the Rhodesian Population" *Zambezia*, Vol.4, December 1976, p.89.

farms) and processed foods, and develop different food consuming habits.

### III. FOOD CONSUMPTION PATTERNS AND NUTRITION

In an earlier booklet in this series, *The Struggle for Health*, it was concluded that "the most important single intervention necessary to promote the health of the Zimbabwean people is the improvement of nutrition".<sup>10</sup> Concern with nutrition does not just mean concern with whether people are likely to be starving or malnourished, but with the elimination of all aspects of malnutrition that lead to the non-fulfilment of personal physical capacity, and the stunting of mental and physical development. The establishment of nutritional policies, nutritional awareness, and of structures that ensure the fulfilment of basic nutritional requirements for the whole population is one important part of a truly civilized society.

Although religious and other organisations have made some contributions to nutritional awareness in Rhodesia, the government's attention to nutritional considerations has been largely inadequate. Most considerations of nutrition within government structures have been within individual Provincial Medical Services, with an emphasis on Nutrition Rehabilitation Schemes for children leaving hospital (a very small proportion of all children suffering from malnutrition), and Well Baby clinics.<sup>11</sup> The stimulation of nutritional awareness through the regular educational system has been slight. Nor has any national study of nutritional requirements or deficiencies been undertaken. Accordingly, it is difficult to assess the extent of malnutrition let alone alleviate it, although it is clear that malnutrition does exist and this has increased considerably since the escalation of the war.<sup>12</sup>

The alleviation of malnutrition in Zimbabwe cannot be solved simply by technical considerations and by isolated nutritional education

10. J. Gilmurray, R. Riddell and D. Sanders, *The Struggle For Health*, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe No.7, CIIR, London, 1979, p.14.
11. Although no national statistics are available, studies conducted in particular areas indicate the level of malnutrition; a case study in Ndanga TTL in Victoria Province estimated that 80% of the children there were undernourished. Gilmurray *et al.* (1979), p.25-26.
12. Gilmurray *et al.* (1979), p.29-32.

programmes. A more detailed appraisal of the socio-economic forces that constrain the production, distribution and consumption of important foods also needs to be made, and acted upon. At present, no mechanism exists for regularly incorporating nutritional considerations into the planning of food supplies or for analysing these socio-economic constraints.

A number of household expenditure surveys have been undertaken in urban areas of both the African and European populations during the last fifteen years. These have primarily been undertaken, however, for the bureaucratic purpose of up-dating the weighting structures of the two urban consumer price indices, rather than for considerations of the well-being of the population. The most recent study suggested that "they (household budget surveys) are also of interest and value to industrialists, commercial undertakings, market research workers and sociologists",<sup>13</sup> but no mention is made of nutritionists or food planners. The consumer price index is often used in both wage bargaining and in income assessment. Since January 1973, continuous surveys have been undertaken of the expenditure patterns in European urban households in Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali and Gwelo, but surveys of the African population have been more irregular.

The average percentage of total household expenditure by each European family spent on food decreased from 18.7% in 1968 to 15.8% in 1975/76.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, the weighting structure for food in the European consumer price index was modified from 22.5% in 1968 to 20.9% in 1975/76 (20.5% in 1978). Even in the lowest quintile by income in European households in 1975/76 the average monthly expenditure on food was \$77.54, and only constituted 20% of total expenditure.\* It seems very unlikely that any Europeans in Rhodesia today are undernourished, although some may be malnourished.

In comparison, two of the most recent official Urban African Budget Surveys were undertaken in Salisbury in 1969 and in Umtali in 1971 (both surveys being conducted in October and November).<sup>15</sup> These

13. *European Expenditure Survey 1975-76*, C.S.O. Salisbury, AD/1171/500, April 1978, p.1.
14. *European Expenditure Survey (1978)* p.7.
15. *Urban African Budget Survey, Umtali (1971)*, Salisbury (1969), C.S.O. Salisbury, 1971 and 1973.

\*R\$1 is approximately equal to £0.70. \$ = Rhodesian throughout the text unless otherwise stated.



gave an average monthly expenditure per household on foodstuffs as \$21.57 (47.3% of total expenditure) for Salisbury, compared with 53.1% of total expenditure in 1963, and \$21.20 (52.1% of total expenditure) for Umtali, compared with 57.7% of total expenditure in 1963. The average monthly expenditure for foodstuffs by the lowest income quintile constituted 57% for Salisbury and 59% for Umtali. The weighting structure for the urban African consumer price index for food for different towns was set at 51.1% for Bulawayo (1968), 49.6% for Salisbury (1969), 55.3% for Midlands (1970) and 54.8% for Umtali (1971) and the average used for 1978 was 49.6%. It would appear that the importance of food in the European consumer price index is upgraded in the weighting structure more than in the African index, despite foodstuffs contributing about 50% of the expenditure of most urban African households, compared with only 15% in European households, and that in recent years this distortion has increased (see Table 2).

**Table 2: AVERAGE MONTHLY EXPENDITURE ON FOODSTUFFS BY URBAN AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN HOUSEHOLDS FOR THE LOWEST QUINTILE FOR EACH RACIAL GROUP**

Item	EUROPEAN			AFRICAN			Consumer Index Weighting	Consumer Index Weighting
	1975/6 \$	% of total Expenditure	1975/6	1971 \$	% of total Expenditure	1971	1975/6	1977/8
Beverages	2.46	0.6	6	7	0.36	1.2	12	12
Bread and Cereals	9.69	2.5	25	24	6.78	23.2	210	181
Fats and Oils	2.98	0.8	8	10	0.92	3.2	29	22
Fish	0.84	0.2	2	4	0.25	0.9	8	6
Fruit and Veg.	9.32	2.4	25	32	1.81	6.2	52	41
Meat	25.75	6.7	68	62	3.37	11.5	127	151
Dairy Products and Eggs	14.44	3.7	35	36	1.43	4.9	38	17
Other Foodstuffs	12.06	3.1	40	40	2.31	7.9	64	88
Total Foodstuffs	77.44	20.0	209	215	17.23	59.0	549	518
Total Expenditure	387.17	100.0	1000	1000	29.20	100.0	1000	1000

Sources: *European Expenditure Survey 1975/6 and Umtali Urban African Budget Survey 1971*, C.S.O. Salisbury and *Report of the Committee on Incomes Policy*, April 1978.

In the last five years, the annual rates of inflation, based on the urban consumer price indices, have increased at record levels and

the lower income African urban families have been hardest hit. Between 1974 and 1978, food prices rose by 44.7% for European urban families and by 50% for African urban families. During 1978, African urban families were even harder hit; food costs for European families accounted for 36% of inflation and for African families for 50% of a more rapid rise in inflation. A report in the Rhodesian press stated that between September 1978 and February 1979, food prices in supermarkets rose by between 12% and 25%. The report suggested that the official consumer price index now no longer reflects a "realistic" position in current conditions (*The Sunday Mail*, March 11, 1979). Since then, the wholesale price of a 5kg bag of maize meal has gone up by another 8% while in January average beef prices rose by 12%.

The major constituents of the urban diets in value terms are set out in Table 2, with the weighting values used. It should be noted that the number of people in European households (3.28) in the survey was less than in African households (4.8).<sup>16</sup> The African figures in Table 2 exclude gifts in kind, which were estimated at \$0.73 per month net, probably an underestimate.

In their study on the Urban Poverty Datum Line (PDL), Cubitt and Riddell pointed out that "The PDL diet must be assessed according to its nutritional adequacy and its acceptability given the eating habits and customs of the urban African population. The construction of the diet rests on the assumption that the family has the necessary knowledge to budget for a nutritionally adequate and least cost diet." However, poverty and ignorance are more often major causes of malnutrition rather than the lack of available food. The situation in Rhodesia seems no exception to this. They also pointed out that "There is no specifically Rhodesian table available by which we can establish a dietary standard for Rhodesian Africans in general, or for different groupings within the African population", and that "there is no comprehensive survey material available on the 'typical' urban African diet in Rhodesia."<sup>17</sup>

The main constituents of the urban African diet in Rhodesia of nutritional importance are mealie meal (maize meal), bread, milk, meat, vegetable oil, green vegetables, tomatoes, fruit, groundnuts and mar-

16. Overseas Development Group (ODG), "Zimbabwe: a review of agricultural and rural sectors", prepared by ODG, University of East Anglia, April 1979 (draft report), p.3.2.

17. V.S. Cubitt and R.C. Riddell, *The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia*, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Rhodesia, 1974, p.18, 20 and 21.

garine. Some idea of the extent of shortfall in urban African diets and specific products is given in Table 3.

**Table 3: APPARENT AVERAGE MINIMUM CONSUMPTION OF MAJOR FOOD ITEMS PER AFRICAN MAN-UNIT IN SALISBURY (1969), UMTALI (1971) AND CONSIDERED MINIMUM MONTHLY DIET FOR A MODERATELY ACTIVE MAN (kilograms)**

Item	Lowest quintile by income		Minimum Diet**		Difference	
	Umtali	Salisbury	Umtali	Salisbury	Umtali	Salisbury
	A	B	C	D	E	D-E
Bread	4.7	6.2	4.3	5.4	3.4	+0.7
Maize Meal	9.2	10.3	8.8	9.7	10.6	-1.8
Meat	1.4	3.2	1.1	2.1	1.7	-0.6
Potatoes	0.5	0.1	0.5	0.1	1.7	-1.2
Fresh Veg.	3.2*	2.6*	3.0*	2.3*	5.1	-2.1
Fruit	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.9	-0.7
Milk	1.4	1.9	1.4	1.3	0.9	+0.5
Sugar	2.0	2.3	1.7	2.1	0.4	+1.3
Margarine	na	0.2	na	0.1	0.4	na
Groundnuts	na	0.1	na	0.1	0.4	na
Tea	na	0.1	na	0.1	0.4	na

Source: Monthly consumption data, *Urban African Budget Survey, Salisbury (1969) and Umtali (1971)*, C.S.O. Salisbury; minimum monthly diet, V.S. Cubitt and R.C. Riddell *The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia*, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Rhodesia, 1974, p.24.

Notes: \*All vegetables and tomatoes (potatoes excluded)

\*\*The minimum diet also includes 0.4 kg of salt and vegetable oil, but consumption data on these items is not available.

In June 1977, 75% of African non-agricultural waged employees received cash wages of less than \$70 a month.<sup>18</sup> In September 1976, an income of \$70 was considered the minimum in the PDL evaluations for an African family of four (including two adults) in Salisbury; how-

18. "Wage Distribution of African Employees by Industrial Sector for the month of June 1977", C.S.O. Salisbury, April 1978, DL/1115 (mimeo).

ever in 1969, the average number in an African family in Salisbury was 5.8 persons and in 1973 it was estimated that 54% of African families in Salisbury lived in households of seven or more persons.<sup>19</sup>

Clearly then, there are serious inadequacies in the African urban diet and these have undoubtedly worsened in recent years both with the absolute decline in urban employment and also with the growing influx into the urban areas of displaced persons with no formal means of employment.

None of the above studies, however, assess the nutrition and food requirements of the rural population which constitutes over 75% of the African population. In addition, there has been no detailed appraisal of the seasonal impact of food availability on diet, or of the best measures to adopt in providing alternative foods or stored supplies to ensure adequate continued supplies for healthy nutritional levels throughout the year. These are important factors in Rhodesia where reported malnutrition has often been higher in the months of November through to March, immediately prior to harvesting time.

Over one million Africans live on European farms where the vast majority of wage earners are dependent upon employment as farm labourers. In June 1977, over 80% of these received cash wages of less than \$20 a month.<sup>20</sup> In addition, most received rations, wages 'in kind', consisting chiefly of maize meal, meat, dried beans and salt. Although there have been no national surveys of the diets of agricultural workers and their families, the inadequacy of their diets and widespread malnutrition have been documented for particular areas. In one study in 1973, a medical specialist described the food rations given to farm workers as wholly inadequate.<sup>21</sup> In a separate study carried out by the University, it was found that of all farmworkers' children aged under five years who were sampled, 90% were malnourished, some severely so.<sup>22</sup> Finally, on one farm investigated in 1974, which farmworkers considered one of 'the best in the area', for all families of four or more

19. Urban African Budget Survey for Salisbury (1973) and D.G. Clarke, *Inflation and Subsistence Wages. Revised estimates of the urban poverty datum line in Rhodesia for September 1976*, Development Studies Research Group, University of Natal, (Discussion Paper No.1, January 1977, Table 2.
20. Wage Distribution (1978).
21. D.G. Clarke, *Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia*, Mambo socio-economic series No.6, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1976, p.47.
22. Clarke (1976) p.105.

persons, the employer's supply of meat and groundnuts did not cover the minimum dietary requirements.<sup>23</sup>

Sixty two per cent of the African population lives in the TTLs and African Purchase Areas where conditions are often worse than on European farms. Average monthly income in the TTLs in 1977 was estimated to be \$12 and in the PAs \$67.<sup>24</sup> Taking the TTLs as a whole, one government official has argued that the availability of maize averaged 231 lbs a year in 1977, 40% less than the estimated annual requirements of 385 lbs a year.<sup>25</sup> Inequalities in access to land within the TTLs make nutritional problems worse in some areas than in others. According to agro-ecological criteria, each TTL farmer should have available to him between 27 and 250 hectares of land, depending upon the farming region. In 1977, 16.5% of tribal cultivators had less than eight hectares of land and 70% had less than 15 hectares of land.<sup>26</sup> Even in the 1969-70 season, it was estimated that in one TTL that agricultural production in the TTL only provided 50% of food requirements.<sup>27</sup>

With the disruption to African agriculture caused by the war, together with increases in the rural population, the African rural population is having to rely more and more on the purchase of food products to feed itself. Even this is becoming more and more difficult; recent reports tell of huge price increases for basic food products — returns of \$10 and \$12 are being made on a 5 kg bag of maize meal, normally costing \$5 and \$6 and cooking oil prices of over 50% higher than town prices have been recorded (*The Sunday Mail*, December 10, 1978).

The important consideration in viewing nutritional requirements is not so much to establish significant statistics, but to establish which sections of the population are inadequately fed, and what methods of direct and indirect support can be undertaken to alleviate those deficiencies, ranging from employment generation, increased incomes and/or financial subsidies on the one hand, to a stimulation of nutritional awareness, improvement of the productive capacities of these com-

23. P.S. Harris and R.C. Riddell, *The Poverty Datum Line as a Wage Fixing Standard*, Mambo socio-economic series No.4, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1975, p.54.
24. Whitsun Foundation, *A Strategy for Rural Development Data Bank No.2: the peasant sector*, Whitsun Foundation, Salisbury, 1978, p.5-15.
25. E.G. Cross, "The tribal trust lands in transition: the national implications", *The Rhodesia Science News*, Vol.11, August 1977, p.188.
26. Whitsun Foundation (1978) p.18.
27. Theisen (1975) p.2.

munities, and/or the improvement of the distribution system in that area on the other. An effective nutritional policy starts by trying to establish clearly who are the vulnerable population, and then looks at how the food supply structures and income-generating structures can best be modified to alleviate any present, or anticipated deficiencies. Regardless of the exact state of malnutrition in the country at present, the unpreparedness in the past of the Rhodesian authorities to assess systematically the extent of malnutrition, and to introduce structural changes that will alleviate it, is a deficiency that should not be overlooked by any government in a new Zimbabwe.

