
**From
Rhodesia
to
Zimbabwe**

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About the author

DUNCAN CLARKE has produced a wide range of studies on the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean and Southern African economies. He has been a major contributor to the Mambo Socio-Economic studies of contemporary Zimbabwe. Dr. Clarke lectured in economics at the University in Salisbury from 1970-1974. He has worked as a research economist for the Rhodesian Justice and Peace Commission and, until recently, was with the World Employment Programme at the ILO in Geneva. He is currently working on a study of foreign investment in Zimbabwe.

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About the series

FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE consists of a collection of papers which address the social, economic, administrative and legal problems to be faced by an independent government of Zimbabwe. CIIR has launched this series in collaboration with the Justice and Peace Commission in Rhodesia as a contribution to the important debate about the creation of a just society in Zimbabwe—a debate which the Commission has been concerned to promote since its inception in 1971. Each paper will take as its starting point the question: how can the new government of Zimbabwe provide for the basic needs of the poorest sectors of society? The views expressed in individual papers are those of the contributors; they do not necessarily reflect the views either of CIIR or of the Justice and Peace Commission.

Introduction

There can be little doubt that "the unemployment crisis" forms an integral component of the contemporary problems in Zimbabwe. The present crisis has emerged out of prevailing development patterns and can be related to policies pursued over the last four decades.

In large part, this paper focuses on unemployment *per se*. However, this is only part of the economic and social reality affecting the peoples of Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, it is an area in which major policy initiatives will eventually be needed. The stress here is on how the unemployment problem is interdependent with more general questions of poverty and underdevelopment. For this reason, partial solutions will only yield marginal and inconsequential long-term results. Indeed, they may even make long-term changes more difficult. Therefore, substantive economic reforms are required.

In focusing on African unemployment, it is not suggested that "full employment" pertains for all non-Africans. It is merely a recognition of the need to concentrate on the major part of the issue.

Some material has been drawn from an early work (*Unemployment and Economic Structure in Rhodesia*, Mambo Press, 1977). In the author's view, most of the empirical analysis which can be found in that text still remains valid—except that the seriousness of the issue has grown significantly since 1976 when that study was undertaken.

The last two years have wreaked a terrible toll on the poor in Zimbabwe and have raised dramatically the spectre of joblessness. In the main, these appalling conditions can ultimately be attributed to various successive policies of the regime. It is clear, too, that the end of the road has not yet been reached. Even so, with the imminent prospects of politico-economic change, there must be some measure of hope. If for this reason alone, it is now that future policy-makers must begin to apply themselves to the formulation of alternatives.

The Unemployment Crisis

I. THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN ZIMBABWE

Unemployment, especially on a large-scale or when the trend is rising, has major economic and political significance. This is especially so in underdeveloped economies and in Zimbabwe in particular which has a specific settler colonial economic structure.

On the economic side, a variety of results tend to follow a growth in unemployment. Loss of employment or failure to obtain employment usually reduces income and consumption. For workers already living in poverty, or on the very edge, as is typical for most African workers and workseekers, this means foregoing in some measure the bare essentials of life. Workers are then forced to retain a greater dependence on their rural economic base, if they have one, or must attempt to gain access to subsistence in various other ways. In this regard, the widespread dependence on lineage forms of support is crucial. But even those social relationships are today dissolving under the impact of urbanisation, rural impoverishment and tendencies towards exchange relationships established through the (impersonal) market. Without regular income receipts, the unemployed are also under greater pressure to sell their (*albeit* limited) assets or to alienate their future rights to such assets or income-yielding opportunities, or else to fall into indebtedness.

The economic effects do not occur in a vacuum. The political and social implications which accompany the phenomenon of unemployment permeate the whole society. In the case of Zimbabwe, these effects have been primarily evident in the search for alternatives to the prevailing order. Where earlier this foray expressed itself in nationalist and constitutionalist measures, today with the economic base in a significantly worse state those movements for change which have been nurtured have been forced to consider more far-reaching options. Indeed, the sort of insecurity generated by mass unemployment and landlessness in a poor rural-based economic structure must inevitably find some drastic resolution. It is not surprising, therefore, that the current war in the country should in its economic manifestations be in significant part about just how to resolve the existing crisis.

All this is made more pertinent when it is realized that somewhere around 65-70% of all African households in Zimbabwe have either a primary or secondary dependence on wage-labour in order to generate the necessary income required for their subsistence. As the problem in effect touches all, so logically should its solution be designed to have an equally far-reaching impact.

II. OFFICIAL POLICY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Despite the long-term persistence of African unemployment in Zimbabwe in the post-1945 period, successive administrations have persistently denied its scope and importance as well as at times its very existence. Even today, official recognition of the issue is relatively muted whilst in terms of practical policy little is done to alter conditions of unemployment.

The first economic crisis in which unemployment manifested itself significantly, even in the then current administration's view, was in the 1958-59 recession during the Federal period. The State even appointed the Southern Rhodesian Labour Adviser (Mr. G. E. Stent) to examine the question. As late as 1961, under the Chairmanship of A. E. Abrahamson, there existed a Parliamentary Select Committee set up to examine the possibilities of Unemployment Benefits (*albeit* on a restricted basis) for all workers. In retrospect, these actions were part of the tail-end and

ultimate failure of "liberal reformism" built on an ideological base of paternalist welfarism which, when nurtured in the harsh realities of a settler colonial economy, could neither gain acceptance of the dominant groups nor, one might speculate, would it have been successful in alleviating the problem if they had been approved.

The headlong rush towards the entrenchment of Rhodesian Front rule after electoral victory in 1962 saw the hasty brushing aside of all such notions. Other means were to be used to control the rising tide of African demands. These involved the continued preservation of economic structures, not their reform. So it happened that the urban unemployed came to feel the heavier hand of influx control measures. Africans were proclaimed to be "tribesmen", all with "traditional" access to land, the fruits of distributive reciprocity embodied in the kinship system and their place in the newly designated Tribal Trust Lands. "Their problems" (unemployment amongst them) were to be resolved by themselves—through centrally-controlled "Community Development". If anyone was to attempt to deny all this, official ideology had the final answer—in the form of the statement that there was indeed a "shortage of labour" on plantations and (some) mines. In turn, such notions underpinned further unskilled labour import, under onerous contract conditions, from distant peasantries, especially those in Malawi.

However, in practice the matter could not be so easily dismissed. Economists continued to point to the various causes of the emerging problem. In 1964 Pearson predicted that the economy "would face either a growing volume of urban African unemployment or a gradual deepening of poverty in the African peasant farming sector".¹ He was wrong. Both aspects transpired, possibly to an even greater degree than could have been imagined at the time.

