From
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to
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Beyond Community Development

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Beyond Community Development: The Political Economy of Rural Administration in Zimbabwe

MICHAEL BRATTON

Catholic Institute for International Relations
1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1 4JL

About the author

MICHAEL BRATTON was born in England, grew up in Rhodesia, and presently teaches in the United States. He is the author of a comparative overview of the political economies of Zimbabwe and Kenya published in the *Journal of Modern African Studies* in December 1977. He has conducted research on rural administration and local government in Zambia, part of which is published as a chapter in William Tordoff's *Administration in Zambia,* forthcoming in 1979. The author is Assistant Professor of Political Science and African Studies at Michigan State University.

About the series

FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE consists of a collection of papers which address the social, economic, administrative and legal problems to be faced by an independent government of Zimbabwe. CIIR has launched this series in collaboration with the Justice and Peace Commission in Rhodesia as a contribution to the important debate about the creation of a just society in Zimbabwe – a debate which the Commission has been concerned to promote since its inception in 1971. Each paper will take as its starting point the question: how can the new government of Zimbabwe provide for the basic needs of the poorest sectors of society? The views expressed in individual papers are those of the contributors; they do not necessarily reflect the views either of CIIR or of the Justice and Peace Commission.

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Introduction

This study was made from outside Rhodesia, far from the rural areas with which it is concerned. Its content reflects the scarcity of reliable information on African agriculture and administration, a scarcity carefully cultivated by the Rhodesian regime. Although it offers as scrupulous an analysis of existing primary and secondary materials as this author could muster, there is, ultimately no substitute for fieldwork. Informed planning on rural development in Zimbabwe cannot begin until data on peasant production and peasant priorities is gathered. Until that time, all that is done will remain speculative and provisional. Here, then, a provisional review of the place of rural administration in the political economy of Rhodesia, and a speculation on the options and prospects for change during the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe.

Beyond Community Development: The Political Economy of Rural Administration in Zimbabwe

I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL ADMINISTRATION

Development strategies, and the administrative arrangements for their implementation, are only comprehensible with reference to the political-economic context in which they are formulated and received. For instance, one of the fundamental issues for development administration is state power. Specifically, who controls it? Control of state power is a prerequisite of all other state initiatives for change or transformation. As the rural poor of the Third World can readily attest, the answer to the question "who benefits from development?" is often the same as the answer to the question "who controls state power?". A second fundamental issue for development administration is the structure of inherited economies. Under colonial or settler rule, the apparatus of the state is usually designed to stimulate and monitor the construction of economies that combine capitalist and noncapitalist sectors and which are oriented towards the interests of metropolitan and domestic elites. Whether postcolonial development strategies confront or conform to inherited patterns of production and exchange makes a difference to the crucial issue of whether basic human needs are met.

Hence the options and prospects for the administration of change in the rural reaches of Zimbabwe, the topic of this booklet, must be analyzed in political-economic context. The important elements in this context are, first, the struggle over state power in the rural areas among settlers, guerrillas and "moderates" and, second, the structural impoverishment of the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) where most of the black population lives.

Since 1962 the Rhodesian Government has made "community development" and "provincialization" the basis of the administration of African affairs. Under these rubrics certain rural development tasks have been devolved to semi-autonomous, semi-elected bodies which are

supposed to operate according to the formula of local economic self-reliance. On the surface these administrative arrangements cohere to the widely accepted preference in international development circles for institutional decentralization and popular participation.[1] Once the political-economic context of settler Rhodesia is examined, however, the nature of these administrative arrangements is clarified. Community development in Rhodesia vests state power in the rural areas in the hands of white administrative officials and traditional chiefs whereas neither group enjoys decisive support among peasants. Furthermore, the policies of community development and provincialization are superimposed on an apartheid-like economy in which overpopulated and unproductive African reserves serve as dependent appendages of capitalist agriculture and industry. As Riddell has emphasized, "the development of the modern sector is built upon the underdevelopment of the reserve economy".[2] In this context administrative decentralization has deepened underdevelopment by consigning, from central government to local government, the economic costs of maintaining the rural periphery and reproducing its migrant labour force.

One implication of the perspective outlined above is that in order for administrative reform to contribute to development in Zimbabwe, such reform must reflect, and be an aspect of the implementation of, a structural reorientation of the national political economy as a whole. Indeed, the Basic Human Needs strategy proposed in this series of booklets begins to address the questions of structural transformation and the role of popular participation therein. Basic human needs have been defined as constituting personal consumer goods (food, clothing, housing), universal social services (education, health, water supply and communications), universal productive employment (presupposing basic industrialization) and last, but far from least, mass popular participation (in development strategy formulation and implementation). Green points out that popular participation is not superfluous to basic human needs, an optional extra, but a necessary component of an integrated approach to development.[3] In other words the issue

1. United Nations, Decentralization for Local Development, New York, United Nations, 1962; United Nations, Popular Participation in Development: Emerging Trends in Community Development, New York, United Nations, 1971.
2. R. Riddell, "Alternatives to Poverty", No.1 in the series *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1977.
3. R.H. Green, "Basic Human Needs, Collective Self-Reliance and Development Strategy: Some Reflections on Power, Periphery and Poverty", University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies, Mimeo, 1976, p.24.

of state power and who controls it is intimately related to the issue of reshaping and reorienting an economy. Rural development in Zimbabwe requires an holistic analysis and prescription for change of which proposals for reform of rural administration are but one aspect. Rural Zimbabwe cannot move beyond "community development", nor will basic human needs and productive employment be provided by the year 2000, unless administrative reform is accompanied by substantive reform in the political-economic sphere.

One purpose of this booklet is to survey options and prospects for the administration of rural development that will face leadership in a politically-independent Zimbabwe. The range of options and prospects will clearly be conditioned by the manner in which the struggle over state power is resolved. Rural development in Zimbabwe confronts different futures depending on whether state power is transferred to an African majority according to (a) an internal settlement, (b) an Anglo-American settlement, or (c) armed struggle. In general, these three alternatives represent a scale of ascending potential for structural transformation of the Zimbabwean political economy. As for the rural dimension, an internal settlement of the March 1978 variety is likely to perpetuate an unregenerated policy of "community development" through authoritarian District Commissioners and traditional chiefs. Armed struggle, if encompassing in its late stages the establishment of liberated zones with effective local counter-administrations, holds the promise, but not necessarily the guarantee, of development through mass mobilization for the benefit of the rural poor.

Alternative scenarios are explored in detail in the last section of this booklet. First, however, an historical analysis of rural administration in Rhodesia is undertaken in order to understand both the content of existing policies and institutions and the political-economic context into which they fit. Rural administration is here defined to include the administration only of the so-called "African areas" specified in the Land Tenure Act of 1969, that is, the African Purchase Lands (APLs) and Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). Emphasis is placed on the latter. Any new government in Zimbabwe, regardless of the means of its accession to power, will have to make the reconstruction of the indigent Tribal Trust Lands an urgent order of business.[4]

4. M. Bratton, "Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe: Some Comparisons with the Neocolonization of Kenya", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 15, 4, 1977, p.610.

II. THE TRIBAL TRUST LANDS: PRESENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Land has historically been divided in half between black and white in Rhodesia. Yet the land division has been uneven because whites, even at peak immigration at the close of the 1950s, never constituted more than 5.5% of the population. The proportion for 1978 is nearer 3.5%. Moreover, the white "half" of the country contains the largest proportion of fertile soils and the major industrial and infrastructural installations. Whites have appropriated considerably more land than was needed for productive purposes and much white farm land lies fallow. The "African areas", constituting 16 million hectares or 47% of the land have, by contrast, been required to absorb a higher proportion of the population than the land can support. One calculation puts the white to black differential in per capita land availability at just over 88:1.[5] The African areas are fragmented into 165 Tribal Trust Lands where communal land tenure applies, and 71 African Purchase Lands where land is available on an individual freehold basis. The TTLs permanently accommodate approximately 60% of the African population, the APLs a mere 2.7%. The most striking characteristics of both areas, but particularly TTLs, are overpopulation and underdevelopment.

Land shortage, accompanied among Africans by one of the highest birth rates in the world, makes for increasing population pressure on land. The proportion of the African population absorbed by the African areas has increased from 56% in 1956 to a present level ot 63%. Despite rapid urban growth in the last fifteen years, the TTLs are estimated to have absorbed more than a proportionate share of population increase.[6] The number of people in the African areas doubled between 1960 and 1978 and presently stands at approximately 4.4 million. Projections based on present birth rates put the total Zimbabwean population as high as 15 million by 2000 A.D., of which the share of present African rural areas would likely be at least 9 million. The African areas, overpopulated even by the early 1950s, will thus come under overwhelming ecological pressure by 2000 A.D. Massive resettlement based on reallocation of white land or the transformation of existing production

5. International Labour Office (ILO), *Labour Conditions and Discrimination in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)*, Geneva, 1978, p.35.
6. E.G. Cross, "The Tribal Trust Lands in Transition: The National Implications", *The Rhodesia Science News*, 11, 8, August 1977, pp.185-189. Cross presents fresh data in an interesting form; I have drawn heavily on his information but not his recommendations for future development policies.

patterns, or both, would seem unavoidable if Zimbabweans are to feed themselves.

The predominant pattern of production in the TTLs is a mix of livestock-rearing and subsistence food-crop production using labour-intensive techniques. In 1977 about 10% of the TTLs was ploughed, 12% was unsuitable for agriculture, and 78% was devoted to communal grazing.[7] Human overpopulation has been accompanied by overstocking of cattle, so much so that, by 1965, 49% of the TTLs was classified as "overgrazed" or worse. The livestock carrying capacity of the land is today exceeded in the TTLs of all but one of the seven provinces of Rhodesia (see Table 1). The figures presented were derived by Cross from the Robinson Commission Report of 1961; soil erosion and the cultivation of marginal lands have since increased and thus the overstocking rates are probably underestimated for current conditions.

On land set aside for food-crop cultivation, excessive subdivision has rendered most holdings subeconomic. A report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated that in one TTL between two-thirds and three-quarters of the families did not produce enough food to satisfy their own needs, that one-third had no cattle, and that a high proportion lacked adequate agricultural implements.[8] In general it appears that in all TTLs the minority have the means to farm properly but the majority do not; a more accurate assessment is impossible given the reluctance of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to publish statistical breakdowns of African agricultural production. What is clear is that food production is in decline in the African areas, both absolutely and relative to the spread of cash-crops such as cotton, groundnuts and tobacco onto land previously available for food-crops. For example: maize production per capita declined 36% between 1962 and 1977; sales of cattle failed to increase above the low level of 3% of the herd per annum during the same period; the share of commercial (i.e. non-TTL) agriculture in provision of domestic staple food rose from 30% to 70% from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s.[9] All indicators suggest that the dependence of the TTLs on staple food imports from white farmers in the capitalist agricultural sector is dramatically on the rise. The purchase by peasants of maize-meal and other processed food-

7. *Ibid.*, p.4.
8. A.J.B. Hughes, *Development in Rhodesian Tribal Trust Areas: An Overview*, Tribal Areas of Rhodesia Research Foundation, Salisbury, 1974, p.290.
9. Cross, *op.cit.*, p.6.

stuffs with cash from wage-earning urban relatives is now a common phenomenon in the TTLs.[10]

Table 1: RHODESIA: SIZE AND LIVESTOCK CARRYING CAPACITY OF TRIBAL TRUST LANDS

Province	*Area of T.T.L.* *000 ha*	*Non-Agricultural Land* *000 ha*	*Stocking Capacity Rate* *000 L.S.U.*	*Present Stocking Rate* *000 L.S.U.*	*Overstocking Rate %*
Manicaland	1,935	165	220	325	+ 47
Mashonaland North	2,747	205	215	176	– 18
Mashonaland South	1,440	89	205	272	+ 33
Matabeleland North	2,948	335	206	323	+ 57
Matabeleland South	2,384	145	247	417	+ 69
Midlands	2,620	793	272	401	+ 48
Victoria	2,137	247	207	423	+104
Rhodesia	16,211	1,979	1,572	2,337	+ 49

Source: E.G. Cross, "The Tribal Trust Lands in Transition: The National Implications", *The Rhodesia Science News,* 11, 8, August 1977, pp.188.
Note: L.S.U. = Livestock Unit.

There are structural constraints on increasing agricultural production in the rural periphery of Rhodesia. The ILO has called attention to "the structured inability" of the peasant economy in Rhodesia to "produce, market and realize a sufficient and regular cash surplus as a minimum prerequisite for accumulation."[11] Because an economic surplus can rarely be realized at the periphery, rural households are forced to rely upon the sale of labour through the outmigration of family members. According to one estimate, 65-70% of all African households have either a primary or secondary dependence on wage labour, simply to generate the necessary income required for subsistence.[12] A related structural characteristic to outmigration is the demographic profile of the African areas in which women, young children and the elderly predominate. In the APLs this profile is reinforced by polygamy. In

10. R.B. Sutcliffe, "Stagnation and Inequality in Rhodesia, 1946-1968", *Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics,* 33, 1971, p.49, 50.
11. ILO, *op.cit.,* pp.38-9.
12. D. Clarke, "The Unemployment Crisis", No.3 in the series *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe,* London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1978, p.6.

some TTLs up to 60% of the men are absent during the most productive periods of their lives. Since the advent of civil war the outflow of young men to join the guerrilla armies has contributed to the high absentee rate. More than one-third of the 675,000 households in the TTLs are headed by women farming alone or with husbands away most of the time. In the long-run the makeup of the population of the TTLs leads to an added precariousness and high cash content of subsistence and to an inhibition on the productive reinvestment of occasional surpluses.