#### IV. THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION STRUCTURE

Due to the secrecy surrounding much quantitative data on agricultural production and marketed surplus since UDI, it is difficult to obtain an accurate and detailed picture of agricultural production in recent years. Throughout this period, however, the proportion of agricultural production coming from European farming areas has steadily increased. In 1978, the total value of agricultural production from European areas was \$428.4 million, compared with a production for rural household consumption in African areas that was valued at \$90.1 million, and official sales from African areas mounting to \$26.7 million.<sup>28</sup> Sales of principal crops and livestock from European areas in 1978 were valued at \$331.9 million, compared with sales of \$24.6 million from African areas over the same period.<sup>29</sup> The value of European sales has continually increased, whereas the value of official African sales has been decreasing since 1976. The trends in unofficial African sales, which can often be as high as 40% of crops coming on the market,<sup>30</sup> are difficult to measure, but have probably increased.

Although Rhodesia has been a predominantly agricultural economy,

28. *Zimbabwe Rhodesia Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics April 1979*, C.S.O. Salisbury, Table 11.
29. *Zimbabwe Rhodesia Monthly Digest of Statistics April 1979*, C.S.O. Salisbury, Table 6.
30. In her study in Karangaland, Weinrich found that 50% of millet, 35% of groundnuts, 30% of maize and 7% of sorghum that came on to the market in one PA was sold illegally to neighbours in TTLs, representing 38% of all their crops sold. A.K.H. Weinrich, *African Farmers in Rhodesia*, International African Institute, London, 1975, p.193.

with a large proportion of the population involved in agriculture, much of the country's food supplies have come from a very limited number of commercial farms. It has recently been estimated that 70% of the country's food requirements are provided by commercial farms, predominantly owned and run by white Rhodesians.<sup>31</sup> In 1976, the European areas were responsible for 92% of the marketed output in value terms. At the end of 1976 these 'European' areas contained 6,682 farms. Of these farms, 72% covering 23% of the European land area were producing only 21% of the total output, while 5% of the farms, covering 50% of the same area, were producing 48% of the total output.<sup>32</sup> Thus about 350 of the larger farms are responsible for about half of the commercialised agricultural production in Rhodesia at present. In the tax year ending June 1978, 1,514 self-employed farmers had a taxable income of \$22.8 million and another 669 farming companies had a taxable income of \$21.1 million. Only 165 of the individual farmers had taxable income of over \$30,000.<sup>33</sup> In 1976, 52% of the total income tax paid by the farming community was paid by only 271 European-owned units.<sup>34</sup>

Foreign companies, particularly South African and British ones, have played an important role in Rhodesian agriculture, and some of the largest producing units have foreign participation or control. In 1963, the last year for which figures are available, five South African companies accounted for £2.9 million net profits from the agriculture and forestry sector out of a total net profit in this sector for the 17 foreign companies involved of £3.1 million, and a total for all net profits in this sector of £3.7 million.<sup>35</sup> The size of the South African share is largely accounted for by the big investments of Anglo-American Corporation and Huletts Corporation in sugar. In 1975, companies in agrarian production which were wholly or partly controlled by AMRHO (Anglo-American Rhodesia) included Eastern Forests Estates Ltd., Hippo Valley Estates, Mkwasine Estates (jointly owned with Triangle Ltd.), Mazoe Citrus Estates and Premier Estates Ltd. Hippo Valley

31. Cross (1978) p.188.

32. R.C. Riddell, *The Land Problem in Rhodesia*, Mambo socio-economic series No.11, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1978, p.11.

33. *Rhodesia Income Tax Statistics, analysis of assessments and losses issued during the fiscal year 1977-78*, Government Printer, November 1978.

34. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Economic Review Rhodesia Malawi Annual Supplement* 1978.

35. C. Stoneman, "Foreign Capital and the Prospects for Zimbabwe", *World Development*, Vol.4, No.1, 1976, p.45.

Estates produces sugar, citrus fruits, cotton, wheat and livestock. Huletts Corporation owns Triangle Ltd. Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Co. and has large investments in ranching (Nuanetsi Ranch Ltd.).<sup>36</sup> British companies, such as Lonrho (UK) and Aberfoyle Plantations (Eire) have substantial land holdings in Rhodesia, while Brooke Bond Liebig's have large ranches in the low-veld covering 526,000 hectares with over 65,000 cattle. Foreign companies also have substantial holdings in tobacco and tea plantations.

Ever since early this century the contribution of the African producers to the agricultural surplus has been steadily reduced. When mining settlers first came to Rhodesia, much of their food supplies came from local African producers. As white settlers turned to agriculture the Africans were steadily squeezed out of the market and removed to the less productive lands. Leys states that "the policy of land apportionment emerged, in the years after the First World War, largely as a reaction to the growing tendency of African farmers to enter the market for cash crops and to buy land from the government close to, and in competition with, Europeans".<sup>37</sup> Murray states that "the African producers' share of the domestic market for maize was severely limited in the Maize Act of 1934; and the Native Development Department was placed under the control of the Native Affairs Department, so that Africans would not be encouraged to grow crops that competed with those of European producers."<sup>38</sup>

As a result of food shortages during the second world war, restricting policies towards African farmers were relaxed and African agriculture received some encouragement. But, although some individuals in government service and some private white farmers have continued to give support to African producers to remain in the market, the nature of the structures that exist have meant that African farmers have been steadily squeezed more out of the market again by advantaged European units. Whereas in 1955 Africans sold 30% of their agricultural produce, by 1970 this proportion had dropped to 19%.<sup>39</sup>

36. Clarke (1976) p.163.

37. C. Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia*, Oxford University Press, 1959, p.27.

38. D.J. Murray, *The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970, p.90.

39. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Economic Review Rhodesia Malawi Annual Supplement* 1976, p.5.

Thus African producers need to be viewed not just as "subsistence" producers with peripheral interests in the market economy, but more as producers who, if given the opportunity, can and would become more "market-oriented" producers. At present they often find it uneconomic to compete in the market as they are limited by their own productive capacity, their consumption requirements, their poverty, their inability to obtain finance and to benefit from economies of scale and technological developments as well as restrictive structures in marketing and transport. Although there are individual exceptions, the prevailing ethos among white Rhodesians has been one of minimising the African potential to produce for the market. Accordingly, information on the more market-oriented African farmers is hard to come by. Hume argued in 1978 that

"It is not known how many families in tribal areas are actual or aspirant commercial farmers. Some argue that no more than 10% of the population fall into this category, others that it may be as high as 30%."<sup>40</sup>

He considered that the 30% figure is closer to the truth, representing 200,000 farmers. However, considering the amount of illegal trading conducted by TTL farmers outside their areas and the amount of trading between neighbours in TTLs, it is likely that a much higher proportion are potential commercial farmers and these figures should be seen as highly speculative underestimates. A detailed evaluation of the potential for incorporating African farmers into the market and of the constraints operating on them has still to be undertaken.

Besides the poorer quality of much of the soil in TTL areas and problems of over-grazing, a number of major factors have led to the poorer production in TTLs, namely: ignorance of management skills, poor communications with agents servicing agriculture, lack of labour in crucial agricultural seasons, lack of adult male labour, tenurial problems, high transport, levy and handling costs, lack of credit facilities, inadequate marketing outlets, circumstances that encourage the satisfaction of minimum wants only, limited technical knowledge of farmers, poor supplies of physical inputs, lack of insurance against drought and shortages of draught power.<sup>41</sup>

40. I.M. Hume, *A Preliminary Essay on Land Reform in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe* Whitsun Foundation, Salisbury, 1978.

41. See the following: M.Z. Mukundu "Factors limiting increased crop production in Tribal Trust Lands as an extension worker sees them" and R. Gapare "Problems in crop production as seen by a Tribal Trust Land Farmer". *The Rhodesia Science News*, Vol.10, No.10, October 1976.

Some of these factors stem from the basic political division of land in Rhodesia that has restricted Tribal Trust Lands to the poorer soils. Only 32% of African rural land falls within the three highest categories of land (as defined by Vincent and Thomas), compared with 57% of the 'European' land area.<sup>42</sup> Some of them stem from 'traditional' influences in African society that operate against the often highly individualistic mode of development encouraged by the individualistic, capitalist ethos of the white Rhodesian community. Some of them stem from ignorance of African farmers with inappropriate or poor educational backgrounds. Some stem from inappropriate extension work that focuses on specific technical points without recognising (or ignoring) other social and economic constraints that inhibit the successful introduction of technical innovations. Some stem from a general political system that has restricted African farmers from competing on equal terms with European farmers, that have included inadequate provision of credit and investment capital and inadequate marketing outlets. For example, in 1975, European farmers received \$111 million of credit, whereas African farmers only received \$1 million, half of which went to PA farmers. Some stem from the political 'dual economy' that has been created, where TTLs are seen as a cheap labour pool for industry and European commercial farms, as well as a marginal social security system to substitute for the lack of social security provided by the government or private industry. Some of them stem from the general poverty trap within which many Africans are restricted. There are many factors involved here, and their complexity should not be under-rated. Some, however, are inimical to the political and economic structures that have been created in the society. Piece-meal treatment of one or two of these factors is unlikely to achieve much unless the other factors are also tackled at the same time.

The African Purchase Area (PA) scheme that was started in 1930 was meant to have been a mechanism for encouraging the formation of a small class of African farmers, who would firmly espouse private ownership of property, develop their production along more modern technological lines and enter firmly into the market economy. To do this they were isolated spatially from other African farmers, and their numbers controlled, thus increasing the likelihood that they would

42. Riddell (1978) p.35-36 and B.H. Walker, "Utilisation of marginal lands in Rhodesia", *The Rhodesia Science News* Vol.9, No.6, June 1975 for problems of crop production on poor quality land.



develop a separate consciousness and develop into a separate class, that would more readily support the prevailing capitalist system.

**Table 4: PRODUCTION OF FOOD CROPS AND SALES FROM PURCHASE AREAS. 1975 to 1977 (tonnes)**

Item	1975	1976	1977	Average sales as a percentage of production 1974-1977
Hybrid maize	51,072	65,651	59,583	62
Other maize	2,408	2,976	1,504	24
Shelled groundnuts	6,256	6,855	3,451	60
Cotton	8,766	6,374	7,415	100
Rapoko	2,240	2,547	2,027	21
Munga	1,004	1,073	732	15
Nyimo	1,520	1,737	1,157	37
Sorghum	1,140	948	667	66
Wheat	325	300	207	43
Rice	419	257	216	17
Potatoes	267	234	219	89
Edible beans	395	613	557	na
Soya beans	82	217	306	na
Sunflower seeds	1,140	3,368	3,906	94
Sweet potatoes	1,710	1,298	663	54
Slaughtered cattle	10,913	12,113	14,765	na

Sources: "Report on the agricultural extension situation in African Purchase Land Areas in Rhodesia", SD/2/6/77 (mimeo), p.5, *Agricultural Production in Purchase Lands 1977*, C.S.O. Salisbury, 1978, Overseas Development Group (ODG) "Zimbabwe: review of agricultural and rural sectors", ODG, University of East Anglia, April 1979 (first draft), pp.4 and 16.

In 1975 there were only about 92,000 people on the 66 PAs that cover 3.7 million acres (about 9% of the total African land area). In 1977, there were 8,080 occupied farms in these areas and 379 vacant or illegally occupied ones.<sup>43</sup> Although some PA farmers are firmly entrenched in the market economy and have reasonable yields, a substantial number are not and the quantities of officially marketed produce coming from these PAs has not been as great as expected,<sup>44</sup>

43. *Agricultural Production in Purchase Lands 1977*, C.S.O. Salisbury, September 1978, p.37.

44. S. Cross and D. Gibbon *A Short Evaluation of the African agricultural situation in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, FAO, Rome, May 1975, p.10-12.

and for quite a number of products has slumped over the last few years. When the African Purchase Area system was established, it was envisaged that PA farmers would become more integrated in the market economy than most have done in practice. The production of hybrid maize has increased markedly since 1975, but the production of other products, such as sorghum, cotton and groundnuts has dropped or fluctuated. Production figures for different food crops in the PAs for the period 1975 to 1977 are set out in Table 4, with the average sales as a percentage of production shown for the 1974 to 1977 period.

Although the Rhodesian government has not particularly helped the development of PAs over the last few decades, with a move towards the establishment of an independent Zimbabwe, following the escalation of the war by the Patriotic Front forces and the closure of the border with Mozambique in 1976, there has been a resurgence of support for the PA scheme. Hume, in his paper on *Agriculture in Rhodesia* has tried to reinforce the idea that PA farmers are commercially oriented, arguing that "farming in this sector represents a vanguard in the shift from peasant-subsistence to peasant-commercial type operations",<sup>45</sup> However, this viewpoint is not supported by the available data for the majority of PA farmers.

## V. THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYTEM AND GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT

### a. *Agricultural Marketing*

Despite the frequent claims that the advances of Rhodesian agriculture in European Areas are based on individualistic 'free enterprise', the European farming sector has for many years been protected and supported by the state, particularly in regard to agricultural marketing and pricing. In most cases this government involvement has been sought by the farmers themselves. It is only in more recent years, particularly after UDI, that the initiative for government intervention has come from the administration or the government. In the early years of this century, European farmers used the state to give them advantages over African farmers, to restrict the commercial development of the latter,

45. I.M. Hume "Agriculture in Rhodesia", Whitsun Foundation, 1977 (mimeo), p.2.

and to establish the unequal land distribution system that exists today. Beyond this, government support was mainly limited to technical and scientific support and extension work, and marketing was left to the private sector. As production expanded in the 1920s, however, and overproduction started occurring, the farmers called on the government to establish statutory marketing, to stabilise and guarantee producer prices and to help find domestic and foreign outlets for their produce. It was following these demands in the early 1930s that the first statutory marketing boards – the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and the Maize Control Board (later to develop into the Grain Marketing Board (GMB)) – were established. These boards played an important part in the marketing and processing of the products under their responsibility, and in the control of prices.

During the Second World War, from a situation of overproduction the country was temporarily plunged into a period of under-production, and the role of the marketing boards was extended to ensure adequate supplies of agricultural produce to consumers. A Price Control Advisory Board and a Nutrition Council were temporarily established, which involved the government more in the planning and control of food supplies. These food shortages also stimulated the government to give assistance to production in African areas, which had previously been largely ignored by the state from the point of view of agricultural production, despite a few individual efforts by members of the Native Development Department. In marketing, the 1944 Native Production and Trade Commission recommended that progress be made towards “compulsory planned production . . . and to control the distribution and marketing of the consequent products”.<sup>46</sup> After the war, however, even though production increased again, the statutory marketing boards remained in a strengthened position as an integral part of the marketing structure and support to African areas slowed again, particularly when African producers began competing effectively with European producers. In 1952 the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) was established following the collapse of private enterprise and co-operative dairy marketing.

After UDI in 1965, the state took an even greater role in agricultural marketing, strengthening the powers of individual boards and co-ordinating their activities and financing through the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) which was established in 1967. Prior to UDI,

46. Quoted in Murray (1970), p.305.

most agricultural products were still marketed by the private sector. In 1965 only an estimated 35% of total agricultural sales were handled by statutory agencies, but by 1973 they handled over 70%,<sup>47</sup> although much of this increase was due to the statutory control of tobacco after UDI. These marketing boards actually buy and sell the agricultural products for which they are responsible, but the powers they possess to enable them to stabilise prices and supplies vary. The CSC has a monopoly on beef exports, but does not have a monopoly in the local market. With its network of abattoirs, cold stores, auctions and sales it now accounts for about 80% of all cattle slaughtered, but only about 55-60% of the local market. The DMB now accounts for about 90% of milk supplies, which are delivered to dairies under its control.<sup>48</sup> The GMB has expanded its responsibilities and now has a domestic monopoly on the purchase and sale of the controlled products under its responsibility, namely: coffee, groundnuts, maize, sorghum, soya beans and wheat. The annual reports of the GMB have often reiterated the government's justification for the existence of the Marketing Boards when saying:

“Under the former free market conditions, Government was powerless to use the domestic market, as so many other countries do, as a means of offsetting the generally lower realisations obtainable on external markets, thus maintaining a viable producing industry and safeguarding the local market against shortages and violent price fluctuations. Also, there is hardly a producing country in the world which has not found it necessary to have some form of statutory control over, and support for, the marketing of its main agricultural products.”<sup>49</sup>

In 1969, the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) was established, taking over responsibilities for cotton and cotton seed marketing from the GMB. For the products covered by these boards, the final prices obtained by the producers are partly determined by the market (internal and external), but the producer is protected from major price fluctuations by being offered a guaranteed price, which in the case of GMB crops has recently been extended to be announced as a pre-planting price to encourage production. Producers may (and do) receive supplementary payments if the market realises a higher price.<sup>50</sup>

The activities of the various boards are now co-ordinated by the small

47. Hume (1977), p.10.

48. E.G. Cross, “Produce marketing in Zimbabwe”, 1978, p.3 (mimeo).

49. *Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31st March 1969*, Grain Marketing Board of Rhodesia, Salisbury, 1969.

