


*Nguyen Chi Thanh*

WHO WILL WIN  
IN SOUTH VIET NAM?

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## NO WAY OUT FOR U.S. IMPERIALISM

In 1954, the U.S. imperialists, taking advantage of the French colonialists' defeat at Dien Bien Phu, drove the French out of south Viet Nam and set up a puppet regime headed by Ngo Dinh Diem. In essence, this meant that U.S. neo-colonialism replaced French old colonialism and became dominant in south Viet Nam.

The United States thought that, with its numerous arms, dollars, rich political and military experience and a faithful lackey Ngo Dinh Diem, it could solve all the problems in south Viet Nam in a very short time. Events, however, have proved this to be sheer wishful thinking.

Nine years have elapsed and the U.S. imperialists are still unable to come to any definite conclusion as regards their plans for aggression.

Much discussion on the situation in south Viet Nam has been going on in the American press and radio, and opinions are varied. U.S. politicians and generals, who agree on invading south Viet Nam, are widely divided over the line of action. Some of them stand for kicking out Ngo Dinh Diem because he has dirtied the showcase of American "democracy". Others are against "changing the horse in the middle of the stream". Militarily, U.S. generals have so far failed to work out a single, consistent strategic and tactical line for aggression in south Viet Nam. Some of them hold that the anti-guerrilla tactics employed in Malaya should be applied *in toto* in south Viet Nam, while others say that this would be an in-

flexible approach. Some of them advocate using large mobile forces in "spectacular" campaigns to wipe out the armed forces of the National Liberation Front, while others believe that victory can be obtained only through the use of smaller units in surprise attacks since their opponents, appearing and disappearing mysteriously, are difficult to deal with.

They all stick to their own arguments, which are equally absurd, being subjective and detached from the actual situation.

It should be granted, however, that the United States did try to learn from its trials and errors in south Viet Nam. It came to the "wise" conclusion of setting up "strategic hamlets" to control the people and isolate the armed forces of the National Liberation Front, thinking this to be the sure way to success. However, even this latest "wise" conclusion has driven U.S. imperialism into utter confusion.

U.S. capital is world-renowned for its cleverness in clicking the abacus for cold-blooded exploitation. However, it can hardly be found in the annals of U.S. imperialism where its political and military leaders committed such serious blunders and long-standing errors as they did in appraising the situation in south Viet Nam. This is understandable since what is involved here is not a business calculation but brain-racking "political arithmetic".

Their formula is perhaps something like this:

Step 1. Set up a puppet regime (headed by Ngo Dinh Diem or any other lackey).

Step 2. Consolidate this puppet regime and take measures to stabilize the situation in south Viet Nam: direct their main efforts on suppressing the revolution-

ary forces and the former Resistance forces, and gradually eliminate the French influences so as to clear the way for further U.S. economic, political, military and cultural penetrations.

Step 3. Strengthen the puppet regime, turn south Viet Nam into a stable colony of a new type and a complete military base under absolute U.S. control.

The above formula appears at first sight to be well thought out. Its greatest fallacy, however, lies in the fact that it only suits the United States and disregards all others. The United States does not see the other factors in this situation.

It is true that U.S. neo-colonialism has scored certain successes in some parts of the world. In south Viet Nam, however, it is "born at the wrong time", or to borrow from business language, it will not "pay off". This is because the United States has overlooked a fundamental factor, that is, when U.S. neo-colonialism made its way to south Viet Nam, it ran into certain unexpected circumstances, which may be listed as follows:

— Great, sharp social contradictions exist between U.S. imperialism and north Viet Nam which is advancing towards socialism.

— With the restoring of peace, social contradictions in south Viet Nam, instead of being eased, have further sharpened and matured. These are contradictions between the south Vietnamese people on the one hand and the U.S. imperialists, the feudal landlord class and comprador capital represented by Ngo Dinh Diem on the other.

— The south Vietnamese people have learned much from their struggle and have been able to utilize correct methods to resolve the social contradictions in south Viet

Nam. These methods have been crystallized in the clear-sighted programmes of the South Viet Nam National Liberation Front and of the People's Revolutionary Party of South Viet Nam.

— Generally speaking, the world situation is not favourable to U.S. imperialism. The socialist camp is mightier than the imperialist camp; the movements for democracy and national independence are gaining momentum. These are great and ever-sharpening contradictions, driving the U.S. imperialists into a situation in which they can no longer do as they please.

It appears that south Viet Nam is the focus of many contradictions. The United States should have used algebra in gauging the situation there; instead it used simple arithmetic. Consequently it has run into a blind alley. The United States tries to find a way out by sending a batch of generals and over ten thousand troops to south Viet Nam. This will not help, now or ever. It now appears that the United States may "change the horse in the middle of the stream", but the substitution of one traitor for another will come to nothing. Such a change will not save the U.S.-Diem rule from ruin.