In other words, the African areas cannot currently provide for the basic human needs of Zimbabwean peasants. Rural income can be taken as an index of capacity to meet basic human needs. In the African areas of Rhodesia rural income is lower as a proportion of total national income than for virtually any other African country.[13] Weinrich has calculated that a rural household has an average income of only $26* per annum of which $22, or 17.5%, is contributed by wage-earners outside agriculture. Only three per cent of TTL peasants have qualified as master farmers with incomes up to $270 per year.[14] Even APL farmers have displayed disappointing productivity. Rural income is constrained in large part because the anatomy of the Rhodesian political economy is so constructed that African agriculture is structurally disadvantaged. The Agricultural Finance Corporation serves predominantly white farmers and does not offer credit facilities to agriculturalists in the TTLs. The 1975 average credit line available to farmers was $18,000 for whites and $2.00 for blacks.[15] In 1977/78 the Rhodesian government allocated $46.1 m to subsidies for controlled agricultural products, overwhelmingly grown by white farmers, whereas it allocated $2.25 m to development expenditures in the African areas.[16] Finally, the opportunities available to Africans to market their produce are limited: although 36% of white land lies within ten miles of a railway station or

*In this book $ refers to Rhodesian dollars throughout.

13. P. Okigbo, "The Distribution of National Income in African Countries", in Jean Marchal and Bernard Ducros (eds.), *The Distribution of National Income,* London, 1968, p.402; cited in Sutcliffe *ibid.,* p.54.
14. A.K.H. Weinrich, *African Farmers in Rhodesia,* London, Oxford University Press, 1975, p.14.
15. The Whitsun Foundation, *An Appraisal of Rhodesia's Present and Future Development Needs,* Whitsun Foundation, Salisbury, No.03, 1976.
16. *Rhodesia, Estimates of Expenditure year ending 30th June 1979,* Salisbury, Government Printer, 1978, pp.77 and 79.

siding, only five per cent of African land is similarly located.[17] The infrastructure laid down by the state is thus a major factor that locks the African areas into a peripheral economic position.

The present economic structure of the African areas and their subordinate place in the Rhodesian political economy can be summarized in terms of three component aspects. The African areas serve, firstly, as a labour pool at the disposal of the productive sectors at the centre of the economy. They serve secondly as a growing market for the processed foods and other consumer goods produced at the centre. Lastly, they serve as a social security "net" on which migrant labourers can fall back in times of unemployment, ill-health and old age, and for which neither business nor the state has to pay. Since the blocking of development in the TTLs is a direct corollary of growth elsewhere in the economy, the settler state has little incentive to alter the present order.

Problems of basic human need such as low rural income, limited market opportunities and lack of productive employment, what we might call "problems of production", will remain as long as the existing political-economic structure remains. So too will "problems of people" such as the fulfilment of basic human needs for access to social services and to channels of popular participation. This booklet focuses on these "problems of people", but on the clear understanding that they are inseparable, except analytically, from "problems of production". Self-reliant community development is achievable only when communities are capable of generating and controlling the reinvestment of local economic surpluses. The differential allocation of land in Rhodesia and subsequent overcrowding are at the root of the underdevelopment of the African areas. It is no exaggeration to say that, for the TTLs, ecological collapse looms. Much of the natural resource deterioration that has already occurred may be irreversible. But, to repeat an earlier point, rural development in Zimbabwe is not susceptible to administrative or technical solutions alone. As Dunlop unequivocally states "a solution to the conservation problem is impossible within the constraints of the Land Tenure Act."[18] Effective administration reform presupposes a change in the economic structure and position of the TTLs of which land reform is the most basic measure.[19]

17. ILO, *op.cit.*, p.36.
18. Harry Dunlop, "Development in the Rhodesian Tribal Areas", *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, 8,4, 1974, p.184-5.
19. See Roger Riddell, "The Land Question", No.2 in the series *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, London, CIIR, 1978.

III. "NATIVE AFFAIRS": AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1897-1962)

Once the African resistance of 1893-7 had been crushed by force of arms, direct rule was established over the rural population by the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council and the Southern Rhodesia Native Regulations of 1898. The former provided for the appropriation of land by European farmers and mining corporations, created African reserves, and initiated a labour policy based on pass laws. The latter set up an administrative apparatus which gave the task of appointing chiefs and headmen to a Native Affairs Department and which gave extensive discretionary jurisdiction to Native Commissioners (NCs). These white government officials combined administrative, judicial and legislative powers including, after 1910, powers to decide civil and criminal cases concerning Africans. No aspect of African life was beyond the purview of the Native Affairs Department.[20]

The unchanging principles of rural administration in Rhodesia have been that few limitations are placed on the exercise of state power, that the administration of civil and military affairs are complementary, and that central control takes precedence over popular participation. Bowman summarizes these principles well when he states that the white minority always enjoyed "the technological and organizational skills to conquer and then directly administer the African population."[21] Native Commissioners were often recruited from amongst former military men. Chiefs and headmen were reduced to the position of subordinate state officials and designated as "constables" with powers of arrest. The relationship of NCs to their clients was authoritarian rather than participatory since the Native Affairs Act of 1927 required that all Africans were bound to "obey and comply promptly" to orders given by officials of the colonial state. Direct rule backed by military power was the central feature of rural administration under the settler state, a feature which later flirtations with indirect rule through reconstituted traditional institutions did not erase.

The conventional wisdom that colonial administration in Africa was limited simply to the maintenance of law and order, leaving traditional patterns of social and economic life relatively undisturbed, is, however, misleading. On the contrary, the conduct of "native affairs"

20. L.W. Bowman, *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1973, p.11.
21. *Ibid.*, p.2.

in Rhodesia contributed directly to the growth of the colonial political economy in the sense that the state oversaw and managed the transformation of African areas into an economically dependent status. Numerous examples can be given. Native Commissioners were empowered to allocate African land and to resettle Africans evicted under the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. They could also regulate the number of cattle that Africans owned. The power of Native Commissioners and other government officers to compel "correct" methods of land and livestock management was consolidated under the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 under which traditional agricultural practices of communal land tenure and shifting cultivation were disrupted in favour of measures to encourage individual tenure and fixed, continuous cultivation. The intention of the Act, which became the cornerstone of rural administration for a decade, was to prevent the fragmentation of land by consolidating "optimum" farming and grazing units in the hands of accountable individual farmers. The cost of LHA implementation was covered by a state levy on African agricultural produce and the precedent was thus established that peasants shoulder the financial burden of implementing policies which they did not request. Although Native Commissioners were instructed to consult closely with traditional chiefs on questions of land allocation, they did not always do so.[22]

In addition to intervening directly in African agriculture, the local agents of the colonial state were also responsible for administering the registration of adult African males for purposes of urban influx control. This measure, coupled with the collection of taxes which they also supervised, was directed towards the creation of a stable labour force. Africans were thus not only drawn into the new exchange relations of the cash economy but also into new patterns of production, both on the land and in the towns. The role of the state in this process was crucial. The state administered the extra-economic coercions that ensured changes in African economic practices, changes that low industrial and agricultural wages were unable to induce by market incentive alone. Since the Rhodesian economy, like other colonial economies, was characterized by an uneasy combination of diverse modes of production, it tended to require, for effective policing and management, a state apparatus that was both large and strong.

The Land Husbandry Act represents perhaps the best example of the

22. Gloria Passmore, *The National Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia,* Salisbury, University of Rhodesia, 1972, p.29.

consequences of the colonial approach to rural administration. It resulted not only in a worsening of the economic position of the rural poor but in a further alienation of African support from the settler state. First, some Africans, notably those temporarily engaged in urban employment, lost their claims to land. As early as 1959 landlessness affected approximately 30% of those eligible,[23] leading both to a proletarianization of large numbers of peasants and an increased pressure on land from those migrants whom the industrial sector could not permanently absorb. The productivity of the peasantry had been in decline since African reserves were first established. Policies of continuous cultivation under the Land Husbandry Act tended to exacerbate rather than ease an already chronic soil erosion situation. Estimates show that subsistence production kept pace with population growth in the 1950s, but only at an increasing "effort price" for subsistence cultivators.[24] Average rural personal incomes, however, fell by approximately 13% in the period 1951-1961, suggesting a significant decline in absolute rural living standards.[25]

Second, the Land Husbandry Act was roundly resisted, particularly in the most heavily populated and overstocked areas. The removal of the right of free access to land provided fuel to the flame of African nationalism and in the rural areas of Rhodesia in the 1950s was probably more important than the Central African Federation as an issue for nationalist political agitation. Peasants, sometimes encouraged by the African National Congress, refused to participate in destocking schemes or to construct soil conservation works. The Robinson Commission of 1961 reported that the Land Husbandry Act "more than anything else has soured the relationship between the Native Commissioner and the rural African".[26] By 1964, with individual tenure implemented on less than 10% of African land, the Rhodesian Government had no option but to abandon the Land Husbandry Act.

The colonial state responded to rural resistance by modifying its administrative apparatus and approach. The African Councils Act of

23. M. Yudelman, *Africans on the Land,* Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1964, p.123.
24. G. Arrighi, *The Political Economy of Rhodesia,* The Hague, Mouton, 1967, pp.31, 38, 43.
25. Based on data from Sutcliffe *op.cit.,* pp.43, 48.
26. Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into and Report on Administrative and Judicial Functions in the Native Affairs and District Courts Departments,* Salisbury, Government Printer, 1961, para. 65.

1957 crowned for the colonial period a general trend in settler policy to reinvest traditional chiefs with lost authority. As noted above, chiefs and headmen had initially been recruited as constables and tax-collectors, mere executive agents of the state. By the 1950s, however, the myth that they represented rural African opinion came to be emphasized by the settler government as a counter-weight to African nationalists. Seeds of this new policy were sown in 1937 when a degree of legal jurisdiction in civil cases was returned to certain chiefs and in 1938 when African Councils based on the boundaries of chiefdoms, but with sparse powers and still sparser funds, were initiated. Because this approach to rural administration simultaneously attempted to bolster the powers of an hereditary office and to provide a channel of political expression through elected councils it embodied inherent tensions. These tensions came to focus on the position of the chief who, for example, on the one hand had to implement land husbandry measures and on the other hand to represent the views of the people on the unpopularity of the self-same measures. As increased responsibility for rural administration was extended to each chief so "his role as a conveyor of Government instructions tend(ed) to outweigh his role as representative of his people . . . the term 'government stooge' . . . gained wide currency in African rural circles."[27] As Garbett comments, the policy to reinforce traditional authority had "exactly the opposite effects to those desired".[28]

Far from recognizing that chiefs were widely discredited, the colonial administration proceeded with its chosen policy. The African Councils Act of 1957 provided for the establishment of elected institutions on an English local government model wherever "the inhabitants of the area concerned (express) a general wish that (a) council should be established".[29] African Councils could impose rates and make by-laws; the power to tax had been devolved to Councils as far back as 1944. The Native Commissioner was ex-officio president of every council

27. Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Mangwende Reserve Commission of Inquiry*, Salisbury, Government Printer, 1961, p.70.
28. G.K. Garbett, "The Rhodesian Chief's Dilemma: Government Officer or Tribal Leader?", *Race*, 8,2, 1966, p.122. To a large extent, the anthropologist's quibble about whether the chief represents people or government is irrelevant. Many post-1897 chiefs were settler appointees who adopted the form but not the functions of "traditional leaders". I am indebted to Munhamu Utete for reminding me of this.
29. *The African Councils Act*, No.19 of 1957, Salisbury, Government Printer, 1957, sec.9.

in his district, every chief a vice-president, and every headman an ex-officio member of council. The composition of the councils and the role of the N.C., unchanged from previous years, revealed the consistent underlying preoccupation of colonial administrators with the problems of political and administrative control. Roger Howman, a senior official in the Department of Native Affairs and architect of the African Councils Act, argued quite bluntly that "if we can foster the corporate life of the African and design wisely the devices whereby leaders emerge, we may influence very greatly the kind of leaders we shall have to face in the future".[30] Followers of the ANC consequently withheld participation and actively opposed local institution-building by the colonial state. In addition, African councils were ineffective in reaching "to the heart of the problems which troubled the African population . . . more schools and better health facilities".[31] Thus few communities requested councils. Between 1952 and 1959 only twelve new councils were created, and by 1962 the total was fifty-five.[32] This total figure represents less than twenty per cent of the communities that were eligible for local government institutions. By 1962, the Chief Native Commissioner conceded in his annual report that the council system was in a state of advanced deterioration and would have to be completely rebuilt.

A number of continuities in the conduct of rural administration had emerged after sixty-five years of settler rule in Rhodesia. First, over time, the state placed heightened reliance on traditional leaders for the administration of "native affairs". The pre-1962 period of rural administration can be regarded as a gradual transition from direct to indirect rule. Chiefs were rewarded for exercising state functions in numerous ways, such as by salary increases. Arrangements were also made for their symbolic involvement in national affairs such as the convention for the 1961 Constitution, plus formation of Provincial Assemblies and a National Council of Chiefs in 1962. Second, central administrative control took precedence over attempts to channel demands for peasant political participation into elected local institutions. In this regard the poorly-implemented African Councils Act of 1957 had less impact than the ultimately successful chief's petition of

30. H.R.G. Howman, "African Leadership in Transition", *NADA*, Salisbury, 33, 1956, p.13.
31. Passmore, *op.cit.*, p.55.
32. A.K.H. Weinrich, *Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia*, London, Heinemann, 1971, p.18.

1959 which called for the banning of ANC meetings in rural areas. Finally, the move to decentralize certain administrative tasks, particularly development tasks, set an unfortunate precedent. Administrative decentralization worked at cross-purposes to the economic orientation of rural peripheries towards the new industrial centre. As the impoverishment of the reserves was intensified so the settler state announced an intention to make peasants increasingly responsible for their own development. It was against this background that the policy of community development was unveiled.

