
Volume VI
The New Stage
August 1937–1938

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MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

Revolutionary Writings 1912·1949



Stuart R. Schram, Editor

Nancy J. Hodes, Associate Editor

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Volume VI

The New Stage

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Revolutionary Writings

1912 · 1949

This volume was prepared under the auspices of
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Harvard University

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The Cover

"March forward resolutely, fight Japan, and save China." (Inscription for the Second Congress of the Northwest Youth National Salvation Association, November, 1938)

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Stuart R. Schram, Editor
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An East Gate Book

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Nancy Hodes, associate editor of the series until her departure for Soka Gakkai University in 2000, was involved in all aspects of the work on the present volume. She played a major role in the revision and annotation of the translations, and in checking the final versions against the Chinese originals. She also drafted some translations. In particular, she prepared the initial drafts of all Mao's poems, which were then revised in collaboration with Stuart Schram. Final responsibility for the accuracy and literary quality of the work as a whole rests with him as editor.

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Schwartz carefully read the manuscripts of earlier volumes of this series, and made stimulating and thoughtful criticisms of the introductions. Subsequently, he continued, so long as his health allowed, to offer insightful comments on the themes raised by the materials translated. For any remaining errors and inadequacies, the fault lies once again with the editor.

General Introduction

Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912–1949

Mao Zedong stands out as one of the dominant figures of the twentieth century. Guerrilla leader, strategist, conqueror, ruler, poet, and philosopher, he placed his imprint on China, and on the world. This edition of Mao's writings provides abundant documentation in his own words regarding both his life and his thought. Because of the central role of Mao's ideas and actions in the turbulent course of the Chinese revolution, it thus offers a rich body of historical data about China in the first half of the twentieth century.

The process of change and upheaval in China which Mao sought to master had been going on for roughly a century by the time he was born in 1893. Its origins lay in the incapacity of the old order to cope with the population explosion at the end of the eighteenth century and with other economic and social problems, as well as in the shock administered by the Opium War of 1840 and further European aggression and expansion thereafter.

Mao's native Hunan Province was crucially involved both in the struggles of the Qing dynasty to maintain its authority and in the radical ferment which led to successive challenges to the imperial system. Thus, on the one hand, the Hunan Army of the great conservative viceroy Zeng Guofan was the main instrument for putting down the Taiping Rebellion and saving the dynasty in the middle of the nineteenth century. But, on the other hand, the most radical of the late nineteenth-century reformers, and the only one to lay down his life in 1898, Tan Sitong, was also a Hunanese, as was Huang Xing, whose contribution to the revolution of 1911 was arguably as great as that of Sun Yatsen.[1] In his youth, Mao profoundly admired all three of these men, though they stood for very different things: Zeng for the empire and the Confucian values which sustained it, Tan for defying tradition and seeking inspiration in the West, Huang for Western-style constitutional democracy.

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1. Abundant references to all three of these figures are to be found in Mao's writings, especially those of the early period contained in Volume I of this series (regarding Zeng, see pp. 10, 72, and 131; on Tan, see "Zhang Kundi's Record of Two Talks with Mao Zedong," September 1917, p. 139; on Huang, see "Letter to Miyazaki Toten," March 1917, pp. 111–12).

Apart from Mao's strong Hunanese patriotism, which inclined him to admire eminent figures from his own province, he undoubtedly saw these three as forceful and effective leaders who, each in his own way, fought to assure the future of China. Any sense that they were contradictory symbols would have been diminished by the fact that from an early age Mao never advocated exclusive reliance on either Chinese or Western values but repeatedly sought a synthesis of the two. In August 1917, Mao Zedong expressed the view that despite the "antiquated" and otherwise undesirable traits of the Chinese mentality, "Western thought is not necessarily all correct either; very many parts of it should be transformed at the same time as Oriental thought."[2] In a sense, this sentence sums up the problem he sought to resolve throughout his whole career: How could China develop an advanced civilization and become rich and powerful, while remaining Chinese?

As shown by the texts contained in Volume I, Mao's early exposure to "Westernizing" influences was not limited to Marxism. Other currents of European thought played a significant role in his development. Whether he was dealing with liberalism or Leninism, however, Mao tenaciously sought to adapt and transform these ideologies, even as he espoused them and learned from them.

Mao Zedong played an active and significant role in the movement for political and intellectual renewal which developed in the aftermath of the patriotic student demonstrations of May 4, 1919, against the transfer of German concessions in China to Japan. This "new thought tide," which had begun to manifest itself at least as early as 1915, dominated the scene from 1919 onward and prepared the ground for the triumph of radicalism and the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. But though Mao enthusiastically supported the call of Chen Duxiu, who later became the Party's first leader, for the Western values incarnated by "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy," he never wholly endorsed the total negation of Chinese culture advocated by many people during the May Fourth period. His condemnations of the old thought as backward and slavish are nearly always balanced by a call to learn from both Eastern and Western thought and to develop something new out of these twin sources.

In 1919 and 1920, Mao leaned toward anarchism rather than socialism. Only in January 1921 did he at last draw the explicit conclusion that anarchism would not work and that Russia's proletarian dictatorship represented the model which must be followed.[3] Half the remaining fifty-five years of his life were devoted to creating such a dictatorship and the other half to deciding what to do with it and how to overcome the defects which he perceived in it. From the beginning to the end of this process, Mao drew upon Chinese experience and Chinese civilization in revising and reforming this Western import.

To the extent that, from the 1920s onward, Mao was a committed Leninist, his understanding of the doctrine shaped his vision of the world. But to the extent that,

2. Letter of August 1917 to Li Jinxi, Volume I, p. 132.
3. See his letter of January 21, 1921, to Cai Hesen, Volume II, pp. 35–36.

although he was a Communist revolutionary, he always "planted his backside on the body of China,"[4] ideology alone did not exhaustively determine his outlook. One of Mao Zedong's most remarkable attributes was the extent to which he linked theory and practice. He was in some respects not a very good Marxist, but few men have ever applied so well Marx's dictum that the vocation of the philosopher is not merely to understand the world but to change it.

It is reliably reported that Mao's close collaborators tried in vain, during the Yan'an period, to interest him in writings by Marx such as *The 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.* To such detailed historical analyses based on economic and social facts, he preferred *The Communist Manifesto,* of which he saw the message as "*Jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng!*" (Class struggle, class struggle, class struggle!). In other words, for Mao the essence of Marxism resided in the fundamental idea of the struggle between oppressor and oppressed as the motive force of history.

Such a perspective offered many advantages. It opened the door to the immediate pursuit of revolutionary goals, since even though China did not have a very large urban proletariat, there was no lack of oppressed people to be found there. It thus eliminated the need for the Chinese to feel inferior or to await salvation from without, just because their country was still stuck in some precapitalist stage of development (whether "Asiatic" or "feudal"). And, by placing the polarity "oppressor/oppressed" at the heart of the revolutionary ideology itself, this approach pointed toward a conception in which landlord oppression and the oppression of China by the imperialists were perceived as the two key targets of the struggle.

Mao displayed, in any case, a remarkably acute perception of the realities of Chinese society, and consistently adapted his ideas to those realities, at least during the struggle for power. In the early years after its foundation in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party sought support primarily from the working class in the cities and adopted a strategy based on a "united front" or alliance with Sun Yatsen's Guomindang. Mao threw himself into this enterprise with enthusiasm, serving first as a labor union organizer in Hunan in 1922–1923 and then as a high official within the Guomindang organization in 1923–1926. Soon, however, he moved away from this perspective, and even before urban-based revolution was put down in blood by Chiang Kaishek in 1927, he asserted that the real center of gravity of Chinese society was in the countryside. From this fact, he drew the conclusion that the decisive blows against the existing reactionary order must be struck in the countryside by the peasants.

By August 1927, Mao had concluded that mobilizing the peasant masses was not enough. A red army was also necessary to serve as the spearhead of revolution, and so he put forward the slogan: "Political power comes out of the barrel of

4. Mao Zedong, "Ruhe yanjiu Zhonggong dangshi" (How to Study the History of the Chinese Communist Party), talk of March 30, 1942, to a Central Committee study group, in *Mao Zedong wenji,* vol. 2, pp. 399–408.

a gun."[5] In the mountain fastness of the Jinggangshan base area in Jiangxi Province, to which he retreated at the end of 1927 with the remnants of his forces, he began to elaborate a comprehensive strategy for rural revolution, combining land reform with the tactics of guerrilla warfare. In this he was aided by Zhu De, a professional soldier who had joined the Chinese Communist Party and soon became known as the "commander-in-chief." This pattern of revolution rapidly achieved a considerable measure of success. The "Chinese Soviet Republic," established in 1931 in a larger and more populous area of Jiangxi, survived for several years, though when Chiang Kaishek finally devised the right strategy and mobilized his crack troops against it, the Communists were defeated and forced in 1934 to embark on the Long March.

There were periods during the years 1931–1934 when Mao Zedong was reduced virtually to the position of a figurehead by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, dominated in substantial measure by the Moscow-trained members of the so-called "Internationalist" faction. At other times, he was able to maintain a substantial measure of control over the military tactics of the Red Army and to develop his skills both as a theorist and as a practitioner of the art of war. Even when he was effectively barred from that domain, he continued to pursue the investigations of rural conditions which had long been one of his trademarks.[6] Such inquiries into the conditions in a particular area served as the foundation for an approach to revolution stressing the need to adapt the Party's tactics to the concrete realities of the society in which it was operating.

The defeat of 1934 weakened the position of Mao's rivals for the leadership. In meetings of the Politburo held in December 1934, in the course of the Long March, Mao was supported for the first time in over two years by a majority of the participants.[7] At the conference held at Zunyi in January 1935, Mao began his comeback in earnest. Soon he once again played a dominant role in decisions regarding military operations, though his rise to unquestioned dominance in the Party was a long process which reached its culmination only in 1945.

In the course of the northward march from Zunyi to Shaanxi Province, Mao was driven at times by the continuing threat from Chiang Kaishek's campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression" to advocate that the Red Army should fight its way to the borders of the Soviet Union, in order to obtain Soviet aid and protection.[8] Once the survivors of the Red Army had established themselves in Shaanxi

5. See the relevant passages of the texts of August 7 and August 18, 1927, in Volume III, pp. 31 and 36.

6. See, in particular, in Volume III, the Xunwu and Xingguo investigations, pp. 296–418 and 594–655, and in Volume IV, the circular of April 2, 1931, on investigating the situation regarding land and population, pp. 54–55, and the texts of 1933 on the "Land Investigation Movement," pp. 408–526 *passim.*

7. See Volume IV, pp. xciii–xciv.

8. See below, the Introduction to this volume, and also in Volume V, "Resolution of the Central Committee on Problems of Military Strategy," December 23, 1935.

Province in 1936, Mao's perspective began to change, and a vision of the Chinese people as a whole as the victim of oppression came progressively into play. For a time, Mao's line called for overthrowing the traitorous running dog Chiang Kaishek in order to fight Japan, but soon the growing threat of Japanese aggression and strong Soviet pressure in favor of collaboration with the Guomindang led to a fundamental change in the Party's policy. The Xi'an Incident of December 1936, in which Chiang Kaishek was kidnapped in order to force him to oppose the invader, was the catalyst which finally produced a second "united front." Without it, Mao Zedong and the forces he led might well have remained a side current in the remote and backward region of Northwest China or even been exterminated altogether. As it was, the collaboration of 1937–1945, however perfunctory and opportunistic on both sides, gave Mao the occasion to establish himself as a patriotic national leader. Above all, the resulting context of guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines allowed the Communists to build a foundation of political and military power throughout wide areas of Northern and Central China.

During the years in Yan'an, from 1937 to 1946, Mao Zedong also finally consolidated his own dominant position in the Chinese Communist Party and in particular his role as the ideological mentor of the Party. Beginning in November 1936, he seized the opportunity to read a number of writings by Chinese Marxists, and Soviet works in Chinese translation, which had been published a few years earlier while he was struggling for survival. These provided the stimulus for the elaboration of his own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and in particular for his theory of contradictions. As noted above, another of the main features of his thought, the emphasis on practice as the source of knowledge, had long been in evidence and had found expression in the sociological surveys in the countryside which he himself carried out beginning as early as 1926.

Although Mao attained a dominant and unchallengeable position in the Party only in the mid-1940s, the year 1938 was of crucial importance in his rise to power. In May and June, he produced two of his most important and influential military writings, "Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" and "On Protracted War." Meanwhile, it had been decided in March 1938 to send an emissary to Moscow to seek instructions from the Comintern in the face of the acute rivalry between Mao and Wang Ming, who had recently returned to China. In September the reply came back that the leading organs of the Chinese Communist Party, "with Mao Zedong as their head," should strive for close unity. Having been thus annointed by Georgi Dimitrov, speaking on behalf of Stalin, Mao delivered in October 1938 his report "On the New Stage," in which he put forward the call for the "Sinification of Marxism," making it very plain that he was the one who best understood this imperative. By this term he meant the modification not only of the language but of the substance of Marxism in order to adapt it to Chinese culture and to Chinese realities.

In 1939 and 1940, while paying lip service to the role of the Guomindang in China's struggle against Japanese imperialism, Mao began increasingly to suggest

that a successful Chinese revolution would be possible only under Communist leadership. By 1941, he made plain that, in his view, no one else was capable of carrying out this enterprise and attacked those in the Party who preferred to translate ready-made formulas from the Soviet Union. The "Rectification Campaign" of 1942–1943 was designed in large measure to change the thinking of such "Internationalists" or to eliminate them from positions of influence.

When Mao was elected chairman of the Politburo and of the Secretariat in March 1943, the terms of his appointment to this second post contained a curious provision: Mao alone, as chairman, could outvote the other two members of the Secretariat in case of disagreement. This was the first step toward setting Mao above and apart from all other Party members and thereby opening the way to the subsequent cult. At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945 came apotheosis: Mao Zedong's thought was written into the Party statutes as the guide to all work, and Mao was hailed as the greatest theoretical genius in China's history for his achievement in creating such a remarkable doctrine.

In 1939–1940, Mao had put forward the slogan of "New Democracy" and defined it as a régime in which proletariat (read Communist Party) and bourgeoisie (read Guomindang) would jointly exercise dictatorship over reactionary and pro-Japanese elements in Chinese society. Moreover, as late as 1945, when the Communists were still in a weaker position than the Guomindang, Mao indicated that this form of rule would be based on free elections with universal suffrage. Later, when the Communist Party had military victory within its grasp and was in a position to do things entirely in its own way, Mao would state forthrightly, in "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," that such a dictatorship could in fact just as well be called a "People's Democratic Autocracy." In other words, it was to be democratic only in the sense that it served the people's interests; in form, it was to exercise its authority through a "powerful state apparatus."

In 1946, when the failure of General George Marshall's attempts at mediation led to renewed civil war, Mao and his comrades revived the policies of land reform which had been suspended during the alliance with the Guomindang and thereby recreated a climate of agrarian revolution. Thus national and social revolution were interwoven in the strategy which ultimately brought final victory in 1949.

In March 1949, Mao declared that, though the Chinese revolution had previously taken the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside, henceforth the building of socialism would take place in the orthodox way, with leadership and enlightenment radiating outward from the cities to the countryside. Looking at the twenty-seven years under Mao's leadership after 1949, however, the two most striking developments—the chiliastic hopes of instant plenty which characterized the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s, and the anxiety about the corrupting effects of material progress, coupled with a nostalgia for "military communism," which underlay the Cultural Revolution—both bore the mark of rural utopianism. Thus Mao's road to power, though it led to total victory over the Nationalists, also

cultivated in Mao himself and in the Party attitudes which would subsequently engender great problems.

Revolution in its Leninist guise loomed large in the world for most of the twentieth century, and the Chinese revolution was, with the Russian revolution, one of its two most important manifestations. The Bolshevik revolution set a pattern long regarded as the only standard of communist orthodoxy, but the revolutionary process in China was in some respects even more remarkable. Although communism now appears bankrupt throughout much of the world, Mao's impact is still a living reality in China nearly three decades after his death. Particularly since the Tiananmen events of June 1989, the continuing relevance of Mao's political and ideological heritage has been heavily stressed by the Chinese leadership.

Though the ultimate impact of these recent trends remains uncertain, the problem of how to come to terms with the modern world while retaining China's own identity still represents one of the greatest challenges facing the Chinese. Mao did not solve it, but he boldly grappled with the political and intellectual challenge of the West as no Chinese ruler before him had done. If Lenin has suffered the ultimate insult of being replaced by Peter the Great as the symbol of Russian national identity, it could be argued that Mao cannot, like Lenin, be supplanted by a figure analogous to Peter because he himself played the role of China's first modernizing and Westernizing autocrat. However misguided many of Mao's ideas, and however flawed his performance, his efforts in this direction will remain a benchmark to a people still struggling to define their place in the community of nations.

Introduction

The Writings of Mao Zedong, August 1937–1938

This volume covers only a year and a half, from the summer of 1937 to the end of 1938, but it could be argued that this brief span saw more important developments in Mao Zedong's thought than any comparable period in his life before the Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949. These modifications took shape against a background of substantial changes in the objective situation, affecting Mao's own political role and the balance of forces within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the relations between the Communists and the Guomindang. Broadly speaking, the period in question saw the transition, not only in theory but in fact, from civil war against the Guomindang to limited albeit real cooperation in the war against Japan, in the context of the Second United Front. As this change was taking place, Mao elaborated new military tactics, as well as political ideas which served as the justification for the shift from social revolution to national revolution as the main task until victory over Japan was won. Central to this enterprise was the theme of the "Sinification of Marxism," which came to define the main thrust of his theoretical endeavors and served to buttress Mao's claim to leadership of the Party and of the country.

Mao and Marxism

As noted in the introduction to Volume V, despite the dramatic events surrounding the Xi'an Incident, Mao had found the time in late 1936 and early 1937 to undertake a serious study of Marxist writings for the first time in many years.[1] In addition to the writings of Marx himself, he was able to read Soviet works in Chinese translation as well as books by Chinese Marxist philosophers, making copious annotations in the margins.[2] He then proceeded, in the summer of 1937, to deliver

1. See Volume V, pp. ci–cii.

2. The Chinese texts of these annotations, of which the first and most important were made between November 1936 and June 1937, have been published in a volume entitled *Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuji* (Mao Zedong's Philosophical Annotations), ed. Department for Research on Party Literature under the Central Committee (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988) (hereafter Mao, *Philosophical Annotations*).

deliver a series of lectures on dialectical materialism, of which the final sections, in revised form, have come to be known as "On Practice" and "On Contradiction." A complete translation of these texts appears below. Because of the close relationship between the notes and the lectures, they have been placed together in a separate section toward the end of this volume, which also includes Mao's annotations of early 1938 to Li Da's *Shehuixue dagang* (Outline of Sociology).

These materials occupy a central place in Mao's intellectual development and in what came to be called "Mao Zedong Thought" and must therefore be given proper attention in this Introduction. At the same time, they are so extensive, totaling some two-hundred pages, and raise so many complicated issues that they cannot be dealt with exhaustively here. Further comments regarding many important points of detail will be found in the notes to the texts themselves, and fortunately there is an entire volume devoted to the subject, which provides a valuable perspective on Mao's first major steps as a Marxist philosopher.[3]

Mao had earlier read some Marx in translation, both as a student in Changsha and while he was a responsible official of the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang during the First United Front, but the translations of works by the influential Soviet scholars Mitin and Shirokov were his first introduction to the latest and most authoritative interpretations of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow. He began reading and annotating these two volumes in November 1936 and finished this task in June 1937. Thus he was able to draw on what he had learned from them in the lectures he delivered in July and August of that year.

The volume containing these annotations published in Beijing shows the relevant passages from the text of the books Mao read and his marginal comments on them in parallel columns, and our translation appears in the same format. Many of Mao's notes are summaries or paraphrases of the argument in the Soviet text, but a few develop or call into question the arguments of Shirokov and Mitin. Equally interesting and significant are the notes illustrating the points made in the books Mao was reading by examples drawn from Chinese history, both ancient and modern, and developing the implications of the arguments in the original works for the policy of the Chinese Communist Party. Another point, to which sufficient attention has perhaps not previously been paid, relates to the portions of the two books which Mao annotated. Mao's notes appear on only about a quarter of the 581

3. See Nick Knight (ed.), *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism: Writings on Philosophy, 1937* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990) (hereafter Knight, *Mao on Dialectical Materialism*). As explained in greater detail in the source notes to Mao's philosophical writings of 1937, Professor Knight has kindly allowed us to use his translations of many of these materials as the basis for the versions included in this volume. His book also contains a long and thoughtful introduction dealing with Mao's contribution to Marxist thought. The reader who consults this work will soon discover that there are very considerable differences of opinion on many points between Professor Knight and the editor of this series. That is undoubtedly a good thing rather than a bad thing, for the issues raised by these writings are so complex that it is desirable to view them from more than one perspective.

pages of the Shirokov volume and about the same proportion of the approximately 180 pages of the contribution by Mitin. Obviously, one would not have expected him to annotate every page, but it turns out that the pages that he did annotate are almost entirely those related to the arguments of those portions of his lectures which subsequently became "On Practice" and "On Contradiction." Clearly, Mao was more interested in these topics than in the discussion, in general terms, of other aspects of Marxist philosophy, and its historical roots, that occupied the rest of the two Soviet volumes.

This fact is relevant to the controversy as to whether or not Mao's 1937 lectures were based largely on plagiarism from the writings of Mitin, Shirokov, and others on dialectical materialism. Mao, interviewed by Edgar Snow in 1965, denied that he had written anything on this subject in 1937, apart from those portions of his lectures revised in 1950–1952 for inclusion in his *Selected Works,* and some foreign scholars took this denial at face value. Even before Mao's death, however, the full text of his lectures had been published for internal use, and in recent years its authenticity has been openly accepted in Beijing and the relationship between it and Mao's Soviet sources commented upon. Indisputably, Mao often copied whole paragraphs word for word, or with only minor changes, from the translations of Soviet texts. This point was first made by Karl Wittfogel in an article of 1963.[4] Nick Knight, who takes a very positive view of Mao's contribution to Marxist dialectics, deals quite frankly with the problem of the relationship between Mao's lectures and the materials he had been reading and annotating, and provides the most detailed and precise information hitherto published on the sources copied or paraphrased by Mao.[5]

Such borrowing can be found in "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," but it is most extensive in the earlier parts of Mao's lectures, devoted to the history of materialist thought and the basic principles of dialectical materialism. This is not surprising, for there was little Mao could add to what his Soviet sources said about Heraclitus and Bacon, or about the history of Western philosophy in general, and his audience was probably little interested in such matters. Mao, therefore, did not bother to annotate those portions because he had nothing particular to say about them. For the same reason, he contented himself, when he came to write his lectures, with summarizing the accounts in the Soviet manuals he had been reading. Practice, especially the practice of the Chinese revolution, and contradictions, especially the contradictions in Chinese society, were far more meaningful to Mao and to his comrades, and it was therefore natural that Mao should have annotated most heavily those portions of his sources relating to these topics.

4. Karl A. Wittfogel, "Some Remarks on Mao's Handling of Concepts and Problems of Dialectics," *Studies in Soviet Thought* III, 4 (December 1963), pp. 251–77. See also S. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung as a Marxist Dialectician," *China Quarterly,* no. 29 (January–March 1969), pp. 155–65.

5. See Knight, *Mao on Dialectical Materialism,* pp. 30–48, and the tables on pp. 74 and 80–83.

In addition to the two Soviet texts of which Mao's annotated copies have survived, he was also strongly influenced, as he developed his own interpretation of Marxist theory, by the writings of two Chinese philosophers, Li Da and Ai Siqi. All these works were, however, as Nick Knight has aptly pointed out, essentially similar in style and content because "Soviet and Chinese philosophers alike were constrained to operate within an emerging orthodoxy," of which the limits had been set by Stalin.[6] It is against this background of the "pervasive influence of Soviet philosophy" that one should view the substance of Mao's 1937 lectures.

Although the first part of Mao's lectures (Chapter 1, and sections 1–10 of Chapter 2) is less important than the balance (Chapter 2, section 11, and Chapter 3, section 1), which became "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," some points deserve to be mentioned here. The opening section in Mitin's *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism,* one of the first two Soviet works read by Mao in early 1937, is entitled "The Two Lines in Philosophy."[7] The first section in Mao's lectures is entitled "The Battle Between Two Armies in Philosophy." Too much should not be made of this verbal difference, but it does constitute a striking manifestation of the centrality of war, and of military metaphors, in Mao's thought.

Another significant detail is Mao's statement, in Chapter 1, section 1, that "the tasks of philosophy during the present stage in China are subordinate to the general tasks of overthrowing imperialism and the semifeudal system, the thorough realization of bourgeois democracy, the establishment of a completely new Chinese democratic republic, and preparing the transformation by peaceful means to a socialist and a communist society." Here one can see a prefiguration of the "New Democracy" which Mao would promote in the 1940s. On the other hand, a striking paragraph in Chapter 2, section 2, goes entirely against the grain of a position Mao was to take in 1938 and never subsequently abandoned:

> Because of the backwardness of the evolution of Chinese society, the philosophical current of dialectical materialism developing in China today has resulted not from taking over and reforming our own philosophical heritage, but from the study of Marxism-Leninism. Nevertheless, if we wish to make the dialectical materialist current of thought penetrate deeply and continue to develop in China, give firm direction to the Chinese revolution, and lead it onto the road of complete victory, then we must struggle with all the outworn philosophies now existing in China, raise the flag of criticism on the ideological front throughout the whole country, and thereby liquidate the philosophical heritage of ancient China. Only thus can we attain our goal.

This argument is obviously in total contradiction with the slogan of the "Sinification of Marxism" Mao put forward only one year later. The reasons for this about-face are considered below. Meanwhile, let us move on, in this discussion of Mao's philosophical writings of 1937, to "On Practice," which was originally section 11 of Chapter 2 of the lectures on dialectical materialism.

6. Knight, *Mao on Dialectical Materialism,* pp. 60–61.

7. M. B. Mitin et al., *Bianzheng weiwulun yu lishi weiwulun* (On Dialectical and Historical Materialism), in *Zhexue xuanji,* trans. Ai Siqi (n.p., Jiefang she, 1939), p. 39.

"On Practice" underwent far fewer and less extensive revisions and additions than "On Contradiction" in preparing the post-1949 edition of the *Selected Works.* This has been pointed out most authoritatively by Gong Yuzhi, former deputy head of the Department for Research on Party Literature, which edited the volume of Mao Zedong's philosophical annotations.[8] In fact, Mao found it so hard to revise "On Contradiction" to his own satisfaction that he decided to let Vol. 1 of his *Selected Works* go to press without it, so it originally appeared in Vol. 2. (The resulting anomaly was rectified in subsequent printings of the two volumes.)

This difference in the difficulty of the problems encountered by Mao in dealing with the two essays is not surprising. From his earliest days, Mao had placed great emphasis on learning from revolutionary practice and had himself conducted local surveys, a number of which have appeared in earlier volumes of this edition.[9] Many of the variants which do exist between the original version of this text and the current official version result simply from the removal of references to concrete circumstances of the mid-1930s which would have seemed out of place after 1949. For example, near the beginning of "On Practice," a statement regarding the Guomindang inspection team which Mao had welcomed to Yan'an on May 29, 1937, was replaced by a vague reference to visitors from outside.[10] Regarding matters of greater substance, the chief difference between the account of the process of cognition in the Soviet texts and Mao's view, as expressed in his notes to those texts and further elaborated in "On Practice," lies in Mao's emphasis on the importance of testing and refining knowledge in an ongoing process of revolutionary practice.[11]

8. See Gong Yuzhi, "'On Practice': Three Historical Problems," translated in a special issue entitled *The Philosophical Thought of Mao Zedong: Studies from China, 1981–1989,* edited by Nick Knight, *Chinese Studies in Philosophy* (Spring–Summer 1992), pp. 144–67. This article begins with a historical account of all the versions of Mao's 1937 lectures issued between 1937 and 1946 which disposes so thoroughly of the views put forward by various Western and Soviet scholars to the effect that Mao did not write, and could not have written, "On Practice" in 1937 that it is unnecessary to deal with this question here. It also includes a concise listing of the main substantive changes Mao made in "On Practice" in preparing it for the *Selected Works.*

9. See, in particular, apart from the celebrated "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (Volume I, pp. 429–464), "An Example of the Chinese Tenant-Peasant's Life" (ibid., pp. 478–83), the Xunwu, Xingguo, Dongtang, and Mukou investigations (Volume III, pp. 296–418, 594–655, 658–66, and 691–93), the Changgang investigation (Volume IV, pp. 584–622), and, in more general terms, "Oppose Bookism" (Volume III, pp. 419–26), in which Mao put forward the slogan "Without investigation, there is no right to speak."

10. See the text of Mao's address of welcome in Volume V, pp. 673–75.

11. On this point, see Shi Zhongquan, "A New Document for the Study of Mao Zedong's Philosophical Thought: Introducing *The Philosophical Annotations of Mao Zedong,*" *Chinese Studies in Philosophy* (Spring–Summer 1992), pp. 132–37, and, below in this volume, the corresponding portions of the notes on Shirokov, as well as "On Dialectical Materialism," Chapter 2, section 11.

"On Contradiction" presented much more complicated problems. In the end, Mao added six or eight pages of new text, made extensive changes throughout the essay, and deleted numerous passages, including all of section 1, par. B, on "The Law of Identity in Formal Logic and the Law of Contradiction in Dialectics."[12] As a result, no more than half the text as published in the *Selected Works* was the same, or nearly the same, as the 1937 version.

The text printed below, which includes the whole of both the 1937 and 1952 versions, is much too long and complex to be analyzed in detail here. It will be immediately apparent that many of the passages added in the *Selected Works* version summarize and pay homage to the latest Soviet contributions to Marxist theory, while many of those deleted from the original text contain references to Chinese history and Chinese literature. One particularly striking instance of this can be found toward the end of section 1, par. D, of Chapter 3 of "On Dialectical Materialism," where a citation from an essay by Su Dongpo seen by Mao as illustrating the relationship between the universality and the particularity of contradiction has been removed and a passage from Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism* inserted instead. A brief summary of the main points of originality in Mao's treatment of the subject of contradictions can be found in Shi Zhongquan's article cited above.[13]

One final comment is perhaps in order regarding the question of why Mao attached so much importance to these lectures and devoted so much time to them. Apart from delivering the lectures in four-hour sessions on Tuesday and Thursday mornings totaling some 110 hours, Mao himself also attended discussion sessions in the afternoons.[14] He undoubtedly thought that Marxism was important and that he had grasped some central ideas which should be imparted to others. It may also be assumed, however, that—confronted as he was by rivals who were inclined to denigrate him as a guerrilla leader and peasant revolutionary without much understanding of the finer points of theory and policy—Mao was resolved to demonstrate his mastery in this domain as well.

Toward a New United Front

Volume V ended with July 1937, when the July 7 Japanese attack on the Marco Polo Bridge had given a new impetus to the efforts to create a united front between

12. He did so because he had changed his views on formal logic after reading Stalin's *Marxism and Questions of Linguistics* and taking note of the ensuing discussion in Soviet philosophical circles (information from Gong Yuzhi, in a conversation with Stuart Schram).

13. Shi, "A New Document," pp. 138–39.

14. See *Mao Zedong nianpu* (Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong), ed. Pang Xianzhi (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), Vol. 1, pp. 671–72 (3 vols.). Since Mao Zedong is the central figure in our edition, the short title for this work is simply *Nianpu*; in the case of similar chronological biographies of other figures, such as Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, our short title includes the name of the subject. Material relevant to the present volume is to be found in Vol. 2 of the *Nianpu,* covering the period July 1937–August 1945.

the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang, but no formal agreement had yet been concluded. An accord was finally reached on August 22, but the terms of the statements by the two sides both before and after that date made it abundantly clear that differences and tensions remained. The very first item in the present volume, Mao's speech of August 1, 1937, vividly illustrates this point. In it, after asserting that the soviet areas are the model for the whole nation in fighting Japan, Mao states that, despite repeated exhortations by the Communists, "they" had never made up their minds to fight Japan resolutely, and the fall of Beiping and Tianjin had been caused by their vacillation. Although "they" are not named, and Mao proceeds to direct his criticism at the authorities in North China, it is obvious that the culprits referred to here are, in the first instance, Chiang Kaishek and other leaders of the Guomindang.[15]

In the days that followed, Mao declared that the importance of reaching an agreement with the Guomindang made it appropriate for Zhou Enlai and others to go to Nanjing and submit the Communists' plan for national defense in person.[16] But, at the same time, he stressed that no more than half to two-thirds of the Red Army's forces should be committed to the struggle against Japan, the rest being retained to defend the base area, and Chiang should not be informed of the percentages, since it was his intention to set up a "warlord stronghold." Once the main Communist forces had left the "reliable rear" of Shaanxi and Gansu, Chiang would occupy it with the ten divisions he still had there.[17]

In these circumstances, the Red Army should assist the operations of the "friendly forces" by engaging in guerrilla warfare on the flanks of the enemy, but should do so independently "under overall strategic command."[18] Asked by Nym Wales, in a brief but pithy interview of August 13, 1937, whether the Red Army was being reorganized for the anti-Japanese war, Mao replied bluntly that it was not, because Chiang Kaishek had delayed dealing with this question, had refused to allow the publication of the political program put forward by the Communists, and had not appointed a commander-in-chief of the Communist forces, though he had given them a number as a unit of the National Revolutionary Army. Moreover, Nanjing had failed to accept other Communist demands, such as freeing political prisoners and freedom of speech and the press. Asked why Chiang was delaying publication of the manifesto, Mao said the reason was no doubt fear of the Japanese reaction;

15. See below, "Speech at the 'August 1' Rally of the Campaign to Mobilize for the War of Resistance."

16. See below, the text of August 3, 1937.

17. See below, the text of August 5, 1937.

18. See the telegrams of August 4, 5, and 10, 1937. Regarding this point, see Gao Hua, *Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqide* (How the Red Sun Arose) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2000), pp. 123–25. The allusion is to the song "The East Is Red," in which Mao Zedong is identified with the "Red Sun."

consequently, it could appear only after fighting had broken out. For its part, Mao said, the Chinese Communist Party demanded "immediate war" with Japan.[19]

Fierce fighting between Chiang Kaishek's best troops and the Japanese had, in fact, begun in Shanghai on the day Mao gave this interview, and it was in this context that Chiang had finally agreed to give the Communist forces a "number"—that of the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army—and to allow the appointment of Zhu De as commander-in-chief and Peng Dehuai as deputy commander-in-chief. Mao continued to suspect, however, that as soon as the former Red Army was on the move, Chiang Kaishek might refuse to allow the issuance of a declaration, and even eliminate the Soviet Area.[20]

At this point, an enlarged plenary session of the Politburo was held from August 22 to 25 in Luochuan, some 45 miles south of Yan'an. Mao Zedong delivered reports on military affairs, and on relations between the Communist Party and the Guomindang, as well as concluding remarks. Unfortunately, the texts of these speeches are not available, but the key points are included in the outline, dated August 25, which Mao drafted for the Propaganda Department regarding the situation and the Party's tasks. This text, and the "Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Country" incorporated into it, while commending the positive changes in Nationalist policies since the Xi'an Incident, criticized the Guomindang once again for its unwillingness to lift the ban on popular anti-Japanese movements, or to carry out political reforms, and for its insincerity in dealing with the Communist Party. Only by carrying out the Ten-Point Program and waging a war of "total resistance," Mao argued, could the motherland be defended and the Japanese aggressors be defeated.[21]

This relatively hard and skeptical line toward the Guomindang was not entirely accepted by all the leading figures in the Communist Party present in Yan'an.[22] In any case, despite his reservations, on August 25 Mao ordered the reorganization of the Red Army along the lines agreed with the Guomindang. In order to meet the requirement that the Communist-led forces should total no more than three divisions, armies, army groups, and front armies were renamed downward as constituent parts of the 115th, 120th, and 129th divisions of the Eighth Route Army. Divisions were changed into battalions, regiments were changed into companies, and companies were changed into platoons.[23] While Mao and other leading figures in the Chinese Communist Party accepted such formal and symbolic changes,

19. See below, the interview of August 13, 1937.

20. See below, the text of August 18, 1937.

21. See below, "For the Mobilization of All Our Forces to Achieve Victory in the War of Resistance," August 25, 1937.

22. See, in particular, Gao Hua, *How the Red Sun Arose,* pp. 122–26.

23. See below, "Order Concerning the Reorganization of the Red Army . . ." and "Telegram Ordering the Reorganization of Various Independent Red Armies and Divisions in Northern Shaanxi," August 25, 1937.

some of Chiang Kaishek's other proposals they did not accept. Thus, on August 30, Mao rejected Kang Ze's suggestion that Ding Weifen, recently vice president of the Guomindang Control Yuan, should be appointed chairman of the Border Region government; this post, he insisted, must go to Lin Boqu.[24]

At a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo on August 27, Mao stressed that the political and organizational level of the proletariat was superior to that of the bourgeoisie; consequently, it was the proletariat which had proposed the united front. Under the conditions of joint resistance against Japan, the national revolution and the social revolution must be linked. During the period of the united front, the Guomindang would seek to draw in the Communist Party; the Communists must be vigilant and strive in turn to attract the waverers in the Guomindang.[25] He made very similar points in a report of September 1, 1937, to Party activists. The goal, he said, was to "set up a democratic republic of the workers, peasants, and bourgeoisie during the war, and prepare for the transition to socialism." Meanwhile, a crucial problem was whether the Guomindang should be allowed to draw in the Communist Party or the Communist Party would draw in the Guomindang.[26]

It is in this context that Mao wrote his well-known essay "Combat Liberalism," which appears in the *Selected Works* with only very slight changes. The manifestations of "liberalism" denounced in this piece are, in fact, largely manifestations of selfishness, self-indulgence, and a traditional Chinese concern with face, rather than of liberalism as commonly understood. The essay does, however, make it extremely clear that Mao was opposed not only to laissez-aller but to liberalism as a political philosophy. "We stand for active ideological struggle because it is the weapon for ensuring unity within the Party and the revolutionary organizations in the interest of our fight," runs the opening sentence. Liberalism, he explained, "robs the revolutionary ranks of compact organization and strict discipline," and thereby "prevents policies from being carried through."[27]

24. See *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 17.

Kang Ze (1904–1967), a native of Sichuan, was a graduate of the Huangpu Academy and had long been one of Chiang Kaishek's closest advisers. Chiang had apparently proposed in July 1937 that Kang be named deputy director of the Eighth Route Army Political Department. For further details, see the relevant note to the text of July 28, 1937, in Volume V, p. 711.

Lin Boqu (1886–1960), also known as Lin Zuhan, a native of Hunan, had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. He had been commissar for finance in the Jiangxi Soviet Government, had participated in the Long March, and had already been serving as chairman of the Border Region government since its inception.

25. See *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, pp. 16–17.

26. See below, the outline of this report, entitled "The Situation and Our Tasks After the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War," September 1, 1937, and also the account in *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 18.

27. See below, the text of September 7, 1937.

On September 22, the Guomindang Central News Agency published the "Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Cooperation Between the Communists and the Guomindang" of July 8, 1937.[28] On the following day, Chiang Kaishek issued from Lushan a talk of his own, stressing the necessity of unity and recognizing the legality of the Chinese Communist Party. In a telegram of September 25 to Zhou Enlai, Mao declared that the appearance of these two documents "proclaimed the success of the united front and established the necessary foundation for unity between the two parties in order to save the country."[29] But although some improvement in Guomindang-Communist relations had taken place, real confidence had by no means been established.

In early September, Mao expressed concern at the efforts of the Guomindang to send the Red Army to the front as soon as possible. While acknowledging that they might not understand how inappropriate it was to send a big army to wage guerrilla warfare in a narrow region, he wondered whether they were not bent on deliberately sending the Red Army to fight difficult campaigns. Nanjing, he argued, should only make strategic decisions, leaving the Red Army complete freedom to carry them out.[30] He also noted that, in the context of the united front, a local Party could "easily fall into right opportunism," a trend which had already become "the principal danger for the Party."[31]

As for military tactics, at this time Mao still held that there was only one "excellent kind of warfare" at which the Red Army was particularly adept: "truly independent and self-reliant guerrilla warfare in the mountanous regions (not mobile warfare)." "Dividing up to conduct mass work" was the only way in which the Communist forces could defeat the enemy and assist the friendly armies. The situation was not at all the same as during the Civil War period, and the Red Army should not concentrate its forces for battle as it had in the past.[32]

On September 25, Mao asserted that the declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party dated July 15, 1937, which had finally been released by the Guomindang authorities, would not only provide the basis for unity between the Communist Party and the Guomindang, but would define the basic orientation of the grand national unity of the people of the whole country. Chiang Kaishek's statement of July 17, Mao added, although it established the legitimate status of the

28. This text was quoted *in extenso* in Mao's statement of July 23, 1937, which appears in Volume V of this edition.

29. See below, "Our Declaration and Chiang's Statement Have Proclaimed the Establishment of the United Front," September 25, 1937.

30. See below, the telegram of September 12, 1937, to Peng Dehuai.

31. See below, the text of September 14, 1937.

32. See below, the telegram of September 21, 1937, to Peng Dehuai.

Communist Party, showed "arrogance and lack of self-criticism."[33] In another telegram to Zhou on the same date, Mao reiterated his view that all the Communists' work in North China should be oriented solely toward guerrilla warfare. "If the regular warfare in North China ends in defeat," he wrote, "we shall not be held responsible, but if guerrilla warfare fails, we must assume a heavy responsibility."[34]

On this same date of September 25, Mao announced that he had "new views on strategy,"[35] and at Pingxingguan Lin Biao won the first Chinese victory of the war against Japan.[36] Neither Mao's new views nor Lin Biao's victory marked, however, a substantial departure from the tactics of guerrilla warfare, involving concealment and the skillful use of relatively small forces in a limited area, which had already been laid down.[37]

Even in the midst of this new war, Mao was still pondering his earlier experience and wrote a preface to the rural surveys he had conducted in 1928–1930, though the volume for which it was intended did not appear until 1941.[38] In another echo of that same early period, he confirmed the death sentence on Huang Kegong, who had joined the Red Army on the Jinggangshan, for killing a young woman because she had refused to marry him. He felt very sorry, he said, but the Communist Party and Red Army must impose stricter discipline on their members and soldiers than on ordinary civilians.[39] In another brief comment on the relationship between punishment and class, Mao laid down that, in dealing with Chinese traitors, the property of big landlords should be resolutely confiscated. The property of middle-level elements who had become traitors should not be confiscated in a hurry before the approval of the popular masses had been obtained, and workers

33. See Mao's telegram of September 25, 1937, to Zhou Enlai, entitled "Our Declaration and Chiang's Statement Have Proclaimed the Establishment of the United Front." Zhou had drafted the declaration, which had been sent to the Guomindang on July 15, but had been published by the Guomindang Central News Agency only on September 22, 1937. The text of the declaration can be found in Tony Saich (ed.), *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis, 1920–1949.* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 771–73. (Hereafter Saich, *Rise to Power.*). For extracts from Chiang's statement calling for a War of Resistance, see the text of July 23, 1937, in Volume V, pp. 704–5.

34. See below, "Guerrilla Warfare Should Be the Only Orientation of All the Work in North China."

35. See below, his two telegrams to Zhu De and others, including Lin Biao.

36. For a brief but very clear assessment of this battle, see the *Cambridge History of China* (hereafter CHOC), Vol. 13, pp. 639–40.

37. For Mao's own assessment at the time, see his telegram of October 1, 1937. Although Lin Biao's forces had captured 82 trucks and killed more than a thousand enemy troops, while suffering 400 casualties, thus earning a telegram of congratulations from Chiang Kaishek, many of the enemy troops had escaped.

38. See below, "First Preface to *Rural Surveys,*" October 6, 1937.

39. See below, his message to the chief judge in this case, dated October 10, 1937.

and peasants who had been forced to become Chinese traitors should be treated leniently, with the emphasis on persuasion and education.[40]

Divergences Regarding Policy Toward the Guomindang

Although a formal agreement had been reached with the Guomindang regarding the establishment of a new united front, there were, as noted above, significant differences within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party regarding the attitude which should be adopted in dealing with Chiang Kaishek. Mao's attitude continued to be relatively firm. It is well illustrated by his statement of September 29, 1937, in which, although citing Chiang Kaishek's recent call for putting aside "personal grudges and prejudices" and uniting to realize the Three People's Principles, he argued that Chiang had not in fact "abandoned his Guomindang arrogance" or made any self-criticism, still less accepted the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan proposed by the Communist Party on August 25.[41]

In an interview with the British journalist James Bertram, Mao dealt with several fundamental questions. Asked what effects the war had produced so far, Mao replied that, by seizing Chinese territory, raping, plundering, burning, and massacring, Japan had finally brought the Chinese people face to face with the danger of national subjugation and made them understand that the crisis could not be overcome unless the popular masses and the government waged the War of Resistance together. Guomindang-Communist cooperation provided a basis for unity, and the war had aroused the sympathy of international public opinion. At the same time, China's weaknesses had been exposed, especially in the lack of unity between government and people. The present government must be transformed into a united front government which would carry out the necessary revolutionary policies. In the military domain, the Eighth Route Army was undertaking "mobile guerrilla warfare applied independently and with the initiative in our hands." It was also skilled in political work. In conclusion, Mao called for democratic centralism and for the convening of a new National Assembly.[42]

In a report delivered in October 1937, after three months of combat, Mao declared that the situation was now wholly different from what it had been after the Japanese aggression of 1931. This time, China had carried out a "resolute, brave war of national self-defense," overcoming the "fear of Japan disease" of the past. To be sure, there had been defeats, as might be expected in a war between a semicolonial country and an imperialist country, but the "decisive force" within the resistance faction, Chiang Kaishek, continued to advocate a resolute War of

40. See below, the telegram to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Ren Bishi dated October 15, 1937.

41. See below, "Urgent Tasks of the Chinese Revolution Following the Establishment of Guomindang-Communist Cooperation," September 29, 1937.

42. See below, Mao's interview with James Bertram, October 25, 1937.

Resistance. China was capable of winning in the end after a protracted war. For the time being, the goal should be "resisting Japan above all else"; Democracy and the People's Livelihood were both secondary to this. But at the same time, it was essential to set up a strong Communist Party across all of China and to seize every opportunity to "come down from the mountains."[43]

After the fall of Taiyuan, Mao argued in a report to Party activists that regular warfare in which the Guomindang played the chief role had ended and guerrilla warfare in which the chief role fell to the Communist Party had become primary. In this situation, the political influence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army was spreading "fast and far," the movement of the popular masses had developed a step further, the national bourgeoisie was leaning toward the left, and the forces favoring reforms were growing within the Guomindang. Other key factors were the strength of the worker and peasant masses and assistance from the Soviet Union. In relations with the Guomindang, the Communists must still guard against "Left" closed-doorism, but, at the same time, the united front must be based on the execution of a definite program. Otherwise, cooperation would become "unprincipled and a manifestation of capitulationism." The key to leading the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war to victory was to uphold the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front."[44]

Meanwhile, Wang Ming [Chen Shaoyu], who had spent six years in Moscow and was a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, set out for China on November 14 and arrived in Yan'an on November 29, accompanied by Kang Sheng and Chen Yun.[45] Wang, who agreed with Stalin's view that a united China under Chiang Kaishek's leadership offered the best prospects both for China and the Soviet Union, was not at all pleased to learn that Mao had persuaded the Chinese Communist Party to adopt his much more skeptical approach and immediately arranged for a Politburo meeting (commonly known as the "December Conference"), which took place on December 9. On this occasion, Wang Ming delivered a long report in which he transmitted the latest Comintern instructions and discussed the way to win victory over Japan. He advocated closer cooperation with Chiang Kaishek and criticized the decisions of the Luochuan Conference of August 1937 and Mao's speech of November 12. Apart from the fact that he had long been a high official of the Comintern and was also a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, Wang had been

43. See below, "Outline for a Report on the Current Situation in the War of Resistance and the Party's Tasks," dated October 1937.

44. See below, "The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan," November 12, 1937.

45. See Thomas Kampen, *Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 88–89 (hereafter, Kampen, *Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Leadership*); Gao Hua, *How the Red Sun Arose,* p. 136.

received by Stalin and Georgi Dimitrov a few days before his departure for China and regarded himself as their spokesman.[46] In any case, he quickly became the Party's *de facto* number two leader. Together with Kang Sheng and Chen Yun, he and his supporters occupied three of the five posts on the Secretariat. Mao subsequently declared that, after Wang Ming's return, "my authority didn't extend beyond my cave." That was undoubtedly an exaggeration, but for some nine months Mao was not as much in control of Party affairs as previously.[47] As Frederick Teiwes has put it, "Wang Ming's interpretation of the united front was more attuned to Stalin's vision of Chiang Kaishek's armies as the bulwark of China's resistance to Japan than was Mao's emphasis on protracted guerrilla warfare designed to expand CCP-controlled base areas."[48]

Some of Mao's writings immediately after the "December Conference" appear to reflect a certain degree of acceptance of Wang Ming's insistence on treating the Guomindang with respect. For example, a telegram to leading cadres in the Central Shaanxi Plain declared that, "because of the enemy's instigation," as well as because of the "narrow-minded views of some comrades," some kind of friction had arisen with the "friendly party and the friendly army." In order to expand the united front, great efforts should be made to persuade these Guomindang friends to accept the ideas of the Communists, "in the interests of the War of Resistance," but if they did not agree, "temporary concessions" should be made to them. Toward the shortcomings of the friendly parties and armies, the Communists "should adopt an attitude of well-meaning criticism and suggestion instead of laughing at them or ridiculing them."[49]

In January 1938, Mao declared in a letter to Ai Siqi: "I am beginning to study military questions, but for the time being I still cannot write articles."[50] As we have seen, during the half-year since the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, Mao had repeatedly expressed definite views regarding the military tactics which should be followed, but perhaps he felt that he was not yet ready to put forward a systematic analysis in this domain. Instead, underscoring the continuity between the tasks of the Communists during the Civil War period and those of the anti-Japanese war, he revised and published an excerpt from a pamphlet entitled *Guerrilla Warfare,* which he had written in 1934.[51] The following brief passage sums up Mao's

46. See Gao Hua, *How the Red Sun Arose,* pp. 136–41, and Kampen, *Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Leadership,* p. 90.

47. See Frederick C. Teiwes, *The Formation of the Maoist Leadership: From the Return of Wang Ming to the Seventh Party Congress* (London: SOAS, 1994), pp. 5–8.

48. Ibid., pp. 26–27.

49. See below, "We Should Resolutely Uphold the Principle of the United Front in the Territory of Friendly Armies," December 24, 1937.

50. See below, the letter to Ai dated January 12, 1938.

51. See below, "On the Basic Tactic of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare—The Surprise Attack," published on January 11, 1938.

view at this time of the relation between guerrilla operations and the War of Resistance as a whole:

> The overall objectives of the surprise attack in guerrilla warfare are to eliminate the small enemy, weaken the large enemy, harass enemy flanks and rear areas, coordinate with the political work of guerrilla troops, wreck enemy political power, arouse the popular masses to resist the enemy, and preserve or restore anti-Japanese political power, so as to create guerrilla bases for the Anti-Japanese War. This complements the fighting by regular armies, because the capture of weapons gradually develops guerrilla units into regular anti-Japanese armies.

If Mao felt he still had something to learn in the military domain, he had no such doubts about his grasp of political issues, although he was well aware that his views were not necessarily shared by a majority of comrades either in Moscow or in China. In early 1938, he made a number of forceful statements in which a central theme was the problem of relations between the Communist Party and the Guomindang. One of the most interesting and revealing documents is an interview of February 1938 on the issue of one-party dictatorship.[52] Dealing first with the Soviet Union, Mao argued, quoting Stalin at great length, that what existed there was not a party dictatorship but a class dictatorship. If only the Communist Party existed there, it was because the working class and the Russian people had withdrawn their support from all other parties. Germany and Italy, in contrast, could not be said to practice a one-party dictatorship because "the Social Democrats, the Communists, and all other parties and groups that support democracy and oppose the fascist dictatorship are all fighting heroically underground."

As for China, the Guomindang's attempt, during the previous decade, to destroy other parties and groups had ended in failure, and the Chinese Communist Party had also failed in its attempt to create a régime led by a single party "under the conditions now existing." Thus the only solution was the establishment of an anti-Japanese national united front on the basis of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Rejecting the argument that the Three People's Principles were incompatible with communism, Mao declared the willingness of his Party to struggle, together with the comrades of the Guomindang, for the unfinished revolutionary cause of Sun Yatsen. Quoting Sun Yatsen, who wrote in *The Three People's Principles:* "What is the Principle of Livelihood? It is communism and it is socialism. . . . Communism is a very high ideal of social reconstruction," Mao argued that it was possible to "create political and military unity unprecedented during the past several decades," and that this was "the only hope of survival for the Chinese nation."

52. See below, "Interview with a Correspondent of *New China News* in Yan'an," February 2, 1938.

It is hardly necessary to add that Chiang Kaishek did not take quite the same view of this issue as that expressed by Sun Yatsen, but for the time being relations between the two parties were relatively smooth, so Mao had some grounds for referring to a "Chinese united front" against Japan. The "world united front" of which he spoke in early 1938 was a somewhat more dubious concept; many countries disapproved of Japanese behavior in China, but few were prepared to take concrete steps against Japan. And the "united front against [Japanese] aggression" which Mao said "a majority of the popular masses in Japan" were forming was obviously in large measure a fantasy.[53] Whether Mao himself actually held this view of "unprecedented internal conflicts inside Japan" or it was merely a part of his effort to reassure and encourage Chinese popular opinion is impossible to say.

Meanwhile, Mao continued to give thought to issues of military strategy and tactics. In a February 1938 interview, he argued that, by employing a combination of mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare, China could force the Japanese armies into a very difficult position. Positional warfare should not be the primary form of combat for the present because of China's technological weakness, but national defense industries must be established to produce high-quality weapons for positional warfare. Guerrilla warfare, he said, was always secondary to other forms of warfare, but in wars of national liberation in semicolonial countries it played a crucial strategic role.[54] In a telegram of late February, he called for a force of "at least 200,000 fighting men" to enable the Eighth Route Army to carry out mobile warfare.[55]

On December 18, 1937, following the "December Conference," a delegation including Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu had left for Wuhan, where they met with the members of the Yangzi Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party. It was decided to combine the two groups and to call them the Chinese Communist Delegation in dealings with people outside the Party and the Yangzi Bureau within the Party. Wang Ming regarded this organization as coequal with the Politburo and succeeded in forcing Mao to hold a meeting of the Politburo in Yan'an from February 27 to March 1, 1938. This gathering, known as the "March Conference," saw a sharp clash between Mao, supported by Ren Bishi and Zhang Wentian, on the one hand, and Wang Ming, supported by Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Zhang Guotao, on the other, with no clear victory by either side. Mao proposed that Wang Ming remain in Yan'an, but in this he was unsuccessful, so for some months there were two rival centers of the Chinese Communist Party.[56]

53. See below Mao's "Speech at the Yan'an Mass Rally Against Aggression," February 11, 1938.

54. See below, "Interview with United Press Reporter Wang Gongda," February 1938.

55. See below, the telegram to Zhu De and others, February 23, 1938.

56. For a brief summary, see Kampen, *Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Leadership,* pp. 91–93. A more detailed account can be found in Gao Hua, *How the Red Sun Arose,* pp. 147–53.

In March 1938, displaying the continuing interest in education and the role of young people which had characterized him ever since he was principal of a primary school in Changsha two decades earlier, Mao gave a talk to graduating students of the North Shaanxi Public School. Some of them, he said, would work to develop the mass movement in the rear areas. The others would settle in the "bean curd cubes" or small areas near the big cities and main highways occupied by the Japanese. Regarding the overall situation, he spoke once more of the "three united fronts"—the international united front, the Chinese united front, and the united front in Japan—which together could defeat Japanese imperialism. He also stressed the advantages of China's size. Spain's territory, he said, was small, so they had been obliged to adopt the strategy of resolutely defending Madrid. China, in contrast, was "as large as seventeen or eighteen Frances put together." Thus the Chinese had space and time to drive the Japanese devils out.[57]

At this time, Mao stressed repeatedly the importance of fighting the enemy in concert with the Guomindang forces.[58] He also continued to praise Sun Yatsen as a revolutionary precursor and an advocate of uniting with the Communists, and even ended his speech on the thirteenth anniversary of Sun's death with "a special salute to our national leader, and the commander-in-chief of the War of Liberation, Chairman Chiang."[59]

By the spring of 1938, the Eighth Route Army had become known and respected to such an extent that, when it seemed likely that the main force of this army would be redeployed elsewhere in the not-too-distant future, Mao ordered that guerrilla corps, bearing the name of the Guerrilla Contingent of the Eighth Route Army and strengthened by one or two companies from the Eighth Route Army with combat experience, be organized.[60] Speaking once again at the North Shaanxi Public School, this time at the opening ceremony for the second session, Mao declared that the students had come running there because of their high regard for the Chinese Communist Party, which had a correct political orientation and a work-style of hard struggle and was traveling down the road to national liberation.[61] A few days later, he spoke in similar terms at the opening day ceremony for the fourth session of the Anti-Japanese University. Although they would study there for only a few months, instead of a few years as at other universities, the students would, he said, learn one very important thing: the purpose of resisting Japan and saving the country. They must learn to become cadres who would create organized contingents, without which it would be impossible to defeat Japanese

57. See below, "Parting Words of Advice to the Graduates of the North Shaanxi Public School," dated March 3, 1938.

58. See below, the telegrams of March 6 and 9, 1938, to Zhu De.

59. See below, the text of March 12, 1938.

60. See below, "Immediately Organize Guerrilla Detachments Which Operate Using the Name of the Eighth Route Army," March 24, 1938.

61. See below, the speech of April 1, 1938, on this occasion.

imperialism, for "without organization, there is no power." They must abandon hope of riches or high office and resolve to sacrifice their lives for their 450 million compatriots.[62]

Returning to the "central problem" of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, Mao declared that the national contradiction between Japan and China had become the principal contradiction, which determined the character and tasks of the revolution. As a result, the China-Japan contradiction outweighed the Guomindang-Communist contradiction. Without the united front, it would be impossible to resist Japan, so it must be consolidated and expanded. In order to do this, there must be a common program and mutual respect. The Guomindang, he said, should expand to at least ten million members and the Communist Party to one million. "Love and protect the Communist Party; make it develop and expand. Do the same for the Guomindang," was his conclusion.[63] Returning to this topic a few weeks later, Mao said that cooperation between the two parties was a problem for the future, not the present. For the time being, the situation was stable, but would the Guomindang and the Communist Party continue to cooperate after the overthrow of Japanese imperialism? Mao declared his conviction that the two parties would not fight. The Guomindang could not possibly want to fight a civil war, since no good had resulted from this in the past.[64]

Apart from the problem of the united front with the Guomindang, Mao also referred on occasion to the need to establish good relations with China's national minorities, especially the Mongols. Already in a proclamation of December 1935, he had called on the Mongols to show that the "descendants of Genghis Khan" could not be bullied.[65] Now, finding himself very close to Inner Mongolia, and only some 400 miles from Mongolia, an independent republic with strong links to Moscow which offered access to the Soviet Union, Mao several times called for better relations with the Mongols. In November 1937, while noting that the Japanese were seeking to create a puppet government in Inner Mongolia, "taking advantage of Prince De and Prince Sha," he called for an effort to create an anti-Japanese united front with "the upper levels of the various banners," under the slogan "Let the two nationalities of Mongols and Hans unite as one to resist the Japanese."[66] In June 1938, he called again for cooperation with the Mongols.[67] In November 1938, finally, he proposed that in seeking to establish a guerrilla base area near Outer Mongolia, attempts should be made "out of consideration for the

62. See below, the text of April 9, 1938.
63. See below, the text of April 5, 1938.
64. See below, "Both Sides Will Benefit If We Cooperate, Both Sides Will Suffer If We Split," May 4, 1938.
65. See, in Volume V, pp. 70–72, the "Proclamation of the Central Soviet Government to the People of Inner Mongolia."
66. See the telegram of November 16, 1937, to Gao Gang.
67. See the telegram of June 11, 1938, to Zhu De and others.

national consciousness of the Mongols, and the Mongols' faith in the nobility," to win over Prince De, then ruling there under the protection of the Japanese, and persuade him to "turn around and resist Japan." The customs, habits, and religion of the Mongols must, he declared, be respected.[68]

Mao also devoted considerable attention to cultural matters. In a brief statement of February 1938 regarding the founding of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts, he declared: "The arts—drama, music, fine arts, and literature—are the most effective weapons in propagandizing, inspiring, and organizing the masses. Artistic workers are an indispensable force in the current War of Resistance." In order to train cadres specialized in artistic work, it had been decided to establish this academy and name it after China's greatest writer.[69] Speaking there two months later, he declared that the Communists believed in realism in art, but romanticism in art was by no means entirely wrong. Revolutionary romanticism, which meant imagining the future with revolutionary enthusiasm, had been a progressive force in history. "Simultaneously to discover defects in the present and the hope and glory of the future—this is the revolutionary spirit," he declared.[70]

Although half a year earlier Mao had declared that he "could not write articles" about military questions, May and June 1938 saw the appearance of two of his most important military writings. The first, "Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War," was published in *Jiefang,* no. 40, dated May 30. The second, "On Protracted War," was a speech delivered at the Yan'an Symposium on the War of Resistance to Japan, delivered between May 26 and June 3. It is impossible in this introduction to offer a detailed analysis of these two long works, but some essential points must be underscored.

The article about problems of strategy was written by Mao for a small volume entitled *All the Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War,* which also contained contributions by four other writers. Although it has been suggested in the past that Mao edited these other texts, there is no evidence of this, so they are not included here.[71] Mao's contribution begins with a topic which, as we have already noted, he stressed repeatedly: that of the singularity of the Chinese case. In China, just as everywhere else, regular warfare was primary and guerrilla warfare secondary. Why, then, raise the question of strategy? If China were a small country in which guerrilla warfare served only to give direct support over short distances to regular army campaigns, there would be only tactical problems concerning it. If

68. See below, "Persist in Long-Term Guerrilla Warfare in the Daqing Mountains," November 24, 1938.
69. See below, "An Account of the Founding of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts," February 1938.
70. See below, Mao's "Speech at the Lu Xun Academy of Arts," dated April 28, 1938. During the Great Leap Forward of 1958, Mao would once again advocate "revolutionary romanticism."
71. See below, the document dated May 30, 1938.

China were as strong as the Soviet Union, so the enemy could not occupy extensive areas, guerrilla warfare would once again play only a supporting role. The question of strategy in guerrilla warfare did arise, however, because China was both a large and a weak country, under attack from a small and strong country. Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare consisted primarily of independent operations on exterior lines, and the warfare was large-scale. "For all these reasons, China's anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at the gates of strategy." Such extensive and protracted guerrilla warfare is "quite new in the entire history of wars within the human race."

The basic orientation of guerrilla warfare must be the offensive, which took the form of surprise attacks, by concentrating a large force to strike at a small section of the enemy force. Japanese imperialism could be driven out only through the cumulative effect of many victories in offensive actions. The question of the initiative was vital. It was not ready-made, but something that required conscious effort and resulted from flexibility in dispersal, concentration, and shifts of position. Planning was vital; without it, victories in guerrilla warfare were impossible. Coordination with regular warfare in strategy, campaigns, and battles was vital. Since the war was protracted and ruthless, guerrilla warfare could adapt itself only by developing into mobile warfare. In the process, guerrilla units would undergo the necessary steeling and gradually transform themselves into regular army forces, increasing in numbers and improving in quality. Guerrilla warfare required some centralized command, but excessive centralization would restrict its flexibility and sap its vitality.

As compared to the text on strategy in guerrilla war, Mao's "On Protracted War" is much longer, and much more general in character, dealing not only with military tactics but with politics and even with the philosophy of history. In it, Mao addresses the questions of whether China can win victory and, if the war will necessarily be protracted, how such a war should be waged. He characterizes his lecture as a contribution to "two great anniversaries": that of the War of Resistance, which had begun approximately a year before, and that of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party, on July 1, 1921.[72]

The experience of ten months of the War of Resistance, Mao declared, has sufficed to explode both the theory of national subjugation and the theory of quick victory. The first of these gives rise to the tendency to compromise, and the latter to the tendency to underestimate the enemy. Both are subjective, one-sided, and unscientific. China will not be subjugated and will win final victory, but the War of Resistance will be a protracted one. To demonstrate that he had taken a basically similar view two years earlier, Mao proceeded to quote from his interview of July 16, 1936, with Edgar Snow.[73] Summing up, he declared that, although Japan

72. See below, "On Protracted War," May 26, 1938.
73. For the relevant passage, see Volume V, pp. 259–66 *passim.*

had great military, economic, and political power, its war was reactionary and barbarous, its manpower and material resources inadequate, and its international position unfavorable. China, in contrast, had less military, economic, and political power, but was in its era of progress, its war was just, and it was a big country, so it could sustain a protracted war. China was also supported by most countries and peoples of the world. Thus the final victory would go to China.

Yet, the exponents of quick victory were likewise wrong. We recognize, Mao said, that the two possibilities of national subjugation and liberation both exist, although liberation is the dominant possibility. In the course of the war, the factors working to the enemy's disadvantage and the factors working to China's advantage will both develop, and eventually a great change will take place, leading to the enemy's defeat and our victory. Concretely, he argued, the protracted war between China and Japan would be played out in three stages: the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defense; the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counteroffensive; and our strategic counteroffensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. Those who did not believe in this progression were adherents of the theory that "weapons decide everything." Weapons, Mao conceded, are important, but the decisive factor is people, not things. It is possible, Mao said, that the enemy will occupy more than half of China proper, plus the Three Northeastern Provinces, but within this large part of China, the Japanese could actually hold only the big cities, the main lines of transportation, and some of the plains, while the greater part would be taken up by the guerrilla areas that would grow up everywhere. Thus the rural areas would be transformed into regions of "progress and light," while the enemy-occupied areas and the big cities would temporarily become "regions of backwardness and darkness." The people of all China should "consciously throw themselves into this war of a jigsaw puzzle."

At this point in his argument, Mao raised the theme of the fight for perpetual peace. Never, he argued, in the several-hundred-thousand-year history of humanity, had this goal been so near as it was at present. During the first of the two long eras in human history, production was extremely poor, and the only thing one could do was to wage war against nature; wars between human beings were "unnecessary and impossible." During the second era, from the end of clan society to the present, because of the development of production and the appearance of social divisions, the era of the warlike life of humanity had arrived. In the imperialist epoch of capitalist society, wars were particularly extensive and particularly ruthless. The present war was historically unprecedented and came close to being the final war, leading to perpetual peace for humanity. The present war, he said, would lead to a second world war, and this war would result, "not in the salvation of capitalism but in its collapse." Because of the existence of the Soviet Union, "great revolutionary wars" would undoubtedly emerge from the coming conflict, giving this war "the character of a struggle for perpetual peace." Thereafter, "the third era in the life of humanity would emerge, an era of peaceful life that will be forever without wars." Mao did not say explicitly that this transformation would involve

the total destruction of capitalism and its replacement by socialist régimes throughout the world, but this was the clear implication of his argument.

Protracted war and final victory required human action, and effective action required "conscious activity," a characteristic that distinguished human beings from things. Conscious activity, he added, "is displayed by human beings in all of their actions, but nowhere so strongly as in war. . . . The stage of action for commanders in a war must be built upon objective possibilities, but on that stage they can direct the performance of many living dramas, full of sound and color, power and grandeur. . . . War is politics by other means."

There follows an extensive discussion of strategy and tactics, too long to be summarized here. In the course of his argument, Mao refers twice as often to examples drawn from Chinese history as to modern warfare in the rest of the world, but he does cite also the victories of Napoleon, Hindenberg, the civil war in the Soviet Union, and French tactics during the First World War. The key to victory, Mao declared in conclusion, was "extensive political mobilization of the whole army and the whole people." The War of Resistance would be a protracted war, but final victory would be China's.

Despite his preoccupation with military tactics at this time, Mao Zedong did not neglect politics. In the spring of 1938, the Guomindang government had announced the creation of a People's Political Council. This was an appointed but widely representative body, including a number of Communists. It met for the first time in early July, and on this occasion Mao sent a congratulatory telegram to the speaker of the council, Wang Jingwei, and published a joint statement with the other Communist members. In his telegram, Mao said he was unable to come and listen to everyone's "eloquent speeches and profound comments" because he was caught up in "so many trivial tasks," but he had asked his other comrades to express his "humble ideas" regarding the anti-Japanese war and building the country.[74] In a joint statement with the other six Communist members, he hailed the meeting of the council as "a further step in the political life of our country toward a democratic system." Even though it was "by no means a perfect plenipotentiary representative organ of the people in terms of the way it has been established or in terms of its functions and powers," these defects would not deprive it of its utility and significance. Therefore, the Communists would participate in the council "with the most active, most enthusiastic, and most sincere attitude."[75]

As regards military strategy, Mao declared that the key to the defense of Wuhan was to mobilize the popular masses. The emphasis must be placed on attacking the enemy's flanks and rear, while avoiding "any disadvantageous decisive battle with the enemy." "Once it becomes impossible to defend Wuhan, we should not hesitate to give it up." The capitulationists might take advantage of this to attack Chiang

74. See below, the telegram of July 5, 1938.
75. See below, "Our Views on the People's Political Council," July 5, 1938.

Kaishek, and the overall orientation of the Communists should be "to consolidate Chiang's position." But the preservation of military strength was the foundation for carrying out this orientation.[76] Once more he called for the "regularization" of the guerrilla forces in eastern Hebei and other areas, by sending units of the regular army, regiments or battalions, to merge with the guerrilla units and serve as their "backbone." Local guerrilla units should also be drawn into the Eighth Route Army.[77] At this time, Mao also gave thought to monetary problems. The border region, he argued, must maintain the value of its currency so as to be prepared to carry on a protracted struggle against the Japanese invaders.[78]

A Turning Point in the Struggle for the Leadership

Since the end of the Long March, Mao had striven to assert his primacy in the Party. Zhang Guotao, who had previously been his most threatening rival, had eventually arrived at Mao's base in the Northwest in the autumn of 1936 very seriously weakened by a series of military defeats. Although he occupied several nominally important posts, he never thereafter exercised any real power.[79] Frustrated by this situation, Zhang took advantage of a mission to Xi'an in April 1938 to continue his journey to Hankou and place himself under the protection of the Guomindang. Meanwhile, after his return to China in November 1937, Wang Ming had become, as noted above, a skillful and threatening challenger to Mao for the effective leadership of the Party. Because of the stalemate between the factions of the Politburo, it was decided in March 1938 to send Ren Bishi to Moscow for instructions. Ren duly reported to the Comintern, which made a decision in June, and precise instructions were given to Wang Jiaxiang, who returned to China to deliver them. At a meeting of the Politburo on September 14, 1938, he communicated the directives of the Comintern as laid down by Georgi Dimitrov: "The leading organs of the Chinese Communist Party, with Mao Zedong as their head, should resolve the problems of the united front, and the leading organs should be penetrated by an atmosphere of close unity."[80] This was the first official confirmation from Moscow of the fact that Mao, rather than Wang Ming or any of his other remaining rivals, was to be henceforth the undisputed leader of the Party.[81]

76. See below, the telegram of August 6, 1938, to Chen Shaoyu and others.
77. See below, "The Situation in Eastern Hebei and the Rapid Regularization of the Guerrilla Forces in Eastern Hebei," September 10, 1938, and "The Creation of a Base in the Hebei-Rehe Border Region Is of Strategic Significance," October 2, 1938.
78. See below, "The Monetary Policy of the Border Region," August 17, 1938.
79. On these developments, see the Introduction to Volume V, *passim.*
80. *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 90.
81. In addition to *Nianpu,* see also Kampen, *Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Leadership,* p. 93; Gao Hua, *How the Red Sun Arose,* pp. 161–71; and Teiwes, *The Formation of the Maoist Leadership,* pp. 29–31.

It was in this context that Mao delivered, from October 12 to 14, his report to the Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, under the title "On the New Stage."

Not all of this long document is of equal interest and importance. Parts of it merely repeat or rephrase arguments Mao had already advanced, but elsewhere he put forward entirely novel ideas which add significant dimensions to his thought. At the outset, he reiterated that defeating Japan would require three conditions: progress by China, which was primary; difficulties for Japan; and international support. Thus, the war would be protracted, but at the same time defeatist talk was entirely unfounded. "Ultimately," Mao asserted, "victory or defeat in a war is determined mainly by people rather than by things." He then proceeded to quote Chairman Chiang to the same effect: "The war for independence and survival . . . does not depend upon weapons and military preparation, but relies instead on a strong and unyielding revolutionary spirit, and a strong and unshakable national consciousness."[82]

The Sino-Japanese war, Mao argued, would fall into the category of three-stage wars. First, the more powerful enemy would attack and China would be on the defensive; then, there would be a long period of stalemate; and finally, thanks to China's progress and to international support, would come China's victorious counteroffensive.[83] The stage of stalemate, Mao argued, was the pivot of the war. "Whether China becomes a colony or is liberated does not depend on the loss of the big cities and important lines of communication in the first stage but, rather, on the level of effort of the whole nation."[84] Following the principle of giving up territory to preserve military strength, the Chinese must avoid big and unprofitable decisive battles during the first and second stages. Summing up his argument on this theme, Mao asserted: "The enemy occupies the cities and we occupy the countryside, so the war is protracted, but, in the end, the countryside is capable of defeating the cities." Such a protracted peasant war in the countryside against the cities was, Mao said, inconceivable in countries such as Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy, and it was also impossible in a small semicolonial country. Three interrelated conditions were required to make it possible. First, it must be a semicolonial country. In such a country, the cities cannot rule the countryside completely, for they are too small, and it is the countryside that contains the vast human and material resources. Second, it must be a big country, so if you lose part of it, another part remains. Third, it must, like China, have progressed and seen the emergence of new political parties, new armies, and new people, who constitute the basic force for defeating the enemy. Once again he quoted Chiang Kaishek: "The heart of China's protracted War of Resistance, the source of her

82. "On the New Stage," Section II, par. 2 and 3.
83. Section III, par. 3.
84. Section III, par. 6.

ultimate victory, is to be found neither in Nanjing nor in any other big city, but lies in reality in the villages of the whole country and in the firmness of heart of the people."[85]

During this stage of stalemate, Mao asserted, guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear would become, temporarily, the major form of struggle, but it would develop in a new guise. In some of the important strategic regions, there would be a savage offensive by the enemy, making it difficult to maintain large bodies of troops in the plains, so the hilly regions would become the main base areas. Guerrilla warfare would be much more difficult, but it could be sustained.[86]

The present time, when the War of Resistance against Japan had developed to a new stage was also, Mao declared, the time when the Anti-Japanese National United Front had developed to a new stage. He began the discussion of this topic by declaring that the Guomindang had a brilliant future:

> The Guomindang and the Communist Party are the foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, but of these two it is the Guomindang that is the first great party. . . . The Guomindang has its own glorious history, of which the main achievements are the overthrow of the Qing, the establishment of the Republic, opposition to Yuan Shikai, . . . and carrying out the Great Revolution of 1926–27. Today it is once more leading the great War of Resistance against Japan. It enjoys the historic heritage of the Three People's Principles; it has had two great leaders in succession—Mr. Sun Yatsen and Mr. Chiang Kaishek; and it has a great number of loyal and patriotic party members. . . . In the conduct of the War of Resistance against Japan and the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front the Guomindang occupies the position of leader and backbone. . . . Provided only that it acts in accordance with the great premise of persisting in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, one can foresee a bright future for the Guomindang.

But after this lavish tribute came a warning. Many people, Mao said, are suspicious of the Guomindang. The issues which arouse their suspicion are "whether it can continue the War of Resistance, whether it can continue to progress, and whether it can become a national union in the War of Resistance against Japan and in building the country." Elaborating on the third of these points, Mao called for "the democratization of the organizational form of the Guomindang, so that it may itself be transformed into a national alliance for resisting Japan and building the country, and the best organizational form for the Anti-Japanese National United Front." And he added: "If the Guomindang refuses to open its doors to the broad popular masses, and to accept all the patriotic parties and factions, as well as the patriotic individuals, in a great organization, it will be impossible for it to fulfill the difficult task of continuing the War of Resistance and defeating the enemy."

85. Section III, par. 14.
86. Section III, par. 16.

The Communist Party, he declared, had "opened its doors wide to all the revolutionary comrades." The Guomindang should do likewise.[87]

In a later section of the report, Mao dealt in greater detail with the organizational form of long-term cooperation with the Guomindang. Reproducing his statement in praise of the Three People's Principles in a report of May 3, 1937,[88] Mao reiterated that the Communist Party was ready to fight for their complete realization, because they were "the general objectives the people of the whole country want to achieve." Only when they had been thoroughly fulfilled would it be possible for China to develop into the "future period of great ideals" envisaged by the Communists.[89] That being the case, there was a basis for collaboration between the Guomindang, the Communists, and other anti-Japanese parties or factions, which should find expression in an Anti-Japanese National United Front. Such a front might take one of three organizational forms. In the first, the Guomindang itself would become a "national league." Members of all anti-Japanese parties could join it, but Communists would do so openly, and a list of their names would be handed over to the Guomindang. Alternatively, all the parties together could organize a national union, with Chiang Kaishek as supreme leader. This, Mao added, had been proposed long ago by the Communists, but unfortunately it had not been adopted. The third method was the existing system of ad hoc negotiations among the various parties about any problems which arose. This Mao did not regard as advantageous, but if the first and second methods were impossible, it would have to suffice for the time being.[90] Not surprisingly, Chiang Kaishek saw Mao's first two methods as representing a Trojan horse strategy and rejected them out of hand.[91]

All the sections summarized above are omitted from the version of Mao's report included in the *Selected Works,* which consists exclusively of section VII, on the place of the Chinese Communist Party in the national war. The changes made in this portion of the report are numerous but, on the whole, not of great significance. Paragraph 13, on the topic of study, is a striking exception. Here the variants raise issues which Mao had previously never dealt with explicitly, and which throw a revealing light on his thought as a whole.

The theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, declared Mao, are "universally applicable," but they should be regarded not as dogma but as a guide to action. We should, he said, study not the letter of Marxism-Leninism but, rather, the standpoints and methods by which Marx and Lenin observed and resolved problems. "The study of theory," he concluded, "is the condition for victory" in the anti-Japanese war.

87. Section III, par. 17 and 18.
88. See Volume V, pp. 644–45.
89. Section V, par. 4.
90. Section V, par. 5.
91. See Chiang Kaishek, *Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-up at Seventy* (London: Harrap, 1957), pp. 87–88.

At the same time, Mao stressed the importance of studying China's historical heritage and summing it up critically. This crucial passage continues as follows:

> The history of this *great* nation of ours goes back several thousand years. *It has its own laws of development,* its own *national* characteristics, and many precious treasures. As regards all this, we are mere schoolboys. Today's China is an outgrowth of historic China. We are Marxist historicists; we must not mutilate history. From Confucius to Sun Yatsen, we must sum it up critically, and we must constitute ourselves the heirs to this precious legacy. *Conversely, the assimilation of this legacy itself becomes a method that* aids considerably in guiding the present great movement. A Communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be put into practice.[92] *There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, and not Marxism abstractly used.* If a Chinese Communist, who is a part of the great Chinese people, bound to his people by his very flesh and blood, talks of Marxism apart from Chinese peculiarities, this Marxism is merely an empty abstraction. Consequently, the *sinification of Marxism*[93]—that is to say, making certain that in all its manifestations it is imbued with Chinese characteristics, using it according to Chinese peculiarities—becomes a problem that must be understood and solved by the whole Party without delay. We must put an end to foreign formalism. There must be less repeating of empty and abstract refrains; we must discard our dogmatism and replace it with a new and vital Chinese style and manner, pleasing to the eye and to the ear of the Chinese common people. To separate internationalist content from national form is the way of those who understand nothing of internationalism, and we must link the two inseparably. As regards this question, serious shortcomings still persist in our ranks and must be resolutely eliminated.

The implications of this brief text are extremely weighty. China, Mao states, "has its own laws of development." We are "Marxist historicists," and therefore we must not mutilate our unique history. The translators of the *Selected Works,* to avoid the awkward question of what Mao meant by calling himself a historicist, render the clause *Women shi Makesizhuyi de lishizhuyizhe* as "We are Marxist in our historical approach." This reading is so noncommittal as to be meaningless. The term "historicism" has been given a range of meanings, some of which imply that the history of a given society is the only factor determining its development.

92. Marxism must take on a national form before it can be put into practice → We can put Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific characteristics of our country, and acquires a definite national form. The great strength of Marxism-Leninism lies precisely in its integration with the concrete revolutionary practice of all countries. For the Chinese Communist Party, it is a matter of learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of China. (Please refer to "Note on Sources and Conventions" for an explanation on use of italics and arrows.)
93. The sinification of Marxism → Applying Marxism concretely in China

As a Marxist revolutionary, Mao obviously could not share that view. But he did call on his compatriots to "sum up Chinese history from Confucius to Sun Yatsen, and constitute ourselves the heirs to this precious legacy," and, in a clause deleted from the revised text, he added that "the assimilation of this legacy itself becomes a method" that aids in guiding the present great movement. In other words, the Chinese Communists should make use of the two methods at their disposal: the Marxist method, and another method or approach rooted in Chinese history. In the synthesis of these two approaches, Marxism remained in his view preeminent, so the outcome would be sinified Marxism, not marxified Chinese thought. But to separate "internationalist content" from national form was the way of "those who understand nothing of internationalism" or of the correct application of Marxism in non-European societies.

The concept of the Sinification of Marxism was to loom larger and larger in the theories and rhetoric of the Chinese Communist Party for over a decade. It played a central role in the increasing glorification of Mao Zedong for his theoretical contributions of genius, from the Rectification Campaign of 1942 to the Seventh Party Congress of 1945, when Liu Shaoqi hailed his thought as "an admirable model of the nationalization of Marxism" and declared that it was "the highest expression of the wisdom of the Chinese nation, and its highest theoretical achievement."[94] These developments, which played a central role in Mao's ascension to a position far above any of his colleagues, will be fully documented in Volume VIII of this edition. In the early 1950s, with the publication of the new official edition of Mao's *Selected Works,* the term "Sinification" disappeared from the scene, manifestly because Stalin and his representatives who participated in the editing of this series found it offensive as an affirmation of China's uniqueness and of Mao's refusal blindly to copy the Soviet Union. For a third of a century it was never used, but in the mid-1980s it appeared occasionally in scholarly writing. In 1991 the authentic original text of "On the New Stage" containing the term was reproduced in an official documentary collection.[95] An extremely detailed and lucid monograph appeared in 1994, and finally, in December 1998, on the occasion of the 105th anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth, a symposium on the topic was held, with the participation of many high-ranking Party experts.[96] It would be

94. For extracts from Liu Shaoqi's speech of May 1945 on this theme, see Hélène Carrère d'Encausse and Stuart R. Schram, *Marxism and Asia* (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 259–61.

95. *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* (Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), Vol. 11 (Beijing: Central Party School, 1991), pp. 557–662.

96. See Yang Kuisong, *Makesizhuyi zhongguohua de lishi jincheng* (The Historical Course of the Sinification of Marxism) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1994); and *Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping yu Makesizhuyi de zhongguohua* (Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and the Sinification of Marxism) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999).

inappropriate to discuss these recent works here, but their appearance after an interval of nearly half a century forcefully underscores the importance of Mao's introduction of the concept.

On November 5, 1938, Mao delivered concluding remarks to the Sixth Plenum. "For the sake of long-term cooperation," he said, "it is necessary for all political parties and groups in the united front to help one another and make mutual concessions. . . . Each side refrains from undermining the other and from organizing secret [party] branches within the other's party, government, and army. . . . To sustain a long war by long-term cooperation or, in other words, to subordinate the class struggle to the present national struggle against Japan—such is the fundamental principle of the united front." At the same time, he declared that the slogan "Everything through the united front" was wrong. For some things, the Communists should secure prior consent from the Guomindang; for other things, such as the expansion of their forces to over 200,000 men, they should act first and report afterward. Continuing his remarks on November 6, he declared: "Experience tells us that China's problems cannot be settled without armed force. . . . The fact that the whole nation is rising in armed resistance in the war against Japan should inculcate a better understanding of the importance of this question in the whole Party, and every Party member should be prepared to take up arms and go to the front at any moment. . . . Every Communist must grasp this truth: 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. . . . Everything in Yan'an has been created from the barrels of guns. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power." In the present period, he declared, guerrilla warfare was primary; the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare against Japan belonged to the future development of the war, so there was no need to discuss it now.[97] Thus Mao rejected categorically the view, which had been defended in 1937–1938 by Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, and others, and which he had himself been obliged to accept as recently as May 1938, that at present positional warfare should play the decisive role in the strategy of the Chinese Communist Party.

At this time, Mao advocated not simply guerrilla warfare, but "long-term guerrilla warfare," leading to the establishment of guerrilla base areas, and even "high-level contacts" with "large groups of bandits or spontaneous anti-Japanese troops of a semi-bandit nature." Out of consideration for the Mongols, and their faith in the nobility, he went so far as to call for attempts to win over the pro-Japanese Prince De.[98] But though he was flexible in tactics, to a point which might even be

97. See below, "The Question of Independence and Autonomy Within the United Front," November 5, and "Problems of War and Strategy," November 6, 1938.

98. See "Persist in Long-term Guerrilla Warfare in the Daqing Mountains," November 24, 1938.

called opportunist, his strategic vision was clear and unbending. On the one hand, he sought to strengthen the position of the Communist Party vis-à-vis the Guomindang. Yet, at the same time, he aimed to bolster his own role as the leader of the Party. During the three years from 1939 to 1941, he laid the foundations for the cult of his own personality which was to prevail for the ensuing thirty-five years, as will be chronicled in Volume VII of this series. His rivalry with Chiang Kaishek would not be so easily or quickly resolved.

Note on Sources and Conventions

This edition of Mao Zedong's writings in English translation aims to serve a dual audience, comprising not only China specialists but those interested in Mao from other perspectives. In terms of content and presentation, we have done our best to make it useful and accessible to both these groups.

Scope. This is a complete edition in the sense that it will include a translation of every item of which the Chinese text can be obtained. It cannot be absolutely complete because some materials are still kept under tight control in the archives of the Chinese Communist Party. The situation has, however, changed dramatically since Mao's death, as a result of the publication in China, either openly or for restricted circulation (*neibu*), of a number of important texts.

Although the Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (Department for Research on Party Literature), which is the organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party responsible for the publication of Mao's writings, has always disclaimed any intention of producing his complete pre-1949 works, it appeared at one time that an edition containing a very full selection was in fact on the way, at least for a part of his early career. An advertising leaflet dated December 20, 1988, announced the appearance, in the spring of 1989, of two volumes, *Mao Zedong zaoqi zhuzuo ji* (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong from the Early Period) and *Jiandang he da geming shiqi Mao Zedong zhuzuo ji* (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong During the Period of Establishing the Party and of the Great Revolution [of 1924–1927]), and invited advance orders for both volumes. The events of June 4, 1989, led, first, to the postponement of publication and, then, to the decision to issue only the first of these volumes, for internal circulation, under the new title of *Mao Zedong zaoqi wengao, 1912.6–1920.11* (Draft Writings by Mao Zedong for the Early Period, June 1912–November 1920).

Until June 1989, further volumes in a similar format were in preparation. These plans have now been set aside, and no complete Chinese edition can be expected unless there is a radical change in the political situation. But, as forecast in Volume I, the corpus of available materials has now been substantially expanded by the publication in Beijing of two major series to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of Mao's birth. These are *Mao Zedong wenji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong), of which the first two volumes, for the years 1921–1942, appeared in December 1993; three more, covering the period 1943—September 1949 came out in August 1996; and three volumes, for the years 1949–1975, in 1999. A six-volume edition of Mao's military writings, *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* (Collected Military Writings of Mao Zedong), published in December 1993, also contains an abundance of new materials, many of which are not of purely military interest.

Sources. Despite the appearance of these two important collections, there is still no complete, or nearly complete, Chinese edition of Mao's writings from December 1920 onward. This and all subsequent volumes of our edition must therefore be drawn from a variety of materials.

The twenty volumes of *Mao Zedong ji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong) and *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong. Supplement), edited by Professor Takeuchi Minoru and published in Tokyo in the 1970s and 1980s, still constitute the most important single collection of Mao's pre-1949 writings available outside China. (For details on this and other sources cited below, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.) Apart from the *Selected Works* of the 1950s (discussed below), other official Chinese editions of Mao's works, especially the two centenary series described above, contain a large number of important new items. The various specialized volumes issued in the 1980s to commemorate Mao's ninetieth birthday also provide useful materials from the pre-1949 period. Those drawn on in this volume include *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji* (Selected Correspondence of Mao Zedong) and *Mao Zedong xinwen zhuzuo wenxuan* (Selected Materials Regarding Mao Zedong's Journalistic Work), both of which appeared in 1983.

As already indicated, all of these recent publications of the Party center are selective. Fortunately, we have been able to supplement them with materials drawn from an extremely wide range of sources, including contemporary newspapers and periodicals, individual texts published in China for restricted circulation, and facsimiles of handwritten materials.

Information regarding the source we have followed is given in an unnumbered footnote at the beginning of each text. We have also included in these source notes information about the first publication, or the earliest known version, of the writing in question, whenever available. To avoid ambiguity, all works referred to in these notes are designated by their Chinese titles, sometimes in a shortened version. (For indications regarding short titles, and for full bibliographical details regarding all works cited, including those mentioned above, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.)

Other things being equal, we have commonly referred the reader who wishes to consult the Chinese text to *Mao Zedong ji* and *Bujuan* whenever the item in question appears there, because this series offers the convenience of a large quantity of materials in compact form. There are, however, many instances in which the version contained in recent official Chinese publications is more accurate or more complete, and we have accordingly taken it as the basis for our translation. In such cases, the nature of the more significant differences is indicated in notes to the text in question, but we have not sought to show the variants systematically. That has been done only in dealing with changes made in the original text of Mao's writings when they were revised for inclusion in the official edition of his *Selected Works.*

Variants. While there are some differences between the various versions of texts by Mao published in the 1930s and 1940s, these are on the whole minor.

Systematic revision of his pre-1949 writings was undertaken only from 1950 onward, in preparing the four-volume edition of *Mao Zedong xuanji,* translated into English as the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.* This problem did not arise in our Volume I because its coverage ended in 1920, and the earliest item in the *Selected Works* is the "Analysis of All the Classes in Chinese Society," written in 1925. Apart from this text, Volume II contained the well-known "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" of February 1927. Volumes III and IV each included four texts of this kind, and Volume V included six. In the present volume, the number has increased to twelve, including such important works as "On Protracted War" and "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War."

Much ink has been spilled regarding the question of which version of the texts included in the official canon is more authentic or more authoritative. Despite the passions formerly aroused by this issue, the answer seems rather obvious. For purposes of the historical record, only the text as originally written (when it is available) can tell us what Mao actually said in the 1920s and thereafter. For the study of Mao Zedong's thought, both versions have their uses in documenting how his ideas evolved over time. For purposes of defining ideological orthodoxy under the People's Republic, the *Selected Works* version is, of course, the ultimate standard.

In any case, the purpose of this edition is not to lay down which was the "real" Mao but to enable the reader to distinguish between what Mao wrote at any given moment in his life and the revised texts produced in the 1950s under Mao's close supervision, and often with his own active participation. As in previous volumes of this edition, we have endeavored to do this in the following manner:

1. The translations that appear here correspond to the earliest available version of the text in question.

2. Words and passages from this original version that have been deleted in *Xuanji* are printed in italics.

3. Substantive and significant changes in the text, including additions made by Mao or under his authority, in the 1950s, are shown in the footnotes. *Mao Zedong ji* indicates meticulously *all* changes, including those that involve only matters of punctuation or style (such as the frequent replacement of the somewhat more literary conjunction *yu* by the more colloquial *he,* both meaning "and"). We have shown in the English version only those changes that appeared to us to have a significant impact on the meaning of the text. Any such judgment is, of course, in some degree subjective. We have sought to err on the side of showing too many variants, rather than too few, even when there was monotonous repetition in the changes, but we have not hesitated to leave out variants we regarded as trivial.

In footnotes of this kind, the words that appear *before* the arrow reproduce enough of the original text to identify what has been changed. The words that appear *after* the arrow correspond to what has been added or revised in *Xuanji.* Because, in the rewriting of the 1950s, sentences and whole passages have often been substantially recast, it would take up far too much space, and make our text

unreadable, to show every variant in detail. In some instances, it has been possible to show the new version in the form of complete sentences, but frequently we include only enough of the new wording to make plain the main thrust of the changes.

Because the official translation of the *Selected Works* has been available for four decades, and has been widely quoted in the literature, we have taken this version as our starting point, but have modified or corrected it as we judged appropriate, both to improve the accuracy of the translation and to bring it into conformity with the conventions adopted in this edition. In those few instances where other materials in this book had already been published in English, we have made our own translations, comparing them subsequently with existing versions.

Annotation. So that any attentive reader will be able to follow the details of Mao's argument in each case, we have assumed no knowledge of anything relating to China. Persons, institutions, places, and events are briefly characterized at the point where Mao first refers to them. Some individuals of secondary importance, especially those who appear only as names in a long list, are not included in the notes. We have also ruled out, with rare exceptions, annotations regarding people or events in the West. Despite these limitations, the reader will soon discover that the personages who appear in these pages are as numerous as the characters in a traditional Chinese novel.

To keep the notes within reasonable compass, we have generally restricted those regarding Mao's contemporaries to their lives down to the period covered by each volume. To make it easier to locate information, references have been inserted indicating where the first note about a given individual appears in the volume or in previous volumes.

In most biographical notes, dates of birth and death, separated by a hyphen, are given immediately after the name. A blank following the hyphen should, in principle, signify that the person in question is still living. In the case of individuals born in the nineteenth century, this is obviously unlikely, but in some instances even the editors working in Beijing have not been able to ascertain the facts. We have done our best to fill these gaps, but have not always succeeded. Sometimes a Chinese source ends with the word "deceased" (*yigu*), without giving the date of death. Here we have inserted a question mark after the hyphen, and have mentioned the fact in the note. It should not be assumed that all those born in the 1900s for whom no second date is given are already dead; some of them are still very much alive as of today.

As pointed out in Volumes III and IV, Mao's writings regarding military operations for the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi Soviet periods contain references to an extremely large number of places, many of them of no particular significance. To annotate all of the place names mentioned would have imposed an intolerable burden on the printer and on the reader. We therefore provided notes regarding geography, or the terrain, only in exceptional cases. At that time, however, the action took place primarily in a relatively limited area of Jiangxi, Fujian, and neighboring provinces, so it was possible to include in the two previous volumes maps showing the principal localities mentioned by Mao, in order to facilitate the understanding of the text. Because of the extremely extensive area in which the Red Army operated both during and after the Long March, the present and succeeding volumes would have required a large number of maps to cover the terrain in sufficient detail, and we must therefore refer the reader to an atlas of China—preferably one showing the place names in use before 1949.

The introductions to the volumes in this series should be considered in a very real sense as an extension of the notes. These texts will, we hope, help readers unfamiliar with Mao Zedong, or with twentieth-century China, find their *own* way through Mao's writings of the pre-1949 period. Any controversial or provocative statements which they may contain are intended to stimulate reflection, not to impose a particular interpretation on the reader. This is a collection of historical source material, not a volume of interpretation.

Use of Chinese Terms. On the whole, we have sought to render all Chinese expressions in accurate and readable English, but in some cases it has seemed simpler and less ambiguous to use the Chinese word. These instances include, to begin with, *zi* (courtesy name) and *hao* (literary name). Because both Mao, and the authors he cited, frequently employ these alternative appellations instead of the *ming* (given name) of the individual to whom they are referring, information regarding them is essential to the intelligence of the text. The English word "style" is sometimes used here, but because it may stand either for *zi* or for *hao,* it does not offer a satisfactory solution. The Chinese terms have, in any case, long been used in Western-language biographical dictionaries of China, as well as in Chinese works.