50. Hume (1977), p.11.

parent organisation, the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA), which has conducted market research for different products, studied the marketing channels for different products, helped co-ordinate pricing policies, advised government on other marketing policies, and has been a channel for most of the external short-term financing of the four boards under its control to enable them to conduct their marketing activities. The AMA has helped the government to stimulate a successful diversification of agriculture away from a greater dependence on tobacco since UDI, in securing domestic supplies of different products, and hence reducing the need for imports and providing alternative agricultural products for export. The AMA has given the state a stronger influence in agricultural marketing and food supplies, but has in general been warmly accepted by European farmers. The salient economic statistics relevant to these Boards are set out in Table 5.

**Table 5: BASIC STATISTICS RELATED TO THE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARDS**

Board	Total fixed assets \$m	Sales \$m	Number of employees (1973)	Intended capital investment 1979 to 1983 <sup>d</sup> \$m	Estimate of Government expenditure 1978-79 \$m
Agricultural Marketing Authority	0.01 <sup>b</sup>	na	20	5.0	0.05
Cold Storage Commission	26.4 <sup>e</sup>	50.1	2,350 <sup>f</sup>	38.6	0.75
Cotton Marketing Board	5.1 <sup>a</sup>	33.7 <sup>a</sup>	631	8.1	
Dairy Marketing Board	7.2 <sup>b</sup>	25.6 <sup>b</sup>	2,330	11.1	
Grain Marketing Board	6.6 <sup>c</sup>	93.8 <sup>c</sup>	1,995	27.5	

Source: Annual Reports of Boards, AMA data and Ministry of Finance (1979).

Notes: a = 1973; b = 1978; c = 1975-76; d - according to Ministry of Finance estimates 1979; e = 1975; f = 3,500 in 1979.

Although the statutory marketing boards are responsible for purchases from both European and African areas, and in theory they are

equally concerned with both, in practice the bulk of the support has gone to the larger producers who are the European farmers. All the dairy producers bar one are Europeans; the bulk of the cereals and most of the beef comes from European farms. Groundnuts, sorghum and cotton are marketed from African producers, but this marketing has often been co-ordinated with the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the past, and directed predominantly to the largest and most accessible African producers of these crops and specific extension and development schemes. The policy of the AMA and its boards has been clearly stated by the AMA's current chief economist, E.G. Cross:

"The Agricultural Marketing Authority recognises the key role which the provision of marketing services can play in the development of agriculture in areas remote from the main centres of development. However, its prime function is not to act as a development agency, but to ensure that farm produce is handled efficiently and at the least cost to the country, while ensuring that returns from sales are maximised. Our marketing institutions have played a key role in the development of agriculture in Rhodesia, by pursuing this objective with single minded determination. It is the Authority's intention that this should remain its prime concern."<sup>51</sup>

In practice, this policy has meant that African producers in remote (and hence expensive) areas have usually been poorly helped by the marketing authorities. Although food processing plants have been decentralised to different parts of the country, they are still almost exclusively in European areas. The transportation system of roads and rail that exist predominantly in European areas, along with a payment structure to farmers that is based on the principle of farmers meeting their primary marketing costs to points of sale (which are mainly located at processing plants and points accessible to the transportation system) have meant that many African farmers have been disadvantaged in marketing their produce. In 1978, the GMB considered opening new depots in more remote areas, but the necessary capital for doing so was not forthcoming. Registrations of African producers with the GMB increased in the late 1960s. The GMB complained in 1970 that the increase in registered African producers "has intensified the disproportionate amount of work in relation to the quantity of grain involved".<sup>52</sup> After an abrupt cutback in 1969, the numbers of registered African producers with the GMB began to grow again after 1973, and at the end of March 1975 stood at 13,796 (about 2% of all African cultivators). The GMB

51. Cross, "Produce Marketing in Zimbabwe" (1978), p.6 and 7.

52. *Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31st March 1970*, Grain Marketing Board of Rhodesia, Salisbury, 1970.

has also admitted that the system of supplementary payments discriminated against the TTL farmer, because their share was put into a trust fund administered by the District Commissioners.<sup>53</sup>

Besides the constraints on African farmers outlined above, the 10% levy imposed in 1948, but lifted in early 1979, on the sales of produce from TTLs in order to finance development in TTLs through the African Development Fund (ADF) has been another factor inhibiting sales through official channels and has in some cases resulted in African sales being made illegally directly onto a black market or through intermediaries in PAs and European areas. In past years revenues from this levy have supplied about a quarter of the ADF's income. Repeated calls have been made to revoke this levy, by MPs, the AMA and other organisations. Partly because revenues from sales tax have reduced the need for it the levy was abolished in April 1979.

In addition, sales through official channels have also sometimes been subjected to first stop order arrangements, by which payments for credits and inputs provided for farmers are first deducted. Although this is an effective way of enforcing repayments, the rigid enforcement and lack of ability of the African farmer to have any say in these deductions has been a discouragement. The Ministry of Internal Affairs which has been involved in these measures, has also provided some support and advice on marketing in recent years through its Native Production and Marketing Branch and its Co-operatives Branch in each district. Following a review of the functions of the Co-operatives Branch, it was resolved in August 1976 that the Branch's role would be widened to become more responsible for problems of agricultural marketing and supply in the TTLs. It was redesignated the Marketing and Co-operative Services Section.<sup>54</sup> On July 1, 1978, most agricultural departments of Internal Affairs were transferred to the Ministry of Land and Resources; however for the present the Marketing and Co-operative Branches have remained with Internal Affairs.

Besides statutory marketing, there has been a long tradition of co-operative production and marketing in Rhodesia, but as A.F. Hunt, the former chief economist of the AMA has said:

"In Rhodesia the activities of European co-operative organisations are concen-

53. See M. Nziramasanga, *Research on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: the state of the art*, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1978.

54. See C.B. Roberts, "The co-operative movement in Rhodesia: a historical perspective", 1978, p.4 (mimeo).

trated largely on the provision of input items and other requirements of the farming community, and there is relatively little involvement in the marketing of agricultural produce. Exceptions do exist in that there are co-operative organisations involved in the marketing of pigs, fruit, cheese and eggs, whilst the largest co-operative providing input requirements also handles relatively small quantities of certain crops on behalf of farmers."<sup>55</sup>

One of these exceptions has been COLCOM (under the National Pig Breeders Co-operative) which is responsible for the marketing of most pigs and the processing of pork products, following the devolution of pig marketing from the CSC. There are also a number of co-operatives for deciduous fruit and potato marketing in the European sector. In 1974, the total turnover of European co-operatives was over \$78 million and in 1975, there were 22 registered societies.<sup>56</sup>

In the African areas, there are a large number of smaller co-operatives. At the end of 1977, there were 270 registered co-operatives in the TTLs and 57 in the PAs, covering a total of 41,000 members.<sup>57</sup> These co-operatives account for about 15% of the small amount of African marketed agricultural produce. In recent years, co-operative organisation has become more centralised and linked with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Co-operative officials have spent more of their time on book-keeping and running committee meetings than in giving advice and support in marketing and have often adopted paternalistic approaches that have alienated members. As the centralised marketing services have extended their influence and demanded prompt payment, individual co-operative farmers have tended to bypass the co-operative organisation in marketing their produce, particularly in the PAs.<sup>58</sup>

The marketing of citrus fruits, sugar, fresh vegetables, sunflower seeds, pyrethrum, goats and poultry remains totally in the hands of private firms or individuals.

Government has also been involved indirectly with agricultural marketing through its role in transport. Rhodesia Railways, a nationalised organisation, is responsible for the transportation of a high per-

55. A.F. Hunt, "European Agriculture", G.M.E. Leistner *Rhodesia Economic Structure and Change*, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 1976, p.88.

56. Overseas Development Group (1978), p.7.22.

57. Roberts (1978).

58. See A.P. Cheater, "Co-operative Marketing among African Producers in Rhodesia", *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, Vol.10, No.1, p.56 and Weinrich (1975).

centage of agricultural produce, and has worked in close collaboration with the statutory marketing boards to provide an efficient and subsidised service. At the end of 1978 there was a backlog of agricultural products waiting to be transported by the railways, but in January 1979 it was estimated that the backlog would be cleared by March.<sup>59</sup> In January 1979, "a spokesman for the AMA confirmed that during the last twelve months their transport problems have been relatively few",<sup>60</sup> although there are sometimes delays on low value high bulk products. Greatest pressure is usually felt between June and August, when the maize and tobacco crops come onto the market. The value of agricultural products transported by Rhodesia Railways (including operations in Botswana) has continued to expand to just over \$10 million for the year ending June 30, 1978, although the tonnage transported has not increased proportionately.

Road Motor Services Branch (RMS) provides road transport to and from railheads and is owned by Rhodesia Railways. This service has provided an important extension to rail services in certain areas, particularly for livestock. 91,000 tonnes of livestock were transported in 1976, representing 183,000 animals, but private road hauliers have also benefited in recent years in linking up with the railways and in some areas competing with them. The value of revenue generated by RMS has remained fairly static since 1975, and it was \$3.2 million for the year 1977-78. The tonnage of freight transported by RMS decreased from 669,000 tonnes in 1975 to 584,000 tonnes in 1976.<sup>61</sup> RMS services have been provided mainly for European farmers and their minimum load requirements have worked to the disadvantage of small-scale African producers. Most TTLs still have poor access to urban markets and the high cost of transport on the poor road system within the TTLs is a severe marketing constraint. The bulk of private road haulage is undertaken by haulage companies, rather than private individuals. In 1963 foreign companies accounted for £1.4 million of the £2.4 million gross profits from the Transport and Communications sector (of which South-African controlled companies only constituted £0.1 million).<sup>62</sup> The British Electric Traction Co. Ltd. (UK) and Barlow Rand have a number of subsidiaries in the transport sector.

59. *The Rhodesian Financial Gazette* January 19, 1979.

60. *The Rhodesian Financial Gazette* January 19, 1979.

61. Rhodesia Railways *Annual Report* 1976, 1977, p.5.

62. Stoneman (1976) p.46.

## b. Food Processing

The processing of agricultural products has long been an important and integral part of the Rhodesian economy, and has continued to expand in recent years, although some manufacturing sectors have experienced faster growth rates at different times. The growth in processed food production slowed over the 1973-75 period but accelerated again in 1976, and in 1977 it was 8.3% greater than in 1976. Only in 1978 did production slow markedly when there was a decrease of 2.4%. In comparison, the general index of manufacturing production has continued to decline steadily since its peak in 1974. The gross output of the food industry was valued at \$288.2 million in 1976 (21.5% of the total manufacturing gross output valued at \$1,341.1 million). The food manufacturing sector's sales of own products in recent years are set out in Table 6.

Table 6: THE FOOD MANUFACTURING SECTOR'S SALES OF OWN PRODUCE 1968 to 1976. \$000s

Commodity	1968	1974	1975	Average annual growth rate 1968 to 1974	1976	Percentage for the year 1976
Fresh meat, poultry and fish	24.1	59.2	60.4	12.2	60.8	23.7
Other meats, including canned meat	5.2	10.3	10.3	8.9	9.5	3.7
Dairy products, including dried milk	12.1	21.1	23.1	9.7	26.9	10.5
Maize meal	12.3	14.4	18.1	5.0	17.8	6.9
Bakery products	14.0	24.8	27.3	8.7	30.0	11.7
Tea, coffee and sugar	11.1	17.7	20.5	8.0	22.5	8.8
Margarine, oil and fats	6.0	14.4	16.2	13.2	22.2	8.7
Canned fruit and veg., frozen and pre-packed food	1.6	4.5	4.8	14.7	5.7	2.2
Other foods, including flour and food supplements	12.7	23.0	30.1	11.4	28.7	11.2
Sugar confectionary	2.1	6.4	6.0	14.0	5.4	2.1
Animal foodstuffs	8.4	18.9	21.2	12.3	27.2	10.6
TOTALS	109.6	214.7	238.0	10.2	256.7	100.0

Source: *Monthly Digest of Statistics* January 1977, *Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics*, January 1979, C.S.O., Salisbury.



Obviously, some of these processed food products might be considered luxuries such as Camembert cheese, cornflakes, certain bakery products, sugar confectionary and certain canned products, but other processed products are important for the nutritional well-being of the majority of the population, particularly fresh meat, fish, milk, maize-meal, bread, margarine, cooking oil, fats and salt. Some canned foods have an importance as suppliers of off-season food.

Government involvement in food-processing has not been as great as in the agricultural marketing sector, although the CSC and the DMB are responsible for the major part of the beef and dairy processing. The government has intervened in the manufacturing sector mainly through controls on site location for factories and depots, export of profits and dividends, investment plans where foreign exchange costs are involved and through import controls. The siting of the new abattoirs of the CSC in Gatooma, Marandellas and Sinoia, and of the new DMB cheese factory in Gatooma, are presumably linked to central government policies of decentralisation. Although 80% of all manufacturing capacity and output in Rhodesia was owned or controlled by international capital in 1976 – chiefly British and South African – foreign involvement in food processing companies was not as great as in some other manufacturing sectors. In 1976 of 105 transnational firms recorded in one study as operating in manufacturing in Rhodesia, only 4 (3 British and 1 American) were recorded in the foodstuffs sector.<sup>63</sup> This appears an underestimate, however, as Tate and Lyle (UK), Anglo-American Corporation (SA) and Hulett's Corporation (SA) are all involved in sugar production and processing; a Rhodesian affiliate of Unilever (UK) produces cheeses and vegetable oils; Food Specialities, selling condensed and powdered milk, baby foods and instant drinks, is a Nestlé's (Swiss) subsidiary; African Distillers (SA) are whole owners of the Rhodesian Food Corporation. In the foods of most nutritional importance to the majority of Rhodesians, Brooke Bond Liebig (UK) have major investments in meat products and food canning, while Lonhro (UK), Associated British Foods (UK) and Spillers (UK) have investments in milling companies, Associated British Foods has subsidiaries in the bakery sector and Reckitt and Colman (UK) in the general processed food sector. Major details on the Rhodesian Food Manufacturing Sector are set out in Tables 7-9.

63. United Nations General Assembly *Report of the Special Commission on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples*, UN, New York, 1976.