IV. THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PHASE (1962-1972)

According to its proponents community development constituted a break with the past. Passmore argues that the policy constituted a "fundamental change of approach in administration" and Holleman that it put an end to paternalism and authoritarianism.[33] Because

> "attempts to force the rural population to accept measures imposed for their good by the outside agencies of government had failed . . . the problem (now) facing the administration was how to inspire collective action by the people in measures for their own advancement."[34]

As an approach to the decentralization of rural administration devised originally by American sociologists, community development became fashionable throughout the British colonial sphere in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was first introduced in India in 1952 and later transplanted to several African colonies including Kenya, Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia. Many postcolonial rural development strategies in anglophone Africa were also based on community development principles. Community development appeared to offer several distinct advantages over previous policies. It cast development in terms of the realization of integrated human communities rather than in purely technical terms; it promised to minister to the "felt" needs of clients rather than "objective" needs as determined by state planners; and it

33. Passmore, *op.cit.*, p.129; J.F. Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner: Some Problems of Government in Rhodesia*, Assen, Netherlands, Afrika-Studiecentrum, 1969, pp.256-7.
34. Passmore, *ibid.*, p.123.

ostensibly tempered administration from above with participation from below.

The Rhodesian government adopted community development as an official policy in 1962 and, with technical assistance from the United States Agency for International Development, began implementation in 1964. Ironically, 1964 was the year in which both the Indian government and USAID dropped community development because of manifest imperfections. In practice elsewhere in the world community development proved to promote welfare activities more effectively than productive activities, to fail to stimulate the emergence of local communities, and, through collaboration with established local leaders of colonial heritage, to inhibit the growth of participatory initiative from below.[35] The application of the principles of community development in the context of the Rhodesian political economy might thus have been expected to lead less to a break with the past than to significant continuities.

The administrative reforms that accompanied the adoption of the policy of community development were of form rather than substance. But the community development phase brought a division of administrative responsibility which persisted as the basis for rural administration in Rhodesia through to the 1970s and, thus, is worth recounting. Two formal innovations were made. First, the multipurpose Division of Native Affairs was disbanded and its functions, such as judicial and certain agricultural functions, were dispersed among the relevant technical ministries. In its place the Ministry of Internal Affairs was created and its role delimited to district administration. The "new" District Commissioners (DCs), were supposed to be the spearheads of socio-economic development in the African areas and to coordinate the work of technical ministries at district level. At village level the state would be represented, not only by chiefs and headmen, but by generalist community advisers and specialist extension staff. Training facilities would be provided for the community development personnel. Above all, according to official ideology, DCs would use their powers of co-ordination "to build responsible communities rather than produce a population better served with roads and pumps and so on".[36]

35. Akhter Hameed Khan, "Ten Decades of Rural Development – Lessons from India", Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, December 1977, p.18.
36. Passmore, *op.cit.*, p.107.

Local self-reliance was to be encouraged by the second formal innovation of the community development phase. Certain legislative and financial powers were to be decentralized to African councils. The earlier demise of councils was attributed by state officials in part to a lack of council authority on matters of vital concern to peasants, namely the construction of schools, clinics, roads and water supplies. Steps were therefore taken to make councils more responsible. Instead of the state expending funds on the direct provision of social services in rural areas, African councils would take over, first by administering state grants and, later, by raising local revenues. Moreover, the policy of community development called for a renewed effort to promote local government in rural areas, not only by the formation of additional African councils, but by the establishment of community boards, which were to be informal advisory bodies at the level of headman's ward. Local government institutions would thus "counteract the remoteness of government" and, though not explicitly stated, extend the state apparatus closer to the peasantry.

Despite decentralization, community development was intended neither to transfer state power out of settler hands nor to challenge the prevailing orientation of the Rhodesian political economy. As the Paterson Commission on administrative reorganization emphasised in 1962,

> "we must so arrange our administrative system that . . . there is encouragement of the development and growth of a socio-political structure which is compatible with the acculturation process of the indigenous rural system and the incoming technological system of the West".[37]

James Green, the USAID adviser, warned that community development would not succeed if simply "tacked on" to an "existing system of government".[38] Administrative reform, as outlined above, was therefore undertaken. What Green did not add was that community development would not succeed if "tacked on" to an existing political economy. The policy of community development did not respond to the fundamental demands of leaders of African political parties for participation in national, not local, politics, and for unrestricted access to economic opportunities. The policy instead soon became associated with the Rhodesian Front government that acceded to state power in

37. Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Organization and Development of the Southern Rhodesia Public Services, 1961*, Salisbury, Government Printer, 1962, para.6.5.
38. "Report on African Development and Local Government in Southern Rhodesia, Part 1, Native Councils". Salisbury, September 1962, mimeo

1962. Indeed community development was promoted as the foundation upon which the entire rural development policy of the Smith regime was to stand in relation to the African areas. Given the ideological inspiration that the Rhodesian Front drew from the Nationalist Party of South Africa, the idea that rural Africans should be left to develop themselves was seen by white liberals and black nationalists to bear a close resemblance to "separate development".[39]

Community development ran into initial implementation problems, and, as a result, momentum for the policy was not achieved until 1967 or 1968. The source of problems was located both within the state apparatus and without. From within, the dissolution of the Central African Federation tended to relegate all other administrative tasks to low priority in 1963 and 1964. More importantly, administrators in technical ministries were reluctant to hand over functions to what they perceived as "immature and irresponsible local government bodies".[40] A definitive division of responsibilities between central and local government was not laid down until 1968.[41] As will be shown, few powers of importance were devolved even then to African councils, due in part to the protectiveness of white civil servants over departmental prerogatives. From without, African nationalists attacked the policy of community development as "unworkable except under a system of majority rule".[42] Teachers, fearing loss of job security under decentralized educational management, used their influence in rural localities to stir up opposition to community development. Peasants saw the policy as another means for the state to extract taxes.[43] Resis-

39. Holleman gives an interesting interpretation of the transition of community development from a relatively "nonracial" to an explicitly "racial" policy. He sees this transition as a consequence of the power struggles within the RF which resulted in 1964 in the replacement of Winston Field and Jack Howman by Ian Smith and William Harper as Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs respectively. The ultimate withdrawal of USAID from Rhodesian community development was based upon a perception that the policy was underpinned by a philosophy of racial segregation; *op.cit.*, pp.273-277.
40. Passmore, *op.cit.*, p.139.
41. The Batten Commission reported in 1965 that there was "no general acceptance and understanding of community development, either within any one ministry or between ministries", Rhodesia, *Community Development and Training*, Salisbury, Government Printer, 1967.
42. Passmore, *op.cit.*, p.140, my emphasis.
43. Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Secretary for Internal Affiars* (S.I.A.), 1963, Salisbury, Government Printer, 1964, p.85.

tance was particularly strong in Matabeleland where rural living standards had been adversely affected by several years of severe drought and where the state was able to establish only five new councils between 1962 and 1969. In other areas, community advisers were confronted with political threats and had to be withdrawn.[44] Holleman cites cases "by the dozen" in which formative self-help projects were blocked by nationalists using tactics of arson and personal violence against participants.[45]

Problems of implementation within the state apparatus were addressed in the long-delayed Prime Minister's directive on community development of 1965 which called upon each ministry to "define its role in relation to community development and coordinate its efforts with other ministries involved in rural administration".[46] In an attempt to quell outside doubts, formal responsibility for African primary education and preventive health services was transferred from the state to African Councils in 1966. During subsequent years the rate of formation of African Councils and community boards began to accelerate, almost tripling in the first decade of the new policy (see Table 2).

The growth in local government institutions under community development can be attributed to a number of factors. Peasants undoubtedly responded in some parts of the country to new opportunities to obtain desired social facilities by means of community action. According to a survey conducted by the University of Rhodesia in conjunction with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 831 discrete local projects were underway by 1968.[47] The most responsive region of the country, from the point of view of state administrators, was Manicaland where the largest group of community advisers was concentrated and where 30% of the local projects were found. Opportunity for primary education facilities was the most frequent trigger of council or community board activation, followed by agricultural and health projects.

Other, less salutary, factors were also at work. Chiefs had in the past opposed council formation insofar as it promoted an alternative locus of power to their own, but their opposition was terminated by

44. S.I.A., *ibid.*, p.84.
45. Holleman, *op.cit.*, pp.282-3.
46. Rhodesia, Prime Minister's Office, *Local Government and Community Development: The Role of Ministries & Coordination*, Salisbury, Government Printer, 1965, p.1.
47. Survey results reported in full in Passmore, *op.cit.*, chapter 5.

1967 when chiefs were granted enhanced powers (see below). The state also acceded to the practice that chiefs nominate council members, thus allowing the domination of many councils by elders of traditional status and predisposition. Membership of long-established councils was a mixture of traditional leaders and directly elected members,[48] but by the 1970s membership of new councils was by appointment only as a matter of government policy. A cardinal precept of community development, that it be participatory, was thus violated.

Table 2: RHODESIA: AFRICAN COUNCILS AND COMMUNITY BOARDS, 1963-1978

	African Councils	*Estimated Inactive Councils*	*Community Boards*	*Estimated Inactive Community Boards*	
1963	55*	6			Community Devpt. Phase
1964	56				
1965	60		77		
1966	68		109		
1967	76		135		
1968	87		274	87	
1969	96	10	274		
1970	105				
1971	145				
1972	153	12	287	92	
1973	177				Civil War Phase
1974	188				
1975	210 (est.)				
1976	232				
1977	241	52			
1978 (June)	241	60			
	out of a possible 260		out of a possible 970		

Sources: Figures were drawn from numerous sources including: Weinrich (1971), p.25 (for 1963-1967); Hughes, p.138 (for 1968-69 and 1974); Ministry of Internal Affairs Annual Reports (for 1971-1973); International Defense and Aid Fund, p.11, (for 1977).

*55 councils existed before "community development" was introduced, i.e., under the Native Councils Act of 1937 and the African Councils Act of 1957.

48. The UR survey of 1968 showed that community boards followed the same mixed structure which incorporated a strong tendency to reinforce traditional political forms. Only 14% of community boards were composed of purely elected members, 59% mixed elected and traditional members, and 20% were composed on the traditional councils of elders known as *dare* (Shona) or *inkundla* (Ndebele).

Another factor accounting for the rapid growth of councils was indirect pressure brought to bear by the state. Local communities that refused to participate were faced with the prospect of withdrawal of existing public services or blockage of spontaneous development attempts. In 1969 expansion of mission primary schools was forbidden unless peasants formed councils and took over educational responsibilities. Documentation is available for at least one case, in the area of Chief Nzou of Victoria Province, where the construction of a clinic was blocked by the DC until a council was formed to administer it.[49] And a protracted struggle ensued in the APLs in the Enkeldoorn area between peasants, who were satisfied with a road council, and state officials intent on forming a multipurpose institution in accordance with the African Councils Act.[50] Hence a second precept of community development, that it be voluntary, was also violated in the Rhodesian political-economic context.

Nor was acceptance of community development by chiefs necessarily an indication of widespread acceptance by peasants. Of seven cases of attempted council formation among the Karanga investigated by Weinrich, five were met with strong local opposition.[51] Successful community development in the form of self-help projects was possible only in the two remaining cases where "moderate consensus" existed, and in one where a strong chief was able to override negative popular sentiment. The proportion of successful to unsuccessful instances of project initiation found by Weinrich is probably generalizable to the rest of the country for the decade up to 1972. Sixteen per cent of the community advisers who answered the questionnaire in the 1968 University of Rhodesia survey were willing to admit "no action" as a result of their efforts, and at least some of those who claimed action may have done so simply for self-protection. Moreover, only 210 out of a projected 600 community advisers had been recruited by the end of the 1960s and a growing number of vacant posts went unreplenished. Substantial expanses of rural area were left with little or no contact with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition, of the 831 projects underway in 1968, a mere 10-20% had reached completion and some projects were never subsequently completed. Indeed, not all of the new councils and community boards were active and some existed on paper only (see Table 2). Community boards, in particular, operated intermittently and were project-specific. Notably in Matabeleland they proved insufficiently institutionalized to outlast the life of projects for which they were created.[52]

49. Weinrich (1971), *op.cit.*, p.211-12.
50. Rhodesia, *Parliamentary Debates*, October 14, 1977, col.1262.
51. *Ibid.*, chapters 9 and 10.

African Purchase Lands in general provided a more receptive environment for community development than TTLs and a higher proportion of councils, approximately one-third, was concentrated in APLs than their size or population warranted. Extension personnel were similarly concentrated. The benefits of community development thus tilted in favour of already privileged strata within the African areas and tended to grant lower priority to the needs of the poor. Despite the uneven impact of community development, however, the settler state did succeed in establishing significant numbers of local government institutions where none of national scope had existed before. Given the estimate that 260 African councils were needed for comprehensive rural administration in Rhodesia, the state achieved, on paper, 59% coverage by 1972 and 93% coverage by 1977. The record for community boards was less impressive. But the relatively rapid growth of African councils in the community development phase is testimony at least to the raw effectiveness and efficiency of settler administration under conditions of less than universal popular support.

V. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: CONTINUITIES IN RURAL ADMINISTRATION

The community development phase in Rhodesia is best analyzed as an extrapolation and refinement of rural administration as practised in earlier historical periods of settler rule. Major continuities are discernable. First, the state continued to move from one anachronistic colonial model, direct rule, to another, indirect rule, by further fortifying the position of traditional leaders. As Weinrich said, "if during the Federal period African chiefs rose to power, during the post-Federal period they were propelled into prominence".[53] In the Dom-

52. Rhodesia, Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Survey of African Progress, 1962-72*, mimeo, 1973, p.1; Passmore, *op.cit.*, pp.224,252.
53. Weinrich (1971), *op.cit.*, p.20.

boshawa "indaba" of 1964, chiefs were used to legitimize the RF's claims for independence from Britain without majority rule. Subsequently chiefs were reinvested with the two most important powers lost under conquest. The power to allocate land was returned under the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967 and the power to judge civil and certain criminal cases under the African Law and Tribal Courts Act of 1969. Salaries of chiefs were also raised far above average African wages during this period, and bodyguards and weapons were provided for their protection. In 1973 the African Councils Act was amended to give legal effect to the administrative and executive powers of chiefs vis-a-vis councils.