Others, like Faber, saw parallels in the similarity of structural conditions to those evident in Latin American economies. The

1. D. S. Pearson. Employment Trends in a Developing Economy: The Case of Southern Rhodesia, *East African Economic Review*, 11, 1 June 1964.

implicit solutions involved in this model were far beyond the political scope of the colonial regime.²

Then, too, deeper tendencies were identified by Arrighi illustrating that the economic pattern was strongly conducive to the reproduction of a cheap and expanding labour surplus.³ In this view, the capitalist sector's development path implied capital-deepening, the export of investible surpluses, the sustenance of luxury consumption, great inequality in wealth and incomes and a growing incapacity on the part of the peasantry to obtain the necessary means of subsistence from the land, much of which had been alienated and that which had not had become heavily overstocked and subject to diminishing returns.

None of these investigative initiatives were obscured by consequent attempts by State officials and advisers to "write down" estimates of the significance of unemployment. The Treasury claimed that unemployment could not be quantified and anyhow could be dealt with through the process of economic growth. At the time (1968), it mentioned the rate of 9 per cent annual G.D.P. growth, a level far above what subsequently has become the 1969-78 trend line. The Treasury also saw the solution in "population control" and rural sector "absorption". The former was at best a long-run option whilst the latter was, as has been proven, wildly unrealistic in the circumstances.

The statistical acrobatics which took place in the early 1970s, in an attempt to "de-scale" estimates of unemployment, were essentially the penultimate phase of a bankrupt ideology and policy. The weaknesses of such arguments, examined elsewhere, rested on their dismissal of a problem which even to casual observers was growing in importance. The limit of absurdity was reached in the then Minister of Labour's unequivocal claim in 1974 that "There is no unemployment in Rhodesia".⁴ Now even this position has had to be revised, at least privately, such that

2. MLO Faber, *Economic Structuralism and Its Relevance To Southern Rhodesia's Future*, Manchester University Press, 1965.

3. G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective, *Journal of Development Studies*, 6, 3, 1970.

4. *The Rhodesia Herald*, 11 January, 1974.

by 1978, during the "internal settlement" talks the Minister of Finance Mr. David Smith was reported to have made a statement which no such Minister has even been heard utter in public: "Economically we are in bad shape. There is high unemployment in the country. This affects more blacks than whites. This worries me. Unless we can come up with something that stops the war and gives confidence to big business, we are in trouble."⁵

At the same time, economic policy and trends have not yet been directed to the resolution of the crisis. Indeed, they continue to move in a contrary direction. Hence, development of the peasant economy, little as there was, has been arrested and large parts of the population have been "villagised" on an immense and damaging scale. Investible surpluses have been drained off to prosecute an increasingly costly war. Political change—the prerequisite for cessation of the war and the lifting of sanctions—has been strongly resisted. Indirect taxes, e.g. sales taxes, which have a relatively more severe effect upon low-income households, have been raised. These are circumstances within which it would seem impossible to resolve the unemployment crisis. For a measure, then, of what is needed, it is necessary to examine existing trends, the dimension of the problem, some determinants of future structural problems and the sorts of policies which might be useful in making a beginning in what will be a long-term policy of reconstruction and struggle against poverty and unemployment.

III. RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS AFFECTING AFRICAN UNEMPLOYMENT

African unemployment in Zimbabwe responds to a variety of factors both in an aggregate and sectoral level. Some of these are briefly noted below.

Firstly, consider the overall macroeconomic trend as shown by the rate of change in Gross Domestic Product over the period 1971-76 (Table 1).

5. Minutes of the "10th Meeting of the Constitutional Settlement Talks", January 1978.

Table 1: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND RELATED INDICES 1971-76

Year	(dollars: millions)			Population Millions	Index
	GDP Current Prices	GDP 1965 Prices	GDP Per Capita 1965 Prices (\$)		
1971	1235	1091	198	5,500	122.5
1972	1400	1190	209	5,690	126.7
1973	1542	1236	209	5,900	131.4
1974	1843	1345	220	6,100	135.9
1975	1993	1328	210	6,310	140.5
1976	2108	1283	196	6,530	145.4

Source:

C.S.O., *National Accounts of Rhodesia 1976*, Government Printer, Salisbury 1977.

The table illustrates the economic decline of the period after the intensification of the war since 1972. Growth rates slipped downwards although they remained positive until 1975 when GDP first fell in real terms. This decline has continued since—becoming more serious in each subsequent year. The real GDP fall in 1976 measured 3.2 per cent and is reported (by the Standard Bank) to have been around a further 7 per cent in real terms over 1977. It is most unlikely that 1978 will be any different. Indeed, for several reasons it could even be worse.

The effect is that, as of 1978, real standards of living are on average lower than in 1971. Indeed, taking distribution shifts into account, such levels as persist today for the bulk of worker-peasant households are likely to be even lower than in the late 1960s. It could thus take some years, following the cessation of the war and the removal of sanctions, for historical levels to be reached again, and this in conditions of significant rates of population growth, problems of reconstruction and refugee re-absorption.

Falling Employment Levels

It is not unexpected in these circumstances that falling GDP has been translated quickly into sizeable reductions in the volume of (African) employment. This is shown clearly for 1975-77 in Table 2.

Table 2: ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT TRENDS 1975-77 (thousands)

Year	Agriculture		Mining		Manufacturing		Domes. Serv.		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1975 ¹	357.8	-0.5	59.8	+3.8	132.4	+1.0	126.3	+1.5	934.0	+1.2
1976	350.2	-2.1	61.2	+2.3	131.0	-1.1	126.1	-0.2	920.0	-1.5
1977 ²	357.7	+2.4	60.9	-0.5	125.2	-4.4	123.5	-2.1	921.0	+0.1

Source:

C.S.O., *Supplement to The Monthly Digest of Statistics, October 1977*, Salisbury.

Notes:

- ¹ The percentage figures for 1975 are in respect of changes over 1974.
- ² Provisional figures.

Aggregate African employment levels have fallen in all main sectors. It has also fallen overall to a level below that for 1974. The latest figures (in Table 2) are also now nine months dated. In this period lay-offs have increased such that present levels could even be below the 900,000 mark.

It should also be mentioned that the above figures are inclusive of "all workers" irrespective if they are involved in "short-time working", a practice increasingly adopted in industry as a measure to cushion the effect of widespread redundancies. Nor does the data fully sum up the changing conditions of labour for those in employment. For many, inflation and the "wage-freeze" have reduced real earnings and increased relative poverty (see later section).

Investment and Short-term Employment Levels

With negative trends in output, it is difficult to expand investment levels and rates, especially if an increasing amount of potential surplus is devoted to investment allocations of a non-productive nature, e.g. war expenditure and administrative outlays which do not add to productive capacity or the generation of output. Recent trends in investment are broadly indicated in Table 3.

TABLE 3: INVESTMENT TRENDS (1974-76) (millions of dollars)

Year	Gross Fixed Capital Formation (market prices)	Gross Fixed Capital Formation as % of GDP	African Rural Household Production (excluding sales) (market prices)
1974	415.0	23.7	89.0
1975	460.6	24.9	71.2
1976	374.0	18.5	86.0

Source: C.S.O., *National Accounts of Rhodesia 1976*, Salisbury.