Table 7: THE FOOD MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN RHODESIA, 1975

	Gross output excluding sales of goods not produced on premises \$m	Total purchases & changes in stock excluding goods purchased for resale \$m	Wages & salaries paid \$000	Average number employed	Value of total stocks at end of year \$m	Net capital expenditure 1970-75 \$m	No. of firms paying income tax in fiscal year ending in 1978 30/6/78	Estim. no. of firms operating in 1978 as at 1.8.78	Statutory minimum wage for labourer \$/month
Slaughtering and meat processing	76.2	71.7	5,368	3,994	5.7	30.6	(a)	12	45.0 <sup>d</sup>
Dairy products	23.2	17.3	3,679	2,877	2.9	5.9	(a)	4	55.9
Canning and preserving fruit and vegetables	3.9	2.8	714	1,110	1.5	0.7	(a)	14	na
Grain mill products and animal feeds	66.6	53.1	5,975	4,724	9.0	5.5	5 <sup>b</sup>	13	68.2
Bakery products	27.2	19.2	4,408	3,933	0.9	5.2	24	39	47.7
Chocolate and sugar confectionery	6.0	3.7	991	1,098	1.1	1.7	(a)	24	49.8 <sup>e</sup>
Other food products	50.4	34.8	5,531	3,659	14.6	14.4	24	31	50.7 <sup>f</sup>
Total for food indus.	253.5	202.6	26,666	21,395	35.7	64.0	53 <sup>c</sup>	115g	n/a
Food industries as a % of all manufacturing industries	20.6	28.0	12.0	14.0	10.4	15.3	na	na	na
Total for all manufac- turing industries	1 232.6	723.3	222,290	152,055	342.4	417.9	na	na	na

Sources: ARnI, Statutory Minimum Wages of Labourers and Drivers as at 1st August 1978. The Census of Production 1974/5, Mining, Manufacturing, Construction, Electricity & Water Supply, CSO Salisbury Oct 1977.

\* all figures are provisional.

a. included in other foods. b. Grain mill products (4 of these firms were very large). c. Also includes drinks – There were also 8 individual income tax payers in the food & drink manufacturing sector. d. Meat processing only (CSC \$50.24/month. e. Sweets & confectionery. f. food processing (edible oils & fats \$59.36/month). g. This represents the total of individual firms (some have operations in more than one sub-sector). Manufacturers of animal feeds, spices and condiments are excluded.

Table 8: THE LOCATION OF THE FOOD INDUSTRY IN RHODESIA

	Gross output including sales of goods not pro- duced on premises 1974, \$m	Average number employed 1974	Number of Factories 1978
<b>Bakery products</b>			
Salisbury	11.6	1,949	18
Bulawayo	6.9	1,084	10
Other places	7.6	1,030	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>26.1</b>	<b>4,063</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Grain mill products and animal feeds</b>			
Salisbury	30.5	2,169	8
Other places	27.3	1,965	9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>57.8</b>	<b>4,134</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Other foodstuffs</b>			
Salisbury	70.8	5,673	na
Other places	82.5	6,232	na
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>153.3</b>	<b>11,905</b>	<b>na</b>

Source. *The Census of Production 1974/75*, C.S O Salisbury, October 1977 and ARNI Register and Buyers Guide 1978, Salisbury 1978.

### c. Food Imports

Attention is given here to food imports, mainly on the assumption that in a transition to an independent Zimbabwe, there may be a need for certain food imports. As Rhodesia is largely a food exporting country and as it is now largely self-sufficient in many basic food-stuffs, this is only likely to be a temporary need.

Unfortunately, information on imports since 1965 is hard to obtain and published figures on imports into Rhodesia have largely not been available. Accordingly it is not possible to give a comprehensive quantitative picture of the extent of food imports in recent years. It is likely that a certain proportion of food imports, particularly of processed foods, are comparatively luxury items intended for the more sophisticated palates of the more affluent.

Table 9: MAJOR FOOD MANUFACTURERS IN RHODESIA

Sector	Main manufacturers	Factory location	Approx. no. of employees
<b>Fish</b>	Irvin and Johnson <sup>†</sup>	B.	100
<b>Poultry</b>	Arbor Acres	S.	
<b>Fresh and other meat</b>	Colcom Central Coop Cold Storage Commission* Liebigs (Rhodesia) <sup>†</sup> Super Cannors	S, B, G, U. S, B, U, FV Gt, Ma, Si West Nicholson B.	3,500 1,500 <sup>a</sup>
<b>Dairy Products</b>	Dairy Marketing Board* Food Specialities (Nestlé) <sup>†</sup>	S, B, G, Gt, U. S.	2,330
<b>Flour and maize meal</b>	Heinrich's Processes Products <sup>†</sup> Impala Milling <sup>†</sup> Midlands Milling National Foods <sup>†</sup>	S. G. S, B, U, G, Gt, Q, Essex Vale, Gwanda, Plumtree, Rusape.	
	National Milling <sup>†</sup> Premier Milling <sup>†</sup> Rhodesian Milling <sup>†</sup> Rhodesian Wattle <sup>†</sup> Shabani Millers <sup>†</sup> Wightman and Co. <sup>†</sup>	S, U. U. Shabani S, B, U, Gt, Hartley	3,500
<b>Bakery products</b>	Aroma Bakeries <sup>†</sup> Bake An' Take Lobels London Bakery <sup>†</sup> Midlands Bakery J.A. Mitchell North West Bakery <sup>†</sup> Pomona Bakery Strathaven Bakeries <sup>†</sup>	S, FV B. B, S. S. Q. U. S. S. S.	4,000 incl. 30 other firms
<b>Tea, coffee and cocoa</b>	Aberfoyle Plantations <sup>†</sup> Eastern Highlands Tea <sup>†</sup> Lyons Brooke Bond <sup>†</sup> Rhodesia Tea Estates <sup>†</sup>	U. U. S, B, U, G. U.	450
<b>Sugar</b>	Hippo Valley Estates <sup>†</sup> Rhodesia Sugar Refineries <sup>†</sup> Triangle Ltd. <sup>†</sup>	Chiredzi S. Triangle	9,550 8,500 incl. non-sugar employees

Sector	Main manufacturers	Factory location	Approx. no. of employees
Margarine, oils and fats	Lever Brothers† Rhodesian Industries National Foods†	S, B, U, G, Chiredzi S, B, G, U. see above	
Canned fruit and vegetables	Carolina Enterprises National Cannery† National Foods† Liebigs (Rhodesia)† Gibbs Insurance	Ma. U. see above see above S.	1,200 incl. 9 other firms
Confectionery and sweets	M.E. Charhon† Piccadilly Sweets (part of Willards Foods) + 22 small firms	S.  	1,000
Other foods	Willards Foods Nutritional Research and Food Products Reckitt and Colman† Pronto Packers Protein Foods† <sup>b</sup> National Foods† Tanrose† Rhodesian Food Corptn.†	S. S. S. S. S. see above S.	220+

Notes: A number of firms have changed their names in recent months with the creation of Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

†subsidiary or partly-owned by foreign company

\*government owned parastatal

<sup>a</sup>for all Liebig's plants (excluding 2,000 ranch employees)

<sup>b</sup>part of the Delta Corporation, which owns Rhodesia Breweries

S = Salisbury; B = Bulawayo; U = Umtali; FV = Fort Victoria; G = Gwelo; Gt = Gatooma; Ma = Marandellas; Si = Sinoia; Q = Que Que.

It is likely that meat imports have been negligible (maybe some luxury processed meat items) and that even with the present outbreaks of disease amongst livestock in the country, the country should remain self-sufficient. Mutton and lamb imports have been prohibited since 1970, although live imports of sheep have continued. Although fish production in the country has expanded, there may be an economic justification as well as nutritional need to import fish, possibly from Beira or Lake Cabora Bassa in Mozambique, where fish production is expanding.

Imports of dairy products on a wholemilk equivalent basis averaged

11,000 tonnes each year from 1970 to 1974 and dropped to 4,580 tonnes in 1975.<sup>64</sup> Part of this fall has been due to the government's decision not to allow imports of butter in 1975 and the 1974-75 fall in domestic milk production. On average, 700 tonnes of skim milk powder (9,030 tonnes in wholemilk equivalent) have been imported in recent years, accounting for most of these imports.<sup>65</sup> Rhodesia has been deficient in milk protein requirements while having a surplus of milkfat. Recently, it has been more profitable to manufacture full cream milk powder for export and to import skim milk powder rather than to manufacture the full requirements of the country and be left with excess supplies of butter which would have to be sold and be left with excess supplies of butter which would have to be sold on a depressed world market. It is likely, therefore, that these forces will continue to operate in an independent Zimbabwe, but progress towards self-sufficiency might be achieved by modifying local processing and pricing policies. In recent years, there have been restrictions on the importation of all dairy products and the importation of skim milk powder has been on a single channel basis through the DMB.

Despite the statement by Denis Norman, President of the Rhodesian National Farmer's Union (RNFU), in March 1979 that "this year we will not feed ourselves in maize",<sup>66</sup> it is likely that Rhodesia will continue to have sufficient supplies of maize, problems relate more to distribution. Nziramasanga in his study for USAID suggested that "if up to 50% of the maize producing European farms stopped operating there would be no food supply problems, but exports would be eliminated; if more farms cease operations, food prices would go up".<sup>67</sup> Although this is an oversimplistic presentation of how the market operates, it reflects the capabilities of the maize-producing farmers. In July 1979, the Minister of Finance stated that stockpiles of maize would mean that there would be no shortage of maize in 1979/80. (*The Herald*, July 27, 1979.)

64. *Report on the Dairy Industry*, Agricultural Marketing Authority, Salisbury, September 1976.

65. *Report on the Dairy Industry* (1976), p.16.

66. *The Herald*, March 8, 1979. On July 25 1979 the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union changed its name to the Commercial Farmers' Union of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. The former name, RNFU, is used in this booklet.

67. M. Nziramasanga, "The Agricultural Sector in Rhodesia", Occasional Paper No.7, CREDA, University of Michigan, January 20, 1977.

The one important product for which Zimbabwe may need substantial imports is wheat, despite production in the country reportedly reaching self-sufficiency in 1978. At present the African population consumes 75% of the wheat (mainly in urban areas), while only producing 2% of the domestic output. It has been estimated that in most recent years imports supply about 25% of total requirements. Some import substitution might be possible by developing further bread production from a mixture of wheat flour and maize flour, as has been tried in other African countries.

There may also be a need to import certain vegetables, though any shortage is likely to be local rather than national; in recent years fresh vegetables have been imported from South Africa. Fresh vegetables could be imported by truck from Angonia in Mozambique which currently runs surpluses at certain times of the year.

#### *d. Food Distribution*

The food distribution system has only marginally been touched by government intervention, and then usually through indirect interventions such as price controls and sales taxes. Sales tax (currently at 15%) was recently increased to help make up for the revenue shortfall, very largely caused by the present war. Exemptions remained, however, on bread, meal, milk and meat, but the sales prices of these products (as well as others) have subsequently been permitted to rise to cover increases in producer prices, rather than engage in higher subsidies.

Because the distribution system has been of peripheral interest in government policy and because distribution systems are often treated as subjects of ancillary interest after attention to production, there have not been many detailed studies of the structure of the sector and its operations, particularly regarding food distribution. In 1963, of the total gross profits from distribution of £5.2 million, £3.1 million (60%) came from foreign controlled companies, of which £1.3 million was from South African controlled companies. South African companies are thought to have further penetrated retail distribution in recent years, but domestic companies still play an important part.<sup>68</sup> In 1975 there were an estimated 1,400 wholesale establishments operating and 4,500 retail ones.<sup>69</sup> For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1978, there were 370 companies and 88 individuals liable for income taxation in

wholesale distribution, and 1,115 companies and 1,175 individuals liable for taxation in retail distribution.<sup>70</sup> Companies were supplying over 96% of the income tax coming from the wholesale sector.

Isolating the food distribution part of the distribution sector is difficult. The Retail Trade Value Index for food, drink and tobacco businesses has continued to expand steadily, although slowing slightly in 1977. The resurgence in 1978 may be a result of significant price rises in foodstuffs. Retail sales increased 2.5% in volume in 1978, after falling 7.4% in volume in 1977.<sup>71</sup> This is partly explained by the relaxation of the pay restraint policy in mid-1978 and partly by pre-emigration buying of consumer durables.

In urban African townships much of the retail trade is dominated by Asian traders. As the distribution sector has grown in recent years, however, it is thought that more jobs in the sector have been taken by Africans. The decrease in the European population employed in distribution, restaurants or hotels since 1975 has been proportionally greater than that of Africans. In Harare (the major African township in Salisbury) the numbers of most types of retail outlets (excluding public markets) were declining over the 1969-74 period, although the number of butchers increased.<sup>72</sup> It is probable that the limited purchasing power of the residents of African townships accounts for the small range of low-cost goods recorded in the shops there.<sup>73</sup> The low level of capital possessed by many of the smaller traders within the townships has inhibited the development of small African businessmen, although in 1975 there were estimated to be 15,000 of them.<sup>74</sup> Basic foods are estimated to account for about 60-70% of the African retail market and groceries for another 15-20%.<sup>75</sup> In the past many African retailers have purchased their supplies from European and Asian wholesalers, who often charge higher prices. African retailers

68. Stoneman (1976), p.54.

69. C.A. Willis in Leistner (1976), p.157.

70. *Rhodesia Income Tax Statistics. Analysis of assessment and loss during the fiscal year 1977-78*, Government Printer, Salisbury, November 1978.

71. *Economic Bulletin Rhodesia, March 1979*, Standard Bank Group, Salisbury, 1979.

72. M.A.H. Smout *Commercial Growth Consumer Behaviour in Suburban Salisbury, Rhodesia*, Series in Social Studies, Occasional Paper No.1, University of Rhodesia, 1974, p.69.

73. M.A.H. Smout, "Shopping centres and shopping patterns in two African townships", *Zambezia*, Vol.2, No.1, December 1971.

74. C.G. Msipa, "The African retail market - opportunities and difficulties", *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, Vol.9, No.1, March 1975.

75. Msipa (1975), p.16.

also suffer from competition with European and Asian retailers who have better long and short-term credit facilities.

In the rural areas retail distribution has mainly been in the hands of individual private traders. Because of transport and other distribution difficulties, retail prices in the rural areas have been as much as 30-50% higher than in the urban areas. One or two different proposals and projects have been followed up to improve the distribution system in African rural areas in recent years. One of these was the establishment of the Progress Trading Association (Private) Ltd., that was set up in 1972 by a group of African businessmen in Salisbury, to improve the efficiency of distribution to African areas (as well as to make them profits). This involved the setting up of a cash and carry wholesale system with 37 wholesale depots (32 in rural areas strategically situated at growth and business centres).<sup>76</sup> The Whitsun Foundation made an in-depth study of the Company's proposed developments over the next 4-5 years.<sup>77</sup> In 1976, it looked as if the Whitsun Foundation was going to support this project despite it having "above average risks", but this does not now appear to have materialised. Another development has been with the Tribal Trust Lands Corporation (TILCOR), which has also engaged in wholesale and retail trading and has established a subsidiary company, TILTRADE, to create or expand trading facilities in selected areas, as well as to train shopkeepers and salespersons. Several firms from the private sector are associated with this company and TILCOR now only has a 12% interest in TILTRADE. Some African opposition has been shown to the activities of TILTRADE.<sup>78</sup>

The weaknesses in the rural distribution system have been further exacerbated by the present war, with the Patriotic Front forces operating in many rural areas. Rural traders (most of whom are Africans) have been charging higher and higher prices for the distribution of essential foods and other goods to rural areas, justifying these rises on the security risks they run in transportation. Some of these rises may be justified, but in other cases traders are simply profiteering. The response

76. R.J. Gondo, "Proposals to improve the distribution system in the African rural areas of Rhodesia with a view to increasing productivity in African agriculture", (mimeo).

77. Whitsun Foundation *Project 3.10: Progress Trading Association Report and Recommendation of the Director on the Proposed Loan to the Progress Trading Company (Pvt) Ltd*, Salisbury, September 1976.