Similarly, in the case of second- or provincial-level, and third- or metropolitan-level graduates of the old examination system, we have chosen to use the Chinese terms, respectively, *juren* and *jinshi.* We have also preferred *xian* to "county" for the administrative subdivision which constituted the lowest level of the imperial bureaucracy and still exists in China today. Apart from the Western connotations of "county," there is the problem that *xian* is also often translated "district" (as in the expression "district magistrate"), and "district" itself is ambiguous in the Chinese context. We have also preferred to use the Chinese word *li* rather than to translate "Chinese league" (or simply "league"), or to give the equivalent in miles or kilometers.

Presentation. In the previous five volumes of this series, Mao's writings have been arranged in a single chronological series, according to the date of composition. The only exception to this pattern occurred in Volume IV, where the forty laws to which Mao had put his signature as the chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic appeared in an appendix and in a smaller size type, because it seemed unlikely that he had actually written these documents himself. In the present volume, the diverse nature of the materials included made it seem appropriate to arrange the texts by category. The first of these contains the bulk of Mao's writ-

ings in chronological order. The second consists of his notes for lectures on dialectical materialism, delivered in July and August 1937, and the third of his notes on writings by Soviet and Chinese Marxist thinkers which he read between 1936 and 1938 and on which he drew in developing his own ideas on the subject. The fourth category, finally, is made up of brief notes and inscriptions which are neither lengthy enough nor important enough to justify presenting them individually as separate documents, but are of sufficient interest to justify their appearance here. (The very brief items piously reproduced in Chinese sources even though they say nothing significant have not been included.)

As already indicated, we have tried to turn Mao's Chinese into good English. At the same time, since this is a work of reference, we have sometimes followed Mao in directions which do not accord with English usage. Mao frequently emphasized words or phrases by placing dots or circles next to each of the characters involved. In this edition, the corresponding text has been set in boldface. Usually we have also added a note explicitly pointing this out, but it should be clearly stated that all such highlighting is Mao's, not ours. Also, some of the Chinese texts we have translated contain omissions because the editors in Tokyo, or even those in Beijing, did not have access to a complete version of the document in question or could not read a few characters. When the number of missing characters is small, each one is commonly represented in the printed Chinese text by a hollow square occupying the space which would normally be taken up by a single character. In our English version, each such square has been represented by the symbol [X], so that the reader of the translation can see how much is missing. Where the gap is a long one, we have dispensed with this procedure and conveyed the necessary information in a footnote.

Finally, like many Chinese writers, Mao tended to produce very long paragraphs, sometimes extending to several pages. Although this may seem monotonous to the English reader, we have generally followed his paragraphing exactly, because it must be presumed to reflect Mao's own sense of where the crucial turning points in his argument are to be found. We have not followed this pattern rigidly; on occasion, massive blocks of text containing figures and other data have been turned into tables, which are easier to follow. For the most part, however, the translations in this volume seek to reproduce Mao's original in form as well as in substance.

Part I: Texts

1937

Speech at the "August 1" Rally of the Campaign to Mobilize for the War of Resistance

(August 1, 1937)

Comrades, the Japanese imperialists are extending the war to North China! Beiping and Tianjin have fallen! If we fail to mobilize for the War of Resistance, the Japanese imperialists will soon be attacking us right here! Do not imagine that Beiping and Tianjin are far, far away from here. Out there lies Shanxi, bordering on our area, and beyond Shanxi are Beiping and Tianjin, which are being bombarded at this moment by Japanese airplanes and big guns. Therefore, the people of the whole country, wherever they are, must be mobilized urgently. The soviet areas are the model areas for the whole nation in fighting Japan, so it is of the highest significance that we are holding this rally of the campaign to mobilize for the War of Resistance here, at this critical moment, when North China is threatened, and the Chinese nation has arrived at a decisive pass. We want to set ourselves up as an example and hereby express our determination to prosecute the War of Resistance. A long while ago, we talked to them[1] over and over again, expressing our hope that they would commit themselves to resolute participation in the War of Resistance, but they did not listen to us. From beginning to end they wavered and never made up their minds to fight the War of Resistance resolutely. The fall of Beiping and Tianjin this time was actually caused by their vacillation and lack of determination in fighting the War of Resistance. The authorities of North China from the very start resorted to the tortuous pursuit of compromise, without making sufficient preparations militarily. Unnecessarily wary of the popular masses, they made no effort to arouse the popular masses or to expand the patriotic movements of the popular masses. On the contrary, they put up public notices enforcing martial law and told the popular masses to remain "calm," thus making it impossible for the popular masses, who were patriotic and seething with enthusiasm, to take any action. The result of this behavior was that they lost Beiping and Tianjin! I hope

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This speech was first published on August 2, 1937, in a special supplementary issue of *Xin Zhonghua bao.* We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 93–94, which reproduces this text.

1. The deliberately vague term "they"/"them," with no antecedent, clearly refers to Chiang Kaishek, the Guomindang in general, and other powerful military commanders, whom Mao chose not to denounce by name at this time.

that the officers and men throughout the country who are fighting to safeguard our territory and resisting aggression will heed this tragic lesson! We now have only one policy orientation, and it is to fight Japan resolutely! Immediately mobilize the popular masses of the whole country—workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers—people of all parties, all factions, and all social strata. Let them all unite and wage a life-and-death struggle against the Japanese imperialists! That is the one and only policy for our national independence and liberation!

The rally of the campaign to mobilize for the War of Resistance we are holding today is a step toward this orientation. This rally is not simply for the purpose of competition in the campaign; we want to mobilize the people for the War of Resistance. We want to mobilize the popular masses of the whole country for the defense of the country and its territory. Comrades, get ready to go to Hebei. Get ready to go to the front lines in the battle of resistance to Japan. Take the policy orientation and methods which we are applying here to the other parts of the country! Take our resolve to the front lines in the battle of resistance to Japan!

Let us loudly shout:

Down with Japanese imperialism!
Recover Beiping and Tianjin!
Safeguard North China!
Recover the Four Eastern Provinces![2]
Long live the August 1 Campaign Rally!
Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

2. By "the Four Eastern Provinces," Mao was referring to Liaoning, Jilin (formerly Kirin), Rehe (formerly Jehol), and Heilongjiang, that is, to what was formerly known as Manchuria. When, in the numerous references to this area to be found in this volume, he sometimes spoke of the "Three Eastern Provinces," he was probably lumping together Liaoning and Jilin. In editing Mao's writings for the *Selected Works,* both in Chinese and in English, those responsible changed "eastern provinces" to "northeastern provinces," no doubt because they assumed that some readers might think "eastern" referred to the coast, from Beijing to Shanghai. This change was made, however, only in a relatively small proportion of Mao's total output, and in any case, our practice in this edition is to translate Mao's writings in the form he originally gave them.

On the Operational Principles of the Red Army

(August 1, 1937)[1]

Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu],[2] Lin [Boqu][3]:

As regards the operations of the Red Army, on the basis of the present situation on the enemy's side as well as on our own, we think that we should resolutely adhere to the following two principles:

1. In accordance with our overall strategic orientation, we should carry out independent, self-reliant, and dispersed guerrilla warfare, and not positional warfare, nor should we concentrate our forces for a campaign. Consequently, we cannot allow ourselves to be restricted in campaigns and tactics. Only in this way can we bring into full play the professional skills of the Red Army and strike appropriate blows against the Japanese invaders.

2. According to the above principle, during the initial stage it is appropriate for the Red Army to use one-third of its forces. If too large a force is used, it will not be able to fight a guerrilla war and can, on the contrary, easily suffer a concentrated attack by the enemy. As for the rest of the forces, they should be brought into play gradually as the war develops.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 20–21, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. It is indicated at the end of this document by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 5:00 and 7:00 P.M.

2. Qin Bangxian (1907–1946), whose pseudonym was Bo Gu, had been the dominant figure in the Party during the period of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic. Although he lost that position at the time of the Zunyi conference in January 1935, he continued to play a significant role. For details, see the numerous references to him in Volume V. At this time, he had recently been sent to Nanjing to serve as a liaison officer with the Guomindang.

3. Lin Boqu (1886–1960), also known as Lin Zuhan, a native of Hunan, had been commander of the First Army Corps during the Jiangxi Soviet period. At the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, he became commander of the 115th division of the Eighth Route Army.

Please discuss the above principles with the various comrades, and be prepared to inform the Guomindang.

Luo [Fu][4] Mao [Zedong]

4. Luo Fu was the pseudonym of Zhang Wentian (1900–1976), a native of Nanhui, Shanghai. Zhang had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925, and thereafter spent four years studying in the Soviet Union. Returning to China at the end of 1930, he became one of the leading members of the "International Faction" in the Party. In 1934, he supplanted Mao as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In January 1935 at Zunyi, he threw his support behind Mao, and as a result became "the person with overall responsibility" for the leadership of the Party, although he did not assume the formal title of Secretary General. At this time he was head of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

Concerning the Submission in Person to Nanjing of the Plan for National Defense and Other Matters

(August 3, 1937)[1]

Zhou, Bo (and to be transmitted to Ye)[2]:

1. It would be appropriate for Zhou, Zhu [De], and Ye to go and submit the plan for national defense in person. It is not appropriate to send it by telegram.

2. We are just now considering the plan. Please inform us today by telegram of your agreed views on this matter, as well as on the operational guidelines for the Red Army and the measures to be taken.

3. Telegrams have been sent separately to the soldiers[3] and the Secretariat about the danger of the westward advance by the Japanese invaders, Sino-Soviet relations, and the need of the Red Army for Soviet coordination in the fight against Japan.[4]

4. In your present trip to Nanjing, seek to solve the following problems in one package:

a. Publication of the declaration;
b. Formulation of the political program;
c. Ratification of the plan for national defense;
d. Announcement of the command system of the Red Army and the number of the initial reinforcements for the Red Army;
e. Guidelines for the operations of the Red Army.

Luo [Fu] Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Wenxian he yanjiu,* 1985, no. 4 (pp. 220–21 of the annual volume).

1. It is indicated at the end of this document by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M.

2. The reference is to Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu (i.e., Qin Bangxian), and Ye Jianying.

3. A note to the available Chinese text states that the reference here is not clear.

4. Regarding Mao Zedong's emphasis during and after the Long March on the importance of obtaining material support from the Soviet Union, see in particular the resolution of December 23, 1935, on problems of military strategy, in which Mao wrote: "'Fighting a way through to the Soviet Union' should be taken as the central [strategic] task" (Volume V, pp. 77–83), and various references to this theme in the Introduction to Volume V.

Our Views Regarding the Problem of National Defense[1]

(August 4, 1937)

To Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], and Ye [Jianying], and also for the information of Bo [Gu], Lin [Boqu], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Liu [Bocheng], Zhang [Hao],[2] He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], Chen [Guang], Nie [Rongzhen], Xu [Haidong], Cheng [Zihua], Chen [Zaidao], Wang [Hongkun], Xiao [Ke], and Guo [Shushen]:

Regarding the question of national defense, our opinions are as follows:

1. The first defensive front should run through places such as Zhangjiakou, Zuozhou, Jinghai, and Qingdao. The emphasis should be on Zhangjiakou, and we should concentrate enough military forces for the first decisive campaign.

2. The second defensive front should run through places such as Datong, Baoding, Machang, and Weixian. We should concentrate an advantageous number of troops, to reinforce the first defensive front at the appropriate time while at the same time preparing for the decisive campaign along the second front.

3. As far as Taiyuan, Shijiazhuang, Cangzhou, and other places are concerned, they can only be used as the third defensive front. We must absolutely not pay attention only to this front and not concentrate our forces on the first and second fronts.

4. The key at present is the first front.

5. For the time being, the general strategic orientation should be offensive defense. We must launch a destructive counteroffensive against the advancing enemy and must absolutely not conduct a pure defense. In the future we should prepare to switch to the strategic offensive and to recover lost territory.

6. In combining regular warfare with guerrilla warfare, the Red Army and the other appropriate armed forces and people's armed forces may participate in guerrilla warfare. Under the general strategic dispositions, they should be allowed to exercise the power of command independently and with the initiative in their own hands.

7. Those units which are responsible for guerrilla warfare should use their troops properly in accordance with the topography and the situation on the battlefield. In accordance with the nature of guerrilla warfare, the troops should in principle be used separately instead of collectively.

8. According to the present situation, the Red Army should contribute one-third of its forces, use the area where the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, and Suiyuan come together as the center, aim at the enemy troops which are moving westward along the Ping-Sui railway line and southward along the Ping-Han railway line, and carry on guerrilla warfare from the flanks. Apart from that, send another unit to be active in the Rehe-Hebei-Chahar Border Region and threaten the enemy's rear (this force should not exceed one regiment). The Red Army should provide it with the necessary reinforcements.

9. The mobilization of a people's campaign of armed self-defense is a central link in guaranteeing the victory of the army. Vacillation regarding this orientation will lead to certain defeat.

10. You may come up with other ideas as opportunity offers, but not too many, and firmly grasp the essentials.

Luo [Fu] Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 22–24, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. In late July 1937, Chiang Kaishek convened a meeting of the National Military Council and invited the Chinese Communist Party to send representatives to participate. At the beginning of August, the Communist Party Central Committee decided to send Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Ye Jianying to Nanjing for this purpose. This telegram was addressed to them by Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian) and Mao Zedong.

2. Zhang Hao was an alternate name for Lin Yuying (1897–1942), a delegate to the Communist International who played an important role in communications between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party in 1935–1937. See Volume V, p. lii and note 62, and numerous other references to him in that volume.

The Red Army's Operational Tasks, and Principles Relating to the Use of Our Troops

(August 5, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu], Lin [Boqu], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

Your telegram sent between 3:00 and 5:00 on August 4 has been received. Our reply is as follows:

1. The question of taking responsibility for operations on one front. The Red Army is responsible for the task of suppressing the majority of the enemy forces and eliminating part of them by engaging in mobile guerrilla warfare independently and with the initiative in its own hands. Concretely, the demand is that it assist the operations of friendly forces by harassing, suppressing, and attacking the flank of the enemy advancing westward along the Ping-Sui railroad and advancing southward along the Ping-Han railway line in the designated region bordering on the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, and Suiyuan (a quadrangular area, not a triangular area). It is also appropriate to send some units to as far away as Rehe. This does not mean "being independently responsible for one front" but entails assisting in the operations of regular friendly forces which are at the front in a given locality. Such a formulation is freer, livelier, and more effective. In other words, it is appropriate for us to engage in combat only from the flanks and not from the front. Hence, it is inappropriate to use language implying that we are dealing independently with one front.

2. The question of the use of troops. We have put forth the principle of using troops in accordance with the circumstances. Under this principle, we agree that our main force will be dispatched (in terms of numbers, the main force may consist of half or two-thirds of the troops). We shall not tell Chiang Kaishek the precise fraction. In fact, we need to fully take into account the long-drawn-out and cruel nature of this war and Chiang's intention to set up a warlord stronghold (Chiang demands that the entire Red Army be dispatched). We should also take note of the fact that Shaanxi and Gansu constitute our most reliable rear (Chiang still has ten divisions here, and once all of us are gone, he will safely occupy this rear) and of other problems.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 25–27, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

3. The question of supplies and logistics from the rear. Apart from the fact that the issue of Shaanxi and Gansu should not be raised, we may demand Baotou and Ningxia, but we must put the emphasis on seeking western Shanxi, Ningxia, Suiyuan, and [the three *xian* of] Yulin, Shenmu, and Fugu. In reality we fear that it will be difficult to cooperate with Ma Hongkui,[1] and that this will be possible only after the establishment of the Sino-Soviet military alliance.

Luo [Fu] Mao [Zedong]

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1. Regarding General Ma Hongkui, see the numerous references in Volume V, and in particular the biographical note on p. 62 of that volume.

Adopt a Modest Attitude While Consulting with People from All Sides

(August 10, 1937)

Comrade [Peng] Xuefeng:[1]

I have taken note of all your telegrams, and I am greatly reassured.

1. While consulting with people of all circles, under the overall orientation of actively promoting the War of Resistance, we must have a modest attitude. We must not boast of the merits of the Red Army ourselves or say that the Red Army is sure to win the War of Resistance against Japan; on the contrary, we must ask them for advice on all sorts of things, such as the fighting capacity of the Japanese army, campaigns in the mountains and on the plain, and other circumstances of which the Red Army generally has no experience, so that the Red Army will have some basis and will gradually overcome the difficulties. We must not conceal certain shortcomings of the Red Army that should not be concealed, such as that it can only wage guerrilla war and not positional war, mountain warfare and not warfare in the plains, or that it is suited only to fighting independently and self-reliantly under overall strategic command, and not to circumstances in which it is bound by a centralized command in campaigns and tactics, in which it will lose all its strengths. Because of [this suitability for] mountainous terrain and guerrilla warfare, the Red Army should be positioned in the four-cornered area bordering on the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, and Suiyuan and should launch a flank attack against the enemy troops that are marching westward along the Ping-Sui railway line and those marching southward along the Ping-Han railway line in cooperation with the strategic operation of the friendly forces in the front. We must also let them know that the technology and equipment of the Red Army are rather primitive and ask them to supply us with the five categories and nineteen kinds of commodities listed in yesterday's telegram, for otherwise it will be very hard to be successful in fighting a strong enemy.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 28–29, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. For a biography of Peng Xuefeng (1905–1944), alternate name Peng Yufeng, see Volume V, p. 559, note 1. In late 1936 Peng had been sent to Shanxi to engage in united front work, and in particular to persuade Yan Xishan cooperate with the Communist forces.

2. Since the current situation is very critical, the Red Army is planning to set out before reorganization, and the reorganization can be carried out after arriving at Datong. Zhu [De] and Zhou [Enlai] flew to Nanjing on the 9th.[2] The Red Army will set out as soon as we receive their telegram. If they ask why the Red Army is still not reorganized, you may say that it is because of the delay by Nanjing. (The declaration was not published, no decision was made regarding political principles, and there was no announcement regarding headquarters or designation; the designation [as the Eighth Route Army] was only issued a few days ago, but the headquarters has not yet been appointed.)

3. As regards the itinerary, because there is no grain along the distance of over a thousand *li* from Luochuan to Fugu, and no grain for sale in the area 800 *li* to the north and south of Yan'an (the grain the institutions consume was bought from western Shanxi and Xi'an), we must absolutely not take the way of northern Shaanxi. Instead, the only way is to cross the river at Hancheng, by way of Puxian, Xiaoyi, and Fenyang, and concentrate at Datong. This must be achieved while negotiating with Yan [Xishan].[3]

4. The office in Taiyuan should be set up immediately, and you are appointed its director.

Mao Zedong

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2. As indicated in the telegram of August 4, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai had gone to Nanjing at the invitation of Chiang Kaishek to participate in the meeting of the National Military Council.

3. Regarding Yan Xishan (1883–1960), the unchallenged ruler of his native province of Shanxi, see the brief note in Volume V, p. 61.

Interview with Nym Wales on Negotiations with the Guomindang and the War with Japan

(August 13, 1937)[1]

Wales: Is there any news about the conclusion of the United Front negotiations with the Guomindang?

Mao: Yes. The Red Army has just received an order from Nanjing to go to the front to fight the Japanese under the command of the Nanjing government. Commander Zhu De has gone to Nanjing to join the National Defense Conference now being held there. The political program of the unification of the two parties has not yet been permitted by Chiang Kaishek to be published. Now the Communist Party wants to publish a manifesto announcing the unification of the two parties in the Chinese press, but Nanjing will not permit this publication and the manifesto can only be published after actual fighting with Japan has begun.

Although the Communist Party now has a legal position and Zhu De can join the National Defense Conference, on the other hand, political prisoners have not yet been released by Nanjing. Moreover, up to the present the Communist Party still cannot work publicly in the White districts. Some things in China are very strange, you see. There is so far no order to release political prisoners, and only the seven National Salvation leaders in Suzhou have been released.

Wales: I understand the Red Army is now being reorganized for the anti-Japanese war in accordance with the terms of the negotiations with Nanjing. Is this true?

Our source for this document is the English text published by Helen Foster Snow (Nym Wales) in *My Yenan Notebooks,* pp. 151–53. In a few instances, we have followed the wording in her contemporary typescript, conserved in the archives of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Variations between the two versions are of no substantive importance and have not been noted. Unlike the interview of July 4, 1937, which appears in Volume V, this interview is not included in *Mao Zedong zishu,* and no Chinese text appears to exist.

1. At the beginning of her handwritten notes, which are also found in the Hoover Institution archives, Nym Wales wrote: "Mao Tse-tung—August 11th. My interview written 13th." In *My Yenan Notebooks,* p. 151, she states, "Originally, I talked with him August 11 for this interview, but the date was changed to the 13th." In *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 12, it is indicated, however, that the interview took place on August 13, and we follow that dating. As in the case of the July 4 interview, we have modified the spelling of Chinese names to conform to the style of this edition.

Mao: No. The Red Army has not yet been reorganized, because Chiang Kaishek has delayed [answering] this question and has not yet appointed a commander-in-chief. However, we have received our number as a unit of the National Revolutionary Army. Now we can only send the Red Army to the front and change the number there.

Wales: Has the name of the Red Army been changed, and the red star?

Mao: Not yet. We still use the old name of the Red Army. As to the red star, I don't know whether it has been changed at the front or not. Nanjing is now supplying the uniforms for the army and this question is decided by them.

Wales: Will the Red Army carry the Red Flag as well as the national flag in fighting the Japanese?

Mao: No. If we change the uniforms and the red star, of course, we must also change our flag.

Wales: What is the reason for the delay on the part of Chiang Kaishek?

Mao: I suppose it is because Nanjing is afraid that if the manifesto is published it will raise a strong reaction on the part of Japanese imperialism. Therefore, we want to publish the manifesto and many other things after the fighting breaks out. We have requested to publish the manifesto earlier than this, but Nanjing has refused.

Wales: Are there any problems which cannot be settled between the Guomindang and the Communist Party?

Mao: There are many questions not yet settled, such as the fact that Nanjing wants to appoint the commander-in-chief and the head of the political department in the army from Nanjing, and we refuse this. Other demands have been accepted by Nanjing but are not yet realized, such as freeing political prisoners, granting freedom of speech and press, permitting the Communist Party to work openly in the White districts, and the publication of the manifesto. Although Nanjing has accepted these demands, they are not yet realized.

Wales: Are there any Communist Party demands which Nanjing has not yet accepted?

Mao: Yes. (1) We have suggested a political program, which until now has not yet been decided upon. (2) We want to publish the cooperation manifesto but this has not been permitted. (3) Our request for the release of political prisoners has not been granted.

Wales: What are the main points of the political program advocated by the Communist Party?

Mao: We have made ten demands in connection with the Japanese problem:[2]

1. To fight against Japan thoroughly and decisively, and to drive Japanese imperialism out of China;
2. To stop all diplomatic negotiations with Japan and oppose the compromising and wavering attitude of the Nanjing government;
3. To mobilize the armies of the whole nation on the front to fight against the Japanese;
4. To mobilize the whole body of the masses to join the war front against the Japanese, to give the people the freedom of patriotism, and to give the people the freedom to arm themselves;
5. To organize a national defense government of all parties, clearing out the traitors and other forces of Japanese imperialism in China;
6. To establish an anti-Japanese diplomatic policy, enter into a military agreement with the USSR, and enter into a Pacific anti-Japanese agreement with England, America, and France;
7. To adopt an anti-Japanese financial policy, the principle of which financial policy to be that everybody who has money must support the nation and that all the property of Japanese imperialism must be confiscated. The principle of the economic policy should be to boycott the use of Japanese goods and to increase the use of national goods;
8. To improve and reconstruct the life of the people, including the removal of the many unjust surtaxes, decreasing the taxes, and decreasing rents;
9. To develop the anti-Japanese national defense education;
10. To organize a united front of the whole country with the unification of the two parties (Guomindang and Communist Party) as the basis for struggle against the Japanese.

This is our great program for resisting Japan. These ten were sent to Nanjing, asking the government to accept them. If we can realize these ten points, we can strike down Japanese imperialism; if not, China will perish.[3]

Wales: Does the Communist Party now demand immediate war with Japan?

2. The ten points listed here by Mao Zedong are essentially the same as those put forward formally in the propaganda outline of August 25, 1937, translated below. The only substantive difference consists in the elimination of the second point, which had been overtaken by events, and the addition of a new point, attacking the Chinese traitors, near the end of the list, to bring the number back up to ten.

3. According to Nym Wales's handwritten notes, Mao placed particular emphasis on this last sentence.

Mao: Yes, the Communist Party demands immediate war with Japan.

Wales: Does Nanjing agree to this demand?

Mao: Yes, the Nanjing government agrees with this. However, although Nanjing has accepted this principle, only the future will prove the fact. Only to accept is no use.

Wales: What do you estimate to be the future development of the war with Japan?

Mao: The policy of Japanese imperialism will determine the time this war breaks out. The future of the war contains two possibilities: first, victory, and second, defeat. How shall we achieve victory? We must struggle with hope and courage, and continue this struggle, and we must realize the ten demands presented by the Communist Party. Then victory is sure. If we do not, we shall fail.

Wales: Where will the Red Army front be during this war?

Mao: This is not yet determined.

Wales: Where do you anticipate the immediate center of Japanese war operations to be in the near future?

Mao: Japan will perhaps attack Suiyuan and Chahar provinces, and we shall guard these two territories. Besides these two provinces, the Beiping-Hankou and Tianjin-Pukou railways will also be a main front, and also the Qingdao-Jinan railway in Shandong. These places will be the main front of the war.

Speech at the Evening Send-Off Party for the Northwest Battlefield Service Corps

(August 15, 1937)

An evening party was given in the Auditorium at 7:00 P.M. on the 15th, sponsored by all circles of Yan'an, to give a warm send-off to the Northwest Battlefield Service Corps before it leaves for service on the anti-Japanese battlefront. Present at the party, besides all the members of the service corps totaling several dozen, were representatives from various organs and from various circles. The event started at 7:10 with a speech by Chairman Mao. His remarks were roughly as follows:

The Battlefield Service Corps is an important undertaking because it serves the fight against Japan, and the fight against Japan is a grand affair, both at home and throughout the world. For many years, we have been voicing our demand that the whole nation unite and fight Japan together, and today we can say that this is already becoming reality. We can say of this war that it has the significance of finality. The Battlefield Service Corps is going to the front together with the Red Army to work there. You will fight Japan with your pens and with your tongues, while the army fights Japan with its guns. We shall attack Japanese imperialism from both the literary and the military fronts, making the Japanese bandits perish before our very eyes, and so on, and so on.

The speech was followed by talks by the representatives of various circles. [The texts are omitted here.]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 95, where it is reproduced from the mimeographed edition of *Xin Zhonghua bao* dated August 19, 1937.

The Main Force of the Red Army Will Follow Not the Beiping-Hankou Railroad, but the Datong-Pukou Railroad

(August 17, 1937)

To Mr. Zhang Huinan,[1] and to be transmitted to the three elder brothers, Zhu [De], Zhou [Enlai], and Ye [Jianying]:

We have taken note of Nan Mixi's telegram.[2]

1. We agree that the main force of our troops will be concentrated in the region of Yangyuan, Weixian, Laiyuan, Guanglin, and Linwu. But we will advance not along the Ping-Han railroad, but along the Tong-Pu railroad. We will get on the train at Houma, get off at Daixian, and move toward the destination to concentrate.

2. There is no money to buy rice. Quickly collect the 600,000 *yuan* for August and the funds for development.

3. Quickly order Taiyuan to prepare the supply of leather coats, weapons, and ammunition.

4. Be guided by Yan Baichuan[3] in accordance with the principles of independence and initiative in command, guerrilla warfare, and mountain warfare. Notify Yan quickly.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 30–31, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Zhang Chong (1904–1941), *zi* Huinan, was a native of Zhejiang. In November 1936 he was elected to the Guomindang's Fifth Central Executive Committee. At the time of the Xi'an Incident, he had been sent to hold discussions with Zhou Enlai. At this time, he was acting head of the Guomindang Organization Department and was again involved in talks with the Communists. In September 1937, he was appointed head of the Development Office of Gansu Province.

2. It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M.

3. Yan Baichuan is the *zi* of Yan Xishan.

The Luochuan Meeting Will Discuss Major Military Questions

(August 18, 1937)[1]

To Bo [Gu], Lin [Boqu], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], and for transmittal to Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying]:

1. The Guomindang's scheme has already been revealed very clearly. Its intention is to:
   a. Send all Red Army troops to the front lines.
   b. Advance along several routes so that we will not be concentrated and will be forced to obey their commands.
   c. After the Red Army has started to move in accordance with the order, it will be subordinated to Chiang, and he will achieve his purpose by issuing orders to it. At that time, the question of the Party and the question of the Border Region will be resolved by him, even to the point of not allowing the issuance of a declaration, or abolishing the soviet area.
2. As for our policy, refer to the instructions given to Zhou and Ye by the Central Committee.
3. This is a very important matter and should be discussed very carefully at the Luochuan meeting.
4. It is requested that eight comrades—Bo [Gu], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Liu [Bocheng], Zhang [Hao], He [Long], and Guan [Xiangying]—attend this meeting together, and they are requested to leave Yunyang on the 20th.

Luo [Fu] Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 32–33, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 1:00 and 3:00 P.M.

To Comrade Ren Bishi and Comrade Deng Xiaoping of the General Political Department

(August 19, 1937)

Comrade Bishi and Comrade Xiaoping:

Mrs. Snow is coming to the front and will stay with our army as a foreign correspondent. Please provide her with assistance on matters such as living expenses.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 87, where it is reproduced from a photocopy of Mao's handwritten original, formerly held at the Hoover Library and Institution. Helen Foster Snow (Nym Wales) never made use of it because Edgar Snow came to the Border Region, and she traveled with him, rather than going independently to the war zone as a reporter. She subsequently took back the original from Hoover and presented it to Deng Xiaoping when she met him during his visit to the United States in 1979.

Telegram to Xie Juezai

(August 21, 1937)

[Received a telegram from Chairman Mao:]

Zhu [De] and Zhou [Enlai] have already returned from their trip to Nanjing. The Red Army is to be reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, with Zhu as commander-in-chief and Peng [Dehuai] as deputy commander-in-chief. The War of Resistance has already started on a national scale. Our vanguard troops set off on the 19th; the rest of the army will leave after the publication of the proclamation regarding cooperation. Cadres should be selected locally. At present, we have no suitable people to send. The Muslims[1] may organize their own party of a national character, which they might call something like the Muslim Association for Fighting Japan and Saving the Country, etc., etc. [Advised me not to go back to Shaanxi.]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 99, where it is reproduced from Xie Juezai's diary.

1. The term used is *Huizu,* now treated as the name of a national minority, but commonly employed in the 1930s to refer to Muslims in general.

Order Concerning the Reorganization of the Red Army into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army

(August 25, 1937)

Nanjing has already started the War of Resistance against Japan, and the Guomindang and the Communist Party have successfully carried out the first stage in their cooperation. In order to fulfill the promise of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the Third Plenary Session of the Guomindang to rename the Red Army,[1] to make the Red Army a model in the nation's war against Japan, and push the War of Resistance forward to make of it the anti-Japanese revolutionary war of the whole nation, so as to win final and complete victory, it is now announced that the Red Army has been renamed the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army, in compliance with the results of our political discussions with the Guomindang in Nanjing. It is ordered that:

The Front General Headquarters is renamed as the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, with Zhu De as the commander-in-chief, Peng Dehuai as the deputy commander-in-chief, Ye Jianying as chief of the General Staff, and Zuo Quan as deputy chief of staff.

The General Political Department is renamed as the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army, with Ren Bishi as director and Deng Xiaoping as deputy director.

The First Army Group, the Fifteenth Army Group, and the Seventy-fourth Division are reorganized into the 115th Division of the ground forces, with Lin Biao as division commander, Nie Rongzhen as deputy division commander, Zhou Kun as chief of staff, Luo Ronghuan as director of the Political Training Department of the division, and Xiao Hua as its deputy director.

The Second Front Army, the Twenty-seventh Army, the Twenty-eighth Army, the First and Second Independent Divisions, as well as Chishui Battalion of Guards and part of the detachment directly under the Front General Headquarters are reorganized into the 120th Division of the ground forces, with He Long as division

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 34–36, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. This promise was made in a telegram of February 10, 1937, translated in Volume V, pp. 606–7.

commander, Xiao Ke as deputy division commander, Zhou Shidi as chief of staff, Guan Xiangying as director of the Political Training Department, and Gan Shiqi as deputy director.

The Fourth Front Army, the Twenty-ninth Army, the Thirtieth Army, and the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Independent Regiments of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia are reorganized into the 129th Division of the Ground Forces, with Liu Bocheng as division commander, Xu Xiangqian as deputy commander, Ni Zhiliang as chief of staff, Zhang Hao[2] as director of the Political Training Department, and Song Renqiong as deputy director.

When the above reorganization has been carried out in accordance with the foregoing orders, individual appointments will be made through orders by the Front General Headquarters. After each division is reorganized into the National Revolutionary Army, they must strengthen Party leadership, maintain and carry forward the glorious tradition that has been developed in the ten-year struggle, and resolutely comply with the orders issued by the Party Central Committee and its Military Commission, so as to guarantee that the Red Army will remain the armed force of the Communist Party after the reorganization, strive for the implementation of the Party line and Party policy, and accomplish the great mission of China's revolution.

Chairman of the
Revolutionary Military
Commission of the
Central Committee — Mao Zedong

Vice Chairmen — Zhu De
Zhou Enlai

2. That is, Lin Yuying.

For the Mobilization of All Our Forces to Achieve Victory in the War of Resistance

Outline of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the Present Situation and the Tasks of Propaganda and Agitation

(August 25, 1937)

1. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7 marked the beginning of Japanese imperialism's all-out invasion of China.[1] The fight put up by the Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge marked the beginning of China's nationwide War of Resistance. The ceaseless Japanese attacks, the people's resolute struggle, the national bourgeoisie's leftist tendency,[2] the Communist Party's vigorous advocacy and firm application of a national united front policy and the nationwide support this policy has won—all these have compelled the Chinese authorities to begin changing their policy of nonresistance, as pursued ever since the September Eighteenth Incident of 1931, to a policy of resistance since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and have caused the Chinese revolution to develop beyond the stage reached after the December Ninth Movement, that is, the stage of ending the civil war and preparing for resistance, into the stage of actual resistance. The initial changes in the Guomindang's policy with the Xi'an Incident and the Third Plenary Session of its Central Executive Committee as their starting point, Mr. Chiang Kaishek's Lushan statement of July 17,[3] and many of his measures of national defense, all deserve commendation. The troops at the front of resistance,[4] whether the land and air forces or the local armed units, have all fought courageously and demonstrated the heroic spirit of the Chinese nation. In the name of the national revolution, the

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 249–256, where it is reproduced from a contemporary mimeographed version.

1. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, was a skirmish between Chinese and Japanese troops just southwest of Beiping that was used by the Japanese to justify a full-scale invasion of China. For the reaction of Mao and the Communist Party at the time, see Volume V, pp. 695 and 703–10.

2. Leftist tendency → Tendency toward resistance

3. Statement of July 17 → Statement of July 17 on the question of resistance to Japan

4. At the front of resistance → At the front

Chinese Communist Party ardently salutes our patriotic troops and fellow countrymen throughout China.

2. The Japanese imperialists' massive military offensive against China proper since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7 is the result of the Chinese authorities' erroneous policies after the September Eighteenth Incident,[5] *and in particular, the lesson of the failure of the Hebei and Chahar authorities to adopt resolute policies of resistance and* the compromises and concessions made by them after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which suppressed the zeal of the patriotic troops and clamped down the movement of national salvation of the patriotic people, *thus enabling the enemy to grab Beiping, ancient capital with a history of several hundred years, and Tianjin, major port city of the north, within only twenty days. This is the most serious loss and the gravest lesson after the loss of the Four Northeastern Provinces.* There is no doubt that, having seized Beiping and Tianjin, Japanese imperialism will press ahead with its policy of large-scale offensives, take the second and third steps in its premeditated war plan, and launch fierce attacks on the whole of North China and other areas, relying on its own brute military strength, while at the same time drawing support from German and Italian imperialism, exploiting the vacillations of British imperialism, and waiting for[6] the estrangement of the Guomindang from the broad popular masses of the toilers. The flames of war are already raging in Chahar and in Shanghai. To save our motherland from peril, to resist the attacks of the powerful bandits, to defend North China and the seacoast, and recover Beiping, Tianjin, and the northeast, the people of the whole country and the Guomindang must thoroughly learn the lesson of the northeast, Beiping, and Tianjin, learn and take warning from the fall of Abyssinia, learn from the Soviet Union's past victories over its foreign enemies, learn from Spain's present experience in successfully defending Madrid, and firmly unite to fight to the end in defense of the motherland. Henceforth the task is: "Mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance," and the key to its accomplishment is a complete and thorough change in Guomindang policy. The step forward taken by the Guomindang on the question of resistance is to be commended; it is what the Chinese Communist Party and the people of the whole country have looked forward to for many years, and we *warmly* welcome it. But the Guomindang has not changed its policies on such matters as the mobilization of the masses and the introduction of political reforms. It is still basically unwilling to lift the ban on the people's anti-Japanese movement or make fundamental changes in the government apparatus; it still has no policy for improving the people's

5. The Japanese imperialists' massive military offensive against China proper since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7 is the result of the Chinese authorities' erroneous policies after the September Eighteenth Incident → But on the other hand, even after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, the Guomindang authorities are continuing to pursue the wrong policy they have pursued ever since the September Eighteenth Incident

6. Waiting for → Exploiting

livelihood and is still not thoroughly sincere[7] in its cooperation with the Communist Party. If, at this critical juncture when we are threatened by the destruction of the country and the extinction of the race, the Guomindang continues to follow the policy outlined above and is unwilling to change it quickly, it will cause very great harm to the War of Resistance. Some Guomindang members say, "Wait to introduce political reforms until after victory." They think the Japanese bandits can be defeated by the government's efforts alone, but they are wrong. A few battles may be won in a War of Resistance fought by the government alone, *but such a course will almost inevitably cause the defeat of the war*, and it will be impossible to achieve complete victory over Japan.[8] Only a comprehensive national war of resistance can lead to the thorough defeat of the Japanese bandits. But in order to carry out such a war there must be a complete and drastic change in Guomindang policy, and joint efforts[9] to carry out a thoroughgoing program,[10] that is, a national salvation program formulated in the spirit of the revolutionary Three People's Principles and the Three Great Policies[11] drawn up personally by Mr. Sun Yatsen during the first period of Guomindang-Communist cooperation.

3. In all earnestness, the Chinese Communist Party proposes to the Guomindang, to the people of the whole country, to all political parties and groups, to people in all walks of life, and to all the armed forces a Ten-Point National Salvation Program for the purpose of thoroughly defeating Japan.[12] It firmly believes that only by carrying out this program fully, sincerely, and resolutely will it be possible to defend the motherland and defeat the Japanese aggressors. Otherwise, the responsibility will fall on those who procrastinate and allow the situation to deteriorate; once the country's fate is sealed, it will be too late for regrets and lamentations. The Ten Great Points for national salvation are as follows:

1. Overthrow Japanese imperialism.

Sever diplomatic relations with Japan, expel Japanese officials, arrest Japanese agents, confiscate Japanese *imperialists'* property in China, repudiate debts to Japan, abrogate treaties signed with Japan, and take back all Japanese concessions.

Fight to the finish in defense of North China and the seacoast.

Fight to the finish for the recovery of Beiping, Tianjin, and the northeast.

Drive the Japanese imperialists out of China.

Oppose all vacillation and compromise.

7. Thoroughly sincere → Sufficiently sincere

8. Japan → The Japanese aggressors

9. Joint efforts → Joint efforts of the whole nation from top to bottom

10. A thoroughgoing program → A thoroughgoing program of resistance to Japan

11. The "Three Great Policies" endorsed by Sun Yatsen toward the end of his life included alliance with those countries that treated China as an equal (in the first instance, the Soviet Union), cooperation with the Communist Party, and union with the peasants and workers.

12. Japan → The Japanese aggressors

2. Mobilize the military strength of the whole country.

Mobilize all land, sea, and air forces throughout the country for a nationwide war of resistance.

Oppose a passive, purely defensive strategy and adopt an active, independent strategy.

Set up a permanent National Defense Council to deliberate and decide on national defense plans and strategy.

Arm the people and develop anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in coordination with the operations of the main forces.

Reform the political work in the armed forces to achieve unity between commanders and fighters.

Let the army unite as one with the people, and bring the army's militant spirit into play. Support the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army and the Northeast Volunteer Army,[13] and disrupt the enemy's rear.

Assure equal treatment of all troops fighting in the War of Resistance.

Establish military zones in all parts of the country, mobilize the whole nation to join in the war and thus effect a change[14] from the mercenary system to one of a volunteer army.

3. Mobilize the people of the whole country.

Let all the people of the country (with the exception of traitors) have freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and association in resisting Japan and saving the nation, and the right to take up arms against the enemy.

Annul all old laws and decrees which restrict the people's patriotic movements and promulgate new, revolutionary laws and decrees.

Release all patriotic and revolutionary political prisoners and lift the ban on political parties.

Let the people of the whole country mobilize, take up arms, and join the War of Resistance. Let those with strength contribute strength, those with money contribute money, those with guns contribute guns, and those with knowledge contribute knowledge.

Mobilize the Mongolians, the Hui, and all other minority nationalities, in accordance with the principle of national self-determination and autonomy, in the common fight against Japan.

4. Reform the government apparatus.

Call a national assembly which is genuinely representative of the people to adopt a genuinely democratic constitution, to decide on policies for resisting Japan and saving the nation, and to elect a government of national defense.

13. The Northeast People's Revolutionary Army and the Northeast Volunteer Army → The Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army

14. A change → A gradual change

The government of national defense must draw in the revolutionaries of all parties and mass organizations, and expel the pro-Japanese elements.

The government of national defense shall practice democratic centralism and shall be at once democratic and centralized.

The government of national defense shall pursue revolutionary policies for resisting Japan and saving the nation.

Institute local self-government, throw out corrupt officials, and establish clean government.

5. Adopt an anti-Japanese foreign policy.

Conclude anti-aggression alliances and anti-Japanese pacts for mutual military aid with all countries that are opposed to Japanese aggression, provided that this entails no loss of our territory or of our sovereign rights.

Support the peace front[15] and oppose the front of aggression of Germany, Japan, and Italy.

Unite with the worker and peasant masses of Korea, *Taiwan*, and Japan against Japanese imperialism.

6. Adopt wartime financial and economic policies.

Financial policy should be based on the principle that those with money should contribute money and that the property of the Chinese traitors should be confiscated in order to meet war expenditures. Economic policy should consist in readjusting and expanding defense production, developing the rural economy, and assuring self-sufficiency in wartime agricultural produce.[16] Completely prohibit Japanese goods. Suppress profiteering merchants and ban speculation and manipulation of the market.

7. Improve the people's livelihood.

Improve the conditions of workers, *peasants*, office employees and teachers, and of soldiers fighting the Japanese.

Give preferential treatment to the families of the soldiers fighting the Japanese.

Abolish exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies.

Reduce rent and interest.

Give relief to the unemployed.

Regulate grain supplies.

Aid the victims of natural calamities.

8. Adopt an anti-Japanese educational policy.

Change the existing educational system and curriculum and put into effect a new system and curriculum aimed at resisting Japan and saving the nation.

15. The peace front → The international peace front

16. Agricultural produce → Commodities

Adopt a program of generalized, compulsory, and free education, and raise the people's national consciousness.

Carry out military training of the students throughout the country.

9. Weed out traitors and pro-Japanese elements and consolidate the rear.

10. Achieve national unity against Japan.

Build up the Anti-Japanese National United Front of all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces on the basis of *complete* cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party in order to lead the War of Resistance, unite in good faith, and meet the national crisis.

4. Discard[17] the policy of resistance by the government alone and enforce the policy of total resistance by the whole nation. The government must unite with the people, fully restore the *entire* revolutionary spirit of Mr. Sun Yatsen, put the above Ten-Point Program into effect, and strive for complete victory. Together with the masses of the people and the armed forces under its leadership, the Chinese Communist Party will firmly adhere to this program and stand in the forefront of the War of Resistance, defending the motherland to the last drop of its blood. In keeping with its consistent policy, the Chinese Communist Party is ready to stand side by side with the Guomindang and the other political parties and groups and unite with them in building the solid Great Wall of the national united front to defeat the infamous Japanese aggressors and strive for a China[18] which is independent, happy, and free. To achieve this goal, we must firmly repudiate the Chinese traitors' theories of compromise and capitulation, and combat national defeatism, according to which it is impossible to defeat the Japanese aggressors. The Chinese Communist Party firmly believes that the Japanese aggressors can definitely be defeated provided the above Ten-Point Program is carried out. If our 450 million countrymen all exert themselves, the Chinese nation will certainly achieve final victory!

Down with Japanese imperialism!
Long live the national revolutionary war!
Long live New China, independent, happy, and free!

17. Discard → It is imperative to discard
18. A China → A new China

Telegram Ordering the Reorganization of Various Independent Red Armies and Divisions in Northern Shaanxi

(August 25, 1937)

Various Independent Armies and Divisions, Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia, Shenfu, Guanzhong, North Shaanxi as well as Wang Hongkun, Chen [Jihan], Li [Zonggui], He [Jinnian], Yan [Hongyan], Du [Ping], Gan [Weihan], Wang [Weizhou], Ye [Daozhi], Chen Bojun, Ma [Mingfang], Huang [Luopin], Chen [Xianrui], and Wang [Zhaoxiang]:

It is proposed that the various independent armies and divisions shall be specifically reorganized as follows:

1. The organizational principle: It shall take as its basis the preservation of the original organizational systems, in a form suited to expansion and adapted to the geographical conditions for obtaining supplies in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region. Hence, it is decided that the size of the company is limited to ninety fighters. Regiments currently consisting of four companies will be reduced to three companies; those now consisting of three companies will not be changed. Only the names will be changed as follows: a company will become a platoon, and a regiment will become a company. Catering units will be set up at the platoon level.

2. The original Seventy-fourth Division will be changed into the two artillery battalions of the 115th Division of the National Revolutionary Army and be stationed to defend the area of Fuxian and Ganquan. The original Second Independent Division of Wang Zhaoxiang will be changed into the engineers' battalion of the 120th Division and be stationed in Shenfu. The original First Independent Division and the Independent Regiment of North Shaanxi will be changed into the special forces battalion of the 120th Division. It is proposed that it be stationed in the vicinity of Jingbian and Henshan. The Twenty-seventh Army will be changed into two artillery battalions of the 120th Division, and it is proposed that it be stationed in the area south of Anbian and Ningtiaoliang. The original Thirtieth Army will be reorganized into the artillery battalion of the 129th Division and be

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 37–39, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

stationed in the vicinity of Qingyang and Zhenyuan. Two to three companies of the Third Regiment of Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia and the Guanzhong Guards Battalion will be turned into the baggage battalion of the 129th Division and be stationed in the area of Ning *xian.* The First, Second, and Fourth Regiments of Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia will be changed into the engineers' battalion of the 129th Division and be stationed in the vicinity of Huai *xian* and Heshui. The Twenty-ninth Army will be changed into the 129th Engineers' Battalion and stationed at Dingyan. One regiment of the 129th Division that stays behind will be stationed either at Tongguan or at Luochuan; another will be stationed at the Chunhua-Xunyi-Zhengning line.

3. Shenfu, Jingbian, Anding, Zhidan, Fushi, Ganquan, Fuxian, Luochuan, and other *xian* will be designated as the eastern zone. Chen Bojun will be the director of the rear office, with Chen Xianrui as his deputy. They will be stationed in Luochuan. Dingyan, Huanxian, Qinghe, Zhenning, Xunchun, and other *xian* will be designated as the western zone. Wang Hongkun will be the director of the rear office, with Wang Weizhou as his deputy. They will be stationed in Zhenning. The rear department of the Eighth Route Army will be set up in Yan'an.

4. All of the above-mentioned units will be under the command of Xiao Jingguang.[1]

5. The above-mentioned units shall immediately undergo reorganization on receiving the telegraphic order and will make a detailed report concerning the work of reorganization.

6. All the other local forces will make separate arrangements in accordance with telegrams from Security Headquarters.

Mao Zedong

1. At this time, Xiao Jingguang was chief of staff of the Central Military Commission.

The Situation and Our Tasks After the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War

(September 1, 1937, noon)

1. The situation
a. The massive attack by Japan has begun
It is massive
It is continuous
A powerful imperialism, with foreign assistance
Yet at the same time it is a risky attack
b. China's nationwide War of Resistance has begun
It is nationwide, rather than regional
We have entered the stage of carrying out the War of Resistance
But it is still a War of Resistance by the government alone, in which the initiative of the people is suppressed, and this involves serious dangers
Changes are once again taking place in the class relationships among the leftists, centrists, and rightists within the anti-Japanese front, and we should be prepared for a new situation of class integration
The time of a War of Resistance by the whole people has not yet come, but without it, we will not be able to defeat Japan
The Anti-Japanese National United Front has already begun to be organized successfully in the whole country, but it is not yet substantial or strong
c. Conclusion
It is a protracted war
Struggle to mobilize all the forces for victory in the War of Resistance, and to establish a substantial and strong Anti-Japanese National United Front
2. Our tasks
a. Mobilize every possible force to strive for the victory of this War of Resistance, to carry out the Ten-Point Program, and to wage an all-out war of the whole nation
b. The unity of the Red Army is the central task
Independent and self-reliant guerrilla warfare in the mountainous areas
From a "vigorous and vital army" to a position of leading from real strength

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 8–10, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

The problems of the anti-Japanese base areas and the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army

c. Our tasks in the territory of friendly parties and friendly armies

The position of the Party should be changed from the present status to that of leadership based on real strength

d. Our tasks in the Border Region

The source of politics and military affairs, as well as of cadres

e. In the course of the war, set up a democratic republic of the workers, peasants, and bourgeoisie, and prepare for the transition to socialism

Two characteristics

Two prospects

f. Should the bourgeoisie follow the proletariat, or should the proletariat follow the bourgeoisie (should the Guomindang attract the Communist Party, or should the Communist Party attract the Guomindang)?

Consciously or unconsciously

Oppose impetuosity

Oppose right opportunism, that is, capitulationism—which will become the major threat to the whole Party (getting mixed up with different classes, parties, and policies)

There are two kinds of national defeatism: one is "leftist"—Trotskyism; the other is rightist—national pessimism (it exists in the right wing of the anti-Japanese front)

g. Unite the cadres around the Party's line

Negotiate with Yan Xishan on the Zone of Red Army Activities

(September 3, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

1. The situation on the Beiping-Suiyuan line: The four divisions of Tang Enbo's[1] army have lost almost half of their strength and have been withdrawn and concentrated at Zhulu. The three divisions of Wei Lihuang's[2] army are located on the south bank of the Yongding River to the west of the Juyong Pass. Liu Ruming's division and the Seventy-second Division of the Shanxi army have withdrawn and concentrated on the south bank of the Yang River. Fu Zuoyi's[3] reinforcements of approximately six regiments are probably located within the Huilai area. Zhao Chenshou's cavalry army is probably in the Xinghe-Tianzhen area. The main force of the Shanxi army is located in the Datong-Guanglin-Daixian region.

2. The Red Army's First and Second Armies will probably be able to deploy their forces in the area between Beiping, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Datong, and Zhangjiakou around the 25th of this month.

3. After arriving at Taiyuan, Zhou and Peng should negotiate with Yan Xishan regarding the activity of the Red Army in the following areas: (1) all those areas of the three *xian* of Zhulu, Yangyuan, and Weixian at present not occupied by friendly troops; (2) all those areas of the four *xian* of Wanping, Fangshan, Laishui, and Yixian at present not occupied by friendly troops; (3) the areas to the west of the *xian* towns of the six *xian* of Wanxian, Tangxian, Quyang, Xintang, Lingshou, and Pingshan; (4) the whole of the three *xian* of Laiyuan, Fuping, and Lingqiu to serve as the central base area for our forces; and (5) the five *xian* of Guanglin, Hunyuan, Fanchi, Wutai, and Mengxian. The above total twenty-one *xian*, in some cases the whole *xian*, and in other cases some part of them. All these must be clearly and

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 40–41, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Tang Enbo (1899–1954) was commander of the Guomindang Twentieth Army Group and of the Thirteenth Army.

2. Wei Lihuang was at this time the commander-in-chief of the Fourteenth Group Army of the Guomindang's Second War Zone.

3. Fu Zuoyi was at this time front line commander of the Northern Route Army of the Guomindang Second War Zone.

positively designated, and Nanjing and Yan of Shanxi[4] must order and inform the provincial governments of the three provinces, which in turn will issue orders to the various *xian* governments, while at the same time issuing orders to the troops stationed near these *xian*, explaining the deployment of the Red Army and its task of creating guerrilla base areas. For if the zone of operations and the tasks of the Red Army are not clearly specified, and an order sent to friendly forces and localities concerning this, many disputes are bound to occur, resulting from the ambiguous delineation of zones and definition of tasks.

Mao Zedong

4. The reference is to Yan Xishan, who was at this time commander of the Guomindang Second War Zone.

Combat Liberalism

(September 7, 1937)

We stand for active ideological struggle because it is the weapon for ensuring unity within the Party and the revolutionary organizations in the interest of our fight. Every Communist and every revolutionary should take up this weapon.

But liberalism rejects ideological struggle and stands for unprincipled peace, thus giving rise to a decadent, philistine attitude and bringing about political degeneration in certain units and individuals in the Party and the revolutionary organizations.

Liberalism manifests itself in various ways.

To let things slide for the sake of peace and friendship when a person has clearly gone wrong, and refrain from principled argument because he is an old acquaintance, a fellow townsman, a schoolmate, a close friend, a loved one, an old colleague, or old subordinate. Or to touch on the matter lightly instead of going into it thoroughly, so as to keep on good terms. The result is that both the organization and the individual are harmed. This is one type of liberalism.

To indulge in irresponsible criticism in private instead of actively putting forward one's suggestions to the organization. To say nothing to people to their faces but to gossip behind their backs, or to say nothing at a meeting but to gossip afterward. To show no regard at all for the principles of collective life but to follow one's own inclination. This is a second type.

To let things drift if they do not affect one personally; to say as little as possible while knowing perfectly well what is wrong, to be worldly wise and play safe and seek only to avoid blame. This a third type.

Not to obey orders but to give pride of place to one's own opinions. To use cadre policies as an excuse, but to ignore organizational discipline.[1] This is a fourth type.

To indulge in personal attacks, pick quarrels, vent personal spite, or seek revenge, instead of entering into an argument and struggling against incorrect views for the sake of unity or progress or getting the work done properly. This is a fifth type.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 257–60, where it is reproduced from the 1944 Chinese edition of Mao's *Selected Works.*

1. To use cadre policies as an excuse, but to ignore organizational discipline. → To demand special consideration from the organization but to reject its discipline.

To hear incorrect views without rebutting them and even to hear counterrevolutionary remarks without reporting them but, instead, to take them calmly as if nothing had happened. This is a sixth type.

To be among the masses and fail to conduct propaganda and agitation or speak at meetings or conduct investigations and inquiries among them, and instead to be indifferent to them and show no concern for their well-being, forgetting that one is a Communist and behaving as if one were an ordinary person. This is a seventh type.

To see someone harming the interests of the masses and yet not feel indignant, or dissuade or stop him or reason with him, but allow him to continue. This is an eighth type.

To work half-heartedly without a definite plan or direction; to work perfunctorily and muddle along—"So long as one remains a monk, one goes on tolling the bell." This is a ninth type.

To regard oneself as having rendered great service to the revolution, to pride oneself on being a veteran, to disdain minor assignments while being quite unequal to major tasks, to be slipshod in work and slack in study. This is a tenth type.

To be aware of one's own mistakes and yet make no attempt to correct them, taking a liberal attitude toward oneself. This is an eleventh type.

We could name more. But these eleven are the principal types.

They are all manifestations of liberalism.

Liberalism is extremely harmful in a collective.[2] It is a corrosive which eats away unity, undermines cohesion, causes apathy, and creates dissension. It robs the revolutionary ranks of compact organization and strict discipline, prevents policies from being carried through, and alienates the Party organizations from the masses which the Party leads. It is an extremely bad tendency.

Liberalism stems from petty-bourgeois selfishness. It places personal interests first and the interests of the revolution second, and this gives rise to ideological, political, and organizational liberalism.

Liberals look upon the principles of Marxism as abstract dogma. They approve of Marxism, but are not prepared to practice it or to practice it in full; they are not prepared to replace their liberalism with Marxism. These people have their Marxism, but they have their liberalism as well—they talk Marxism but practice liberalism; they apply Marxism to others but liberalism to themselves. They keep both kinds of goods in stock and find a use for each. This is the methodology of certain people.[3]

Liberalism is a manifestation of opportunism and conflicts fundamentally with Marxism. It is a negative thing and objectively has the effect of helping the enemy;

2. In a collective → In a revolutionary collective

3. This is the methodology of certain people. → This is how the minds of certain people work.

that is why the enemy welcomes its preservation in our midst. Such being its nature, there should be no place for it in the ranks of the revolution.

We must use the positive spirit of Marxism to overcome the negative spirit of liberalism. A Communist should be openhearted and aboveboard, staunch and active, looking upon the interests of the revolution as his very life and sacrificing his personal interests;[4] always and everywhere he should adhere to correct principles, and wage a tireless struggle against all incorrect ideas and actions, so as to consolidate the collective life of the Party and strengthen the ties between the Party and the masses; he should be more concerned about the Party and the masses than about any private person, and more concerned about others than about himself. Only thus can he be considered a Communist.

All loyal, honest, active, and upright Communists must unite to oppose the liberal tendencies shown by certain people among us, and set them on the right path. This is one of the tasks on our ideological front.

4. Sacrificing his personal interests → Subordinating his personal interests to those of the revolution

Strive to Have Fuping and Other Xian *Designated as Zones of Eighth Route Army Activities*

(September 7, 1937)[1]

Zhou [Enlai], Peng [Dehuai], and Lin [Biao]:

1. The sixty thousand or so troops of the three units of Tang Enbo, Wei Lihuang, and Liu Ruming have already occupied the four *xian* of Weixian, Laiyuan, Guanglin, and Linqiu and areas to their northeast. There is no more room for maneuver for the Red Army in these areas, and it is extremely disadvantageous to be stationed between these troops.

2. Yan [Xishan] has the intention of dispatching the Red Army to Yangyuan and Datong, and Chiang may also attempt this.

3. The areas which are advantageous for the Red Army at present are Fuping, Tangxian, Quyang, Xintang, Linshou, Pingshan, Fanchi, Huiyuan, Wutai, and Mengxian, as well as areas in the southern part of the two *xian* of Laiyuan and Linqiu. It is hoped that you will make an effort to have Yan specify these areas.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 42–43, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 9:00 and 11:00 P.M.

Explanation of the Basic Principles for Waging Independent and Self-Reliant Guerrilla Warfare in the Hilly Areas of North China

(September 12, 1937)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

I have taken note of your telegram of the 11th.

1. I agree with your plan to go to Nanjing with [Zhou] Enlai.

2. In Shanxi, Hebei, and Nanjing, you should stress the explanation of our basic principle of "independent and self-reliant guerrilla warfare in the mountainous regions," and obtain their complete understanding and approval.

3. This principle includes: (1) freedom to use our forces according to the specific situation. Now Jiang Jingwen[1] is still saying that the Liu division[2] should go to the front as soon as possible. As regards these people's intention, either they do not understand that it is inappropriate to use a large army group to fight a guerrilla warfare in a narrow region, in which case, it is obvious that we have not made any thorough and persistent explanation to them about this principle; or they harbor evil intentions and are trying to force the Red Army to fight difficult battles. (2) The Red Army should have the freedom to mobilize the masses, set up base areas, and organize volunteer armies, and local political authorities as well as the friendly armies should not interfere. If this is not made clear, it is certain that endless disputes will arise, and the great role of the Red Army will not be brought into full play. (3) Nanjing will only make strategic decisions, and the Red Army has complete freedom in carrying them out. (4) Stick to the principles of depending on the mountainous regions and not fighting difficult battles.

4. I shall command until you come back; please inform Zhu [De], Ren [Bishi], Lin [Biao], and He [Long].

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 44–45, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 11–12.

1. Jiang Jingwen was at this time the head of the field headquarters of the Guomindang Military Affairs Committee in Xi'an.

2. The reference is to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.

The Orientation to Which We Should Adhere While Negotiating the Reorganization in the Guerrilla Regions in the South

(September 14, 1937)

To Bo [Gu], Ye [Jianying], and Zhou [Enlai], and for the information of Lin [Boqu], Dong [Biwu], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

Regarding the question of the united front in every border region:

1. It is completely wrong for the representatives sent to the negotiations in Wuhan by Fu Qiutao and others of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border area[1] to accept many disadvantageous conditions, such as allowing the field headquarters in Wuhan to send directors of military supplies and directors of aides-de-camp to our troops. We have telegraphed Boqu and Biwu to tell the representatives to the negotiations to cease negotiating and come back immediately. Fu Qiutao should send other representatives, repudiate the conditions which have been agreed upon, make new rules, and firmly adhere to the following points:
   a. The Guomindang may not send a single person into our ranks;
   b. The amount of the soldiers' pay and provisions should be fixed;
   c. Set up camps in the mountainous regions where there are natural barriers that can be defended, be strictly on guard against secret attacks and sabotage, and do not ask to be stationed in big places.
2. Has Zheng Weisan met yet with Bo and Ye since he went to Nanjing? Please ask Bo to tell Zheng Weisan to stick strictly to the aforementioned three points in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui negotiations. In the future, Henan and the other regions should not repeat the mistakes of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi and Fujian-Guangdong border areas.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 13–14, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Fu Qiutao (1907–1981) was at this time secretary of the Special Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the border area in question.

3. Ask Nanjing to order Yu Hanmu[2] to return the personnel as well as the weapons of He Ming's troops;[3] not a single person or weapon should be missing. How are Bo and Ye's negotiations going?
4. In the united front, a local Party can easily fall into right opportunism. This has already become the principal danger for the Party; please pay close attention to it.

Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] [Mao] Zedong

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2. Yu Hanmu (1897–1981), a native of Guangdong, was at this time deputy commander of the Guomindang's Fourth War Zone.

3. He Ming (1910–1939), a native of Guangdong, was at this time the commander and political commissar of the South Fujian Third Independent Regiment. In July, the Guomindang had surrounded and disarmed approximately a thousand of his men.

On the Assessment of the Enemy's Situation, and Our Strategic Dispositions

(September 17, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]; Lin [Biao] and Nie [Rongzhen]; He [Long] and Xiao [Ke]; and Liu [Bocheng] and Xu [Xiangqian]:

Concerning the assessment of the situation and strategic dispositions:

1. We conclude that, broadly speaking, the enemy is attacking North China by four routes, with a force totaling between 150,000 and 200,000 men. One route is via Shandong, where there is no action for the moment. Another is along the Tianjin-Pukou line, with one and a half divisions, whose offensive edge has reached Machang. Still another is along theBeiping-Hankou line, with one division, which is now stationed north of Zhuozhou[1] without taking any action. The fourth route, operating along the Beiping-Suiyuan line and the Datong-Puzhou line, with about three divisions, is his main force. It is moving in an outflanking pattern with the intention of capturing Taiyuan, threatening the Central Army along the Beiping-Hankou line, and then defeating it so as to seize the area north of the Yellow River. This disposition, menacing the rear of Henan and Shandong, is advantageous for the final capture of Shandong, thus fulfilling the enemy's intention of seizing the five provinces of North China. His main strategic orientation is outflanking on the right. As for his advance toward Shanghai, apart from destroying the lifeline of China's economy, [the enemy] aims to pin down the main force of the Central Army and expedite his seizure of North China. The above is a general assessment of Japan's operational plan for the first phase.

2. The right wing of the Japanese bandits' main force is once again divided among three routes, all advancing in a posture of pursuit and attack. One route, estimated at approximately one division, is moving toward Yanmenguan[2] along the eastern portion of the Beiping-Suiyuan line and the northern portion of the

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 46–49, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 15–18.

1. This city, located a short distance southwest of Beiping, was called Zhuo *xian* in 1937, but had been Zhuozhou until 1913 and has now taken that name again.

2. Yanmenguan, located in the northern part of Dai *xian* in Shanxi, is one of the important strategic passes of the Great Wall.

Datong-Puzhou line; it has not been active since capturing Datong. Another, having started from Tianzhen and seized Guangling, is now moving up to attack Lingqiu and Pingxingguan, and to outflank the armies of Shanxi and Suiyuan on the right. The third, having started from Zhangjiakou and seized Wei *xian*, is likely to attack Laiyuan; it is outflanking Wei Lihuang's army and the troops at the Zijing Pass on the left. The last two are estimated to have formed a joint army corps, made up of at least two divisions, which intended a central breakthrough as the first step and then with that impetus to achieve its second-stage purpose, namely, a flanking movement on both sides.

3. Chiang [Kaishek], seeing Wei Lihuang's army surrounded by the enemy, has ordered its retreat. Yan [Xishan], regarding Lingqiu as the lifeline of Shanxi, plans to concentrate fourteen regiments for a decisive battle north of Pingxingguan. We estimate that if the decisive battle is victorious, the southward advance of the enemy will be somewhat delayed, but this will require sending in more troops and fighting fiercely. If the decisive battle is lost, the enemy will necessarily attack Pingxingguan and Yanmenguan without delay; when the reserve corps from the rear arrives, the enemy's main force will move and take Taiyuan directly. Consequently, the Shanxi and Suiyuan armies stationed to the west of Suiyuan, the armies in the south of the Heng mountain range, in places like Wutai, and along the northern portion of the Beiping-Hankou line, will have to retreat on their own initiative, so the enemy can take over these areas without firing a single shot, with Niangziguan unable to play its role as a natural barrier.

4. Laiyuan and Lingqiu are the two spots that the enemy will necessarily fight for. If there is no north-south highway, Fuping, Wutai, and Yuxian may not be occupied by the enemy for the time being; if there is such a highway, it is possible that the enemy will send troops southward to cut the Zhengding-Taiyuan line. No matter what, the Heng mountains remain the strategic center if the enemy is to seize the provinces of Hebei, Chahar, and Shanxi. That he will send his main force to this center has been borne out by the occupation of Hunyuan, Weixian, and Guangling.

5. The armies of Fu [Zuoyi], Yang [Aiyuan], Liu [Mao'en], and Tang [Enbo], all under Yan's command in Shanxi, have lost their morale, so we cannot conclude whether these armies are able to frustrate the enemy operation plan in their respective battlefronts.

6. The Red Army at present has the nature of a detachment, playing no decisive role in decisive battles. If deployed properly, however, it can play a decisive role in sustaining the guerrilla warfare in North China (mainly in Shanxi).

7. Our previous plan that all of the Red Army should stay in the Heng mountains to build base areas for guerrilla warfare is altogether outdated in the present situation as described above. Should we carry out our original plan, our entire army will be trapped in the enemy's outflanking strategy; even if we retreat to the Taihang mountains as our second step, we will still find ourselves within its outflanking (assuming that it has occupied Taiyuan) and completely fallen into a passive position.

8. Basing ourselves on the above-described situation and assessment, for the purpose of maneuvering in a strategically flexible position, that is, maneuvering on the enemy's flanks, so as to hold up the enemy from attacking Taiyuan and going farther south, and to assist the armies of Shanxi and Suiyuan and help them to avoid overly heavy losses; for the purpose of actually carrying on the independent guerrilla warfare in hilly areas; for the purpose of mobilizing the masses extensively, organizing the volunteers, and opening up guerrilla base areas in support of the guerrilla warfare in North China; and for the purpose of expanding the Red Army itself, it is proposed to alter our original plan and adopt the following strategic deployment: (1) Our Second Front Army is to assemble in Yi *xian*, north of Taiyuan, pending orders, and be ready to move, once Yan's approval has been obtained, to areas like the Guancen mountains in northwestern Shanxi and carry out operations there; (2) Our Fourth Front Army is to enter the Luliang mountain range at the appropriate time and start operations there; (3) Our First Front Army, deliberately assuming a passive manner, will now enter the southern part of the Heng mountain range and, if the enemy moves southward and our allied armies fail to defeat it, get ready to go gradually south and operate between the Taihang and Taiyue mountain ranges in southeastern Shanxi; (4) The headquarters will move to the neighborhood of Taiyuan and then choose the proper location in accordance with the actual circumstances.

9. What do you think? Please consider and reply by telegraph.

The Question of the Strategic Zones of the Eighth Route Army

(September 19, 1937, noon)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. We have taken note of your telegram dated the 18th. Have you received my long telegram on strategy dated the 17th?[1]

2. The enemy is resolved to take Taiyuan. At present we should look one step ahead when making deployments.

3. Wutai, Dinxiang, and Meng *xian* are rather narrow. After the enemy enters Taiyuan, he will be encircled. The present deployment of Lin Biao and Yang Aiyuan's units in these areas is temporary in nature. There is no possibility of their staying there for long. It is estimated that that area can only support a guerrilla war fought by a few thousand people.

4. He Long's unit should be stationed in northwestern Shanxi, located on the outer flank of Datong and Taiyuan, and engage in guerrilla warfare in the direction of Datong and Suiyuan. Only in this way will they be able to play quite an effective role in containing the enemy, which is advancing southward toward Taiyuan. There are the two units of Lin and Yang in the Wutai area. This is quite sufficient. If He's division goes there, too, it will lose its strategic significance.

5. Therefore, He's division should advance to the northwest of Shanxi and hasten to be the first to occupy that region.

6. In the future, Liu [Bocheng]'s division may move nearer to Lin [Biao]'s division and be stationed in the Taiyue mountain range and the Luliang mountain range (between Jixian and the Fenhe River) in the south of Shanxi. It is all right to transfer some units from northern Shaanxi to support them.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 50–51, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the preceding telegram.

The Main Force of Wang Zhaoxiang's Unit Should Prepare to Support the Operations of the 120th Division

(September 21, 1937)

To the Special Committee of Shenfu and Wang Zhaoxiang:

1. The Japanese bandits are attacking Yanmenguan. Our First and Second Front Armies have already moved to northern Shanxi to engage in the War of Resistance.

2. Zhaoxiang and other comrades should prepare to lead the main force to leave Wuzhai and Shenchi within five days, and support the Second Front Army in promoting the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. You should leave a third of your forces, plus local armed forces, to defend the soviet areas and the ferries.

3. Notify us quickly regarding your preparations.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 52, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Resolutely Maintain the Principle of Independent and Self-Reliant Guerrilla Warfare in the Mountainous Regions

(September 21, 1937)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

Yan Xishan is now caught in an unresolvable contradiction: if he refuses to fight a battle, he will be unable to respond to the popular masses in Shanxi, while if he does fight, there is no guarantee whatsoever that he will be victorious. Your judgment that he will give up Pingxingguan, and that his determination to fight a decisive battle at Shahe is wavering, is absolutely correct. None of his subordinates has resolution, and his troops have lost their fighting capacity. It is possible that he will be forced to fight a decisive battle in the area of Yanmenguan, Pingxingguan, and Shahe, but the general trend will not remain favorable for long. Regardless of who wins this decisive battle, the situation in Taiyuan and all of North China is extremely precarious. It seems that a few comrades still do not have a clear understanding of this kind of objective and inevitable trend, and are led astray by the present temporary situation. If this kind of view remains unchanged, like Yan Xishan, the Red Army will fall into a passive position, in which it can only go through the motions of defending itself, and will take a beating and be crushed one by one. Today the Red Army plays no deciding role in any decisive battle. Nevertheless, there is one excellent kind of warfare at which the Red Army is particularly adept, and in which it can definitely play a deciding role, and this type of warfare it is good at is truly independent and self-reliant guerrilla warfare in the mountainous regions (not mobile warfare). In order to carry out such an overall policy, strategically there must be powerful forces positioned on the enemy's flanks, primary importance should be given to creating base areas and mobilizing the masses, and we must disperse our forces, rather than laying emphasis on concentrating them for combat. We will not be able to conduct mass work if the stress is on concentrating our forces for combat, nor can we concentrate our forces for fighting if the emphasis is on conducting mass work; we cannot accomplish both

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 53–54, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 19–20.

simultaneously. But dividing up to conduct mass work is definitely the only way through which we can defeat the enemy and assist the friendly armies. At present, concentrating our forces for battle will have no result worth speaking of. The present situation is not at all the same as that during the civil war period. We should never think in terms of things as they were and continue to imitate now what we did in the past. I agree completely with the view you put forward in your telegram of the 18th, "See to it that, although the enemy has penetrated deeply into Shanxi, he is still surrounded on all sides by our guerrilla warfare." Hold resolutely to this view, think of everything in a broad future perspective, and as regards the incorrect ideas of a few comrades, explain to them in depth so that our strategic policy will be unified. Comrade Lin Biao has telegraphed saying that he is in complete agreement with my judgment and dispositions of the 17th.[1] He only wanted to concentrate Chen's brigade,[2] and strike a heavy blow at the enemy when the opportunity presented itself, and for the time being not disperse his forces. This kind of temporary concentration of one brigade is naturally acceptable. Nonetheless, if no opportunity arises after a fairly long time, it will be better to switch the emphasis to mass work at the appropriate time. It is also all right for Wang Zhen to lead one regiment temporarily to Wutai. Please pay attention, however, to the fact that it is still better for him to move to northwestern Shanxi at the appropriate time. Judging from the situation, we predict that even if the Chen brigade under Lin's command can win one or two battles, before long it must also move to Wutai. Please take all these points into consideration and deal with the matter appropriately.

Mao Zedong

1. See above the telegram of that date.
2. The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

My Views About Developing Guerrilla Warfare in Shanxi

(September 23, 1937)

To Comrade [Peng] Xuefeng, and for the information of Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Lin Yuying]:

I have taken note of your telegram of the 18th. As regards Mr. Yan [Xishan]'s suggestions, if under unfavorable conditions the two armies can unite as one, and follow the orientation of resolutely resisting the attack of the Japanese bandits by means of guerrilla warfare, I am in complete agreement. Nevertheless, I have the following suggestions:

1. The guerrilla warfare should take place mainly on the enemy's flanks and in his rear. In Shanxi it should be divided into the four districts of northwest Shanxi, northeast Shanxi, southeast Shanxi, and southwest Shanxi, adopting the posture of surrounding and attacking the enemy, who has already entered the central cities and intercepted important communication lines from four sides. It is inappropriate to concentrate all our forces in the single district of the Wutai mountain range. It will be very difficult to gain a foothold if we concentrate all our forces in one district.

2. We should make the Wutai mountain range one of the important guerrilla areas. We must intensify our preparations right away. Both sides may send some people to investigate and plan everything; there should be no delay in this.

3. At the same time, adequate attention should also be given to the Guanyin mountain range in northwestern Shanxi, and to deployment and preparation there, for the enemy is sure to take Shenchi and Ningwu in that region first, in coordination with its operation to capture the Heng mountain range in the east, so as to put itself into the advantageous position of occupying a commanding height, before attacking Taiyuan.

4. Although the Taihang and Taiyue mountain ranges in southeastern Shanxi, and the Luliang mountain range in southwestern Shanxi are relatively farther away from the enemy, proper deployment should be carried out without delay, such as

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 21–22, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

the preparation of certain materials for removal. It is inappropriate to concentrate all the materials in one place in Wutai.

5. Apart from the military arrangements, the most important thing in guerrilla warfare is to depend closely on the broad masses of the people in the countryside, for only in this way can we win final victory.

6. The aforementioned deployments and plans do not interfere at all with the present plan of trying to use the main forces to launch a decisive campaign in a sector of the Great Wall.

7. We admire and are grateful for Mr. Yan's sincere willingness to cooperate and to discuss the matter of command.

8. Please give Mr. Yan my aforementioned opinions on the guerrilla warfare for consideration as soon as possible. If they are adopted, it will really be most fortunate for the War of Resistance.

Mao Zedong

Deployment for Guerrilla War in the Wutai Mountain Range Assuming Japanese Occupation of Taiyuan

(September 24, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], and for the information of Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], Yang Shangkun, and Zhu Rui:

1. Zhu and Peng's telegram on deployment, and Zhou's telegram on the situation have been received and noted.

2. We have already ordered Liu's division[1] to get ready to set off. It is appropriate for the route of its advance still to be Houma-Shangche.

3. Now that both Lin's division[2] and Wang Zhen's unit[3] have been used for combat, the emphasis should be put on the making of deployments by the local Party as regards the guerrilla war in the Wutai mountain range. The Shanxi local Party organization at present should do its utmost to make arrangements for waging a guerrilla war in the three major mountain ranges of Heng, Wutai, and Guancen. The key is the Wutai mountain range, for there they can obtain more assistance from Yan [Xishan] and Yang [Aiyuan], and in the future they can expand to the north of the Heng mountain range. Therefore, a leading organ such as the Military-Political Committee should be established there. Cadres should be selected who are able to lead the various work of the Party, the government, and the military independently. It is imperative that work shall proceed immediately to organize local contingents and mass organizations everywhere. All these dispositions should be completed within half a month, and initial achievements be recorded. All work should take as its point of departure the assumption that the enemy has occupied Taiyuan.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 55–56.

1. The reference is to the 128th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.

2. The 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao.

3. The reference is to the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Wang Zhen.

Our Declaration and Chiang's Statement Have Proclaimed the Establishment of the United Front

(September 25, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai]:

1. Your speeches should please be based on the following points: Our declaration and Chiang's statement have announced the success of the united front and established the necessary foundation for unity between the two parties to save the country.

2. This declaration shall define not only the basis for the unity between the two parties but also the basic orientation of the grand national unity of the people of the whole country. The revival of the Chinese nation and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism shall be given a basis by the unity between the two parties and the unity of the whole country in the future.

3. Chiang's statement points out the profound significance of the unity for the salvation of the country, establishes the legitimate status of the Communist Party in the whole country, and makes the promise to "go all the way together with the people of the whole country." It is regrettable, however, that the statement still shows arrogance and lack of self-criticism. The problem for the future is the thorough application of the Three People's Principles and the Ten Major Points [i.e., the Ten-Point Program] of the Chinese Communist Party that correspond to these principles.

4. The declaration was drafted on March 4, handed in on May 15,[1] and published on September 22. Inform also Bo Gu [Qin Bangxian], [Ye] Jianying, [Pan] Hannian, Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], [Zhang] Yunyi, and [Xie] Juezai. It should also be relayed by Lin [Boju] to Comrades Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], Liu [Bocheng], and Zhang [Hao].

Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Wenxian he yanjiu,* 1985, no. 4 (pp. 222–23 of the annual volume).

1. According to a note to the Chinese text, March 4 and May 15 should read July 4 and July 15.

Guerrilla Warfare Should Be the Only Orientation of All the Work in North China

(September 25, 1937)

To Zhou Enlai; to be relayed to Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], [Yang] Shangkun, and Zhu Rui, and for the information of Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi].

1. All our work in North China should be oriented solely toward guerrilla warfare. All work, such as the soldiers' movement, the united front, and so on, should center on guerrilla warfare. If the regular warfare in North China ends in defeat, we shall not be held responsible; but if guerrilla warfare fails, we must assume a heavy responsibility.

2. Apart from the dispositions in Shanxi, about which you have already been notified, the Party organizations in Hebei should be ordered to devote every effort to guerrilla warfare. Making use of the prestige of the Red Army in fighting Japan, the Party organizations in all of North China (including Shandong) should be encouraged to mobilize the masses, incorporate stragglers and their rifles into our forces, and organize guerrilla units in an extensive but planned way. Should Zhou have another talk with Feng Zhi'an and Huang Shaohong about this matter?

3. To achieve this purpose, special attention should be paid to the allocation of our high-ranking cadres, and to the establishment of Party, government, and army organs under their independent leadership. We must envisage how we can persist in extensive and forceful guerrilla warfare in the event of the occupation of the whole of North China by the enemy. We must make plain to the whole Party that, from now on, mobilizing the people both inside and outside the Party, we have no other task than guerrilla warfare. To this end, the Red Army should render all possible assistance.

4. Please let me know regarding the deployments in the whole of North China.[1]

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* pp. 57–58, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. A version of this document published in *Renmin ribao* for July 7, 1981, includes two more paragraphs, dealing with obtaining arms from Yan Xishan, running cadre schools at the front, and a possible coordinated attack by the 115th Division and two or three Guomindang divisions. (For a translation of this text, see Saich, *Rise to Power,* p. 794.) The more authoritative version of these military orders, which appears in *Junshi wenji,* reveals that these two paragraphs belong in fact to Mao's telegram to Zhou Enlai of September 29, 1937, translated below.

The Eighth Route Army Should Play a Strategic Role in the Decisive Battle at Baoding and in Northern Shanxi

(September 25, 1937)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

I have new views regarding strategy. A long telegram will be sent out immediately.[1] For the moment, I want to ask you to keep all Red Army units in northeastern Shanxi temporarily stationary, conceal the target, and do not alert the enemy. In this way, when the main forces of the enemy penetrate as far as the vicinity of Daizhou and Baoding, we will strike suddenly northward, to retake the Heng mountain range. The Red Army will play a strategic role in the decisive battle at Baoding and in northern Shanxi.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 59, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. See the text immediately following.

My Views Regarding Strategy in the Operations in North China

(September 25, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], and also to Zhou [Enlai], and to be communicated to Lin Biao:

My strategic views:

1. Based on the present situation, in which the enemy is attacking Baoding and Daizhou, and is advancing toward Shijiazhuang and Taiyuan, but does not appear to have many troops defending the four *xian* of Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei, and in the light of the talk between Chiang [Kaishek] and Yan [Xishan] in which they decided to adopt the policy of fighting a decisive campaign in Baoding, but resorting to a tenacious defense in northern Shanxi, in order to prevent the enemy from occupying Taiyuan and Shijiazhuang to the south, and to support the protracted war in North China, I propose to ask Chiang and Yan to send He Zhuguo's[1] entire cavalry army, as well 15,000 to 20,000 strong infantry troops from the Guangxi faction or the Central Army, to cooperate with the whole of Lin's division of our armies,[2] [the joint forces] to be commanded by Zhu and Peng. When the enemy from Wei and Lai is marching toward Baoding, and the enemy from Ling and Guang is marching toward Daizhou, and when they have indeed gone deeply into these regions, you should launch a sudden attack northward from between Ling and Lai (a counteroffensive breakthrough in the center), regain the four *xian* of Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei, and then launch a large-scale surprise attack from the rear flank along the Datong-Zhangjiakou-Beiping line, the Datong-Taiyuan line, and the Beiping-Shijiazhuang line, and set up fortified mass base areas in Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei. If this succeeds, we may use a fairly large unit to go in and out of Rehe, thus perhaps creating a new prospect in the war in North China, and sustaining this protracted war for quite a long period of time. Please think about this and then make suggestions to Chiang and Yan.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 60–62, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 25–27.

1. He Zhuguo was at this time commander of the Second Cavalry Army of the Guomindang Army.

2. I.e., the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao.

2. Whether or not Chiang and Yan help, at the moment it is not appropriate for the Red Army to be exposed too early, and it is particularly inappropriate to send out tactical detachments. You should wait until the enemy in Wei and Lai has left Wei and Lai and gone to the vicinity of Mancheng, wait until the enemy in Ling and Guang has left Ling and Guang and gone to the vicinity of Fanzhi, and the number of enemy troops in these four *xian* has become extremely small (at this moment the enemy in Zuozhou should be attacking in the vicinity of Xushui, and the enemy in Datong should be attacking in the vicinity of Yanmenguan). Then you can use our entire Lin division to launch an attack northward. On the basis of the specific situation, it may be subdivided into numerous small detachments or two to three corps, and carry out an extensive surprise attack on the enemy's empty rear flank in the extended region to the east, west, and north of the Heng mountains. If the main forces of the enemy have not been concentrated at its major point of attack, and the enemy's rear is not yet entirely empty, it will be disadvantageous to expose the target of the Red Army and attract the enemy's attention. It is no use at all if you send only tactical detachments.

3. If you agree with the above ideas, please conceal all our military forces for the time being, conserve strength and store up energy, and wait to carry out our plan until the necessary conditions are ready. At that time, Wang Zhen's forces[3] should be put in a place where they will be able to assist the front as well as to maintain the rear. The same principle applies to the use of He's division[4] in northwest Shanxi.

4. If you have reached the enemy's rear, you should adopt the policy of confiscating the property of the big landlords and mobilize the masses extensively. Thus, the Red Army will not be isolated.

5. Chiang and Yan's policy of fighting a decisive battle in Baoding and mounting a firm defense in northern Shanxi (see Chiang's telegram of the 19th regarding deployment) is absolutely a passive posture inviting defeat. Without the surprise attack in the enemy's rear by an army suddenly appearing from nowhere mentioned above, they will not be able to hold out for long. Only by carrying out the aforementioned plan can we turn a passive situation into an active one. Now that this is the only move left, you should try your best to persuade Chiang and Yan (for the moment, do not tell them that the Red Army is operating independently; only ask them to send some troops to assist you).

6. If the above plan can be carried out, even if Baoding and Daizhou fall, it will not be something to fear. Without paying the price of the fall of certain places, we will not be able to obtain the advantage of operating in the enemy's rear.

3. Wang Zhen was at this time deputy commander of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

4. The reference is to the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by He Long.

7. The above plan should be carried out under the conditions that the enemy troops in Ling, Lai, Guang, and Wei are extremely few, and that there is the kind of topography in which the enemy troops in the rear find it very difficult to operate while our infantry forces find it very easy to move around.

8. The above is a suggestion. Please think it over and reply by telegram.

Mao Zedong

Estimate of the Operational Plans of the Japanese Military in North China and Need for Urgent Mobilization by the Border Region in Preparation for War

(September 27, 1937)

Commanders of the various units of Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia:

1. It is estimated that the operational plans of the Japanese bandits in North China consist of the occupation of the Beiping-Tianjin-Nankou-Zhangjiakou line as the first step, and the occupation of the Cangzhou-Baoding-Daixian-Laiyuan-Datong line as the second step. Now, except for Baoding and Daixian, they have completed the seizure of all the rest, and are advancing very rapidly toward Baoding and Daixian. There are approximately seven divisions of Japanese forces, totaling around 150,000 men, along the Shanxi-Suiyuan, Beiping-Suiyuan, Beiping-Hankou, and Tianjin-Pukou lines.

2. The enemy will have much more difficulty in accomplishing the third step in his plan. His lines of communication to the rear are longer, and his present forces are tired. Once he enters the mountainous areas, he will have difficulty with supplies, and his heavy artillery and tanks cannot display their might. Unless they send reinforcements, the present seven divisions cannot accomplish their mission. Such being the case, the situation is advantageous for the operations of our forces in the future.

3. Our forces are already beginning to enter Shanxi. The authorities are taking a relatively positive attitude, and the masses are more lively than before. The morale of the Shanxi forces has improved. Under the slogan of defending Shanxi and recovering Beiping and Tianjin, we should urgently mobilize the broad masses to strive for control of Shanxi, and engage in protracted war in the whole country.

4. With this intention, the Border Region should be urgently mobilized. We should oppose the former conception of peace and tranquillity, oppose corruption and waste, and oppose laxity in work-style. We must thoroughly eliminate bandits and traitors, assist the localities to organize and train new recruits, consolidate the

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 63–64, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

armed forces, and expand air defense, safeguards against poison, night actions, and training in guerrilla tactics and political mobilization for guerrilla war. We need to advocate frugality and display our inherent spirit of hard work, so as to accomplish our present urgent mission.

Mao [Zedong] and Xiao [Jingguang]

In the Dangerous Situation Prevailing in North China, We Must Firmly Uphold the Orientation of Waging Guerrilla War

(September 29, 1937, 10:00 A.M.)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

1. The overall situation in North China is extremely dangerous. The enemy has already broken through between the Beiping-Hankou line and the Tianjin-Pukou line. Baoding is lost. The enemy is just now carrying out a flanking operation on the side of Shijiazhuang. Hebei is finished. The three armies of Wei Lihuang, Zen Wanzhong, and Sun Lianzhong have retreated to the Fuping-Huolu line. They are digging in on the side taking advantage of the Taihang mountain range. After the loss of Hebei, the enemy will land at Haizhou and advance to take Xuzhou. Then Shandong will be lost without a battle. Very soon, the Chinese positions will be to defend the lines along the Yellow River and the Grand Canal. Such a situation will cause some changes at the Shanghai front. Nanjing will be subject to major bombardments. If the Guomindang does not compromise, it will have to change its capital. It is estimated that the political situation in China will undergo changes in the next few months. During this time, we should strive to achieve the goals of reforming the government, reforming the military, putting into practice the Three People's Principles and the Ten Major Points of the political program, and continuing to support the national war. And only at that time will it be possible to realize a true national people's war. It is estimated that at that time the Soviet Union will render China truly powerful assistance.

2. Shanxi will become a special case in North China. This is basically because of the existence of the Red Army, and secondarily because of the collaboration between Yan Xishan and us. The union of these two forces will result in a guerrilla war participated in by several millions of people. We should uphold this policy and make arrangements for waging guerrilla war in the whole province. We should uphold the fundamental orientation of abolishing the system of exorbitant taxes

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 65–67, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 28–30.

and levies, reducing rent and interest, letting people participate in government, and reforming the Shanxi forces.

3. At present, the situation of fighting the Resistance War along the Great Wall is only a temporary phenomenon, and a very temporary phenomenon at that. Yan [Xishan] will definitely request that our forces play a supportive role in fighting a battle or two in concert with his forces. In order to exert more effective influence on the Shanxi forces, if the conditions are truly advantageous, we may, of course, participate in such actions. We must, however, take into account the fact that this is only a temporary situation in the combat. The fundamental policy lies in winning over the masses, and organizing guerrilla contingents with participation by the masses. Guided by such a general policy, we shall concentrate and fight battles only when conditions are right. You should request that Yan provide ten thousand rifles to arm the people. You should set up a cadres' school at the front for from five hundred to one thousand people, to be run jointly by the Red Army and the local Party organization so as to supply cadres for the guerrilla war. In six months' time, a substantial part of the first class of Kangda[1] can be used in Shanxi.

4. As regards the plan to have the 115th Division collaborate with two or three Guomindang divisions to make a sudden thrust toward Linqiu, Laiyuan, Guangling, and Weixian and north of these *xian* to disrupt the empty rear of the enemy after he has penetrated very deeply, I ask you to make a serious study of this. If such a plan is carried out, we may be able to open up a new situation within a certain period. Although we will not be able to disrupt fundamentally the strategic plans of the enemy, it is possible to disrupt his plans temporarily and partially. This will be extremely helpful in creating our base areas in the whole of Shanxi Province.

Mao Zedong

1. The Resist Japan University set up at about this time.

Urgent Tasks of the Chinese Revolution Following the Establishment of Guomindang-Communist Cooperation

(September 29, 1937)

The Establishment of the United Front Between the Two Parties

As far back as 1932,[1] the Chinese Communist Party issued its *well-known* declaration proposing to conclude an agreement for resisting Japan with all those in the Guomindang[2] *who are willing to stop the civil war with the Communist Party, the Soviet régime, and the Red Army and to resist Japan together,* under three conditions.[3] This declaration was made because after the September Eighteenth Incident,[4] resistance to the Japanese imperialist invasion became the primary task of the Chinese revolution.[5] But we did not achieve our objective.

In August 1935, the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Soviet Government[6] called upon all political parties and groups and the people throughout the country to organize an anti-Japanese united army and a government of national defense for a joint fight against Japanese imperialism. In December of that year, the Chinese Communist Party published a resolution regarding the formation of an anti-Japanese national united front.[7] In May 1936, *when the Red Army returned from Shanxi, the Central Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Council of* the Red Army once again published a declaration calling on the Nanjing government to stop the civil war and make common cause against Japan. In August of that year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a well-

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 261–74, where it is reproduced from the 1944 Chinese edition of Mao's *Selected Works.*

1. 1932 → 1933
2. All those in the Guomindang → All those Guomindang army units
3. Under three conditions → On three conditions, namely, that attacks on the Red Army be stopped, that democratic freedoms be granted to the popular masses, and that the popular masses be armed.
4. The September Eighteenth Incident → The September Eighteenth Incident of 1931
5. The Chinese revolution → The Chinese people
6. The Central Soviet Government → The Chinese Red Army
7. Here the revised text adds: "with the national bourgeoisie."

known petition[8] to the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang requesting[9] that the Guomindang stop the civil war and form a united front of the two parties to fight jointly against Japanese imperialism. In September of the same year, the Communist Party published a resolution on the establishment of a unified democratic republic in China. Besides these declarations, letters, and resolutions, we *actually* sent representatives to hold discussions with people from the Guomindang side on many occasions, and yet all in vain. It was only toward the end of 1936, after the Xi'an Incident, that the plenipotentiary of the Chinese Communist Party and the principal authorized representative of the Guomindang reached an agreement on an important political issue at that time, namely, *the achievement of* the cessation of the civil war between the two parties *and the two armies,* and brought about the peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident. This was a great event in Chinese history and provided the necessary precondition for a united front[10] between the two parties.