It is self-evident that even before the large decline in GDP in 1977-78, Gross Fixed Capital Formation levels were falling seriously—by 18.6 per cent in 1976. Measured in real terms, against an inflation rate of around 11 per cent, the fall is even more serious. It is likely that this serious decline continued in 1977-78.

The fall-off in investment levels was most sharp in Manufacturing and Services. The overall deteriorating position also appears now to be of a structural character since in 1976 the share of investment/GDP also fell sharply.

The data also probably disguise a large and growing element of "unproductive investments". This is reflected in the growing size of funds recorded as investment but which were designated as "General Purpose Investment by Government"—up from \$23.6 million in 1973 to \$28.2 million in 1976. Much of this could have been for military purposes.

The fall in real investment levels will undoubtedly occasion further reductions in African employment in the short-term, assuming little prospects of significant alterations on external capital account. And in future, some of the funds which might have been available for investment in productive capacity will probably have to go towards reconstruction. Hence, the short to early medium-term implications on the investment/employment side are in a decidedly negative direction or one that, with considerable good fortune, could at best only be thought by optimists to be mildly positive.

All this is made more critical by the serious deterioration on the peasant economic base over the last few years. Even in

current price terms, the African rural household output level (excluding sales) has fallen. Today it could well be much lower than in 1976. Yet the population located in this sector has grown apace. To this must be added the fact that marketed sales from African rural households have *fallen* over 1974-76—from \$23.3 million to \$20.8 million (current prices).⁶ On a *per capita* basis measured in real terms, this represents a massive impoverishment of the peasantry which has in no measure been offset by any compensatory adjustments (indeed, with increasing Sales Taxes, the opposite effect could be said to have occurred). Without expanding employment options, and forced to subsist in more onerous rural conditions, the bulk of the population have come to face an exacting short-term future.

The Reallocation of State Monies to War Expenditure

In the last four years, the burdens placed on the African majority by the growth of unemployment and higher taxes (continued with a "wage freeze" for many employees) have been accentuated by the re-direction of State outlays towards war efforts. As a result, allocations directed towards African households have fallen. This is strikingly illustrated in Table 4.

Table 4: STATE (CENTRAL GOVERNMENT) ALLOCATIONS 1973/74-1977/78 (millions of dollars)

Vote	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78
Treasury	10.3	8.4	9.0	17.0	48.2
Combined Operations	—	—	—	0.1	0.2
Defence	38.8	45.1	60.8	98.4	141.8
Internal Affairs	16.3	25.2	27.9	41.1	39.9
Prisons	3.4	4.3	4.9	5.9	6.6
Law and Order	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.2
BSAP	24.6	29.9	35.3	48.7	55.6
TOTAL	94.1	113.8	139.0	212.3	293.5
As % of all outlays	30.9	31.3	34.8	40.7	45.3

Source: C.S.O., *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Salisbury, January, 1978.

6. C.S.O. *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, January, 1978.

The Table shows those votes which are most strongly connected with war outlays. The absolute and relative rise in outlays is great. However there are also concealed expenditures in other votes, e.g. in "Roads" (for military roads, etc). With the continuation of the war, it is unlikely that this trend will significantly reverse, if at all. The burden of finance is reflected in African impoverishment, rural stagnation, cuts in subsidies and higher taxes. It is also in part financed by cutbacks in expansion in productive sectors, i.e. higher African unemployment.

IV. THE NATURE AND DIMENSION OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Because of the nature of available data, it is necessary to consider the situation as it was in 1969, the last Census date.⁷ At that time, people were asked if they had been "actively seeking work in the 7 days *immediately* prior to the date of enumeration." The results, broadly classified, are shown in Table 5.

Table 5: CENSUS-DEFINED UNEMPLOYED "ACTIVE AFRICAN WORK-SEEKERS" 1969

Age (years)	Males	Females	Total
Under 15	970	370	1,340
15+	24,610	3,960	28,570
Not stated	290	30	420
Total	25,870	4,460	30,330

Source:

Rhodesia, *Census of Population 1969*, C.S.O., Salisbury 1976, p.26.

Note:

'Active workseeker' is defined as someone who searched for work in the week prior to the Census.

On the basis of the results, there were 30,330 unemployed Africans in 1969. But this assumes *all* workseekers would have "actively" sought work at *that* time and *also* would have declared this fact. For various reasons, it is difficult to accept this methodology as giving a good reflection of the dimension of unemployment.

7. Much of this is drawn from D. G. Clarke, *Unemployment and Economic Structure in Rhodesia*, Mambo Socio-Economic Series, No. 9, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1977.

The point is well emphasised in reference to Table 6 which shows "active workseekers" (so defined by the Census) alongside the "residual" category "All other Persons" (viz. neither employees or self-employed outside agriculture nor workseekers).

The data suggest that active adult male workseekers only constituted 4.12 per cent of the African adult male population not then in employment or self-employment *outside* agriculture. The figure given for women is 0.35 per cent. These "facts" do not square with the extremely advanced degree of proletarianisation which is known to have taken place, some 70-75 per cent of African households now deriving their main source of "subsistence income" from employment through a "primary dependence" thereon. Further, this does not account for "secondary dependence" effects articulated through kinship links and other obligations. It is also out of line with what is historically known about the socioeconomic state and historical function of the Reserves.

In this light it might be expected that the *defined* level of active workseekers is unduly low. And, relatively small changes in the percentage level of workseekers to economically inactive persons could substantially affect recorded levels of unemployment. Under Census conditions, with the application of the one week inclusion/exclusion criterion removed, this sort of change could easily be very large, particularly so because many men and women of 15-60 years classified as inactive are in fact *located* in the Reserves where they obtain subsistence. An availability of jobs, paying wages above the meagre level of subsistence which the latter are able to obtain, would probably have a profound effect on labour supplies to the market. The unemployment question thus *cannot* be divorced from either rural underdevelopment or the low-wage issue, as Ministers, officials and some statisticians have attempted to do. Solutions for dealing with it must thus move on a wide development front.

Quantitative Changes, 1969-75

In Table 7 data are shown on estimated changes in adult African male labour supplies. They should be considered in the light of "Notes to the Table".

Table 6: CENSUS-DEFINED UNEMPLOYED "ACTIVE WORK-SEEKERS" IN RELATION TO AFRICANS CLASSIFIED "ECONOMICALLY IN-ACTIVE" 1969

Age (years)	Males		Females		Total	
	E.I.	A.W./E.I. %	E.I.	A.W./E.I. %	E.I.	A.W./E.I. %
Under 15	1,115,300	0.08	1,139,550	0.03	2,254,850	0.06
15+	597,650	4.12	1,116,520	0.35	1,714,170	1.66
Unstated	7,070	4.10	13,190	0.98	20,260	2.07
Total	1,720,020	1.50	2,269,260	0.19	3,989,280	0.76

Sources: Rhodesia, *Census of Population 1969*, Salisbury, C.S.O., 1976, P. 26.