78. J. Handford, *A portrait of an economy under sanctions 1965-75*, Mercury Press, Salisbury, 1976, p.60.

of the authorities has not helped. One District Commissioner was recently quoted as saying: "I tell people this is one of the costs of the terrorist war. If we can stop the war, prices will drop".<sup>79</sup>

Over and above this, however, the security forces have been harassing and restricting food supplies to rural areas, particularly since the imposition of martial law in many areas at the end of 1978. The security forces have been using a policy of "starve the terrorists", but as the population in many rural areas support the Patriotic Front, the security forces, unable (and sometimes unwilling) to differentiate between the "terrorists" and the people, have been causing widespread hunger through the harsh restriction of food distribution and the destruction of crops.<sup>80</sup> In addition food relief provided by international and local agencies has been prohibited in certain areas.<sup>81</sup>

It is clear that any emerging government in an independent Zimbabwe will need to give much greater attention to the problems of distribution in the rural areas, particularly as the present productive capacity of these areas declines and the population is then more dependent upon food imports from other areas of the country. Also, if further disruption to food production occurs in the transition to Zimbabwe, more rural areas are likely to suffer even more.

## VI. THE SUPPLY OF INDIVIDUAL FOOD PRODUCTS

In this section, the supply of those foodstuffs which are of nutritional importance to the majority of the Rhodesian population will be discussed; in such a short booklet, the coverage must needs be fairly cursory. Particular emphasis is given to the basic foods required by the African population and those foods for which there might be supply problems during the transition to an independent Zimbabwe.

### a. Livestock and meat

The national cattle herd of Rhodesia is larger than the national herds of Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland

79. *The Sunday Mail*, December 10, 1978.

80. *The Guardian*, April 12, 1979.

81. See position paper prepared by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, March 1979, Salisbury (mimeo).



combined. Meat exports have formed an important part of Rhodesia's agricultural foreign exchange earnings in recent years. Domestic consumption of meat is comparatively high. One estimate suggested that beef consumption alone amongst the European population was now 47 kg/year, and amongst the African population 35 kg/year.<sup>82</sup> The latter figure is probably an overestimate, however, as it is likely that meat consumption is considerably lower in the smaller towns and in the rural areas (see also Table 3, above). In the 1975-76 season, it was estimated that 152,000 tonnes of beef were produced of which about 90,000 tonnes came from European farms and the rest from African farms.<sup>83</sup> Other estimates put the European contribution to the domestic beef market at about 75%.<sup>84</sup> The official estimates of the numbers of livestock in the country are shown in Table 10.

Table 10: OFFICIAL ESTIMATE OF LIVESTOCK IN RHODESIA  
000s

	Beef cattle	Sheep	Pigs	Goats
European Areas (March 1978)	2,734	175	108	31
African Areas (1977)	3,592*	486	104	1,787

Source: *Zimbabwe Rhodesia Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics*  
April 1979, C.S.O. Salisbury p.8.

Note: Over one million have died as a result of the war. (*The Herald*, July 28, 1979)

The beef herd in European areas grew steadily until 1977, except for a drop in 1972 and 1973, but was marginally reduced in 1977. Offtake from the herd is about 20-25% in European areas. The potential for expansion is great: it has been estimated that the European herd could be increased by about 50% to a herd of about 4.34 million.<sup>85</sup> At present the European herd (on about 4,700 farms) is distributed in all provinces

82. *New African*, April, 1979, p.24.

83. Southern Africa Task Force, Office of Southern and East African Affairs, Africa Bureau, USAID, *Transition in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe*, Washington, February 1977, pp.IV-5.

84. Handford (1976), p.108.

85. Agricultural Marketing Authority, *Production Potential of the Rhodesian Beef Industry*, Salisbury, January 1976, p.17.

with the heaviest concentrations in Mashonaland South and Matabeleland. The areas with the greatest potential for expansion are in Manicaland and Mashonaland North, but there is scope for expansion in all provinces. The current economic squeeze has meant that a number of European ranchers have been faced with liquidity problems and high cost of feedstuffs, and have been selling their breeding and other cattle. In May this year, it was reported that over the past 18 months, 50% of the cattle slaughtered were females (when 45% is considered a safe percentage to ensure adequate herd growth); in March 1979, 63% of cattle slaughtered were females and 30% of these were in calf.<sup>86</sup> In January, there was a 12.5% increase in producer prices to try and help the economic squeeze felt by farmers; this was passed on to consumers in February by an average increase of 15% in the wholesale price of beef. The President of the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union (RNFU) has recently been making statements about future developments in beef supply arguing that "if we continue at the rate we are going, we could find ourselves in a position in 18 months or two years time where we could have beef rationing in this country".<sup>87</sup> Beef rationing was introduced on 3rd September 1979.

The African cattle herd has supplied a much lower offtake of cattle for slaughter than the European herd: between 2% to 5% in comparison with 20% to 25% for the European herd. With the escalation of the war, cattle dipping has been most seriously curtailed and it has been estimated that all but 1,500 of the 8,000 cattle dips and spray races in the African areas are no longer in use. Tick-borne disease and other diseases such as trypanosomiasis and theileriosis have hit many African herds. Official estimates suggest that more than 250,000 African owned cattle died during the last rainy season.<sup>88</sup> In July 1979, the government admitted that over 1 million out of a total of 3.4 million TTL cattle had died (*The Herald*, July 28, 1979). In recent years, TTL sales of fattened cattle for slaughtering have been increasing, from an average of 4,800 in 1970-72 to 14,500 in 1973-74.<sup>89</sup> Cattle form part of an integrated system in TTLs, and are important as draught animals and suppliers of manure as fertilisers. It has been suggested that more older cattle could be culled and sold for slaughter to increase beef supplies and reduce overgrazing in certain areas.

86. *The Herald*, May 16, 1979.

87. *The Star Weekly*, March 17, 1979.

88. *The Farmer*, September 8, 1978.

89. Danckwerts in Leistner (1976), p.100.

The bulk of the beef is slaughtered in the abattoirs in Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali, Fort Victoria, Gatooma, Marandellas and Sinoia. Prices are controlled and the loss on beef sales is usually made up from fifth quarter sales and government subsidies. The CSC has tried to regularise the intake of cattle for slaughter, by offering delivery incentives over the rainy season. The average intake cattle weight has been about 210 kg cold dressed weight in recent years. Local market beef sales have increased on average at a rate of 9.7% a year over the 1969-76 period.

The European sheep flock has been declining steadily since 1969. The African flock continued to expand up to 1975, was sharply reduced in 1976, but has begun to grow again since then. The European flock is most concentrated in Mashonaland. In 1978, 92% of these sheep formed flocks of less than 600 head.<sup>90</sup> Most of the African sheep are held in TTLs. In 1970 it was estimated that about 26% of local lamb and mutton production was from African areas.<sup>91</sup> At present the European flock probably supplies about 50,000 sheep a year for slaughter, while the African flock supplies about 170,000 sheep a year. In 1971, only about 26% of sheep were slaughtered by the CSC, while about 57% were slaughtered by local butchers, and the rest on-farm. It is likely that as food supplies to TTLs have become more difficult, there have been more on-farm slaughtering by African producers. Average mutton and lamb consumption per head in Rhodesia was estimated at 7.6 kg/per year in 1971,<sup>92</sup> although consumption amongst the European population has been higher than amongst the African population.

The African pig stock has fluctuated around 100,000 since 1970, while the European pig stock after increasing over the 1975-77 period, dropped to 108,000 at the end of March 1978. During 1976 about 177,000 pigs were processed through COLCOM, the pig marketing co-operative organisation that has the bacon monopoly and dominates the market, and the European stock dropped. Producer prices for pork were increased in 1977, with a further increase of 4 cents/kg in 1979, but many smaller European pig producers have been experiencing difficulties, especially as the failure of the maize crop means higher prices for pig feed. As a recent report in the Rhodesian press suggested,

90. *Agricultural Production in European Areas 1978, Livestock*, C.S.O., Salisbury, September 1978, p.16.

91. *Agricultural Marketing Authority Market Prospects for Mutton and Lamb in Rhodesia*, October 1971, p.5.

92. *Agricultural Marketing Authority* (1971), p.9.

“some small or part-time pig producers are going out of business due to rising costs, low returns and the security situation”.<sup>93</sup> In recent years, African producers have been selling more of their pigs, rather than keeping them for home consumption. But the dominating influence of the larger European producers in COLCOM, which has the monopoly, has worked to the comparative disadvantage of these African producers.

The European goat stock is comparatively small and has been declining since 1973. The African goat stock has ranged between about 1.7 and 2.0 million since 1971. In 1972/73, 65,777 goats were slaughtered in abattoirs.<sup>94</sup> The AMA investigated possibilities for goat marketing in 1972 and 1973, but the numbers marketed have remained comparatively low and efforts to increase the number marketed have been disappointing. This is possibly because goats have provided a convenient source of home killed meat for the rural African population, which is an important source of animal protein in their diet.

Sales of meat to the public are made through general and grocery stores and through a large number of butchers who are linked together in associations. The butchers' mark-up is nominally 26%, but in practice mark-ups have been as high as 100%.<sup>95</sup> Many poorer people still find it hard to purchase their meat requirements because of their low incomes. As one African MP in the previous parliament, who runs a butchery, indicated, “most of my customers can afford only 20 cents worth of meat a day, and that is what they are capable of buying . . . if 15 cents is going to produce no more than 300 grams, what does it mean in terms of relish for the night for the family?”.<sup>96</sup>

#### b. Fish

With its inland location, fish production in Rhodesia has been less than in coastal countries, although some small-scale fishing takes place in rivers and lakes. One company, Irvin and Johnson (the subsidiary of a South African company) has been importing fish in recent years, and filleting and packing it in its Bulawayo factory for local distribution. More recently, it has expanded into commercial fishing on Lake Kariba,

93. *The Sunday Mail*, March 11, 1979.

94. E.G. Cross in *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal*, Vol.71, No.6, 1971.

95. *Rhodesia Parliamentary Debates House of Assembly*, Vol.97, No.34, Col.2435, February 24, 1978.

96. *Rhodesia Parliamentary Debates House of Assembly*, Col.1446, August 25, 1976.

catching bream and kapenta (a small sardine-like fish). It would appear that the potential exists for expanding fish production considerably within the country and this would increase the country's supply of protein.

#### *c. Poultry and eggs*

There are only two or three significant large-scale poultry meat producers in the country and most of the commercial production comes from European producers. At the end of March 1978, there were 698,823 laying stock hens, 138,135 breeding stock hens, 3,983 turkeys and 2,761 ducks on European farms.<sup>97</sup> The numbers of commercial laying stock hens have decreased slightly in recent years, whereas the numbers of breeding stock hens, turkeys and ducks fell sharply after September 1977 when slaughterings increased markedly.

Production in African areas is also significant, but only a small proportion of this production is marketed. At the end of March 1978, there were 11,860 domestic fowls recorded as held by 89 African registered producers.<sup>98</sup> The numbers of domestic fowls held by African registered producers reached a peak of 20,000 at the end of June 1977, but have dropped since then. There are numerous African producers who are not registered. In 1971, it was suggested that a Poultry and Egg Marketing Board be set up, but this was rejected by the AMA, partly because of the existing concentration of commercial production. Of the 1.04 million broilers sold in the first quarter of 1978 from European production, 87% came from only four producers. Of the 9,620 broilers sold by African registered producers over the same period, 53% came from only two producers.

In some rural areas, eggs are rarely eaten by Africans, but in urban areas their consumption is increasing. Egg production is largely in the hands of small backyard producers and large industrial commercial producers, of which there are about 14 firms. The latter account for the vast majority of eggs sold commercially and 70% of their production is marketed by one company, Rhodesian Egg Packers. In the first quarter of 1978, European producers sold 24.6 million table eggs, compared with 0.5 million from the 74 African registered producers.<sup>99</sup> Of the

eggs sold by European producers over this period, 79% came from only 24 producers. Sales of eggs from registered producers in African areas have been increasing since 1977, with the greatest increases coming from two producers in the TTLs. In the first quarter of 1978, 49% of the table eggs sold by African registered producers came from these two suppliers.<sup>100</sup>

#### *d. Dairy products*

Some dairy products might be considered luxury items, such as ice-cream, fruit yoghourts, cheese, and to some extent butter. Fresh milk and skim milk powder form the major part of African consumption of dairy products, being more low-cost items.

Rhodesia has a well-established dairy industry, but it is located almost completely in the European sector. In 1976 there was only one African dairy producer registered with the DMB. The numbers of dairy cattle have been decreasing slowly since 1973 to 117,000 at the end of March 1978. In 1974/5 out of a national dairy herd of 127,000 only 85,288 cows were supplying the DMB with milk. Of the estimated total milk production of 164 million kgs in 1974/75, 144 million (88%) were delivered to the DMB. Wholemilk deliveries accounted for 44% of total milk production in 1974-75; they are now thought to account for about 40%. Over half the dairy herd came from only 200 farms. In 1974-75, 55% of the national dairy herd was in Mashonaland. The number of dairy herds below 200 head has been declining in recent years, while the number of larger herds has been increasing, as smaller producers have been unable to compete with the larger ones. The number of commercial producers has also been declining and the average at the end of June 1978 was 1,068. Of these, only 445 were all-year round suppliers of milk, the others supplying only cream and butterfat. The productivity of the cows has increased substantially in recent years, and in 1974, the average estimated production from sales for the national herd was about 2 tonnes of milk a year, and for recorded herds it was as high as four tonnes of milk a year. The productive potential is considerable, but the industry has been suffering for a number of years from overproduction and low prices. In 1977-78, the DMB made a trading loss of \$1.4 million.<sup>101</sup>

97. *Quarterly Poultry Census: First Quarter 1978*, C.S.O., Salisbury, June 1978.

98. *Quarterly Poultry Census* (1978), p.6.

99. *Quarterly Poultry Census* (1978), p.7-8.

100. *Quarterly Poultry Census* (1978), p.8.

101. Agricultural Marketing Authority, *Dairy Marketing Board, Reports and Accounts for the year ended 30th June 1978*, AMA, Salisbury, 1978, p.6.

Africans have preferred milk with a high butterfat content. The consumption of wholemilk by Africans increased from 7 million kgs (15% of the wholemilk market) in 1971 to 20.7 million kgs (31% of the market) in 1977. In 1977-78, the DMB opened new depots in the townships of Mufakose, Salisbury, and Mzilikazi, Bulawayo, and "a concerted effort commenced in the early part of 1977 to improve the Board's penetration into the African market which necessitated a substantial increase in the labour force",<sup>102</sup> (mainly in delivery men) and in the costs of distribution. A programme of milk sales in schools has also been promoted since 1975; after initial advances these sales fell by 3.3% in 1977 but rose again by 57% in 1978. These programmes of expansion into the urban African market are continuing.

In African rural areas household consumption of own production of milk was valued at \$4.4 million in 1977, compared with \$2 million in 1970.<sup>103</sup> Production of milk in TTLs for own consumption was estimated at about 50,000 tons in 1975-76.<sup>104</sup> Amongst the less prosperous rural population without lactating cows, milk is seen as more of a special food for important occasions.

Skim milk powder, sterilised milk and Lacto (an acidulated milk product) are also increasingly consumed by the African population. Sales of Lacto are highly price elastic, and recent price rises seriously affected sales. Full cream Lacto was taken off the market for some time, and only re-introduced in 1976. It appears that 5% higher prices for Lacto were not introduced with metrification in 1977 because of market resistance. Skim milk powder has often been imported.

#### *e. Maize*

The one major staple of Rhodesia is mealie-meal (maize meal), which forms the basis of the staple African dish of 'sadza'. Maize is widely grown in both European and African areas though less can be grown in the TTLs on lower ground. It is the main calorie and carbohydrate supplier of the African diet. Annual production has fluctuated markedly in recent years, mainly because of the weather, from between 0.6 and 2 million tonnes in the years 1973 to 1976.

