

# AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON **NON-ALIGNMENT**

Edited by  
L. Adele Jinadu & Ibbo Mandaza





# **African Perspectives on the Non-Aligned Movement**

*Edited  
by  
L. Adele Jinadu & Ibbo Mandaza*

*With a  
Foreword  
by The Hon. Dr. N.M. Shamuyarira*

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## Foreword

This book contains 5 articles written by African Scholars from each of the regions of Northern, Eastern, Southern, Central and Western Africa. These are mainly geographical regions. The articles attempt to summarise the theory and practice of non-alignment in each of these regions. They provide valuable background information at a time when the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is facing a major problem on the African continent. The articles are well researched and written in a frank and sympathetic manner. The authors are committed Pan Africanists who have used their pens and skills to advance the zones of liberation on the African continent.

The initiative to publish this book came from the members of the African Association of Political Science. The authors were requested to prepare these articles by the African Association of Political Science (AAPS) — a continental, Pan-African organisation of African Social Scientists many of whom are teaching at African Universities and Colleges. The avowed aim of the Association since it was formed in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, in 1973, is to decolonise the teaching of social sciences in Africa, especially Political Science. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors and of the AAPS. They are not the views of the Government of Zimbabwe which is hosting the Eighth NAM Summit, or the Jongwe Printing and Publishing Company which has printed them.

The articles are factual and objective in their analysis. They summarise the major objectives of the movement, and show some of the shortcomings in the practice of certain African States in the last 25 years.

Of particular interest is the involvement of certain African states in bilateral military arrangements with their former colonisers who are members of the NATO. The articles rightly draw attention to Africa's preoccupation with the elimination of the abhorrent system of Apartheid in South Africa and the much delayed liberation of Namibia and South Africa. That is the last and the longest item on Africa's agenda for decolonisation, and the centre-piece of the Harare Summit.

The NAM places Africa and its agenda in the context of a world-wide movement embracing Asian, Latin American, Caribbean and European peoples. Although the articles are written from an African perspective, the reader is constantly reminded of the importance of the international dimension. NAM Countries such as India, Yugoslavia and Cuba have made enormous sacrifices and material contributions to the liberation struggles of the people of Africa. They and other NAM states have used every international and regional fora to articulate and buttress the position of Africa and its people. The contribution from non-African NAM countries cannot be quantified, but it is enormous.

Since the Lusaka Summit, the NAM has paid increasing attention to the issues of international finance and economic relations, and their effect on Third World countries. Although these issues are not discussed in this book, the AAPS should pay particular attention to them in its research programme. There are many questions that require African answers, and African solutions. Foremost among them is the need for institutional arrangements to give concrete meaning and substance to the cooperation between Third World countries in the economic field. The place of the stalled North-South dialogue should be taken by a practical South-South programme of action.

The authors have written useful and informative articles. I commend the AAPS for involving African Scholars in current issues that are of direct concern to Africa's decision-makers. Problem and policy-oriented research, and publications can assist African states and justify the enormous expenditures on higher education on the continent.

**N.M. SHAMUYARIRA**  
**HONORARY PAST PRESIDENT**  
**AFRICA ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (AAPS)**

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## Introduction

*by L. Adele Jinadu and Ibbo Mandaza*

This monograph seeks to illustrate the close relationship between African nationalism and the history and development of the Non-Aligned Movement. To that extent there is agreement among the authors that there has been a convergence of thinking and purpose between the African continent and the rest of the non-aligned world. This convergence is reflected in the opposition to imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism as well as in the call for global structural reforms. The African commitment to non-alignment, no doubt problematic in certain respects, is attested by the fact that all independent African states are members of the Non-Aligned Movement; and in the fact that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is the only international organisation in the world which has enshrined the principle of non-alignment in its Charter.

This monograph, therefore, is an attempt to provide an over-view of African thinking on non-alignment by examining such issues as the meaning attached to non-alignment in the various regions of the African continent; the role Africa has played in the movement; the extent to which African foreign policy behaviour conforms to the principles of the movement; and Africa's contribution to the movement.

The monograph is divided into chapters, dealing respectively with Anglophone West Africa; Francophone West and Central Africa; East Africa; North Africa and Southern Africa. The chapter on Anglophone West Africa by L. Adele Jinadu highlights the role of Africa in the founding of the NAM, focusing on the role of that great son of Africa, Kwame Nkrumah, in the formative years of the movement. The chapter also shows the various and varying Anglophone West African perspectives on the NAM, and how non-alignment becomes integral to the foreign policy of such a key African country as Nigeria.

The chapter on Francophone West and Central Africa is written by Guy Martin. It shows why it was natural for the former French colonies of West and Central Africa to join the NAM when they became

independent in the 1960s. The chapter then goes on to examine the implications of the closer ties which some of these countries have established with either France and the West or with socialist countries for their membership of NAM.

In the chapter on East Africa, Katete Orwa traces the development of non-alignment in two key countries — Kenya and Tanzania — in the region. He argues that although, from a theoretical standpoint, both countries agree on the basic principles of non-alignment, there are also fundamental, ideological differences in how commitment to those principles is reflected in their foreign policies.

The chapter on North Africa by Abdel Monem El Maschat examines the role of the North African and Arab world in the NAM. It does this by discussing and showing how the impact of national security and inter-Arab tensions and conflicts has led to a decline in the North African and Arab role in the movement since the death of another great son of Africa, Gamal Nasser in 1970.

The final chapter on Southern Africa by Ibbo Mandaza outlines briefly the historical relationship between the NAM and the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The fact that the NAM Summit returns to the Southern African region a second time within fifteen years is a testimony that the region has been one of the dominant concerns of the NAM. It is also a great honour to the two countries — Zambia and Zimbabwe — which have played a pivotal role in the history of the sub-continent. It is also an acknowledgement of the historical significance of two great African brothers and statesmen — Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.

As a progressive continental organisation, the African Association of Political Science (AAPS) wishes, through this publication to associate itself with the letter and spirit of NAM. We honour the NAM, of which we are a part, and congratulate Zimbabwe and Prime Minister Mugabe for taking up the challenge of the NAM for the next three years.

What future NAM? This becomes all the more pertinent in view of the current global economic crisis and the accelerated radicalisation in the progressive direction of black African nationalism in South Africa and Namibia. Those two developments serve to dramatise the deepening and maturing contradictions of imperialism and capitalism on a world scale. The transformation of the contemporary hegemonic capitalist world system, of which the crisis of the South African State is but a reflection, must now as before be given the highest priority

by the NAM. That was the rationale for its creation. It is also the rationale for its continued existence as a force for progress and social transformation.

## **West African Perspectives on the Non-Aligned Movement\***

*by L. Adele Jinadu*

### **Introduction**

West African concern with non-alignment dates back to the immediate post-World War II years. It was a period when non-alignment as a world movement was in the process of gestation and its theoretical assumptions being formulated. Its development, as well as West African perspectives towards it, was not unconnected with a number of developments in the structure of world politics and the emergent post-World War II international system.

These structural developments played a crucial role in defining the nature and limits of non-alignment as a movement and as a theory or perspective towards international politics. But non-alignment is not simply reactive to these structural changes. It has had some impact on international politics and the international system by providing a forum for the discussion of world issues from a particular perspective, that of the emergent third world. What were these post-World War II developments? How did they shape West African perspectives towards non-alignment?

### **I Originating Structural Factors**

A number of interrelated factors account for the emergence of non-alignment as a movement and as perspective towards international politics. These interrelated factors must be viewed in the wider context of the decolonization process in Asia and Africa, of the aspirations and expectations that were unleashed by that process especially in the immediate post-World War II period. It is also in the context of these factors that one must situate West African perspectives to non-alignment. What then are these factors?

\*"West Africa" here refers to Anglophone West Africa.

The independence of Burma, India, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Pakistan was a critical factor in the genesis of non-alignment. This was more so in the case of India. With respect to the Non-Aligned Movement some aspects of the independence movement in Asia were particularly important. These were the confrontations with colonialism and imperialism and the search for racial identity which the independence movement represented. It was therefore the concern with colonialism, imperialism and racialism which provided unifying themes for the various conferences of Asian countries between 1945 and 1955, which culminated in the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955.

The other factor was the impact which political developments in Asia had on West Africa during this period. Political and constitutional developments in the then Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Nigeria and to a lesser extent in Sierra Leone and Gambia were influenced by developments particularly in India. West African political leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo watched events in India closely and saw in the Indian nationalist movement a model for the evolving nationalist movements in their countries. The political writings of Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru were read with considerable interest by these leaders. West African ex-servicemen returning from active service in Asia provided another linkage between political developments in Africa and Asia.

Together these two interrelated factors, reflected in the emergent Afro-Asian nationalism, helped to define the initial focus of non-alignment with what has been described as anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-racism. These factors did not in themselves ensure the form and direction which non-alignment would assume; nor did they prove unproblematic for Afro-Asian solidarity or unity. They, however, facilitated the evolving framework for Afro-Asian cooperation as a means for the pursuit of the collective and national interest of the various Afro-Asian countries. It was therefore this coincidence of interests which initially attracted such West African countries as the then Gold Coast and Nigeria towards non-alignment, even before they became independent. For example, the Gold Coast was represented by Kodjo Botsio as an observer at Bandung in 1955.

There was another structural development in the immediate post-World War II years which was also a major factor in the genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement. This was the emergent bi-polar structure of the international system. Non-alignment soon came to denote a policy

as well as a strategy designed to avoid entanglement in the cold war which characterized this bi-polar structure. It was in connection with the desire to avoid military alliances with either side in the cold war that non-alignment came to be used interchangeably with neutralism or positive neutrality — the latter terms being used to distinguish non-alignment from neutrality which is a term used to describe a country's legal undertaking not to take side in a war between two or more belligerent countries.

However, as West African perspectives towards non-alignment unfolded in the 1950s and early 1960s, they were initially less concerned with peaceful co-existence, as non-entanglement in the cold war is sometimes characterized, than with colonialism, imperialism and racism. Indeed, the attainment of independence by a large number of African countries in the 1960s meant that they would bring different perspectives to the Non-Aligned Movement, depending on their ideological orientations and national interests. But it also meant that they would be more concerned with such African issues as decolonization in Southern Africa and economic development than with the broader goal of co-existence. The problem then as now is how to reconcile regional goals with the broader goals of the movement.

In this way, too, there seems to be a convergence between the Pan-Africanism of West African leaders and non-alignment. This was particularly clear in the Pan-Africanism of Kwame Nkrumah for whom non-alignment became a vehicle for pursuing Pan-Africanist goals. This link between Pan-Africanism and non-alignment was not far from the minds of the founding-fathers of the OAU and was given expression in Article III (7) of the OAU Charter.

What these three structural factors also point to is the need to link the genesis and conceptualization of non-alignment to another feature of the emergent international system since 1945. This is the emergence of a third world counterpoised to the first and second worlds. This third world was conceptualized as a moral force, made up of small and medium powers, whose mission would be to restore peace to the world and help prevent a nuclear holocaust. This moral element was attractive to West African leaders and provided another source of the attraction of non-alignment to them.

The initial conceptualization of and perspectives towards non-alignment in West Africa derived from these various sources. It was an essentially political and cultural conceptualization. This in itself was



due to the concern of such leaders as Nkrumah, Azikiwe, Awolowo and Magai with seeking the political kingdom first. It was also due to their concern with laying a cultural foundation for the newly acquired statehood of their countries. Hence their fascination with the concept of the African Personality or "Africa Renascent". Thus just as there was initially little awareness of the antagonistic contradictions between politico cultural independence and economic dependence in West Africa, so also was little thought given to the tension between what has come to be described as political non-alignment and economic alignment.

The pervasiveness and salience of economic dependence as a powerful constraint to the foreign policy behaviour of West African states in due course gave rise to embarrassing questions about their commitment to non-alignment as such. But this is just one powerful residue of their colonial legacy. Yet the more attention is focused on this economic dependence or alignment, the more non-alignment as such focuses on the need for fundamental structural changes in the contemporary global capitalist system. This then was the dilemma which faced the Non-Aligned Movement as the 1960s came to an end and as the fragile nature of the political economies of African and other third world countries was accentuated by the incipient crisis of the global economy.

## II The Nature of West African Perspectives

The form which West African perspectives towards non-alignment have assumed is intrinsically bound up with the originating structural factors identified above. The perspectives themselves have basically remained constant over the years, although the emphasis placed on them as well as the relative importance attached to each of them has changed from time to time in response both to changes and developments in the international system and also to the imperatives of the differing national interests of the countries in the sub-region.

But another important factor in determining the nature of West African perspectives is the important role played by public debate, particularly by the intellectual fringes in Ghana and Nigeria, about the movement itself. Such debates have served the function of casting critical searchlight on the compatibility between the movement and continental and global concerns of African countries. Non-alignment thus was inescapably a foreign policy issue, controversial at times or at least

demanding justification to a sometimes sceptical segment of the intellectual community.

### Political Dimensions

Some dimensions of West African perspectives therefore are political ones, in so far as non-alignment is viewed as a foreign policy issue. What is the political character of non-alignment? Some indication of this was given in the previous section. It is political precisely in the sense that it is linked to statehood or sovereignty and its consolidation. The assertion of non-alignment as a policy option is viewed as an expression of independence, which is more likely to be strengthened by refusal to take sides in the cold war.

In a statement before the House of Representatives in Lagos on August 20, 1960, less than two months before Nigeria's independence, the country's Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa explained his government's choice of non-alignment as follows:-

**"... we shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone, so far as is possible, the policy on each occasion will be selected with a proper independent objectivity in Nigeria's national interest. We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs."**

Kwame Nkrumah contends in *AFRICA MUST UNITE* (London, Panaf Books, P.197) that in choosing "... a policy of neutral non-alignment, but not of passivity," African countries could "... exercise their right of free choice in supporting those acts which they consider will help to maintain the peace on which their continuance as independent nation rests."

The reference to "... power blocs" in Balewa's statement and to the need "... to maintain the peace ..." in Nkrumah's points to another political dimension of West African perspectives to non-alignment. Properly speaking, this is an ethico-political dimension, ascribing to non-alignment a moral force and mission. The threat posed to world peace by the cold war is highlighted and non-alignment is credited with the potential of helping to avert war. As Nkrumah puts it, "by moral force, if not by material strength, the non-aligned nations must exert their influence to save the world from ultimate disaster." (*AFRICA MUST UNITE*, p. 200.)

This argument is linked in West Africa to the effect which disarmament can have on the global distribution of resources by channeling funds and resources hitherto devoted to arms build-up to development purposes in the developing world. It therefore becomes important to Nkrumah for instance, that "the influence of the uncommitted nations must be exerted to the full to restore a proper sense of values to the world," because "... one tenth of the expenditure involved in armaments would be enough to raise the whole of the less developed world to the level of a self-sustaining economy." (AFRICA MUST UNITE, p. 199).

This perspective is still very much shared in West Africa. There is, however, also now an awareness of the progress made in defusing world tension because of the policy of *detente* pursued by both the east and western blocs. The danger of linking non-alignment solely to the cold war, to the exclusion of other strands in the movement, was reflected in a recent Nigerian debate on foreign policy.

