# DOCUMENTS

## on the

# Cease-Fire and Armistice Negotiations In Korea

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# INTRODUCTION

Ever since imperialist America unleashed its war of aggression against the Korean people on June 25 last year, the Chinese People's Republic and the U.S.S.R. have consistently advocated a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This is the demand of the world's peace-loving people, but the U.S. imperialists and their satellites have continued to flout the people's will, pushed on with their armed invasion of Korea, and even attempted to carry the war towards the Chinese borders.

The invaders have, however, suffered repeated reverses. Their casualties, by their own admission, had by June this year reached over 220,000.

On June 23 in a broadcast speech over U.N. Radio, Yakov Malik, Soviet delegate to the Security Council, reiterated the proposal for a peaceful solution of the Korean question. The democratic forces the world over acclaimed and voiced their full support.

Following on this and an exchange of messages between the parties concerned, negotiations began on July 10, 1951 at Kaisung between the high command of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese people's volunteers, on the one hand, and the U.N. Command, on the other. The Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese people's volunteers is composed of General Nam Il (chief delegate), General Li Sang Cho and General Chang Pyong San, who represent the Korean People's Army, and General Teng Hua and Hsieh Fang, who represent the Chinese people's volunteers. The Delegation of the United Nations Command is composed of Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, Major General L. C. Craigie (airforce), Major General H. I. Hodes (army), Rear Admiral A. Burke and Major General Pak Sun Yup.

Considerable time however was taken up in trying to reach agreement on the agenda. The delay was caused by extended discussions on the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, which the Delegation of the United Nations Command consistently refused to put on the agenda but which is of the greatest importance in ensuring against a re-opening of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. On the proposal made on July 21 by the Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese people's volunteers, the Kaisung talks were recessed for three days to give both sides further time to consider carefully the question. On July 25 the talks were resumed and on the following day a 5-point agenda was adopted.

This 5-point agenda which now forms the basis of the Kaisung negotiations was put forward by the Korean and Chinese delegation so that an early armistice agreement might be arranged to fulfil the initial hopes of the world's peace-loving people. As agreed upon by both sides, the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea is now left to be decided at another meeting after the cease-fire and armistice are realised.

In view of the importance of the issues involved, and in order that our readers may avail themselves of all relevant records, we reproduce on the following pages the documents released on both sides. Where necessary, marginal notes have been added to make clear the sequence of events. Otherwise the documents here reproduced speak for themselves.

# Documents on the Cease-Fire and Armistice Talks in Korea

*On June 30, 1951, a week after Yakov Malik's peace proposal, General Matthew B. Ridgway, in the name of the United Nations Command, broadcast the following message to the high command of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese people's volunteers:*

## FROM GENERAL M. B. RIDGWAY, June 30, 1951

As Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, I have been instructed to communicate to you the following:

I am informed that you wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantee for the maintenance of such armistice.

Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired, I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbour.

* * *

*The following day General Kim Il Sung, as Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese people's volunteers, jointly replied to Ridgway's message:*

## FROM GENERAL KIM IL SUNG AND GENERAL PENG TEH-HUAI, July 1, 1951

General Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces:

Your statement of June 30 this year concerning peace talks has been received. We are authorised to inform you that we agree to meet your representative for conducting talks concerning the cessation of military action and establishment of peace. We propose that the place of meeting be in the area of Kaisung on the 38th Parallel. If you agree, our representatives are prepared to meet your representative between July 10 and 15, 1951.

*(Signed)*

KIM IL SUNG,
*Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.*

PENG TEH-HUAI,
*Commander of the Chinese people's volunteers.*

## FROM GENERAL M. B. RIDGWAY, July 3, 1951

General Kim Il Sung, General Peng Teh-huai:

I have received your reply to my message of 30 June.

I am prepared for my representatives to meet yours at Kaisung on July 10 or at an earlier date if your representatives complete their preparations before that date.