Maize production is highly concentrated; one estimate suggested that

102. DMB Reports and Accounts (1977).

103. *National Accounts of Rhodesia 1977*, Government Printer, Salisbury, October 1978.

104. USAID (1977), p.IV-5.

in the 1975-76 season, of the 1.75 million tonnes produced, 1.26 million (72%) came from the European sector, 0.05 (3%) from the African PAs and only 0.44 million (25%) from the TTLs.<sup>105</sup> In 1978, 60% of the national maize crop was grown by only 1,100 European producers.<sup>106</sup> In 1976-77, the maize intake was similar to the 1975-76 season. Maize production was down in 1978 and it is likely to be considerably lower in 1979 due to the severe drought. With the large stocks that exist, there is likely to be enough for 1979; but, as was mentioned above, there are serious problems both of distribution and of poorer people not having the money to buy their maize requirements. The President of the RNFU has recently been reported as saying that "the maize intake will fall by half this year", and that "there would be no maize for export and Rhodesia would have to dig into its reserves to feed its own people . . . though there are enough stocks to get through to the middle of next year".<sup>107</sup> The exact circumstances are not available to the discerning public, however, and there appear to be some contradictions as only a month or so earlier Denis Norman and others were blithely talking of using Rhodesian stockpiles of essential food-stuffs to political advantage to supply Mozambique, Angola, Zaire, Malawi and Zambia (the latter is currently experiencing severe grain deficits).<sup>108</sup> At the end of March 1976, the GMB had stocks of all products under its control, valued at \$23.8 million.

Maize sales from TTLs have been declining as more maize has been consumed locally and as production has been disrupted. It was estimated that in 1975 about 30% of production came from African farmers, but less than 5% was sold through official commercial channels. Much of these sales probably came from PAs. In 1973, sales of maize from TTLs through official channels were valued at \$172,640 (probably about 6,150 tonnes), while household consumption of own production of maize and other grains in African areas was estimated to have increased from approximately \$14.9 million in 1970 (probably about 460,000 tonnes) to \$23.7 million in 1977 (probably about 500,000 tonnes).<sup>109</sup> However these figures are exceedingly unreliable. In the last few years

105. USAID (1977), p.IV-5.

106. *The Herald*, May 24, 1979.

107. *The Star Weekly*, March 17, 1979.

108. See *The Herald*, February 2, 1979, Standard Bank, *Business Trends*, February 1979 and Rhodesian National Farmers Union "Stability Through Agriculture", March 1979, p.3 (mimeo).

109. *National Accounts* (1977).

TTLs have had to import substantial quantities of maize and maize meal from other areas of the country.

The production of maize in PAs has continued to expand, particularly with the introduction of hybrid varieties in recent years. Their sales of maize in 1973 were valued at \$242,360. In 1976, the PAs produced 68,625 tonnes of maize, and over the 1971-75 period 58% of PA maize production was sold through official channels. It is also thought that substantial quantities of maize are sold illegally by both PA and TTL farmers. On April 6, 1979, following increases in the price of maize to millers by the GMB, the wholesale price of maize meal was increased from 8.5% to 10%, according to pack size. The price of maize to producers had been raised 10.4% to \$63 per tonne three days earlier. After the RNFU had rejected pre-planting prices of \$66 and \$72.50 for class A maize in 1979-80, a price of \$75 was agreed in August 1979.<sup>110</sup>

Considering the importance of maize to the African producer and the current problems within the TTLs, this sub-sector merits far greater public scrutiny and the provision of more detailed information on production in deficit areas. Although shortages of maize have been reported repeatedly throughout the 1970s, and more frequently with the escalation of the war, the size of the national problem has not been fully documented.

#### *f. Wheat*

At present the African population consumes 75% of the wheat and wheat flour products consumed in the country, but African producers are only responsible for 2% of the local production of it. Most wheat flour and wheat flour product consumption by Africans is in urban areas. Wheat production in the country has continued to increase substantially since 1965, with government support (particularly in the form of subsidies) to help import substitution. In 1971, wheat production was estimated at about 82,000 tonnes, while local consumption was estimated at about 109,000 tonnes (75% self-sufficiency), compared with only 16% self-sufficiency in 1967. It was envisaged in 1971, that the country would be self-sufficient in wheat by 1973 or 1974, but sharp increases in demand for wheat flour products (see Table 6) necessitated imports up until 1978, when the country reportedly became self-sufficient. In 1975/76 it was estimated that the total wheat production was 125,892 tonnes.<sup>111</sup> In 1979, the wheat producer

110. *The Herald*, August 6, 1979.

price is to stay at \$100/tonne (AS class), and it was anticipated last February that current levels of production are likely to be sustained.<sup>112</sup>

The price of bread is government controlled. The price of a loaf rose from 19.5 cents to 21 cents in November 1978, but it was announced in June that the price would rise again soon.<sup>113</sup>

#### *g. Other grains*

Rice has only recently begun to be grown in more substantial quantities. Its production is expanding, as is consumption. In 1976, there were problems experienced in marketing rice and one MP suggested that the GMB might take responsibility for marketing it.<sup>114</sup>

Production of sorghum, millet, barley and other cereals was estimated at 270,000 tonnes in 1975-76. Sorghum is another basic staple for many Africans, and sorghum and millet are estimated to account for about 12% of the cultivated area of TTLs. Munga (bulrush millet) and Rapoko (finger millet) are the main types of millet grown. Their production has remained fairly static in recent years, with some slight increase in rapoko. The only controlled product of these that is marketed by the GMB is sorghum. The bulk of this marketed sorghum (about 82% in 1976) is used for brewing in African beer. During the 1960s sorghum supplies were often inadequate for maltsters' requirements and sorghum was imported. Although sorghum obtained higher prices than maize, European farmers have not been interested in its cultivation. By 1972, the quantities of sorghum produced were less than half annual domestic requirements and producer prices were increased to stimulate production, which they did. By 1978 self-sufficiency in sorghum was apparently achieved. About 75% of the marketed sorghum from African areas comes from TTLs.

#### *h. Vegetable oils and oilseeds*

Vegetable oil and fat for cooking and for margarine, are nutritionally important basic processed foods that rural as well as urban Africans need to purchase. The sales of these products have increased substantially in recent years (see Table 6). Groundnuts and cottonseed have been the main oilseeds used in the industry in recent years. The increases

111. USAID (1977). p.IV-5.

112. *The Herald*, February 22, 1979.

113. *The Herald*, June 28, 1979.

114. *Rhodesia Parliamentary Debates House of Assembly*, Col.1402, August 28, 1976.



in cotton production have meant that cottonseed has tended to replace groundnuts, although it is not wholly substitutable. Some alternative oilseeds have been imported and in recent years increased production of sesame and sunflower have provided other alternatives. The marketing of sunflower seed (a highly nutritional oilseed) was studied by the AMA in 1977, but is still supplied by private outlets.

Groundnuts are purchased by the GMB and are mainly grown in African areas both as a basic staple, and for cash, primarily to supply the oil-expressors. In 1975-76 total production was estimated at about 122,000 tonnes, of which about 90% came from TTLs.<sup>115</sup> In 1975, 90% of marketed groundnuts went to the oil-expressors, and only 10% went for local sales. In 1972, new grading standards were introduced to encourage a groundnut production that was more acceptable for edible, crushing and confectionary purposes, and unshelled groundnuts were accepted for the first time by the GMB. In 1975, 84% of the groundnuts purchased by the GMB were already shelled. The ground crop in 1977 was low because of the rainfall distribution and marketing problems in remote areas. A more detailed appreciation of the inter-relationship between groundnut production for local consumption, and sales to the GMB as a cash crop by African farmers, which also takes into consideration alternative oilseeds for oil-expressing, would help to ensure a more balanced and regular production.

Soyabean was used for the first time in 1975 as an alternative in vegetable oil production, but most of the expanded production since 1970 has been going to poultry and other animal feeds and for export, rather than constituting part of the public's diet. In 1976, the AMA specifically studied the possibilities of soyabeans as an alternative, but they have presented some processing difficulties, and accordingly all the supplies now go to one oil-expressor.

The major problems for vegetable oils do not appear to be related so much to supplies, but more to the problems of distribution. The Rhodesian press recently quoted the case of traders in one TTL charging 85 cents for cooking oil which usually costs 57 cents.<sup>116</sup> Cooking oil is one product which is important to Africans in the rural areas and that has to be purchased from outside; an expensive or exploitative distribution system can only work against their obtaining the quantities they need.

115. USAID (1977), p.IV-5.

116. *The Sunday Mail*, December 10, 1978.

### i. Fruit

Besides citrus fruits, which are grown chiefly on plantations for export, there is a substantial group of European deciduous fruit producers that produce for local urban consumption, for export and for canning. In 1968 the AMA investigated the possibility of setting up a Co-operative Company for the marketing of deciduous fruit, and the Fruit and Vegetable Committee of the RNFU was pressing for certain deciduous fruits to be marketed by the GMB. Apples, apricots, grapes, nectarines, peaches, pears and plums subsequently became 'designated' products in 1969, with a registration of producers, a tree/vine census and crop forecasts and returns. In 1972, production was 1,945 tonnes of peaches, 298 tonnes of plums, 74 tonnes of apricots, 112 tonnes of nectarines, 2,735 tonnes of apples, 80 tonnes of pears and 1,375 tonnes of grapes. It is now thought that Rhodesia also produces some 5,000 tonnes of bananas which are consumed locally.<sup>117</sup> In 1978, of a total production of all types of deciduous fruit of 6,839 tonnes, apples constituted 3,642 tonnes (53%) and grapes 1,577 tonnes.<sup>118</sup> A variety of fruits have been studied by the AMA every year since then, but the marketing still remains in private hands. In 1974 there were investigations of fruit surplus disposal problems following overproduction. Fruit canning and fruit juice canning expanded in 1974, but have subsequently returned to a steadier growth.

The extent to which African producers have developed fruit growing is poorly documented, but this probably accounts for a significant food intake in certain seasons in the form of mangoes, some citrus fruit and wild fruit such as *mazhanje* which are consumed in the rural areas.<sup>119</sup> In 1970, the household consumption for own consumption in African areas for beans, fruit and vegetables together was valued at \$4.3 million and by 1977, it had increased to an estimated \$6.2 million.<sup>120</sup>

### j. Beans, pulses and vegetables

A wide variety of edible beans and pulses are grown, predominantly in TTLs, and are consumed locally. Although the AMA has done marketing studies of some of these in recent years, all marketing of

117. Handford (1976), p.116.

118. Overseas Development Group (1979), p.8.3.

119. See for example R. Kwenhuri and U. Kwemuli, "Food for your family", Nutrition Council of the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign, 1975, p.15 (mimeo).

120. National Accounts (1977).

these products is carried out privately; most of the production is consumed by the producers or their neighbours. Because some of these beans and pulses offer a potential as a supplementary source of vegetable protein — to rural, as well as urban diets — their production and distribution merit further attention.

The provision of fresh and green vegetables also forms an important nutritional contribution to most people's diet. All vegetables are marketed by the private sector, and accordingly there is little quantitative information on them. It is thought that sales in urban areas of vegetables by Africans contribute substantially to the cash incomes of rural Africans. The provision of fresh vegetables for their own consumption also provides an important component of rural diets, but this contribution has been poorly documented.

Potatoes are also grown in large numbers by European producers. The crop in 1979 is likely to be poor, however, and Denis Norman of the RNFU suggested there will be a potato famine next year.<sup>121</sup>

## VII. RECENT CHANGES IN FOOD SUPPLY AND PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE

Until the Independence of Mozambique from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, the subsequent closure of the border between Mozambique and Rhodesia in March 1976, and the escalation of the war by Patriotic Front forces since 1976, there was almost no effort by the white community to consider establishing an independent Zimbabwe, or modifying any of the food supply structures to fit in with such an Independence. Since 1976, however, as the struggle to establish an independent Zimbabwe has progressed, questions of modifying the food supply system for Zimbabwe have gradually begun to be discussed, and proposals made.

The one crucial issue that has been discussed most fully is the question of land reform. It has been recognised that some type of land reform would be necessary in an independent Zimbabwe. The RNFU, the African Farmers' Union of Rhodesia (AFUR), The Whitsun Foundation, and various African political organisations, as well as individuals have put forward different evaluations and proposals. These will not be

121. *The Star Weekly*, March 17, 1979.

fully discussed here as they have been discussed more fully in another booklet in this series and in other publications.<sup>122</sup> Suffice to say that a number of the land reform proposals so far put forward by organisations within the country have been efforts to forestall a more radical land reform, and few of them allow for a large enough re-distribution of land to meet the desires of the African rural population, or the needs for developing a more just production structure. Nor have these proposals taken very much into consideration questions of the optimum size of redistributed units, the structure of production on them and the quantities of marketable surplus expected from them. Nor has much consideration been given to the division and location of re-distributed units in such a way as to facilitate access to local markets through the transport system. Egalitarian redistribution is not the only consideration necessary. Other factors including the nature of the proposed organisation of production, unit size and location, technical potential, the skills of farmers and links with the marketing system need to be considered if such land reform is to be of longer-term utility and keep farmers in the market economy, rather than regressing to more subsistence production. Proposals to provide Africans with credit to buy land from Europeans have also been mooted, particularly with the possibility of using external funds from the proposed Zimbabwe Development Fund (ZDF) or the World Bank to do this.<sup>123</sup> These need to be reviewed critically as similar approaches have been tried elsewhere in Africa in recent years, which, if applied in Zimbabwe, would not only leave African purchasers heavily indebted, with debts owing to external creditors, but also would enable emigrating Europeans to extract a lot of wealth from the country, which they cannot do at the moment.

The public proposals of African political organisations on policies and changes related to the food supply sector have been very general. Statements by the UANC on land reform (very similar in approach to those of the RNFU), in their election manifesto argue that they would "encourage commercial farmers to maintain or increase production through a system of incentives, encourage and establish co-operative societies to increase production in agricultural areas; decentralise industry into the rural areas to reduce population pressures in the towns and to create jobs in these rural areas; that the present railway

122. See Riddell (1977), Riddell (1978), Hume (1978) and RNFU *Information Folder*, 1977.

123. See Information Folder RNFU (1977), Nos.6 and 7.

system will be expanded, where necessary, to serve the needs of the whole Zimbabwean community and that private enterprise will be encouraged . . . in the operations of bus services and road cartage operations".<sup>124</sup> The UANC seems to be advocating a type of mixed economy in which private enterprise will be 'guided by the State'.

The other political parties represented in the internal settlement have been even less explicit or have expressed a similar plethora of objectives without indicating how they might be effected. In June 1978, a symposium took place under the auspices of the AFUR, which represents the more market-oriented farmers in the PAs, on 'Agriculture in Zimbabwe', at which different political groups were represented. Most of the parties represented, including the internal wing of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), appeared to agree on the need for the following: i) an end to discriminatory legislation in agriculture; ii) the consolidation of uneconomic production units; iii) the use of vacant land; iv) the creation of individual ownership wherever possible in TTLs; v) the development of TTLs; and vi) the placing of all agricultural matters, together with advisory and professional services under the Ministry of Agriculture.<sup>125</sup>

In the opening of the new parliament of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, the new government of Bishop Muzorewa spelt out in vague terms its general policies for food supplies for the future as follows:

My Government is fully aware of the necessity of maintaining self-sufficiency in the production of foodstuffs and its policies are designed with this end in view . . . My Government will also encourage subsistence farmers to broaden the base of their agricultural operations, so that they can play an increasing part in the commercial sector. In this regard emphasis will be diverted away from the production of minimum food requirements and towards cash crops suitable for any particular area. This move will be accompanied by the development of primary marketing facilities in the remote rural areas.<sup>126</sup>

The two organisations represented in the Patriotic Front, ZAPU and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), have not been very explicit in their public statements regarding proposals for changes in the food supply sector. ZANU have, however, been establishing co-operative production and distribution systems in the areas of the country occupied by them in recent months.<sup>127</sup> Nevertheless, it appears that even if the

124. UANC Party Manifesto, Salisbury, 1979.

125. *The Zimbabwe Times*, June 10, 1978.