Some of the protagonists in the debate argued, somewhat inaccurately that since the cold war was *passé* Nigeria should abandon its policy of non-alignment. Dr. Chuba Okadigbo, later to become Political Adviser to the Nigerian President, Shehu Shagari, argued in the Nigerian daily, *The New Nigerian* of September 30, 1978 that "... since the world is now multi-polar, non-alignment, as foreign policy, has lost its basis and attraction." Earlier at a conference on Nigeria and the World, organized by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in 1976, one of the papers presented had argued that "... it is necessary to recognize that a new era of *detente* in East-West relations is the new reality. The old ideas of the cold war generated non-alignment for Nigeria which should now give way to a new ... policy arising out of the era of *detente*."

The argument was vigorously rejected at the conference. The counter argument was that it was debatable that the cold war was *passé*, that in any case there were other planks than opposition to the cold war on which non-alignment was based; that these other planks were as important as before. It was further argued that *detente* was in any case diversionary, a form of mystification or false consciousness. It was essentially the pursuit of the cold war in new guise and had not involved the kind of radical structural transformation which the Non-Aligned Movement wanted to create.

It was also pointed out that disarmament itself was far from be-

ing achieved. Rather, the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race as well as the manufacture and development of weapons of mass destruction was proceeding unabated. This is why the connection between non-alignment and disarmament drawn by Nkrumah and quoted above is still a valid characterization of the structure of the international system.

The relationship of *detente* to the Non-Aligned Movement was debated at length at the Fourth Non-Aligned Countries Conference in Algiers in September 1973. The conclusion reached was that *detente* had brought little benefit to the non-aligned world, in spite of its helping to reduce super-power tension. The Political Declaration issued at the end of the conference observed that:

"So long as there are colonial wars, apartheid, imperialist aggression, power politics and economic exploitation and plundering, peace will be limited both in principle and in scope. In a world which is already divided into the rich, poor countries, it would be dangerous to widen this division by restricting peace to the rich regions of the world, while condemning the rest of mankind to insecurity and the domination of the most powerful. Peace is indivisible."

Another major political dimension of West African perspectives to non-alignment is the concern with decolonisation as a global process, although much of the West African focus in this respect was with Africa. Of the six African countries which attended the Bandung Conference, only two, Liberia and the then Gold Coast were from West Africa. The four other African countries were Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya and Sudan. The concern with the decolonisation process was in fact a general African perspective to non-alignment.

But this general statement must be qualified because of the differing commitment to the decolonisation process among African countries. For example in West Africa, a majority of the Francophone countries were at best lukewarm on the question of Algerian independence because of their dependence on France. Nonetheless the broadly-based concern with decolonisation in Africa and elsewhere has always been an important dimension of West African perspectives towards non-alignment.

If there was any disagreement on this issue it was more over strategy and which of competing liberation movements to recognise. For example, in this respect Ghana under Nkrumah tended to pursue a more radical posture than the other Anglophone countries in West Africa. For the West African as for the other African countries, however, the Non-Aligned Movement provides another multi-lateral forum, in conjunction with the Commonwealth, the OAU and the UN for focusing international attention on colonialism, imperialism and racism. The decolonisation process is thus defined to include the eradication of imperialism and racism as well as colonialism.

On the issue of decolonisation in Southern Africa, Nigeria among the West African countries has since 1975 assumed the most radical posture. This is due as much to her economic leverage as to the reorientation of her Pan-African policy from a modest, low-profile approach to an activist and nationalistic one. Nigerian opinion in the late 1970s was urging the Non-Aligned Movement to concern itself with "... such an important item as the plans to create the SATO military bloc. That bloc would be a threat not only to independent African countries in view of the South African participation but also to the non-aligned Latin-American countries ..."

(*The Sunday Punch*, Lagos, 11 February 1979, p.15)

Another aspect of the Nigerian discussion of decolonisation and the Non-Aligned Movement since the late 1970s has focused on Nigeria pursuing the nuclear option as a counter and deterrence to South Africa's acquisition of a nuclear capability which could be turned to aggressive use against Nigeria and other African countries. For example, Nigeria's former Head of State, General Obasanjo was quoted in the 24th October 1977 issue of the weekly magazine, *West Africa* as saying that if South Africa was prepared to defend apartheid, with nuclear weapons, Nigeria would not stand idly by. On the issue of the nuclear option for Nigeria there was considerable debate and division within the country, however.

The West African concern with decolonisation is also linked to the imperative of securing world peace. Here again Nkrumah gave expression to a radical West African point of view which saw colonialism, imperialism and racism as threats to world peace and their termination a pre-requisite for structural transformation of the contemporary world system. It is indeed this linkage which explains the West African con-

cern with and support for extra African liberation movements in the Middle East, including Palestine, in Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam.

The West African countries have, however, not been altogether happy with the practical steps taken by a number of non-African members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Ghana's *Kumasi Pioneer*, for example observed on 10th September 1970 that "... If even a fraction of the non-aligned states from outside Africa refused to trade with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, severed diplomatic relations with them, and refused them aircraft landing rights and port facilities, these callous minority governments could not but have a healthy change of outlook."

At the 5th Non-Aligned Conference held in Colombo in 1976, Brigadier Joe Garba, Nigeria's Minister of External Affairs referring to Southern Africa, urged "... the Non-Aligned Movement not to shirk its own responsibility in carrying out one of its basic objectives." At the same conference, Colonel J. Felli of Ghana called for a, resolution "... here and now that no non-aligned country should ... grant *de facto* or *de jure* recognition to any so-called Bantustan state."

Here then was a source of friction between the West African and other African countries on the one hand and the rest of the Non-Aligned Movement. But it was not an irreconcilable or incompatible juxtaposition of the claims of regionalism against those of universalism in the context of the Non-Aligned Movement. The decision to hold the Third Non-Aligned Conference in Lusaka in 1970 and the forthcoming eighth one in Zimbabwe in 1986 was intended to emphasise the concern of the movement with the questions of racism and colonialism in Southern Africa.

No less an important political dimension of West African perspectives to non-alignment is their attitude to or relationship with the major world powers. The dilemma of West African countries on this score is reflected in what can be described as their love-hate relationship with the West. This relationship has had profound implications for their relations with the East. Of course the dilemma is not unique to these countries. It arises from the colonial inheritance of much of sub-Saharan Africa and the conjuncture of substructural and superstructural factors that have combined to determine the character and dynamics of Africa's international relations with the wider world.

What this has meant is that historical and socio-cultural ties with the West developed as a result of colonial rule have been built on and strengthened by the economic dependence of these countries on the

West. This fact therefore raises some questions about their commitment to political non-alignment. Let us take one country — Nigeria — to illustrate this dilemma.

Nigeria, as was indicated earlier on, adopted a policy of non-alignment at independence. Yet the first six years of independence were marked by a pro-West posture in world affairs; so much so that questions were raised as to whether the government was practising a policy of non-alignment in world affairs. For example, a secret defence pact was concluded with Great Britain although it was subsequently abrogated in January 1962 when it became a matter for public knowledge and debate. It was also alleged that the government had allowed a secret NATO radio station to be opened in the country. On the other hand, relations with the USSR and the eastern bloc were lukewarm and not actively cultivated.

Much has changed in the orientation and direction of the country's foreign policy since the First Republic collapsed in January 1966. Relations with the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc have improved. A more independent foreign policy posture in world affairs vis à vis the foreign power blocs has been evident since the end of the country's civil war in 1970. Nevertheless, Nigeria's historically determined position in the world economy has not enabled her to delink substantially in a political and socio-cultural sense from the West. As Jide Aluko once put it, "... the whole range of our (i.e. Nigeria's) technological, economic and social development is inextricably bound up with the Western powers. This is largely a result of historical accident, as well as the general under-development of the country."

If we take another country — Ghana — in the sub-region much the same observation can be made. It is true of course that under Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana pursued a much more militant non-alignment policy in world affairs. Relations with the eastern block were cultivated much more vigorously and as a counterpoise to the head-start and influence within the country which the West had had as a result of colonial rule. All of this was evidence to the West that Nkrumah was pro-East and anti-West; that Nkrumah's Ghana had become a client-state or satellite of the Soviet Union.

However, the political and socio-cultural constraints which Nkrumah had to contend with serve to underline the pervasive strength of the influence and stranglehold of the West over the country, even while he was still in office. Objectively, then as now, Ghana was as

much neocolonial as Nigeria. Nkrumah himself realized the limitations which this historically-determined fact imposed on the terrain of options available to him as he pursued his domestic and external policies.

These historical and socio-cultural ties are still strong in both countries and must be taken into account in any discussion of perspectives towards non-alignment in both countries. Indeed, non-alignment as a foreign policy option in both countries is as much political as it is socio-cultural in so far as it involves a declaration of cultural authenticity. Moreover their continued membership of the Commonwealth, about which there have been serious reservations in both countries since Great Britain joined the EEC, shows that, for these two countries, there is some compatibility between attachment to these ties and membership of the non-aligned movement.

### **Economic Dimensions**

Although the initial focus and thrust of the non-aligned movement emphasized politico-cultural issues — decolonization and peaceful co-existence, for instance — economic issues were nonetheless not far from the surface. What are the economic dimensions of the movement? What are the West African perspectives to them? The starting-point for the identification of these economic dimensions must be the realization by members of the movement of their economic dependence on the West. Of particular importance are the implications of such a dependence not only for their own development but also for world peace and equitable growth in the world. In this way the economic dimensions of the movement are linked to the political by the non-aligned countries.

That they can assert this linkage is due to the structuralist view of imperialism articulated by such members of the movement as Algeria and Yugoslavia. On this view national economic development is organically linked to the structure and dynamics of world economic and social relations. Prevalent international economic relations and structures were reproducing much the same dependence that developing countries experienced under colonialism. In such circumstances, they could not really develop unless the cycle of structural dependence to which they were subjected was broken. There was in other words need for a radical structural transformation of the hegemonic capitalist world system. This was a task that required collective political action by the developing countries.

The organization of such a collective political action took form in the establishment of UNCTAD in 1964 as an international organization concerned with trade and development. Although UNCTAD is a United Nations specialized agency, the non-aligned movement played a key role in its creation. Indeed the momentum for its creation could be traced partly to the deliberations at the Belgrade Non-Aligned Countries Conference in September 1961.

However, it was not until the Lusaka Non-Aligned Conference in September 1970 that the movement articulated its views on the relationship between the structure of the world economy and development by adopting the Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress. This declaration had been preceded by the statement on Economic Development and Cooperation issued at the end of the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference in October 1964.

Taken together, it could be argued that both the declaration and statement presaged the subsequent North-South Dialogue and the third world call for a New International Economic Order.

An underlying assumption in these economic declarations or statements is the need for collective self-reliance. This notion of self-reliance was, moreover, given a radical, leftist emphasis in the Georgetown Declaration issued by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of non-aligned-countries in Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972. The significance of the Georgetown Declaration lies in its operationalising self-reliance to mean the total exercise of sovereignty over their economies by the non-aligned and other developing countries.

The Preamble to the Action Programme For Economic Cooperation, adopted as part of the Georgetown Declaration, affirmed that:

The non-aligned countries believe it is fundamentally important to stress that the full exercise of their sovereignty over natural resources is essential for economic independence, which is closely linked to political independence and that the latter is consolidated by strengthening the former. The sovereign right of each state to dispose of its natural wealth and resources, even including nationalisation, is inherent to the principles of self-determination of the peoples and of non-intervention.

... The non-aligned-countries condemn such practices and activities of transnational corporations which invariably impair the principle of non-intervention and self-determination of the people, and at the same time make a call to the end that such activities be systematically denounced to world public opinion.

What have been West African perspectives to the economic dimensions of non-alignment as described above? Nigeria will be used to illustrate these perspectives partly because of the critical economic position she holds in the sub-region and partly because of the intense nationalistic sentiments that have characterized the debate in the country since the end of her civil war in 1970 over the relationship between the Nigerian polity and the Nigerian economy. Those sentiments have echoed the radical orientation of the Georgetown Declaration.

The focus on self-reliance and control over natural resources in the Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress coincided with the policy trend in Nigeria towards the indigenisation of the country's economy. The Lusaka Declaration as well as the Georgetown Declaration and subsequent declarations by the Non-Aligned Movement on the same subject therefore struck a positive responsive chord in Nigeria.

The policy trend referred to above is the indigenisation of foreign enterprises begun in 1972 under the regime of General Yakubu Gowon. Indigenisation of the commanding heights of the Nigerian economy was viewed as the logical extension to the substructure of the Nigerianisation of the superstructural institutions of the state — the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the educational system etc. Thus indigenisation has been defined by Bade Onimode as "the promotion of indigenous equity participation in the expanding sectors of the economy, and the development of domestic entrepreneurship". To achieve this end, foreign enterprises were divided into two groups: those to be wholly transferred to Nigerians; and those which require 40 per cent to 60 per cent Nigerian equity participation.

Within the Non-Aligned Movement itself, it seems that great importance was assigned to Nigeria in the evolving institutional framework and deliberations for the transformation of the world economy. Her position as a major oil producing country and her membership of OPEC partly accounted for this. Thus Nigeria was among the 19 third world and non-aligned countries that were invited to participate in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris in October 1975. The Conference was convened to discuss issues of North-South economic cooperation.



Nigeria was also chosen to serve on the new Coordinating Bureau, established at the Fifth Non-Aligned Countries Conference in Colombo in August 1976 to "review and assist in the implementation of the Action Programme For Economic Cooperation among the non-aligned . . ." among other functions. Nigeria was also one of the five countries in the South initially invited to Vienna, Austria in 1980 to discuss the convening of a North-South summit along the line suggested in the Brandt Commission Report, *North-South: A Programme For Survival*. The Cancun Summit in Mexico, to which Nigeria was also invited, originated in the Vienna meeting.

As was indicated above, Nigeria's position on the North-South issue was a nationalistic one, deriving in part from a new anti-West radicalism born out of disappointment with the role played by the West during the Nigerian civil war. Many Nigerians would subscribe to the suggestion made by a columnist in *The Sunday Punch*, Lagos of 11 February, 1979 that "along with protection alliances and associations (like OPEC) the non-aligned could take certain concrete measures against the discriminatory and neo-colonialist practices of multinational corporations in Africa . . ."

On the question of North-South dialogue, Nigeria has tended to side with countries like Algeria, Tanzania and Yugoslavia in insisting that this must be based on the concept of Global Negotiations articulated in Resolution 9 of the Economic Resolutions passed at the Sixth Non-Aligned Countries Conference in Havana in September 1979. Rather than be conducted in the diplomatic niceties to which summits are accustomed, the resolution argues that North-South dialogues should be characterized by ". . . sustained negotiations on international economic cooperation for development . . . action-oriented allowing for an integrated approach to the main issues involved, proceeding simultaneously on different planes . . ."

Such dialogues should, therefore, "include major issues in the field of raw materials, energy, trade, development, money and finance."

What the resolution and the position of Nigeria implied was that a radical structural change in the world economy was necessary. This also implied that the basic issues in the North-South dialogue were interrelated, requiring an integrated approach not a piecemeal one to their solution. This point was perhaps not lost on the columnist who observed in the Nigerian daily *The National Concord* of 10 September 1981, that "the positive role of the Non-Aligned Movement has shown that it is

the only entity capable of affording comprehensive long-term solutions that could lead the world out of the political and economic imbroglio into which the bloc powers had pushed it."