These administrative arrangements were aimed at sustaining community development and local government policy. A favoured metaphor among policy-makers at the time was that rural administration resembled three "legs" supporting a "pot" of rural African life: the chief as spiritual authority, the chief as land authority, and the DC and council as secular authority for development. According to the Secretary for Internal Affairs, local government in Rhodesia was "very much part of the tribal authority" and aimed to identify African Councils with "traditional tribal government".[54] A modicum of indirect rule also had the advantage of relieving the state of enforcement of "difficult" policies. For example, Tribal Land Authorities were established at the time of the restoration of land allocation powers, in large part to manage soil conservation and the problem of peasants made landless by the Land Husbandry Act. Chiefs or headmen were thus handed a problem, in the opinion of one commentator, "so complex and potentially explosive that the European authorities had despaired of solving it".[55]

The alliance between chiefs and settlers was cemented firmly with the incorporation of the former into the highest institutions of state under the Republican "constitution" of 1969. Provision was made for a Senate with powers of delay over legislation: 10 of the 23 senators were to be African chiefs nominated by the Council of Chiefs, five from Mashonaland and five from Matabeleland. Chiefs, along with headmen and African councillors were also empowered to nominate 8 MPs to the

54. S.I.A., *op.cit.*, 1971, p.17; 1973, p.14; The Minister of Internal Affairs stated in Parliament that, "It is certainly very noticeable that where there is strong tribal leadership, the councils are more efficient; we equate the level of progress in a TTL with the strength of tribal leadership." *Parliamentary Debates,* October 14, 1977.
55. Holleman, *op.cit.*, p.333.

House of Assembly through "tribal electoral colleges" and the number of directly elected African MPs was reduced by half. As legislators, traditional leaders generally have supported the Smith government's rural development strategy, for example by endorsing the "border industry" programme of TILCOR. They have also used Parliament as a platform to press for increased monetary subsidization and military protection for themselves.[56] Such criticism of government as has been voiced, as over the segregation before 1978 of European and African agriculture into separate ministries with disproportionate extension policies, has been ineffective.[57]

The policy of "provincialization", introduced in stages beginning with the Regional Authorities Act of 1973, reinforced both the separation of black and white affairs and the promotion of traditional leaders. The policy called for seven regional authorities, based on provincial boundaries and composed predominantly of chiefs and headmen, which would gradually take over the administration of African areas (see Chart 1). Regional authorities were designed as an upper tier to the organization of African local government and as a further step in state divestiture of direct responsibility for rural development. Throughout the new administrative apparatus, from provincial authority to African council, the principle was observed that "tribal" representatives outnumber popularly elected representatives in a minimum ratio of 2:1. Each regional authority was to have its own staff charged with responsibility for coordinating African council projects. The plan was that regional authorities report to provincial authorities which in turn report to cabinet councils, one for Mashonaland and one for Matabeleland. The latter were headed after 1976 by senator chiefs appointed by the Smith government to "ministerial" rank with rural development "portfolios" within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. African "ministers" have no jurisdiction over white personnel or white affairs, their function being to represent "the African point of view".[58] The plan for provincialization also entertained the possibility that Africans could "rise right to the top of their own Civil Service, the nucleus of which will be Africans transferred from the European Civil Service".[59] Provincializ-

56. Rhodesia, *Parliamentary Debates,* October 14, 1977, col.1244.
57. P. O'Meara, *Rhodesia: Racial Conflict or Coexistence?,* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1975, pp.86-7.
58. *The Rhodesia Herald,* 29 April 1977, as quoted in International Defence and Aid Fund, *Zimbabwe: The Facts About Rhodesia,* London, 1977, p.27.
59. Rhodesian Front, *Provincialization,* marked "confidential", 1974, mimeo, Annexure A, p.5.

Chart 1: RHODESIA: ORGANIZATION OF RURAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE "PROVINCIALIZATION" PLAN



ation thus provided for the further institutionalization of chiefs in national affairs to a point "far beyond the concept of authority in either Shona or Ndebele society",[60] but not so far as to provide for genuine sharing of state power. It also provided for the further institutionalization of segregation of white affairs from black, and of Shona affairs from Ndebele. Provincialization was no more than the extension from local to national level of the philosophy of community development; it offered no more than a Rhodesian version of balkanization by Bantustan.

The second continuity discernable in the practice of community development was the precedence placed on the maintenance of administrative control. A measure of direct rule was retained despite experiments with administrative autonomy for chiefs. The main instrument of control was, as always, the principal field agent of the state. In theory the District Commissioner was the "guardian of community development" endowed in his tasks of coordination with a "field of influence" and distinct from a "field of authority".[61] In practice the Ministry of Internal Affairs was staffed by the same administrative personnel as the Division of Native Affairs and, with few exceptions, the new DCs were able to maintain their little kingdoms in the bush and rule with the same authoritarian style as their predecessors. DCs did hand over council chairmanship to elected Africans, a position they had filled in the past, but they retained the statutory role of president which enabled them to intervene in the work of councils. DCs were permitted to examine the work of councils and take corrective action to ensure "reasonable standards of efficiency" and "to expose corruption"; they controlled the flow of financial resources to councils by making recommendations as to the size of grants and the conditions for payment; and they retained the right to invalidate the decisions of a chief, including decisions on land allocation, and to augment chief's salaries with bonuses for cooperation with prevailing administrative policies. Above all, the DCs role included the brief to "inculcate a proper understanding of the disciplinary and penalizing influences of Government in regard to national matters" including education, human and animal health, natural resources and public administration.[62]

60. O'Meara, *op.cit.*, p.81.
61. Rhodesia, Cabinet Coordinating Committee, *Local Government and Community Development Policy: The Role of Ministries and Coordination*, Salisbury, Government Printer, 1971, p.2.
62. Prime Minister's directive (1965) *op.cit.*, pp.8-11.

In other words, DCs had the final say in all matters supposedly under the purview of chiefs and councils. The Prime Minister's directive on community development was open to many interpretations and DCs usually interpreted it to their own advantage. Even apologists for state policy concede that the DC "still retains very considerable powers and can and does exert a very considerable influence on the particular types of development action that are emphasized in his district".[63] In some cases, DCs exceeded their already broad authority by continuing to intervene in the process of selecting chiefs. In other cases, DCs were granted freedom of action by the failure of district level field administrators to meet in district conferences.[64] In any event, community development was "conceived as an integral part of the hierarchical structure of the Public Service . . . (which was) designed for technical and administrative but not political decision-making".[65] The main planning and coordination decisions for community development were made at district, provincial, and Cabinet Coordinating Committee levels, levels at which no African was involved. The power of DCs thus came to derive from their key linkage position in the community development chain. They executed at local level the determination of the RF caucus that "all local governments, whether local or otherwise, whether European or African, are and will remain subservient to central government and their (sic) authority".[66]

A third aspect of rural administration in Rhodesia which links community development with past practices, and which casts additional light on the limits of decentralization, is the issue of national projects. Officially,

> "not all development is community development. It is essential to be realistic and recognize that the sphere of practical organized self-help on a community basis, in spite of its vital importance as the focus of so many agencies of Government, is likely, in the underdeveloped areas, to be a small and initially a feeble one. It must be differentiated from the most basic sphere of primary development and from overall national development which are the responsibility of Government".[67]

National projects, which by-passed African councils and which were

63. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p.16.
64. Passmore, *op.cit.*, p.155. In 1971 the ineffectual district conferences were replaced with smaller district teams to "ensure that everyone concerned is fully involved in what is going on", S.I.A., 1971, p.28.
65. Holleman, *op.cit.*, p.281.
66. Rhodesian Front, Provincialization, *op.cit.*, p.1.
67. Prime Minister's directive (1965), *op.cit.*, p.13.

beyond community control, were thus defined to include a wide gamut of "primary development" measures.

The formal division of administrative responsibilities laid down in 1968 left extensive rural development initiative in the hands of the state.[68] For example, main and branch roads would be centrally built and maintained, whereas African councils would be responsible for roads of "purely local significance whose misuse or deterioration have little or no effect on administration".[69] The planning and operation of irrigation schemes and other settlement schemes was perceived as a matter of purely central prerogative, as was the installation and maintenance of village water supplies up to 1973. Responsibility for rural industries was vested in a centralized public corporation, TILCOR, a body which at least initially included no African on its board of directors. TILCOR was mandated to "exploit natural resources" on reserved African land and to plan projects according to criteria of profitability "*for* (rather than with) the inhabitants" of the TTLs.[70] As for education, only African primary schools were cited for devolution to African councils; responsibility for African secondary schools and all rural European schools was retained by central government. As for health, only preventive services, notably family planning, were devolved; major curative services were retained. Matters in which the settlers had little direct interest such as "the relief of distress", were regarded as "properly a function for devolution to local authorities".[71] Finally, the state reserved the right to add or subtract from the list of national projects according to central financial or security considerations. To summarize, all functions relating to the predetermined economic development path of the African areas or to state security were administered along well-worn lines during the community development phase. From the outset in practice, and after 1968 according to clear administrative instruction, community development was never more than one subsidiary approach to rural development among several centralized approaches.

68. Southern Rhodesia, Department of the Prime Minister, "Community Development and Local Government: Division of Functions between Central Government and Local Government", *Circular No.1 of 1968.* Marked "restricted", this document was circulated to "senior officers most vitally concerned with the implementation of community development" with the instruction that "its contents should on no account be made public".
69. *Ibid.*, p.3.
70. Rhodesia, *Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation Act,* No.47 of 1968, Section 4.
71. Circular No.1 of 1968, *op.cit.*, p.8.

The various facets of the practice of community development are well illustrated by a brief examination of African primary education. This constitutes a useful case for policy evaluation since primary education has been repeatedly publicized as an example of effective rural self-help and administrative devolution. African primary education expanded modestly after councils were urged to take over from missions: 156 new schools opened between 1964 and 1973, an increase of 5.2% (see Table 3). This increase should, however, be viewed in context. The African rural population jumped by 44% over the same period, and school enrolments by 19%. Existing facilities became overcrowded and more than half of eligible African children were still without places in school.[72] In neighbouring Zambia during the same period, 1964-1973, a 41% increase in the number of primary schools was achieved, a record eight times higher than the Rhodesian.[73] The data in Table 3 provides for another critique. As shown earlier, African primary education is a mere fraction of the state's total concern with education and the only fraction for which responsibility was in principle to be devolved. In practice, even African primary education was never fully devolved. By 1973 fewer than half of the African primary schools slated for transfer were actually under the control of local authorities. 1,655 of 3,147 schools remained under the central control, either of the state or of religious organizations. The "interim measure" whereby the Division of African Education assumed management of primary schools until local authorities were financially capable had about it, after a decade of community development, an air of permanency.

Primary education, like other community development initiatives, should be seen in political-economic context. The African areas have been underdeveloped to the point where insufficient economic surplus is generated to support extensive social services, education included. Yet the government has endeavoured to absolve the state at the centre of responsibility for social services at the periphery. Under the 1966 Ten Year Plan for Education, spending on African education was pegged at no more than 2% of GNP.[74] In the face of international economic sanctions, further cost cutbacks were made, for example in the reduc-

72. An official census figure of 55% is quoted by M. Murphree *et.al., Education, Race and Employment in Rhodesia,* Salisbury, 1975, p.50.
73. Zambia Information Services, *Zambia 1964-1974,* Lusaka, Government Printer, 1974, p.31.
74. Lester K. Weiner, "African Education in Rhodesia since UDI", *Africa Today,* 1967, p.15.

tion of primary education from eight to seven years, and in the reduction of intakes into African teacher training colleges by half. Increases in school registration fees were also made to the point where they accounted for an average of fifteen per cent of the slim cash income available to peasants.[75] An effort to have African councils absorb 5% of teachers salaries had to be dropped in 1977 because of the inability of councils to support such a measure by extraction of further taxes from the poor. Meanwhile over ten times as much per capita – $322 to $27 in 1976 – was being spent by the state on white education as on black education.[76]

Table 3: RHODESIA: AIDED AFRICAN PRIMARY SCHOOLS: CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES, 1964-1973

	1964		*1973*	
Central control		2894		1655
Division of African Education			1093	
Mission	2894		562	
Local control		97		1492
African Council	21		1111	
Community Board			41	
Committee	76		340	
TOTALS		2991		3147

Sources: A.J.B. Hughes, *Development in Rhodesian Tribal Trust Lands: An Overview* (Salisbury, TARFF, 1974) p.79; Gloria Passmore, *The National Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia,* Salisbury, Government Printer, 1972, p.203; both based on the annual reports of the Secretary for African Education.

Thus, if primary education policy is the model for other self-help initiatives, then the entire community development approach can be seen as attempt to relocate costs for social services away from the settler state. Hughes exposes the underlying rationale for devolution when he raises the alarm about

> "the threat that population explosion posed. The demand for public education was assuming such proportions that it threatened to overwhelm the resources of finance and skills which could reasonably be expected to be available. The transfer of responsibility for primary schools ensured that expansion became dependent on communal capacity to organize, to experience the discipline inherent in local government, and to raise production on the basis of self-help".[77]

75. *Ibid.*
76. *Financial Mail,* Johannesburg, February 25, 1977.
77. Hughes, *op.cit.,* p.79.