126. *The Herald*, June 27, 1979.

127. *The Guardian*, April 12, 1979 and *Zimbabwe News*, October/November 1978.

Patriotic Front came to power at the moment they are weakly prepared for dealing with the food supply sector, and would have difficulties tackling the problems.

The most concrete proposals have come from the European sector, from the RNFU, the European-dominated Whitsun Foundation and the Ministry of Finance.

It is clear that the main slant of the RNFU proposals have been to "enable farmers to continue operating in a free enterprise economy, largely as in the past".<sup>128</sup> This implies maintaining the status quo as far as possible. The main focus of the RNFU, in relation to the future, has been on land policy, their recommendations being presented in early 1977 just before the amendment to the Land Tenure Act, finance (union and agricultural), and the legislation, structure and organisation of agriculture. The gist of the RNFU proposals in 1977,<sup>129</sup> reflected a desire for an extension of individual property ownership, based on freehold title, to plan the phasing out of communal farming in the TTLs and to convert such projects as those carried out by the Sabi-Limpopo Authority schemes into individual ownership-schemes. Any possibility of longer-term communally-based development of African agriculture is rejected out of hand. In addition it was envisaged that there would be a "direction and compulsion of people" in TTLs to develop the agronomic potential of TTL lands, and also for them to enter into (and remain in) the market economy. Foreign aid was expected to be directed towards currently non or only marginally productive land. Vacant land should only be re-distributed to market-oriented, modern farmers, and then only on a controlled basis. Surplus population, with little aptitude for farming, should be found employment in industry and commerce, leaving only those with the aptitude (suggested as 10% to 15% of Africans) to engage in farming.<sup>130</sup> The Ministry of Agriculture should become responsible for all aspects of agriculture and a government agency should be set up to control and co-ordinate all resource planning and development, as well as to provide advice.

Perhaps, not surprisingly, the main interest in these RNFU proposals

128. Information Folder RNFU (1977), No.3.

129. Information Folder RNFU (1977), Nos.4 and 6.

130. In March 1979, the RNFU modified this and quoted 15% to 20% of Africans in the TTLs as likely to have the ambition, ability or inclination to be farmers. RNFU (1979), p.5.

is to preserve the European farming areas intact and to enable European farmers to carry on as they have done before. It is strongly suggested that any policy seeking to expropriate European farmers will have dire consequences for the country's food supplies because of the extent of the country's current dependence on them. It is also asserted that if any expropriation does occur, it must also include substantial compensation.<sup>131</sup> The main proposals of the RNFU in relation to acquisition and compensation have been written into the 1979 constitution.<sup>132</sup> Obviously, because of the enormous disparities between European and African land ownership, European farmers see a radical distribution of land as a feasible, but unwanted possibility. In seeing these RNFU statements one is reminded of Gertrude's comment in *Hamlet* on seeing herself portrayed, "The lady doth protest too much, methinks". Over the last two years there has been a growing moral blackmail on the part of European farmers that says "If you touch us, we'll cut your food supplies, and because you can't afford to have your food supplies disrupted, you had better let us continue just as we are; we'll agree to develop African agriculture, but you can be sure we will slow down implementation to ensure that African agriculture does not compete with us, and you are left in an even more dependent situation".

The Whitsun Foundation (founded in 1975) has been particularly concerned to develop "projects of the kind which would be relevant to foreign aid financing which will be available after a political settlement", and "to contribute to their being prepared to a state of readiness for foreign funding".<sup>133</sup> Its emphases to date have been on agricultural credit, agricultural management and administration training, adult literacy, rural village water supplies, and rural wholesale distribution. The Whitsun Foundation has had close ties with the World Bank (I.M. Hume, its ex-director, formerly worked there and has subsequently returned there) and different American organisations. It has been particularly oriented to the type of credit approaches to development that have been common in the World Bank and which have been criticised.<sup>134</sup> The Whitsun plan to assist an urban-based wholesale

131. These views are spelt out in detail in RNFU (1979), Appendix III.

132. These are discussed in R.C. Riddell, "Prospects for land reform in Zimbabwe", *Rural Africana*, No.4, 1979 (forthcoming).

133. Information Folder RNFU (1977), No.16.

134. For a recent critique of World Bank financing in Tanzanian agriculture see Y. Tandon, "The social, economic and environmental implications of maize technology in Tanzania", University of Dar-es-Salaam, March 1978, (mimeo).

company to distribute in rural areas seems to have fallen slightly flat since 1977. This was the only project that specifically focused on the distribution sector.

How has international finance and aid money responded to questions of food supply in Rhodesia? The Zimbabwe Development Fund (ZDF) idea, started by Kissinger in 1976, has been held in abeyance, but it still appears to be very much part of the thinking of the British and American governments, who both have numerous interests in the area. Amongst the potential project areas of relevance to food supply that might come from such financing are: the improvement of transport and marketing facilities in African areas; the building of new trunk and feeder roads, training Africans in public administration and the development of agricultural processing facilities. The expected size of this fund (US\$1.5 to \$2.0 billion) has continued to be a carrot that has dangled before the eyes of Rhodesians. The most recent proposals by the Ministry of Finance for a 'Five-Year Programme of Development' has to be seen in the context of receiving foreign funding, and the hope of a significant degree of international recognition after the elections in April 1979.

This Five-Year Public Sector Development Programme with its individual strategies for rural and urban development was presented in January 1979 as a basis upon which the leaders of the government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia that emerged after the April elections could decide on future policy.<sup>135</sup> There is every indication that the incoming Muzorewa government fully intends to implement these proposals in their entirety. In the opening of the new parliament, the President stated that "the planning organisation for rural development which comes under the overall direction of the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) has now been firmly established", while the chairman of the ARDA, Mr Nick Cambitzis, has recently confirmed that the January plan is to be initiated under the new government.<sup>136</sup>

The crux of the proposals rests on several new emphases. There appears to be an apparent reversal of previous policies which have maintained the TTLs as a labour pool for the modern sectors of the economy towards a new policy of encouraging Africans to move to the

135. *Proposals for a Five-Year Programme of Development in the Public Sector*, Ministry of Finance, Salisbury, January 1979.

136. *The Herald*, June 26, 1979, 'War against poverty, battle pledge in rural areas made by ARDA'.

urban areas, so reducing the food supply crisis within the TTLs while encouraging the labour force to become completely dependent upon the money economy. In the rural areas, the emphasis is on leaving the European farming sector as it is (and even to encourage its growth — presumably partly to supply the increased number of Africans in urban areas), on stimulating the development of expanded PA-type farmers having private ownership and, by continued efforts on making the remaining TTL farmers more efficient farmers. Few ideas of a redistribution of wealth or income, or control of production are contained within the overall scheme which is more a policy of juggling with the population distribution, and enlarging the cake, rather than changing the proportions of the cake going to different sections of the population.

The new attitude towards urban migration seems hastily conceived and liable to cause more problems than it is likely to solve. Within these proposals it is expected that the urban African population (particularly of Salisbury and Bulawayo) will increase to about 1.8 million by 1983 (a rate of growth of 11.5% a year compared with 4.6% a year in 1977). From the point of view of food supply this would not in itself present major distribution problems, but it would probably create an even greater dependence on food supplies from the European farmers and it takes very little account of the purchasing power of those newly urbanised Africans. The assumption that urban employment will continue to grow at a rate of 22,000 a year once the war has ended, sanctions have been lifted and foreign capital has begun to flow again into the country at pre-UDI levels seems unjustified, even if that were the rate of increase over the 1969-75 rapid growth period. In fact, the annual increase over this period was only 17,000. No detailed analysis in quantitative terms of the possible scenarios for urban job creation for different sectors appears to have been made. Similarly, not much thought appears to have been given to the income levels of urban employees and hence to the purchasing power of the urban population. Accordingly it would appear that even if food supplies could be brought comparatively easily to urban areas, the overall purchasing power of the urban population is unlikely to increase proportionately, resulting in undernourishment. There also seem to be only marginal proposals to channel this migration towards provincial towns and new urban centres rather than Salisbury and Bulawayo towards which the migrants would most probably wish to go. The development of 10 new small urban centres is a step in this direction, but these appear to be predominantly service and administration growth points, rather than

having any industrial expansion (including food processing plants) that would stimulate further growth. Also, the objective of reducing population growth from 3.6% per year (if that is the present rate) to less than 1% per year during the next decade seems totally unrealistic, regardless of the \$4.64 million going to family planning. Accordingly, a too-abrupt relaxing of restrictions on migration to urban areas after earlier restraints is likely to lead to uncontrollable problems. Some influx is necessary, but this still needs to proceed at a gentler pace.

In the rural areas it is not contested that there is a need for continued and improved extension work in African areas, as suggested in the proposals, and a need to improve the productive potential of those areas, particularly through irrigation schemes. What needs to be considered in more depth, considering the government's past performance regarding irrigation projects in African areas, is how 'competent Africans' will be resettled as commercial farmers and what sort of debt traps and other constraints are likely to restrict them, as well as the merits of channelling such vast amounts of money to this type of project. Furthermore, although they are not as forthright as the RNFU, these proposals still are marked with an unwarranted respect for the value of individual land tenure, and an unpreparedness to look in depth at schemes of a more communal or co-operative nature, that would fit in better with existing social structures. While it is true that many different constraints on agricultural development in TTLs cannot be combatted singly but need an integrated rural development approach that focuses on some of the TTLs with the highest population and livestock pressures and some with high agricultural potential, it is to be feared that the way in which these projects are executed will break up existing social structures and be very selective so that in the end only a small proportion of people will benefit, just as happened in earlier projects in the African rural areas. What also does not appear to have been fully considered in these schemes is which crops will be developed in these projects, whether the types of projects and their locations predispose them towards certain crops, and whether there are the outlet infrastructures available for them. All of these have an impact on food supply and it is to be feared that pressure to repay the costs of development will lead to an emphasis on high value cash crops rather than basic foods.<sup>137</sup> In regard to the critical area of grain production, for example, the emphasis

137. The irrigation project for the Holdenby TTL in the Honde valley would 'exploit the potential for tea and coffee production', Integrated Plan for Development July 1978 (1979), p.19.

seems to be on increasing production to cater for local needs but also strongly to build up bulk stocks to be able to take advantage of any potential markets (particularly in neighbouring countries) as they arise.

The crucial point to note, however, is that the European farming area is still expected to receive a large proportion of the proposed funding. It is envisaged that \$147 million would go to large irrigation schemes, \$162 million to TTL development and \$55 million to land settlement, but that commercial agriculture could still receive \$216 million (of which \$139 million would come from government). Although it is possible that this would generate some employment for Africans, no indication is given of the likelihood of them receiving higher incomes or having any more say in operations than they do today, and the trends towards capital intensive operations on some of these farms may mean that employment generation is slight. This latter point is reinforced by the suggestion that "if agricultural wage levels were to increase significantly" there would probably be a "move towards mechanised techniques".<sup>138</sup> Unfortunately, neither the employment potential, nor the wage levels, nor the trends towards mechanised techniques are analysed sufficiently in these proposals. Accordingly it would appear that this investment will mainly be a boost to the 5,900 odd white farmers which, with the type of pricing policy oriented to input costs that European farmers have been pressing for in recent months, will increase the European dominance of production rather than decrease it.

A major omission in both urban and rural plans is a detailed appreciation of infrastructural needs, particularly of transport and marketing facilities that are of importance to the food supply sector. Some provision is made for increasing feeder road construction in TTLs but otherwise infrastructural requirements are not fully detailed or related to other proposals.

The specific treatment of public sector finance for those sectors that involve food supply also has some weaknesses. It was proposed that the "Road Motor Services will gradually reduce its fleet of vehicles" although, it "will remain in existence to fulfil the demand for a gradually reducing number of essential services, and to assist with the movement of exceptionally large volumes of traffic — particularly agricultural products".<sup>139</sup> A more detailed analysis of the intended reduction of activities of RMS would be more reassuring to those concerned with

food supply nationwide. The provision for cheap "nutrition centres at all district hospitals" which still reflects the hospital orientation of most nutritional education leaves out the many people who do not get hospital treatment.<sup>140</sup>

Some of the capital investment proposals for the AMA and its boards would appear to be trying to take advantage of any investment capital that is going rather than reflecting real need. Government expenditure on the boards has decreased from an estimated \$1 million in 1977/78 to \$0.75 million for 1978/79.<sup>141</sup> Considering the acknowledged static nature of cotton production, further capital investment would appear unnecessary, although bulk handling installations for ginned seed would help supplies of cotton seed to oil-expressors. In the DMB there will be a continued need to promote sales of dairy products in local markets, and additional distribution depots and cold storage facilities may be necessary, but other expenditure on dairies may not. Almost 95% of GMB proposed capital investment is for 13 local bulk grain elevators and a port elevator, with an additional \$1.04 million for a groundnut processing plant. These investments should be looked at more closely to see where they are to be located, whom they are going to serve and whether the money could be better spent providing more local storage in African areas. Besides a sales depot at Gatooma, the CSC proposals are for improvements to their abattoirs at Bulawayo, Salisbury and Fort Victoria. No indication is given as to whether these capital investments include appreciations related to the decentralisation of industry. The \$5 million proposed for the AMA to establish "cotton and grain depots in areas remote from the main lines of communication where reasonable levels of production already exist, resulting in no farmer having to transport his products more than 60 kilometres to reach his nearest receiving depot", seems on the surface to be a valuable proposal, but the \$4 million proposed for a new office block to house the AFC and the AMA could do with more scrutiny.

These proposals from the Five-Year Public Sector Development Programme have been examined at some length because they represent some of the fullest proposals publicly presented in the last few years and because they have been accepted substantially by the incoming

138. Integrated Plan for Rural Development July 1978 (1979) p.29.

139. Proposals for a Five-Year Programme (1979), p.21.

140. See Gilmurray *et al.* (1979).

141. *Rhodesia, Estimates of Expenditure for the Year Ending June 30, 1979*, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1978.

Muzorewa government. Although some of the proposals undoubtedly would have a favourable impact on food supplies (and with a proposed investment of some \$3.5 billion this is hardly surprising), the overall plan would leave enormous gaps. In particular, no mention is made of the political and war environment of present-day Rhodesia. If, as seems likely, the war is going to continue for many months, the emigration of many more whites, both farmers and those involved in agricultural marketing and distribution, will continue. And this means that the present, highly skewed, food supply and distribution systems will be even less capable of meeting the needs of the majority of the country's population. Accordingly, these proposals need to be analysed much more carefully and evaluated much more critically. The implementation of some of them might preclude other approaches, drain resources away from more appropriate projects and create further problems for the future.

#### VIII. THE WAR AND THE PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION

Some indication of the serious and growing food supply problems caused by the war have been outlined in previous sections. Here we shall consider chiefly the long-term implications of the war on food supply. Certainly if the war were brought to an end a considerable expenditure that is currently being directed to the war effort (estimated at about \$1 million a day in March 1979) could be re-channelled in more positive directions. The present state of the war in European farming areas, with the high expenditure on security fencing, the Agric-Alert system and other defence measures is also a drain on resources. In addition the call-up of many white farmers and farm managers, is also a managerial drain, which is inhibiting the running of these farms. White farms have been feeling the pressure, and the RNFU has estimated that at least 500 out of the remaining 5,900 white farmers would leave the land in 1979 "even if there is a moderate pro-capitalist national government in Rhodesia" established in 1979.<sup>142</sup> The Rhodesian press reported a meeting held in Gatooma in March where it was stated that "because of terrorist and security problems, farmers were leaving the land all over the country".<sup>143</sup> If the war continues, as is likely, more European farmers will leave after this year's harvest in July or August.