Since an agreement on armistice terms has to precede a cessation of hostilities, delay in initiating meetings for reaching an agreement will prolong fighting and increase losses.

To ensure efficient arrangement of many details connected with the first meeting, I propose that not to exceed three of my liaison officers have a preliminary meeting with an equal number of yours in Kaesong 5 July or as soon thereafter as practicable.

If you concur, my liaison officers, the senior of whom will not be above the rank of colonel, will depart from Kimpo airfield southwest of Seoul by helicopter at 23:00 hours GMT 4 July (9 A.M., July 5 Tokyo time) or at the same hour on the day agreed upon for this meeting, proceeding directly to Kaesong.

In the event of bad weather these officers will proceed in convoy of three unarmed one-quarter ton trucks commonly known as jeeps, along the main road from Seoul to Kaesong.

Each vehicle will bear a large white flag. The convoy will cross the Imjin River on the Seoul-Kaesong road at about 23:00 hours GMT 4 July or at the same hour on the day agreed upon for this meeting.

A convoy bearing your liaison officers to and from the meeting will be granted immunity from attack by my forces provided you advise me of its route, schedule and manner by which my forces may identify it.

Your reply is requested.

*(Signed)*

M. B. RIDGWAY,
*General, United States Army, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.*

## FROM GENERAL KIM IL SUNG AND GENERAL PENG TEH-HUAI, July 4, 1951

General Ridgway:

Your reply to us dated July 3 has been received. To insure efficient arrangement of the many details connected with the first meeting of the representatives of both parties, we agree to your proposal that both parties each send three liaison officers to the Kaisung area to conduct the preliminary meeting. If you agree, we propose that the time for the meeting of the liaison officers of both parties be fixed for July 8. We have already informed the commanders of our forces in the Kaisung area to prepare to receive your liaison officers.

*(Signed)*

KIM IL SUNG,
*Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.*

PENG TEH-HUAI,
*Commander of the Chinese people's volunteers.*

## FROM GENERAL M. B. RIDGWAY, July 5, 1951

General Kim Il Sung, General Peng Teh-huai:

I have received your reply dated 4 July. The date of 8 July for an initial meeting is acceptable. Reference is made to my message dated 3 July. In addition to the three liaison officers specified in that message, two interpreters will be sent. Positive assurance of safe conduct for this personnel is requested. Your reply is requested.

*(Signed)*

M. B. RIDGWAY,
*General, United States Army, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.*

## FROM GENERAL KIM IL SUNG AND GENERAL PENG TEH-HUAI, July 6, 1951

General Ridgway:

We have received your second reply dated July 5. We agree to the number of liaison officers and their aides you are sending and the time of their departure for Kaisung. We undertake to assure their safe conduct. But for their more certain safety and to cut down the possibility of misunderstanding to the minimum, we suggest that they proceed to Kaisung by a convoy of jeeps.

At the same time we inform you that our three liaison officers, one of whom is a colonel, together with two interpreters and reception personnel and assistants, will set out at five a.m. (Pyongyang time) on July 7, (the day before the preliminary meeting) from the Pyongyang area on five jeeps and five motor trucks for the Kaisung area via Sariwon and Namchun to prepare and take part in the preliminary meeting agreed upon by both parties. Each motor vehicle will have a white flag spread on top of it. Please take note of this information.

KIM IL SUNG,
*Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.*

PENG TEH-HUAI,
*Commander of the Chinese people's volunteers.*

* * *

*At the first session of the negotiations on July 10, General Nam Il, Chief of the Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese people's volunteers, defined the basic attitude of the Korean and Chinese peoples towards the negotiations for an armistice in Korea in the following terms:*

## STATEMENT BY GENERAL NAM IL, July 10, 1951

Commander of the United Nations Forces General Ridgway on June 30 stated that he was willing to conduct negotiations for an armistice. My Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung and Commander Peng

Teh-huai of the Chinese volunteers, conforming with the hopes and desires of the peoples of Korea and China and all the people of the world, agreed to conduct negotiations with General Ridgway, and have sent me as a representative of the Korean People's Army to these negotiations. The Korean people have always held and still do, that the war in Korea should be ended quickly. Therefore, they agreed with enthusiasm to the proposal of Mr. Malik, Soviet representative to the United Nations, on June 23, that both belligerent parties negotiate a cease-fire and an armistice, and that both parties withdraw their troops from the 38th Parallel.