A 1971 survey of white opinion revealed that although 78% of the respondents considered development of the TTLs vital, 58% of those who identified themselves as Rhodesian Front supporters would not countenance an increase in white taxation for that purpose.[78] Community development did not break with past because in all aspects of administration the mandate of the Rhodesian Front was to preserve an old order, not to establish a new one. In this regard the preamble to the Rhodesian Front policy document on provincialization, in which the purposes of devolution were enunciated, is germane:

"(1) Make the African aware that he must look primarily to the African area to provide him with his living and occupation, skilled and unskilled;
(2) Ameliorate the problem of the influx of Africans into the European area;
(3) Remove pressure on the European taxpayer to supply unlimited finance to provide ever increasing services in the African areas;
(4) Take the heat our of domestic politics in the National Parliament".[79]

VI. CIVIL WAR AND THE BREAKDOWN OF ADMINISTRATION (1972-1978)

The maintenance of seventy-five years of administrative control over an extensive rural periphery was a notable accomplishment given the small size and predominantly urban residence pattern of the settler population. Eighty per cent live in towns. Control was predicated on the fact that rural resistance was intermittent and uncoordinated. African nationalist organizations grew over time, however, and were transformed by the late 1970s into movements for national liberation. The goals of the liberation movements moved beyond earlier demands for equal political representation towards a nascent concern for mass mobilization and fundamental socioeconomic change. Armed struggle was accepted as a legitimate and effective strategy both for gaining power and for initiating the achievement of broader transformational goals. The rural areas of Rhodesia became the arena in which the

78. M. Hirsch, *A Decade of Crisis: Ten Years of Rhodesian Front Rule*, Salisbury, Dearlove, 1973, p.155.
79. Rhodesian Front (1974), *op.cit.*, Annexure A, p.1.

armed struggle was played out, unlike the urban setting initially favoured in nationalist days. The locus of the armed struggle, from the viewpoint of the settler state as well as the liberation movements, was the "hearts and minds" – the political allegiance – of Zimbabwean peasants.

An important watershed in the course of rural administration and rural resistance was the year 1972. In that year Africans, including even chiefs, reported to the Pearce Commission an overwhelming rejection of proposals to give Rhodesia independence under a modified version of the 1969 Constitution. This occurrence demonstrated quite clearly community development had not met the political and economic aspirations of rural Zimbabweans and that the gambit to make chiefs simultaneously representatives of the state and of their own people had failed. The response to the Peace Commission was regarded by state officials as "a severe setback to administration".[80]

In addition, 1972 saw the start of a campaign of persisting guerrilla insurgency. Isolated incursions in the late 1960s, mostly from the northwest, had been readily contained by Rhodesian security forces. The liberation movements subsequently undertook a review of military strategy. After 1972, guerrillas, now entering from the northeast, avoided positional confrontations with Rhodesian forces and sought to prepare hospitable political bases amongst the peasantry in advance of military action. The new strategy was so effective that by early 1978 the forces of the Patriotic Front were present and operational within every rural district in the country as well as within the boundaries of Salisbury and Bulawayo. The state was compelled to allocate more than half the national budget to the cost of the war and related economic programmes for the ailing economy; the war alone was costing over $800,000 per day by mid 1978.

On the administrative front, response to the escalation of guerrilla activity took the form of the rehabilitation of old administrative practices and the promulgation of new ones. The year 1972 marked the point at which community development was effectively dropped in favour of a concerted endeavour to reestablish state control over the rural periphery. This endeavour bore scant regard for the social and economic welfare of peasants. Community development continued to be official policy and ideology for several years after 1972 but administrative practices diverged widely from stated public goals. The arrange-

80. Rhodesia, *Report of the Secretary for Internal Affairs* (S.I.A.), 1972, p.1.

ments made by the settler state to deal with civil war exposed again the intimate symbiosis between the administration of civil and military matters in Rhodesia. What transpired, in essence, was a return to the practice of direct rule. Direct rule, a consistent thread through Rhodesian administrative history, has been most visible at times when settlers perceive a threat of African military uprising. Direct rule predominated in the aftermath of 1893-7; it faded into the background subsequent to the banning of nationalist parties during the community development phase of 1962-1972; it was revived with a vengeance after 1972.

In keeping with previous instances of rural resistance, guerrillas have singled out the projects and personnel of the settler state as prime objects of attack. A key catalytic event in the escalation of hostilities was the raid on the DCs office in Mount Darwin in January 1973 in which members of the security forces were killed; shortly thereafter two government land inspectors were killed and a third captured. Since that time teachers in government schools and chiefs and headmen considered by the guerrillas to be agents of the incumbent regime have been selectively kidnapped, beaten or killed. State security resources have been stretched so thin that protection is often unavailable to those chiefs and headmen who would otherwise wish to report the presence of guerrillas. Council buildings, primary schools and forest plantations have been burned and dip tanks destroyed. Government and council roads have been landmined. Other targets included beer halls and bottle stores, lucrative sources of revenue to government and councils, but to guerrillas a symbol of peasant dependence.

The work of white District Officers and their African District Assistants, as well as the work of development and maintenance crews, has been disrupted in the TTLs, often with loss of life. By mid-1978, over three thousand "noncombatants" had been killed in the civil war. The Minister of Internal Affairs reported in 1977 that this figure included the deaths of 114 of the personnel of his department; 25 were missing or abducted, and 243 had been wounded.[81] Wilkinson comments that, at first, the administration "appeared to have been thrown off balance by the suddenness of attacks and the significant degree of support the guerrillas had secured among the local population".[82] Once

81. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia (CCJPR), *The Propaganda War,* London, CIIR, 1977, p.12.
82. A. Wilkinson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe" in B. Davidson, J. Slovo and A. Wilkinson *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution,* Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1976, p.262.

security risks became a regular feature of the conduct of rural affairs, however, state officials retaliated with a series of harsh administrative measures. Security legislation has always been used in Rhodesia, in the name of preserving law and order, to inhibit political expression by Africans. Two pieces of legislation, the Emergency Powers Act and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, both originating in 1960, have become what Austin calls "virtually the alternative constitution of Rhodesia".[83] Each has been extended and amended, the former 32 times and the latter a dozen times since 1965, to broaden the control of the state over the population. The new measures served to strengthen the executive powers of Provincial and District Commissioners and to make civil administrators responsible for paramilitary tasks. Several examples will be given. Under existing law, the penalty for acts of "terrorism" or for assisting "terrorists" was death or life imprisonment; in 1973 the penalty was extended to civilians who "failed to report" the presence of "terrorists". Yet peasants, who regularly supply food, shelter and services to guerrillas, seldom comply with the statutory requirement to report. They evidently identify with the political goals of the liberation movements or calculate that the risk of guerrilla reprisal is greater than the risk of reprisal from the state.[84]

In another administrative response to insurgency, Provincial Commissioners were empowered in 1973 to impose collective fines on communities in which contact with guerrillas was suspected. Collective punishment has taken the form of the confiscation of cattle, as in Chiweshe and Mzarabani TTLs, and in the forced resettlement of communities in remote parts of the country, as with the people from Madziwa TTL.[85] Among both Shona and Ndebele people the ownership of cattle is a key emotive and economic issue, yet the settler regime persisted from the 1890s on, in cattle confiscation as a means of control of the African population. Collective punishment has in extreme cases taken the form of military reprisal against entire populations of pro-guerrilla villages.

The jurisdiction of DCs has also been enhanced in numerous ways by emergency regulations. Since 1974 DCs have been permitted to

83. R.H.F. Austin, "White Response to New Pressures", *African Perspectives* (Leiden) 1976/1, p.83.
84. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), *Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia,* London, CIIR, 1976, p.55.
85. *Ibid.,* pp.59-61; see also Wilkinson *op.cit.,* p.283; Weinrich (1977), pp. 213-215.

recruit residents of border zones for forced labour on roads, bridges and fences deemed necessary for security, although these measures appear to have been used predominantly in the Zambezi valley. DCs can also intervene in the disposition of food and cattle and have done so wherever "protected villages" have been set up. In addition their powers include the legal right to "inflict corporal punishment on anyone who behaves in a contemptuous manner towards the District Commissioner and his staff".[86] DCs can also control entry and exit from TTLs. And, even though DCs were authorized since 1928 to prohibit public meetings of more than twelve persons, they were further allowed in 1975 to prohibit any meeting, regardless of numbers attending, if politics was to be discussed. The myth that the sting was taken from the tail of Rhodesian DCs by community development was difficult to sustain before 1972 and impossible to sustain thereafter.

Throughout the war, the tasks undertaken by civilian administration and military forces have been complementary and, over time, merged. The Secretary for Internal Affairs, in a rare official reference to the civil war, noted in 1973 that his Ministry "always enjoyed a close association with the Police, Army and Air Force (and) the security situation made this association even closer".[87] Indeed the four new administrative districts created in 1974 to "maintain sufficiently close contact with tribesmen"[88] were located precisely in the hottest operational zones of the east and north-east. At the same time a decision was made to establish an African militia: to this end District Assistants were given basic military training and whites were permitted for the first time to do national service with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[89] The African militia was developed into a new paramilitary unit, the Guard Force, when in 1976 the responsibility for "population removal" and the administration of "protected villages" was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Defence.[90] Yet Internal Affairs personnel in the rural areas carry firearms on official duty.[91] In 1976 a

86. Wilkinson, *ibid.*, p.286.
87. S.I.A., 1972, p.1.
88. *Ibid*; with one exception, this was the first such reform in rural administration in forty years.
89. Wilkinson, *op.cit.*, p.286.
90. For further analysis of the complex relationship between civilian and military aspects of rural administration see C.M. Brand, "From Compound to Keep: on the nature of civilian control in Southern Rhodesia", paper read to the 9th World Congress on Sociology, Upsalla, Sweden, August 1978.
91. International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), Zimbabwe: The Facts about Rhodesia, *op.cit.*, p.56.

new hybrid grade of local administrator, the African District Security Assistant, was introduced specifically for counter-insurgency work at the grass-roots level. Paramilitary state officials have claimed since 1972 a portion of the effective local power that, under the community development strategy, was intended for return to chiefs and headmen.

The administrative measures that have most severely disrupted peasant society and economy are those concerning forced resettlement and "protected villages". Resettlement of peasant populations has been a constant element in rural administration in Rhodesia. During the Federal years 113,000 Africans were removed to the TTLs to make way for the influx of white settlers; from 1967-72 the removal and resistance of the Tangwena people attracted international attention; other programmes, such as that of the movement of 80,000 from Karangaland to Gokwe in the late 1960s, attracted less attention but also involved coercion.[92] By far the largest resettlement exercise undertaken by the settler regime, however, has been in response to civil war. Over half a million peasants, one-seventh of the African rural population, have been consolidated into defensive settlements of the "strategic hamlet" type. From 1973 to May 1977, 203 protected villages were created, predominantly in 17 TTLs in the east and northeast (see Table 4). By mid-1978 the official figure had risen to 220, including several in the central and western operational zones.[93] These figures do not include populations moved to "consolidated villages", that is, unfenced government settlements established along main rural roads as a preliminary stage in the protected village policy. A reasonable estimate of the total figure for Zimbabweans displaced, directly or indirectly, by all types of resettlement programmes, is between one and a half million.[94]

The official reasons given for population resettlement are, first, the "protection" of civilians from guerrillas and, second, the isolation of guerrillas from sources of food, shelter, information and recruits. A third reason is apparent from a newspaper account of consolidated

92. Weinrich (1978), *op.cit.*
93. G. Matatu, "Zimbabwe: Inside Story", *Africa*, 81, May 1978, p.13.
94. The figures are based on the following rough estimates for mid-1978: protected villages and consolidated villages, 750,000 (projection of mid-1977 figure to include new protected villages); urban migrants since introduction of protected village policy, 500 (*Washington Post*, 4 July 1978); refugees in Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia, at least 100,000 (Christian Aid, *Refugees: Africa's Challenge*, London, April 1978).

villages in Chikore: "the move was not voluntary initially – it was suggested by the security zones for better control".[95]

A most useful account of administrative control measures and conditions of life in protected villages has been provided by Weinrich.[96] Described as "keeps" by Zimbabweans, "protected villages are built in such a way that the only persons really protected are the European administrators and their African attendants".[97] Within the fenced com-

Table 4: RHODESIA: PROTECTED VILLAGES, 1977

Tribal Trust Land	*No. of PVs*	*Total*	*Approx.Pop.*	*Totals:*
Mashonaland Province				
Dande	4		1,800	
Mzarabani	3		5,600	
Gutsa	6		3,832	
Chiswiti	10		17,000	
Kandeya	30		60,000	
Chiweshe	21		120,000	
Madziwa	10		25,000	
Uzumba	20		70,000	
Maramba	6		12,000	
Pfungwe	20		16,000	
Mtoko	17		68,000	
Mudzi	5		20,000	
Ngarwe	12		48,000	
Chikwizo	3	159	12,000	479,232
Manicaland Province				
Honde Valley	7		14,000	
Ndowoyo	12		24,000	
Chipinga Area	5		76,000	
Musikavanhu	3		6,000	
Makoni District	4	31	10,000	61,600
Victoria Province				
Sangwe	4		8,000	
Chiredzi	9	13	32,000	40,000
TOTALS		203		580,832

Source: Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War,* London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1977, p.15.

95. *The Rhodesia Herald*, 23rd June 1976.
96. A.K.H. Weinrich, "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia", *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 3,2, 1977, pp.207-229.
97. *Ibid.*, p.217.

pounds each family is assigned a plot of 15 square yards on which to build a house and latrine and to accommodate poultry. Sanitary facilities are primitive; typhoid and diarrhoea are not uncommon. The movement of the rural population in and out of protected villages is closely monitored by means of regular identification checks and by a dusk-to-dawn curfew. Food may not leave a keep. Nevertheless, the consensus among observers is that protected villages, like the indiscriminate application of collective fines and capital punishment, have failed. Successive measures for administrative control served only to further alienate the "hearts and minds" of the African rural population from the settler state. Guerrillas, far from being isolated, continue to be fed by their relatives and supporters and some protected villages have been thoroughly infiltrated by the liberation movements.[98] Only those Africans loyal to the government such as certain chiefs and headmen have expressed gratitude for resettlement; conversely, the policy seems also to have provided the liberation movements with large numbers of fresh and furious recruits.[99]

Like any other administrative measure, population resettlement cannot be adequately analyzed out of context. The context in this case is the dependent structure and position of the TTL econonomy; dependence has been reinforced and deepened by resettlement. Protected and consolidated villages are part of a wider state strategy to fashion "no-go" zones where guerrillas are to be deprived, not only of contact with villagers, but of the sustenance of the land. The settler state has accordingly adopted a form of "scorched earth" policy at the frontline whereby, at the time of resettlement, existing villages and crops have been put to the torch or poisoned. Cattle have been summarily sold. The money is retained by the state, in part to purchase food for residents of keeps, in yet another manifestation of the perverse Rhodesian interpretation of self-help. The burning of crops and the sale of cattle amounts in those TTLs where resettlement has been enforced to a wholesale destruction of the peasant pattern of production. In its place, resettled peasants are placed in an undignified position of dependence on the state for provision of food and of acceptance of a rising cash component to subsistence. Food is rationed in protected villages and increasingly stringent curfew regulations have made difficult the cultivation of distant gardens outside the fence.