Nigeria's active role in the establishment of ECOWAS is consistent with the position of the Non-Aligned Movement that regional economic cooperation among the countries of the third world should be encouraged. ECOWAS should, therefore, be viewed as a concrete effort, in the West African sub-region, to achieve collective self-reliance, in the spirit of the various declarations made by the non-aligned countries since their Lusaka Conference in 1970.

### III. West Africa and Cleavages within the Non-Aligned Movement

The Non-Aligned Movement has had its share of intra-movement cleavages. These cleavages have tended to be drawn along ideological lines within the movement and have sometimes also been exploited by the two power blocs. The cleavages in effect are symptomatic of internal contradictions within the movement. What has been the West African position on some of these cleavages? There have of course been no uniform West African responses in so far as the countries in the region are themselves ideologically heterogeneous. Let us examine some of these cleavages and how some West African countries responded to them.

An issue which divided the Cairo preparatory meeting for the First Non-Aligned Conference in Yugoslavia was the Algerian war of liberation and the representation of the Provisional Government of Algeria, then in exile in Tunisia, at meetings of the movement. The West African and indeed the African response to this issue was reflected in the ideological division of African States between the moderate Monrovia and Brazzaville Groups and the radical Casablanca Group. Members of the Casablanca Group which included Ghana sided with the Provisional Government-in-exile and worked for its representation. Ghana's and the Casablanca Group's position on this issue was based on the argument that colonial issues were then central to the rationale for the movement. This, therefore, required the recognition of legitimate national liberation movements like the FLN in Algeria.

The recognition and admission of the Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government (GRP) and Sihanouk's Royal Government

of the Khmer National Union (GRUNK) in Cambodia divided the movement on the eve of the Lusaka conference in 1970. Although the GRP was subsequently granted an observer status at Lusaka, this status was denied to the GRUNK. Of the West African states, Liberia voted against the admission of the GRUNK, preferring instead the admission of the Lon Nol delegation while Ghana abstained from voting.

A much more fundamental cleavage revolved around Cuba's continued membership of the movement. The admission of Cuba to the movement in 1961 had been promoted as a solidarity gesture in view of the hostility of the US to Castro's government. Cuba was thus seen as a symbol of one of the fundamental goals of the movement. Yet by the time the Sixth Non-Aligned Conference was held in Havana in September, 1979, Cuba had become a test case for the *raison d'être* of the movement, splitting it along sharply polarized ideological lines. What was at stake? Where did the West African countries stand?

The controversy, which came to a head in Havana in September 1979, was over the allegation that Cuba was so militarily and politically aligned to the Soviet Union that she had lost all claim to being "non-aligned". Her alleged role as a proxy for the Soviet Union was another source of the controversy, with such countries as Egypt, Zaire and Somalia leading the onslaught against Cuba. The Western press, moreover, waded in, ridiculing the idea of Castro assuming the chairmanship of the movement. On the other hand, Cuba justified its relations with the Soviet Union on the ground that the Soviet Union was objectively a natural ally of the non-aligned world in its struggle against colonialism, imperialism and racism.

At issue, therefore, was how the relationship between the theory of equidistance from the two power blocs and commitment to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism was to be construed and concretized in policy terms. The natural ally thesis was eventually rejected at Havana. Castro concurred with this decision. The attempt to expel Cuba from the movement and to deny Castro the chairmanship of the movement, however, failed.

What was the stand of West African countries over Cuba? Ghana sided with Egypt, Morocco and Somalia in condemning the presence of Cuban troops as Soviet proxies in Angola and Ethiopia. On the other hand a columnist in the Nigerian daily, *The Daily Star* of September 28, 1978, posed the rhetorical question, "Why for example, such clamour around Cuba's role in Africa? What new has been discovered

by Egypt, Zaire, Somalia and Kampuchea in Havana helping the people of the black continent to uphold their right to a social choice? Nothing."

But on the "natural ally" thesis, Nigeria's *National Concord* of 10th September, 1981 argued that acceptance of the thesis "... would mean the involvement of non-alignment in bloc confrontation and the transformation of non-alignment into a conveyor belt for a ruling power centre ... This is because for the movement to realize its set goal of ensuring world peace and security lies in its insistence on the movement's independence of either power blocs." What these two quotations suggest is the moderate line Nigeria took on the issue; upholding the Cuban role and presence in Angola and Ethiopia while rejecting the natural ally thesis.

## Conclusion

The Non-Aligned Movement fed on the rising tide of nationalism in West Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. The movement itself was perceived by articulate and informed West African opinion as an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movement. It was viewed as part of a world-wide nationalist upsurge in the third world. But while it fed on this nationalist upsurge, the Non-Aligned Movement helped in mobilizing world support for the decolonization process in Africa. But it has done more. It has also contributed to the awakening of West African consciousness about the third world. It has done this by dramatizing the common problems facing African and other third world countries and by situating these problems in the nature of the hegemonic world system.

In this way, the Non-Aligned Movement has contributed significantly to strengthening West African commitment to third world solidarity. And it has done this in a period when, through British cultivation of European ties and dithering position on issues of decolonization in Southern Africa, West African interest in the Commonwealth was weakening. Indeed British decision to turn to the EEC was another demonstration of the salience of race in international politics and a blow to the multiracialism of the Commonwealth. For West Africans this development further underscored the importance of non-alignment as an expression both of racial identity and racial solidarity in a world dominated by the white race.

West African re-examination of the relevance of the Commonwealth to the solution of African problems was reflected in the important role which Nigeria played in the establishment of ECOWAS. The resurgence of African interest in regionalism since the mid-1970s is perhaps not unrelated to, and is in any case in the spirit of the notion of collective self-reliance which the Non-Aligned Movement has helped to popularise.

It seems that as the 1980s come to an end, West African interest in non-alignment will receive added impetus. The concern as before will be with global issues in the context of a search for world peace. The agenda deriving from the impetus will include decolonization and the termination of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia; the drive for a new international economic order based on priorities identified and set by the third world; a renewed commitment to multilateralism, including institutional reforms which will take account of third world interest by increasing their representation in multilateral institutions.

The agenda itself is dictated by the aggressive radical conservative revival in Europe and North America in the period since the mid-1970s. This revival has posed, perhaps, the most serious threat ever to the Non-Aligned Movement. For indeed, the radical conservatism of Reagan and Thatcher is anti-the third world and is aimed at nullifying gains which the Non-Aligned Movement and the third world have achieved within the contemporary international system. As the Non-Aligned Movement faces the future therefore, the West African, indeed the African role within the movement will be to work for its institutional cohesion and development so that it can cope with the challenge of the 1990s.

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# The Theory and Practice of Non-Alignment: The Case of the Francophone West and Central African States

*by Guy Martin*

## Introduction

Non-alignment is both a concept and a political movement. Thus, non-alignment is primarily a principle of foreign policy in individual countries. But it is also an informal grouping of nations sharing certain common principles and objectives. In a world system dominated by the two super powers (the United States and the Soviet Union), non-alignment is an expression of the resolve of the smaller nations of Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Pacific to maintain a reasonable degree of political, military and economic independence in foreign policy decisions and actions. Thus, it was quite natural for the former French colonies of West and Central Africa to join the movement when they became independent in the early 1960s. However, while some of these countries retained close political, military and economic ties with France throughout the following decades, others moved away from France towards closer ties with Socialist countries. The purpose of this chapter is to retrace this separate, but unequal, historical evolution and to assess the extent to which the Francophone African states can still be characterised as "non-aligned", using such criteria as diplomatic and military alignment, voting in the United Nations, and economic relations (trade and aid) with developed countries. This will lead us to conclude that by the time of the Eighth Non-Aligned Summit Meeting (Harare, August-September 1986), very few, if any, Francophone African states remain non-aligned in the original sense of the term.

## I. Principles and Evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement

As a principle of foreign policy, non-alignment is essentially an assertion of freedom of judgement and action enabling smaller powers to "deal with each problem as it occurs, and on its own merits" (Nyerere, 1975: 673). The essence of non-alignment is the ability to exercise a reasonable degree of independence of policy and action in world affairs. As a movement, non-alignment is a solidarity of protest, a movement for moderation in East-Western relations, and a commitment to global reform in North-South relations (Mazrui, in Willetts, 1978: xiii). The genesis of non-alignment, as a concept and as a political movement, cannot be dissociated from the basic features of the post-World War II international system. This system is characterised by four basic, interrelated factors: decolonisation, the Cold War, socio-economic underdevelopment and the development of international organisations (Farajalla, 1984: 199). The 1970 Lusaka Declaration adopted at the Third Non-Aligned Summit Conference provides an adequate summary of the fundamental objectives of non-alignment:

( . . . ) the pursuit of world peace and peaceful co-existence by strengthening the role of non-aligned countries within the United Nations so that it will be a more effective instrument against all forms of aggressive action and the threat or use of force against the freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country; the fight against colonialism and racialism which are a negation of human equality and dignity; the settlement of disputes by peaceful means; the ending of the arms race followed by universal disarmament; opposition to great power military alliance and pacts; opposition to the establishment of foreign military bases and foreign troops on the soil of other nations in the context of great power conflicts and colonial and racist suppression; the universality of, and the strengthening of the efficacy of the United Nations; and the struggle for economic independence and mutual co-operation on a basis of equality and mutual benefit.

A careful reading of this summary reveals a number of recurrent themes which still characterise the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to this day.

These are:-

- (1) anti-colonialism;
- (2) anti-racism;
- (3) the preservation of the small states' independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- (4) the quest for world peace, security and disarmament, and the peaceful settlement of disputes;
- (5) the opposition to great power conflicts, military alliances and pacts;
- (6) the promotion of multilateral diplomacy within the framework of the United Nations; and
- (7) economic independence.

Indeed, the 1970 Lusaka Summit Conference constitutes a watershed between the two main historical periods of the movement. From the First Summit Conference (Belgrade, September 1961) to the Lusaka Summit, the non-aligned countries demonstrated a clear tendency to assert themselves as full-fledged actors in the international system. This may be characterized as the "political" period of the Movement. With the progressive realization, after 1970, that political independence and national sovereignty are meaningless without economic independence, the main emphasis of the NAM's declarations and activities has noticeably shifted from the political to the economic domain. What most non-aligned countries have in common is that they are small, weak, underdeveloped and dependent in the contemporary world system. The economic weakness, underdevelopment and dependency of the non-aligned countries is perceived as being as threatening to their independence as Super Power military competition. In Julius Nyerere's words, "The real and urgent threat to the independence of almost all the non-aligned states thus comes not from the military, but from the economic power of the big states" (Nyerere, in Hveem & Willetts, 1974: 4).

To some extent, therefore, the NAM has adapted the main emphasis of its objectives to the changing configuration of power within the world system. During the Cold War era (1945-1960), diplomatic and military alignment with the great powers constituted the main criteria of definition and membership of the NAM. The "detente" between the USA and the USSR throughout the 1960s largely contributed to a decrease of political-strategic factors and brought to light the more

urgent and pressing issue of autonomous socio-economic development. Similarly, the "New Cold War" brought about by the aggressively anti-communist foreign policy of the Reagan administration in the U.S. in the early 1980s has again brought to the fore politico-strategic factors within the NAM. This changing international environment has substantially altered the nature and structure of the NAM which has evolved from a non-military, anti-colonial alliance to a trade union of and for the weak and poor nations. As they progressively acceded to international sovereignty, all Third World nations systematically sought (and obtained) membership in the NAM, just as they automatically became members of the United Nations. This movement has resulted in a quadrupling of the membership of the NAM (from 25 to 101 member states) between the First (Belgrade, September 1961) and the Seventh (New Delhi, March 1983) Summit Meetings. Although three European states and an increasing number of Caribbean and Latin American states are members of the NAM,<sup>2</sup> the bulk of the membership is constituted by relatively small, weak and poor Asian and African states.

This has inevitably brought a measure of diversity and heterogeneity within the NAM in terms of unequal political, military and economic power among member states. Such diversity and heterogeneity has, to some extent, adversely affected the group's cohesion and effectiveness. As considerations of "realpolitik" and national interest generally tend to prevail over NAM solidarity, an increasing number of conflicts have erupted over the last twenty years between NAM member states, the most dramatic of which is undoubtedly the continuing Iran-Iraq war. This has led some Western observers to categorically state that "there is no such thing as 'non-alignment', there are only non-aligned countries" (Lacouture, in Brailard & Djalili, 1984: 110). Such views are, in our opinion, excessive. Ultimately, the NAM is only as strong as its members, and its influence, real and potential, will vary depending upon which issue or criterion its achievement is measured against (Halliday, 1985: 51). The fact remains, however, that Third World countries must necessarily improve the domestic management of their vast economic resources and rationalize and reorient their domestic economic and social policies. This is essential for the non-aligned countries to gain a position of economic strength from which the NAM will be able to make its influence felt in, and to imprint its distinctive mark on, the contemporary international system (Halliday, 1985: 52; Vohra, 1983: 338-9).



## II. The Francophone African States in the Non-Aligned Movement in Historical Perspective

As the 14 constituent territorial units of the French West and Central Africa Federations became independent in the early 1960s,<sup>3</sup> the context and conditions in which such independence was granted insured the perpetuation of France's political, military, economic and cultural dominance over its former colonies (Martin, 1985: 189-192). Yet as early as 1958, a marked cleavage began to appear among these countries between those who eagerly accepted and exploited this situation and those who tried to somewhat mitigate its most negative aspects. The latter (Guinea and Mali) soon joined the "Casablanca Group", a collection of radical, socialist-oriented African states who took a militant stance over the burning political issues of the time, notably the Congo (Zaire) affair. The Casablanca Group also advocated Pan Africanism, namely the immediate and total (i.e. political *and* economic) integration of the African continent. The former, including the other 12 West and Central African countries, known as the "Moderates", constituted successive groupings between 1960 and 1965 whose common objectives were the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, loose economic cooperation (rather than political integration), and the promotion of regionalism as a stepping-stone towards African unity.<sup>4</sup>

With the May 1963 Addis-Ababa Summit Meeting which led to the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), this Radicals/Moderates cleavage among the Francophone African States (FAS) temporarily abated in the face of pressing decolonization issues, only to reappear at regular intervals, and with various degrees of intensity, in the following decades. Furthermore, French Neo-colonialism remains a persistent and crucial factor in the foreign policy of these states. As we have amply demonstrated elsewhere (Martin, 1985), to this day France continues to wield considerable power and influence in the Francophone African countries politically, economically, socially, and culturally, thanks to a tightly-knit network of formal and informal relations. Yet, all these countries without exception are members of the NAM. This raises the delicate issue of the degree and extent to which the FAS can be said to be truly non-aligned in the face of continuing and pervasive French influence on their political and economic systems. Such an evaluation will, of necessity, depend on the definition or criteria used to measure the degree of alignment, or non-alignment. Hveem and Willetts (1974: 7-30) and Willetts (1978) have

developed four indexes of alignment which, when appropriately modified and simplified, might be useful for our purpose. These variables are diplomatic alignment, voting in the United Nations' General Assembly (UN-GA), military alignment and economic alignment (i.e. trade and aid) with developed countries.<sup>5</sup> In the following sections, we shall attempt to evaluate the degree and extent of non-alignment of the Francophone African States members of the NAM in the light of these various criteria.