On February 10 of this year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a telegraphic notice to the Third Plenary Session of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee on the eve of its meeting, making comprehensive *and specific* proposals for the concrete establishment of a united front[11] between the two parties. In that telegram we demanded that the Guomindang give the Communist Party guarantees on the following five points: the ending of the civil war, the realization of democratic freedoms, the convening of a national assembly, speedy preparations for a war of resistance against Japan,[12] and improvement of the people's livelihood. At the same time the Communist Party offered guarantees to the Guomindang on the following four points: the elimination of the opposition[13] between the two régimes, the redesignation of the Red Army, the adoption of the democratic system,[14] and the discontinuance of the confiscation of the land.[15] This was likewise an important political step, for without it the establishment of the united front[16] between the two parties would have been postponed, and this would have been wholly detrimental to speedy preparations for the War of Resistance against Japan.[17]

Since then, the two parties have moved a step closer to each other in their negotiations. The Communist Party has made more specific proposals on the question

8. A well-known petition → A letter
9. Requesting → Demanding
10. A united front → Renewed cooperation
11. Establishment of a united front → Cooperation
12. A war of resistance against Japan → Resisting Japan
13. Opposition → Antagonism
14. The adoption of the democratic system → The application of the new-democratic system in the revolutionary base areas
15. The confiscation of the land → The confiscation of the land of the landlords
16. The united front → The cooperation
17. The War of Resistance against Japan → Resisting Japan

of a common political program for the two parties, on the question of lifting the ban on the mass movements and releasing political prisoners, and on the question of redesignating the Red Army *and the administration of the soviet areas.* Although thus far the Common Program has not yet been promulgated, nor has the ban on movements of the popular masses been lifted, nor has the new system in the soviet areas[18] been recognized. And yet, about a month after the fall of Beiping and Tianjin, an order was issued to the effect that the Red Army was to be redesignated as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army (also called the Eighteenth Group Army in the anti-Japanese battle order). The declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the establishment of cooperation between the two parties, which had been *drafted already on July 4* and conveyed to the Guomindang as early as July 15, and Chiang Kaishek's statement recognizing the legal status of the Chinese Communist Party, which should have been published as agreed simultaneously with the declaration, were finally released to the public (unfortunately after a long delay) by the Guomindang Central News Agency on September 22 and 23 respectively, when the situation at the front had become critical. The Communist Party's declaration and Chiang Kaishek's statement announced the establishment of the united front[19] between the two parties and laid the necessary foundation for the great cause of alliance between the two parties to save the nation. The declaration[20] embodies not only the principle of unity between the two parties but also the basic principle of the great unity of the people of the whole country. It is good that Chiang Kaishek, in his statement, recognized the legal status of the Communist Party throughout China and spoke of the necessity of unity to save the nation. He has not, however, abandoned his Guomindang arrogance or made any necessary self-criticism, and we can hardly be satisfied with that. Nevertheless, the establishment of the united front between the two parties has been proclaimed. This has ushered in a new era in the history of the Chinese revolution. *This great political significance should be recognized by the people of the whole country. From now on,* it will exert widespread and profound influence on the Chinese revolution, and defeat Japanese imperialism decisively.[21]

The Impact of the Establishment of the United Front Between the Two Parties

Ever since 1925,[22] the relationship between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party has played a decisive role in the Chinese revolution. The *successful great* revolution of 1925–1927[23] took place as a result of the cooperation *and leadership* of the two parties on the basis of a definite program. In a mere two or three years, successes unprecedented in history[24] were achieved in the national revolutionary cause of *nationalism, people's rights, and people's livelihood,* to which Mr. Sun Yatsen had devoted forty years and which he had been unable to carry to completion. These successes were the establishment of the revolutionary base in Guangdong and the victory of the Northern Expedition. They were the products of the formation of the united front of the two parties. But at the very moment when the revolution was nearing its goal, some people who failed to uphold the revolutionary cause disrupted the united front of the two parties, and so brought about the failure of the *Chinese* revolution. *Thereafter, political power belonged to one class and one party. This created a deep rift not only between the Communist Party and the Guomindang but also between the government and the people.* The door was left open for foreign aggression, and *a history of utmost misery and humiliation unfolded.* These were the consequences of the disruption of the united front of the two parties. Now the newly reestablished united front between the two parties has ushered in a new period in the Chinese revolution. There are still people who do not understand the historical role of the united front and its great future and regard it as a *very* temporary but unavoidable and perfunctory method devised under the pressure of circumstances. Nevertheless, through this united front, the wheel of history will propel the Chinese revolution forward to a completely new stage. This united front[25] will play a decisive role in whether China can extricate itself from the national and social crisis, which is now so grave. There is already fresh and concrete evidence.[26] First, as soon as the policy of the united front was put forward by the Chinese Communist Party, it won the approval of people throughout the country. This is a clear expression of the will of the people. Second, immediately after the Xi'an Incident was settled peacefully and the two parties *and two armies* ended the civil war, all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life, and all armed forces in the country achieved unprecedented unity. *The extent of* this unity, however, still falls far short of meeting the needs of the War of Resistance,[27] especially as the problem of unity between the government and the people remains basically unsolved. *Nevertheless, sharp conflicts between various provinces and the central government were alleviated greatly and immediately under the impact of the truce between the two parties.* Third, and most striking of all, is the fact that the nationwide War of Resistance has started. We are not satisfied with the War of Resistance in its present

18. The soviet areas → The revolutionary base areas
19. The united front → Cooperation
20. The declaration → The declaration of the Communist Party
21. Defeat Japanese imperialism decisively → Play a decisive role in defeating Japanese imperialism
22. 1925 → 1924
23. 1925–1927 → 1924–1927
24. Successes unprecedented in history → Tremendous successes
25. This united front → How this united front develops
26. There is already fresh and concrete evidence. → There is already fresh evidence that the prospects are favorable.
27. The War of Resistance → Resistance to Japan

state because, though national in character, it is still confined to the government and the armed forces. As we pointed out long ago, Japanese imperialism cannot be defeated by a War of Resistance of this kind. Nevertheless, for the first time in a hundred years, China is definitely putting up nationwide resistance to a foreign invader, and this could never have come about without internal peace and without the united front[28] between the two parties. If the Japanese bandits were able to take the Four Eastern Provinces without firing a single shot *and with the greatest of ease* during the time when the two-party united front had broken down, then today, when the united front has been reestablished, they will not be able to occupy more Chinese territory without paying a price in bloody battles. *It is reported that the daily war expenditure of the Japanese bandits is 20 million to 25 million yen. If China can persist in the war for a year, the financial resources of the Japanese bandits will be exhausted, for they will have to lose 7.2 billion yen. In fact, their future expenses will greatly increase and will not be limited to this figure.* Fourth, there is the international effect. The anti-Japanese united front proposed by[29] the Chinese Communist Party has won the support of the workers, peasants, and popular masses, and of the communist parties all over the world. With the establishment of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, *its impact will be greater and* the people of various countries, and particularly *the popular masses* of the Soviet Union, will help China more actively. China and the Soviet Union have concluded a treaty of nonaggression, and relations between the two countries can be expected to improve still further, *moving to a stage when the two countries will oppose the Japanese bandits more concretely.* From all the above evidence, we can state with certainty that the development of the united front *of the two parties* will cause China to move toward a glorious and magnificent future. *To summarize in a single sentence, the historic task of national liberation will be accomplished in the future development of the united front between the two parties. And the result will be* the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the establishment of a unified democratic republic.

But the united front cannot accomplish this great task if it remains in its present state. The united front of the two parties must be developed further, for the united front which has now been established is not yet substantial or consolidated.

What Is a Substantial and Consolidated United Front?

Should the Anti-Japanese National United Front be confined to the Guomindang and the Communist Party? No, it should be a united front of the whole nation, with the two parties forming only a *small* part of it. *Undoubtedly, the two parties are the leading component of this great united front, but from beginning to end they are*

28. The united front → The cooperation
29. The anti-Japanese united front proposed by → The proposal for the anti-Japanese united front put forward by

only a part of it. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is a united front of all parties and groups, of people in all walks of life and all the armed forces, a united front of all patriotic fellow-countrymen—the workers, peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals.[30] So far, the united front has in fact been confined to the two parties, while the masses of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and petty bourgeoisie[31] and a large number of other patriots have not yet been aroused, *their enthusiasm* has not been mobilized, and they have not been organized or armed. This is the most serious problem at present. It is serious because it makes victories at the front impossible. It is no longer possible to conceal the critical situation at the front both in North China and in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, nor is there any need to do so; the question is how to save the situation. And the only way to save it is to put Mr. Sun Yatsen's Testament into practice, to "arouse the popular masses." In his deathbed Testament, Mr. Sun declared he was deeply convinced, from the experience accumulated over forty years, that only thus could the goal of revolution be achieved. What reason is there for obstinately refusing to put this testament into practice? What reason is there for failing to do so at a moment when the fate of the nation is at stake? Everybody knows that autocracy and suppression run counter to the principle of "arousing the popular masses." *The essence of the contradiction is that those who have seized the latrine pit can't shit, while the people of the whole country, who suffer acutely from bloating, have no pit.* Resistance by the government and the army alone can never defeat Japanese imperialism. Early in April[32] this year we warned *our brother* ruling party[33] in all seriousness that unless the masses of the people were aroused to resist, China would follow the same path to disaster as Abyssinia. *(The Tasks of the Anti-Japanese National United Front at the Present Stage.)*[34] This point has been made not only by the Chinese Communists but by progressive compatriots throughout the country, and by many intelligent members of the Guomindang itself. Yet the policy of autocratic rule remains unchanged. As a result the government has estranged itself from the people, the army has estranged itself from the masses, and the military commanders are estranged from the fighters. Unless the united front is reinforced by the participation of the popular masses, the crisis on the war fronts cannot be avoided and will inevitably be aggravated, not mitigated.

Why has the policy of autocratic rule not changed up to now? Because the present united front[35] still lacks a political program to replace the policy[36] of autocratic rule, a program accepted by both parties and formally promulgated. In relation to

30. Intellectuals → Intellectuals and merchants
31. Petty bourgeoisie → Urban petty bourgeoisie
32. April → May
33. Our brother ruling party → The Guomindang
34. See Mao's report of May 3, 1937, in Volume V, pp. 637–50, especially paragraph 7, p. 642.
35. The present united front → The present anti-Japanese united front
36. The policy → The Guomindang's policy

the masses, the current practices[37] are still the same practices that have been followed for the last ten years; there has been no change and, on the whole, everything has remained the same for the last ten years, from the government apparatus, the army system, and the policy toward civilians to financial, economic, and educational policies. There have been some changes, and very important ones—cessation of civil war and unity against Japan. The civil war between the two parties has come to a stop, and the nationwide War of Resistance[38] has started; such are the very great changes in the Chinese political scene since the Xi'an Incident. But so far there has been no change in the practices enumerated above, and there is thus a disharmony between the things that have not changed and those that have. The old practices are suited only to compromise abroad and suppression of the revolution at home, and they prove ill-suited in every respect and reveal all their inadequacies when it comes to coping with the Japanese imperialist invasion. It would be another story if we did not want to resist Japan, but since we do, and resistance has actually begun, and since a serious crisis has already revealed itself, refusal to change over to new ways will lead to the gravest dangers imaginable. Resistance to Japan requires a broadly based united front, and hence all the people should be mobilized to join it. Resistance to Japan requires a consolidated united front, and this calls for a common program. The common program will be the united front's guide to action and will serve also as the tie which, like a cord, closely binds together all the organizations and people[39] in the united front, all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life, and all armed forces. Only in this way will we be able to speak of firm unity. We are opposed to the old binding rules because they are unsuited to the national revolutionary war. We look forward to the introduction of new binding rules to replace the old, that is, to the promulgation of a common program and the establishment of revolutionary order. Nothing else will suit the War of Resistance.

Struggle for the Realization of the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point Program

What should the common program be? It should be the Three People's Principles of Mr. Sun Yat-sen and the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation proposed by the Communist Party on August 15[40] this year.

In its declaration announcing Guomindang-Communist cooperation, the Chinese Communist Party stated that "the Three People's Principles of Mr. Sun Yatsen being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization." Some people find it strange that the Communist Party should be ready to

37. The current practices → The current practices of the Guomindang
38. War of resistance → War of Resistance against Japan
39. People → Individuals
40. August 15 → August 25

put the Three People's Principles of the Guomindang into practice; Zhu Jinglai of Shanghai, for instance, has expressed doubts in a local periodical. These people think that communism and the Three People's Principles are incompatible. This is a purely formalist perspective. Communism will be put into practice at a future stage in the development of the revolution. At the present stage the Communists harbor no illusions about being able to apply it now, but will carry out the national and democratic revolution as required by history. This is the basic reason why the Communist Party has put forward the slogans of an anti-Japanese national united front[41] and a unified democratic republic. As for *carrying out* the Three People's Principles, at the Guomindang's First National Congress the Communist Party and the Guomindang jointly decided to put them into practice during the first two-party united front over ten years ago, and they were put into practice from 1925[42] to 1927 in the whole country[43] through the efforts of all loyal Communists and all loyal members of the Guomindang. Unfortunately that united front broke up in 1927, and in the subsequent ten years there was a situation in which the application of the Three People's Principles was stopped.[44] But as far as the Communist Party is concerned, all its policies in these ten years have been fundamentally in line with the revolutionary spirit of Mr. Sun's Three People's Principles and Three Great Policies. Not a day has passed in which the Communist Party failed to struggle against imperialism, and this constituted a thoroughgoing application of Nationalism; the soviet system of the people's representative congresses[45] is nothing but the thoroughgoing application of Democracy; the agrarian revolution is *even more unquestionably* the thoroughgoing application of People's Livelihood. Why, then, has the Communist Party announced the abolition of the soviet régime and the discontinuance of land confiscation?[46] The reason, as we explained some time ago, is not that there is anything at all wrong with this system,[47] but that the Japanese imperialist armed aggression has led to a change in class relations within the country. It has become necessary to unite the nation[48] against Japanese imperialism, and possible to do so. At the same time, a democratic united front for the sake of the common struggle against the threat of fascism is in the process of being

41. Has put forward the slogans of an anti-Japanese national united front → Has proposed an anti-Japanese national united front
42. 1925 → 1924
43. In the whole country → In large areas of the country
44. There was a situation in which the application of the Three People's Principles was stopped → The Guomindang opposed the application of the Three People's Principles
45. The soviet system of the people's representative congresses → The worker-peasant democratic dictatorship
46. The abolition of the soviet régime and the discontinuance of land confiscation → The abolition of the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship and the discontinuance of confiscating the land of the landlords
47. This system → This system and these methods
48. The nation → All classes of the nation

established throughout the world.[49] *This is what China really needs today.* It is on this basis that we have replaced the slogan of the soviets with the slogan of a democratic republic.[50] The agrarian revolution, which put into effect the principle of "land to the tiller," was precisely what Mr. Sun Yatsen proposed. We have now discontinued this policy *entirely* for the sake of uniting greater numbers of people against Japanese imperialism, but that does not mean that China does not need to solve the land problem. We have already explained without the slightest ambiguity our position regarding the objective reasons for these changes in policy and their temporary nature. It is precisely because the Chinese Communist Party, basing itself on Marxist principles, has consistently adhered to and developed the *spirit of the* common program of the first Guomindang-Communist united front, that is, the Three People's Principles,[51] *and has never been in the slightest degree disloyal to the revolution,* that in this hour of crisis,[52] when our country is invaded by a powerful aggressor, the Party has been able to put forward the timely proposal for a national-democratic united front, which is the only policy capable of saving our nation from destruction, and to apply this policy with unremitting effort. The question now is not whether the Communist Party believes in or carries out the Three People's Principles,[53] but whether the Guomindang does so. The present question[54] is to restore the spirit[55] of Mr. Sun's Three People's Principles throughout the country and, on this basis, to work out a definite political program and political policies, and put them into practice sincerely and not half-heartedly, conscientiously and not perfunctorily, promptly and not tardily. The Chinese Communist Party has been earnestly praying day and night for this to happen. For this very reason, it put forward the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident *on the very day of August 15.* The Ten-Point Program is in line both with Marxism and with the genuine revolutionary Three People's Principles. It is an initial program, the program for the Chinese revolution at the present stage, which is the stage of the anti-Japanese, national-revolutionary war; China can be saved only if this program is put into effect. History will punish those who persist in any course conflicting with this program. *The punishment will be the subjugation and enslavement of the Chinese nation.*

49. Throughout the world → Not only in China but also throughout the world
50. We have replaced the slogan of the soviets with the slogan of a democratic republic → We have proposed a democratic republic based on the alliance of all classes in place of a worker-peasant democratic dictatorship
51. The Three People's Principles → The revolutionary Three People's Principles
52. Crisis → National crisis
53. The Three People's Principles → The revolutionary Three People's Principles
54. The present question → The present task
55. The spirit → The revolutionary spirit

It is impossible to put this program into practice[56] without the consent of the Guomindang because the Guomindang today is still the biggest party in China and the ruling party. *Without its consent, it is impossible to put the program into practice throughout the country.* We are convinced that the day will come when intelligent members of the Guomindang *and their leaders* will agree to this program. If they do not, the Three People's Principles will forever remain an empty phrase, and it will be impossible to restore the revolutionary spirit of Mr. Sun Yatsen, impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism, and impossible for the Chinese people to escape the fate of becoming slaves without a country. No really intelligent member of the Guomindang *or their leaders* can possibly let this happen,[57] and our people will never allow themselves to be turned into slaves without a country with their eyes open. Moreover, in his statement of September 23, Mr. Chiang Kaishek declared:

> I hold that we who stand for the revolution should put aside personal grudges and prejudices and devote ourselves to the realization of the Three People's Principles. At this critical juncture of life and death, we should all the more let bygones be bygones and, together with the whole nation, make a completely fresh start and work strenuously for unity in order to preserve the very life and existence of our country.

This is most true. The urgent task at present is to strive for the realization of the Three People's Principles, to discard personal and factional *sentiments and* prejudices, to change the old set of practices, to carry out a revolutionary program in line with the Three People's Principles immediately, and to make a completely fresh start together with the whole nation. Today this is the only way out.[58] With further delay it will be too late to repent.

But if we want to carry out the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point Program, there must be instruments for doing so, and this raises the question of reforming the government and the army. The present government is still a one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang and not a government of the national-democratic united front. In the absence of a government of the national-democratic united front, it is impossible to carry out the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point Program. The present army system[59] is still the old one, and it is impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism *thoroughly* with troops organized *and controlled* according to this system. The troops are now engaged in *sacred* resistance *at the front*, and we have great admiration and respect for them all, and especially for those fighting at the front. But the army system must be changed, as it is unsuited to the task of completely defeating the Japanese aggressors and to the suc-

56. Practice → Practice throughout the country
57. Let this happen → Want this to happen
58. Only way out → Only course
59. The present army system → The present army system of the Guomindang (The same variant occurs several more times in this paragraph, and will not be noted again.)

cessful application of the Three People's Principles and the revolutionary program. There must be a reform *of the system, for only thus will it be up to the tasks.* The lessons of the War of Resistance during the last three months have already demonstrated this. The change should be based on the principles of unity between officers and men and unity between the army and the people. The present army system is fundamentally opposed to both these principles. It prevents the officers and men,[60] despite their loyalty and courage, from bringing their activism into play because they are ensnared in the old system, and therefore an immediate start must be made to reform it. This does not mean that the fighting has to stop until the system is reformed; it can be reformed while the fighting is going on. Here the central task is to bring about a change in the army's political spirit and political work. The [Guomindang] Party army[61] during the Great Revolution[62] provides an admirable precedent, for in general it did establish unity between officers and men and between the army and the people; a revival of that spirit[63] is absolutely necessary. China should study the lessons of the war in Spain, where the army of the Spanish government[64] has been created under extremely adverse circumstances. China is in a *much* better position than Spain, but it lacks a substantial and solid united front, it lacks a united front government capable of carrying out the whole revolutionary program, and large numbers of troops organized according to a new system. China *itself* must remedy these defects. The Red Army can at present play only a partial role in the anti-Japanese front[65] as a whole, it cannot yet play a decisive role.[66] Nevertheless, its political, military, and organizational strong points are well worth acquiring by friendly armies throughout the country. At its inception, this Red Army was not what it is today; it, too, has undergone many reforms, the main ones being the weeding out of feudal practices politically[67] and the application of the principles of unity between officers and men and unity between the army and the people. Friendly armies throughout the country can draw on this experience.

Comrades[68] of the ruling Guomindang! Today we share with you the *historic* responsibility for saving the nation from extinction and ensuring its survival. You have already established an anti-Japanese united front with us, and that is very

60. The officers and men → The masses of officers and men
61. Party army → National Revolutionary Army
62. The Great Revolution → The Northern Expedition
63. That spirit → The spirit of those days
64. The army of the Spanish government → The army of the Spanish Republic
65. The Red Army can at present play only a partial role in the anti-Japanese front → The Red Army led by the Communist Party can at present play only a vanguard role in the anti-Japanese War
66. A decisive role → A decisive role on a national scale
67. Feudal practices politically → Feudal practices within the army
68. Comrades → Anti-Japanese comrades

good. You have carried out *the policies of* the War of Resistance,[69] and that is also very good. But we do not approve of your continuing your other policies in the old way. Our united front must continue to develop, and we must strengthen it and draw in the masses of the people. We must consolidate the united front and pursue a common program. We must resolutely reform the political system and the army system. It is absolutely necessary to have a new government, which alone can carry out the revolutionary program, and start to reform the armies on a national scale. This proposal of ours answers the needs of the times. Many people in your party have also reached this conclusion and feel that now is the time to put it into practice. Mr. Sun Yatsen, in his day, made up his mind and reformed the political and army systems, thereby laying the foundation for the previous Great Revolution.[70] This responsibility[71] now falls on your shoulders. We believe that no loyal and patriotic member of the Guomindang will consider that our proposal is ill suited to the needs of the situation. We are firmly convinced that it meets the objective needs. *We place special hope in Mr. Chiang Kaishek to take up responsibility for this reform.*

Our nation *and our country* are at a critical juncture where their very existence is at stake; let the Guomindang and the Communist Party unite closely! Let all our fellow countrymen who refuse to become slaves without a country unite closely on the basis of the unity between the Guomindang and the Communist Party! The urgent task of the Chinese revolution today is to carry out all necessary reforms in order to overcome all difficulties. When this task is accomplished, we can surely defeat Japanese imperialism. Provided only that we make the utmost efforts, our future will be bright.

69. The War of Resistance → The War of Resistance against Japan
70. The previous Great Revolution → The revolution of 1924–1927
71. This responsibility → The responsibility for effecting the same kind of reform

The Results of the Pingxingguan Campaign

(October 1, 1937)

Bo and Ye, Xiaokai:[1]

In the Pingxingguan campaign on the 25th, apart from capturing eighty-two trucks, one cannon, more than two thousand shells, a few hundred rifles, and killing more than a thousand enemy troops, our forces also surrounded a high-level command post of the enemy, and captured numerous secret documents, among them the enemy's overall plan of campaign in North China, as well as a map which was marked with their objectives in Japanese. Taking advantage of the dark night, the remainder of the besieged enemy troops broke through the position of the Shanxi Army and escaped. Before the campaign, the Shanxi Army had promised to attack in two directions, but it did not set out until dusk, and as a result there was no way it could wipe out this enemy completely. Our forces suffered over four hundred casualties, including two to three deputy regimental commanders and battalion commanders. This campaign has already disrupted the enemy's plan to attack Pingxingguan, but the enemy is still attacking from the area around Yanmenguan. Our guerrilla detachment is operating in the area between Lingqiu, Laiyuan, and Weixian, and it has captured a considerable amount of booty. The enemy is using a big army corps in dealing with our guerrillas, yet he still does not know the tactics of the Red Army guerrillas. The news of our success spread all over the country, and in the last few days there have been a great many telegrams of congratulation. Among them are telegrams from Chiang Kaishek, Yang Hucheng, Ma Hongkui, Fan Changjiang, Long Yun, Sun Weiru, the Shanghai *Dagongbao,* the Shanghai Professional Society for National Salvation, the provincial party departments of Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Hubei, Guangdong, Shaanxi, and Kaifeng, the Wuhan field headquarters, the Kaifeng administrative office, the provincial governments of Zhejiang and Fujian, the Anti-Japanese Society for Assistance in the Rear in Zhejiang, and so on.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 68–69, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Bo and Ye are Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) and Ye Jianying, who at this time were the representatives of the Chinese Communist Party engaged in negotiations with the Guomindang in Nanjing. Xiaokai refers to Pan Hannian, who was the head of the Eighth Route Army's office in Shanghai.

Treat the Friendly Armies Which Are Put Under the Command of the Eighth Route Army Correctly

(October 4, 1937)

Z.hu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], and for the information of Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], Luo [Ronghuan], He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Guan [Xiangying], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Lin Yuying]:

As regards the Nationalist troops which are put under our command, we should adopt a caring and supportive attitude. Do not assign to them the most dangerous tasks, do not let them feel the shortage of supplies and materials. In terms of the fighting, we should mainly let them win a few small victories. As for mobilizing the popular masses, we should inform them in detail regarding the policies and methods, and discuss it with them many times, display a solicitous and caring attitude, and strictly avoid erroneous attitudes such as looking down on them, neglecting them, ridiculing them, treating them with indifference, and putting them in a dangerous position. By following the orientation just described, we should try to win them over so that they will unite as one with the Red Army, and wholeheartedly attach themselves to the Red Army. In order to achieve the stated objective, except for the battlefield commands, which should be the responsibility of the superior officer, we should educate all our officers and soldiers regarding the proper attitude and methods we should adopt toward them, so that this policy will be carried out thoroughly by all.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 70–71, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

On the Operational Deployment of Every Division in Shanxi

(October 5, 1937, 3:00 P.M.)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai]:

1. I am in complete agreement with the plan of campaign discussed and decided on by Zhou, Cheng Qian,[1] and Yan Xishan.

2. All of our 115th Division, except for one unit, which is conducting local work, should quickly concentrate in the hilly area to the north of Taihuaizhen and south of Dayingzhen and Shahezhen. When the enemy has been attracted to the Yuanping and Yixian area and is fighting fiercely, we should take by surprise the Pingxingguan-Daying-Shahe-Fanzhi line. After succeeding in this, we should hand over the occupation of this line to the friendly army, while our forces make a sudden assault toward the north, take the Hunyuan and Yingxian area, and inaugurate a new phase.

3. Wang Zhen's forces should quickly rejoin the ranks of He [Long]'s division.[2] At this time, all the main forces of He's division, except for the guerrilla detachment, should conceal themselves in the Wuzai area. When the fighting on what was originally the main front of Ping[xingguan] is being waged fiercely, and, moreover, when our 115th Division is already carrying out the operation toward Daying and Hunyuan, He's division should use its main forces to march beyond the Great Wall to attack the Suxian and Zuoyun area and disrupt the entire rear of the enemy in response to the action of the 115th Division.

4. The 129th Division should place one regiment in Xiaoyi, and its main forces should be stationed on the rear wing of the Zheng-Tai railway line, which includes Niangziguan. Their main tasks are to mobilize the workers, and the peasants on both sides of the line, to assist the two divisions of Lin[3] and He, to provide strategic support to strengthen the rear.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 72–73, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Cheng Qian was at this time the chief of staff of the Military Commission of the Guomindang government and the acting commander of the First War Zone.

2. Wang Zhen's unit was the 717th Regiment of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army; He Long was the commander of the 120th Division.

3. The reference is to the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao.

5. In the regions which were originally assigned to Lin's and He's divisions, we should send local workers as necessary to disperse and carry out the work as planned and to fulfill certain tasks in certain districts. We should never neglect the local work in the areas originally decided on just because the main forces are fighting a campaign. Zhu and Peng should quickly think about and carry out the above-proposed deployment.

6. Yan Xishan can only be informed face to face of the deployment of our forces. He must not be informed by telegraph. In addition, you should tell Yan not to transmit this information to any of his subordinates, so as to avoid leaks.

Mao Zedong

To Zhou Suyuan[1]

(October 6, 1937)

Respected Elder Suyuan,

Your letter has been respectfully perused. We feel that you are a very dear and respected friend and revolutionary comrade, and we do not at all feel that you "sit back and enjoy preferential treatment." Your actions and work should be determined entirely by your health and interest, for you, sir, are advanced in age and should not be compared with young people. This point should be taken into consideration not only by us, but also by yourself. The work can be done better only when the conditions and environment are more appropriate, and your health is further assured.

Regarding the plan of returning to and working in Guizhou mentioned by you, if you have already made up your mind and believe that this is a better course of action, I agree completely. Three hundred *yuan* for travel expenses will be provided for you. I do not know whether this is enough; please calculate yourself and let me know the sum. In the future, when we have more financial resources, we can help you a little with your living expenses every month, more or less the same as for life in Yan'an. This is entirely because you, sir, are a fighter, and not for any other reason. Please leave your address before you depart and inform me as well. Whenever you leave, I will come to see you.

Respectful salutations!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 108–9, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Zhou Suyuan (1879–1958) was born in Bijie, Guizhou. He participated in the Revolution of 1911 and served as premier of the military government of Guizhou. Zhou joined the Long March of the Second Field Army of the Red Army and reached northern Shaanxi in 1936. He served as a senior adviser to the Eighth Route Army after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. In 1938, he returned to his home province, as he had told Mao he intended to do.

Supplementary Opinions About Operations in North China

(October 6, 1937, 1:00 A.M.)

To Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], and Peng [Dehuai], and for the information of Lin [Biao] and Nie [Rongzhen]:

Here are some supplementary opinions about the operations:

1. Cheng Qian is correct in giving up Shijiazhuang and concentrating his forces to defend the mountainous regions in the Taihang mountains. But after taking Shijiazhuang, the enemy will attack toward the west. Therefore, we should concentrate heavy forces in Longquanguan and Niangziguan and resort to resolute defense so that the main forces will win victory north of Taiyuan. What other forces do we have on the right wing besides Zhu Huaibing,[1] and will they be able to fulfill the task of firm defense?

2. We judge that the total number of enemy forces that have entered Shanxi does not exceed two and a half divisions. In order to defend the several dozen *xian* already occupied in northern Shanxi, it has to disperse at least one division, so that the forces used to attack Taiyuan will not exceed one and a half divisions at most. More troops have to be spared for the defense along the way of the places to the south of Yanmenguan, so it seems that the forces which will actually reach the Xikou area for the combat will not be more than about one division, and they will be surrounded by us on three sides. If we can hold out for one month in Longquanguan and Niangziguan, and if, in addition, our dispositions are appropriate, in terms of the quantity and quality of our forces, it is possible that we will be able to shatter the enemy's offensive plans temporarily. Because our forces number more than 150,000, and in terms of quality, the Red Army troops and those of Wei Lihuang may be the best in the campaign in northern Shanxi, it is also the last critical moment for the Shanxi Army, and it has to fight.

3. The key to this campaign lies in the following three points:

a. Firm defense in Longquanguan and Niangziguan.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 76–79, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Zhu Huaibing was the commander of the Guomindang Ninety-fourth Division.

To Zhou Suyuan[1]

(October 6, 1937)

Respected Elder Suyuan,

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Respectful salutations!

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1. Zhou Suyuan (1879–1958) was born in Bijie, Guizhou. He participated in the Revolution of 1911 and served as premier of the military government of Guizhou. Zhou joined the Long March of the Second Field Army of the Red Army and reached northern Shaanxi in 1936. He served as a senior adviser to the Eighth Route Army after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. In 1938, he returned to his home province, as he had told Mao he intended to do.

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2. We judge that the total number of enemy forces that have entered Shanxi does not exceed two and a half divisions. In order to defend the several dozen *xian* already occupied in northern Shanxi, it has to disperse at least one division, so that the forces used to attack Taiyuan will not exceed one and a half divisions at most. More troops have to be spared for the defense along the way of the places to the south of Yanmenguan, so it seems that the forces which will actually reach the Xikou area for the combat will not be more than about one division, and they will be surrounded by us on three sides. If we can hold out for one month in Longquanguan and Niangziguan, and if, in addition, our dispositions are appropriate, in terms of the quantity and quality of our forces, it is possible that we will be able to shatter the enemy's offensive plans temporarily. Because our forces number more than 150,000, and in terms of quality, the Red Army troops and those of Wei Lihuang may be the best in the campaign in northern Shanxi, it is also the last critical moment for the Shanxi Army, and it has to fight.

3. The key to this campaign lies in the following three points:

a. Firm defense in Longquanguan and Niangziguan.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 76–79, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Zhu Huaibing was the commander of the Guomindang Ninety-fourth Division.

b. The garrison and attacking forces in the Xikou area in the front (the offense being most important).
c. Sabotage in the enemy's rear.

4. In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives:

a. Ask Nanjing to send promptly three to four divisions of fresh troops to take up their stations in Niangziguan.
b. Ask that the four divisions of Wei's army be the main offensive forces of the army group in the front, and that two divisions of the Shanxi Army assist in the attack, while the rest assume garrison duties.
c. The main forces of Lin [Biao]'s and He [Long]'s divisions of the Red Army will be responsible for sabotaging the enemy's deep rear area in the wings from the east and the west. In addition, ask Nanjing to send out two divisions of fresh troops to operate from Laiyuan and Weixian.

5. For this purpose, not only should the main forces of our 115th Division not proceed to Hebei, but it is also not appropriate that it be stationed in Longquanguan. It seems that, as the first step, it should move to Doucun and Taihuai, so that it will be able to attack Daying, Shahe, and Fanzhi when the proper time comes. Furthermore, when it is possible and necessary, it is prepared to cross over the Great Wall and proceed to Hunyuan and Yingxian, use them as the center, divide up into several detachments, adopt the tactics of operating at night, attack the Yanmen-Datong and Datong-Zhangjiakou railway lines, and attack the Zhangjiakou-Guangling and Guangling-Daixian highways. This operation of the 115th Division (it will be even better if two divisions from Nanjing can be added), in cooperation with the operation of the main force of He's division in Zuoyun, Youyu, Pinglu, and Suxian, will lead to a pause in the offensive of the enemy in Shanxi at the front, or even temporary and partial retreat. Moreover, it will result in the stopping of the penetration to the south of Shijiazhuang by the enemy forces along the Ping-Han railway line. Instead, the enemy will use one unit to defend the Beiping-Shijiazhuang line and divert another unit to the localities of Lingshou, Laishui, Guangzong, and Weixian to deal with our forces. As far as the 115th Division itself is concerned, because of the frequent moving about and combats, it must be prepared to pay a considerable price, that is, it must be prepared to lose 2,000 to 2,500 men, and, moreover, because of this reduction in numbers, it will have to give a small number of weapons to the local popular masses so that they can arm themselves. Nonetheless, in terms of sustaining the campaign in Shanxi, that is, in terms of the strategic objective of sustaining the campaign in North China for a relatively long period, it is of great importance.

6. Therefore, after you have given the matter careful consideration, if you are basically in agreement with this orientation, please carry out the following measures:

a. Ask Cheng [Qian] and Yan [Xishan] to determine which units and which individuals will make up the newly added defensive forces in Longquanguan and Niangziguan, and when they will arrive, so as to guarantee the security of the east.

b. Ask Cheng and Yan to send two divisions, which will go to the north end of the Heng mountains.
c. Ask Cheng and Yan to supply our forces with 3,000 to 3,500 rifles, and 30 to 35 machine guns, and ask them to permit us to recruit 5,000 to 7,000 soldiers.
d. The training battalion of the 115th Division should go to the area of which Taiyuan is the center and carry out the policy of expanding the Red Army. Do not go to Hebei, for we cannot be sure of recruiting Red Army soldiers there. The cavalry battalion should operate together with the main forces. The General Headquarters and He's division should send some people to the Taiyuan region to recruit Red Army soldiers as well.
e. The main forces or the whole of Liu's division[2] should be used along the Zheng-Tai railway line, to mobilize the masses and to reinforce the rear in cooperation with the garrison troops in Niangziguan.

7. Please think carefully about the above suggestions and reply by telegram.

After composing this telegram, I received Zhu and Peng's telegram of six o'clock today. Our ideas are now basically the same, but I do not know whether Lin and Nie will have any different opinions? In addition, please suggest to Yan and Cheng that we request them to pay close attention to secrecy. It would be better if they do not deal with their deployments by radio; otherwise, it will be extremely dangerous.

Mao Zedong

2. The reference is to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.

Establish Anti-Japanese Base Areas in Northwestern Shanxi

(October 6, 1937)[1]

He [Long], Xiao [Ke]:

Since Wang Zhaoxiang's troops are being used in northwestern Shanxi, we have the following suggestions regarding the arrangements for the work:

1. We estimate that, after the enemy has penetrated in depth, his forces in the rear can only defend major strongholds in order to maintain their communications lines.

2. Consequently, conditions will be advantageous for us to launch an extensive guerrilla movement in Pianguan, Suxian, Pinglu, Zuoyun, and Youyu, as well as the Qingshuihe area in Suiyuan. We can cooperate flexibly with our main forces in the south, and with Song [Shilun]'s[2] detachment to the east of Pinglu and, if necessary, cooperate with the operations of the friendly armies. Therefore, in accordance with the current tasks, as regards deployment, you should first launch a guerrilla movement in the Pinglu, Pianguan, Suxian, Zuoyun, Youyu, Qingshuihe, Hequ, Baode, and Kelan area and create anti-Japanese base areas. You should rely on Shenchi, Ningwu, Hequ, Baode, and Kelan as the mass basis and shield the work of those who are involved in this task. The remaining guerrilla forces should appear in the guise of the volunteer army. Second, in the Qingshuihe area in Suiyuan, the main task is to recruit the guerrilla and volunteer armies. Third, under the guerrilla units, a few small guerrilla groups can be organized.

3. In the same way, we and Song's detachment would recruit guerrillas in the area to the east of Pinglu and west of Daiyue, and connect these regions as one. First, use Pianguan as the rear for the time being, and the fixed leadership organ of the work team should be stationed there. You should select one platoon of soldiers from our forces as the backbone and organize a guerrilla detachment in the Pianguan region. Second, organize guerrilla detachments in Pinglu and Suxian, but every

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 74–75.

1. It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 5:00 and 7:00 P.M.

2. Song Shilun (1907–1991), a native of Hunan, was at this time the commander and political commissar of a detachment of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

guerrilla unit must have at least one platoon of soldiers from our forces as the backbone. Only in this way can the guerrilla detachments be formed. Since the masses in Shanxi do not have the experience of armed struggle, it will be very difficult if we do not send armed forces as the backbone.

Mao Zedong

First Preface to Rural Surveys[1]

(October 6, 1937)

Beginning with the war of the Northern Expedition in 1927, until we left the Central Soviet Area in 1934, I personally gathered materials from the countryside. Now only those portions of the materials listed below remain: (1) the Xunwu investigation; (2) the Xingguo investigation; (3) investigation in Dongtang and other places; (4) the Mukou Village investigation; (5) circumstances regarding land distribution in southwestern Jiangxi; (6) clarifying the rent question; (7) mistakes in the land struggle in Jiangxi; (8) the rich peasant problem in Yongxin after land distribution; (9) two early land laws; (10) investigation in Changgang Township; (11) investigation in Caixi Township. The last two items were published in the newspaper *Douzheng* in the Central Soviet Area; all the rest remained in manuscript and have not yet been lost even after the Long March. Everything else was lost. Among these, the most regrettable is the loss of the investigations which I conducted in the spring of 1927 in Hunan in the five *xian* of Changsha, Xiangtan, Xiangxiang, Hengshan, and Liling, which were lost as a result of Xu Kexiang's rebellion. The investigation in the spring of 1928 in the two *xian* of Ninggang and Yongxin on the Jinggangshan was lost when we were obliged to leave the Jinggangshan. The materials which remain here are all from investigations in the Central Soviet Area. The first nine are from the early period in the agrarian revolution; the last two deal with the agrarian revolution when it was well advanced. Although they are incomplete, they are worth a look. In order to prevent further loss, we are printing a few copies, and giving them to comrades for their study. These are historical materials, and some of the points of view expressed in them are those of the time and have subsequently been changed.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji,* pp. 14–15, where it is reproduced from the *neibu* edition of Mao's rural surveys published in Yan'an in 1941.

1. This preface was written by Mao in 1937 for an edition of his *Rural Surveys,* which never appeared. When the volume was finally published in 1941, Mao added a second preface and a postface, which appear in Volume VII of our edition. The texts themselves were included in Volume III, under the dates of their composition (from 1928 to 1930).

To Lei Jingtian[1]

(October 10, 1937)

Comrade Lei Jingtian,

Both your letter and Huang Kegong's letter[2] have been received. Huang Kegong's past history of struggle was honorable. He receives capital punishment today and the comrades of the Party Central Committee and I feel sorry about it. But he committed an unpardonably serious crime. If a Communist Party member and Red Army cadre were pardoned for such a mean and brutal act, an act that deserted the stand of the Party, the revolution, and humanity, it would be impossible to educate the Party, the Red Army, and the revolutionaries, or to teach people how to be ordinary human beings. Therefore, the Party Central Committee and the Military Commission cannot do otherwise than to sentence him to death in view of his criminal act and in accordance with the discipline of the Party and the Red Army. It is precisely because Huang Kegong was not an ordinary person, because he was a Communist Party member for many years and a Red Army man for many years, that we cannot do otherwise. The Communist Party and the Red Army must impose stricter discipline on their members and soldiers than on ordinary civilians. At the time of a national crisis and a tense revolutionary situation, Huang Kegong could be malicious, contemptible, cruel, and selfish to such a degree; his execution was determined by his own acts. All Communist Party members, all Red Army commanders, and all revolutionaries must draw lessons from Huang Kegong's act. Apart from announcing the verdict of the court, you may read this letter from me before Huang Kegong and the masses present at the public trial. Comrade Liu Qian's family members should be comforted and compensated.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 110–11, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Lei Jingtian (1904–1959) was born in Nanning, Guangxi. He served as president of the Superior Court of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and was chief judge in the case of Huang Kegong at the time.

2. Huang Kegong joined the Red Army in early youth and participated in the struggle on the Jinggangshan and the Long March. He served as leader of the Sixth Brigade of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College. In October 1937, he shot to death Liu Qian, a female student of the Shanbei Public School, after failing to force her to marry him. After a trial by the Superior Court of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, Huang Kegong was sentenced to death.

The Crucial Point in the Combat Situation in North China Is in the Taihang Mountains in the Area of Niangziguan and Longquanguan

(October 13, 1937)

To Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], and Peng [Dehuai], and for the information of Bo [Gu] and Ye [Jianying]:

1. The judgment in Zhou's telegram of the 10th is correct. There is inadequate assurance of a counteroffensive at Xikou in the north, nor can the defense at Niangziguan in the east be relied on.

2. Consequently, the deployment by Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi] on the 12th providing for the redivision of the region is correct, and we should be very cautious in using the 129th Division.

3. The weakness in North China lies in the fact that the troops are too miscellaneous, and there is not a single main force army.[1] Under the principle of trying our best to cooperate in the campaign, and to sustain North China as long as possible, the Red Army should at the same time consider our deployment in case the friendly armies prove unreliable.

4. I wonder if we could suggest to Chiang [Kaishek], Cheng [Qian], and Yan [Xishan] the appointment of Huang Shaoxiong as the commander-in-chief of all the troops in Niangziguan and Longquanguan, and those to the east of the Taihang mountains (not including the Red Army), in order to unify the command and make sure that Niangziguan does not fall. Because even if Taiyuan falls but Niangziguan does not, we will still be able to hold out, but if Niangziguan falls, the war situation in North China will immediately become a local war and will lose its overall importance. We must be aware that the focus of the war situation in North China is not in Taiyuan, but in the Taihang mountains in Niangziguan and Longquanguan

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 80–81, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The adjective *za,* or *za pai* (miscellaneous), also has the meaning, when applied to armies, that they belong to the forces of various local warlords and are not of the same quality as Chiang Kaishek's own troops or those of other major Guomindang commanders, referred to here as "main force armies."

area. If the Taihang mountains and the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line are in our hands, then if the enemy enters Taiyuan, he will be like a turtle in a jar, and our troops will be able to achieve something. Please think deeply about this point.

Mao Zedong

Opinions Regarding Strategic Deployment in North China After the Fall of Taiyuan

(October 13, 1937)

To the five comrades Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Bo [Gu], and Ye [Jianying]:

Please think about the following suggestions regarding strategic deployment, put them forward to the Guomindang, and be prepared to carry them out as soon as Taiyuan falls:

1. Even if Taiyuan falls, it will not greatly affect the overall situation, because on both sides of the Datong-Taiyuan railway line, our troops are attacking it, and the enemy is surrounded by us on four sides. The pivot of the overall situation in North China is now in the Heng mountains and the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line. If this region falls, the war situation in North China will at once become a partial war, the enemy will have achieved the goal of controlling the pivot in all of North China, the whole of our Red Army will be in a passive position, and Henan will be under immediate threat as well.

2. In order to guarantee that the Taihang mountains and the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line are in our hands, be prepared to launch a strategic counteroffensive on the Datong-Zhangjiakou-Beiping line, and sustain the protracted war in North China. For the purpose of exhausting the enemy and defending the various provinces in the Central Plains, we should carry out the following deployments:

a. Take the various units stationed to the east of the Taihang mountains, plus five to ten fresh and combatworthy divisions, put them in Longquanguan and Niangziguan as well as in the area to the east, appoint Huang Shaoxiong as the commander-in-chief, build strong and fortified positions in the wings, launch a mobile war of annihilation against the advancing enemy, as well as the Beiping-Hankou railway line, so as to achieve our goal of defending these two passes and the whole of the Heng mountain range.

b. Place the troops under Wei Lihuang, Hao Menglin, and Liu Mao'en, plus two divisions of the Sichuan Army, in the Shouyang, Yuxian, area east of Taimian, with Wei Lihuang as the commander-in-chief. Apart from building strong and fortified positions in the wings, deal with the enemy in Taiyuan by a mobile war of annihilation.

c. Place the 115th Division of the Red Army, and Chen Changjie's troops from Shanxi, plus two divisions of the Guizhou Army, and one cavalry division in the Wutai area. Apart from using one unit to attack the line along Pingxingguan, Shahe, Daixian, Chunxian, and Yuanping, the main forces should be prepared, when it is possible and necessary, to move northward, take the northern section of the Heng mountains, and attack the Beiping-Suiyuan railway line.

d. Put the 129th Division of the Red Army in the area from Pingding and Xiyang to the south of the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line to southern Yuzi, set up base areas, and get ready for a defensive campaign in the south, should the situation by any chance turn against us.

e. Put the main forces of the 120th Division of the Red Army, in cooperation with about fifteen regiments of the main forces of the Shanxi Army, in the northwest of Shanxi, outside the Great Wall, make sure that this region is in our hands, and launch a surprise attack on the Taiyuan-Datong railway line.

f. Put about twenty regiments of the Shanxi Army, in cooperation with Chen Bojun's troops of the 120th Division of the Red Army,[1] in the area from Fengyang and Xiaoyi to the west of Taiyuan to the Lishi and Zhongyang area, and resist the westward advance of the enemy.

g. Put the remaining forces of the Shanxi Army in the Taigu, Pingyao, area to the south of Taiyuan, and complete the encirclement of Taiyuan from four sides.

h. Move all the residents of Taiyuan, as well as those in the nearby area, to the Fengshui valley. Be prepared to burn the city of Taiyuan. (Zhu, Zhou, and Peng should consider to what extent this is possible; if you reckon that it is impossible, then do not propose it.)

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 82–84, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. At this time, Chen Bojun commanded the 359th Brigade of the 120th Army.

On the Problem of Confiscating the Property of Chinese Traitors

(October 15, 1937)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi]:

We have taken note of your telegram of the 11th. Confiscating the property of the big landlords constitutes the main class content of the policy of confiscating the property of Chinese traitors. Of course, those big landlords who have not turned Chinese traitors are not included among those whose property is to be confiscated. Of all Chinese traitors, we should, first, resolutely confiscate the property of the big landlords. In the case of middle-level elements who have become Chinese traitors, we should not be in a hurry to confiscate their property before we have obtained the approval of the popular masses. As for those among the workers and peasants who have been forced to become Chinese traitors, we should adopt a policy of leniency, placing the emphasis on persuasion and education. This is the class line in the united front, and it is necessary to explain it clearly to everyone.

Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian] Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, p. 41, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Use Guerrilla Warfare to Cooperate in the Operations of Friendly Armies

(October 16, 1937)

To Comrade Lin Biao, and for the information of Zhu [De], Ren [Bishi], He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], Nie [Rongzhen], and [Peng] Xuefeng:

1. According to Peng Xuefeng, a certain army of the Japanese bandits from Tianzhen and the Guandong Army[1] from Weixian are advancing rapidly toward Guanglin. Yan [Xishan] of Shanxi is planning to concentrate fourteen regiments to fight a decisive battle against the enemy, and he hopes that our 115th Division will also participate in the battle, and so on.

2. Our forces should adhere resolutely to the policy which has been decided on and use guerrilla warfare to cooperate with the campaigns of our friendly armies. This principle was agreed upon with Chiang [Kaishek] and He [Yingqin] in Nanjing. Moreover, Zhou [Enlai] and Peng [Dehuai] reaffirmed the same decision in face-to-face discussions with Yan in Shanxi and, generally speaking, this orientation should not be changed.

3. Please telegraph me at once about the current situation, as well as about your opinions as to how we can cooperate with the campaign of the friendly armies. Subsequently, you should inform me promptly about developments.

4. Where is the 115th Division now?

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 85–86, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. I.e., the Japanese army of occupation in the northeast.

On Lu Xun

Speech at the Memorial Meeting at the North Shaanxi Public School

(October 19, 1937)

Comrades,

Today, our main tasks at the North Shaanxi Public School are the ones of training anti-Japanese vanguards. At a time when this great war of national self-defense advances rapidly, we need large numbers of activists to lead and we need large numbers of capable vanguards to blaze trails. These vanguard elements are open and aboveboard, loyal, enthusiastic, and upright. They do not pursue their own self-interest and serve only the liberation of the nation and of society. They do not fear hardship, have steadfast resolve in front of difficulties, and advance courageously. They are not haughty and showy persons, but persons who are down-to-earth and full of the practical spirit. They play a guiding role on the road of revolution. The present war situation is one in which only the government and army are waging a war of resistance, without the participation of the broad masses of people; one in which there is absolutely no guarantee of final victory.[1] We now need to create large numbers of vanguards who will fight to the very end for national liberation and have them lead the masses and organize the masses so as to complete this historic task. First and foremost, the vast numbers of vanguards throughout the whole country should get organized immediately. Our Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat and is at the same time the vanguard working for the most thorough national liberation. We shall fight tenaciously to the end to fulfill this task.

In commemorating Mr. Lu Xun today, we must first of all understand Mr. Lu Xun and recognize the position he occupies in Chinese revolutionary history. We

This speech was first published in 1938, and that version has been reprinted in *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 279–82. The author of this transcript (who signed himself Dahan) stated in an accompanying note that he had not shown the text to Mao and took responsibility for any errors it might contain. A carefully edited version differing only slightly from the earlier text was printed in *Renmin ribao* on September 22, 1981, and is reproduced in *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 42–45. We have taken this as our source.

1. This last sentence does not appear in the 1938 version.

commemorate him not merely because he wrote good articles and was a great literary figure, but also because he was a vanguard of national liberation and provided great assistance to the revolution. He was not a member of the Communist Party organization, yet his thinking, actions, and writings were all Marxist. He was a non-Party Bolshevik.[2] Especially in his later years he demonstrated more youthful strength. He consistently waged relentless and resolute struggle against feudalist forces and imperialism. In the adverse environment of oppression and persecution by the enemy, he endured and resisted, just as the comrades of the North Shaanxi Public School are able to study revolutionary theory diligently under such poor material conditions, filled with the spirit of arduous struggle. All material facilities at the North Shaanxi Public School are poor, but here there is truth and freedom, and this is the place to foster revolutionary vanguard elements.

Lu Xun came out of a collapsing and failing feudal society, but he knew how to turn around and fight back, attacking the corrupt society that he had personally experienced and the vicious forces of imperialism. He used his sharp, humorous, and forceful brush to paint the evil faces of the dark forces and the ugly features of imperialism. He was simply a superb artist. In recent years he stood on the side of the proletariat and national liberation and fought for truth and freedom. Mr. Lu Xun's first characteristic is his political farsightedness. He observed society with both a telescope and a microscope, so he could see very far and with accuracy. As early as 1936 he boldly pointed out the dangerous tendencies of the Trotskyite bandits, and current reality fully proves how accurate and illuminating his views were.[3]

The value of Lu Xun in China, in my view, is as China's number one saint. Confucius was feudal society's saint, and Lu Xun is modern China's saint. To commemorate him eternally, we have established a Lu Xun Library in Yan'an and opened a Lu Xun Normal School in Yan'an, so that people in the future may be able to envisage his greatness.

Lu Xun's second characteristic is his fighting spirit. As mentioned just now, amid the onslaught of darkness and violence, he was a large, independent tree standing tall, not a small leaf of grass leaning to either side. Once he clearly discerned the political direction, he courageously struggled toward a goal, never to surrender or compromise midway. Some revolutionaries, who fail to be thoroughgoing, participate in the struggle at first and "drop out" later. Germany's Kautsky and Russia's Plekhanov, for instance, are obvious examples of this. There are quite

2. The preceding sentence does not appear in the 1938 version. The Chinese means literally "a Bolshevik outside the Party," but this is undoubtedly intended as a translation of the term "non-Party Bolshevik," commonly used in the Soviet Union to designate a person who follows the Party line without actually being a member.

3. The 1938 version contains the following sentence, omitted here: "It has already become quite obvious that the Trotskyite faction has become an organization of Chinese traitors and receives subsidies directly from Japanese intelligence organs."

a few people of this sort in China as well. Just as Mr. Lu Xun said, at first everyone is Leftist and revolutionary, but as soon as oppression begins, there are some who recant and even offer up their comrades to the enemy as gifts. Lu Xun deeply hated such people and struggled against them, at all times educating and training the literary youth under his leadership, teaching them to struggle resolutely, serve as vanguards, and blaze their own paths.

Lu Xun's third characteristic is his spirit of sacrifice. He was not in the least bit cowed by the enemy's threats, enticements, and persecution. Not shrinking in the least from sharp attacks, he thrust his swordlike pen at everything he hated. He often stood amid the bloodstains of the fighters as he advanced, tenaciously resisting and crying out. Lu Xun was a thorough realist who would not compromise in the least and was full of resolve. In one of his articles he advocates beating the dog that has fallen into the water.[4] He says that if such a dog were not beaten, then as soon as he jumped out of the water he would bite you or, at the very least, splash you all over with muck. So he was in favor of fighting to the finish. He had in him not a trace of false mercy or fake gentlemanliness. At present we have not even beaten the mad dog of Japanese imperialism into the water, so we want to beat it all the way to the point that it can't get up and withdraws from within China's borders. We must emulate this spirit of Lu Xun's and apply it in all of China.

The sum total of the above characteristics forms a great "Lu Xun spirit." Lu Xun's entire life was permeated with this spirit. For this reason he became a writer of great artistic acclaim, and in the revolutionary ranks he was an outstanding and experienced vanguard element. In commemorating Lu Xun we must emulate the spirit of Lu Xun, bring it into the ranks of the anti-Japanese forces all over the country, and fight hard for the liberation of the Chinese nation!

4. This refers to an article Lu Xun wrote on December 29, 1925, entitled "On the Idea That 'Fair Play' Should Be Postponed," published in the first issue of the semimonthly *Mangyuan,* January 10, 1926.

The Operational Deployment of the Eighth Route Army After the Japanese Army Has Taken Taiyuan

(October 20, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi]:

1. After the enemy has taken Taiyuan, great and rapid changes will take place:
a. The enemy in Niangziguan is sure to take the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line quickly. Lin's division[1] of our forces and our General Headquarters will face the danger of being cut off from each other.
b. The enemy in Taiyuan will take one route to Fengyang and Lishicheng to cut off He's division[2] of our forces, and march to the south; they will also take another route to the Fenhe valley to cut off our General Headquarters from the divisions of Lin and Liu,[3] and march toward the west.
c. The forces to the north of Taiyuan engaged in the War of Resistance will be scattered in disorder, and the forces of resistance in Niangziguan may face the risk of being scattered in disorder as well.

2. Consequently, the main forces of Lin's division should not go too far to the north, and Liu's division should not go too far to the east. General Headquarters should move to the area near the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line, and Wang Zhaoxiang's troops should not cross the Great Wall to the north, so that in times of emergency it will be easier to move away.

3. Our planned arrangements are as follows:
a. Leave Yang Chengwu's regiment[4] in the mountainous area around Hengshan and Wutai, to sustain the guerrilla warfare.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 87–88, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao.

2. The reference is to the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by He Long.

3. The reference is to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.

4. The reference is to the independent regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Yang Chengwu.

b. The main forces of Lin's division should be prepared to move to the Luliang mountains on the west bank of the Fenhe River.
c. Liu's division will carry on guerrilla warfare in the present location to the south of the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line.
d. General Headquarters should be prepared to move to Xiaoyi and Lingshiqu.
e. He's division should carry on the guerrilla warfare in the northwest of Shanxi, but Wang Zhaoxiang's forces should be prepared to come back to Shenfu when necessary, strengthen the defense along the river, and build more boats.
f. Chen Bojun's forces should stay where they are for the time being and prepare to go to the riverside to support by coordinated action when necessary.
g. The ammunition in Shangshe and Hongdong should be moved away immediately.

4. Please think about the above estimates and preparatory dispositions, and let us know your views as quickly as possible.

Mao Zedong

The Operational Deployment of Units Such as the 129th and 120th Divisions

(October 21, 1937)

To Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai], and for the information of Zhou [Enlai]:

1. Please be prepared to send the whole of one regiment of the 129th Division, which is stationed to the north of Xikou, or the main forces of the General Headquarters Special Task Regiment, to the south of Jiexiu and north of Huoxian (mainly the Lingshi area) at the appropriate moment, choose sections of the railway in narrow defiles, destroy several of them, and stop the enemy's southward march. The sabotage should be carried out after Taiyuan has fallen, and the enemy is advancing toward Jiexiu, and the principle is not to miss the opportunity.

2. Please order He's division[1] to be prepared to send out one battalion, under the leadership of a capable commander, and equipped with a transmitter, to leave the Shijiaojie area, advance to the border region of Fenyang and Lishi, choose narrow sections, wait until the enemy has advanced to Fenyang and the area to its west, and then destroy the roads in this area without missing any opportunity and prevent the enemy from marching westward.

3. Yang Chengwu's regiment[2] should be prepared to maneuver independently and self-reliantly for a long period in the border region where the three provinces of Hebei, Chahar, and Shanxi meet. As soon as possible you should provide a few senior cadres who are both militarily and politically reliable to strengthen it. You should plan to use these methods of communication as well as the communications equipment for as long as two years. They should be provided with clear, precise political and military programs. In addition, a company of cavalry should be assigned to them.

4. As far as the Wutai mountains are concerned, Yang Chengwu's regiment will not be able to deal with this. Please consider choosing one of the best battal-

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 89–91, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by He Long.

2. The reference is to the Independent Sixth Regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Yang Chengwu.

ions from the Special Tasks Regiment of General Headquarters and appointing a few military and political cadres who are capable of leading more than three thousand people. They will be acting independently and self-reliantly for a long period in the Wutai mountain area, in concert with Yang Chengwu's regiment.

5. The whole of Song Shilun's regiment (those units which were detached should rejoin their original organizational system) should be prepared to maneuver for a long period of time in the area to the north of the Great Wall and west of Datong and Yanmen, to work in concert with Yang Chengwu in the east and the main forces of the 120th Division in the south.

6. Of the two regiments of the 120th Division main forces as well as the unit directly attached to the division, apart from the one battalion which will be sent out to maneuver along the Fengyang-Wuchengzhen-Lishi line, the rest should be divided into two groups. The first group will be the main force and should prepare to operate in the three *xian* of Shenchi, Ningwu, and Jingle and in the area to the west of the Yanmenguan-Taiyuan railway line; the second group will be the secondary forces, which will operate in the Wuzai, Kelan, Pianguan, Hequ, and Xingxian area.

7. Wang Zhaoxiang's unit[3] should be prepared to come back to Shenfu in part or in whole when it is necessary. He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying] will be responsible for guiding the work in Shenfu.

8. Wen Niansheng's[4] regiment should set out from Luochuan and Fuxian today, and place themselves along the Wuchengbao, Zaolinping, Mahuiping, Xuejiamao, Chuankou, Hekou, Qingjiancheng line to consolidate the defense along the river, and support Shanxi by coordinated action. Chen Xianrui's troops of the 74th Division[5] will, however, be moved to Luochuan and Fuxian to relieve the garrison (they have now reached Yaoxian).

9. Please think about these various suggestions while making your decisions.

Mao Zedong

3. The reference is to the engineers' battalion of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Wang Zhaoxiang.

4. Wen Niansheng was the commander of the Eighth Garrison Regiment of the Rear Office of the Eighth Route Army.

5. Chen Xianrui's forces originally constituted the 74th Division, of which he was commander. In August 1937 this division was reorganized as the artillery battalion and baggage battalion of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Chen Xianrui was at this time the deputy commander of the eastern sector of the Rear Office of the Eighth Route Army.

Restore the System of Political Commissars and Political Organs in the Army

(October 22, 1937)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Deng [Xiaoping], and Zhou [Enlai]:

As regards restoring the original system of political commissars and political organs, we agree completely. Please issue an order immediately to carry this out. The only thing that is inappropriate is the name of the Party's representative; he should still be called the political commissar. Only when, in the future, the Guomindang adopts the system of party representatives, can our troops change this to Party representative.

Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian] Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 92–93, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

The Operational Deployment of General Headquarters and of the 115th Division

(October 22, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], and for the information of Zhou [Enlai]:

1. We have taken note of your telegram of the 21st. Your opinions are in complete agreement with ours. Instead of asking the General Headquarters and the main forces of the 115th Division to move immediately to the south of the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway line, what we want is that you should not be cut off by the enemy, and that you should definitely be assured of the possibility of moving southward at the proper time. You should pay attention to choosing such an opportunity. Moreover, you should immediately start arranging all the necessary work in the Heng and the Wutai mountains. In addition, you should also think about the problem of leaving the entire espionage regiment of General Headquarters in the Wutai mountains. In the future we can set up another espionage regiment.

2. In the future, when you are moving to the south, as the first step, the 115th Division can send out one brigade to the Luliang mountains on the west bank of the Fen River. The other brigade, as well as the directly affiliated unit of the division, can establish its position along the rivers in the Taiyue mountains. Furthermore, it can cooperate with the campaign of the 129th Division in the Taihang mountains. The first step of the General Headquarters may also be on the east bank of the Fen River. So long as you are not cut off from each other, you need have no fear.

3. It does not seem to be a good idea for the General Headquarters to move south by way of northwestern Shanxi, rather than moving westward by way of southeastern Shanxi. The main thing is the safety of the General Headquarters.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 94–95, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Inscription to Commemorate the Founding and Opening of the Northern Shaanxi Public School

(October 23, 1937)

It is imperative to train a large number of people who are vanguards of the revolution, who have political vision, and who are full of the spirit of struggle and sacrifice. These people are open and aboveboard, loyal, active, and upright. These people do not seek self-interest and only serve the cause of national and social liberation. These people fear no hardship, are always resolute in the face of difficulties, and advance courageously. These people are not mad, nor are they opportunists. On the contrary, they are very down-to-earth and practical. If China has a large group of such vanguard elements, the tasks of the Chinese revolution can be accomplished smoothly.

Our source for this text is *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 33. It can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, p. 283.

Our Duties

(October 23, 1937)

We must absolutely defeat Japanese imperialism. Such is the duty of the Communist Party, the Red Army, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Special Region. We must definitely arouse the people of the whole country and the parties and factions in the whole country to carry out the ten great guiding principles put forward by the Communist Party for resisting Japan and saving the country, so as to reverse the crisis situation and defeat the Japanese bandits. Every Communist Party member and every progressive element should unite, yield to no difficulties, make careful preparations for everything, and smash the Japanese imperialists in the end.

This text was first published in *Xin Zhonghua bao,* November 4, 1937. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, p. 127, which reproduces this version.

Guerrilla Warfare Should Be Carried Out Mainly on the Flanks and in the Rear of the Enemy

(October 23, 1937, noon)[1]

Comrades [Peng] Xuefeng, Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Li Yuying]:

We have taken note of your telegram of the 18th [of September]. As far as Mr. Yan [Xishan]'s suggestions are concerned, I totally agree with the orientation he proposes according to which, if circumstances are unfavorable, the two armies can unite as one and firmly resist the attack of the Japanese bandits by means of a guerrilla war. I have, however, the following suggestions:

1. A guerrilla war should be mainly in the enemy's flanks and rear. Shanxi should be divided into the four districts of northwestern Shanxi, northeastern Shanxi, southeastern Shanxi, and southwestern Shanxi. Toward the enemies that have entered central cities and major communication lines, we should adopt the posture of surrounding and attacking the enemy troops from four sides. It is unwise to concentrate in the single region of the Wutai mountains, and it is difficult to concentrate for long in one region.

2. We should make the Wutai mountain range one of the important guerrilla regions. In order to achieve that, the preparation should be speeded up. Both sides should send people there to investigate and plan everything without delay.

3. At the same time, we should pay full attention to the Guanyin mountain range in northeastern Shanxi, as well as to the arrangements and preparations there, since the enemy is sure to take first the Shenchi-Ningwu area in this region in order to coordinate this action with the action aimed at taking the Heng mountain range in the east, and to obtain the advantage of occupying a commanding position before attacking Taiyuan.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 96–97, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 11:00 A.M. and 1:00 P.M.

4. Although the Taihang and Taiyue mountain ranges in the southeast of Shanxi and the Luliang mountain range in southwestern Shanxi are still far away from the enemy now, it is still impossible to neglect proper preparations at this time, such as the preparation and moving of some supplies and materials. It is inappropriate to concentrate all the materials in Wutai alone.

5. Apart from the military deployment, the most important thing in guerrilla war is to rely closely on the broad masses of the people in the countryside. Only thus can final victory be obtained.

6. The aforementioned arrangements and plans will in no way obstruct the current plan of striving to use the main forces to launch an advantageous, decisive battle along the Great Wall.

7. We truly admire and appreciate Mr. Yan [Xishan]'s sincere cooperation and his discussing the command with us.

8. Please submit the above suggestions for guerrilla war to Mr. Yan for his consideration. If he can accept them and adopt them, it will be most advantageous for the War of Resistance.

Mao Zedong

The Border Region Should Immediately Carry Out Preparation and Mobilization for a Direct War of Resistance

(October 23, 1937)

To all leading political officers, including Zhong [Hanhua], Du [Ping], and Wang Hongkui of the 27th Army, Gan [Weihan], Liu [Suichun], and [Chen] Bojun of the 29th Army, and those in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, Shenfu, the Central Shaanxi Plain, northern Shaanxi, and Yunyang:

1. The Japanese bandits have entered and occupied Datong and are now attacking Taiyuan, Suiyuan, and Ningxia. They are trying to begin by taking all of our North China.

2. The Border Region is very close to the areas that the Japanese bandits are attacking. As a result of the circumstances already mentioned, it will soon become a region participating directly in the War of Resistance. Consequently, we must immediately carry out preparation and mobilization for such direct participation.

3. Preparation and mobilization for direct participation in the War of Resistance should involve the following:

a. Point out clearly the current situation as regards the Japanese offensive and its influence on the Border Region. Point out that peaceful circumstances have already come to an end in the Border Region and it will move into a situation of direct involvement in the War of Resistance. Carry out this mobilization in depth among the troops through the Party branches and clubs, and by giving lectures. Change the old peaceful ideas, strengthen the training, and eliminate the atmosphere of guerrillaism. Consolidate the forces politically and organizationally so that they will advance toward regular army status.

b. Speed up the wiping out of bandits and exterminate the Japanese invaders. Within the Border Region we should intensify the consolidation and training of our own local security troops and strictly carry out reconnaissance.

c. In the economic domain, carry out a savings movement, improve the provisions, oppose embezzlement and extravagance, and conduct strict economic

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 98–99, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

investigation. In order to push forward this work, a savings committee should be set up in every leadership organ down to the company.

4. Use all the aforementioned work to cooperate with the work of the local Party and government. Fight for the protection of the Border Region while at the same time cooperating with the work in the whole country. Fight for final victory over Japanese imperialism, for the defense of China, and for national liberation.

Mao [Zedong] Luo [Fu] Zhang [Guotao]

We Must Link the Spirit of Bravery with the Spirit of Prudence

(October 25, 1937)

To Comrades Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]; Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], and Luo [Rongqu]; He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], and Xiao [Ke]; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Lin Yuying]; and to be transmitted to responsible comrades at all levels:

After small[1] victories, arrogance is bound to appear, together with looking down upon the enemy and thinking oneself extraordinary. The surprise attack on the 771st Regiment at Qigen Village was a consequence of letting these victories go to our heads.[2] You should issue an order to the whole army, and relay it even to all the soldiers in the companies, explaining that the war against Japanese imperialism is a long process of arduous struggle. All those cadres who regard themselves as number one under heaven, swell with pride, and regard everyone as beneath them, should be sincerely admonished with words like these: the spirit of bravery must be linked to the spirit of prudence, and one-sided and mechanical opinions in the army must be opposed.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 102–3, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. According to a note to the Chinese edition, two of the three existing copies of this text have "small" here; the other one has "numerous." They have opted for "small," and we follow them in this. At the time, the Eighth Route Army had not recorded a large number of victories, and it seems more likely that Mao was warning the commanders not to take themselves too seriously because of the few successes they had enjoyed.

2. On October 23, 1937, the 771st Regiment of the 386th Brigade of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army was attacked at Qigen Village (situated in Shanxi, 35 kilometers east of the Pingding *xian* seat) by a Japanese contingent, supported by cavalry numbering over two hundred, and suffered more than thirty casualties.

Interview with British Journalist James Bertram

(October 25, 1937)

The Communist Party[1] and the War of Resistance

James Bertram: What specific statements has the Chinese Communist Party made before and since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war?

Mao Zedong: Before the war broke out, the Chinese Communist Party warned the whole nation time and again that war with Japan was inevitable, and that all Japan's talk[2] of a "peaceful settlement" and all the fine phrases of the Japanese diplomats were a mere smoke screen covering up their preparations for war. We repeatedly stressed that we must strengthen the united front and carry out revolutionary policies; only then could a victorious war of national liberation be waged. What is exceptionally important among these thing[3] is that the Chinese government must institute democratic rights[4] in order to mobilize all the popular masses to join the anti-Japanese front. We repeatedly pointed out the error of those who believed Japan's "peace pledge" and thought that war might be avoided, and of those who believed in the possibility of resisting the Japanese bandits without mobilizing the popular masses. Both the outbreak of the war and its course have proved the correctness of our views. The day after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Communist Party issued a declaration to the whole country, calling upon all political parties, all groups, and all social strata to resist the invasion of the Japanese bandits unanimously and strengthen the national united front. Soon afterward we issued the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Country, setting out the policies that the Chinese Government ought to adopt in the War of Resistance. At the time of the establishment of Guomindang-Communist cooperation, we issued another important declaration. All this testifies to our firm, unfailing adherence to the general policy of waging war[5] by strengthening the united

The Chinese version of this interview was first published in *Jiefang ribao,* no. 23, November 13, 1937. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 285–303, which reproduces the text as it appeared in the 1944 Chinese edition of Mao's *Selected Works.*

1. The Communist Party → The Communist Party of China
2. Japan's talk → The Japanese imperialists' talk
3. Among these things → Among the revolutionary policies
4. Democratic rights → Democratic reforms
5. War → War of Resistance against Japan

front and putting revolutionary policies into effect. In the present period our slogans[6] are *focused on one point:* "All-out war[7] by the entire nation."

The Situation and Lessons of the War of Resistance Against Japan

Question: According to your observations, what effects has the war produced so far?

Answer: There are two main aspects. On the one hand, by attacking our cities, seizing our territory, raping, plundering, burning, and massacring, Japanese imperialism has finally brought the Chinese people face to face with the danger of national subjugation. On the other hand, the great majority of the Chinese people have consequently become very much aware that the crisis cannot be overcome without greater unity and without resistance by the whole nation. At the same time, the peaceable countries of the world have begun to be awakened to the necessity of resisting the Japanese menace. These are the effects that have already been produced.

Question: What do you think are Japan's objectives, and how many of them have been achieved?

Answer: Japan's plan is to occupy North China and Shanghai as the first step and then occupy other regions.[8] *This is its objective.* As to the extent to which the Japanese bandits have realized their plan, they seized the three provinces of Hebei, Chahar, and Suiyuan within a short period of time, and now Shanxi is in imminent danger; the reason is that China[9] has so far been confined to a War of Resistance by the government and the army alone. This crisis can be overcome only if the popular masses and the government wage the War of Resistance in unison.

Question: In your opinion, has China recorded any achievements in the War of Resistance? In terms of lessons, what lessons might be drawn?

Answer: I would like to discuss this question with you at some length. First of all, there have been achievements, and, moreover, they are great ones. They are to be seen in the following: (1) Never since imperialist aggression began against China has there been anything comparable to the present war.[10] This is truly a war involving the territory of the entire country. This war is revolutionary in character.

6. Slogans → Basic slogans
7. War → War of Resistance
8. Other regions → Other regions of China
9. China → China's War of Resistance
10. Present war → Present War of Resistance against Japan

(2) The war has taken the country's disintegrated condition and made it relatively united. The basis of this unity is Guomindang-Communist cooperation. (3) The war has aroused the sympathy of international public opinion. Those in other countries who once disdained China for its nonresistance now have come to respect it for its resistance. (4) The war has been a great drain on the Japanese bandits. The daily depletion of their funds is said to be 20 million *yuan*[11] and the drain on manpower is also undoubtedly very heavy, though figures are not yet available. While the Japanese bandits took the Four Northeastern Provinces with little effort, now they cannot occupy Chinese territory without *paying the price of* going through bloody battles. The aggressors sought to satisfy their ravenous desires in China, but China's protracted resistance will *as its result* put Japanese imperialism itself on the road to collapse. Thus China's War of Resistance is not only to save itself but also to discharge its great duty in the whole world's antifascist front. This is another way in which the revolutionary character of the War of Resistance against Japan is manifest. (5) We have drawn some lessons from the war. They were paid for in territory as well as in flesh and blood.

As for the lessons, they are very great ones. In the several months of the War of Resistance, many of China's weaknesses have been exposed. They are primarily evident in the area of politics. Although the war involves the territory of the entire country, it is not being waged by the whole nation. As in the past, the broad masses are restrained by the government from taking part, and so the war is not yet of a mass character. Unless it has a mass character, a war against Japanese imperialist aggression cannot possibly succeed. Some people are saying, "The war is already an all-encompassing war." But this only expresses how much territory is involved in the war. In terms of the part of the population that is participating, it is still a partial war because it is being waged only by the government and the army, not by the people. This is precisely the chief reason for the great loss of territory and for the many military setbacks during the last few months. Therefore, although the present War of Resistance is a revolutionary one, its revolutionary character is incomplete because it is not yet a mass war. This, too, is a problem of unity. Although the various parties and factions in China are relatively united compared with the past, unity still falls far short of what is needed. Most of the political prisoners have not yet been released, and the ban on political parties has not been completely lifted. Relations between the government and the people, between the army and the people, and between officers and the rank and file are still extremely bad; what we have here is estrangement instead of unity. This is a most fundamental problem. Unless it is solved, victory is out of the question. In addition, military errors are another major reason for our losses. The bulk of the fighting has been in passive battles, or, to put it in military terms, it has been "pure defense." We can never win by fighting this way. To win victory, policies greatly different from the

11. *Yuan* → Japanese *yen*

present ones must be adopted in both the political and the military fields. These are the lessons we have learned.

Question: What, then, are the political and military prerequisites?

Answer: On the political side, first, the present government must be transformed into a united front government in which representatives of the people participate. Such a government would be both democratic and centralized. It would carry out the necessary revolutionary policies. Second, grant the people the freedoms of speech, publication, assembly, association, and armed resistance against the enemy, thus giving a mass character to the war. Third, the people's livelihood must be improved through such measures as abolishing exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, reducing rent and interest, improving conditions for workers, junior officers, and soldiers, giving preferential treatment to the families of soldiers fighting the War of Resistance against Japan, and relief for refugees and disaster victims. Government finance should be based on the principle of reasonable burden, meaning that those who have money should contribute money. Fourth, making foreign policy positive. Fifth, the reform of cultural and educational policy. Sixth, the stern suppression of Chinese traitors. This problem has reached a point of extreme seriousness. The Chinese traitors are running wild. At the front they are helping the enemy; in the rear they are recklessly causing trouble. Some of them even put on an anti-Japanese pose, denounce patriotic people as traitors, and have them arrested. But really suppressing the Chinese traitors will be possible only when the people rise up and cooperate with the government. As regards military matters, comprehensive reforms are also required, the most important of these being to change from an orientation of pure defense in strategy and tactics to one of actively attacking the enemy; to change the armies of the old system into armies of a new system; to change the method of forcible mobilization into one of arousing the people to go to the front lines; to change the divided command into a unified command; to change from a state of indiscipline and detachment from the people into *scrupulous* discipline built upon the principle of consciousness; to change the present situation in which warfare is conducted only by the regular army into one in which guerrilla warfare of the people is extensively developed in coordination with regular army operations; and so on. All these political and military prerequisites are mentioned in the Ten-Point Program that we have proclaimed. They all conform to the spirit of Mr. Sun Yatsen's Three People's Principles, his Three Great Policies, and his Testament. The war can be won only when these things are carried out.

Question: How will the Communist Party see to it that this program is carried out?

Answer: Our task is to explain the current situation tirelessly, *intensely, but also patiently*, and to unite with the Guomindang and all other patriotic parties and groups in order to expand and consolidate the Anti-Japanese National United Front,

mobilize all forces and struggle to achieve victory in the War of Resistance. *Because* the Anti-Japanese National United Front is still very narrow in scope and it is necessary to broaden it, that is, to carry out Mr. Sun Yatsen's Testament in "arousing the popular masses," by mobilizing the popular masses of the lower levels of society to join this united front. What the consolidation of the united front means is carrying out a common program and using this program to constrain the actions of all political parties and groups. We agree to accept Mr. Sun's revolutionary Three People's Principles, Three Great Policies, and Testament as the common program of the united front of all political parties and all social strata. But so far this program has not been accepted by all the parties, and above all the Guomindang has not agreed to the proclamation of such a program in its entirety. The Guomindang has now partially put into practice Mr. Sun Yatsen's principle of Nationalism; this is manifested in its carrying out resistance against Japan. But the principle of People's Rights has not been carried out, nor has the principle of People's Livelihood, and this has now caused a serious crisis in the current War of Resistance. With the war situation so critical, it is time that the Guomindang applied the Three People's Principles in full, or otherwise it will be too late for regrets. The duty of the Communist Party is to raise its voice loudly to the Guomindang and the whole nation, tirelessly explaining and persuading, to ensure that the genuinely revolutionary Three People's Principles, the Three Great Policies, and Mr. Sun Yatsen's Testament are fully and thoroughly applied throughout the country, in order to broaden and consolidate the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

The Eighth Route Army in the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance

Question: Please tell me about the Eighth Route Army—this is something many people are interested in—for instance, about its strategy and tactics, its political work, and so on.

Answer: Indeed a large number of people have become interested in its activities since the Red Army was redesignated as the Eighth Route Army and went to the front. I'll now give you a general overview.

First, the combat situation. In terms of strategy, the Eighth Route Army is making Shanxi the center from which it carries out warfare. As you know, the Eighth Route Army has had many victories. Examples are the battle of Pingxingguan; the recapture of Jingping, Pinglu, and Ningwu; the retaking of Laiyuan and Guangling; the capture of Zijingguan; the severing of three main transportation routes of the Japanese army (between Datong and Yanmenguan, between Wei *xian* and Pingxingguan, and between Shuo *xian* and Ningwu) and the assault on the rear of the Japanese forces south of Yanmenguan; two recapturings of Pingxingguan and Yanmenguan; and the recent recovery of Quyang and Tang *xian* in Hebei. The Japanese troops in Shanxi are being strategically encircled on all sides by the Eighth Route Army and other Chinese troops. We may say with certainty that the Japanese troops will in the future meet with the most stubborn resistance in North China. If the Japanese troops try to ride roughshod over Shanxi, they will certainly encounter greater difficulties than ever.

Next, on the question of strategy and tactics. We have taken measures that other Chinese forces have not done; *the Eighth Route Army* is fighting chiefly against the enemy's flanks and rear. This way of fighting differs greatly from purely frontal defense. We are not against employing part of our forces in frontal operations, for that is necessary. But the main forces must be used against the enemy's flanks. Only by adopting encircling and outflanking tactics, and attacking the enemy independently and with the initiative in our hands, can we preserve our own strength and destroy the enemy's strength. Furthermore, the use of a certain part of our forces against the enemy's rear has a particularly strong impact because this can disrupt the enemy's transport roads and base areas. Even the troops that are engaging in frontal operations cannot use purely defensive fighting tactics *(also called a position-holding defense)* and should instead mainly make use of the "counterassault." One of the important reasons for the military setbacks of the past few months has been the use of unsuitable methods of fighting. The methods of fighting now employed by the Eighth Route Army are what we call "mobile guerrilla warfare applied independently and with the initiative in our hands." The basic principles of these methods are the same as those we used in the past during the civil war, but there are certain differences. To take the situation right now at this stage for example, we rarely apply our troops in concentration and more often apply our troops in dispersed ways. This is necessary in order to make surprise attacks on the enemy's flanks and rear over an extensive area. In terms of the armed forces of the country as a whole, because they are large in number, apart from one portion that should be used for frontal defense and another portion that should be dispersed to carry on guerrilla warfare, the main forces should regularly be applied against the enemy's flanks. The first precept of military affairs is to preserve oneself and annihilate the enemy, and to achieve this goal it is necessary to use "mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare applied independently and with the initiative in our hands," and to avoid all passive, inflexible, *mechanical* tactics. If a large number of troops wage mobile warfare, with the Red Army[12] supplementing this using guerrilla warfare, then the wreaths of victory will lie in our hands for certain.

Next, the question of political work. The Eighth Route Army has something that is even more exceedingly important and exceedingly distinctive, which is its political work. The basic principles of the Eighth Route Army's political work are three, namely: First, the principle of unanimity between officers and soldiers, which means eradicating feudalism,[13] abolishing the system of beating and abuse, build-

12. The Red Army → The Eighth Route Army
13. Feudalism → Feudalism in the army

ing up conscious discipline, and sharing weal and woe. As a result of this the entire army is closely united. Second, the principle of unity between the army and the people, which means maintaining a discipline that forbids the slightest transgression against the popular masses; conducting propaganda among the popular masses, organizing, and arming them; lightening their economic burdens; and striking out against the Chinese traitors and collaborators who do harm to the army and the people. As a result of this, the army is closely united with the people and is welcomed everywhere. Third, the principle of carrying out propaganda among the enemy troops[14] and giving special treatment to prisoners of war. *With regard to this work*, our victory depends not only upon the fighting of our troops but also upon the undermining of the enemy troops. Although these[15] have not yielded conspicuous results as yet, they will certainly do so in the future. Moreover, in line with the second of the three principles, the Eighth Route Army replenishes its forces not by the method of coercing the people, but by the method of arousing the people to go to the front lines. Compared to the method of coercion, this method is far more effective.

Even though Hebei, Chahar, Suiyuan, and part of Shanxi have now been lost, we will absolutely not become discouraged but are resolutely calling upon the entire army to coordinate its actions with all friendly forces and fight to the last drop of blood to defend Shanxi and recover the lost territory. The Eighth Route Army will coordinate its actions with those of other Chinese troops in order to maintain the War of Resistance in Shanxi; this will be of great significance for the war as a whole, and especially for the war in North China.

(At this point, Mao paused and pointed out on a map the areas of recent activities of the Eighth Route Army in Shanxi. In these places, the Eighth Route Army had already won many military victories. He explained the general strategy and tactics that the Eighth Route Army was using in conducting operations against the enemy's flanks and rear.)

Question: In your view, can these strong points of the Eighth Route Army also apply to other Chinese armies?

Answer: They most certainly can. The spirit of the Guomindang army was once broadly similar to that of today's Eighth Route Army; that was back in the 1925–1927[16] period. At that time the Chinese Communist Party was supporting the Guomindang[17] in organizing armed forces on a new system. At first it was just two

14. Carrying out propaganda among the enemy troops → Undermining the enemy troops
15. These → These measures for undermining the enemy troops and for giving special treatment to prisoners of war
16. 1925–1927 → 1924–1927
17. The Chinese Communist Party was supporting the Guomindang → The Communist Party and the Guomindang were cooperating

regiments, which united with many other troops around themselves and won their first victory against Chen Jiongming.[18] These forces later grew into an army and still more troops came under its influence; only then did the Northern Expedition take place. At that time there was a new atmosphere in this force: there was unity, more or less, between officers and men and between the army and the people, and the army was filled with the revolutionary spirit of forging ahead courageously. A system of Party representatives and of political departments was established within the armed forces, a type of system never before seen in Chinese history, and it was this system that entirely changed the complexion of the army. The post-1927 Red Army and the Eighth Route Army of today *simply* inherited this system and developed it, *nothing more.* In the period of the Great Revolution,[19] the armed forces imbued with this new spirit naturally employed methods of fighting consistent with their political spirit, fighting not in a passive, inflexible, *mechanical* way but, instead, fighting with initiative, enthusiasm, and with an eagerness to take the offensive, and consequently they were victorious in the Northern Expedition. It is troops of this kind that we need today on the battlefields of the War of Resistance. We do not necessarily need millions of them; with a nucleus of a few hundred thousand such men, we could defeat Japanese imperialism. We deeply esteem the armies throughout the country for their heroic sacrifices since the War of Resistance began, but there are certain lessons that need to be learned from the bloody battles. *We especially hope that the main forces that have made heroic achievements in fighting and that have had a glorious history will stand up and lead the transformation of the whole army. The transformation of the government armies of Spain can be a good example for us.*

Question: Your policy of giving special[20] treatment to prisoners of war won't necessarily be effective considering Japanese army discipline, wouldn't you say? For instance, if the Japanese kill them after you release them and they go back, the Japanese army as a whole will not understand the meaning of your policy.

Answer: That is impossible; the more they kill, the more sympathy will be aroused for the Chinese forces among the Japanese soldiers. Such facts cannot be concealed from the eyes of the masses of soldiers. We will persevere in this policy of ours. For instance, the Japanese army has publicly announced that it will use poison gas against the Eighth Route Army, but even if it does that, our policy of special[21] treatment will not change. We will go on looking upon Japanese soldiers

18. Regarding Chen Jiongming (1878–1933) and his defeat by Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang forces in 1925, see Volume II, *passim,* and especially p. 71, n. 12, and p. 228, n. 4.
19. The Great Revolution → The revolution of 1924 to 1927
20. Special → Lenient
21. Special → Lenient

and all cadres who have been forced to fight just as if they were our own brothers,[22] *showing sincere sympathy to them, and giving them special treatment immediately after they are disarmed.* We will not humiliate or rebuke them, but will release them and allow them to go back after explaining to them the identity of interests of the two countries' people. Those who do not want to go back may serve in the Eighth Route Army. If an "international column" appears on the battlefields of the War of Resistance against Japan in the future, they can join this unit and oppose Japanese imperialism with weapons in their hands.

Question: Are you prepared against being attacked by poison gas in the future?

Answer: At present we still do not have any defensive weapons because of material difficulties, but right now we are asking for assistance from Chairman Chiang. Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] is preparing to issue a declaration in response to the Japanese North China Command, which points out that any such inhuman actions by the Japanese fascists would certainly hasten their own destruction.

Capitulationism in the War of Resistance

Question: As I understand it, Japan is carrying out war while, at the same time, making noises about peace in Shanghai. What are its real objectives?

Answer: After successfully taking certain steps, the Japanese imperialists will once again create a smoke screen about peace in order to attain three objectives. These three objectives are: (1) to consolidate the positions already captured for use as strategic launch points for a second stage of offensives; (2) to split China's anti-Japanese front; and (3) to break up the international front of various countries for assistance to China. The present noises[23] are simply the start of the creation of a smoke screen. The danger is that, incredibly, there are certain vacillating elements in China who are ready to succumb to the enemy's wiles and that the Chinese traitors and collaborators are maneuvering among them and spreading all kinds of rumors in their efforts to make China surrender to the Japanese bandits.

Question: As you see it, what are the prospects for these dangerous attempts?[24]

Answer: There are only two possibilities: one is that capitulationism will be overcome, the other is that capitulationism will prevail, with the result that China will descend into disorder and the anti-Japanese front will be split.

22. Looking upon Japanese soldiers and all cadres who have been forced to fight just as if they were our own brothers → Giving lenient treatment to Japanese soldiers and lower-level cadres who have been forced to fight

23. Noises → Peace noises

24. Dangerous attempts → Dangers

Question: Which of the two scenarios is the more likely?

Answer: All the people of China demand that the War of Resistance be fought to a finish. If a section within the contingent of society's upper-stratum elements[25] takes the road of capitulation in their actions, the rest who remain firm will certainly rise up and oppose it, and continue *to carry on* the War of Resistance together with the people. Of course this would be unfortunate for China's anti-Japanese front. But I am sure that the capitulationists cannot win over the masses, and in the end the power of the masses will overcome them, will continue to maintain the war, and will achieve victory in the war. *Mr. Chiang Kaishek seems to have recognized this point, since he mentioned the general policy of persevering to the end in the war in his statement published on October 9 and in his statement responding to the Roosevelt Declaration. He said that fighting will continue even if only one man and one gun are left. The Chinese Communist Party firmly supports this general policy of Mr. Chiang Kaishek and denounces the capitulationism of all vacillating elements. The slogan of the Communist Party is "Shed the last drop of blood to defend the motherland." The spirit of Chiang's statement is compatible with our slogan.*

Question: How can capitulationism be overcome, may I ask?

Answer: Using words, by exposing the danger of capitulationism, and using deeds, by organizing the masses to stop capitulationist activities. Capitulationism has its roots in national defeatism, that is, national pessimism. This kind of pessimism holds that, after having lost some battles, China has no strength left to resist Japan. It does not know that failure is the mother of success, that *profound* lessons learned from the experience of failure are the basis for future triumphs. Pessimism only sees the defeats in the War of Resistance but not the achievements in the War of Resistance. In particular it fails to see that our defeats already contain the elements of victory, while the enemy's victories contain the elements of defeat. [We must] point out to the masses of the people the prospects for victory in the war, make them understand the temporary nature of defeats and difficulties, and that, as long as we keep on fighting in spite of all setbacks, the final victory will certainly be ours. Deprived of a mass base, the capitulationists will have no chance to play their *capitulationist* tricks, and the anti-Japanese front can be consolidated.

A Democratic System and the War of Resistance

Question: What is the meaning of "democracy" as put forward by the Communist Party in its program? Does it not conflict with "wartime government"?

25. Within the contingent of society's upper-stratum elements → Within China's ruling clique

Answer: Not in the slightest. The Communist Party put forward the slogan of a "united democratic republic"[26] as early as September 1936.[27] The political and organizational implications of this slogan include the following three points: (1) It must not be a state and government of a single stratum[28] but must be a state and government of an alliance of all the strata[29] excluding Chinese traitors and collaborators, and must include the workers, the peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie.[30] (2) The organizational form of such a government will be democratic centralism. It will be both democratic and centralized, taking the two things democracy and centralization, which apparently conflict with each other, and bringing them together in a certain form. (3) This government will grant the people all necessary political freedoms, especially the freedom to organize, train, and arm themselves for self-defense. In these three respects, it can be seen that there is no conflict whatsoever with a "wartime government"; this is precisely the kind of state system and government system that would be advantageous in the War of Resistance against Japan.

Question: But isn't "democracy and centralism"[31] a contradiction in terms?

Answer: We must look not only at the term but at the reality. There is no impassable gulf between democracy and centralism, both of which are essential for China. On the one hand, the government we are asking for must be able truly to represent the popular will; it must be supported and embraced by the broad masses throughout the country, and the people certainly must be free to support it and have every opportunity to influence the government's policies. This is the meaning of democracy. On the other hand, the centralization of administrative power is also necessary, and once the policies demanded by the people are handed over to their own elected government through their representative body, the government will carry them out and will certainly be able to do so smoothly, so long as it does not go against the general policy line adopted in accordance with the people's will. This is the meaning of centralism. Only by adopting democratic centralism can a government be really strong, and this *beneficial* system must be adopted by China's government of national defense in the War of Resistance against Japan. *This beneficial form of organization is something that the political life of mankind has acquired from historical summation as it progressed into the present era. The system of democratic centralism is beneficial both in times of peace and in times of war. In wartime, it is particularly able to facilitate political and military effectiveness.*

26. United democratic republic → Democratic republic
27. September 1936 → August 1936
28. Stratum → Class
29. All the strata → All the anti-Japanese classes
30. The petty bourgeoisie → Other sections of the petty bourgeoisie
31. Democracy and centralism → Democratic centralism

Question: This does not accord with a war-cabinet system, does it?

Answer: It does not accord with some of the war cabinets in history.

Question: Do you really mean that there have been some that were in accord with it?

Answer: Yes, there have been. Wartime systems of government can generally be divided into two kinds, one being democratic centralism, the other being absolute centralism, determined by the nature of the war. All wars in history may be divided into two kinds according to their nature, one being revolutionary[32] wars, the other being counterrevolutionary[33] wars. For instance, the Great War in Europe some twenty years ago was an *unjust* war of an imperialist nature. At that time the governments of the imperialist countries forced the people to fight for the interests of imperialism, going against the people's interests. Under these circumstances, a type of government such as the Lloyd George government in Britain was necessary. Lloyd George repressed the British people, not allowing them to say things against the imperialist war; no organizations or assemblies expressing this kind of popular opinion were allowed to exist. Even though Parliament remained, it was merely a Parliament that approved the war budgets whenever commanded to, and was just a pack of imperialists.[34] The lack of concurrence between the people and a government that is committed to war[35] produced a government of absolute centralism, one that wanted centralism but no democracy. But there have also been revolutionary wars in history—for example, France's revolutionary war, Russia's revolutionary war, and Spain's current revolutionary war. In such wars *the people are in concurrence with a government that is committed to war, and so* the government is not afraid that the people will disapprove of the war because the people are extremely willing to wage this kind of war. The government's foundation is built upon the people's willing support, so not only does the government not fear the people, but it must rouse them and encourage them to express their view so that they will actively participate in the war. China's war of national liberation has the overwhelming approval of the people, *there is no discord between the people and a government that is committed to war*, and furthermore the war cannot be won without the people's participation; therefore democratic centralism becomes necessary. *China's Northern Expedition of 1927*[36] *was also a revolutionary war.* Its victories *at the time* were achieved by relying on democratic centralism. Thus it can be seen that when the commitment to war directly reflects the interests of the

32. Revolutionary → Just
33. Counterrevolutionary → Unjust
34. A pack of imperialists → The organ of a pack of imperialists
35. The lack of concurrence between the people and a government that is committed to war → The lack of unity between the government and the people during a war
36. 1927 → 1926 to 1927

people, the more democratic the government, the easier it is to prosecute the war. Such a government should not fear that the people will oppose the war; instead, what it should worry about is that the people will not rise up or will be indifferent toward the war. The nature of a war determines the relationship between the government and the people. This is a principle of history.

Question: So then what steps are you prepared to take toward instituting this new political system?

Answer: The key question is cooperation between the Nationalist and Communist Parties.

Question: Why?

Answer: For the last fifteen years, the relationship between the Nationalist and Communist Parties has been the decisive political factor in China. The cooperation of the two parties from 1925 to 1927[37] resulted in the victories of the first revolution. The split between the two parties in 1927 resulted in the unfortunate situation of the last decade. The responsibility for the split was not ours, however; we were forced to turn to a new direction of resisting the Guomindang's oppression, and we persisted in holding high the glorious banner of China's liberation. Now we have entered the third stage, and the two parties must cooperate fully on a definite program in order to resist Japan and save the nation. Through our ceaseless efforts, such cooperation can be considered to have been established, but the problem lies in both sides' accepting a common program and then acting upon this program. The setting up of a new political system is an important part of such a program.

Question: How would a new system constituted through the cooperation of the two parties be established?

Answer: We are proposing a transformation of the government apparatus and the military system. In order to respond to the present emergency, we propose that a provisional national assembly be convened. We should adopt Mr. Sun Yatsen's suggestion of 1924 that the delegates to this assembly be chosen in certain proportions from all the various anti-Japanese political parties, anti-Japanese armies, and anti-Japanese popular and business organizations. This assembly should be the supreme organ of state authority; it should decide on the general policies for saving the nation, adopt a constitutional program, and elect the government. We believe that the War of Resistance has reached a critical turning point and that only

37. 1925 to 1927 → 1924 to 1927

the immediate convening of such a national assembly that has power and also is representative of the people's will can turn around China's political situation and overcome the present crisis. We are exchanging views with the Guomindang about this proposal and hope to obtain its agreement.

Question: Doesn't the Communist Party advocate a system of universal suffrage?

Answer: We do advocate a system of universal suffrage because only a system of universal suffrage can fully represent the will of the people. The provisional national assembly is a transitional measure. Emergency conditions do not allow for unhurried elections, and right now there is no way to guarantee that the elections would reflect the will of the people. At present, in order to represent the will of the people in a relative way, what Mr. Sun Yatsen proposed when he was alive is still best: having the political parties, armies, and associations of the popular masses each choose their own representatives. Naturally there are differences between this and a system of universal suffrage. We will definitely get to a system of universal suffrage; this method is merely a bridge toward a system of universal suffrage, but it is comparatively the best method at present.

Question: In your judgment, will the Guomindang agree to this?

Answer: As the national disaster has unfolded, many sensible people in the Guomindang have issued this kind of appeal. Mr. Chiang Kaishek has also expressed the desire to institute the principle of People's Rights, and many people of all sectors of society and many generals and officers of the armies of the War of Resistance have also felt such a need. I would say that I think the Guomindang has no reason to turn down this proposal. If they accept, the Communist Party and the Guomindang will enter a new stage of close cooperation. This is a precondition for the well-being of the country and the prosperity of the people.

Question: Didn't the National Government announce that it was canceling the convening of the National Assembly?

Answer: That cancellation was correct. What was canceled was the kind of National Assembly that the Guomindang has prepared to convene in the past; under the Guomindang's guidelines, such a National Assembly would have had no power at all, and the procedures for its election were entirely at odds with the will of the people. Together with people of all sectors of society, we disapproved of that kind of National Assembly. The provisional National Assembly we are proposing is completely different *in spirit* from the one that has been canceled. After this provisional National Assembly has met, the situation[38] will certainly become an en-

38. Situation → Situation throughout the country

tirely new one, and a necessary condition for transforming the government apparatus, for transforming the army, and for mobilizing the people will have been met. A favorable turn in the War of Resistance is at stake here.