142. *The Financial Times*, July 11, 1979.

143. *The Herald*, March 5, 1979.

The loss of European managerial staff from the European farms is usually depicted as likely to cause a complete breakdown of European farming. It is unlikely, however, that those agricultural farms with foreign interests will lose many staff under any type of transitional government, or else they would swiftly replace them. It is also clear that some Rhodesian white farmers would remain whatever the government.

Training of African farm managers has been on a very small scale. At present the University takes only 50 new agricultural students a year; Gwebi and Chibero agricultural colleges have only a total of 67 graduates a year, and the two government and the one private agricultural training institutions (for lower levels of training) are only producing 81 trained people a year.<sup>144</sup> Nor are these people particularly being trained for management roles for large farms; more appear to be trained for extension work. Very few Zimbabweans currently outside Rhodesia are training in agricultural management. Accordingly, there are unlikely to be many capable Africans to take over some of the complex managerial roles needed for running large farms, particularly ones with substantial infrastructure and mechanised equipment. It is probable that at present there are only about 750 Africans in a position to assume these functions. In 1977, only 650 Africans employed in agriculture received cash wages of over \$130 a month, compared with an average European monthly wage of \$478. The numbers of skilled white people involved in agriculture are estimated to be about 6,700 at the present time. At least with the demands of the call-up and with many white farmers going to live in town, more responsibility has been delegated to black farm managers over the last year, which means that some of these people may prove good potential for swift training. This is one task to which any new Government will need to pay attention; the proposals for manpower training in agriculture indicated by the Ministry of Finance are only touching the surface and are grossly inadequate.

Amongst the white government employees that service agriculture, despite their diminishing numbers, it is likely that a fair proportion would remain after a genuine independence, or be persuaded to remain for a time on short-term contracts. In 1975, there were probably about 6,000 people in the public sector directly concerned with agriculture.

144. In 1975, there were 129 European and 1,228 African extension workers in Rhodesia, R. Riddell, "Skill needs in the Agricultural sector in Zimbabwe", *Zimbabwe Manpower Survey Volume III*, IUEF, Geneva, 1979, p.23.



About 2,500 of these jobs were established posts (of which only about 300 were held by Africans). The loss of some of these people would have a disruptive effect on the working of the system, but would not cause real chaos unless over half left abruptly. The numbers of government employees in other departments that have a direct impact on food distribution are small. It is clear, however, that in Rhodesia Railways, where the 620 managerial and executive staff are all white, the loss of some of these could have a fairly severe impact on agricultural marketing and distribution. The numbers of different people employed in the food processing sector in 1974, are shown in Table 11.

Although the numbers of non-Africans in some food processing industries have decreased in recent years, particularly in the dairy, grain milling and bakery products industries, in others their numbers have remained fairly static, and they still hold almost all of the managerial, technical and executive posts.

High level manpower requirements for all these sub-sectors will need to be looked at in more depth as Zimbabwe moves towards independence (regardless of the government), and adequate training programmes (particularly in-service and rapid training programmes) will need to be initiated, if the food supply sector is to continue performing adequately to supply food requirements in the country.

Besides questions of manpower, immediate concerns of a transitional government will need to focus upon questions of food stocks and their location and supply. It would appear that there is not going to be an easy or swift transition to an independent Zimbabwe, and that hostilities, particularly in rural areas, may continue for some time. In these circumstances, where food production and food distribution is being disrupted, sufficient food stocks should be secured, which may, but hopefully will not, involve food imports.

It should also be noted that the government almost certainly has sufficient food stocks to feed the Zimbabwean people at the moment and that it should accept this responsibility rather than turn to international relief agencies. Of course, the Muzorewa government would be more than happy to have international relief agencies bringing in foreign exchange to purchase from the country's own food stocks and perform the duty that the government should be undertaking itself.

Arrangements need to be made with remaining major food crop producers to ensure a continued supply of at least the food require-

Table 11: NUMBERS EMPLOYED AND EARNINGS IN THE FOOD MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN RHODESIA IN 1974

Sector	Average Number Employed		Total	Total Earnings (\$000s)		Total
	Africans	Non-Africans		Africans	Non-Africans	
Slaughtering and processing of meat	3,418	550	3,968	1,957	2,527	4,487
Dairy products	2,307	370	2,677	1,381	1,614	2,995
Canning and preserving of <sup>a</sup> fruit and vegetables	1,114	58	1,172	324	250	576
Grain mill products and animal feeds	3,666	468	4,134	2,337	2,454	4,795
Bakery products	3,657	406	4,063	2,296	1,708	4,001
Chocolate and sugar confectionery	991	70	1,061	531	371	900
Other food products	2,666	361	3,027	1,949	2,365	4,314
Total for food industries	17,819	2,283	20,102	10,775	11,289	22,068
% of all manufacturing	14.0	10.7	13.5	13.0	10.2	11.4
Total for all manufacturing industries	127,560 <sup>b</sup>	21,405	148,965	82,647 <sup>c</sup>	111,176	193,823

Sources: *The Census of Production 1974/5*, Wage Distribution of African Employees June 1977, (mimeo), C.S.O. Salisbury.

Notes: a. Some establishments in this group include a relatively high proportion of rural African female workers who have been paid less than men, and accordingly the overall earnings of the group are less.

b. In June 1977, there were 128,570 African employees in manufacturing.

c. 152,055 in June 1975, the peak year.

ments needed for the country. This could be done by drawing up short-term contractual agreements between government and producers.

In the food processing sector, it would be important to ensure that the major processing units are kept operational, particularly slaughterhouses, dairies, flour mills, bakeries, vegetable oil factories and fruit and vegetable canning factories, and that they are supplied with the necessary raw materials.

It is likely that before Zimbabwe gains a genuine independence, the transport system is likely to be further disrupted and emergency measures of vehicle co-ordination and road and rail maintenance may need to be taken.

The distribution of foodstuffs, particularly to rural areas that are temporarily without food, may necessitate extraordinary measures of distributor co-ordination or direct intervention by government structures and an early warning system that can ensure that no community is left in hunger.

If these major areas of concern can be dealt with by swift action taken during a transition, the worst rigours of what will, undoubtedly, be a difficult time, might be avoided and everyone be adequately fed.

## IX. GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

Rhodesia is an agricultural country, rich in natural resources and quite capable of both feeding its own population and being an important exporter of food within Africa. However, as has been shown in this booklet, there are major problems of food supply within the country that have their origin in the history of Rhodesian agriculture and which have created a highly distorted system of food production, distribution and access to basic foodstuffs. In the urban areas, the growing African population is undernourished. In the rural areas, undernutrition is even more severe. Since the war with the forces of the Patriotic Front has escalated, food shortages in many areas have been experienced and problems of undernourishment are extending to problems of starvation in some parts of the country. The effects of the war, the recent drought and the incidence of cattle disease led one Ministry of Information

official to comment in April that the present situation is "what is politely called malnutrition — in effect starvation".<sup>145</sup>

It is clear that action is needed to ensure that starvation is eliminated, undernourishment is decreased and that adequate food supplies reach the population.

Given the constraints of a small booklet, it is not possible to make very detailed and specific recommendations for individual projects, companies or institutions to solve these problems. It is hoped, however, that from the preceding text some recommendations will be self-evident. The guidelines offered below, following the order discussed in the text, are intended to cover the most likely short-term needs of food supply during the transition to Zimbabwe and to give some indication of longer-term policies and activities which would lead to the most balanced and democratic development during the 1980s.

### a. Short-Term Needs

1. Make public relevant government economic data for the period 1965-79 and require private companies to make public information regarding their operations over that period (particularly information on assets, capital, employment and production) to enable a wider public to participate in assessing and integrating future development.
2. Establish a small Food Supply Unit, within a Ministry of Internal Trade to be responsible for monitoring national food supplies, co-ordinating suppliers and distributors, advising government on priorities and responding to any emergency shortages, in order to ensure adequate food provision for the whole population during a transitional period.
3. Conduct a new Population Census (preferably in 1980) to give a more accurate picture of population distribution and development; particularly trying to obtain information on seasonal, temporary and longer-term migration patterns through this Census.<sup>146</sup>

145. Lord Chitnis, *Free and Fair? the 1979 Rhodesian Election*, a report by observers on behalf of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, House of Commons, London, May 1979, p.20.

146. Evidence of dramatic changes in population location is indicated by figures released in June. Ptungwe TTL, which had a population of about 15,000 now has a population of about 1,500; Maramba TTL used to have a population of about 20,000 and now has about 2,000; Uzumba TTL used to contain some 45,000 people but now has only about 5,000 people. *The National Observer*, June 21, 1979.

4. Try to find means to limit too rapid a movement of people from rural areas to urban areas.
5. Restructure government departments and parastatal organisations relevant to food supply in such a way as to cater more equitably for national needs, to use available personnel to the optimum and to facilitate a closer integration of economic policy.
6. For government to establish close contact with large agricultural and processed food suppliers producing basic foods, to establish short-term contractual arrangements with them to secure a continuation of adequate food supplies and to assess producers' requirements to enable them to do this, particularly regarding the supply of raw materials to basic food processors and inputs for agriculture.
7. For the government to take control of any 'abandoned' or 'vacant' land, to put it into immediate production either as state farms, co-operatives or on an individual basis (perhaps only on a temporary two-year basis), gradually sorting out aspects of legal ownership, organisation and control later. Resettlement of Zimbabwean refugees is likely to form an important part of such a programme.
8. Facilitate and structure the release of urban workers at peak agricultural seasons to enable them to help in agricultural production, without risk to their permanent employment.
9. Make a critical assessment of the food stock position, of likely domestic supplies during the following two years and of any import requirements, if necessary. Ensure adequate stocks.
10. Monitor and establish firm government control of all international trade of agricultural and food products, restricting the import of luxury food items according to the abilities of the whole economy to pay for them.
11. Monitor and control by government of all international transfers of capital, profits, dividends and wealth to ensure that there is no drastic loss of wealth from the country.
12. Make a critical assessment of likely bottlenecks in the agricultural marketing and food distribution system and take measures to combat these using existing structures, using temporary government structures, or through a stronger co-ordination of private

intermediaries, giving particular attention to the transport system and food distribution in rural areas.

13. Make a provisional assessment of producer and consumer price policies and establish adequate guaranteed and fixed prices to ensure an adequate return for producers, while keeping consumer prices within the purchasing power of the mass of the population to cover the first two years.
14. Establish a nucleus for national food supply planning and begin at least two-year planning programmes, giving initially particular emphasis to personnel availability, requirements and training and to data collection and processing.

#### *b. Longer-term Objectives*

Longer-term objectives will, of course partly depend on what happens through such a transitional period and the productive capacity of different sectors and organisations at the end of it. The major longer-term objectives that need to be considered in greater depth are:

1. How to control the rate of migration from rural to urban areas and into other rural areas. It would seem wiser to try and limit urban growth to 6-8 percent per year and modify it according to urban job creation rates and the capability of the urban communities to provide an adequate infrastructure for the influx. Policies of decentralisation of industrial production and services to provincial towns, new growth centres and rural areas should be continued.
2. Develop a clear population policy that contains provision for effective family planning based on co-operative approaches.
3. Establish a land reform programme and resettlement that allows for the creation of agricultural producing units that are commercially viable, that are preferably linked in co-operative structures that are related to the skills of farmers, extension capabilities and the location of the units in relation to distribution systems and transport networks. Some compulsory acquisition of land in European areas would almost certainly be necessary to do this effectively.
4. Establish legislation for all agricultural producing units, food processing units and support institutions to ensure that all workers in these units are fully represented in the major decision-making

structures of these units, whether they are private or state controlled.

5. Integrate the planning of individual producing and distributing units with national planning.
6. Re-evaluate at regular intervals the balance of different agricultural products to ensure that the demands of producing crops for export do not outweigh the demands to supply all the Zimbabwean population with an adequate diet.
7. Establish a long-term programme to optimise the development of the agricultural production potential of the whole country (which is considerable) and develop appropriate improvement projects, particularly using water resources and irrigation schemes, with emphasis in areas of overpopulation and areas of very good potential.
8. Provide a good appropriate agricultural extension service for all farmers (but particularly for those ready and able to learn new techniques and apply them), paying attention to socio-economic as well as technical factors, and encourage the development of co-operative farming that is integrated with national and regional service structures, but which leaves much of the decision-making to the co-operative members.
9. Review agricultural taxation and establish a progressive taxation system based on current productive potential of land, without prejudicing further improvement of that land, in order to stimulate the maximum use of the land.
10. Regularly review the operations and structure of agricultural support service structures to ensure a continued rationalisation that maintains a continued efficiency, while catering for a wider range of needs.
11. Review thoroughly the pricing policies for agricultural and food products, paying particular attention to the role that prices play as an incentive to production and evaluating the balance between production costs, marketing costs and producer prices and any complementarity between products that is effected by price.
12. Establish an effective control of incomes (including social security) and prices for food products to help ensure that the purchasing-power of all the population is adequate to meet dietary needs and to facilitate a more balanced distribution of wealth. Particular

attention needs to be paid in establishing producer, wholesale and retail prices to these factors and marketing costs.

13. Establish short and long-term credit systems for agriculture, food processing and food distribution that are integrated with the other needs of government.
14. Regularly review the operations of the transport sector regarding the transportation of agricultural products and the distribution of food products, to ensure that the transport sector is working effectively with the food distribution sector. Identify weaknesses in the system that inhibit efficient food supply, particularly from producer to collecting point and transport of food to rural areas and alleviate them.
15. Review the operations of the food processing sector to ensure that those food processing units that produce foods that are of importance for the diet of the majority of the population are not disadvantaged or suffer from competition for resources from higher-value more luxury items or export products.
16. Establish a continued policy of decentralisation of industrial production away from the two major centres of Salisbury and Bulawayo.
17. Establish a closer monitoring of the structure and operations of the wholesale and retail food distribution system, particularly in rural areas and take measures to support existing structures or create new ones to ensure a regular and reasonably-priced distribution system to all parts of the country.
18. Explore the possibilities for the encouragement of the formation of consumer co-operatives (including work-place consumer co-operatives) in urban areas (and maybe in rural areas) to reduce the costs of retail distribution. Review the position of urban street markets and hawkers involved in retail food distribution in urban areas.
19. Evaluate the extent of participation by foreign firms in the food supply sector in Zimbabwe and the extent of their control and influence over subsidiaries and affiliates. These evaluations should be incorporated with others from other sectors and both individual and general policies developed towards foreign capital, investment,

training of African managers and other skilled staff and the transfer of technology.

20. Establish a small Nutrition Policy Unit that can evaluate nutritional levels throughout the country, the constraints that lead to dietary deficiencies, and develop policy and programmes for eliminating malnourishment that involve nutritional education linked with the balanced planning of food supplies, paying particular attention to nutritional needs and the purchasing power of individual groups.
21. Establish a small Food Import Unit within a Ministry of External Trade to organise and plan any necessary food imports to optimise purchases on the world markets and particularly to co-ordinate with friendly neighbouring African countries in these supplies. Such a Unit might also link up with a Food Export Unit.
22. Stimulate a greater awareness amongst the general public and the more politically active population of food supply considerations and encourage informed discussion on specific demands.

The fundamental changes demanded in this list of objectives can only be effected if people in all sections of society are made aware of the issues involved and if they participate in broad-based decision-making. An elitist policy emanating from isolated government structures will not work. This booklet is partly intended to be a contribution to extending the awareness of those issues in order to facilitate the kind of broad-based fundamental restructuring which will ensure that all Zimbabweans are adequately fed in the future and form the basis of a more just society.

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

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