## III. The Practice of Non-Alignment by the Francophone African States

### 1. Diplomatic Alignment

As indicated above, a nation cannot be considered 'non-aligned' if it has any permanent diplomatic identification with the great powers. Consequently, this section will try to see which of the FAS, by their behaviour, identified themselves with either side of the Cold War in the 1960s. During the decade 1960-1970, four countries of the world were (and three still are) split between the opposing camps of the East-West conflict and have since stabilized into six separate regimes which exercise "de facto" control over their own territory. They are China, Germany, Korea and Vietnam. Therefore, the pattern of relations with the divided states gives an indication of the extent of diplomatic alignment. On the basis of an elaborate index of diplomatic alignment, Hveem and Willetts (1974: 13) and Willetts (1978: 116-127) conclude that over the period 1964 to 1970, 9 of the 14 FAS were either moderately or highly (Cameroon, Gabon and Togo) aligned to the West; two (2) (Guinea and Mali) have been consistently aligned to the East; two (2) others (Congo and Mauritania) have progressively become pro-East; one (1) (the Central African Republic/CAR) is non-aligned. A close scrutiny of the general diplomatic behaviour of the FAS since 1970 reveals a number of significant changes in this overall pattern. Eight (8) states are either moderately (Cameroon, Chad, Mauritania and Niger) or highly (CAR, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo) aligned to the West; three (3) (Congo, Guinea and Mali) have consistently been aligned to the East; two (2) others (Benin and Burkina Faso) have recently become pro-East.

### 2. Voting in the United Nations General Assembly

As emphasized in the Lusaka Declaration, the United Nations is of great

importance to the non-aligned countries. Since these countries are generally small, weak and endowed with limited human and financial resources, the UN-GA provides them with a convenient forum and a useful arena of activity. Thus, it enables these countries to actively participate in the debates and decisions relating to major world issues on an equal footing with the big powers, in spite of the limited resources at their disposal.

A quantitative analysis of the voting pattern of the FAS in the UN-GA reveals that between 1964 and 1970, 7 states were Western-aligned, three (3) (Cameroon, Chad and Senegal) were Non-aligned, and three (3) others (Guinea, Mali and Mauritania) were Eastern-aligned (Hveem & Willetts, 1974: 36-40). These findings are, on the whole, consistent with those relating to diplomatic alignment for the same period. A global analysis of the general voting pattern of these states in the UN-GA since 1970 reveals, by and large, a close correspondence with the changing pattern of diplomatic behaviour noted above. Taking voting in the UN-GA on the issues of Afghanistan and Kampuchea as an indicator of Eastern alignment, one observes that during the period 1980 to 1984 when these issues were raised yearly, countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso and the Congo have consistently abstained on the Afghanistan vote, and have cast negative votes (i.e. favourable to the Soviet position) on the Kampuchea issue. (*Laidi, 1986: 256-260*).

### 3. Military Alignment

As the Lusaka Declaration clearly indicates, a fundamental dimension of non-alignment includes the opposition to arms race and to the establishment of foreign military bases and foreign troops in third world countries. Indeed, the June 1961 Cairo preparatory meeting to the First Non-Aligned Summit had put forward the most widely accepted definition of non-alignment still recognized to this day. Among the main criteria of non-alignment outlined in that definition were the abjuring of multilateral military alliances concluded in the context of great power conflicts, the refusal to conclude a bilateral alliance with a great power, and the refusal to permit the establishment of foreign military bases for purposes related to great power conflicts (Brailard and Djalili, 1984: 102; Vohra, 1983: 144). Thus, any NAM member state who concludes any such bilateral or multilateral military alliance, or allows the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil would automatically disqualify as a "bona fide" member of the Movement. Yet when one

takes a close look at the pattern of bilateral and multilateral military alliance of the FAS, the global picture which emerges is one of a high degree of military alignment on the West in general, and on France in particular. Between 1960 and 1965, all Francophone West and Central African States (except Guinea and Mali) were militarily linked to France. This was done within the framework of fairly loose "Regional Defence Councils" set up within each region as a multilateral military alliance designed to harmonize and integrate the military infrastructure of the various countries of the regions under the overall authority and supervision of France (Chaigneau, 1984: 23). More importantly, France has, since 1960, concluded a number of bilateral Defence Agreements and Military Technical Assistance Agreements with most FAS. These agreements have been renegotiated and extended in the mid-1970s without significant changes. In addition, France maintains a number of military bases, troops and military advisors in those countries, with which she occasionally conducts joint military manoeuvres. Finally, France remains the single most important arms exporter to these countries. Table I presents a global view of French military commitments in Francophone Africa. This data clearly demonstrates that all the FAS (except Guinea) maintain Military Technical Assistance Agreements with France. While a number of these states (Benin, Burkina, Congo, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) seem, on the whole, to remain on the periphery of this military alliance system, a nucleus among them (Cameroon, CAR, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo) have also concluded Defence Agreements, harbour French military bases, are host to a number of French troops and military advisors, and import the bulk of their arms requirements from France. This elaborate network of defence and military assistance agreements and logistical support structures has enabled the French army to intervene about 20 times in Africa during the twenty-year period 1963-1983 (Martin, 1985: 204-5). The basic objective of this network is the continued integration of the Francophone States within the framework of French geo-strategic planning and, ultimately, within the Western defence system of NATO and the Atlantic alliance (Luckham, 1982c: 58; Martin, 1985: 206-7). More generally, the military arrangements made with the African states are part of the dense network of economic, political and cultural cooperation agreements through which the latter are tied to France.

A survey of the main sources of arms deliveries to the FAS over the period 1976 to 1980 (table II) tends, on the whole, to confirm this over-all pattern of military alliances. What clearly emerges from this data is that those states which have been identified as remaining on the fringe of the French military alliance system get the bulk of their arms requirements from the USSR (Benin, Congo, Guinea and Mali) or, exceptionally, from West Germany or the United Kingdom (Burkina and Togo). The same data reveals that the FAS get 46.3 per cent of their arms requirements from the West (including 42 per cent from France alone), and 26.6 per cent from the Soviet Union. Out of a total expenditure of 940 million US\$ over the period 1976-1980 for all 14 FAS (which represents 11.2 per cent of total arms deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa), the heaviest spenders (in percentage of total expenditure) are the Ivory Coast (26.6 per cent), Mali (12.8 per cent), and Gabon (11.7 per cent). Finally, it should be noted that Congo is the only country of the region with which the USSR has concluded, on 13 May 1981, a "Friendship and Cooperation Treaty" which does not, however, include a military assistance clause.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, the general picture which emerges from this survey is that five (5) FAS (Cameroon, CAR, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Senegal) demonstrate a high degree of military alignment on France and the West. Another five (5) (Burkina, Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Togo) are moderately aligned in the same direction, while the remaining four (4) (Benin, Congo, Guinea and Mali) are distinctively aligned to the East. This predominantly Western-aligned military pattern has not, however, prevented the existence of tensions and the outbreak of conflicts among the states of the region. Thus a brief, but violent armed conflict has recently erupted between Burkina Faso and Mali over the Agacher border area (25-30 December 1985), which resulted in a total of 300 casualties. This conflict between two West African states, members of the NAM has occurred within a context of shifting alliances in which Mali apparently obtained military and logistical support from France while Burkina Faso is progressively turning to the Socialist countries for military assistance (Martin, 1986).

#### 4. Economic Alignment: Trade and Aid

As we have seen above, the 1970 Lusaka Summit Conference constituted a watershed between the political and economic periods of the NAM. The latter came with the realisation by the member states of the ab-

solute necessity to achieve economic independence, in addition to political independence, in order to give its full meaning to the concept of "sovereignty". Hence the quest for autonomous, self-reliant development at the national level, and for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) at the international level, as priority objectives pursued by the NAM. The question arises as to whether and to what extent the FAS are truly non-aligned economically, i.e. are able to pursue a relatively independent strategy of development without being overly dependent on one bloc or the other. In a world system characterised by increasing economic interdependence, Third World nations need to engage in commercial relations with, and to resort to the economic assistance of, developed capitalist or socialist countries if they are to survive and develop economically and socially. In so doing, however, they must endeavour to strike a delicate balance between the two blocs lest they might fall in the dependency trap.

In the area of trade, the destination of exports and origin of imports are generally accepted as reasonable indicators of dependency. Looking at the trade of the FAS with developed capitalist countries and with socialist countries respectively (table III), it becomes quite clear that these states are still overwhelmingly dependent on the West in this area, both for their exports and for their imports. One notes a high degree of Western dependence in such countries as Cameroon, CAR, Gabon and a lesser, but still significant, degree of Western dependence in Benin, Congo, Guinea, Mauritania and Togo. Trade between the FAS and the Socialist countries is negligible. Except in the case of Burkina and Mali, commercial transactions between the two groups of states remain at a symbolic level. It is noteworthy that such staunchly capitalist countries as Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo conduct a small, but not insignificant, proportion of their trade with Socialist countries. The available data thus reveals a rather unorthodox pattern of trade alignment. While such avowedly socialist countries as Benin, Congo and Guinea are Western-dependent to a significant degree, a number of capitalist countries also trade with the East. The analysis of aid patterns might provide a more balanced view of these economic relations.

A survey of the aid data (table III) shows that, on the whole, the FAS remain highly dependent on Western aid. Thus, aid to these states by 17 member states of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) consistently represented, on average, over 60 per cent of total

disbursements to these countries between 1980 and 1984. While a number of states' dependency in 1980 exceeded 80 per cent (Ivory Coast, Benin and Cameroon), this dependency was, on the whole, reduced in 1984 but remains significant (above 70 per cent on average) for some states (Gabon, Senegal, Benin and Cameroon). It should be noted that the global amount of aid by the DAC countries to the African countries has substantially decreased (by about 60 per cent) between 1980 and 1984. During the same period, aid by the socialist countries members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to the FAS has been negligible. While this aid amounted to only 2 million US \$ in 1980 (to all African states combined), it is increased to 18.6 million in 1984, which still represented only one per cent of total Western aid for the same year. Regular beneficiaries of Eastern aid have been Benin, Congo, Guinea and Mali. The greatest beneficiaries of such aid in 1984 have been Guinea (8 million US \$) and the Congo (7 million). Another source indicates that in 1984, Guinea obtained Soviet aid amounting to US \$232 million, which represents over twice the amount of all aid received by this country during that year (i.e. 129 million) (Laidi, 1986: 244). Overall, the pattern of Socialist aid to African countries is consistent with the politico-ideological orientation of these countries, the bulk of this aid going, except in special circumstances (Mali, Mauritania and Senegal) to socialist-oriented countries. It is noteworthy in this regard that Burkina, which had never been a beneficiary of socialist aid, received US \$200 000 in 1984 following the coming to power of the socialist-leaning Revolutionary regime of Captain Thomas Sankara in August 1983 (Martin, 1986). On balance, however, Eastern aid pales in significance by comparison with Western aid. Paradoxically, a number of socialist-oriented African countries such as Benin and the Congo remain highly dependent on Western aid.

#### **IV. Summary and Evaluation: How "non-aligned" are the Francophone African States?**

It might be useful, at this point, to summarise our findings on the degree and extent to which the FAS conform to the various criteria of non-alignment which have been identified in this study (table IV). On the diplomatic/UN voting dimension, a fairly consistent pattern emerges whereby 5 states (CAR, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo) are highly aligned to the West; 4 other states (Cameroon, Chad, Mauritania

and Niger) are moderately Western-aligned, while the remaining 5 (Benin, Burkina, Congo, Guinea and Mali) have been either consistently or progressively aligned to the East. On the military dimension, it has been found that 5 states (Cameroon, CAR, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Senegal) are highly Western-aligned, another 5 (Burkina, Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Togo) are moderately Western-aligned, while the remaining 4 (Benin, Congo, Guinea and Mali) are distinctly aligned to the East. On the economic dimension one observes, in the area of trade, a greater degree of Western dependence in some states (Cameroon, CAR and Gabon) than in others (Benin, Congo, Guinea, Mauritania and Togo), while trade between the FAS and the Socialist countries is negligible. Finally, aid dependency on the West is greater for some states (Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Senegal) than for others. The main beneficiaries of the limited amounts of Eastern aid available have been Benin, Congo, Guinea and Mali. The economic dimension reveals an unusual alignment pattern. Thus, a number of socialist African countries such as Benin, the Congo and Guinea are moderately to highly Western dependent in trade and aid, while various capitalist countries (Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo) have some trade relations with the East.

The overall conclusion that might be drawn from these findings (as summarised in table IV) is that on the politico-diplomatic and military dimensions, all FAS but 4 (Benin, Congo, Guinea and Mali) are either moderately or highly Western-aligned, the others being Eastern-aligned. On the economic dimension, all these states (except Guinea) are moderately to highly Western-aligned. On the basis of this evidence, one might conclude that while the FAS are all members of the NAM, they are in fact, according to our criteria, aligned to the West for the majority of them, and to the East for only 4 of them. Consequently, they cannot be considered to be genuinely "non-aligned". Such a conclusion, however, is somewhat disputable in that it is based on criteria which, on the whole, are more rigid than those used by the NAM itself for admission in the Movement. Thus, since France is not one of the great powers, its bilateral and multilateral military arrangements with the FAS cannot be considered, strictly speaking, as constituting a Cold War alliance. Ultimately, it all boils down to which criteria are being used to measure the degree of the FAS alignment or non-alignment, and to how strictly these criteria are applied. Thus, while the FAS might qualify as "bona fide" non-aligned coun-

tries when using the loose and permissive membership criteria of the NAM, they certainly do not meet our own tighter and more stringent criteria.

We are of the opinion that through their tight and continuing political, military and economic relations with the Western countries in general, and with France in particular, the majority of the Francophone African States are indeed distinctly Western-aligned. Consequently, any claim to the contrary on their part should be dismissed as mere political window-dressing designed to give to the outside world the impression that they are not really involved in East-West rivalries and conflicts. In other words, these states are merely presenting a façade of non-alignment while in actual fact they are clearly Western-aligned.

Similarly, one might argue that such states as Benin, Burkina, Congo, Guinea and Mali are unquestionably aligned to the East and do not, therefore, belong in the NAM. The case of the socialist Francophone African States should, however, be viewed in its proper politico-strategic and economic context. Thus while these states (except for Mali) openly adhere to the Marxist-Leninist ideology and proclaim their resolve to build socialism in their countries, their external economic relations are in fact heavily Western-oriented. This situation therefore introduces some kind of balance, or equilibrium, between their Eastern-oriented politico-strategic relations, and their Western-oriented economic relations. While this might have serious implications for their ability to maintain genuine and consistent socialist policies at home and abroad, it does place them in a convenient position of "equidistance" between East and West which is of the essence of non-alignment. On this account, these five countries might be viewed as more genuinely non-aligned than the other, Western-aligned Francophone African States.

## Conclusion

What, then, is the future of the Francophone African States within the Non-Aligned Movement? It is our conviction that as long as they remain aligned on the West, the FAS can only have, at best, a very limited impact on the Movement. Because their room for manoeuvre is extremely limited, and their credibility seriously affected, they are actually not in a position to take meaningful initiatives and to significantly influence decisions within the Movement. Because of their greater degree of equidistance between the two blocs, the socialist FAS might be in a bet-

ter position to take such initiatives and to be more active and influential within the NAM. Ultimately, the achievement of a reasonable degree of power and influence by all the Francophone African States in the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as in the wider international system, will depend on these states' capacity to significantly decrease their overall dependence on the West in general, and on France in particular, and thus to progressively become more autonomous and self-reliant in all areas. In the final analysis, the FAS will have to build a much stronger and healthier domestic economic base if they are to gain, one day, their rightful place in the concert of nations.