Note: E.I. — Economically Inactive; A.W. — Active Workseekers.

Table 7: ADULT AFRICAN MALES, AGE 16-60 YEARS 1969-75

Year	New Entrants		Annual Mortality		Emigration of		Retirals		Net		Stock	
	Age 16 years	Age 60 years	at 0.8% (1)	at 0.8% (1)	Foreigners	Aged 60 yrs.	Age 60 yrs.	Age 60 yrs.	Additions	16-60 years	16-60 years	16-60 years
1969	51,110	—	9,452	—	2,140	—	7,150	—	+ 32,368	1,162,733	1,162,733	1,162,733
1970	62,560	—	9,802	—	9,260	—	15,790	—	+ 27,798	1,190,581	1,190,581	1,190,581
1971	52,890	—	9,947	—	9,750	—	5,690	—	+ 27,503	1,218,034	1,218,034	1,218,034
1972	56,360	—	10,195	—	10,195	—	10,130	—	+ 28,385	1,246,419	1,246,419	1,246,419
1973	62,910	—	10,475	—	NIL (2)	—	4,930	—	+ 47,505	1,293,974	1,293,974	1,293,974
1974	72,710	—	10,933	—	530	—	13,930	—	+ 48,377	1,342,301	1,342,301	1,342,301
1975	72,280	—	11,317	—	6,830	—	6,830	—	+ 46,653	1,388,954 (3)	1,388,954 (3)	1,388,954 (3)
Totals	430,820	—	72,121	—	35,100	—	65,100	—	+ 258,555			

Source:

Estimates based on Rhodesia, *Census of Population 1969*, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1976.

Notes:

1. Mortality estimates are based on the annual estimates of 0.8 per cent used by C.A.L. Myburgh (*R.J.E.* 5.2 June, 1971). However the deduction is made on an annual basis after adding in new entrants thereto to the previous years stock. The numbers thus rise over time.
2. The 1973 the *M.D.O.S.* records a net inflow of foreign African men of 3,950. As was reported at the time (*Rhodesian Financial Gazette*, 8 February, 1974), this figure, against the trend, represented new registrations and re-registrations of persons already inside the country.
3. This figure should strictly be downwardly adjusted for 8,622 Wemela contractees and about 2,000 African males believed to have left the country 'illegally' in 1975 for political reasons. The adjusted figure would be 1,378,332.

With appropriate qualifications, it is shown from Table 7, that adult male new entrants numbered 430,820 which, after allowing for emigration of foreigners (35,100), retirals at age 60 years (65,100) and mortality (72,122), left a *net* addition to potential adult male labour supplies of 258,589 persons in the 1969-75 period.

Using the same approach for adult females (16-60 years), it is found that new entrants numbered 437,740 which, after allowing for mortality (78,332) and retirals at age 60 years (46,110), left a net addition to *potential* adult female labour supplies of 319,310. On this basis, the stock of persons so classified rose to 1,424,555 by 1975.

Supply/Employment Growth Relationships, 1969-75

The magnitudes of supply trends shown in Table 7 may be compared to the record of employment growth over the same period.

During the period 1969-75, total African employment in *enumerated* jobs grew from 735,000 to 945,000. Not all the workers in formal employment in 1969 were adult men. Some were women and others juveniles (below 16 years of age).

The 1969 Census of Employees showed that 9.06 per cent were women workers and 6.29 per cent were juveniles. Applying these ratios to the (revised) 1969 employment level, it is estimated that 66,517 women, 46,231 juveniles and 622,252 men constituted the African labour force at this time.

There are no data on the exact age structure of African workers in 1975, but data do exist on the sex structure thereof. The C.S.O. has estimated that in March, 1975 there were 127,158 women workers (13.69 per cent) out of a total of 928,640 workers. The balance were juveniles and adult men.

Whilst it would be reasonable to expect that the use of juvenile labour has increased proportionately, as it has done markedly for women, a secure assumption would be that *at least* the proportion has not fallen. Thus applying the juvenile/adult male ratio of 1969 to the averaged 1975 total African employment figure of 945,000, it is found that juveniles numbered 60,193, women numbered 129,370 and adult men number 755,437.

It is now possible to calculate the growth in the number of adult men in jobs at 133,185 for 1969-75. This represented an overall growth in adult African male employment of 21.4 per cent (or 22,197 jobs per annum).

Compared against the growth in net adult male labour supply, then, it is found that a shortfall of 125,404 developed between the latter and formal employment growth. This number represented the *potential* adult male labour supply which did not get employment *during* the period. To it should be added at least the stock of "unemployed" (as per Census) of 24,900.

Not all of this large number of adult men, most of whom would have been principal income-earners in households, would have been strictly "unemployed". The figure should be reduced by the numbers of persons who *in the period* found jobs or self-employment in the petty production sector outside the agrarian system. The total numbers *recorded* as being so employed in 1969 were 15,980. There are no growth rates for this sector but if it grew at a *rate* of 50 per cent greater than formal employment, the overall employment increment would have been 4,794 jobs (not all of which would necessarily have been taken up by adult men).

There is also the *growth* in employment in African Purchase Areas to be taken into account as well as that of workers employed by Africans in urban areas and the Tribal Trust Lands.

Finally, the growth in the size of the African employer class should be deducted.

Once all qualifications are made, there is only one reasonable conclusion—unemployment, which was significant in 1969 (and before), must have grown over 1969-75. What then of future supply trends?

Quantitative Changes, 1976-1985

The starting point used is the conclusions derived from analysis of the 1969-75 period. The objective is to ascertain broad changes in labour supply (16-60 years) and to estimate the required rates of expansion in jobs needed to accommodate in employment the various elements of future African labour supplies.

Table 8: ADULT AFRICAN MEN 16-60 YEARS 1976-85

Year	New Entrants ages 16 yrs.	Annual Mortality (1) at 0.8%	Retirals aged 60 yrs.	Net Additions (Excluding Emigration)	Stock 16-60 yrs. (Excluding Emigration)
1976	92,010	11,847	8,410	+ 80,163	1,469,117
1977	71,440	12,324	8,990	+ 59,116	1,548,233
1978	85,890	13,072	27,270	+ 45,548	1,593,781
1979	80,700	13,395	17,840	+ 49,465	1,643,246
1980	91,980	13,881	31,650	+ 46,449	1,689,695
1981	83,220	14,183	19,820	+ 49,217	1,738,912
1982	82,830	14,514	18,840	+ 49,416	1,788,328
1983	90,390	15,032	9,950	+ 65,408	1,853,736
1984	104,020	15,662	17,480	+ 70,878	1,924,614
1985	103,380	16,223	16,380	+ 70,777	1,995,391
Totals	+ 886,260	- 140,193	- 176,630	+ 567,437	—

Sources:

Calculated from Rhodesia Census of Population 1969, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1976.