The Decisive Battle at the Moment Is Along the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway Line

(October 25, 1937, 5:00 A.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

We have taken note of your telegram of the 24th.

1. Are you going to use Chen Guang's brigade[1] on the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line? I think this is necessary. Moreover, it also seems necessary for the main forces of Xu Haidong's brigade[2] to move southward to do battle. It is sufficient to leave one unit behind in the northwest to cooperate with the special task regiment of General Headquarters and Yang's detachment.[3] At the moment the decisive battle is along the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line.

2. For the purpose of really cutting off the major north-south communication line at Yanmen, it would seem advantageous for Wang Zhen's forces[4] to take part in the operation in Yanmenguan area,[5] and to cooperate in the campaign of Song's detachment.[6]

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 100–101, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

2. The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

3. The reference is to the independent regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Yang Chengwu.

4. At this time, Wang Zhen was leading the main force of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

5. Yanmenguan, located in the northern part of Dai *xian* in Shanxi, was one of the major passages through the Great Wall.

6. The reference is to the Yanbei Detachment, which had as its basis the Second Battalion of the 716th Regiment of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and was commanded by Song Shilun.

The Deployment of the 120th Division in Northwestern Shanxi

(October 27, 1937)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. It seems that the Far Eastern Army of the Soviet Union has put on a show of force toward Manchuria and Japan. It is said that one unit of the Japanese forces in northern China has moved beyond the Shanhaiguan, and another unit has gone back to Japan, but this is not confirmed. Please do not pass it on to your subordinates, lest it encourage an attitude of underestimating the enemy.

2. As our main forces on the right have concentrated along the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway line, if we fight well, we should be able to halt the enemy's advance. In my last telegram I suggested that the main forces of the 120th Division should march northward, but I have as yet had no reply. I still hope that you will think about it. In my opinion, we should leave only one regiment to the west of Yuanping. Of the two regiments of main forces troops, put the whole of Song's regiment[1] in the area from Datong, Huairen, Daiyue, Zuoyun, and Youyu to Pinglu and divide it into several detachments. The main forces will attack the area along the railway. One unit will launch new work in the west; the other regiment will be in the Shanyin, Yanmenguan, Suxian area, and its main forces will carry out surprise attacks on the railway line. One unit will open up a new prospect in Su *xian,* and its purpose is to make sure, on the one hand, that the major transportation line is cut, while, on the other hand, developing the work in the north.

3. Wang Zhaoxiang's unit[2] should stay where it is for the moment and await further orders. If the negotiations to the effect that the Eighty-sixth Division[3] should

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 109–10, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the 716th Regiment of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Song Shilun.

2. The reference is to the Engineer's Battalion of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Wang Zhaoxiang.

3. The reference is to the Eighty-sixth Division of the Guomindang, commanded by Gao Shuangcheng.

not occupy the Shenfu soviet area are successful, then this division may not go back, and it will recruit and reconsolidate in Shanxi. If the negotiation is not successful, we can tell it in a telegraph to move back.

Mao Zedong

Outline for a Report on the Current Situation in the War of Resistance and the Party's Tasks

(October 1937)

Part I. The Current Situation in the War of Resistance

A. The Sino-Japanese War: Current State and Assessments

1. The latest developments in the war in North China and the Yangzi River area following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

2. The Japanese bandits have achieved temporary, partial victory in this war of aggression. This is because: (a) Japan is an imperialist country with powerful armed forces; (b) it is a close neighbor of China; (c) it was a planned, prepared invasion.

3. But this time it is different from "September 18." Japan has paid an extremely high price for every inch of territory it has occupied and has met with forceful resistance.

4. China has carried out a resolute, brave war of national self-defense against Japan, and, though it has suffered temporary, partial defeats, this war of national self-defense: (a) brought out the great and resolute brave spirit of the Chinese nation in an unprecedented way, eliminated the "fear of Japan disease" of the past, and dealt a considerable blow to the Japanese invaders; (b) consolidated China's internal solidarity and unity in an unprecedented way, of China, signaling a new atmosphere in the Republic of China; (c) caused the Nationalist and Communist Parties, which had been opponents for the past ten years, to resume cooperation, and brought about a decisive transformation in the Guomindang.

5. These temporary and partial defeats are also due to the fact that China is a country of semicolonial and semifeudal relations, and so: (a) Its military technology is backward; (b) the government and the military are old and corrupt, with many morbid states and weaknesses; (c) the military command is thoroughly backward; (d) the government is afraid to allow an open people's movement.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 48–61, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

6. Such defeats are usually difficult to avoid at the beginning of a war between a semicolonial country and an imperialist country.

B. The Crisis and the Difficulties of the Current Situation

1. It is precisely these temporary and partial defeats that have caused the many current military, political, fiscal, and economic difficulties.

2. These difficulties are being used by the national defeatists, Chinese traitors, and pro-Japanese factions to prove the inability of China to resist Japan and to support their own capitulation and compromise. We should never underestimate the overt emergence of their activities, their dangerous nature, or their strength. Their weakness is that they do not have the support of the military and the people.

3. These difficulties have caused wavering and disappointment among some people within the anti-Japanese faction. They feel that the War of Resistance is hopeless, and they are cowed by the yammering of the pro-Japanese elements that "if we are not subjugated by Japan, then we will be subjugated by the Communists." This is the biggest danger at the moment. Still, the "decisive force" within the resistance faction, Chiang Kaishek, has so far continued to advocate a resolute War of Resistance.

4. The current moment is crucial for turning the crisis around.

C. Our Standpoint

1. We firmly believe that the defeats at this point have been temporary and partial, and are not a final and complete defeat. The war that will determine victory or defeat is still ahead of us, and the ultimate victory or defeat will be decided in a protracted war.

2. We believe, nonetheless, that we are now at a critical moment in the crisis. Our urgent task at the moment is to unite those within the resist-Japan faction, which means first and foremost further cooperation between the Nationalist and Communist Parties, in order to use all of our force to shatter the conspiracy of the pro-Japanese faction, overcome all the current difficulties, and continue the War of Resistance.

3. We must use the most concrete facts to prove before the people of the whole country that China's War of Resistance can be won and propose specific methods to solve the current difficulties.

Part II. Can China's War of Resistance Be Victorious?

A. The Three Factors That Will Determine Victory or Defeat in the Sino-Japanese War

1. China's strength.
2. Japan's strength.

3. The international strength.
But the decisive factor is China's own strength.

B. China's Strength Is Becoming Greater as the War of Resistance Proceeds

1. The War of Resistance has expanded and strengthened the Anti-Japanese National United Front and China's domestic unity and firmness (the cooperation between the Nationalist and Communist Parties, between the government and the people, between the localities and the center).

2. The War of Resistance made the government begin to become a government of national defense. It has laid down the beginnings of a foundation for a unified government of national defense: a national defense policy of resolute resistance war, the determination to convene a national defense conference—the release of political prisoners—eliminating the emergency criminal procedure law—legalizing, to a certain degree, the National Salvation movement—struggle against corruption—struggle against Chinese traitors.

3. The National Revolutionary Army has begun to become a unified army of national defense, and it has laid down the beginnings of a foundation on which to build a unified national defense army: the establishment of a unified supreme commanding headquarters—the differentiation of individual war zones—the moving to the front lines of each provincial army—the reorganization of the Red Army into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army—beginning to set up a new army—beginning to establish political work in the more progressive of the armies.

4. The broad masses have been mobilized to participate in the War of Resistance, creating a high tide in the national War of Resistance.

5. The longer the War of Resistance persists, the more internally united China will be, the more powerful it will become, the more it will be able to become a democratic republic and defeat the Japanese invaders.

C. The Weaknesses and Difficulties of the Japanese Invaders

1. Fiscal and economic difficulties, particularly the failure to develop military industry.

2. The intensification of domestic contradictions (between the government and the people, and within the military and the bourgeoisie themselves).

3. The large territory and rich resources of China mean that the Japanese troops are inadequately distributed and cannot consolidate the occupied regions.

4. Japan's rear area is not consolidated (Korea, Taiwan, the Four Eastern Provinces, and so on).

5. The longer the War of Resistance persists, the more Japan's weaknesses will increase, and the more advantages we will have for achieving victory in the War of Resistance.

D. The International Situation

1. China's War of Resistance has aroused the sympathy and assistance of the proletariat and the people of the entire world—the attitude of the social democratic parties—the attitude of England's Labor Party and labor unions—the sympathy of France's labor unions and Social Democratic Party—the most reactionary union federation in America advocates opposing Japan and a boycott of Japanese goods—the admission of the Soviet labor union into the International Federation of Labor Unions in Amsterdam. The Soviet Union.

2. The attitude of all the countries of the world—France—Great Britain—America—the inconsistencies in their internal attitudes. Germany, Italy.

3. Generally speaking, the international situation favors China, and Japan is relatively isolated.

E. Conclusion

1. China has the strength to defeat Japan. Both the domestic and the international situations are advantageous to China.

2. The central thing today is to persevere in the War of Resistance and to wage a protracted war.

Part III. How to Achieve Victory in the War of Resistance

A. Expand and Strengthen the Anti-Japanese National United Front, Which Is Founded on Cooperation Between the Nationalist and Communist Parties

1. First, it must be explained to people both within and outside the Party that the basic precondition for this united front is resistance to Japan. "Resisting Japan above all else." Democracy and People's Livelihood are both secondary to this.

2. The content of the united front is: (a) cooperation among all parties and factions resisting Japan; (b) a unified government of national defense; (c) a unified army of national defense; (d) unified associations of the popular masses. This does not mean a government, an army, or associations of the popular masses monopolized by one party or faction.

3. The objective of cooperation between all parties and factions within the united front is "mutual help, mutual development"; it is not a matter of who should lead whom. For instance, our attitude toward the Guomindang and all the Guomindang's different factions is to assist in their development, consolidation, and unification; it is not to weaken and splinter them (the question of dealing with the different

factions of the Guomindang such as the CC Clique,[1] the Huangpu Clique,[2] the Revival Society,[3] and the fascists).

4. Our methods in working with our allies: (a) practical, tangible assistance, often taking the form of suggestions; (b) making appropriate requests and slogans based on the degree of their consciousness and the urgency of their needs; these should not be too demanding or too leftist; (c) well-meaning criticism, and we should also praise their merits; (d) make use of the motive force of the masses, that is, motivate forces from the bottom up, but do not engage in confrontation.

5. Make clear to the Guomindang that the Communist Party will cooperate with the Guomindang not only in the War of Resistance against Japan but also in realizing the Three People's Principles and in founding a new China. Therefore, this is a long-term cooperation to last for several decades, not short-term cooperation or merely subterfuge. We must struggle to the end for the united front.

6. Contradictions and friction within the united front are inevitable; they cannot be eliminated and can only be diminished. We should resolve and alleviate internal contradiction and friction under the principles of developing the resist-Japan movement and putting resistance to Japan above all else.

7. The struggle between the two lines within the united front; oppose capitulationism and closed-doorism. What is "maintaining independence and keeping the initiative"?

8. How to expand the united front: (a) the united front of every party and faction; (b) all mass organizations joining the united front; (c) organizing the unorganized to join the united front; (d) splitting the pro-Japanese faction and striving to win over those elements who are under the influence of the pro-Japanese faction.

B. Establish a Unified Government of National Defense on the Basis of the National Government

1. Instead of establishing another government, we want to establish a unified government of national defense on the basis of this anti-Japanese National Government. Push the current government forward.

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1. The conservative faction known as the CC Clique, or the Organization Clique, was led by the two brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu.

2. The Huangpu Clique was made up of those who had studied or served as instructors at the Whampoa Military Academy when Chiang Kaishek was its commandant in the 1920s.

3. The Revival Society (*Fuxingshe*), also known as the "Revive China Society," was the front organization for the shadowy body commonly referred to as the Blue Shirt Society, founded by Chiang Kaishek in 1932, of which the actual title was the *Lixingshe* (Society for the Forceful Application [of the Three People's Principles]). On this last point, see the article by Xu Youwei and Philip Billingsley, "Behind the Scenes of the Xi'an Incident: The Case of the *Lixingshe*," *China Quarterly,* no. 154 (June 1998), pp. 283–307. On the "Blue Shirts" and other related bodies in general, see Lloyd Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 31–79, and Hung-mao Tien, *Government and Politics in Kuomintang China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 54–65.

2. We call upon those members of all parties and factions, including the Communist Party, who have prestige to join this government, consolidate the center, and persist in the policy of the overall policy of the War of Resistance.

3. Gradually weed out the pro-Japanese elements and the corrupt and degenerate elements from the government.

4. Help the central government to improve the local governments, oppose the situation of feudal separatist rule, help the local governments make progress in becoming organic components of the central government. Eliminate the antithesis between the central government and the localities.

5. Solve the problem of special districts. The principles for solving the problem of special-district governments are: (a) maintain the leadership of the Party; (b) make the special districts into local governments that are part of the Republic of China; (c) maintain the special districts as progressive regions in the War of Resistance against Japan, as the locomotives of nationwide democratization, and as embryonic models for the new China.

6. We should strictly differentiate the special districts from the united front areas (for example, regions in which the Eighth Route Army is stationed).

7. Communist Party members in governments of all levels should become models of resolve and bravery, endurance and diligence, public-spiritedness, politeness, and honor, and should be subject to strict supervision by the Party at the central and local levels.

8. Our objective is to establish a democratic republic with a parliamentary structure; both the domestic and the international situations demand this. (The example of Spain)

C. Expand and Establish a Unified Army of National Defense on the Basis of the Current Military Forces

1. Expand and establish it on the basis of what exists, rather than discarding the existing military forces.

2. We cannot say that the existing forces fighting the War of Resistance are still warlord forces or that those who lead the troops are warlords. Warlords can become national heroes and good military men.

3. How should we assist in expanding and building a unified army of national defense? (a) set up a political work system: (i) to strengthen the fighting capacity of the military forces, (ii) to improve military-civilian relations, (iii) to improve officer-soldier relations; (b) unify command, discipline, armaments, supply, battle plans, and so on; (c) oppose the warlordist practice of commanding one's own army for self-defense only, but also oppose discrimination against the localities by the central government; (d) help the government carry out the military conscription system; (e) train talented military and political staff in large numbers, improve, and expand military and political schools; (f) improve our military skills and military command.

4. Expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army, strengthen the Party's leadership, strengthen political work, and improve its technical equipment, to make it a part of the national army and act as a model within it.

5. The Communist Party members should go to the army, go to the schools for military officers, go to the guard teams, the recruit teams, the volunteer forces, and the guerrilla units, to become models of political consciousness, resolve and bravery, endurance and diligence, and disciplinary obedience. They should also use their position to influence other officers and soldiers, and improve the quality of the army.

6. Coordinate the guerrilla warfare with the regular warfare. Relying on guerrilla war alone, it will be impossible to defeat the Japanese bandits.

D. Mobilize and Arm the People to Help the Government and the Military to Fight the War of Resistance and to Organize a Consolidated Rear Area

1. The Guomindang's contradiction regarding the mass movement: on the one hand, it "wants" it, but, on the other hand, it "fears" it. Because it "wants" it, it cannot avoid giving it a certain legitimacy; because it "fears" it, it cannot refrain from dominating it.

2. Our contradiction: we want to mobilize the masses, but our allies are afraid of mobilizing the masses and want to dominate them. It is about the difference between a "one-sided War of Resistance" and a "Total War of Resistance."

3. The mass movement can, however, still be mobilized in such a situation. The problem is through what kind of methods, what kind of paths.

4. The fundamental principles for the mass movement should be "legality" and "unity." Use all kinds of legal forms, even old forms. Everything should be done for the purpose of unification and against splits. Even the movements started and organized by the Communist Party are also subject to these two general principles.

5. About launching the struggle between the two fronts within the Save-the-Nation-from-Extinction movement, go deep into the midst of the masses.

6. As regards the relationships between the government, the military, and the popular masses (for instance, concerning friction over the issues of democracy and People's Livelihood), the Party should play the role of bridge and mediator. The government and the army should make some concessions, but the people should also support the government in resisting Japan. It is a mistake to provoke sharp conflicts.

7. How to arm the popular masses? (a) Mainly by seizing the enemy's weapons; (b) asking the government to provide some; (c) coming up with ways to buy some; (d) gathering together miscellaneous guns and such to organize armed self-defense forces, picket teams, and traitor-elimination teams.

8. Struggle against Chinese traitors, enemy spies, and Trotskyite bandits, particularly the latter, to consolidate the rear area. (a) the role of the Trotskyite bandits; (b) the danger of the Trotskyite bandits; (c) resolutely wipe out the Trotskyite bandits.

E. Carry on the War of Resistance and Guerrilla Warfare in North China

1. Because of our Party's increasing strength in North China, we are shouldering important responsibilities in North China, particularly in developing guerrilla warfare. We must set a good example there to influence the whole country.

2. We should stick to the overall policy of the national united front. Rather than seeking to swallow them up, we should cooperate with all the anti-Japanese parties and factions, and help them organize in order to develop their strength.

3. In places where the old régimes still exist, we should use them and work through the old régimes to achieve our goal of carrying on the War of Resistance; in places where there are no old régimes, we should set up united front governments of all parties and factions, preserve the old forms, and ask the higher-level governments for direction, appointments, and assistance. When the old systems of command still exist, we should continue to use them and work through them to achieve our goal of carrying on the War of Resistance; when there are no such old systems of command, we should set up unified command headquarters and ask higher-level organs for direction, appointments, and assistance.

4. Help the Guomindang to set up party headquarters in the two provinces of Hebei and Chahar, and put them in touch with the Guomindang Central [Executive] Committee.

5. Regarding the organizations of Chinese traitors in the occupied regions, such as the Peace Preservation Society, we should splinter them and try to put them to our use.

6. We should arm the people on a large scale, expand the anti-Japanese army and the Eighth Route Army, and organize self-defense armies, volunteer armies, guerrilla forces, and such, of all kinds and under various names.

7. Use all the old and legal forms to organize the masses to cooperate and unite with one another; all struggles should have resistance against Japan as their primary purpose.

8. Set up Communist Party organizations everywhere, and pay attention to the connection between open work and secret work. There should be secret Party organizations everywhere.

F. Expand and Build Up the Defense Industry

1. The national government has thus far not paid attention to the importance of the defense industry in a protracted war.

2. The central government should set up a ministry of national defense industry to unify planning and direction.

3. Issue defense bonds to develop defense industries.
4. Defense industries should be built in safe areas.
5. It is also necessary for every province to set up small-scale defense industries.
6. The special zones should also apply themselves to this matter.

G. Seek International Assistance to Strengthen the Forces of Resistance

1. Strengthen international propaganda (films, picture books, newspapers, joint declarations, delegations, and so on) to win the sympathy and assistance of all countries and their boycott of Japanese goods, and to persuade them not to sell their munitions to Japan, but to sell them to us instead.

2. Go a step further in drawing closer to England, the United States, France, and all other countries in the peace front; make use of contradictions in the international domain.

3. On relations with the Soviet Union.

4. The connection between domestic policy and foreign policy.

H. Conclusion

[The completion of] these tasks is a necessary precondition for achieving victory in the War of Resistance. They are not the tasks of the Communist Party alone; they are the tasks of the whole nation. We are willing to struggle hard, together with the government authorities, every party, every faction, every sector of society, and every military force in order to bring about the accomplishment of these tasks.

Part IV. Set Up a Strong Communist Party Across All of China

A. What Has the Chinese Communist Party Done in the Resistance War?

1. Our achievements: (a) the cooperation between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party opened up prospects for a War of Resistance; (b) we laid out a specific program for achieving victory in the War of Resistance, carried out extensive propaganda, and have, moreover, carried out some parts of the program in some regions; (c) the participation of the Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance and its effectiveness; (d) the War of Resistance and guerrilla war in North China; (e) the mobilization of Party members nationwide to participate in the war; (f) the obtaining of semi-open and open status for organizations of the Communist Party—these achievements have greatly increased the Party's influence and prestige.

2. Our weak points: (a) the united front is inadequate, and Party members do not have a deep understanding of the united front policy; (b) our capacity to mobilize the masses is still weak, and Party members are unable to go deep among the masses; (c) our organizational strength is weak; it has fallen behind our political influence; (d) We are short on cadres with the ability to work independently. These weaknesses have made us unable to develop our work still further.

3. Relying on the position we have already achieved, we should correct our weaknesses and develop our work, so that our Party can play a decisive role in the War of Resistance.

B. Going from a Party of the Soviet Regions and the Red Army to Building a Party Across All of China

1. Strive to win open status for the Party on a nationwide basis, take advantage of every possible activity to "come down from the mountains."

2. Develop and strengthen the Party; set up leadership bodies in every locality.

3. Heighten alertness within the Party to prevent traitors, enemy agents, opportunists, and capitulationists from worming their way into the Party.

4. Set up an open, nationwide Party newspaper and circulation network.

5. Prepare to convene the Seventh Party Congress.

C. Cadre Policy

1. The present panic of the cadres. Reinforce the education, training, and promotion of the cadres. "Cadres decide everything."

2. Investigating the cadres, and testing the cadres' political aspect and work abilities.

3. Make our cadres capable not only of managing the Party but also of managing the country. They must understand how to speak to the people of all China and the people of the entire world and work on their behalf. They must have broad, far-reaching political vision and the demeanor of statesmen.

D. Struggle for Solidarity and Unanimity Within the Party

1. Solidarity and unanimity within the Party is a precondition for defeating the Japanese bandits.

2. The interests of the Party are above all else. Everything for the Party. Sabotage of the Party is the sabotage of the revolution.

3. Strengthen Marxist-Leninist education within the Party, and the unity of theory and practice.

4. Correctly develop ideological struggle and self-criticism.

5. Strictly enforce the Party's discipline; resolutely observe the organizational principle of democratic centralism.

6. Struggle on behalf of the Bolshevik line of the International and the Chinese Communist Party.

Instructions at the Inauguration Ceremony for the Buildings of the Anti-Japanese University

(October 1937)

I want to talk with the comrades about the reason for the success of this great cause. To sum it up, it is the ability to surmount difficulties and connect with the masses. The experience of struggle over the past decade, as well as the cave-digging by you this time, have demonstrated, and the future process of the War of Resistance will once again demonstrate, that if we can continue in this way, we can triumph over everything!

Although overcoming natural obstacles and conquering the soil has many similarities with overcoming living enemies and defeating the Japanese bandits, there are many respects in which they are not entirely the same. The latter will be somewhat harder and more difficult. Hence, in the War of Resistance, we must not simply have the mental attitude of surmounting difficulties and connecting with the masses. We can only succeed if we are also good at work such as applying strategy and tactics, organizing, mobilizing, and leading the masses, securing allies, and so on.

Now you already possess the spirit of overcoming difficulties and connecting with the masses. So long as you continue to mobilize and display your talents on this basis in defeating and expelling Japan, it is entirely possible to drive Japan out of China.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, p. 277, where it is reproduced from a Red Guard publication.

To Ai Siqi[1]

(1937)[2]

Comrade Siqi:

Your *Philosophy and Life*[3] is the profoundest of all your books. I have derived great benefit from reading it and have taken some notes. I am sending them to you with the request that you see whether what I have written is correct. In the notes, there is one question regarding which I take a somewhat different view (it is not a fundamental disagreement).[4] Please give further consideration to this point, and tell me frankly and in detail what you think. Today, whenever I have some free time, I will come to see you.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 112–13, where it is reproduced from the handwritten manuscript.

1. Ai Siqi (1910–1966) had published in 1934 an extremely influential work of popularization of Marxism, entitled *Dazhong zhexue* (Philosophy for the Masses) and was admitted into the Chinese Communist Party a year later. In 1936 he had taken the side of "literature for national defense," rather than that of "people's literature," and in 1937 he had gone to Yan'an, where he rapidly became one of the Party's most influential propagandists.

2. The letter is dated simply 1937 in the available sources, but it must have been written no earlier than October, since Ai Siqi arrived in Yan'an only at that time.

3. This work had been published in Shanghai in April 1937.

4. For details regarding the point on which Mao disagreed with him, see below, in the section of this volume devoted to his reading notes, his comments on *Philosophy and Life.*

The Current Situation and Orientation[1]

(November 1, 1937)

Comrades:

You have asked me to talk about problems of the current situation, and I shall take advantage of the opening of your school to address this question. You are intimately involved in this question because those who study and those who teach have a single goal, which is to resolve the national and social crises.

The situation now is extremely tense. The second line of defense in Shanghai has fallen. The enemies in eastern Shanxi have already broken through Niangziguan, and they are attempting to act in concert with the enemies in northern Shanxi and advance toward Taiyuan. At present, there are two issues facing us: 1. To continue to fight or to stop fighting? 2. How to fight?

The present war situation is obviously unfavorable to China. This is because in the past we only engaged in a one-sided War of Resistance, and not an all-out war. Now many people say that the present war is already an all-out war. This is incorrect because, although from a territorial standpoint, it is an all-out war, in terms of social composition it is still a one-sided war. The broad masses have still by no means been mobilized for the War of Resistance. Only armies and governments are involved, so we have suffered many defeats. Under such circumstances, a new kind of danger is growing: Traitors and pro-Japanese elements are taking the opportunity to raise their heads, and such arguments as "Fighting will inevitably lead to defeat" and "Weapons alone will determine the outcome" will certainly be encouraged as a result. Their conclusion is that China cannot win, so it must surrender. The theory of national surrender is the new danger now.

We must realize that the War of Resistance has registered indelible achievements in the past. What are these achievements? (1) China's War of Resistance is unprecedented in the past hundred years and is by nature a revolutionary war. (2) During the War of Resistance, China has become more united internally. (3) Although we have suffered many military setbacks, we have dealt rather heavy blows

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 62–64, where it is reproduced from the text published in *Xin Zhonghua bao,* November 4, 1937. The same version can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 131–32.

1. This is Mao Zedong's speech at the opening ceremony of the Northern Shaanxi Public School.

to the Japanese bandits. (4) We have gained international sympathy. (5) Most important, we have learned a profound lesson in the war, namely, that we cannot win by waging a one-sided War of Resistance.

We must never become disillusioned because of the current situation. We are in complete agreement with Mr. Chiang Kaishek's speech of October 9 and will fight to the end with determination, even to the last person and the last gun. This is the meaning of the Communist Party's statement about "shedding the last drop of blood for the defense of the motherland," and it constitutes our fundamental policy in the current situation.

We shall certainly continue to fight, but how should we fight? Militarily, we must emulate the methods of the Eighth Route Army, that is, we should fight flexibly and not rigidly. In the past, we were always attacked by the enemy, so our method of fighting must change, and we should attack the enemy. The most important thing is that we must carry out the Ten-Point Program for resisting Japan and saving the country put forward by the Communist Party, mobilize the 450 million Chinese to take part in the War of Resistance, organize them, and arm them. They constitute an extremely great force, and it is only with this force that China can be victorious. The whole country should definitely learn from the Eighth Route Army, truly bring about unity between soldiers and civilians, and between officers and soldiers, transform the spirit of the army, and strengthen political work in the army, in order to achieve our goals. Only thus can we turn around the current grave situation. This is the correct method for carrying out the policy of continued fighting.

If we have the two aspects represented by the above orientation and methods, we can definitely defeat Japanese imperialism.

We need to create for the national revolution large numbers of cadres who understand revolutionary theory, are infused with the spirit of sacrifice, and are the vanguards of the revolution. Only by relying on tens of thousands of good cadres, capable of applying revolutionary policies and methods, can an all-out nationwide revolutionary war emerge in China and the enemy be finally defeated.

After the Fall of Taiyuan, North China Will Carry on a Guerrilla War of Resistance Against Japan with the Eighth Route Army as the Main Force

(November 8, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], and for the information of Lin [Biao] and Nie [Rongzhen], He [Xiaoguang] [He Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying], and Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Lin Yuying]:

1. After the fall of Taiyuan, the period of regular warfare in northern China will be basically over, and the period of guerrilla warfare will begin.[1] The Eighth Route Army will play the principal role in this phase of guerrilla warfare, and the others will rely on the Eighth Route Army. This is the overall situation in North China.

2. We judge that, in order to defend Henan, before the fall of Jincheng and Linfen, the remaining troops in Shanxi will not withdraw, and it is also possible that Liu Xiang's[2] forces may enter Shanxi. The remaining troops of Yan [Xishan], Wei [Lihuang], Sun [Lianzhong], Ceng [Wanzhong], Feng [Qinzai], Zhao [Shoushan], Deng [Xihou], Sun [Chu], and others will be scattered in large numbers. In that case it must be feared that even a guerrilla war will not be able to sustain them for long. Yan will not have the energy to interfere too much with the local work of the Eighth Route Army, and consequently the Eighth Route Army will become the backbone of the guerrilla war in the whole of Shanxi. In accordance with the principle of a united front, you should set out to mobilize the masses, expand your forces, gather supplies, and incorporate the scattered soldiers into your own forces. We should adopt the principle that each division should recruit three regiments. Do not rely on the Guomindang for salaries, but raise the money yourselves and pay them.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 111–13, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Taiyuan in fact fell to the Japanese on the next day, November 9.

2. Liu Xiang (1888–1938) was at this time commander of the Guomindang Seventh War Zone.

3. The Luliang mountain range is a major base of the Eighth Route Army, but the work there has not yet begun. Consequently, not only should Xu's brigade[3] move away at once, but Chen's brigade,[4] under the command of Lin, should also not fight any longer in the east, and it will be better for it to start moving away immediately as well. We calculate that it will take at least twenty days from the time of moving away until beginning work, and it will take another ten days before the work can become effective (after the start). We are afraid that by that time the enemy will have gone deep into the Feng River drainage area and will have already taken Xiaoyi and other places. After the moving away, it is better if Xu's brigade can use Fengyang as its center, and Chen's brigade can use Puxian as its center. The General Headquarters should start moving to the west right away.

4. The forces under the command of Wen Niansheng, Yan Hongyan, and Bai Zhiwen[5] are responsible for the defense along the river from Jia *xian* to Yanchang. Chen Qihan[6] is the garrison commander for the five *xian* of Sui, Mi, Qing, Jia, and Wu; Guo Hongtao[7] is the political commissar, and together they command all the troops under Wen and Yan. Wen's troops have finished arranging the defense in Suide, Mizi, Jia *xian,* and Wubu. Yan's troops will set out from Yan'an tomorrow to relieve the garrison along Wayaobao, Qingjiancheng, Hekou, and Majiaping. He Changgong is the defensive commander of the two Yans.[8] He will command Bai's troops to build boats, and their additional task includes supervising and protecting transportation. Xiao Jingguang is the commander-in-chief of the river defense, holding to the west bank to resist the enemy on the east bank. Only in this way can the west bank of the river be forcefully defended, and can we assist in the most important task of He's entire division in the Luliang and Guanyin mountain ranges.

5. The entire 129th Division, in southeastern Shanxi, and the 120th Division in northwestern Shanxi should prepare to sustain a protracted guerrilla war. Their main forces should not withdraw from Shanxi unless they are facing the danger of having their retreat cut off. The concrete details of their deployment will be dealt with by Zhu and Peng. Zhou should please come back to Yan['an] by way of Suide.

Mao Zedong

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3. The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

4. The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

5. Wen Niansheng was the commander of the Eighth Garrison Regiment, Yan Hongyan was the commander of the Third Garrison Regiment, and Bai Zhiwen was the commander of the Fifth Garrison Regiment.

6. Chen Qihan was at this time commander of the garrison forces of the Eighth Route Army in Suide.

7. Guo Hongtao was at this time secretary of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee.

8. The "two Yans" refers to Yanchuan and Yanchang *xian,* located on the banks of the Yellow River in northern Shanxi.

Opinions Regarding the Situation in North China and Readjustments in the Deployment of the Eighth Route Army

(November 9, 1937, 4:00 A.M.)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ren [Bishi], for the information of Zhou [Enlai], and to be transmitted to Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi], Yang [Shangkun], and Peng [Xuefeng]:

In the situation in which regular war in northern China has already ended, and the guerrilla war has taken the leading position, the Japanese bandits will soon divert their main forces to attack key points in the *xian* in the interior. Shenchi, Ningwu, and Jingle in northwestern Shanxi; Wutai, Yu *xian*, Wei *xian*, Guangling, and Lingqiu in northeastern Shanxi; Xiyang, Heshun, Liao *xian,* and Jincheng in southeastern Shanxi; Lishi, Zhongyang, Xiaoyi, Lingshi, Pu *xian,* and other places in southwestern Shanxi, are all places the enemy will advance to next. Consequently, new dispositions should be adopted for the work of Nie [Rongzhen]'s forces, He [Long]'s division, Liu [Bocheng]'s division, and Lin [Biao]'s division (Lin's division should be moved to the Luliang mountain range) in these four major areas. The general guiding principle for these deployments is to dispose of one unit as the attack team, while the top priority for the majority is to disperse them as much as possible in important places to organize armed forces of the popular masses. Generally speaking, the troops should be deployed first in the areas near the railways and highways, where they should serve as advance detachments. They should work first in areas which the enemy will soon reach; work can be undertaken later in areas which the enemy will not reach soon. All the armies have been routed, and even Yan [Xishan] does not know what to do next. In accordance with the basic principles of the united front, the Red Army should take the initiative in mobilizing the people, abolishing the exorbitant taxes and levies, reducing rent and interest rates, incorporating the scattered troops into our own forces, buying guns, collecting money for soldiers' pay and provisions, carrying out a policy of self-sufficiency, expanding the army, cracking down on the Chinese traitors, incorporating the leftists into our ranks, and further bringing into play the spirit of

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 65–66. The same version appears in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 114–15, under a different title.

independence and self-reliance. If we continue like this, we will achieve striking successes in a month, thus helping to prepare us to resist with all our strength the enemy's forthcoming attack upon the *xian* in the interior.

Mao Zedong

The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan

(November 12, 1937)

I. The Present Situation Is One of Transition from a War of Partial Resistance to a War of Total Resistance

1. We support any kind of war of resistance, even though partial, against the invasion of Japanese imperialism. For partial resistance is a step forward from nonresistance, and to a certain extent it is revolutionary in character and is a war in defense of the motherland.

2. But a war of partial resistance by the government alone without the participation of the popular masses will certainly fail, as we have already pointed out (at the meeting of Party activists in Yan'an in April of this year, at the Party's national conference in May, and in the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee in August). For it is not a national revolutionary war in the full sense, not a war of the masses.

3. We stand for a national revolutionary war in the full sense, a war in which the people of the entire country are mobilized, in other words, all-out resistance. For only such a war of resistance constitutes a war of the masses and can achieve the goal of defending the motherland.

4. Although the partial war of resistance advocated by the Guomindang also constitutes a national war and is revolutionary in character, its revolutionary character is far from complete. Partial resistance is bound to lead to defeat in the war; it can never successfully defend the motherland.

5. Herein lies the difference in principle between the stand of the Communist Party and the present stand of the Guomindang with regard to resistance. If Communists forget this difference in principle, they will be unable to guide the War of Resistance correctly, they will be powerless to overcome the Guomindang's one-sidedness, and they will debase themselves to the point of abandoning their Communist principles and reducing their Party to the level of the Guomindang. That

Our source for this document is the 1991 revised edition of *Mao Zedong xuanji,* Vol. 2, pp. 387–96. No contemporary version is available.

would be a crime against the sacred cause of the national revolutionary war and the defense of the motherland.

6. In a national revolutionary war in the full sense, in an all-out war of resistance, it is essential to put into effect the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation proposed by the Communist Party,[1] and it is essential to have a government and an army that will enforce this program in its entirety.

7. The situation after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan is as follows:

a. In North China, regular warfare in which the Guomindang played the chief role has ended, and guerrilla warfare in which the Communist Party is playing the chief role has become primary. In Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the Japanese aggressors have broken through the Guomindang's battle lines and are advancing on Nanjing and the Yangzi valley. It is already evident that the Guomindang's partial resistance cannot last long.

b. In their own imperialist interests, the governments of Britain, the United States, and France have indicated that they will help China, but so far there has been only verbal sympathy and no practical aid whatsoever.

c. The German and Italian fascists are doing everything to assist Japanese imperialism.

d. The Guomindang is still unwilling to make any fundamental change in its one-party dictatorship and autocratic rule over the popular masses, through which it is carrying on partial resistance.

This is one side of the picture.

The other side is seen in the following:

a. The political influence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army is spreading fast and far, and they are being acclaimed throughout the country as "the saviors of the nation." The Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army are determined to persevere in the guerrilla warfare in North China, so as to defend the whole country, tie down the Japanese bandits, and hinder them from attacking the Central Plains and the Northwest.

b. The movement of the popular masses has developed a step further.

c. The national bourgeoisie is leaning toward the left.

d. Forces favoring reforms are growing within the Guomindang.

e. The movement to oppose Japan and aid China is spreading among the people of the world.

f. The Soviet Union is preparing to give forceful assistance to China.

This is the other side of the picture.

8. Therefore, the present situation is one of transition from a partial war of resistance to a full-scale war of resistance. While partial resistance cannot last

1. See above, the outline of the Propaganda Department dated August 25, 1937.

long, all-out resistance has not yet begun. The transition from one to the other, the gap in time, is fraught with danger.

9. In this period, China's partial War of Resistance may develop in one of three directions:

The first is the ending of the partial War of Resistance and its replacement by an all-out war of resistance. This is what the majority of the nation demands, but the Guomindang is still undecided.

The second is the ending of the War of Resistance and its replacement by capitulation. This is what the Japanese bandits, the Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese elements demand, but the majority of the Chinese people oppose it.

The third is the coexistence of armed resistance and capitulation in China. This could come about as a result of the intrigues of the Japanese bandits, the Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese elements to split China's anti-Japanese front when they find it impossible to attain the second direction. They are now engineering something of this kind. This is a very real and serious danger.

10. Judging from the present situation, the domestic and international factors which prevent capitulationism from winning out have the upper hand. These factors include Japan's resolute policy of destroying China, which leaves China no alternative but to fight; the existence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army; the demands of the Chinese people; the wishes of the majority of Guomindang members; the anxiety of Britain, the United States, and France lest capitulation by the Guomindang damage their interests; the existence of the Soviet Union and its policy of helping China; the high hopes which the Chinese people place (by no means in vain) in the Soviet Union. The proper and coordinated use of these factors would not only frustrate capitulationism and splitting but also overcome the obstructions to any advance beyond partial resistance.

11. Consequently, the prospect of going over from partial to total resistance does exist. To strive for this prospect is the urgent common task of all Chinese Communists, all progressive members of the Guomindang, and all the people of China.

12. China's anti-Japanese national revolutionary war is now confronting a grave crisis. This crisis may be prolonged, or it may be overcome fairly quickly. Internally, the decisive factors are Guomindang-Communist cooperation and a change in Guomindang policy on the basis of this cooperation and the strength of the worker and peasant masses. Externally, the decisive factor is assistance from the Soviet Union.

13. Political and organizational reform of the Guomindang is both necessary and possible. The main reasons are Japanese pressure, the Chinese Communist Party's united front policy, the demands of the Chinese people, and the growth of new forces inside the Guomindang. Our task is to strive for this reform of the Guomindang as a basis for reforming the government and the army. This reform undoubtedly requires the consent of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang, and we are only in a position to offer suggestions.

14. The government should be reformed. We have proposed the policy of convening a provisional national assembly, which is likewise both necessary and possible. Undoubtedly this reform also requires the consent of the Guomindang.

15. The task of reforming the army consists in building up new armies and reforming the old armies. If a new army of 250,000 to 300,000 men imbued with a new political spirit can be built up within six to twelve months, the situation on the anti-Japanese battlefield will begin to take a turn for the better. Such an army would influence all the old armies and rally them around itself. This would provide the military basis for the turn to the strategic counteroffensive in the War of Resistance. This reform likewise requires the Guomindang's consent. The Eighth Route Army ought to have an exemplary role to play in the course of this reform. And the Eighth Route Army itself should be expanded.

II. Capitulationism Must Be Combatted Both Inside the Party and Throughout the Country

Inside the Party, Oppose Class Capitulationism

16. In 1927 Chen Duxiu's capitulationism[2] led to the failure of the revolution. No member of our Party should ever forget this historical lesson written in blood.

17. With regard to the Party's line of an anti-Japanese national united front, the main danger inside the Party before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was "Left" opportunism, that is, closed-doorism. The primary reason for this was that the Guomindang had not yet begun to resist Japan.

18. Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident the main danger inside the Party has no longer been "Left" closed-doorism but has become, rather, Right opportunism, that is, capitulationism. The primary reason for this is that the Guomindang has already begun to resist Japan.

19. As early as the April meeting of Party activists in Yan'an, again in May at the national conference of the Party, and especially in August at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee (the Luochuan meeting), we posed the follow-

2. Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) was one of the leading figures in the May 4th Movement, and exercised great influence over Mao at that time. (See Volume I, especially the article in praise of Chen on pp. 325–330, and the accompanying note.) Chen was, with Li Dazhao, one of the two founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party, and its first leader. He and Mao worked together in 1923–1924, when Chen Duxiu was chairman and Mao secretary of the Central Committee. (See the two texts jointly signed by them in Volume II, pp. 218–221). At the time of the crucial confrontation with Chiang Kaishek in 1927, however, Chen had taken a much more conciliatory stand, and was removed from his leading position in the Party on orders from the International. By 1929, Mao had come to regard Chen's actions as "truly outrageous." (See Volume III, p. 193.) That being said, it was obviously not Chen Duxiu's lack of militancy, but the overwhelming military force commanded by Chiang Kaishek that had led to the defeat of 1927.

ing question: Within the united front, will the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie, or the bourgeoisie the proletariat? Will the Guomindang draw over the Communist Party, or the Communist Party the Guomindang? In relation to the current specific political task, this question means: Is the Guomindang to be raised to the level of the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and of an all-out War of Resistance advocated by the Communist Party? Or is the Communist Party to sink to the level of the Guomindang dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie, to the level of partial resistance?

20. Why must we pose the question so sharply? For the following reasons:

On the one hand, we have the Chinese bourgeoisie's tendency to compromise; the Guomindang's superiority in material strength; the declaration and the decisions of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang, which slander and insult the Communist Party and cry out for "an end to the class struggle"; the Guomindang's yearning for "the capitulation of the Communist Party" and its widespread propaganda to this end; Chiang Kaishek's attempts to place the Communist Party under his control; the Guomindang's policy of restricting and weakening the Red Army and the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; the plan concocted during the Guomindang's Lushan Training Course in July "to reduce the Communist Party's strength by two-fifths in the course of the War of Resistance"; the attempts of the Guomindang to seduce Communist cadres with offers of fame and fortune and wine and women; the political capitulation of certain petty-bourgeois radicals (represented by Zhang Naiqi);[3] and other similar circumstances.

On the other hand, we have the uneven theoretical level within the Communist Party; the fact that many of our Party members lack the experience of cooperation between the two parties gained during the Northern Expedition; the fact that a large number of Party members are of petty-bourgeois origin; the reluctance of some Party members to continue a life of bitter struggle; the existence of a tendency toward unprincipled accommodation with the Guomindang in the united front; the emergence of a tendency toward a new type of warlordism in the Eighth Route Army; the emergence of the problem of Communist participation in the Guomindang

3. Zhang Naiqi (1897–1977), a native of Zhejiang, was a banker and economist. In the early 1930s, he criticized the Guomindang because of its lack of resistance to Japan, and he was one of the founders of the National Salvation Association, established on May 30, 1936. Mao hailed this development with enthusiasm. (See, in Volume V, his letters of August 10 and September 18, 1936, to Zhang and three of his fellow organizers.) Because of their active opposition to Japan, the leaders of the National Salvation Association, who became known as the "Seven Gentlemen," were arrested and imprisoned by the Guomindang authorities, and released only after the Japanese attack of July 1937. After being freed from prison, Zhang adopted a less hostile attitude toward the National Government, hence, Mao's denunciation of his "political capitulation."

government; the emergence of a tendency toward excessive accommodation in the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; and other similar circumstances.

In view of the grave situation described above, we must sharply pose the question of who is to lead and must resolutely combat capitulationism.

21. For several months now, and especially since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Party organizations at all levels have waged a clear-cut and firm struggle against capitulationist tendencies, actual or potential, have taken necessary precautions against them, and have achieved good results.

The Central Committee has issued a draft resolution on the problem of Communist participation in the government.

A struggle has been started against the tendency toward new warlordism in the Eighth Route Army. This tendency is manifest in certain individuals who, since the redesignation of the Red Army, have become unwilling to submit strictly to Communist Party leadership, have developed individualistic heroism, taken pride in being given appointments by the Guomindang (i.e., in becoming officials), and so forth. The tendency toward this new type of warlordism, which manifests itself in beating and abusing people, violating discipline, and so on, has the same root (the reduction of the Communist Party to the level of the Guomindang) and the same result (the alienation from the masses) as the tendency toward the old type of warlordism. It is particularly dangerous because it is occurring in the period of the Guomindang-Communist united front, and it therefore calls for special attention and determined opposition. Both the system of political commissars, which was abolished because of Guomindang intervention, and the system of political departments, which were renamed "political training offices" for the same reason, have now been restored. We have initiated and staunchly carried out the new strategic principle of "independent guerrilla warfare in the mountain regions with the initiative in our own hands," thus basically ensuring the Eighth Route Army's successes in fighting and in its other tasks. We have rejected the Guomindang's demand that its members should be sent to the Eighth Route Army units as cadres and have upheld the principle of absolute leadership of the Eighth Route Army by the Communist Party. Similarly, we have introduced the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front" in the revolutionary anti-Japanese base areas. We have corrected the tendency toward "parliamentarism" (of course, not the parliamentarism of the Second International, which is absent in the Chinese Party); we have also persisted in our struggle against bandits, enemy spies, and saboteurs.

In Xi'an we have corrected the tendency toward unprincipled accommodation in our relations with the Guomindang and have developed the mass struggle anew.

In eastern Gansu we have, on the whole, done the same as in Xi'an.

In Shanghai we have criticized Zhang Naiqi's line of "issuing fewer calls and offering more suggestions" and begun to correct the tendency toward excessive accommodation in the work of the national salvation movement.

In the guerrilla zones in the south—which represent part of the gains of our decade of sanguinary warfare with the Guomindang, our strategic strongholds for the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war in the southern provinces, and our forces which the Guomindang tried to wipe out by "encirclement and suppression" even after the Xi'an Incident, and which it has tried to weaken by the newer method of "luring the tiger out of the mountains" even after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident—we have taken special care (1) to guard against concentrating our forces regardless of circumstances (which would suit the Guomindang's desire to destroy these strongholds), (2) to reject Guomintang appointees, and (3) to be on the alert against the danger of another He Ming Incident (i.e., the danger of being surrounded and disarmed by the Guomindang).[4]

Our attitude in *Jiefang* has continued to be one of serious and fair criticism.

22. In order to persevere in armed resistance and strive for final victory, as well as to turn partial resistance into total resistance, it is necessary to adhere to the Anti-Japanese National United Front and expand and strengthen it. No views disruptive of the Guomindang-Communist united front will be tolerated. We must still guard against "Left" closed-doorism. But at the same time we must closely adhere to the principle of independence and initiative in all our united front work. Our united front with the Guomindang and other parties is based on the execution of a definite program. Without this basis there can be no united front, and in that case cooperation would become unprincipled and a manifestation of capitulationism. Thus the key to leading the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war to victory is to explain, apply, and uphold the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front."

23. What is our purpose in all this? In one respect, it is to hold the ground we have already won, for this ground is our strategic point of departure, and its loss would mean the end of everything. But our chief purpose lies in another direction. It is to extend the ground already won and realize the positive aim of "winning the masses in their millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism." Holding our ground and extending it are inseparably connected. In the last few months, many more left-wing members of the petty bourgeoisie have become united under our influence, the new forces in the Guomindang camp have grown, the mass struggle in Shanxi has developed, and our Party organizations have expanded in many places.

24. But we must clearly understand that generally speaking the organizational capacity of our Party is still very weak in the country as a whole. The strength of the masses in the country as a whole is also very small, because the workers and peasants, the basic elements of the masses, are not yet organized. All this is due to the Guomindang's policy of control and repression, on the one hand, and the inadequacy of our own work or even its complete absence, on the other. This is the

4. See above, the text of September 14, 1937.

fundamental weakness of our Party in the present anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. Unless we overcome this weakness, Japanese imperialism cannot be defeated. To this end we must apply the principle of "independence and initiative within the united front" and overcome all tendencies toward capitulation or excessive accommodation.

In the Country as a Whole, Oppose National Capitulationism

25. The above points deal with class capitulationism. This tendency would lead the proletariat to accommodate itself to bourgeois reformism and bourgeois lack of thoroughness. Unless it is overcome, we cannot succeed in carrying forward the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, in turning partial resistance into total resistance, and in defending the motherland.

But there is also another kind of capitulationism, national capitulationism, which would lead China to accommodate itself to the interests of Japanese imperialism, make China a Japanese colony, and turn the Chinese people into colonial slaves. This tendency has now appeared in the right wing of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

26. The left wing of the Anti-Japanese National United Front is composed of the Communist-led masses, which include the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Our task is to do our utmost to extend and consolidate this wing. The accomplishment of this task is the basic prerequisite for reforming the Guomindang, the government, and the army, for establishing a unified democratic republic, for turning partial resistance into total resistance, and for overthrowing Japanese imperialism.

27. The intermediate section of the Anti-Japanese National United Front is composed of the national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. Those for whom the major Shanghai newspapers speak are now tending toward the Left, while some members of the Revival Society have begun to vacillate and some members of the CC Clique are also wavering.[5] The armies resisting Japan have learned severe lessons, and some components of it have begun to introduce or are preparing to introduce reforms. Our task is to win over the intermediate section to move forward and transform itself.

28. The right wing of the Anti-Japanese National United Front consists of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. It is the supreme headquarters of national capitulationism. These people fear both the destruction of their property in the war and the rise of the masses, so it is inevitable that they should tend toward capitulationism. Many of them are already collaborators, many have become or

5. On the Revival Society (*Fuxingshe*) and its inner core, the *Lixingshe,* commonly known as the "Blue Shirts," and on the CC Clique, see above, the relevant notes to Mao's report of October 1937 on the current situation.

are ready to become pro-Japanese, many are vacillating, and only a very few, because of special circumstances, are resolutely [anti-Japanese]. Some among them have joined the national united front temporarily, under compulsion and with reluctance. Generally speaking, it will not be long before they split away. Many of the worst elements among the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are at this very moment engineering a split in the Anti-Japanese National United Front. They are manufacturing rumors, and allegations such as "The Communists are engaged in insurrection" and "The Eighth Route Army is in retreat" are sure to multiply daily. Our task is to combat national capitulationism resolutely and, in the course of this struggle, to expand and consolidate the left wing and help the intermediate section to move forward and transform itself.

The Relation Between Class Capitulationism and National Capitulationism

29. Class capitulationism is actually the reserve force of national capitulationism in the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war; it is a vile tendency that lends support to the camp of the right wing and leads to defeat in the war. In order to achieve the liberation of the Chinese nation and the emancipation of the toiling masses, and invigorate the struggle against national capitulationism, we must fight this tendency inside the Communist Party and the proletariat, and launch this struggle in all spheres of our work.

The Tasks of the Eighth Route Army in Shanxi During the Transition to a Full-Scale War of Resistance

(November 13, 1937)

Comrades Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], as well as [Zhou] Enlai, Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], and [Yang] Shangkun, and for the information of Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Guan [Xiangying], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Zhang [Hao] [Lin Yuying]:

1. The partial resistance war in the whole nation is no longer sustainable, a full-scale War of Resistance has not yet come, and right now we are in a critical and serious moment of transition when the new crop is still in the blade and the old one is all consumed.

2. All the armies in Shanxi have suffered big defeats. Apart from Liu Xiang and Tang Enbo, the rest are simply unable to fight at present. With the regular war over, the only thing left is the guerrilla war, waged primarily by the Red Army. The ruling class of Shanxi, as well as the leaders of all the armies, are shaken and lost.

3. The task of the Red Army lies in further bringing into play the principle of independence and self-reliance and sustaining the guerrilla war in North China, while at the same time fighting fiercely with the Japanese bandits for the majority of the villages in the whole of Shanxi Province, in order to turn them into guerrilla base areas, mobilize the masses, incorporate the scattered troops into our own forces, expand our own strength, be self-sufficient, not relying on others, fight more victorious small-scale combats, raise morale, so as to influence the whole nation, facilitate the reform of the Guomindang, the government, and the military, overcome the crisis, and realize the new prospect of a full-scale War of Resistance.

4. Xu's brigade[1] of Lin [Biao]'s division should move as quickly as possible to the Wuchengzhen area and prepare to fight a few small victorious battles in coop-

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 67–69. The same version appears in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 116–18, with a slightly different title.

1. The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

eration with He and Liao's detachment of He's division.[2] The General Headquarters, the division headquarters of Lin's division, and Chen Guang's brigade[3] should go quickly to the Fengxi and Xixian area, and be prepared to win a few small-scale battles. Liu's division should place the division headquarters and Chen Geng's brigade[4] in the Taihang mountains, and win as many small-scale battles as possible. Another regiment of Liu's division should be turned over to and commanded by either the General Headquarters or Lin's division. It should be stationed on the east bank of the Fen River to the east of Jiexiu and Lingshi. In cooperation with Chen's brigade on the west bank, they should launch a converging attack on the enemy troops that are moving southward along the Fen River, and win as many small-scale battles as possible. It is quite right for the Rongzhen Military District to organize the First Independent Division on the basis of Yang's regiment.[5] It should be prepared to organize the Second Independent Division on the basis of the General Headquarters' special task battalion. Zhu and Peng are requested to deal with this matter as soon as possible.

5. The plan to recruit in the south and in Sichuan is out of the question for the time being. The method for recruiting Red Army soldiers should focus mainly on expanding the guerrillas. Second, the recruiting should focus on big places. Although it is impossible in the places east of Fengyang and north of Jiexiu at the moment, it is still possible in places west and south of Fengyang and south of Jiexiu. General Headquarters, as well as Lin's division, should pay attention to this promptly. It will be impossible if further delayed. In the past all our plans were based on the assumption of the fall of Taiyuan and Niangziguan. In the future all our plans should be based on the fall of Jundu, Linfen, Puxian, and Jincheng. In northwestern Shanxi the plan should be based on the fall of Ningwu, Shenchi, and Wuzai; in the northeast the plan should be based on the fall of Wutai, Weixian, Guangling, Lingqiu, and Fuping. Please take all the above into consideration.

Mao Zedong

2. The reference is to the 716th Regiment of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, of which He Bingyan was the commander and Liao Hansheng was the political commissar.

3. The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

4. The reference is to the 386th Brigade of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Geng.

5. The reference is to the Independent Regiment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Yang Chengwu.

Further Carry Out the Principle of Independence and Self-Reliance Within the United Front

(November 15, 1937)

Zhou [Enlai], and for the information of Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi]:

1. We have received Zhou's telegram sent on the 13th between 9:00 and 11:00 P.M.

2. The working principle in Shanxi at present is to "further carry out the principle of independence and self-reliance within the united front" because, in the face of the attacks by the Japanese bandits, the Guomindang as well as Yan [Xishan], Huang [Shaohong], and Wei [Lihuang] have basically lost the spirit as well as the capacity to hold out in Shanxi. It is essential that we "take a step forward" in assuming responsibility ourselves, reducing our expectations of and reliance on them, and acting with "independence and self-reliance." But at the same time, this is still independence and self-reliance within the united front, rather than absolute independence and self-reliance. As regards major matters, we should still discuss them with the Guomindang as well as with Yan, Huang, and Wei. For example, the various points listed in Zhou's telegram, and Zhu and Peng's request for reinforcements are entirely correct. The only thing is not to cherish too much hope or rely too much on them, for they are unable to keep many of their promises. Our plan should be based on the premise that even if they fail to reply or their promises are unreliable, we will still be able to continue.

3. We agree that when you return to Yan'an after the meeting of Zhu, Peng, and Ren with Yan, Huang, and Wei, it is better to take the road passing through Yanchang. Please ask Zhu, Peng, and Ren to cross the Fen River quickly for a discussion. The best place [to meet] would be at Xixian.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 70–71, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

The Cavalry Regiment of the Eighth Route Army Should Advance Toward the Mongolian Border

(November 16, 1937)

Comrade Gao Gang:[1]

1. Taiyuan has fallen, and the situation of Suiyuan has become more critical. Among the princes of the various allied banners in Inner Mongolia, some are already vacillating and leaning toward Japan, and others are hesitating and do not know what to do. The Japanese bandits are taking advantage of Prince De and Prince Sha[2] in an attempt to create a puppet government in Inner Mongolia. After the fall of Guisui[3] and Baotou, the forces of Ma Zhanshan[4] and others are concentrated near Xiwuyuan. If the Japanese troops and the puppet troops continue to advance westward, we are afraid that the current situation will be very difficult to sustain. It is highly necessary that we send some troops northward beyond the borders of Mongolia to reassure the people, make contact with every banner, launch a guerrilla war, and defend the three Bian.[5]

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 119–20, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Gao Gang was at this time commander at the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region in Bao'an.

2. Demchukdonggrub (1902–1966), commonly known in Chinese as De Wang or Prince De, was a Mongolian prince of the West Sunid Banner. In 1936 he had proclaimed the independence of Inner Mongolia, under the protection of the Japanese, and launched an attack on Suiyuan Province. For further details, see Volume V, pp. 126n.4, 307, 315n.3, and 317. At this time or shortly afterward, he became vice-chairman of the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government, which was supported by the Japanese. Prince Sha was the chairman of a governing council established by the Guomindang.

3. Guisui was the name of the provincial capital of Suiyuan Province. It is now called Huhehot and has become the capital of Inner Mongolia.

4. Ma Zhanshan (1885–1950) was appointed acting governor of Heilongjiang in 1931, and made a name for himself by his resistance to Japanese penetration. In early 1932 he was compelled by force of circumstances to collaborate with the Japanese in establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo, but in April of that year he escaped and fought the Japanese once again. When the Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, he was given the mission of resisting the Japanese offensive in Inner Mongolia and succeeded in halting their drive.

5. The reference is to Dingbian, Anbian, and Jingbian in northeastern Shaanxi.

2. Consequently, we have decided to appoint you commander of the cavalry of the Eighth Route Army, to lead the cavalry regiment and the Mongolian and Han Detachment to the area of the East and West Wusheng banner and the Etuoke Banner in the north, operate in the area to the north of Sanbian and south of the desert. Your tasks are:

a. Use the slogans "Let the two nationalities, Mongolian and Han, unite as one to resist the Japanese" and "Defend Suiyuan" to promote and advocate a joint conference of all the princes of the banners, bring about an anti-Japanese united front among the upper levels of the various banners in the Ikezhao league, unite to resist Japan (adopt a critical attitude toward Prince De and Prince Sha). Meanwhile, carry out extensive work with the Mongolian and Han nationalities, organize and arm them, set up new anti-Japanese guerrilla units, and expand yourselves.

b. Get in touch with Ma Zhanshan, He Zhuguo,[6] and the local Guomindang people, inform them about our anti-Japanese views as well as about the situation of the Eighth Route Army in Shanxi, urge them to improve their nationalities policy, so as to unite all the anti-Japanese organizations in the whole of Suiyuan, and arm the local people, struggle resolutely against the Chinese traitors, develop an independent and self-reliant guerrilla war of the masses, to strike a blow against the attack of the Japanese bandits.

3. The majority of the workers in the Mongolian Work Department of the provincial committee must go with you to work in Mongolia. Only one or two people should be left behind in Dingbian, to be responsible for reception and communications.

4. After a few days of reorganization, mobilization, and preparatory work, the cavalry regiment and detachment can set out. If you do not have leather uniforms, you may obtain two thousand *yuan* from the Bureau of Salt and Tax to buy leather uniforms.

Mao [Zedong], Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian], and
Xiao [Jingguang]

6. See note on page 59.

The Urgent Task at Present Is to Strengthen Security Along the River

(November 17, 1937, in the evening)

To He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Guan [Xiangying], and Gan [Siqi];[1] Wang [Zhaoxiang] and Sun [Chaoxun], and for the information of Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Zhou [Enlai]:

1. In order to guarantee to our troops on the east bank of the [Yellow] river in Shanxi the possibility of sustaining an arduous and protracted guerrilla war in Shanxi, and also to assure them the possibility of crossing the river rapidly and safely to the west bank when this proves necessary, and to increase the obstacles to crossing by the enemy, the strengthening of security along the river has become an urgent task at the present.

2. We have divided the entire line of defense along the river, from Shenfu and Mazhen to Linzhen and Yichuan,[2] into three sections, and we have set up a river security headquarters in each section to exercise command.

a. The Two Yans[3] River Security Headquarters will be set up and is responsible for the section from the north of the Linzhen River to the mouth of the Qingjian River,[4] with He Changgong as commander and the Fifth Garrison Regiment as the river security troops.

b. The Five-*xian*[5] River Security Headquarters is responsible for the section from Hekou to Jiaxian, and the River Security troops are the 718th Regiment and the Third Garrison Regiment.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 121–23, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. He, Xiao, Guan, and Gan were respectively commander, deputy commander, political commissar, and head of the Political Department of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

2. Shenfu and Mazhen are located near the northern end of the boundary between Shaanxi and Shanxi Provinces. Linzhen and Yichuan are some two hundred miles to the south.

3. The two Yans refers to Yanchuan and Yanchang, located between Yan'an and the Yellow River.

4. The Qingjian River flows into the Yellow River between Yanchuan and Yanchang.

5. The five *xian* are Suide and four others in the middle of the portion of the Yellow River dealt with here.

c. The Shenfu River Security District Headquarters will be set up and is responsible for the section from Jiaxian to Mazhen.[6] The Shenfu Security Forces are the river security forces.

3. In order to guarantee the crossing to the west of the troops on the east bank, we have selected the following places as the main crossing points:

a. All the ferries from Sanjiao to Sui and Mi.

b. The two ferries in Matou and Pingdu between the two Yans.

c. Choose two or three ferries in the Shenfu River Security District (in case the troops in northwestern Shanxi need to use them).

4. Each crossing area should prepare more than twenty boats, of which each big boat can carry a hundred people each time. Moreover, there must be enough sailors and steersmen. For the purpose of concealing our intentions, these boats should be hidden on the west bank of the river and be guarded by our troops so as to prevent them from being destroyed or discovered by the enemy. Of the boats at the other ferry points, apart from leaving one or two boats for crossing in case of necessity, all the rest should be either gathered in another place or anchored along the west bank. In addition, you should be prepared to destroy them when necessary.

5. All the ferries which our troops do not need should be completely destroyed step by step according to our plan. Moreover, in some of the major spots along the river, particularly in the crossing points, we should take advantage of the places which are strategically located and difficult of access, either to destroy them or to build up some kind of fortifications. Every River Security Command Headquarters will be responsible for the specific arrangements, surveillance and planning, and they should keep us informed.

6. The Two Yans and the Five-*xian* River Security Regions have already begun the arrangements. As regards the Shenfu District, He and Xiao should assign somebody directly, or they can ask Wang Zhaoxiang to appoint a capable cadre as the commander of this river security district to go there to investigate and arrange everything, as well as command the security forces that are responsible for the security of this section of the river. Please also inform the Shenfu Special Committee of this.

Mao [Zedong] Xiao [Jingguang]

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6. As already noted, Shenfu is located in the northern tip of Shaanxi.

To Wen Yunchang

(November 27, 1937)

Elder Brother Yunchang,[1]

Mo Liben[2] arrived and gave me your letter. Today I have also received your detailed letter of November 16, which has given me great pleasure and comfort. I am deeply saddened by the passing away of my eighth uncle and aunt, yet it is wonderful that you and your wife are alive and healthy. Hard and difficult living conditions are not confined to one family or one individual. The majority of the people of the whole country are in the same situation. Joining the masses in their struggle and driving out the Japanese imperialists are the only paths to survival. Your desire to come and work is good. The only thing is that we have only clothes to wear and food to eat here, and the treatment for a commander-in-chief at the top and a cook at the bottom are all the same. As our Party works only for the state, the nation, and the toiling popular masses, sacrificing individual self-interest, we are all equal and have no salaries. If you have heavy burdens at home and need to find a big or small job to earn some income to help make ends meet, then it is not a good idea to come here. It is a long way to travel, and I cannot send any money as travel expenses. The plan of running a military school in Hunan is very good, but it is also hard to carry out for the time being. Although in my heart I would like to assist you, it is difficult to do in reality. In the past, the state sent Zhou Runfang 20 *yuan* as travel expenses. Because she is the widow of Martyr Zetan, who died[3] (Zetan was killed in Jiangxi the year before last), the state gave the money, not because of me personally. I hope that you can understand it. I am making some efforts on behalf of society as a whole, including the members of my mother's family, for whom I have great respect, and all the poor people in my native place. I miss all the brothers and their children of my mother's family and all the poor

This letter was first published in *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 114–16. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 72–73, and we have taken it from that source.

1. Wen Yunchang (1884–1961), a native of Xiangxiang *xian* in Hunan, was Mao's first cousin.

2. Mo Liben, also known as Fang Ke (b. 1918) was a young Hunanese who had left Changsha to come to Yan'an.

3. Mao's younger brother, Mao Zetan, was left behind in Jiangxi at the time of the Long March and was killed there.

people from my native place very much. But I can only help you all in this way, as you have probably understood already.

Even so, I want to exchange letters frequently with you and other cousins and their children, and I am glad even to get a few lines and words from you.

Are you informed about the situation in Shaoshan or not? If you are, please let my relatives and friends in the countryside know that if they want to write me I would like very much to hear from them. But please tell them that they should not come here for jobs because there are no salaries here.

Is Mr. Liu Linsheng[4] still alive and healthy? Please convey my regards to him in your letters.

Right now, Japanese imperialism is launching massive offensives, and we are very busy with our work, but we are all very happy and healthy. My health is somewhat better now than it was two years ago. Please send my greetings to the various brothers, sisters-in-law, and their children, and tell them that the victories of the Eighth Route Army are the victories of them all, so as to comfort them in the face of hardships and difficulties.

May my brother and sister-in-law enjoy good health!

Mao Zedong

4. Liu Linsheng (1865–1949) was a cousin of Mao and of Wen Yunchang.

To Surround and Attack the Bandits in the Sanbian Area, There Must Be a Comprehensive Plan

(November 28, 1937, 3:00 P.M.)

Comrade Gao Gang:[1]

1. Since the two bandits Zhang and Fan[2] are entrenched in fortified villages, there must be careful surveillance and a carefully thought-out and detailed plan in order to take the fortified villages by storm. In addition, there must also be a close watch over the enemy both in as well as outside of the fortified villages. You must not be careless.

2. Please find out immediately and inform us in detail regarding the following: how strong the fortified villages are, the number of troops and fortifications in the hands of the bandits, the supply of food, hay, fuel, and water of the bandits, the conditions of the masses, and the possible assistance of the bandits from the outside.

3. Does the 27th Army have mortars? How is your firepower if you are going to storm the fortifications? Do not act until you have a real guarantee of success.

Mao [Zedong] Xiao [Jingguang]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 124–25, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Regarding Gao Gang (1905–1954), a native of Shaanxi, see Volume V, p. 712, n. 4. He was at this time commander at the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region in Bao'an.

2. Zhang Tingfa and Fan Yushan were the leaders of a bandit gang established in northern Shaanxi.

Operational Methods for Dealing with the Enemy Troops That Are Attacking the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region

(December 5, 1937)

Zhu [De] and Ren [Bishi]:

As far as the enemy troops that are attacking the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region are concerned, apart from our telegram of the 29th of last month and your own telegram, you should also pay attention to the following;

1. Avoid frontal resistance; make a surprise attack on the troops in the enemy's rear.

2. Maneuver both in the enemy's distant and immediate rear, so that the enemy will still be encircled by us even if he advances.

3. You must also operate actively along the Tongpu and Zhengtai railway lines to cooperate strongly with your present operations.

4. Pay attention to sabotaging the puppet organizations and puppet troops in the enemy's rear.

5. Intensify the work of disintegrating the enemy troops.

6. Under the condition of assured victory, it is necessary to concentrate considerable strength to wipe out part of the enemy forces, impose a forceful blow upon the enemy, and increase the enemy's fear and their difficulty of attack. You should, however, be very careful and cautious.

Mao [Zedong] Peng [Dehuai]

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Mao [Zedong] Peng [Dehuai]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 126–27, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

To the Ninth Brigade of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University

(December 15, 1937)

Comrades of the Ninth Brigade:

Congratulations on your founding of the Office of National Salvation. The two words "national salvation" correspond exactly to the only general goal for you and for the people of the whole country at the present stage. The road to reach this goal is that of the anti-Japanese national united front. I hope that you will study the theory and methods of this united front. Only if there is a united front can we achieve the goal of national salvation.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* p. 117, where it is reproduced from a photocopy of Mao's handwritten manuscript.

Send Two Detachments to the East of the Beiping-Hankou Railway to Carry Out Guerrilla Missions

(December 16, 1937)

Zhu [De] and Ren [Bishi]:

1. According to Nie [Rongzhen]'s telegram, the area to the east of the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway line is very empty at present. We plan to send out two detachments to the east on guerrilla missions.
   a. The 129th Division should send out one infantry battalion and one company of cavalry to go deep into the large area of Yongnian, Guangping, Quzhou, Guangzong, Qinghe, Pingxiang, Nangong, Xinhe, and Zaoqiang to the east of Cixian, Shahe, and Zhaoxian, and maneuver there.
   b. Rongzhen should organize two infantry companies and one company of cavalry into one detachment, send it deep into the area east of Shijiazhuang, Baoding, Ding *xian*, north of the Cang-Shi Highway, and south of Tianjin, Baxian, and the Dingxing Highway. First, they should destroy the highway from Baoding, Gaoyang, and Renqiu to Dacheng before they can maintain an area for flexible maneuvers. After that, the destruction of the Cang-Shi Highway is also very important.
2. These two detachments should be assigned enough capable military and political cadres and a radio transmitter number, and they should have their own cipher codebook.
3. The tasks of these two detachments:
   a. Reconnoiter the situation.
   b. Expand the anti-Japanese united front, mobilize the popular masses, and organize guerrillas.
   c. Sabotage the puppet organizations.
   d. Collect the scattered weapons and expand themselves.
4. After setting out, these two detachments should be extremely cautious, careful, and flexible, and they should make their own decisions flexibly to decide what to do according to the circumstances.

Mao Zedong Peng Dehuai

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 128–29, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

We Should Resolutely Uphold the Principle of the United Front in the Territory of Friendly Armies

(December 24, 1937)

To leading military and political cadres of the five-*xian* garrison command, the headquarters of the two Yans,[1] the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh Garrison regiments, the Independent Battalion in the Central Shaanxi Plain, and all political organs:

1. To expand and consolidate the united front has been from beginning to end our central concern and general policy. Because of the enemy's instigation, and the sabotage of the Chinese traitors, some elements are afraid of the mass movement, as well as of the expansion and growth of the influence of our Party and of the Eighth Route Army. The weaknesses of the united front which exist in every region, and the narrow-minded views of some comrades, as well as the stiffness of their manner have created some kind of friction with the friendly party and the friendly army, and the local governments in the united front areas close to the Border Region. If we let this situation continue, it will affect the unity of the resistance to Japan.

2. In order to achieve our objective of expanding the united front, under the slogan of joint responsibility, joint leadership, mutual assistance, and mutual development, in our discussions with the local authorities of every united front region, and in the conduct of mass work, we must pay attention to trying our best to obtain their approval and cooperation, and persuade them to accept our ideas and suggestions on the basis of the interests of the War of Resistance. In case they do not agree, we should not force them, but should make temporary concessions.

3. In order to avoid unnecessary friction, and to reduce any friction which may arise, we have the following special instructions:

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 130–31, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army's river defenses in the two *xian* of Yanchuan and Yanchang in Shaanxi.

a. As far as some of the shortcomings of the friendly parties and armies are concerned, we should adopt an attitude of well-meaning criticism and suggestion instead of laughing at them or ridiculing them.
b. In addition to publicizing our Party's ideas and the victories of the Eighth Route Army, we should praise and encourage the determination of the government to carry on the War of Resistance, its other good measures and behavior, and the bravery and spirit of sacrifice of the friendly army in the War of Resistance.
c. We should act as the mediator in the friction between the masses and the government resulting from recruitment and tax collection, in order to avoid confrontations.
d. Help the government to conduct mobilization for recruiting, giving the necessary assurances, while at the same time asking the government to help us fulfill our plan of recruitment.
e. Stop at once the fundraising and grain-collecting campaign within the united front. We must return immediately the reserve grain we borrowed which is now in storage. Approval of the government must be obtained when confiscating the property of the Chinese traitors and disposing of it, as well as when arresting them. The best way is to hand them over to the government to be dealt with.

Mao Zedong Xiao Jingguang Tan Zheng

We Should Concentrate Our Forces to Fight Two or Three Victorious Campaigns While the Enemy Is Moving Southward

(December 29, 1937)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Ren [Bishi], and for the information of Lin [Biao], Nie [Rongzhen], He [Long] and Xiao [Ke], Liu [Bocheng] and Xu [Xiangqian], and Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi] and Yang [Shangkun]:

1. The enemy troops in their southward offensive will be divided into three routes. The right route will take the Xiaoyi-Duijiu area and threaten Pucheng. The left route will attack Qin *xian*, and the central route will attack Linghuo. The right and central routes at least will advance simultaneously. They cannot let the central route go forward alone, or they will be exposed to our pincer attack.

2. We expect that you will arrange your deployment for the campaign on the basis of these judgments. In addition, you should also tell Yan [Xishan] and Wei [Lihuang] to prepare in good time. The local guerrillas should also base their deployment on this.

3. During the southward advance of the enemy troops on this occasion, our forces should concentrate the necessary forces under favorable conditions to fight two or three good victorious battles. Consequently, you should complete the necessary preparations for the campaign in good time, so as to avoid acting in haste when the time comes. We look forward to hearing from you.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 132–33, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Assessment Regarding the Offensive Situation of the Attacking Japanese Army, and Proposals Regarding the Deployment of Our Own Forces

(December 30, 1937)

Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Xiang [Ying], Bo [Gu] [Qin Bangxian], and Ye [Jianying]:

1. We judge that after taking Ji'nan, Xuzhou, and Bangbu, and perhaps also Zhengzhou and Kaifeng, and fulfilling the operational tasks of the first period, the objectives of the enemy in the second period should be to take the three points of Lanzhou, Guangzhou, and Wuhan, and to connect them with one another. But for the purpose of cutting off China's communications with the outside world as soon as possible, and hemming China in, it seems that they will take Lanzhou and Guangzhou first, and leave the occupation of Wuhan until a bit later. It is very difficult for the enemy to take Lanzhou directly from Ningxia. It seems that they will first take Ningxia. According to reliable information, they have prepared thirty thousand troops for the offensive. Their second step will be divided into two routes: one group will attack Liangzhou[1] in the west, the other will attack Pingliang in the south, thus cutting the Xin-Lan and Xi-Lan Highways. Their third step will be to take Lanzhou. By that time they must have taken Zhengzhou in the front or even cut off Tongguan. This danger is almost at hand, and we and Chiang [Kaishek] must quickly take the necessary dispositions, or it will be too late.

2. Will you please suggest the following deployment to Chiang:

a. Of the three main force divisions of the Eighth Route Army, one division should go to Ganzhou[2] and Liangzhou. This division should set out without delay. One division should go to the Guyuan area, and this division should also prepare to leave. One division should head for western Henan; this division should set out only when the enemy has begun to attack Zhengzhou and

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 134–35, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Liangzhou is the name of a former prefecture, corresponding to the Wuwei district in Gansu.

2. Ganzhou is the name of a former prefecture, corresponding to the present Zhangye district in Gansu.

Tongguan. Each of these three divisions should leave one regiment of troops behind in Shandong and Shanxi to support the guerrilla war in North China in cooperation with the guerrilla forces.

b. The Central Army should send two additional divisions to reinforce the defense to the south of Ningxia.

c. Xinjiang should send one unit to reinforce the defense in Xi'an and Lanzhou.

We look forward to hearing your reactions to these proposals.

Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian] Kang [Sheng]
Chen [Yun] Mao [Zedong]

Let the Enemy Attack Wuhan and Be Trapped in Our Strategic Encirclement

(December 30, 1937)

Comrades Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Xiang [Ying], Bo [Gu] [Qin Bangxian] and Ye [Jianying]:[1]

Our views about the deployment for operations to the south and to the north of the Yangzi:

1. In order to induce the enemy to attack Wuhan and be trapped in our strategic encirclement, our forces must set up the following two major military districts and six supplementary military districts.

a. The Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui-Jiangxi Border Military District, with southern Anhui as its core, which should attack or prepare to attack the enemy forces in Nanjing, Wuhu, Hangzhou, the Zhe-Gan railway line,[2] and Hukou.

b. The Hubei-Henan-Anhui Military District, centered on Shu, Tong, Huang, Guang, Shang, and Gu,[3] which should attack or prepare to seize the three railway lines, and attack the enemy troops along the river. The aforementioned two districts are the major districts. The Guomindang should appoint high-ranking figures to exercise command there. Moreover, thirty to fifty thousand troops should be deployed in each district. We will put Chen Yi's detachment in southern Anhui, and Gao Jingting's detachment plus one more unit in northern Anhui.

c. The Southern Zhejiang Military District, which should attack and take the enemy troops along the Hang-Yong railway line[4] and Zhe-Gan railway line.

d. The Hubei-Jiangxi Military District, which should prepare to attack and take the enemy forces along the river and along the Nan-Xun railway line.[5]

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 136–37, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The recipients of this telegram were members of the Communist Party delegation which had been sent to negotiate with the Guomindang in Hankou.

2. The Zhe-Gan railway line runs from Hankou in Zhejiang to Zhuzhou in Hunan.

3. The reference is to Shucheng and Tongcheng in Anhui, Huangmei and Guangji in Hubei, and Shangcheng and Gushi in Henan.

4. The Hang-Yong railway ran from Hangzhou to Ningbo.

5. The Nan-Xun railway line ran from Nanchang to Jiujiang.

e. The Hanshui Military District, which should be prepared to attack and take the enemy troops along the southern end of the Ping-Han railway line.[6]
f. The Western Henan Military District, which should be prepared to attack the enemy troops along the central part of the Ping-Han railway line.

2. For the purpose of playing the role of strategic pin-down in the enemy's distant rear, we should set up the Jiangsu-Shandong Military District, the center of which should be in the border region of Jiangsu and Shandong. It should also command the guerrilla warfare in eastern Shandong. The Guomindang should appoint reliable high officials to this district, and we can send some people to assist them. The deployments in this district as well as in the southern and northern Anhui districts should begin right away. Please reflect on the aforementioned proposals, and then suggest them to Chiang.

Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian] Kang [Sheng]
Chen [Yun] Mao [Zedong]

6. The Ping-Han railway line ran from Beiping to Hankou.

1938

On the Basic Tactic of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare—The Surprise Attack[1]

(January 11, 1938)

1. Surprise Attacks Are the Basic Form of Fighting in Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare cannot be carried out for one minute away from the popular masses. This is the most fundamental principle. As for tactics, the basic form of fighting in guerrilla warfare is none other than the surprise attack. Surprise attacks are one form of offensive. Guerrilla warfare does not emphasize the form of regular positional offensives but, instead, stresses the form of sudden raids or the reputation for unexpected raids. This is because, at the level of strategy, guerrilla warfare defeats the many by the few and the strong by the weak. There is no other way to achieve the objective.

2. The Key Points of Surprise Attack Tactics

Generally speaking, there are twelve key points in the tactics of the surprise attack in guerrilla warfare:

First, the basic principle of the surprise attack is the need to have secret and meticulous planning and to take swift and sudden action.

This text was first published in *Jiefang*, no. 28, January 11, 1938. It is there attributed to Chen Bojun, who prepared this extract, but, as indicated in note 1 below, it was actually written and revised by Mao. Our source is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 138–52, where it is reproduced from the version in *Jiefang*.

1. This article as published in *Jiefang* was introduced by the following paragraph:

> This essay is Comrade Chen Bojun's excerpt of the section on guerrilla tactics in Comrade Mao Zedong's 1934 pamphlet, *Guerrilla Warfare*. In order to adapt it to the conditions of the anti-Japanese war, Comrade Chen has made some additions and deletions in wording and paragraphing, and it has also been revised by Comrade Mao. It is now published in this periodical as reference material for leading cadres in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war around the country.

The editors of *Junshi wenji* (p. 152) confirm that this introduction was actually written by Mao. Mao's 1934 pamphlet is not available to us and could not be included in Volume IV of this edition.

Second, the overall objectives of the surprise attack in guerrilla warfare are to eliminate the small enemy, weaken the large enemy, harass enemy flanks and rear areas, coordinate with the political work of guerrilla troops, wreck enemy political power, arouse the popular masses to resist the enemy, and preserve or restore anti-Japanese political power, so as to create guerrilla bases for the Anti-Japanese War. This complements the fighting by regular armies because the capture of weapons gradually develops guerrilla units into regular anti-Japanese armies. As for the concrete objectives of the surprise attack, they are to eliminate small enemy units one by one, to harass large enemy units, to eliminate enemy militia, to wreck enemy institutions in the rear areas, to sabotage enemy communication routes, and so forth.

Third, surprise attacks should choose favorable conditions to strike. When such conditions are nonexistent or inadequate, attention should be paid to creating them. Quite often, this is possible and it is only necessary to adopt the following methods in view of the quality of the enemy units, the character of their commanders, and the tactics they use: (1) Make the enemy overconfident. For example, deliberately use guerrilla squads with weak fighting strength to engage the enemy, so as to make the enemy think that everything is fine. Then launch a sudden surprise attack against the enemy when he is unprepared. (2) Lull and confuse the enemy. For example, create an uproar in the east and strike in the west;[2] strike in the south one minute and in the north the next. Make the enemy uncertain. Then attack him by surprise at one point. For another example, dispatch guerrilla squads or small groups to operate in place A with handbills or notices under the name of larger guerrilla units, while a large guerrilla detachment makes a surprise attack in place B or C. (3) Exhaust and intimidate the enemy. For example, mobilize the popular masses to harvest crops and hide grain in order to cause the invading enemy unbearable hunger and fatigue. Again, divide a guerrilla detachment into several groups or send several small guerrilla units to raid and harass enemy garrisons incessantly. Startle and awaken them several times a night; leave them tired and depressed. Then select an opportune moment and attack them by surprise. If the enemy is strong in number but weak in quality and his commanders are timid, spread rumors and exaggerate one's own strength to increase his vacillation. Then launch a surprise attack. (4) Send spies to sneak into the areas where the invading enemy is garrisoned. Win over local people and soldiers who are sympathetic to us among the enemy to become our supporters from within, and to improve the success of surprise attacks. (5) Use small guerrilla units or the people's self-defense corps to maneuver in all four directions so that the enemy in that area has to be entrenched to defend himself. Pin down those enemy forces which could possibly counter our

2. The formula "Create an uproar in the east and strike in the west" occurs in the commentaries to Sunzi's *Art of War* and is frequently cited. For the source, see Samuel B. Griffith's translation of *Sunzi, The Art of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 79–80 (Commentary of Zhang Yu).

assault in order to assist the success of our surprise attack in another place. All the above are the various circumstances in which we change the enemy with our own actions to facilitate the success of guerrilla detachments. Although they may not always work, they are often effective.

Fourth, reconnaissance before an attack is of primary importance. The content of reconnaissance should include the following items: (1) The size of the enemy forces, the state of their fighting capacity and arms. If an attack is to be launched on an enemy garrison, it is essential to know the deployment of the enemy forces, the degree of their alertness and security, their schedule for the changing of the guard, and so forth. (2) Whether or not there are other enemy forces in the surrounding areas, their size and the possibility of reinforcement by them, transportation speed, the distances, the circumstances of their telephone or telegraph communications, the minimum time required for reinforcement, and the directions and road conditions of reinforcements are all items that should be checked carefully and taken into account individually. (3) The situation of the local residents. (4) The large and small roads that lead to the place where the surprise attack will be carried out and whether or not there are areas nearby in which the surprise attack troops can take cover. Secret and clever methods must be used in gathering intelligence on the above items. The more precise is the intelligence information, the more accurate will be the attack plan. Whenever possible, a simple map should be drawn beforehand with the deployment of enemy forces marked on it.

Fifth, the timing of a surprise attack involves no more than the following four situations: (1) At night: This timing is generally used to deal with enemy garrisons, and it is used because other times are not appropriate for such fighting. First, at night one can best camouflage oneself and approach the enemy. Second, charging in the darkness of night can reduce one's own casualties, inflate the impression of one's own strength, and increase panic among the enemy. Third, it is difficult for the enemy in the vicinity to bring in reinforcements at night. Therefore, guerrilla units should regularly give attention to practicing their operations at night. (2) Before dawn: This timing is also used to attack enemy garrisons. It takes advantage of the darkness of night to approach the enemy and launch the attack before daybreak. This is the most opportune time for attacks by guerrilla units that are quite far away from the enemy or are still unfamiliar with night operations. But it is better for the assault to start before the enemy gets up. (3) At dusk: This timing is also generally used against enemy garrisons for surprise attacks, particularly when the enemy is relatively alert at other times, the roads approaching the enemy are relatively under cover, and there are no problems in marching during daytime or it is possible to disguise oneself in crossing the area. At this time, if the attack should fail, it is still possible to withdraw safely under the cover of darkness. (4) During the day: The enemy often maneuvers during the day, so surprise attacks on the enemy on the move are always set during the day. If guerrilla troops want to make the most effective surprise attack on the enemy, they must not miss the opportunity to catch the enemy on the move. Such opportunities must be seized frequently.

The most popular form of such surprise attacks is the ambush. If one desires to attack an enemy garrison in broad daylight, it should take place only under the following circumstances: (1) The quality of the enemy is very poor: not vigilant, lacking fortifications, and very careless. (2) The enemy knows nothing of the forthcoming surprise attack by the guerrilla unit. (3) The enemy is isolated and lacks reinforcements. (4) During heavy rains or fogs that can best cover the movements of the surprise attack. Under such conditions, it is possible to mount a successful surprise attack on enemy garrisons in daylight.

Sixth, the plans for the surprise attack must be kept secret. The plans of a surprise attack may be excellent, but if they are known to the enemy, they are not only worthless but run the risk of losses. So it is of cardinal importance to keep surprise attack plans strictly confidential. Apart from energetically using the anti-Japanese people and small guerrilla groups to operate in all four directions for the purpose of confusing the enemy, as mentioned in point 3 above, the following points also deserve attention: (1) Do not inform the lower ranks of the whole surprise attack plan. Tell them only what they need to know or tell them stage by stage (i.e., before setting off, during the march, and after arriving at the destination). (2) Neither the local people around the garrison nor the hired guides should be told of the planned surprise attack by guerrilla troops. (3) Whenever possible, start off in a false direction for a while and then turn toward the destination of the surprise attack in a roundabout way. This method can be employed in places where the enemy has many eyes and ears.

Seventh, the following points deserve emphasis for the advance of surprise attack forces: (1) If rivers and areas with obstacles must be crossed, methods of passages should be studied before departure and necessary tools should be brought along. (2) Bring handbills and notices and such. (3) Agree on various kinds of signals, such as the signal for the start of a charge and so forth and decide on a meeting place in case the assault fails or special difficulties arise. (4) When on the move, choose very hidden, small roads and even take routes that have no roads. (5) During the march, keep absolutely quiet; forbid talking and laughing. Apart from reconnaissance and security personnel, other group members should not carry red markings (but only secret markings).[3] (6) Ahead of the main column, assign a few armed scouts in plain clothes to carry out reconnaissance and security duties. (7) The marching should be as fast as possible. (8) During the march, preparations should be made to fight any of the enemy accidentally encountered on the way.

3. It seems probable that the security people were to wear red markings because there were relatively few of them; it was essential that they be able to identify themselves to the Communist forces, and they were presumably skilled at concealment when necessary. Others were to wear markings described as *an* (literally "dark," but here perhaps meaning "secret"), i.e., markings which would not identify the other soldiers as "Reds" and therefore giving warning to the enemy.

Eighth, preparations after arriving at the scene of the surprise attack. These are important links in the entire plan of the surprise attack, so the following points deserve attention: (1) Rapidly converge forces under cover outside the enemy cordance line. If the enemy is still unaware of the imminent attack, by no means alert him to it. At this time, the commander of the whole force should immediately call together the leaders of the various groups and give concrete instructions on the methods for this attack. In daylight, the leaders of various groups should be directed to observe under camouflage the arrangement and deployment of the enemy forces and be told in person the specific tasks of their respective groups. If it is possible, plainclothes scouts should quietly capture enemy sentries to further the reconnaissance. (2) A large force (larger than a battalion) should be divided into two routes (not separated too far from each other) to carry out the attack. A small force (smaller than a company) should make the assault together. (3) Send a few men and guns to feign an attack on the heavily defended area to tie down part of the enemy, while the main force should storm one or two enemy positions that are weak and relatively easy to break through. However, under no circumstances should one's forces be divided equally. (4) If there are additional troops, a small number of them may be dispatched to lay an ambush along the enemy's likely escape route to cut it off. (5) A few people must be dispatched to guard the routes by which reinforcements for the enemy could come and to sabotage their telephone and telegraph lines, bridges, and roads. (6) The position from where an attack is launched should be neither too far away nor too near. Preparation time for the attack should be as short as possible and preparations for the attack should be completed as quickly as possible. (7) Surprise attacks at night require very good identification signals to avoid confusion.

Ninth, the assault itself: (1) As soon as the assault starts, it should be carried out swiftly and suddenly according to the prearranged time, direction, and route. If the assault is carried out by several routes simultaneously, the time to start the whole assault should be decided by the time needed for the main force to reach the assault point. The other routes should coordinate their advance in parallel with the main route to avoid premature discovery by the enemy. (2) At the start of the assault, no noise should be made, no guns should be fired (even if the enemy fires first, it should be ignored), and no battle cries should be uttered. Instead, use bayonets, spears, and swords to storm enemy positions in one stroke, engage in face-to-face fighting, and so destroy the enemy quickly. If there are hand grenades, they should be thrown first. (Attention: Do not strike down our own people; prepare a few men at the front of the assault to throw them and do not give any to those behind.) Seize the disorientation of the hand grenade explosions to fall upon the enemy and kill him. (3) Only where one tries to pin down the enemy forces should one fire a few shots to attract their attention thereby assisting the rapid victory in the main direction of assault. (4) If the enemy forces obstinately defend a building and put up a stiff resistance, the building may be burned down to compel them to surrender (only buildings defended stubbornly by the enemy may be burned down;

no random burning is permitted), or advantage may be taken of the chaos among the enemy forces to assail them from another building. (5) If the surprise attack succeeds, and the enemy forces flee, the troops responsible for ambushing and intercepting them should first block their retreat. At the same time, the troops who have broken through should not concern themselves with capturing weapons and goods. And, apart from the necessary troops who must take care of the captives and guard the battlefield, the rest should all pursue and attack the enemy forces in order to decimate their strength and make it impossible for them to launch counterattacks. But if there is suspicion that the enemy forces have reinforcements, do not pursue them far.

Tenth, after the surprise attack: (1) After the success of the surprise attack, the troops should be gathered at once, and, together with the wounded and the captured goods, they should be directed to concentrate in a position near the road from which you have come. A portion of the troops should occupy the position to prevent counterattacks by the enemy. (2) If the remnants of the enemy forces have run far away, lacking any strength to counterattack, and there is no suspicion that they have reinforcements, then the surprise attack troops may remain in the local area for a while. During this time, some personnel may distribute captured enemy goods to the local poor and help the people deal with notorious Chinese traitors. The main force of the guerrilla unit should choose a position where there is room to fight, to gather together, and to rest. It is absolutely forbidden to act on one's own. Even so, the main force of the guerrilla unit should in general not take up quarters in the local area and should move and take up quarters in a good location a few *li* away. (3) If the situation is tense, then the time for handling matters after the battle should be reduced and the guerrilla troops should leave the place quickly and victoriously. (4) As for the prisoners, when you are close to our own base areas or regular anti-Japanese armies, escort all the prisoners to the rear areas or turn them over to the regular armies to handle. Otherwise, they should be released immediately after questioning and given suitable propaganda. It is strictly forbidden to kill prisoners. Only leading traitors who are deeply hated by the popular masses may be executed at the request of the popular masses. Even if captives sometimes do not want to go with the guerrilla troops, they may only be disarmed and let go. It must be clear that killing prisoners of war will only strengthen the enemy's fighting strength and provides no advantage with respect to the war against Japan. But one must take care to keep one's own actions secret while releasing prisoners. To achieve this objective, one must first release the prisoners who wish to go and lock in a room those who will not go, so that they will not see the direction in which the guerrilla unit withdraws. (5) If the surprise attack fails or enemy reinforcements come in the middle of the assault, our troops should quickly disperse without any hesitation. If the retreat from the battlefield must be carried out under pressure from the enemy, practice dispersed retreat under the cover provided by the most capable old guerrilla soldiers. Usually, the meetingplace after the retreat will be the previous day's camp site or other predesignated place.

(6) Guerrilla units should withdraw under disguise even if there is no great enemy pressure. For example, they should go some *li* in a false direction and then come back to the route really intended to be taken in order to confuse the enemy, and leave nothing to aid their pursuit.

Eleventh, surprise attacks on blockhouses, stockades, fortified villages, or walled towns.[4] Surprise attacks on blockhouses, stockades, fortified villages, or walled towns will not work if one relies only on the meager weapons of guerrilla units and ordinary fighting methods. Surprise attacks can work against these things, but the following conditions should be taken into consideration: (1) It is better to arrange spies or people and enemy soldiers who are sympathetic to the guerrilla unit to serve as supporters from within the city, village, or blockhouse before the surprise attack. Guerrilla units should regularly do such political work in a planned way. (2) Select the most neglected point of the enemy's security to sneak in quietly under the cover of the darkness of night and at a time when the enemy is unprepared. The most dangerous place is also the place to which the enemy pays the least attention and sometimes it is also the best place for us to steal in quietly. But this is certainly not usual. (3) If the surprise attack is discovered by the enemy, a small unit should also launch a false strike in another direction to lure the main force of the enemy, while the main force of the guerrilla unit strikes through the enemies' weak and neglected points. (4) When conducting surprise attacks in daylight over long distances, guerrilla units should disguise themselves as enemy troops whenever possible and seize opportunities to strike. (5) When the enemy forces are put to flight on a battlefield immediately outside such fortifications, engage them in a hot pursuit and take the opportunity to storm the city. Such opportunities should not be wasted. (6) The methods of siege and dynamiting walled town and blockhouse fortifications in the vicinity of our anti-Japanese base areas, and sometimes also in the distant or weak rear areas of the enemy, may be used, provided that the conditions of the popular masses are good and the guerrilla unit has ample forces. But this method can be used only when the enemy is isolated and without support.

Twelfth, harassing and pinning down the enemy. Harassment is a secondary but necessary part of the tactics of surprise attack in guerrilla warfare, and its purpose is to increase the anxiety of enemy and diminish their threatening posture. This creates the conditions for us to wipe them out or force them out. The methods are as follows: (1) When a nighttime surprise attack is unsuccessful, shift the goal

4. Mao is referring to the most likely fortified spots guerrilla units might come up against. Blockhouses were used more in the Guomindang's encirclement campaigns against the Jiangxi soviet in the early and mid-1930s, when the original version of this text was produced, though the Japanese built some after 1938. Stockades would be fortified army encampments. Finally, since rural violence was not new to China, many villages had mud walls around them (especially in North China), and local administrative towns usually had high stone walls.

to harassment. Shouting slogans, singing loudly, and shooting from all four directions are all ways of harassing. Before retreating, scatter slogan handbills on open ground. (2) In coordinating fighting with regular armies, harassment may be adopted to disperse enemy forces and to tie them down to one place, unable to offer support in other directions. At such times, the guerrilla units may be split into several groups, creep near the enemy garrisons, and shoot and shout suddenly in turns at dusk, midnight, and dawn. This will cause bewilderment and uncertainty among the enemy forces and make them unable or too slow to offer reinforcement. (3) Another method is to bluff and bluster. This method puts up more flags and bonfires in the vicinity of the enemy garrisons. The ancients called this the tactics of sowing doubt. The objective is to deceive the enemy and facilitate our own actions at other places or to intimidate the enemy and increase its sense of panic. At such times, our guerrilla units should only make mock engagements with the enemy and never engage in serious fighting, so as to avoid unnecessary losses.