## Notes

1. *Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Independence, Developments, Co-operation and Democratisation of International Relations* adopted by the Third Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Lusaka (Zambia), 10 September 1970, pp. 67-68.
2. The three European member states of the NAM are Yugoslavia, Malta and Cyprus. In addition, there are now seven (7) Caribbean and ten (10) Latin American NAM member states.
3. The present study will focus exclusively on the 14 Francophone West and Central African States to the exclusion of (a) North African states formerly under French tutelage (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia); (b) former French colonies situated in East Africa and the Indian Ocean (Comoros, Djibouti and Madagascar); and (c) former Belgian colonies (Burundi, Rwanda and Zaïre). These 14 states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic/CAR, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
4. Among these groupings, the most significant were the Brazzaville Group (December 1960), the Monrovia Group (May 1961), and OCAM (Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne) (February 1965).
5. It should be noted (a) that Hveem and Willetts (1974: 7) use only trade, to the exclusion of aid, as an economic indicator of alignment; and (b) that we present here a much simplified version of the Hveem/Willetts (1974) and Willetts (1978) models which leaves out the more mathematical and statistical elements of these models. The quantitatively-minded reader might wish to refer to the original models as outlined by these authors in their respective works.
6. The absence of a military clause in the Soviet-Congolese treaty seems to be due to the fact that Congo adamantly refused to accede to Soviet pressures for the granting of access rights to the naval facilities at Pointe-Noire, in the true spirit of non-alignment (Laidi, 1986: 252).

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Table I: French Military Commitments in Francophone Africa (as at 1st January 1984)

Country	French Bases (B)	Defence Agreements (D)	Joint Military Manoeuvres (M)	Military Technical Assistance Agreement (TA)	French in bases and Military Installations (Nr.)	Number of French Military Advisers (Jan 1980)	Share of Arms Import Purchased From France % 1970/80
Benin				TA		0	4.4
Burkina Faso				TA		18	47.5
Cameroon		D (2)		TA	60	75	34.5
CAR	B	D (2)		TA	1,100	32	98.1
Chad				TA (3)		81	98.4
Congo				TA		8	24.7
Gabon	B	D	M	TA	500	132	52.7
Guinea				TA			17.5
Ivory Coast	B	D	M	TA	500	111	57.4
Mali				TA			
Mauritania				TA		44	4.5
Niger				TA		63	1.2
Senegal	B	D	M	TA	1,200	40	97.0
Togo		D (2)	M	TA		71	56.9

Source: Luckham, 1982a:99; 1982c:57, Chaigneau; 1984: 113-4

1. Includes both bases and garrisons.

2. Cameroon and Togo agreements not published; that with the CAR was probably abrogated before the 1979 coup against Bokassa, but was subsequently restored.

3. Abrogated in the course of 1980.

Table II: World Arms Deliveries to Franchophone Africa, 1976 — 1980  
(in millions of current US\$)

Country	Global	USA	USSR	France	United Kingdom	Federal Republic of Germany
Benin	30		20		5	10
Burkina Faso	30					
Cameroon	20	20				
CAR	10					
Chad	10		5	5		
Congo	70		60	60		
Gabon	110		5			
Guinea	50		50			
Ivory Coast	250			200		
Mali	120		110			
Mauritania	90			40		
Niger	40			40		
Senegal	70			30		
Togo	40			20		5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>940</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>15</b>

Source: Foltz & Bienen, 1985 : 40 - 41

Table III: Economic Relations (Trade & Aid) of Francophone African Countries with Developed Capitalist Countries and with Socialist Countries, 1980-1984

Countries and with Socialist Countries; 1980-1983

Exports (destinat.)

Imports (Origin)

Total Net Disbursements by DAC Countries Combined (5)

Total Net Disbursements by CMEA Countries Combined (6)

Developed Countries Total %

Socialist Countries %

Developed Countries Total %

Socialist Countries %

1980 (US \$ million)

% of Total

1984 (US \$ million)

% of Total

1980 (US \$ million)

% of Total

1984 (US \$ million)

% of Total

Benin (4)

Burkina Faso (4)

Cameroon (3)

CAR (1)

Chad (3)

Congo (1)

Gabon (1)

Guinea (4)

Ivory Coast (3)

Mali (1) (4)

Mauritania (4) (1)

Niger (2)

Senegal (2)

Togo (2)

Total

93.5

34.6

89.2

97.6

65.4

76.2

86.7

93.7

74.5

70.0

79.2

64.4

37.5

76.6

0.0

11.4

0.4

0.6

0.0

0.1

1.8

0.0

3.2

15.0

0.0

0.0

1.1

1.5

60.8

61.2

85.3

89.1

67.1

77.5

93.6

65.3

63.8

54.2

74.2

55.3

62.0

80.1

-

2.5

3.3

1.1

-

2.5

1.7

0.0

2.1

-

-

1.7

4.8

4.4

331.9

164.9

604.8

93.4

19.5

46.6

-36.4

71.7

771.0

133.0

42.1

172.4

340.9

110.3

2 902.5

82.8

72.4

82.5

72.2

56.2

55.7

-

53.6

84.0

49.4

25.3

66.7

77.0

61.0

1 745.7

77.9

64.6

73.5

59.1

50.3

57.5

81.4

28.4

51.8

68.4

43.1

58.2

78.2

51.8

2.9

0.5(1981)

-

-

-

-

0.2

-

0.3

-

1.0

-

-

-

-

0.4

-

-

-

-

0.2

-

0.2

-

0.4

-

-

-

-

1.0

0.2

-

-

-

7.0

-

8.0

-

2.0

0.3(1983)

-

0.1(1983)

-

18.6

0.6

0.1

-

-

-

6.0

-

6.2

-

0.6

0.1

0.02

-

-

Source: UNCTAD, *Handbook of international trade & development statistics, 1983 supplement* (New York, 1985), pp. 110-133; OECD, *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1981/1984* (Paris, 1986), pp. 26-29 & various tables; OECD, *Geographical Distribution* (.), 1980/83 (Paris, 1984), various tables.

(1) 1980; (2) 1981; (3) 1982; (4) 1983;

(5) Includes the 17 most developed capitalist countries

(6) Includes 7 Socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

Table IV: Overall Pattern of Alignment of the Francophone African States, 1960 — 1984

	Diplomatic/UN Voting Alignment			Military Alignment			Economic Alignment					
							Trade			Aid		
	High West	Moderate West	East	High West	Moderate West	East	High West	Moderate West	East	High West	Moderate West	East
Benin			X			X	X			X		
Burkina Faso			X		X			X			X	
Cameroon		X		X			X			X		
CAR				X			X				X	
Chad		X			X		X			X		
Congo			X			X	X				X	
Gabon	X			X								
Guinea			X			X			X			X
Ivory Coast			X					X		X		
Mali	X		X			X		X			X	
Mauritania		X			X						X	
Niger		X			X		X				X	
Senegal	X			X				X			X	
Togo	X						X					

Source: Author's Computation

## CHAPTER THREE

## Non-Alignment: the East African Perspective


by D. Katete Orwa

### The Situation in East Africa Up to 1964

Both the Bandung (1955) and the Belgrade Conferences on non-alignment took place when none of the then East African territories had attained independence. At the time of the Belgrade Summit meeting only Tanganyika was due to become independent. But after that the decolonisation process moved very fast with Uganda acceding to statehood in 1962, Kenya in 1963 and Zanzibar in 1964. This acceleration is explained in part by the growing internationalisation of Non-Aligned Movement and the advocacy for "national independence based on peaceful coexistence" and support of "national liberation movements . . ." (Mortimer, 1984:12).

Propelling the movement was the international fear borne out of the threatening cold war and the development of more deadly nuclear weapons which could not discriminate enemy from friend, or participant from neutralist. The threat appeared real when the international system that previously had been based on a multipolar power system became a bipolar power system (Waltz, 1979: Chapter 6) dominated by two superpowers — the Soviet Union as the leader of the Warsaw Pact and the United States of America as the head of spiralling North-South military bloc. There was therefore no doubt after 1949 that each of the superpowers wished to incorporate much of the uncommitted World into its own sphere of influence, a prospect that threatened not only national independence but also aspirations for self-determination and independence among those territories still bearing the yoke of imperialism.

## Bipolar System after World War II



What emerged out of Bandung and Belgrade can be reduced to four basic principles of international behaviour. First, non-alignment accepts plurality as a fact in international system. Second, it opposes war and favours seeking international goals by peaceful means. Third, it seeks a viable coalition that can constitute a third middle pole to mediate between East-West military blocs whose bipolar relations threaten international peace. Finally, the third pole coalition can only succeed in creating a new international order characterised by equitable interdependence if it rejected permanent alliance with either the Warsaw Pact or NATO military blocs and by being actively involved individually and collectively in international affairs (see Thompson, 1969: 187-188; Subrahmanyam, 1984; Othman, 1982:1; Sanu, 1977: 2-4).

The impact of the ideas of Non-Aligned Movement that emerged from Bandung and Belgrade had an immediate effect on nationalist leaders in East Africa. Ruth E. Meena notes that the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) set out:

twelve Party objectives, six specifically define the norms which would guide the international process between Tanzania and the rest of the international community. Defence of the Nation's independence and safeguarding the freedom of its people were the core objectives of the Party and Government internally, while African freedom and unity, and world peace were the general objectives in external relations (Meena, 1981: 6).

Professor S.S. Mushi has observed that "non-alignment was the main guiding principle in [Tanzania's] foreign policy during the 1961-1966 period" (Mushi, 1981:51). This meant that Tanzania's foreign policy would be one of independent action. The country would not commit itself to either side of "ideological and power quarrels of the world . . ." Diplomatic interactions would be conducted on the basis of equality with no one friend being "exclusive" (Nyerere, 1968: 368-369).

For Tanzania non-alignment is an assertion of "national independence", rejection of superpower military alliances and call for equitable economic co-operation between Tanzania and the developed world of the North (Mushi, 1968:54). Nyerere explained economic non-alignment to be a policy that avoided exclusive state ownership of the means of production found in the East as well as the capitalism practised in the Western bloc, the former because it severely curtailed individual freedom and the latter because it aggravated inequality. (Nyerere, 1968: 192-193). Oscar Kambona had already in 1963 declared that "the major conflict of our age is the struggle between capitalist and socialist systems of economy. Tanzania's economy is non-aligned" in that the economy lay between capitalist and socialist economies (Kambona, 1968: 1-3). In 1970 Nyerere recalled what non-alignment meant in the 1960s. He observed that as early as 1961 non-alignment could not be treated as a temporary development. As an expression of the non-aligned's determination not to become "willing participants in the cold war struggle, while participating effectively in "world affairs" by promoting "peace and freedom" without necessarily joining as "permanent allies of any big Power", non-alignment had become a reality of international politics (Nyerere, 1970: 1-4).

Similar views were also prevalent in Kenya where the two dominant nationalist parties, Kenya African National Union (KANU) and African Democratic Union (KANU) declared their commitment to non-alignment as early as 1961. In its 1961 Election Manifesto KANU declared that the division of the world into an Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union and a Western one led by the United States of America was a hinderance "to the development of world peace and welfare". Thus the party rejected "this division of the world into camps in which Superpowers provide the philosophy, way of life and the wherewithall of life in their own camps or spheres". Thus, in line with the emerging non-alignment attitudes, KANU declared that a KANU-led government would pursue a "policy of non-alignment with either East or West

military blocs" and no "foreign military bases" would be allowed in Kenya, because Kenya would not be transformed into a battleground in the event of an East/West military conflict". Nor would Kenya allow its territory to be "used by NATO or British in any localized conflicts involving NATO or British forces in any part of Africa, Asia or the Middle East". For this reason an independent Kenya would act immediately to dismantle the British military base at Kahawa in Nairobi (KANU Manifesto, 1961: 28-30).

Taking more or less the same line of argument KADU declared that the foreign policy of a KADU government would be guided by (a) the "interest and welfare of our nation" (b) maintenance of "peace" and non-alignment with any power blocs" (c) pursuit of friendly relation with all states of the World and (d) refusal to permit the establishment of "foreign [military] bases on our soil" (KADU Manifesto, 1961: 6). It therefore, did not matter which of the two dominant nationalist parties assumed political power in 1963. Kenyan nationalists, like their counterparts in Tanzania and Uganda, accepted the policy of non-alignment and wished to pursue the policy of "Positive Independence" by which they meant active participation in international affairs, a refusal to compromise "truth and right", a rejection of neutralism in major international issues because there could not be any neutral ground between right and justice, on the one hand, and wrong and inhumanity, on the other; and opposition to "imperialism, neocolonialism, racialism and all forms of foreign or national oppression" (KANU Constitution 1960: 1-2; Orwa, 1984: 7-8; see also KANU Manifesto, 1961: 27-28).

After independence, Kenya, like Tanzania and Uganda, formally adopted non-alignment as the basis of its global policy. Thus in 1965 Kenyatta wrote in the forward to the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development's Sessional Paper No. 10 on *African Socialism and its Planning in Kenya* that "we rejected both Western Capitalism and Eastern Communism and chose for ourselves a policy of positive non-alignment" (Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965:1). The 1969 KANU Election Manifesto declared that the government had continued "to adhere to the policy on non-alignment" by persistently seeking "to diversify both the markets for our exports and sources of our imports whether of goods, capital or manpower" (KANU Manifesto, 1969:22).

The late Tom Mboya who dominated policy-making in Kenya between 1963 and 1969, first as Minister for Constitutional Affairs and,

second, as Minister of Economic Planning and Development had elaborated the policy in 1964. In a speech at Makerere University on 17 August 1964 Mboya said that isolationism or neutralism as postures in international affairs did not fit in Kenya's foreign policy. Kenya "belonged to the growing 'Third World' which believed in the policy of positive non-alignment". He accepted as valid the President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere's advice that "the poor countries of the world should . . . not allow themselves to be used as tools of any of the rich countries", whether capitalist or socialist. He explained that to Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda "Non-alignment means that we are not going to take sides permanently and automatically with either the Western bloc or the Eastern bloc" (Mboya, 1970:234).

The now well discussed Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism gives a further insight into the conception of non-alignment in Kenya. The document is generally associated with Mboya. The word "African" here is used to denote a rejection of all attempts to transplant "a foreign ideology" in Kenya. The word is further used to define an indigenous "African political and economic system that is positively African". In such a system a status of "a satellite relationship with any other country or group of countries" would negate "the political and economic independence" of the country and the people. When carried to its final conclusion, political and economic non-alignment means in Kenya a readiness to borrow from any country technology and "economic methods . . . without commitment; to seek and accept financial assistance from any source — without strings; and to participate fully in world trade — without political domination". (Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965: 2-3, 8-9).

From a theoretical standpoint Kenya and Tanzania hold a common position on the essentials of non-alignment. Both reject "foreign ideology"; advocate the pursuit of African socialism; subscribe to the principle of not permitting the establishment of foreign military bases in their respective countries; and do not belong to any permanent military alliance (see Nyerere, 1968:368-69; Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965:2; Mushi, 1981:54; KANU Election Manifesto, 1979:8). Consensus also exists on the view that ideological affinity is not a necessary condition for membership in the non-aligned grouping (Nyerere, 1970:4) and that economic imperialism represents the greatest threat to national independence (Nyerere, 1970:5; Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965: 8-9; KANU Manifesto, 1969: 22; Kambona, 1963). They are also unanimous



in their commitment to decolonisation and to the dismantling of apartheid in Azania.