When the U.S. imperialists dispatched ten thousand troops to south Viet Nam, they believed that the rebellious forces could be put down within eighteen months. Later they said it would probably take ten years. Now, some people in the United States are not at all sure if they could succeed in eighteen years.

U.S. imperialism is certainly not ready to reconcile itself to its defeat in south Viet Nam. But it is an indisputable fact that it is being confronted with a crisis in its political line, which has, in turn, given rise to crises in military strategy and tactics.



The causes of these crises lie in the following:

— The fundamental cause is that the U.S. imperialists are doing an unjust thing — invading another country — and therefore they meet with the firm resistance of the south Vietnamese people, are disapproved of by the American people, condemned by other peoples, and even disliked by some of their henchmen in the Ngo Dinh Diem administration.

— Pursuing its aggressive aims, the United States egged Ngo Dinh Diem on to adopt a number of stupid policies, which aggravated the contradictions within the Ngo Dinh Diem regime.

— The U.S.-Diem clique faces an opponent who, although lacking American dollars, arms and other material, is full of anti-imperialist spirit, full of patriotism and revolutionary courage, and experienced in political and military struggles.

The indication of failure of American policy was evident even at the time when the United States scored a first victory in south Viet Nam by kicking out France and setting up the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. This factor of failure has grown daily ever since. Even though the United States throws in a hundred million more dollars and builds up a wall of gold, it will not be able to hold back the development of the situation which is governed by its own law, and the law is: the United States is bound to be defeated.

Shouldn't Britain's defeat in America, the defeat of Napoleon and Hitler, France's defeat in Indo-China and the defeat of the United States itself in Korea be enough evidence for the U.S. aggressors to draw the necessary conclusion?

## WE WILL WIN

Since the re-establishment of peace, the Ngo Dinh Diem administration has borrowed more than 2,000 million dollars from the United States, used nearly 500,000 troops including regulars, armed police and militiamen, brought in over 10,000 American troops and officers, etc. That is to say, it has mobilized a huge force in an attempt to annihilate the revolutionary forces. In spite of all this, however, Ngo Dinh Diem cannot help worrying over his own dark future. Perhaps he will suddenly realize that it is not the revolutionary forces of the people, but he himself, who is being destroyed.

Ngo Dinh Diem, the self-styled founder of the "republican and democratic system", a man more monarchic than a monarch, was quite sure of himself at the time he assumed the presidency. He thought that as long as he hung on to the U.S. imperialists, even heaven would not dare to do him the slightest harm. The U.S. imperialists, too, overestimated Ngo Dinh Diem. They thought that their time and money spent on him would not be in vain. They expected Diem, "a man of ambition", to have enough "moral strength" and "ability" to take up the "heavy responsibility" of a puppet. U.S. imperialism and its puppet, haughty and conceited, cannot possibly know about themselves and their enemy. That is why they have fought one losing battle after another and will continue to do so.

During its nine years of control in south Viet Nam, the Diem regime has hardly spent nine days at ease. As is shown above, this regime and the U.S. policy of aggression were confronted with crisis at the very beginning. This reactionary superstructure was conceived at

a time when the storm of world revolution, the Vietnamese revolution in particular, was raging.

The United States adopted in those days a policy which appeared to be more enlightened than that of the French colonialists. It tried to create a so-called national and democratic regime, establish itself in south Viet Nam and set up a seemingly independent society which in substance is a colony of a new type.

However, we never allowed ourselves to be fooled. We took the viewpoint that the centre of world reaction had shifted from Europe to North America, and that after World War II, the United States became the international gendarme, the arch enemy of the world's people. We also learned from our experience during the Resistance when the United States helped the French to attack our people. Thus we were able to correctly identify the true nature of the U.S. scheme in south Viet Nam and exposed it at its very inception. At this critical time, we gave correct and timely answers to the basic questions involving the revolutionary movement in south Viet Nam. We pointed out unequivocally that the Ngo Dinh Diem regime was reactionary, that it was bent on selling out rather than saving the country, that it was dictatorial rather than democratic, and that it was a henchman of the United States rather than a representative of the south Vietnamese people of any section. Our Party maintained that in scheming to kick out the French, the United States meant not to bring any benefit to our people but to take the place of the French colonialists and introduce neo-colonialism into our country. Our Party later affirmed that south Viet Nam was a colony of a new type. We correctly appraised the United States and Ngo Dinh Diem, the relationship between the two,

the character of the society in south Viet Nam, and the contradictions and balance of power between the enemy and ourselves. That is to say, we drew a clear-cut line between our enemy, our friends and ourselves.

We, therefore, called upon the people never to compromise with Ngo Dinh Diem. We pointed out that the people must deal blows at U.S. imperialism, and that instead of coexisting peacefully with the U.S.-Diem clique the people must carry on the revolution uninterruptedly.