3. Surprise Attacks on the Enemy When He Is on the Move

Although the above twelve points address the general principles of the tactics of surprise attacks, they mainly deal with surprise attacks on enemy garrisons. Often, surprise attacks on the enemy when it is on the move offer the best chances for the greatest victories in guerrilla warfare. Therefore, guerrilla units should not waste any opportunity to strike the enemy when it is on the move and when the conditions are right. By nature, all these attacks are contact engagements, which may still be divided into two types of attacks: ambushes and sudden raids. An ambush is by nature a planned encounter, but it takes the form of entrapment. A sudden raid occurs in an unexpected encounter and takes the form of a rapid attack. The former is an important tactic of guerrilla units and therefore needs more detailed explanation. The latter refers to a fortuitous situation, so it shall be addressed only briefly.

First, an ambush is to lie in wait. It is the planned and camouflaged deployment of guerrilla troops along one side or both sides of the road that the enemy forces must take followed by a sudden attack when they pass. Such operations are called hidden attacks.[5] Based on different circumstances and deployment of troops, there are two types of ambushes: (1) To lie in wait. Forces are concealed beforehand along the road that the enemy must pass and make a sudden attack when they pass. (2) To lure the enemy into a trap. The main force should be deployed to lay the trap and small units may be used deliberately to display weaknesses and induce the enemy into the trap. Then the surprise attack is launched.

Second, according to the enemy's tactics and the quality of its troops, as well as the terrain and various other factors, several methods may be taken in laying an ambush: hiding on one side, on two sides, on several sides, or in multiple layers.

5. In these two sentences Mao is distinguishing two related terms, *maifu* (to lie in ambush) and *fuji* (to attack from a hidden position).

Third, the objectives of an ambush are as follows: (1) Destroy or weaken enemy infantry, artillery, cavalry, transportation units, requisition and dispatch units, automobiles, trains, ships, and so on. (2) Capture individual or several enemy messengers, scouts, telephone operators, and quartermasters in order to collect information about the enemy. (3) Use an ambush to intercept the enemy in retreat.

Fourth, an ambush requires, first and foremost, a clear understanding of the circumstances. If the circumstances are unclear, it is possible that the ambush may be futile, or may even cause us to suffer losses. Therefore, the scouting must be thorough and precise before making an ambush. In scouting, attention should be focused on the following points: (1) Methods of scouting. First, employ local residents sympathetic to the guerrilla units to approach the enemy by any means available to obtain the necessary information from the mouths of enemy soldiers and coolies. Second, use plainclothes scouts to approach the enemy to conduct intelligence work. Third, eavesdrop on enemy telephone calls. Fourth, seize enemy personnel to acquire information from their mouths or their documents. (2) The key facts to scout out are mainly the departure time of the enemy, the size of enemy troops, the route they will take, their destination, the presence of special weapons and equipment, whether or not they will have supply wagons, the state of communications and liaison during the movement of their troops, particular habits in marching, and so forth. (3) The techniques of reconnaissance follow the principle of concealing one's own intentions while obtaining information about the enemy. Except for those who need to know, the information acquired through reconnaissance should all be kept secret and leaks should be prevented. You must keep in mind that, no matter where, no matter when, enemy spies may be hidden both in the rear areas of the enemy and in the anti-Japanese areas.

Fifth, the choice of ambush sites. The choice of an ambush site should be based on the principle of maximizing the use of our greatest power and the minimizing the enemy's ability to use his greatest power. So, in choosing ambush sites, pay attention to the following points: (1) Good hiding spots make it easy for guerrilla units to see the enemy and difficult for the enemy to see the guerrillas. (2) Good terrain makes it easy for the guerrilla unit to attack the enemy and difficult for the enemy to strike at the guerrilla unit. (3) The roads near ambush sites must be convenient for the guerrilla units to retreat but not for the enemy. (4) The ambush site should be picked in areas other than directly in front of the enemy's march or patrols. There may be good spots by the side of a road, but if they are too close to the road that the enemy uses, such spots should not serve as secret gathering places in an ambush. Appropriate places should be selected in areas farther back. (5) There should be good observation positions. It is better for an ambush to have all these conditions, but it is not necessary to have everyone of these to lay a trap.

Sixth, deploying ambush troops: (1) An ambush should not be laid too early, in order to save the guerrilla units from a long ambush, which diminishes tension and caution, making the exposure of our intentions more likely, and increases the danger of detection by the enemy. But neither should it be laid too late, so that there is

not enough time to arrange the trap. (2) The road for the deployment should be hidden. It is better to take small roads and even mountain and valley routes that have no roads. (3) During the march, plainclothes scouts posing as the enemy should be sent ahead of the troops to look out and provide security. If it is necessary to pass residential areas, it is best to disguise our troops as the enemy and keep operational secrecy. (4) After arriving at the ambush area, this news should be blocked.

Seventh, carrying out the ambush: (1) The deployment of troops should depend on the size of the guerrilla unit, the size of the enemy forces, and the terrain. Usually a small unit (below 30 percent of the total force) will seize positions that have strategic importance and are difficult to reach, and from them pin down the enemy with firepower and inflict casualties on him. The main force will lay the trap at the best place for the assault and carry out the attack. Sometimes, a few men with a few guns should be posted to watch out in the direction from which enemy reinforcements may come and to secure the protective positions for withdrawal. (2) When making a surprise attack on a large enemy force, let its advance and main troops pass, and launch a surprise attack on its tail. Meanwhile, if possible, a small guerrilla detachment can raid the forward troops of the enemies and draw their attention. This will help the surprise attack of the ambushing troops. It is also possible to destroy roads and bridges by any means available in advance (flooding, blocking, barricading with stones and turning ordinary bridges into unsafe ones, and so on) to extend the enemy's column, so that it is hard for the head and the tail to assist each other. (3) In a surprise attack on a small enemy force, it may be possible to block its escape, cut off its incoming route, and eliminate it completely. (4) Regarding the signals for the start of an attack, the specific tasks of the various subunits, the routes of the strike, which unit starts firing first, and so forth, all leaders of various subunits should be informed in detail in advance. (5) Before an attack, keep well hidden and keep utmost silence. No eating or smoking, no talking and laughing, no casual looking about and visiting. (6) Survey the battlefield. Establish two observation posts in advance. The first one may be set up some ten *li* up the route by which the enemy will come. Three or four communication personnel, all disguised in enemy uniform, carry out these observation duties. They provide constant reports to the commander of the guerrilla units on the length of the enemy ranks, the strength of the enemy troops, and their surveillance efforts, so that the commander may make timely decisions in light of these developments. After the complete passage of the enemy, this post should return to the main group. The second observation post should be set up close to the ambush area for the commander so that he can observe the scene personally and issue the signal for the start of an attack at the right time. (7) The timing to begin the attack should be selected for the moment most opportune for ourselves to attack the enemy on the march. At the same time, all the guerrilla troops must strictly obey orders. No free movement is permitted so as to avoid alerting the enemy in advance. (8) The actual attack should be swift and fierce and should catch the enemy "off guard." In short order

all weapons should be fired together. The charge should start at once, and the battle should be finished quickly. Any doubt or hesitation will be harmful.

Eighth, as soon as the fighting has succeeded, immediately gather the troops together, deal with the prisoners of war, and collect the captured matériel and the wounded for a speedy withdrawal. If only a part of the enemy has been destroyed, a quicker withdrawal should begin to prevent a counterattack. All heavy equipment and goods that cannot be carried away should be destroyed.

Ninth, arrangements in case an ambush is impossible or unsuccessful: (1) If an attack has started but the battle between the two sides has not begun, and it is discovered suddenly that the enemy forces are too overwhelming or that they have found out in advance about our ambush and have already taken positions such that the attack is unlikely to be successful, stop the attack immediately and by all means quit the field. This is to preserve our own strength. Such times require the best judgment and inspiration from the commander. (2) If the fighting has already started and the enemy puts up stiff resistance and it is certain that the battle cannot be won, then stop fighting and retreat with determination.

Tenth, harassing the enemy. When the objective is not to destroy the enemy or the ambush cannot conclude the battle decisively, then take on the work of harassment. This method uses a small detachment to spread them over several points, to kill and wound the enemy with firepower for the purpose of harassing their columns on the march or to push huge rocks and old trees from high mountain cliffs to kill and wound their men and horses.

Eleventh, the tasks of the plainclothes scouts sent by small guerrilla groups [*xiaozu*] or guerrilla detachments are to ambush individual or groups of enemy dispatchers, purchasing agents, scouts, and so on. There are many such opportunities which should not be wasted.

Twelfth, ambushing cavalry. (1) The power of movement and attack of enemy cavalry is relatively strong, so choose forests or narrow roads (sometimes residential areas may also be appropriate), where the enemy cavalry will have difficulty maneuvering, to carry out the ambush. (2) Firepower should be concentrated on killing and wounding horses. After that, the people are easily captured. (3) When ambushing a few enemy cavalry offers the certainty of catching them, then a multilayered ambush from all directions may be laid. (4) Our troops may disguise themselves as civilian residents, hide in a village ahead of time, wait for the enemy cavalry to enter the village, and then launch a surprise attack against them when the enemy personnel and horses are scattered.

Thirteenth, ambushing trucks. The ambush site should be selected in a mountain valley, the bottom of a valley, the bottom of a gully, a corner, or on a rising or falling slope. Set up barricades and booby traps or lay mines (or bind together hand grenades and mortar shells) ahead of time, thus forcing the trucks that reach them to stop or to be blown up and turned over. Then the guerrilla units hidden nearby wait for the moment when the trucks stop or turn over to block their advance with one small force and cut off their retreat with another small force, while

the main force launches a direct assault on the vehicles and captures people and goods. If there are guards, they should be disarmed first before burning the vehicles. Attention should, however, be placed on winning over the captured drivers and soldiers, who should not be killed or harmed.

Fourteenth, ambushing trains. (1) Turns, rising or falling slopes, high embankments, hollows, and entrances of tunnels are all good sites for laying an ambush. (2) Methods: First, loosen spikes on train rails or dismantle a section of the railroad to derail the train when it arrives. Or erect barricades by piling up big rocks and large logs on the rail lines or at the mouths of tunnels to halt the advance of the train. The guerrilla unit should divide into three parts: One part should take over the position and prevent the guards on the trains from resisting. Another part should fire at the train carriages. The last part should prepare to enter the carriages, seize weapons, and capture the personnel. Finally, the train should be set on fire and destroyed. (3) Special attention should be paid in particular to armored trains, for they are moving cannon platforms. Guerrilla units should not only loosen rail spikes in advance but also try to blow them up with mines. Attacks should be launched only after the rails collapse.

Fifteenth, ambushing ships and boats: (1) The ships and boats which guerrilla units may ambush are mainly commercial ships and smaller inland river gunboats used by the enemy for transportation. (2) Ambush sites should be in concealed places along riverbanks, at river bends, and near our location on the banks. (3) During an ambush, the main firepower and military force of the guerrilla unit should be ready to attack the head and a small force should be responsible for striking at the tail, ready to intercept it with firepower if the enemy turns around. As soon as the enemy ship arrives, start a fierce barrage of rifle and machine-gun fire. Cannon fire is especially good. (In case there are no foreign cannons, homemade cannons and pine tree cannons can also serve the purpose.) (4) Wooden ships should be ordered to stop and anchor near the banks. Search them for military equipment and goods. Private ships should be let go, and the crew should be given back their belongings. Official ships should be set on fire and burned.

Sixteenth, ambushing enemy requisition teams: (1) Ambush enemy requisition teams before they reach the villages. Guerrilla units must lay the ambush in advance along the sides of the road that the enemy forces must take, wait for them to arrive, and launch a surprise attack and wipe them out. (2) Or launch a surprise attack against the enemy requisition teams when they have entered a village and started to collect from house to house. At such times, the enemy is dispersed and cannot concentrate his forces, and so is easiest to eliminate. If a small detachment of guerrillas in disguise is planted in a village ahead of time, and the main force attack from outside the village, the outcome will be even better. But those concealed inside the village must wait for the major force outside the village to act first, so as not to alarm the enemy and allow him to flee. (3) If, because there is not enough time, the above two methods cannot be adopted, then you can wait for the enemy forces to finish their requisitioning and return with all the goods, and ambush them from the side of the road on their return. After the success of such an ambush, all captured money and goods should be returned to the popular masses from whom the goods were taken originally. Only when the popular masses want to express thanks to the guerrilla unit voluntarily can a portion of the money and goods be distributed to add to the supplies of the guerrilla unit. (4) However, the objective of ambushing enemy requisition teams, no matter when it takes place, can be achieved only by sudden action and the destruction of their covering troops first.

Seventeenth, ambushing enemy transportation units: (1) Narrow roads or bottlenecks of roads should be selected. (2) If the enemy guard troops are relatively powerful, then the guerrilla unit can be split into two. The main force should fight the enemy guard troops and draw them toward itself, while a small force should seize the goods being transported or burn them. (3) If the enemy guard troops are few, then these troops should be destroyed first, and then the transport goods should be captured. (4) The general principle in ambushing enemy transportation units is, first, to fire at the advance part of their ranks to cause disorder in the procession, as civilian porters try to escape and the road is blocked. Next, destroy or drive away the enemy guard troops with sudden force and then seize the supplies. (5) To prevent the transportation unit from turning back and running away, a small force should be deployed in advance to cut off their retreat.

Eighteenth, sudden raids: This is a method to handle unexpected encounters. (1) Guerrilla units on the move may encounter enemy suppression troops,[6] requisition teams, or transportation units on the move. So guerrilla units on the move should always be ready for such sudden attacks. (2) During their advance, guerrilla units should regularly dispatch plainclothes scouts to places three to five *li* in front of the advance part of the our troops, so that news of encountering the enemy may be obtained and ways of dealing with them may be decided quickly. (3) If a small enemy unit or an enemy unit with a force equivalent to our own is encountered, then the earliest opportunity should be seized and the guerrilla unit should turn rapidly toward the flanks of the enemy forces, open fire at them suddenly, charge toward them with full force, and destroy them in one stroke. Meanwhile, if the enemy forces retreat in defeat and there are no worries about support from other enemy forces, then they should be pursued and eliminated completely. But they should not be pursued too far. (4) If large numbers of enemy forces are encountered and the facts are unclear, a rapid withdrawal should be carried out without any hesitation, with the aim of getting away. If the enemy fires first, we should use a small force to occupy positions to resist and cover the main force as it with-

6. Suppression troops (*taofa dui*) was the term used for the Guomindang troops carrying out the encirclement campaigns against the Jiangxi soviet in the early and mid-1930s. After 1938, Japanese occupation troops also organized to suppress Communist guerrilla units in areas of North China under Japanese military control.

draws first. Then the guerrilla covering forces should withdraw thereafter to avoid losses. (5) In sum, sudden encounters with the enemy require quick decisions first and foremost, whether to fight or to retreat. There should be no hesitation, for indecisiveness and hesitation are dangerous.

The above eighteen points are all methods for making surprise attacks on the enemy on the move, and the anti-Japanese guerrilla units should study them.

All tactics should, however, be based on the principle of adapting to objective conditions. Words and articles can only serve as references for the actual fighting, and they should not be applied rigidly. There will certainly be many new and valuable experiences in the anti-Japanese war that will surpass previous words and articles. We hope that all of you will encourage one another to defeat the Japanese imperialists.

To Ai Siqi

(January 12, 1938, at night)

Comrade Siqi:

I do not have the *Complete Works of Lu Xun*. I do have several individual works, including his *Dawn Blossoms Plucked at Dusk,*[1] but I can't find it anywhere.

I am just starting to study military questions, but for the time being I cannot write an article in this domain.

It would be somewhat better [for me] to study philosophical works a while longer before writing anything, and there would seem to be no immediate urgency.

Liang Shuming has come here. His *Theory of the Rural Movement*[2] contains a number of strange ideas. One could look him up and talk with him.

When you are free come over for a chat, but please come in the evening, any time except Monday or Friday.

Best wishes!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 118–19, where it is reproduced from the manuscript conserved in the archives.

1. *Dawn Blossoms Plucked at Dusk* was a slim volume containing ten essays written by Lu Xun in 1926.

2. The correct title of this work is *Theory of Rural Reconstruction.* Liang Huanting (1893–1988), commonly known by his *zi*, Shuming, was a native of Guangxi. In the early 1930s, he undertook to promote rural reform based on Confucian principles in Shandong.

Interview with a Correspondent of New China News *in Yan'an* (on One-Party Dictatorship)

(February 2, 1938)[1]

Question no. 1: Is the current political system in the Soviet Union a one-party dictatorship?

Answer: The Soviet Union is a state of the dictatorship of the working class, that is, a socialist state of the workers and peasants, but not a state of party dictatorship. From a Marxist-Leninist point of view, a class-based dictatorship and a party-based dictatorship are two distinct things. A party is composed only of the most conscious elements of a class. The Party must, and indeed can only, play the leading role in a state of the proletarian dictatorship. The Party must not, and indeed cannot, supplant the class in imposing the dictatorship. Consequently, the founders of the Soviet political system, Lenin and Stalin, have never confused a party-based dictatorship with a class-based dictatorship. If, on occasion, they have used the term of so-called Party dictatorship, they were merely referring to the leading role of the Party in the state structure, and that was all. In order to help you understand and accept this argument of mine, I'm happy to inform you regarding some of the things Lenin and Stalin have said about this issue. To help you remember and understand, I will, in particular, explain to you how Stalin, in his work *On*

This text was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 28, January 11, 1938, and that is our source. The interview also appears in *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 305–21, where it is reproduced from this and several other contemporary sources, but as noted below, a long passage is missing from that version. The text as published in *Jiefang* is preceded by the following note:

> The correspondent of *New China News* in Yan'an, Mr. Qiguang, has recently published some articles in newspapers and reviews putting forward the idea of a so-called one-party dictatorship, basing his arguments, first of all, on the example of the Soviet Union and, then, on that of Germany and Italy. On February 2, he paid a visit to Mr. Mao Zedong, to learn his views of this matter. We are publishing the complete record of their talk here, so that all our compatriots throughout the country can read it quickly.

1. As stated in the source note, this interview appeared in the issue of *Jiefang* dated January 11, 1938, but in China at this time, the effective date of publication of a periodical often did not correspond exactly to the date on the cover. We therefore follow the indication in the introductory note to the *Jiefang* version to the effect that the interview took place on February 2.

Questions of Leninism, presents Lenin's views on this problem, as well as his own. In the chapter in this book entitled "The Party and the Working Class in the System of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," Stalin gave a detailed and clear exposition of Lenin's views on this issue. He said, for example:

> The highest expression of the leading role of the Party, here, in the Soviet Union, in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, is the fact that not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organizations without guiding directives from the Party. In *this sense* it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat is, in essence, the "dictatorship" of its vanguard, the "dictatorship" of its Party, as the main guiding force of the proletariat. Here is what Lenin said on this subject at the Second Congress of the Comintern:
>
> Tanner says that he stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the dictatorship of the proletariat is not conceived quite in the same way as we conceive it. He says that by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, in essence, the dictatorship of its organized and class-conscious minority.
>
> And, as a matter of fact, in the era of capitalism, when the masses of the workers are continuously subjected to exploitation and cannot develop their human potentialities, the most characteristic features of working-class political parties is that they can embrace only a minority of their class. A political party can comprise only a minority of the class, in the same way as the really class-conscious workers in any capitalist society constitute only a minority of all the workers. That is why we must admit that only this class-conscious minority can guide the broad masses of the workers and lead them. And if Comrade Tanner says that he is opposed to parties, but at the same time is in favor of the minority consisting of the best organized and most revolutionary workers showing the way to the whole of the proletariat, then I say that there is really no difference between us.
>
> But this, however, must not be understood in the sense that a sign of equality can be put between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the Party (the "dictatorship" of the Party), that the former can be identified with the latter, that the latter can be substituted for the former. Comrade Sorin, for example, says that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party." This thesis, as you see, identifies the "dictatorship of the Party" with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Can we regard this identification as correct, and yet remain on the ground of Leninism? No, we cannot.[2]

2. In the case of the foregoing long quotation from Stalin, and most of the other quotations in this passage, we have followed the English text in J.V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), rather than retranslating the Chinese rendering of the Russian text into English. (The above passage appears on p. 184.) There are no substantial differences between this text and the version Mao was following, except that Mao was using a translation from the second Russian edition of Lenin's writings, which had not yet been sanitized by the removal of all favorable references to Stalin's victims of the late 1930s. Thus, the version followed by Mao refers, in the last paragraph just quoted, to "Comrade Sorin," while in the edition reprinted in Beijing in 1976 he has become simply "Sorin." On such points, whenever they arise, we follow Mao and the second edition.

It can thus be seen that what the Soviet Union practices is the dictatorship of the working class, and not the dictatorship of the Communist Party. To confuse the dictatorship of a class with the dictatorship of a party conforms neither to Marxist-Leninist theories nor to the reality of the Soviet Union. I think that, in terms of understanding this problem in the Soviet Union, the views of the creators of the Soviet political system, Lenin and Stalin, are the most authoritative and trustworthy.

Question no. 2: Even though the Soviet Union is not a party dictatorship, why does the Communist Party alone exist there?

Answer: On the one hand, this is the result of the choice made by the will of the people during the past long struggle between the different parties and groups in Russia. In other words, it is the result of the Russian people's withdrawing their support for other parties and groups in the course of a long historical struggle and giving their support to the Communist Party. On the other hand, it is because there is already no social basis for the existence of other political parties in the socialist Soviet Union; consequently, there is neither the necessity nor the possibility for other political parties to exist. In order to help you understand and believe these statements of mine, it is best to refer you to Stalin's own words on this issue. The fact that the Communist Party alone exists in the Soviet Union is not fabricated, imagined, or created through administrative orders by the workers. It has taken shape as the result of historical life. On this point, Stalin put this very clearly in his talk with the First Delegation of American Workers on September 9, 1927. He said:

> Our Party's position as the only legal party in the country (the Communist Party's monopoly) is not something artificial and deliberately invented. Such a position cannot be created artificially by administrative machinations, and so forth. Our Party's monopoly grew out of life, it developed historically as a result of the utter bankruptcy of the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties.[3]

In the Soviet Union, there are no social bases for the existence of political parties other than the Communist Party; nor is there the necessity and possibility of the existence of other political parties.[4] On this point, Stalin gave a special explanation in his report on the new constitution of the Soviet Union on November 25, 1936. He said:

> Finally, there is yet another group of critics. While the last-mentioned group accuses the Draft Constitution of abandoning the dictatorship of the working class, this group, on the contrary, accuses it of not changing anything in the existing position in the USSR, of leaving the dictatorship of the working class intact, of not granting freedom to political parties, and of preserving the present leading position of the Communist Party in the USSR. And this group of critics maintains that the absence of freedom for parties in the USSR is a symptom of the violation of the principles of democratism.
>
> I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the USSR. If the esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft Constitution, that is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks regard it as a merit of the Draft Constitution.
>
> As to freedom for various political parties, we adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a part of a class, its most advanced part. Several parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable—in which there are, say, capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, rich peasants and poor peasants, etc. But in the USSR, there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the rich peasants, and so on. In the USSR there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests—far from being mutually hostile—are, on the contrary, friendly. Hence there is no ground in the USSR for the existence of several parties, and, consequently, for freedom for these parties. In the USSR there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party. In the USSR, only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end. And that it defends the interests of these classes not at all badly, of that there can hardly be any doubt.
>
> They talk of democracy. But what is democracy? Democracy in capitalist countries, where there are antagonistic classes, is, in the last analysis, democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. In the USSR, on the contrary, democracy is democracy for the working people, i.e., democracy for all. But from this it follows that the principles of democratism are violated, not by the Draft of the new Constitution of the USSR, but by the bourgeois constitutions. That is why I think that the Constitution of the USSR is the only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world.[5]

We can, therefore, see that the fact of the existence of a single party can take shape and be realized only in countries, such as the socialist Soviet Union, in which parties and groups other than the single party in question have been completely abandoned or overthrown by the people in the course of the revolution, and in which there are no social bases for the existence of other parties and groups.

Question no. 3: Why can Germany and Italy both practice a one-party dictatorship?

Answer: Above all, we must clearly distinguish the question of the control of political power by one party within a country from the question of whether or not

3. We have taken this passage from the English translation of Stalin's works (J.V. Stalin, *Works* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954], vol. 10, p. 120).

4. This almost verbatim repetition of the third sentence in Mao's reply to the second question appears in the Chinese original.

5. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 818–20.

only one party really exists in a country. It is true that, both in Germany and in Italy, one party alone controls political power; but this does not mean that only the party in control of political power exists in these countries. In Germany today, though of course the only party in control of political power is the fascist National Socialist Party, other political parties that existed before the fascist party came to power—such as the Social Democratic Party, which had millions of votes in the last parliamentary election (1933), the Communist Party, which had 5 to 6 million votes, and various other pro-democratic bourgeois parties and groups that enjoyed the support of millions of voters and their own historical tradition—all continue to exist and operate, albeit in an underground and illegal manner. Anyone who goes to German cities and villages and observes carefully will immediately see that, although hundreds of thousands of antigovernment elements are incarcerated in concentration camps, the Social Democrats, the Communists, and all other parties and groups that support democracy and oppose the fascist dictatorship are all fighting heroically underground. They are secretly publishing their newspapers and journals. They are arduously carrying out the work of educating and organizing the popular masses. In countries such as France, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium, German political expatriates are forming ties with their own political parties and groups in these countries in order to establish a popular front to oppose fascism and support democratic politics. Representatives of the German Social Democratic Party and the German Communist Party all sit in the governing organs of the Social Democratic International (the Second International) and the Comintern. The situation in Italy is no different from that in Germany. The Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, and all democratic parties and groups are similarly carrying out heroic underground activities against the fascist party. The representatives of these parties and groups are also working both inside and outside Italy to establish an antifascist popular front. Representatives of the Italian Communist Party and the Italian Social Democratic Party also occupy important positions in the governing organs of the Third International and the Second International.

Thus it can be seen that, although only one party controls political power and enjoys a legal status in Germany and Italy, it is completely contrary to the facts to say that only fascist parties exist in these countries.

Question no. 4: Some say that the Guomindang should now impose a "one-party dictatorship." What are your views regarding this question?

Answer: I can respond to this question of yours from two perspectives.

First, if the "one-party dictatorship" you are talking about refers to the fact that the Guomindang alone controls the National Government, that is already an established fact today, for as everyone knows, only members of the Guomindang or those designated by the Guomindang are in charge in the National Government, and no other parties and groups in China today have representatives inside the government. Our Communist Party is the largest political party next to the

Guomindang. At present, we definitely do not demand to join the government. Our Party's position on this issue has been sincerely explained on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party by one of the Party's leaders, Comrade Chen Shaoyu [Wang Ming], in his talk with the American reporter Mr. Biden [?], on December 25 of last year, and by another leader of our Party, Comrade Zhang Wentian (i.e., Luo Fu), in his article "Strengthen the Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communists to Seek Victory in the War of Resistance" (published in the current issue). On this point, I can solemnly state once again, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Our Chinese Communist Party is now assisting, in complete good faith, the Guomindang in its war of resistance to Japan, but at present we make no demand to join the National Government.

Second, so-called one-party government, which refers to the control of a country's political power by one party, need not necessarily employ the method of "dictatorship." If the methods of "one-party dictatorship" were, in fact, equivalent to the policies carried out by the Guomindang during the past decade, then I think it would be necessary to consider the matter. As I see it, although the Guomindang can maintain the situation of the control of political power by one party today, it should, it seems, adopt rather democratic methods in order to rally together those who want to fight Japan and save China and in order to demonstrate the popular resolve to fight Japan and save China. Of course, such democratic methods are those absolutely favorable to fighting the War of Resistance, strengthening the government, and increasing the people's support for and confidence in the government.

Question no. 5: Some people are now saying that the Guomindang should once again carry out the policy of "no party outside the party," in other words, the policy of not allowing any political parties other than the Guomindang to exist legally. What is your view, sir, on this issue?

Answer: Not only is the policy of permitting only the Guomindang to exist legally, and not only refusing to recognize the legal existence of the Communist Party and other political parties (such as the Nationalist Youth Party and the National Socialist Party) but of striving to destroy all parties except the Guomindang by military force by no means a new theory in China, but it is in fact an old policy that has already been carried out in China for a decade. But the tragic consequences of this are that we have not only suffered endless internecine strife but invited an unprecedented foreign disaster. The painful experience of actual political life in China during the past ten years tells us that the Guomindang's policy of attempting to use force to destroy other parties and groups has already ended in failure. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party's attempt to create a régime led by a single party under the conditions now existing in China has also failed to achieve the expected results. The lessons of the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, which led to the victory of the Northern Expedition, and

the reality of the grave national crisis caused by the split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party in the last decade have taught the comrades of the two parties, the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as the Chinese people as a whole, a bitter truth, namely, that the truly effective means for creating a unified China is not to be found in an internal struggle by one party to oppose or attempt to destroy the other party but, rather, through forming a national united front of the forces of all the parties and groups on a common political basis and, above all, in the close cooperation between the two parties of the Guomindang and the Communist Party. The reason it has been possible in our country during the past six months to create the fundamental prerequisite for waging a war of resistance to Japan lies in the fact that the national forces in our country have been united and unified. Moreover, the specific form and content of the unity and unification of the nationalist forces in our country resides in the establishment of an anti-Japanese national united front formed on the basis of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Not only have the Guomindang and the Communist Party both abandoned their previous position of mutual nonrecognition and opposition, but they have begun to cooperate closely on the basis of fighting Japan to save China. This means that the Guomindang has given up its previous position of denying the existence of the Communist Party and other parties in favor of an orientation of uniting all anti-Japanese parties and groups to resist the foreign invader. The Communist Party and other parties have also abandoned their previous position of opposing the Guomindang and are cooperating with the Guomindang to pursue the common cause of fighting Japan and saving the country. It can thus be seen that the union of the forces of the various parties and groups to form an anti-Japanese national united front is a necessary precondition for China's war of resistance to Japan. If there is no such precondition, or if this precondition is destroyed, this will in fact cause China to continue to suffer from internal turmoil. A China torn by internal turmoil is incapable of continuing its war against Japan. This is a self-evident and commonly recognized truth. Moreover, precisely because of this, the Japanese fascist warlords, in addition to military aggression, also attempt, at all times, to employ the venomous scheme of "using Chinese to control Chinese," above all by trying to rekindle the internal strife between the various parties and groups in China, so that the Anti-Japanese National United Front may be split. It can thus be seen that the theory being touted by certain individuals today that does not allow the existence of any party except the Guomindang is, in fact, a theory which has already been negated by the facts of China's history. This represents an attempt to return China to the situation of internecine strife that existed before we united to fight the war. At the same time, this would make it impossible for the situation of unity created by the Anti-Japanese National United Front in China to continue. Consequently, it would create once again a situation in which China is powerless to fight a war of resistance to Japan. Thus, no matter how loudly the individuals espousing this theory shout "national unity," if their theory were unfortunately to be put into practice, the real

effect would certainly be to destroy the existing unity in resisting Japan and make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance against Japan. Thus, no matter how loudly the individuals espousing this theory shout "resist Japan," if their theory were unfortunately to be applied, the actual result would certainly be to destroy our unity in waging the war against Japan and make it impossible for the War of Resistance to continue. Precisely because of this, I firmly believe that such theories, which damage our real unity in the name of unity, harm our war against Japan in the name of resisting Japan, and attempt, in essence, to force China to return to the tragic conditions prior to the emergence of national unity in the struggle against foreign aggression, will undoubtedly be opposed by the patriotic people of our country, negated by the country's soldiers who are fighting the war and, at the same time, denounced and rejected by the wise leaders of the Guomindang and all the comrades in the Guomindang who are willing to continue to fight the war for our country and our people. There is nothing surprising about this. First, this is because such theories are completely incompatible with reality and in fact contradict reality. These individuals are saying, "If other parties and groups apart from the Guomindang enjoy legal status, the war against Japan will be hampered because of interparty disputes." What the facts have proved is that when, previously, only the Guomindang was allowed to exist legally, while all other parties were denied legal status, there was, indeed, very serious interparty strife in China, which led to China's failure to wage a war of resistance to Japan—or, at most, China fought a localized war of resistance and was powerless to prosecute a full-scale war against Japan. On the contrary, when the Guomindang allowed other parties to exist legally, and cooperated with them, the civil war in China did stop, and interparty strife was resolved, creating an unprecedented situation of unity in the nation's government and armed forces. It was only because of this that we could wage an unprecedented holy war of national self-defense to ensure our national survival and seek our national liberation. These individuals are saying, "If, in addition to the Guomindang, other parties are given a legal right to exist, the fact of the legal existence of many parties will become a factor hampering and disrupting the unity of our country." The facts in China have proved that when only the Guomindang enjoyed a legal status, while denying it to other parties, our civil turmoil intensified to the point of unending civil war. On the contrary, when the Guomindang permitted other parties to have the legal right to exist, a situation of internal unity emerged, and different parties, despite their disagreement on certain issues, would never resort to arms as a means of criticism. At most, they would do no more than use friendly mutual criticism as weapons. The facts in England, the United States, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland also show: the fact of the legal existence of several parties has never hampered or hurt the unity of these countries. It can thus be seen that the theory that China can be unified and fight a war against Japan only by allowing the Guomindang alone to exist legally is a theory that is not compatible with China's real life; it is a theory that will make China neither truly unified nor truly capable of fighting a war against Japan. This

theory will never be accepted by those Chinese armed forces and people who cherish unity and are resolved to fight Japan.

Question no. 6: Now some people are saying that since the Communist Party has declared that it believes in the Three People's Principles, it can no longer believe in communism. What is your view on this issue?

Answer: The first thing I want to declare is that some people are saying that when members of the Communist Party proclaim they will fight for the realization of the Three People's Principles, this is equivalent to abandoning their own faith in communism. I can, officially on behalf of our Party, declare once again that this is nothing but a rumor launched by troublemakers and absolutely does not correspond to the facts. We are members of the Communist Party. We declare our willingness to struggle, together with the comrades of the Guomindang, for the unfinished revolutionary cause of Mr. Sun Yatsen—that is to say, the cause of the Three People's Principles, which seek equal international status, equal political status, and equal economic status for China. At the same time, we can certainly never give up our communism, which we have faithfully believed in, and sacrificed and struggled for over so many years. Second, some are saying that if you declare that you are fighting for the realization of the Three People's Principles, but at the same time believe in communism, this position is not in accordance with the Three People's Principles, since the Three People's Principles and communism are fundamentally incompatible. On this point, I can once again solemnly point out that such statements are absolutely erroneous. Such statements neither are in agreement with the theory and practice of Mr. Sun,[6] the revolutionary teacher who formulated the Three People's Principles and founded the Guomindang, nor correspond to the reality of the Chinese revolution. From a theoretical point of view, the primary components of the Three People's Principles—nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood—are precisely compatible with the ideas which communism advocates: thoroughly overthrowing imperialist oppression, so that the Chinese people can enjoy national independence; thoroughly destroying feudal oppression, so that the Chinese people can enjoy democratic freedom; and thoroughly reforming China's economic system to help the Chinese people achieve higher standards of living. Therefore, communism and the Three People's Principles are by no means incompatible, and it is not impossible for our Party and the

6. Three versions of Sun's name have long been commonly used in China: Sun Wen, including his original given name, or *ming,* Wen; Sun Yatsen, Yatsen being the Cantonese pronunciation of one of his *hao,* Yixian; and Sun Zhongshan, using another *hao*. Throughout the discussion of Sun's Three People's Principles in this interview, Mao refers to him not as "Mr. Sun Zhongshan," but as "Mr. Zhongshan." This usage, in Chinese, has overtones both of familiarity and of respect, but might seem odd in English. We have therefore rendered the name throughout the balance of this text simply as "Mr. Sun."

Guomindang to coexist legally and cooperate closely. On this issue, Mr. Sun had given explicit instructions repeatedly in his lectures on the doctrine of People's Livelihood. For example, in the second lecture on People's Livelihood, Mr. Sun openly denounced such erroneous views of some members of the Guomindang. He said:

> So soon as social problems are mentioned, most young men rise to champion communism and want to apply Marx's theories in China. How much careful thinking have these youthful zealots done who are thus espousing Marxism? They are a very thoughtful group; they are proposing a radical solution; they feel that political and social problems must be righted at the foundation and cleared at the source, and so radical measures are necessary. Therefore, they are actively organizing a communist party and are beginning to agitate in China. This has given rise to many misgivings among the older comrades in the Guomindang, who feel that communism is incompatible with the Three People's Principles of our party.[7] (See *Zhongshan quanji,* vol. 1, Second lecture on People's Livelihood, p. 42)

From this we can see that Mr. Sun openly pointed out that if, among the members of the Guomindang, there were some comrades who regarded the Three People's Principles and Communism as incompatible, this was the result of a misunderstanding. Why did such a misunderstanding arise? Mr. Sun, in the lecture cited above (on pp. 44–45 of the lecture cited above), pointed out, in order to clarify this point, that in general the reason was that such people did not understand the interconnected character of the Three People's Principles. In particular, they did not understand the principle of People's Livelihood. Consequently, after explaining these reasons, Mr. Sun went on in his lecture to say:

> Why do I dare to say that our revolutionary comrades have no clear idea of the Principle of People's Livelihood? Because many of them, since our recent reorganization of the Guomindang, have in their opposition to the Communist Party, declared offhand that communism is different from the Three People's Principles; the Three People's Principles are all that is necessary in China, and communism should

7. As indicated above in the source note, a substantial passage of Mao's interview, as published in *Jiefang*, has by some accident been omitted from the text as reprinted in *Mao Zedong ji.* This gap begins after the words "who feel that communism is incompatible with the Three People's Principles of our party" and ends at the point indicated below by another note. For the quotations from Sun's lectures, we have used the translation of Frank W. Price, *SAN MIN CHU I: The Three Principles of the People* (Shanghai: China Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1927), where the passage just quoted appears on pp. 423–24. This version is reasonably accurate and has the advantage of enabling users of this series who do not read Chinese to see the context of the passages cited by Mao. The Chinese text we have followed in checking the accuracy of the quotations from Sun is that in *Zhongshan congshu* (Collected Writings of Sun Yatsen) (Shanghai: Dayi tongyuan shuju, reprinted June 1927, i.e., before significant changes could have been made in the wake of the break between the Communists and the Guomindang).

under no conditions be admitted. But what really is the Principle of People's Livelihood? In my last lecture I revealed a little of what it means; I said that *Minsheng*, or Livelihood, has been the central force in the cultural progress of society, in the improvement of economic organization, and in moral evolution. Livelihood is the driving power in all social movements; and if livelihood does not go right, social culture cannot advance, economic organization cannot improve, morals will decline, and many injustices such as class war, cruelty to workers, and other forms of oppression will spring up—all because of the failure to remedy the unfortunate conditions of livelihood. All social changes are effects; the search for livelihood is the cause.

In view of this conclusion, what is the Principle of Livelihood? It is communism and it is socialism. So not only should we not say that communism conflicts with the *Minsheng* principle, but we should even claim communism as a good friend. The supporters of the *Minsheng* principle should study communism thoughtfully.[8]

In his lecture, Mr. Sun continues by raising a question:

If communism is a good ally of the *Minsheng* Principle, why do members of the Guomindang oppose the Communist Party? The reason may be that the members of the Communist Party themselves do not understand what communism is and have discoursed against the Three People's Principles, thus arousing a reaction within the Guomindang. But the blame for these ignorant and reckless communists should not be charged to the whole Communist Party or to the principles of the party. We can only say that they are acting as individuals; we cannot take the bad behavior of some individuals as representative and oppose the whole Communist Party. Since we cannot use the actions of a few persons as an excuse for opposing the principles of a whole group, why has the question arisen among our Guomindang comrades? Because they have not understood what the Principle of People's Livelihood really is. They do not realize that our principle of Livelihood is a form of communism.[9]

What conclusions should we draw from this lecture of Mr. Sun? The conclusions are, first, that the Three People's Principles and communism can coexist. The Three People's Principles and communism have a very good, friendly relationship. Second, those who consider that the Three People's Principles and communism are incompatible are, in reality, people who do not understand the Three People's Principles, and in particular those who do not know what the principle of People's Livelihood is all about. Such people should be a very small minority within the Guomindang. Similarly, those who consider that communism and the Three People's Principles are incompatible in reality do not understand communism, and in particular do not understand the reciprocal relations between communism and the Three People's Principles. These people should also constitute an extremely small number within the Communist Party. As regards the method for resolving this problem, Mr. Sun considers that this is a matter of individual behavior on one side or the other, and neither side can, in response to this, oppose the whole party or the entire ideology of the other side. Third, Mr. Sun considers that, not only should those who advocate communism understand the Three People's Principles; at the same time, he also points out that those who advocate People's Livelihood should also study communism in detail. This is an open, aboveboard, and unselfish attitude. We Communists greatly admire this attitude of Mr. Sun. In reality, any great thought or ideology in the world cannot be patented by a single party; it should and must welcome anyone else and any other party to come to study and apply it. Not only are we willing to fight for the application of the Three People's Principles; we also welcome anyone—especially our comrades from the Guomindang—to come, in accordance with Mr. Sun's directives, and study communism attentively. For we are profoundly convinced that all those who want to struggle for the cause of the liberation of humanity, and who also truly study and understand communism (or Marxism), will assuredly recognize that Marxism is the highest ideal for the resolution of social questions and that it is the great synthesis of several thousand years of human thought. Communist society is the most satisfactory, the most joyful, the happiest society; there is absolutely nothing frightening about it. Precisely for this reason, our country's greatest revolutionary of the modern era, Mr. Sun Yatsen, has said:

8. See *SAN MIN CHU I,* pp. 427–28.
9. *SAN MIN CHU I,* pp. 428–29.

Soon after man's conquest over nature and the wild beasts came the introduction of money.[10] Now in modern times has come the invention of machinery and the men with the keenest minds have taken the world's most valuable materials and have monopolized them for their own profit, making other classes of men their slaves. This has made our age one of fierce human struggle. When can this struggle be settled? Only when we initiate a new period of communism. What is man struggling for, anyway? He is struggling for bread, he is struggling for the rice bowl. In the communistic age, when all have bread and rice enough to eat, there will be no fighting between men and the human struggle will be eliminated. So communism is a very high ideal of social reconstruction. (See "The Second Lecture on People's Welfare," *Zhongshan quanji,* vol. 2, p. 38)[11]

Mr. Sun once said, about the value of Marxism:

His books and theories may be said to have crystallized the best thinking of mankind for thousands of years upon social questions. Soon after Marx set forth his doctrines, the whole world began to follow him, while scholars of all lands declared their faith in him and became his disciples.[12]

10. The text as reprinted in *Mao Zedong ji* resumes here.
11. *SAN MIN CHU YI,* pp. 415–16.
12. *SAN MIN CHU YI,* p. 377. (The quotation is from the first lecture on People's Livelihood.)

You may see, from every word said above, that we can find absolutely no reference in the theory of the Three People's Principles formulated by Mr. Sun to the incompatibility between the Three People's Principles and communism. As for how Mr. Sun dealt with this issue in his own actions, it is even more widely known. The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921. From that time forward, Mr. Sun kept close ties with members of the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, when Mr. Sun decided to reorganize the Guomindang in 1924, he openly cooperated with the Communist Party. Moreover, the forms of cooperation were very close. Not only did he establish a national revolutionary alliance between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but he allowed members of the Communist Party in their capacity as individuals to become members of Guomindang organizations and share responsibility for revolutionary tasks. At that time, the Communist Party had no more than a few hundred members in the entire country and a history of only a few years since its establishment. Did Mr. Sun, even under those circumstances, demand of members of the Communist Party that, apart from the Three People's Principles, they were not allowed to believe in communism at the same time? No, he did not! Did Mr. Sun, even under those circumstances, advocate that only the Guomindang alone be allowed to exist and the Communist Party not be allowed to exist legally at the same time? No! Not only did he never do this, but Mr. Sun resolutely opposed the raising of such demands and the advocacy of such views by others. This represents precisely Mr. Sun's great farsightedness and clear understanding of the situation. Mr. Sun understood perfectly that the emergence of any ideology and political party is by no means an accident, but has its social basis and historical origins. No one's beliefs can be suppressed or abolished by force. Throughout history there have been countless people who have laid down their lives for their beliefs. No organization with its own social basis and mass support can possibly be disbanded or destroyed by force. In our history, countless revolutionary organizations have continued to exist and develop despite tyrannical oppression and extreme persecution. Furthermore, present circumstances differ markedly from those in the past. The Chinese Communist Party already has a seventeen-year history of revolutionary struggle, and hundreds of thousands of members. It has a strong organization long hardened in struggle, and leaders and cadres who have fought resolutely and heroically for the [communist] ideology, for the Party, for the revolution, for the liberation of the Chinese people, and for the liberation of all mankind. It has the faith and support of the masses in their tens of millions. How can one talk about abolishing Communist Party members' belief in communism and the Party organization? If one claims that we should abolish our belief in communism because we have declared our resolve to fight for the complete realization of the Three People's Principles, this would be a complete misunderstanding. Because we understand the relationship between the Three People's Principles and communism in exactly the same way Mr. Sun did—which is to say that we believe they are good friends and are compatible with each other—not only did we Communists, in our capacity as members of the Communist Party,

fight together with the comrades of the Guomindang for the realization of the Three People's Principles during the first period of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists, but even after the split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and in our own difficult revolutionary struggles, we were fighting for the goal of national independence, democracy and freedom and People's Livelihood for China, that is, for a goal in keeping with the fundamental ideas of the Three People's Principles. The only difference between today and the previous period of a split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party is that, after our previous cooperation with the Guomindang collapsed, we Communists single-handedly fought for the cause of our own Communist ideals and of the revolutionary Three People's Principles. Today, at a time of renewed cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, we Communists and the comrades of the Guomindang are again struggling together for the common revolutionary cause. Therefore, under these conditions, if someone insists that members of the Communist Party give up their Communist ideals and organization, this is not only unacceptable to the Communist Party, but directly contravenes Mr. Sun's theory and practice.

Judging from the actual circumstances in China, the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party was responsible for the rapid development of the revolution between 1925 and 1927, and the great victory of the armies of the Northern Expedition. The split in the relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party brought about the unprecedentedly grave situation of external aggression and internal turmoil during the past ten years. Now that the Guomindang and the Communist Party are once again cooperating, it is possible as regards foreign affairs to launch an unprecedentedly glorious War of Resistance for the defense of the nation. Within the country, it is possible to create political and military unity unprecedented during the past several decades, as well as unprecedented unity among the different parties, factions, strata, and social forces of the entire nation. Thus our compatriots in the entire country and the people of the whole world come to feel that this is the only opportunity and hope of survival for the Chinese nation at this critical juncture in its national existence. Whether the legal coexistence of two ideologies and parties is beneficial or harmful to the Chinese people and the Chinese nation should be judged according to living facts that everybody knows, and should not be based on the prejudices and subjective wishes of a few. The iron-clad facts of China's past and present have repeatedly demonstrated that when the Three People's Principles and communism cooperate, the country is united and the revolution advances; when the Three People's Principles and communism are opposed to and negate each other, the country is divided and the revolution encounters difficulties. Therefore, any view that violates these facts will certainly be impracticable. If, unfortunately, such views were put into practice, it would certainly lead to new calamities for our country and our people.

It can thus be seen that the view which holds that the Three People's Principles and communism are incompatible, and thus concludes that the Guomindang and

the Communist Party cannot both be legal at the same time and coexist is totally baseless and harmful to the cause of the liberation of the state and the nation. Such views go against the legacy of the theory and practice of Mr. Sun and against the realities of China. The real danger of such views is to turn the present excellent political situation, in which our nation is united against external aggression, into a possible situation in which our attention is directed inward and our internal difficulties are multiplied.

At the conclusion of this conversation, let me therefore emphatically repeat a few sentences to you. If the substance of the so-called one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang means the control of the political power of the government by the Guomindang alone, this is an established fact about which there can be no doubt. Although we Communists do not join the government ourselves, we absolutely support the National Government, which is leading the War of Resistance. Today, only the Japanese fascist warlords repudiate and attempt to overthrow the National Government; today, only the Trotskyites and their disciples, who are acting in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese intelligence agencies, are capable of launching the rumor that the National Government is a Kerensky-type transitional government and consequently of adopting the Chinese traitors' policy of "outwardly submitting to the National Government," while "in reality preparing to overthrow it." The policy of supporting and assisting the National Government adopted by us Communists is absolutely sincere; its basic postulate is to support the fundamental interests of our state and nation. At the same time, if the substance of the one-party dictatorship by the Guomindang is to be expanded and distorted to mean that no Communist Party or parties other than the Guomindang are to enjoy a legal existence, and that, aside from the Three People's Principles, members of the Communist Party are not allowed to have their own Communist beliefs, this will be by no means a new theory, but an old practice. This is to return to the dead-end road and the impracticable methods of the last ten years. If this mentality were unfortunately put into practice, it would harm both unity and resistance to Japan. It would cause the established Anti-Japanese National United Front in China to disintegrate, thus endangering the cause of fighting the war and saving our country. Objectively speaking, therefore, this mentality will certainly be exploited by the Japanese fascist warlords and Chinese traitors. And precisely because of this, it is hard for me to believe that this mentality can gain the sympathy of the enlightened individuals in the Guomindang who value the fundamental interests of our nation and people. Such a mentality is, of course, even less likely to gain the sympathy of the majority of our soldiers and citizens, who, untainted by partisan prejudices, cherish unity and are willing to fight the war to the end. Nonetheless, since this issue was openly raised at the critical moment of our national crisis, this cannot but arouse the serious concern of the Communists and all other parties, groups, and Chinese compatriots who are engaged in resisting the Japanese to save China. Indeed, this concerns not only the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communist Party but other parties and the survival of the

entire Chinese nation. Therefore, I hope that people from all walks of life and the enlightened and farsighted members of other parties in our country will all pay serious attention to the development of this issue and make every effort to ensure that the Chinese Anti-Japanese National United Front based on cooperation between all parties not be threatened, and that the cause of national unity, resistance to Japan, and national salvation not be endangered, so that the War of Resistance may be fought to the end, and we can strive for the final victory of our state and nation.

The Region of Mount Wulong Offers Prospects for Development; Highly Skilled Cadres Should Be Sent There

(February 9, 1938)

To the Frontline General Headquarters, Hankou, Zhu [De], and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. The region of which Mount Wulong is the center offers prospects for expansion and development. But, as it is an independent battle zone, the forces to be dispatched there must be crack troops and should not be too few in number. The military, government, and Party leading personnel should have the capacity to cope independently with new situations. Full preparations must be made before setting off.

2. Except for the principal cadres, who have been assigned by Yunzhen[1] and the rest of you, cadres for the Northeast and the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar regions are being selected by the rear area as well. Meanwhile, the Northern Bureau is also requested to select and send cadres.

3. Yunzhen cannot leave the Hebei-Chahar area right now, but should be prepared to order senior leaders to Mount Wulong at an appropriate stage of development. This matter may be considered by the front line and the rear jointly.

4. Xu's brigade[2] is in the region at this time only for ordinary guerrilla warfare, and they come under your direct leadership. It seems that Comrade Lin Biao does not need to go.

This is the first in a series of telegrams sent by Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and others regarding the uprising in eastern Hebei between February and November 1938. Our source is *Wenxian he yanjiu*, no. 3, 1985, pp. 11 and 15.

1. Yunzhen stands for Nie Rongzhen (1899–1992), a native of Sichuan. Nie had been a work-study student in France and Belgium and had also received military training in the Soviet Union. In November 1937 he had been appointed commander of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military District by the Communist government in Yan'an. At a conference held in January 1938, he had been chosen as one of the two Communist members of a regional government formed under joint Communist and Guomindang sponsorship.

2. The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

5. Sending troops to Shandong must be given consideration only after the completion of the action at Mount Wulong. It is also inappropriate to mention it to the Guomindang just now.

Mao [Zedong]

Also inform Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi], Yang [Shangkun], Zhou [Enlai], and Ye [Jianying] at the same time.

Speech at the Yan'an Mass Rally Against Aggression

(Delivered at 7 P.M. on February 11, 1938)

Comrades:

Today's rally against aggression is not only for Yan'an but for the entire country. Similar rallies are being held across the country these days, all of them having one goal: opposing the war of aggression. Moreover, this rally is not only for China but for the world. Tomorrow, a world antiaggression rally will be held in London, with the participation of delegates from several dozen countries. This signals the beginning of an unprecedented, great, worldwide struggle. The aggressors of the world have now formed a front of the aggressors to destroy world peace; in consequence, those opposed to aggression have united the majority of the people of the world to defend world peace and oppose wars of aggression. These two opposing fronts are struggling against each other in the world. Never before in history has there been such a great international movement, nor has there been such a great movement similar to today's mobilization of all the regions of the world. Now is the moment for the overwhelming majority of good people in the world to settle accounts with the minority of bad people in the world.

Because China stands now at a critical moment for its national survival, the Chinese people have achieved unprecedented great unity, such as has never existed before in Chinese history. There is now already a basis for the great union of the whole country, and it is now in the process of expanding. Despite temporary defeats and the loss of some territory, such great unity has unparalleled power. With additional assistance from the world and the Japanese people, we will certainly triumph over the Japanese aggressors. At present, there are three antiaggression united fronts: the Chinese united front, the world united front, and, lastly, the Japanese united front. Today, the majority of the popular masses in Japan do not support their government's aggression against China and are forming a united front against aggression. The goal of these three united fronts is the same; it is to oppose unanimously the war of aggression waged by the Japanese imperialists. Some people say that China's antiaggression movements during the past several

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This speech was first published in *Xin Zhonghua bao,* February 20, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 149–50, which reproduces that version.

decades have all failed, and today's antiaggression movement will also fail. This is wrong. Today's situation is different from that in the past, principally because not only is there a national united front against aggression today, but this united front coincides with an unprecedented world united front against aggression. Moreover, it coincides not only with the world united front but also with unprecedented internal conflicts inside Japan—with the united front of the Japanese people. These historical characteristics used to be absent. Now they all happen to be present. Therefore, this is the basis for us to say that China's defeat is temporary, and China's War of Resistance will certainly win final victory. The three united fronts, like the rising sun, are advancing toward greater strength and expansion. The final victory certainly belongs to us. There is no ground for pessimism.

That is why today's rally in the city of Yan'an has its national and international significance. Those Chinese who are unwilling to be slaves, regardless of their party affiliations, beliefs, sex, and age, are all rallying around the same goal. All the people in the world who love peace and hate war are also rallying around the same goal. A great majority of the Japanese people are also rallying around the same goal. This goal is to oppose aggression. This is the overall direction of world politics today. Such a great unity among the Chinese people, the people of the world, and the people of Japan is so powerful that it will undoubtedly weaken the strength of the aggressors gradually and ultimately defeat them. Therefore, we resolutely declare: so long as we make an effort, China will certainly be able to defeat the aggressors, and a New China will certainly be established.

To Fan Changjiang[1]

(February 15, 1938)

Mr. Changjiang:

Thanks to Mr. Ma's visit, I have received and read your letter. Comrade Zhang returned to Yan'an and passed on to me your esteemed letter of January 3. I beg your forgiveness for not responding for so long.

The issues you raised are all crucial issues for the country, and a short missive is not enough to explain them clearly. But the main point in solving the problems you have raised comes down, I believe, to truly recognizing and carrying out a common program. At present, quite a number of things are already being said and done jointly, from waging the War of Resistance to certain democratic freedoms, but not everything. There is not yet a complete thing extending from the War of Resistance to building the country, a thing which inspires the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as all social groups in the country, sincerely to recognize it and to strive for its realization. If this thing existed, and people sincerely recognized it and sought to put it into practice, then all the problems you, Sir, have raised would be solved.[2] As for using practical action to help the Guomindang perfect itself, we have already begun to do so and hope that the press and everybody else in the country will do the same. Precisely as you feel, this is an important issue. But, on the other hand, it is also necessary that the comrades of the Guomindang should welcome, or at least not reject, such assistance. We have already raised the slogan of mutual assistance. If there is a common program, things will be a lot easier. The problem of the military, which you regard as an obstacle to the mutual trust between the two parties, is really caused by the absence of a program covering the period from the War of Resistance to building the country. If there were one, neither party would have had such concerns. Because, in the light

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 120–22, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Fan Changjiang (1909–1970), a native of Sichuan, had been sent to Xi'an and Yan'an by the Tianjin *Dagongbao* to report on developments following the Xi'an Incident. See, in Volume V, p. 631, Mao's letter to him thanking him for his positive assessment. On his return from the Northwest in 1939, he joined the Chinese Communist Party.

2. Presumably the "thing" referred to in this and the previous sentence is the "common program" mentioned above and referred to again below.

of the lessons from the past decade, any party which wanted to go against this program and launch a new civil war would certainly be opposed by the people of the whole country and would not be able to start a civil war even if it wanted to. Otherwise, there will be obstacles to the mutual trust not only between the two parties but within one party. Do not the innumerable wars fought during the past decade inside the Guomindang—under the same ideology and within the same political party—provide the clearest evidence of this? In the conclusion of my report delivered at a meeting in Yan'an in May of last year (I expect that you, Sir, must have read this text), I pointed out that the Communist Party should seek a peaceful transition and avoid bloodshed not only in the period during which we are defeating external enemies and building a democratic state but also in China's distant future—the transition from the democratic revolution to the social revolution.[3] Therefore, the essence of the question lies in the true political attitude, not of the Communist Party but of the Guomindang, that is, its attitude toward a comprehensive program governing the whole period from the War of Resistance to building the country. Historically speaking, it is clearly established by solid evidence known by everyone who initiated the split and who was on the receiving end ten years ago, and why this took place. You, Sir, can certainly tell us who broke with that common program (the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang) at that time and thus started the civil war. If we remain mindful of earlier lessons, this instructs us about the future. In the future, therefore, the key lies not only in the presence of a program but also in a guarantee that neither side will be allowed to tear it up. This is the most central issue. There was no Eighth Route Army ten years ago. It came into being because of the split between the two parties. Based on this logic, even if the Eighth Route Army, or even the Communist Party, were to be disbanded today, who could guarantee that another Eighth Route Army would not emerge, or another Communist Party would not be created, inside the borders of China? One must know that these things do not happen without a reason; they are not, as certain people see it, deliberately and willfully caused by the leaders of the Communist Party, nor are they, as is claimed, "unsuitable to the conditions of our country." Indeed, these are the consequences of our country's politics and economy. As for the second issue you raised—that, on the one hand, the authorities feel uneasy, and, on the other, the people demand reform—I believe that it is of the same nature as the above problem, and the crux lies in the Guomindang's acceptance and carrying out of a common program.

To reach this objective, efforts from all sides are undoubtedly required. Members of both parties and their leaders, as well as all those in our country concerned

3. The reference is to Mao's concluding remarks at the Party Congress of the Soviet Areas on May 7, 1937, which appear in Volume V, pp. 651–58. The statement about avoiding bloodshed is not quite so generous as Mao suggests here. The relevant sentence, which appears on p. 656, reads: "A sound transition (that is, bloodless) is what we would like and we should strive for it, but what will happen will depend on the strength of the masses."

with the future of the nation, must jointly promote and struggle for the realization of this program. The affairs between the two parties are not their private affairs—they are the joint affairs of our country's citizens. I have boundless admiration for your deep concern regarding this issue. Having received your queries from afar, I am now briefly offering my humble opinion and hope to benefit from your instructions. With this reply, I respectfully send you a national liberation salute!

Mao Zedong

The Mao Mountain Range Is Advantageous for the Expansion of the New Fourth Army

(February 15, 1938)

Xiang [Ying] and Chen [Yi]:

We have taken note of your various telegrams.

1. We are in agreement with the principles of action contained in the telegram of the 14th, to strive to concentrate on the borders of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui to develop guerrilla war. But the area that is the most advantageous for the expansion of our forces at present is still the Mao mountain range within the borders of Jiangsu. That is, if we take the area of Liyang and Lishui as the center and engage the enemy located along the Nanjing-Zhenjiang-Danyang-Jintan-Yixing-Changxing-Guangde line, we will definitely be able to establish base areas and expand the base of the Fourth Army. If there are two detachments, then at least one should be deployed in the Mao mountain range. The other one should be deployed to the west of the Wuxing-Guangde-Xuanchen line to support them by coordinated action.

2. When the third class of prospective cadres graduates from the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, a group of them should be sent to the Fourth Army, but if for the moment they cannot be transferred, we hope you will send a few men to study.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 155–56, where it is reproduced from a copy preserved in the Central Archives.

Opinion Concerning the 115th Division Advancing to Hebei, Shandong, and Other Places in Three Steps

(February 15, 1938)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Lin [Biao], and Zuo [Quan], and for the information of Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying]:

At a time when the enemy is concentrating his forces to attack the Longhai railway, he must suffer from a severe lack of forces in the whole of Hebei, Shandong, and northern Jiangsu. At the same time, the enemy in the three provinces of Shanxi, Chahar, and Suiyuan does not have enough forces to advance southward. Given this estimate, please consider the following questions and send your reply by telegram.

1. Use the whole of the 115th Division to advance eastward. Xu's brigade[1] will go to the area between Tianjin, Cangzhou, Beiping, and Shijiazhuang via Fuping. The division headquarters will command Chen's brigade[2] to go from its present location to the area of Cangzhou, Qihe (the north shores of Jinan), Shijiazhuang, and Zhangde via the area of Handan and Cixian *xian*. They will engage in actions there for a while as the first step. If it proves beneficial for a large army corps to engage in temporary actions on the plains, and there is no difficulty either in crossing the Yellow River southward or in crossing the Grand Canal westward, then, the second step, the third step, and so on can be taken. Otherwise, if and when they fail to obtain a foothold there or an urgent situation arises elsewhere, they may advance in the direction of Anhui and Henan or be withdrawn westward.

2. Assuming that the first step is beneficial, and they can cross the river, and also obtain the agreement of the Guomindang, the second step should be taken. The two brigades should stand side by side and suddenly cross the river in several columns to enter the borders of Shandong. They should engage in combat to the east of the Tianjing-Pudong railway line and throughout Shandong, take the mountainous area in southern Shandong as the base area for their command, and expand to the south and north of Xuzhou and Haizhou. Within this step, we shall persist in our efforts for as long as the situation permits. Then, we shall take the third step.

3. For the third step, we shall move instead to Anhui and take the Hubei-Henan-Anhui border area as the base area for our command, and engage in combat for the defense of Wuhan.

4. If, after taking the first step, Henan and Wuhan are in danger, then either we do not go to Shandong, turning the third step into the second step, or Xu's brigade will go to Shandong and Chen's brigade will go to Anhui. Under these circumstances, as a separate move, the main force of the 119th Division should go to western Henan to play a supportive combat role. Other decisions shall be made as the situation dictates.

5. The 115th Division shall, however, ultimately be prepared to move to western Henan and western Hubei.

6. Needless to say, this strategic move has a very clear function in domestic and international politics. It is also necessary and beneficial from the point of view of the military strategy of resistance to Japan. The problem is that it is rather risky. Just how risky will mainly be a function of our ability to solve the problem of crossing the various big and small rivers.

7. If, on reflection, you deem this strategy feasible, then you should request that Zhou and Ye get in touch with the Guomindang regarding the various necessary conditions for moving to Hebei. You should not, however, raise the question of moving to south of the Yellow River. None of the things after the second step should be raised.

Mao [Zedong] Teng [Daiyuan][3]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 157–59, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

2. The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

3. Teng Daiyuan (1904–1974), a native of Hunan, had served as political commissar in Peng Dehuai's Third Army Corps during the Jiangxi period. At this time, he was chief of staff of the Central Military Commission.

Strive to Establish a Key Strategic Fulcrum for Engaging in a Prolonged War of Resistance

(February 21, 1938)

1. Assuming that the Guomindang all by itself is ultimately able to defend Wuhan, Chiang will not let us get a foothold in Hubei, Henan, and Anhui. But if it is unable to do so, then there remains the possibility that Chiang may allow us to get a foothold.

2. The important strategic fulcrums for engaging in a prolonged War of Resistance are the following six: the Shanxi region; the Hubei-Henan-Anhui area; Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangxi border area; the Shaanxi-Gansu region; the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi border area; and the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border area. This is assuming that the four points of Xi'an, Wuhan, Changsha, and Nanchang are under enemy attack and it proves impossible to defend them. In that case, we must strive to establish key strategic fulcrums for the War of Resistance. The Jiangsu-Shandong border area, the southern Hebei area, and the Daqing mountain range region will play a supportive role. If Wuhan should become indefensible, there is the possibility that we will be permitted to get a foothold in all these regions, including places near Wuhan itself.

3. Consequently, as regards the positions of the three main force divisions, generally speaking we should plan in advance that one shall be in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui region, one in the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi region, and the third in the Shaanxi-Gansu region, that is, two being on interior lines and one on exterior lines.

4. Although the region on the interior lines to the west of the Beiping-Hankou railway line is vast, only the regions through which the Fenshui, Weishui, and Hanshui Rivers pass are relatively rich. Moreover, the two regions through which the Fenshui River and Weishui River flow are two regions that the enemy is bound to fight to seize. If we want all three divisions to have future prospects for substantial expansion, to play a major role in checking the enemy, and to influence the situation in the whole country, then it is necessary to be prepared to deploy one division in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui region. Of course, we may continue to reflect on this point of view.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 160–61, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

We Must Deploy Sufficient Forces on Exterior Lines When the Japanese Army Is Launching a Deep Penetration Attack

(February 23, 1938)

To Comrades Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Lin [Biao]; Nie [Rongzhen]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]; Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi] and Yang [Shangkun]; Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu] [Qin Bangxian], and Ye [Jianying]:

1. Evaluation of the enemy's intentions

a. In order to seize the two railways, the Longhai and the Pinghan,[1] the enemy will advance directly toward Xi'an and Wuhan; the key battlegrounds will certainly be at Tongguan and Wushengguan.[2]

b. If the enemy wants to take Tongguan, it would be relatively difficult to attack westward from Luoyang because of the terrain and easier to attack southward from Linfen. Therefore, enemy forces on the Pinghan and Tongpu[3] lines will probably split into several columns to advance from the north and the east toward southern Shanxi, with the overall objective of driving our forces out of Shanxi, occupying Linfen and Fenglingdu, and, finally, seizing Tongguan and providing protection for the right wing that will be attacking Wushengguan. The plan of the enemy force that is advancing along the Daoqing line[4] appears to be to begin by trying to cross the river at Mengjin and occupy Luoyang, thus forcing our army in Shanxi to retreat toward the south.

c. The forces the enemy will be employing to attack Wushengguan[5] will be transferred mainly via the Jinpu line.[6] The enemy units on the Pinghan and Tongpu lines will be used primarily to seize Tongguan.

2. The first phase of our strategic plan

a. The battle to defend Tongguan and Xi'an cannot be fought successfully by deploying all our forces on interior lines, west of the Pinghan line and south of the Yellow River. If we attempt to do so, we will certainly not be able to defend Tongguan and Xi'an, just as previously we were unable to defend Taiyuan by positioning all our forces inside Yanmenguan and Niangzhiguan.[7]

b. To defend Tongguan, we consider that our forces must be split into two groups. The first group consists of the units of Liu Shi, Song Zheyuan, Shang Zheng, Hu Zhongnan, and Fan Songpu; they are to defend the Zhengzhou-Luoyang-Tongguan line, devise tactics for the units fighting north of the line, and prevent the enemy from crossing the river. The second group consists of all the armies north of the Yellow River, including Yan [Xishan] and Wei [Lihuang], as well as the whole of the Eighth Route Army, who are to defend the combat positions in southern and western Shanxi. Under favorable circumstances, they should attempt to annihilate the enemy in the areas north and east of Linfen, check the enemy's offensive, and dispatch a strong force to the north of Daoqinglu to put pressure on the enemy units attempting to cross the river. Under unfavorable circumstances, supposing that, by some chance, Linfen cannot be defended, Luoyang is taken, and our units in Shanxi are unable to cross the river, and we have to transfer to exterior lines, then we should, on the contrary, attack the enemy's rear, cut the route by which the enemy came, and then seek to find a way to annihilate the enemy and completely foil his plan to attack Tongguan. When the enemy attacks and takes the three points at Jincheng, Huo *xian,* and Xi *xian,* our army should use no less than half its forces to move to areas outside these three points (move to the enemy's rear); only thus can we control the enemy.

c. We believe that every effort must be made to seek the approval of Chiang [Kaishek], Bai [Chongxi], Yan [Xishan], and Wei [Lihuang] for the above plan, and encourage all units to execute it. Only such efforts can defend

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 162–65, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. The Longhai line ran from Baozhi near the Gansu-Shaanxi border to the sea in northern Jiangsu. The Pinghan line was the main north-south line from [Bei]ping to Han[kou].

2. Tongguan was located in the northeastern part of Tongguan *xian* in Shaanxi Province, at the strategic point where Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Henan meet. Wushengguan was located in the southern part of Xinyang *xian* in Henan Province, at a strategic point on the boundary between Henan and Hubei, on the Pinghan line. It was one of the passes leading into the Dabie mountains.

3. The Tongpu line was a narrow-gauge line running southward from Datong to Fenglingdu.

4. The Daoqing line ran in Henan from Daokou city in Hua *xian* to Qinghua city in Bo'ai *xian.*

5. The Chinese text reads "Wuhanguan" but the editors believe this is a typographical error for "Wushengguan."

6. The Jinpu line, from Tianjin to Pukou, across the river from Nanjing, was a segment of today's main line from the north to Shanghai.

7. Yanmenguan is situated in the northern part of Dai *xian,* Shanxi Province; it is one of the important strategic passes in the Great Wall. Niangziguan is located in the eastern part of Pingding *xian* in Shanxi and is an important thoroughfare between Shanxi and Hebei.

Tongguan; Wushengguan will also thus be made secure, and Wuhan will then be safe. Otherwise, once Tongguan is lost, Wushengguan will be in danger.

d. If Yan and Wei are unwilling or unable to execute the above plan and retreat across the river in defeat, these units will not only be unable to take part in the defense of Tongguan, but on the contrary will have a harmful influence on the units in Luo[yang] and Tong[guan].

3. The second phase of the strategic plan

a. In order to defend Wushengguan and Wuhan, we must first make sure that Tongguan remains in our hands. Second, we must fight a frontal, positional battle to provide support for the battles of movement on the flanks.

b. A force of at least 200,000 fighting men is required for the mobile warfare on the flanks. They should be kept to the east of the Pinghan railway for a long time. This force is as important as the massive forces deployed in Shanxi. It must not retreat to the west of Henan and Hubei unless there is no alternative. Only thus can this force act in coordination with the units in the front and on the western flank, and vigorously defend Wushengguan and Wuhan. Even if Wuhan cannot be defended, this will put the enemy inside our encirclement.

4. The future actions of the Eighth Route Army

a. Suppose we gain advantage in providing support for Yan and Wei in their battles in Shanxi, and achieve the objective of annihilating and checking the enemy and successfully defending Tongguan and Xi'an, while at the same time Wushengguan is not in danger. In this case, all the forces [of the Eighth Route Army] will remain in Shanxi and continue to fight, and they should prepare to send an additional unit to Hebei to establish a strong base for the War of Resistance in North China, to be used to defend the Central Plains, the Northwest, and Wuhan.

b. Assuming that Yan and Wei can execute the above plan, and secure Tongguan and Xi'an, but Wushengguan and Xi'an are in danger, we should take out a division and move it to the east of Wushengguan to provide support for the friendly forces.

c. Assuming that Yan and Wei are unable to execute the above plan, and Tongguan and Xi'an are in danger, but Wushengguan and Wuhan are not yet in danger, we should also take out one division and move it into the line west of Tongguan to provide support for the friendly forces.

d. Assuming that both Tongguan and Wushengguan are in danger, we should take out two divisions and move them southward, one of them to be deployed east of the Pinghan railway line, and the other west of the Pinghan railway line, to provide battle support for the friendly forces. There will remain one more division, to conduct operations in Shanxi and Hebei; it is not to be withdrawn unless some necessity arises.

e. The units left behind for garrison duty in the Border Region are to defend Shanxi and Gansu.

5. We believe that we must inform the Guomindang that, if nearly a million troops all withdraw to interior lines south of the Yellow River and west of the Pinghan railway line, while the Longhai and Pinghan railway lines are all occupied by the enemy, great difficulties will take shape. Therefore, the overall guideline must be that, when the enemy launches deep-penetration offensives, we must deploy sufficient forces on exterior lines, for only thus can we provide combat support for the main forces fighting on interior lines, increase difficulties for the enemy while reducing our own difficulties, and create favorable military and political conditions for a protracted war.

6. Our views are as stated above. What are your views? We hope you will inform us.

Mao Zedong Ren Bishi

To He Changgong[1]

(February 25, 1938)

Comrade Changgong:

In principle, I agree entirely with the methods you propose. Please meet with Comrade Wang Qun and deal with all these matters. You must definitely make every effort to correct the past wrong orientation, **actively carry out the training of cadres,** and do it well. The name should probably be changed to **training academy.** Stop calling it a home for the disabled. You are the director of the academy and concurrently head of its political department. Wang Qun is the political commissar and quartermaster. Find another specialized person to head the health department. You three will then be responsible for the overall administration of the academy. Find one or two houses near the office of the [Central] Military Commission and start to work. Call a good meeting on the work of the soon-to-be-opened training academy. You chair the meeting, with Wang Qun helping you. I can come and give a talk. Consult with Fuchun, Teng, Xiao, Tan, and Mo[2] about the key points of the meeting; that is, discuss the things you have drafted.

Mao Zedong

Take advantage of this meeting to conduct a thorough investigation of the conditions in all the academies.

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji,* pp. 123–24, where it is reproduced from the manuscript. The words set in bold are those which Mao underscored by placing dots underneath them.

1. He Changgong (1900–1987), a native of Hunan, was deputy director of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy, but because the director, Lin Biao, was in very bad health, he was in fact in charge, as Mao indicates below.

2. The reference is to Teng Daiyuan, at this time chief of staff of the Central Military Commission; Xiao Jingguang, head of the Rear Office of the Eighth Route Army; Tan Zheng, deputy head of the Political Department of the Central Military Commission; and Mo Wenhua, head of the Political Department of the Rear Office of the Eighth Route Army.

We Must Do Our Utmost to Wipe Out the Enemy Advancing Westward from Fucheng

(February 25, 1938, 3:00 P.M.)

Zhu [De], and inform Peng [Dehuai]:

We have taken note of your telegram sent on the evening of the 24th.[1] Your judgment is correct. We must exert every effort to eliminate the enemy advancing westward from Fucheng. But please warn Yan [Xishan] and Wei [Lihuang] in advance that even if the said enemy makes a breakthrough to Linfen, he will absolutely not be able to change the entire war situation. The said enemy is few in number. We can surround him with a single unit. The rest of our forces should be determined to fight a mobile war in the rear of the enemy which allows him no way out for retreat. In this way, we will definitely be able to defeat the enemy in the end.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, p. 166, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Here Mao indicates the time using a Chinese character signifying the period from 5 to 7 P.M.

The 343rd Brigade Should Immediately Change Its Battle Plans

(February 28, 1938)

Comrade Lin Biao, and inform Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and He [Long]:

1. The enemy has already advanced to the lower reaches of the Fenhe River. The Fengling ferry and Tongguan are threatened. Yan [Xishan] and Wei [Lihuang] have reached the bank of the river and are preparing to cross it.

2. The enemy is attacking the west side of the river ferociously from the two points of Jundu and Jikou, and is preparing to cross the river. Suide is in imminent danger.

3. The whole of Chen's brigade,[1] under your command, should immediately change its battle plans.

a. Quickly use one part of your forces to control the Damaijiao-Shuitou-Chuankou-Shikou region. Mobilize the masses to organize guerrilla units and consolidate the key strategic position.

b. Dispatch enough [political] workers to mobilize the masses in the two *xian* of Shilou and Yonghe with all their might, organize guerrilla units, and consolidate the ferry point.

c. Dispatch [political] workers to the two *xian* of Lingshi and Fenxi to mobilize the masses, organize guerrillas, and get prepared for the forces in eastern Shanxi to move westward when necessary.

d. The main force should move to the Xianxian-Wucheng-Daning region to look for combat opportunities and eliminate the enemy when an opportunity arises.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 167–68, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, under the command of Chen Guang.

Interview with United Press Reporter Wang Gongda

(February 1938)

Wang Gongda: Many people are now pessimistic about the future of the War of Resistance in China. What is your view of this?

Mao Zedong: I am completely optimistic about it because the course of China's War of Resistance will necessarily be characterized by defeat first and then victory, and by a transition from weakness to strength. This has already become a well-defined direction. In the initial stage of the Sino-Japanese war, the overall situation was that Japan was strong and China was weak. But from now on, the situation is certainly going to be that Japan's weaknesses will be gradually exposed, while China's strength will gradually increase. Japan is now borrowing money to fight the war. Aside from the 2.2 billion *yuan* expended in the last six months, it is said that it will need 4 billion *yuan* this year, and this figure will surely be exceeded. This has already exhausted much of its national resources. Japan's international credit rating has been lowered, and the value of its bonds has fallen. Its "Blitzkrieg" strategy has failed. Let me ask where it can get so much money to fight an endless war. From a military standpoint, Japan's battlefronts in China have already been extended to the point where they stretch for thousands of kilometers, from Hangzhou to Baotou. Its forces are insufficient to defend all this. Consequently, its military strength has gradually been weakened as a result of this deep penetration and overextension. It has seized long-distance railways and, as a result, needs troops to guard every station. Japan has mobilized one-third of its armed forces to invade China. If it wants to occupy Hankou, Guangzhou, and other cities, it will have to mobilize at a minimum several hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers. By that time, its situation will become extremely difficult. Since China is not Japan's only enemy, and because of the other enormous international and domestic contradictions facing Japan, in the end it will ultimately take the road to total collapse.

Wang: Would you say that China's strength can gradually increase?

This interview was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 32, March 5, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 99–103, which reproduces this version.

Mao: On the basis of the experience of the last seven months of fighting, from a military point of view we can certainly force the enemy armies into a very difficult position if we can employ mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare to support each other. My view is that, at present, in addition to forming several powerful field armies with two to three hundred thousand crack troops to deliver annihilating blows against advancing enemy units in mobile warfare, we should take out eighty to ninety thousand troops to form twenty to thirty guerrilla units, each with three to four thousand soldiers. They should be led by firm but flexible officers, and their political work should also be strengthened. They should be deployed in front of the enemy lines from Hangzhou to Baotou to penetrate into the enemy's rear through the twenty to thirty gaps in this long front line. If they can be used effectively, work closely with the popular masses, and breed countless smaller guerrilla units, they will certainly be able to establish anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's rear, mobilize tens of millions of people, and provide effective support for the field armies in their mobile warfare, thus harassing the enemy and exhausting his resources. As for positional warfare, it should not be regarded as the primary form of combat now because of our technological weakness. But we must establish our national defense industries and produce our own heavy weapons and high-quality weapons, while at the same time trying to import these weapons, so that we can effectively wage defensive and offensive positional warfare. This is very necessary. Some say that we advocate only guerrilla warfare. This is nonsense. We have always advocated a combination of mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare. At present, mobile warfare should be the primary form of combat, with the other two playing a secondary role. In the future, positional warfare should be waged to provide effective support for mobile warfare. As for guerrilla warfare, it is always secondary to other forms of battle. Nevertheless, in the wars of national liberation in semicolonial countries and especially in countries with huge territories, guerrilla warfare undoubtedly plays a crucial strategic role. As regards politics, we already have internal unity and enjoy the sympathy and support of all the democratic countries in the world. But our achievements at present are insufficient and must be further strengthened. The military and political strengthening described above is necessary. As long as we continue to work hard, we can certainly gain strength. This is indicative of a bright future.

Wang: Does the Eighth Route Army, which is encircled by the Japanese armies on several sides, face the danger of being driven out or annihilated by the Japanese?

Mao: The Eighth Route Army is now conducting extensive guerrilla warfare in four zones. The first zone includes the areas between the four railway lines—Pinghan, Pingsui, Zhengtai, and Tongpu—as well as the areas north and east of them. This zone includes popular masses, numbering 12 million, who support resolute opposition to the Japanese, and all of whom are intimately linked to our forces. This is an immense fortress for the War of Resistance. The Eighth Route

Army has established itself solidly in this zone. Although the enemy is intensifying his attacks against this zone, it is impossible for him to drive our army out, still less destroy it. Several large detachments of the Eighth Route Army, advancing toward the east, have already pressed forward to the vicinity of the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] line. The second zone includes the northwestern parts of Shanxi—the areas south of the Pingsui line, west of the northern segment of the Tongpu line, and east of the Yellow River. The third zone includes the southeastern parts of Shanxi and southwestern parts of Hebei—the areas along the middle stretch of the Pinghan, Zhengtai, and Tongpu lines. The fourth zone is the southwestern parts of Shanxi. All of them [i.e., of the units of the Eighth Route Army] there enjoy close relations with the local population. They are fiercely attacking the enemy's lines of communication in the rear at all times and have won many large and small victories, causing the enemy to reduce the strength of his advancing forces substantially. Looking at these areas, what China has lost is no more than a few railway lines and cities. It has not lost anything else. This concrete example provides the people of the whole country with concrete evidence: As long as this method is adopted everywhere, it will be impossible for the enemy to destroy China. This is one of the powerful bases from which counterattacks can be launched and lost land retaken in the future.

Wang: Do you feel that this time the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party will be of a lasting character?

Mao: I think so. When the Guomindang and the Communist Party split in 1927, this was originally against the wishes of the Communist Party. The Communist Party has consistently been unwilling to split with the Guomindang. In the last ten years, both the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as the people of the whole country, have gone through bitter experiences. Such experiences can strengthen unity in the future. The goal for the present and future cooperation is to fight Japan together and build the country together. Under this principle, provided only that our allied party has the same good faith as we do, and with the scrutiny of the people of the whole country, this cooperation will certainly last.

Wang: It is true that the Communist Party has declared in its statement on the current situation that the Guomindang and the Communist Party will not only resist Japan together, but will, after victory in the war, build the country together. Let me ask you, however, how these parties, which represent two different classes, can cooperate to build a new country in the future.

Answer: Because China is in the position of a semicolonial country and, moreover, because it is now facing a critical moment, which will decide whether or not it suffers the loss of the state and the extinction of the race, even its status as a semicolonial country is in danger. Although our parties and our classes are different,

we are all in this same position. This determines that the two parties can cooperate not only to fight the war against Japan but to build the country. But cooperation means cooperation on the basis of certain principles. It is principled and genuine cooperation, not unprincipled and seeming cooperation. If we diverge from our programs and principles, then our cooperation will certainly become unprincipled and seeming cooperation, and this is something which cannot be tolerated by any party which has its own principles. Cooperation on the basis of a program and principles is similar to the ethical relationship between friends. Only when there are such ethical relationships can the relationship endure.

Wang: What is the "democratic republic" advocated by the Communist Party?

Mao: The democratic republic we are advocating refers to a country with a system under which all those people in the country who are unwilling to be slaves without a country make use of a system of unrestricted universal sufferage to elect representatives to form representative organs. Such a country is a country of People's Rights, which is basically like that advocated by Mr. Sun Yatsen a long time ago. The orientation for the establishment of the state in China should take this direction.

Wang: Is the Communist Party satisfied with the current central government? Is it still necessary to convene an extraordinary national congress?

Mao: We support the current central government because it persists in its policy of fighting the War of Resistance and is leading the war efforts. But we hope to strengthen and expand this government, as well as carry out the necessary reforms in its internal policies, in the interest of further strengthening the War of Resistance. We have once proposed convening an extraordinary national congress, as Mr. Sun Yatsen also proposed. We believed that this would be advantageous in uniting the whole country and strengthening the forces of the War of Resistance. But we have no fixed views as to the methods that will be most advantageous to the prosecution of the War of Resistance. As long as they genuinely contribute to the war, any methods can be adopted.

Wang: Did the Chinese Communist Party send people to lead the anti-Japanese activities of the Volunteer Army in the Three Eastern Provinces?

Mao: The Chinese Communist Party does have a very close relationship with the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army in the Three Eastern Provinces. For example, the celebrated generals of the Volunteer Army, such as Yang Jingyu, Zhao Shangzhi, and Li Hongguan, are all members of the Communist Party. Their achievements in resolutely fighting Japan and waging a difficult struggle are well known. There is also a national united front there. Aside from members of the Communist Party,

there are other groups, as well as all kinds of different military units and organizations of the popular masses. They have also united under a common program.

Wang: What are your general views of the United States?

Mao: We welcome and appreciate the American Democratic Party's support for world peace, President Roosevelt's denunciation of fascism, the Scripps-Howard newspaper group's sympathy for China's War of Resistance against Japan, and especially the support of the broad masses of the American people for China's struggle against Japan. I hope, however, that the United States will go a step further, come out, and unite with other countries to impose real sanctions against a violent Japan. It is time for China, the United States, and all other countries opposed to aggression to unite further against the enemy.

An Account of the Founding of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts

(February 1938)

Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the people of China have risen as one to struggle for the survival and liberation of our nation, to resist the aggression of the Japanese imperialist bandits and drive them out of China, and for the consolidation of world peace. All parties and factions have rallied under the Anti-Japanese National United Front to wage the sacred national revolutionary anti-Japanese war until final victory is achieved.

During this period of the War of Resistance, we must not only mobilize and make use of all presently existing forces to resist Japan, but should seek out and prepare new forces, which is to say that we must pay attention to the problem of training the cadres urgently required for the war effort. "Cadres decide everything!"[1] This is a very urgent question, not only in times of peace but in times of war. In the bloody combat against the Japanese bandits at the front, as well as in the work of mobilization in the rear, we need tens of thousands of military, political, economic, and cultural cadres. There is no doubt at all about that.

The arts—drama, music, fine arts, and literature—are the most effective weapons in propagandizing, inspiring, and organizing the masses. Artistic workers are an indispensable force in the current War of Resistance. Therefore, the task of training cadres specialized in artistic work for the War of Resistance is one that at present can no longer be put off.

Our Border Region has actively carried out educational efforts regarding the War of Resistance and established many schools (such as the Chinese Anti-Japanese Military and Political University and the Northern Shaanxi Public School) that are suited for training generalist political and military cadres needed for the war. But there is a gap in establishing schools specialized in the arts. Therefore, we have decided to establish this academy of fine arts and, moreover, to name it after China's greatest writer, the late Lu Xun. This is not only to pay tribute to this great teacher but to demonstrate that we will march forward on the road he opened up.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 151–52, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979.

1. This was one of the key slogans put forward by Stalin at this time regarding the requirements for developing socialism in the Soviet Union.

We are deeply aware that it is an arduous task to establish the Lu Xun Academy of Fine Arts; it is a task that the limited ability of a few of us can by no means accomplish. Therefore, we urgently hope the people from all walks of life in the country will offer us their sympathy and assistance, so that the academy may grow quickly. This will also help our country's heroic War of Resistance move forward victoriously and win final victory by driving the Japanese bandits out of China!

Concerning the Deployment for the Consolidation of the Defenses Along the River

(March 2, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Lin [Biao]; Nie [Rongzhen]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], Guan [Xiangying]; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]:

1. The enemy's intention is to attack northern Shaanxi, on the one hand, and Tongguan, on the other. At present, the enemy is attacking fiercely in two columns at Jundu and Jikou, and there is the possibility that the river defenses will be broken through. Suide and Yan'an are in danger, and the route of retreat of all the forces on the east side of the river is being threatened.

2. It is imperative that at present our forces in northwestern Shanxi, in accordance with the previously formulated plans of He, Xiao, and Guan, should use the Sixth Guard Regiment to cope with the enemy that is attacking Hequ, use one brigade to attack the enemy that is attacking Linxian from Wuzhai, and send another brigade on a forced march night and day to the north of Lishi to attack from the enemy's rear at Jikou and Jundu to obstruct his efforts to cross the river. These three units also should make a major effort to mobilize the masses to consolidate all the ferry points that have not been lost in the northern sector of the defenses along the river and safeguard the route of retreat. If the enemy breaks through the river defenses and attacks Suide, it is necessary to have one brigade cross the river and eliminate the enemy in coordination with our forces on the west side of the river, thus defending Yan'an.

3. Xu's brigade[1] must move westward immediately and be reintegrated into the 115th Division. It should eliminate the enemy in that region in coordination with Chen's brigade,[2] energetically mobilize the popular masses at Lishi, Zhongyang, Shilou, Yonghe, Daning, Xianxian, Jixian, and the whole of the Luliang mountain range, support friendly forces, consolidate all the ferry points in the middle sector

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 175–76, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.

2. The reference is to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Guang.

of the river defenses, and safeguard the route of retreat for the whole of the Guomindang forces in southeastern and southwestern Shanxi. If Tongguan and Xi'an are in danger, before the transfer of the main force of the Guomindang armies in Shanxi, we should be prepared to use one brigade of the 115th Division to cross the river to move southward and to fight in defense of Yan'an.

4. The 129th Division should be deployed to the east of Tongpu to establish positions on the flanks, destroy the railroad, obstruct and delay the enemy's attack on Tongguan, and support the combat operations of the two divisions of Lin and He. If Tongguan and Xi'an are in danger, and Chiang [Kaishek] intends to transfer the main forces of the Guomindang troops within the borders of Shanxi to the other side of the river to fulfill the mission of defending Xi'an, the main force of this division should also be ready to move westward. Some units should, however, be kept permanently in southeastern Shanxi to engage in guerrilla war. The Politburo meeting has completely endorsed the orientation outlined above. We trust that it will be resolutely carried out.

Mao [Zedong]

Parting Words of Advice to the Graduates of the Northern Shaanxi Public School[1]

(March 3, 1938)

Students:

The Northern Shaanxi Public School is a miniature of all China. You come from different places, different professions, and different social strata, but you all have the same ambition, that is, the ambition to build a new China. You are progressive elements, the elements that are going to create a new China. Therefore, the Northern Shaanxi Public School represents the united front of all China, and it is the progress of China in miniature.

In the past, there was Huangpu,[2] and it displayed a kind of vitality, a vitality that represented an ambition. At both the Northern Shaanxi Public School and Huangpu students were drawn from different regions and then were sent out to different regions. At that time, Huangpu wanted to overthrow the warlords and imperialism. It was progressive China in miniature for that time. The goal of our Northern Shaanxi Public School is to overthrow Japanese imperialism and to build a new China. We should resolutely pursue this orientation. Those who violate this orientation also violate the aims of the Northern Shaanxi Public School. Our students should help one another and supervise one another.

Today, the enemy wants to attack Wuhan, Xi'an, Changsha, Nanchang, and other such places. China will suffer some unavoidable difficulties. In the face of

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 104–10, where it is reproduced from a record of the speech kept in the Central Archives.

1. This is Mao Zedong's talk to the graduating students in the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth classes (*dui*) of the Northern Shaanxi Public School.

2. The reference is to the Huangpu Military Academy (known in contemporary English-language sources as the Whampoa Military Academy), established in the Huangpu area of Canton (Guangzhou) by Sun Yatsen in 1924 with the help of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Chiang Kaishek was the commandant, and Zhou Enlai was the head of the Political Department. Other prominent Communists also worked there, and among the students at the academy were many Party cadres and Communist Youth League members. At this time, Huangpu was a highly ambiguous symbol. On the one hand, it evoked a conservative or reactionary clique of Guomindang officers loyal to their former commandant, Chiang Kaishek; on the other, it could be used, as it is here, as a symbol of Guomindang-Communist cooperation in 1924–1927.

these difficulties, it is quite possible that some people will waver. For you students, graduating and going out into the world is like being scattered into the river. It is possible that some of you might be overwhelmed by the waves, but the great majority of you will struggle through the waves, maintain your direction, and reach your designated goal. In order to keep going in the right direction, you must have a steadfast will as well as a spirit unafraid of sacrificing everything through hardship and difficult struggle.

The present situation is different from that of the past. There are three united fronts in the world—the international united front, the Chinese united front, and the united front in Japan—which can defeat Japanese imperialism. If these three united fronts cooperate and pursue a common set of objectives, we are sure that we can change the situation. China is sure to march in this new direction.

A comrade who came from Wuhan said, "There is a formula now going around among the outsiders concerning our War of Resistance, namely, 'Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, it is certain that China will ultimately be victorious.'" This sentence is correct, but one passage is missing from it: the section on how we are going to win that victory. This question is absolutely critical. We must answer it. We must write that middle passage well.

Things are constantly changing, and it is impossible today to describe future events in detail. Such a desire is not much different from utopian socialism. We do not approve of a utopia that is based on fantasy. The scientific view of things is not like this at all. How can we get from the old China to the new China? Although it is impossible today to describe the specific contents completely, we can point out the general orientation. The protracted nature of the Chinese revolution is determined by the process of historical change. Based on our experience in the past six months, we can say the two following things: "Failure first, victory later. Transform weakness into strength." This is the future of our protracted War of Resistance. Our China has made many steps forward in the past six months: the War of Resistance, cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, our alliance with the Soviet Union, the beginning of freedom of speech, the beginning of political work in the military. None of these things existed in the past. They are the contents of the march which was determined by the enemy's invasion. What is the path on which we make this journey? Our answer is: "A path of many difficulties and hardships." If places such as Wuhan and Xi'an fall, that means that large areas will be in the hands of the Japanese, while small areas will be in our hands. If such things happen, does it mean the end of us? No, there can assuredly never be such an end. China's geographic conditions are different from those of Spain. Spain's territory is small, and there is not much room to maneuver. After using the first thirty-five tricks, there is no room for the thirty-sixth.[3] Hence, they adopted

3. I.e., running away. Mao is here referring to the classic text of military strategy, *The Thirty-Six Strategems.*

the strategy of resolutely defending Madrid. China is different. There is ample space to walk around. It is extremely difficult for Japanese imperialism to occupy the whole of China. China's territory is as large as seventeen to eighteen Frances put together. Its population is also several times that of France. Even if most of China's territory is occupied by Japan (and this is possible), we still have a way out, because we have two regions which will enable us to inflict fatal blows on the enemy—the interior front and the exterior front. These are two arenas of battle. The interior front includes Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Hunan, which are basically under the control of the central government. The exterior front is the large area of land that the Japanese occupy, the front lines. We absolutely must struggle to achieve a future with an anti-Japanese national united front based on cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, improve political as well as military conditions, create a new Chinese army that can employ airplanes and artillery, and fight both from within and from without. Only in this way can we drive the [Japanese] devils out of all of China. If we want to achieve this objective we may have to endure many difficulties. For instance, if Wuhan falls, the problem of wavering and compromise, as well as doubts about whether or not the War of Resistance should continue, will arise. Such problems may arise both at the front as well as in the rear areas. If that happens, there must be a political party with broad vision to judge the trends in the political situation.

Now let us review the history of the Guomindang. The Guomindang has suffered numerous defeats, but has also won many victories in its history; it has traveled a hard and tortuous road. It was only after the failure of the 1911 Revolution, and the subsequent reorganization of the Guomindang, that a new prospect for the Great Revolution appeared. The result of the Northern Expedition was the divorce between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, which benefited only the feudal forces and imperialism. We believe it is more likely that the Guomindang will continue to pursue the War of Resistance, for surrender is not a solution. No such question hangs over the Communist Party; it has always firmly insisted on the War of Resistance. The majority of the people are also against capitulation. Now many people recall the situation at the time of the Northern Expedition and hope that the three forces of the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the people will all take a stand in favor of carrying on the War of Resistance to the very end.