Kenya and Tanzania also take a common stand on the issue of a New International Economic Order. Harub Othman has underscored the contribution of Tanzania on this matter. He notes that the 1970 Lusaka Conference of the Non-Aligned States marked "the beginning of cries for social justice and equality in international economic relations" (Othman, 1982:7), a view shared by Robert Martimer (1984). Othman observes that the Tanzania paper "Cooperation against Poverty" presented to the Lusaka Conference had far reaching effect. The paper's call for the establishment of a "trade union of the poor" which would struggle with the rich for a just international economic order did not end in Lusaka. Its theme on a united action of the poor against the rich formed the basic theme of the 1973 Algiers Conference (Othman, 1982:7-8). In Kenya, the 1979 KANU Election Manifesto echoed this very theme by insisting that the movement for a new International Economic Order is a "struggle for the establishment [of] stability [and] justice". Hence the movement for a New International Economic Order is a corollary to economic non-alignment (KANU Manifesto, 1979:9; See also Nyerere, 1970:9). It was also in this spirit that Kenya contributed the concept of "Exclusive Economic Zone" to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Sen, 1978:9).

By and large, however, there exists divergence between Kenya and Tanzania with respect to the application and operation of non-alignment, although they seem to have converged somewhat in the early 1960s. In 1964 Kenya closed down the British military base at Kahawa in Nairobi in line with its policy of non-alignment (Mboya, 1970:237), while Tanzania took a hard decision to forego West Germany's economic and technical assistance to uphold the policy of independent action in international affairs by allowing East Germany to open a diplomatic mission in Dar-es-Salaam against West Germany's opposition (Nyerere, 1968: 190-91; 187-206). In the first few years of independence Kenya, like Tanzania, established diplomatic relations with a number of socialist countries including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. By 1966, due to misinformation from the British High Commission and Embassy of the United States of America (see Attwood, 1967), it had broken diplomatic relations with the Peoples' Republic of China and Czechoslovakia and rejected Soviet military and economic assistance (see Okumu, 1973). It was also about

the time of these developments that non-alignment received a new interpretation through a "policy of equidistance". The use of non-alignment as a means of reducing dependence on the capitalist Western world was reduced to a principle. Emphasis shifted to what officials call a "coincidence of interests" between Kenya and market economies.

Consequently, as Tanzania took steps to diversify its international trading partners by going East and the Far East in addition to the traditional West, Kenya entrenched its Western links. Kenya objected, that a policy of balance between the Socialist camp and the Capitalist bloc would not be in the best interest of the state and would be inconsistent with national development strategies. This position also explains the difference between the two countries in their pursuit of African socialism. In Tanzania African socialism meant what I call the indigenisation of the economy so as to achieve social justice. In Kenya African Socialism means, first, limitation to mass access to the means of production; second, development in partnership of the local bourgeoisie and the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Thus the redistribution of resources would be a gradual process obeying the law of "trickle down effect".

Divergence also exists on the issue of foreign military bases. Tanzania interprets non-alignment to mean abstention from all forms of military arrangements with the super powers as well as the big powers that may call into question national independence, security and sovereignty. Kenya, on the other hand, limits military non-alignment to mean two things (a) a refusal to become a permanent ally in either the Warsaw pact or NATO and (b) a refusal to permit permanent basing by any foreign power. Hence, to have bilateral military treaty with either Britain or the United States, to allow bilateral military treaty with either Britain or the United States, to allow British forces to hold exercises in Kenya, and to grant the United States' Rapid Development Force access to Kenya's military facilities in time of need are not inconsistent with the policy of non-alignment just in the same way that to choose closer political, economic and social cooperation with the capitalist bloc does not take away from being non-aligned as long as there are no impositions from outside.

Whether or not Kenya is non-aligned, as is officially maintained, is a matter of individual opinion and perspective. H. Hveem and P.W. Willetts concluded in 1973 that Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are non-aligned (Hveem and Willetts, 1973:13, 15, 25). I take a non-aligned country to be one which makes concerted effort to balance all its tran-

sactions *more or less* between the East and the West. Tanzania is such a country. A mere diplomatic representation in a socialist country, accompanied with low level cultural, economic, social and political interactions, is not enough to qualify a country as non-aligned. In the same vein, to be involved in a bilateral military arrangement that calls for the presence of super power troops in one's country is not consistent with non-alignment.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

# Non-Alignment and National Security in the North African and Arab World

by Abdel Monem El Maschat

### Introduction

There is no doubt that the North African and Arab regional system confronts severe international and regional crisis which affects negatively its international role. A regional system such as the Arab one which enjoys many characteristics of an integrated system should have been more involved in world politics especially Third World politics. However, the Arab role in both arenas is becoming more limited. This is more true if we examine the role of the Arabs in the Non-Alignment Movement.

It is well known that Egypt — under Nasser — initiated with India and Yugoslavia non-alignment in the mid 1950s. After the Bandung Conference, Egypt encouraged most of the Arab States to participate in the movement. This policy continued until Nasser's death in September 1970. By 1974/75 the role of the Arabs in the movement had declined under the pressure of the two major issues, national security and inter-Arab tensions and conflicts. Hence, this paper deals with the two issues respectively.

### 1. Arab National Security

Recent developments in the Arab region require that a thorough and comprehensive analysis should take place for better understanding of the contemporary crisis of Arab security. Some of these developments are Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the war between Iraq and Iran, the Islamic resurgence, the Intra-Palestinian conflict, the enormous aspects of discrepancies among the

Arab countries, the dilemma of democracy in the Arab world, and the unequal distribution of wealth between the Arab world. Associated with all this, is the anticipated end of the oil boom and its impact of the structure of the Arab region.

National security is coming to the forefront of academic and political interests. It is true that one glance at the national security literature discloses that in the period between mid-1960s and mid-1970s there was very little interest in studying national security. However, one can distinguish between three periods where national security occupied the core of interest in international politics i.e. the period between the end of the World War II and mid-1950s; early 1960s; and since 1970s up to now.

Such an oscillation can be explained in the light of the changes in the nature of the relations between the super powers, the conflict ridden spots of the world, and the increased awareness of the limits to power in world politics.

Another issue of great importance to our study is the concept of multiple sources of threat. Traditionally, threat to national security was perceived to be generated externally. Most recently, threat is seen to be both external and internal. Moreover, it is becoming important to distinguish in the study of threat perception between principal sources and secondary sources of threat. While the former requires immediate and urgent allocation of resources including designing a confrontation strategy, the latter may be postponed until national resources can be mobilised. Principal threat in periods of high domestic tension would be looked at as secondary threats, while secondary threats would emerge as the principle ones. It may be an attempt to diffuse the domestic awareness concerning the principal threats for a while or to occupy the public with causes of less importance to them so as to be less tense and more obedient.

It may be useful in this context to define national security as the capacity of the society to protect individuals, groups and nations from the physical and socio-economic dangers and damages and/or the threat of such dangers by both systematic and attributional conditions. This capacity manifests itself in the ability of the society to overcome the grinding nature of fear from the danger of violence.


## Principal Sources of Threat to Arab National Security

Israel and the incompetence of the Arab regimes, politically and socially, form the principal sources of threat to Arab National Security.

### a) Israel as an Intruder into the Arab System.

Up to the end of 1977, Egypt, being the central regional power in the Arab region, tried to maximize the centripetal forces and minimize the centrifugal forces. However, the rapprochement between Egypt and Israel, formally generated in 1977, has the effect of intensifying the centrifugal forces when Israel was permitted to design the patterns of the regional interactions. The following chart 1 shows the strategy of the intruder onto an integrative system. The intruder, that is, Israel is in protected conflict not only with the central power but also with all members of the system. It does not share with them their identity, or the regional consensus or the political interactions. It becomes a truly exogenous actor which tries to create an interaction with the central power either through offences or dependancy or both.

Chart 1



The Arab region did not have the capability to respond to the Israeli challenge especially after the 1967 defeat. However, the frequency and intensity of interactions between the central power, that is, Egypt and the Arab region continued to increase through the centripetal forces especially in the years 1976-1977 (Table 1). Yet, starting from 1973

cooperative interactions between Egypt and Israel increased, while conflict interactions decreased. This development continued up to 1977 when the peace process started officially between the two countries. As a result elements of disintegration started to work out between Egypt and the Arab region as follows:

- a) Egypt has been co-opted by the intruder to form an alienated and isolated sub-system supported by a super power; that is, United States.
- b) Cooperative interactions between Egypt and the Arab region declined from 2253 in 1977 to 877 in 1978. At the same time cooperative interactions between the Arabs and Egypt declined even more, that is, from 3953 in 1976 to 798 in 1978. For the first time in modern history, conflictive interactions between the Arabs and Egypt increased tremendously from 241 in 1975 to 1024, 2535, 1083 in 1976, 1977, 1978 respectively.
- c) Conflict over identity increased as well. Arab nationalism which has been defended by Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s conflicted with Islamism which Saudi Arabia defended. This conflict created attitudinal confusion especially in Egypt. In a study regarding political attitudes in the Egyptian Universities only 44 per cent accepted to acquire the Arab nationality. At the same time 44 per cent rejected that choice (Al Mashat 1983: 394-411).

All this has resulted in the lack of Arab consensus over the principal issues in Arab politics. Moreover, the Arab region was divided into a number of sub-regions such as the Gulf region, the North Africa region, and Egypt and Israel as a sub-system. While the latter was alienated, the first three were vulnerable. Hence, the Arab regimes were incapable to respond to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982.

#### b) Elements of the Israeli Strategy towards the Arab System.

The Israeli strategy is built on three main elements: On the one hand, Israeli security is equivalent to expansion both horizontal and vertical. Annexation of Palestinian and Arab land and establishing new settlements in West Bank and Gaza (Ann Lesch, 1983) become an essential part of creating defensible borders for Israel (Yigal Allon, 1976). At the same time, Israel is keen to establish the most powerful military force in the Middle East. Table II shows that Israel owns an equivalent military force to the whole Arab region. From a qualitative perspec-

tive as well as that of efficiency, Israel proved to be more superior than the Arab forces together.

On the other hand, Israeli strategy is built on both recognition and acceptance. Israel's concept of peace means social, political and economic interactions with the Arab peoples. This meaning is known as normalisation. Arab acceptance is psychologically important to the Israelis so that they can overcome the historical Ghetto feeling.

The Israeli strategy is built on the attempt to diffuse the Palestinian question. There is no doubt that the Palestinian success since mid 1960s to emphasize their identity world wide annoyed the Israelis. Hence, they tried and still try to diffuse the Palestinian issue, sometimes by rejecting that there are Palestinians and sometimes by talking about different groups of Palestinians; e.g. West Bank Palestinians, refugees, Palestinians of 1948 who are Israeli citizens . . . *et cetera*. One may argue that the autonomy talks represent another method to diffuse the Palestinian question.

Thus Israel was able to add to the disintegration of the Arab region. The Israel strategy put a challenge, a real one, to the Arabs in designing their security policies.

#### c) Inability of the Arab Regimes Politically and Socially (Inefficiency)

This inability especially the lack of response to the demands of the Arab citizens concerning quality of life, physically and politically, forms the second principal source of threat to the Arab security. There is no doubt that such inability is a real threat to the security of the Arabs on two bases; on the one hand, the social psychological theories regarding frustration and violence prove that violence is determined by the lack of response to the human needs. Feierabend and Feierabend found

that systemic frustration is a function of  $\frac{\text{social want satisfaction}}{\text{social want formation}}$

One would argue that what determines the amount of aggression in a society is not only the ratio between satisfaction and want formation, but the discrepancy between satisfaction of political wants and that of social wants. This discrepancy is the major factor in altering the systemic frustration into violent acts. This relation can take one of these three forms:

1.  $\frac{\text{political want satisfaction low}}{\text{social want satisfaction high}} = \text{high probability of violence}$
2.  $\frac{\text{political want satisfaction low}}{\text{social want satisfaction low}} = \text{medium probability of violence}$

3.  $\frac{\text{political want satisfaction high}}{\text{social want satisfaction high}} = \text{low probability of violence}$

The first form is the most common form in the Arab states where the satisfaction of political needs is very low. Hence, violence both direct and structural is a high probability.

On the other hand, there are objective indicators which prove the inability of the Arab regimes to create homogeneity. Table III discloses some indicators for the heterogeneous Arab region. It shows that the most populated country, i.e. Egypt belongs to the poorest group in terms of GNP per capita. As for Lebanon, while it has the highest education ratio, and the second place in physical quality of life it belongs to the third group in population and the lower group in income. While Saudi Arabia belongs to the lower group in education and physical quality of life, it belongs to the richest group.

Such political and social inability of the Arab regimes results in three damaging phenomena which threaten Arab security.

d) Structure of Dependency

Such inability increases the dependency of the Arabs on others. It is well known that integration decreases dependency (Axline, 1977: 83-105). The Arab states are unable to achieve independent development. They are dependent on one of the super powers or the other. Whenever dependency becomes more complex, the ability of the region to design a holistic security policy decreases.

e. Diffusion of Capabilities.

As a result of the heterogeneity, high competition took place between the traditional central power, that is, Egypt and the newly emerging powers such as Saudi Arabia.

Associated with this are competitions between Syria and Iraq, between Libya and most of the Arab states . . . etc. All this resulted in the diffusion of Arab capabilities and prohibited them from investing time and energy in designing a regional perspective. Instead, each one or sub-system became preoccupied with the local and more parochial policies.

f. Alienation

One reason for alienation is the existence of material need in civil societies as a result of exploitation and inequality in the distribution of resources (Schachito, 1970:73-117). One aspect of the social and political inabilities of the Arab systems is the lack of distributive capability. This

creates a high degree of dissatisfaction, disloyalty and alienation. It leads also to a separation between political systems and their intellectuals and highly educated stratum who will emigrate in the form of brain drain. This phenomenon will deprive the society from utilizing one of its active groups.

## Secondary Sources of Threat to Arab National Security

The secondary sources of threat to Arab national security are the competition between the super powers in the Middle East, dangers generated by the peripheral powers and consequences of ethnic, religious, ideological and linguistic minorities.

These three sources are secondary because they do not threaten Arab national security directly. They can affect Arab security in an environment which is conducive to the activities of the main sources of threat. Added to this is the fact that an Arab strategy to contain and deal with the principal sources of threat will take care of the secondary sources.

It is important to remember that any efficient national security strategy should deal mainly with the principal sources. Otherwise, capabilities will be diffused, and real opportunity to confront threats to national security will be lost. Associated with this is the fact that dealing only and foremost with the secondary sources of threat will create unnecessary national security problems which should have been avoided. Such problems would consume the energies and resources of the system. At the same time, preoccupation with the secondary sources of threat would be manipulated as an excuse for external intervention on one hand, and an increased degree of oppression on the other. To direct the attention from the principal sources of threat would delay the inevitable change if not the transformation of the system.

## Arab Formulation of National Security


National security can be defined as the ability of the society to confront the grinding nature of violence. This requires both tranquility (T) and wellbeing (W). Thus national security means the ability of society to create cooperation, internally and internationally, as well as the ability to build policies characterised by more justice and equality.