98. IDAF, *op.cit.*, p.48; Weinrich, *ibid.*, p.219.
99. Weinrich, *ibid.*, p.221, Wilkinson, *op.cit.*, p.287-8, CCJP, *op.cit.*, p.13.

A particularly striking case of the ruinous economic consequences of resettlement is that of Chiweshe TTL. Just forty miles north of the capital city, Chiweshe was one of the least dependent TTLs: many of its residents had gained access to an agricultural credit programme sponsored by white farmers and had earned reliable incomes from the sale of maize and tobacco. After 1974 more people were resettled in Chiweshe, 120,000 in all, and more protected villages built, than in any other TTL (see Table 4). "Today", according to Weinrich, "agricultural production in the area has collapsed".[100] Indeed, the entire rural African economy has entered a precipitous plunge since 1972. Due in part to the Chiweshe and other similar experiences, marketed African agriculture declined in the decade before 1976 during which time its share of GDP fell from 7.1% to 5.5%.[101] The overall decline in food production in the TTLs is therefore closely connected to the implementation of administrative control measures. Population resettlement in Rhodesia has historically been associated with the underdevelopment of the TTLs and never more so than under the exigencies of civil war.

Like agriculture, community development has come to a virtual standstill in the war zones. What began as a slowdown in council formation in 1972 deteriorated by 1978 into the breakdown of civil administration and social services. The peak year for the formation of African Councils was 1971 when 40 new councils were formed (see Table 2) and the Secretary for Internal Affairs confidently predicted a similar expansion for 1972.[102] After the Pearce Commission and the escalation of insurgency, "people who had asked for councils suddenly became lukewarm; those who opposed them stepped up their efforts to persuade others to adopt their views".[103] The Ministry was able to establish only 12 councils in 1972, though the policy subsequently regathered partial momentum outside the war zone.

The aim of the liberation movements has been to reverse the extension of the settler state apparatus into rural localities. Guerrillas have successfully urged peasants to withhold council rates and to refuse payment of fees for education and cattle-dipping. School boycotts affected 36,000 children and 494 teachers in the Manicaland TTLs alone in

100. *Ibid.*, p.228.
101. ILO (1978) *op.cit.*, p.37.
102. S.I.A. (1971), *op.cit.*, p.28.
103. S.I.A. (1972), *op.cit.*, p.17.

1977.[104] Cattle-dipping has also been suspended in Manicaland, the very region that was regarded as the leading model for community development projects in the 1960s. African Councils, unable without revenue to provide services or remunerate personnel are closing down. Councillors and council secretaries, fearing association with the state, no longer participate in the administration of their areas. According to one Provincial Commissioner, at least 50 councils out of 241 were bankrupt in 1977.[105] Forty of these councils were placed under the direct management of DCs in a dramatic reversal of the stated intent of community development.[106] Since 52 council clinics had also closed their doors by the end of 1977,[107] a figure almost identical to the number of bankruptcies, an estimate can be made that at least 52 African councils were by then "inactive" (see Table 2).

The rapidity with which rural administration is collapsing in Rhodesia is discernable from figures on African school closures in 1978. In February, 438 primary schools and 16 secondary schools, mostly in eastern districts, were officially reported closed.[108] Some were destroyed, others abandoned on guerrilla orders. 90,000 children were estimated to be without education. Just four months later, the Ministry of African Education put the figures at 771 primary schools and 28 secondary schools closed, with 200,000 children affected.[109] This included over 200 schools closed in Matabeleland and Midlands, for example in Zhombe TTL. By August 1978, the government reported that 947

104. T. Hodges, "Counterinsurgency and the Fate of Rural Blacks", *Africa Report*, September-October 1977, p.17.
105. *Africa News*, (Durham North Carolina) July 4, 1977.
106. Hodges, *op.cit.*; The DC and his staff were made directly responsible for collection of rates and taxes and their arms were strengthened by the Emergency Powers (Collection of Amenities Debts) Regulations which authorized the seizure of cash or property from noncompliant peasants.
107. *The Sunday Times* (London), February 19, 1978.
108. *Ibid.*
109. *Africa News*, June 26, 1978. To supplement the picture of disruption in the delivery of rural social services, reference should also be made to non-government school and clinic closures, such as those at mission stations. Roman Catholic authorities report the closure of 23 of their 107 schools, three of their 39 hospitals and one of their 16 clinics (*New York Times*, May 1, 1978). Eleven mission hospitals of all denominations have been closed and resident doctors at 17 mission hospitals deported. The upsurge of widely-publicized attacks on missions in June 1978, such as that at Elim Pentecostal mission in the Vumba mountains, will undoubtedly raise these figures.

schools had been abandoned, involving 231,550 black school children.[110] Thus by mid-1978 one-quarter of African primary schools, 24% of the 1973 total (see Table 3), were closed. On the assumption that council-operated schools are more likely to close than centrally-controlled schools, and that school closure is an indicator of council collapse, it can be conservatively estimated that at least one-quarter of African councils, approximately 60 out of 241, were inactive by mid-1978. Some have been fully dismantled.[111] Given the rapidity of administrative collapse, even these estimated figures are likely to be soon overtaken by events.

The breakdown of rural administration is not only attributable to the direct military actions of guerrillas but to a purposive state policy to withdraw services from the rural population. For example, from 1973 onwards schools, stores and grinding mills were shut down by the state in selected areas "in order for the police and soldiers to be able to do their work properly".[112] The closure of stores has led to shortages of processed foods such as sugar, salt and oil, and the closure of grinding mills to shortages of staple foodstuffs. Schools that have shut down have done so as much from the result of population resettlement as of guerrilla attack. Protected villages are proclaimed by state officials as attractive growth points where urban social facilities are reproduced in rural localities and much is made of the availability of piped water. Community advisers are assigned to keeps, the only areas in the war zones where they can now work. Yet protected villages rarely duplicate the educational or health services available in the TTLs in the past.[113] Indeed, the state has diverted development funds away from the provision of basic rural services into military expenditures. As far back as financial year 1971 central government budget allocations to the Ministry of Internal Affairs included significantly more for resettlement and roads, including security roads, than for development projects.[114] Allocations for resettlement and protected villages rose six times from

110. *The Herald*, August 25, 1978.
111. *Washington Post*, July 5, 1978.
112. Government of Rhodesia notice to residents of Masoso TTL: reprinted in CCJPR, *Civil War in Rhodesia: A selection of press-cuttings*, London, CIIR, 1976.
113. Weinrich (1977) *op.cit.*, p.222; CCJPR, The Propaganda War, *op.cit.*, p.13-14.
114. S.I.A., 1971, *op.cit.*, p.19; whereas $1.1m was allocated to roads and resettlement only $886,000 was allocated to irrigation, water supplies, etc.

1972 to 1975.[115] Whereas $3.6m of the Internal Affairs vote for 1977-78 was devoted to "protective security" only $1.1m was devoted to African Councils.[116]

What began as the temporary "sealing off" of individual TTLs in 1973 ultimately became a blanket administrative abandonment to the military of whole regions as "no-go" or "free-fire" zones. By mid-1978 these zones encompassed the eastern Zambezi valley, several sections of the Mozambique border, the Belingwe region in the southwest, and the 550-mile border with Botswana. For example, in January 1978, an 18-hour-a-day curfew was imposed on adult residents, and a 24-hour-a-day curfew on juveniles in Maranke and other TTLs on the eastern border.[117] Violators were to be shot on sight on the assumption that any person moving beyond village perimeters was a guerrilla. Moreover, an important development in the civil war occurred by mid-1978. In the wake of abandonment of administrative claims on border regions, the Rhodesian security forces in turn abandoned military claims. Six TTLs, mostly to the north and east of Mtoko, appear now to be guerrilla territory.[118] Fourteen protected villages in the Mtoko-Mrewa areas were destroyed by one of the armies of the liberation movements and peasants have returned to the land. The state has ceased regular patrols and relinquished police posts. The final indication of the state's inability to administer the rural areas of the country is in the declaration of martial law in large parts of Rhodesia from 23rd September 1978. Rhodesia Government Notice No.733A of 1978 states that "the existing provisions of the law in force in Rhodesia have proved inadequate for the prevention of . . . internal disorder and the restoration and maintenance of good order and public safety in those parts of Rhodesia" where martial law has been declared. Under this new legislation, the absolute power of the security forces has been finally institutionalised. Rural administration by the settler state began with military conquest; its demise was sealed in military retreat.

115. From $0.4m to $2.6m. Wilkinson, *op.cit.*, p.285; The Minister of Finance, presenting the 1977 budget warned in understated terms that "monies other than for security purposes, will merely allow existing services to be maintained at current levels and in some instances a decrease in standards is unavoidable": Rhodesia, *Parliamentary Debates*, July 15, 1976.
116. Rhodesia, Estimates of Expenditure, *op.cit.*, pp.76-77.
117. Rhodesia, *Parliamentary Debates*, February 22, 1978.
118. *New York Times*, April 26, 1978, quoting "a source with access to top government commanders".

VII. BEYOND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: PROPOSALS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The reconstruction of the rural areas of Zimbabwe, particularly areas ravaged by war, will pose one of the most pressing challenges of the post-colonial period. Reconstruction means nothing less than the transformation of the peripheral structure and position of the TTLs and the initiation of a development process from which no class of Zimbabwean is excluded. As the centrepiece of a Zimbabwean rural development strategy, imaginative programmes and projects must be designed to end the neglect of peasant agriculture. "Problems of production" are paramount in any rural development strategy. In Zimbabwe, where the present subdivision of land into subeconomic holdings is the main source of low productivity in the TTLs, primary attention will have to be paid to land reform. Of no less importance is the problem of food production which could rapidly reach critical proportions given the dependence of the TTLs on food "imports" and the likely exodus of white farmers under a black government. Only after land reform is achieved and food supplies assured can other problems of production such as livestock management and rural industrialization be tackled. Care will have to be taken by the first Zimbabwean government that the rush of short-term problems does not obscure the need for planning long-term structural transformation. If the ILO target of fulfilling Basic Human Needs by the year 2000 is to be met, then the bulk of employment and income opportunities, and the bulk of social services, will be required in the rural areas.

In order to place proposals for administrative reform in political-economic context, it is useful to first review the various suggestions made to date concerning land reform and agricultural production. These fall basically into two categories. The first category includes models of the future that would leave the current division of land and labour intact, that is with agricultural production concentrated in the hands of employers of wage-labour farming large-scale holdings on white land. Proposals from the United African National Council (UANC), the African National Council Zimbabwe (ANCZ) and the Rhodesian National Farmers Union (RNFU) fall into this category.[119] On the other hand, more radical analyses and prescriptions have emanated

119. For UANC and ANCZ see *Africa Confidential* 18, 14, July 18, 1977; also "RNFU Land Policy Objectives: An Antedote to Chaos", *Rhodesian Farmer*, May 6, 1977.

from scholars at universities in Britain, Tanzania and Mozambique and from the external wings of the liberation movements.[120] This category includes proposals for the resettlement of TTL peasants on unused or abandoned white farmland, the consolidation of TTL and APL holdings, and the establishment on all land of medium and large-scale production units, some mechanized, on principles of communal ownership, production and marketing. Thus the first approach to agricultural production rests on continuity with the past, the second on structural transformation.

Proposals for administrative reform are offered below. A guiding assumption is that agrarian development and community development are inseparable. If implemented piecemeal or without change in political-economic context, administrative reform will have little impact on rural development. If implemented as one aspect of wider systematic transformation, administrative reform may make a modest contribution to the fulfilment of basic human needs.

The transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe offers the first opportunity in almost a century to break with established modes of development administration. The state always had a large interventionist role in Rhodesia. The state in Zimbabwe is likely to grow rather than shrink in size because economic change, substantive or shallow, presupposes consistent and sustained state planning. The key question then becomes whether a powerful state will manifest inherited patterns of administrative organization and performance, and constitute thereby a constraint on development, or whether the state apparatus will itself be transformed and harnessed to the realization of the needs of peasants and workers. Administrative reform must thus address this issue: what is the proper balance between state control and popular participation that will ensure that the development preferences of the rural majority are heard and met?

The following list of proposals implies no order of priority.

(i) Unification of administration.

The plural administrative apparatus introduced under "Native Affairs" and consolidated under the "provincialization" plan should be abolished

120. Riddell, "The Land Question", *op.cit.*, pp.28-38; Weinrich, "Agricultural Reconstruction in Zimbabwe" *op.cit.*; University of Eduardo Mondlane, Centre of African Studies, "Zimbabwe: Notes and Reflections on the Rhodesian Question" (Maputo, mimeo, July 1977).

and replaced with a unitary apparatus. There can be no room in Zimbabwe for the separate administration of black and white affairs. Local government should be integrated with the relevant "European" ministry into single departments. This will necessarily entail the dissolution of the Ministry of Internal Affairs as it is now constituted because many of the diverse functions of this "government within a government" will be reassigned. Careful study should be undertaken concerning the disposition of responsibilities for provincial and direct administration, now under Internal Affairs. Possible options include making district administrators directly responsible to the chief executive of the state. Alternatively, if authoritarian precedents are to be avoided, then the possibility of dispersing administrative responsibility collectively among provincial and district executive teams could be entertained and mechanisms explored for the inclusion on these teams of the representatives of rural residents. Evaluation of Tanzanian and Zambian experience with development teams or committes at provincial and district levels would provide a useful starting point.