We consider that in order to put an end to the Korean war, such important problems have to be solved as a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the troops of both sides from the 38th Parallel, as a basic condition for the realisation of a cessation of hostilities in Korea, and the withdrawal of foreign troops to ensure that the flames of war will not flare up again in Korea. Therefore, on behalf of the Korean People's Army, I make the following proposals:

1. On the basis of mutual agreement, both parties simultaneously order the cessation of hostile military actions of each and every sort: the army of each party stops its bombardment, blockade and reconnaisance against the other party; the navy of each party stops its bombardment, blockade and reconnaisance; and the airforce of each party stops its bombing and reconnaisance against the other party. Obviously, a cease-fire between the two parties not only can reduce loss of life and property, but is also the first step to put out the flames of war in Korea.

2. The 38th Parallel should be fixed as the military demarcation line from which the armed forces of both parties should simultaneously be withdrawn 10 kilometres. This should be done within a certain limit of time. The areas evacuated by both parties will be a non-military zone in which neither of the parties should station its armed forces or carry out any military action. The civil administration of those areas should be restored to the *status quo ante* June 25, 1950.

At the same time, talks should be conducted immediately on the exchange of prisoners of war, so that prisoners of war of various countries may return home quickly and rejoin their families.

3. All foreign troops should be withdrawn in the shortest possible time. With the withdrawal of foreign troops, the ending of the Korean war and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question will be basically assured. The Korean people, the Chinese people, the Soviet people and the peace-loving people throughout the world, including the American and British peoples, all ardently demand an early termination of the Korean war and a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. I hope that we can reach an agreement in these negotiations in order to satisfy the demands of the broad masses of the people.

* * *

*General Teng Hua, representative of the Chinese people's volunteers, was next to address the meeting. He whole-heartedly endorsed the three proposals put forward by General Nam Il.*

## STATEMENT BY GENERAL TENG HUA, July 10, 1951

I come to this meeting on the orders of General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese people's volunteers who are fighting in Korea in aid of the Korean People's Army. Together with the representatives of the Korean People's Army, we shall discuss with the representatives of General Ridgway, Commander of the United Nations Forces, the realisation of a cease-fire and armistice and other questions in Korea on a fair and reasonable basis. I consider that the settling of these questions will be a big step towards the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

The interests of the Chinese and Korean peoples are absolutely identical. The ending of the Korean war and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question are also the consistent demand of the Chinese people and the goal towards which they constantly strive. The aim of the Chinese people's volunteers in helping the Korean People's Army is to restore peace in Korea and to safeguard the safety of China. Therefore when, on the basis of the consistent stand of the Soviet Government for settling the Korean question peacefully, Mr. Malik, Soviet representative to the United Nations, proposed that both belligerent parties in Korea negotiate a cease-fire and armistice and that both parties withdraw their troops from the 38th Parallel, this proposal immediately received the warm support of the Chinese people and the Chinese Government.

A cease-fire by both belligerent parties in Korea, the designation of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line of both parties and the withdrawal of all foreign troops, conform with the wishes and demands of the Korean people, Chinese people and people throughout the world.

We consider that the three proposals raised by the representative of the Korean People's Army constitute the necessary premise and basis for the ending of the Korean war and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Chinese people's volunteers whole-heartedly support these proposals and hold that they should be the starting point of negotiations. People of all countries hate war and ardently wish for peace. We hope that we can successfully accomplish the task of ending the Korean war.

*Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, senior United Nations Command delegate, made the following statement at the first session of the negotiations:*

## STATEMENT BY VICE-ADMIRAL C. TURNER JOY, July 10, 1951

The United Nations Command delegation here present represents and speaks for the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. It does so fully and solemnly, conscious of the great importance to the peoples of the entire world of the discussions begun here today.

It is understood, of course, that the hostilities will continue in all areas except in those neutral zones agreed upon, until such time as there is an agreement on the terms governing the armistice and until such time as an approved armistice commission is prepared to function.

The U.N. Command delegation is prepared to do its part in trying to work out an armistice agreement with representatives of the Communist forces in Korea, for the cessation of hostilities in Korea, under conditions which will assure against their resumption. This delegation is for that sole purpose. It will discuss military matters in Korea limiting to that subject.

This delegation will not discuss political or economic matters of any kind. This delegation will not discuss military matters unrelated to Korea.

Success or failure of negotiations begun here today depends directly upon the good faith of delegations here present. With good faith on both sides there can be created an atmosphere of mutual confidence. In such an atmosphere there is every reason to hope for success. Such an atmosphere can exist where truth prevails.

As the senior U.N. Command delegate and personal representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the U.N. Command, I desire to state with the utmost earnestness and emphasis and in language so clear that it cannot be misunderstood that the U.N. Command delegation will act in good faith. We must assume that the representatives of the Communist forces in Korea here present will do likewise.

* * *

*The U.N. Delegation failed to attend the 3rd session scheduled for July 12. The pretext was that 20 correspondents from the U.N. side had not been allowed to go to Kaisung.*

*At the meeting the day before, that is on July 11, the U.N. Delegation had in fact raised the question of correspondents covering the armistice negotiations. The Korean and Chinese delegates had at the time agreed to give this due consideration. They stated that correspondents of both parties should be permitted to go to Kaisung at a propitious time, and made it clear that news reporters would be welcomed as soon as an agreement was reached on this point. But in violation of the principle of mutual agreement the U.N. Delegation carried 20 pressmen in its motor convoy when it set out for the meeting the next day. The 20 pressmen were denied passage through to Kaisung as no agreement had yet been reached concerning their presence in Kaisung. There was no obstruction to the passage of members and staff of the U.N. Delegation. However the whole convoy turned back.*

## FROM VICE-ADMIRAL C. TURNER JOY, July 12, 1951

General Nam Il, Korean Army

1. At 09:30 hours, 12 July, 1951, my motor convoy proceeding along the Munsan-Kaesong road bearing personnel desired by me at the conference site was refused passage past your controlled post by your armed guards.

2. I have ordered this convoy to return to United Nations lines.

3. I am prepared to return with my delegation and continue the discussions which were recessed yesterday upon notification from you that my convoy bearing personnel of my choosing including such press representatives as I consider necessary will be cleared to the conference site.

C. TURNER JOY,
*Vice-Admiral, United States Navy, Senior United Nations delegate.*

## FROM GENERAL NAM IL, July 13, 1951

Vice-Admiral Charles Turner Joy:

Your letter has been received, I hereby make the following reply:

1. We did not prevent your delegation from coming here to the conference at 07:45 hours, on the 12th. With regard to the pressmen coming with the convoy, it is only natural that they could not be allowed into the area of negotiations, as no agreement was reached by both parties. And it is not right of your delegation to refuse to attend the meeting because of this.

2. As to the question of coverage by reporters and press representatives, we are of the opinion that without mutual agreement, no reporters or press representatives of either party should enter the area of negotiations.

3. We propose that the meeting be continued at 09:00 hours (Pyongyang time) today.

GENERAL NAM IL,
*Chief of the Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese people's volunteers.*

## FROM GENERAL M. B. RIDGWAY, July 13, 1951

General Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai:

In my initial message to you on 30 June I proposed that representatives meet aboard a Danish hospital ship. I suggested this since it would have offered equal freedom of access to both parties, including any elements as newsmen associated with the parties. It would have provided a completely neutral atmosphere free of the menacing presence of armed troops of either side. It would have provided adequate communication facilities of all kinds. Your reply message made no reference to my proposed meeting place. Instead you proposed Kaesong.