Notes:

1. Mortality calculated as in Table 7.
2. Data for 1985 are based on births recorded in 1969, which are not complete in the Census. The 1969 data were adjusted on an annual basis.

In Table 8 data are shown on labour supply trends for adult men, omitting the foreign emigration effect.

The Table shows that new entrants in the 10 year period will number around 886,260, the annual inflow becoming greater from 1992 onwards. Mortality (140,193) and retirals (176,630) reduce the net inflow, *excluding* allowance for any foreign emigration, to 569, 437 adult men roughly 57,000 annually.

A major depressing influence in the calculation is the rising level of retirals, the average for 1984-85 being approximately 90-95 per cent above the 1975-76 level. This compares to an anticipated 35.8 per cent rise in the total labour supply. Undoubtedly, then, a social security crisis is looming ahead at a time when no legal Unemployment Insurance exists and there is no statutory Old Age Pension provision for Africans. Thus, it might be expected, in the absence of legislative and other changes, that more persons aged 60 years plus will seek to find remunerative employment, or will hold on longer to their jobs. Failing this, they will try to obtain means of subsistence elsewhere.

It may also be pointed out that the "historical" mortality figure (0.8 per cent) applied could be expected to fall if health expenditures increased. The present (1960) crude death rate of 16 per 1,000 for Africans could thus well fall further in the future, although this does not mean that it will.

Taking all factors into account, then, the conclusion reached is that supply growth will be significant, especially in relation to historical employment growth.⁸ This evidence suggests the emergence of an accentuating unemployment problem.

V. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF UNEMPLOYMENT TO DATE

The level, sectoral distribution and pattern of African unemployment has had a number of discernible consequences.

8. This conclusion would remain true even after deductions on the supply side made in respect of the temporary "withdrawal" of refugees from the labour market and the effect of war deaths amongst the population.

Firstly, there is a case for arguing that African poverty has deepened. In the wage-labour sector, the cash wage distribution of monthly income has always been such that many fall below conventionally defined Poverty Datum Lines (see Table 9).

Table 9: ZIMBABWE: AFRICAN CASH WAGE STRUCTURE FOR SELECTED SECTORS NUMBERS BY MONTHLY CASH WAGE (JUNE, 1976)

Sector	\$10	\$10-\$20	\$20-\$30	\$30-\$40	\$40-\$50
Agriculture ¹	94,644	121,651	20,374	10,378	3,076
Mining	1,183	10,038	15,268	12,594	7,898
Manufacturing	591	3,763	7,363	23,949	30,450
Private Domestic Services ²	12,361	67,244	39,024	6,866	1,141
Total Excl. Agriculture	15,979	92,883	81,582	81,148	86,878
Total Incl. Agriculture	110,623	214,534	101,596	91,526	89,954

Source:

C.S.O., Revised Wage Distribution: African Employees, June 1976. (DL/1066/100), Salisbury, March 1977 (mimeo).

Notes:

¹ Agriculture excludes 88,711 casual/seasonal workers and 24,100 contract workers, most of whom would fall into cash wage categories below \$Rh 20 monthly.

² Includes domestic service workers on farms.

The African cash wage distribution for 1976—the latest available—should be compared against the assessed PDL levels for different household sizes which (for Salisbury, September 1976) showed the minimum necessary income as \$45.73 for a household of two persons, \$63.16 for one with 4 members, \$91.79 in the case of 6 persons and \$115.99 for 8 household members.⁹ If the 1976 PDL was updated on an inflation-adjusted basis *alone* (as per the All Items Index), the resultant figures (for December 1977) for these household sizes would be: \$50.30, \$69.47, \$100.92, and \$127.58. Wages have not moved up to anything near these levels over the period 1976-1977. Indeed, with the "wage freeze" applicable to wages above \$70 and a tendency on the behalf of

9. D. G. Clarke, *Inflation and Subsistence Wages in Rhodesia*, Discussion Paper No. 2, Development Studies Research Group, Pietermaritzburg, 1976.

employers to hold back wage rises (on the grounds, according to them, that such measures would be employment-generating), there is every likelihood that for the bulk of those persons with employment wages have fallen further behind respective household PDL's. The conclusion is inescapable that the payment of poverty wages is the norm.

A second consequence has been an undoubted impoverishment of rural-based households which are significantly dependent on wage-labour for subsistence. Now, with fewer options in the labour market, or at best uncertain earnings from various forms of petty production, such households must seek to survive more from the land than before. Under current conditions of "villagisation" and rural insecurity, as the data show (see Table 3), this must have implied greater poverty. In this manner, management of the economic crisis in the modern sector—through cuts in the employed labour force—translates into worker and peasant poverty.

Table 10: ZIMBABWE: FOREIGN WORKERS IN AGRICULTURE 1941-75

Year	Numbers	% of Total Employment
1941	56,083	—
1946	84,089	56
1951	114,878	62
1956	137,030	60
1961	135,330	50
1969	130,235	43
1970	114,693	39
1971	119,275	39
1972	120,964	36
1973	118,000	34
1974	119,000	33
1975	116,700	34

Source:

C.S.O., African Farm Employees Classified by Sex and Country of Origin, 1974 (mimeo).

Thirdly, a greater portion and number of local workers have been required to take up employment in the low-wage plantation sector. This trend has been evident over a number of years (see Table 10) especially as the numbers of "foreign" farmworkers in absolute terms has dropped since the onset of structural un-

employment in the 1950s. At the same time, because of war conditions, the sealing of international borders and extreme poverty on the farms, foreign workers have increasingly become a "captive labour supply".¹⁰ Whereas before, they migrated regularly between workplace and their original peasant base, now this movement has become steadily circumscribed. Few now travel to Malawi or Mocambique. The result of colonial policy has thus been to install such a labour force on a semi-permanent basis in the low-wage primary sectors (See Table 11).

Table 11: ZIMBABWE: RELATIONSHIP OF FOREIGN AFRICAN WORKERS AND FREE FLOW LABOUR MOVEMENTS 1956-76

Year	Foreign Workers ¹	Foreign Adult Men/Foreign Workers (Percentage)		
		In-migrants/Workers	Out-migrants/Workers	In-migrants + Out-migrants Workers
1956	309,755	36.8	37.7	74.6
1961	278,373	24.7	26.9	51.6
1969	229,154	6.9	7.8	14.7
1976	198,022	3.2	1.7	4.9

Source:

Calculated from Rhodesia, *Population Census 1969*, Salisbury.

Note:

¹ Includes women (e.g., 18,295 in 1975).

Unemployment amongst local African workers can hence no longer be so easily accommodated by foreign labour "displacement", much as the State would like to exercise this option. Traditionally, this mechanism has provided for an illusory element of support against the rising tide of unemployment. No longer is this so.