(ii) Africanization of administration.

Immediate steps should be taken to promote qualified Zimbabweans into decision-making positions at all levels of the state apparatus but particularly in management and administrative grades. More than half of Rhodesia's 56,000 civil servants are black, but 95% are in the lowest grades, and most appear to be messengers or clerks. An administration-wide programme, perhaps supervised by a specially-appointed Africanization Commission, will be required to ensure compliance from departments and parastatal units traditionally hostile to nonwhite applicants. In any event, the present Public Services Board should in the long run be permanent replaced by a politically-sensitive body of non-bureaucrats applying recruitment criteria both of competitive examination and "affirmative action". Early attention should be paid to Africanization of personnel in district administration as a visible manifestation to peasants of the transfer of state power from settler hands. Auxilliary positions in direct administration are already Africanized, for example the 1,200 agricultural extension assistants, the 200-plus community advisers, and the 67 administrative officers in the co-operatives and young farmers sections of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But as of 1977 only one senior District Officer and no District Commissioner was African, a situation which calls for rapid remedy. Furthermore, despite Africanization at the lowest levels, extension work in agriculture and community development has always been hampered by

personnel shortages as evidenced by persistent vacancies in established posts. One estimate places the extension service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at about half the required size even for present low levels of capital expenditures.[121] Nor is personnel available for tasks of systematic rural development planning within the ministry.[122] Programmes are thus required to rapidly recruit and train new extension workers and to retrain the old.

(iii) Demilitarization of administration

The prototype of merged military and civilian administrative organizations should be abandoned. Police and army functions should be vested in ministries independent of provincial and district administration. The paramilitary powers of the DC and his staff should be removed as should residual powers of arrest, detention or legal judgement. Indeed, consideration might be given to further reducing the authoritarian nature of field administration by splitting the office of District Commissioner in half. In Zambia and Tanzania the political component of the DCs job was assigned to a party appointee (the District Governor or Area Commissioner) and the executive component to a civil servant (the District Secretary). The Zimbabwean government may wish to examine the costs and benefits of a thoroughgoing politicization of administration, in place of present militarization. The appointment of a political head to each province and district and the establishment of joint party-state development teams at lower administrative levels would seem to offer a much needed constraint on hierarchial and bureaucratic decision-making. The acid test of politicization, as in Zimbabwe's neighbours to the north, will be the existence of a party apparatus that offers an effective alternative to hierarchy and bureaucracy by mobilizing and institutionalizing peasant participation. At minimum, however, a division of the DCs concentrated authority offers an opportunity for the reconciliation of political hostilities in the rural

121. The Whitsun Foundation, *op.cit.*, p.19. Of the 336 trainees enrolled in the Public Service Training Centre in the beginning of 1978, only 32 were black.

122. A. Dixon notes the low priority granted to TTLs by departments of central government and the poor quality of basic data and projections available to them. Witnesses to the 1977 Select Committee on Decentralization, including the Secretary of Internal Affairs "had not prepared evidence on the economic development of the TTLs, generally because the magnitude of the task is beyond their resources", quoted in "No Room for Complacency: The Public Service in Rhodesia", *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, 8,3, 1974, p.121.

areas. Paramilitary units like the Guard Force and the corps of African District Security Assistants will clealy have to be disbanded, but other African personnel of the colonial state might well be incorporated, their scarce skills with them, into the new order. Extension agents and clerks, even district messengers if the Zambian precedent has validity, could be exmployed and promoted within the executive wing of district administration. The political wing could accommodate those with proven leadership abilities from the national liberation struggles.

(iv) Redrawing administrative boundaries.

For purposes of rural administration below the district level the settler state used the boundaries of chiefs' areas. One fact that is clear from recent Rhodesian history, however, is that chiefs have lost claim to represent peasants because of their collective decision to join forces with the settlers against Zimbabwean nationalism. Chiefs cannot be rehabilitated. No major administrative role awaits them in Zimbabwe. Their legal powers should be taken over by a secular state ministry concerned with legal affairs. Chiefs' boundaries should no longer be taken as defining the constituency for local government councils in order to clearly reverse the settler strategy of linking traditional authority with local government. Instead, consideration should be given to the merging of several chiefs' areas into one council area and reducing the number of councils, for purposes of administrative economy and convenience, from 260 to 54, one for each District. Below council level, or coordinated with it, the "communes" proposed by Riddell could become not only production units, but administrative units as well.[123] If agrarian development and community development are to be mutually interdependent then the coordination of the boundaries of production and administration is a useful general principle for reform. Study should be made of the existing cooperatives to determine if they are suitable for adaptation or extension into communal organizational form. The lowest administrative unit would still be a residential village, preferably regrouped and with substantial population. Local administration aside, Zimbabwean planners might wish to redraw provincial and district boundaries to take account less of the Land Tenure Act, which would be scrapped, but more of the natural agro-ecological zones of the country. Consistent with a regional approach to

123. *Ibid.*, p.33. The suggestion that the commune organization could be created out of the traditional units of *nyika* (chiefdom) and *dunhu* (tribal ward) might have the unintended effect of reinforcing traditional authority more than the new government might wish.

planning, the new provinces and districts could conceivably be designated as decentralized spending units with development budgets of their own.

(v) Reconstitution of local government councils.

Zimbabwe will be decolonized without an adequate framework of elected local government institutions. Attention must be given to reconstituting the present African Councils into District Councils and the replacement of appointed councillors with councillors elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. It is likely that candidates will be recruited primarily through political party channels; councillorships will provide an important source of patronage reward for activists from the national liberation movements. Provision may possibly be made for the honorary minority representation of chiefs on District Councils if the Zimbabwean government wishes to capitalize on the remnant authority of traditional leaders; a symbolic House of Chiefs may even be retained at national level for the same reasons. Elected District Councils would fulfil many of the same functions that African Councils did before, with three provisos. The first is that devolution of administrative functions be pegged to the capacity of councils to maintain and expand services without undue hardship to rural ratepayers. The second proviso is that state subsidization of rural services through councils be expanded to compensate for the past drain of surplus from rural economies. A close study of the existing pattern of local government financing and the development of a set of alternative options for capitalization would seem to be called for. Lastly, the *ad hoc* structure of community boards should be replaced with a universal framework of elected development bodies at the level of communal production unit. The experience of other African countries is that participatory institutions rarely function at village level except where the population is concentrated and the local economy productive. Hence local institution-building should initially be confined to the level immediately below the Rural Council and coordinated with the establishment of communal production units.

(vi) Reformation of the planning process.

Development planning in Zimbabwe is an issue over which the tension between state control and popular participation will be keenly felt. The planning process involves not only the identification of development goals and the design of programmes and projects, but also implementation and evaluation activities as well. If the purpose of administrative

reform is to integrate all Zimbabweans into the development drive, then planning, in the broad sense, is the process by which such integration must be achieved. Care must be taken to devise a planning process which balances national priorities and considerations of profitability and technical feasibility on the one hand with local priorities and considerations of social equality on the other. Hence a premier requirement is a planning machinery that permits rapid and repeated communication between bottom and top. The Chinese model of decentralized planning may well hold ideas that could be adapted to Zimbabwean circumstances.[124] In any event, the formulation and implementation of the first and subsequent national plan for Zimbabwe should not be the concern of imported "experts" alone as has been the case in many African countries. It should involve the incorporation of development priorities from each commune and District Council into composite district and provincial plans, which in turn would be modified at the centre and returned to the lower levels for approval. Special attention will have to be devoted at each stage in the planning process to ensure that the basic human needs of the most underprivileged rural groups such as women and the landless, are not overlooked. Regional biases too, such as those that distinguish richer APLs from the most underdeveloped TTLs, must be scrutinized by planners at national level.

(vii) Establishment of priorities for rural services.

Much basic infrastructure for rural development has been, and is being, destroyed by the civil war. Restoration and reopening of roads, schools, clinics and dip-tanks will be necessary before new projects are initiated. Certain priorities can and should be set at the centre. For example an early commitment can be made to universal primary education accompanied by review of the peasant primary school curriculum. Expanded educational opportunities, however, will only boost urban migration and unemployment at a later date unless content is designed to prepare students for careers in agricultural production and rural industry. Political education is another proper element in the new curriculum. Pride in rural occupation may have to be nurtured not only in students, but in teachers and administrators too. In addition, commitment to universal functional literacy for adults is not unrealistic if Tanzanian

124. Joan Robinson, *Economic Management in China*, London, Anglo-Chinese People's Friendship Association, 1974; Benedict Stavis, *People's Communes and Rural Development in China*, Ithaca NY, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1977.

guidelines are followed and not insignificant to development if the content emphasizes farming and cottage industry skills. One of the most glaring flaws in the rural service infrastructure concerns basic health care: whereas urban areas of Zimbabwe had one doctor per 1,650 persons, the rural areas have one per 45,500, according to 1976 figures. This discrepancy will have widened in 1978 with the departure (often forced) of mission doctors and hospital staff. The provision of a network of clinics offering a programme of integrated preventive and curative medicine will be a priority upon which peasants and central policymakers are unlikely to disagree. The test of unanimity in planning will come when funds for staff and equipment for clinics have to be provided by the state at significantly higher levels than before. As for road construction and water conservation projects, a programme of public works with hired labour, centrally funded but locally administered, would meet some short-run demand for productive employment in rural areas. In the long-run, however, devolution of financial responsibility for rural services is desirable provided that the economies of TTLs are structurally sound.

(viii) Designation of rural growth points.

Central government policy-makers will have to make a fundamental decision as to the place of rural development in the national development strategy. Zimbabwe has a diversified economy by African standards with highly productive agricultural and industrial enclaves. The temptation to simply expand existing growth points and to continue to neglect the TTLs will be strong. While rural-urban income gaps will undoubtedly remain, an effort must be made to minimize such gaps by encouraging the emergence of growth points in the TTLs. Nuclei for growth points can be found at existent rural service sites where population naturally tends to cluster. In regions where rural services have been destroyed and populations removed, there may be no alternative but to use former "protected" and "consolidated" villages as growth points. These settlements are well located in relation to rural communication axes and, although despised by peasants, may be eventually preferred by some to yet another forced resettlement. The FRELIMO government has successfully transformed former *aldeamentos* in the northern provinces of Niassa, Tete & Cape Delgado into productive communal villages.[125] Whether on the Mozambican model or on the

125. Allen Isaacman, "Transforming the Mozambique Economy" in Wiley and Isaacman, *op.cit.*

models of Tanzanian *ujamaa* villages or Zambian village regrouping, consolidated settlement is the only efficient pattern for deployment of state resources in the delivery of rural services. Rural growth points will presumably also make the rural areas more attractive and help to mitigate for Zimbabwe the mass migration and hyperurbanization that has so distorted Zambia's post-colonial rural development prospects.

(ix) Revival of self-help.

The Rhodesian government promoted slogans of popular participation and economic self-reliance during the community development phase. Just because self-help did not constitute an effective strategy for rural development in the political-economic context of settler colonialism, this does not invalidate self-help *per se* as a potentially effective strategy for rural development in the future. Indeed the reconstruction of rural Zimbabwe will not be possible without the mobilized labour of Zimbabwean peasants. Self-help, in the form of the pooling of labour and small amounts of local capital, remains the single most appropriate organizational model for the construction of basic health, education, communications and water-supply facilities. It can be applied to other basic human needs such as the need for permanent housing. A most promising avenue for research on rural development concerns the extension of self-help techniques from rural services into rural production. The communal thrust of the organization of labour in self-help schemes could provide a bridge to the organization of communal labour in agriculture. Weinrich has pointed to traditional precedents such as the *nhimbe* work parties; Riddell has noted the success of trial agricultural cooperatives organized by Zimbabweans in Mozambique.[126] Agricultural surplus could almost certainly be generated from communal production on redistributed land and would constitute the foundation for productive local reinvestment. Numerous administrative problems would remain: access to market at a fair price (marketing cooperatives? state subsidies?), ensuring constraints on consumption (community savings clubs? credit unions?), productive reinvestment itself (co-operative mechanization stations? fertilizer and improved seed? fenced pastures?), and equitable distribution (work-point system? political education?).

The proposals for administrative reform outlined above are but a first sketch. More research and discussion, especially among Zimbabweans, is crucial. Administrative decentralization and community development have been used in the past as a means of absolving the state of responsibility for assisting the rural poor. Nor does majority rule necessarily bring transformation as illustrated by the neocolonial economic strategy and administrative approach of Kenya, where self-help has grown as a desperate response of the poor to state neglect. Only if decentralized forms of administration are coupled with responsible state assistance in redressing the structural constraints of rural dependence can they be revived for purposes of meeting basic human needs in rural Zimbabwe.

126. Weinrich (1978), *op.cit.*, Riddell *op.cit.*, p.30.

VIII. BEYOND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: THREE SCENARIOS

What ought to be, rarely is. The prescriptions in this booklet are not predictions. The structural transformation on which the proposals for administrative reform are conditional is, in reality, an uncertain prospect. In the concluding section of this booklet, three concrete scenarios – internal settlement, Anglo-American settlement, and liberation through armed struggle – are outlined. The writer cannot pretend to know the outcome of the struggle over state power in Zimbabwe. But, to repeat an earlier point, the manner in which state power is transferred will affect the degree of economic innovation which in turn will affect the prospects for rural development and rural administration. From the vantage point of mid-1978, liberation through armed struggle proffers the best, but not a perfect, prediction of transformational change. Furthermore, there is good reason to question Stoneman's assertion that "even on the most conservative outcome the structure will change considerably".[127] Colonial institutions for the administration of economic development have shown a strong propensity to survive elsewhere in Africa. In at least two of the three proposed scenarios, Zimbabwe may be no exception.