Simultaneously, our study of political attitudes in Egypt discloses that our alert elite considers Egyptian national security in a non strategic

context. For instance, (Al Mashat: 1983) the majority of the sample sees economic problems as the main threat to Egypt's security (40%), Israel was seen as the second source of threat (33%). Political structure, the Soviet Union, and the United States were seen also as threats to Egypt's security (14%, 9% and 4% respectively).

Moreover, about half of the sample (48%) considers economic problems to be most urgent if the objective is to maintain our security. In an attempt to rank-order the important elements in achieving Egypt's security, the economic becomes the first on the list (86%), followed by more democracy (12%), alliance with the Arabs (60%) and building a strong army (56%).

Arab national security can be seen as a function of three main variables. Tranquility, Wellbeing and Military Might as shown in Diagram 1.



Tranquility means the ability of the Arab system to create national and regional consensus and international cooperation. It can be measured quantitatively through events data. Wellbeing can be defined as the ability to improve both physical and psychological quality of life. It is not enough to increase the standard of living using any economic or quantitative measures. But it is important to improve the quality of life in economic, environmental and political terms.

Added to T and W is the Military Might (MM) which means the improvement of modern, sophisticated armies. These advanced armies should reflect the social concerns and needs and not only the elite's worries. If that is the case, how can the Arabs design a national security strategy?

### Aspects of Arab National Security

The critical developments which surround the Arab system make it essential to think about aspects or elements which would help the maintenance of Arab society. Putting in mind the forementioned variables, the following aspects seem important in designing Arab strategy.

First: Arab Political Ideology is the most important aspect. Without this frame of reference, other aspects cannot be achieved. This ideology can be thought of as a sum of four elements.

1. National consensus over identity: It is not true that the identity of the Arab system is resolved. Arab identity, for instance, is but an amorphous concept. It does not create a commitment among the Arabs toward national goals. Identity is essential to decide on priorities and goal achieving processes.
2. Regional consensus on the principal enemy. There has to be an Arab agreement on the fact that Israel resembles the main enemy and main source of threat to Arab security. This step is important so that Arabs will be able to mobilize their capabilities against their enemy.
3. Regional agreement on the main friends to the system. Friends on international level are the ones who can help in confronting the main enemy.
4. Arab agreement towards the future Palestinian state: Practically Arab national security concentrates on the Palestinian issue. The failure of the Arab system to establish a Palestinian state in Palestine will always be seen as a failure of its national security strategy. The Arabs have to agree on the nature of that state as well as the dynamics of establishing it.

Second: Arab Social Ideology: If the political ideology is essential to achieve Tranquility, the social ideology is important to achieve wellbeing. This ideology is built on three elements:

1. Improvement of physical quality of life which can be measured by education level, life expectancy, infant mortality as well as improving the environmental conditions including pollution and waste of all resources.
2. Increasing the distributive capability of the Arab system. This element is important to create a more just society not only inside each country but equally important between Arab countries. The inability of the Arabs to increase such a capability will lead to more stress

from the secondary sources of threat especially the ethnic, religious and linguistic problems.

3. Political participation: A secure society is characterized by a high level of political participation. This is due to the fact that legitimacy of a regime is conditioned by how much freedom it gives its citizens. At the same time such a regime will enjoy the loyalty of its citizens. The Arab regimes, in general, suffer from a lack of legitimacy and consequently a doubt about citizen loyalty.

In developing a solid national security policy, the role of the citizen in and his link to the system should increase to an organic degree.

Third: Military Strategy: The function of the military is to defend and sustain the system which creates it. Two main elements should be stressed in order to achieve such a role.

1. Armaments: Arab countries should begin a policy of producing indigenous weapons so as to get rid of the political strings and economic cost attached to importing weapons. In this sense it is not a matter of balance of power with Israel, but it exceeds that to achieve self sufficient policy in both defensive weapon and offensive systems. I argue that without an advanced Arab policy regarding weapons, any national security policy will be insufficient if not ineffective.
2. Regional training: Arms sales mean importing strategy, techniques, and the necessary training. Nonetheless, training of officers and military experts, especially in the Western countries, proved to have negative psychological and political connotations. It becomes similar to brain washing processes. It affects many of the ideological and political values which are more appropriate to our setting and role.

Hence, it becomes essential to establish local and regional training programmes to create confident and efficient armies.

National security challenge, as we have seen, occupies the Arab mind and Arab politics to a great extent. It becomes no more energy or national will to be Arabs in order to retain or maintain an active role in the Non-Alignment Movement. In other words if inter-Arab cooperation is losing momentum, it is so hard for the Arabs to initiate momentum to other movements or regions.

## 2. Inter-Arab Tensions/Conflicts:

In the 1970s the frequency and intensity of inter-Arab tensions and conflicts are increasing. Starting with 1973 the Arab regional system

was divided into two major axes: the oil producing, that is, the rich countries and non-oil producing countries, that is, the poor. On the other hand, and notwithstanding the wealth criterion the Arabs were divided into radical states and moderate states. These divisions led to many tensions and conflicts all over the Arab world.

The share of North African states in such tensions and conflicts was more than that of the rest of the Arab World. Let us try to mention some of these problems which, in my view, impede the Arabs from playing an active role in any Third World movements.

Morocco has been involved during the last decade in conflict with the Polisario over Western Sahara region. This conflict expanded to a conflict between Morocco and both Algeria and Libya. However, Libya reached a union with Morocco according to which it declined to support Polisario. But the conflict is still there in spite of the UN recent mediation. This conflict affected negatively not only Pan-Arab institutions but also Pan-African institutions, especially the Organisation of African Unity.

On the other hand, the conflict between Libya and Chad created tensions in the relations between Libya and both Egypt and Sudan. Both countries support the legitimate authority which is supported also by the West. This tension developed into a conflict and war between Libya and Egypt in 1977. Also, Libya's cooperation with Ethiopia intensified the conflict with Sudan because of the Southern problem.

Added to the forementioned tensions are the Arab worries regarding the Red Sea and the Security of the Horn of Africa. After 1973, the Arabs tried to coordinate their policies concerning the Red Sea so that they can be able to contain the Israeli danger. Many symposia and conferences were held in many of the Arab capitals. However, more of the security problems related to the Red Sea were resolved. The conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden is still latent. The problem of Eritria has not been resolved yet. The Israelis are active in both the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.

Associated with the forementioned facts is the economic crisis in most of the African states and Egypt as well. It is not related only to the debt problem, though it is serious, but it is related to the economic policies and performance. There is no doubt that the economic crisis and the failure of the South — South dialogue to manage such a crisis spoil the political role of non-aligned group in international politics.



Of course, if we want to complicate the picture we can mention the problems of the Asian region of the Arab World. In this regard, it is inevitable to mention the Iraqi-Iranian war which is draining the rare resources of both Third World countries as well as many other Arab states, both countries incapable of any active policy within the group.

### Conclusion

Recent developments in the Arab World regarding security and inter-Arab tensions/conflicts, do not help the Arabs very much to activate their traditional role in the Non-Aligned Movement. Non-alignment, as well, confronts severe problems especially in areas of security and economics. The movement is no more a political one. It is more comprehensive and hence more complicated. However, it is inevitable to keep the momentum to the movement with the support of all Third World countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

TABLE I  
Some Indicators of Heterogeneity in the Arab System \*

Population (in millions)		Per Capita GNP (\$ US)	Literacy Ratio %	Poli		
1. 1. More than 10		1. Over 5,000	1. More than 50	1. Over 70		
Egypt	34.9	Kuwait	Lebanon	76	Kuwait	77
Morocco	18.9	Emirates	Kuwait	59.6	Lebanon	72
Algeria	17.6	Qatar	Jordan	54		
Sudan	17.4	Saudi Arabia	Oman	50		
Iraq	12.2	Libya	6.910			
2. Between 5-10		2. Between 1,000-5,000	2. Between 30-40	2. Between 50-70		
Saudi Arabia	8.2	Bahrain	Syria	45	Bahrain	61
Syria	8.1	Oman	Egypt	43.5	Syria	57
Tunisia	6.0	Iraq	Bahrain	40	Jordan	56
Yemen, North	5.6	Algeria	Tunisia	40	Egypt	52
		Jordan	Algeria	35		
			Iraq	30		
3. Between 1-5		3. Between 500-1,000	3. Between 20-29	3. Between 30-50		
Somalia	3.7	Tunisia	Morocco	29	Libya	49
Lebanon	3.7	Syria	Emirates	21	Tunisia	49
Jordan	3.0	Morocco	Qatar	20	Algeria	45
Libya	2.7	Yemen, North	Sudan	20	Iraq	45
Yemen, South	1.8		Yemen, South	20	Morocco	43
Mauritania	1.4					
Kuwait	1.2					

4. Less than 1 million	4. Less than 500	4. Less than 20	4. Less than 30				
Emirates	0.8	Yemen, South	420	Libya	18	Emirates	35
Oman	0.8	Egypt	390	Saudi Arabia	12	Somalia	34
Bahrain	0.4	Sudan	320	Yemen, North	12	Oman	33
Qatar	0.2	Mauritania	289	Mauritania	10	Qatar	32
		Lebanon	232	Somalia	5	Sudan	32
		Somalia	130			Yemen, South	32
						Saudi Arabia	29
						Yemen, North	27
						Mauritania	21

Sources of Data: 1. Morris, D. *Measuring the Conditions of the World's Poor: The physical Quality of Life Index*, New York, Pergamon Press, 1979.

2. Sivard, Ruth L., *World Military and Social Expenditures*, 1980.

3. *World Development Report*, 1980.

**TABLE II**  
**Military Balance Between the Arabs and Israel**  
**(1970-1979)\***

	Military Expenditures (\$ millions)		Military Forces (in thousands)		Central Governmental Expenditures (\$ millions)		Government Expenditures (as % of GNP)		Military Expenditures (as % of Central Governmental Expenditures)		Military Expenditures per Individual (in dollars)		Military Forces per 1 000 Citizens	
	1970	1979	1970	1979	1970	1979	1970	1979	1970	1979	1970	1979	1970	1979
Arab States	4 451	28 463	790	1 242	40 343	131 884	690	10.080	24.39	22.39	349.3	535.95	10.30	12.32
Together	639.47		157.21		326.90		156.52		-8.11		153.43		119.61	
Israel	1 417	4 724	105	165	4,926	11 065	25.1	29.6	47.6	39.2	782	1 142	35	43.4
	333.38		157.10		224.62		117.92		-17.65		146		124	

\*US Arms Control Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1970-1979. Washington D.C. 1980.

## Southern Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement

by *Ibbo Mandaza*

"This world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited by two different species. The originality of the colonial context is that economic reality, inequality and the immense difference of ways of life never come to mask the human realities. When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies the economic sub-structure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. This is why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem."

Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*.<sup>1</sup>

"A third theme is the idea of a necessary, continuing, irreconcilable antagonism (in the context of a world in which imperialism remains a dominant force) between the interests of the advanced, Western, and predominantly 'white', colonising societies and the interests of the proletarian, non-Western, and predominantly 'non-white', colonial and semi-colonial societies. In a sense this means taking the contradiction between the imperialist countries and the colonial peoples and insisting that it has priority over all other contradictions, blurring (from a more 'orthodox' Marxist point of view) the internal contradictions within both colonizing and colonized societies . . ."

— Thomas Hodgkin, "Some African and Third World Theories of Imperialism"<sup>2</sup>

### 1. Southern Africa and NAM: Origins of the Relationship:

It is not difficult to recognize the close coincidence between Third World antagonism to imperialism, colonialism and racism on the one hand, and the rise and development of the Non-Aligned Movement on the

other. In turn, it is logical that the crisis in Southern Africa should in the 1970s and 1980s have become one of the most dominant themes of the Non-Aligned Movement. Southern Africa was the venue and subject of the NAM Lusaka Summit of 1970; and is again the venue and subject in the NAM Harare Summit of 1986. But Southern Africa has been a regular subject of the NAM ever since its inception in 1955; at first indirectly in terms of NAM's concern with decolonization and the problem of racism; and later, as Southern African leaders became directly involved in the NAM. The leader of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma attended the 1961 NAM Belgrade Summit, establishing thereby an important precedent and principle of the NAM: that the Liberation Movements of the Third World were an integral part of the movement for Non-Alignment. Accordingly, the National Liberation Movements of Southern Africa have not only been participants in the subsequent history of NAM but also influenced and radicalized the NAM particularly in a period that saw the untimely departure of its founding fathers: Nehru, Tito, Nasser, Sukarno and Nkrumah.

Even the first NAM Conference (in Belgrade in 1961) made the cause and course of national liberation its main concern in the assertion that

a lasting peace can be achieved only if . . . colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations are radically eliminated . . .

Accordingly, among its tasks for further action was the

struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid; support for the national liberation movements.

The NAM has always tried to establish a close correlation between particular aspects of the Movement and the choice of venue. But invariably, this has also coincided with the struggle for national liberation. It is difficult to understand the history of NAM without considering also the Southern African component of it. A brief outline of the history of NAM will illustrate.

As Professor Archie Singham has summarized: the NAM was born in Bandung (1955); nurtured in Belgrade (1961); and transformed in Cairo (1964) when it began to attend directly to the Palestinian Ques-

tion as one of the array of colonial questions that it would have to deal with in subsequent years. The NAM became "combative" in the Lusaka Summit of 1970,<sup>3</sup> in the acknowledgement that Southern Africa was now a central issue in the line of struggle against imperialism, white settler colonialism and apartheid. It raised fundamental economic questions in Algiers (1973), posing the fundamental contradiction between imperialism and the NAM. But it was also an honour to the Algerian people who had fought and defeated one of the most powerful Western European nations, France. Similarly, in 1976, the NAM went to Colombo, Sri Lanka, to celebrate the victory of Vietnam over the leader of the imperialist world, the US. Likewise, in 1977, the NAM went to Havana, Cuba, to say to President Fidel Castro, in the words of Archie Singham, "that you deserve the chairmanship of the movement because of your stand against the most powerful nuclear state."<sup>4</sup>

The NAM went to New Delhi in 1983, to pay homage and gratitude to the home of one of its founding fathers, Jawaharlal Nehru. There, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi emphasized the dominant theme of the NAM: "Anti-imperialism still conditions our outlook." The Conference expressed support for the struggles being waged by Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada against US imperialism, condemned the US policy in the Middle East and accused Washington of supporting the apartheid state of South Africa. It was almost logical, therefore, that the NAM should have chosen Zimbabwe as its venue for the 1986 Summit. It is credit both to the country and its leader, Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe; and a recognition of the centrality of the Southern African situation in the NAM.

## II. Imperialism, African Nationalism and the NAM

Just three weeks away from the 1986 Summit, the Secretary-General of the Eighth NAM Summit in Harare found it necessary to

... dispel an impression which appears to have been created in some circles that this is going to be a Southern African Summit. It is a major Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement and the NAM, with its 101 members, consists of countries from around the globe, where there are issues apart from Southern Africa. Such issues as Central America, the Middle East, South-East Asia and other serious economic issues that the Third World countries and NAM members find themselves in will be discussed.<sup>5</sup>

A modest stance on the part of a host country, but one that just goes to show the degree to which Southern Africa — and Zimbabwe itself — might loom large in the NAM deliberations in 1986. There are good grounds to suggest that Southern Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular epitomise the principles upon which NAM has been established and developed.