In the interest of expediting the end of bloodshed and to demonstrate good faith under which U.N. Command was proceeding, I accepted Kaesong as the site for our discussion. In so doing, I expected that the conditions referred to above as vital to the success of any such discussions would be afforded at Kaesong. In order to provide further assurances that such conditions would in fact exist at the conference site, my liaison officers in their initial meeting with yours on 8th July proposed that a 10-mile wide corridor centred on the Kumchong—Kaesong—Munsanni road and limited by Kumchong on the north and Munsanni on the south be established as a neutral zone free of any hostile action by either party.

They further recommended that the U.N. forces within this corridor remain south of an east-west line to the south edge of Kaesong while your forces within this corridor remain north of an east-west line to the north edge of Kaesong, leaving the town of Kaesong restricted to entry only by those individuals in the delegation parties. Agreement on this proposal would have insured freedom of movement to both delegations to and from meetings and within the town of Kaesong. However your liaison officers declined to agree to this proposal stating that it was not needed to insure satisfactory conditions at the conference site for both delegations. To show good faith and to avoid any delay I accepted your assurances instead of my proposal to establish a neutral zone.

Since the opening of the conference it has been evident that equality of treatment so essential to the conduct of armistice negotiations is lacking. Since the first meeting at Kaesong your delegation has placed restrictions on the movement of our delegation. It has subjected our personnel to the close proximity of your armed guard. It has delayed and blocked the passage of our couriers. It has withheld its co-operation in the establishment of two-way communications with our base even though it agreed to do so immediately. It has refused admittance to the conference area of certain personnel in our convoy which I desire and for whose conduct I stated I assumed full responsibility. Extension of the present recess and delay in resuming the conference by our delegation is solely due to those unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions against which my representatives have repeatedly protested.

As pointed out to your representative by Vice-Admiral Joy, my personal representative, in the first meeting of July 10, the hope of success for these discussions rested upon the good faith of both sides. With good faith, mutual confidence might be established, an atmosphere of truce created, and attainment of an honourable and enduring settlement brought measurably nearer. The record of the U.N. Command delegation to date is open for world inspection. It established beyond any shadow of doubt honorable intentions and good faith at every stage of the proceedings. With a full and solemn realisation of the vital importance of our conference to all peoples of the world, the U.N. Command delegation is prepared to continue our discussions in the same spirit of good faith at any time that we receive assurance that your delegation will proceed in a like spirit.

The assurances I require are simple and few. They include as primary requisites establishment of an agreed conference area of suitable extent, completely free of armed personnel of either side. Each delegation must have complete reciprocity of treatment, to include complete and equal freedom of movement to, from, and within the agreed conference area and complete and equal freedom at all times of selection of personnel in its delegation party to include representatives of the press. Therefore I now propose that a circular area with its centre approximately at the centre of Kaesong and with a five mile radius be agreed upon as a neutral zone. The eastern limit of the neutral zone shall be the present point of contact of our forces at Pan-mon-jon.

I propose that we both agree to refrain from any hostile act within this zone during the entire period of our conference. I propose that we agree that the area of the conference site and roads leading thereto used by the personnel of both parties be completely free of armed personnel of each

delegation within the neutral area which at any time be limited to a maximum of 150. I propose that we agree that the constitution of each delegation party within the foregoing limits be subject solely to the determination of its commander.

It is understood that the personnel to be admitted to the actual conference chamber should be limited to those agreed upon by your representatives and the U.N.'s. If you agree to these proposals the present recess can be terminated and the conference resumed without delay and with some expectation of progress. Radio telephone is available for your communication to me of your reply. If you prefer to send your reply by liaison officer I guarantee his safety within my lines during daylight providing you inform me of the time and route by which he will travel and the manner by which he may be identified. Should you continue to insist that restrictions are necessary for your personal safety, or for any other reasons, I propose that the conference site be removed to a locality which will afford the few simple assurances I have specified herein.