127. Colin Stoneman, "Skilled Labour and Future Needs", No.4 in the series *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, London, CIIR, 1978, p.3.

The *internal settlement* signed in Salisbury on March 3, 1978 makes slim provision for the dissolution of present economic or administrative institutions. The distribution of land and property will be preserved intact by means of constitutional guarantees against uncompensated nationalization.[128] The maintenance of individual tenure on medium- and large-scale land holdings along the lines of the 1977 amendment to the Land Tenure Act will effectively exclude all but the wealthiest blacks from ownership of land in former white areas. Nor will state power be transferred. The executive arm of the state will be preserved intact by means of constitutional guarantees against extensive Africanization of personnel in the public service and police and defence forces, and against "political interference" by leaders of the transitional or new Zimbabwean governments. Africanization and politicization of the office of District Commissioner, for instance, would be out of the question under these circumstances. An "independent" Public Services Board will be appointed but its membership is unlikely to break with the past predominance of retired white public servants. Guarantees of pensions payable abroad to white administrators will cost the Zimbabwean government at least $25m annually at a time when capital for rural development is certain to be short.

The performance of the transitional government indicates clearly the limitations of the internal settlement as an agency of change. Take several examples: the April 1978 dismissal of co-Minister of Justice Byron Hove for his advocacy of rapid Africanization;[129] the June 1978 announcement of the token advancement of 182 blacks into administrative posts in African Education but not in other ministries;[130] the April 1978 appointment of a chief, Kayisa Ndiweni, as co-Minister of Internal Affairs.[131] Indeed, judging by the distribution of ministerial portfolios, the bulk of TTL rural development functions will continue to be the preserve of chiefs under the internal settlement. The traditionalist ZUPO party was awarded not only provincial and district administration but also responsibility for local government, education, health, manpower and social affairs, lands, natural resources and water development. African Councils have been preserved in familiar format with majority representation reserved for chiefs and headmen; attempts will be made to revive "community development". The precedent that the state has gradually withdrawn from responsibility for alleviating rural poverty and has "provincialized" rural administration under traditional leaders is not challenged but perpetuated by the internal settlement.

That the internal settlement was signed at all constituted an admission on the part of settlers that military and administrative control of the rural areas was lost. African nationalist leaders, who professed to enjoy both peasant and guerrilla allegiances, were brought into government for purposes of effecting a cease-fire. Since March 1978, however, the war has not eased but escalated. At least sixty Zimbabweans are dying daily, according to the estimate of officials of the Justice and Peace Commission in September 1978. As territory falls under guerrilla control, so support dwindles among peasants for internal nationalist leaders. The paradigm of rural administration under the internal settlement is found in the Zwimba TTL near Sinoia in the northwest. Zwimba is the home of Chief Chirau, the safety of whose large family has required the erection of a fortified brick compound and the assignment of a guard force of African militia.[132] Yet a Western journalist has reported that peasant opinion in Zwimba TTL runs solidly against the internal settlement.[133] Public meetings organized by the state in order for black and white co-leaders to explain the internal settlement have been poorly attended and unenthusiastically received in rural areas such as Zwimba and Mrewa.[134] Victims of the civil war now include significant numbers of supporters of ZANU (Sithole), and envoys from both UANC and ZANU (Sithole) are reportedly detained in ZANU camps in Mozambique after a failed attempt to get guerrillas to lay down arms. In short, state control of the rural periphery has not been, and will not be, re-established. Under these circumstances, voters cannot be registered, constituencies cannot be delimited and free and fair elections cannot be held before the end of 1978 (as even the members of the transitional government have now admitted). Elections are vital both to the domestic political survival of the internal settlement and to international recognition.

128. Text of Agreement Preparing the Way for Majority Rule, Salisbury, March 3, 1978, sec.A(2). The proposed resettlement of 10 million acres of white land is being initiated more as a means of solving the under-utilisation of white land than of confronting the problem of the TTLs.
129. *New York Times*, May 1, 1978.
130. *The Rhodesia Herald*, June 12, 1978.
131. *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 13, 1978.
132. *New York Times*, July 16, 1978.
133. *Africa News*, May 15, 1978; quoting a report by Nicholas Ashford, *The Times*, London.
134. Michael Kauffman, "Rhodesia Leaders Greeted Coldly at Rural Rally", *New York Times*, May 11, 1978.

In the second scenario, settlement on the terms of the *Anglo-American (A-A) constitutional proposals,* international recognition would be forthcoming and economic sanctions lifted. The settler state would surrender power to a British caretaker administration in a "return to legality".[135] The Patriotic Front would be an indispensable party to such a settlement as the only party capable of bringing an end to guerrilla operations. Assuming the restoration of peace, elections for a National Assembly would be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage and the first Zimbabwean government formed. The A-A proposals do not explicitly raise the issue, but an assumption can be made that the same suffrage qualifications would apply to local government elections at a later date. Elected local councils would presumably be an integral aspect of a "government with the consent and in the interest of all the people".[136] Abolition of blatant racial discrimination would entail the unification of the administration and delivery of presently-segregated social services. This would be guaranteed in the fields of health and education under an A-A settlement, in contrast to the preservation of "civilized standards" under the internal settlement. The Public Services Commission proposed under the A-A plan would secure independence in public service appointments and perhaps even substantial Africanization. But such independence may not be desirable in a politicized administration and Africanization alone does not promote social equality for more than a fortunate few. Although the A-A proposals would alter electoral institutions, it would accept most existent administrative institutions and simply open them to black participation. The emergence would thus be ensured of a black administrative elite, a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie", whose economic interests and style of administering state power would not be greatly different to their settler predecessors.

The A-A proposals embody the same philosophy for the economy as for administration, namely that the structure is sound and that reform is merely a matter of removing racial discrimination. International political recognition of Zimbabwe would dramatically affect prospects for rural development by stimulating a flood of multilateral aid and foreign investment. The A-A proposals make provision for the establishment of a Zimbabwe Development Fund (ZDF) of up to US$1.5 billion. The

135. "Rhodesia – Proposals for a Settlement", text submitted to the British Parliament on September 1, 1977; reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin,* October 3, 1977, pp.424-439.
136. *Ibid.*, p.425.

ZDF would be internationally financed with 40% guaranteed by the United States and 15% by Britain; management would be undertaken by the World Bank. The ZDF would "provide funds for the economic stability and development of an independent Zimbabwe . . . such as rural development, education, health, social and economic infrastructure, and resettlement and training schemes for Africans, including those affected by the present conflict".[137] One USAID planning document also gives the "rural economy" high priority for national development strategies throughout Southern Africa.[138]

The success of the A-A approach to rural development will hinge on three factors. First, commitments to reach the rural poor will only be realized if accompanied by the institutionalization of access for the poor into the entire planning process. World Bank and USAID strategy in the late 1970s still relies overwhelmingly on outside experts or technical assistance personnel for planning purposes. This could cause Zimbabweans to lose control over their own rural development strategy from the outset. Second, international agencies, particularly private investors, harbour preferences for capital-intensive projects with low potential for generating productive employment. In Zimbabwean rural development this preference will be felt primarily as a push to ensure that large-scale commercial food production is adopted as the solution to future food needs. Lastly, the A-A plan is passive on the issue of structural transformation, expressing only the hope that "more balanced patterns of ownership for farms, houses and businesses will emerge".[139] ZDF funds may well be used to promote a nominal land reform programme like those supported by Britain in Kenya and the U.S. in Iran, neither of which altered the structure or orientation of the respective political economies. Emphasis in the Anglo-American proposals lies on political-economic continuity by "minimizing the disruptive effect (of transition) on the potential for economic growth".[140]

137. *Ibid.*, p.427; see also Annex C.
138. USAID, Southern Africa Task Force, "National Requirements, Assessments, and Priorities", Washington, mimeo, 1977. For a critique of the guidelines of capitalist economic structure and Western economic links within which other USAID studies of Zimbabwe have been conducted see James Turner and Sean Gervasi "The American Economic Future in Southern Africa: An Analysis of an AID Study on Zimbabwe and Namibia", *Journal of Southern African Affairs,* 3,1, 1978, pp.85-98.
139. "Rhodesia – Proposals for a Settlement", *op.cit.*, p.438.
140. *Ibid.*

The third scenario, liberation through *armed struggle,* is no less speculative than the previous two. The development strategies for Zimbabwe that have been released by the liberation movements are of a general nature. ZAPU acknowledges "the need to replace the oppressive economic system with a completely different system which will genuinely benefit the masses of the people"[141] and ZANU that a "socialist revolution will be undertaken by a movement with a proletarian ideology".[142] Only the liberation movements express the basic understanding that the elimination of rural poverty is unattainable if the present state power and economic structure persist in recognizable forms. The publication of detailed plans on local political participation and local economic production, for long a matter of serious discussion within the liberation movements, is unlikely to precede the consolidation of Zimbabwean independence through armed struggle. What is known, however, is that leading cadres within both wings of the Patriotic Front have studied and adapted to Zimbabwean circumstances the lessons of other revolutionary movements. The conception of rural administration that will emerge from a sustained guerrilla war is likely to be both decentralized and participatory and incorporate notions of "criticism and self-criticism" of leadership. The dismantling of privately-owned white farms and a reorganization of production and work relations on cooperative or communal lines appear to be high priorities.

The form taken by rural administration under the third scenario will be determined not only by revolutionary ideology but also by revolutionary practice. Future intentions and capacity to implement can be partly inferred from the performance of the liberation movements in "semi-liberated zones"[143] in which the retreat of the settler state has been secured. The opportunity to establish effective counter-administrative organizations and alternative rural services was open to the Patriotic Front by 1978. But information on Patriotic Front strategy, as well as on the numbers of men and women and the amounts of material "on the ground", is difficult to assess from afar. Robert Mugabe has said that in March 1978, 700,000 Zimbabwean peasants

141. G. Silundika, "Establishing a Socialist Base" in *Zimbabwe ZAPU 2,* Richmond B.C., Liberation Support Movement Press, 1974, p.13.
142. Mayor Vurimbo, "Political Education in ZANU: Abridged Commissariat Lectures", *Zimbabwe News,* 10, 1, 1978, p.54.
143. The term "semi-liberated zones" is favoured by the liberation movements presumably to distinguish the stage of development of these areas from fully "liberated zones" which would have a state apparatus and extensive rural service network. Zimbabwe News, *ibid.,* p.9 and 14.

were under the superintendence of the liberation movements and that schools, stores, dip-tanks and grinding mills were being reopened in the semi-liberated zones.[144] Maize seed has been distributed to peasants in guerrilla territory in the northeast. On the other hand, Western journalists and support groups have reported that food, clothing and medical supplies are in short supply in refugee camps outside the country and that medical services for guerrilla casualties within the country are rudimentary. Maxey's observation that in 1974 ZANLA had "major difficulties of administration and supply" is probably still of some relevance.[145] In both liberation movements contact and communication between civilian leadership and military field commanders has sometimes been stretched thin. The ZIPRA army has in recent years achieved better internal control and discipline than ZANLA; yet the latter seems to have granted higher priority to the politicization of the Zimbabwean peasantry than the former.

There is no doubt that counter-administration within Zimbabwe is developed to the point of permitting regular mass meetings for purposes of political education.[146] Some former council and school buildings may even have been given over to this task. Known colloquially as "Genevas", these political meetings are devoted primarily to the discreditation of the internal settlement and, on occasion, have been converted on the spot into people's courts in order to put its supporters on trial. Another indicator of effective politicization activity is the nightly penetration of Rhodesian airwaves by the Mozambican-based Voice of Zimbabwe. At the time of writing there was too little firm evidence on which to estimate the extent of other more extensive, counter-administrative organization. On the one hand the Patriotic Front may opt to replicate the extensive network of self-help health, literacy and agricultural services created in liberated zones by FRELIMO in Mozambique and PAIGC in Guinéa-Bissau. On the other hand, the Patriotic Front may decide to forego the option of creating fully-fledged liberated zones. The terrain of rural Zimbabwe, which leaves guerrillas and

144. *New York Times,* March 22, 1978.
145. K. Maxey, "The Continuing Fight for Zimbabwe", *African Perspectives,* Leiden, 1976, 1, p.94.
146. See for example the accounts of the Dabwa kraal meeting in Ndanga TTL on May 6, 1977 (CCJPR, *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War, op.cit.,* p.19) and of the meeting in Gutu District on May 16, 1978 (*New York Times,* May 17, 1978). Both were disrupted by mass killings of civilians by the security forces.

peasants susceptible to air attack, may render the construction of more permanent administrative institutions inappropriate. In any event, the escalation of the war in 1978 will probably mean that in the short run the liberation movements will grant higher priority to the logistics of immediate combat than to the construction of a civilian administrative apparatus.

IX. CONCLUSION

Although geographically remote and economically peripheral, the rural areas of present-day Rhodesia are central to an assessment of the potential for transformation of the political economy of a future Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean situation is the most recent in a series of Southern African colonial situations where guerrilla movements have wrested state power from white minority regimes.

Moreover, the Patriotic Front has embarked on a path, not only to seek the military defeat of the settlers, but to supplant the settler state with a rural political and administrative apparatus of potentially revolutionary design. The process of establishing self-sustaining liberated zones is still embryonic in Zimbabwe. But one fact is indisputable. The breakdown of state services at the rural periphery and the permanent presence of guerrilla armies within the boundaries of the state introduces a set of historically unprecedented factors into the assessment of alternative futures for the administration of rural development in Zimbabwe. Just as the prospects for national liberation came to hinge on the participation of peasants so, in all likelihood, will the prospects for national reconstruction.

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