Fourthly however, unemployment has given rise to other pressures of an equivalent "displacement" character. On the one hand, the flight of refugees (probably today numbering 80-100,000) has been growing, although such movements of PEOPLE are not identical to labour movements and they have not simply been

10. G. G. Clarke, *International Labour Supply Trends and Economic Structure In Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the 1970s*, World Employment Programme ILO, Geneva, 1978.

caused by unemployed. They nonetheless have effects upon labour supply. And, on the other hand, the State has more actively sought a solution through the contracting of labour exports to the goldmines in South Africa through Wenela (now The Employment Bureau of Africa—TEBA) since 1975.

The trends in Wenela recruitment are shown in Table 12.

Table 12: ZIMBABWE: MONTHLY WENELA RECRUITMENT OF AFRICAN WORKERS (JANUARY 1975-AUGUST 1977)

Month	1975	1976	1977
January	262	3,115	5,936
February	580	3,719	958
March	679	2,641	958
April	567	2,082	720
May	845	1,072	500
June	621	1,381	500
July	473	2,082	500
August	657	2,630	500
September	767	3,158	n/a
October	1,190	3,359	n/a
November	1,263	3,733	n/a
December	709	3,481	n/a
TOTAL	8,622	32,453 (Jan/Aug)	10,572

Source:

D. G. Clarke, *Contract Labour From Rhodesia to the South African Gold Mines*, Saldru Working Paper No. 6, UCT, 1976; various published reports, notably: *Financial Mail*, 11 June 1976; 24 September 1976; 13 May 1976; *Business Herald*, 20 May 1976; 14 October 1976; 24 February 1976; 4 August 1976; *Rhodesia Herald*, 21 April 1976; Agricultural Labour Bureau, *Annual Report for the Period Ended 31 December 1976*, Salisbury.

Notes:

1. All the figures for 1976 may be regarded as reliable as they were based on firm WNLA sources.
2. The 1977 figures are not as reliable as 1976. January's are reliable as are also those for April. The February/March data have been interpolated from a reliable estimate of the first 4 months' recruitment. May/August data are based on WNLA's own estimates (both prior to the use of restrictive quotas in May and thereafter in August). They probably imply a moderate range of error.

The build-up in exports of labour, especially in 1976, certainly provided relief against growing unemployment. Contractees initially were largely urban unemployed youths aged between 18 and 27 years. Now, however, South African demand patterns have altered and there exists a more rigorous quota system applicable under which the numbers employed in South Africa will not rise

much above 20-25,000. In other words, *increased* unemployment levels are unlikely to be reduced by *further* increases in contract labour exports. Indeed, the quota applied could itself be reduced in future.

VI. INDICATIVE FUTURE TRENDS UNDER CURRENT CONSTRAINTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

If the labour supply volume growth trends appear formidable, what are the economic prospects on the demand side? In other words, how might it be said that the economy is moving and with what implication for "imbalances" in supply and demand, especially with reference to the problems, now evident, of a *structural* labour surplus?

In this quarter, prediction is difficult if not impossible. However, some qualitative impressions might be advanced with due caution. At the outset, however, it is necessary to consider the broad scenario in which supply/demand trends might be determined. In this regard, the explicit framework used is the present one of an historically-constructed settler colonial economy undergoing a process of "de-racialisation" which implies a largely unaltered set of private economic interests and an expansive State sector.

In the short-run, of (say) 1-3 years, it is probable that real GDP will remain below even current levels. Overall demands will thus be stagnant at best, this being especially true as long as international sanctions remain and if the resource-absorbing war continues. Even if full capacity is restored in this period, the net employment effect may still be small since in some significant measure attempts to maintain employment volumes have operated in the past (e.g. through "short-time" working policies). New investment will be similarly restrained and even when historical rates are eventually restored there is likely to be some "long effect" before employment upturns significantly. It is improbable that a full employment policy will be witnessed. Neither is the current regime so committed, nor is it able to make such adjustments as would be necessary to effect such a programme. Foreign capital inflows are also likely to be equivocal in this phase and, indeed, one might even foresee the build-up of capital flight from local and international firms—this apart from the anticipated

movement of private assets with funds-on-own-account. In addition, whilst the capitalist sector is likely to face short-run demand constraints, the absorptive capacity of the "subsistence sector" is also likely to follow similar derivative trends, especially as "normal" conditions increasingly do not exist in the countryside. This, it would seem, is probably the Achilles Heel of the current order. For, no matter what "extra-economic" measures are employed, there is unlikely to be a rural transformation or even meaningful and effective rural development policy. Without the latter, a condition of structural labour surplus is almost inevitable.

Over the longer-term, with normalisation in an independent and internationally recognised Zimbabwe, overall labour demand should pick up. However, it would be wise to caution against simplistic optimism and the view that "development" must then necessarily follow in some linear upward trend. The crux of future success or failure will rest precisely on the capacity to make internal changes consistent with full employment requirements (on aspects of the latter see the next section).

These perspectives would seem to be at least supported if not predicted by the existing and prospective supply trends in the short and longer-term.

Population growth itself, now at a rate of 3.6 per cent annually, will not significantly abate in the short-term or even in a medium-term period of 7-10 years. Hence, the annual inflow of work-seekers onto the labour market can be expected to grow—this at a time when net employment may continue to fall. Indeed, ILO projections on population show a population size of 14.9 millions in the year 2000 (see table 13).

What is also critical is that the 20-44 year old age groups will grow *more* quickly than the average. Even applying, as the ILO labour force projections do, relatively low participation rates to women and heavily and steadily discounting the search for jobs amongst those under 20 years of age, by projecting *falling* participation rates over time, the labour force would seem destined to more than double in the coming 22 years, at a rate which would on average require the creation of around 95,000 new jobs annually. In fact, what will happen is that the present pressures for around 60,000 new jobs annually, will grow steadily to a need for