If Wuhan falls—and such a possibility exists—you will all have to run down from the "mountain,"[4] and you may all encounter this phenomenon. Once Wuhan falls, the situation will assuredly become very bad, and those who want peace [at any price] will certainly emerge. We are very confident, however, that we will be able to overcome these difficulties. In addition to persisting in the War of Resistance domestically, we must also consider favorable international conditions. Al-

4. Mao appears to be suggesting that the students he is addressing will have to jump into the practical political and military struggle and leave their sheltered academic life.

though Germany is openly helping Japan, has recognized "Manchukuo,"[5] and refuses to sell arms to China, the attitude of the British cabinet has also changed.[6] But this is only one side of the situation. The peoples of the whole world, who represent the general direction of the world, and particularly those of the Soviet Union, will encourage and assist China. The Soviet Union will definitely help China. It is certain that one day the Soviet Union will become the direct opponent of Japan. So will the United States of America. All this convinces us that Japan will never be able to swallow China. When did the "heavenly dog" ever swallow the moon?[7] This is the first point. The second is that even if Japan does manage to swallow China, it will not be for long. This judgment is based on an analysis of Chinese and international conditions. Japan's military strength is insufficient, nor will it be able to sustain itself for long. From this we conclude that the overall orientation of China's anti-Japanese war will assuredly lead to victory.

Our guiding principle at the moment is: to defend Wuhan, defend Xi'an. Our method is to prepare for retreat but to exhaust the enemy and win time. To fight in the defense of Wuhan and Xi'an and to lose is no cause for anxiety. We have already made it clear that it is also possible to win by fighting outward from interior lines. This is one aspect. Another aspect is this. If the places occupied by the enemy are large areas, then we can write that "middle passage" in the small areas nearby. This is to write the missing section before making the final victorious conclusion. For example, if all of North China and parts of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui should fall, and we could not hold Wuhan, there are many places where we can write that "middle passage."[8]

A young man wrote me a letter from Changsha, saying: "China is sure to perish. If Wuhan falls, then most of our territory will be lost. Then what can we do?" I say that, when our students from the Northern Shaanxi Public School go out, they will certainly find a way. What they will do is draw "beancurd cubes" near

5. Manchukuo was the puppet state set up by the Japanese military in the northeastern provinces of China, still known informally as Manchuria, in 1931. The League of Nations, and most individual nations, never recognized the legitimacy of this regime. Until 1937, Mao and the Communists accused Chiang Kaishek of supinely accepting this development. (See Volume IV, *passim,* and especially pp. 445–47.)

6. In early 1938, following the Brussels Conference of November 1937, which brought together the signatories of the Washington Conference, plus the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain were working together in Asian matters and showing support for China.

7. According to Chinese mythology, eclipses occur when the "heavenly dog" swallows the sun or the moon. Here Mao expresses skepticism both about this legend and about its applicability to relations between Japan and China.

8. Mao is using the metaphor of writing the middle section of the sentence, developed in his commentary on the saying by the comrade from Wuhan cited at the beginning of this talk, to refer to the Communist-controlled base areas in north and central China. These are the places Mao wants these graduates to work in.

the major highways.[9] For the moment we do not have solutions on the borders of the "beancurd cubes." That is because the major highways and big cities are occupied by Japanese troops armed with advanced weapons. That is, "China has not been lost, only the major highways have." The battles of quick decision that have brought Japan the big cities and major highways have also brought them the protracted warfare in the rural villages and small lanes. For instance, if Yan'an in northern Shaanxi is captured by the enemy, we will fight a protracted war in other small areas and in innumerable villages and small paths. Japan can win battles of quick decisions in the cities, while we can win the battles of protracted warfare in the countryside. This time after graduation you will be divided into two groups to work. One group will develop the mass movement in the rear areas. The other group will go into the "beancurd cubes." Now there may be some people who are afraid of drawing "beancurd cubes," so let me give you the example of Nie Rongzhen so you will not be afraid. Nie Rongzhen created a large army of 25,000 men in the Wutai mountain region (not including those still engaged in production). We should tell the people in the occupied territory as well as the people in the territory which will be occupied about this example, to let them see the method and the way out for the resistance to Japan. We are resolutely opposed to the argument that there is nothing to be done in the occupied territories. In that respect, we can also talk about our experiences during the ten-year civil war.

There are many things in the Northern Shaanxi Public School that are not quite satisfactory. We do not care whether we have classes in which the students follow the textbook chapter by chapter as in other schools. Instead, we want students to learn a certain work-style, a certain orientation. The president and faculty of the Northern Shaanxi Public School have all come through hard and difficult struggles. Therefore, you can learn an orientation in the Northern Shaanxi Public School—a political orientation. At the same time, you can learn a certain style—a work-style. You must go to work in all the places occupied by the enemy. In the checkerboard pattern of Shanxi, from the perspective of a few major highways, we are surrounded by the enemy. But, on the other hand, we occupy the many "beancurd cubes" near these major highways and thereby also surround the enemy. From the international perspective, although Japan surrounds China, the antifascist countries in the world also surround Japan. The Sino-Japanese war will not end in a few days. The strength of the Guomindang and the Communist Party is still not very great, and Japan is stronger than we are. Had the united front not been broken up a decade ago, the situation today would certainly not be like this. This point also

9. Mao is using the image of beancurd cubes to suggest the shape and size of anti-Japanese base areas behind the Japanese lines. His major example, given below, is that of the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) Base Area under Nie Rongzhen. While Mao mentions it in terms of the Wutai mountain region in Shanxi, the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area was founded over the border in Fuping, Hebei, in January 1938.

determines the long-term and protracted nature of the Sino-Japanese war. International conditions are also such that the time is drawing near for the people all over the world to launch a movement against invasion and for liberation. China is not alone. It is connected with the struggle for liberation by people all over the world. The world cannot be divided, the revolution cannot be divided, nor can victory be divided. If things continue to develop in this way, there can be no doubt at all that China will be victorious. Comrade Stalin has said: The establishment of socialism can be carried out in one country, but capitalism still exists in this world, it still surrounds the Soviet Union. Consequently, only if the struggle of the world's proletariat and of the colonial peoples is successful can socialism win final victory.

Chinese unity + the world's assistance + Japan's domestic difficulties = China's victory. This formula makes sense. Of course, the slogan of self-reliance is correct, but, at the same time, we should also pay attention to the fact that China must not be isolated.

After graduation, you should work even harder. On the one hand, you should not be lazy. This opportunistic tendency should absolutely be discarded. We should work actively and struggle hard. On the other hand, we must also oppose impetuosity. We must also eliminate the idea that victory can be won in a single day.

Today's difficulties we should solve on the basis of a combination of basic principles and specific conditions. Take the Xi'an Incident, for example. Had it not been solved peacefully but, instead, led to civil war, we would have provided the reactionaries with an opportunity. When you go to work, you should set out to solve problems according to this principle. Take the organization of a guerrilla unit, for example. If the provincial government wants to confiscate the weapons of the guerrilla unit, then our principle is to avoid open conflict, in order not to give the Japanese an opportunity of which they can take advantage. The best example in solving this kind of problem is the Eighth Route Army. Some people want the Communist Party to withdraw from the Eighth Route Army. This is absolutism and will not do. The United Front is relative, and the Communist Party must maintain its relative independence within the United Front.

In sum, our principle is revolutionary, but it is concrete rather than abstract. It must be combined with the specific conditions in order to solve a problem.

So these are my parting words of advice today. You have learned here mainly about orientation, principles, and work-style. When you go out after graduation, no matter whether you are at the front or in the rear areas, on interior or exterior lines, you should all work hard to create countless large and small anti-Japanese base areas. Move from building a Wutai mountain region in Shanxi to building a Wutai mountain region in the entire country, and strive for final victory.

On Condition That Our Route of Retreat Not Be Cut, Our Main Force May Stay Behind in Shanxi to Attack the Enemy

(March 3, 1938, 5:00 A.M.)

Comrades Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

We have taken note of Peng's telegram.[1] The precondition for the main force of the Eighth Route Army to remain in Shanxi to attack the enemy is that the route of retreat via the Yellow River and the Fen River not be cut. Otherwise, it would be very harmful to the whole of the resistance effort and to Guomindang-Communist relations. In particular, the two of you must come back. Even if one of you should remain to command the forces, you should only remain at a place which is not liable to be isolated (such as the Luliang mountain range). You absolutely should not remain to the east of the Fen River. Therefore, it is hoped that the transfer of the Headquarters [of the Eighth Route Army] and the deployment of Xu's brigade[2] and Liu's division[3] will be guided by this orientation, that practical and appropriate ways will be considered, and that you will notify us quickly of your plans.

Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] [Mao] Zedong
[Ren] Bishi

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 177–78, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to Peng Dehuai's telegram of March 1, 1938, on strategic issues to Mao, Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian], and others.
2. The reference is to the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xu Haidong.
3. The reference is to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng.

The Enemy's Situation and the Deployment of the 115th Division

(March 3, 1938, midnight)

Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], and inform Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. The enemy at Xiaoyi reached and occupied Shilou directly, without encountering resistance, and then advanced to the town of Yidie. There is the possibility that he will launch a sudden attack on Jundu. Wang Jingguo's forces[1] are retreating in the direction of Zhongyang. The enemy at Jixian is pressing near Ganzhentan and may possibly make a sudden attack on the ferry at Yanchang. We judge that the enemy's intention is to drive out the Shanxi troops, seize the ferry crossings, blockade the Yellow River, sever the routes of supplies and communications of the Chinese armies, and threaten Yan'an.

2. Under such circumstances, it seems that the 115th Division should deploy those units directly under it in the area of Yonghe, Daning, and Xian *xian* to mobilize the popular masses and work in concert with all the various forces. It should use one regiment to make sudden attacks on the enemy in that region left and right, taking Jixian as the center. It should use the other regiment to advance to the region of Shilou and make a surprise attack on the enemy in the region of Shilou and Yidie. Xiao's detachment[2] shall remain in the region of Damaijiao.[3] In this way, they will be able to support the forces on the west side of the river in consolidating river defenses. If we act appropriately, the enemy will be put in a difficult situation in the towns of Shilou, Yidie, Jixian, and Xiangning, without food supplies or any other support, and will be forced to withdraw. We can then take advantage of their withdrawal to wipe them out. We look forward to hearing your opinion.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 179-80, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Wang Jingguo was at this time commander of the Guomindang's Thirteenth Group Army in the Second War Zone.
2. The reference is to the anti-Japanese forward column of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Xiao Hua.
3. Damaijiao is located in Shanxi Province approximately 25 kilometers to the west of the Fen River and approximately on the 37th parallel.

Instructions to the Unit of Chen Guang and Luo Ronghuan Regarding the Question of the Actions They Should Take

(March 5, 1938, midnight)

Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], and for the information of Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi], Yang [Shangkun], and Cheng Zihua:

1. Concerning your actions, you should still regularly seek instructions from Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]. The Military Affairs Commission will only issue instructions on certain special issues of a temporary nature. You should send telegrams to Zhu and Peng and at the same time notify the Military Affairs Commission.

2. You may rest for a few days near Daning and decide on your actions only after ascertaining the situation of the enemy. In order to make sure of arriving at a correct assessment of the enemy's situation, you should send a lightly armed reconnaissance unit to follow closely the footsteps of the enemy, equipped with radio transmitters so as to report on the enemy without interruption.

3. Besides entrusting to you the local work in the territory west of Damaijiao in Xishuitou, Shikou, and Chuankou, south of there in Xian *xian,* and north of there in Guanshang and Zhongyangchen, as well as in the two whole *xian* of Shilou and Yonghe, the missions of organizing guerrillas, and mobilizing the masses for supporting our forces to the west of the river in their effort to consolidate the route of retreat of our main force are also yours. In a few days we will send to Yonghe fifty Kangda students to be handed over to you for use. It is important, however, that you avoid conflict with friendly forces.

4. Cheng Zihua is commanding several hundred local troops who are just now moving southward from Lan *xian* in the direction of the region of Wuchengzhen. Hu [Fu] and Yang [Shangkun], as well as the second echelon troops under the Headquarters, are moving toward the region of Yonghe and Shilou. Yan Hongyan's Third Guard Regiment is located along the Jieshou-Xinguan-Hekou line. Bai

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 181–82, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Zhiwen's Fifth Guard Regiment is located along the Qingshuiguan-Yanshuiguan-Madouguan-Pingduguan line. It is hoped that you will keep in close touch with all of them.

Mao [Zedong]

Make a Planned Deployment for Guerrilla Warfare in the Shanxi-Henan Border Region

(March 6, 1938)

Comrade Zhu Rui, and inform Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai], Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi] and Yang [Shangkun]:

1. We have taken note of the telegram dated the 3rd.[1] The deployments are very appropriate. The Shanxi-Henan Border Region is very important. It is hoped that you will make systematic plans for engaging in guerrilla war in the regions of Xinshui, Yichen, Qu'ao, Huanqu, Jiyuan, Bo'ai, and Jinchen, and support the actions of the main force from the west and from the north.

2. You should order Magistrate Li of Yangcheng *xian* to send someone to make a detour to Ji *xian* to report to Director Yan[2] on his arrangements for guerrilla war in seven *xian* and his plan to assume the leadership of guerrilla war in the Shanxi-Henan Border Region, requesting him to appoint him to this position and support him with guns, ammunition, and funds.

3. Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai] are commanding the Eastern Route Army in the area of Yushe and Liao *xian.* Wei[3] is commanding the Southern Route Army in the Luliang mountain range with Wei himself at Hejing. Fu Zuoyi is commanding the Northern Route Army to the north of Fenyang and Lishi. Yan is at Ji *xian.* Hu [Fu] and Yang [Shangkun] are making a detour and moving in the direction of Daning and Xian *xian.*

4. One route of the enemy has reached Yangcheng from Bo'ai. One route has reached Linfen from Changzhi and Fucheng. One route is on the way to Linfen

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 183–84, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to Zhu Rui's telegram of March 3 to Liu Shaoqi and Yang Shangkun proposing a plan for guerrilla warfare in the border region between Shanxi and Henan, with Yangcheng as its center.

2. The reference is to Yan Xishan, Guomindang commander of the Second War Zone, designated here by his former title of Director of the Taiyuan Government Pacification Office.

3. The reference is to Wei Lihuang, at this time deputy commander of the Guomindang Armies of the Second War Zone and frontline commander of the Southern Route Army.

from Linshi and Zhaocheng. One route is moving in the direction of Linfen from Xian *xian* and Bocheng. One route has reached Jundu from Fenyang. One route is moving in the direction of Loufanzhen from Wenshui and Jiaocheng. One route is moving in the direction of Wuzhai from Ningwu and Shenchi. One route has reached Baode from Pinglu and the Qingshui River. The total strength of the enemy is no more than fifty thousand. The various units of our Eighth Route Army are now attacking the enemy from the flanks and from the rear in support of friendly forces, with the determination to persist in guerrilla war.

Mao [Zedong]

The 120th Division Should Join Forces with Fu Zuoyi to Destroy the Enemy Who Is Advancing Westward

(March 6, 1938, midnight)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]:

1. According to the telegram of the 5th from Gao Shuangcheng,[1] the enemy at Fugu had already been defeated by the Zhang regiment of the Zuo brigade of his forces[2] on the 3rd and withdrawn back to Baode, and there were no longer any enemy forces at Fugu, and so on. According to Chen Qihan, the enemy at Lishi, Jundu, and Jikou, as a result of the failure of his attack and attempt to cross the river, has temporarily halted his advance. The enemy at Jikou is moving in the direction of Lin *xian.* In addition, according to He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying], some of Fu Zuoyi's forces[3] are engaged at present in combat against the enemy at Dawuzhen. It is estimated that this enemy will divide his main force into two routes to move toward Fangshan and Lin *xian* in an attempt, first, to defeat Fu Zuoyi's units so as to guarantee the safety of his flanks and, second, to support the combat operations of the three routes of the enemy from the two directions of the east and the north. According to Chen Guang, Luo Ronghuan, and Bai Zhiwen,[4] the enemies at Xian *xian*, Daning, and Wuchenzhen are all moving toward Pu *xian.* There is no enemy at these three places or at Fenxi. According to He, Xiao, and Guan, the enemy at Kefeng number no more than eight hundred. But the enemy at Wenshui and Jiaochen has already advanced to the south of

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 185–87, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. At this time, Gao Shuangcheng was the commander of the Guomindang Eighty-sixth Division.

2. The reference is to the 512th Regiment of the 256th Brigade of Gao's Eighty-sixth Division, commanded respectively by Zhang Jie and Zuo Shiyun.

3. Fu Zuoyi was at this time frontline commander-in-chief of the Northern Route of the Guomindang Second War Zone, and commander-in-chief of the Seventh Group Army.

4. Chen Guang and Luo Ronghuan were, respectively, acting commander and head of the Political Department of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Bai Zhiwen was the commander of the Fifth Regiment of the Eighth Route Army garrison forces.

Loufanzhen. We estimate that this enemy has the intention of occupying Jingle *xian*, so as to coordinate his actions with the enemy at Kelan and Dawuzhen.

2. In view of the above circumstances, it is already clear that the enemy is surrounding the 120th Division and Fu Zuoyi's army in five routes in an attempt to compel our forces to cross the river. But the enemy strength of each route is generally not great. Our He division[5] should defeat the enemy one after another in coordination with the forces of Fu Zuoyi.

3. If Wang's brigade[6] is able to defeat the enemy moving from Kelan to Wuzhai in cooperation with Fu Zuoyi's forces, then it will be advantageous that Zhang's brigade,[7] which is now at Dongcunzhen in Feng *xian,* move to Loufanzhen and seize appropriate opportunities to defeat the enemy moving from Loufan to Jingle. After succeeding there, then if the enemy at Dawuzhen continues to advance toward Fangshan, Zhang's brigade may, as the second step, cooperate with Fu Zuoyi's forces to attack the enemy at Fangshan. In such a way we can be sure of controlling the three *xian* of Jingle, Kefeng, and Fangshan. This may prevent Fu's forces from feeling surrounded on several sides and enable them to persist in combat in northwestern Shanxi. If it is felt that Wang's brigade and Zhang's brigade fighting separately cannot smash a single column of the enemy, but by concentrating our forces we may indeed defeat a single column of the enemy, then it is appropriate to concentrate our effort to attack one single column of the enemy. But whether it is appropriate to attack a single column in Kelan or the one in Loufan must be decided on the basis of the circumstances.

4. Now that there are the eight regiments of Fu's forces to the south of Lin *xian*, which are sufficient to constitute a threat to the enemy at Jikou and Jundu, it is no longer necessary for Zhang's brigade to move in the direction of Jikou and Jundu. The priority for now is to attack resolutely and defeat the enemy who is advancing toward the three points of Jingle, Fangshan, and Wuzhai. Only by successfully attacking one or two of these three routes will it be possible to frustrate the enemy's plan of encirclement, consolidate the base area in northwestern Shanxi, and support the combat operations in other regions.

Mao Zedong

5. I.e., the 120th Division, commanded by He Long.

6. I.e., the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, with Wang Zhen as its political commissar.

7. The reference is to the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Zhang Zongsun.

The 358th Brigade Ought to Begin Fighting from the Direction of Loufan

(March 7, 1938, 2:00 P.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai], and for the information of He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]:

1. The main force of the enemy at Liuling and Jundu is intruding into Lin *xian*; the few remaining enemies took to their heels to Lishi on the 3rd, frightened by the reconnaissance platoon of Yan's regiment.[1] This reconnaissance platoon retook Liuling. When this platoon was making a sudden attack on the enemy, the popular masses reported to the enemy that there were three to four thousand Eighth Route Army soldiers on the attack. The enemy then fled in haste, leaving much rice and many cans of food and other things behind. Now, we have one company stationed in Liulin.

2. The main force of the enemy at both Lishi and Qikou is advancing toward Lin *xian* and Fangshan. Their route of retreat is largely empty. If this point is confirmed, then it seems inappropriate that our brigade of Zhang and Li[2] should move in the direction of Xing *xian.* Instead, it should begin fighting from the direction of Loufan. After winning there, they should cut to the route of retreat of the enemy to the south of Fangshan and Ling *xian*. This move will be conducive to victory and relieve the encirclement of Fu Zuoyi,[3] saving Ling *xian* and Fangshan from falling into enemy hands. After that, this brigade should be used in the region north of the Taiyuan-Fenyang-Lishi-Jundu line (at present, this line is the main artery of the enemy). At the same time, you should send a small contingent to support the surprise attack by Cheng Zihua[4] on the road between Fenyang and

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 188–89, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the Third Regiment of the garrison unit of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Yan Hongyan.

2. The reference is to the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Zhang Zongsun, with Li Jingquan as political commissar.

3. Regarding Fu Zuoyi, see the note to the previous text.

4. Cheng Zihua was at this time commander of the People's Armed Unit of the General Mobilization Committee of the National Revolutionary War in the Second War Zone.

Lishi. This is bound to have a major impact, and I hope you will consider it. If the enemy at Loufan does not make a rash advance, or immediately take a shortcut to Fangshan, it is perhaps appropriate to consider directly cutting to the route of retreat of the enemy in Ling *xian.*

Mao Zedong

Guidance by the Military Affairs Commission Shall Be Limited to Putting Forward the Overall Orientation

(March 8, 1938, 4:00 P.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]; and Nie [Rongzhen]:

1. Guidance by the Military Affairs Commission shall consist only in putting forward the overall strategic orientation. It is up to Zhu and Peng to carry out the concrete deployments in the light of this orientation and the present circumstances. Sometimes, the Military Affairs Commission advances opinions regarding specific combat operations, but these are merely suggestions. It is up to Zhu and Peng to take the decisions on the basis of the situation and the enemy's dispositions, without interference from the Military Affairs Commission.

2. Concerning the positions of the enemy and ourselves and the circumstances of the combat, besides the reports sent by Headquarters[1] to the Military Affairs Commission as the occasion demands, each division should also send a copy of its telegraphic combat report to the Headquarters to the Military Affairs Commission, so that the Military Affairs Commission will be fully informed regarding the situation.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 190–91, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. I.e., by the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army.

The Eighth Route Army Should Prepare to Fight Successive Battles in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Henan Region

(March 9, 1938, 10:00 A.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

We have taken note of your telegram sent between 7:00 and 9:00 P.M. on the 7th.

1. The strategic orientation decided on by the Politburo covers two stages: the present stage, during which we operate in North China, and the second stage, when we will have moved to Shaanxi and Henan. It does not refer solely to the present.

2. During the present stage, it is not just because of the orders of Chiang [Kaishek], but mainly because of strategic requirements (as discussed in the telegram of February 23),[1] that under the circumstances in which we are not fundamentally isolated by the enemy, our troops must resolutely engage in combat in the rear of the enemy in support of friendly forces, with a view to the effective elimination and weakening of the enemy. We shall launch an extensive movement to resist Japan. Only in this way will we be able to check and obstruct the advance of the enemy's offensive in the direction of Tongguan,[2] Xi'an, and northern Shaanxi. We must, however, avoid the risk of being cut off and must absolutely not cross the river too early, still less cross the river disregarding Chiang's orders and the timing of the river crossing by the friendly forces. In order to assure that it will be easy to redeploy in the future, it is imperative to consolidate the Luliang mountain range, the axis for redeployment, and to make arrangements for work in the Taiyu and Wangwu mountains (Zhu Rui's department).[3] Deployment for the first stage must take into consideration dispositions for the second stage, when the situation changes.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 192–94, where it is reproduced from a handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Translated above.

2. Tongguan is located in the northern part of Tongguan *xian* in Shaanxi and is an important pass between Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Henan.

3. At this time, Zhu Rui was secretary of the Military Committee of the Northern Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, involved in united front work in the mountainous areas on the border between Shanxi and Henan.

3. In the future stage, that is, during the stage in which the enemy massively invades Tongguan, Xi'an, Wushengguan,[4] Wuhan, and northern Shaanxi, after obtaining the agreement of Chiang [Kaishek], Yan [Xishan], and Wei [Lihuang], the main forces of the Eighth Route Army and of other Guomindang armies should cross to the west and south side of the river to fight in defense of the northwest and of Wuhan. At the same time, an appropriate level of forces should be maintained in the various regions of Shanxi to continue to fight a robust guerrilla war. If the enemy breaks through the Wubao line, attacks Suide, and threatens Yan'an, then we should be prepared to get one brigade from the 120th Division to cross the river first to fight the enemy. If the enemy attacks Tongguan, and Xi'an is in danger, whereas Wushengguan and Wuhan are not yet in danger, then we should withdraw the 115th Division, or at least one of its brigades, as well as some units from the forces of Yan and Wei, to cross the river first to attack the enemy. The specific deployments will be made in the light of the circumstances then prevailing. But no matter how many troops cross the river, it will be imperative then to strive very hard to obtain the prior consent of Chiang and to cooperate with friendly forces.

4. In general, during the present stage, all forces within the borders of Shanxi should carry out the task of eliminating the enemy and mobilizing the popular masses. But at the same time, they should be prepared for redeployment during the next stage when the situation is changing rapidly. If the whole of the Eighth Route Army is confined in an encirclement by the enemy in North China and is completely unable to be redeployed to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Henan region, this will be detrimental to the whole of the resistance effort and to political relations in the whole country. This is the basic spirit of the strategic decision by the Politburo. Proceeding from the prolonged character of the war, it must be so; this is the only advantageous approach.

5. Therefore, when you report to Yan and Wei and convene officers' meetings, you should point out the strategic significance of combat in the enemy's rear and the great number of ways to rely on the popular masses. But at the same time, you should not under any circumstances say anything about all the forces being permanently deployed in North China. In reality, even though Chiang has issued harsh orders, Wei's 54th and 83rd Divisions have already passed Yichuan via Ji *xian* (Wu Ting saw this himself),[5] and one unit of He Zhuguo's forces has already passed Fugu via Baode. (See the telegram of He, Xiao, and Guan.)[6] It is totally incorrect for them to cross the river at this time. But we may also see from this that

4. Wushengguan is located in the southern part of Xinyang *xian* in Henan and is one of the passes into the Dabie mountains.

5. At this time Wu Ting was commander of the artillery regiment of the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army.

6. The reference is to He Long, Xiao Ke, and Guan Xiangying, respectively commander, deputy commander, and political commissar of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

Wei Lihuang and others are wavering in carrying out orders. Also, please pay attention to the double meaning of Chiang's orders. On the one hand, they contain the positive significance of strategic requirements; on the other, it is difficult for them not to harbor any malice.

6. We will notify you separately regarding the rest.

Mao Zedong

Speech at the Rally in Memory of the Thirteenth Anniversary of Sun Yatsen's Death, and in Honor of the Officers and Men Who Have Died in the War of Resistance

(March 12, 1938)

Today is the thirteenth anniversary of Mr. Sun Yatsen's death, and we are holding this solemn rally in his memory. At the same time, the War of Resistance against Japan has been fought for eight months, and many heroic commanders and soldiers have laid down their lives, so we are holding this memorial meeting to mourn for them. All this is by no means casual or accidental; there are inevitable causes in the historical development of our nation.

Where does Mr. Sun's greatness lie? It lies in his program of the Three People's Principles, in his policy of a united front, and in his spirit of hard struggle. When I met Mr. Sun in Guangdong, the First National Congress of the Guomindang was in session, and the new program of the Three People's Principles, authored by Mr. Sun, had already been passed by the congress. That was the famous "Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Chinese Guomindang." At that time, moreover, the policy of a united front based on the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party was beginning to be carried out. This united front included an internal alliance with the Communist Party, and with the workers and peasants, and an external alliance with those nations that treated us as equals to wage a common struggle. Thus the famed "Three Cardinal Policies" were established at this time. Mr. Sun's program of the Three People's Principles and his policy of a united front constituted, indeed, the greatest contribution to the Chinese nation by this great revolutionary in a semicolonial country. Apart from this, the greatness of Mr. Sun also lies in his revolutionary resolve and spirit of hard struggle and uncompromising determination. Without this resolve or spirit, his doctrine and policy could not have been put into effect. As stated in the first sentence of the late Director General's political testament, which we have just read, "I have devoted myself to the national revolution for forty years." He experienced

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This text was first published in *Xin Zhonghua bao,* March 15, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 111–15.

countless difficulties and setbacks during those four decades, but Mr. Sun struggled even harder after each setback and never gave up. When many of his followers became discouraged, lost their resolve, or even surrendered and became traitors in the face of difficulties and temptations, Mr. Sun always held firm. He remained true to his ideas. Throughout his lifetime, Mr. Sun upheld his Three People's Principles, developed them, and never abandoned them. Mr. Sun never gave up his ideas in times of difficulties. From beginning to end, he consistently upheld and developed the Three People's Principles. The manifesto of the First National Congress demonstrated the development of the Three People's Principles. As for the united front, it was the same. Mr. Sun not only upheld the united front, but developed it from an alliance of various revolutionary groups and secret societies with the goal of overthrowing the Qing dynasty to the adoption of the policy of uniting with Soviet Russia, with the Communist Party, and with the workers and peasants in order to overthrow imperialism and feudalism. These accomplishments, together with his fearless, uncompromising, and persistent revolutionary resolve or practical revolutionary spirit, reveal Mr. Sun as a great revolutionary model. Today, we have another united front. Compared with the previous one, this united front is even broader. The enemy this united front must deal with is also more serious than the last one. The program that this united front should carry out remains, at the moment, the same as that declared by the manifesto of the First National Congress. But its form and content have developed in some respects and will certainly develop further in the future. The goal of realizing the Three People's Principles, expanding the united front, and defeating our enemy, Japanese imperialism, will be reached only by upholding the uncompromising revolutionary spirit of hard struggle, determination, and no wavering or compromise in our revolutionary practice. Therefore, in paying our tribute to Mr. Sun, we must, if we are not to follow the old customs, pay attention to the following three points. First, struggle for the thoroughgoing realization of the Three People's Principles; second, struggle for the consolidation and expansion of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; and third, uphold the revolutionary spirit of hard struggle, determination, and persistence. I think that the above three points are the most central, most essential, and greatest legacy Mr. Sun has left us. Every member of the Guomindang, every member of the Communist Party, and all patriotic fellow countrymen should accept this legacy and develop it. The judgment as to whether, in the final analysis, a person is a loyal follower of Mr. Sun depends on his attitude toward these three precious legacies.

Now let us speak about the significance of the commanders and soldiers who have died resisting the enemy. Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the unprecedented great war in the East has been going on for eight months. The enemy has exhausted all his national resources to wage the war; his goal is the destruction of China, and his strategy is fighting a quick battle to force a quick decision. What about us? We have also mobilized all our resources to resist; our goal is to defend our motherland, and our strategy is to wage a protracted struggle. In the past eight

months, our army and air force have fought heroically. Great unity has been achieved in our whole country, and several million troops and countless people have joined in the fighting. Hundreds of thousands of them have gloriously and heroically laid down their lives in executing their sacred tasks. Among these, many were members of the Guomindang, many were Communists, and many were members of other parties or belonged to no party. We pay our heartfelt tribute to the dead and will keep them forever in our memory. All of them without exception—from generals like Hao Menglin, Dong Lingge, Zhao Dengyu, Rao Guohua, Liu Jiaqi, Jiang Yuzhen, Chen Jingxiu, Li Guidan, Huang Meixing, Yao Zixiang, and Pan Zhankui to every soldier—have set a great and noble example for the people of the whole country. The Chinese nation is assuredly not a flock of sheep. It is a great nation rich in national dignity and sense of human justice. For the sake of national dignity and human justice, and for the Chinese people to continue to live in their own land, it will never allow Japanese fascists to reach their criminal and outrageous goal without paying a heavy price. Our methods are war and sacrifice. We will resist war with war; we will pit revolutionary justice against barbarous wars of aggression. This spirit has already been manifested in our nation's history of several thousand years; now it is being magnificently demonstrated once again. General Hao Menglin and hundreds of thousands of soldiers have died for this spirit. We assume that the Japanese fascists will continue to advance; they still want to attack our Xi'an, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Nanchang, Fuzhou, Changsha, and Guangzhou. They want to swallow up and destroy China. But I want to tell these mad enemies, "You will never reach your goal. Do not think that you have reached your goal once you occupy our land. You have not reached your goal and never will. History will judge that the victory of you Japanese fascists is only temporary and will never be permanent. There are sufficient causes to prove that the final victory belongs only to us. Moreover, when the war is concluded, you will occupy only part of our land. It is impossible for you to occupy the entire country. Even when you win a quick victory in a city, you will also get a prolonged war in a village. For example, you have already taken several major roads and several cities in Shanxi, but the countryside several times the size of the land you have occupied will always belong to the Republic of China. We will tell this truth to the people of the whole country: Japan can impose only partial occupation in practically every province. The Japanese armed forces are not sufficient to be spread everywhere; their barbarous policy has also aroused the wrath of every Chinese. China has a huge army and many people. China also carries out a good united front policy. This determines the prolonged nature of the war and to whom the final victory belongs. In terms of the situation in the future, even if, as a result of bloody fighting, Japan occupies most of China's territory and there is only a small part of China that is intact and remains as the central base for continuing the war and struggling for the final victory, Japan will really occupy only the large cities, the major roads, and some flat areas in most of China. Provided only that we can organize the people in most of the countryside in every province to rise up in arms

together with us to fight the Japanese and establish many anti-Japanese base areas, such as the Wutai mountains base area, which has already been established, we will surround the Japanese Army. This war of ours on exterior lines supports the war on interior lines. Let us, moreover, strive in every way to make great progress in various critical tasks in our Party, government, military, and civil affairs throughout the country. The day will come when we can support each other, attack both from without and within, and launch a great counteroffensive. At that time, we will assuredly be aided by support from the world revolution and the people's revolution inside Japan. Who can say that the final victory will not belong to China? Who can say that the warm blood of General Hao Menglin and others was shed in vain? Who can say that it is not a certainty that the Japanese bandits will be driven out of China? Who can say that the three great ideals of Mr. Sun Yatsen—national liberation, democratic freedom, and people's livelihood and happiness—will not be realized in China? We want the people of all China to have this clear understanding and firm belief, and understand the best overall strategy for protracted warfare. Under the leadership of the central government and of Chairman Chiang [Kaishek], let us unite as one during this campaign, and we will certainly be able to get rid of the shackles of being, or the threat of becoming, slaves without a country.

At this rally, we want to salute every officer and soldier fighting at the front because they are all waging a heroic struggle to win final victory. We want to salute all the families of the soldiers who are fighting the Japanese, especially the families of the martyrs, because their families have produced such soldiers who have fought for their country without fear of laying down their lives. We also want to salute every worker, and the leaders at every level, who are toiling selflessly in the rear for the war effort, because their work directly or indirectly guides or contributes to the War of Resistance.[1] At this rally, let us also offer a special salute to our national leader, and the commander-in-chief of the War of Liberation, Chairman Chiang, because he is leading the country with determination and perseverance, and because he has initiated and commanded the great War of Resistance against Japan.

Compatriots at the rally, and of the whole country, let us unite forever! Down with Japanese imperialism! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

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1. The text as reproduced in *Mao Zedong wenji* ends here. The remaining sentences are taken from the version in *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 329–33.

It Is Appropriate That the Main Force of Liu Bocheng's Division and Xu Haidong's Brigade Carry Out the Task of Combat at Zhengtai

(March 14, 1938, midnight)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

In accordance with Chiang [Kaishek]'s opinion as relayed by Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying], and the judgment that changes will soon take place in Henan and on the Longhai railway, it is more appropriate that the main force of Xu Haidong's brigade and Liu Bocheng's division be deployed south of the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway line to carry out the Zhengtai mission. This will also facilitate their northward and westward redeployment in the future. If they penetrate deeply into the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan Border Region, it may be an exercise in futility marching back and forth, not at all favorable to the overall situation. According to Chiang's intention, Wei Lihuang should go to the east of the Datong-Tongguan railway line to command combat along the Datong-Tongguan and Beiping-Hankou railway lines, as well as to the south. It seems that it is not yet decided that Zhu and Peng shall shoulder the responsibility of commanding combat to the north. Under these uncertain circumstances, it is appropriate to be cautious about the deployment of Liu's division and Xu's brigade. In particular, Xu's brigade must be located at an appropriate place which enables it to carry out the present tasks and to redeploy when opportunities arise.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 195–96, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Pay Attention to Distinguishing Between the Two Stages When Holding Discussions with the Guomindang on Military Affairs in North China

(March 17, 1938, 2:00 P.M.)

Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying], Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. When talking with Chiang [Kaishek], Bai [Chongxi], He [Yingqin], and Chen [Cheng] about military issues of North China, please pay attention to dividing things into two stages, the present and the future. Explain to them that it is now necessary and possible to keep large armies in North China. In the future, however, the situation will undergo the following changes:

a. The enemy will adopt the policy of destroying our economic base in a big way. For example, much damage has been caused by large-scale burning in the area around Fuping.
b. He will build and repair roads, attack by several routes, and construct fortifications so as to reduce gradually the zone of our activities.
c. He will occupy all the major ferry points on both shores of the Yellow River so as to create difficulties for our supplies and make it hard to maneuver.

The above-mentioned three circumstances are bound to occur. Some are already being put into effect.

2. Therefore, it is now possible and necessary to keep large military units in North China. In the future, we may only be able to keep a few smaller units, that is, a few guerrilla units, in North China. The main force of various armies must cross the river before the enemy manages to blockade the different ferry points on the Yellow River. Otherwise, we would fall into great difficulties.

3. It is entirely possible and very necessary to establish many anti-Japanese base areas in the rear of the enemy. Both the Guomindang and the Communist Party should do their utmost to do so, and no suspicions should be entertained about this. We should not, however, regard it as easy, nor should we imagine that several hundred thousand regular troops can engage in prolonged combat in North China.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 197–98, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

4. A regiment of Gao Shuangcheng's forces[1] is under siege in Dongshen. The enemy in Pianguan has already crossed the river and is staging an offensive to the north of Shenmu. The enemy at Linfen has sent reinforcements to Pu *xian.* The enemy in Pu *xian* is attacking Daning again, and Madouguan is in danger.

5. Gao Gang[2] is building boats at the mouth of the river. On the basis of the assumption that it will cost 25,000 *yuan* to build one hundred big boats (each costing 250 yuan), please get the money from the Military Affairs Department.

Mao Zedong

1. Gao Shuangcheng was at this time the commander of the Guomindang Eighty-sixth Division.

2. Gao Gang was at this time the public security commander of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia garrison force of the Eighth Route Army.

It Is Advantageous for Liu Bocheng's Division to Stay on the East Side at Present to Conduct Operations

(March 18, 1938, midnight)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. We have taken note of your telegram of the 18th at 7 A.M. Several words were not decoded clearly. Were you saying that it is better for [Peng] Dehuai to stay on the east side and Zhu [De] to go to the west side?

2. Liu [Bocheng]'s division has determined that at the present stage it is advantageous to remain on the east side, but during the stage when the enemy is attacking Wuhan, we think there will definitely be a power vacuum in the eastern sector of the Longhai railway[1] and the middle sector of the Grand Canal along the lower reaches of the Yellow River. There will still be the need and the possibility to go to Hebei, pass through Shandong, and enter Anhui. If there is a way out, then, even if we are isolated we will not be afraid of them.

3. With the boats we had at Laoyaguan, Xinguan, Hekou, and Yongheguan, we were able to take ten thousand men across every night. Now that we have built twenty more big boats, in addition to the boats we had before, we will be able to take at least twenty thousand men across every night. All the boats have been put in the Wuding River under camouflage ready for use.

Pingduguan has been lost. The boats were sunk so as to prevent the enemy from using them.

Mao [Zedong] Teng [Daiyuan][2]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 199–200, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The Longhai railway runs westward from the sea to Xi'an.

2. Teng was at this time chief of staff of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Main Force of He Long's Division Should Gradually Move Southward to Replace Chen Guang's Brigade of Lin Biao's Division

(March 21, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. The main force of He [Long]'s division should get prepared to move gradually southward to replace Chen [Guang]'s brigade of Lin [Biao]'s division so that Chen's brigade may be deployed in a new direction in the future. At present, it is appropriate to order He's division to send one regiment to the region west of Fenyang and Xiaoyi immediately to support Chen's brigade in the battle.

2. After the enemy's occupation of Zhenzhou, the situation in Henan and Wuhan will definitely undergo rapid changes. Chiang [Kaishek] will certainly agree that Liu [Bocheng]'s division should move to the east of Xingyang, and that Lin [Biao]'s division should go to western Henan and participate in combat operations to defend Wuhan. Therefore, it is appropriate for Xu [Haidong]'s brigade and the main force of Liu's division to concentrate in the region of Jinchen and Changzhi to engage in combat. The plan to get Xu's brigade to move to Hebei should be given up.

3. It seems that it is impossible for Chen's brigade to move eastward at present. It is appropriate to decide that it should stay where it is now to engage in combat. I request you all to consider this.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 201–2, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Establish Solid Bases in the Hebei-Shanxi-Henan Area with the Greatest Possible Speed

(March 24, 1938)

Comrade Zhu Rui, and convey to Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], Deng [Xiaoping], and Tang Tianji:[1]

The central task confronting the whole of the Hebei-Shanxi-Henan region is to establish as quickly as possible the Hebei-Shanxi-Henan Border Region as a consolidated base area which persists in the War of Resistance. Consequently, the tasks of the Party organization and the Eighth Route Army where you are located are:

1. Establish several combat-ready guerrilla units (like the guerrilla detachment under Comrade [Nie] Rongzhen) and local guerrilla contingents which are completely under the leadership of the Party.

2. Organize widely self-defense corps which do not quit production and get them to shoulder the responsibilities of reconnaissance, security, sentry duty, and hiding provisions and clearing the fields.

3. Strive to reform the friendly forces, especially those which are prepared to remain permanently in North China to engage in guerrilla war, turning them into strong, progressive forces resisting Japan.

4. Gradually reform the political organs and turn them into democratic régimes resisting Japan with the participation of diverse strata of the people, while remaining Guomindang régimes. Let the mobilization committees at different levels recruit the real representatives of people's organizations and armed forces, and turn them into actual government committees at various levels. Gradually purge the corrupt elements within the political organs, especially the Chinese traitors and wavering elements.

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 203–4, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Tang Tianji (1904–1989) was at this time the commander of the Shanxi-Henan Border Detachment of the Eighth Route Army.

5. Strive to build gradually unity in command and leadership in the military and political domains. Adopt some necessary transitional methods, so as to prepare for the convening of a representative conference of the Hebei-Shanxi-Henan Border Region government in the future to establish a provisional border region government.

6. Under the overall policy of the united front, resolutely carry out the policy of mobilizing and arming the masses and eliminating Chinese traitors.

7. Find a way to convene a representative conference of mass organizations of the whole border region, or one organized jointly by several *xian,* so as to mobilize the masses for participation in the war, and set up organizations which truly include the broad masses. Under the major premise of resistance to Japan, alleviate some of the hardships of the people and satisfy some of their urgent demands in accordance with Yan [Xishan]'s decrees.

8. Greatly expand the Party, and establish and perfect the leadership organs at all levels; set up one or two relatively large schools to train cadres for political, military, and mass organizations and government work, and let the Party run training courses.

9. You should prepare to remain in the Hebei-Shanxi-Henan Border Region to take overall charge, just as Comrade Nie Rongzhen is doing in the Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi Border Region.

Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] Mao Zedong
Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]

The Principal Operational Tasks in Southeastern Shanxi

(March 24, 1938, 2:00 P.M.)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

1. At present, the main combat mission in southeastern Shanxi appears to be to check the enemy who has advanced to Xiuwu and Bo'ai, and is attempting to invade Luoyang to the south by various methods, such as attacking him, weakening him, and cutting off his line of retreat. Second, it is to attack the enemy, who has advanced to Changzhi.

2. Consequently, it seems that Liu [Bocheng]'s division and Xu [Haidong]'s brigade should engage in combat separately. Xu's brigade (or Liu's division) should move southward via Dongyangguan to reach directly the side of the Dao[kou]-Qing[hua] railway line, sabotaging this railroad and attacking the enemy along this railroad. Liu's division (or Xu's brigade) should be deployed near Changzhi to attack the enemy there.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 205–6, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Immediately Organize Guerrilla Detachments Which Operate Using the Name of the Eighth Route Army

(March 24, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Zhu Rui; Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]; He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying]; Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]; as well as the various Party provincial committees; [Cheng] Zihua and [Yang] Shangkun:

Because of the developments in the war situation, perhaps in the not-too-distant future, it will be necessary for the main force of the Eighth Route Army to be redeployed elsewhere for combat. In order that our Party may continue to be able to persist energetically in and lead the War of Resistance in North China within the united front after the main force of the Eighth Route Army is redeployed to a different region, it is imperative to organize immediately in the name of the Eighth Route Army the following guerrilla corps:

1. Besides the Song Shilun contingent in northwestern Shanxi, organize a contingent in Pianguan, Hequ, Baode, Wuzhai, and the region to their north; a contingent in the region of Chunxian, Xinxian, and Ningwu to the south of Yanmenguan; a contingent in the region of Yangqu, Jiaochen, and Wenshui; and a contingent in the region of Fangshan, Linxian, and Lishi. All of them shall be entrusted to the responsibility of He [Long], Xiao [Ke], and Guan [Xiangying], together with the Provincial Committee in northwestern Shanxi and [Cheng] Zihua.

2. Organize a contingent in the region of Zhongyang, Shilou, and Yonghe in southwestern Shanxi; a contingent in the region of Linfen, Xiaoyi, Fenxi, Linshi, Zhaochen, Xianxian, and Hongdong; and a contingent in the region of Xiangning, Jixian, and Daning. All of them shall be entrusted to the responsibility of Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], and [Yang] Shangkun, and the Provincial Committee.

3. Organize a contingent in the region of Taigu, Yuci, and Pingding of southeastern Shanxi; a contingent in the region west of Yuanshi, Jingchen, and Neiqiu;

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 207–9, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

a contingent in the region of Cixian, Wu'an, and Shexian; a contingent in the region of Jinchen, Linchuan, and Xiuwu; a contingent in the region of Yangchen, Jiyuan, and Huanqu; a contingent in the region of Xinyuan and Anze; and a contingent in the region of Yichen, Xinshui, and Jiangxian. All of them shall be entrusted to the responsibility of Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], Deng [Xiaoping], Zhu Rui, and the Provincial Party Committee.

4. Organize several contingents to the east of the Beiping-Hankou railway line and have Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping] inform Chen [Zaidao] and Song [Renqiong] and the local Party organization that will be responsible for them.

5. All divisions should speedily set up training courses for guerrilla cadres. There should be at least a hundred trainees who will be transferred from the various units and guerrilla contingents.

6. The various contingents mentioned above shall each have at least a thousand men, and each of them shall have one or two companies of the Eighth Route Army with combat experience as the core, the balance being made up of local guerrillas and new recruits.

7. If the aforementioned areas are the sectors in which friendly forces station their troops, and it is temporarily not convenient for the Eighth Route Army to send forces there, then these contingents should be organized in other areas for the moment. In the future, when the situation permits and requires it, they shall then move to the designated areas to engage in activities.

8. Military and political cadres should be allocated appropriately to the various contingents, and once they have been set up, they should operate under the name of the Guerrilla Contingent of the Eighth Route Army, and establish their prestige.

Mao Zedong Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]

It Is Urgent to Establish a Unified Military and Political Leadership in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Region

(March 25, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]; Zhu Rui; and Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping]:

1. The work in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan area east of the [Beiping-Hankou] railway line is very important. We have very little information on this locality. We hope you will telegraph us regularly to inform us in detail regarding the activities of Chen [Zaidao] and Song [Renqiong].

2. Comrade Zhu Rui shall be responsible for organizing the Party Committee of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region and for administering the work in the areas east of the Beiping-Hankou railway, south of the Cangxian-Shijiazhuang railway, north of the Yellow River, and in western and northern Shandong.

3. The North Shandong Special Committee has a few guerrilla units. The responsible person of the West Shandong Special Committee, Xing Jinsheng,[1] and Commissioner Fan Zhuxian,[2] who is collaborating with him, have armed forces of several thousands. The Zhinan commissioner, Ding Shuben,[3] is resolutely resisting Japan and has over three thousand armed men. He is also very anxious to collaborate with us, and requests that we send cadres over. Commissioners Ding and Fan have both sent representatives to Hankou and have received awards from the central government. As for our armed forces, besides the Fourth Detachment,[4] we have also expanded the Eighth Brigade at Puyang,[5] which has four hundred men and rifles. Please tell Chen and Song to find a way to get in touch with these forces.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 210–11, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Xing Jinsheng was the pseudonym of Zhang Lin.
2. Fan Zhuxian was the commissioner of the Sixth Administrative Area in Shandong.
3. Ding Shuben was the commissioner of the Puyang Administrative Area in Hebei.
4. The reference is to the Fourth Detachment of the Hebei People's Army, an anti-Japanese force set up at the beginning of the anti-Japanese war by the Communists.
5. This unit had also been set up by the Chinese Communist Party to fight the Japanese.

4. At present, there is an urgent need to establish unified military and political leadership in this region. Besides establishing armed forces, an attempt should be made to establish and reform local governments, and organize the popular masses. The principle for the organization of armed forces should, however, be few but highly trained.

Mao Zedong Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]

It Is Appropriate That Liu Bocheng's Division and Xu Haidong's Brigade Should Be Located to the East of the Tongpu Railway Line[1]

(March 29, 1938)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

In view of the situation of the enemy and of ourselves at present, it is possible that the situation in Henan, Anhui, Tongguan, Xi'an, and even Wuhan will very rapidly undergo serious changes. At the same time, the enemy certainly has a plan for attacking the Communist Party politically by invading northern Shaanxi. Therefore, it is appropriate that Liu's division and Xu's brigade should be located to the east of the Tongpu railway line. Using the Taiyu mountain range as the base area, they should mobilize the popular masses, attack the Tongpu railway, and support the divisions of Lin and He[2] in attacking the enemy in western Shanxi. This will also facilitate redeployment westward.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 212–13, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Regarding the Tongpu railway line, see above, the note to the text of February 23, 1938.

2. The reference is to the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Lin Biao, and the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by He Long.

Speech at the Opening Ceremony for the Second Session of the Northern Shaanxi Public School

(April 1, 1938)

Comrades!

School starts today. You have had several school openings before, and many people have graduated. You come from all over the entire country, from the fighting zones, from the rear areas, from the South Sea archipelago, and from places thousands or tens of thousands of *li* away. Today the school opening ceremony of the second session is being held. I think that the Chinese Communist Party is very happy about the starting of school today, so I am very honored to represent the Chinese Communist Party in welcoming all comrades. [Applause]

As I said the other day, you are not out to get promoted to high office or to get rich, but instead are prepared or are getting prepared to sacrifice your lives in order to participate in the War of Resistance. Why have fifteen or sixteen hundred people like you not gone to some other places, but come here instead? I think that it is because of your faith in the Communist Party. If it weren't for the fact that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is here, you would not have come. For example, after you arrived in Yan'an, why didn't you go out the north gate and keep on going north? There are many places you could have gone to out there! You did not go to those places, but stayed here. Or, you all know Xi'an; transportation is convenient there, and you would not be living in caves and eating millet, but you did not remain there. Without fear of hardship, you walked a distance of eight or nine hundred *li* to come over here. There is only one reason for this, and that is that the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party are here.

So what is good about the Communist Party, then? Why do you like the Communist Party? The Japanese imperialists do not like the Communist Party, and there are many other people who dislike it as well. In the past, there were many pictures around where Communist Party members were drawn with hair growing upward [loud laughter from the whole audience] and with long, pointed teeth; they were drawn to look like demons. Others showed Communist Party members

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 5, pp. 153–58.

killing and burning, having not just communal property but also communal wives [loud laughter]. But that is not the way you see the Communist Party. One comrade told me that when he was outside, he thought that Communist Party members must be very ugly. But when he arrived here and had a look, they weren't ugly after all and in fact were fairly good looking [loud laughter from the whole audience]. I also think that [the Communist Party] is fairly good looking, although it also has some flaws, so it can only be called fairly good looking. It is precisely because it is this way that people believe in the Communist Party and come running over here.

Why is the Communist Party trusted by you while it is detested by the Japanese imperialists and certain other people? I think that is because it has its own special characteristics that cannot be matched by others. These characteristics are:

First, it has an orientation, a political orientation. The people of the entire country think that this is a good orientation, and it is: overthrow imperialism and complete the establishment of democratic politics. This political orientation represents the view of the overwhelming majority of the people of the entire country. The Communist Party decided on this orientation the day it was born. Externally, because the imperialists are oppressing us, we raise the slogan of overthrowing imperialism. Domestically, there are certain things that are old and rotten; they must be overthrown and democratic politics established. This has been the general orientation put forward by the Chinese Communist Party for the past seventeen years and is also the overall orientation approved of by the people of the whole country. There is another direction, which is the ideal of socialism. Everyone think for moment: let us say democratic politics has been established and we have graduated. Should we go on to further schooling? Yes, we should. Is there another school that we can go on to? Yes, there is: the college of socialism. It can give the people the greatest happiness. You cannot get to the end of the road to democracy and then stop moving forward; you have to keep going, and that means taking the road to socialism. But if you want to get to socialism, you must first take the present road and follow the present orientation.

Why do the people of the whole country like the Communist Party in particular? Because it not only has a political orientation but has persisted in this orientation.

Some people say that the Communist Party changes very often. For example, the Northern Shaanxi Public School has changed many times within a few months. They say: I do not know how many schools it has run, but in fact there has never been any change, it is all the same, even the teaching materials date back to the founding year of the Republic. We say: we do change: The Chinese Communist Party has changed three times over the past seventeen years. The first time was the revolutionary civil war from 1924 to 1927; the second time was the soviet movement; and the third time was from the September Eighteenth Incident to the Xi'an Incident to the present Second United Front. Indeed it has changed. But is there anything that has not changed? Yes, the general political orientation has not changed. What was the First Great Revolution for? It was to overthrow imperialism and

complete the establishment of democratic politics. What was the soviet movement for? It was to overthrow imperialism and complete the establishment of democratic politics. The current War of Resistance is still in keeping with this overall orientation. In your school song, there is a line that says: "We are loyal to the cause of national liberation." This is good. The Chinese Communist Party has been loyal to the cause of national liberation for the past seventeen years. Not only does it have a political orientation that is welcomed by the people of the whole country, but it has also persisted in this political orientation. But there are some people who cannot do this and even ask us not to. We have climbed the most difficult mountains, crossed rivers, and crossed grasslands, and we have not been afraid of having our heads chopped off. Even after the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Party members, we have nonetheless continued to move forward. The dead are dead and the living step over their bloody traces to advance with bright-colored banners raised high! [Applause]

This is the first thing that has made the people of the whole country like [the Party].

There is another point, and that is that it has a certain work-style, a certain habit of hard struggle. Lu Xun had Lu Xun's style of work; the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University has its style of work, and your Northern Shaanxi Public School also has the Northern Shaanxi Public School's style of work. The Communist Party has its style of work: arduous struggle! This is the work-style of every Communist Party member and every revolutionary.

There is a comrade who received a letter that was probably written by a graduate of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University or the Northern Shaanxi Public School. The letter stated that nothing was gained after living in Yan'an for a long time, that every day, there was only mountain climbing. Every place has mountains, so why should you rush here to where your Communist Party is to climb mountains? [Loud laughter from the whole audience.] He is an anti–mountain-climbist. [Loud laughter from the whole audience.] I am a mountain-climbist. I do not know whether the Northern Shaanxi Public School has mountain climbing every day. The Anti-Japanese Military and Political University has climbing every day. [Someone replies that the Northern Shaanxi Public School also climbs every day.] In my view, it is necessary to climb mountains.

Marxism is the head. People have heads and they must also have feet. Mountain-climbism is about feet. To overthrow Japanese imperialism, you need feet. Mountain climbing has become a general way of approaching things. No matter what work you are doing, it will always have a general way of approaching things just as mountain climbing does. This general way of approaching things is, in fact, a work-style. Other nations have their work-styles, and our nation's work-style is one of frugality and hard struggle. You see the peasants in the fields: they are always working, sweating and enduring hardship, regardless of what the weather is like. Isn't this the work-style of hard struggle? The workers and soldiers have this work-style as well; the absolute majority of them have this work-style. Other

strata also have it. For example, Mr. Sun Yatsen had this style of work; in times of defeat he would still advance with banners raised high. The Communist Party also has this style of work.

Nevertheless, everyone always feels that the Communist Party has done somewhat better in this regard than others. Why is this so? This is because the Communist Party has persisted in its political orientation. In times when it has run into extraordinary difficulties during the last seventeen years, it still persisted in its political orientation. This kind of arduous struggle has become a kind of traditional style of work for the whole Party; Cheng Fangwu is like this.[1] Apart from educating them to be persistent in political orientation, our Party should require that every Party member have another kind of work-style: being frank, telling the truth, fearing no difficulty, and struggling against all bad tendencies and the enemies of the nation. No matter where they are, if Communist Party members talk about fighting Japan, they should really fight Japan; if they talk about democracy, they should truly carry out democracy; if they talk about opposing corruption, they should really struggle against those unhealthy elements. The majority of Party members have this style of work. But there are also bad elements. We know that the Communist Party does not have an elder Party member living on a mountain, training disciples to master the use of magic weapons and then sending them down the mountain in batches. [Loud laughter] So there are bad elements. The facts of these seventeen years testify that the majority of Party members are persevering and unyielding. They are working arduously. Having such a flock of excellent Party members is an honor to the nation. Your flock of excellent boys and girls uniting around the Party is also an honor to the nation. But our nation also has bad elements; what they study is the art of getting promoted to high office and the art of getting rich; they study these disciplines in colleges and graduate schools. But it is very obvious that there is a majority of good elements, on the one side, and a minority of bad elements, on the other. Many good elements have joined the Communist Party. There are also some bad elements who say that, one, they themselves do not want promotion to high office; two, they do not want to get rich; and, three, they are willing to sacrifice everything, and they join the Party. But they are the absolute minority. Because of this, and guaranteed by the excellent Party members, the Communist Party has persisted in its own political direction, maintained a work-style of arduous struggle, and is traveling down the road toward national liberation. [Applause]

With these two good points, the Communist Party is regarded as excellent by everyone. It looks as though the Communist Party has now become good looking. In fact, it has been this good looking all along, it's just that the painters were bad;

1. Cheng Fangwu (1897–1984), a native of Hunan, had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1928 while studying in France. At this time, he was principal of the Northern Shaanxi Public School.

they painted the Communist Party as ugly. Of course, we have also painted them before [loud laughter], but we never did as harsh a paint job. [Loud laughter] Now things are better and we're not painting each other. That's because we are all fighting on the same front, being very civilized, with no more painting.

School starts today at the Northern Shaanxi Public School. And I should give some gifts. But I do not own all that many things and can only give you two gifts.

The first is a firm and unswerving political direction.

The second is a work-style of arduous struggle.

In the process of your future work, you will certainly encounter big problems, many of them. The road will be hard to travel and so there will be two kinds of attitude. One attitude is when someone frowns if his skin gets grazed or pricked and he sheds a few drops of blood. And then if he goes on and bumps into a nail—how terrible—it's as if the water of the Yellow River is coming down from the sky, and tears flow [loud laughter], and then he turns around and walks away. [Loud laughter] The other attitude is not like this. If he falls down, he climbs up and keeps walking, never losing his own banner. Furthermore, he is able to think up a way out. For example, if you try to get over this mountain opposite us, and you start from the entrance of Cheng Fangwu's cave here, you won't be able to keep climbing, so you take a detour and start to the south where there is a road, or in a place that is not so steep, and then you can climb it.

This War of Resistance demonstrates that our nation has such a work-style; that is, not fearing difficult hardships, fearing no sacrifice, and persevering. This ensures our victory.

The road you have taken is very much the correct one, and you have great enthusiasm for studying. I completely approve of what Principal Cheng Fangwu said to you just now. We must militarize, get close to the masses, and overcome arrogance and self-importance. These are very good suggestions.

My gifts are just these two things. Think again about whether they are good or not. I think they are useful. So long as we have a unanimous political direction and the work-style of hard struggle, and, moreover, persist in this direction and work-style, it will be possible to unite the people of the whole country and defeat Japanese imperialism.

On the Problem of Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party

(April 5, 1938)

Comrades! Today I am going to talk about the problem of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. This is a central problem in the situation at present, and it is likely that it will also be a central problem in the situation in the future. This is a problem that the people of the whole country care about very much, and I am sure that the comrades who have come here to study must be concerned about it as well. Many different opinions have manifested themselves regarding this problem. Some have a well-intentioned attitude, but entertain worries or doubts about this problem. Others have adopted a bad, malicious attitude and are using methods like willful slander to foment discord. Therefore this problem needs to be explained.

1. Why Are the Guomindang and the Communist Party Able to Cooperate?

This is one of the problems within the broad topic of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Although this problem has already become common knowledge and ought not to require much elaboration because it is a foundation and is a basic question, it should be discussed once again.

This problem can be clearly explained with a few brief but comprehensive sentences: The return to cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party resulted from the fact that they have common interests. The national crisis has reached its highest level. Japanese imperialism wants to destroy us, and the national contradiction between Japan and China has become the principal contradiction; this contradiction has become the foundation of all other problems. You have walked several thousand *li* to come here to the Northern Shaanxi Public School in order to put into practice cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and so forth. All these things have been produced on the basis of this principal contradiction. China is a semicolony, and the national contradiction

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This is the text of a talk by Mao at the Northern Shaanxi Public School. Our source is *Dang de wenxian,* 1995, no. 4, pp. 8–11.

is one of [its] basic contradictions. This contradiction determines the character and tasks of the revolution, and so the very first slogan we put forward was "overthrow imperialism." A student at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University wrote a letter saying that he had heard a lot of different views and opinions elsewhere, but could not figure out which was correct. Only after living for a month at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University did he learn that China is a semicolonial and semifeudal society and thus come to understand the nature of Chinese society. Now if he were to go out and see again those things of all different sorts, he would know which was correct and which was unreliable. Understanding these things allows us to put forward a correct slogan: "Oppose national oppression; down with imperialism!" The nationalism put forward by Mr. Sun Yatsen sought to make our nation independent. Given the semifeudal nature of Chinese society, there must be a revolution of People's Rights, or a democratic revolution. For Mr. Sun Yatsen saw that China was infected with two diseases—national oppression and feudal oppression—and to cure these two diseases, it was necessary to apply a remedy appropriate to the illness. Hence he proposed the principle of nationalism and the principle of People's Rights.

Now let us return to the problem itself: how is it that the Guomindang and the Communist Party are able to cooperate once again? It is because, at present, the national contradiction ranks higher than the class contradiction. The China-Japan contradiction surpasses the Guomindang–Communist Party contradiction; it surpasses the contradiction between capitalists and workers, and between landlords and peasants. Because of this, the Guomindang and the Communist Party are cooperating again. All right, they are cooperating now; but some people will ask: why did the Guomindang and the Communist Party fight in the past? Had we just gone crazy? Generally speaking, it is natural for the national contradiction to rank higher than the class contradiction. During the ten-year civil war it seemed on the surface that the class contradiction exceeded the national contradiction, but in reality, the national contradiction in fact exceeded the class contradiction. The fighting between the Guomindang and the Communist Party was one form of anti-imperialism, that is to say, the fighting between the Guomindang and the Communist Party contained within it the national contradiction.

Comrades! We all know that the domestic battlefield in semicolonial China is a microcosm of the world. Among the guns, cannons, and bullets on the front lines are some provided by foreign countries; if China were independent and its own master, the domestic war would not have this kind of situation! The first slogan of the Communist Party has always been overthrow imperialism; it was this way ten years ago, it has been this way for the past ten years, and it will still be this way in the future. China is divided into two kinds of places: in one part there are imperialist powers that forcibly open factories in China; in the other, doing this is not allowed. In one part the customs duties are forcibly reduced; in the other part the customs duties are kept in our own hands. Take Jiangxi in the past, for example. If they had demanded that we reduce customs duties, we would not have been afraid

of fighting; we would have been ready to fight them to the end. Therefore, the first of our slogans is "overthrow imperialism," and we overthrow imperialism in our actions as well. Once, in Hunan, Comrade Peng Dehuai put Mr. He Jian[1] to flight. The imperialist warships then opened fire with their cannons, so we fought them. We also fought them a few times in Hubei. But does that mean that we are against anyone coming to the soviet region to engage in industry and commerce? No, this is not the case. We welcome those who conduct business if they are well intentioned and peaceful, and as long as they do not destroy our sovereignty; if they are vicious and bad, then, of course, we will not be polite to them either.

The second of our slogans is to put into practice democracy, that is, the principle of People's Rights. The soviet movement in the past was actually a People's Rights movement; there was no feudal exploitation in the soviet regions, and the people were also free to speak. There is also the principle of People's Livelihood; we have, in the past, put that into practice too. Mr. Sun Yatsen said, "Land to the tiller." We distributed land to the peasants; isn't that the principle of People's Livelihood? All of this demonstrates that the Communist Party is a loyal follower of Mr. Sun Yatsen. Then you may ask: since the Communist Party is a loyal follower of Mr. Sun Yatsen, why did it want to fight against the Guomindang? These are two different aspects of things. At that time, the two sides had a common program—the Three People's Principles. Then this was destroyed by the other side, but we persisted in carrying out the Three People's Principles, and in this way we fought for ten years. The reason why we are now able to cooperate once again is that a thing called Japanese imperialism showed up from outside. After the "September Eighteenth [Incident]," after the "January Twenty-eighth [Incident],"[2] we asked our friends to go and take a look at these circumstances in the Japanese invasion of China. Some of our friends knew then that if things continued in this way China would perish. Nevertheless, there were other friends who were still unwilling to go and take a look. By now, the majority of our friends and the majority of the people all believe that Japanese imperialism is China's number one enemy.

This contradiction between China and Japan affects the domestic class contradictions as well as international contradictions. As a result of the Xi'an Incident, the British and American newspapers are sympathetic and approving toward our advocacy of bringing about domestic peace. They too have changed their posture; this is evidence.

1. He Jian (1887–1956), a native of Hunan, was governor of that province from 1929 until November 1937. At this time he was minister of the interior in the National Government.

2. September 18, 1931, marked the beginning of Japan's invasion of Manchuria; January 28, 1932, was the date of the Japanese attack on Shanghai.

2. Should We, and Are We Able to, Consolidate and Expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front?

The united front must be consolidated and must be expanded. But how to consolidate it and how to expand it remain a question.

In terms of the question of whether we should consolidate and expand, we can deal with this in a few sentences. Without the united front, we will be unable to resist Japan. Previously, the Red Army was unable to walk freely everywhere in China, and the Guomindang and the Communist Party were fighting each other every day, so how could we resist Japan? We had the help of the Soviet Union, and the sympathy and assistance of the people of the whole world, particularly the proletariat, but still it was impossible to fight Japan without cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Right now every aspect of our strength is inadequate—every aspect of the Party, the government, and the military as well as the people needs strengthening—so we should consolidate and expand the united front. The cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party is like this: as political parties, you could say they are two thumbs, but in terms of the 450 million people of the entire country, they are two small fingers. Japan cannot be overthrown simply by relying on two small fingers; we must use two fists in order to overthrow Japan.

Now we all acknowledge the "should," but will we be "able to"? Our answer is "Yes, we can." It will work as long as we get a few types of things right. First, there must be a political program that everyone abides by; second, there must be mutual respect; and, third, there must be mutual assistance and mutual development.

3. What Is the Common Program?

I said just now that we must have a common program. Why must we have such a common program? We say that this is the weapon for overthrowing Japanese imperialism and building a new China that is independent, free, and happy. To fight Japan, we need to have this weapon in addition to airplanes, cannons, and machine guns. Moreover, this weapon is in charge of the other weapons; it is an important weapon for our national liberation.

On the day school opened I talked about the problem of political orientation. What this political orientation does is point toward the road down which the people of the entire country should walk. A political orientation is like a person's head; only with a head can the other parts move. What should be written in this political program? If we wrote it in simple form, there would be just two or three items such as overthrowing Japanese imperialism, realizing the Three People's Principles, and so forth; but if we put it more elaborately, we would write as many as a dozen or several dozen items, like the Ten-Point Program. Only having a correct road will prevent those who walk down it from losing their direction. The Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the people of the whole country have to work out such

a political program together. Right now one part of this program has been worked out. The first item, resistance to Japan, is there. The second item, cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, is there. The third item, cooperation with the Soviet Union, has also been put into practice. The fourth item, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, is there to some extent, but not completely. This common program is meant to consolidate the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and both parties must respect it. If the stipulations of the common program are inadequately carried out, that would not do and should be criticized. But if it is overdone, and the stipulations of the common program are exceeded, this would also be a violation of the common program. For instance, it would be wrong if we were now to confiscate the land of the landlords and distribute it. In carrying it out, we should do neither too little nor too much; it should be precisely in accordance with the common program. We are very welcoming to friendly parties and hope that everyone will consolidate the united front.

4. Mutual Respect

As I said just now, once there is a common political program there must also be mutual respect. What is mutual respect? There must be mutual respect between people, otherwise the other person will not be happy. People are not like objects. For example, if you put your bundle on the ground and sit on it with your backside, it will not object; it will not make a peep. When I came here today, I am very sorry to say that I rode on that horse for a while, but it did not raise any protest at all. But if you sit on a person's body or ride on a child's body, he will raise a protest and oppose you. So people need respect. In school, instructors and students should respect each other. In the army, officers and soldiers should also respect each other, and if they do not respect each other and the officers begin to beat the soldiers, there will be estrangement between top and bottom. The army should treat the people the same way: they should be fierce toward the enemy but polite toward the people. The Eighth Route Army has the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, two of which are "be polite in speaking" and "be fair in buying and selling," which has exactly this meaning. I hope that you comrades will have two faces when you go to the front lines, one face for the enemy, and another face for friendly armies, for the soldiers, and for the people. There is no need for two faces between friends; friends will be close and united only when there is politeness, and only then will they have the strength to overthrow Japanese imperialism.

Now, to discuss the problem itself, this means that the Guomindang and the Communist Party should respect each other. I read in the newspaper that someone wants the Guomindang and the Communist Party to merge into one party; he wants to eliminate the Communist Party. But the existence of the Communist Party has its class basis. China has landlords, capitalists, workers, and peasants, and as a result the Guomindang and the Communist Party exist. This is beyond doubt and

is inevitable. At the moment neither can swallow up the other. Moreover, things would be difficult to manage if there were no Communist Party. It would have been very difficult to clean up the Xi'an Incident if there had been no Communist Party. Nor is it possible to eliminate the Communist Party; it is in the midst of struggle that we expand. The problem is not that if you feel like eliminating it you can eliminate it. Rather, as long as imperialism has not been overthrown and the feudal forces are still in existence, it is impossible for the Communist Party not to come into being and to exist. For that reason, though the Guomindang wanted to eliminate us in the past, and fought us, the more it fought us the more numerous we became. When we say that we should respect each other, does that mean that we should just have a little politeness and that's all? No; above all, we should have a spirit of self-criticism. Whether it is the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, or the Guomindang, all should criticize themselves. At the same time, because we have mutual respect, there should be well-intentioned, mutual criticism. If the Guomindang can point out the shortcomings of the Communist Party, so long as the criticism is well intentioned and correct, we will, of course, be glad to accept it, and if there are inaccuracies in the criticism we will explain this. The Communist Party should also criticize the Guomindang, and this can be published in *Jiefang,* but it should be appropriate, not overdone. Self-criticism and mutual criticism should be carried out under the condition of mutual respect.

Some people say, "You want unity in the united front, but as long as the two party organizations have an independent existence, there will be no unity." We are greatly in favor of unity, but each of the two parties has its own characteristics; it would be unimaginable for communism to receive approval within the Guomindang, and it would be unimaginable for the Communist Party to abandon the ideals of socialism and communism. A socialist society cannot be realized immediately simply by saying, "I want it." The democratic republic of the future will not be enough; we must continue marching forward to socialism. Only when many people support it can socialism be realized. The Guomindang government magistrate in Yanchang *xian* said to me: "When a socialist society is reached, I will have nothing to do; what will I do when my monthly 200 *yuan* of salary is gone?" I told him that the salary will be much bigger in the future. A socialist society is a good thing, and, moreover, China will, in the future, be able to make the transition without going through war. Last May in the concluding remarks I made at the meeting of soviet-area Party representatives, I said that there may be two roads to transformation from a democratic revolution to a socialist revolution: one is to pass through bloody struggle as in the October Revolution; the other is a transformation without bloodshed, which is what we hope for. Right now it is impracticable to carry out a socialist revolution, as conditions are not ready. China is a semicolonial and semifeudal society, and a small-scale peasant economy prevails, so a socialist revolution still cannot be carried out at the moment.

For the Guomindang to want to abolish the Communist Party will not do. For the two different political parties to unite, there must be a bridge, a committee

must be organized—any name for it will be fine—with both the Guomindang and the Communist Party participating in it. Or a separate party could be organized, with the Communist Party joining it, and the Guomindang also joining it. Both solutions would be fine; this would be the high-level organization of the united front.

5. The Guomindang and the Communist Party Should Develop Greatly

As far as our hopes are concerned, the larger the Guomindang is, the better; it should expand to at least ten million party members. The Communist Party should have at least one million members; of course, to have somewhat fewer would also be all right. If both parties increase in numbers, our power will be great and will be able to overthrow Japanese imperialism. I approve of young people joining the Guomindang, and I also welcome those comrades who join the Communist Party. So long as we are able to withstand hardship and work hard, have a spirit of sacrifice, and work hard for the interests of the great toiling masses, need we fear that socialism cannot be realized in the future? Overthrowing Japanese imperialism and building a new China that is independent, free, and happy—these are not the private affairs of the Guomindang and the Communist Party but, rather, the business of the people of all China. Whether the strength of the Communist Party is great or small, whether its political program is correct or not, matters a great deal to the whole country. Comrades of the Northern Shaanxi Public School! You should love and protect this Party, and you can criticize it in a well-intentioned way, but do not let others slander it, do not let others hurt it. It is natural that there be the occasional corrupt element in our Party, who is Marxist on the surface, but in fact is a follower only of the doctrine of getting promoted to high office and getting rich. We should oppose these corrupt elements, liquidate these corrupt elements.

I hope that you comrades will put forward your opinions more often and help the Communist Party. Meanwhile, I hope that you comrades will defend the Communist Party whenever you hear any vicious slander. Love and protect the Communist Party; make it develop and expand. Do the same for the Guomindang.

What Should You Learn at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University?

(April 9, 1938)

Undeterred by hardship, you students have come here from faraway places to study, trekking through wind and dust—this kind of spirit, this kind of determination, is very good. We do not know one another, yet you could say that we do know one another already because we stand on the same battle line politically. In terms of politics, in terms of spirit, we have thorough knowledge of each other; we are mutually acquainted. The time you will spend studying here is very short, only a few months; you will not be able to learn many things, unlike at other universities where you can study for a few years or more. Nonetheless, you will learn one thing, one very important thing, that is, you will learn a purpose, and this purpose is the purpose of the whole country and the entire Chinese nation: resist Japan and save the country. This is the overall orientation of our school, and it is also the demand of the people of the whole country. Specifically, you should learn the following few things here:

First, to begin with, you must learn a political orientation. There may be many different political orientations; you must learn a correct political orientation, that is, a correct political orientation which includes wanting to fight Japan, how to fight Japan, and why Japanese imperialism can certainly be defeated. Second, you must learn a work-style by which this political orientation can be reached and accomplished—the work-style of arduous hard struggle. You must possess this style in order to reach and accomplish the political orientation just mentioned. Moreover, you must learn a bit of strategy and tactics. The Anti-Japanese Military and Political University is a military school; you must learn to be a military man and learn some military skills. Military men are made from common people. If nobody was willing to be a military man, we would not be able to defeat Japanese imperialism; we want all the broad common people to be willing to become military men, for only then will we be able to defeat Japanese imperialism. Therefore,

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This is the text of Mao's talk at the opening day ceremony for the Third Contingent of the Fourth Session of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. Our source is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 116–20, which reproduces the draft record of Mao's talk preserved in the Central Archives.

you must learn to be a military man, study military affairs, study strategy and tactics—flexible strategy and tactics. Our strategy and tactics here are not rigid; instead they are flexible, that is, no matter what kind of method the enemy uses for attack, we will always have a way to deal with it. If the enemy attacks us using one method, we will fight back with another method. If we bring to bear flexible strategy and tactics, and wait until the enemy has exhausted his tricks, then we will be able to defeat him. In sum, you must learn here a firm and correct political orientation, the work-style of arduous struggle, plus flexible strategy and tactics. With these three things, we will be able to defeat the enemy in the end. This is the first point.

Second, you must learn to be cadres here. Cadres alone cannot defeat the enemy, but without cadres we cannot defeat the enemy either. We need cadres to arouse and organize the broad masses, to turn the thousands and tens of thousands of people into organized contingents. Without organization there is no power; it is impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism without such widespread, organized contingents. No matter whether you are at the front or in the rear, you must all arouse the popular masses, organize the popular masses, organize them politically and militarily. Japan's population is small and China's population is large, but the reason Japan is able to bully us is that the broad masses of our people do not have very good organization; to this day we are still very inadequately organized. You must keep a tight grip on this correct political orientation; it is through you that this political orientation will be transmitted to the broad masses, through you that they will be educated and organized. This is because in reality it is not possible for the people of the whole country to come here to study, but we can rely on you to inform the people of the entire country regarding this political orientation in the course of your work, so that they will all understand how China is to (and surely will be able to) defeat the enemy, so that this political orientation will become the political orientation of the people of the whole country. At the same time, you should also spread the work-style of arduous struggle, so that the broad popular masses will be able to struggle hard against all difficulties, firmly and unshakably. It is just like the way you eat millet here and climb Qingliang mountain. This can also be called a kind of hard struggle, this is to make you change the soft and weak style of being incapable of arduous struggle, to make you a little bit tough. For instance, if you fall while out running and break a tooth, you still come to your feet and march forward. It is not sufficient for you alone to have this work-style; you must make the people of the whole country all have this work-style. One thing lies in our path, and it goes by the name of "hardship." We tell it: we have been steeled at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University; we are not afraid of you! It says that it has great capacities. It can deny us clothes to wear, but we are not afraid; it can deny us food to eat, but we are not afraid. It says that it also has planes, cannons, and tanks, but we are not afraid of any of them. When we have overcome all the hardships, we ask it again whether it has any left. It says that it does not, and finally it has no alternative but to lay down its arms. This is the way

we can definitely defeat Japanese imperialism! You must, moreover, educate the broad popular masses of the whole country so that none of them fears hardship, and, moreover, so they will be able to overcome hardship; in this way, we will certainly be able to defeat Japanese imperialism. Furthermore, you should use flexible strategy and tactics to teach the broad popular masses, so that they all know they must fight Japan, and they all know how to do it. We depend on you cadres to organize the people of the whole country, to train the people of the whole country. Therefore, the second point is that you must learn to be cadres.

Third, you must also be resolute. Since you came to Yan'an from faraway places to study, going through trials and tribulations, I believe that you already are resolute. What kind of resolution, then? There are no opportunities for promotion to high office and getting rich in Yan'an. You came here, number one, not for promotion to high office, and, number two, not to get rich. So why in the end did you come such a long way to be here? Undoubtedly, you came here for the purpose of resisting Japan and saving the country, and so you are resolved to resist Japan and save the country. You want to learn how to resist Japan and save the country, and we want to help you to accomplish this. But some people only have a "general" resolution. By "general," I mean that it might be a bit vague, not completely firm and thorough. Among them there are inevitably some people who came here simply because they saw others going and went along with them, and do not have thorough understanding and resolve. What I mean is that their resolution does not derive from a firm political direction; they did not come here after careful consideration. Today we climb mountains and eat millet here. These are not terrible hardships; there are much greater hardships at the front. You must know that airplanes and cannons do not have eyes. Now, though the Japanese army of invasion suffered a defeat in southern Shandong, it will probably come back again. They seized our Shanghai and Nanjing, and are attempting to capture our Tongguan and even Wuhan; now the enemy army in Shanxi has taken Linfen and arrived at Fenglingdu. If we say that Japanese imperialism is a wild bull, then our big army of several tens of thousands of Chinese troops in Shanxi is pulling the bull's tail from behind its back, trying to stop it from moving south. Or if our Eighth Route Army is in the enemy's rear area, having difficulties in getting supplies, with airplanes in the sky and artillery on the ground, but even in this kind of environment of hardship, it still has to pull the wild bull's tail, continually striking at the enemy. When you set out from those many places, some of you imagined the difficulties in Yan'an, but I am afraid that some other people did not imagine the hardships in Yan'an at all. In other places there are fish, there is meat, and there is rice, but here there is only millet, and you have to climb Qingliang mountain, too. Now you have the resolve to eat millet and climb Qingliang mountain, but in the future you will also have to "pull the wild bull's tail." There are still many hardships along the way of the War of Resistance against Japan, and you must make an even greater resolution—the resolution to march forward without fear of any adversity! The War of Resistance against Japan is a protracted war, it is not something that can be resolved in six

months or a year, and besides, in the future we will have to build a new China. I can see that none of you has a beard or mustache. Those without beards are what are called youth, and young people have courage, but you must remain unwavering and not back off until you have grown beards (female comrades won't be growing beards, naturally), until you grow old and die. The process of the revolution is like traveling in a boat on a river with waves surging all around. Cowards will often start to waver and not know what to do. Historically, within the tide of revolution there have been people who have wavered and backed off upon running into hardship. I hope that there are no such people among you. You should never back off but bravely march straight forward for the liberation of the Chinese nation, and for the building of a new China. You must struggle hard to the very end for your 450 million compatriots in the entire country! You sacrifice everything, not for yourself, but for the 450 million compatriots in the whole country; not for your own family, but for the families of the 450 million compatriots. Therefore, the first resolution is to sacrifice promotion to high office. The second resolution is to sacrifice getting rich. The third is that you must make a final resolution to sacrifice your own lives! Now you have the preliminary resolutions to sacrifice promotion to high office and getting rich, as well as to eat millet and climb Qingliang mountain. But this is not enough without the final resolution. You must also resolve to sacrifice yourselves, to contribute your lives for your 450 million compatriots!

Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the First Representative Assembly of the Border Region National Defense Education Commission

(April 11, 1938)

Comrade Mao Zedong said:

Our nation is a nation that lacks education. But the War of Resistance has greatly changed the Chinese people; this is something that even decades of education could not have achieved. If we are able to continue to persist in the War of Resistance, it will create more new people by the millions or tens of millions. I think that all you gentlemen present today will live to see the realization of a new China, independent, free, and happy, organized by these new people. Since the War of Resistance is such a big help to us, we should use all our strength to deal with the War of Resistance, and use education to support the War of Resistance. At the moment, the War of Resistance is the thing that determines everything. Our education must also take orders from the War of Resistance; that is what's called War of Resistance education. War of Resistance education is not compulsory, but spontaneous; it depends on enthusiasm to learn on the part of the masses or the students, and on the activism of the education cadres. It is also necessary to join the educator and the educated closely together.

This record of Mao's remarks was published in *Xin Zhonghua bao* on April 15, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan,* Vol. 9, p. 369, which reproduces that text.

Consolidate and Expand the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Base Area

(April 20, 1938)

To Comrades [Nie] Rongzhen and Peng Zhen,[1] and to be passed on to Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai]:

Your telegram of the 10th has arrived only today.

1. As a result of various favorable conditions, plus your leadership and the efforts made by our comrades, there has been great development in all aspects of the anti-Japanese movement in the broad area of Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei. On the whole, the establishment of the base area has already been successfully completed, but it is still not consolidated in all respects. Your central task at present is to consolidate the victories that have already been won in all areas and to pursue further development on the basis of consolidating the existing foundation.

2. Your victory and development pose an enormous threat to the base area of the Japanese bandits—Beiping and Tianjin—and the Japanese bandits are bound to exhaust every possible means to attack and destroy you. Besides engaging in brutal armed attacks, they are even more certain to send out and buy off large numbers of Chinese traitors, vagabonds, and local bandits to sneak into various Party, government, military, and mass organizations, and particularly into military organizations, to engage in conspiracy and sabotage. It would be hard to rule out the role of enemy conspiracies in the assassination of the person in charge of the Party Committee for the area east of the railroad and in the various unprincipled disputes within the Party and the army. You should pay serious attention to this.

3. In order to consolidate your forces rapidly, so as to continue to bring about even greater development, we make the following proposals:

a. Step up reorganization and training, and Party work within the armed forces. Purge undesirable elements such as vagabonds, local bandits, and others who have wormed their way into our forces. Investigate and unite cadres at all levels. Carefully and effectively set up security work within the military.

b. Rid the base area of local bandits, and use prudent and effective methods to reform those banditlike anti-Japanese troops. Strengthen the work of eliminating traitors at the local level. Restore and establish an anti-Japanese order.

c. Apart from sending Huang Jing[2] to the east of the railway to rectify the work of the Party there, one person should immediately be chosen from among comrades Wang Ping, Liu Daosheng, and Zhao Erlu,[3] and sent east of the railway to serve as political commissar for Lü's troops[4] and, concurrently, head of the Provincial Military Affairs Department. Or else a command headquarters should be established for the army subdistrict to the east of the railroad, so as to rectify effectively the troops under Lü and Meng.[5] Once Lü's forces have been reorganized and are in order, a portion of his troops may be assigned to follow Deng Hua's forces in expanding toward eastern Hebei and the Rehe border area.

d. Consolidate the Party organization and its internal unity and cohesion, and improve its iron discipline. Any act at present that undermines the internal unity and cohesion of the Party is of the greatest assistance to the enemy. Severely criticize and correct all factional activities, strengthen education with regard to principles within the Party, and raise the prestige of the Party and its leading cadres among the masses.

e. Correct certain ultra-Left actions and guild tendencies in the mass movement, and ameliorate the landlords' and rich peasants' fear of and opposition to us. But the central task must remain the mobilization of the enthusiasm of the masses for the War of Resistance, to establish genuine mass organizations which are truly powerful, and to carry out effective organizational work.

f. There should be no further changes in the way the government is organized. In addition to broadly organizing and training the Self-Defense Army, the main work is to raise funds and procure food so as to solve the problem of supplying the troops. As for the way to raise funds, in addition to regular

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 214–16, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Peng Zhen (1902–1997), a native of Shanxi, was released by the Guomindang in 1935 after six years in prison. When the Sino-Japanese war began, he moved to Yan'an and was assigned to work with the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army in Shanxi, under the command of Nie Rongzhen.

2. At this time, Huang Jing was secretary of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei District Party Committee. On the following day, April 21, he became secretary of the Central Hebei District Party Committee.

3. Wang, Liu, and Zhao were the political commissars for, respectively, the third army subdistrict, the fourth army subdistrict, and the second army subdistrict under the Eighth Route Army's Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Zhao served concurrently as his army subdistrict's commander.

4. The reference is to the unit under the command of Lü Zhengcao, a Communist Party member, which had originally been the Sixty-ninth Regiment of the 388th Column of the Fifty-third Army of the Guomindang Northeastern Army, but which Lü had led in October 1937 to abandon the Guomindang and become part of the People's Self-Defense Army.

5. Meng refers to Meng Qingshan, then commander of the guerrilla army in Hebei.

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taxation and donations, a special point should be made of getting funds from the Chinese traitors. Special task forces may be formed to go to railway stations and places near cities to confiscate from and arrest Chinese traitors. We are unable to help you in a major way with funds.

4. Large numbers of cadres have already been sent out from Yan'an. As for the high-ranking cadres you want, once all the [security] checks have been made we shall see if we can send you one or two. More low-ranking cadres can be sent to you. We will find a way to send you the documents and radio transmitters via northwestern Shanxi.

5. You should find a way to establish communications with Tianjin, and have a group of cadres from the Beiping-Tianjin [area] transferred to work where you are.

Mao Zedong　　Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian]
Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]

Develop Guerrilla Warfare in a Big Way on the Plains of Hebei and Shandong

(April 21, 1938)

To Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], and Deng [Xiaoping], and for transmittal to comrades Chen [Geng], Chen [Zaidao], Zhu Rui, Song [Renqiong], Nie Rongzhen, Peng Zhen, and [Yang] Shangkun:

1. On the basis of our experience since the beginning of the War of Resistance, and under the two present conditions of a resolute War of Resistance in the whole country, and the deepening of mass work, it is possible to expand the anti-Japanese guerrilla war on a large scale on the plains of Hebei and Shandong, and also to persist in guerrilla warfare in the plains.

2. The Party and the Eighth Route Army forces should resolutely adopt the orientation of expanding and developing the guerrilla war to the greatest possible extent, and do their utmost to mobilize vigorously the broad popular masses to take the course of engaging in open, armed struggle against Japan. The secret struggle against Japan should be the main form of struggle only in the cities occupied by the enemy and in areas near the railroads.

3. In the light of the orientation defined above, the Hebei and Shandong plains should immediately be divided into several military districts for guerrilla warfare, and a guerrilla headquarters should be set up in each of these military districts to expand the guerrilla war everywhere in a planned and systematic way, and to organize extensively self-defense forces which are not detached from production.

4. In the areas that have been recovered, governments should be set up immediately and should try to find a way to restore order to some degree to the anti-Japanese resistance in those localities. Such governments should either be appointed by institutions or headquarters at a higher level or be recommended and elected by the organizations of the popular masses. They should all move with a guerrilla contingent, issue simple announcements and decrees, organize the mass struggle to resist Japan, suppress the Chinese traitors, protect the interests of the popular masses, assist the troops to obtain supplies, and so on.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 217–19, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

5. In the areas of Commissioners Fan and Ding, where the original governments still exist, by promoting a united front, these governments must be immediately reformed and strengthened so as to turn them into anti-Japanese people's governments. Those who are resolute and capable must be drawn into these governments, while corrupt and incompetent elements are eliminated, so that the governments, the troops, and the people can be intimately linked together.

6. As for drawing in the guns among the ranks of the masses for the use of the guerrillas and the army, we should make use of propaganda and persuasion, as well as the method of borrowing guns (certificates of gun borrowing may be issued). Or we may incite the popular masses to come with their guns to join the guerrilla units. As for grain procurement and fund raising, the principles must be those of voluntarism, and equitable assessment must be applied while at the same time paying attention to arresting big Chinese traitors in cities and railway stations in order to raise money from them.

7. The People's Self-Defense Army shall be the main form of mass organization. When possible, peasant associations and youth leagues can also be established.

8. A cautious approach should be adopted in dealing with secret societies and bandits. An effort should made to reform them when the concrete circumstances permit.

9. Recruit new Party members, and establish Party organizations at various levels. Most Party members should appear as activists in the anti-Japanese struggle, and engage in various kinds of open work.

10. Generally speaking, the expansion of the Party organization should be kept secret.

Mao [Zedong] Luo [Fu] [Zhang Wentian]
Hu [Fu] [Liu Shaoqi]

Speech at the Lu Xun Academy of Arts

(April 28, 1938)

You have asked me to make a few remarks. But since I do not know much about art, I can only give you a few rough and superficial ideas to consider.

1. What should our views be about the arts? This issue was once hotly debated in China. You may all know that Mr. Xu Zhimo[1] once said: "A poem must sound like a silver needle in a quiet valley." I do not know what a silver needle in a quiet valley sounds like. But I do know that Mr. Xu believed in putting art above everything else. At that time, many people held the same views that he did; he is a representative of this school of thought. Another school of thought, represented by Mr. Lu Xun, is that of the believers in the Marxist theory of art. The theoretical controversies between these two schools regarding art have a long history which I cannot talk about now in detail. The view that we should put art above everything else is an idealistic theory, and it is not correct. Now, however, we need a united front in artistic circles too, in order to resist the Japanese. Just as Mr. Lu Xun said, whether one is a realist, a romanticist, a Communist, or something else, we must all unite to resist the Japanese. Of course, as far as we are concerned, it is necessary to maintain political independence in art. We can never give up our political position in the realm of art, and so this art academy of ours must have its own political standpoint. In matters of artistic theory we are Marxists, not partisans of putting art above everything else. We believe in realism in art, but this does not mean that we advocate that kind of "realism" which is simply an imitation of nature, like bookkeeping, for art cannot simply replicate nature. Romanticism in art is by no means entirely wrong. There are many different sorts of it: there is active and revolutionary romanticism, and passive and reactionary romanticism. Some people explain things through reading each line, and they look down upon romanticism, believing it to be nothing but wind, flowers, snow, the moon, brothers, and sisters. They do not have the slightest idea that the primary spirit of active romanticism is dissatisfaction with the status quo; it is to imagine the future with revolutionary enthusiasm. This school of thought was once a progressive force in

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 121–26, where it is reproduced from the draft record of Mao's talk preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Xu Zhimo (1896–1931), who had studied at Columbia University and Cambridge University, launched the so-called modern poetry movement, whose members sought to write according to the literary standards of the West rather than those of traditional China.

history. If a work of art only records the status quo and does not contain a desire to search for an ideal in the future, it cannot impel people forward. Simultaneously to discover defects in the present and the hope and glory of the future—this is the revolutionary spirit, and it is this spirit that Marxists need.

There used to be a so-called third category of people in art circles in China, but we will not exclude even them now. The first priority today is the National Anti-Japanese United Front of all patriots, and our own political position in the realm of art can only come second. Every artistic school has its own class position. We stand on the side of the proletariat and the toiling masses, but under the guiding principle of the united front, we will not use Marxism to exclude others. Exclusion is closed-doorism, not a united front. Nonetheless, within this united front, we must not give up our position; this was the orientation of Mr. Lu Xun. Your Lu Xun Academy of Art must follow his orientation.

2. A work of art must have content, and must meet the demands of the time, and of the broad masses. Like a good meal, a work of art must be both nutritious and flavorful. The Chinese are the best people at cooking and eating. When we cook, we use just the right amounts of ingredients, then add oil, salt, sauces, vinegar, and every kind of spice. After skillful cooking, a wonderful flavor emerges, and the nutritional value has been preserved. Great chefs learn how to cook well through a long period of practical experience, not simply after studying for one day. When they cook, they use the same ingredients as other people, yet are able to create marvelous flavors. To achieve this, one must master blending spices, cooking time, and cooking temperature. Believers in putting art above everything else pay attention only to whether something tastes good; they do not care if it is nutritious or not. Consequently, the content of their work is often hollow or harmful. Art must stress nutritional value; that is, it must have good content and meet the demands of the time and of the masses. Take Beijing opera, for example. Today, one cannot find advertisements for operas like *A Pleasant Dream in the Garden,* because tickets for that sort of opera do not sell. When performing old operas today, we must increase the performance of those that portray national heroes or resisting an enemy. These are the demands of the time. Works of art must also have moving images and plots, and must be close to real life; otherwise, nobody will want to see them. Stuffing abstract concepts awkwardly into a work of art will never be popular.

3. The Lu Xun Academy of Arts must train a group of artistic workers with grand ideals, rich life experiences, and excellent artistic skills. You should not become artistic workers who are only able to record social life; rather, you should have the grand ideal of struggling hard for a new China. That is to say, you should not only resist Japan, but also strive to construct a new democratic republic during the process of the War of Resistance. You should work not only for the democratic republic but also for the realization of socialist and then communist ideals. Without such great ideals, it is impossible to become great artists. But ideals alone are not enough; you must also have rich life experience and excellent artistic skills. The fact that there has been no great work of art in China for the past few years is

certainly due to objective social causes, but as far as the artists themselves are concerned, it is also because there are too few who fulfill these three criteria. Many of our writers have grand ideals, but they do not have rich life experience, and not a few of them lack strong artistic skills as well. If you lack any one of these three criteria, you will not become a great artist.