*(Signed)*

M. B. RIDGWAY,
*General, United States Army, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.*

## FROM GENERAL KIM IL SUNG AND GENERAL PENG TEH-HUAI, July 14, 1951

General Ridgway:

Your letter dated July 13 has been received. In order to eliminate misunderstanding and arguments over some side questions and to enable the work of peace negotiations to proceed smoothly, we agree to your proposal of fixing the Kaisung area as a neutral zone during the period of the meeting, and that both parties do not carry out hostile acts of any kind within this area, and all armed personnel be excluded from the area of the meeting place and from the routes through which your delegation and ours travel to the area of the meeting place. As to the size of the area of the meeting place and other related concrete questions, we propose that these be left to the delegations of both sides to settle at a single session.

With regard to the question of news reporters, which gave rise to the holding up of the meeting, this has nothing to do with the question of the fixing of a neutral zone. Your delegation never raised the question of fixing a neutral zone after your liaison officers raised it once on July 8. But the task of the liaison officers was to discuss questions of detail. They had no power to discuss a question of this nature—a question of fixing a neutral zone.

The question of news reporters which gave rise to the present suspension of the meeting is a trifling one. It is not worth suspending the meeting for this, much less is it worth breaking up the meeting for this. Your delegation had raised this question at the meeting. Our delegation at the time considered that the arrival of news reporters of various countries in Kaisung to be inappropriate, as the meeting had not yet achieved any result and even the agenda had not yet been passed. Thus on this question no agreement was reached.

We insist on the principle that all matters must be agreed upon by both sides before they can be executed. We hold that this principle is fair and irrefutable. Since agreement was not reached on the question of news reporters, your side should not one-sidedly and forcibly put it into operation.

For the sake of preventing the meeting from being suspended for a long time or broken up as a result of this trifle, we now agree to your proposal: To include the 20 news reporters of your side as a part of the personnel of your delegation. We have already ordered our delegation to provide facilities to your side on this question too.

*(Signed)*

KIM IL SUNG,
*Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.*

PENG TEH-HUAI,
*Commander of the Chinese people's volunteers.*

* * *

*When the negotiations were resumed on July 15, the sessions continued to discuss the proposals for an agenda. A three-day recess followed the 8th meeting on July 21, to facilitate careful consideration of the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops.*

*At the 9th meeting on July 25 General Nam Il, Chief of the Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese people's volunteers, made a statement with respect to the agenda put forward by his Delegation, which was adopted at the next session.*

*General Nam Il stated that the proposed agenda was prompted by the desire to reach an early armistice agreement to gratify the initial hopes of the world's peace-loving people. He set forth the reasons why the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea is of such signal importance to the restoration of peace in Korea. The following is the text of General Nam Il's statement:*

## STATEMENT BY GENERAL NAM IL, July 25, 1951

This morning we heard your opinion (referring to Vice-Admiral Charles Turner Joy, Chief Delegate of the United Nations forces—*Editor*) that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is not enough to ensure that the Korean war will not break out again, and that the effect would even be to the contrary. We think that this view is groundless. What kind of a war is the present Korean war? It is a war involving many countries, and here lies the danger. This situation is brought about by the fact that, in the first place, a foreign country interfered in the internal affairs of Korea and sent its troops to fight in Korea. This situation is amply revealed in the composition of our present meeting. Ostensibly there were indeed no foreign troops in Korea on June 25, 1950. However, the reason for the events of June 25 and their subsequent development may be seen precisely in the fact that on June 27, already large numbers of foreign troops came to Korea. It is this which prevented a peaceful settlement of the internal affairs of Korea for which we have always stood, and enlarged the war into one involving many countries. It was not until the foreign troops which came in on one side of the war were penetrating into the heart of the Korean Democratic People's Republic and were directly menacing the security of the People's Republic of China that the Chinese people were compelled to form their volunteer troops to help the Korean people against the intervention of the foreign troops.