Table 13: ILO PROJECTIONS ON ZIMBABWE'S LABOUR FORCE 1975-2000

	TOTAL			MALES			FEMALES		
	1975	1980	1985	1975	1980	1985	1975	1980	1985
TOTAL	6272	7460	8895	10616	14954	3115	3707	4423	5282
0-9	2162	2619	3126	3701	4986	1083	1315	1571	1862
10-14	782	922	1137	1377	1953	389	459	570	690
15-19	654	769	908	1123	1627	326	382	452	562
20-24	544	640	754	893	1343	271	318	374	443
25-44	1377	1622	1915	2266	3240	684	803	947	1118
45-54	366	432	510	605	859	180	212	251	297
55-64	227	267	317	377	539	109	129	153	182
65+	160	190	228	275	407	74	88	105	127
ACTIVITY RATES (PERCENTAGES)									
TOTAL	34.10	32.82	31.75	30.87	30.43	48.37	46.66	45.16	43.95
0-9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
10-14	14.58	11.97	9.84	7.68	4.60	20.24	16.65	13.69	10.73
15-19	42.44	39.59	36.84	34.13	29.34	59.24	55.57	51.71	47.84
20-24	63.60	62.67	61.96	61.32	60.91	92.38	91.26	90.08	88.89
25-44	68.01	67.59	67.27	66.95	67.02	97.64	97.47	97.32	97.16
45-54	71.16	70.58	70.14	69.69	69.48	97.28	96.91	96.54	96.16
55-64	64.68	63.26	61.80	60.30	57.54	90.99	89.54	87.85	86.15
65+	36.08	33.14	30.12	27.10	21.49	50.91	53.26	48.55	43.84
LABOUR FORCE (IN THOUSANDS)									
TOTAL	2139	2448	2824	3277	4551	1507	1730	1997	2322
0-9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10-14	114	110	112	106	90	79	76	78	74
15-19	277	304	335	383	478	193	212	234	269
20-24	346	401	467	547	818	250	290	337	394
25-44	937	1096	1288	1517	2171	668	783	921	1086
45-54	261	305	358	422	597	175	206	242	286
55-64	147	169	196	227	310	100	115	134	157
65+	58	63	69	75	87	43	47	51	56
PROJECTIONS 1950-2000, Geneva 1977.									
TOTAL	2139	2448	2824	3277	4551	1507	1730	1997	2322
0-9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10-14	114	110	112	106	90	79	76	78	74
15-19	277	304	335	383	478	193	212	234	269
20-24	346	401	467	547	818	250	290	337	394
25-44	937	1096	1288	1517	2171	668	783	921	1086
45-54	261	305	358	422	597	175	206	242	286
55-64	147	169	196	227	310	100	115	134	157
65+	58	63	69	75	87	43	47	51	56

Source: ILO, Labour Force Estimates and Projections 1950-2000, Geneva 1977.

around 180,000 by the end of the century. No amount of "tinkering" is going to patch over these pressures. At the same time, even extensive "Africanisation" in the State and private sectors (a process which has a capacity limit of around 100,000 jobs), the continuation of contract labour exports at current levels, or arrangements to forestall the return flow of Zimbabweans presently located "illegally" in South Africa, will not provide opportunity for avoidance of some serious policy changes to enable a satisfactory alternative system to be devised. The sooner a beginning is made in this direction, the better prospects there might be for the resolution of this crisis in the future.

VII. THE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIVE ECONOMIC REFORMS

If there exists a case for far-reaching economic and social reform, on what basis could new policies operate and in what way could they be made effective? This is a challenging question for future policy-makers.

Before looking at some aspects of these issues, however, it must be stressed that as a minimum what is needed is a government significantly committed to such changes. This is of course a central question of political and social organisation on which it has recently become fashionable in various quarters to pronounce—to the effect that all that is needed is a leap "from white to black rule"¹¹ plus some minor tinkering to patch up systemic inefficiencies. Such approaches—misguidedly described as "reformist"—mostly imagine a world in which the source of economic malaise rests simply on the racial conditions of the colonial state. In similar light, the solution is seen merely as "deracialisation" without any *significant* change. Yet, against the backdrop of conditions as they have developed—precisely *because* of this sort of economic formation—such a change would probably imply little alteration to the pattern of development. Poverty would be reproduced in a revised form, rural misery firmly buttressed under a different hand (because rural household interests would have little say under such an order) and reformism would be firmly

11. See the arguments for example of I. Hume, What Model for Zimbabwe's Economy, *Optima*, 3, 1977.

negated by an incapacity to deliver changes. This is not to say, on the other hand, that alternative strategies will easily succeed. But it would seem appropriate to clarify at the outset that an explicitly *non-structural* strategy would before long lead to the continued marginalisation of the bulk of the population, leaving most people with little effective prospect of meaningful improvement in material and social conditions. In short, the unemployment crisis would continue.

For these reasons, not all the policies discussed below could be followed by a "replacement regime" since they would probably prove inconsistent and in conflict with underlying dominant interests. Nor will the issues and options, with their difficulties in formulation and implementation, be canvassed here in all their complexity. Merely the essence will be noted with the purpose of positing directions in which alternative policies could move.

Basic Development Strategy

At the outset, a basic development strategy is required. This should aim at meeting the basic needs of the population. Full and productive employment would be one of the key elements in such a strategy.

There are various critical dimensions related to such an employment strategy. Firstly, it would need to be aimed at rapid employment growth in the context of meeting basic needs.¹² Second, it should steadily and increasingly bias the allocation of labour time and resources towards the surplus-generating sectors of the economy. Finally, policies for employment provision would need to be formulated in the context of poverty-elimination objectives. These would probably embrace aspects designed both to reduce the incidence of absolute and relative poverty, especially in its extreme forms.

Because of the structure of the economy, especially as it is likely to be inherited upon Independence, it will be critical that a future employment policy is built upon and is intimately linked with a successful rural development and rural poverty elimination

12. See From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, No. 1, R. Riddell, *Alternatives to Poverty*, CIIR, London 1977.

programme. These twin elements form the pivot around which development efforts might be judged. At the one time, they embrace the co-ordinates of action and policy to alter the conditions of subsistence affecting both workers and peasants (and worker-peasant households)—by far the vast majority of households in the economy.

Within such a strategy, various policies could be considered. The final choice and degree of emphasis on any would depend on circumstances and the speed with which it is thought possible to realise various specified objectives.

i *Land reform.* This would be a central focus for development. It would be used as an instrument to make means of production available to currently landless persons, to enhance the productive capacity of those with inadequate holdings and to re-distribute surplus land away from the plantation sector in which monopoly and excess capacity prevails. The objective of a land reform would be to establish a more viable peasant/small producer sector and so reduce the necessity for dependence on wage-labour whilst conditions of relatively low employment growth prevail. These programmes could also be integrated into various collective production policies. Successful and widescale land reform should have a large impact on rural poverty, on the drift to urban-industrial centres, on food production and on income distribution. This is not to underrate the problems involved, as have been noted elsewhere¹³. The relevant question, however, is whether the economy can afford not to attempt such a measure. From the unemployment perspective, there is only one unambiguous answer. Land reform is vital.

ii. *Agrarian development.* Land reform would need to be part of a broader rural development policy, one other branch of which would need to focus on the large-scale and relatively labour-intensive plantation sector. Undoubtedly, certain components of this sector will need to be preserved and even expanded. This would seem to apply to large-scale projects (e.g. Chisumbanje) and lowveld sugar production on the Hippo Valley and Triangle

13. See R. Riddell, *The Land Problem in Rhodesia*, Mambo Socio-Economic series, No. 11, Mambo Press, Gwelo and CIIR London, 1978, and, more briefly, in *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe* No. 2, *The Land Question*, CIIR, London, 1978.