As Mr. Lu Xun wrote in his afterword to *Destroy,* its author [Aleksandr Aleksandrovich] Fadeev personally experienced guerrilla warfare, and so his description of the training of horses was that of an expert. Fadeev even noticed such details as how to climb into a saddle, as did Mr. Lu Xun. This story tells us that great writers do not sit at home, basing their writing on what they imagine. Stuff written in that manner is no good. Many people now look down on the novel *The Dream of the Red Chamber* and are in fact reluctant to mention it. *The Dream of the Red Chamber* is actually a very good novel. In particular, it contains abundant social and historical materials. For instance, it describes how Liu Xianglian, after beating Xue Pan severely, "unfastened his horse, and vaulted into the saddle."[2] Without real experience, nobody could come up with the phrase "vaulted into the saddle." Without personally experiencing something, one cannot know it well. Everything, no matter how trivial, has rich content that can only be learned through real-life experience. You are young artistic workers, and the whole world belongs to you. It is your field of activity. If you want your art to have rich content, you will have to get nutrients from real life. You cannot stay here and study for the rest of your lives. Before long you will scatter to different places and be in the midst of real struggles. Like the words in "The Song of the Guerrillas" which you sing: "We are all flying soldiers, how can we fear high mountains or deep water?" You should not merely mouth these words, but act this way as well. Without abundant real-life experience, there is no real content in art. In order to create a masterpiece, you must first go and enrich your experiences through real struggle. Although it is true that artists must have ideals, they also must study details like how to climb into a saddle. In the past a man who studied *The Dream of the Red Chamber* said that he did indeed tour and survey Prospect Garden. Now your "Prospect Garden" is all China. Every one of you young artistic workers here is a Jia Baoyu or Lin Daiyu;[3] you need really to live in and study your Prospect Garden. In your work, the "big outline" is all China, and the "small outline" is the Wutaishan district. When surveying China, it is not enough simply to use the style of a reporter, for a reporter's work has the quality of one who just passes by. An old expression says: "Looking at flowers while riding on horseback cannot be compared to stopping the horse to look at flowers; stopping the horse to look at flowers cannot be com-

2. Cao Xueqin, *The Story of the Stone*, trans. and ed. David Hawkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), vol. 2, p. 444. (Professor Hawkes adopted for his translation this alternative, and arguably more correct, title for the novel.)

3. These are the two central characters in *The Dream of the Red Chamber.*

pared to dismounting from the horse to enjoy the flowers." I hope that you will all dismount from your horses to enjoy the flowers.

Going among the masses will not only enrich your own life experience but also improve your artistic skills. On summer evenings, farmers find a cool place to relax. They sit on benches with big palm-leaf fans in their hands, telling stories. They know the "eight nots" of Mr. Hu Shizhi.[4] They do not allude to the classics, but the content of their stories is rich, and their language beautiful. These farmers are not only good prose writers, they are poets as well. There are good poems to be found in folksongs. Once when we were working in a school, we asked the students to collect folk ballads from different places and found many good things in them. There is something very wrong here: those with rich life experience and beautiful words are unable to write; on the other hand, many people who can write just sit in pavilions in big cities. They lack rich life experience and are not familiar with the vivid language of the people. We all know that Gorky's life experience was extremely rich; he knew intimately the lives and language of the lower classes in Russia, as well as the reality of the other classes. That is why he was able to produce so many masterpieces.

Every artistic worker must learn artistic skills. Without strong skills, you will not be able to express rich content. Such skill has many aspects and is not restricted to language, although the ability to master language is indeed very important. I think that Mr. Lu Xun must have studied the language of the masses. You must spend much time and effort to master artistic skills.

To be a great artist, you must fulfill the aforementioned three conditions. You cannot lack even one. At present, the writings of some people on our war front lack rich, real content; they do not fit objective reality; and their artistic skills are somewhat crude. We must definitely make an effort to overcome this shortcoming.

4. The reference is to Hu Shi (1891–1962), *zi* Hu Shizhi, one of the earliest and most influential of the participants in the movement to replace the old literary language with the vernacular. Regarding Mao's relations with him in the early years, see Volumes I and II, *passim,* especially Volume I, p. 412, n. 6. Although politically they were at this time on opposite sides, Mao's reference here makes plain that he still recognized the positive role Hu played in China's literary revolution.

Form Organizations and Fight Japan

(April 30, 1938)

The Workers' Representative Assembly of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has been in session for several days, but I have not had time to attend. Today they have asked me to give a talk, so I will discuss one problem, that of "forming organizations and fighting Japan."

The united front, for which another name is "form organizations," is engaged precisely in forming organizations to fight Japan. These organizations are different now from what they were in the past. The united front is a big organization, put together from many small organizations. The workers' union is one of these many small organizations. There are tens of millions of workers in China, and this proletariat of tens of millions of people should unite to form an organization. Among these tens of millions of workers, there are also seventy-two trades, and the workers of every trade and industry should organize a workers' union for each trade and industry. At the same time, within each trade and industry, each locality is different. For instance, Yanchang has the coal miners of Yanchang, the central Shaanxi plain has the coal miners of the central Shaanxi plain, and every place has its own workers' union for coal miners; Shaanxi Province has organized a general union for all the coal miners in Shaanxi. Tai'erzhuang, where China recently won a great victory, produces very good coal, and there are many coal miners there. They too want to organize a workers' union for the coal industry. Once every province has its own workers' union for the coal industry, then a general union for coal-industry workers of the entire country can be organized. In addition, the unions of every industry in every locality in every province can join together to organize a national general workers' union. This is the way we must organize the country's proletariat of tens of millions of people. I am told that you are discussing the issue of unifying and spreading the union organizations. This is excellent; we must organize the proletariat of tens of millions of people in every province and every industry in the entire country to form a workers' organization. This is the way to "form organizations and fight Japan," and its strength will be very great.

Should it be only the workers who form organizations and fight Japan? Are there other organizations? There is another organization that is formed by the farmers

Our source for this text is *Dangde wenxian,* 1995, no. 4, pp. 12–13.

who till the land. There is a saying in China: "If the peasants don't exert themselves, the emperor will starve." But I think that if the peasants do not exert themselves, it is not just the emperor who will starve; there will certainly be a lot of people who starve. Our China has several hundred million peasants, and they should also be formed into an organization. Everywhere, in every province, every *xian*, and every township, a peasants' association, a peasants' society for resisting Japan and saving the country, should be established. If we organize in such a way, and use these kinds of organizations to go fight Japan, need we fear that Japanese imperialism cannot be overthrown?

There are also the businessmen; those who do business should also be organized. Are there others? Cultural workers, those who wield the pen, these people who write articles, should also be organized. The Northern Shaanxi Public School has now been set up, and in cultural circles the National Salvation Society has been established as well. Some people ask what is the use of a pen; can you use a pen to fight the Japanese? Yes, you can fight the Japanese with a pen; axes, hoes, and pens should all be organized, and united in organizations to fight the Japanese. Napoleon said: one pen is stronger than three thousand Mausers.[1] Now we say that if one pen is equal to even one gun, the whole country will have many tens of thousands of guns.

For the people of every profession in the whole country all to be organized in this way is what is called the National Anti-Japanese United Front; this is a big organization of the whole country.

Are there any other organizations or not? Yes, there are big organizations of a global nature; this means forming organizations with other countries. For this, one must understand a bit about the world situation. Back when I was a child I heard people say, "Without stepping outside his gate, the scholar knows all the wide world's affairs"; now I think that this sentence is completely wrong. There are still some old scholars[2] who are still alive today, and they only know about the affairs of a few dozen *li* around them. If you go and ask one about Japanese affairs, about why Japan is fighting China, he would say he does not know. If you go on and ask about the affairs of Italy, Germany, and Spain, again he would not know. What do these scholars know about the wide world's affairs? I say they do not know a thing. There is now another kind of scholar,[3] like the students at the Northern

1. Since Paul von Mauser, the inventor of this weapon, was not born until 1838, after Napoleon's death, Mao's citation cannot be strictly accurate. Perhaps he understood Mauser, in its Chinese transcription, to refer to any nineteenth-century gun.

2. The term *xiucai,* here translated "scholars," refers to the graduates at the lowest level of the imperial bureaucracy. Since the examinations for this rank had been abolished thirty years earlier, any *xiucai* still alive would necessarily have been relatively old.

3. Once again, the term here translated "scholar" is *xiucai*; both before and after 1949, Mao used it deliberately in referring to his contemporaries to underscore that they were fulfilling the role which the graduates of the imperial examinations were supposed to play, but could not.

Shaanxi Public School and the people of the National Salvation Association in cultural circles. They have a kind of skill that enables them to keep in touch with the news sent by radio; they truly know about the affairs of the world. Now when the Spanish government wins a victory, I know that this is because their workers are very well united. The Chinese army won a victory at Tai'erzhuang, and I also know this. Yesterday our Commander in Chief Zhu [De] won a victory, and I knew about it today! What is the reason for this? It is because now there is a kind of thing, made by the workers, which can fly through the sky, and it is called radio.

In the past some people said that foreigners are all straight-legged; their legs are straight, and they cannot walk, if they fall down they cannot get up, and so forth. All this talk was wrong. Among the foreigners there are good foreigners, and there are bad foreigners. You could say that among the foreigners about eight or nine out of ten have sympathy for China or may be willing to help China. I think some of you must have seen that a few days ago the *Xinhua ribao* of Hankou published two articles by Japanese; those are two good Japanese.

In every country of the world now those good foreigners have organizations. The proletarian Soviet Union is the largest organization. In Japan, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the good people in these countries all have formed organizations, antifascist organizations. The workers of foreign countries want to oppose fascism, and we, the Chinese people, also want to oppose fascism; the goal is the same. This is a big organization of world antifascists. In this way, the workers in every country want to overthrow Japanese imperialism. The workers within Japan want to overthrow Japanese imperialism as well; they also want to organize a united front. The three united fronts, one in China, one of the antifascists of the whole world, plus the one of the Japanese proletariat, all want to rise up and overthrow Japanese imperialism, and this will result in a united front of the whole world. This united front must still be organized well, and expanded well, in order to attack Japanese imperialism in unison. Do you think that Japanese imperialism can be overthrown? It certainly can. Whoever says that China cannot defeat Japan is wrong.

If China is to defeat Japanese imperialism, the working class will have a very important role to play in the War of Resistance. Hence, the proletariat must unite together well. We must overthrow Japanese imperialism, for only then can we be sure that we will not become slaves without a country. We will never agree to serve as slaves without a country. We must raise up our heads, we must stand up.[4] Only through unity can we overthrow Japanese imperialism!

4. The term here translated "stand up" is *fanshen,* used by Mao in the late 1930s to symbolize the liberation of the Chinese people, and especially of the peasantry.

Expand the Guerrilla War in the Rear of the Enemy in Central China

(May 4, 1938)

Comrade Xiang Ying:

Although there are difficulties in engaging in guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy, it is better, easier, and less constrained than fighting at the front together with friendly forces and under their command. The enemy situation is more serious there, yet as long as we have the broad popular masses behind us and sufficient areas in which to maneuver, and provided we pay attention to mobility and flexibility in command, such difficulties can be overcome. This has already been proven by the guerrilla war in Hebei and Shandong. A few days after the reconnaissance forces have been sent out, the main force may get ready to follow along. There is every reason to hope that we will be able to create base areas in the extensive areas among the five regions of Guangde, Suzhou, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhu, to mobilize the popular masses to wage an anti-Japanese struggle, to organize armed forces of the popular masses, and to develop new guerrilla contingents. After the Mao mountain base area has been in large measure established, you should also prepare some forces to enter the triangular area of Suzhou, Zhenjiang, and Wusong, as well as a contingent for crossing the river to enter the area north of it. Under certain circumstances, it is possible to wage guerrilla warfare on the plains too. The conditions are very different from those during the civil war. Of course, a cautious attitude should be adopted at all times. One cannot ignore the point that specific combat actions should be taken when the specific circumstances permit. You need to pay serious attention to Xue Yue[1] and others who harbor malicious intent. The present orientation does not, however, consist in competing with him for some time or some more miles of defense sectors, but in obeying his orders to go to the areas designated by him. You will have your own freedom after getting there. In the future, you need not ask for instructions from

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 220–21, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Xue Yue was at this time the commander of the First Army Group of the Guomindang First War Zone.

him or report to him on all matters. You only need to report to him your general course of action and battle victories. In addition, please always keep the good relations with Comrade Ye [Ting].[2] Please give consideration to the above points.

Mao Zedong

2. Ye Ting (1897–1946) had joined the Communist Party while studying in the Soviet Union in 1925. In August 1927, he participated in the Nanchang Uprising. Subsequently, he severed connections with the Chinese Communist Party, but in September 1937 he persuaded Chiang Kaishek to appoint him commander of the New Fourth Army, which was formally created in January 1938.

Both Sides Will Benefit If We Cooperate, Both Sides Will Suffer If We Split

(May 4, 1938)

Our comrades are very concerned about the problem of cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. This is a problem for the future, not the present. The present situation with regard to cooperation is relatively stable and may become more stable. The question is: After the overthrow of Japanese imperialism, will the Guomindang and the Communist Party continue to cooperate? Or will the two parties begin to fight each other? Many people have raised this question; you are not the only ones. Members of both the Guomindang and the Communist Party have also brought it up, and the common people in the whole country have shown concern about it as well. I have given other people an answer to this question. We have several reasons for believing that the Guomindang and the Communist Party will not fight each other, and also that they should not do so.

The two major reasons are: first, the international reason; and second, the domestic reason. These two reasons make it possible for the Guomindang and the Communist Party to continue to cooperate and show that they should continue to do so.

The domestic reason can be further divided into three aspects: first, the Guomindang; second, the Communist Party; and third, the people.

I will begin with the first aspect.

From the point of view of the Guomindang, what are the reasons for which the two parties should continue to cooperate? I am not the Guomindang chief of staff, so how can I speak for them with assurance? Generally speaking, however, that is, looking at the broad trend of things, one can still say a few words about whether or not cooperation is desirable and possible. First, I will now discuss the significance of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party.

Relations between the two parties can be divided into three stages: first, cooperation between the two parties; second, a split between them; and third, cooperation once more. In accordance with the opening words of the classic Chinese novel *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, "It is said that historical trends were ever thus: when the empire has long been divided, it must unite; and when it has long been united, it must divide."[1] The Guomindang and the Communist Party were split for ten years, and now they have once more united. It is, however, incorrect to apply these words to the present situation, for the two parties will not necessarily split again after their present unity. We can change these words into the following: "The Guomindang and the Communist Party will both benefit if we unite, and both suffer if we split." The past has already demonstrated the truth of this. If you look at the historical experience of unity and splits between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, you will understand this. The fundamental reason for the success of the Northern Expedition was that, at that time, the united front of the two parties carried out the correct guiding principle. In January 1924 the Guomindang held its first national congress in Guangzhou. At this meeting it published a declaration asserting its agreement with the guiding principles of the First United Front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. I personally attended this meeting; Mr. Sun Yatsen presided. The congress was held in 1924, and in the same year the Huangpu Military Academy was founded. In 1925 Guangdong was unified, and the Chen Jiongming faction wiped out. Chen Jiongming had been in Guangdong for many years. Nobody had been able to defeat him, but then two eastern punitive expeditions entirely destroyed his forces. This, too, was entirely due to the combined strength of the Guomindang and the Communist Party. At that time, Mr. Chiang Kaishek was commandant of the Huangpu Military Academy, and Comrade Zhou Enlai was the head of its political department. Another example of beneficial cooperation is that Mr. Chiang Kaishek was the commander of the First Army, and Comrade Zhou Enlai was the deputy party representative. In 1926, the Northern Expedition began. Its strength was irresistible, and it took Wuhan, Nanchang, Shanghai, and Nanjing, utterly routing Wu Peifu[2] and Sun Chuanfang.[3] All these victories depended upon the strength of the united front. Without such strength, these results would not have been achieved. Therefore, I say that the victories of the great revolution from 1925 to 1927 are historically unprecedented, and the deep influence that this revolution had among the masses had also never occurred before. This is proof that "both sides will benefit if we cooperate."

Where is the evidence that both sides will suffer if we split? It may be found in the separation between the two parties which lasted from 1927 until the Xi'an Incident. During this period, not two but three sides were hurt, because the ordinary people also suffered terribly. What good did all this do the Guomindang?

This text is an extract from Mao's talk on the occasion of the establishment of the first contingent at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. Our source is *Dangde wenxian,* 1995, no. 4, pp. 13–15.

1. The *Romance of the Three Kingdoms,* a fictional account of the brief period in the third century when China was divided into three rival domains, dates from the fourteenth century and had been one of Mao's favorite novels since his youth.

2. Wu Peifu (1874–1939) was the leader of the Zhili faction, which dominated North China from 1922 to 1924.

3. Sun Chuanfang (1884–1935) was the warlord who controlled Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Fujian in the mid-1920s.

They fought for ten years intending to wipe out the Communist Party, but ended up empty-handed, achieving nothing. Previously, Communists had joined the Guomindang, but at that time the Guomindang did not approve of cooperation, and drove the Communists out during a so-called purge. They would not allow us to organize workers', peasants', and students' unions in different areas, and would not allow us to develop the workers' and peasants' movements, claiming that we were too extreme in our opposition to feudalism and also went too far in resisting imperialism. But this is not what the people in the whole country thought, because not only did our actions at that time not go beyond the Guomindang's declaration at its First National Congress, but in fact we were still not doing enough in support of the declaration. Who, then, in the final analysis, loyally carried out the demands of the declaration? Even Guomindang comrades could not help giving the credit to the Communist Party. The Communist Party honestly and thoroughly carried out the principles of Nationalism, People's Rights, and People's Livelihood. After the failure of the great revolution, hundreds of thousands of Communist Party members, workers, and peasants were executed. What was their crime? Their "crime" was nothing more than that they carried out the Three People's Principles. Back then we had not begun the agrarian revolution. Actually, the agrarian revolution is simply the principle of People's Livelihood as well as the equal right to land. Is it communism or bourgeois democracy to carry out Mr. Sun Yatsen's slogan of "land to the tiller"? In my opinion, it is bourgeois democracy, for when a peasant gets land he then owns property. This remains within the sphere of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, because the system of private ownership is not abolished. You may perhaps ask, why does the Communist Party not carry out communism? We do want to carry out communism, but that is a matter for the future. Adoption of bourgeois democracy at present is a stage along the road to eventual communism. Then some people may say: you did another wrong thing; you set up soviets. As a matter of fact, the soviets are an example of the principle of People's Rights: ordinary people had freedom of speech, travel, and assembly. These rights were all included in the rules of the soviet governments in the past. Now, the Border Region governments have such rules as well, with the sole exception of the Chinese traitors. In the past you would be arrested if you took a walk in Hankou, and your brain would have to find itself a new house. You all know that they are keeping under observation the Seven Gentlemen formerly imprisoned in Suzhou.[4] Why were they imprisoned? Because they advocated resisting Japan, and there in Suzhou the people have no rights and are not allowed to advocate resisting Japan. Here we carry out the principle of People's Rights. "Soviet" is a word of foreign origin, which actually refers to representative meetings. All those opposed to imperialism and feudalism can send representatives to such a meeting and can discuss and make decisions about the issues. This is People's Rights! Do we have the principle of Nationalism here? Imperialists do not like what we have done over the past ten years, because wherever we go, they quake in their boots. Examples of this are Changsha, Huangshi Harbor, and Tianjia Township. When we attacked Zhangzhou in 1932 the imperialists used twenty-three warships to blockade us and aimed their cannons at us. When we assign customs duties for imports from any country, we might choose not to tax those goods we need, to impose heavy duties on those goods we do not really need, and to forbid the importation of products which we do not need at all. It is we who decide everything; what imperialist country dares to interfere with us? If someone wants to do missionary work here, he cannot do so without our permission. In other areas of China, have people dared to treat foreigners, "foreign bigshots," in this way? In those places, the rule has become that the rank and file fear officials, who in turn fear the "foreign bigshots." The Communist Party is not afraid of "foreign bigshots." If they want to do business with us on a basis of equality, then of course we welcome them. This is the principle of Nationalism, which we put into practice.

4. The "Seven Gentlemen" were the leading figures in establishing the National Salvation Association in 1936, to advocate resistance to Japan. The principal organizers were Zhang Naiqi and Shen Junru; one of the seven was a woman lawyer, Shi Liang. (The term *junzi,* commonly translated "gentlemen" in referring to this group, can be used of either sex.) For Mao's letter to this group in August 1936, see Volume V, pp. 295–302. As explained in note 6 on p. 652 of the same volume, the Seven Gentlemen were arrested in April 1937 and sentenced to prison. They were released on bail after the beginning of the war against Japan in July 1937, but as Mao indicates here they were still regarded with suspicion by Chiang Kaishek.

For the past ten years, we have been carrying out the Three People's Principles. We have done nothing at all except to carry out the important tasks of achieving Nationalism, People's Rights, and People's Livelihood. Why would you want to fight us? I really cannot understand it. Let us no longer settle old scores. In a word, what we have been doing has been to carry out the declaration of the First National Congress of the Guomindang and to carry out the guiding principle of a united front between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. The idea of a "purge" was all theirs; we were forced to go up Liangshan.[5] Why did we flee to the Jinggangshan? Because we could not live on the plains below. We had no option but to go up into the mountains and fight a guerrilla war. We want to fulfill the task of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semicolonial and semifeudal country, and so we have raised the banner of anti-imperialism and antifeudalism. But we are not allowed to raise this banner in the cities. So we have had no alternative but to go and fly it on the mountain tops, never letting it fall. In the past, we raised it on the Jianggangshan, on the Snowy Mountains, and on Mount Kunlun. Now we have raised it on Qingliang mountain. The reason you have come here is that this great banner flies on Qingliang mountain. Ever since its birth seventeen years ago, the Communist Party has been raising high this great banner. You have come all the way from Southeast Asia, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou to climb a mountain in Yan'an, not because there are no mountains in these places, but because there is

5. I.e., to take to the wilderness, like the heroes of Liangshanpo, in the popular novel known in English as *Water Margin* or *All Men Are Brothers.*

this banner on this mountain. We warmly welcome you comrades. You and we stand on the same side politically. We share a common goal, which is to transform the old China into the new.

Previously, we cooperated with the Guomindang. After the failure of the great revolution we did not cooperate until the Xi'an Incident. Now the cooperation has begun again.

Cooperation must take place under certain conditions. What are these conditions? They are simply anti-imperialism and antifeudalism. We will cooperate to the end with anyone who is willing to abide by these conditions. At the time of the Xi'an Incident, many people said that we did the wrong thing in releasing our enemies. Now, however, the peaceful resolution of the Xi'an Incident has been proved correct. Some people think that the Guomindang cannot make any progress. They cite as examples the fact that after the peaceful resolution of the Xi'an Incident, the trial of the Seven Gentlemen was carried out in Suzhou,[6] and Yang Hucheng was forced to go abroad. Even some Guomindang members are worried. But consider the fact that since the fighting really began at the time of the July 7 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Guomindang has recently summoned a provisional national assembly.[7] In addition, it published a declaration and the "Guiding Principles for the War of Resistance and Building the Country." These principles are essentially good ones and constitute the manifestation of the Guomindang's progress over the last ten years. Looking back at its own history, the Guomindang cannot possibly want to fight a civil war. What good has come from the past ten years? Even the leaders of the Guomindang admit that there has been none. If they do carry out these principles, if they continue to make progress, the Communist Party will certainly continue to cooperate with them, for both sides will benefit if we cooperate, and both sides will suffer if we split. We will all benefit greatly from the present cooperation in resisting Japan. During the ten-year civil war, although the Guomindang wanted to wipe out the Communist Party, it was unable to do so. Whenever hundreds of thousands of Guomindang troops came to "suppress" us, we would have a big harvest of weapons. Our military equipment factories are to be found in Hankou, Berlin, London, Tokyo, and so on. Whenever the Guomindang troops launch an attack, the Red Army and the Communist Party just grow larger. I believe it is still better not to fight. To put it in dialectic terms: the means and the end are opposed to one another.

This is [looking at things from] the perspective of the Guomindang.

6. According to Mao's statement of December 28, 1936, the terms accepted by Chiang Kaishek for his liberation at the time of the Xi'an Incident included the release of the Seven Gentlemen (see Volume V, p. 570), but instead, as noted above, they were formally condemned.

7. Mao is apparently referring here to the People's Political Council, an appointed but widely representative body, including a number of Communists, set up at this time on the basis of a decision by an Extraordinary Congress of the Guomindang. Elections to the National Assembly called for by the Fifth Congress of the Guomindang were under way at the time of the Japanese attack in 1937, but were never completed, and this body never met.

The Argument Put Forward by the Dagongbao *Regarding a Quasi-Decisive Battle Is Incorrect*

(May 13, 1938)

Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Bo [Gu] [Qin Bangxian], and Kai [Feng][1] [He Kequan]:

We hold that the argument of the *Dagongbao* negating protracted war and advocating quasi-decisive battles is incorrect. The decisive battle at Xuzhou was a decisive battle only to a certain degree in a campaign. It absolutely should not be regarded as a strategically decisive battle. It is imperative that preparations be made so that there will be sufficient troops to fight in defense of Wuhan after defeat in the decisive battle at Xuzhou.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 222–23, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Kai Feng (1907–1955), a native of Hunan, was at this time a member of the Politburo, and probably also the head of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

Offensives Are Primary, But They Are Also Subject to Conditions

(May 14, 1938, at night)

Comrade Lin Biao:

I have already read it, and it is excellent.[1] But there are some inappropriate places, which I have already corrected, and you may want have another look. The phrase "attack unconditionally" is incorrect. Offensives are also conditional, but they are primary, basic, and central.[2]

Publication may be delayed temporarily until the time is fixed for setting out.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, p. 224, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to a speech of May 2, 1938, by Lin Biao, who was then the president of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, to faculty, staff, and students, under the title "The Overall Orientation of Teaching at the Anti-Japanese University."

2. According to a note to *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 70, Mao had replaced the sentence "We should attack unconditionally, and defend conditionally" with the words "In our operations, we should take attack as primary, and defense as complementary."

Proclamation of the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Rear Office of the Eighth Route Army

(May 15, 1938)

It is proclaimed: ever since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the forces of the whole country and the whole nation,[1] *under the leadership of the central government and Chairman Chiang,* have waged a resolute War of Resistance. The generals and soldiers at the front have been sacrificing their lives and shedding their blood; all parties and groups have been uniting in good faith, and the people of all circles have been joining their efforts to save the country from destruction. This is the bright and broad road for the Chinese nation and a strong guarantee of victory in the resistance to Japan; all of our fellow-countrymen must proceed forward upon it. *As a component part of the Republic of China,* our Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region submits[2] to the leadership of the center[3] and works hard for the cause of saving the country. All the measures we have taken are open and aboveboard, and we have engaged in arduous, hard struggle, without daring to boast, thus winning uniform praise from the people of the whole country. This government and this office shall strive only to impel the popular masses of the whole region to continue their efforts, and shall not allow anyone to be lax in his duties, or permit any deed harmful to the cause of saving the country. According to recent investigations, there are within our region persons heedless of the overall situation, who use every means to force the peasants to return the land and houses that have been redistributed to them, or to force debtor families to pay back debts that have been abolished, or to force the people to change the democratic systems that have been established, or to destroy the organizations of military, economic, cultural, and mass associations that have been set up. They even serve as secret agents, establishing relations

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 5, pp. 335–37, which reproduces it from a documentary collection published in 1942. According to *Nianpu,* Vol. 2, p. 70, Mao drafted this document.

1. The forces of the whole country and the whole nation → The patriotic compatriots of the whole country

2. Our Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region submits → The people of our Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region submit

3. Center → Government

with local bandits, inciting mutiny among the troops, carrying out surveying for making maps, secretly investigating the situation, openly carrying out propaganda against the government of the Border Region, *and so on and so forth. In light of the investigations,* these various acts mentioned above are obvious violations of the basic principle of unity in resistance to Japan and are contrary to the public will of the people of the Border Region. They are also attempts to create internal disputes *and to stir up class struggle* in order to sabotage the united front, harm the interests of the people, undermine the reputation of the government of the border region, increase the difficulties of mobilization for resistance to Japan, *and foster among the people suspicion of the supreme commander and the central government.* Investigations show that the cause is none other than a few obstinate elements acting wantonly in defiance of the interests of the nation and the country. Some of them are even used by the Japanese bandits and serve as their tools to cover up conspiratorial activities under false pretenses. Over the past several months, people of every *xian* have constantly reported them and asked that they be stopped. Such occurrences happen several times a day and have become too many to handle. In order to strengthen the forces of resistance to Japan, consolidate the rear area of resistance to Japan, and protect the interests of the people, this government and this office have no choice but to put into effect a ban on the activities stated above. We hereby urgently announce the following clear guidelines:

1. Regarding all land and buildings that had been redistributed and debts that had been abolished as of the beginning of the domestic peace in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Border Region, this government and this office shall protect the vested interests of the people and shall not permit any unauthorized changes.

2. Regarding all military, political, economic, and cultural organizations, organizations of the popular masses, and other such associations that had been set up as of the beginning of the domestic peace or were reformed or developed after that time in line with the principles of the national united front of resistance to Japan, this government and this office shall protect their activities, promote their development, and stop all acts of conspiracy and sabotage against them.

3. Regarding all endeavors beneficial to resistance against Japan and the salvation of the country, this government and this office would be pleased to promote all of them under the principles of resolutely carrying out the *center's* program of resisting Japan and building the country. We express welcome to well-intentioned people from all circles who offer their assistance. All persons are, however, forbidden to enter the Border Region from outside, stay, and carry out activities here without permission of this government or this office and without receiving documents of certification from this government and this office, regardless of the nature of the business to which their activities pertain, so as to prevent deceptions and stop malefactors.

4. During the present tense period of the War of Resistance, all elements who engage in conspiracy and sabotage, or wantonly stir up trouble, or engage in enticement or agitation, or pry into the military situation within the region's borders may be reported and exposed by the people. Those on whom there is reliable evidence may be arrested on the spot. Once this is confirmed through interrogation, they shall be punished without leniency in all cases.

The above four points must be complied with by all the military and civilian population of the entire Border Region and may not be violated. If there are any lawless elements who dare to plot and make trouble, this government and this office shall enforce the laws as they have been promulgated, and shall not be accused of giving no advance warning. This is hereby proclaimed.

Chairman: Lin Boqu
Director: Xiao Jingguang

Prepare to Expand to the Rear of the Enemy in Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shandong

(May 20, 1938)[1]

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Liu [Bocheng], Xu [Xiangqian], Deng [Xiaoping], and for the information of Chen [Shaoyu] [Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], and Ye [Jianying]:

After the loss of Xuzhou, Henan will soon be in enemy hands. Wuhan is in imminent danger. By that time Chiang [Kaishek] will agree to our troops moving southward to engage in actions in the deep rear of the enemy in the four provinces of Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shandong. Before the opportune moment arrives, we should not put forth this point to Chiang or to Li [Zongren], Bai [Chongxi], Cheng [Qian], and others. We should keep it as our own advance preparation. At that time, the two divisions of Liu [Bocheng] and Lin [Biao][2] will engage in entirely new deployments. On the Shandong front, they have already engaged in extensive guerrilla warfare. We have already sent Zhang Jingwu and Guo Hongtao[3] there, leading fifty to sixty military, political, and Party cadres, and taking two radios. Today, after crossing the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railroad, they will reach Tai'an. There are many guns scattered among the people over there. The main thing is to send cadres. It is all the better if we can send one or two battalions over to work as core cadres. But they need to prepare to stay there for a long time without coming back to their original units. There is no problem about crossing the Yellow River southward.

Mao [Zedong]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji,* Vol. 2, pp. 225–26, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was sent between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M.

2. Liu and Lin commanded the 129th and 115th Divisions of the Eighth Route Army, respectively.

3. Guo Hongtao was at this time secretary of the Shandong Provincial Party Committee.

Telegram of Congratulations to the "May Thirtieth" Rallies on the Movement of Mobilization for the Resistance War Held by All Garrisons and Military Formations

(May 22, 1938)

To the senior officers of all units, and for transmittal to all officers and men:

We are extremely moved and gratified by the spirit of resolute struggle with which all the armies in our rear areas have carried out the present fighting and educational tasks, at a time when the Japanese bandits are constantly making ever more ferocious attacks against us, thus bringing about another step forward in the consolidation and enhancement of the foundation of our army units.

The mass meetings to mobilize people for the War of Resistance which will be held by all military units on May 30[1] are a day for reviewing and strengthening our fighting forces. It is hoped that at these rallies, both the strong and weak points of our work will be examined, thus providing an orientation to guide our future work, so that it may make further strides forward toward regularization on the basis of current progress.

At present, the Japanese bandits are madly attacking Longhai and Xuzhou and are once again planning to attack Wuhan and Xi'an. Only if the War of Resistance throughout the whole country is infused with the spirit of a protracted and arduous struggle can it attain final victory. Every commander and fighter of ours should, during and after this mass meeting to mobilize people for the War of Resistance now and in the future, further display a high degree of fighting spirit, heighten political vigilance, eliminate all bad tendencies in the armed forces, and consolidate and put in order our own forces, thereby preparing ourselves to meet and beat

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This text was first published in *Xin Zhonghua bao*, May 25, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 5, pp. 175–76, which reproduces that version.

1. May 30, 1925, was the date on which police in Shanghai, under British command, had shot down workers in Shanghai protesting against low wages and poor working conditions. The initial clash leading to these events had taken place on May 15 at a Japanese-owned cotton mill, and the anniversary of the May 30 killings continued to be the occasion for anti-Japanese demonstrations. For ironic comments by Mao half a year afterward, see his article of December 13, 1925, in Volume II, pp. 290–92.

back the enemy's new offensive, and fight the War of Resistance to the end and to final victory, in order to defend the rivers and the borders, the Northwest, and the whole of China. We are sending this telegram to congratulate you, to wish you a triumphant mass meeting, and to wish all comrades good health!

On Protracted War

A Speech at the Yan'an Symposium on the War of Resistance Against Japan from May 26 to June 3, 1938

Statement of the Problem

1. It will soon be July 7, the first anniversary of the great War of Resistance against Japan. Rallying in unity, persevering in the War of Resistance, and persevering in the united front, the forces of the whole nation have been valiantly fighting the enemy for almost a year. The people of the whole world are attentively following this war, which has no precedent in the history of the East, and which will go down as a great war in world history, too. Every Chinese suffering from the disasters of the war and struggling for the life or death[1] of his nation daily yearns for victory. But what actually will be the course of the war? Can we attain victory or not? Can we win quickly or not? Many people are talking about protracted war, but why is it a protracted war? How should a protracted war be waged? Many people are talking about final victory, but why will final victory be ours? How shall we strive for final victory?

Not everyone has found answers to these questions; in fact, to this day most people have not done so. And so the defeatists who hold to the theory of national subjugation have come running out to tell people that China will be subjugated, that final victory will not be China's. At the same time, some impetuous friends have come running out to tell people that China will win very quickly without having to exert any great effort. In the final analysis, are these views correct? We *Communists* have said all along that they are not. But what we have been saying has not yet been *completely* understood by the majority of people *throughout the country*. This is partly because propaganda and explanation were not extensive

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This work was first published in *Jiefang,* no. 43/44, July 1, 1938. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji,* Vol. 6, pp. 49–145, where the text is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao's *Selected Works,* and the variants as compared to the official edition of the *Selected Works* are shown. We have also checked with the original version in *Jiefang* to elucidate some slight discrepancies between that text and the 1944 edition.

1. Life or death → Survival

enough.[2] It is also partly because the development of objective events had not yet fully revealed their inherent nature, had not yet clearly placed their features before *the masses of* the people, who were thus not able to see the overall trends and prospects, and unable to decide on a complete set of measures and efforts.[3] Now things are better; the experience of ten months of the War of Resistance has been sufficient to explode the utterly baseless theory of national subjugation and to dissuade our impetuous friends from their theory of quick victory. In these circumstances many people are asking for a comprehensive explanation. This is especially so with regard to protracted war, not only because there exist dissenting viewpoints in the theories of national subjugation and quick victory, but also because there are those who understand it only in a shallow, insubstantial way.

"Since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident our four hundred million people have been making a concerted effort, and final victory will be China's." This kind of formula is widely prevalent among the people. It is a correct formula, but needs to be given more content. Our perseverance in the War of Resistance and in the united front has been possible because of many factors. These comprise all the country's political parties from the Guomindang to the Communist Party,[4] all the country's people from the capitalists to the workers,[5] and all the country's armed forces from the regular forces to the guerrillas. Internationally, they range from all the democratic countries to the socialist countries.[6] In enemy countries, they range from people within those countries who are against the war to soldiers at the front who are against the war. All of these have contributed their efforts in varying degrees to our War of Resistance. Every person with a conscience should salute them. We Communists, together with all the other parties and groups of the War of Resistance and the people of the whole country, have no other course than to strive to unite all forces for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese bandits. *This has been our consistent endeavor in the past and at present.* July 1[7] will be the seventeenth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. *This is also the date of the first anniversary of the War of Resistance against Japan.* A serious study of protracted war is necessary in order to enable every Communist Party member to exert better and greater efforts in the *future* War of Resistance. Therefore my lecture will represent an inquiry into protracted war, *as a contribution to these two great anniversaries.* I will speak on *many* problems relevant to protracted war, but I will not go into everything because it is not possible to talk about everything in a single lecture.

2. All the experience of the ten months of the War of Resistance proves the incorrectness of the following two views: the theory of China's inevitable subjugation and the theory of China's quick victory. The former gives rise to the tendency to compromise and the latter to the tendency to underestimate the enemy. Both approaches to the problem are subjective and one-sided or, in a word, unscientific.

3. Before the War of Resistance, there was a great deal of talk about national subjugation. Some said, "China's weapons are inferior, and it is bound to lose in a war." Others said, "If China fights a War of Resistance, it is sure to become another Abyssinia." Since the beginning of the war, open talk of national subjugation has disappeared, but secret talk, and quite a lot of it too, still continues. For instance, from time to time an atmosphere of compromise arises, and the advocates of compromise base their arguments on the idea that "to continue the war would bring certain subjugation." In a letter from Hunan a student has written:

> In the countryside everything seems difficult. As a lone person doing propaganda work on my own, all I can do is talk to people whenever and wherever I find them. The people I have talked to are by no means ignoramuses; they all have some understanding of what is going on and are very interested in what I have to say. But when I run into one of those relatives of mine, they always say: "China cannot win; it is doomed." It's extremely annoying! Fortunately, they do not go around spreading their views, otherwise things would really be bad. The peasants would naturally put more stock in what they say.

Such exponents of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation form the social basis of the tendency to compromise. They are to be found everywhere in China, and therefore the problem of compromise is liable to crop up within the anti-Japanese front at any time and will probably remain with us right until the end of the war. Now that Xuzhou has fallen and Wuhan is in danger, it will be of some benefit, I think, to give the theory of national subjugation a good, sharp rebuttal.

4. During the ten months of the War of Resistance, all kinds of views that show signs of the disease of impetuosity have also appeared. For instance, at the outset of the War of Resistance many people were groundlessly optimistic, underestimating Japan and even believing that the Japanese could not get as far as Shanxi. Some belittled the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance and expressed doubts about the proposition, "With regard to the whole, mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary; with regard to the parts, guerrilla warfare is primary and mobile warfare supplementary." They disagreed with the Eighth Route Army's strategic orientation—"Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favorable conditions"—which they regarded as a

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2. Propaganda and explanation were not extensive enough → Our propaganda and explanation work was not yet adequate

3. Decide on a complete set of measures and efforts → Decide on their own complete set of overall policies and measures

4. From the Guomindang to the Communist Party → From the Communist Party to the Guomindang

5. From the capitalists to the workers → From the workers and peasants to the bourgeoisie

6. From all the democratic countries to the socialist countries → From the socialist countries to justice-loving people in all countries

7. July 1 → July 1 of this year

"mechanical" approach. During the battle of Shanghai many people[8] said: "If we can fight for just three months, the international situation is bound to change; the Soviet Union is certain to send troops, and the war will be over." They pinned their hopes for the future of the War of Resistance chiefly on foreign aid. After the Tai'erzhuang victory, some people maintained that the Xuzhou campaign should be fought as a "quasi-decisive campaign" and that the previous policy of protracted war should be changed. They said things like, "This battle is the enemy's last desperate struggle," or, "If we win, the Japanese warlords will be demoralized and able only to sit quietly and await their Day of Judgment." The victory at Pingxingguan knocked some people's heads giddy with success; the further victory at Tai'erzhuang made even more people giddy. Doubts arose as to whether the enemy would even attack Wuhan; many people thought, "not necessarily," and many others, "definitely not." Such doubts may affect all major issues. For instance, is our strength for resistance to Japan already sufficient? Some people may answer affirmatively, for our present strength is already sufficient to check the enemy's advance, so why increase it? Or, for instance, is the slogan "Consolidate and expand the National United Front of Resistance against Japan" still correct? Some people may answer negatively, for the united front in its present state is already strong enough to repel the enemy, so why consolidate and expand it? Or, for instance, should our efforts in diplomacy and international propaganda be intensified? Here again the answer may be in the negative. Or, for instance, should we proceed in earnest to reform the army system and the political system, develop the mass movement, rigorously implement education for national defense, suppress traitors and Trotskyites, develop war industries, and improve the people's livelihood? Or, for instance, are the slogans calling for the defense of Wuhan, the defense of Guangzhou, and the defense of the Northwest, and for the vigorous development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear still correct? The answers might all be negative. There are even some people who, the moment a slightly favorable turn occurs in the war situation, prepare to intensify the friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, diverting attention from external to internal matters. This kind of situation almost invariably occurs whenever a comparatively big battle is won or the enemy's advance comes to a temporary halt. All the above can be termed "political and military short-sightedness." Such people's talk, however plausible it may seem, is actually quite groundless. To sweep away such empty talk should help the victorious prosecution of the War of Resistance.

5. So the question is: Will China be subjugated? The answer is: No, it will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly? The answer is: No, it cannot win quickly, and the War of Resistance will be a protracted war.

6. As early as two years ago, we broadly indicated our main arguments on these questions. Back on July 16, 1936, five months before the Xi'an Incident and twelve

8. Many people → Some people

months before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in a conversation with the American correspondent Mr. [Edgar] Snow, I made a general estimate of the situation with regard to war between China and Japan and advanced various overall principles for winning victory. The following excerpts may serve as a reminder:[9]

Question: Under what conditions can China defeat and destroy the strength of Japanese imperialism?

Answer: Three conditions are required: first, the completion of a united front of resistance against Japan in China; second, the completion of an international united front of resistance against Japan; third, the rise of a revolutionary movement of the Japanese people within Japan as well as of the oppressed nationalities.[10] Of these three conditions, the grand alliance of the Chinese people is the most important.[11]

Question: How long do you think such a war would last?

Answer: That depends on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front and many other determining factors involving China and Japan. That is to say, apart from the main thing, China's own strength, international help to China and help from the revolution in Japan also matter a great deal. If China's anti-Japanese united front is forcefully developed and effectively organized both horizontally and vertically, if all those governments and peoples that recognize the threat posed by Japanese imperialism to their own interests can give China the necessary aid, and if the Japanese revolution rises up quickly, the war will swiftly be brought to an end and China will swiftly win victory. If this condition is not realized for the time being,[12] the war will be prolonged. But the result will be the same; Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly be victorious. It is just that the sacrifices will be great and it will be necessary to go through a very painful period.

Question: How do you believe the prospects of such a war would develop, politically and militarily?

Answer: Japan's continental policy is already fixed, and as for those people who think they can halt the Japanese advance by making compromises with Japan

9. The full text of Snow's five interviews with Mao in the summer and autumn of 1936, as recorded by Snow himself, has been published in Volume V of this edition. The passages quoted here by Mao appear on pp. 259–66. In substance, they are very close to Snow's English version, but there are some differences of detail. Although no independent Chinese-language text of the interviews exists (see, in Volume V, p. 249, the source note to the first interview), a Chinese version of these interviews was soon published in China under the title *Zhongguo de xin xibei* (China's New Northwest) (Shanghai: Pingfan shudian, 1937). Since it is this text on which Mao based himself in 1938 in preparing the present lecture, we have drawn here on the *Selected Works* retranslation into English, with modifications as appropriate. Those interested in the nuances between the two versions can consult Snow's text in our Volume V.

10. The oppressed nationalities → The people of the Japanese colonies

11. The most important → The most important from the standpoint of the Chinese people

12. If this condition is not realized for the time being → If these conditions are not realized quickly

at the expense of more Chinese territory and sovereign rights, their thinking is merely a kind of *utopian* fantasy. We definitely know that even the lower Yangzi River valley and all the southern seaports are already included in the continental program of Japanese imperialism. Moreover, the Japanese navy[13] wants to occupy the Philippines, Siam, Annam,[14] the Malay Peninsula, and the Dutch East Indies in order to cut off other countries from China and monopolize the southwestern Pacific. This is Japan's maritime policy. In such a period, China will undoubtedly be in an extremely difficult position. But the majority of the Chinese people believe that such difficulties can be overcome; only the rich people in the big port cities are defeatists because they are afraid of losing their property. Many people think it would be impossible for China to continue to fight once its coastline is blockaded by Japan. This is nonsense. To refute them we need only make mention of the war history of the Red Army.

In the War of Resistance against Japan, China's position is much superior to that of the Red Army in the civil war. China is a vast country, and even if Japan is able to occupy *a substantial part of* China with as many as 100 to 200 million people, we would still be far from defeated. We would still have ample strength to fight against Japan, while the Japanese would continually have to fight defensive battles in their rear throughout the war.

The heterogeneity and uneven development of China's economy turn out to be rather advantageous in the War of Resistance against Japan. For example, to sever Shanghai from the rest of China would definitely not be as damaging to China as would be the severance of New York from the rest of the United States. Even if Japan blockades the Chinese coastline, it would have no way to blockade China's Northwest, Southwest, and West.

Thus, once more the central point of the problem is the unity *and mobilization* of the entire Chinese people and the establishment of a countrywide united front of resistance against Japan. This is what we have long been advocating.

Question: If the war drags on for a long time and Japan is not completely defeated, could the Communist Party agree to peace talks and recognize Japan's rule in Northeastern China?

Answer: No. Like the people of the whole country, the Chinese Communist Party will not allow Japan to retain an inch of Chinese territory.

Question: What, in your opinion, should be the main strategic orientation for this war of liberation?

Answer: Our strategic orientation should be to employ our main forces to operate over a highly extended and fluid front. To achieve victory, the Chinese troops must carry out a high degree of mobile warfare on extensive battlefields, making swift advances and swift withdrawals, swift concentrations and swift dispersals. This means large-scale mobile warfare *(rendered as "guerrilla warfare" in several translated versions; this is wrong),* and not positional warfare depending exclusively on defensive fortifications with deep trenches, high ramparts, and row after row of defensive positions.

13. The Japanese navy → Japan
14. Annam → Vietnam

This definitely does not mean the abandonment of all the important military points; positional warfare should be arranged for these points as long as it is beneficial. But the strategic orientation for transforming the overall situation must be mobile warfare. Positional warfare is also necessary, but it is a secondary orientation, auxiliary in nature.

Geographically the field of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to conduct the most effective mobile warfare. After coming up against the vigorous actions of our forces, the Japanese army will have to be cautious. Its war machine is ponderous and slow-moving, with limited efficiency. If we concentrate our forces within small, cramped positions for resistance through a war of attrition, our army would lose the advantageous conditions of our geography and economic organization, and would be making the mistake of Abyssinia. In the early period of the war, we must avoid any major decisive battles and must first employ mobile warfare gradually to break the spirit and fighting strength of the enemy troops.

Besides deploying trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize large numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants *politically and militarily*. One should know that the Volunteer Units for Resistance against Japan in the Three Eastern Provinces are only a minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasants of the whole country. The Chinese peasants have very great latent power; properly organized and directed, they can keep the Japanese[15] busy twenty-four hours a day and wear them out. It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China, that is to say, the Japanese army will be entirely surrounded by the hostile Chinese people, it will be forced to ship in all the military supplies it needs and will have to guard them itself, it will have to use large numbers of troops to protect *all* its lines of transport and constantly be on guard against attacks *by guerrilla troops*, and it will need large forces to garrison Manchuria and Japan as well.

In the course of the war, China will be able to capture many Japanese soldiers and seize many weapons and munitions with which to arm itself; at the same time China will win foreign aid to improve the *mechanization* and equipment of her troops gradually. Because of this, China will be able to conduct positional warfare in the later period of the war and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus Japan's economy will collapse after being drained by China's long War of Resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will flag after being sapped by innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however, the latent power of the War of Resistance will rise and surge forward day by day and large numbers of the revolutionary popular masses will be pouring into the front lines to fight for freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable us to make the

15. The Japanese → The Japanese army

final and fatal assault on the fortifications and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of China.

The Japanese soldiers and officers that we capture should be welcomed and given very good treatment. Not only should they not be killed or harmed, they should be taken good care of just like brothers. All kinds of methods must be used to make the Japanese soldiers rise up and oppose their fascist officers. Our slogan is: "Unite up and oppose our common oppressors." (A Record of Impressions of the Northwest,[16] pp. 10–24.)

The above views have been proved correct in light of the experience of ten months of the War of Resistance and will also be borne out in the future.

7. As far back as August 15,[17] 1937, less than two months after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party clearly pointed out in its "Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party":

The military provocation by the Japanese bandits at the Marco Polo Bridge and their occupation of Beiping and Tianjin are merely the beginning of their *entire* large-scale invasion of the main part of China. The Japanese bandits have already begun their nationwide military mobilization.[18] Their propaganda that they supposedly "do not seek to expand" is only a smokescreen covering their assault.

The battle of resistance at the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7 has become the starting point of China's nationwide War of Resistance.

Thus a new stage has henceforth begun in China's political situation; this is the stage of carrying out the War of Resistance. The stage of preparation for the War of Resistance is over. In this stage the central task is to mobilize all forces to win victory in the War of Resistance.

The key to winning victory in the war now lies in developing the War of Resistance that has already been launched into a total War of Resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a total War of Resistance by the whole nation can final victory be achieved.

Because serious weaknesses still exist in the War of Resistance, many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises, and other such unfavorable situations may occur in the future course of the War of Resistance. *The loss of Beiping and Tianjin is the gravest lesson since the loss of the Four Northeastern Provinces.* Therefore it should be realized that the war will be an arduous, protracted war. But we believe that, through the efforts of the people of the whole country,[19] the War of Resistance that has already been aroused will

16. *A Record of Impressions of the Northwest* → Snow, *A Record of Impressions of the Northwest.* (See above, note 9.)

17. August 15 → August 25

18. Nationwide military mobilization → Nationwide wartime mobilization

19. Through the efforts of the people of the whole country → Through the efforts of our Party and the people of the whole country

break through all obstacles and continue to advance and develop (*Liberation,* no. 15, p. 6).

The above thesis, too, has been proved correct by the experience of ten months of the War of Resistance and will also be borne out in the future.

8. Methodologically[20] speaking, the source of all erroneous views on war lies in idealist and mechanistic tendencies on the question. People with such tendencies are subjective and one-sided in their method of looking at problems. They either indulge in groundless and purely subjective talk, or, basing themselves upon one phenomenon[21] or a temporary manifestation, magnify it with similar subjectivity into the whole of the problem, *and talk about it with a show of earnestness. This is the theoretical source of erroneous viewpoints.* But there are two categories of people with erroneous views.[22] One type are fundamental errors, which are consistently committed; these are hard to correct. The other type are accidental errors, which are temporary ones; these are easy to correct. But because both are wrong, both need to be corrected. Therefore, only by opposing idealist and mechanistic tendencies and taking an objective and all-sided view in making a study of war can we draw correct conclusions on the question of war.

The Basis of the Problem

9. Why is the War of Resistance against Japan a protracted war? Why will the final victory be China's? What is the basis for these statements?

The war between China and Japan is not just any war; it is specifically a war of life and death between semicolonial and semifeudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the 1940s.[23] Herein lies the basis of the whole problem. To put it differently, the two sides in the war have many mutually opposing features, which will be considered in turn below.

10. Concerning the Japanese side. First, Japan is a powerful imperialist country, which lies in the top category in the East in military, economic, and political-organizational power, and is one of the five or six foremost imperialist countries of the world. These are the basic factors in Japan's war of aggression. The inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China result from Japan's imperialist system and its great military, economic, and political-organizational power. Second, however, the imperialist character of Japan's society and economy produces the imperialist character of its war, a war that is retrogressive and barbarous.

20. Methodologically → Epistemologically

21. Upon one phenomenon → Upon one single aspect

22. Two categories of people with erroneous views → Two categories of erroneous views that people have (Unlike most of the changes in the revised version of the 1950s, which modify the substance of Mao's writings, this correction serves to eliminate a carelessness of expression in the 1938 text, in which "people" are the subject in this sentence, and "errors" are the subject in the following sentence.)

23. 1940s → 1930s

In the 1940s,[24] the internal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have driven Japan not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale but also to approach its final collapse. In terms of social development, Japan is no longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity sought by its ruling classes but to the very reverse, the death of Japanese imperialism. This is what is meant by the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. It is this retrogressive quality, coupled with the military-feudal character of Japanese imperialism, that gives rise to the special barbarity of Japan's war. All of which will arouse to the utmost the class antagonisms within Japan, *China's national antagonism* (the antagonism between the entire Chinese nation and the Japanese rulers),[25] and the antagonism between Japan and most other countries *and peoples* of the world. The retrogressive and barbarous character of Japan's war constitutes the primary reason for its inevitable defeat. And that is not all. Third, although Japan's war is conducted on the basis of its great military, economic, and political-organizational power, at the same time it rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's military, economic, and political-organizational power is great but quantitatively inadequate. Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in manpower and in military, financial, and material resources, and it cannot endure a long war. Japan's rulers are endeavoring to resolve this difficulty through war, but again they will get the very reverse of what they desire; that is, the war they have launched to resolve this difficulty will eventually aggravate it and even exhaust Japan's original resources. Fourth and last, while Japan can get international support from the fascist countries, the international opposition it is bound to encounter will be greater than its international support. This opposition will gradually grow and eventually not only cancel out the support but even bring its pressure to bear upon Japan herself. Such is the law that an unjust cause finds meager support, and such is the consequence of the very nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's advantage lies in its great capacity to wage war, and its disadvantage lies in the retrogressive and barbarous nature of its war, in the inadequacy of its manpower and material resources, and in its meager international support. These are the characteristics of the Japanese side.

11. As regards the Chinese side, we are first of all a semicolonial and semifeudal country. From the Opium War, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Reform Movement of 1898, and the Revolution of 1911, to *the great revolution of* the Northern Expedition, without exception the revolutionary movements[26] that sought to extricate China from its semicolonial and semifeudal state all met with serious setbacks, and consequently China remains a semicolonial and semifeudal country. We are still a weak country, manifestly inferior to the enemy in military, economic, and political-organizational power. Here again one finds the basis for the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China. Second, however, China's liberation movement, with its cumulative development over the past hundred years up until the present day, is now different from that of any previous period. Although the domestic and foreign forces opposing it have caused it serious setbacks, they have tempered the Chinese.[27] Although China[28] is not as strong as Japan militarily, economically, politically, and culturally, yet comparing China with itself, one finds factors today that are more progressive than in any other period of its history.[29] It is on the basis of this progress that China's present war of liberation can be protracted and can achieve final victory. China is a country rising like the morning sun; this contrasts starkly with the declining state of Japanese imperialism. China's war is progressive, and the progressiveness of China's war produces its just character. Because it is a just war, it is capable of arousing the nation to unity, of evoking the sympathy of the enemy country's people, and of winning the support of most countries in the world. Third, and again by contrast with Japan, China is a very big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population, and many soldiers; it is capable of sustaining a long war. Fourth and last, *the retrogressive and barbarous nature of Japan's war, and* the progressive and just character of China's war have produced broad international support for China, which is again exactly the reverse of the meager support for Japan's unjust cause. To sum up, China's disadvantage lies in the weakness of its capacity to wage war; its advantage lies in the progressive and just character of its war, its great size, and its abundant international support. These are China's characteristics.

12. Thus it can be seen that Japan has great military, economic, and political-organizational power, but that its war is reactionary and barbarous, its manpower and material resources are inadequate, and it is in an unfavorable position internationally. China, on the contrary, has relatively less military, economic, and political-organizational power, but it is in its era of progress; its war is progressive and just; it is, moreover, a big country, a factor that enables it to sustain a protracted war; and it is supported[30] by most countries *and peoples* of the world. The above are the basic, mutually contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese war. They have determined and are determining all the political policies and military strategies and tactics of the two sides; they have determined and are determining the protracted character of the war and the fact that final victory will go to China and not to Japan. The war is a contest between these characteristics. They will change in the course of the war, each according to its own nature, and from this everything else will follow. These characteristics exist in reality and are not invented to deceive people; they constitute all the basic elements of the war, and are not incomplete fragments;

24. 1940s → 1930s

25. The antagonism between the entire Chinese nation and the Japanese rulers → The antagonism between the Japanese nation and the Chinese nation

26. Revolutionary movements → Revolutionary or reformist movements

27. The Chinese → The people of China

28. China → China today

29. Its history. → Its history. The Chinese Communist Party and the army under its leadership represent these progressive factors.

30. It is supported → It will be supported

they permeate all major and minor problems on both sides and all stages of the war; and they are indispensable. If anyone forgets these characteristics in studying the Sino-Japanese war, he will surely go wrong; and even if some of his ideas win credence for a time and may seem right, they will inevitably be proved wrong by the course of the war. On the basis of these characteristics, we shall now proceed to explain all the problems about which we wish to speak.

Refutation of the Theory of National Subjugation

13. Theorists of national subjugation, who see nothing but the contrast between the enemy's strength and our weakness, used to say, "A War of Resistance will mean certain subjugation," and now they are saying, "Continuing the war will mean certain subjugation." We shall not be able to convince them merely by stating that the enemy, though strong, is small, while China, though weak, is large. They can adduce historical instances, such as the destruction of the Song dynasty by the Yuan and the destruction of the Ming dynasty by the Qing, to prove that a small but strong country can vanquish a large but weak one and, moreover, that a backward country can vanquish an advanced one. If we say these events occurred long ago and do not prove the point, they can cite the British subjugation of India to prove that a small but strong capitalist country can vanquish a large but weak and backward country. Therefore, *to answer this question,* we have to produce other grounds in order to seal the mouths of all the subjugationists, to convince them, and to supply everyone engaged in propaganda work with adequate arguments for persuading those who do not understand or lack resolve and thus consolidate their faith in the War of Resistance.

14. What then are these grounds we should adduce? The characteristics of the times. These characteristics are concretely reflected in Japan's retrogression and paucity of support and in China's progress and abundance of support.

15. Our war is not just any old war; it is specifically a war between China and Japan fought in the 1940s.[31] Our enemy, Japan, is first of all an imperialism that will soon perish; it is already in its era of decline. It is not only different from Britain, which was still in its progressive, capitalist era when Britain subjugated India; Japan is also different from what it was itself at the time of the European War[32] twenty years ago. The present war was launched on the eve of the general collapse of world imperialism and, above all, of the fascist countries; that is the very reason the enemy has launched this adventurist war, which has the character of a last desperate struggle. Therefore, it is an inescapable certainty that it will not be China but the ruling clique of Japanese imperialism that will be destroyed as a result of the war. Moreover, Japan has undertaken this war at a time when many countries have been or are about to be embroiled in war, when we are all fighting

31. 1940s → 1930s
32. The European War → World War I

or preparing to fight against barbarous aggression, and China's fortunes are linked with those of most of the countries and peoples of the world. This is the root cause of the opposition Japan has aroused and will increasingly arouse among those countries and peoples.

16. What about China? The China of today cannot be compared with the China of any other historical period. It has the special characteristics of a semicolonial and semifeudal society, and so it is called a weak country. But, at the same time, China is historically in its era of progress; this is the primary reason for its ability to defeat Japan. When we say that the War of Resistance against Japan is progressive, we do not mean progressive in the ordinary or general sense, nor do we mean progressive in the sense that the Abyssinian war of resistance against Italy, or the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, or the Revolution of 1911 were progressive. We mean progressive in the sense that China is progressive today. In what way is the China of today progressive? It is progressive in that it is no longer a completely feudal country; it already has capitalism; it has a bourgeoisie and a proletariat; it has vast numbers of people who have awakened to political consciousness or are awakening; it has *a Guomindang and* a Communist Party; it has a politically progressive army;[33] and it has the tradition and the experience of many decades of revolution, especially the experience of the past fifteen years.[34] This experience has schooled the people and the political parties of China and forms the very basis for the present unity against the enemy.[35] If it is said that, without the experience of 1905, the victory of 1917 would have been impossible in Russia, then we can also say that, without the experience of the past fifteen years,[36] our future victory in the anti-Japanese Resistance War would be impossible. These are the internal conditions.

The international conditions ensure that China is not isolated in the war, and this fact too is without precedent in history. In the past, China's wars, and India's too, were wars fought in isolation. It is only today that we meet with worldwide people's movements, unprecedented in breadth and depth, which have arisen or are arising and which are supporting China. The Russia of 1917[37] also received world support, and because of this it won,[38] but that support was not so broad in scale and deep in nature as ours today. The people's movements in the world today are developing on a scale and with a depth that are unprecedented. *At the same time,* the existence of the Soviet Union is a particularly vital factor in present-day international politics, and the Soviet Union will certainly support China with the greatest enthusiasm; there was nothing like this phenomenon twenty years

33. It has a politically progressive army → It has a politically progressive army, namely, the Chinese Red Army led by the Communist Party
34. Especially the experience of the past fifteen years → Especially the experience of the seventeen years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party
35. Against the enemy → Against Japan
36. Fifteen years → Seventeen years
37. The Russia of 1917 → The Russian Revolution of 1917
38. It won → The Russian workers and peasants won

ago. All these factors have created and are creating important conditions indispensable to China's final victory. Large-scale direct assistance is as yet lacking and will come only in the future, but China is progressive and is a big country, and these are factors enabling it to prolong the duration of the war and to encourage international help while awaiting its arrival.

17. To these should be added the additional *contrasting* conditions that Japan is a *relatively* small country with a small territory, few resources, a small population, and a limited number of soldiers, while China is a big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population, and plenty of soldiers. Thus, apart from the contrast between strength and weakness, there is the contrast between a small country, retrogression, and meager support and a big country, progress, and abundant support. This is the reason why China will never be subjugated. The contrast between strength and weakness determines that Japan can ride roughshod over China for a certain time and to a certain extent; that China must unavoidably travel a hard stretch of road; and that the War of Resistance against Japan will be a protracted war and not a war of quick decision. Nevertheless, the other contrast—*the three opposites of* a small country, retrogression, and meager support versus a big country, progress, and abundant support—determines that Japan cannot ride roughshod over China indefinitely but is sure to meet final defeat, while China can never be subjugated but is sure to win final victory.

18. Why was Abyssinia vanquished? First, it was not only a weak country but also a small one. Second, it was not as progressive as China; it was an ancient country passing from the slave to the serf system, a country without capitalism or bourgeois political parties, let alone a Communist Party; it had no *progressive* army such as China's, *no army like the [Guomindang] Central Army,* let alone one like the Eighth Route Army. Third, it was unable to hold out and wait for international assistance; its war was an isolated one. Fourth, and most important of all, there were leadership mistakes in its war of resistance against Italy. Therefore Abyssinia was subjugated. But there is still quite extensive guerrilla warfare in Abyssinia, which, if persisted in, will enable the Abyssinians to recover their fatherland during future changes of the world situation.

19. If the subjugationists apply indiscriminately the history of the failure of liberation movements in modern China to prove their assertions that "A War of Resistance will mean certain subjugation" and "Continuing the war will mean certain subjugation," here again our answer is a single sentence: The times have changed. China itself, the internal situation in Japan, and the international environment are all different now. It is a serious matter that Japan is stronger than before, while China, in its unchanged semicolonial and semifeudal position, is still fairly weak. It is also a fact that, for the time being, Japan can still control its people at home and exploit international contradictions as tools to use in invading China. But, during the process of a long war, these things are bound to change in the opposite direction. Such changes are not yet accomplished facts, but they will become so in the future. The subjugationists dismiss this point and pay no attention to it. As for China, not only do we already have new people, a new political party, a new army, and a new policy of resistance to Japan, a situation very different from that of over a decade ago, but what is more, all these will inevitably make further progress. It is true that historically the liberation movements met with repeated setbacks, with the result that China could not accumulate greater strength for the present War of Resistance against Japan—this is a very painful historical lesson, and in the future never again should we destroy any of our own revolutionary forces. Yet even, on the present basis, by exerting great efforts we can certainly forge ahead gradually and increase the strength of our resistance. All such efforts should go toward the general policy of the great Anti-Japanese National United Front. As for the aspect of international support, though direct and large-scale assistance is not yet in sight, it is in the making, the international situation being fundamentally different from before. The countless failures in the liberation movements of the modern era[39] all had their subjective and objective causes, but the situation today is entirely beyond compare. Today, although there are many difficulties which determine that the War of Resistance will be an arduous war—such as the enemy's strength and our weakness, and the fact that the enemy's difficulties are just starting, while our progress is far from sufficient, and so forth—nevertheless many favorable conditions exist for defeating the enemy; we need only add our subjective efforts, and we shall be able to overcome the difficulties and successfully strive for victory. These are favorable conditions which have no parallel before in any period of history, and that is why the War of Resistance against Japan, unlike the liberation movements of the past, will not end in failure.

Compromise or War of Resistance? Corruption or Progress?

20. It has been fully explained above that the theory of national subjugation is groundless. But there are many other people who do not subscribe to this theory; they are sincere patriots, who are nevertheless deeply worried about the present situation. Two things are worrying them: fear of a compromise with Japan and doubts about the possibility of political progress. These two vexing questions are being widely discussed, and no key has been found to their solution. Let us now examine these two questions.

21. As previously explained, the question of compromise has its social roots, and as long as these roots exist, the question is bound to arise. But compromise will not avail. To find evidence to prove the point, again we need only look at Japan, China, and the international situation. First, consider Japan. At the very beginning of the War of Resistance, we estimated that the time would come when an atmosphere conducive to compromise would arise, in other words, that after occupying North China, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, Japan might devise schemes for inducing China to capitulate. True enough, it did so, but the crisis soon passed, one

39. The modern era → China's modern era

reason being that the enemy everywhere pursued a policy of barbarity and practiced naked plunder. Had China capitulated, everyone would have become a slave without a country. The enemy's policy for plundering and subjugating China has two aspects, the material and the spiritual. Both of these are being applied universally to all Chinese, not only to the popular masses of the lower strata but also to members of the upper strata; of course, the latter are treated a little more politely, but the difference is only one of degree, and definitely not of principle. In the main, it[40] is transplanting into the interior of China the same old measures it adopted in the Three Eastern Provinces. Materially, it is robbing the common people of their food and clothing, making them cry out in hunger and cold; it is plundering the instruments of production, thus ruining and enslaving China's national capital.[41] Spiritually, it is working to seize[42] the national consciousness of the Chinese people. Under the flag of the Rising Sun, all Chinese are forced to be docile subjects, beasts of burden forbidden to show the slightest trace of Chinese national spirit. This barbarous enemy policy will be carried deep into the interior of China. Japan with its voracious appetite is unwilling to stop the war. As was inevitable, the policy set forth in the enemy[43] cabinet's statement of January 16, 1938, is still being obstinately carried out. This has enraged all strata of the Chinese people. Their rage is engendered by the retrogressive and barbarous character of Japan's war, [under which] "there is no escape from the calamity," and hence an absolute confrontation[44] has taken shape. It is to be expected that, on some future occasion, the enemy's schemes for inducing China to capitulate will once again appear and that certain subjugationists will again crawl out and most probably collude with certain foreign elements (who are found in Britain, the United States, and France, and especially among the upper strata in Britain) as partners in crime. But the general trend of events will not permit capitulation; the obstinate and particularly barbarous character of Japan's war has determined this aspect of the question.

22. Second, consider China. There are three factors contributing to China's perseverance in the War of Resistance. In the first place,[45] *judging from the history of the Guomindang, its leaders and the majority of its members are all capable of persevering. Next, even the enemies of the Communist Party do not doubt its determination to carry out the War of Resistance.* Finally, the *overwhelming* majority of other political parties and groups *and the people of the whole country* will oppose compromise and support the War of Resistance, *because to compromise is to become slaves without a country.* With unity among these three, *along with mutual oversight,* whoever wants to compromise will be standing with the Chinese traitors, and anybody will have the right to punish him. All those unwilling to be Chinese traitors have no choice but to unite and carry on the War of Resistance to the end; therefore compromise can hardly succeed.

40. It → The enemy
41. National capital → National industries
42. Seize → Destroy
43. The enemy → The Japanese
44. Confrontation → Hostility
45. In the first place → In the first place, the Communist Party; this is the reliable force leading the people in resistance to Japan. Next, the Guomindang; because it depends on Britain and the United States, it will not capitulate to Japan unless they tell it to.

23. Third, consider the international situation. Except for Japan's allies and certain elements in the upper strata within each other country,[46] every other aspect is favorable toward the War of Resistance, and not toward compromise by China. This factor has an impact on China's hopes. Today everyone in the country has[47] a certain hope, believing that international forces will gradually give China increasing help. It is not a vain hope; in particular, the existence of the Soviet Union encourages China in its War of Resistance. The socialist Soviet Union, now strong as never before, has always shared China's joys and sorrows. *Moreover, in accordance with Leninism* and in direct contrast to *some* members of the upper strata in all capitalist countries who seek nothing but profits, the Soviet Union considers it its duty to aid all weak nations and all revolutionary wars. The nonisolation of China in the war has its basis not only in international support in general but in Soviet support in particular. China and the Soviet Union are in close geographic proximity, which aggravates Japan's crisis and facilitates China's War of Resistance. China's geographic proximity to Japan increases the difficulties of China's resistance. *On this point, it is different from the American war of independence against Britain.* China's proximity to the Soviet Union, on the other hand,[48] *provides it a great advantage compared to America in its war of independence. We should not neglect this point.*

24. Hence we may conclude that the danger of compromise exists but can be overcome. Even if the enemy can modify its policy to some extent, it cannot alter this policy fundamentally. In China the social roots of compromise are present, but the opponents of compromise are in the majority. Internationally, there are also some forces favoring compromise but the main forces favor the War of Resistance. The combination of these three factors makes it possible to overcome the danger of compromise and persist to the end in the War of Resistance.

25. Let us now answer the second question. Political progress at home and perseverance in the War of Resistance are inseparable. The greater the political progress, the more we can persevere in the war, and the more we persevere in the war, the greater the political progress. But, fundamentally, everything depends on our perseverance in the War of Resistance. The unhealthy phenomena in various fields of the Party, the government, the army, and civil affairs[49] are very serious, and the historical accumulation of these undesirable factors has caused great anxiety and

46. Within each other country → Of each other capitalist country
47. Everyone in the country has → The people of the whole country have
48. On the other hand, → On the other hand, is a favorable condition for the Chinese War of Resistance.
49. Of the Party, the government, the army, and civil affairs → Under the Guomindang

vexation among the broad ranks of our patriots. But there are no grounds for pessimism, since experience in the War of Resistance has already proved that the progress made[50] in the past ten months is equal to that made over the course of many years in the past. Although the historically accumulated phenomenon of corruption is seriously retarding the growth of our strength for the War of Resistance,[51] thus diminishing our victories and causing us losses in the war, the overall situation in China, in Japan, and in the world is such that we[52] cannot but make progress. This progress will be slow because of the existence of the factor that impedes progress, that is, corruption. Progress and the slow pace of progress are two characteristics of the present situation. This accords poorly with the urgent needs of the war and is a source of great worry to patriots. But we are in the middle of a war,[53] *and war will certainly be able to overcome the phenomenon of corruption.* Revolutionary war is an antitoxin that not only eliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our own filth. A war[54] has tremendous power, which can transform everything.[55] The Sino-Japanese war will transform both China and Japan; provided China perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front, it will surely be able to transform the old Japan into a new Japan and the old China into a new China. The people and everything else in both China and Japan will achieve transformation during and after the war. It is proper for us to regard the War of Resistance and our national reconstruction as interconnected. To say that Japan can also achieve transformation is to say that the war of aggression by Japan's rulers will end in failure and may lead to a revolution by the Japanese people. The day of triumph of the Japanese people's revolution will be the day Japan is transformed. All this is closely linked to China's War of Resistance and is a prospect we should take into account. *To repeat: wars change everything; everyone should have resolute faith in this and make resolute efforts inspired by this faith.*

The Theory of National Subjugation Is Wrong and the Theory of Quick Victory Is Also Wrong

26. In our comparative study of the enemy and ourselves with respect to the basic contradictory characteristics, such as strong and weak, big and small, progressive and retrogressive, much support and little support, we have already refuted the theory of national subjugation, and we have explained why compromise is unlikely and why political progress is possible. The subjugationists stress the contradiction between strength and weakness and exaggerate it until it becomes

50. The progress made → The progress made by the Chinese people
51. Our strength for the War of Resistance → The people's strength for the War of Resistance
52. We → The Chinese people
53. A war → A revolutionary war
54. A war → Every just, revolutionary war
55. Everything → Many things or clear the way for their transformation

the basis of their whole argument on the question, neglecting the other contradictions. The fact that they only bring up the single point of the contrast in strength is their one-sidedness, and their exaggeration of this one side of the matter into the whole is their subjectivism. Thus, if one looks at the matter as a whole, it will be seen that they have no ground to stand on; they are wrong. As for those who are neither subjugationists nor confirmed pessimists, but who are in a pessimistic frame of mind for the moment simply because they are confused by the disparity between our strength and that of the enemy at a given time and in certain respects or by the corruption in the country, we should point out to them that their views stem from a tendency toward one-sidedness and subjectivism. But in their case correction is relatively easy; once they are alerted, they will understand, for they are patriots and their error is only momentary.

27. The exponents of quick victory are likewise wrong. Sometimes they completely forget the contradiction between strength and weakness, and only bear in mind other contradictions. They depart from the true situation and often exaggerate China's advantages, changing them into something beyond recognition.[56] Or they presumptuously take the balance of strength and weakness at one time and place for the whole situation, as in the saying, "A leaf before the eye blocks out Mount Tai." In a word, they lack the courage to admit the truth that the enemy is strong while we are weak. They often deny this point and consequently deny one aspect of the truth. Moreover they do not have the courage to admit the limitations of our advantages, *but confuse boastfulness and politeness,* and thus they deny another aspect of the truth. The result is that they make mistakes, big and small, and there again it is subjectivism and one-sidedness that are doing the mischief. These friends have their hearts in the right place, and they, too, are patriots. But while "the gentlemen's aspirations are indeed lofty," their evaluations[57] are wrong, and to act according to them would certainly be to run into a brick wall. For if appraisal does not conform to reality, action cannot attain its objective; and to act in spite of this would mean the army's defeat and the nation's subjugation, so that the result would be the same as with the defeatists. Hence this theory will not do either.

28. Do we deny the danger of national subjugation? No, we do not. We recognize that China faces two possible prospects, liberation or subjugation, and that the two are in fierce conflict. Our task is to achieve liberation and to avert subjugation. The preconditions for liberation are China's progress, which is basic, the enemy's difficulties, and international support. We differ from the subjugationists. Taking an objective and comprehensive view, we recognize that the two possibilities of national subjugation and liberation both exist at the same time, stress that liberation is the dominant possibility, point out the conditions for its achievement,

56. They depart from the true situation and often exaggerate China's advantages, changing them into something beyond recognition → They depart from the true situation in an exaggerated way and change China's advantages into something beyond recognition
57. Evaluations → Views

and strive to secure them. The subjugationists, on the other hand, taking a subjective and one-sided view, recognize only one possibility, that of subjugation; they do not admit the possibility of liberation and still less point out the conditions necessary for liberation or strive to secure them. Moreover, while acknowledging the tendency toward compromise and the phenomenon of corruption, we see other tendencies and phenomena which, we indicate, will prevail[58] and are already in fierce conflict with the former; in addition, we point out the conditions necessary for these other tendencies and phenomena to be realized, and we strive to overcome the tendency to compromise and to transform the state of corruption. Therefore, we are in no sense pessimistic; this is directly opposite to the pessimists.

29. It is not that we would not like a quick victory; everybody would be in favor of driving the "devils" out tomorrow in a single morning. But we point out that, in the absence of certain definite conditions, quick victory is something that exists only in our subjectivity[59] and not in objective *reality;* it is a mere illusion, a false truth. Accordingly, having made an objective and comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances concerning both the enemy and ourselves, we point out that a strategic, protracted war is the only way to achieve final victory, and we reject the groundless theory of quick victory. We maintain that we must strive to secure all the conditions indispensable to final victory, and the more fully and the sooner these conditions are secured, the surer we shall be of victory and the sooner we shall win it. We believe that only in this way can the course of the war be shortened, and we reject the theory of quick victory, which is just empty talk and an effort to get things on the cheap.

Why a Protracted War?

30. Let us now examine the problem of protracted war. A correct answer to the question "Why a protracted war?" can be arrived at only on the basis of all the fundamental factors making up the contrast between ourselves and the enemy. For instance, if we say merely that the enemy is a strong imperialist power while we are a weak semicolonial and semifeudal country, we are in danger of falling into the theory of national subjugation. Because neither in theory nor in practice can a protracted outcome be produced simply by pitting the strong against the weak.[60] The same is true if one simply sets the big against the small, the progressive against the reactionary, or abundant support against meager support. The annexation of the small by the big or of the big by the small is a common occurrence. It often happens that a progressive country or thing is destroyed by a big, retrogressive country or thing if its power is not great. Abundant or meager support is an important but subsidiary factor, and the degree of its effect depends upon the fundamental factors on both sides. *The saying "Heaven helps those who help themselves" is a scientific truth.* Therefore when we say that the War of Resistance against Japan is a protracted war, our conclusion is derived from the interrelations of all the factors at work on both sides. The enemy is strong and we are weak, and the road of subjugation[61] is there for us. Yet the enemy has other shortcomings, and we have other advantages. The enemy's advantages can be reduced by our efforts and his shortcomings can be aggravated by our efforts. On our own side, our advantages can be enhanced by our efforts and our shortcomings can be overcome by our efforts. Hence, we can win final victory and avert destruction, while the enemy will ultimately fail and will be unable to avert the collapse of the entire imperialist system.

31. Since the enemy has advantages only in one respect but shortcomings in all others and we have shortcomings only in one respect but advantages in all others, why has this produced not a balanced result, but, on the contrary, a superior position for the enemy and an inferior position for us?[62] Quite clearly, we cannot consider the question in such a formal way. The fact is that the disparity between the enemy's strength and our own is now so great that the enemy's shortcomings have not developed, and for the time being cannot develop, to a degree sufficient to offset the factors underlying its strength, while our advantages have not developed, and for the time being cannot develop, to a degree sufficient to compensate for the factors underlying our weakness. Therefore a balance cannot emerge, and what has emerged is an imbalance.

32. Although our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and the united front have somewhat changed the enemy's strength and superiority as against our weakness and inferiority, there has as yet been no basic change. Hence during a certain stage of the war, to a certain degree the enemy will be victorious and we will suffer defeats. But what is the reason that the enemy's victories and our defeats have been limited to a certain stage and a certain degree, and have not gone further and progressed to total victory for the enemy and total defeat for us? First, this is because the original situation of the enemy's strength and our weakness was relative, not absolute. Second, our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front have further accentuated this relativeness. In comparison with the original situation, the enemy is still strong, but unfavorable factors have reduced this strength, although not yet to a degree sufficient to destroy its superiority. Similarly, we are still weak, but favorable factors have compensated for our weakness, although not yet to a degree sufficient to transform our inferiority. Thus what has taken shape is that the enemy is relatively strong and we are relatively weak, that the enemy is in a relatively superior and we are in a relatively inferior position. On both sides, strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority, have never been absolute. *Therefore, the victories and defeats of both sides have been limited to a*

58. Will prevail → Will gradually prevail
59. In our subjectivity → In our brains
60. The strong against the weak → The weak against the strong

61. The road of subjugation → The danger of subjugation
62. Here the *Selected Works* text adds: "at present."

certain stage and a certain degree, giving rise to a situation of protracted war. Besides, our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front during the course of the war have brought about further changes in the original balance of strength and weakness between us and the enemy, *which have created or are creating relative strength and weakness and relative superiority and inferiority.* Therefore, the enemy's victories and our defeats have been limited to a certain stage and a certain degree, and this has created a situation of protracted war.

33. But circumstances will continue to change. In the course of the war, provided we employ correct military and political tactics, make no mistakes of principle, and exert our best efforts, the factors working to the enemy's disadvantage and the factors working to China's advantage will both develop as the war is drawn out. This will inevitably continue to influence[63] our original degree of strength and that of the enemy, and continue to change the comparative superiority and inferiority of the two sides. When a certain new stage is reached, a great change will take place in the comparative degree of strength and superiority, leading to the enemy's defeat and our victory.

34. At present the enemy can still manage to exploit the factors of its strength, and our War of Resistance has not yet fundamentally weakened it. The factors of the insufficiency in its manpower, *troops, and financial* and material resources are not yet such as to check its offensive; on the contrary, they can still sustain its offensive to a certain extent. The retrogressive and barbarous nature of its war, a factor which arouses[64] both class antagonisms within Japan and the antagonism[65] of the Chinese nation, has not yet brought about a situation that fundamentally impedes its advance. The enemy's international isolation is likewise still in the midst of changes and development and is not yet complete. In many countries that assist us,[66] the capitalists dealing in munitions and raw materials for munitions are still bent solely on profit and are supplying Japan with large quantities of war supplies, and their governments are still unwilling to join the Soviet Union in using practical methods to sanction Japan. All this determines that our War of Resistance cannot be won quickly and can only be a protracted war. As for China, the factors of its weakness are found in the military, economic, political, and cultural areas, and although there has been a certain degree of improvement in the ten months of the War of Resistance, it is still a long way from what is required to check the enemy's offensive and prepare our counteroffensive. Moreover, quantitatively speaking, we have had to sustain certain losses. Although all the factors favorable to us are having a positive effect, it will not be sufficient to halt the enemy's offensive and to prepare for our counteroffensive until we make a sweeping effort.[67] Neither the abolition of corruption and the acceleration of progress at home, nor the curbing of the pro-Japanese forces and the expansion of the anti-Japanese forces abroad, are yet accomplished facts. This means that[68] the war cannot be won quickly; it determines that it will be a protracted war.[69]

63. Influence → Change
64. Arouses → Intensifies
65. Antagonism → Resistance
66. In many countries that assist us → In many countries that have indicated that they will assist us

The Three Stages of the Protracted War

35. The protracted war between China and Japan will be played out concretely in three stages.[70] The first stage is the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defense. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counteroffensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counteroffensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. It is impossible to predict the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trends in the war may be pointed out on the basis of present conditions. The objective course of events will be exceptionally rich and varied, with many twists and turns, and nobody can cast a horoscope for the Sino-Japanese war; nevertheless, in order to have strategic direction in the war it is necessary to make a rough sketch of its trends. Although the things we sketch out may not be in full accord with the subsequent facts and will be amended by them, it is still necessary to make such a sketch in order to give firm and purposeful strategic direction to the protracted war.

36. The first stage has not yet ended. The enemy's design is to occupy the three points of Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Lanzhou, and to link these three points together. To accomplish this aim, the enemy will have to use at least fifty divisions, or about one and a half million soldiers, spend from one and a half to two years, and expend more than ten billion *yen*. In penetrating so deeply, the enemy will encounter immense difficulties, with consequences too awful to imagine. If it attempts to occupy the entire length of the Guangzhou-Hankou railway line and the Xi'an-Lanzhou Highway, it will have to fight perilous battles and even so may not fully accomplish its design. But in drawing up our operational plans we should take as a basis the assumption that the enemy may occupy the three points and even certain additional areas, and link them up as well, and we should deploy for a protracted war, so that even if the enemy does so, we will have ways to respond. In this stage the form of fighting[71] is primarily mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare. Because of subjective errors,[72] positional warfare

67. A sweeping effort → An immense effort
68. This means that → All this determines that
69. It determines that it will be a protracted war → It can only be a protracted war
70. The protracted war between China and Japan will be played out concretely in three stages. → As the Sino-Japanese war is a protracted one, and final victory will belong to China, it can reasonably be assumed that this protracted war will be played out concretely in three stages.
71. The form of fighting → The form of fighting we should adopt
72. Because of subjective errors → Because of the subjective errors of the Guomindang military authorities

was assigned the primary role in the first period of this stage, but it is nevertheless supplementary from the point of view of the stage as a whole. In this stage, China has already built up a broad united front and achieved unprecedented unity. Although the enemy has used and will continue to use base and shameless means to induce China to capitulate in attempting to realize its plan for a quick decision, and to conquer the whole country without expending great effort, it has failed hitherto, and it is unlikely to succeed in the future either. In this stage, in spite of considerable losses, China will make considerable progress, which will become the main basis for continuing the War of Resistance in the second stage. In the present stage, *although international assistance may still not be large in quantity or direct, such assistance has already started,* particularly from the Soviet Union.[73] On the enemy side, there are already signs of flagging morale, and the spirit of the enemy army's attack is weaker in the middle period of this stage than it was in the initial phase; it will diminish still further in the concluding period. Signs of exhaustion are beginning to appear in the enemy's finances and economy; war weariness is beginning to set in among its people and troops; "war frustrations" are beginning to manifest themselves within the clique at the helm of the war; and pessimism about the prospects of the war is growing.

37. The second stage may be termed one of strategic stalemate. At the tail end of the first stage, the enemy will be forced to fix certain terminal points to its strategic offensive, because of its shortage of troops and our firm resistance, and upon reaching them it will stop its strategic offensive and enter the stage of safeguarding its occupied areas. In the second stage, the enemy's concern will be to safeguard the occupied areas and to make them its own by the superficial procedure[74] of setting up puppet governments, while plundering the Chinese people to the limit; but again it will be confronted with stubborn guerrilla warfare. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's rear is unguarded, our guerrilla warfare will develop extensively in the first stage, and many base areas will be established, seriously threatening the enemy's consolidation of the occupied areas, and so in the second stage there will still be widespread fighting. In this stage, the form of fighting for both sides[75] will be primarily guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. China will still be able to retain a large regular army, but it will find it difficult to launch the strategic counteroffensive quickly[76] because, on the one hand, the enemy will adopt a position of strategic defense in the big cities and along the main routes under its occupation and, on the other hand, China will not yet be adequately equipped technologically. Except for the troops engaged in frontal defense against the enemy, our forces will be switched in large numbers to the

73. Particularly from the Soviet Union → The Soviet Union has already given our country large amounts of aid
74. The superficial procedure → The fraudulent method
75. The form of fighting for both sides → Our form of fighting
76. Quickly → Immediately

enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed deployments, and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and acting in coordination with the local armed forces of the popular masses, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied areas. They will also keep the enemy on the move as much as possible in order to destroy it in mobile warfare, just as is now being done in the case of Shanxi Province. The fighting in the second stage will be ruthless, and localities will suffer serious devastation. But the guerrilla warfare will be able to succeed, and if it is conducted well the enemy may be able to retain only about one-third of its occupied territory, with the remaining two-thirds in our hands, and this will constitute a great defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. By then the enemy-occupied territory as a whole will fall into three categories: first, the enemy base areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, third, the guerrilla areas contested by both sides. The duration of this stage will depend on the degree of change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy and on the changes in the international situation; generally speaking, we should be prepared to see this stage last a comparatively long time and to endure this arduous stretch of road. It will be a very painful period for China; economic difficulties and the disruptive activities of the Chinese traitors will be two very serious problems. The enemy will go all out to wreck China's united front, and the organizations of Chinese traitors in all the occupied areas will merge into a so-called unified government. Because of the loss of big cities and the hardships of war, vacillating elements within our ranks will clamor for compromise, and pessimistic sentiments will grow to a serious extent. Our tasks will then be to mobilize the popular masses of the whole country to make concerted efforts in carrying on the war with unflinching perseverance, to broaden and consolidate the united front, sweep away all pessimism and ideas of compromise, promote the will to struggle hard, and apply new wartime policies, and so to endure this arduous stretch of road. In the second stage, we will have to call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a united government, we will have to oppose *dissensions and* splits and improve techniques[77] in a planned fashion, transform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people, and prepare for the counteroffensive. The international situation will become still more unfavorable to Japan in this stage, and the main international forces will change toward giving more help to China, even though there may be talk of Chamberlain-type "realism" which accommodates itself to so-called *"faits accomplis."* Japan's threat to Southeast Asia and Siberia will become more serious than before, and a new war may even break out. As regards the enemy, dozens of its divisions will be inextricably bogged down in the quagmire of China. Widespread guerrilla warfare and the people's movement of resistance to Japan will wear down this big Japanese force, greatly depleting it and also undermining its morale by stimulating the further growth of homesickness, war weariness, and even antiwar sentiment. Although it would be wrong to say

77. Techniques → Fighting techniques

that Japan will achieve no results at all in its plunder of China, yet, being short of capital and harassed by guerrilla warfare, it cannot possibly achieve rapid or substantial results. *Its operations in the Three Northeastern Provinces are evidence of this.* This second stage will be the transitional stage of the entire war; it will be the most difficult period but also the pivotal one. Whether China becomes an independent country or is reduced to a colony will be determined not by the retention or loss of the big cities in the first stage but by the extent to which the whole nation exerts itself in the second. If we can persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front, and in the protracted war, China will in this stage gain the power to change from weakness to strength. It will be the second act in the three-act play of China's War of Resistance. And through the efforts of the entire cast it will become possible to perform a most brilliant last act.

38. The third stage will be the stage of the counteroffensive to recover our lost territories. Their recovery will depend mainly upon the strength which China has built up in the preceding stage and which will continue to grow in the third stage. But China's strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces and on the changes that will take place inside the country of the enemy, or otherwise we shall not be able to win; this adds to China's tasks in international propaganda and diplomacy. *These tasks will not be fully accomplished within a short time, for the vast occupied areas can only be recovered through bloody fighting.* In the third stage, our war will no longer be one of strategic defense, but will turn into a strategic counteroffensive overtly manifesting itself in strategic offensives, and it will no longer be fought on strategically interior lines, but will gradually shift to strategically exterior lines. Not until we fight our way to the Yalu River can the entire war[78] be considered over. *If a revolutionary war breaks out in Korea or other places and requires China's assistance, that will belong to a separate war.* The third stage will be the last stage in the protracted war, and when we talk of persevering in the war to the end, we mean going all the way through to the end of this stage. The primary form of fighting[79] will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise to importance. While positional defense cannot be regarded as important in the first stage because of the prevailing circumstances, positional attack will become quite important in the third stage because of the changed conditions and the requirements of the task. In the third stage, guerrilla warfare will again provide strategic support by supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it will not become the primary form as in the second stage.

39. Seen this way, it is obvious that the war will be of long duration and consequently ruthless in nature. The enemy will not be able to gobble up the whole of China, but will be able to occupy many places for a fairly long period of time. China will not be able to oust the Japanese quickly, but the greater part of its

78. The entire war → This war
79. The primary form of fighting → Our primary form of fighting

territory will remain in China's hands. Ultimately the enemy will lose and we will win, but we shall have a hard stretch of road to travel.

40. The Chinese people will become tempered in the course of this long and ruthless war. All the political parties taking part in the war have also been tempered and tested.[80] *There should be only cooperation and no confrontation among them, for confrontation is the road to destruction.* The united front must be persevered in; only by persevering in the united front can we persevere in the war; and only by persevering in the united front and persevering in the war can we win final victory. If indeed we do so, all difficulties can be overcome. After traveling the arduous stretch of road we shall reach the highway to victory. This is the natural logic of the war.

41. In the three stages the changes in our strength and the enemy's strength will proceed along the following lines. In the first stage, the enemy is superior and we are inferior in strength. With regard to our inferiority, we must reckon on changes of two different kinds from before the War of Resistance to the end of this stage. The first kind is a change for the worse. China's original inferiority will be aggravated by war losses, namely, decreases in territory, population, economic strength, military strength, and cultural institutions. Toward the end of the first stage, the decrease will probably be considerable, especially on the economic side. This point will be exploited by some people as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and of compromise. But the second kind of change, the change for the better, must also be noted. It includes the experience gained in the war, the progress of the armed forces, the political progress, the mobilization of the people, the development of culture in a new direction, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the increase in international support, and so forth. What is changing for the worse in the first stage is the quantity and the quality of the old, the manifestations being mainly quantitative. What is changing for the better is the quantity and quality of the new, the manifestations being mainly qualitative. It is the second kind of change that gives us a basis for our protracted war[81] and final victory.

42. In the first stage, changes of two kinds are also occurring on the enemy's side. The first kind is a change for the worse. It manifests itself in hundreds of thousands of casualties, the depletion of arms and ammunition, deterioration of morale, popular discontent at home, shrinkage of trade, the expenditure of over ten billion *yen,* condemnation by world opinion, and so forth. This trend also gives us a basis for our protracted war[82] and final victory. But we must likewise reckon on the second kind of change on the enemy's side, a change for the better, that is, its expansion in territory, population, and resources. This too is a basis for the protracted nature of our War of Resistance and the impossibility of quick victory, but at the same time certain people will use it as a basis for their theories of national

80. Have also been tempered and tested → Will also be tempered and tested
81. Our protracted war → Our ability to endure
82. Our protracted war → Our ability to endure

subjugation and of compromise. But we must take into account the temporary and partial character of this change for the better on the enemy's side. Japan is an imperialist power heading for collapse, and its occupation of China's territory is temporary. *The stubborn resistance by China's main forces and* the vigorous growth of guerrilla warfare in China will restrict its actual occupation to small and narrow zones. Moreover, its occupation of Chinese territory has created and intensified the opposition[83] between Japan and other foreign countries. Besides, generally speaking, such occupation involves a fairly long period in which Japan will make capital outlays without drawing any profits, as is shown by the experience of the Three Northeastern Provinces. All of these points again give us a basis for demolishing the theories of national subjugation and of compromise, and for establishing the theories of protracted war and of final victory.

43. In the second stage, the above changes on both sides will continue to develop. While the concrete circumstances cannot be predicted, on the whole Japan will continue to change for the worse and China to change for the better. For example, Japan's military and financial resources will be seriously depleted by China's guerrilla warfare, popular discontent will grow in Japan, morale will deteriorate further, and it will become more isolated internationally. As for China, it will make further progress in the political, military, and cultural spheres and in the mobilization of the people; guerrilla warfare will develop further; there will be a certain degree of new economic growth on the basis of the small industries and widespread agriculture of the interior; international support will gradually increase; and the whole picture will be quite different from what it is now. This second stage may last quite a long time, during which there will be a great reversal in the balance of forces, with China gradually rising and Japan gradually declining. China will emerge from its inferior position, and Japan will lose its superior position; first the two countries will become balanced, and then their relative positions will be reversed. Thereupon, China will in general have completed its preparations for the strategic counteroffensive and will enter the stage of carrying out the counteroffensive and expelling the enemy from the country. It should be reiterated that the change from inferiority to superiority and the completion of preparations for the counteroffensive will include an increase in China's own strength, an increase in Japan's difficulties, and an increase in international support; it is the combination of all these forces that will bring about China's superiority and the completion of its preparations for the counteroffensive.

44. Because of China's unbalanced political and economic situation, the strategic counteroffensive of the third stage will not present a uniform and even picture throughout the country in its initial period, but will be regional in character, rising here and subsiding there. During this stage, the enemy will assuredly not desist from employing divisive ploys in attempts to rupture China's united front; consequently, the task of maintaining internal unity in China will become still more important, and we

83. Opposition → Contradiction

shall have to ensure that the strategic counteroffensive does not collapse halfway through internal dissension. In this period the international situation will become very favorable to China. China's task will be to take advantage of this international situation in order to attain complete liberation and establish an independent democratic state; at the same time this will help the world antifascist movement.

45. China moving from inferiority to parity and then to superiority, Japan moving from superiority to parity and then to inferiority; China moving from the defensive to stalemate and then to the counteroffensive, Japan moving from the offensive to consolidation and then to retreat—such will be the course of the Sino-Japanese war and its inevitable trend.

46. Hence the questions and the conclusions are as follows: Will China be subjugated? Answer: No, it will not be subjugated; final victory will be China's. Can China win quickly? Answer: No, it cannot win quickly, there must be a protracted war. Is this conclusion correct? I believe it is.

47. At this point, the exponents of national subjugation and of compromise will again rush in and say, "To move from inferiority to parity China would need military and economic power equal to Japan's, and to move from parity to superiority it would need military and economic power greater than Japan's. But this is impossible; therefore the above conclusions are incorrect."