From this, it can be seen that to settle the Korean question peacefully and to have a firm guarantee for our ceasefire and armistice, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea.

Since our first meeting, our side has consistently held that the present meeting should discuss and solve the question of withdrawing all foreign troops from Korean territory. The present meeting is a ceasefire and armistice meeting having the object of bringing about a ceasefire and armistice in Korea on a just and reasonable basis by agreement between both sides. It is obvious that we want a ceasefire and armistice not for either side to gain a breathing space to prepare for war again, but for the way to be paved for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This is what the peace-loving people throughout the world hope that both sides will do. And both sides have expressed their views and are agreed that for our conference to achieve its task successfully they must have sincerity in regard to the ceasefire and armistice and must, during our negotiations, arrive at a firm assurance that there will be no recurrence of hostile military actions after the carrying out of the ceasefire and armistice in Korea. Since both sides agree that the ceasefire and armistice which we will achieve is not for either side to gain a breathing space for endless fighting, then is there any need for the foreign troops that came to fight in Korea to continue their stay in Korea after the ceasefire and armistice?

Since both our sides have agreed that we will obtain, through the negotiations, firm guarantees against the recurrence of hostile military actions after the ceasefire and armistice in Korea are realised, what can better guarantee that there will be no recurrence of hostile military actions after the ceasefire and armistice in Korea than the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea? From whatever point of view it is considered, the question of withdrawing all foreign troops from Korea is inseparable from the question of fulfilling the ceasefire and armistice in Korea.

It is on these self-evident grounds that we, in the past eight meetings, explained our views tirelessly and repeatedly and, time and again, put forward the withdrawal of all foreign troops as a subject for discussion. The reasons which your side has given for refusing to include this subject on the agenda do not hold water. Nevertheless, our views failed to get the agreement of your side, through all the discussions in the eight meetings, and we cannot but regard this as highly regrettable.

Now, in order to arrive at an early armistice agreement so as to fulfil the initial hopes of the world's peace-loving people, we agree to the proposal of your side that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea be left for another meeting to solve after the ceasefire and armistice are realised and do not include it on the agenda for this meeting.

But since the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea is so closely related to the ceasefire and armistice which we are striving to reach, and all the troops of the foreign countries engaged in the war are so anxious to return home and live in peace after the armistice, we believe that after discussing and solving the questions concerning the ceasefire and armistice, our present meeting nevertheless must handle this important question explicitly. Therefore we propose that, to the four items on the agenda already agreed upon, a fifth should be added, namely "proposals to the governments concerned on both sides," so that, after discussing the four above-mentioned items on the agenda and reaching concrete agreement, both our sides may, under this item, discuss proposals to the governments concerned on both sides for the convening of a meeting of representatives of both sides at a higher level, within a certain time after the carrying out of the armistice agreement, to discuss the question of withdrawing by stages all foreign troops from Korea.

We believe that this item for the agenda and the contents of the proposals which we shall submit during the discussion of this item will not only help to fulfil the desire to reach an early armistice agreement, but will also bring further hope for guaranteeing peace in Korea. We believe that the delegates of your side will certainly agree to this point.

## THE AGENDA FOR THE CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS IN KOREA

*Agreement on the agenda was reached at the 10th meeting on July 26. Thus the 11th meeting on July 27 was scheduled to begin discussions on questions of substance.*

*The agenda finally agreed upon by both sides is as follows:*

1. Adopting of the agenda.

2. Fixing the military demarcation line between both sides to establish a non-military zone as a basic condition for ending hostilities in Korea.

3. Making practical arrangements for the carrying out of the ceasefire and armistice within the confines of Korea, including the composition, powers and functions of the machinery for supervising the carrying out of the ceasefire and armistice terms.

4. Questions of arrangements concerning prisoners of wars.

5. Proposals to the governments of the various countries concerned on both sides.

# People's China

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