Estates. However, for these enterprises different ownership patterns could be considered. The rest of the plantation sector would also need careful attention. To the extent that it would be sustained, there would be pressing need to give attention to conditions of labour and subsistence of farmworkers and their families—now around 20 per cent of the total African population¹⁴.

iii. *Nationalisation or confiscation of absentee holdings.* Absentee landlords exist in significant measure in certain areas e.g. Western Matabeleland. The conversion of their assets to peasant producers would have a positive employment effect where the latter are enabled to productively employ them.

iv. *Investment.* Many firms or sub-sectors employ relatively capital-intensive technologies, under the incentive of fiscal and tariff arrangements. These tendencies could be reversed into a more employment generating direction with respect to new investment. Here the State could play a larger role. There can also be a greater direction of investment towards labour-intensive sectors than exists at present and a more careful regulation of foreign investment. This would be feasible under a more emphatic development planning mechanism than is provided for in the current 3 year "rolling" Public Sector Investment Programme.

v. *Income distribution.* A more equal distribution of income could possibly improve employment levels. This could operate through reduced imports because of changed shares of income going to rich households whilst boosted effective demand amongst the poor would tend to increase demand for locally produced output and hence employment in related sectors. It is also the latter sectors which tend to be more labour-intensive.¹⁵

vi. *Restructured demand.* The pattern of output (and the volume of employment) could be influenced by altered expenditure patterns. These might be caused both by income distribution shifts and/or by pricing and tax/subsidy policies. The objective

14. For a discussion of the conditions of farmworkers and their families see D. G. Clarke, *Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia*, Mambo Socio-Economic Series, No. 6, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1977.

15. The present distribution of income and wealth is analysed in D. G. Clarke, *The Distribution of Income and Wealth in Rhodesia*, Mambo Socio-Economic Series, No. 7, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1977.

would be to shift the production emphasis onto labour intensive sectors.

vii. *Africanisation*. Africanisation in the private and State sectors will absorb some of the unemployed but not sufficient numbers to really alter basic conditions. For one thing, Africanisation policies would be a "once-off affair".¹⁶ Secondly, that would be largely restricted to semi-skilled and skilled jobs and so will have a restrictive impact at the unskilled level where the principal problems are to be found. Nonetheless, there will be some contribution to resolutions of the problem forthcoming from application of such policies.

viii. *Return migration to neighbouring States*. Since there are close to 200,000 workers in the economy who were born outside the country, with normalised borders and conditions established it may materialise that some will seek to return to their countries of origin. To this extent, a process of employment replacement could operate to the benefit of local workseekers. It must, however, be borne in mind that most of these workers are located in low-wage sectors.

ix. *State public works schemes*. Possibilities exist for labour-intensive public works programmes, especially in rural areas and in the direction of creating productive capacity and social infrastructure. Such work could even be seasonally organised at a local level.

x. *Emergency schemes*. Such measures could be adopted in the short-run and on a more local basis for specific "badly affected" areas, e.g. for the Batonka peoples south of Kariba. External aid funding could be obtained for such measures.

xi. *Controls on tax revenues*. Fiscal arrangements might be tightened to reduce leakages of monies which should accrue to the State. In this way, tax evasion control could raise State revenues and available funds for investment.

xii. *Control of income/capital outflows*. Reduced outflow of funds on investment account could raise local employment growth. Here attention could be directed at "transfer pricing" and the illegal movement of assets outside the economy.

16. For an expansion of this point see From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe No. 4, Colin Stoneman, *Skilled Labour and Future Needs*, CIIR, London, 1978.

xiii. *Trade re-structuring*. A return to legality will possibly bring an improvement in the net terms of trade, this yielding greater foreign exchange and revenues to private/State sectors such that a net employment effect could be anticipated. At the same time, if Zimbabwe is able to participate in the Preferential Trade Area now being mooted in Eastern and Southern Africa, it could obtain further benefits. The economy would also have the prospect of participation in the Lomé Agreement (scheduled for renegotiation in 1980) and hence could obtain preferential access to EEC markets.¹⁷

xiv. *Debt cancellation and relief*. The situation concerning external debt liabilities is at present unclear with respect to a future Zimbabwean government. However, some debts might be cancelled—e.g. possibly "secret debt"—whilst others could be re-scheduled to allow easier adjustment in the transitional period. These actions could have employment effects, depending on how they are managed.

xv. *Aid*. Zimbabwe would be in a position to negotiate aid receipts from a wide variety of concessional sources including OECD/DAC, EEC, the UK, World Bank and socialist economies. These flows—if properly structured—could be designed to aid employment growth.

VIII. RECENT CHANGES AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT CRISIS

It would be to beg the question, as well as a calculated omission, to ignore an examination of the relationships between "the unemployment crisis" (so described) and current political changes exemplified in the new accord which has been struck between the Rhodesian Front regime and African politicians. This is even more so because the outcome on economic change of current tendencies has the profoundest bearing on the lives of close to seven million Zimbabweans, touched as so many are by the depth of the current crisis.

The "Internal Settlement", as it is widely known, embodies a number of explicit and implicit restraints on economic and social policy which cannot be ignored. These may be identified irrespec-

17. The Lomé agreement and future negotiations are analysed in a forthcoming publication from CIIR, London.

tive of ideological commitment on either side of the divide between those opposing or proposing such an accord.¹⁸

Firstly many of the reforms in economic policy which appear "necessary" as measures to cope, and eventually surmount, the unemployment crisis would seem to lie largely outside the scope of *feasible* policy options of currently envisaged scenarios. This, for example, clearly applies to nationalisation measures, substantive land reforms (based on social criteria, and not those merely of private/market efficiency), even far-reaching "Africanisation", and certainly in respect of major alterations to the dimensions of income/asset distribution and the character of rural development. Present imperatives by contrast seem to rest more securely on the anticipated "spin-offs" of economic growth without structural adjustments.

Secondly, there would appear to be a significant "deliverability constraint" implied in the (former set of) manoeuvres now open to the present administration. Forced to comply with pre-ordained "rules" explicitly created to maintain the *status quo* which themselves are part cause of the current predicament—it would be exceptionally fortuitous if events were allowed to be so designed, or even transpire, to change the *relative* conditions of poverty of the bulk of households. The prospect, and at this stage it can merely be at a level of possibility, that conditions of absolute poverty *might* eventually alter favourably for some should in itself not be regarded as a sufficiently mitigating factor. What is needed, difficult as it may be, is a judgement "on balance". In this estimation it should not be forgotten that overall conditions are unlikely to alter much without consistently planned and implemented reforms. Laissez-faire and liberal abandonment to prevailing "market forces" have been, as proven by the country's historical experience, a recipe for the concentration of socio-economic power in the hands of those other than the powerless. It is in this area of future development strategy that, for the poor, the present political disposition is most vacuous, whether this is sufficiently realised or not. In such a scheme, the economic future of Zimbabwe's grandchildren seems left to a fate both uncharted and fraught with a high probability of recidivism.

18. For an analysis of the terms of the 'Internal Settlement' see *Rhodesia's Internal Settlement*, Comment No. 34, CIIR London, 1978.

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