48. This is the so-called theory that "weapons decide everything," which constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war, a subjective and one-sided view. Our view is opposed to this; we see not only weapons but also human power. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The balance of forces is not only a contest of military and economic power but also a contest of human power and human hearts. Military and economic power requires people to wield it. If the great majority of the Chinese people, the great majority of the Japanese people, and the great majority of the people of other countries are standing with our War of Resistance against Japan, how can Japan's military and economic power, wielded as it is by a small minority through coercion, count as superiority? And if not, then does not China, though wielding relatively inferior military and economic power, become the superior? There is no doubt that China will gradually grow in military and economic power, provided it perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front. As for our enemy, weakened as it will be by the long war and by internal and external contradictions, *the present situation of* its military and economic power is bound to change in the reverse direction. In these circumstances, is there any reason why China cannot become the superior? And that is not all. Although we cannot as yet count the military and economic power of other countries as being openly and to any great extent on our side, is there any reason why we will not be able to do so in the future? If Japan has more than just China alone as its enemy, if in the future any one country[84] makes open use of its considerable military and economic power

84. Any one country → One country or several countries

defensively or offensively against Japan and openly helps us, then will not our superiority be still greater? Japan is a small country, its war is retrogressive and barbarous, and its international position will tend more and more toward isolation; China is a large country, its war is progressive and just, and its international position will tend more and more toward abundant support. Is there any reason why the long-term development of these factors should not definitely change the situation of relative superiority between the enemy and ourselves?

49. The exponents of quick victory, however, do not realize that war is a contest of strength, and that before a certain change has taken place in the relative strength of the belligerents, there is no basis for trying to fight strategically decisive battles and shorten the road to liberation. Were their ideas to be put into practice, we would inevitably run into a brick wall. Or perhaps they are just talking empty talk for their own pleasure without really intending to put their ideas into practice. In the end Mr. Reality will come and pour a bucket of cold water on these purveyors of empty talk, proving them in fact to be mere empty-talkists who want to get things on the cheap, to have gains without pains. We have had this kind of empty-talkism before and we have it now, though not very much so far, but there will be more[85] as the war develops into the stage of stalemate and then the stage of counteroffensive. But in the meantime, if China's losses in the first stage are fairly heavy and the second stage drags on very long, it is the theories of national subjugation and of compromise that will gain great currency. Therefore, our fire should be directed mainly against the theories of national subjugation and of compromise, and only secondarily against the empty-talkist theory of quick victory.

50. That the war will be of long duration is certain, but nobody can predict exactly how many months or years it will last, as this will depend entirely upon the degree of the change in the balance of forces. All those who wish to shorten the war have no alternative but to work hard to increase our own strength and reduce that of the enemy. Specifically, the only way is to work hard to fight more victorious engagements and wear down the enemy's forces; work hard to develop guerrilla warfare to reduce enemy-occupied territory to a minimum; work hard to consolidate and expand the united front and unite the forces of the whole country; work hard to build up new armies and develop new war industries; work hard to promote political, economic, and cultural progress; work hard to mobilize the people of the industrial, agricultural, commercial, and educational sectors; work hard to undermine the enemy forces and win over their soldiers; work hard to carry on international propaganda to strive to achieve foreign support; and work hard to win the support of the Japanese people and other oppressed peoples. Only by doing all this can we reduce the duration of the war. There is no magic shortcut.

85. There will be more → There may be more

A War of a Jigsaw Pattern

51. We can say with certainty that the protracted War of Resistance against Japan will represent a glorious, special page in the history of human wars. A jigsaw pattern of war is one of its rather special features. This pattern arises from such contradictory factors as the barbarity of Japan and its shortage of troops, on the one hand, and the progressiveness of China and the extensiveness of its territory, on the other. There have been other wars of a jigsaw pattern in history; the three years' civil war in Russia after the October Revolution was this kind of situation. But what distinguishes this war in China is its especially protracted and widespread character, which will break historical records. The jigsaw patterns manifest themselves in the following several ways.

52. Interior and exterior lines. The anti-Japanese war as a whole is being fought on interior lines; but as far as the relationship between the main forces and the guerrilla units is concerned, the former are on the interior lines while the latter are on the exterior lines, taking the remarkable form of a pincer attack around the enemy. The same can be said of the relationship between the various guerrilla areas. From its own viewpoint, each guerrilla area is on interior lines and the other areas are on exterior lines; together they form many battlefronts, which attack the enemy in pincers. In the first stage of the war, the regular army operating strategically on interior lines is withdrawing, but the guerrilla units operating strategically on exterior lines will advance with great strides over wide areas toward the rear of the enemy—they will advance even more fiercely in the second stage—thereby forming an unusual pattern of both withdrawal and advance.

53. Possession and nonpossession of a rear area. The main forces, which extend the front lines to the outer limits of the enemy's occupied areas, are operating from the rear area of the country as a whole. The guerrilla units, which extend the battle lines into the enemy rear, are separated from the rear area of the country as a whole. But each guerrilla area has a small rear of its own, which it relies upon to establish its fluid battle lines. The case is different with the guerrilla detachments that are dispatched by a guerrilla area to operate temporarily behind the enemy; such detachments have no rear, nor do they have a battle line. "Operating without a rear area" is a special feature of revolutionary war in the new era, when circumstances include a vast territory, a progressive people, and an advanced political party and army. There is nothing to fear but much to gain from it, and far from having doubts about it we should promote it.

54. Encirclement and counterencirclement. Taking the war as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy, because the enemy is on the strategic offensive and operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive and operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy encirclement. We for our part can encircle one or more of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes because we apply the policy of fighting campaigns and battles from exterior lines by using numerically preponderant forces against these

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enemy columns advancing on us from strategically exterior lines. This is the first form of our counterencirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai mountains, or on three sides, like the northwestern Shanxi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement. If, however, one looks upon all the guerrilla base areas as linked up together and also considers the guerrilla base areas as linked up with the positions of the regular forces, one can see that we again surround a great many enemy forces. In Shanxi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Datong-Puzhou railway line on three sides (the east and west flanks of the railway and its southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all four sides; there are also many similar encirclements in Hebei, Shandong, and other provinces. This is the second form of our counterencirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement of the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own—rather like playing *weiqi.*[86] Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of enemy strongholds (such as Taiyuan) and our guerrilla base areas (such as the Wutai mountains) resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. Weiqi *is, however, mechanistic in that the "spaces" in* weiqi *cannot be destroyed, whereas war is dialectic in that the "spaces" in war can be destroyed.* If one includes also the global game of *weiqi*, there is yet a third form of encirclement between us and the enemy: the interrelation between the front of aggression and the front of peace. The enemy encircles China, the Soviet Union, France, and Czechoslovakia with its front of aggression, while we counterencircle Germany, Japan, and Italy with our front of peace. But our encirclement, like the hand of Buddha, will turn into the Xumi Mountain[87] lying athwart the universe, and these new-style Sun Wukongs[88]—the fascist aggressors—will finally be buried underneath it, never to rise again. Therefore, if on the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, with the Soviet Union and other countries which may join it as another strategic unit, and with the Japanese people's movement as still another strategic unit, and thus form a gigantic net from which the fascist Sun Wukongs can find no escape, then that will be our enemy's day of doom. Indeed, the day when this gigantic net is formed will undoubtedly be the day of the complete overthrow of Japanese imperialism. This is not at all a joke; this is the inevitable trend of the war.

86. *Weiqi*, literally "encircling chess," is better known in the West under its Japanese name of *go*, though it took its present form in China as early as the Tang dynasty. It is played on a board containing 361 points of intersection. The object, as the name suggests, is to encircle the adversary's pieces, remove them from the board, and thereby take control of the greater part of the area of the board.

87. Xumi Mountain → Mountain of Five Elements

88. Sun Wukong is the name of the character also known as Monkey, the hero of the traditional Chinese novel *Journey to the West.* Many references to him are scattered through Mao's writings, and, although he is here assimilated to the fascist aggressors, Mao often took a more positive view of him.

55. Big pieces and little pieces. There is a possibility that the enemy will occupy more than half of China proper, and only less than half will be kept intact. That is one aspect of the situation. But within this greater part, which does not include the Three Eastern Provinces, the enemy can actually hold only the big cities, the main lines of transportation, and some of the plains—which may rank first in importance, but will probably constitute only the smaller part of the occupied territory in area,[89] while the greater part will be taken up by the guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere. That is another aspect of the situation. If we go beyond China proper, and include Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet, then the unoccupied area will constitute the greater part of China's territory, and the enemy-occupied area will become the smaller part, even with the Three Eastern Provinces. That is yet another aspect of the situation. The area kept intact, *which constitutes the main rear area of the whole country and the location of the center of direction,* is of course important, and we should devote great efforts to developing it, not only politically, militarily, and economically but, what is also important, culturally. The enemy has transformed our former cultural centers into culturally backward areas, and we for our part must transform what have in the past been culturally backward areas into cultural centers. At the same time, the work of running extensive guerrilla areas behind the enemy lines is also extremely important; we should develop these areas in every respect, and we should develop cultural work as well. All in all, the big pieces of China's territory—the rural areas—will be transformed into regions of progress and light, while the small pieces—the enemy-occupied areas and especially the big cities—will temporarily become regions of backwardness and darkness.

56. Thus it can be seen that the protracted and far-flung War of Resistance against Japan is a war of a jigsaw pattern militarily, politically, economically, and culturally. It is an unusual spectacle in the annals of war, a magnificent feat by the Chinese nation, an astoundingly grand undertaking. This war not only will affect China and Japan, strongly impelling both to advance, but will also affect the whole world, impelling all nations, especially the oppressed nations such as India, to march forward. The people of all China should consciously throw themselves into this war of a jigsaw pattern, for this is the form of war by which the Chinese nation is seeking liberation for itself, the special form of war of liberation waged by a big semicolonial country in the 1940s.[90]

Fighting for Perpetual Peace

57. The protracted nature of China's anti-Japanese war cannot be separated from the fight for perpetual peace in China and the world. In no historical epoch was war ever so near to perpetual peace as it is today. *The life of humanity over several hundreds of thousands of years has already passed through two eras—the*

89. In area → In area and population

90. In the 1940s → In the 1930s and the 1940s

era of the peaceful life of humanity and the era of the warlike life of humanity. The first of these eras occupied the longest historical period. In this era, humanity's production was extremely poor, and the only thing was to wage war against nature; wars between groups of human beings were unnecessary and impossible. The second era extends roughly from the last period of clan society to the present day. Because of the development of production and the appearance of social divisions, the era of the warlike life of humanity arrived.[91] Although this era has existed for no more than a few thousand years in all, each nation has fought countless wars, either within its own national group or with other national groups. When this fighting has continued into the imperialist epoch of capitalist society, wars are waged on a particularly extensive scale and with a peculiar ruthlessness. The first great imperialist war of twenty years ago was unprecedented in all previous history, but it was not yet *a war such as will not be known in all of history, still less was it* the last of all wars. Only the war that has now begun *has the character of being historically unprecedented and, moreover,* comes close to being the final war, that is, comes close to perpetual peace for humanity. At present one-third of the world's population has entered the war. Just look. Italy, then Japan; Abyssinia, then Spain, then China. The population of these countries participating in the war now amounts to about 600 million, or fully[92] a third of the total population of the world. The characteristics of the present war are its uninterruptedness and its nearness to perpetual peace. Why is it uninterrupted? After attacking Abyssinia, Italy attacked Spain, and Germany joined in; then Japan also attacked China. Who will come next? Undoubtedly Hitler will fight the great powers next. "Fascism is war"—this is perfectly correct. *Although one cannot say that once victory has been decided in the war between antifascism and fascism, there will be no more wars, and wars will certainly continue to be fought afterward,* there will be no interruption between the present war and a second world war.[93] Humanity will not be able to avoid the calamity of war. Why, then, do we say the present war is close to perpetual peace? The present war has developed on the basis of the general crisis of world capitalism.[94] This general crisis is compelling all the capitalist countries to enter into a war[95] and is driving all the fascist countries into war adventures[96] first. *In view of this kind of general crisis* we can foresee that this war will result, not in the salvation of capitalism, but in its collapse. This war will be bigger and more

91. In the *Selected Works* version, this entire paragraph has been replaced by the following sentence: "Because of the emergence of classes, for the past several thousand years the life of humanity has been full of wars."
92. Fully → Nearly
93. And a second world war → And the development of a world war
94. The present war has developed on the basis of the general crisis of world capitalism → The present war has developed on the basis of the general crisis of world capitalism, which was the reason for the start of World War I
95. A war → A new war
96. War adventures → New war adventures

cruel than the war of twenty years ago; all nations will inevitably be drawn in, and it will drag on for a very long time; *it will settle all old accounts;* and humanity will suffer greatly. But because of the existence of the Soviet Union and the heightened political consciousness of the people of the world, great revolutionary wars will undoubtedly emerge from this war, and will intervene in[97] all counterrevolutionary wars, thus giving this war the character of a struggle for perpetual peace. Even if later there should be another period of war, perpetual world peace will not be far off. Once mankind has reached perpetual peace,[98] there will be no more need for war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, nor poison gas will then be needed. Thereafter, *the third era in the life of humanity will emerge, an era of peaceful life that will be forever without wars,* and our children and grandchildren[99] will never again see war for all eternity. The revolutionary wars that have already begun are part of the war for perpetual peace. The war between China and Japan, two countries which have a combined population of over 500 million, will occupy an important place in this war for perpetual peace, and out of it will come the liberation of the Chinese nation. The liberated new China of the future will be inseparable from the liberated new world of the future. Hence our War of Resistance against Japan takes on the character of a struggle for perpetual peace.

58. The wars that have taken place in history are divided into two kinds, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary.[100] All progressive wars are revolutionary,[101] and all wars that impede progress are counterrevolutionary.[102] We Communists oppose all counterrevolutionary[103] wars that impede progress, but we do not oppose progressive, revolutionary[104] wars. Not only do we Communists not oppose wars of the latter type, but we actively participate in them. As for counterrevolutionary wars, World War I is an instance in which both sides fought for imperialist interests; therefore the Communist Party[105] firmly opposed that war. The way to oppose a war of this kind is to do everything possible to prevent it before it breaks out and, once it breaks out, to oppose war with war, to oppose counterrevolutionary[106] war with revolutionary[107] war whenever possible. Japan's war is a counterrevolutionary[108] war that impedes progress, and the peoples of the world, including

97. Intervene in → Oppose
98. Once mankind has reached perpetual peace → Once mankind has eliminated capitalism, it will reach perpetual peace, and at that time
99. Our children and grandchildren → Humanity
100. Revolutionary and counterrevolutionary → Just and unjust
101. Revolutionary → Just
102. Counterrevolutionary → Unjust
103. Counterrevolutionary → Unjust
104. Revolutionary → Just
105. The Communist Party → The Communists of the whole world
106. Counterrevolutionary → Unjust
107. Revolutionary → Just
108. Counterrevolutionary → Unjust

the Japanese people, should oppose it and *are beginning to* oppose it. In our China, from the government to the people, from the Guomindang to the Communist Party,[109] *from the main forces to the guerrilla detachments*—all have raised the banner of righteousness and carried out the national-revolutionary war against aggression. Our war is sacred and just; it is progressive, and its aim is peace. The aim is peace not just in one country but throughout the world, not just temporary but perpetual peace. To achieve this aim, we must wage a life-and-death struggle, be prepared for any sacrifice, persevere to the end, and never stop short of the goal. However great the sacrifice and however long the time needed to attain it, a new world of perpetual peace and brightness already lies clearly before us. Our faith in waging this war is based upon the new China and the new world of perpetual peace and brightness for which we are striving. Fascism and imperialism wish to extend war endlessly, but we wish to put an end to it in the not-too-distant future. The great majority of mankind should exert its utmost efforts for this purpose. The 450 million people of China constitute one-quarter of the world's population, and if by their concerted efforts *and perseverance in the War of Resistance and in the united front* they overthrow Japanese imperialism and create a new China of freedom and equality, they will most certainly be making a tremendous contribution to the struggle for perpetual world peace. This is no empty hope, for the whole world is approaching this point in its social and economic path, and, provided that the majority of mankind works together, our goal will surely be attained with a few decades of effort.

Man's Conscious Activity in War

59. We have so far explained why the war is a protracted war and why the final victory will be China's, mainly dealing with "what it is" and "what it is not." Now we shall turn to the question of "how to do it" and "how not to do it." How to conduct protracted war and how to win final victory? These are the questions answered below. We shall therefore discuss successively the following problems: man's conscious activity in war, war and politics, political mobilization for the War of Resistance, the object of war, offense within defense, quick decisions within a protracted war, exterior lines within interior lines, initiative, flexibility, planning, mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare, positional warfare, war of annihilation, war of attrition, the possibilities of exploiting the enemy's mistakes, the question of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war, the army and the people as the foundation of victory, *and finally the conclusion.* Let us start with the problem of man's conscious activity.

60. When we say we are opposed to looking at problems subjectively, we mean that if an individual's ideas are not based upon or do not correspond to objective

109. From the government to the people, from the Guomindang to the Communist Party → From the people to the government, from the Communist Party to the Guomindang

facts, such ideas are fanciful and fallacious and will lead to failure if acted on, so we must oppose them. But whatever is done has to be done by human beings; protracted war and final victory will not come about without human action. *To take such action and* for it to be effective there must first be ideas, principles, opinions, plans,[110] orientations, policies, strategies, and tactics. Ideas and so forth are subjective things, while deeds or actions are the objective manifestations of the subjective, but both represent the capacity for action peculiar to human beings. We term this "conscious activity," and it is a characteristic that distinguishes human beings from things. All ideas based upon and corresponding to objective facts are correct ideas, and all deeds or actions based upon correct ideas are correct actions. We must develop such ideas and actions; we must develop this conscious activity. The anti-Japanese war is being waged to drive out an imperialist[111] and transform the old China into a new China; these goals can be achieved only when we mobilize the whole Chinese people and cultivate their conscious activity in resisting Japan. If we just sit and take no action, only subjugation awaits us and there will be neither protracted war nor final victory.

61. Conscious activity is a characteristic of human beings, and especially of human beings at war.[112] *Conscious activity is displayed by human beings in all of their actions, but nowhere so strongly as in war.* Victory or defeat in war is decided, on the one hand,[113] by the military, political, economic, and geographical conditions on both sides, the nature of the war, and international assistance, but not by these alone; in themselves, these factors provide only the possibility of victory or defeat, but do not decide the issue. To decide the issue, subjective efforts must be added, that is, efforts in directing and waging the war, that is, conscious activity in war.

62. In seeking victory, those who direct a war cannot overstep the limitations imposed by objective conditions; within these limitations, however, they can and must strive actively for victory. The stage of action for commanders in a war must be built upon objective possibilities, but on that stage they can direct the performance of many *living* dramas, full of sound and color, power and grandeur. Given the objective material foundations, the commanders in the War of Resistance against Japan should display their prowess and marshall all their forces to overthrow those enemies of the nation, transform the present situation in which our country and society are suffering from aggression and oppression, and create a new China of freedom and equality. Here is where our subjective ability to direct can and must be exercised. We do not want any of our commanders in the war to detach himself from the objective conditions and become a blundering hothead, but we must urge every anti-Japanese commander to become a general who is both courageous and

110. There must first be ideas, principles, opinions, plans → There must first be people who derive ideas, principles, and opinions from objective facts, then put forward plans

111. An imperialist → Imperialism

112. And especially of human beings at war → Human beings strongly display this characteristic in war

113. On the one hand → To be sure

wise. Our commanders should have not only the boldness to overwhelm the enemy, but also the ability to remain masters of the situation throughout the changes and developments of the entire war. Swimming in the ocean of war, they must not founder, but must reach the opposite shore resolutely with measured strokes. Strategy and tactics, which constitute the laws for directing war, define the art of swimming in the ocean of war.

War and Politics

63. "War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character. The anti-Japanese war is a revolutionary war waged by the whole nation, and victory is inseparable from the political aims of the war—to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality. It is inseparable from the general orientation of persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front, from the mobilization of the people of the whole country, and from political principles such as the unity between officers and men, the unity between the army and the people, and disintegrating the enemy forces. It is inseparable from the effective application of united front policy, from mobilization on the cultural front, and from the efforts to win international support and the support of the people of the enemy country. In a word, war cannot for a single moment be separated from politics. Any tendency among the anti-Japanese soldiers to belittle politics, to regard war in isolation, and to treat war as an absolute, is wrong and should be corrected.

64. But war has its own particular characteristics and in this respect it cannot be equated with politics.[114] War is politics by other means.[115] *It is something that is used to achieve political ends.* When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed in the old way, war breaks out and is used to sweep the obstacles in the way of politics. For instance, the semi-independent status of China is an obstacle to the political development of Japanese imperialism, and so Japan has unleashed a war of aggression to sweep away that obstacle. What about China? Imperialist oppression has long been an obstacle to China's bourgeois-democratic revolution; hence many wars of liberation have been waged in the effort to sweep this obstacle away. Japan is now using war for the purpose of oppressing China and completely blocking the advance of the Chinese revolution, and therefore China is compelled to wage the War of Resistance against Japan in its determination to sweep away this obstacle. When the obstacle is removed, politics will appear again,[116] and the war will be concluded. But if the obstacle is not completely

114. Politics → Politics in general

115. War is politics by other means. → "War is the continuation of politics by particular means." (This latter formulation, inserted by Mao in the *Selected Works,* is a direct quotation from Lenin.)

116. Politics will appear again → Our political aims will be attained

swept away, the war will have to continue until the aims are fully accomplished. Thus anyone who seeks a compromise before the task of the anti-Japanese war is fulfilled is bound to fail because even if a compromise were to occur for one reason or another, the war would break out again, since the broad masses of the people would certainly not submit, but would continue the war until its political objectives were achieved. It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.

65. From the particular characteristics of war there arise a particular set of organizations, a particular set of methods, and a particular kind of process. The organizations are the armed forces and everything that goes with them. The methods are the strategy and tactics for directing war. The process is the particular form of social activity in which the opposing armed forces engage in attacking each other or defending themselves against one another, employing strategy and tactics favorable to themselves and unfavorable to the enemy. Hence war experience is a particular kind of experience. All those who take part in war must rid themselves of their customary ways and accustom themselves to war before they can win victory.

Political Mobilization for the War of Resistance[117]

66. Such a gigantic national revolutionary war as ours cannot be victorious without universal and thoroughgoing political mobilization. Failure to undertake political mobilization for the War of Resistance before it began was a great deficiency on China's part, which resulted in the loss of a move to the enemy. Even after the War of Resistance[118] began, political mobilization was very far from universal, let alone penetrating. News of the war reached the great majority of the people through the enemy's shelling and aerial bombardment. That was also a kind of mobilization, but it was done for us by the enemy; we did not do it ourselves. Even now the people in the remote regions beyond the noise of the guns are still very quiet.[119] This situation must be changed; otherwise we cannot win victory in our life-and-death struggle. We must never lose another move to the enemy; on the contrary, we must fully exploit this move to vanquish him. This move is crucial; it is truly of paramount importance, while our inferiority in weapons and other things is only secondary. The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war. To win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, persevere in the united front, and persevere in the protracted war. But all these things are inseparable from the mo-

117. For the War of Resistance → for Resistance Against Japan

118. War of Resistance → Resistance to Japan

119. Still very quiet → Still living quietly there

bilization of the common people. To wish for victory and yet neglect political mobilization is like "trying to go south by driving the chariot north," and the result would inevitably be to forfeit victory.

67. What does political mobilization mean? First, it means telling the army and the people about the political aims of the war. It is necessary for every soldier and civilian to see why the war must be fought and how it concerns him. The political aims of the war are "to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality." We must tell everyone, soldiers and civilians, about these aims, before we can create an upsurge in the War of Resistance[120] and unite hundreds of millions in a concerted effort to contribute their all to the war. Second, it is not enough merely to explain the aims to them; the steps and policies for their attainment must also be given, that is, there must be a political program. We already have the Program for the War of Resistance and the Building of the Nation;[121] we should popularize both of them in the army and among the people and mobilize everyone to carry them out. Without a clear-cut, concrete political program, it is impossible to mobilize all the armed forces and the whole people to carry the War of Resistance through to the end. Third, how should we mobilize them? By word of mouth; by leaflets and bulletins; by newspapers, books, and pamphlets; through plays and films; through schools; through the mass organizations; and through our cadres. What has been done so far[122] is only a drop in the ocean, and, moreover, it has been done in a manner ill suited to the people's tastes and in a spirit uncongenial to them; this must be earnestly changed. Fourth, to mobilize once is not enough; political mobilization for the War of Resistance must be continuous. Our job is not to recite our political program to the people, for nobody will listen to such recitations; we must link the political mobilization for the war with developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement. This is a matter of immense importance on which our victory in the war primarily depends.

The Object of War

68. Here we are not dealing with the political aims of war; the political aims of the War of Resistance against Japan have been defined above as "to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality." Here we are dealing with the elementary object of war, war as "politics with bloodshed," as mutual slaughter by opposing armies. The object of war is specifically "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy" (to destroy the enemy means to disarm him

120. In the War of Resistance → In resistance to Japan

121. We already have the Program for the War of Resistance and the Building of the Nation → We already have the Ten-Point Program of Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and also the Program of the War of Resistance and the Building of the Nation

122. What has been done so far → What has been done so far in the Guomindang-ruled areas

or "deprive him of the power to resist," and does not mean his physical destruction).[123] In ancient warfare, the spear and the shield were used, the spear to attack and destroy the enemy, and the shield to defend and preserve oneself. To the present day, all weapons are still an extension of the spear and the shield. The bomber, the machine gun, the long-range gun, and poison gas are developments of the spear, while the air-raid shelter, the steel helmet, the concrete fortification, and the gas mask are developments of the shield. The tank is a powerful weapon[124] combining the functions of both spear and shield. Attack is the chief means of destroying the enemy, but defense cannot be dispensed with. In attack the immediate object is to destroy the enemy, but, at the same time, it is self-preservation, because if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be destroyed. In defense the immediate object is to preserve yourself, but, at the same time, defense is a means of supplementing attack or preparing to go over to the attack. Retreat is in the category of defense and is a continuation of defense, while pursuit is a continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that destruction of the enemy is the primary object of war and self-preservation the secondary, because only by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one effectively preserve oneself. Therefore attack, the chief means of destroying the enemy, is primary, while defense, a supplementary means of destroying the enemy and a means of self-preservation, is secondary. In actual warfare the chief role is played by defense much of the time and by attack the rest of the time, but if war is taken as a whole, attack remains primary.

69. How do we explain the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Does it not contradict "self-preservation"? No, it does not; *to put it more correctly*, sacrifice and self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. War is politics with bloodshed and exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high price. Partial and temporary sacrifice (nonpreservation) is incurred for the sake of general and permanent preservation. This is precisely why we say that attack, which is basically a means of destroying the enemy, also has the function of self-preservation. It is also the reason why defense must be accompanied by attack and should not be defense pure and simple.

70. The object of war—namely, the preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy—is the essence of war and the basis of all war activities, an essence which pervades all warlike actions, from the technical to the strategic. The object of war is the underlying principle of war, and no tenets or principles of techniques, tactics, campaigns, or strategy can in any way depart from it. What for instance is meant by the principle of "concealing the body and making full use of fire-power" in shooting? The purpose of the former is self-preservation, of the latter the destruction of the enemy. The former gives rise to such techniques as making use of the terrain and its features, advancing in spurts, and spreading out in dispersed formation. The latter gives rise to other techniques, such as clearing the field of

123. Physical destruction → Complete physical destruction

124. A powerful weapon → A new weapon

fire and organizing a network of fire. As for the assault force, the containing force, and the reserve force in a tactical operation, the first is for annihilating the enemy, the second for preserving oneself, and the third for either purpose according to circumstances—either for annihilating the enemy (in which case it reinforces the assault force or serves as a pursuit force) or for self-preservation (in which case it reinforces the containing force or serves as a covering force). Thus, no principles or operations can in any way depart from the object of war in terms of techniques, tactics, campaigns, or strategy, and this object pervades the whole of a war and runs through it from beginning to end.

71. In directing the War of Resistance against Japan, leaders at every level must lose sight neither of the contrast between the fundamental factors on each side nor of the object of this war. In the course of military operations, these contrasting fundamental factors play themselves out, becoming the struggle by each side to preserve itself and destroy the other. In our war we strive in every engagement to win a victory, big or small, and to disarm a part of the enemy and destroy a part of his men and materials. We must accumulate the results of these partial destructions of the enemy into major strategic victories and so achieve the final political aim of expelling the enemy, protecting the motherland, and building a new China.

Offense Within Defense, Quick Decisions Within a Protracted War, Exterior Lines Within Interior Lines

72. Now let us examine the concrete strategic orientation of the War of Resistance against Japan. We have already said that our strategic orientation for resisting Japan is that of protracted war. That is true, and it is perfectly correct. But this is a general orientation, not a concrete orientation. Concretely, how should the protracted war be conducted? That is the question we shall now discuss. Our answer is as follows. In the first and second stages of the war, that is, in the stages of the enemy's offensive and the preservation of his gains, we should conduct campaigns and battles of attack within the strategic defensive, campaigns and battles of quick decision within the strategically protracted war, and campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. In the third stage, we should launch the strategic counteroffensive.

73. Since Japan is a strong imperialist power and we are a weak semicolonial and semifeudal country, it has adopted the overall policy of strategic offensive, while we are in a position of strategic defense. Japan is trying to execute the strategy of a war of quick decision; we should consciously execute the strategy of protracted war. Japan is using dozens of army divisions of fairly high combat effectiveness (now numbering thirty) and part of its navy to encircle and blockade China from both land and sea, and is using its air force to bomb China. Its army has already occupied a long front stretching from Baotou to Hangzhou and its navy has reached Fujian and Guangdong; thus exterior-line operations have taken shape on a vast scale. On the other hand, we are in the position of operating on

interior lines. All of this results from the fact that the enemy is strong while we are weak. This is one aspect of the situation.

74. But there is another and exactly opposite aspect. Japan, though strong, does not have enough soldiers. China, though weak, has a vast territory, a large population, and many soldiers. This raises two big issues.[125] First, the enemy, employing its small forces against a vast country, can only occupy some big cities, main lines of transportation, and part of the plains. Thus there are extensive areas in territory under its occupation which it has had to leave ungarrisoned, and which provide a vast arena for China's guerrilla warfare activities. Taking the country as a whole, even if the enemy manages to occupy the line connecting Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Lanzhou and its adjacent areas, it can hardly occupy the regions beyond, and this gives China a general rear and central bases from which to carry on the protracted war to final victory. Second, in pitting its small forces against large forces, the enemy is encircled by our large forces. The enemy is attacking us along several routes. Strategically the enemy is on exterior lines while we are on interior lines; strategically the enemy is on the offensive while we are on the defensive. All this appears very much to our disadvantage. But we can make use of our two advantages—our vast territory and large forces—and, instead of stubborn positional warfare, carry on flexible mobile warfare, employing several divisions against one enemy division, several tens of thousands of our men against ten thousand of his, several columns against one of his columns, and suddenly encircling a single column from the exterior lines of the battlefield and attacking it. In this way, while the enemy is on exterior lines and on the offensive in strategic operations, he will be forced to fight on interior lines and on the defensive in campaigns and battles. And for us, interior lines and the defensive in strategic operations will be transformed into exterior lines and the offensive in campaigns and battles. This is the way to deal with one or indeed with any enemy column. Both of the points discussed above follow from the fact that the enemy is small while we are big. Moreover, *there is also a third point;* the enemy forces, though small, are strong (in arms and training) while our forces, though large, are weak (only in arms and training, not in morale). Consequently, in campaigns and battles we should not only employ large forces against small and operate from exterior against interior lines, but also follow the general policy of seeking quick decisions. In general, to achieve quick decision, we should attack the enemy when he is moving, not when he is at rest. We should concentrate a big force under cover beforehand, alongside the route that the enemy must take, and seize the opportunity, while he is on the move, to advance suddenly to encircle and attack by surprise, *before he has a chance to deploy his troops, use his heavy weapons, and bring his advanced weapons into play. In general, within half a day, one day, or a day and an evening,* the fighting should be concluded.[126] If we fight well, we may destroy the entire enemy

125. This raises two big issues → This produces two important consequences
126. The fighting should be concluded → Concluding the fighting rapidly

force or the greater part or some part of it, and even if we do not fight well, we may still inflict heavy casualties. This applies to any and every one of our battles. If each month we win one fairly large victory like those at Pingxingguan or Tai'erzhuang, not to speak of more, it would greatly demoralize the enemy, stimulate the morale of our own forces, and call forth international support. Thus our strategically protracted war is translated in the field into battles of quick decision. The enemy's war of strategic quick decision can only change into protracted war after the enemy is defeated in many campaigns and battles.

75. To sum up the above general operational orientation for fighting campaigns and battles in a single sentence, it is one of "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines." It is the opposite of our overall strategic policy of "protracted defensive warfare on interior lines," and yet it is an indispensable orientation for carrying out this overall strategic policy. If we should use "protracted defensive warfare on interior lines" as the principle for campaigns and battles too, as we did at the beginning of the War of Resistance, it would be totally unsuited to the *contrasting* circumstance in which the enemy is big while we are small[127] and the enemy is strong while we are weak. In that case we could never achieve our strategic objective, we could never achieve an overall protracted war, and we would be defeated by the enemy. That is why we have always advocated the organization of the forces of the entire country into a number of large field armies, each counterposed to one of the enemy's field armies but having two, three, or four times its strength, and so contending with the enemy in extensive theaters of war in accordance with the general orientation outlined above. *After the loss of Nanjing, we learned the lessons of the first period of fighting and have started to adopt the general orientation for fighting and the method for organizing field armies described above. It is just that they have not yet been used skillfully. But the campaigns of southern Shandong and southern Shanxi achieved notable results and demonstrate that this orientation is the only correct orientation.* This general orientation can be used not only in regular warfare; in guerrilla warfare too it *is usually suitable and* can be used, indeed must be used. It is applicable not only to any one stage of the war but to its entire course. In the stage of strategic counteroffensive, when we are better equipped technically and are no longer in the position of the weak fighting the strong, we shall be all the more able to capture prisoners and matériel on a large scale if we continue to employ superior numbers in quick-decision offensive battles from exterior lines. For instance, if we employ two mechanized divisions[128] against one mechanized enemy division, we can be all the more certain of destroying it. It is a commonsensical truth that several big fellows can easily beat up one.

76. If we resolutely apply "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines" in battlefield operations, we shall not only change the balance of forces on the

127. The enemy is big while we are small → The enemy is small while we are big
128. Two mechanized divisions → Two, three, or four mechanized divisions

battlefield but also gradually change the general situation. On the battlefield we shall be on the offensive and the enemy on the defensive; we shall be employing superior numbers on exterior lines and the enemy inferior numbers on interior lines; and we shall seek quick decisions, while the enemy, though he will seek to protract the fighting in the expectation of reinforcements, will not be in a position to have his way in this respect. For all these reasons, the enemy's position will change from strong to weak, from superior to inferior, while that of our forces, in contrast, will change from weak to strong, from inferior to superior. After the fighting of many such victorious battles, the general situation between us and the enemy will change. That is, through the accumulation of victories on many battlefields by quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, we shall gradually strengthen ourselves and weaken the enemy, and this will necessarily affect the general balance of forces and bring about changes in it. When that happens, these changes, together with other factors on our side and together with the changes within the enemy and a favorable international situation, will turn the overall situation between us and the enemy first into one of parity and then from parity into one in which we are superior and the enemy inferior. That will be the time for us to launch the counteroffensive and drive the enemy out of the country.

77. War is a contest of strength, but the original pattern of strength changes in the course of war. Here the decisive factor is subjective effort—winning more victories and committing fewer errors. The objective factors provide the possibility for such change, but turning this possibility into actuality requires both correct policy and subjective effort. It is then that the subjective plays the decisive role.

Initiative, Flexibility, and Planning

78. In quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines, as discussed above, the crucial point is the offensive; exterior lines refers to the scope of the offensive and quick-decision to the duration of the offensive. Hence the name "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines." This is the best overall orientation for waging a protracted war, and it is also the orientation for what is known as mobile warfare. But it cannot be put into effect without initiative, flexibility, and planning. Let us now study these three questions.

79. We have already discussed conscious activity, so why do we also talk about initiative? Conscious activity refers to conscious actions and efforts, a characteristic distinguishing human beings from animals, and this human characteristic manifests itself most strongly in war; these points have already been discussed. The initiative referred to here means an army's freedom of action, as distinguished from an enforced loss of freedom. Freedom of action is the very life of an army, and, once it is lost, the army is close to defeat or destruction. The disarming of a soldier is the result of his losing freedom of action through being forced into a passive position. The same is true of the defeat of an army. For this reason both sides in war do all they can to gain the initiative and avoid passivity. It may be said

that the quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines that we advocate, as well as the flexibility and planning necessary for its execution, are designed to gain the initiative and thus force the enemy into a passive position and achieve the object of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. But initiative or passivity is inseparable from superiority or inferiority in capacity to wage war. Consequently it is also inseparable from the correctness or incorrectness of the subjective direction of war. In addition, there is the question of exploiting the enemy's misconceptions and unpreparedness in order to gain the initiative and force the enemy into passivity. These points are analyzed below.

80. Initiative is inseparable from superiority in capacity to wage war, while passivity is inseparable from inferiority in capacity to wage war. Such superiority or inferiority is the objective basis of initiative or passivity. It is natural that the strategic initiative can be better maintained and exercised through a strategic offensive, but to maintain the initiative always and everywhere, that is, to have the absolute initiative, is possible only when there is absolute superiority matched against absolute inferiority. When a strong, healthy man wrestles with an invalid, he has the absolute initiative. If Japan were not riddled with insoluble contradictions, if, for instance, it could throw in a huge force of several million or ten million men all at once, if its financial resources were several times what they are, if it had no opposition from its own people or from other countries, and if it did not pursue the barbarous policies which arouse the opposition[129] of the Chinese people, then it would be able to maintain absolute superiority and have the absolute initiative always and everywhere. In history, such absolute superiority rarely appears in the early stages of a war or a campaign but is to be found toward its end. For instance, on the eve of Germany's capitulation in the European War,[130] the Entente countries became absolutely superior, Germany became absolutely inferior, and thus Germany was defeated and the Entente countries were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority toward the end of a war. As another example, on the eve of the Chinese victory at Tai'erzhuang, the isolated Japanese forces there were reduced after bitter fighting to absolute inferiority while our forces achieved absolute superiority, so that the enemy was defeated and we were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority toward the end of a campaign. A war or campaign may also end in a situation of relative superiority or of parity, in which case there is compromise in the war or confrontation in the campaign. But in most cases it is absolute superiority and inferiority that decide victory and defeat. All this holds for the end of a war or a campaign, and not for the beginning. The outcome of the Sino-Japanese war, it can be predicted, will be that Japan will become absolutely inferior and be defeated, and that China will become absolutely superior and gain victory. But at present superiority or inferiority is not absolute on either side, but is relative. With the advantages of

129. The opposition → The all-out resistance
130. The European War → World War I

its military, economic, and political-organizational power, Japan enjoys superiority over us with our military, economic, and political-organizational weakness, which creates the basis for its initiative. But because quantitatively its military and other power is not great and it has many other disadvantageous factors, its superiority is reduced by its own contradictions. Since arriving in China, Japan's superiority has been reduced still further because it has come up against our vast territory, large population, great numbers of troops, and resolute national resistance. Hence, Japan's general position has become one of only relative superiority, and its ability to exercise and maintain the initiative, which has thereby been restricted, has likewise become a relative thing. As for China, though placed in a somewhat passive position strategically because of its inferior strength, it is nevertheless quantitatively superior in territory, population, and troops, and also superior in the morale of its people and army and their hatred of the enemy; this superiority, together with other advantageous factors, reduces the extent of its inferiority in military, economic, and other power, and changes it into a relative strategic inferiority. This also reduces the degree of China's passivity so that its strategic position is one of only relative passivity. Any passivity, however, is a disadvantage, and one must strive hard to shake it off. Militarily, the way to do so is resolutely to wage quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, to launch guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy and so secure overwhelming local superiority and initiative in many campaigns of mobile and guerrilla warfare. Through such local superiority and local initiative in many campaigns, we can gradually create strategic superiority and strategic initiative and extricate ourselves from strategic inferiority and passivity. Such is the relationship between initiative and passivity, or between superiority and inferiority.

81. From this we can also understand the relationship between initiative or passivity and the subjective direction of war. As already explained, it is possible to escape from our position of relative strategic inferiority and passivity, and the method is artificially to create local superiority and initiative in many campaigns, so depriving the enemy of local superiority and initiative and plunging him into inferiority and passivity. Combined, these local things will add up to strategic superiority and initiative for us and strategic inferiority and passivity for the enemy. *But* such a change depends upon correct subjective direction. Why? Because while we seek superiority and the initiative, so does the enemy; viewed from this angle, war is a contest in subjective ability between the commanders of the opposing armies in their struggle for superiority and for the initiative within the arena of the material basis.[131] Out of the contest there emerge a victor and a vanquished; apart from the contrast in objective material conditions, the victor will necessarily owe his success to correct subjective direction and the vanquished his defeat to erroneous subjective direction. We recognize that the phenomenon of war is more

131. Within the arena of the material basis → Within the arena of the material basis of military strength, financial strength, and such

elusive and is characterized by greater uncertainty than any other social phenomenon, in other words, that it is more a matter of "probability." Yet war is not supernatural, but a mundane process governed by necessity. That is why Sunzi's axiom "He who knows himself and knows the enemy will win a hundred times in a hundred battles"[132] remains a scientific truth. Mistakes arise from ignorance about the enemy and about ourselves, and, moreover, the peculiar nature of war makes it impossible in most settings[133] to have full knowledge both of the enemy and of oneself; this gives rise to the uncertainty about military conditions and operations, and hence to mistakes and defeats. But whatever the situation and the actions in a war, one can know their general aspects and essential points. It is possible for a commander to reduce errors and give generally correct direction, first through all kinds of reconnaissance and then through intelligent inference and judgment. Armed with the weapon of "generally correct direction," we can fight more victorious battles and transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into initiative. This is how initiative or passivity is related to the correct or incorrect subjective direction of a war.

82. The idea that correct or incorrect subjective direction can effect changes between superiority and inferiority and between initiative and passivity becomes all the more convincing when we look at the record of defeats suffered by big and powerful armies and of victories won by small and weak armies. There are many such instances in Chinese and foreign history. Examples in China are the Battle of Chengpu between the states of Jin and Chu,[134] the Battle of Chenggao between the states of Chu and Han,[135] the battle in which Han Xin defeated Zhao's armies,[136] the Battle of Kunyang between the states of Xin and Han,[137] the Battle of Guandu

132. "He who knows himself and knows the enemy will win a hundred times in a hundred battles" → "He who knows the enemy and knows himself will never in a hundred battles be in peril" (Here the *Selected Works* version replaces Sunzi's maxim as commonly quoted by Mao and others at the time with the formulation which appears in the text of *The Art of War*, chapter 3.)

133. In most settings → In many settings

134. In this battle, which took place in 632 B.C.E., the Chu armies initially had the advantage, but the Jin forces, after retreating, attacked the enemy's weak spots, the right and left flanks, and inflicted heavy defeats.

135. In 203 B.C.E., battles took place in Chenggao between Liu Bang of Han and Xiang Yu of Chu. Initially Xiang Yu had the advantage, but Liu Bang, the future founder of the Han dynasty, attacked his adversary's forces while they were crossing a river and crushed them.

136. In 204 B.C.E. Han Xin, a general of Han, defeated the army of Zhao Xie, which was several times the size of his own, by attacking the enemy's rear.

137. In 23 C.E. a battle took place in Kunyang between Liu Xiu, the founder of the Eastern Han dynasty, and Wang Mang, who had usurped the throne in 9 C.E. Although Liu Xiu had only 8,000 or 9,000 men, as compared with some 400,000 for Wang Mang, he won a crushing victory by exploiting the failings of Wang Mang's generals, who underestimated their enemy.

between Yuan and Cao,[138] the Battle of the Red Cliff between the states of Wu and Wei,[139] the Battle of Yiling between the states of Wu and Shu,[140] the Battle of Feishui between the states of Qin and Jin,[141] and so forth. Among examples to be found abroad are most of Napoleon's wars,[142] *Hindenburg's East Prussian Campaign,* and the civil war in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution. In all these instances, victory was won by the few fighting the many, by the inferior fighting the superior. In every case, the weaker force, pitting local superiority and initiative against the enemy's local inferiority and passivity, first inflicted one sharp defeat on the enemy and then turned on the rest of its forces and smashed them one by one, thus transforming the overall situation into one of superiority and initiative. The reverse was the case with the enemy, which originally had superiority and held the initiative. Owing to subjective errors and internal contradictions, the enemy [commander] managed to forfeit completely an excellent or fairly good position in which he enjoyed superiority and initiative, and became a general without an army or a king without a kingdom. Thus it can be seen that although superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war is the objective basis determining initiative or passivity, it is not in itself actual initiative or passivity; it is only through a struggle, a contest of subjective ability, that actual initiative or passivity can emerge. In the struggle, correct or incorrect subjective direction can transform inferiority into superiority and passivity into initiative, or transform superiority into inferiority and initiative into passivity. The fact *that the Ox-Devil King could not defeat the Monkey King*[143] *and* that every ruling dynasty could not defeat revolutionary armies shows that merely having superiority[144] does not mean definitely having a position of initiative, much less does it definitely mean final victory. Through a

138. Guandu was the scene of a battle between Cao Cao and Yuan Shao in 200 C.E. Cao Cao launched a surprise attack on his careless enemies, set their supplies on fire, and wiped out Yuan Shao's main force.

139. The battle of the Red Cliff (Chibi) took place in 208 C.E. between Cao Cao, the ruler of Wei, and Sun Quan, the ruler of Wu, allied with Liu Bei of Shu. Although greatly outnumbered, the allied forces succeeded in setting fire to Cao Cao's fleet and won a decisive victory.

140. In the battle of Yiling, in 222 C.E., Lu Sun, a general of Wu, defeated Liu Bei, the ruler of Shu, by avoiding combat for seven months and fighting only when Liu's forces were exhausted and demoralized.

141. In 383 C.E. Xie Xuan, a general of the Eastern Qin dynasty, defeated Fu Jian, the ruler of Jin, even though his forces were outnumbered ten to one, by asking the overconfident enemy to move his troops back from the river between them so Xie's forces could come and fight them, thus provoking panic and confusion in the ranks of the Jin army.

142. Wars → Campaigns

143. The reference is to an episode in *Journey to the West*, recounting the clash between the Monkey King (Sun Wukong) and the Ox-Devil King.

144. Merely having superiority → Merely having a certain kind of superiority

leap of subjective ability,[145] initiative and victory can[146] be wrested from the hands of the side with superiority and initiative by the side of inferiority and passivity.

83. To have misconceptions and to be caught unawares may mean to lose superiority and initiative. Hence, deliberately creating misconceptions for the enemy and then springing surprise attacks upon it are two ways—indeed two important ways—of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative. What are misconceptions? "To see every bush and tree on Mount Bagong as an enemy soldier" is an example of misconception. And "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west" is a way of creating misconceptions among the enemy. When the mass support is sufficiently good to block the leakage of news, it is often possible by various ruses to succeed in leading the enemy into a morass of wrong judgments and actions so that it loses its superiority and the initiative. The saying "There can never be too much deception in war" means precisely this. What does "being caught unawares" mean? It means being unprepared. Without preparedness, superiority is not real superiority and nor can there be any initiative. Having grasped this point, a force that is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superior enemy by surprise attack. We say an enemy on the move is easy to attack precisely because it is then off guard, that is, unprepared. These two points—creating misconceptions among the enemy and springing surprise attacks on it—mean transferring the uncertainties of war to the enemy while securing the greatest possible certainty for ourselves and thereby striving for superiority and the initiative, and striving for our victory. Excellent organizations of the popular masses are the prerequisite for attaining all this. Therefore it is extremely important to arouse all the people who are opposed to the enemy to arm themselves to the last man, make widespread raids on the enemy, and at the same time prevent the leakage of news and provide a screen for our own forces; in this way the enemy will have no way to know where and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis will be created for misconceptions and unpreparedness on its part. It was largely owing to the organized, armed popular masses that the weak and small force of the Red Army[147] was able frequently to win battles in the period of the civil war.[148] Logically, a national war should win broader mass support than a civil war;[149] however, as a result of historical mistakes the people are in an unorganized state; not only is it difficult to put their storehouses and manpower to our use, but these are sometimes even made use of by the enemy. The resolute rallying of the whole of the popular masses on a broad scale *under the general orientation of persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front* is the only way to secure inexhaustible resources to meet all the requirements of the war. It will definitely play a big

145. Through a leap of subjective ability → Through a leap of subjective ability and having obtained certain conditions

146. Can → Can, in accordance with actual circumstances,

147. The Red Army → The Chinese Red Army

148. The civil war → The Agrarian Revolutionary War

149. A civil war → An agrarian revolutionary war

part in carrying out our tactics of defeating the enemy by misleading it and catching it unawares. We are not Duke Xiang of Song and have no use for his idiotic virtue and morality.[150] In order to achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing its eyes and ears, and create as much confusion as possible in the minds of its commanders, making them into madmen. All of this concerns the way in which the initiative or passivity is related to[151] the subjective direction of the war. This[152] is indispensable for defeating Japan.

84. By and large, Japan has held the initiative in the stage of its offensive by reason of its military power and its exploitation of our subjective errors, past and present. But its initiative is beginning to wane to some extent because of its many inherent disadvantages and of the subjective errors it, too, has committed in the course of the war (of which more later) and also because of our many advantages *and of the fact that some (only some) of our subjective errors have begun to be corrected.* The enemy's defeat at Tai'erzhuang and its predicament in Shanxi prove this clearly. The widespread development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear has placed its garrisons in the occupied areas in a completely passive position. Although it is still on the offensive strategically and still holds the initiative, its initiative will end when its strategic offensive ends. The enemy's troops are insufficient, and it cannot continue the offensive indefinitely; that is the first reason why the enemy will not be able to maintain the initiative. Our offensive warfare in campaigns and our guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, together with other factors, constitute the second reason why it will have to cease the offensive at a certain limit and will not be able to retain the initiative. The existence of the Soviet Union and other changes in the international situation constitute the third reason. Thus it can be seen that the enemy's position holding the initiative is limited and can be broken. *In the first period of the war, we were in a passive position; inappropriate positional warfare and the fact that the popular masses were not aroused were important subjective reasons for this. But since beginning to adopt the general orientation toward mobile warfare in the second period, we have made some progress. Unfortunately, however, it is still only an extremely small portion of the popular masses that has been aroused.* If, in *future* military operations, China can keep up offensive warfare by its main forces in campaigns and battles, vigorously

150. In 638 B.C.E. Duke Xiang of Song faced the army of Chu at the River Hong. When the Chu forces were halfway across, Duke Xiang's minister urged him to attack, but he refused this opportunity to take advantage of his adversary. When the enemy had finished crossing but was not yet arrayed for battle, Duke Xiang once again refused to attack him, declaring: "The sage does not crush the feeble nor give the order for attack until the enemy have formed their ranks." As a result, the duke was wounded and his forces scattered. In this context, Mao's refusal to emulate him is, as General Griffith has written, "interesting." See Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 30, note.

151. Is related to → Is interrelated with

152. This → Such subjective direction

develop guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, and arouse the popular masses on a broad scale politically, we can gradually build up a position of strategic initiative.

85. Let us now discuss flexibility. What is flexibility? It is something that means the concrete realization of the initiative in combat operations; it is the flexible employment of troops. The flexible employment of troops is the central task in directing a war; it is the task most difficult to perform well. In addition to organizing and educating the army, organizing and educating the people, and so forth, the business of war consists in employing the army in combat, and all these things are done to win victory in combat. Of course it is difficult to organize an army and so forth, but it is even more difficult to employ the army, particularly in circumstances when the weak are fighting the strong. To do so requires subjective ability of a very high order, and requires the overcoming of the confusion, obscurity, and uncertainty that are characteristic of war and the discovery of order, clarity, and certainty in it; only thus can flexibility in command be realized.

86. The basic orientation of field operations for the War of Resistance against Japan is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines. There are various tactics or methods for putting this orientation into effect, such as dispersion and concentration of forces, diverging advance and converging attack, the offensive and the defensive, assault and containment, encirclement and outflanking, advance and retreat. It is easy to understand these tactics, but not at all easy to employ and vary them flexibly. Here the three crucial links are the time, the place, and the troops. No victory can be won unless the time, the place, and the troops are well chosen. For example, in attacking an enemy force on the move, if we strike too early, we expose ourselves and give the enemy a chance to prepare; if we strike too late, the enemy may have encamped and concentrated its forces, presenting us with a hard nut to crack. This is the question of the time. If we select a point of assault on the left flank which turns out to be the enemy's weak point, victory will be easy; but if we select the right flank and hit a snag, nothing will be achieved. This is the question of the place. If a particular unit of our forces is employed for a particular task, victory may be easy; but if another unit is employed for the same task, it may be hard to achieve results. This is the question of the troops. We should know not only how to employ tactics but how to vary them. For flexibility of command the important task is to make changes back and forth such as from the offensive to the defensive or from the defensive to the offensive, from advance to retreat or from retreat to advance, from containment to assault or from assault to containment, and the same with encirclement and outflanking and so forth, and to make such changes promptly and properly according to the circumstances of the troops and terrain on both sides. This is true of command in campaigns and strategic command as well as of command in battles.

87. The ancients said, "Ingenuity in application is contained in a single mind." This "ingenuity," which is what we mean by flexibility, is the contribution of the intelligent commander. Flexibility does not mean recklessness; recklessness must be rejected. Flexibility consists in the intelligent commander's characteristic of

taking[153] timely and appropriate measures on the basis of objective conditions after "judging the hour and sizing up the situation" (the "situation" includes the enemy's situation, our situation, and the terrain), and this flexibility is what is called "ingenuity in application." On the basis of this ingenuity, we can win more victories in quick-decision offensive warfare on interior lines,[154] change the balance of superiority and inferiority in our favor, gain the initiative over the enemy, and overwhelm and crush the enemy so that the final victory will be ours.

88. Let us now discuss the nature of planning. Because of the uncertainty peculiar to war, it is much more difficult to prosecute war according to plan than is the case with other activities. Yet "in every endeavor, preparedness means success and unpreparedness means failure"; there can be no victory in war without advance planning and preparation. There is no absolute certainty in war, and yet it is not without some degree of relative certainty. We are comparatively certain about our own situation. The enemy's situation is the most uncertain,[155] but here too there are signs for us to read, clues to follow, and sequences of phenomena to ponder. These form what we call a degree of relative certainty, which provides an objective basis for planning in war. Modern technological developments (telegraphy, radios, airplanes, motor vehicles, railways, steamships, and so forth) have added to the possibilities of planning in war. But complete or stable planning in war is limited[156] because there is only very limited and transient certainty in war; such planning must change with the movement (or flow, or evolution) of the war and vary in degree according to the scale of the war. Tactical plans, such as plans for attack or defense by small formations or units, often have to be changed several times a day. A plan of campaign, that is, of action by large formations, can generally stand until the conclusion of the campaign, in the course of which, however, it is common to have partial changes, and occasionally there are even total changes. A strategic plan is based on the overall situation of both belligerents and it has even more stability, but it too is applicable only in a given strategic stage and has to be changed when the war evolves toward a new stage. The making and changing of tactical, campaign, and strategic plans in accordance with their scope and circumstances is a key link in directing a war; it is the concrete application of flexibility in war, in other words, it is ingenuity in varying one's tactics, *and victory in war cannot depart from this.* Commanders at all levels in the War of Resistance against Japan should take note of this.

89. Because of the fluidity of war, some people categorically deny that war plans or general orientations can be relatively stable, describing such plans or orientations as "mechanical" things. Such views are wrong. In the preceding section we fully recognized that, because the circumstances of war are only relatively certain and the forward flow (or movement, or evolution) of war is rapid, war

153. Characteristic of taking → Ability to take
154. Interior lines → Exterior lines
155. The most uncertain → Very uncertain
156. Limited → Difficult

plans or general orientations should be given only relative stability and have to be changed or revised in a timely way in accordance with changing circumstances and the flow of the war; otherwise we would become mechanists. But one must absolutely not deny the need for war plans or general orientations that are relatively stable over given periods; to negate this is to negate everything, including the war itself as well as the person himself who says so. As both military conditions and operations have relative stability, we must grant the relative stability of the war plans and policies resulting from them. For example, as both the circumstances of the war in North China and the dispersed nature of the Eighth Route Army's operations have relative stability for a particular stage, it is completely necessary during this stage to acknowledge the relative stability of the Eighth Route Army's strategic orientation for operations, namely, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favorable conditions." The period of validity of an orientation for a campaign is shorter than that of a strategic orientation, and for a tactical orientation it is shorter still, but each is stable over a given period. To deny this would mean having no way of handling warfare; it would mean becoming relativists in war with no settled views whatsoever—this is wrong and that is wrong too, or this is right and that is right too. No one denies that even an orientation valid for a given period is fluid; otherwise, one orientation would never be abandoned in favor of another. But it is fluid within limits, fluid within the scope of the various war operations undertaken for carrying it out, but not fluid as to its essence.[157] Within such a given period of time, this essence is definitely not fluid, which is what we mean by relative stability within a given period. In the great river of absolute fluidity throughout the war, there is relative stability for each particular stretch—this is our view regarding the fundamental nature of war plans or orientations.

90. Having dealt with protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy and with quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, and also with initiative, flexibility, and planning, we can now say a few words by way of summing up. The War of Resistance against Japan must have a plan. War plans, which are the concrete application of strategy and tactics, must be flexible so that they can be adapted to the circumstances of the war. We should always seek to transform inferiority into superiority and passivity into the initiative so as to change the situation between the enemy and ourselves. All these find expression in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles and protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy.

Mobile Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare, and Positional Warfare

91. A war will take the form of mobile warfare when its content is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles within the strategy of interior lines, protracted war, and defense. Mobile warfare is the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operation. At the same time, it includes "mobile defense," which is conducted when necessary to facilitate such offensive battles; it also includes positional attack and positional defense in a supplementary role. Its characteristics are regular armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive, and fluidity.

157. As to its essence → As to its essence; in other words, it is quantitatively but not qualitatively fluid

92. China has a vast territory and a large number[158] of soldiers, but its troops have inadequate technology and training, while the enemy's forces, on the other hand, are inadequate in number, but have relatively superior technology and training. In this situation, there is no doubt that we must adopt offensive mobile warfare as our primary form of warfare, supplementing it by others and integrating them all into mobile warfare. We must oppose "only retreat, never advance," which is flightism, and at the same time oppose "only advance, never retreat," which is desperate recklessness.

93. One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great strides. This has, however, nothing in common with flightism of the Han Fuqu brand.[159] The primary requirement of war is to destroy the enemy, and the other requirement is self-preservation. The object of self-preservation is to destroy the enemy, and to destroy the enemy is in turn the most effective means of self-preservation. Hence mobile warfare is in no way an excuse for people like Han Fuqu, and can never mean moving only backward and never forward. That kind of "moving," which negates the basic offensive character of mobile warfare would, if practiced, "move" China out of existence, *even if it had "Kamchatka," which would be of no use.*[160]

94. There is, however, another kind of thing[161] that is also wrong, and that is the desperate recklessness of what is called "only advance, never retreat." The mobile warfare we advocate, the content of which is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, includes positional warfare in a supplementary role, "mobile defense," and retreat, without all of which mobile warfare cannot be adequately carried out. Desperate recklessness is military shortsightedness, originating often from fear of losing territory. The advocates of desperate recklessness do not know that one characteristic of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great

158. Large number → Multitude

159. Han Fuqu (1890–1938), a native of Hebei, had been in 1936 pacification commander for Shandong Province. At that time, Mao had expressed a desire to "establish a relationship" with him. See Volume V, p. 316, n. 4.

160. Even if it had "Kamchatka," which would be of no use. → Despite its large size. (This passage is not altogether clear, but presumably the meaning of the original text is: Even if China's territory extended northward as far as the Kamchatka Peninsula, to include the extreme northeast corner of the Soviet Union, a "flightist" strategy of withdrawing there could only lead to defeat.)

161. Another kind of thing → Another kind of thinking

strides. On the positive side, in order to draw the enemy into a fight unfavorable to it but favorable to us, it is usually necessary that the enemy should be on the move and that we should have a number of advantages, such as favorable terrain, a vulnerable enemy, a local population that can prevent the leakage of information, and the enemy's fatigue and unpreparedness. This requires that the enemy should advance, and we should not begrudge a temporary loss of part of our territory. For the temporary loss of part of our territory is the price we pay for the permanent preservation and recovery of all our territory. On the negative side, whenever we are forced into a disadvantageous position which fundamentally endangers the preservation of our forces, we should courageously retreat, so as to preserve our forces and strike the enemy again when new opportunities arise. In their ignorance of this principle, the advocates of desperate recklessness will contest a city or a piece of ground even when it is obvious that they are in a decisively unfavorable position; as a result, they not only lose the city or ground but fail to preserve their forces. We have always advocated the policy of "luring the enemy in deep," precisely because it is the most effective military policy for a weak army strategically on the defensive to employ against a strong army.

95. Among the forms of warfare in the War of Resistance against Japan, mobile warfare comes first and guerrilla warfare second. When we say that in the entire war mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, we mean that the outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibility for deciding the outcome. It does not follow, however, that guerrilla warfare does not have an important strategic status in the War of Resistance against Japan. Its role in the strategy of the war as a whole is second only to that of mobile warfare, for without the support of guerrilla warfare we cannot defeat the enemy. In saying this we also have in mind the strategic task of developing guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare. Guerrilla warfare will not stay at the same status throughout this long and cruel war, but will elevate itself into mobile warfare. Thus the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold: on the one hand, to support regular warfare and, on the other hand, to transform itself into regular warfare. Considering the significance of the unprecedented extent and unprecedented duration of guerrilla warfare in China's War of Resistance, it is all the more important not to underestimate its strategic role. Consequently, guerrilla warfare in China has not only its tactical problems but also its special strategic problems. I have already discussed this in "Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War."[162] As indicated above, the forms of warfare in the three strategic stages of the War of Resistance are as follows. In the first stage, mobile warfare is primary, while guerrilla and positional warfare are supplementary. In the second stage, guerrilla warfare will advance to

162. This work, which Mao says he has "already" produced, appears below, because it was published in the middle of the ten-day period during which Mao delivered the present speech.

the first place and be supplemented by mobile and positional warfare. In the third stage, mobile warfare will again advance to become the primary form and will be supplemented by positional and guerrilla warfare. But the mobile warfare of the third stage will no longer be undertaken solely by the original regular forces; part, possibly quite an important part, will be undertaken by forces which were originally guerrillas but which will have progressed from guerrilla to mobile warfare. From the viewpoint of all three stages in China's War of Resistance against Japan, guerrilla warfare is absolutely not something we can either have or do without. It will perform a great drama unparalleled in the history of human combat. For this reason, out of the several millions of regular troops around the country, it is absolutely essential to assign at least several hundred thousand to disperse through all enemy-occupied areas, arouse and support the popular masses in arming themselves, and wage guerrilla warfare in coordination with the masses. The regular forces so assigned should shoulder this sacred task conscientiously, and they should not think their status lowered because they fight fewer big battles and for the time being do not appear as national heroes; this kind of thinking is wrong. Guerrilla warfare does not bring the same kind of quick results and illustrious renown as does regular warfare, but "a long road tests a horse's strength and a prolonged task proves a man's heart," and in the course of this long and cruel war guerrilla warfare will demonstrate its immense power; it is indeed no trivial undertaking. Moreover, such regular forces can conduct guerrilla warfare when dispersed and mobile warfare when concentrated, as the Eighth Route Army has been doing. The orientation of the Eighth Route Army is: "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favorable conditions." This principle is perfectly correct; the views of its opponents are wrong. *After the enemy's occupation of Linfen, the military authorities ordered that the entire army in Shanxi should "engage in guerrilla warfare in units of brigades." This is an arrangement with strategic vision.*

96. At China's present technological level, positional warfare, defensive or offensive, is generally impracticable, and this is where our weakness manifests itself. Moreover, the enemy is also exploiting the vastness of our territory to bypass our fortified positions. Hence positional warfare cannot be adopted as an important method, still less can it be used as the principal method. But in the first and second stages of the war, it is possible and essential, within the scope of mobile warfare, to employ localized positional warfare in a supplementary role in campaigns. Semipositional "mobile defense" is a still more essential part of positional warfare[163] undertaken for the purpose of resisting the enemy at every step, thereby depleting its forces and gaining extra time. China must strive to increase its supplies of modern weapons so that it can fully carry out the tasks of positional attack in the stage of the strategic counteroffensive. In the strategic counteroffensive stage, positional warfare will undoubtedly play a greater role, for then the enemy will be

163. Positional warfare → Mobile warfare

holding fast to its positions, and we shall not be able to achieve our goal of recovering lost territory unless we launch powerful positional attacks in support of mobile warfare. Nevertheless, in the third stage too, we must exert our every effort to make mobile warfare the primary form of warfare. For the art of leadership in war and the active role of man are largely nullified in positional warfare such as that fought in Western Europe in the middle and later periods of the European War.[164] *This is an adverse consequence of modern technology.* It is only natural that we should "liberate the war by taking it out of the trenches," as the war is being fought in the vast expanse within China's borders, and as our side will remain poorly equipped technologically for quite a long time. Even during the third stage, when China's technological position will be better, it is unlikely to surpass the enemy in that respect and so will be forced to concentrate on highly mobile warfare, without which it cannot achieve final victory. Hence, throughout the War of Resistance against Japan China will not adopt positional warfare as primary; the primary and important forms are mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. These two forms of warfare will afford opportunities to exercise fully the art of leadership in war and man's active role. What a piece of good fortune out of our misfortune!

Wars of Attrition and Wars of Annihilation

97. *This is a question concerning the essence of the war.* As we have said before, the essence, or the object, of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy. As there are three forms of warfare—mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare—for achieving this object, and as they differ in degree of effectiveness when employed, there arises the general distinction between what are called wars of attrition and wars of annihilation.

98. To begin with, we may say that the War of Resistance against Japan is a war of attrition, and at the same time it is also a war of annihilation. Why? Because the enemy is still making good use of its factors of strength, and it retains strategic superiority and initiative, and therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot effectively and speedily reduce its factors of strength and break its superiority and initiative. We still have our factors of weakness and have not yet rid ourselves of strategic inferiority and passivity; therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot win time to improve our internal and international situation and alter our unfavorable position. Hence campaigns of annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition. In this sense war of annihilation is war of attrition. It is chiefly by using the method of attrition through annihilation that China can wage protracted war.

99. But the objective of strategic attrition may also be achieved by campaigns of attrition. Generally speaking, mobile warfare performs the task of annihilation,

164. The European War → World War I

positional warfare performs the task of attrition, and guerrilla warfare performs the task of attrition and at the same time also performs the task of annihilation; the three forms of warfare are thus distinguished from one another. In this sense war of annihilation is different from war of attrition. Campaigns of attrition are supplementary but necessary in protracted war.

100. Speaking theoretically and in terms of needs, in order to achieve the strategic objective of greatly depleting the enemy's forces, China in its defensive stage should use mobile warfare's primary function of annihilation and guerrilla warfare's partial function of annihilation, and supplement these with positional warfare's primary function of attrition and guerrilla warfare's partial function of attrition. In the stage of stalemate we should continue to exploit the functions of annihilation and attrition fulfilled by guerrilla and mobile warfare for further large-scale depletion of the enemy's forces. All this is aimed at making the war situation more protracted, gradually changing the general situation between ourselves and the enemy, and preparing the conditions for our counteroffensive. During the strategic counteroffensive, we should continue to employ the method of attrition through annihilation so as finally to expel the enemy.

101. But as a matter of fact, it was our experience in the last ten months that many or even most of the mobile warfare campaigns became campaigns of attrition, and guerrilla warfare did not adequately fulfill its proper function of annihilation in certain areas. The positive aspect of this situation is that at least we depleted the enemy's forces, which is important both for the protracted war and for our final victory, and did not shed our blood in vain. But the drawbacks are first, that we did not sufficiently deplete the enemy, and second, that we were unable to avoid rather heavy losses and captured little matériel. We should recognize the objective cause of this situation: the disparity between us and the enemy in technical equipment and in the training of troops. But in any case it is necessary, both theoretically and practically, to urge that our main forces strive hard to fight battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favorable. And although our guerrilla units have to wage battles of pure attrition in performing specific tasks such as sabotage and harassment, it is necessary to urge and vigorously carry out campaigns and battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favorable, so as to achieve our goal of greatly depleting the enemy's forces while at the same time greatly replenishing our own.

102. The "exterior lines," the "quick-decision" and the "offensive" in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, and the "mobility" in mobile warfare find their main operational expression in the use of encircling and outflanking tactics; hence the necessity for concentrating superior forces. Therefore concentration of forces and the use of encircling and outflanking tactics are the prerequisites for mobile warfare, that is, for quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines. All this is aimed at annihilating the enemy forces.

103. The strength of the Japanese army lies not only in its weapons but also in the training of its officers and men—its degree of organization, its self-confidence

arising from never having been defeated, its superstitious belief in the Mikado and in ghosts and spirits, its arrogant self-esteem, its contempt for the Chinese people, and other such characteristics, all of which stem from long years of indoctrination by the Japanese warlords and from Japanese national customs. This is the chief reason we have taken very few prisoners despite killing and wounding a great many enemy troops. It is a point that has been underestimated by many people in the past. To destroy these things will require a long process. The first thing to do is to give the matter serious attention and then patiently and in a planned way to work at it in the political field and in the fields of international propaganda and the Japanese people's movement; in the military sphere war of annihilation is one of the means. In these enemy characteristics, pessimists may find a basis for the theory of national subjugation and passively minded military men a basis for opposition to war of annihilation. We, on the contrary, maintain that these strong points of the Japanese army can be destroyed and that their destruction has already begun. The chief method of destroying them is winning them over politically. We should not insult the *arrogant* self-esteem of the Japanese soldiers but, rather, should understand this self-esteem of theirs and channel it in the proper direction. By using such methods as treating prisoners of war leniently *and people's diplomacy,* we should lead them to see the antipopular character of the Japanese rulers' expansionism. On the other hand, we should demonstrate in front of the Japanese soldiers the indomitable spirit and the heroic, stubborn fighting capacity of the Chinese army and the Chinese people; this in itself will be waging a war of annihilation against them. In terms of military operations, our experience in the last ten months shows that annihilation is possible—the Pingxingguan and Tai'erzhuang campaigns, and so forth, are proof. The Japanese army's morale is beginning to waver, its soldiers do not understand the aim of the war, they are trapped in encirclement by Chinese armies and by the Chinese people, in assault they show far less courage than the Chinese soldiers, and so on; all these are objective conditions,[165] and these objective conditions will, moreover, steadily develop as the war becomes protracted. From this standpoint,[166] annihilation is one of the prerequisites for shortening the war and accelerating the emancipation of the Japanese soldiers and the Japanese people. Cats only make friends with cats, and nowhere in the world do cats make friends with mice.

104. On the other hand, it must be admitted that, for the present, we are inferior to the enemy in technical equipment and in the extent of troop training. Therefore, in many settings it is difficult to achieve the maximum in annihilation, such as capturing the whole or the greater part of an enemy force, especially when fighting on the plains. In this connection the excessive demands of the theorists of

165. All these are objective conditions → All these are objective conditions favorable to our pursuit of a war of annihilation

166. From this standpoint → From the standpoint of destroying the enemy's arrogance through a war of annihilation

quick victory are wrong. What should be correctly demanded in the War of Resistance against Japan is "war of annihilation as far as possible." In all favorable circumstances, we should concentrate superior forces in every battle and employ encircling and outflanking tactics—encircle part if not all of the enemy forces, capture part if not all of the encircled forces, and inflict heavy casualties on part of the encircled forces if we cannot capture them. On the other hand, in circumstances that are unfavorable for the carrying out of war of annihilation, we should carry out a war of attrition. In the former, we should employ the principle of concentration of forces and, in the latter, employ the principle of dispersion of forces. As for the relationship of command in campaigns, we should apply the principle of centralized command in the former and the principle of decentralized command in the latter. This is the basic orientation for field operations in the War of Resistance against Japan.

The Possibilities of Exploiting the Enemy's Mistakes

105. As for dealing with the enemy, the enemy command itself provides a basis for this. From ancient times, there has never been an infallible general, and the enemy makes mistakes just as we ourselves can hardly avoid making them; hence, the possibility exists of exploiting the enemy's errors. In the ten months of the war of aggression, the enemy has already made many mistakes in strategy and tactics. There are five major ones.

First, gradual reinforcement. This results from the enemy's underestimation of China and also to its shortage of troops. The enemy has always looked down on us. After grabbing the Four Eastern Provinces at small cost, it occupied eastern Hebei and northern Chahar, all by way of strategic reconnaissance. The conclusion the enemy came to was: [China is] a plate of loose sand. Thus, thinking that China could not stand a single blow, it mapped out a plan of so-called quick decision, attempting with very small forces to set us collapsing in panic. It did not expect to find such great unity and such immense powers of resistance as China has shown during the past ten months, forgetting as it did that China is already in an era of progress and already has advanced political parties and groups, an advanced army, and an advanced people. Meeting with setbacks, the enemy then gradually increased its forces bit by bit from about a dozen to thirty divisions. If it wants to advance further, it will have to make further increases. But because of Japan's antagonism toward the Soviet Union and its inherent shortage of manpower and finances, *we say that* there are inevitable limits to the maximum number of men it can field and to the furthest extent of its advance.

Second, absence of a main direction of attack. Before the Tai'erzhuang campaign, the enemy had divided its forces more or less equally between North China and Central China and had again divided them equally inside each of these areas. In North China, for example, it divided its forces among the Tianjin-Pukou, the Beiping-Hankou, and the Datong-Puzhou railway lines, and along each of these

lines it suffered some casualties and left some garrisons in the places occupied, after which it lacked the forces for further advances. After the Tai'erzhuang defeat, it summed up the lessons and concentrated its main forces in the direction of Xuzhou, and so this mistake can be considered temporarily corrected.

Third, lack of strategic coordination. On the whole, coordination exists within the groups of enemy forces in North China and in Central China, but there is a serious lack of coordination between the two. When the forces on the southern section of the Tianjin-Pukou railway attacked Xiaobengbu, those on the northern section made no move, and when the forces on the northern section attacked Tai'erzhuang, those on the southern section made no move. After the enemy came to grief at both places, the Japanese minister of war arrived on an inspection tour and the chief of the General Staff turned up to take command, and for the moment one could say there was coordination. There exist very serious internal contradictions among the landlord class, the bourgeoisie, and the warlords of Japan, and these contradictions are developing; the lack of military coordination is one of the concrete manifestations of this fact.

Fourth, failure to grasp strategic opportunities. This failure was conspicuously shown in the enemy's halt after occupying Nanjing and Taiyuan, chiefly because of its shortage of troops and its lack of a strategic pursuit force.

Fifth, it encircles many, but annihilates few. Before the Tai'erzhuang campaign, in the campaigns of Shanghai, Nanjing, Cangzhou, Baoding, Nankou, Xinkou, and Linfen, many Chinese troops were routed but few were taken prisoner, which shows the stupidity of the enemy command.

These five errors—gradual reinforcement, absence of a main direction of attack, lack of strategic coordination, failure to grasp opportunities, and encirclement of many, but annihilation of few—were all points of incompetence in the Japanese command prior to the Tai'erzhuang campaign. Although the enemy has made some improvements since the Tai'erzhuang campaign, it cannot possibly avoid repeating its errors because of its shortage of troops, its internal contradictions, and other factors. In addition, what it gains at one point it loses at another. For instance, by concentrating its forces in northern China on Xuzhou, it left a great gap in the occupied areas in northern China, which gave us free rein to develop guerrilla warfare. These mistakes were of the enemy's own making and not induced by us. On our part, we can deliberately make the enemy commit errors, that is, we can mislead it and maneuver it into the desired position by ingenious and effective moves under the cover of organized popular masses, for example, by "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west." This possibility *also exists, and* has already been discussed. All the above shows that in the enemy's command, too, we can find some resources for victory. We should not take this as an important basis for our strategic planning; on the contrary, the only reliable course is to base our planning on the assumption that the enemy will make few mistakes. Besides, the enemy can exploit our mistakes just as we can exploit the enemy's. It is the duty of our command to allow the enemy few opportunities for doing so. In

any event, mistakes of the enemy command have in fact taken place, will again occur in the future, and can be manufactured through our endeavors. All these errors we can exploit, and our generals in the resistance to Japan should do their utmost to seize upon them. Although much of the enemy's strategic and campaign command is incompetent *(not all of it is incompetent),* there are quite a few intelligent points in its battle command, that is, in its unit and small formation tactics, and here we should learn from them.

The Question of Decisive Engagements in the War of Resistance Against Japan

106. The question of decisive engagements in the War of Resistance against Japan should be divided into three types: we should resolutely fight a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory; we should avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are not sure of victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically decisive engagement in which the fate of the whole nation is at stake. The characteristics differentiating our War of Resistance against Japan from many other wars are also revealed in this question of decisive engagements. In the first and second stages of the war, when the enemy is strong and we are weak, the enemy's objective is to have us concentrate our main forces for a decisive engagement. Our objective is exactly the opposite. We want to choose conditions favorable to us, concentrate superior forces, and fight decisive campaigns or battles only when we are sure of victory, as in the battles at Pingxingguan, Tai'erzhuang, and many other places; we want to avoid decisive engagements under unfavorable conditions when we are not sure of victory, this being the orientation we adopted in the Zhangde and other campaigns. As for fighting a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked, for instance as in the recent withdrawal from Xuzhou, we simply must not do so. In this way the enemy's plan for a "quick decision" will be foiled, and it will not be able to avoid going through a protracted war with us. This orientation cannot be carried out in a country with a small territory and would be difficult to carry out in a country that is too backward politically. But we can carry it out because ours is a big country, and it is in an era of progress. *Our worry is that our country's main forces may be tricked by the enemy into a decisive engagement and thus sacrificed.* If strategically decisive engagements are avoided, then "as long as the green mountains are there, one need not worry about firewood," for even though some of our territory may be lost, we will still have plenty of room for maneuver and will thus be able to promote and await domestic progress, an increase in international support, and the internal disintegration of the enemy; that is the best policy for us in the War of Resistance against Japan. Unable to endure the arduous trials of a protracted war and eager for an early triumph, the impetuous theorists of quick victory clamor for a strategically decisive engagement the moment the situation takes a slightly favorable turn. To do what they want would be

to inflict great damage on the entire War of Resistance, spell an end to the protracted war, and land us in the enemy's deadly trap; it would truly be the worst policy. Undoubtedly, if we are to avoid decisive engagements, we shall have to abandon territory, and we must have the courage to do so when (and only when) it becomes completely unavoidable. At such times we should not feel the slightest regret, for this policy of "trading territory for time" is correct. History tells us how Russia made a courageous retreat to avoid a decisive engagement and then defeated Napoleon, the terror of his age. *In late August 1914, France avoided a decisive engagement on the Franco-Belgian border, made a courageous retreat, and defeated the German army, which menaced Europe.* China should now do likewise. *The loss of some territory is the precondition for the liberation of the whole country, and temporary suffering is the precondition to eternal happiness. All true patriots should know this truth.*

107. Are we not afraid of being denounced as "nonresisters"? No, we are not. Not to fight at all but to compromise with enemy—that is nonresistance, which not only should be denounced but is utterly impermissible. We must resolutely fight the War of Resistance, but, in order to avoid the enemy's deadly trap, it is absolutely necessary that we not allow the country's main forces[167] to be finished off at one blow, thereby adversely affecting *national survival and* the continuation of the War of Resistance. To put it in a single sentence, it is absolutely necessary to avoid national subjugation. To have doubts on this point is to be short-sighted on the question of the war and is sure to lead one into the ranks of the subjugationists. We have criticized the desperate recklessness of "only advance, never retreat" precisely because, if it became generally prevalent, this doctrine would make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance and would lead to the danger of ultimate national subjugation.

108. We are for decisive engagements whenever circumstances are favorable, whether in battles or in major or minor campaigns, and in this respect we do not tolerate any passivity whatsoever. Only through such decisive engagements can we achieve the objective of annihilating or depleting the enemy forces, and every soldier in the resistance to Japan should go and do so resolutely. For this purpose, considerable partial sacrifices are necessary; the avoidance of any sacrifice whatsoever is the attitude of cowards and of those afflicted by the fear of Japan, and must be firmly opposed. The killing of Li Fuying, Han Fuqu, and other flightists was correct. Within the scope of correct combat planning, encouraging the spirit and practice of brave self-sacrifice and dauntless advance is something that is absolutely necessary and inseparable from protracted war and final victory. We have strongly condemned the flightism of "only retreat, never advance" and have supported the strict enforcement of discipline, because it is only through heroic decisive engagements, fought under a correct plan, that we can vanquish the powerful enemy; flightism, on the contrary, is a direct supporter of the theory of national subjugation.

167. The country's main forces → Our army's main forces

109. Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and then abandon territory later? Will not these heroic fighters have shed their blood in vain? This is a highly inappropriate line of questioning. To eat first and then to shit later—is this not to eat in vain? To sleep first and then to get up later—is this not to sleep in vain? Can questions be posed in such a way? I think not. When eating, to keep on eating without a stop; when sleeping, to keep on sleeping without a stop, when fighting heroically, to keep on fighting all the way to the Yalu River without a stop—this is mechanism and formalist logic applied to the question of war; they do not exist in the world of men and things.[168] As everyone knows, although in fighting and shedding our blood in order to gain time and prepare the counteroffensive we have had to abandon some territory, we have indeed gained time; we have indeed achieved the objective of annihilating and depleting enemy forces; we have indeed acquired experience in fighting; we have indeed aroused hitherto inactive people; and we have indeed improved our international standing. Has our blood been shed in vain? Certainly not. Territory has been given up in order to preserve our military forces and in fact precisely to preserve territory, because if we do not abandon part of our territory when conditions are unfavorable but blindly fight decisive engagements without the least assurance of winning, we shall lose our military forces and then be unable to avoid the loss of all our territory, to say nothing of recovering territory already lost. A capitalist must have capital to run his business, and if he loses it all he is not much of a capitalist. Even a gambler must have money to stake, and if he risks it all on a single throw and his luck fails, he cannot gamble any more. Events have their twists and turns and do not follow a straight line, and war is the same; only formalists are unable to comprehend this truth.

110. I think the same will also hold true for the decisive engagements in the stage of strategic counteroffensive. Although by then the enemy will be in the inferior and we in the superior position, the principle of "fighting advantageous decisive engagements and avoiding detrimental ones" will still apply and will continue to apply until we have fought our way to the Yalu River. This is how we will be able to maintain the initiative from beginning to end, and as for all the enemy's "letters of challenge" and other people's "goading us with taunts," we should brush them aside and ignore them without being perturbed by them in the slightest. In the resistance to Japan, only those generals who show this kind of firmness can be deemed courageous and wise. This is beyond the ken of those people who "jump at a single touch." Even though we are in a more or less passive position strategically

168. This is mechanism and formalist logic applied to the question of war; they do not exist in the world of men and things. → These are subjectivist and formalist illusions, not realities of life.

in this first stage of the war, we should have the initiative in every campaign; and we should have the initiative throughout the later stages. We are believers in the theory of protracted war and final victory;[169] we are not believers in the gambler's theory of risking everything on a single throw.

The Soldiers and the People are the Foundation of Victory

111. Standing before revolutionary China, Japan[170] will never relent in its attacks and repression; this is determined by its imperialist nature. If China did not resist, Japan would easily occupy China without firing a single shot; the loss of the Four Eastern Provinces is a precedent. If China resists, it is an inexorable law that Japan will try to repress this resistance and will only stop when the force of its repression is unable to exceed the force of China's resistance. The Japanese landlord class and bourgeoisie are very ambitious, and in order to drive south to Southeast Asia and its islands, and north to Siberia, they have employed a breakthrough in the center[171] by first attacking China. Those who think that Japan will be content with the occupation of North China and the area of Jiangsu and Zhejiang completely fail to perceive that imperialist Japan, which has developed to a new stage and has been pushed to the brink of extinction, differs from the Japan of the past. When we say that there is a definite limit both to the number of men Japan can field and to the extent of its advance, we mean that, on the basis of its strength, Japan can commit only a certain part of its forces and can only fight[172] up to the limit of its strength, in order to attack further[173] and to defend itself against other enemies. Meanwhile, for its part, China has demonstrated its own progress and capacity for stubborn resistance, and it is inconceivable that there should be fierce attacks by Japan without the necessary capacity for resistance by China. Japan cannot occupy the whole of China, but it will spare no effort to suppress China's resistance in all the areas it can reach and will not stop this kind of suppression until internal and external conditions bring about a crisis in Japanese imperialism that pushes it to the brink of the grave. The domestic political situation in Japan faces two different paths to a yawning chasm.[174] Either the entire class that is in power collapses rapidly, political power is handed to the people, and the war thus comes to an end—but for the time being this possibility does not exist—or its landlord class and bourgeoisie become more fascist day by day and sustain the

169. We are believers in the theory of protracted war and final victory → We are believers in the theory of protractedness and the theory of final victory

170. Japan → Japanese imperialism

171. They have employed a breakthrough in the center → they have adopted the overall policy of breaking through in the center

172. And can only fight → And can only fight China

173. In order to attack further → In order to launch further attacks in other places

174. The domestic political situation in Japan faces two different paths to a yawning chasm → There are only two possible outcomes to the domestic political situation in Japan

war until the day of their collapse, which is the very road Japan is now traveling. There can be no third outcome other than these. As to those who hope that the moderates among the Japanese bourgeoisie will come forward and stop the war—this is merely a kind of illusion. The reality of Japanese politics over the past year[175] has been that the bourgeois moderates of Japan have fallen captive to the landlords and the financial oligarchs. Now that Japan has started to fight China, so long as it does not suffer a fatal blow from Chinese resistance and still retains sufficient strength, it is bound to attack Southeast Asia or Siberia, or even both. It will pull that trick as soon as war breaks out in Europe. The rulers of Japan have mapped out their maximum ambitions on an extremely large scale. Of course, the following kind of possibility does exist: Japan may have to drop its original plan of invading Siberia and adopt a fundamentally defensive posture toward the Soviet Union on account of the Soviets' *greater* strength and the fact that Japan has been greatly weakened by its war in China. But if that situation appears, it will not mean Japan's relaxing its offensive against China, but will mean its intensification of this offensive, because then the only path left to it will be that of gobbling up the weak. China's task of persevering in the War of Resistance, persevering in the united front, and persevering in the protracted war will then become all the more serious, and it will be all the more necessary not to slacken our efforts in the slightest. *"When Lord Lei beat the bean curd, he chose a weak object to bully." This is a law of the natural world and of class society.*[176]

112. Under these kinds of circumstances, the main prerequisites for China's victory over Japan are unity and all-around progress throughout the country on a scale ten or even a hundred times greater than in the past. China is already in an era of progress and has achieved very great unity, but at present the degree [of progress and unity] is still far from adequate. That Japan has occupied such an extensive area is due in part to Japan's strength, but also in part to China's weakness; this kind of weakness is entirely the cumulative result of the various historical errors of the last hundred years, and especially of recent years,[177] which have confined the factors of China's progress to their present state. It is impossible to vanquish so strong an enemy without making an extensive and long-term effort. There are many things we have to exert ourselves to do. Here I will discuss only two fundamental aspects: the progress of the army and of the people.

113. The improvement of our military system cannot be separated from modernization and the strengthening of technological conditions, without which we will be unable to drive the enemy back across the Yalu River. In our use of troops, we need strategy and tactics that are progressive and flexible, without which we likewise cannot win victory. Nevertheless, soldiers are the foundation of an army; unless there is concentration on a progressive political spirit within the army, and

175. Over the past year → For many years

176. Lord Lei was the god of lightning in Chinese mythology.

177. Recent years → The past ten years

unless there is progressive political work to promote such concentration, it will be impossible to achieve genuine unity between officers and men, it will be impossible to arouse to the utmost limit the enthusiasm of officers and men for the War of Resistance and impossible to provide the best basis for all our technology and tactics to display the effectiveness they should. When we say that Japan will finally be defeated despite the superiority of its technological conditions, we mean that apart from the blows of annihilation and attrition that we deliver, we will eventually through our blows shake its military morale; its weapons and soldiers are not stably integrated. With us, on the contrary, officers and men are at one on the political aims of the War of Resistance. *This is fundamentally different from the civil war period.* This gives us a foundation upon which to build political work among all forces.[178] The forces should, within certain limits, put into effect democratization, chiefly by abolishing the feudal system of bullying and beating and by having officers and men share weal and woe in their lives. After this is done, the goal of unity between officers and men will be achieved, the combat effectiveness of the army will be increased to an extremely great degree, and there will be no doubt of our ability to sustain the long, cruel war.

114. In war, the profoundest source of mighty power lies within the popular masses. It is mainly because of the unorganized state of China's popular masses that Japan dares to bully us. When this defect is remedied, then the Japanese aggressor will be placed before our hundreds of millions of people who have stood up. It will be like a wild bull crashing into a bed of fire—a single shout[179] would be enough to give it a big scare, and this wild bull cannot fail to be burned to death. On our side, the armies must have an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements, and the brazen "press-ganging" and "buying of substitutes" that are now being recklessly practiced at the lower levels must be speedily banned and replaced by widespread and enthusiastic political mobilization; in this way, enlisting even millions *or tens of millions* of men will be easy. Financial resources for the War of Resistance[180] present great difficulties, but once the popular masses are mobilized, several billion or tens of billions[181] will not be a problem. How can a country as large and populous as China suffer from lack of funds? The army must merge with the people, to make it so that, in the eyes of the popular masses, the army is seen as their own army. Such an army will have no match throughout the world, and merely fighting Japanese imperialism will hardly be a sufficient challenge for it.

115. As regards the unsatisfactory relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, many people think it is the methods that are wrong. I always tell them that it is a question of basic attitude (or basic purpose), and this attitude should be respect for the soldiers and respect for the people. Start from

178. All forces → All forces in the resistance to Japan
179. A single shout → A single shout from us
180. War of Resistance → Resistance to Japan
181. Several billion or tens of billions → Finances

this attitude, and then have the various policies, methods, and forms. Depart from this attitude, and the policies, methods, and forms will certainly also be wrong, and you will never be able to get the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people right. The three major principles for the army's political work are, first, unity between officers and men; second, unity between the army and the people; and third, winning over[182] the enemy forces. To apply these principles effectively, we must start with this basic attitude of respecting the soldiers, respecting the people, and respecting enemy prisoners of war.[183] Those who take all this as a technical matter and not one of basic attitude have truly got their thinking wrong, and this should be corrected.

116. At this moment, when the defense of Wuhan and such places has become an urgent task, it is a task of the utmost importance to arouse to the full the activism of the whole army and the whole people in support of the war. Beyond a doubt, the task of defending Wuhan and such places must be conscientiously raised and carried out. But in the end, whether we can be certain of holding them will depend not on our subjective desires but on concrete conditions. One of the most important of these concrete conditions is the political mobilization of the whole army and the whole people to rise up and struggle hard. If a strenuous effort is not made to secure all the necessary conditions—indeed, if even one of these conditions is missing—disasters like Nanjing and such places[184] are bound to be repeated. Where China's Madrid will be located will depend on which places possess the conditions for a Madrid. So far China has not had a Madrid, and from now on we should work hard to have several, but it all depends on the conditions. The most fundamental of these conditions is extensive political mobilization of the whole army and the whole people.

117. In all our work we must persevere in the overall orientation of the National United Front of Resistance against Japan. For only when we have this kind of orientation can we persevere in the War of Resistance and persevere in protracted war; only then can we bring about a widespread and profound improvement in relations between officers and men and between the army and the people; only then can we arouse to the full the activism of the entire army and the entire people to fight for the defense of all the territory still in our hands and for the recovery of all the territory we have lost; and only then can we strive to win final victory.

118. This question of the political mobilization of the army and the people is truly of the greatest importance. The reason we have not hesitated to repeat ourselves over and over in discussing it is that without it there will simply be no victory. There are, of course, many other necessary things without which there

182. Winning over → Undermining
183. Respecting enemy prisoners of war → Respecting the human dignity of enemy prisoners of war once they have put down their arms
184. Disasters like Nanjing and such places → Disasters like the loss of Nanjing and such places

will be no victory, but this is the most fundamental precondition for victory. The National United Front of Resistance against Japan is a united front of the whole army and the whole people; it is certainly not a united front merely of the headquarters and members of a few parties and groups. Mobilizing the whole army and the whole people to participate in the united front is the fundamental objective of this united front.

Conclusions

119. What are our conclusions? They are:[185]

"Under what conditions can China defeat and destroy the strength of Japanese imperialism? Three conditions are required: first, the completion of a united front of resistance against Japan in China; second, the completion of an international united front of resistance against Japan; third, the rise of a revolutionary movement of the Japanese people.[186] Of these three conditions, the grand alliance of the Chinese people is the most important."[187]

"How long would such a war last? That depends on[188] China's united front of resistance against Japan and many other determining factors involving China and Japan."

"If these conditions are not realized quickly, the war will be prolonged. But the result will be the same; Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly be victorious. It is just that the sacrifices will be great and it will be necessary to go through a very painful period." "Our strategic orientation should be to employ our main forces to operate over a highly extended and fluid front. To achieve victory, the Chinese troops must carry out a high degree of mobile warfare on extensive battlefields."

"Besides deploying trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize large numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants *politically and militarily*."

"In the course of the war, China will be able . . . to improve the *mechanization* and equipment of its troops gradually. Because of this, China will be able to conduct positional warfare in the later period of the war and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus Japan's economy will collapse after being drained by China's long War of Resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will flag after being sapped by innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however,

185. As will be seen, this passage consists of portions of the extracts from Snow's July 16 interview quoted above in section 6 of this lecture.

186. A revolutionary movement of the Japanese people → A revolutionary movement of the Japanese people within Japan and the people of the Japanese colonies

187. Of these three conditions, the grand alliance of the Chinese people is the most important → Of these three conditions, the most important from the standpoint of the Chinese people is the grand alliance of the Chinese people

188. That depends on → That depends on the strength of

the latent power of the War of Resistance will rise and surge forward day by day and large numbers of revolutionary popular masses will be pouring into the front lines to fight for freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable us to make the final and fatal assault on the fortifications and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of China." (From a conversation with Snow in June[189] 1936.)

"Thus a new stage has henceforth begun in China's political situation. . . . In this stage the central task is to mobilize all forces to win victory in the War of Resistance."

"The key to winning victory in the war now lies in developing the War of Resistance that has already been aroused into a total War of Resistance by the whole nation; only then[190] can final victory be achieved in the War of Resistance."

"Because serious weaknesses still exist in the War of Resistance, many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises, and other such situations may occur in the future course of the War of Resistance. . . . Therefore it should be realized that the war will be an arduous, protracted war. But we believe that, through the efforts of the people of the whole country,[191] the War of Resistance that has already been aroused will break through all obstacles and continue to advance and develop." (The August Decision of the Chinese Communist Party.)[192] These are our conclusions. The subjugationists see the enemy as supernatural beings and see ourselves as worthless. The theorists of quick victory see the enemy as worthless and see ourselves as supernatural beings. These are both wrong. Our view is the opposite: the War of Resistance against Japan will be a protracted war, and final victory will be China's—these are our conclusions.

120. Here my lectures come to a close. The great War of Resistance[193] is now unfolding, and many people have been hoping for a summary of experience to facilitate the winning of complete victory. What I have discussed are simply general things from the experience of the past ten months; perhaps it may serve as a kind of summary. This question ought to stimulate wide attention and discussion. What I have given is only an outline; I hope all of you will study and discuss it, and provide corrections and additions.

189. June → July

190. Only then → Only through such a total War of Resistance by the whole nation

191. Through the efforts of the people of the whole country → Through the efforts of our Party and the people of the whole country

192. The August Decision of the Chinese Communist Party → The "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party" of August 1937

193. War of Resistance → War of Resistance against Japan