The people in south Viet Nam have stood the test for nine years. Although they have not yet won complete victory, they have gradually scored impressive gains. The factor of victory had existed at the very outset of the struggle: the revolution in south Viet Nam is a just cause. From the very beginning, seeds of victory have been embodied in the correct line of the revolution in the south.

Although ultimate conclusions cannot yet be reached insofar as the struggle is still going on in south Viet Nam, we may however put forth the following views:

1. The U.S. imperialists are not invincible. Compared with imperialists of other countries, they are mightier, but compared with the revolutionary forces and the forces of the people of the world, they are not at all strong. If the proletarian revolution and people of the world resolutely struggle against U.S. imperialism, they can surely repel it step by step and narrow down its domain.

We do not have any illusions about the United States. We do not underestimate our opponent — the strong and cunning U.S. imperialism. But we are not afraid of the United States. This strategic concept thoroughly pervades the revolutionary line of south Viet Nam and is

the fundamental factor determining the success of the revolution. If, on the contrary, one is afraid of the United States and thinks that to offend it would court failure, and that firm opposition to U.S. imperialism would touch off a nuclear war, then the only course left would be to compromise with and surrender to U.S. imperialism.

2. A powerful north Viet Nam will be a decisive factor in the social development of our entire country. But this does not mean that simply because the north is strong, the revolutionary movement in the south will automatically succeed. The powerful north Viet Nam and the revolutionary movement of the south Vietnamese people are mutually complementary and must be closely co-ordinated; the building of the north itself cannot replace the resolution of the inherent social contradictions of south Viet Nam. Adhering to this correct view, we have avoided opportunistic mistakes. If, on the contrary, we had feared the United States and had no faith in the success of our struggles against it, we would have called on the people in south Viet Nam to "wait" and "coexist peacefully" with the U.S.-Diem clique, and committed an irreparable error. We have correctly handled the relations between north and south Viet Nam. This is a Marxist-Leninist strategic concept which is in conformity with the latest experience in the world developments and those in our own country.

We have formulated a correct line of strategy and tactics, proceeding from a correct assessment of the character of society both in south Viet Nam and in the whole country, the balance of power between the enemy and ourselves and the contradictions within our society. This line may be summed up as follows:

The south Vietnamese society is one with a neo-colonial and semi-feudal character. Therefore, the revolution there must be a national and democratic one.

To overthrow the U.S.-Diem clique and win victory for the revolution, south Viet Nam must:

— be led by a Marxist-Leninist party;

— have a broad national united front, based on a worker-peasant alliance, and with all the component forces concentrated and directed against the main enemy — the U.S.-Diem clique;

— have a strong political force and a determined armed force;

— employ such tactics which serve to isolate the main enemy to the greatest extent possible, and take advantage of the enemy's inner contradictions to strengthen its own forces and weaken the enemy forces.

We have laid down this line by combining Marxist-Leninist ideology with the practice of the revolution in south Viet Nam. This line is a banner which rallies and organizes the masses in their struggle.

In any society, when conditions are ripe for direct revolutionary action, that is, when contradictions in the society have become very sharp and matured, and when there is a revolutionary political party with a correct political line leading the masses, revolution will surely succeed, whoever its opponents may be.

During the last nine years Ngo Dinh Diem has exhausted all his methods in dealing with the revolutionary movement in the south. The United States has also resorted to all sorts of schemes in a concentrated effort to solve the problem of south Viet Nam. However, all

their efforts have proved fruitless. Although U.S. imperialism still insists on using every possible method to tackle the revolutionary movement in south Viet Nam, it has begun to lose enthusiasm and is hopelessly bogged down because its opponent is unyielding and resourceful. The revolutionary movement in south Viet Nam has yet to undergo many years of hard struggle before winning final victory. But victory is on our side because the south Vietnamese people are carrying on a just, patriotic struggle, because they have scored tangible victories after nine years of severe trials, and because the revolution in south Viet Nam is guided by a correct political line. Moreover, the revolution in south Viet Nam does not stand alone. The whole of north Viet Nam, the entire socialist camp and all the oppressed peoples of the world hold the south Vietnamese people close to their hearts and regard the revolution in south Viet Nam as part of their own cause, as a common cause of the world revolution.

The south Vietnamese people already possess the factors of victory, but the more the U.S. imperialists get bogged down, the more cruel and cunning they become. Therefore, to win further success and advance to complete victory, the people and armed forces in south Viet Nam must continue to struggle more determinedly and bravely against U.S. imperialism and its henchmen. The U.S.-Diem troops may have more than enough aircraft, guns and money but they lack fighting spirit. That is why they will lose everything. Our people in south Viet Nam have the revolutionary fortitude, which, if utilized to the maximum, will win for us everything.

We have every reason to believe that victory will be ours!







阮志清  
誰將在越南南方獲勝？

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