First, as the epigrams from Frantz Fanon and Thomas Hodgkin might help to indicate, there is an obvious relationship between nationalism and NAM. For its part, African nationalism has its roots in the century-old ideology of white supremacy, the indignities of slavery and colonialist oppression and exploitation; and it continues to survive in the apparent coincidence between the dominance of the northern hemisphere and the deprivation of the dark races, in the division of the world into whites and blacks; in the survival of racism as an ideology. It is on the basis of African nationalism that the bloody struggles have been fought in pursuit of African liberation; and hundreds of thousands of African heroes and heroines have so far perished in the pursuit of this objective. African nationalism is the indispensable force in the movement for national liberation; it remains at the centre of Africa's quest for total liberation, for the re-assertion of African dignity, for Africa's return to history.

Second, the fact of apartheid South Africa remains a symbol of Africa's unique historical experience as a continent — and its diaspora — which has had to endure overall oppression and exploitation almost on the basis of colour. It is this unique historical experience that is Africa's basis for "African Unity", a rallying call that remains unique to Africa (as a continent) alone. The coincidence of interests between the NAM and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is therefore illustrated in the fact that all OAU members are also members of NAM. There is a very close relationship between Pan Africanism and Non-Alignment. The Frontline States of Southern Africa are therefore an important dimension among the various elements that now constitute both the OAU and the NAM. But the definition of the forum of Frontline states (Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe) coincides with that of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). In addition, the Liberation Movements (ANC, PAC and SWAPO) expressed solidarity with SADCC, giving an early indication

that when liberated their countries will join the SADCC. In a speech read on their behalf by SWAPO President Nujoma at the last SADCC meeting (in Harare, January, 1986), the Liberation Movements had this to say:

It has become imperative that we translate our common recognition that SADCC and the national liberation struggle are two sectors of a single front into action. Only by harmonizing our actions can both SADCC and the Liberation Movements realize our common cherished goals.<sup>6</sup>

Third, the aims and objectives of both the Frontline and SADCC states relate specifically and immediately to the struggle for liberation in Namibia and South Africa and for the regional cooperation and autonomous development of the sub-continent. But these aims and objectives also enhance those of the OAU and the NAM: total liberation from the subordination of the northern hemisphere; the elimination of apartheid; and the need for economic cooperation among developing countries.

The choice of Zimbabwe as a venue for the Eighth Summit is an act of solidarity with the struggle in Southern Africa. The summit itself will begin when other international fora will have discussed the Southern African situation, particularly the problem of apartheid. The OAU will have completed its deliberations in late July, 1986; and the Commonwealth will have made its proposals with regard to the need to put more pressure on the apartheid regime. Both organizations will emphasize the need for solidarity with the Frontline and SADCC states and for more aid to the national liberation movements of South Africa and Namibia. The NAM will seek to integrate these resolutions with its own in a process that will certainly highlight the dubious role of the US, Britain and other Western countries on the question of South Africa; and help to isolate the South African regime internationally, as a significant prelude to its eventual downfall at the hands of the South African masses.

But the NAM will also come to realize the particularities of the imperialist interest in Africa in general and in Southern Africa in particular. It is an interest that is as old as Europe's contact with Africa and assumes a special significance ever since the balkanization of the continent at the Congress of Berlin of 1884/1885. Reagan's recent

pronouncement<sup>7</sup> on the South African situation is yet another reaffirmation of the US imperial claim on Africa and its resources. The belief that not only Southern Africa but Africa as a whole is a US sphere of influence is imperial arrogance of the first order. The architect of current US African policy, Chester Crocker, has given a new definition of US objectives in Africa. Addressing a State Department Foreign Policy Conference in Washington on 2nd June, 1981, he stated:

The Reagan administration recognizes that Africa is a region of growing importance to US global objectives — economic, political, strategic, human and so forth. We cannot afford to neglect a region where our interests are so clearly growing and I would simply refer here in passing to the obvious facts of our long history of involvement with Africa: to the many links of culture and a blood that ties an important portion of our own citizenry to Africa; to our growing import-dependence on fuel and non-fuel minerals produced in Africa; to Africa's growing place as a focus of world politics and its growing role as an actor in world politics.<sup>8</sup>

Accordingly, the intention is to "support regional security in Africa" and to

cooperate with our allies and friends in Africa to deter aggression and subversion by our global adversary. We intend to assure the US and our allies fair commercial access to essential fuel and non-fuel minerals and other raw materials produced in Africa, and at the same time to promote the growing engagement of the American economy and the American private sector in Africa's growing economy.

So called "constructive engagement" is based on these imperial assumptions. In US neo-globalism, the South African white minority regime and white settlers are key both to the stability of Southern Africa and the perpetuation of imperial interests. The factors — i.e. "economic, political, strategic, human and so forth" — which led to the colonization of Africa are sadly still relevant a century afterwards. The point is that no country in the world — least of all the small countries most of whom comprise the NAM — can afford to be oblivious to the reali-

ty of imperialism as a threat to world peace. It continues to wrangle even those of our world that have undergone socialist revolutions; and threatens to undermine the political independence of those small countries that seek to de-link from the capitalist world system and its related imperialist hegemony. It is impossible to explain Africa's current condition without acknowledging imperialism as the basic cause. As Nyerere stated in a recent speech:

The evidence is all around us. The gap between African poverty and the wealth of the developed nations gets larger. African nations get further into debt and have less and less ability even to sustain such economic progress as they had earlier made. Then, when the natural disasters of drought or flood strike, or when indebtedness becomes extreme, the quid pro quo for temporary relief is liable to be 'facilities' for military or communications units of a Great Power, or the forced adoption of their economic policies. And if an African nation is not sufficiently cooperative, then the lessons of Angola and of Libya are there to see — to say nothing of the more subtle and camouflaged interventions in our political systems which are frequent.<sup>10</sup>

The history and dimension of imperialist policy in Southern Africa is now well known. But a recent book on Zimbabwe<sup>11</sup> helps to highlight its dimensions in the Zimbabwean situation: the reality of economic imperialism; political blackmail; the threats of economic blockades and manipulation of "aid" administration by the US and its allies; the heavy hand of international financial institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund); in addition to the threat of open aggression and intervention by South Africa.

The US expects that Zimbabwe should condemn "terrorism" (and with regard to South Africa, that it does not offer rear base support to the freedom fighters); that it pursues a "pragmatic" course; shuns Marxist ideology and keeps the socialist bloc at arm's length; and in general does not fundamentally run counter to the broad objectives of imperialist policy in Southern Africa. The US expects African countries to be non-aligned to the socialist bloc and, therefore, by implication, to be aligned to the US itself. At least, this was one of the themes in the speech by Mr. David Charles Miller, the US Ambassador to Zimbabwe, on 25 January 1985.

For those of us who are optimists and who believe that constructive engagement will work, we see a number of exciting and positive changes in Southern Africa which are only halfway to fruition. These would include the return of Mozambique to a truly non-aligned status — and hopefully domestic tranquility; a dialogue with the Angolan Government which however difficult is much improved over our position of no dialogue a few years ago; and a great deal of what is required to implement Resolution 435 is in place. The final elusive steps remain precisely that — elusive . . .

All of this has important bearing on Zimbabwe. If the mainly liberal community in the United States succeeds in crippling foreign policy objectives of drawing South Africans into the world, I am confident that the conservative community will see to it that aid and diplomatic outreach to Marxist governments in Southern Africa will be adversely affected. If the policy of constructive engagement comes unravelled, I am confident that it will mean not only less engagement with South Africa, but also with Zimbabwe and our budding relationship (sic) Angola. While bilateral relations between the United States and Zimbabwe are in an acceptable state today, they would easily become the victim of a domestic political fight in the United States with the Prime Minister's occasional Marxist speeches being used as the rationale for reducing our presence here. Rarely have your personal interests been so directly at stake in our legislative process. If we in effect withdraw from South Africa and they retreat down a conservative road, while at the same time we withdraw support for Zimbabwe and Mozambique — and possibly Angola — my guess is that the region has the possibility of taking a large and distinct step backward.<sup>12</sup>

It is difficult to believe that the US would ever consider withdrawing voluntarily from Southern Africa; and its current manouvres on South Africa would confirm the contrary. The threat is therefore perhaps based in the confidence that imperialist policy in the sub-region has been so largely successful, and that therefore the US simply wants to maintain that *status quo*. The intention is to use bullying tactics, designed more to flaunt Reaganism than a trend towards disengagement. More seriously, it could be indicative of a lingering nervousness on the part of the imperialist centre, the fear that Zimbabwe — and Southern Africa in general — might still break out of the imperialist cage.

The US therefore sought to punish Zimbabwe when the latter decided to abstain on the resolution condemning the Soviet downing of the

Korean airliner and for co-sponsoring a resolution condemning the US action in Grenada. A threat to be repeated in July, 1986, following Zimbabwe's Foreign Minister's condemnation of the US position on South Africa. As Prime Minister Mugabe retorted in response to these threats:

There have been these threats and I understand some aid which was due to be signed has not been signed for. This is the behaviour of a country which on one strain, one vein, would want us to believe that it does not ever want to impose sanctions and in another, it is imposing sanctions against us for saying it refused to impose sanctions against South Africa. I find that quite ironical, but what I find quite objectionable is the fact that the United States, of all the countries, tends to use its aid as a weapon to coerce or impel countries which are the beneficiaries to toe a certain political line, even contrary to their own political and ideological persuasion. Perhaps, it is their tradition but of course such aid comes to us generously, if the donor decides to withdraw we will still say thank you for what you gave us in the past. But, let it be known that when we fought for our independence and sovereignty, we never meant to sell it at all and so what I give you for the future is independent Zimbabwe with resources and determined population to exploit those resources and become their own masters and not beggars and beneficiaries.

*(Hansard: Vol. 13, No. 11, col. 392-393.)*

### III. NAM and Liberation

The foregoing helps to highlight the need for the NAM to consider carefully the Southern African situation. First, that US imperialism (and its allies) are the aggressors in this sub-region, as evidenced, for example, by their reticence on the sanctions issue. More than that, imperialism is integral to the problem in South Africa; without the support of the US and its allies, the apartheid regime would be long gone. Equally important to note is the fact that the support of the Socialist bloc has been a crucial factor in the struggle of the Southern African people.

For the NAM to acknowledge these facts should not be construed to mean that it has lost its non-aligned posture. It is obviously racist of those who imagine that Africa — and the NAM — must be necessarily always aligned to one or the other of the "Super Power" blocs. For, like any other people, Africans can distinguish between good and bad; can choose as allies those who recognise the right of African countries

to self-determination and the basis for self-reliant economic and social development; and will acknowledge the help of all those who assist in the course of the struggle for liberation in South Africa and Namibia.

This is a point to emphasise because the detractors of both the NAM and the cause of African liberation have tended to view non-alignment and liberation as synonymous with alignment to a particular "super power".

As leader of a national liberation movement, Amilcar Cabral made the point quite clear:

In Africa, we are for an African policy which seeks to defend first and foremost the interests of the African peoples, of each African country, but also for a policy which does not, at any time, forget the interests of the world, of all humanity. We are for a policy of peace in Africa and of fraternal collaboration with all the peoples of the world. On an international level, we . . . practise a policy of non-alignment. But for us non-alignment does not mean turning one's back on the fundamental problems of humanity and of justice. Non-alignment for us means not aligning ourselves with blocs, not aligning ourselves with the decisions of others. We reserve the right to make our own decisions, and if by chance our choices and decisions coincide with those of others, that is not our fault.

We are for the policy of non-alignment, but we consider ourselves to be deeply committed to our people and committed to every just cause in the world. We see ourselves as part of a vast front of struggle for the good of humanity.<sup>14</sup>

Implicit in the policy of non-alignment is also that of "solidarity with every just cause": with Cuba, with Palestine, with the "Blacks of North America, when they are deprived of all possibility of life, we suffer with them"; with Southern Africa; and with all those who are "seeking to resolve their problems in the face of imperialist aggression and of the manoeuvres of imperialism through their puppets". And that is "why we . . . proclaim loud and clear that we are against Tshombe, against all the Tshombes of Africa".

Cabral concludes:

We strongly support all just causes in the world, but we are also reinforced by the support of others. We receive concrete assistance from many people, from many friends, from many brothers. We accept every sort of assistance, from wherever it comes, but we



never ask anybody for the assistance which we need. We just wait for whatever assistance each person or people can give to our struggle. Those are our *ethics* of assistance.<sup>15</sup> (His emphasis).

The challenge to the NAM is particularly poignant at a time that the struggle in Southern Africa has reached such an advanced stage. First, as Reagan's "Peace Plan for South Africa" (22 July, 1986) indicates, the US will now try more than ever to blackmail those who support the liberation struggle — and those directly involved in the struggle — by equating the liberation process with alignment to the Soviet Union. In reality, the US is concerned more about its strategic and economic interests than liberation in South Africa:

If this rising hostility in Southern Africa — between Pretoria and the front line states — explodes, the Soviet Union will be the main beneficiary — and the critical ocean corridor of South Africa, and the strategic minerals of the region would be at risk. Thus, it would be a historic act of folly for the United States and the West — out of anguish and frustration and anger — to write off South Africa.<sup>16</sup>

Second, the NAM and the rest of the progressive world should guard against a US sponsored initiative which seeks a "compromise" in South Africa, but a compromise within which genuine liberation will be further delayed and the entire sub-region subjected to even more violence and destabilization than it has so far. For, the US appears intent on a "settlement" only if the latter means the maintenance of its imperial interests at the expense of African liberation.

The NAM has had to deal in the past with numerous other problems. But that of Southern Africa might prove to be the toughest yet in the history of the NAM. The final solution of the South African problem will constitute an important landmark in the development of both Southern Africa and the NAM itself. This is why it is imperative that the NAM should in 1986 take effective steps to ensure that this solution will be integral to the policies and practices of the NAM itself.

## Conclusion

There is an obvious relationship between African nationalism and the struggle for national liberation in Southern Africa on the one hand and the history and development of NAM on the other. This relationship

has not been clearly spelt out on the part of Southern Africans, except in as far as there was the active participation of the Southern African liberation movements in the NAM Summits and meetings ever since 1961. The recent history of the NAM therefore coincides also with this last phase of the Southern African (and African) struggle for total liberation from colonialism and imperialism. The NAM Summit of 1970 in Lusaka was therefore an important land mark in the history of the relationship between Southern Africa and the Movement. The return of the NAM to Southern Africa in 1986 is both a sign of the maturity of that relationship and evidence that this sub-region now constitutes an important dimension in the history and future development of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Lastly, Zimbabwe's (and Southern Africa's) main challenge must relate to the aims and objectives of the NAM, particularly with regard to the liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa. What does non-alignment mean in this era of the contradiction between imperialism and the Third World? How is it to be effectively practised in this era of super-power rivalry and the threat of nuclear war? How are we to understand non-alignment when it would appear to be naive to expect that any country in the world can be truly non-aligned?


The questions themselves indicate that non-alignment must be viewed as the endless quest for national independence and self-determination on the part of the countries of the Third World, in a world in which imperialism and super Power rivalry constantly threatens to undermine and render meaningless even political independence itself.


It is a quest that cannot be oblivious to the existence of the super powers and the contradictions that exist between them; nor imply that any dealings with any of them means that non-alignment will have died. That is the challenge for Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement.

## Notes

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14. *Revolution In Guinea: An African People's Stuggle*, Stage 1, London, 1969, pp. 66.
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16. Reagan's "Peace Plan for South Africa", 22 July, 1986.





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